US V Purganan (MR)

FACTS
Before the Court are private respondents Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 October 2002,
petitioners Comment thereon dated 05 November 2002, private respondents Motion for Leave of Court
to File and to Admit Additional Arguments in Support of Motion for Reconsideration dated November 6,
2002, and Reply (to petitioners Comment) dated November 26, 2002.

ISSUES + RULING
WoN private respondent should be granted bail. NO.

Suffice it to say that petitioners repeated invocation of the Extradition Courts grant of bail has not
convinced us that he deserves bail under the exception laid down in our Decision, namely," (1) that,
once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there
exists special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as matter of reciprocity, those
cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein."cra

There has been no clear and convincing showing as to the absence of flight risk and the non-
endangerment of the community, or as to the existence of special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances justifying grant of bail.

WoN the Extradition Court negated the flight risk posed by him. NO.

The Extradition Court did not negate the flight risk posed by him. It did not make a finding on flight risk
as it considered the issue irrelevant, having already determined bail to be a matter of right.

o Without making any finding on flight risk, it found the capacity to flee subservient to "the benefits
that respondent may be able to deliver to his constituents" despite the absence from the records
of evidence showing the existence of such benefits.

WoN private respondents right to due process has been violated. NO.

Private respondent argues that allegedly our Decision violates his due process rights. Again, we have
discussed this matter in our Decision saying that, in its simplest concept, due process is merely the
opportunity to be heard which opportunity need not always be a prior one.

o In point of fact, private respondent has been given more than enough opportunity to be heard in
this Court as well as in the Extradition Court. Even his Motion for Reconsideration has been
given all the chances to persuade by way of allowing "additional arguments" in his Motion dated
November 6, 2002 and Reply. These latter pleadings are normally not allowed, but precisely
because this Court wanted to give him more than enough opportunity to be heard and to argue,
we have bent backwards and admitted these additional pleadings.

WoN private respondent, as a member of Congress, is immune from arrest. NO.

 Private respondent contends that as a member of Congress, he is immune from arrest "arising from
offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment," saying that he cannot be prevented
from performing his legislative duties because his constituents would be disenfranchised.

o He perorates that a member of Congress may be suspended or removed from office only by two
thirds vote of the House of Representatives.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw

Citing People v. Jalosjos, our Decision has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument. Furthermore,
our Decision does not in any manner suspend or remove him from office. Neither his arrest or detention arising
from the extradition proceeding will constitute his suspension or removal from office. That is clear enough.
While equal protection and reasonable classifications are not directly in issue in this case, we nevertheless
stress, paraphrasing Jalosjos, that respondents election to the position of congressman, does not constitute a
substantial differentiation which warrants placing him in a classification or category apart from all other persons
confined and deprived of their liberty pending resolution of their extradition cases. We reiterate that lawful
arrest and temporary confinement of a potential extraditee are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.
As we have stated, the procedure adopted by the Extradition Court of first notifying and hearing a prospective
extraditee before the actual issuance of the warrant for his arrest, is tantamount to giving notice to flee and
avoid extradition. Whether a candidate for extradition does in fact go into hiding or not is beside the point. In the
final analysis, the method adopted by the lower court was completely in dispute with the purpose, object and
rationale of the law, and overlooked the evils to be remedied.
As already suggested in our Decision, private respondent can avoid arrest and detention which are the
consequences of the extradition proceeding simply by applying for bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him in the USA. He himself has repeatedly told us that the indictments against him in the United
States are bailable. Furthermore, he is capable, financially and otherwise, of producing the necessary bail in
the US. Why then has he not done so?
Otherwise stated, Respondent Jimenez has the actual power to lift his arrest and detention arising from his
extradition by simply and voluntarily going to and filing bail in the USA.

Private respondent has not given any compelling reason to warrant a reversal or modification of our earlier
rulings.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with finality.

VITUG, J.dissenting:
I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration and maintain my dissent.
Extradition is an exceptional measure running against the tradition of asylum.
The surrender of a person who has been granted the privilege of presence or refuge in the requested state is
deemed to be an exceptional measure running against the tradition of asylum and hospitality of the requesting
state, and it has given rise to the speculation that the term "extradition" evolved from what used to be then
known as "extra-tradition."
Extradition, nevertheless, does not find basis in Customary International Law.
Despite its ancient roots, extradition, as it is presently exercised by states, adopts the view represented by
Puffendorf who argues that the duty to extradite is only an imperfect obligation which requires an explicit
agreement in order to become fully binding under international law and secure reciprocal rights and
duties of the contracting states. 9 The exception would be with respect to international crimes, such as
terrorism and genocide, in which extradition is seen as being a definite legal duty. As D.W. Grieg so
bluntly puts it, there exists no duty to extradite under customary international law. 10 Prevailing practice among
states indeed supports the conclusion that the duty to extradite can be demanded only by virtue of a
treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral; 11 conversely, in its absence, there is no legal right to demand
and no corresponding obligation to extradite. Once, of course, an extradition treaty is concluded, respect
for and compliance with the treaty obligation is, under the international principle of pacta sunt servanda,
expected from the states that enter into the agreement.
Neither can extradition be considered a generally accepted principle of international law.
Clarifying the term "generally-accepted principles of international law" during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna points out that" (w)hen we talk of generally-
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, we mean that it is part of the statutory
part of laws, not of the Constitution.
The remark is shared by Professor Merlin M. Magallona who expresses that the phrase "as part of the law of
the land" in the incorporation clause refers to the levels of legal rules below the Constitution such as legislative
acts and judicial decisions. Thus, he contends, it is incorrect to so interpret this phrase as including the
Constitution itself because it would mean that the "generally-accepted principles of international law" falls in
parity with the Constitution.
A treaty being the primary source of the obligation to extradite has given occasion to a lack of cohesive and
uniform standards on extradition.
Not finding basis in customary law and failing to qualify as a generally-accepted principles of international law,
the present state of international law on the return of fugitives for trial is hypothesized by Brownlie: "With the
exception of alleged crimes under international law, surrender of an alleged criminal cannot be
demanded of right in the absence of treaty." 23 The result has been a failure of consistency in extradition
practice among states. Indeed, the reality is that there is to date no uniform standard applicable to all
states. D.W. Gregg 24 attributes this lack of "universal" and cohesive standards in the extradition
process to the adoption of a variety of procedures which can be as diverse as the contracting states
would want them to be. In formulating their extradition treaties, contracting states insert particular provisions
and stipulations to address specific particularities in their relationships (Example: English Extradition Act of
1870 requires that the offense, for which a fugitive is to be extradited, be also considered a crime under English
law. No such requirement, upon the other hand, exists under the US Extradition Act, which limits "extraditable
crimes" to those enumerated under the treaty, regardless of whether the same are considered crimes under its
laws)."Since extradition is effected as the result of the provisions of treaties entered into by the nations two by
two, it is impossible to formulate any general rule of law upon the subject."
The elevated status of a treaty over that of an ordinary statute is taking ground.
The International Tribunal, has consistently held that, in consonance with the Vienna Convention, a state
cannot plead provisions of its own laws or deficiencies in that law in an answer to a claim against it for an
alleged breach of its obligations under international law. From the standpoint of International Law and of the
International Court, municipal laws are merely expressions of the will and constitute the activities of the
states within its boundaries in the same manner as do ordinary legal decisions or administrative
measures. But, viewed domestically, reactions have been varied. Differing internal laws among the
members of the international community has resulted in the divergence of responses when treaty law
clashes with ordinary municipal law.
The principle being that treaties create rights and duties only for those who are parties thereto pacta tertiis
nec nocre nec prodesse possunt it is considered necessary to transform a treaty into a national law in
order to make it binding upon affected state organs, like the courts, and private individuals who could,
otherwise, be seen as non-parties. The US-RP Extradition Treaty in particular, undoubtedly affects not
only state organs but also private individuals as well.
A treaty, nevertheless, cannot override the Constitution; in case of conflict, the Constitution must prevail.
When a controversy calls for a determination of the validity of a treaty in the light of the Constitution, there is no
question but that the Constitution is given primary consideration. When a state, through its government,
concludes a treaty with another state, the government of the latter has no reason and is not entitled to question
the constitutionality of the act of the former. But this rule does not prevent the government of a state, after
having concluded a treaty with another state, from declaring the treaty null and void because it is made
in violation of its own constitution. This preeminence of the Constitution over any treaty is not hard to
explain. The Constitution is the act of the people from whom sovereignty emanates. It reflects the popular will.
A treaty, on the other end, is merely negotiated by the treaty-making authority. Surely a few good men,
themselves mere delegates of the sovereign people, cannot be permitted to thwart the intent of the
Constitution. An agent could never go beyond the mandate of the agency under whose authority he acts.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution has its own standards for the grant of bail.
No country is under any legal obligation to adopt, or blindly be in conformity with, procedures from other
jurisdictions. The proposed solution of developing a "special circumstances standard" in determining
whether bail should be granted or not, following what could be considered to be mere pro hac vice
pronouncements of some foreign courts, might not be apropos. Indeed, setting up the so-called
"special circumstances standard" would be to ignore our own constitutional mandate on bail.
Section 13, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution clearly sets the parameters for the judicial exercise of the grant
of bail

"All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."cralaw vir
Starting with the declaration that the right to bail is available to all persons, the Constitution proceeds to define
its exceptions and qualifications 1) when a criminal offense is a capital one and the evidence of guilt is
strong, and 2) when granted the bail shall not be excessive. The circumstance of "high risk of flight" upon
which the main decision anchors its refusal to grant bail is conspicuously absent from the recital. The
Eighth Amendment of the US Federal Constitution, unlike the Philippine Constitution does not categorically
provide for bail as a matter of right. Thus, wrestling with the compatibility of the grant of bail in extradition
proceedings with basic constitutional guarantees, which US judges have been faced with, should not be our
dilemma.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Extradition proceedings are part of the criminal process.

Verily, an extradition proceeding before the extradition court forms part of the criminal process. It is predicated
on criminal indictment of an extraditee. Like any criminal proceeding, it ultimately ends in either
conviction or acquittal for the potential extraditee. Except for the reality that it involves two sovereign
states, at least, extradition proceedings before the extradition court can be likened to the preliminary
investigation conducted before an investigating fiscal. Like the investigating fiscal, the judge acting in an
extradition proceeding does not rule on the issue of guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee, his main
concern being the determination of whether a prima facie case exists against the potential extraditee. Stated
otherwise, both proceedings are an inquiry into whether a person should stand trial. The right to a preliminary
investigation is a component part of due process in the criminal justice system. The initial findings of the
investigating fiscal, which may result in a dismissal of the case, could spare the respondent from hasty
malicious prosecution, as well as the resultant prolonged anxiety, aggravation and humiliation, that a protracted
trial brings. In the same vein, the extradition process can result in an extended restraint of liberty
following arrest that can even be more severe than the accompanying detention within a single state.
Extradition involves, at minimum, administrative processings in both the asylum state and the demanding
state and a forced transportation in between. Thus, the rules governing the extradition process should
not be viewed as existing in a vacuum, totally divergent and isolated from the entire criminal process
of which it, in fact, forms part. Indubitably, bail is available in this country even in the preliminary
investigation stage. The eligibility for bail exists once the person is placed under legal custody
regardless of whether a complaint or information has been filed or yet to be filed in court against him.

In sum, I yield to the following submissions:chanrob1es

1aw lib
a) The obligation to extradite does not find basis in customary international law, nor is it a generally accepted
principle of international law, the commitment to extradite being dependent, by and large, on an extradition
treaty between two sovereign states.

b) There is an absence of a "universal" or "uniform" extradition practice applicable to all states. This lack of a
"standard" extradition procedure should mean that the Philippines is not obligated to follow extradition practices
from other jurisdictions, particularly when its own Constitution itself has provided for such standards.

c) A treaty, entered into by the delegated authority although occupying an elevated status in the hierarchy of
laws predicated on the principle of pacta servanda, cannot override the Constitution, the latter being the
ultimate expression of the will of the People from whom all sovereignty emanates. In case conflict, the of
Constitution must prevail.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw librar
The draft ponencia would assume that the Constitution confines the grant of provisional liberty to criminal
cases, and that it has no application to extradition proceedings. This assumption would have reason for being if
it was solely in criminal cases that a person could face an imminent threat of deprivation of his right to life or
liberty, for indeed, it is this threat, rather than case nomenclature, that must be the focus and it would be
superficial to think otherwise. While defying a neat definition, extradition has all the earmarks of a criminal
process an extraditee would suffer deprivations, be denied his freedom and restricted in his
movements, not much unlike a criminal indictee. Extradition proceedings involve an extended restraint
of liberty following arrest, peculiar to an accused in a criminal case, which can even be more severe
than an accompanying detention in a single state, for at a minimum, it can mean protracted
proceedings in both the asylum state and the demanding state and a forced transportation in between.
In Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, the Court observed that bail is constitutionally available to all persons, even
those against whom no formal charges are filed.
It should be borne in mind that the private respondent has most definitely been indicted, 7 and the threat to the
loss of his freedom is very real. If the purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from the rigors of
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at trial, 8 then by analogy, an
extraditee, who may or may not yet have been charged, and who is threatened with temporary
imprisonment in both the requested and requesting states, should also benefit from the right to bail.
Due to the striking similarity in their circumstances, there is therefore no sufficient basis for
distinguishing between an accused person and a potential extraditee in terms of their entitlement to
bail. This occasion calls for the adherence to the well-entrenched principle ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. 9 The Constitutional grant of bail should, as a matter of right, be made available to the
accused and the extraditee alike.
In our jurisdiction, the supreme law governing the question of bail is the Constitution, and its hallowed
provisions dictate the general rule that bail is granted as a matter of right, with its denial reserved to very few
and very specific instances. Being the subject of an extradition request is not one of these exceptions.
It is unfortunate that the draft resolution proposes to summarily deny petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case could have provided this Court with the opportunity to pass upon a novel issue and, in the process,
uphold the supremacy of Constitutional rights. Instead, the right to bail has been reduced to a hollow promise
and has lost its efficacy as a fundamental right of the individual.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration.