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Republic of the Philippines

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.

FERIA, J.:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to
continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that
the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And
the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established
in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.

On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their
Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In
said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in
the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as
in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the
Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate
coordination of the existing central administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore,
with approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were
continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive
Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No. 3 of
February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in
exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the
administration organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs. . . ."

On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was
effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine
Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a
proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the
people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control.

On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on
behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the
Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."

In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present
case may be reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the
Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces;
(2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of
the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings
of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation,
whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued
during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts
at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.

We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not
the governments established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they
were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that
government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the
Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and
maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British
possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the
United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not
concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.

Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not
become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are
usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, civil authority, supported more
or less directly by military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the case of Castine, in Mine,
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the
case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9
Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull and regular governments at war
with the country of which the territory so possessed was part."

The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague
Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of
said Section III provides "the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with
the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de facto
government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as
he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the
occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and
regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political
relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the
right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military
occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a
country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial
officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in
their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the Commander in Chief of the
occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and
have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.

The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The
right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession,
during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited.
Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The
municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all
the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones."

And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied
in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898,
relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers of the military
occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of
things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they
were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the
authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under
the supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President, X, p.
209.)

As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of
Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de facto
government. In that case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States differed from
the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful
acts of regular war; but it was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed
among the governments of which these are examples. . . .

In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity
of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government, the same general laws for the
administration of justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion,
remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be
treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): "The existence of a
state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property
regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial
or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in
their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of
citizens under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases."

And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That what occured or was done in
respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be
disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union
established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between the United States and the
Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil
obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the
laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy's territory
although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized
to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with actual
intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing
the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode
of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution."

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No.
1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from
the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck
says, "The government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation may exercise all the
powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that
code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its
character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws
of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the
legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not
a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when
Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of
a french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading
France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an
English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in
1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of
every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)

The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent
from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the
belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and
government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been
already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the
Government of the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer
the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military
occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by
a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in
International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the
population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being
essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure
government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead
of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by
Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of
transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the
mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people
in her war against the United States and other allied nations.

Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino who, taking
advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese
forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under the name with the support and backing of
Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion
against the parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that
organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the by the Supreme
Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly
vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the
Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named
case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional
government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the
Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof was surrendered to the United
States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class
of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '."
That is to say, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against
the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at
regular war with the legitimate power.

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of
the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in
a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it
otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and
the individuals the evil would be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under
duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals
should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.)
And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present
case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own
sovereignty as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing
the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are
and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the
Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws,
regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it
would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of any other government" as used
in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the
intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation.

The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also
to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other
governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact
that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial
proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military
occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power
of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said
phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court proceedings, for according
to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."

It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not
unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of
the military occupation demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power
of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by
an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in
chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently
less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or
a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the
United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court
of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later
embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas
MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines
full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the
international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of
section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."

Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public
interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled
accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become
immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that
almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is
another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular
construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction
is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law,
unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.)

The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a
territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the
belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military
occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be
expected that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions may
afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy
that they may escaped the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.

That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of the courts of justice during the
Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the
President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive order abolished the Court of
Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of
General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly
appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10,
1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases
pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been
disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all,
appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of
First Instance during the Japanese regime.

The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an
occupier's acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must
be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong
would be committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but
the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p.
245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant
should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule
of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that
denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the
obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."

There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the
laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in
view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government" and not "judicial
processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul
and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be
determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or
nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial
processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not
General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide,
undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of
Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror.

Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages
established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public of conscience,
constitute or from the law of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part
II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in
discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h),
section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . . suspended . . . in a
Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any declaration
preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of
Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is
required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from
asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of
liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said
courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague
Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts
the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes
without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower another to undo
the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States Army has
violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in
construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the case of Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general rules of international
law and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies."

In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of
the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of
chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved
respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and
duties of military officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the
court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large
governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . . The clearest language would be
necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so exercised. . . . It
was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have
conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law
that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what
the exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1
Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold
that the order was void."

It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has not
invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the
Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and now
good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.

3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those
existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission
and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions
pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino
forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored.

Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of
course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which
he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated
but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before
the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." And
Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From
the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor,
International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and
business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially
provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces
proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the
territory occupied by the army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as
executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the time being as in the past," and "all public
officials shall remain in their present post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine
Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942,
the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5,
respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of
courts, with the same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the
Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and
jurisdiction thereof.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been
continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called
Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of
the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then
pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said
proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity,
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. .
. . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their
original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing
of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.)

The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his conclusion that the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of
this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . . shall have
provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the
cases commenced and the left pending therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the Commonwealth
Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation,
but they had become the laws — and the courts had become the institutions — of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs.
Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines."

The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country
occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign
nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is
essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant.
What the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his
and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institution or
courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of
the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of
the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit everything which
would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in
the political life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the
courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their
sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to
Wheaton, however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the
Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of
Nancy to administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the
ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and government was at least an implied
recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the
use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the
name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)

Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until
changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H.
Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the
same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or
interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people
it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change take place, and
when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until
the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."

As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon
them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of
sovereignty, and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation
that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such
proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore,
even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards
transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had
become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have
continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same
jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until
they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.
As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or
transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary
only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands
ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the
cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme
Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the
Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of
sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present
Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese
occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Island were continued.

On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil
jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the
Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the
provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme
Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in
the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending
therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.

That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore,
can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in
connection with the second question. Said Executive Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and
established under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished," and "(2) that all
cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same
that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated
in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore (that
is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of First
Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive
Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the
time of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that
occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in
cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the
laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government;
and that the respondent judge of the court, having refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his
office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this
particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DE JOYA, J., concurring:

The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation; and
the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944. The
decision of this question requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal
law in force in this country, before and during Japanese occupation.

Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13
Sup. Ct. 224; 36 Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, under the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, section 3).

As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever
questions of right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting as an international as well as a
domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).

Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof
of the existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to abide by that rule; and this consent is
evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages and customs are, the
universal practice is to turn to the writings of publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different
countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320).

But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, great international treaties are a later source of
increasing importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declares that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile
army.

The occupation applies only to be territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert
itself.

ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant,
the later shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat. II, 1821.)

The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among
which is United States of America (32 Stat. II, 1821).

The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only
when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of
international Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441;
MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law, section
167).

There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese military occupation, from January, 1942, up to
the time of the reconquest by the armed forces of the United States of the Island of Luzon, in February, 1945.

It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the
hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory continue usual for the invader to
take the whole administration into his own hands, partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of
the native officials, and partly because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and
partly because the latter are more competent to administer the laws in force within the territory and the military
occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under
him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him.
(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. U.S.,
229 U.S., 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on International Law, sections 576. 578; Wilson on
International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on International Law, 6th Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence on
International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332 335; Holland on
International Law pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake on International Law, 2d ed., pp. 121-23.)

It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the so-called Philippine Republic, during
Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting the local courts to function and
administer such laws, as proclaimed in the City of Manila, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial
Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.

If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental
agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the
laws in force within territory it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts
established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government establish by the
military occupant has been displaced by the legitimate government of the territory.

Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely settling the rights of
private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States,
nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion had been declared valid and binding (Cock vs. Oliver, 1
Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96
U. S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700;
Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for
the purchase money of slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871(French vs. Tumlin,
10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).

Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of America were
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had
been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate States were a de facto government in the
sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters, and did not become
responsible, as wrong-doers, for such acts of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361).

In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court held — "It is now settled law in this court that
during the late civil war the same general form of government, the same general law for the administration of justice
and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its
continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the
national authority, or the just and legal rights of the citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated
as valid and binding." (William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20
id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.)

The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following
definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government, called also by publicists, a government de facto, but which
might, perhaps, be more aptly denominateda government of paramount force. Its distinguishing
characteristics are (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to
such force, do not become responsible, as wrong doers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of
the rightful government. Actual government of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent
and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered,
also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (Macleod vs. United States [1913] 229
U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, was and should be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted
before the courts which had been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, are to be considered
legal and valid and enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as long as the said
judicial proceedings had been conducted, under the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the settlement of property rights,
under the provisions of the Civil Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and
during Japanese occupation.

Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, under the provisions of the
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation "nullifies all the
laws, regulations and processes of any other government of the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines."

In other words, petitioner demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and
uncertainties.

When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the
courts will always adopt the former (U. S. vs. Coombs [1838], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of
Granada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guarina [1913], 24
Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national
welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote
the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible
construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd
consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language, which
would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (U. S. vs.
Kirby, 7 Wall. [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed., 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. U. S., 143 U. S. 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law.
ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U. S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re
Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two
constructions to adopt that which saves is constitutionality, includes the duty of avoiding a construction which raises
grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (U. S. vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., U.S., 366; 29
Sup. Ct., 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).

According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial
proceedings conducted before the courts of justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely
applying the municipal law of the territory, such as the provisions of our Civil Code, which have no political or military
significance, should be considered legal, valid and binding.

It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with said rules and principles, as International Law
is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. And it is also to be presumed that General MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and
principles of International Law, which have been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the
nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during Japanese occupation would lead to
injustice and absurd results, and would be highly detrimental to the public interests.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

Law must be obeyed. To keep the bonds of society, it must not be evaded. On its supremacy depends the stability of
states and nations. No government can prevail without it. The preservation of the human race itself hinges in law.

Since time immemorial, man has relied on law as an essential means of attaining his purposes, his objectives, his
mission in life. More than twenty-two centuries before the Christian Era, on orders of the Assyrian King Hammurabi,
the first code was engrave in black diorite with cunie form characters. Nine centuries later Emperor Hung Wu, in the
cradle of the most ancient civilization, compiled the Code of the Great Ming. The laws of Manu were written in the
verdic India. Moses received at Sinai the ten commandments. Draco, Lycurgus, Solon made laws in Greece. Even
ruthless Genghis Khan used laws to keep discipline among the nomad hordes with which he conquered the greater
part of the European and Asiastic continents.

Animal and plants species must follow the mendelian heredity rules and other biological laws to survive. Thanks to
them, the chalk cliffs of the infusoria show the marvel of an animal so tiny as to be imperceptible to the naked eye
creating a whole mountain. Even the inorganic world has to conform the law. Planets and stars follow the laws
discovered by Kepler, known as the law-maker of heavens. If, endowed with rebellious spirit, they should happen to
challenge the law of universal gravity, the immediate result would be cosmic chaos. The tiny and twinkling points of
light set above us on the velvet darkness of the night will cease to inspire us with dreams of more beautiful and
happier worlds.

Again we are called upon to do our duty. Here is a law that we must apply. Shall we shrink? Shall we circumvent it ?
Can we ignore it?

The laws enacted by the legislators shall be useless if courts are not ready to apply them. It is actual application to
real issues which gives laws the breath of life.

In the varied and confused market of human endeavor there are so many things that might induce us to forget the
elementals. There are so many events, so many problem, so many preoccupations that are pushing among
themselves to attract our attention, and we might miss the nearest and most familiar things, like the man who went
around his house to look for a pencil perched on one of his ears.

THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION

In October, 1944, the American Armed Forces of Liberation landed successfully in Leyte.

When victory in islands was accomplished, after the most amazing and spectacular war operations, General of the
Army Douglas MacArthur as a commander in Chief of the American Army, decided to reestablish, in behalf of the
United States, the Commonwealth Government.

Then he was confronted with the question as to what policy to adopt in regards to the official acts of the
governments established in the Philippines by the Japanese regime. He might have thought of recognizing the
validity of some of said acts, but, certainly, there were acts which he should declare null and void, whether against
the policies of the American Government, whether inconsistent with military strategy and operations, whether
detrimental to the interests of the American or Filipino peoples, whether for any other strong or valid reasons.

But, which to recognize, and which not? He was not in a position to gather enough information for a safe basis to
distinguished and classify which acts must be nullified, and which must validated. At the same time he had to take
immediate action. More pressing military matters were requiring his immediate attention. He followed the safe
course: to nullify all the legislative, executive, and judicial acts and processes under the Japanese regime. After all,
when the Commonwealth Government is already functioning, with proper information, he will be in a position to
declare by law, through its Congress, which acts and processes must be revived and validated in the public interest.

So on October 23, 1944, the Commander in Chief issued the following proclamation:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PROCLAMATION

To the People of the Philippines:

WHEREAS, the military forces under my command have landed in the Philippines soil as a prelude to the
liberation of the entire territory of the Philippines; and

WHEREAS, the seat of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines has been re-established in
the Philippines under President Sergio Osmeña and the members of his cabinet; and

WHEREAS, under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines" was
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction
of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to exercise Executive, Judicial and Legislative
powers of government over the people;

Now, therefore, I, Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, as Commander in Chief of the military
forces committed to the liberation of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim and declare:

1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of
the Government of the United States, the sole and the only government having legal and valid
jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;

2. The laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
regulation promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people
in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and

3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free enemy
occupation and control; and

I do hereby announce my purpose progressively to restore and extend to the people of the Philippines the
sacred right of government by constitutional process under the regularly constituted Commonwealth
Government as rapidly as the several occupied areas are liberated to the military situation will otherwise
permit;

I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted
government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.

October 23, 1944.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General U. S. Army
Commander in Chief

IS THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION LAW?