G.R. No. 120082
G.R. No. 120082
G.R. No. 120082
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v Marcos GR No 120082, September 11, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner was created by virtue of RA 6958. Section 1 thereof states that the authority shall
be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. However, the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded
payment for realty taxes from petitioner. Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the
Regional Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the Local Government
Code withdrew the tax exemption granted to Government owned and controlled
corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether the city of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner
RULING:
Yes. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted
to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government- owned and
controlled corporations, section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz, they are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts,
cooperatives, duly registered under RA 6938, non stock and nonprofit hospitals and
educational institutions and unless otherwise provided in the LGC.
THIRD DIVISION
For review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law are the
decision of 22 March 19951of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 20,
dismissing the petition for declaratory relief in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 entitled
"Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. City of Cebu", and its order of 4, May
19952 denying the motion to reconsider the decision.
We resolved to give due course to this petition for its raises issues dwelling on the scope
of the taxing power of local government-owned and controlled corporations.
Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of
exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its
Charter.
Sec. 14. Tax Exemptions. The authority shall be exempt from realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities . . .
a) . . .
Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account,
insisting that the MCIAA is a government-controlled corporation whose tax
exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the
Local Governmental Code that took effect on January 1, 1992:
(a) . . .
(c) . . .
The petition for declaratory relief was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16900.
In its decision of 22 March 1995,4 the trial court dismissed the petition in light of its
findings, to wit:
However, RA 7160 expressly provides that "All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decress [sic], executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." ([f],
Section 534, RA 7160).
With that repealing clause in RA 7160, it is safe to infer and state that the tax
exemption provided for in RA 6958 creating petitioner had been expressly
repealed by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of 1991.
So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties
effective after January 1, 1992 until the present.
This Court's ruling finds expression to give impetus and meaning to the overall
objectives of the New Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160. "It is hereby
declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of
the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Towards this end,
the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby
local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities,
and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national
government to the local government units. . . .5
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court in its 4 May 1995
order, the petitioner filed the instant petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
Anent the first assigned error, the petitioner asserts that although it is a government-
owned or controlled corporation it is mandated to perform functions in the same
category as an instrumentality of Government. An instrumentality of Government is
one created to perform governmental functions primarily to promote certain aspects
of the economic life of the people.6 Considering its task "not merely to efficiently
operate and manage the Mactan-Cebu International Airport, but more importantly,
to carry out the Government policies of promoting and developing the Central
Visayas and Mindanao regions as centers of international trade and tourism, and
accelerating the development of the means of transportation and communication in
the country,"7and that it is an attached agency of the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC),8 the petitioner "may stand in [sic] the same footing as an
agency or instrumentality of the national government." Hence, its tax exemption
privilege under Section 14 of its Charter "cannot be considered withdrawn with the
passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter LGC) because Section
133 thereof specifically states that the taxing powers of local government units shall
not extend to the levy of taxes of fees or charges of any kind on the national
government its agencies and instrumentalities."
As to the second assigned error, the petitioner contends that being an instrumentality
of the National Government, respondent City of Cebu has no power nor authority to
impose realty taxes upon it in accordance with the aforesaid Section 133 of the LGC,
as explained in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation;9
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The latter
joke is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government,
PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its
operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere
Local government.
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over
local government.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, make references to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at
least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51)
and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a
federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its
federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of
them. (Antieau Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140)
Otherwise mere creature of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities
or enterprise using the power to tax as "a toll for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340
US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to
destroy" (McCulloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to
wield it. (Emphasis supplied)
It then concludes that the respondent Judge "cannot therefore correctly say that the
questioned provisions of the Code do not contain any distinction between a
governmental function as against one performing merely proprietary ones such that
the exemption privilege withdrawn under the said Code would apply
to allgovernment corporations." For it is clear from Section 133, in relation to Section
234, of the LGC that the legislature meant to exclude instrumentalities of the national
government from the taxing power of the local government units.
In its comment respondent City of Cebu alleges that as local a government unit and a
political subdivision, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its
jurisdiction. Such power is guaranteed by the Constitution10 and enhanced further by
the LGC. While it may be true that under its Charter the petitioner was exempt from
the payment of realty taxes,11 this exemption was withdrawn by Section 234 of the
LGC. In response to the petitioner's claim that such exemption was not repealed
because being an instrumentality of the National Government, Section 133 of the LGC
prohibits local government units from imposing taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on it,
respondent City of Cebu points out that the petitioner is likewise a government-owned
corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish between government-
owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish between
government-owned corporation, and Section 234 thereof does not distinguish
between government-owned or controlled corporations performing governmental
and purely proprietary functions. Respondent city of Cebu urges this the Manila
International Airport Authority is a governmental-owned corporation, 12 and to reject
the application of Basco because it was "promulgated . . . before the enactment and
the singing into law of R.A. No. 7160," and was not, therefore, decided "in the light of
the spirit and intention of the framers of the said law.
As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its
range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to
be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective limitations thereon may be
imposed by the people through their Constitutions.13 Our Constitution, for instance,
provides that the rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.14 So potent indeed is the power that it was
once opined that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."15 Verily, taxation is
a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property for the support of
the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.16 But since taxes are what we pay
for civilized society,17 or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority.18 A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based
on language in the law too plain to be mistaken.19 Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule,
exemption therefrom is the exception.20 However, if the grantee of the exemption is a
political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply
because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of
money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its operations.21
The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may
be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X
of the Constitution.22 Under the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide which, however, must be
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is
exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any
of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation
is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be
withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is
where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration
of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.23
The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the
exercise by local government units of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its
limitations, and the exemption from taxation.
Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of
local government units as follows:
Sec. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government Units.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial
institutions;
(e) Taxes, fees and charges and other imposition upon goods
carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of
local government units in the guise or charges for wharfages, tolls
for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees or charges in any form
whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(l) Taxes, fees, or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and
for the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of
thereof, except, tricycles;
Needless to say the last item (item o) is pertinent in this case. The "taxes, fees or
charges" referred to are "of any kind", hence they include all of these, unless otherwise
provided by the LGC. The term "taxes" is well understood so as to need no further
elaboration, especially in the light of the above enumeration. The term "fees" means
charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or inspection of business
activity,24 while "charges" are pecuniary liabilities such as rents or fees against person
or property.25
Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax, which is governed by
Section 232. It reads as follows:
Sec. 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax. A province or city or a municipality
within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy on an annual ad valorem tax on
real property such as land, building, machinery and other improvements not
hereafter specifically exempted.
Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of real property taxes
and withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural and juridical
persons, including government owned and controlled corporations, except as
provided therein. It provides:
Sec. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted
from payment of the real property tax:
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and
exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or
controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of
water and/or generation and transmission of electric power;
These exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and use of the property.
Thus;
Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges. It provides:
On the other hand, the LGC authorizes local government units to grant tax exemption
privileges. Thus, Section 192 thereof provides:
Sec. 192. Authority to Grant Tax Exemption Privileges. Local government units
may, through ordinances duly approved, grant tax exemptions, incentives or
reliefs under such terms and conditions as they may deem necessary.
The foregoing sections of the LGC speaks of: (a) the limitations on the taxing powers of
local government units and the exceptions to such limitations; and (b) the rule on tax
exemptions and the exceptions thereto. The use of exceptions of provisos in these
section, as shown by the following clauses:
initially hampers a ready understanding of the sections. Note, too, that the
aforementioned clause in section 133 seems to be inaccurately worded. Instead of
the clause "unless otherwise provided herein," with the "herein" to mean, of course, the
section, it should have used the clause "unless otherwise provided in this Code." The
former results in absurdity since the section itself enumerates what are beyond the
taxing powers of local government units and, where exceptions were intended, the
exceptions were explicitly indicated in the text. For instance, in item (a) which excepts
the income taxes "when livied on banks and other financial institutions", item (d) which
excepts "wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by the local government
until concerned"; and item (1) which excepts taxes, fees, and charges for the
registration and issuance of license or permits for the driving of "tricycles". It may also
be observed that within the body itself of the section, there are exceptions which can
be found only in other parts of the LGC, but the section interchangeably uses therein
the clause "except as otherwise provided herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause
"except as otherwise provided herein" as in items (c) and (i), or the clause "excepts as
provided in this Code" in item (j). These clauses would be obviously unnecessary or
mere surplus-ages if the opening clause of the section were" "Unless otherwise
provided in this Code" instead of "Unless otherwise provided herein". In any event,
even if the latter is used, since under Section 232 local government units have the
power to levy real property tax, except those exempted therefrom under Section 234,
then Section 232 must be deemed to qualify Section 133.
Thus, reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a
general rule, as laid down in Section 133 the taxing powers of local government units
cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and local government units";
however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan
Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except
when the beneficial used thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to
a taxable person", as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.
Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity
of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the
said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it
necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its
charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be
justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in
Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the
said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234.
In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the
taxing powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy of:
I must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one
of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of
the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit provision of
the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an
"instrumentality of the Government", it could only be within be first item of the first
paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the
Philippines" to embrace . . . . . . "instrumentalities" and "agencies" or expediency we
quote:
This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an
instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly
mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the
fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a).
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not
interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the
"corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are
exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government."27 These
autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the
political subdivision.28
On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the
central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local
Governments."29 The National Government then is composed of the three great
departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial.30
An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" 31 while an
"instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations".32
If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the
exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said
section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned
in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not
Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in
Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of
the government including government-owned and controlled corporations is further
borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646,
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code, which reads:
Sec 40. Exemption from Real Property Tax. The exemption shall be as follows:
Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any government-owned
or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for
this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption
privileges, specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from
payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last
paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State
policy to ensure autonomy to local governments33 and the objective of the LGC that
they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in
the attainment of national goals.34 The power to tax is the most effective instrument to
raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government
units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare
and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also
be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other
units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and
distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need
for this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by
paying the taxes and other charges due from them.35
The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question
belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to
the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person".
Section 15 of the petitioner's Charter provides:
Sec. 15. Transfer of Existing Facilities and Intangible Assets. All existing public
airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or
immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all
assets, powers, rights, interests and privileges relating on airport works, or air
operations, including all equipment which are necessary for the operations of air
navigation, acrodrome control towers, crash, fire, and rescue facilities are
hereby transferred to the Authority: Provided however, that the operations
control of all equipment necessary for the operation of radio aids to air
navigation, airways communication, the approach control office, and the area
control center shall be retained by the Air Transportation Office. No equipment,
however, shall be removed by the Air Transportation Office from Mactan
without the concurrence of the authority. The authority may assist in the
maintenance of the Air Transportation Office equipment.
The "airports" referred to are the "Lahug Air Port" in Cebu City and the "Mactan
International AirPort in the Province of Cebu",36 which belonged to the Republic of the
Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO).37
It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then
administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent
City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of
the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the
beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the
Philippines.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of
the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to
make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.
Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real
property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be
conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person
for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to,
applies to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The challenged decision and order of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. CEB-16900 are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
2 Id., 30-31.
3 Rollo, 10-13.
4 Supra note 1.
5 Rollo, 28-29.
12 Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) vs. Commission on Audit, 238 SCRA 714
[1994].
15 Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 4 L. ed. 579, 607.
Later Justice Holmes brushed this aside by declaring in Panhandle Oil Co. vs. Mississippi
(277 U.S. 218) that "the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."
Justice Frankfurter in Graves vs. New York (306 U.S. 466) also remarked that Justice
Marshall's statement was a "mere flourish of rhetoric" and a product of the "intellectual
fashion of the times to indulge in a free case of absolutes." (See SINCO, Philippine
Political Law [1954], 577-578).
16 AGPALO, RUBEN E., Statutory Construction [1990 ed], 216. See also SANDS, DALLAS
C., Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol. 3 [1974] 179.
17 Justice Holmes in his dissent in Compania General vs. Collector of Internal Revenue,
275 U.S. 87, 100[1927].
21 Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr. 197 SCRA 771, 799 [1991]; citing 2 COOLEY on the Law on
Taxation, 4th ed. [1927], 1414, and SANDS, op. cit., 207.
26 PIMENTEL, AQUILINO JR., The Local Government Code of 1991 The Key to
National Development [1933], 329.
30 Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation, 100 Phil. 468, 472 [1956].
39 Supra note 9.