EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines) G.R. No.

164273 March
28, 2007

Facts:

Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard)

issued by Citibank with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida,
planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour,
Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.

Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in

Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency in Indonesia (to
purchase tickets to Bali) but the was not honoured for the reason that his card was
blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan
Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards.

On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that
Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced
him, his wife and grandchildren to abort important tour destinations and prevented them
from buying certain items in their tour. To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard,
Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS
FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G")
with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in
question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

As a defence, Citibank’s Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented

Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its cancelled cards covering
the period of Aznar’s trip.

On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos,
rendered its decision dismissing Aznar’s complaint for lack of merit. The trial court held
that as between the computer print-out presented by Aznar and the Warning
Cancellation Bulletins presented by Citibank, the latter had more weight as their due
execution and authenticity were duly established by Citibank. Aznar filed a motion for
reconsideration this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña of Branch 10 of Cebu City,
the court issued an Order granting Aznar’s motion. Thus, Citibank filed an appeal with
the CA and its counsel filed an administrative case against Judge De la Peña for grave
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence, claiming among others that
said judge rendered his decision without having read the transcripts. On January 30,
2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting Citibank’s appeal. Aznar filed a motion for
reconsideration which the CA dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not Exh. "G" qualifies as electronic evidence following the Rules on
Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the
Best Evidence Rule hence, should not be excluded as evidence.

Held:

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August
1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G"
would still be found wanting.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an

electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in
the manner provided in this Rule.

Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as

authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following
means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed
the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be

authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents
were applied to the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other
evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The
Court is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely
handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the
same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability.
As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does
not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in
passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to
show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because
while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not
reflected in the print-out. Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information
reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied
upon as true.

Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not
know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage
between Mercado and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of nullity of
the former marriage.

HELD:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent

one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the
earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva
right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the
nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia

CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop
owned by the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the
defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was
accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio
and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby
boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On

February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and
he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he
continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s”
sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another
woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given
instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to
acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the
other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia.
The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of
the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the
father's resolution to admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages
to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be
based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC
found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to
Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it
is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of
pension.