Hegemony

Patrick Dove, Indiana University

The conceptual development of “hegemony” has had a lasting impact on Latin

Americanist political thought beginning in the 1960s. The concept has been touted for its

explanatory power in a wide range of contexts including: the role of intellectuals in social

transformation, the transition from dictatorship to democracy, the triumph of neoliberalism or

the “Washington consensus” in the 1980s and 90s, as well as the return of populism in its

neoliberal and anti-neoliberal forms. The virtues for which the theory has been embraced

include its sensitivity to the complexity of social organization in modern, industrialized societies

together with the premise that it enables us to think the tenuous unity of the social without

losing sight of the key roles played by heterogeneity and contingency.

However, it could also be argued that in hegemony theory, heterogeneity has a way of

becoming indistinguishable from homogeneity. If there is a weakness in the theory as it has

evolved in recent decades, it is that it can only account for differences in terms of their

submission to being administered within a governing logic of equivalency. For hegemony

theory, equivalency is the administrative end (telos) which guides thought and praxis in their

attempts to come to terms with heterogeneity. The fate of all heterogeneity is thus

programmed in advance: either accede to administrative reason or relinquish all political

potentiality. For heterogeneity, these alternatives no doubt resonate as a false choice. To use a

Lacanian psychoanalytic metaphor, hegemony theory would seem to be all about the symbolic

to the exclusion of the real. When the question of the real does come up, as in Ernesto Laclau’s

On Populist Reason, it is framed exclusively in terms of the (re)organization of symbolic

economy. Laclau understands the real as partial object or objet petit a, a particularity which
 2

paradoxically embodies universality and thereby facilitates the mutual recognition of

commonality between particulars. What tends to get pushed aside in Laclau’s appropriation of

Lacanian theory, however, are the ways in which the real also names a stumbling block for such

economies. When Laclau claims that populism and hegemony are at the core of all modern

politics, it would appear that he is reducing politics to modifications in the symbolic: as either

enforcing or reforming a specific configuration of the sensible, and thus as strengthening the

perception that the symbolic as such is all there is. In Lacan’s terms (2007), hegemony theory is

a discourse of the master.

A brief overview of the history of the concept in Western political thought will help to

shed light on how its vicissitudes coincide with major transformations in modern social

organization and political thought. Hegemony traditionally designates the leadership or

sovereignty of a person, group or state within a society, confederacy or union. In the classical

world it described the role played by leading Greek city-states in alliances: Athens as hegemon

of the Delian League, King Philip of Macedon to the League of Corinth, and so on. In the wake of

the democratic revolutions of the late 18th and 19th centuries, hegemony continues to refer to

the leadership of particular states within alliances (Prussia in the German Confederation; the

struggle between the US and the USSR to expand regional influence into global hegemony

during the Cold War), but it is also used in a new context: to describe the investment of

sovereign authority in a particular leader or social group in the context of national politics (the

bourgeoisie in post-revolutionary France; the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution; Perón

in Argentina from 1945 until his death in 1974).

In Marx and Engel’s analyses of post-1789 Western Europe, the concept of hegemony

acquires a double valence in which concrete factors related to class conflict are folded into the

realm of abstraction, i.e., the representations through which a given class understands and

projects itself in relation to the social totality. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch

the ruling ideas,” write Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, “i.e., the class which is the

ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force” (64). The

influence of ideas tends to be perceived as something altogether separate from social relations,

and thus as constituting an autonomous cultural history or history of ideas. Here we see what

will become one of the key components of hegemony theory for thinkers such as Laclau: a

slippage in which particularity (class interest and its ideational representatives) passes itself off

as universality. Under aristocratic rule, for instance, the aristocratic code of “honor” and

“loyalty” was internalized by subordinated sectors; in the wake of the bourgeois-democratic

revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, meanwhile, “liberty” and “equality” emerge as new

ideational hegemons. They circulate in the realm of ideas as if they were free from the

particularity of material relations, as if they were neutral or innate ideas which reflected the

common interests and aspirations of all.

The transposition of the particular into the universal is seen by Marx and Engels as a

necessary component of all social authority and political power. Coercion alone is not enough;

the governed must also be convinced. “Each new class which puts itself in the place of one

ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interests

as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to

give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid
 4

ones” (65-66). This is the counterpart to the line in the 18th Brumaire about the subordinate

classes (the small holding peasantry) who “cannot represent themselves [but] must be

represented” (Marx and Engels 1978, 608).

The class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed
to [another] class, not as a class but as the representative of society; it appears as the
whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class [Marx’s note in the margin:
Universality corresponds to (1) the class versus the estate, (2) the competition, world-
wide intercourse, etc., (3) the great numerical strength of the ruling class, (4) the illusion
of the common interests (in the beginning this is true), (5) the delusion of the ideologists
and the division of labor]. It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more
connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the
pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as
the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many
individuals of the other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only
insofar as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling
class [emphasis added: PD]. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of the
aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above
the proletariat, but only insofar as they become bourgeois. Every new class, therefore,
achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the ruling class previously
(Marx and Engels 1978, 174; emphasis in the original except where noted).

Things look slightly different to Marx and Engels in a revolutionary context, where the

ascendant class (e.g., the bourgeoisie in post-1789 France) acts as a universal class—that is, a

non-class—whose actions are in fact in tune with the common interests of all. In this situation,

what we ordinarily think of as class—social groups possessing their own discrete interests and

sensibilities which are defined in large part by their conflicts with other classes—is relatively

amorphous, since the differences between non-dominant classes are minute in comparison

with the more immediate and overarching conflict that each group has with the ruling class.

Any classism and determinism present in Marxian thought are thus temporarily suspended in

the revolutionary situation. Under the combined pressure exerted by the pre-revolutionary

situation, in which the aristocracy’s authority was experienced by all subjugated classes as
 5

tyranny, together with the new revolutionary moment in which all non-ruling classes struggle

toward the same end, class particularism among non-hegemonic groups has yet to crystallize. In

such moments there is truth in appearances: by assuming leadership of the revolutionary

assault on the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie does in fact carry out the wishes of all other (non-

ruling) classes in society.

With the overthrow of the aristocracy and the triumph of the bourgeoisie, meanwhile,

this common interest vanishes. Now the revolutionary lexicon—“equality, “fraternity” and

“liberty”—begins to reveal itself as an army of tropes for advancing the specific interests of the

bourgeoisie under the disguise of “universality”: “liberty” now stands for unfettered economic

opportunity for capitalists; “equality” belies the fundamental inequality perpetuated in the

separation of capital and labor; and “fraternity” masks the social reality in which the many are

exploited and dominated. In retrospect, what once appeared as universality now seems to have

been an illusion: to those who are not of the bourgeoisie, the only meaningful freedom

offered—for those who can pull it off—is to join the bourgeoisie at the center of the hegemonic

game. All other options lead to the unfreedom of exploitation and domination.

A major conceptual development in hegemony theory occurs in the work of Antonio

Gramsci (2011), whose innovative contributions to modern political thought respond to the

social impact of industrialization in Western Europe during the second half of the 19th century

and, specifically, to conflicts arising in Italy when northern industrialization begins to create

ripple effects in the lives of the southern peasantry. Gramsci’s transformative appropriation of

“hegemony” reflects, for one, his debt to Lenin and the latter’s conception of class alliance

under the political leadership of the Russian working class during the Revolution. It also initates
 6

a rethinking of the Marxian understanding of history, of the capitalist system’s limits and of its

ability to reproduce its own conditions of production despite its internal “contradictions.”

Gramsci’s focus on “civil society”—as opposed to “political society” and the State—as a new

terrain for revolutionary praxis in the 20th century has the effect of calling into question the

rigidly deterministic understandings of history and class that had previously dominated the

Marxian tradition. The ever-growing complexity of industrial societies, together with the

increasing interpenetration of national economies with world markets, lead Gramsci to

conclude that the old revolutionary strategy of direct assault on the state apparatus is no longer

capable of bringing about a radical transformation of capitalist society. In modern,

industrialized capitalist nations, the state and its institutions have become a mere “outer ditch”

behind which stand what Gramsci calls “a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks”

(Gramsci 1971, 238). This latter network is constituted by the institutions and organizations of

civil society, all of which act to stabilize and reproduce prevailing relations of production and

their accompanying modes of behavior and thought. In industrialized capitalist countries,

where the formative forces of civil society are more or less fully invested in the reproduction of

capitalist social relations, classes can no longer be understood as stable, pre-constituted

entities possessing their own innate interests and outlooks. A revolutionary political project

that would appeal to the sensibilities of subjugated classes must begin by constructing such a

revolutionary mode of perception and thought via education and culture.

The impact of Gramsci’s thought in Latin America becomes patent in the early 1960s

when a group of Argentine intellectuals lead by José Aricó and Juan Carlos Portantiero left the

Argentine Communist Party and founded the journal Pasado y presente. As Aricó describes it
 7

(1988), Gramsci’s writings appealed to Latin American intellectuals in part because it offered a

framework in which they could understand their own participation in contestatory politics

(what Gramsci termed a “war of maneuver,” designed to cultivate revolutionary sensibility

through education and cultural production, rather than seeking to capture the state apparatus

directly) and also, just as importantly, because Gramsci’s focus on heterogeneity within the

context of relatively late and incomplete development in Italy provides evidence of how a

theoretically driven project could work within the Marxian tradition while at the same time

avoiding the tendency to treat the English, French and German histories studied by Marx as a

paradigm to be played out in other latitudes at a later date and following some lag time.

Gramsci’s example provides space for attending to local and regional realities that cannot easily

be mapped onto a single historical trajectory modeled by development of Western European

countries, and it thus offers the promise of a thinking relation to history that would not be

governed entirely by the developmentalist teleology of the Hegelian tradition.

Since the late 1970s, in his own writings and in books coauthored with Chantal Mouffe,

Judith Butler and Slavoj Zizek, Ernesto Laclau has put forth a theoretically sophisticated account

of hegemony which follows Gramsci in distancing itself from classical Marxian economism and

determinism while emphasizing the political potentiality of heterogeneity in modern societies.

But whereas Gramsci made room within Marxist thought for a new appreciation of culture as

indispensable tool for anti-capitalist political struggle, Laclau enacts a step away from the

Marxian tradition through his rejection of economic determinism in any form. This move is

clearly motivated by practical as well as theoretical concerns: the influence of post-structuralist,

anti-foundationalist thought complements the need for theoretical accounts of the emergence
 8

of so-called “new social movements” since the 1960s. In light of new political struggles seeking

to secure rights for women, gays and ethnic minorities, together with the decline of traditional

class-based politics (especially the decline of labor movements since the 1970s), economy

comes to be seen as one sphere among many capable of giving rise to political demands.

Drawing principally from Saussurean linguistic theory and Lacanian psychoanalytic

theory, Laclau develops an account of hegemony as a process whereby a particular “demand”

(say, a strike organized by meat packers seeking improved working conditions under a

repressive regime) is taken up by other disaffected groups who see the strike as bearing some

significance for them. Formally speaking, the logic of hegemony is almost identical to Saussure’s

description of language [langue] as a system composed of differences. Whereas traditional

theories of language posit that meaning derives from the connection between signifier

(phoneme, word) and signified (mental image, idea), Saussure theorizes that signification

initially bypasses the signified and proceeds along channels between signifiers. The “value” or

sense of a given signifier is determined by its contiguity with—both likeness to and difference

from—other signifiers. The proper sense of the word “dread,” for example, is determined by its

proximity to words such as “worry,” “fear” and “anxiety.” If these latter words did not exist,

“dread” would be obliged to cover all of their meanings and would thus relinquish much of its

specificity. Formally speaking, signification happens through the metonymical sliding from

signifier to signifier. However, as both Lacan and Derrida will point out, a system could never be

constituted through endless deferral alone. Systems by definition require limits, which can

neither belong to the system nor be completely foreign to it. The need for a limit in Saussure’s

linguistic system is evidenced by the fact that as speaking beings we always think and act as if
 9

the relation between word and ideas or things were natural and absolute rather than

conventional and relational. For Lacan, the term that accounts for this gap between linguistic

systematicity and our self-perception as speaking beings is the point de capiton. Literally a

“quilting point” in a cushion, this term describes how language produces the effects of stable

meaning despite the fact that in language stability is nowhere to be found.1 The point de

capiton is the internal limit, an exception within language to the differential logic of

signification.

Hegemonic situations as understood by Laclau are constituted in an analogous way. In

the example of the striking meat packers, a hegemonic situation arises when the particular

demands presented in the strike begin to resonate with other groups who are at odds with the

regime for their own reasons (say, the regime’s hostility to intellectual freedom, its refusal to

extend civil rights to women, its violation of constitutional protections, its refusal to safeguard

the privileges of the old elite, etc.). On the basis of their shared opposition these discrete

groups come to see their demands as analogous with one another; the demands are thus

perceived as forming a “chain” in which particular interests and claims are synonyms for the

same thing: a unified front against tyranny which in turn (at least potentially) translates

revolution and freedom. Laclau terms this process the creation of equivalencies. In the

meantime, one such particular (a group or individual) tends to find itself in the central position

of embodying the hopes and aspirations of all. In the context of the French revolution, as we

have already seen, this universalization of a particular is illustrated by the capacity of the
1
In the Psychoses seminar (Seminar III) Lacan describes two versions of this “quilting” effect (Lacan 1993, 258-70).
One is the synchronic effect of metaphor, in which the signifier “crosses the bar” into the signified. The other is the
diachronic procedure whereby the meaning of a phrase or sentence is constituted retroactively; it is only when a
phrase or sentence is completed through punctuation that the meaning of the first word and the initial syntactical
components become clear.
 10

bourgeoisie to be the part that represents the whole, to carry out the wishes of other groups

disaffected with the Anciene Régime. Such universalization is necessarily contingent: there are

no essential criteria to be found within the constituted social order that could explain why the

bourgeoisie—rather than, say, the proletariat—should find itself at the center of the new

hegemonic situation; and likewise, there is no reason why some other group or figure could not

take its place at some other moment.

Laclau’s theory of hegemony gathers together all the important elements of Saussurean

linguistic theory. Included in this is the spectral presence of antagonism, which translates the

Lacanian and Derridean concerns about the system’s boundaries or limits. The boundary, as we

have seen, is the condition of possibility for the system constituting itself, but as limit it also

marks its impossibility. The boundary introduces a non-systematizable shadow or trace within

the system, one which the system can neither appropriate nor expel. For Laclau, the

constitutive limit of social organization is found in what Marx called antagonism. On one hand

antagonism is a sine qua non for the hegemonic conversion of social differences into

equivalencies. It is only when groups feel their specific way of life to be threatened—by the

tyranny of the absolutist monarch, by domination under aristocratic rule, etc.—that they

perceive the merely particular demands of others as synonymous with their own interests;

equivalence presupposes a common measure that remains unseen and unspoken. Where

Marxian thought only allows for this kind of social malleability in the exceptional time of

revolution, for Laclau this residual indeterminacy constitutes the norm of modern social life.

How do we account for the difference?

One possible explanation can be found in Laclau’s elaboration of the Marxian principles

of contradiction and antagonism in light of Althusser’s development of the concept of

overdetermination (Althusser 1970).2 Following Althusser it is longer tenable to describe

antagonism as a conflict between classes based on predetermined, stable and mutually

exclusive interests. Overdetermination sheds light on the way in which class consciousness or

sensibility is informed by a multiplicity of social registers, not all of which are reducible to the

category of class. How does this affect our understanding of antagonism? Antagonism

necessarily involves an overlapping of the social relations of production on one hand (e.g., the

separation of labor and capital) and the ways in which social life in general (not just in the

workplace) is constituted at a given historical moment on the other hand. A conflict between

workers and capitalists can only become antagonistic in Laclau’s sense when one group (the

workers) experiences conflict over the conditions of production within the workplace as a

threat to its way of life outside of the workplace. For example, in the time of late capitalism,

sociality is profoundly influenced by the many ways in which we are encouraged to identify

ourselves as consumers in so many marketplaces. If, to continue the example, contingent

employment—divested of traditional rights, benefits and relative job security—has become

paradigmatic in the time of flexible accumulation, then the relations of production could be said

to threaten my social being as a consumer, since my ability to consume depends on my having

disposable income and being able to afford education, health care and so on. Antagonism thus

involves conflict between an inside (working conditions under flexible employment) and an

2
For a concise presentation of Laclau’s theory of antagonism see the eponymously titled essay of New Reflections
on the Revolution of our Time (London: Verso, 1990). For a clearer illustration of the role played by Althusser’s
thought in the development of Laclau’s thinking, see the early Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London:
New Left Books, 1977).
 12

outside (e.g., the equation of social membership with consumerism) with which the inside does

not share any necessary common measure. The logic is not unlike that of the threat discussed

above, in which the formation of a chain of equivalencies depends on the shadowy presence of

an external register (the tyrant, the absolute monarch) over against which each of the terms

defines itself using a common language of equivalency (emancipation, freedom).

The outside of hegemony (the threat or the interpellative force of consumerism) is thus

both constitutive of the inside and irreducible to its terms. It is the condition of possibility for

social subjectivity but it also marks a gap that prevents the social—either the individual form of

discrete actors or the collective form of hegemonic equivalencies—from becoming a complete,

closed system. The thought of the constitutive outside introduces an aporia at the heart of

social and political life, and for Laclau this illustrates why classical Marxian economism is

unsustainable: “economy has a constitutive ‘outside’ and…the abstract logic of capital, far from

dictating the laws of movement in every area of social development, is itself contingent, since it

depends on processes and transformations which escape its control” (Laclau 1990, 23).

Antagonism requires that equivalency be understood in a dialectical manner as the other side

of heterogeneity, in the sense that equivalency does not erase or negate social differences so

much as it allows them to find something of themselves in others within a given historical

conjuncture. At the same time, the emergence of relations of equivalency between differences

is also marked by an even more radical kind of heterogeneity: the singularity of the “radical

outside,” an “Other” whose presence is neither visible nor legible within the equivalential chain

but which nonetheless enables their relations with one another to be configured as

equivalency. There is no room within the chain of equivalency for the radical outside, and yet
 13

the chain itself can only take shape in juxtaposition to it, i.e., insofar as the particular links

perceive themselves and others as threatened with negation by it.

The deconstructive notion of a radical outside would seem to position Laclauian

hegemony theory against all forms of ethical, political and epistemological closure. No matter

how inclusive and open a hegemonic situation becomes, there will always be an other scene

that has not been subsumed within the identitarian logic of equivalency, a scene whose trace is

inscribed as unnamable within the common lexical system of the hegemonic situation.

Hegemony theory thus appears to be aware not only of its own contingency—in Laclau’s terms,

it would thus be non-ideological—but also of the fact that its language retains a debt it can

neither name nor liquidate.

In an essay entitled “Tesis acerca de la forma hegemónica de la política” (Labastida

1985) Laclau shows how hegemony theory sheds light on subtle but important shifts in the way

the political sphere is constituted in Argentina, beginning in the second half of the 19th century

and carrying through the late 1960s. Laclau has examined in other venues how the vicissitudes

of the Peronist movement during the period of Perón’s exile (1955-73) could be mapped onto a

theory of hegemony.3 The “Tesis” text is one of the few published work in which he attempts to

work out how hegemony theory could provide a broader understanding of post-Independence

Argentine history. Not surprisingly, he maintains that the crisis of Liberalism and the emergence

of popular political movements in the early 20th century constitute not just a change in regime

but a reconfiguration of the political as such. Regrettably, this important point is not fully

developed in the “Tesis” essay. Particularly surprising is the fact that Laclau’s brief discussion of

3
See in particular the collection of public lectures delivered in Santiago, Chile and published under the title
Hegemonía y antagonismo: el imposible fin de lo politico (Santiago: Cuarto Propio, 1997).
 14

the origins of the Peronist movement in the mid-1940s does not address whether or not the

emergence of this social movement could or should be understood in terms of the logic of

hegemony. Instead, Laclau limits himself to a remark on how the opposition sought to

disqualify Perón’s labor reforms by linking him and his political tactics to a chain of well-known

villains: Rosas, Hitler and Mussolini. So the opposition attempted—and failed, at least initially—

to counteract Perón by establishing a counter-hegemony. No problems so far. But was

Peronism in its inaugural moments the product of a hegemonic operation or was it something

else? Laclau does not pose this question. Perón’s tendency to fashion himself as the “older

brother” (more than the “father”) of the Argentine labor movement could no doubt be likened

to what Laclau calls the universalization of the particular. But it is far from clear that the

emergence of a new social actor, as exemplified by the massive October 17, 1945 public

demonstration in support of Perón and his labor reforms, could provide evidence of the

formation of equivalential relations among discrete groups and their particular demands.4

Another important point in Laclau’s discussion of Argentine social history is found in his

observation that Latin Americanist political thought and practice have frequently lapsed into a

paradigmatic mode of thinking in which a particular historical sequence drawn from the

European context is elevated to the status of a paradigm for world history (e.g., 1789 is

understood as an instance of “the bourgeois revolution” and posited as either the culmination

of world history or as a necessary stage between feudalism and socialism). Latin American

historical processes are then interpreted as proceeding in a parallel direction in principle

4
I propose that a more compelling account of this event can be found in Jacques Rancière’s notion of politics as a
rupture within the prevailing “distribution of the sensible” occasioned by the emergence of the “part that has no
part.”
 15

(Mexico experiences its “bourgeois revolution” relatively late, in 1910), while any elements

from Latin American reality that do not map neatly onto the trajectory of European history are

categorized as deviations from the historical norm: as “regression,” “the return of barbarism,”

“uneven development,” etc. For Laclau, the understanding of differences as variations on a

paradigm has the effect of rendering hegemony inconceivable, since hegemony—like

Saussure’s signification—presupposes the constitutive role of contingency in political events.

Laclau finds an instance of what he calls paradigmatic thinking at work in 19th century

Liberalism, which with Sarmiento reduces the social in its entirety to the civilization/barbarism

opposition and thereby precludes difference from appearing as anything other than a falling

away from truth. Liberalism successfully establishes a social rationality or common sense in

which any difference (i.e., any social form or political project at odds with modernization driven

by the centralization of political power in Buenos Aires and the capitalist industrialization of

Argentina’s agro-export economy) is defined a priori as barbarism, i.e., as the absence of a

moral code, good judgment and so on. In such a discursive situation there can be no thought of

differences forming equivalencies vis-à-vis the facticity of antagonism, and thus hegemony itself

becomes unthinkable. He identifies a similar anti-hegemonic, paradigmatic operation in the

Liberal opposition to Peronism, whose supporters the opposition seeks to disqualify as

legitimate political actors by portraying their presence as a deviation from the proper course of

historical development, e.g., in the infamous description of Peronist delegates (uttered by a

member of the Radical Party) as an “aluvión zoológico.” Finally, Laclau also locates a

paradigmatic tendency in the armed guerrilla movements of the 1960s and 70s, especially

following the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana, in the wake of which these groups
 16

began, through an inversion of Eurocentric paradigms, to understand their own situations as

essentially the same as those faced by national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and the

Middle East. Paradigmatic reason blocks hegemonic reason insofar as it determines equivalency

by erasing the sociohistorical specificity of difference and heterogeneity. In Laclau words, it

“renders unthinkable the social qua heterogeneity [constituye un impensable de la sociedad y

de la política]” (Laclau 1985, 31). If we take seriously the Saussurean thread in Laclau’s thinking,

it is not just that paradigmatic thinking remains deaf to social difference as such; it actually

prevents social difference from taking shape. There is no social difference before relation, and it

is relationality itself that is foreclosed by Liberalism and other forms of paradigmatic thinking.

In the “Tesis” essay Laclau proposes a key distinction between two forms of hegemonic

politics, which he terms transformismo and ruptura popular. Transformismo refers to the

centrist political strategy of using moderate reform to marginalize radical elements of the

political spectrum and to secure the positions of traditional elites. Transformismo entails

recognition of unsatisfied demands on an individual basis, so that they cannot come together

and form the equivalential grouping of a counter-hegemonic politics. It is perfected as a

strategy by leaders such as Disraeli, Bismarck and Giolitti. Ruptura popular, meanwhile, refers

to a situation in which popular demands are not addressed sufficiently by the status quo, and

thus an opposition takes shape based on equivalency between unsatisfied demands. This new

chain acts in the name of “the People.” Transformismo and ruptura popular name two versions

of hegemony, one of which serves to strengthen the existing social, political and economic

system while the other threatens to break with it and give rise to an alternative order. This

distinction represents an important—albeit frequently overlooked—step in any attempt to

understand the somewhat perplexing fact that, despite Laclau’s insistence that hegemony

constitutes the core of modern political thought, hegemony theory is unable to provide any

meaningful distinction between “Left” and “Right” politics. Hegemony, as we have just seen, is

equally capable of manifesting itself in conservative programs as in progressive or socialist

projects.

As suggested at the outset, Laclau’s theoretical development of hegemony presents

itself as leaving space for heterogeneity in comparison with other accounts of social

organization.5 While this may be true of the popular/ruptural form described by Laclau in the

“Tesis” essay, it is decidedly less so in the case of transformative/stabilizing hegemonic

operations, where articulation serves to absorb social differences and to neutralize their ability

to form counter-hegemonic equivalential articulations. One difficulty with this conceptual

distinction, however, is that it presupposes that we can readily distinguish between popular

rupture and conservative transformation, whereas Latin American history would seem to

indicate that the distinction is frequently anything but clear cut. Consider, for instance, the

inaugural scenes of the Peronist movement in October 1945. On one hand, there is the

occupation of the Plaza de Mayo by striking workers, heretofore regarded as second class

citizens and whose presence in the civic center of the nation was portrayed by the Liberal order

as defiling the nation’s most hallowed ground. This is clearly a scene that evinces popular

rupture, even if the social differentiation of the participants turns out to be relatively minor.

But in the parallel to this scene, which occurs in the same plaza after nightfall, we see Perón

himself returning to center stage after his time in prison, telling the striking workers that they

5
Consider, for instance, Althusser’s conceptualization of interpellation, which leaves room only for assimilation
within the existing order and which offers no account of its own limits, internal or external.
 18

have accomplished their primary objective—which he retrospectively interprets as the

liberation of Perón himself. He counsels them to suspend plans for further demonstrations and

to return to their homes, and from there to resume their regular work routines (“del trabajo a

casa y de casa al trabajo” is Perón’s eternal transformative motto). Whatever connection

Peronism as social movement bears with what Laclau calls popular rupture, nothing could

better illustrate the conservative impulses of transformismo than Perón’s speech of the night of

October 17th, 1945. This is not to say that the demands associated with the rally (the liberation

of Perón but also the restoration of the far-reaching reforms authored by the Secretary of

Labor) would be simply absorbed by the existing political order. Quite the contrary: General

Farrell’s government would soon dissolve and, against the expectations of the various anti-

Peronist elites, Perón would be elected President the following year. Transformismo takes

places here at another level: in dispelling an incipient threat to the prevailing order of capitalist

developmentalism, a threat which Perón’s discourse does everything in its power to bring back

under the sway of the state.

As Brett Levinson has shown (2004), the situation becomes even more complicated

when one looks at the possible correlations between hegemony theory and the neoliberal

restructuring of the social in terms of the market. The descriptive and normative selling point of

hegemony is that it provides a framework for thinking the common (equivalency) and

difference (heterogeneity) at the same time, and without subordinating one to the other. But

Laclau’s hegemony theory is also formally indistinguishable from the logic of the market, which

happens to be most effective when it works to make room for a nearly-unlimited diversity of

differences: different brands for different niches and individual tastes. This is not to say that
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hegemony and the market are always the same thing; as Levinson reminds us, we can also

envision a hegemonic politics that would oppose the unlimited opening of the social to global

market forces. But it is a reminder that there is nothing in hegemony theory that could establish

a secure and stable distinction between itself and the market, or between popular rupture and

conservative absorption.

Texts cited

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Aricó, José. La cola del diablo: Itinerario de Gramsci en América latina. 1988. Buenos Aires:
Puntosur.
Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. 1971. London:
Lawrence and Wishart.
Labastida, Julio, ed. Hegemonía y alternativas políticas en América latina. 1985. Mexico: Siglo
XXI.
Lacan, Jacques. Seminar III: The Psychoses. 1993. New York: Norton.
———. Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. 2007. New York: Norton.
Laclau, Ernesto. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. 1977. London: New Left Books.
———. “Tesis acerca de la forma hegemónica de la política.” 1985. In Julio Labastida, ed.,
Hegemonía y alternativas políticas en América latina. Mexico: Siglo XXI.
———. “New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time.” 1990. In New Reflections on the
Revolution of Our Time. London: Verso.
———. On Populist Reason. 2005. London: Verso.
Levinson, Brett. Market and Thought: Meditations on the Political and Biopolitical. 2004. New
York: Fordham University Press.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. 1978. In The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed.
New York: Norton.
Marx, Karl. “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed.
New York: Norton.
Moreiras, Alberto. Línea de sombra: El no sujeto de lo político. Santiago: Palinodia, 2006.