Thesis
Thesis
Thesis
PROEFSCHRIFT
door
ISBN-10: 90-9020697-3
ISBN-13: 978-90-9020697-4
A thesis like this is not the product of one person; it is a collaborative project.
For the efforts and support of many people I am immensely grateful.
The main part of this study was carried out during my work as associate-ex-
pert under the Dutch Directorate for International Collaboration (DGIS) – a
lifetime opportunity to do the work I had always dreamed of. The first pe-
riod (1996-98) was spent at ICLARM in the Philippines (now the World Fish
Centre in Malaysia) under the inspiring guidance of Robert Pomeroy whom
I admire very much for his work and want to thank for his ongoing support.
I felt privileged to be able to work in such international working environ-
ment and am very grateful for the support of ICLARM staff and colleagues of
whom I want to mention Chingkel, Chell, Jojo, Bing, Albert, Deng Palomares
and Marco Noordeloos.
The operational costs for the sasi study were borne by IDRC and partly by DA-
NIDA through the Fisheries Co-management Research Project. In Maluku, I
worked together with Irene Novaczek who is a dedicated and gifted research-
er and development worker, and with Ansye Sopacua and Marcus Tatuhey
to whom I am all very grateful. Many thanks also to Irene Sahertian, Tetha
Hitipeuw, Hermien Soselisa and others at Yayasan Hualopu and Pattimura
University. For their friendship, lodging, support and the fun times we had I
would like to thank Kiki Dethmers, Klaas Jan Teule, Hans van Oostenbrugge,
Manon Osseweijer and Arie Brouwer.
The second period (1998-2000) was spent at the Institute for Fisheries Man-
agement and Coastal Community Development (IFM) in Denmark where I
finished the research report and focused more on Africa again, initially with
Sten Sverdrup-Jensen and Jesper Raakjaer Nielsen and in a later phase Poul
Degnbol and Doug Wilson who were all very inspiring people to work with.
Other colleagues and friends at the North Sea Centre were Anne Katrine
Normann, Jan and Tatiana Sohn, Dorte Holmgaard, Kirsten Klitkou, Nina
Broen, Christian Olesen and Ulrik Jes Hansen whom I like to thank for their
support, assistance and company.
The actual writing of this thesis has been made possible by Gerard Persoon
who has not only arranged a table and chair for me at CML, but who has also
supervised and guided this ‘project’. I am very grateful for all his warm sup-
port. My gratitude also concerns my promotor Reimar Schefold. All my col-
leagues at CML have also played an important role and I like to thank them
for their interest and support: Hans Bauer, Ruth Norduyn, Marieke Hobbes,
Koen Overmars, Myrna Eindhoven, Marco Huygen, Tessa Minter, Jan van der
Ploeg, Merlijn van Weerd, Wouter de Groot, Barbara Slee, Hans de Iongh,
Paul Loth, Denyse Schnelder, Annelies Oskam, Roswitha Adelaar, Edith de
Roos, Louis Defo and Norbert Sonne and all the others who came and went
from the research stations in the Philippines and Cameroon and brought
with them a breeze from the field.
People outside CML who have been of great support are Carel Drijver, Maarten
Bavinck, and Peter van der Heijden. I would further like to thank Anky Frank
and Elke Heyer for helping me to clarify where my heart and ambitions lay
– which is in the work I do now…
Most important are my family and friends. I want to acknowledge the never-
ending love and support of all these people so dear to me. Dear family, Wille-
mijn, Roos, Carla, Marietta, Hetty, Brigitte, Madelon, Diny, Trienette, Saskia,
Manon, Natascha, Janni, Maryze, Hans, Herman, Sylvia, Liz, Hugh, Astrid,
Maria, and Dick:
1 Theoretical framework 27
1.1 The road towards environmental anthropology 27
1.1.1 Environmental determinism versus cultural determinism 27
1.1.2 The ecosystem approach, human ecology and processual
human ecology 29
1.1.3 Ecological anthropology and environmental sciences
in the Netherlands 30
1.1.4 Environmental anthropology today 31
1.2 Other environmental approaches 32
1.2.1 The systems view 32
1.2.2 Adaptive management 33
1.2.3 Resilience thinking 34
1.3 Common property theory 34
1.3.1 The tragedy of the commons 34
1.3.2 The study of common property resource management 35
2 Co-management 39
2.1 Co-management defined 39
2.2 The parties in co-management 40
2.3 Important issues in co-management 43
2.3.1 Property rights 44
2.3.2 Participation 45
2.3.3 Local knowledge 45
2.3.4 Conflict resolution 47
2.3.5 Compliance and enforcement 48
2.3.6 Transaction costs 49
2.4 Shortcomings of co-management 49
2.5 Co-management today 50
2.6 The role of the anthropologist 53
3 Methodology 55
3.1 The research framework 55
3.2 Study site selection 57
3.3 Research methods 57
3.4 Inventory 60
3.5 Performance 61
3.6 Institutional resilience 61
3.7 Fisheries management and legal framework 62
3.8 Decentralisation 63
3.9 Conditions for success of co-management 63
3.10 Measuring of project success 64
References 263
Summary 287
Samenvatting 299
Curriculum Vitae 313
MAP OF MALUKU 15
16
Glossary
Introduction
This PhD thesis is the result of my work during my position as associate ex-
pert for the Dutch Ministry of International Cooperation (DGIS) from 1996
to 2000 within the framework of the worldwide Fisheries Co-management
Project funded by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA).
The Centre of Environmental Science of Leiden University enabled me to
write and compile additional material to complete this thesis.
1 In Southeast Asia participating countries were: the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand,
Malaysia and Bangladesh. African partner countries were: Senegal, Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi,
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and South Africa. Similar research has also been carried out
in the Caribbean.
2 We worked in an inter-disciplinary team with as principal co-researcher Irene Novaczek (PhD
phycology and marine biology). Ansye Sopacua (BSc chemistry) was translator and carried out the
interviews on management structures. Marcus Tatuhey was responsible for data input and analy-
sis. The parts of the research projects presented in this dissertation are the ones where I was the
principal researcher (unless stated otherwise).
20 FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Worldwide, fish stocks are being over-exploited (FAO 2001; FAO 2003). The
productive and highly diverse coral reefs in Southeast Asia are in a critical
state (Amor 2002a; Amor 2002b). For many poor Asian communities aquat-
ic resources represent a crucial rural safety net that not only bolsters food
security, but also gives families a way to earn extra cash selling on the local
markets. In countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, close to 50% of
people’s animal protein intake comes from fish consumption. Degradation
of natural resources, reduced access to markets and lack of political power to
reverse these processes are a severe threat to people’s livelihoods. Increasing
competition and conflict over limited resources further stress fisheries man-
agement systems.
Clearly defined property rights are an important tool for fishers to exclude
others and to be able to enforce rules and regulations concerning the fish-
ery. Co-management therefore often includes the transfer of responsibility
over natural resources to local communities (Jentoft et al. 1998; Jentoft 2003;
Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004). Under pressure of large international organisa-
tions, supported by NGOs, and as a result of civil demands, central govern-
ments all over the world are now supporting decentralisation as a way to
INTRODUCTION 21
Sasi
Coastal villages in Central Maluku claim de facto rights of access and with-
drawal over fairly extensive areas of both land and sea through a set of rules
and regulations called sasi. Sasi is nested in adat which lays down the basic
ethics and codes of conduct and is an intrinsic part of the culture. Sasi of-
fers an important research opportunity because it is one of the few (if not
the only) long enduring local resource management systems in Asia (Zerner
1994a; von Benda-Beckmann et al.1995). While land sasi (sasi darat) controls
and manages agro-forestry, marine sasi (sasi laut) deals mostly with the fish-
ery, i.e. sedentary marine organisms and pelagic fishes found in the waters
close to shore. Sasi also applies to social behaviour. Fishery related rights and
rules usually apply to coastal waters facing a village, bay, coral reef ecosystem,
or other areas having easily recognized boundaries. However, while in some
villages of Maluku sasi was still functioning, in others it was growing weaker
or had disappeared entirely. The extent of sasi and how quickly, where and
why it weakened was not clear.
The government of Maluku realized that in some parts of the province, vil-
lage people were more likely to comply with traditional management systems
than with formal regulations. Sasi institutions as well as other traditional
local customs, however, were not reflected in national and provincial laws
and policies. Without acknowledgement by the government, fishing commu-
nities were not able to defend their institutional arrangements and hold off
the slow demise of their management systems. More recently, the situation
is changing as the government of Indonesia has decided to devolve manage-
ment authority over natural resources to lower levels. However, while govern-
ment policy makers know that local management exists, they lack information
on how well these systems perform. This research project went beyond the
descriptive studies that have already been carried out on sasi and undertook
a quantitative performance analysis. Information about the performance of
sasi potentially forms the basis for changes in policy to support, maintain and
develop local culturally appropriate and effective forms management.
As a village-level institution that has roots in the local culture, sasi is not
a co-management structure. However, research on sasi helps to understand
how traditional local systems change and adapt over time, providing insights
that are critical for the design of new systems as is provided under the new
decentralisation laws. The results can be of use to both the government of
Indonesia, the fishers and local resource users and other parties involved in
22 FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
the process. The results are also useful to a worldwide audience interested in
the design and implementation of local (co-)management systems.
This study covers the institution and changes until 1998 when a civil strife
broke out that has highly impacted Central Maluku and, unavoidably, also
the sasi institution. The period 1998-2004 was one of major clashes between
Muslim and Christian populations, and the destruction of mosques, church-
es and whole villages throughout the islands. Ambon Island became divided
into a Christian and Muslim part and thousands of people fled to refugee
camps. In the end, over 5000 people lost their lives. The role of police and
army has been unclear and questionable at the least. The cause of the conflict
is unclear and various explanations are given, including ignition by outside
Muslim extremist groups, e.g. Laskar Jihad, while local gangs and groups
allegedly further fuelled the violent outbreaks. Aside from some scattered in-
formation (see also Chapter 10) the long-term effects on the social structure
and culture in Central Maluku, including sasi, are not clear. Information on
the legal framework and changes in the context of decentralisation are up to
date until January 2005.
Decentralisation
decentralisation presents the highest hope for establishing the conditions for
sustainable resource use and a more equitable and efficient social political
system. When assessing the current results of the decentralisation process,
it is also important to change the point of view and compare the situation
the past so that the important changes that have been made are done justice,
especially in a country like Indonesia that is undergoing a major transforma-
tion from an authoritarian centralised state to a more democratic regime.
Over the past 15 years, a growing number of projects and coastal manage-
ment initiatives has been documented and assessed in terms of success. In
1999, the first 5-year phase of the international Fisheries Co-management
Research Project came to an end and all the sites in Southeast Asia that were
part of the project were evaluated in order to identify the principles and con-
ditions that facilitate fisheries co-management at the household, community
and supra-community level, i.e. government, including the legal framework
and administrative structures.
Within Southeast Asia, the government of the Philippines has been a leader
in decentralising management of natural resources to the local level. Be-
tween 1984 and 1994 more than a hundred community-based resource man-
agement (CBRM) projects were undertaken. The time, funds, and collective
effort put into these projects accumulated a wealth of valuable knowledge.
However, the results in some ways were disappointing: less than 20% of the
projects were evaluated as being successful (Pomeroy and Carlos 1997). In-
terestingly, the project participants themselves did not perceive these projects
as failures at all (Pomeroy et al. 1996). Apparently, there was a discrepancy
in the perception of success between the project implementers and the re-
cipients.
This thesis�
This thesis consists of several published articles and book chapters that have
been edited into ‘new’ chapters. The overlap in information from the differ-
ent articles has been edited out as much as possible, yet, some chapters will
contain similar information for which I apologise. Some chapters are parts of
the research report I wrote with Irene Novaczek, Ansye Sopacua and Marcus
Tatuhey3. While they have done most work on the legal and political context
that are part of Chapter 8, I like to take credit for the overall project design,
the case-studies (Chapter 5) and study on institutional resilience (Chapter
7). Chapters 4 and 6 were a collaborative effort. Chapter 11 on conditions for
success was written with other ICLARM staff working in the various sites in
Southeast Asia and where I contributed information and insights from Indo-
nesia. All the other chapters spring entirely from my own brain.
3 Novaczek, I., I.H.T. Harkes, J. Sopacua, M.M.D. Tatuhey (2001). An institutional Analysis of
Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia. Technical Report 59. ICLARM, Manila.
27
1 Theoretical Framework
As both terrestrial and marine ecosystems are under severe pressure from
human use, climate change and other external impacts, the need for the prac-
tical application of science becomes more eminent. Scientists from various
disciplines have organised themselves to look into management of common
resources. Common property research is an outcome of this movement.
Multi-disciplinary and international research projects have been devised in
a search for solutions and better management approaches. The theory of
environmental anthropology helps us to understand the role of humans in
their environment and the impact they have on the ecosystem. This chapter
gives a chronologic overview of the theoretical schools in anthropology and
in environmental sciences to show the developments of both disciplines over
time and how they came together in environmental anthropology. It further
presents new schools of thought like Common Property Research that are
important in studying and analysing issues in resource management and
fisheries in particular. It is these (more applied) research lines that form the
context of the sasi study central in this thesis. In line with this pragmatic
approach, the chapter ends with the potential role of the anthropologist in
modern fisheries management approaches.
As a reaction, in the 1960s and 1970s new schools of thought were formed
based on cultural determinism, i.e. the idea that culture influences the en-
vironment. One of those schools, ethno-ecology, describes the conceptual
models that people have of their environment.1 It distinguished, for example,
‘folk nature’ or the perceptions that people have on nature, from ‘real na-
ture’ on which these perceptions are based. The approach used classifications
and shared its methods and underlying premises with cognitive anthropol-
ogy.2. In the end, however, neither environmental nor cultural determinism
1 The prefix ‘ethno’ was used to denote the field of knowledge defined from the viewpoint of the
people being studied (Fowler 1977). ‘Ethno’ was already used in the 19th century in ethno-botany
which focused on how and why people used and conceptualised herbs, plants and trees. It is still
an important approach in medicinal research.
2 The focus on classification and the extraction of knowledge in cognitive anthropology lead to
the development of structured methods of research still in use today such as interviews, direct
observation and participation.
THE ROAD TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY 29
3 Human-environment relationships can be defined as the interplay between people and their
environment, including the elements and arrangements by which humans use the environment
and the limitations that the environment puts on human behaviour. Culture plays a prominent
role in human-environment relations (Milton 1996, 6).
4 Functionalism originally attempted to explain social institutions as collective means to fill indi-
vidual biological needs; later it came to focus on the ways social institutions fill social needs, es-
pecially solidarity. Functionalists argue that social institutions are functionally integrated to form
a stable system, and a change in one institution will precipitate a change in other institutions
(http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/).
5 Within neo-functionalism the social organisation and culture of specific populations are seen as
functional adaptations which permit the population to exploit their natural environment success-
fully without exceeding the carrying capacity through negative feedback (Orlove 1980; Bettinger
1996 in McGrath 2003).
6 If adaptive strategies are seen as the outcome of decision-making or repeated allocation of scarce
resources to a hierarchy of goals under conditions of constraint, then it is necessary to examine the
pattern of resource distribution and the source of goals and constraints. This is the contribution of
recent work in Marxism (Orlove 1980).
30 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A major influence in the 1970s were the actor-based models which shifted
the focus from cultures towards the study of social processes and individual
incentive structures for certain (environmental) behaviour (Orlove 1980).
The actor-based models were elaborated by Vayda who developed the meth-
odology of progressive contextualisation (Vayda 1983, 1996).7 In the 1980s
Dutch environmental science searched for an approach to study environ-
mental problems without having to describe entire people-environment sys-
tems. Vayda’s approach formed the inspiration and therewith the basis of the
Action-in-Context approach which describes the role the different actors in-
volved in a problematic environmental action and their influence in the deci-
sion-making process at different levels. This model was developed further by
De Groot (1992, 1998) into the Problem-in-Context approach – a normative,
solution oriented approach to environmental problems.8 This approach has
been applied to study the social dynamics and driving forces of deforestation
in the Philippines (Van den Top 1998) and in Brazil, Ecuador and Cameroon
(Cleuren 2001).
7 Progressive contextualisation works its way from a defined (problematic) action outward to the
actors and factors that explain that specific action.
8 The Problem-in-Context approach contains a so called ‘actors field’ which presents the interac-
tions between actors at different levels (horizontal and vertical linkages). Options and motivations
of actors are influenced by contextual factors but also by other actors, usually at a higher level i.e.
in a more powerful position. The social chain in the model describes the institutional setting, the
social arrangements and the dependencies.
THE ROAD TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31
The distinction between people’s actions and what they hold in their minds,
made ‘choice’ available for investigation. It allows us to look at the incentives
that people have for certain behaviour and the choices they make about their
environment and the use of it (Milton 1996). Attention on the rationale be-
hind these choices, i.e. the options and motivations of people, is growing as
they appear essential in adaptation of behaviour, for example, in the setting
up of a management system and the institutions that support this over a
longer period of time. In the Fisheries Co-management Research Project the
study of the ‘patterns of interaction’ was essential to understand local initia-
tives towards resource management, i.e. the creation of organisations, rules
and regulation. Also studied were the outcomes in terms of sustainability,
equity and efficiency. Insight into these components and the incentives that
people have can provide a key in resource management as it identifies the
level on which adaptations can be made to stimulate people to change their
behaviour towards a more sustainable approach in resource use.
32 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The vital role of the life-support functions for economic development and
sustainability has caused a shift from ecology to economics and is theoretical-
ly as well as empirically analysed through ecological economics (Odum 1975).
The shift has, in part, given rise to the terminology of natural capital and
human-made capital. In contrast to the assumptions of standard economic
theory, ecological economists regard human-made capital and natural capital
as fundamentally complementary. Natural capital consists of non-renewable
resources such as oil and minerals, renewable resources such as fish and
wood, and the quality of the atmosphere and climate. Human-made capital
on the other hand is capital generated via economic activity through human
ingenuity and technological change – the produced means of production.
Natural capital and its derived goods and services are the basis for economic
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACHES 33
Cultural capital refers to factors that provide human societies with the means
and adaptations to deal with the natural environment and to actively modify
it. It pays attention to how people view the world and the universe and in-
cludes cosmology, environmental philosophy and ethics (including religion),
traditional ecological knowledge, and social-political institutions. Cultural
capital, as used here, thus includes the wide variety of ways in which socie-
ties interact with their environment (Berkes and Folke 1998). From a systems
perspective, it is emphasized that the three types of capital are strongly inter-
related and form the basis for guiding society towards sustainability (Gunder-
son et al. 1995).9
9 There are a number of other approaches, such as ecosystem management (Schramm and Hu-
bert 1996 in Jentoft et al. 1998, 423) and participatory environmental research (Berkes 2001), but
these are not further discussed here.
34 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Currently, one of the most prominent approaches in dealing with natural re-
sources management is common property theory or commons research. Because
this approach is important as it forms the context of this thesis, it is dealt with
in more detail.
10 The Resilience Alliance is a multidisciplinary research group that explores the dynamics of
complex social-ecological systems in order to discover foundations for sustainability (www.resal-
liance.org/).
COMMON PROPERTY THEORY 35
By the mid-1980s, more and more questions were being raised about Har-
din’s model and the number of scientists from various fields and countries
examining common-pool resources increased. Yet, the issues were not dis-
cussed widely across scientific disciplines because each tended to use its own
language and theory and there was little exchange between scholars from
various regions of the world. In 1983, the Panel on the Study of Common
Property Resource Management recognised the need for a common research
framework, which was designed by Oakerson (1986) and developed over the
following years.13 The Institutional Analysis Framework (IAF) used in the
Fisheries Co-management Research Project was derived from this model
(see Chapter 3).
The members of the panel also identified needs in research and lessons
learned that still provide guidance in studying common property regimes
(Dietz et al. 2002):
13 In 1990, the International Association for the Study of Common Property was established
(IASCP). At their bi-annual meetings, scientists from over 50 countries exchange their findings
(Dietz et al. 2002, 8).
THE ROAD TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY 37
Currently, common property theory and ‘the commons’ are at the centre
of the international research agenda on the human dimensions of global
change. It is an important theme in studies on international cooperation,
environmental decision-making, and the design of resource management in-
stitutions in order to achieve global sustainable development (Ostrom 1999;
NRC 2002). Commons research is at a point of rapid growth in work intend-
ing to understand the dynamics of common-pool resources and the institu-
tions that manage (and mismanage) them (Dietz et al. 2002). This is even of
more relevance in the light of ongoing decentralisation processes where de-
cision-making power is being transferred to the local level (see Chapter 10).
New kinds of commons are being analysed and new methodological tools
and theoretical perspectives developed. This thesis aims to contribute to this
field through the study of sasi and insights that have been derived from my
experience in fisheries research.
39
2 Co-management
Over the years, the concept of co-management has been used for a wide va-
riety of arrangements in various contexts. In its broadest sense, co-manage-
40 CO - MANAGEMENT
According to the definition, the two main parties in co-management are the
local community and the government (or government institution). In real-
ity, however, the process is often supported by NGOs or external agents and
can involve scientists, the private sector, and other stakeholders.1 Naturally,
the more parties become involved, the more difficult it is to establish a func-
tional management institution without alienating certain groups (Jentoft et
al. 1998).
Even where only two parties are involved, the process is complex as both the
community and the government are not one-dimensional and homogeneous.
Many scholars have contested the notion of a community as a homogenous
and static entity (Pannell 1997; Brosius et al. 1998; Van Est 1999; Leach et al.
1999; Ellen 2003; Persoon and van Est 2003; Wilson 2003a). There are often
divisions and power issues in a community based on gender, ethnicity, age or
social class. Also in a region, the group of resource users is often heterogene-
ous and composed of indigenous people as well as migrant resource users.
Such a complex group cannot be approached as one single community or as
one partner in co-management (Osseweijer 2001).
1 Large international organisations and donors such as the World Bank, USAID and the Asian
Development Bank are important as they are playing a key-role in the move towards decentralisa-
tion (Persoon and van Est 2003). Also private organisations, the tourist industry, scientists and
researchers have a potentially important role in co-management. For the sake of simplicity, they
are not further discussed here.
THE PARTIES IN CO - MANAGEMENT 41
Local community members that live in the same place share their history and
culture and have social bonds such as kinship. As a consequence, important
cultural integrative aspects such as reciprocity, interdependence, commit-
ment and continuity are stronger in communities of place (Jentoft et al. 1998;
Osseweijer 2001). These integrative aspects are not only important incentives
in fisheries management and compliance on the longer term, they also cre-
ate the mechanisms that enhance social stability and institutional resilience
(see Chapter 7). It is thus important to identify the type of community when
establishing a co-management system.
It is also important to identify the locus and scale of a community in rela-
tion to the resources to be managed. Sedentary species or marine reserves
can be regulated locally, but for resources that cover more than one village
territory a local community may not be the appropriate structure. To manage
pelagic fish, for example, it is more appropriate to set up a management sys-
tem at supra-local level through functional community where access is access
is regulated by means of Individual Transferable Quota (ITQs).
2 A third community type identified in international environmental politics and that of growing
importance in co-management are so called ‘epistemic communities’. These are communities that
centre on specific management issues or management bodies and can be made up of industry
members, lobbyists, bureaucrats, journalists and scientists.
3 In addition to providing enabling legislation, the government may provide assistance and serv-
ices (administrative, technical and financial) to support the sustainability of the local organisations
and institutional arrangements (Pomeroy 2003).
42 CO - MANAGEMENT
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Many cases show inadequate transfer of powers or
a lack of government support (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Wilson et al. 2003).
Sometimes it is sheer greed that keeps higher government levels from giving
up control, but often it is also the inadequacy of the organisational structures
of government departments to cope with the new management concepts and
approach. Besides, government institutions are often ridden with internal
conflicts, vested interests and, in some cases, corruption. At the same time,
the central government is under pressure from lobbyists and multi-nationals
to balance sustainable resource use and economic development. This can
lead to a situation where the government uses co-management as an instru-
ment to reach its own management objectives more efficiently (Hara and
Raakjær Nielsen 2003; Ahmed et al. 2004; Raakjær Nielsen et al. 2004, 6).
Instead of being part of a collaborative process, fishing communities are only
allowed to be involved in the implementation process. As a result, in some
places, local communities felt used and have developed a suspicious attitude
towards the state.
4
For details on the process of co-management see Pomeroy (1998).
IMPORTANT ISSUES IN CO - MANAGEMENT 43
The government can further increase legitimacy of the new structures and
downward accountability5 through: 1) overseeing local arrangements and
dealing with abuse of local authority, 2) conflict management, 3) by back-
stopping local monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and 4) by apply-
ing regulatory standards (Pinkerton 2003; Pomeroy 2003). The government
may also act to address issues and problems beyond the scope of local ar-
rangements and can act as a gatekeeper in case the co-management partners
do not carry out their responsibilities (Pomeroy 2003). Finally, the way the
government may serve a coordinating role is by setting up an appeal mecha-
nism, forum or other formal administrative structure for the various parties
to interact. These mechanisms stimulate accountability and thus serve as a
counterbalance for the relatively powerful role of the government (Jentoft et
al. 1998; Agrawal and Ribot 1999).
5 Legitimacy and downward accountability are the two main pillars of decentralised systems
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 2004).
44 CO - MANAGEMENT
The metaphor of the ‘free rider’ refers to a person who enjoys the benefits
from the contributions provided by others without paying the costs. By stress-
ing the self-interest of people this metaphor reflects a negative view on user
involvement, but what it merely describes is human behaviour as a response
to a particular institutional context, such as an open-access regime. An open-
access regime can have certain advantages; it is in principal more equitable
and less divisive than other systems. But in general, open-access makes it
more difficult to enforce cooperation and agreed upon rules because of the
free rider problem and it thus contributes to competition and over-exploita-
tion (Jentoft et al. 1998). For this reason, to manage common-pool resources,
private property has been promoted.
6 A common pool resource is a valued natural or human-made resource that is available to more
than one person and subject to degradation as a result of overuse.
7 Renewability refers to the rate at which resource units that are extracted, replace themselves
over time.
IMPORTANT ISSUES IN CO - MANAGEMENT 45
2.3.2 Participation
Participation of all stakeholders is often mentioned as vital in the formula-
tion and successful implementation of decisions concerning environmental
resources (Uphoff 1984; Costanza 1998; Jentoft 2003; Berkes 2003). Effec-
tive management requires participatory decision-making processes that are
legitimate, accountable, and inclusive in the sense that they take into account
multiple stakeholders and interests (Agrawal and Gibson 2001). Participation
thus is the key word,8 but in reality, meaningful participation in management
processes proves more difficult than at first sight. Often there is no authentic
participation, i.e. true power sharing in the sense that there is local input
in allocation decisions and authority over commercially interesting products
(Pinkerton 1989; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Hildebrand 1997 in Jentoft 2003;
Pinkerton 2003). Where powerful players are involved, the voices of local
stakeholders are often not heard (Berkes 2003).
8 For a wider definition of participation, including the dimensions and types of participation, I
would like to refer to Uphoff 1984; Drijver 1991; Pretty 1994; and Harkes 1995.
46 CO - MANAGEMENT
These cultural and social qualities of human societies are assets or ‘social
capital’ (Jentoft et al. 1998). Incorporation of this social capital into fisheries
management is thought important in reversing negative social and environ-
mental impacts and in building more socially and environmentally stable
systems that are efficient and legitimate (McCay and Jentoft 1996; Milton
1996; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Ribot 2002; Raakjær Nielsen et al. 2004).
The use of local environmental knowledge however has to be dealt with criti-
cally and limitations need to be acknowledged. Some knowledge, for exam-
ple, is secret and therefore inaccessible to outsiders or certain groups in the
community. Also the fact that people’s view is based on a limited geographi-
cal locality can cause blind spots or worse. ‘Local ignorance’ can form a seri-
ous obstruction in negotiations or the establishment of a fisheries manage-
ment scheme.9 In many places people are simply in denial of environmental
problems and blame it on God or other externalities. This is also my personal
experience: ‘C’est a Dieu’ is repeatedly heard in north Cameroon when peo-
ple are asked why their fish catches are in decline (Harkes 1994).
One of the main current challenges expressed in the search for solutions to
environmental problems, is to combine or integrate local knowledge and so-
called ‘global knowledge’. Despite increasing willingness on the part of fish-
eries managers to make use of local knowledge found in the communities,
the integration of local ecological knowledge and research-based scientific
knowledge into a common basis for management decisions remains a diffi-
cult task (Hobart 1993; Raakjær Nielsen et al. 2004). In fisheries, there seems
to be a fundamental gap in the perception of the condition of the stocks be-
9 It also refers to ‘ignorance’ in relation to scientific knowledge for social and economic develop-
ment. Ignorance is not a simple antithesis of knowledge, writes Hobart (1993). It is a state which
people attribute to others and is laden with moral judgement. The relationship of developers and
those to-be-developed is constituted by the developers’ knowledge and categories. Knowledge of
people being developed is ignored or treated as a mere obstacle to development.
IMPORTANT ISSUES IN CO - MANAGEMENT 47
tween fishing communities, scientists, and fisheries agents. The data gener-
ated through conventional scientific methods are often quite distinct from
the knowledge local people bring in, and which is by default context specific
and qualitative in nature. To make use of this knowledge, it is often redefined
and extracted from its context (Agrawal 1995 and Warren et al. 1995 in Ellen
and Harris 2000). Ellen and Harris (2000) warn for this so-called ‘decontex-
tualisation’ of knowledge.10
Interestingly, conflict is not only a destructive, but can also be a creative force
for resource management (Wilson 2003b). This is beautifully illustrated
through a comparative case study by Donda (2001) in Malawi. At Lake Chiuta
10 Decontextualisation refers to the separation of knowledge from its human agents and from the
situations in which it is produced, reproduced, transformed and presumably at its most effective
(Ellen and Harris 2000). See also Hobart (1993).
48 CO - MANAGEMENT
11 Norms create social pressure. Moral is established in interaction with others, but differs from
norms by representing individual values based on personal reflections (Giddens 1984).
SHORTCOMINGS OF CO - MANAGEMENT 49
The reduction of transaction costs is one of the main arguments for adopt-
ing co-management. This is especially the case in countries with an exten-
sive coastline and vast resources, such as the Philippines and Indonesia.
Co-management can be cost-effective because fishers can provide a direct
source of relevant information on fishing patterns, the state of the resource
and fish catches (Hanna 1995). The operational costs (the costs for undertak-
ing the fishing activities) can be reduced through more equal access and a
fair division of benefits. Through its participatory process co-management
is also expected to increase legitimacy and rule compliance, which, in turn,
further reduce enforcement costs. Enforcement costs can be further reduced
when violations of rules can be handled effectively at local level (Jentoft et al.
1998).
The study of Osseweijer (2001) on marine resource use on the Aru Islands
(Indonesia) is a clear illustration of the vague application of co-management
that is often seen today. In Aru, WWF decided on the establishment of a
marine reserve. The process involved sensitization and awareness raising by
a local NGO in order to stimulate a feeling of ownership and rule compli-
ance. Hence the project was labelled ‘co-management’. The local population,
however, was not convinced of the need of a marine reserve at all and as the
establishment of the marine reserve was merely imposed on people rather
than the outcome of a negotiation process, it created resistance. This typical
example of fitting an existing WWF project into a ‘co-management jacket’ has
not only distorted the concept of co-management in the region, but whilst
this approach may have been possible during the centralistic Suharto years,
it has most probably ruled out any support for ‘proper’ co-management13 in
the future.
12 In his thesis, Donda (2001) compares two different processes of the establishment of co-man-
agement. The first, in Lake Chiuta was initiated by the local fishers. The second, in Lake Malombe
was government driven and subsequently has a distinct process and outcomes from the former
case.
13 ‘Proper’ as only now, after the reformasi, the necessary foundation is in place to actually sup-
port local resource management (see chapter 10).
14 Globalisation can be understood in various ways, but is characterised by the spread and ex-
change of ideas, practices and technologies on a world-wide scale (Milton 1996).
15 Rights of indigenous peoples and the preservation of biodiversity on a global scale through in-
ternational conventions are issues that are important, but that fall outside the scope of this thesis,
which focuses on fisheries.
CO - MANAGEMENT TODAY 51
munities, who can become marginalized in the process (Berkes 2003; Jentoft
2004). Also in coastal fisheries, local communities can encounter a loss of
control and authority as the scale increases. Industrialised high-tech fisher-
ies require substantial financial and organisational resources and long-term
access to fisheries. As local communities rarely have the means or power to
counter these powerful distant stakeholders, they are likely to become disem-
powered (Raakjær Nielsen et al. 2004).
Uncertainty refers to social and natural systems that are highly dynamic and
with limited predictability. The challenge in fisheries management is to make
decisions in relation to this uncertainty (Wilson 2002). Over the years, the
problems have become progressively more complex and difficult to manage.
Over-fishing, ocean disposal and spills, the destruction of coastal ecosystems,
land-based contamination and climate change affect marine ecosystems and
conventional management approaches based on predictability have become
increasingly unworkable (Costanza 1998). One solution to deal with uncer-
tainty is sought in adaptive fisheries management which is ‘based on institu-
tional structures which can evaluate outcomes, develop new understandings
of the situation, and take corrective action both in terms of management
measures and the institutional framework for management decisions’ (Deg-
nbol and Raakjær Nielsen 2002). Learning from past experiences and modi-
fication for future action is an important process to be included in co-man-
agement.
52 CO - MANAGEMENT
The ‘nested systems’ mentioned earlier refers to the fact that institutions thus
work at different levels of society and institutions exist within institutions
(Ostrom 1990).16 Aside from vertical linkages, multiple horizontal linkages
may exist with other institutions (Pinkerton 2003). Horizontal collaboration
is called institutional interplay. Fisheries management can also be regarded
as a nested system of institutions. Local management institutions, for exam-
ple, are often nested within larger political institutions such as associations
which deal with resource management issues at a higher level, for example,
a watershed. These associations in turn may be represented at the level of the
province or state. Decisions at one level are ‘passed up’ to the next through
representative structures (Degnbol et al. 2003). Local level decisions are in-
fluenced by higher-level rules and regulations and vice-versa, and the suc-
cessful exercise of rights on one level thus depends strongly on the exercise
of rights of the other.
16 Nested systems: management institutions exist within a hierarchical structure in which deci-
sions are made at the lowest possible appropriate scale (subsidiarity principle).
17 I will not go deeper into definitions of democracy, but in this context it refers to election proce-
dures for representatives. Undemocratic representation, i.e. by appointment, can be highly legiti-
mate as is the case in Indonesia (see Chapter 5).
THE ROLE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGIST 53
18 This is, as mentioned before, to a certain extent due to the preference for other scientific input
(e.g. biological and economic) in management of natural resources and environmental issues. It
can, however, also be attributed to anthropologists themselves who have historically focused on
in-depth case studies without being able or willing to extend their focus beyond the local situation
under study. Results were not extrapolated to other sites or wider debates, partly because of the
ethical codes that kept anthropologist from sharing, sometimes sensitive, information (see also
Persoon and Hobbes 2003).
55
3 Methodology
Biological, physical,
technological
attributes
Fisher
Community Market
Level (Supply-demand)
Exogenous attributes
attributes Incentives to Patterns of
macroeconomics, Attributes of fishers coordinate, interactions
political, social and stakeholders cooperate among OUTCOMES
natural community and resource
contribute users
Fisher or com-
munity institutional
and organizational
arrangements
The degree and type of interactions among resource users and managers
both at local and higher levels determines where an institution lies along the
continuum of potential co-management arrangements (Fig. 3.2 adapted from
McCay 1993 and Berkes 1994).
Co-management
Goverment-based
management
Community-based
management
Centralized government
control
Informing
Consultation
Cooperation
Information exchange
Advisory role
Joint action
Partnership
Community control
Community self-governance
and self-management
Research was focused primarily on the islands of Ambon, Seram and the
Lease Islands of Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut (Figure 1). To determine
the extent and activity of sasi, every village on the three Lease Islands was in-
cluded in the inventory. On Ambon Island, which has a total of 61 villages, we
left out the 23 suburbs of Ambon city where the sasi institution has virtually
disappeared. Of the 38 remaining coastal villages on the island, 50% were
included in the inventory. On the large island of Seram, which has 136 rural
coastal villages, we surveyed only those seven that are within easy reach of
Ambon (5% of the total).
In 6 case study villages (two with a strong sasi institution, two where it was
lost, and two that were in the process of revitalization) a comparative insti-
tutional analysis was carried out. We studied how local institutional arrange-
ments interacting with the contextual variables, affect the actions of the re-
source users since these shape the incentives to comply to, adapt and enforce
local management rules (ICLARM/IFM 1996). In each village, data were
gathered on contextual variables, structure and function of institutional ar-
rangements and management outcomes. In surrounding marine territories
marine surveys were carried out.
Table 3.1 – Informants interviewed in the three phases of the sasi study
Sasi can be characterized as church sasi or adat sasi according to the dom-
inant power in the institution (Imron Masyhuri 1995). Respondents were
asked whether they considered their sasi to be adat sasi, church sasi or some
other form of sasi, also to reveal the authority figures i.e. traditional (adat)
leaders, the minister (church), Muslim religious leaders or others (e.g. com-
RESEARCH METHODS 59
mercial harvesters). The role of the village government, and especially the
village head, was also documented.
The resilience study is based on information from both the inventory and the
comparative analysis of case studies with reference also to the contextual at-
tributes (political, economic and socio-cultural). Key informant interviews cov-
ered questions on the objective of sasi, the rules and regulations, the role of the
village government and traditional authorities, leadership, boundaries, compli-
ance and enforcement, and external factors having an impact on management
institutions (based on Lubis 1992; Ruddle 1993; von Benda-Beckmann et al.
1995; ICLARM/IFM 1996). The data from the inventory shows the process
of decline; the additional information was used to explain the mechanism
behind this process.
3.4 Inventory
The activity of marine sasi was quantified by combining the scores for indi-
cators e.g. presence of sasi fisheries rules, periodic closure of a marine sasi
area, existence of written rules and active enforcement of access restrictions.
Each indicator had a maximum score of 3. Scores reflected the relative degree
of activity i.e. the breadth of application of a closure or the functionality of
enforcers.
3.5 Performance
The values for each indicator are based on the perceptions of fishers using a
self-anchored ladder scale (Pomeroy et al. 1996). This standard tool provides
ordinal data, which allows statistical analysis. Fishers were asked to answer
questions using a picture of a ladder with ten rungs as a visual aid. Fish-
ers pointed to the rung that in their opinion represented past (15 years ago),
present and future (15 years ahead) conditions. The aim was to record fish-
ers’ perceptions of current conditions, change through time and degree of
optimism for the future. In addition, base-line data was gathered from each
respondent, including people’s economic status.
Aim of the study was to determine the reasons for loss or survival of sasi.
The similarities and differences among study sites were explored to reveal
the (social) mechanisms behind the process of decline of sasi and answer the
questions: What makes sasi strong or weak and why do some villages want
to revitalize it?
The resilience study is based on information from both the inventory and the
comparative analysis of case studies with reference also to the contextual at-
tributes (political, economic and socio-cultural). Interviews conducted for the in-
ventory of sasi included questions on whether sasi had ever been functional in the
village, when various functions had ceased and why. In addition, key informant
interviews in the case study villages (Table 3.3) covered questions on the objec-
tive of sasi, the rules and regulations, the role of the village government and tra-
ditional authorities, leadership, boundaries, compliance and enforcement, and
62 METHODOLOGY
The results of the inventory interviews were analyzed quantitatively. The re-
sults of the semi-structured interviews conducted in each case study village
were analyzed in a qualitative way and compared with the trends evident from
the inventory. The data from the inventory shows the process of decline; the ad-
ditional information was used to explain the mechanism behind this process.
The research area Central Maluku, includes two administrative districts: Ka-
bupaten Maluku Tengah and Kotamadya Ambon. Interviews with government
staff involved questions on fisheries management, control and enforcement
and the responsibilities of the various (government) institutions involved (Ta-
ble 3.4). They took place in 1997-98 at the district office in Ambon city and
Masohi on Seram, and at two sub-district offices on Haruku and Nusa Laut.
The perception of local level government staff was drawn from the interviews
of the general institutional analysis. Information regarding the perception
of people in coastal villages of central Maluku was drawn from interviews of
village government officials, traditional leaders and fishing families that were
conducted as part of the larger study on sasi (see Novaczek et al. 2001). In ad-
dition, published documents detailing law and policy were reviewed.
After the social upheaval and changes in government law as part of the de-
centralisation process, major revisions have been made in the legal frame-
work, including authority structures at the local and district level. An updated
version of the legal framework was derived from a literature survey. These
changes up to January 2005 are briefly presented in Chapter 9.
1 Detailed information on each of these aspects is described in the individual case studies (see
Chapter 5 and Novaczek et al. 2001).
CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS OF CO - MANAGEMENT 63
3.8 Decentralisation
Data for this chapter came from project partners working at the various (re-
search) sites of the Fisheries Co-management Research Project in the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Bangladesh. Over forty-
five individual research projects and activities were undertaken during the
life of the project. These research projects and activities include: reviews of
community-based and co-management projects, case study analyses, impact
evaluations, the testing of hypotheses on the benefits and outcomes of co-
management, analysis of legal and policy documents, and information ex-
changed at meetings and workshops (see Table 3.5).
Case study analysis: Bangladesh (Khan and Apu 1998; Thompson et al. 1998)
Thailand (Masae 1998)
Indonesia (Nikijuluw 1996b; Novaczek et al. 2001)
Vietnam (Pham and Phung 1999)
Philippines (Pomeroy and Pido 1995; Villavicencio and Bal-
ing 1995; Agbayani and Babol 1997; ICLARM et al. 1997;
Katon et al. 1997; Baticados and Agbayani 1998; Garces and
Done 1998; Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom and Tria 1999)
Hypothesis testing of advantages (Kuperan et al. 1996; Kuperan et al. 1997; Kuperan et al.
or benefits of co-management: 1998; Susilowati 1998; Murshed-e-Jahan 1999)
Government legal, institutional (Susilowati 1996; University of the Philippines 1996; Fellizar
and policy analysis: et al. 1997; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Torell 1998; Ehsanul
1999; La Vina 1999; Purwaka 1999)
Meetings and workshops: (Pomeroy 1994; Pomeroy and Williams 1994; IFM 1995; Foltz
et al. 1996; ICARM 1996; Pido 1996; Middendorp et al. 1999)
The study on the measurement of project success was based on a literature sur-
vey and closer analysis of project documents. Pomeroy et al. (1996) describe
over a hundred community-based resource management (CBRM) projects in
the Philippines that were carried out over a period of 10 years. A later study
by Pomeroy and Carlos (1997) evaluated the success of these projects, which
was not very high (less than 20%). A literature study on perceptions, a closer
analysis of what people in fact did find positive about the projects, and a study
on why these perceptions can be different, revealed some keys in explaining
the difference in views on project success. From this information and mak-
ing use of various participatory techniques (PRA), a method was developed to
measure people’s development as well as the project’s outcomes in different
points in time.
65
Many of these islands are very small and surrounded by productive coral
reefs. The productive base on the islands is limited by geomorphologic fac-
tors (steep slopes) and most settlements and farming activities are concen-
trated along the strip of relatively flat coastal land. The majority of families
living in the small Maluku coastal communities gain at least a portion of
their living from exploitation of marine resources such as reef fish, pelagic
fish, shellfish and sea cucumbers (Hualopu 1996). Fisheries resources are
exploited throughout the islands, but exploitation in some places is regulated
through sasi, a traditional local resource management system.
Villages organized under local government are believed to have formed in the
Neolithic approximately 4500 years ago (de Jonge and van Dijk 1995). From
this period archaeologists have determined that canoes, gardening tools and
simple stone axes were in use. Evidence of the building of a Baileo, the tra-
ditional community house, familiar in adat culture, dates back to the first
century A.D. (see also Cooley 1962). At this time there was already trade be-
tween central Maluku and China and other areas of Southeast Asia. The local
religion was animist (Holleman 1923).
The political structure of Central Maluku over the period of 1000-1500 A.D.
has been characterized as ‘patrician republican’ with an aristocratic ruling
class. The original inhabitants generally referred to as Alifuru lived in moun-
tain villages. Organized in tribal groups (uku) consisting of clans (lumah tau
or soa), the most important leaders were the chieftain or king (latu), the heads
of the uku, and the mauwin, a shaman mediating between the people, nature
and the world of ancestors and spirits (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).
Each village was occupied by a number of clans with a patrilineal descent sys-
tem. The village-based groups of clans related by geographical proximity or
kinship, were grouped together as soa under a leader called the kepala soa (see
also Holleman 1923). The soa were in turn organized into small kingdoms
(negeri lama) led by a great leader (tamaela umi haha).
In Maluku, the period between the 15th and 17th century was full of turmoil
and dramatic political, economic and religious change (von Benda-Beck-
mann et al. 1995). Around 1500 the traditional economy of Maluku was
based on subsistence agriculture and fishing. Sago was important both as
food and as a trade item. The clove trade in Maluku was mainly in hands of
the Hindu-Javanese Majapahit kingdom, but soon Maluku was to be the bat-
tlefield where foreign powers struggled for control over the region’s natural
resources, particularly spices (Knaap 1981).
At this time Muslim Arab traders arrived in northern Maluku. Their influ-
ence led to the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in the 15th century. Islamic
laws were incorporated into adat law and Arabic words were incorporated
SOCIO - POLITICAL HISTORY OF CENTRAL MALUKU 67
into local language. As the Majapahit hegemony declined, four powerful Is-
lamic kingdoms emerged in north Maluku. Islam moved south into central
Maluku, in particular to Hitu, a seaport on the north of Ambon Island. On
Ambon, a union of nine negeri (patasiwa) dominated the Leitimur peninsula,
while a union of five negeri (patalima) was established in the Leihitu section
of the island. On Haruku Island, Saparua and Nusa Laut powerful negeri also
emerged to dominate island life and establish kingdoms that competed with
one another.
In the course of the expansion of clove production from Ternate, via Hoamoal
on Seram to the central Maluku islands in the early 16th century, immigrant
groups, coming from the northern Maluku islands and Java settled along the
coast (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995), (see also Fig. 1). The 16th century saw
Portuguese traders entering Maluku and engaging in the political rivalries of
the native kingdoms. They built a fortress at Hitu on Ambon in 1515. In this
period Catholic missionaries made Ambon the centre of Catholic evangeli-
cal activity. The Portuguese were followed by the Dutch who dominated and
eventually defeated the Ambonese kingdoms.
By the 17th century the Dutch were firmly established as a trading power in Ma-
luku, with their Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) backed up by naval fleets.
After the Dutch defeated the Portuguese a period followed of warfare among
Dutch, British and the Maluku population, wherein the Dutch ultimately pre-
vailed. Yet, the ‘spice wars’ punctuated by local uprisings continued off and
on into the 20th century. With the defeat of the Portuguese, Roman Catholi-
cism disappeared and the settlements and villages in central Maluku eventu-
ally became either Islamic or Protestant (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995).
The Dutch colonial rule led to poverty and social disruption, and when in
1796 the British reappeared, complete lack of local support forced the Dutch
to give up their ruling power (Riedel 1886). The early 1800s was a period of
relative isolation for Maluku and inter-island contact was mostly via Buginese
and Makassar traders from Sulawesi and Java (Fox 1996). At this time the
Chinese also began to play a major role in local trade. However, in 1817 the
British were again defeated and the Dutch established their provincial capital
in Ambon.
The Dutch, with a degree of local support, attempted to retain control over
Maluku but this uprising was finally defeated by Indonesia’s military, after a
period of struggle that lasted up to 1952. In 1952, central Maluku was granted
official status as an autonomous administrative regency of Indonesia, and
in 1957 Maluku gained the status of a province with its own parliament. The
years 1955-65 were ones of political unrest at the national level that involved
a number of prominent Maluku politicians. It was also a period of rapid de-
velopment and poverty alleviation as the First Long Term Development Plan
covering 25 years, was implemented.
HISTORY OF SASI IN MALUKU 69
In some Maluku communities, control over the land and marine territory
(petuanan) and its resources is vested in a social institution with a code of con-
duct, rules and regulations known as sasi (Volker 1925, Ellen 1978, Kriekhoff
1991). Sasi is not simply an institution designed to regulate resource use, it
also has a significant cultural role: ‘It is an encompassing body of meaning-
ful relations between people, the natural environment and gods, ancestors
and spirits’ (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 1995). Although the origins of sasi
70 DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH AREA
are lost in the mists of time, local legend speaks of sasi being in place in the
14th century and perhaps earlier (Topatimasang 1997). Others maintain that
sasi developed in the 16th century in response to the needs of clove traders
(Kissya 1994), but it was almost certainly based on older adat tradition that
aimed to protect and control exploitation of natural resources (von Benda-
Beckmann et al. 1995).
The ‘spice wars’ of the 1600-1900s had the effect of stimulating militancy as
well as mobility in Maluku people and fostered fierce attachment of the peo-
ple to their territories (Chauvel 1981). This could have been positive in terms
of reinforcing adat. On the other hand, however, the battles were ultimately
lost, many of the bravest killed, and the sovereignty of local leaders abolished.
In some cases wholesale slaughter (as happened in Banda) and forced remov-
als, alienated people from their territories. In general, adat culture is believed
to have reached its zenith in the mid-1600s and the pattern since then has
been one of decline, although with periods of resurgence (Cooley 1962).
During World War II, the period of occupation by the Japanese represented
an extreme threat to all adat institutions. Lack of appropriate ceremonial
HISTORY OF SASI IN MALUKU 71
cloth and other goods meant that adat rituals could not be performed accord-
ing to tradition, so that in this period many substitutions were made (Cooley
1962). Indonesian independence involved civil war in Maluku, a time when
many leaders were lost and clans scattered. Integration into the new nation
of Indonesia meant a further blow to local indigenous language and culture
because Indonesian Malay became the language of compulsory schooling.
Subsequent decades of civil strife and political turmoil at local and national
levels doubtless continued to challenge the strength of local culture. In more
recent decades, cultural change has intensified as economic development
proceeded. By the 1960s there was a confident prediction (Cooley 1962) that
sasi was doomed to disappear ‘in the very near future’. But although weak-
ened over time, sasi never disappeared.
The aim of sasi and its function in resource management and conservation
has been debated (Pannell 1997). Zerner (1994a) argues that, although there
may be spin-off benefits in terms of resource sustainability, sasi is essen-
tially an institution for managing social interactions and mediating tenure
disputes or maximizing economic returns, rather than a resource conserva-
tion and management institution per se. On the other hand, sasi clearly was
performing a conservation function in the 1920s when the use of poisons
in the fishery was banned under sasi rules (Volker 1925). In the 1990s, sasi
again underwent change, with a renewed emphasis on conservation aspects
(Zerner 1994a).
The application of sasi to marine resources may have never been as wide-
spread as sasi on land crops. Zerner and Thorburn (forthcoming) have specu-
lated that in its original form, marine sasi was applied only to pelagic fish,
with the objective of protecting migratory fish from disturbance so as to max-
imize harvests for local consumption. In the decades following the 1930s,
the emerging international markets for top shell and sea cucumber appear to
have prompted the development of additional types of marine access prohibi-
tions and related ceremonies in places such as the Kei Islands in southern
Maluku (Zerner and Thorburn, forthcoming). Similar rules are evident in
central Maluku today and appear to date back at least to the 1960s.
The raja governed together with administrative and legislative councils (sa-
niri) whose members were the clan leaders. The raja’s powers under this
system were not absolute. He (or occasionally she) was obliged to consult
with the village council. Other hereditary functionaries included a war leader
(kapitan), persons responsible for communicating government decisions to
the people (marinyo), keepers of sacred knowledge (tuan negeri) and other
adat leaders (tuan tanah). There were also the hereditary leaders (kepala ke-
wang) of groups responsible for enforcing social and resource management
regulations called the kewang. The kewang applied and enforced sasi rules on
both land and sea within the village territory.
the larger unit (desa). The village head and his government office may there-
fore be many kilometres away. Dusuns are represented in the desa govern-
ment through their local leaders (kepala dusun).
The LMD (Lembaga Masyarakat Desa) is the formal village legislative body oc-
cupied with decision-making and development of regulations. It has 10 to 15
members presided over by the village
head and the village secretary and is
divided into sections, i.e. village de-
velopment, government administra-
tion and community affairs, each of
which has a chief. The LMD reports
to the sub-district government level.
The decisions and regulations of
the LMD are executed by the LKMD
(Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat De-
sa), which is the administrative body
of the village government. As we
found out from our interviews, in
many cases LMD members are in
fact selected from among traditional
authorities (i.e. adat and clan lead-
ers). The extent to which the current
government overlaps with the previ-
ous, traditional village council var-
ies, yet, there was no village where
traditional authorities were not rep-
resented at all.
ognized in Maluku villages. These three key institutions are called the Tiga
Tungku, or three hearthstones: the government, the church (or in Muslim vil-
lages the mosque) and adat or traditional authorities. In some villages, teach-
ers are also important and may displace adat leaders in the Tiga Tungku.
The TAKESRA groups are small saving groups (±10 people) that particularly
target low-income women. It is an initiative of the National Coordinating
Agency for Family Planning (BKKBN) and is usually carried out by the village
head. The members save a weekly amount and when a certain sum is reached,
the group can get an additional government loan to start small businesses
(chicken breeding, restaurant, etc.). Another (informal) saving program is
called ARISAN. It is initiated by villagers from the lower social classes who
feel disconnected from the mainstream and do not expect the government
to take care of their problems. Therefore they use a revolving fund system to
provide the members with some capital.
The Social Service Department of the government has set up various eco-
nomic development groups including IDT and KEP. Farmers, fishers and
other small business people may be assisted through the IDT, which is a
national program to alleviate poverty. Each qualifying village receives a Rp
20 million loan from the government to subsidize small-scale development.
Each member has to pay back the amount to the government or to the group’s
treasury within a year. Participants are the poor fishermen who cannot afford
fishing gear. This was a pilot program in 1997 with the prospect of involving
more groups over the years to come.
Sir Alfred Wallace, on his expedition to Ambon Bay in the 1850s, marvelled
at the incredible diversity of coral and fish. Eastern Indonesia, including Cen-
tral Maluku, is part of the global centre for coral reef biodiversity. Endangered
species inhabiting this area include dolphins and whales, turtles, giant clams
and some other types of molluscs including top shell (Trochus niloticus). A
MREP survey (PSL-Unpatti 1996) revealed diverse biological communities
in the intertidal, inshore reef flats and reef slopes. Except for some sheltered
estuaries where mangrove forests are quite extensive, mangroves are mostly
confined to narrow coastal strips. Conversion of coastal land, including man-
groves, for shrimp pond development is just beginning in central Maluku
(northern Seram) but conversion for housing development is already wide-
spread.
The tiny Lease Islands hold 12.5% of the population of Maluku province and
are 9-10 times more densely populated than the rest of Maluku. In general,
the settlements and farming activities are concentrated along the narrow strip
of relatively flat coastal land. Artisanal and small-scale commercial fisheries
contribute significantly to village economies in terms of employment and
income but villagers are also active in the agriculture sector. Because good
farmland is limited and the population relatively dense, the fisheries sector is
seen as an opportunity for economic development. The sea is a source of in-
come as well as a source of family food (Ruhunlela et al. 1994a, 1994b; LIPI
1996). On average, income from fisheries in a typical village ranges from
about 12 – 28% of the total income.
The fishery of Maluku mirrors that of Indonesia as a whole in that the labour
force is dominated numerically by the artisanal sector. In 1991, for example,
it was estimated that out of all fishing units operating in Indonesia, 92%
were tiny canoes powered by paddle and/or sail. Another 6% of boats em-
ployed outboard motors and the rest were large, motorized ships (Agriculture
Statistics 1993, Dept. of Agriculture, Jakarta). In Maluku province, with a
population of about 2 million people, 104,600 are considered to be fishers
(CBS 1995). Many more are fisher-farmers who actually show up in the gov-
ernment statistics as farmers.
Artisanal fishers using fishing lines, spears, traps, hand-nets and set-nets
target a mixture of reef and pelagic species (for details see Novaczek et al.
2001). Women in fishing families supplement catches by harvesting octopus
78 DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH AREA
and shellfish from intertidal and upper subtidal areas. Utilization of coastal
resources in the nearshore areas is intensive. For instance in Ameth on Nusa
Laut, fishers using 21 types of fishing gear collect 73 different species of fish
and shellfish from the reef flat, reef slope and inshore waters. An additional
19 species are harvested from the intertidal zone (Hualopu 1996).
Fisheries production figures over the past decades show an increase in ex-
ploitation from 59,485 tonnes in 1974 to 189,081 tonnes of fish in 1993.
In 1997, total recorded landings had reached 329,147 tonnes (Anonymous
1993, 1994, and 1995). In addition, a great deal of fish catch goes unrecorded
because it is trans-shipped at sea and taken directly to distant markets. Actual
records of landings and local research results are at odds with the official
federal optimism regarding potential for further development.
reduced catch rates, skipjack are now considered to also be overfished (Niki-
juluw 1995; M.S. Latukonsina, Governor of Maluku, pers. comm. November
1998). Policy-makers are looking to expand fish and shellfish aquaculture in
an attempt to compensate for declining wild stocks.
Sea cucumbers (Class Holothuroidea) have been a trade commodity for cen-
turies ever since Chinese, Makassar, Buginese and other wandering traders
first came to Maluku (Fox 1996). Older fishers can remember when inshore
sandy bottoms were thick with sea cucumbers. Today, however, the traders
rarely bother to visit many of their traditional harvesting areas because the
stocks have been largely fished out.
81
This chapter describes the situation in Nolloth, one of the 6 case-study villag-
es in the period 1997-98. This case was selected as it is most illustrative for
a fully functioning sasi system. The description of the case conforms to the
Institutional Analysis Framework (see Chapter 2) and provides an elaborate
description of the local marine management system including the contextual
variables.
FIGURE 5.1 – Sketch map marine territory Nolloth (features not necessarily to scale)
*Based on: Novaczek, I., I.H.T. Harkes, J. Sopacua, and M.D.D. Tatuhey (2001). An Institutional
Analysis of Sasi Laut in Maluku, Indonesia. Technical Report No. 59, Chp 10. ICLARM, Manila.
82 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
The forest garden area straddles the northeastern cape of Saparua Island (Fig-
ure 5.1), south of the village of Itawaka. The main marine territory lies along a
6-7 km stretch on the eastern side of the cape. South of Nolloth’s village ter-
ritory lies the shore claimed by Ihamahu (just a few hundred meters), then a
stretch claimed by Itawaka and finally the village marine territories of Ulath
and Ouw. The villages of Iha and Tuhaha have no claims on this coast.
The marine sasi area is about 2.5 km long, lying on the east side of the island,
approximately one hour by small boat from the village. The area is wave ex-
posed and fringed by a narrow reef dominated by massive and soft corals and
interspersed with sandy patches (Andamari et al. 1993).
Most fishing took place in the open sea and not in the sasi area. Fishers per-
ceived that the general condition of the marine environment had drastically
declined over the past 15 years, and they expected resources to decline further
in the future (for more details see Table 5.4). In Nolloth, the main causes for
resource decline identified were household waste and industrial pollution.
The number of motorboats has also increased and subsequently, more oil
spills into the sea.
Nearly all fishers also perceived significantly reduced fish catches. Blamed for
resource depletion were the increasing numbers of vessels from outside of
Lease and the use of modern gear, such as Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs or
rumpons), fine mesh lift nets (bagans), nylon gill nets, and blast fishing. Since
the 1980s, the number of motorized boats, modern gears, FADs and lift nets
had increased markedly around the Lease Islands. Fishers complained that
pelagics no longer came to the shore because FADs in offshore waters had
disturbed their migratory routes.
PHYSICAL , BIOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTES 83
Most fishers agreed that fishing was different compared to the past. They
had to paddle further and further in trying to keep their fish-catches stable.
Nearly all fishers (93%) reported reduced catches and a subsequent decline
in income. In the late 1990s, the prices of fish had become so high, that
lower yields still provided an acceptable income. But the price increases were
not expected to make up for the increased input of time and labour for long.
In current times with increased financial needs for education and ‘luxury’
commodities such as TVs, in combination with increasing prices for boats,
engines and nets, fishers found it more and more difficult to cover their ex-
penses and make a living.
The top shells are found around 1-5 m deep at low tide, among the corals and
rocks. Depending on the size and abundance of the top shells, sasi could be
closed for up to several years. The optimal closure is three years. In three
years the animal matures and its shell reaches prime condition (Zerner and
Thorburn, forthcoming). The minimum size for harvested top shells in Nol-
loth was four fingers (6 cm) and after the harvest the remaining small shells
were left to grow.
Biological surveys indicated that Nolloth had better than average living coral
cover compared to other areas in Saparua. During the opening of sasi, spear-
fishers had access to the sasi area and fishers reported that the fishing in the
sasi area was better than elsewhere. They believed that the ban on gill netting
and destructive gears in the sasi area helped to preserve the living coral reef
and allowed the fish to grow. In fact, the sasi areas of Nolloth and Ihama-
hu were the only places surveyed by the research team in 1997 where top
84 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
shells could be found at all. Top shell yields dropped precipitously through
the 1980s (Evans et al. 1997). The 1998 harvest of almost 500 kg of top shell
from the sasi area revealed that management under the new village head,
who was committed to waiting at least two years between harvests, had al-
lowed the resource to recover.
Catches varied greatly depending on gear type, species, weather and season.
For the inshore pelagic fishery, the year went like this: Jan-April moderate
seas and catches small; May-Sept huge waves, can hardly fish at all; October-
December seas calm, catches large. On a good trip, a small-scale net fisher
working with several helpers could bring two to four baskets of fish to shore.
Depending on the species and size, a basket could hold 50-150 fish. The catch
was divided up according to long established tradition, with one third going
to the owner of the boat and net, and two thirds going to the other crew of
up to four fishers. If the fish was landed at Nolloth each man got his share of
fresh fish. If landed elsewhere and sold, they split the money. The boat/gear
PHYSICAL , BIOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTES 85
owner covered any expenses (gas for the motor, repairs). His profit was in the
order of 30,000-50,000 Rp per fishing trip (12-20 USD, early 1997 rate).
Costs for net fishers rose dramatically in the late 1990s. The price of some
types of netting, nylon line and buoys increased two to five-fold. Nets can last
ten years but must be repaired three to four times a year. Before the currency
crisis pushed prices up in 1998, a longboat suitable for net fishing cost 5.5
million Rp (± 2200 USD) and a motor 1.3 million Rp (± 520 USD).
In spite of the increased difficulty in catching fish, most fishers saw no rea-
son for concern. The trend in fishing was still towards intensification and
fishing techniques increased both in number and in effectiveness (smaller
mesh sizes, change to nylon nets). Rather than limiting their fishing, fishers
competed over the fish and had a wish to have faster boats. The younger gen-
eration was still optimistic and interested to take up fishing. They explained
that they would fish using the same techniques as used by older people from
whom they learned it, but ‘with some improvements towards the modern
methods.’
The economic benefits from the large-scale pole and line fishery were signifi-
cant. The village did not collect any formal fees from the boats, but accepted
‘voluntary’ contributions. The boat owner gave one share of the total catch to
the church in Nolloth, half a share to local widows and orphans, and half a
share to the village government and others who had been helpful. The total
added up to Rp 50,000-200,000 a month (20-80 USD, early 1997 exchange
rate). All in all, the fishery brought in about Rp 50 million a month (± 20,000
USD), including the wages for about 150 fishers who worked on the boats.
86 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
Village facilities included electricity, three elementary schools, two gas sta-
tions, a food market, a drug store, and a banking service from the KUD.
Many residents had a television. The village also had an open storm drain
system and there were both private and community wells with some water
being brought in from a spring in Itawaka. Additional water-wells were being
developed. The nearest health centre was in Ihamahu, a neighbouring village
within walking distance.
Transportation to the village was good. The village had hard top roads and
there were frequent public minibuses connecting Nolloth with Saparua Kota,
the largest town centre on the island. Also speedboats took passengers and
trade goods directly from Nolloth to the urban centers of Ambon, and to
Masohi on Seram. Communication links were limited to a radio connection
and there was no telephone.
5.2.1 Employment
The village depended mainly on agriculture and fisheries. Fishing was a full-
time job for 40% of the villagers while another 30% fished part-time. There
had been a slight shift from farming to fishing due to increased revenues
from fishing (higher fish prices).
From 1979 to 1997, the number of small shopkeepers had increased to 18.
There were a few artisans who made furniture and several who worked in
housing construction. As a result of the new government structure, the num-
ber of government employees had tripled from 16 to 44 persons.
In Nolloth there was a large overlap between traditional and modern village
institutions. The LMD consisted mainly of clan leaders (kepala soas) from
the former saniri negeri. After the installation of the formal village structure
in 1979, it became possible to elect a village head not from the raja clan.
This sometimes led to problems. For example, in 1987 Arnold Matatula be-
came the new village head (Table 5.1). He was also the treasurer and when
problems arose with village finances, he lost people’s trust. Therefore, people
were glad that in November 1995, Pieter Huliselan returned from Ambon to
become the new village head. Being from the raja clan he had a legitimate
claim on this position. Yet, after his ‘election’ he did not automatically have
the traditional authority connected with adat. To also acknowledge him as the
kepala adat (head of the adat), the tuan negeri of the village had to perform
FIGURE 5.2 – The mother of the village headman Oma Huliselan with Semmy Littik of
the research team
88 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
The village cooperative (KUD) in Nolloth was a Manderinti (highest level) and
primarily occupied with the clove and nutmeg trade. Roughly a third of the
adults in the village were members. They got a monthly payment from the
KUD and a yearly bonus. The amount depended on the profitability of KUD
enterprises (several shops and a speedboat). The annual turnover was Rp 70
ATTRIBUTES OF THE COMMUNITY AND FISHERS 89
million per year (± 30,000 USD, 1996 rate). Of this, the KUD donated Rp 1
to 2 million yearly to the church and the village government.
The women were worried about the decline in marine resources because they
depended on shellfish for food, and on the fishery for household income. To
the women, sasi – just like most village matter – was a ‘government affair’.
They had no voice in decision-making around sasi, nor did they attend the
sasi rituals. Women interviewed did express the need to be involved in deci-
sion-making around marine resource management. Yet, they thought that
since their fishery was for food and not profit, the men in charge would not
take their concerns seriously.
1 The sago processed in Nolloth is imported from Seram, and the end product is sold in Ambon.
2 The women involved in the fish trade are usually those living next to the shore in Nolloth and
Itawaka where fish are landed.
90 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
On an average, fishers had been active in this profession for 27 years. They
generally spent more than 8 hours per day at sea (most common was 7-10
hrs daily), which was second highest from our sample villages. The fishers
expressed great personal satisfaction in their chosen career, but only 18%
(still twice as high as the other villages) wanted their children to become
fishers. Most (61%) wanted them to be government staff. Only three of our
respondents belonged to a fishers’ group and membership in other village
organisations was also low. All of them said that sasi was very important.
The principal part of their income (81%) was from fishing. Other income
came from land crops (peanuts, coconuts, spices etc.). About a third (27%)
had income that was sent from a distant family member. Children who left
Nolloth to find work elsewhere would often provide the family with an exter-
nal income of on average Rp 264,000 per year (105 USD, early 1997 rate).
The economic indicator of the fishers sample was made up of adding scores
for land ownership, boat ownership, type of house and fishing gear. Most
fishers (83%) were landowners and almost half (47%) had permanent hous-
ing (cement with zinc roof). For Nolloth the average economic score was 8.1
(with a standard error of 0.35), which was in the lower third of the 27 villages
investigated. When TV ownership was factored in, the economic score be-
came 8.5 – the lowest of the case-study villages (see Appendix 3 in Novaczek
et al. 2001).
Compared to fishers in other case study villages, Nolloth fishers sold a rela-
tively high percentage of their catch; only 13% was used for family consump-
tion. Eight fishers said they did not eat any of the fish they caught, and none
ate more than half of their catch. The shellfish and fish gathered by women,
in contrast, were not sold but used for family consumption.
The small-scale fish trade was mainly in hands of village women, called pa-
palele, many of whom were wives of fishermen. The female fish vendors
bought and sold all kinds and sizes of fish, both in fresh and smoked form.
Post harvest processing of fish was limited to smoking. None of the vendors
MARKET ATTRIBUTES 91
had access to ice. The price of fish depended on various factors: weather con-
ditions, the amount of fish in the market, the size of the trader network, and
the auction price of fish set by the fish brokers who handled the commercial
catches. The profit of the retailer could approach 150-200%.
The fish vendors sold mostly in the local village market or in other villages on
Saparua Island, including Saparua town. The remainder ended up in urban
centres like Masohi, Tulehu and Ambon city. Fish were taken to the market
using public transportation. The women never travelled to or from a market
empty handed and often dealt in sago and vegetables as well as fish. Fish that
could not be sold fresh before noon that day was smoked and either went into
the stock needed for a long distance trading trip or was peddled door-to-door
in the village in the late afternoon.
Compared to the other case study villages on Saparua and Haruku, the wide
range of markets enjoyed by Nolloth traders was exceptional. The fish ven-
dors used their long experience and a strategy of flexibility to find the best
place to sell fish for the best price. They gathered information on city market
prices from bus and speedboat drivers and from people freshly arrived home
from the city. The ones that chose a district or provincial market for their
sales did this because: 1) the price was higher than on the local markets, 2)
they were easily accessible, and 3) they could sell fish together with other
commodities.
The pole and line boats targeted pelagic fish, especially skipjack. Fishing took
place throughout central and northern Maluku. Prices of fish were increas-
ing: in February 1998 the price given to Nolloth fishers for export quality fish
almost doubled. These trends were directly related to the availability of fish
and to market structures. More details on the commercial fishery and on the
commercial fish trade can be found in Chapter 5 of Novaczek et al. (2001).
Trochus niloticus is a protected species under national law and trade in top
shells is therefore illegal. As a result, all shells must be sold to certain traders
who have government permits to handle cultivated top shells and use this
as a cover for trading wild shells. The profits enjoyed by those in control of
this trade monopoly are significant (see also Zerner and Thorburn, forthcom-
ing). On the international market the price is paid in US dollars. The traders
however, paid the villagers in Indonesian rupiahs and so benefited from the
plunging exchange rates. Profits at the village level were therefore far below
what they could have been if the controlled harvest of top shells in sasi areas
had been legal and villagers had direct access to the foreign market.
Nolloth was one of the villages where sasi was still strong. Here, the practice
of sasi dates back at least to the colonial period (Huliselan 1996, pers. comm.).
The two main objectives of sasi were said to be protection of the harvest and
theft control. Sasi rules in Nolloth, whether implemented by kewang, church
or the village government, are based on adat or customary law. In the absence
of a formal and legal mandate to manage the marine village territory, adat
provides village authorities with the legitimacy to undertake resource man-
agement and collect resource rents, both within and outside of sasi (Hualopu
1991). The adat rules are in effect the constitutional rules of the sasi institu-
tion. Under adat law, the rights, authority and obligations of the kewang are
defined, as well as the boundaries of the village territory and the marine sasi
area. The rights of villagers to enter common property areas and utilize natu-
ral resources are recognized and supported. Some of these de facto rules and
customs were written down, while others were not like the decision-making
process (see for Nolloth sasi rules Appendix 6, in Novaczek et al. 2001).
In Nolloth, the traditional sasi institution (sasi adat) was complemented with
a type of sasi controlled by the church (sasi gereja) that was applied on coco-
nuts. These arrangements too were not written down.
On land, sasi defines what areas belong to which families and thus manages
the resources as a private property system under constitutional rules. The
sea, on the other hand, by its nature is seen as a common property resource
with defined access rights in the sasi area. Within the village territory, lo-
cal residents and their non-resident children have rights of access and with-
drawal for all living marine resources except those under sasi or other village
regulation (see Table 5.2). Adat allows sasi authorities (the kewang and village
government) to exclude outsiders from fishing in the village territory, or at
least require that they ask permission and/or pay for access rights.
SASI INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 93
Collective-choice rules under sasi concern what types of activities may be con-
trolled in the village, define a process and confer authority on certain leaders
to resolve land and resource disputes. These rules also define the structure
of marine sasi as an institution that regulates access and withdrawal rights in
the marine sasi area. Examples of collective-choice rules are that the respon-
sibility for patrolling the sasi area lies with the kewang, or that sanctions for
stealing sasi resources are applied by the village head and the police.
TABLE 5.2 – Products whose harvest times are determined under land sasi
Land sasi operational rules
Various sets of operational sasi regulations control the harvest of certain com-
mercially important marine resources and terrestrial crops. These operation-
al sasi rules were written down.
Some rules were rather specific: The harvest of coral and large rocks was
limited to what is needed to build a house, with a maximum of 2m³ per per-
son. However, even though most people knew that these rules existed, there
was confusion over exactly where the rules were applicable. Some rules were
embedded in formal government rules. For example, for larger amounts of
coral, according to the village government, a permit from the sub-district
level was required. However, when asked about coral harvesting, the sub-dis-
trict office declared that they would never grant a permit because officially it
was prohibited to harvest any coral at all (!).
94 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
In other cases the operational rules could be overruled by the village head,
who has the authority to make decisions based on constitutional rules (adat).
In emergencies, when individuals asked to open sasi on their own land, per-
mission was usually granted to harvest some products. For marine sasi, a
communal resource, individuals could not be granted access rights. Howev-
er, in exceptional cases the prohibitions on diving and harvesting were lifted.
Two occasions may illustrate this. First, in 1997, a research team from the
Department of Fisheries in Jakarta was allowed to harvest top shells for an
aquaculture project. Later, an ICLARM-Hualopu research team was allowed
to enter the sasi area to carry out a biological survey. However, this was only
possible under the supervision of the kewang and after permission from the
village head.
In addition to the official sasi area, a part of the village marine territory north
of Umisini (Figure 5.1) was also managed for top shells and sea cucumber.
The ban on net fishing, diving and swimming was not exercised here. After
the sasi harvest was complete and if the KUD had agreed to it, Butonese or
Madurese divers were usually permitted to enter after having paid a fee to the
village head.
Aside from the sasi rules, other formal operational rules existed. Gill net fish-
ing, for example, was allowed only after explicit permission from the village
head and the payment of a Rp 100,000 fee. Blast fishing and the use of poisons
were banned. These regulations were applied to all villagers and outsiders.
Because marine sasi in Nolloth had evolved into an institution for collecting
resource rents for the village government, it was the village head who held
the key decision-making role. Although he conferred with other authorities,
it was really he who decided when and how often the sasi area would be
opened. Also, if thieves were apprehended it was the village head who im-
posed and collected the fine and who decided whether to turn the offender
over to the police.
The kewang’s main role was to patrol the area but they did not have the man-
date to punish offenders (see below). The kewang also monitored the size of
the shellfish and sea cucumbers in the sasi area. When the products under
sasi were big enough to be harvested, the kewang members informed the
SASI INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 95
head of the kewang who reported to the village head. In a meeting with the
harvesters (in this case the KUD), the traditional authorities, and the church
minister, a date was set to open the season.
Although the church played a part in land sasi and prayers accompanied ma-
rine sasi ceremonies, the minister was not among the decision-makers or
enforcers for marine sasi. As villagers explained, fish is too important to be
under church sasi because an infringement of the rules would be punished
by God and this would be too hard on people who are dependent on fish for
food.
The KUD had no decision-making role, but had an economic interest, espe-
cially when it organized the harvest and division of the catch. The KUD of-
ficials and the members (to a lesser extent) shared in the catch/revenues. The
common villagers played no active role in sasi and were merely recipients of
the indirect benefits derived from sasi.
When sasi was opened, there was a communal prayer in the office of the vil-
lage government where they awaited the arrival of the attendants for ‘buka
sasi’. The real ceremony to open marine sasi took place at the sea-shore near
the sasi area. With the village officials and kewang in attendance, the tuan
negeri made a speech explaining how important sasi is and how the kewang
are responsible for guarding the area. This was followed by a prayer by the
minister. All the players (village government, traditional and religious lead-
ers, and the kewang) then went out to sea, where the minister prayed again
for a rich harvest. The village head uttered an invocation in the traditional
language and then sprinkled fresh water over the sea as a symbolic gesture.
Sasi was declared open. Skin-divers, hired through the village cooperative,
harvested at least three top shells and there was a break during which eve-
ryone rested and ate a traditional feast (patita) provided by whomever had
won the auction for harvest rights. Then the divers continued their work (see
Figure 5.3-5.14).
FIGURE 5.3 – Traditional authorities
and kewang members go to the sasi
area for the opening ritual
FIGURE 5.12 –
Processing of the
Trochus shells
FIGURE 5.13 –
People gather on
the beach where
the food is pre-
pared
100 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
Profits from top shell and sea cucumber can be attractive. However, during
the 1980s, a former village head opened sasi every six months. The result was
that the harvest dropped dramatically from 1200 kg in 1988, to only 50 kg in
1994 (Evans et al.1997). In 1995, with the new village head Huliselan, they
went back to a longer closed season (appr. 2 years). Sasi was closed through-
out 1995 and opened near the end of 1996 and again in January 1998.
Formerly, the right to harvest in the sasi area was sold to the highest bidder.
This could be an outsider (e.g. Chinese traders from Ambon) or a local who
hired clan-members and friends to dive for the top shells. It also happened
that a villager was ‘sponsored’ by a Chinese trader to buy the rights. Com-
mon villagers without connections were excluded from the harvest. However,
resistance against this style of business grew and the villagers objected to
the sale of harvest rights to outsiders. To have more control over the harvest
and more benefits for the villagers, in 1995 after his installation, village head
Huliselan decided to arrange the harvest and sale of top shell through the
village cooperative (KUD).
The harvesting was done by selected KUD members (skin divers). In 1998,
they received Rp 5000 per kg of shells, which is about third of the final sale
price. Once the harvesters and other expenses had been paid, the profits were
split evenly between the village government and the KUD. The village head
then contributed a part to the church and the kewang. The money for the vil-
lage treasury was meant to redistribute the benefits to the village population
in the form of development projects.
The total revenues from marine sasi can be considerable. The price per kilo
(3-5 large shells) in 1996 was Rp 14,000 (6 USD, 1996 rate) and in 1997
Rp17,000 (7 USD, early 1997 rate). Before the currency crisis, that meant
that a 1000 kg harvest could yield about Rp 14 million or up to 6000 USD
gross returns. In January 1998, sasi was officially opened again. The total
catch of 460 kg of top shells and 67 kg of sea cucumber was larger than in
former years, but lower than expected. Previously, the divers had reckoned
that a harvest of over a 1000 kg was feasible, but when they entered the shal-
102 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
lows, most of the large shells were gone. Villagers believe the top shells were
probably stolen during the Christmas activities in the village. The catch was
sold for Rp 19,500/kg for the high quality shells (300kg) and Rp 9,500/kg
for the rest. The total yield was approximately 7.3 million Rupiah, which was
with the 1998 exchange rate only 730 USD.
Since trade in sea cucumber had proven lucrative as well, the village head was
studying the feasibility of sea-cucumber culture at Tinauw in the sasi area.
The villagers were planning to have a holding area of stakes, planks and nets,
feed the young ones with mangrove leaves and harvest every six months.
5.4.4 Enforcement
Enforcement of sasi on land crops has traditionally been in hands of the ke-
wang. Traditionally, Nolloth had two kewangs (one from each clan group).
Each had a leader – or head of the kewang – and both were under the au-
thority of a man called the pakter. The 40 kewang members were selected
from particular families. The kewang had one secretary, one treasurer, and
two marinyo (news-bearers).
Where there was a difficult problem with a persistent violator of land sasi,
the kewang would ask the village head to help with enforcement or punish-
ment. In the past, people were publicly sentenced and would serve as an
example. For instance, they could be made to wear a sign around their neck
that said ‘Do not do what I did’. Later, offenders could be forced to work in
the village (road construction, cleaning of the village) or would face corporal
punishment at the hands of the village head. Serious offenders and especially
outsiders were not prosecuted locally, but reported to the police in Saparua
Kota.
The marine sasi area was guarded by the kewang members who stayed in their
two guardhouses. They took turns in guarding the area. Armed with knives
and bamboo sticks they patrolled along the beach. However, the kewang
lacked equipment such as motorboats, communication devices and modern
weapons. Also, the remoteness of the sasi area made it hard to control. In the
case of thefts of top shells from the sasi area, the village head imposed large
cash fines directly. Since the proceeds of sasi went to the village, the village
head felt this was his responsibility although it was the kewang who guarded
SASI INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 103
the area. Just before the time of our study, Butonese intruders were caught in
the marine sasi area and punished to serve as an example.
5.4.5 Compliance
Every month the kewang caught one or two locals who were stealing coconuts
from the village gardens. These were usually poorer villagers or people that
indulged in greed. As income was said to depend for a large part on the per-
sonal efforts of people, those who steal were usually considered ‘just lazy’.
Thefts from the marine sasi area also occurred. Within six months there had
been two cases of intercepted thefts of top shells from the sasi area by out-
siders (none by Nolloth villagers). In addition, there was the unconfirmed
suspicion of a major theft of top shells over the Christmas holidays of 1997,
just before sasi was opened. It is likely that such thefts were most common
in the six months leading up to a harvest, when the top shells were relatively
large and plentiful.
formation and thus was not ready to receive it. To keep the tradition alive, it
is essential that knowledge is passed on to the younger generation.
Most villagers had little practical knowledge about sasi. To them, sasi was part
of the tradition and people just ‘did what the ancestors did.’ What was clear
to them though, is that sasi did have certain benefits. For example, it was
mentioned that sasi protected the reef from being damaged by blast fishing
and nets. Otniel Patty, a Nolloth fisherman explained: ‘Sasi helps to protect
the area from people’ and ‘to keep the fish big and many’. Most villagers and
all fishers interviewed agreed that sasi was important because it prevented
people from stealing or destroying the resources. Sasi thus not only ensured
that the products were ripe when harvested, but also that the yield was maxi-
mal. This worked for forest products and certain marine products, but was
not applied to fish because ‘people have to live’ and a prohibition on catching
fish would have been unacceptable (Otniel Patty, pers. comm.). In the sea, con-
servation in the form of sasi regulations was only applied on resources that
were not essential for people’s livelihood and that had a considerable market
value, i.e. top shells and sea cucumbers.
To most women, marine sasi was less relevant than land sasi. The women
gathered shells in the sasi area but there were no sasi rules that directly ap-
plied to the species that they harvested. Apart from the share of the top shell
yield, which they got if they were KUD members, the women, since they
could not work as harvesters, got no direct benefits from marine sasi.
ernment levels. The village head was meeting every three months in Saparua
Kota with other village authorities to exchange information. Fisheries issues
however were not discussed here. Fisheries regulations were not high prior-
ity in the village; people were more concerned about developing the fishery.
Besides, there was no government assistance for monitoring and there was
no patrol boat for enforcement. For the village head, the most reliable sources
of information on fisheries regulations besides the radio and TV, were the
Ambon-based NGO Yayasan Hualopu and friends in the university.
5.6.2 Legitimacy
The sasi rules in Nolloth were the result of a collective process nested in
adat and therefore highly legitimate. Adat, the traditional customary law, pro-
vided the constitutional basis of sasi as an institution. The village officials
explained: ‘Adat is important, and adat cannot be changed. People acknowl-
edge adat and this is their incentive to accept the rules and regulations that
come with it.’
The overlap between formal and traditional village authorities in Nolloth was
very high compared to other villages. The village government was therefore
seen to be highly legitimate. The legitimacy conferred upon the village head
through his association with sasi and adat was an incentive for him to sup-
port and participate in sasi.
Sasi could and did evolve through time, as seen in Nolloth. With the increas-
ing involvement of the church, the sasi institution became both more com-
plex and even more legitimate in the eyes of the people. On the other hand,
the minister also came to share the legitimacy and respect of adat through
his association with sasi.
5.6.3 Status
There was no clear answer to the question why Nolloth still had sasi while it
had been lost in many other villages. But although the villagers could not give
an explanation for the strength of sasi, they felt it was important to have sasi.
They were proud to be a sasi village and not in the least because of the atten-
tion of researchers, NGOs, and tourists that are attracted to the village. This
pride and status accrued to all the (traditional) village officials and kewang
members.
INCENTIVES TO COOPERATE 107
Whereas land sasi benefited the individual landowners because they could
keep their harvest, the profits from marine sasi were for the whole communi-
ty and disappeared into the village treasury. The KUD, harvesters, the kewang
and church got direct shares, but the other villagers only benefited indirectly
(through village development). The money was spent at the discretion of the
village government and the villagers had neither knowledge of nor control
over the expenditures. However, because the village head was well respected
people did not complain about the lack of transparency. Like most Mollucan
villagers, Nolloth people believed that their leaders would act for the common
good. This belief was an incentive to cooperate.
Most fishers interviewed, however, thought that the people should benefit
from sasi directly. They argued that the revenues from sasi ought to be shared
among those who are excluded from the fishery. Several respondents (Ca-
tharina Huliselan, Frederik Matatula, Augustina Lohenapessy) indicated that
under the arrangement in place ‘the rich benefited more than the poor.’ From
this it is clear that if the people do not feel they benefit, they will have less
incentive to support sasi.
In our survey of 30 fishers, the majority (53%) disagreed with the sale of re-
source harvest rights to outsiders. Therefore the move by the village head to
sell the harvest rights to the local KUD rather than to outsiders was politically
wise. At that moment, the enforcement of sasi regulations was strong and
compliance was high. However, if in the future the people would not support
sasi any longer because they perceive it to be too unfair, some might encroach
the area as soon as the power of the kewang declines.
5.6.5 Sanctions
The sanctions and enforcement by the village head and kewang were an im-
portant incentive for people to comply. The kewang was impartial and vigor-
ous in applying the rules, and therefore respected. The kewang’s authority
and the fear of social or religious sanctions was amplified by the involvement
of the church in sasi. ‘Even if the kewang is strong, the people are very clever
and escape. God however is everywhere, and the presence of the church helps
the people to obey the rules’ (Otniel Patty, pers. comm.).
5.6.9 Attitudes
Laziness and greed were often mentioned as a reason for people to non-com-
ply. Most offences committed by young people involved theft of coconuts,
simply because they were ‘greedy’. Another reason for non-compliance was
the tendency towards individualism as the result of modernization. Sever-
PATTERNS OF INTERACTION 109
The history of sasi in Nolloth shows that the system is a common property re-
gime of which the access rights and the rights of withdrawal have changed. In
the late 1960s when top shells became a commercially interesting commod-
ity, government officials realized that the sasi system offered an institutional
and legal means to control the top shell harvest and its profits (Zerner 1995).
In Nolloth in 1968, Mr. Matatula, the village-level government head issued
a proclamation declaring the existence of sasi on top shells within commu-
nity waters and asserted control over sasi on behalf of the local government
(Matatula in Zerner 1995). Thus, from a common pool resource where, at set
times, the whole community could harvest, the rights of extraction became
limited to a defined group within the community (the divers appointed by the
village cooperative).
The benefits were divided amongst the appointed harvesters, the KUD, and
the village government. It was stressed that the benefits were for the com-
munity as a whole in the form of village development. The villagers thus
benefited indirectly and some villagers benefited more than others (e.g. KUD
members). Also, common villagers no longer had the rights of extraction or
the rights of access. In theory, the resource was still managed as a common
property, but as soon as the benefits flew to the village government, in prac-
tice, the property rights regime changed from communal property to private
property. The benefits were for the community, but it was the village leader
who made the decisions on how to spend the revenues for village develop-
ment.
Compliance, however, must also be seen in the light of marine resource use
in general. The sasi area was only a small part of the total fishing area used
by the fishers. Nolloth’s artisanal fishers had always ventured far to sea in
their small boats to catch skipjack, tuna and other pelagic species. This re-
110 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
duced pressure on the sasi area and also decreased any incentive to break sasi
rules.
In the past (20 years ago and more) most fishers targeted reef fish within the
village marine territory, and fish were both abundant and cheap. However,
with the introduction of nylon gill nets, the area became too crowded with
nets and fish were rapidly depleted. Fishers moved increasingly into the pe-
lagic fishery. In response, the village government instituted rules to limit the
use of gill nets on the inshore reef by imposing access fees. In this case, the
rule was developed outside of sasi and applied to the entire village territory.
There was a general agreement, especially among village elders, that the de-
pletion of the reef fish stocks was caused by over-fishing. People were be-
coming more environmentally aware and sasi was said to be important for
protection of natural resources. Even so, management in the form of a closed
area and regulated harvest was applied only to several sedentary species in
the sasi area.
For the pelagic fishery, the village government followed the general policy set
out by the national government – which was to try and further expand the
fishery (Budiman 1982 and Hannig 1988 in Mantjoro 1996). Nolloth fishers
were involved in government programs that supplied motorboats and larger
nets with fine meshes. Although the village government saw the need to ad-
dress the decline in the fishery, regulations limiting the number of fishers or
types of gears allowed were not part of the strategy. The importance of fish as
a primary source of income and food impelled the village government to opt
for intensification instead of management. The results (higher yields) were
‘promising’. At a meeting, the village officials explained: ‘It has already be-
come better since they became motorized and can go further to get the fish.’
It thus is clear that compliance within a limited area – whether communal
property or private property – is easy when there is a state governed ‘open ac-
cess’ area where fishers have unlimited access.
5.8 Outcomes
5.8.1 Equity
fishers (33,3%) who actually wanted to change the fisheries rules. The major-
ity (56,7%) agreed with the current regime.
Access to resources
Fishers’ individual access to fisheries resources had significantly declined
and they expected more restrictions in future. The respondents explained
that this was caused by the fact that there were more and more regulations
and the requirement of permits. Over 50% of the fishers thought it was ac-
ceptable to ask for dispensation to enter the sasi area. This did not mean that
it would be granted (because it would not), but reflected the fishers’ wish to
have flexibility in the application of rules.
Income distribution
When asked about the level of economic disparities between the villagers,
fishers reported that conditions had remained the same. The village women
distinguished three social classes: the rich, the medium (who were just able
to send their children to school in Ambon), and the poor (who lived on a sub-
sistence level). Social status was easily recognized in the housing situation of
the villagers. Fishers appeared to be mostly in the middle and lower classes.
Contact between the different classes seemed limited. One fisher mentioned
that the drop in clove prices had positively influenced the level of economic
disparities, because, although it had had a dramatic effect on Nolloth’s econ-
omy, it had levelled out the incomes of people in the village. Increasing ‘in-
dividualism’ was mentioned as causing people to look only for their personal
advancement, resulting in competition.
5.8.2 Efficiency
Communal decision-making
The degree to which fishers have been able to communally make decisions
with regard to the fishery had decreased and future expectations were nega-
tive. Many fishers (77%) saw the style of decision-making in the village as
being a process of common or majority agreement. The other fishers felt that
the village head with village government staff made all the decisions. In fact,
whether or not the people were involved in decision-making at all depended
mainly on the village leader.
All in all, only 10% of the respondents felt that local groups had no role in
decision-making at all. Most respondents (87%) said that outsiders had no in-
fluence in village decision-making, but all agreed that all stakeholders should
be involved in decision-making.
Compliance
Compliance with fisheries rules as perceived by our respondents was said to
be relatively high (score 7.47) and had not changed significantly over time.
This was contrary to the fishers in the key informant interviews who stated
that compliance had become better now that there was a new village head
who was trustworthy. There were no changes in compliance to be expected
in the future.
Family well-being
Generally, family well-being was moderate compared to other villages and
had remained stable over the years. No changes were expected in the future.
Income
The actual income of people had not changed dramatically, but individuals
noted an up or downward change depending on whether they had seen their
catches increase (fishers with modern gear) or decline (artisanal fishers).
Village harmony
Village harmony was highest compared to other villages (score 6.20) and had
not changed significantly over time. Conflicts generally arose over land, sago
and cloves. Alcohol abuse was also mentioned. On the village level conflicts
were more apparent, especially in cases where outsiders tried to illegally har-
vest sasi products. Others, however, had the opinion that conflicts in the com-
munity were less compared to the past. An important role was played by the
village head, who was perceived as legitimate and trusted by the people. Also
the harvest rights and boundaries of the sasi area were generally accepted.
114 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
TABLE 6.4 – Results of performance analysis in Nolloth using chi square tests (average conditions)
and paired t-tests (within group differences between past-present-future).
Indicator Average Average change Average future
condition in through time expected change
1997-98 on (statistical (statistical
scale of 1-10 significance) significance)
Equity
6 Ease of entry into the fishery 7.20 -1.0333* -10% -1.000*** -10%
N = 30 heads of fishing households. Ns = trend not significant; * = p<0.05, ** = p<0.01, *** = P<0.001
SYNTHESIS 115
Fish catches
Fish catches too had reduced drastically. The average drop noted was 38%
and the fishers expect a further decline of 20% in future. In Nolloth, the main
problems causing both general decline of the resources as well as declining
fish-catches were said to be: 1) pollution, 2) intensification of the fishery and
3) the use of modern gear.
Nevertheless, biological surveys indicated that Nolloth had better than aver-
age living coral cover compared to other Saparua shores (Chapter 3). Also,
fishers reported that the fishing was better in the sasi area than elsewhere,
suggesting that the management system did have a positive effect on the
state of the inshore resource.
5.9 Synthesis
Women in the village were marginalized and have a dependent attitude. Com-
munication among women seemed minimal also where it concerned village
issues or problems. This was possibly a result of the village organisational
structures that were hierarchical and left little space for internal discussions.
116 CASE - STUDY : DESA NOLLOTH , SAPARUA ISLAND
Common women had no voice and were not well represented within the
women’s organisations. When it came to village affairs and decision-making,
the women generally showed a lack of interest.
The Nolloth form of sasi conferred certain economic benefits to the village
in general and to the ruling elite and their associates in particular. Leaders
associated with the institution were also rewarded with high social status.
However, the institution cannot be said to have been inclusive or democratic.
In fact, the originally common property regime had become a system with
private property rights.
The village government used the financial benefits from marine sasi for de-
velopment projects and infrastructure. The villagers thus benefited indirect-
ly. Nevertheless, to the villagers sasi was meaningful, especially in regulating
theft and destruction of resources. It was considered as something relevant
and important to village life and ‘people are used to it.’ The cooperation of
traditional and government authorities and the church in the context of sasi
served as a model for cooperation in village life and contributed to social
sustainability.
Fishers as a group did not participate in the development of sasi and other
fisheries regulations, and there was mild resentment over the fact that the
system of selling harvest rights seemingly benefited the rich more than the
poor. The sasi system thus proved not very equitable, but it was still highly le-
gitimate. On the other hand, sasi in Nolloth was certainly efficient: decisions
were made with a minimum of fuss by a respected central authority and the
rules were enforced at no cost by volunteers in the kewang. The biological out-
comes were also positive. Despite the severe general resource degradation,
the sasi area had relatively healthy resources. Sasi rules were only applied to
two commercially interesting products in a small area and sasi therefore had
little impact on the larger fishery.
Although the ladder survey indicated strongly that marine resources (and fish
catches) were in decline, fishery problems in the sense of over-fishing were
not generally acknowledged. Pollution and the use of modern fishing-tech-
SYNTHESIS 117
niques were seen as having a major impact on the fishery but interventions
to deal with these were not suggested. Although they needed to go further
and further for their daily catch, most fishers still caught enough to cover
their daily needs. The impact of the decline was also obscured by the fact
that fish prices had increased and thus rewards were still good. The species
caught had changed dramatically over the years. From inshore fishing on
demersal fish, the fishery had become nearly fully geared towards pelagics
in the open sea.
Despite its profound cultural embeddedness, sasi has adapted and changed
under influence of trade (the spice wars), colonization (by respectively the
Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch), religion (Christianity and Islam),
and the imposition of nationally defined government structures in the 1970s.
This chapter presents the results of a study performed in 1997-98 on the
presence, performance and institutional resilience of sasi. The presence and
functionality of sasi in 63 villages was determined by way of structured key
informant interviews that explored the existence of sasi ceremonies, presence
of written rules and sanctions, level and consistency of activity over time, area
of application of rules, and governing authorities. Performance (expressed
in terms of biological and social sustainability, efficiency and equity) was
measured in 11 villages with strong sasi and 11 villages where it was weak. A
number of factors were identified that contributed positively to the resilience
of sasi as a local institution. The results of this study can be useful in the
revitalization of traditional institutions or the establishment of new institu-
tions in the context of decentralisation and co-management in Indonesia and
elsewhere.
6.1 Inventory
*Published as: I.H.T. Harkes and I. Novaczek (2002) Presence, Performance, and Institutional
Resilience of Sasi, a Traditional Management Institution in Central Maluku, Indonesia. Ocean &
Coastal Management, 45: 237-260.
120 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
# Village Island Dominant Size Sasi area Type of sasi Sasi river species
religion class managed
V L S R A C O
1 Nolloth Saparua Christian 3 + + + - + + - top shell, sea cucum-
ber, gillnet fishery
on reef
2 Haruku Haruku Christian 3 + + + + + + - pelagic fish
3 Kabau Haruku Muslim 3 + - + - - - + pelagic fish, sea cu-
cumber, ornamental
fish
4 Pelauw Haruku Muslim 4 + + + - - - + inshore net fishery
5 Makariki Seram Christian 2 + + + - - + - inshore net fishery
6 Ihamahu Saparua Christian 2 + + + + + + - inshore net fishery,
corals, ornamental
fish, sea cucumber,
top shell, giant clam
7 Siri Sori Saparua Muslim 3 - - + - + - - top shell, (sea
cucumber?)
8 Itawaka Saparua Christian 3 + + + - + - - mangroves, top
shell, sea cucumber,
caping-caping
9 Paperu Saparua Christian 3 + + + - + + - sea cucumber
10 Porto Saparua Christian 4 + + + - + + - top shell, sea cu-
cumber, piring shells,
giant clam, batu laga
11 Morela Ambon Muslim 3 + + + - - - + top shell, sea cu-
cumber
12 Seith Ambon Muslim 4 + + - - - - + all species in sasi
area
13 Tengah- Ambon Muslim 3 - + + - + - - inshore net fishery,
Tengah sea cucumbers
14 Rutah Seram Muslim 3 - - - - - - - none
15 Soahuku Seram Christian 4 - + - - - + - none
16 Batu Dua Ambon Muslim 4 - - - - - - - none
17 Hitulama Ambon Muslim 4 - - - - - - - none
18 Tiouw Saparua Christian 2 - - - - - - - none
19 Eri Ambon Christian 4 - - - - - - - none
20 Seilale Ambon Christian 4 - + - - - + - none
21 Iha Saparua Muslim 1 - - - - - - - none
22 Ouw Saparua Christian 1 - - - - - - - none
23 Booi Saparua Christian 2 - - - - - - - none
24 Saparua Kota Saparua Christian 4 - - - - - - - none (lost)
25 Tuhaha Saparua Christian 2 - + - - - + - none (lost)
26 Hulaliu Haruku Christian 2 - + - - - + - none (lost)
27 Seri Ambon Christian 2 - - - - - - - none (lost)
Sasi applied to land crops occurred in 41 villages and was most common in
Christian villages and on Haruku and Nusa Laut. Marine sasi on the other
hand, occurred only in 17 villages. It occurred equally in Muslim and Chris-
tian communities but its distribution varied significantly with village popu-
lation. It was most common in villages with 2001-3000 people and absent
from villages with fewer than 1000 people.
Occurrence of marine sasi also varied significantly from island to island, be-
ing most common on Seram and Saparua (over 50% of villages sampled on
each of these islands had marine sasi). In 18 cases, villagers indicated that
marine sasi used to be practiced but had died out in living memory. There-
fore, we can say that historically, over half of the villages in the study area
practiced some form of community-based marine management.
In six Muslim villages people did not describe their sasi institution as adat
sasi. These are tabulated under the name ‘other’. Here, the role played by adat
leaders, if any, is not clear. Funds generated from sasi harvests may be shared
with the local mosque or Muslim leader, but religious authorities also have
no defined role in decision-making or enforcement.
In church sasi it is the church that plays the most visible role. Prayers per-
formed publicly by villagers at the time of the closing of an area to harvest-
ing, function as a deterrent to potential rule-breakers. There were 22 villages
that had only church sasi on land, and 4 villages where church sasi applied
to marine resources. Church and adat sasi occurred together in 10 villages.
All of these had land sasi, and four also had marine sasi. The recent history
of the sasi institution in Central Maluku is characterized by a movement of
authority from adat to church leaders and (since 1979) to newly defined vil-
lage governments.
The type of sasi (adat, church or other) did not vary significantly with island or
village size class (Chi Square test, p>0.05) but of course was correlated with
religion, as both church and ‘other’ sasi are specific to one religious group.
INVENTORY 123
The use of sanctions varied with the type of sasi. The use of physical pun-
ishment and financial fines is the rule for adat and ‘other’ forms of sasi. In
church sasi, participants make a common commitment through prayer to
obey the sasi rules and it is God who punishes offenders. Where adat is still
strong or where village government controls sasi, the role of the church is
limited to providing support through a prayer at sasi ceremonies.
Traditionally, the opening and closing of harvest times and fishing grounds
under sasi was accompanied by adat ceremonies. Now, the ceremony may be
restricted to a prayer, although villagers in Haruku and Nolloth still perform
more elaborate adat ceremonies. Regardless of their size, island or religion,
roughly a third of sasi villages carried out ceremonies. Ceremonies were most
common in villages that had both adat sasi and church sasi. In the majority
(75%) of cases, however, fewer than 100 people attended.
What villagers called marine sasi covered a number of different types of ma-
rine management arrangements. The sasi rules may or may not be written
down and the kewang, usually responsible for monitoring and enforcement,
may be active or dormant. There were always rules restricting access to the
village territory. There may or may not be closed seasons or closed areas. Al-
most all village institutions had bans on destructive gear types. In most cases
124 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
this supported the national ban on blast and poison fishing. In several cases
other gears (lift nets, fine mesh nets, certain fish traps destructive to coral)
were also regulated. In none of the community-controlled fishing areas was
there any limit on total catch. Instead, sasi rules controlled harvest intensity
by limiting the number of persons having access to the village territory and
sasi area, by defining the length of the harvest period, by restricting the size
of individual fish or shellfish that could be landed and by banning destructive
gear types (Table 6.2).
TABLE 6.2 – Fisheries rules and marine management scores in Central Maluku: differences be-
tween villages according to the presence, absence, or history of having sasi
Attribute/activity Marine sasi Lost marine Any sasi No sasi All villages
n=17 sasi (land, sea or village) n=17 n=63
n=20 n=46
Non-sasi auction of 0 3 3 0 3
harvesting rights 0% 15% 7% 0% 5%
Gear ban 16 13 37 11 48
94% 72% 83% 65% 77%
Every village regulated different species, and in many cases, only one or two.
The most common species managed under sasi were top shell (Trochus nilo-
ticus), sea cucumbers and small pelagic fishes. On average, a sasi village had
rules affecting four of the following groups of marine organisms: corals,
mangroves, pelagic fish, ornamental fish, reef (food) fish, sea cucumbers or
shellfish. Over half of the sasi villages sold or auctioned harvesting rights for
one or more species.
When there is an access restriction and the time comes when sasi is declared
open, the resources may be harvested in a number of ways: by individual
fishers living in the community (e.g. Ihamahu), by the whole community in a
single communal harvest (e.g. Haruku), or by individuals from within or out-
side the community who have paid for the privilege of access and withdrawal
(e.g. Nolloth, Itawaka, Kabau, Pelauw).
PERFORMANCE 125
In a majority of villages, the national ban on blast and poison fishing was
supported, either formally (i.e. written as a legal village or sasi regulation) or
informally (by verbal decree of the village leader). In sasi villages, support for
this rule was particularly strong. In villages that had only land or village sasi,
fisheries rules were still relatively common compared to villages with no sasi
at all. Overall, the average marine management score for Central Maluku
was low because some villages had few or no rules affecting the fishery. Also,
because sasi was applied to relatively small areas and few species, there was
no comprehensive area or species management in place anywhere.
From the inventory we see that in many villages marine sasi, land sasi, or both
have disappeared. Interestingly, the village leaders who were interviewed for
the inventory were unfailingly positive about sasi, even if it was no longer
functional in their village. It was generally valued for economic reasons: it
benefits the people by securing a maximum harvest and controlling theft.
However, some respondents mentioned environmental benefits, for example
a village authority in Amahai who stated: ‘Sasi has to be preserved because
it is a positive force. The population is rising and people want to take every-
thing which will ruin the resources.’
6.2 Performance
However, fishers do have concerns about equity in cases where harvest rights
are sold or auctioned, whether this happens under sasi or by any other ar-
rangement. Fishers prefer a system where direct benefits of a management
arrangement are shared and they find the sale of harvest rights to people
outside the village to be particularly objectionable. If benefits are not seen to
be fairly distributed or if they accrue to outsiders, this can lead to non-compli-
ance to management rules. On the other hand, where the decision-makers
are respected, a rental, auction or purchase arrangement can be very efficient
126 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
and also reasonably equitable in that the profits are used for the benefit of all
through community development.
The possible impact of sasi on the broader (pelagic) fisheries resource is not
clear. In seeking to document the impact of the sasi institution on fisheries,
one significant problem is the general lack of ‘fit’ between the sasi institu-
tion and the modern fishery that is geared to deep-water pelagics. Fishers’
perceptions of declining stocks pertain to the impact of all forms of resource
management as it exists in Maluku and not specifically to sasi. Fish catches of
artisanal and small scale fishers are in decline throughout the study area, sig-
naling the failure of centralized fisheries management regulations (Novaczek
et al. 2001), to conserve resources and fairly allocate resource withdrawal
rights in Maluku.
It is unlikely that, through protecting small areas of coral reef and sea grass
bed, the sasi institution provides even an incremental and indirect benefit to
the larger fishery, unless these inshore areas happen to be critical spawning
or nursery habitat for pelagics. However, the ethic underlying adat and sasi,
and the example of management provided by functional marine sasi may well
have positive psychological impacts on fishers. Through their familiarity with
sasi, villagers are led to embrace fundamental and important management
concepts packaged in a culturally acceptable way.
The 1970s, at the eve of the introduction of the new formal government struc-
ture, was one period of decline of sasi (Table 6.3 and 6.4). This decade was
one of rapid economic growth, poverty alleviation programs in the villages
and social change. A fundamental factor in the loss of sasi was confusion or
conflict in the village or between village authorities. Political instability and
a dysfunctional kewang invited non-compliance and led to abandonment of
operational rules. Sasi being taken over by the church, either because of such
conflicts or in an attempt to improve compliance, was a common scenario.
The church, interested only in land sasi on coconuts, did not get involved in
marine sasi, which in some cases then declined.
TABLE 6.3 – Attrition of sasi institution (i.e. total loss of all forms) on each island. Note: one village
in Ambon never had sasi
Sasi institution lost in Ambon Seram Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Total
percentages (n=19) (n=11) (n=1) (n=0) (n=6) (n=1) (n=19)
lost in 1990s 16 5 0 16 5 42
lost in 1980s 11 0 0 0 0 11
lost in1970s 16 0 0 5 0 21
lost earlier 16 0 0 10 0 26
Total 58 5 0 32 5 100
128 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
The 1980s was a period of relative stability. Villages where sasi was alive and
functioning remained stable. In some villages there was a tendency to revital-
ize sasi. The 1990s is a period of further decline of sasi. The period between
the 1970s and 1990s covers one generation. Modernization and commer-
cialization as a result of improved communication infrastructure and educa-
tion and the expansion of market relations, influence the local culture and
especially younger generations. The generational change, together with the
rapid rate of social, economic and political change in Maluku in the 1990s is
most likely the reason why sasi is now suffering such relatively rapid losses.
TABLE 6.4 – Attrition of sasi institution in villages of various sizes and religion. Note: the village
that never had sasi is a village of Butonese immigrants, size class 4 (>3000 people)
Sasi institution lost in Size class Size class Size class Size class Muslim Christian
percentages ≤1000 1001-2000 2001-3000 >3000 (n=9) (n=10)
(n=19) (n=5) (n=5) (n=1) (n=8)
lost in 1990s 11 16 5 10 21 21
1980s 5 5 0 0 5 5
1970s 5 0 0 16 5 16
Earlier 5 5 0 16 16 11
Total 26 26 5 42 47 53
The case studies underscore the inventory evidence that contemporary de-
cline of sasi stems often from conflicts (see Novaczek et al. 2001). Conflicts
can in some cases be related to the social change that resulted from the in-
troduction of the new village structure by the national government. Also, the
election system has opened up possibilities for opportunists with vested inter-
ests to take the position of village leader. On the other hand, where traditional
authorities merged into the new government, adat and sasi have remained a
significant aspect of village life. Overlap between the traditional and formal
governments proved to be essential in the prolongation of sasi.
Of all the forms of sasi, marine sasi, though less generally prevalent, appears
to be relatively robust. Whereas sasi generally has suffered severe losses in
recent years, marine sasi has been relatively stable and even shows signs of
revitalization in the 1990s. This revival comes basically out of the heartfelt at-
tachment of people to adat in general and sasi in particular, but also the com-
mercial value of marine products such as Trochus niloticus, other shellfish
and sea-cucumber for foreign markets is an important incentive to keep or
reinstitutionalize sasi. The process is further being facilitated and reinforced
by intervening NGOs, government and academic supporters who see the po-
tential value of sasi as a resource management system.
Where the people do not expect to benefit directly, they seem not interested
in revitalization of sasi. A lack of transparency in distribution of benefits fur-
ther hampers the process. There is a risk that in villages where sasi is being
used as a tool to extract resource rents that sasi then turns into ‘a government
thing’ controlled by local elites. This is a disincentive for fishers to follow the
new sasi rules.
Church sasi is the most common type of land sasi in Christian villages. The
church also has the potential to play an important role in marine sasi. Church
sasi derives it strength from the strong religious beliefs of rural villagers. The
church is more stable than ever-changing village governments. Church sasi,
when applied to coconuts, provides direct individual benefits to the people
and so is valued. Past shifts of authority over land sasi from adat to the church
helped to shore up the effectiveness of the institution when the kewang lost
enforcement capacity. In many cases, villagers believe that the threat of sanc-
tion by God is a more powerful deterrent than the sanctions imposed by the
kewang. As seen from the inventory, where sasi is taken over by the church,
adat sasi as well as marine sasi may be lost. However, Haruku and Nolloth
provide examples where introduction of church sasi actually strengthened
the local institution. Therefore, in sasi systems that are being revitalized, the
church can play an important supporting role.
In some Muslim villages, sasi has evolved away from adat. Ceremonies and
inherited positions have been abandoned, and religious leaders also have not
developed a direct role in the institution. Sasi has become more of a com-
mercial transaction between the village government and whoever wins the
auction for resource harvesting rights. Nevertheless, this also appears to be
a stable and resilient institution. The benefits and drawbacks of this form of
sasi require further investigation, but the performance analysis did show that
this sort of arrangement leads to problems in compliance when local fishers
see benefits accruing only to elites.
It was clear that sasi flourishes where the village leader is legitimate (from the
raja family line) and where he collaborates harmoniously and honestly with
130 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
adat leaders and the church. Ostrom (1990) mentions reciprocity and trust
as important conditions for successful common property institutions. From
our study we would add legitimacy as another key factor for success. Appar-
ently, the discrepancy between the theory of formal administrative structure
and the de facto power structure that involves traditional authorities, makes
village politics susceptible to manipulation and instability. Amendment of
the law on village government (No. 5, 1979) may be required to accommodate
the need for legitimate adat authority figures in rural villages and increase
stability of local government.
Because the constitutional rules of sasi are part of adat, and ‘adat is some-
thing that can not be changed’ as village officials in Nolloth stated, the proc-
ess of revival concerns the re-establishment and adaptation of operational
rules (harvest regulations, access rules) and collective level arrangements (re-
establishment of the kewang). Adat still forms the basis of sasi, but a redefi-
nition of responsibilities and involvement of non-adat institutions, i.e. the
church, the police and higher government levels, is possible. Such adaptation
of the constitutional rules carries certain risks and must be advanced with
care and tact.
6.4 Conclusion
Berkes and Folke (1998) explain that there are social mechanisms behind
social-ecological practices that deal with disturbances and so enhance institu-
tional and ecological resilience. Various social-ecological practices they men-
tion are found in sasi, e.g temporal restrictions of harvest, intergenerational
knowledge, role of stewards, taboos and regulations, sanctions and ceremo-
nies etc. However, our study shows that these mechanisms are components
of the institution itself, and as a consequence apt to change. What makes the
institution, including all these components, strong (and thus resilient) is that
CONCLUSION 131
The majority of central Maluku villages still retain some form of local sasi
institution. Within living memory, half of the villages covered by the inven-
tory had local marine management rules. Yet, by 1997-98, only a quarter of
them had rules pertaining to marine management. The traditional sasi style
of resource management, involving ceremony, volunteerism and inherited
status, is most common in homogeneous villages in the 1000-3000 popula-
tion range. Marine sasi is most common in villages of 2000-3000 people and
is most usually administered by adat or local government leaders, with the
church playing only a supporting role. Marine sasi is least evident on Ambon
Island, close to the largest regional urban center and a rapidly developing
consumer culture.
The sasi institution thus is in decline and in many villages has disappeared
(for more details see Chapter 7), but the need for effective conservation and
management is more urgent than ever. In the study area there are overall
declines in social interaction and cooperation, compliance to fisheries rules,
fish catches, and environmental health. Yet, the majority of villagers are still
directly or indirectly dependent on the fishery. Collapsing inshore fish catches
have driven subsistence fishers ever farther out to sea. Their fishing grounds
now overlap the area utilized by commercial and industrial fishers and con-
flict between the sectors is inevitable if management and conflict resolution
arrangements are not set in place.
The existence of sasi means that certain important management concepts are
widely known and valued as part of local culture. Village leaders’ perceptions
of sasi are that it is a useful institution. From this we can see that using sasi
as the basis for development of a modern management institution can be
considered to be efficient because through sasi these core concepts are gener-
ally known and seen to be legitimate. This reduces potential costs of public
education and enforcement.
Application of sasi to marine resources has always been limited in scope and
some modern forms of marine management date back only a few decades
132 PRESENCE , PERFORMANCE , AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF SASI
(Zerner 1994a). Sasi practices vary from village to village. In no case is man-
agement under sasi comprehensive; only small areas of shallow water and
few species are regulated. Nevertheless, the existence of sasi means that cer-
tain important management and consevation concepts are widely known and
valued as part of local culture. These include:
• The concept of open and closed areas / open and closed seasons.
• The concept of community tenure rights over a marine area.
• The concept of limiting access to resources.
• Controlled harvest and distribution of benefits.
• Locally developed and agreed upon regulations. These may be specific to
the village (limitation of gear types, size of fish or shellfish harvestable) or
may reinforce national laws (prohibition of blast fishing, use of poison).
• Local wardens or enforcers (the kewang) who have defined rules of proc-
ess as well as prescribed sanctions to impose.
• A responsibility shared by all residents to report violations of sasi rules.
• Methods in place for advising all residents at regular intervals of the sub-
stance of sasi rules.
• An overall goal of improving or maintaining community welfare which,
being rooted in adat or the concept of the unity of man with nature, is
consistent with modern concepts of sustainable use.
• A hierarchical institutional structure wherein various tasks are divided
among clearly defined bodies (i.e. the village government, the kewang, or
the church).
• Low or no financial cost to formal government i.e. kewang members and
church leaders involved are not paid wages, although they may receive a
share of harvests. Local government offices may also receive income from
the sale of harvesting rights for communal resources.
• Resiliency and the ability to evolve.
Sasi thus offers a solid foundation for resource management in the region.
It provides a structure that is culturally embedded, a functional enforcement
mechanism, and a set of rules and regulations that are acceptable to most.
The familiarity with management concepts, the acknowledgement of a need
to protect natural resources, perceived benefits and general appreciation of
sasi makes it highly legitimate. With a formally acknowledged kewang who
have access to funds, training and a network, enforcement of regulations can
be carried out locally in a legitimate way. With the assistance of NGOs, scien-
tists and government, (co-) management structures could be established that
include the principles and components of sasi.
From our study we identified the following factors that contribute positively
to the resilience of sasi as a local institution and therefore should be consid-
ered during the process of revitalizing and modernizing the institution:
CONCLUSION 133
1 A legitimate village leader, descending from the traditional royal raja line
or being a traditional authority. Legitimacy contributes positively to the
execution of his authority with regard to sasi.
2 A village head elected with a large majority. Fragile leadership and politi-
cal instability hampers sasi.
3 A large overlap between the traditional and formal authorities in the vil-
lage government leads to prolongation of traditional structures including
sasi.
4 Critical for the process of revitalization is acknowledgement of the tradi-
tional village authorities within the new structure.
5 Retain traditional titles and structures as well as elements of ceremony,
to provide a strong spiritual and cultural basis for resource management,
but not alienate new generations of fishers.
6 Acknowledgement of institutions such as the kewang leads to effective
enforcement of sasi regulations. Rights and mandates between informal
and formal structures (police) should be clearly defined.
7 Collaboration between management institutions and stable religious au-
thorities (church and Muslim institutions) lead to higher resilience of
sasi.
8 The support and participation of the younger generation for sasi as part of
a value system (adat) that needs to be adaptive to modern times.
9 Direct (equitable) benefits for villagers and control over revenues of re-
source management. This also leads to incentives to comply with the
regulations.
10 Acknowledgement of powers and responsibilities within the framework
of provincial and national legislation. This would provide local institu-
tions with more capacity to deal with external threats and allow them to
be involved in the planning, execution and evaluation of fisheries develop-
ment projects and formal fisheries laws.
Collaboration, trust and legitimacy are a function of a village size and ho-
mogeneity. When the population exceeds 3000 people and/or the village
becomes heterogeneous, the cohesive mechanisms break down. In these vil-
lages another type of management institution i.e. not traditional sasi, needs
to be established.
Other researchers and policy makers have suggested that sasi could be the
basis for decentralized regional management bodies (Zerner 1994; Nikiju-
luw and Susilowati 2000; Thorburn 2000). Our findings suggest that this
could indeed be a fruitful approach to the development of a more effective,
adaptive and culturally embedded system for fisheries and coastal zone man-
agement in eastern Indonesia. However, it is also recognized that sasi has its
limitations, that it is neither a homogeneous nor comprehensive institution,
and that the relative roles of traditional and religious leaders, local governing
elites and other participants in some future co-management arrangement
have yet to be defined. This will not be a simple task.
135
Even though sasi has been in place over 400 years, in some parts of Central
Maluku it is disappearing. While in many villages on the Lease Islands, Am-
bon and Seram sasi, or remnants of it, are still present, entirely functioning
systems are becoming rare. Sasi is dynamic through time and has adapted
and changed under influence of trade (the spice wars), colonisation (by re-
spectively the Portuguese, the English, and the Dutch), religion (Christianity
and Islam), and the imposition of nationally defined government structures
in the 1970s. Current threats to the system are commercialisation, moderni-
sation and a general loss of traditional values. Interestingly, some villages
have been able to maintain a strong and functional sasi system both on land
(sasi darat) and water (sasi laut). In 1996-98 a study was carried out to study
the presence of sasi, the degree of activity and the reasons for loss or survival
of sasi. The results of this study can be useful in the revitalisation of tradi-
tional institutions or in the process of institution building in the context of
co-management.
7.1 Introduction
Based on: I.H.T. Harkes and I. Novaczek (2003). Institutional Resilience of Marine Sasi, a Tra-
ditional Fisheries Management System in Central Maluku, Indonesia. In: G.A. Persoon, D.M.E.
van Est, and P. Sajise (eds.) Co-management of Natural Resources in Asia: a Comparative Perspective.
NIAS Press, Copenhagen, pp. 63-85.
136 INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF MARINE SASI
Various scientists have studied sasi (Zerner 1994; von Benda-Beckmann et al.
1995; Nikijuluw 1995; Thorburn 2000). Yet, the existence of sasi and its dy-
namics have never been studied on an overall scale. Our research project cov-
ered most islands and villages in Central Maluku. The results are described
in this paper which tries to analyse where and when sasi – or aspects of sasi
– disappeared, which factors caused it to decline, but also which factors made
it endure over time and/or stimulated villages to re-establish sasi. Under-
standing this process and the factors behind it will help to develop, maintain,
or revitalize sasi and other fisheries management systems.
The first part of this paper presents the general patterns of decline of sasi in
the region and marine sasi in particular. The second part goes deeper and
based on case studies tries to uncover the changes and reasons for break-
down or strengthening of sasi. In the conclusion the results of the two studies
are synthesized and factors identified that play a role in the continued exist-
ence of sasi.
TABLE 7.1 – Attrition of sasi institution (i.e. total loss of all forms) on each island.
Note, one village in Ambon never had sasi.
Sasi institu- Seram Ambon Haruku Saparua Nusa Laut Total
tion lost
TABLE 7.2 – Attrition of sasi institution in villages of various sizes and religion. Note, the village
that never had sasi is a village of Butonese immigrants, size class 4 (>3000 people).
Sasi institution Size class 1 Size class 2 Size class 3 Size class 4 Muslim Christian
lost (≤1000) (1001-2000) (2001-3000) (>3000)
lost in 1990s 2 3 1 2 4 4
1980s 1 1 0 0 1 1
1970s 1 0 0 3 1 3
Earlier 1 1 0 3 3 2
Total 5 5 1 8 9 10
138 INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF MARINE SASI
Losses have been steady in both Muslim and Christian villages (Table 7.2),
but there is a clear difference when you consider village size. Losses have
been greatest in size class 4 (>3000 people) and much less in size class 3
(2001-3000). Apparently, there is an optimum size for villages with regard
to sasi.
In over half the cases where marine sasi has been lost, the loss occurred prior
to 1970 (Table 7.3, 7.4). Since then, marine sasi has been relatively stable
compared to land sasi. Most losses in the 1970s to 1990s have been in either
size class 1 (≤1000) or size class 4 (>3000) villages (Table 7.3), and in the
1990s the only recorded loss was on Ambon Island (Table 7.4).
TABLE 7.3 – Attrition of marine sasi in relation to village size and religion
Marine sasi Size Size class 2 Size Size Muslim Christian Total
lost class 1 (1001-2000) class 3 class 4
(≤1000) (2001-3000) (>3000)
1990s 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1980s 3 0 0 0 0 3 3
1970s 2 1 0 1 0 4 4
Lost earlier 2 4 1 3 3 7 10
Subtotal: lost 7 5 1 5 4 14 18
Number still 0 4 10 3 5 12 17
existing
Never had 6 7 6 9 11 17 28
marine sasi
Total 13 16 17 17 20 43 63
FACTORS INFLUENCING ACTIVITY OF SASI 139
1990s 0 1 0 0 0 1 (6%)
1980s 0 2 0 0 1 3 (17%)
1970s 0 1 0 2 1 4 (22%)
Earlier 1 2 2 2 3 10 (56%)
Total 1 6 2 4 5 18 (100%)
The level of activity of marine sasi was measured in every village using in-
dicators for the presence of sasi (rules), closures (open and closed season),
consistency of application (frequency over previous 3 years) and local effort
(signage and enforcement). The maximum activity score is 12. Using this
system we find that land sasi is significantly more active in villages with a
population size between 2001-3000 (ANOVA, p≤0.01).
Homogeneity status: 1 = 95-100% is of dominant religion, 2 = 60-80% is of dominant religion. * Sasi moved to
church in 1992; ** Sasi moved to church in 1995.
TABLE 7.6 – Type of sasi in villages that have or had or never had, marine sasi
Current status of village Adat sasi village Church sasi village with Muslim sasi village
(n=15) no adat sasi (n=21) (n=6)
Weak leadership and conflicts seem to be key elements in the erosion of sasi.
Reasons that villagers gave for the partial or complete loss of the institution
were: conflicts within the village government, conflicts between the village
leader and adat authorities, conflicts between the village leader and the ke-
wang, conflicts among church organisations, and conflicts over land. Con-
flicts between adat leaders and the village government leading to erosion of
sasi were reported only in Christian villages and never on Nusa Laut.
Confusion over land and rights was in some cases due to changes in govern-
ment unit boundaries. Changes in administrative boundaries and the effects
of World War II were most prevalent on Ambon and Nusa Laut. In addition,
pressure from worsening economic conditions has been mounting since the
collapse of the clove price in the early 1990s. Crop failure and decline of the
resource were also mentioned as causing sasi to collapse.
on Ambon Island. In eight cases, the village government delegated the au-
thority over sasi to the church, in many cases causing sasi adat and marine
sasi to decline. As of 1997, 12 of the remaining sasi villages were affected by
political or religious conflicts. In other words, in about a quarter of remain-
ing sasi villages the institution is under strain.
The findings from the in-depth interviews conducted as part of the institu-
tional analysis in the six villages, underscore the link between the different
components (objectives, rules), the players and the external context of the sasi
institution, and illustrate the interactions among these through time.
Although Nolloth and Haruku villages both have a strong sasi institution, the
types of sasi are distinct. Whereas Nolloth can be described as a system de-
signed primarily to provide resource rent for the village government, Haruku’s
sasi has more to do with fair distribution of fish resources and conservation.
Nolloth is a stable village, with legitimate leadership and strong representa-
tion of traditional authorities. The kewang is functional and, together with
the village head, serious in the prosecution of offenders. The harvest rights
of sasi are reserved for the village cooperative (KUD) and income accrues to
the village government and the harvesters. Other villagers benefit indirectly
through village development. In Haruku, a more important role is ascribed
to the kewang and relatively less to the village head, except when he is also a
traditional authority. Kewang members feel a strong responsibility towards
sasi. The harvest is communal and distributed among the villagers. Recently,
the villagers in Haruku have become divided as a result of the installation of
a new village head. This leader, elected with a slender majority, supports sasi
but also favours mining development that threatens the resources under sasi.
This has led to confusion and a dysfunctional village government, a situation
that in turn poses a threat to sasi.
In Hulaliu, conflicts between the village head and kewang, and in particular
problems with accountability for the use of resource rents in the past, lie at
the root of the decline of sasi. The current leader is trying to revitalize sasi, but
his position is unstable because he lacks the support of a large part of the vil-
lage population. The revitalization process is thereby threatened. In Tuhaha
there have been problems in the past between formal and traditional authori-
ties. There is also a tendency to revitalize sasi, but the relationship between
the village government and traditional authorities first needs to be restored.
The village government, which is currently only partly functional, has to be
reorganized before a kewang can be installed.
RESULTS OF THE COMPARATIVE CASE - STUDY 143
In the remainder of this section we describe the various elements of sasi and
provide an analysis of how sasi functions and persists under different condi-
tions.
A shift from communal harvests to the sale of marine harvest rights has oc-
curred in most villages where sasi was revitalized by a local government. Al-
though in most villages the principles of sasi are valued and sasi is perceived
as ‘a good thing’, many fishers we interviewed object to the auctioning of
harvest rights, especially to outsiders. In both Tuhaha and Hulaliu, village
heads plan to auction the harvest rights and use sasi revenues for village de-
velopment. However, fishers declared that they would respect sasi only if they
would get direct benefits from a communal harvest.
Villagers may be kept satisfied with village development projects, but there
may be problems when village income and revenues are not transparent. For
example, in Nolloth in the 1980s profits appeared to be used for the personal
benefits of the village head at the time, rather than for the public good. As a
result, sasi nearly broke down.
the base on which the fishers make their day-to-day decisions about compli-
ance. Collective-choice rules define the decision-making process for closures,
access, and enforcement. The third level, the constitutional rules, is defined
through adat. Adat prescribes which persons are involved in sasi and what
their role is, e.g. who or which clan is responsible for decision-making, con-
flict resolution, execution of ceremonies and enforcement (see also Ostrom
1990).
Over the last decades operational rules have been modified. Boundaries of sasi
areas, frequency of open and closed seasons, division of benefits, restrictions
on gear use, etc. all may and do change. In practical management terms, this
affects the function of sasi, but does not threaten its continued existence. On
the other hand, where the constitutional rules were challenged, e.g. a shift of
authority from the kewang to the church, the loss of the kewang, the introduc-
tion of police as enforcers, or the promulgation of national fisheries legisla-
tion, then the structure or legal basis of the sasi institution changed and this
can lead to disappearance of part or all of a local sasi institution. Adaptation
of constitutional rules may also, however, strengthen sasi. For example, in
Haruku where marine sasi is enforced by the kewang, the people requested
the church to become involved in land sasi in a period when theft was sig-
nificant. Since that time, the church functions complementary to the kewang,
who are still mainly responsible for marine resources.
Our study shows that the degree of overlap is decisive for the continuation
and stability of sasi. However, some villages have been more successful in
combining the formal and traditional government structures (i.e. Nolloth)
than others where traditional authorities became marginalized (i.e. Tuhaha).
Where newcomers entered the village government through elections, vil-
lages became politically unstable. The villages where sasi ceased to function
had problems with village leaders who did not successfully collaborate with
traditional authorities. In Nolloth, where the traditional authorities function
within the new system, the sasi institution is strong.
The rituals and knowledge of sasi are traditionally passed on from father to
son within certain lineages, for example, through that of the head of the ke-
wang. The rituals are secret and involve an almost extinct indigenous lan-
guage (bahasa tana). In order to preserve traditional sasi, it is imperative that
the process of passing down of knowledge is perpetuated. Many youngsters,
however, have lost interest in sasi. The process of ‘modernisation’ acceler-
ates as the younger generations leave to study in Ambon city where adat is
regarded as a superstitious belief. There is a risk that when ‘the keepers of
sasi knowledge’ die, they will take their knowledge with them. The support
and participation of the younger generation, therefore, is necessary for the
success of sasi as a viable management institution.
7.6.4 Leadership
Before 1979 the position of village leader was hereditary; nowadays the vil-
lage head is elected by the people. Where government officials lack knowl-
edge and are poorly informed about village issues, decision-making may
rest almost exclusively with the village head. In principle, the village head
is elected for four years. Yet, elections can be subject to manipulation and
in other cases the people automatically ‘elect’ the legitimate (traditional) vil-
lage head. The modern village head may therefore hold a very powerful and
authoritarian position and as such he is also a key decision-maker in the sasi
institution.
Our results support those of Riedel (1886) and Volker (1921) who maintained
that compliance to sasi rules depended largely on strong and tactful leader-
ship. The village head must be honest and respected or sasi is undermined.
Local legitimacy is very important and this still stems largely from being part
of the raja family line. In Haruku, for instance, the village head is not a long-
term resident of the village and suspected to represent the interests of the
146 INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF MARINE SASI
External interests may influence the election of a village head, as was report-
ed in Haruku and Hutumuri. Elections can be manipulated either in favour
of or against traditional leaders. Under the Indonesian system, all candidates
must be screened and approved by the government. At this stage, popular
candidates may be disqualified, or some votes may simply be neglected dur-
ing the election process. So, on one hand lingering adat structures may make
nonsense of the concept of democratic elections, while on the other tradi-
tional leaders with broad popular support may also be vulnerable.
7.6.5 Boundaries
Marine sasi is generally applied to shallow inshore areas. Outside the sasi
area, other parts of the village territory, including deep water beyond the
fringing reef, may be rented out to outsiders. Generally, boundaries of the
sasi and other rented areas are clearly defined, have remained largely the
same over the years, and are generally acknowledged. Fishers may accept ar-
eas of restricted access without complaint, but they do have reservations. For
some non-sasi rented areas, the lack of legitimacy is compensated by a strong
enforcement mechanism. Crucial in acceptance of boundaries of restricted
areas are legitimacy of the leaders, direct benefits for the excluded users and
the presence of a kewang (local enforcers).
The traditional kewang is highly legitimate and not in the least because they
enforce the law without showing favouritism. The police have the formal au-
thority to implement the rules, but they are felt to act arbitrarily and therefore
not trusted by the people. The effectiveness of the police is also hampered by
the fact that they reside far from the village and when needed, they take too
long to arrive. In villages that have no active kewang enforcement is difficult.
THE ROAD TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY 147
7.6.7 Externalities
In and out-migration and (limited) tourism have no impact on village de-
mography and appear to pose no threat to traditional institutions. Tourism
in Haruku, stimulated by sasi ceremonies, may even help support the institu-
tion. Compared to the villages on Ambon, the communication and transpor-
tation links of the villages on Haruku and Saparua are limited. By contrast,
Ambon Island villages (Seri and Hutumuri) are heavily influenced by their
proximity to Ambon city. It is here that the loss of adat ideology and tradition
is largest and appreciation of sasi the least. Apparently, the greater involve-
ment of people in the process of modernisation and globalisation affect the
appreciation that people have for sasi and traditional structures. This is an
important aspect to take into account when reinstitutionalising sasi or devel-
oping a comparable management institution that must be widely applicable.
to higher levels of government. The sasi institution does not offer villagers
the ability to intervene in regional development planning and licensing of
mining operations. The kewang is powerless to prevent pollution from min-
ing activities affecting sasi resources, and there is no provincial or national
management body to which they can appeal.
National laws and programmes are implemented through the provincial, dis-
trict and sub-district government offices, but information on fisheries and
environmental law rarely reaches the village level. Knowledge of fisheries
regulations is fragmented and generally fisheries regulations are poorly im-
plemented. There are no government patrol boats in the area, and where it
comes to protection of fishing rights, the villages are left to their own devices.
This may motivate people to work together in defence of local resources. On
the other hand, if sasi as an institution remains disconnected from govern-
mental power centres, people may give up local operational rules because
they are ineffective against externalities.
The tendency to revitalize sasi is fed by the appreciation of sasi by the people,
not just as a management system, but as a cultural phenomenon. In Nolloth
and Haruku, where sasi is still strong, people explained: ‘Sasi has a spirit,
and everybody carries it because it is adat and part of our culture.’ It is at the
constitutional level that sasi as an institution has its strongest resilience. The
constitutional rules of sasi are based on and part of adat, and because they
cannot be separated from the local culture, it is at this level that sasi as an in-
stitution has its strongest resilience. The embeddedness in adat explains why
sasi is still spiritually and ideologically significant, even where the practical
execution of sasi has vanished.
In Hulaliu and Tuhaha the village elites are seriously attempting to revitalize
sasi. In both cases the reason for revitalising sasi has less to do with its spir-
itual significance than with the possibility of controlling common property
THE REVIVAL OF SASI IN CENTRAL MALUKU 149
In recent years local NGOs, such as Yayasan Hualopu, have been working
in the Lease Islands. They provided villagers with information on sustain-
able fisheries development and encouraged local leaders to embark on the
management of village territorial waters. In 1997, for example, Yayasan Hua-
lopu was engaged in a program of mapping village marine territories and
facilitating the development of local management plans. In this work they
tried to capitalize on the basis that sasi provides and encouraged the rein-
stallation of kewangs and the revival of the island-level institutions (latupati)
with an emphasis on conflict resolution and management planning. They
were supported by a number of academics from Ambon-based universities,
some Fisheries Agency staff, and others from the government research in-
stitute LIPI, also based in Ambon. The general plan was to promote develop-
ment of a new law at the provincial level which could give legal recognition
to the right of villages to enter into marine resource management and erect
kewang-style management organisations. The aim of these supporters of sasi
is clearly resource management and conservation.
Hence, in the process of revitalization there are three streams of thought that
must be reconciled: the wish of the village fishers to preserve adat culture
and share in the benefits from fisheries resources while protecting their ter-
ritories from outsiders; the desire of local governments to extract resource
rents; and the push by academics, environmentalists and managers to de-
velop viable local fisheries conservation and management.
150 INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF MARINE SASI
7.8 Conclusion
Before the 1970s a large number of villages lost sasi due to post World War
II social, administrative and economic change, internal village conflicts and
other reasons that were difficult to trace (Novaczek et al. 2001). The more re-
cent breakdown of sasi has occurred in two distinct periods and villagers are
able to articulate reasons for decline in their village.
The 1970s, at the eve of the introduction of the new formal government
structure (Law No. 5, 1979), was one period of decline. A fundamental factor
in the loss of sasi was confusion or conflict in the village or between village
authorities, which undermined the legitimacy of the village leader or the in-
stitution itself. This decade was one of rapid economic growth, poverty alle-
viation programs in the villages and social change. Political instability and/or
a dysfunctional kewang invited non-compliance and led to abandonment of
operational rules. Sasi being taken over by the church, either because of such
conflicts or in an attempt to improve compliance, was a common scenario.
The church, interested only in land sasi on coconuts, did not get involved in
marine sasi, which in some cases then declined.
The 1980s was a period of relative stability. Villages where sasi was alive and
functioning remained stable. In some villages there was a tendency to revital-
ize sasi.
The 1990s is a period of further decline of sasi. The period between the 1970s
and 1990s covers one generation. Modernization and commercialization as
a result of improved communication infrastructure and education and the
expansion of market relations, influence the local culture and especially
younger generations. The generational change, together with the rapid rate
of social, economic and political change in Maluku in the 1990s is most
likely the reason why sasi is now suffering such relatively rapid losses.
The case studies underscore the inventory evidence that contemporary de-
cline of sasi stems often from conflicts (see Novaczek et al. 2001). Conflicts
can in some cases be related to the social change that resulted from the in-
troduction of the new village structure by the national government. Also, the
election system has opened up possibilities for opportunists with vested in-
terests to take the position of village leader. On the other hand, where tradi-
tional authorities (saniri negeri) merged into the new government, adat and
sasi have remained a significant aspect of village life. Overlap between the
traditional and formal government proved to be essential in the prolongation
of sasi.
Of all the forms of sasi, marine sasi, though less generally prevalent, appears
to be relatively robust. Whereas sasi generally has suffered severe losses in
recent years, marine sasi has been relatively stable and even shows signs of
revitalization in the 1990s. This revival comes basically out of the heartfelt at-
tachment of people to adat in general and sasi in particular, but also the com-
mercial value of marine products such as Trochus niloticus, other shellfish
and sea-cucumber for foreign markets is an important incentive to keep or
reinstitutionalize sasi. The process is further being facilitated and reinforced
by intervening NGOs, government and academic supporters who see the po-
tential value of sasi as a resource management system.
The church also has the potential to play an important role in marine sasi.
Church sasi derives its strength from the strong religious beliefs of rural vil-
lagers. The church is more stable than ever-changing village governments.
Church sasi, when applied to coconuts, provides direct individual benefits to
the people and so is valued. Past shifts of authority over land sasi from adat
to the church helped to shore up the effectiveness of the institution when the
kewang lost enforcement capacity. In many cases, villagers believe that the
threat of sanction by God is a more powerful deterrent than the sanctions
imposed by the kewang. As seen from the inventory (Novaczek et al. 2001),
where sasi is taken over by the church, adat sasi as well as marine sasi may
be lost. However, Haruku and Nolloth provide examples where introduction
of church sasi actually strengthened the local institution. Therefore, in sasi
systems that are being revitalized, the church can play an important support-
ing role.
In some Muslim villages, sasi has evolved away from adat and become more
of a commercial transaction between the village government and whoever
wins the auction for resource harvesting rights. Ceremonies and inherited
positions have been abandoned, and religious leaders also have not devel-
oped a direct role in the institution. Nevertheless, this also appears to be a
stable and resilient institution. The benefits and drawbacks of this form of
sasi require further investigation, but the performance analysis (Novaczek et
al. 2001) did show that this sort of arrangement leads to problems in compli-
ance when local fishers see benefits accruing only to elites.
152 INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE OF MARINE SASI
Where the people do not expect to benefit directly, they seem not interested
in revitalization of sasi. A lack of transparency in distribution of benefits fur-
ther hampers the process. There is a risk that in villages where sasi is being
used as a tool to extract resource rents that sasi then turns into ‘a government
thing’ controlled by local elites. This is a disincentive for fishers to follow the
new sasi rules.
Because the constitutional rules are part of adat, and ‘adat is something that
can not be changed’ as village officials in Nolloth stated, the process of revival
concerns the re-establishment and adaptation of operational rules (harvest
regulations, access rules) and collective level arrangements (re-establishment
of the kewang). Adat still forms the basis of sasi, but a redefinition of respon-
sibilities and involvement of non-adat institutions, i.e. the church, the police
and higher government levels, is possible. Such adaptation of the constitu-
tional rules carries certain risks and must be advanced with care and tact.
It was clear that sasi flourishes where the village leader is legitimate (kepala
adat) and where he collaborates harmoniously and honestly with adat leaders
and the church. Ostrom (1990) mentions reciprocity and trust as important
conditions for successful common property institutions. From our study we
would add legitimacy as another key factor for success. Apparently, the dis-
crepancy between the theory of formal administrative structure and the de
facto power structure that involves traditional authorities, makes village poli-
tics susceptible to manipulation and instability. Amendment of the law on
village government (No. 5, 1979) may be required to accommodate the need
for legitimate adat authority figures in rural villages and increase stability of
local government.
The 1990s appear to be a critical decade, i.e. sasi must adapt to modern soci-
ety or it may, at the operational level, cease to function. According to Ostrom
(1990) well-functioning local management systems are dependent on the en-
forcement and protection and legal recognition of local rights by higher lev-
els of government. As a village organisation active in enforcement, the kewang
is more functional than the police. However, the kewang has never obtained for-
mal enforcement powers. In cases where the kewang is being revitalized, their
mandate needs to be formalized, and the kewang and police need to collaborate
within a legal construction under provincial law. One possible model is that of
Itawaka village, where as a result of a village proclamation in 1995, the kewang
became part of the official government. On the other hand, an arms length re-
lationship with local government also has certain advantages. Various models
need further investigation. Wherever the local institution is placed, it will still
require legal recognition and support from higher government levels.
the temptation to abuse the system for personal benefits is strong. The extent
to which external factors affect the social structure in the village depends
on the feedback mechanisms, i.e. the degree to which the local institution
itself can mitigate the effects of external perturbations. Holling (in Berkes
and Folke 1998) speaks in this context of adaptive management. Sasi has al-
ready outlived repeated predictions of imminent demise (Volker 1925; Cooley
1962) and is clearly both adaptive and resilient. There is therefore hope of
rebuilding the institution in the form of a modern element in co-manage-
ment, in which the needs and aspirations of the various proponents (fishers,
local governments, adat leaders, environmentalists, fisheries managers) can
be successfully accommodated.
155
In 1997-98, research into the status of sasi in Central Maluku revealed that
the management institution was under stress and facing threats that could
conceivably cause its demise (see Chapter 7). As part of the work of char-
acterizing the context of and outside influences on the local management
institution, data were collected concerning the activities and attitudes of gov-
ernment departments having jurisdiction over various aspects of fisheries
management and development. At that point in time, President Suharto was
still in power and formal fisheries management was primarily the domain
of a highly centralized national power structure. Since then, Suharto has
been removed from power and in 1999 dramatic legislative changes were
set in place that in theory devolve powers of management of coastal waters
to the provinces and districts (Thorburn 2000). These current changes are
described in Chapter 9 of this thesis.
Under national law, the sea and all its resources are considered to be the prop-
erty of the national government of Indonesia. In 1997-98, national fisheries
and coastal management consisted of rules and regulations administered by
more than 20 largely uncoordinated ministries (Nikijuluw 1996c; Kusuma-
Atmadja and Purwaka 1996). The consequences of poorly organized man-
agement structures at the national level could be seen in terms of confusion,
lack of information, and poor motivation at provincial and regional levels. Ef-
forts to redress the problems included the establishment of a national, mul-
ti-ministerial body (DKN) charged with coordinating marine development
and conservation policy. There was pressure towards decentralisation and
the national government was encouraging provinces to back up national law
by developing more detailed and locally appropriate provincial legislation.
Under Act No. 24/1992 on spatial planning, regional governments had been
given the mandate to zone coastal areas and to establish management plans
in consultation with village level governments. In 1997, policy-makers were
attempting to clarify whether the zonation of territory could be extended into
the sea, giving the province powers to zone marine waters for various com-
mercial and conservation purposes, but as of 1998, consultation with the vil-
lage level on coastal zonation and planning had barely begun. Also, for most
*Based on: I. Novaczek, J. Sopacua and I.H.T Harkes (2001) Fisheries Management in Central
Maluku, Indonesia. Marine Policy, 25: 239-249.
156 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL MALUKU
National level laws that, if enforced, affected Maluku’s artisanal fishers stem
largely from two pieces of legislation: Law No. 9/1985 on Fisheries and the
Agriculture Minister Decree No. 607/1976 concerning fishing zonation.
Consequent to these laws, the use of destructive gear types such as explosives
and poisons were prohibited. An inshore fishing zone was designated for use
by small-scale and artisanal fishers, and mesh sizes of nets were regulated.
All meshes had to be over 25 mm, whereas seine nets for tuna and skip-
jack were to exceed 60 mm. Fish habitats including coral reefs, mangroves
and sea-grass beds were specifically protected under the Biological Resource
Conservation Act No. 5/1990. Forty eight marine mammals, birds, crabs,
shellfish and coral species were declared protected species, including some
that were at that time commonly harvested in Maluku, e.g. turtles, dugong,
coconut crab, top shell, giant clams and a number of other edible shellfish.
A few marine protected areas were also set up, including Pombo Island in
Haruku Strait in Central Maluku. However, the majority were ‘paper parks’
with little or no effort made to manage or protect them.
In spite of its huge marine territory, before 1999, Indonesia had no separate
Department of Fisheries. It was a division under the Department of Agri-
culture. The country was divided into nine fisheries resource management
areas, two of which were in Maluku province. For each area there was an an-
nual exercise of setting the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), which was in turn
linked to the standard fisheries management concept of Maximum Sustain-
able Yield (MSY). There was also an attempt underway to determine the MEY
(Maximum Economic Yield) and MSOY (Maximum Social Yield).
statistics, Maluku province alone had a standing stock of fish and shrimp
totalling 2.74 million tonnes. MSY, calculated as 50% of the stock, was there-
fore estimated to be 1.37 million tonnes. Total catch in 1997 was only 24.4%
of the theoretical MSY leading the national government to promote expan-
sion of the industrial fishery.
158 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL MALUKU
However, the reliability of the government figures at the time can be ques-
tioned. One major problem with the national expansionist policy and with
the process of setting catch limits was that calculations of potential yield were
extrapolations from stock assessments conducted in the early 1980s. These
old data were augmented with catch statistics that were limited in their cov-
erage and often of unknown or suspect quality (Proceedings of the National
Conference on the Role of Communities in Coastal Resource Management
in Indonesia, 1996).
LIPI, the national research institution, had plans to develop and introduce a
system at some future time, but as of 1998 Maluku had no coherent, compre-
hensive and reliable system for collecting catch data (Purnomo 1996). It was
widely acknowledged that fishing boats from other provinces and countries
frequently failed to land their catches in Maluku, preferring to trans-ship
at sea. Thus these catches would go unrecorded. Hence, despite having, in
theory, a large available fish biomass, several important commercial stocks
were in fact already over-fished and declining in Maluku (Governor Latukon-
sina, pers. comm. 1998).
A second key issue was the lack of enforcement power to defend Indonesia’s
vast EEZ from illegal fishing by foreign and domestic boats, including live
fish traders using potassium cyanide. This illegal fishing also contributed to
the total of unrecorded fish catches (Fox 1996).
A third key issue was one of allocation: the need to balance industrial scale
fisheries serving export markets with the need for local food security and
employment for coastal communities. In the Agriculture Ministry Decree
No. 607/1976 Indonesian waters were divided into zones in an attempt to
reserve inshore waters for the artisanal and small-scale sectors. Under this
law, vessels over 5 GT were prohibited from fishing within 3 miles of shore;
vessels over 25 GT had to operate over 4 miles from shore; and vessels over
100 GT had to stay 5 miles from shore. Small boats were free to enter the
offshore fishing grounds at will. However, as this law was not effectively en-
forced, clashes between the industrial sector and coastal communities were
increasingly common (Galanggajir 1996). Those behind the drive for further
expansion of industrial fleets failed to acknowledge this problem.
provincial office of BAPPEDA was also the governor’s office. The provincial
governor held two positions: he was head of the provincial government as
well as the provincial representative of the Minister of Internal Affairs. BAP-
PEDA had a close working relationship with the Department of Internal Af-
fairs.
BAPPEDA had to that point largely concerned itself with the expansion of
fisheries rather than with management or conservation. The department was
also in charge of environmental impact assessment (EIA). However, assess-
ments that did occur were typically very narrow, not cross-sectoral.
The various agencies and institutions involved in the fishery resource man-
agement system in Maluku could be classified into two major groups; both
groups were coordinated through BAPPEDA (Table 8.1). Group I was the
group of institutions directly involved in the fishery activities and dealing
with the supply of skilled human resources in the marine and maritime are-
as; the supply of maritime facilities such as ships, harbours, and other equip-
ment; facilitating training; and the provision of necessary funding (according
to formal regulations). Group II was a group of institutions that dealt with
marine and fishery problems as a subset of their duties. In addition there
was the national research institute LIPI which was to provide information to
policy makers. LIPI had a regional research centre in Ambon.
TABLE 8.1 – Government bodies involved in fisheries management at the provincial level (1997-98)
BAPPEDA
Group I Group II
Fisheries Agency (Dinas Perikanan) Dept. Internal Affairs (Dep. Dalam Negeri)
Dept. Transport (Dep. Perhubungan & Dept. Forestry (Dep. Kehutanan & Dirgen
Dirgen Perhubungan Laut) PHPA)
Formally, enforcement was a shared responsibility of the police, the navy and
the Fisheries Agency. The Department of Transport played a role in enforcing
licensing regulations, whereas various government offices facilitated report-
ing of offences or, in the case of village chiefs, applied sanctions available
under local government and sasi rules.
AGENCIES INVOLVED IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN MALUKU 161
• Control by the navy was difficult because they were found only at the pro-
vincial level and tended to focus on international piracy and deep-water
fisheries infringements.
• Cooperation between the navy and the police as well as with the army
(Babinsa who may be present in villages) was not optimal.
• The enforcers (police and navy) were important players. In many cases
infractions that were not dealt with properly caused other problems to
arise (for instance bad relations with community leaders) which ham-
pered management.
1 Village level. Various village stakeholders had the chance to suggest their
ideas through the Village Development Deliberation (Musbangdes). These
could include ideas for development of fisheries.
2 Sub-district level. Ideas from the village were introduced to the Permanent
Work Region Unit (UDKP), which would select ideas for project develop-
ment.
3 District level. Representatives from relevant sectoral institutions (such as
the Fisheries Agency) presented their planning, including suggestions for
coastal development at a Development Coordination Meeting (Rakorbang
I).
4 Provincial level. At a higher level, Development Coordination Meeting (Ra-
korbang II) proposals from all of the districts and from the province were
reviewed to ensure that provincial and district level projects supported
one another.
IMPLEMENTING FISHERIES POLICY 163
5 The final work programs were reviewed by the Regional House of Rep-
resentatives (DPRD) and if approved, were announced as development
projects.
Because the process started at the village level it seemed a bottom-up ap-
proach. In reality this was not the case. What was finally approved after the
lengthy rounds of selection and project development could be far from the
original proposal. Ideas from a village could even be dropped entirely. Anoth-
er problem was that only formal government structures were involved and no
informal ones. At the Musbangdes level input from local stakeholders was co-
ordinated by the formal village structure (LKMD) assisted by a representative
from the sub-district level. Traditional leaders and kewang members involved
in a local sasi institution could be invited by the village government to discuss
and participate in the planning process as individuals. However, even though
it was the kewang who specifically dealt with the village resources, they could
not formally represent their position as an institution.
Once the academic draft was completed, the Fisheries Agency would propose
it to the Governor, routed through the Head of the Law Bureau (Department
Dalam Negeri) for legal examination. In the review process the Law Bureau
considered higher-level regulations related to the proposal, assessed the ad-
vantages and disadvantages, and then invited the Fisheries Agency to coop-
eratively present the proposal. In the next stage the Law Bureau would call
for a meeting with the Regional Regulations Pre-planning Reviewing Team1
(Tim Pembahasan Pra Rancangan Perda) to discuss the proposal.
After several rounds of examination, the team would decree the proposal as a
Regional Regulation Plan (Rancangan Perda) to be sent to the regional House
of Representatives (DPRD) for approval. With a Letter of Introduction from
the Governor the proposal was sent to the DPRD who would then form a
1 The Team was led by the Regional Secretary (Sekwilda) and consisted of the following mem-
bers: Sekwilda assistants, BAPPEDA, Social Politic Directorate, Finance Bureau, Economy Bureau,
Environment Bureau, Government Bureau, Fishery Agency (Dinas Perikanan) and other related
institutions as required.
164 FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL MALUKU
8.6 Licensing
Artisanal fishers did not need a license to fish with hand-lines, spears, traps
or simple nets. Commercial operators had to obtain permits from the De-
partment of Transport. This department regulated the placement of floating
lift nets (bagan) and fish aggregating devices (FAD or rumpon) and issued
permits for boats to operate out of a particular harbour. Interviews with staff
in the Department of Transport revealed that in general they simply stamped
forms and collected fees. There was little attempt to consciously manage or
control where and how commercial boats operated.
Decree No. 51/1997 of the Minister of Agriculture defined the rules for the
deployment of fish aggregating devices (referring to both FADs and lift nets).
FADs within 3 nautical miles from shore were regulated by the district gov-
ernment; devices between 3 and 12 miles offshore were regulated by the prov-
ince; and deep water FADs by the national Directorate of Fisheries.
8.7 Enforcement
Because of the immensity of the coastline, the national laws as well as pro-
vincial regulations were often effectively unenforceable. This was a major
problem in Maluku with its multitude of small islands. Fish and turtle trad-
ers exploiting endangered species or using prohibited gear types could easily
bribe enforcement officials or simply operate in places where the patrol boats
never went.
Enforcement was officially in the hands of the navy (which operated at a pro-
vincial level) and the police. There was a special water police squad to deal
with fisheries offences. In theory, the police could rely on the navy for assist-
2 If the Fisheries Agency was in urgent need of a Law, they could ask the Governor (for Level I
purposes) or the District Head/Bupati (for Level II Purposes) to give out a decree/statement that
could be used as a law in principal for their urgent need.
COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION 165
Another problem with the police was that they were rarely present in a fish-
ing village to patrol or to arrest offenders. Furthermore, the police were com-
monly perceived by villagers to be less legitimate, less impartial and thus
trustworthy than local traditional enforcement agents (kewang) or the village
government.
Also, when it came to fisheries issues, relationships between the village, dis-
trict and provincial levels were not close. The Fisheries Agency had extension
staff (three on Haruku, two on Saparua, and one on Nusa Laut) whose job
it was to convey information to the village level. However, they usually acted
in response to a request rather than proactively. They assisted commercial
operators to renew their licenses, but in our interviews with artisanal fish-
ers we found that they were virtually invisible to this sector. Extension staff
had attempted to influence fishers to stop using destructive fishing gears
but in their own estimation, this program had failed to make any difference.
Instead, they felt that providing gear and motors to groups of fishermen and
promoting aquaculture were the ways to effect change. Their ability to de-
liver such assistance was, however, very limited. The extension service was
strapped for funds and found it difficult even to cover transportation costs
for field visits.
ment (Table 8.2). In many cases, however, management at the local level was
hampered by a lack of means, time and motivation. In a political climate of
top-down decision-making, many local leaders were reluctant to be proactive,
preferring to act only when directed by a higher authority. Thus, very little
was likely to happen outside of the official, centrally programmed activities.
At that time, in the Suharto era, there was no approval for any non-govern-
mental, grassroots fishers’ organisation or union whose activities may have
filled the vacuum.
8.9 Conclusions
The national government was faced with the difficult task of controlling a vast
marine area and multitudes of islands and offshore reefs. Yet, enforcement
of national fisheries regulations was lax and there were serious deficiencies
in government management agencies in terms of motivation, coordination,
knowledge, infrastructure and funding support. At the same time, fisheries
exploitation and marketing systems encouraged over-fishing and the use of
destructive gears (Novaczek et al. 2001). There was no provincial body that
focused specifically on marine resource management and conservation and
that had power to coordinate the many agencies bearing management re-
sponsibility. BAPPEDA, which could have played this role, had many other
sectoral responsibilities. Besides, it was focused on development rather than
management and conservation; it was weak in areas of evaluation and inter-
sectoral coordination, and it had no presence below the district level. Also,
among the other agencies, limits of power and jurisdiction were often un-
clear.
Even though government staff generally agreed that the role of the local com-
munity in fisheries management was essential, there were no legal provisions
for them to actively participate. Legal researchers pointed out that under vari-
ous national laws the village heads had responsibility to ensure that local re-
sources were managed to provide an optimal income for the community. Yet,
traditional management systems (sasi) were not recognized. The kewang and
other traditional authorities long involved in enforcement and management
had no legal position and were effectively isolated from regional and provin-
cial management structures and planning. The development of fisheries pol-
icy and regulations were largely controlled from the centre and passed down
to provincial, district and sub-district levels. Development schemes focused
on intensification of resource exploitation, not on sustainability. Suggestions
for management developed on the village level (Haruku) could hardly get
through to the national level.
Results of interviews with various agencies involved in marine resource management and development in Maluku. Management functions as follows: 1)
information gathering and provision; 2) project planning; 3) project implementation; 4) evaluation of projects (physical and legal aspects); 5) enforce-
ment of fisheries law; 6) funding of projects; 7) routine fisheries policy implementation and monitoring; 8) licensing and collection of taxes and fees.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Environment Provincial * * • Human resources inadequate
Bureau • Weak laws
• No role in coordination
• Jurisdiction and authority unclear
• Relationship with environment
section of BAPPEDA confused
Dept. Forestry Provincial * * * * * • Direct authority under CITES to • Budget and means limited
(Resource conser- protect endangered species • Motivation weak
vation section) • Jurisdiction unclear
• Limited to protected species and
national parks; no input into
fishing quotas
Law Bureau Provincial * * • Works well with Fisheries Agency
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL MALUKU
The previous chapter described the legislation and policy framework in In-
donesia until 1998. Right after this period Indonesia, and Central Maluku
in particular, was in great turmoil and economic crisis resulting in major
changes during a period of reformation, or ‘reformasi’ in Indonesian lan-
guage. This section will explain the process after 1998, the implications for
fisheries and coastal management in Indonesia and Maluku province and
future prospects.
Since the fall of President Suharto in 1998 there has been a growing de-
mand for transparency, honesty and especially autonomy from the central
government (Patlis et al. 2001). The central government has responded with
a series of laws shifting both the political power and financial control from
the central government to the regional level. The demand for transparency,
honesty, and autonomy was met by the enactment of new legislation against
corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The result is nothing less than what
Patlis et al. (2001) call a revolution in governance. The changes also signal a
shift in the management of natural resources with profound implications for
the rights and roles of local communities (Thorburn 2002). Decentralisation,
however, is still in its initial stages and brings with it a host of new worries
and problems which often have roots in the previous regimes (Peluso 2002;
Thorburn 2002).
The role of the central government is primarily one of indirect action rather
than direct regulation and control. Yet, the central government retains au-
thority to develop policy regarding natural resource management and to take
administrative action against a regional government that fails to implement
existing laws or regulations (Law No. 25/2000, art. 7), (Patlis et al. 2001). The
province is responsible for: (a) exploration, exploitation, conservation and
management of the sea, (b) administrative affairs, and (c) law enforcement.
District and municipal governments are now empowered to set resource use
and spatial planning policy, and to manage revenues and budgets. District
and provincial assemblies (DPRD) must issue scores of new regulations and
decrees to administer these new responsibilities (Thorburn 2002).
2 Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy/management authorities and its implementing Regu-
lation No. 25/2000.
Law No. 25/1999 on financial relations between the centre and regions and its implementing
Regulation No. 104/2000.
3 Government levels: Province (Propinsi); District (Kabupaten); Municipal (Kotamadya);
Sub-district (Kecamatan); Village (Desa).
4 The National Maritime Council consists of politicians, private sector representatives, NGOs and
government officials. The ministry has five directorate generals: Coastal and Small-island Affairs,
Research and Technology, Enforcement and Surveillance, Capture and Culture Fisheries, and In-
stitutional and Capacity Development. The office of the secretary general provides expertise on law
and governance (Dahuri 2001).
5 DKP: Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan.
FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND DIVISION OF BENEFITS 173
Law No. 25/1999 recognizes two basic budgets for governance: central gov-
ernment and regional budgets. The regional budgets consist of original rev-
enues, loans and equilibrium funds. Part of these funds come from natural
resource use. The central government gets 20% of the revenues from natural
resources (forestry, mining and fishing), while the regional governments get
80%. The central government additionally allocates 25% of its budget to the
regional government. Of this general allocation, 10% goes to the provinces
and 90% to the district governments. A third part comes from special alloca-
tion funds from the central government. Under the decentralised scheme,
central government allocations are being greatly reduced, forcing provincial
and district governments to generate a larger portion of their own revenue
(Thorburn 2002).
Article 11 (Reg. No. 104) relates to revenues from the fishery. Section 2 states
that the revenues ‘shall be distributed in equal sums to regencies through-
out Indonesia.’ This is a fundamental difference compared to other natural
resources of which the revenues are distributed primarily to the region of ori-
gin. It highlights the fact that fisheries are treated as true commonly owned,
i.e. national resources to be shared by all (Patlis et al. 2003). The good thing
about this arrangement is that it removes much of the financial incentives for
the districts to sell of the fishing rights, as they are already doing with con-
cessions in the forestry sector (Patlis et al. 2001; Tien Wahyuni pers. comm.
March 2004).
174 CURRENT LEGISLATION AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
As much of the income is derived from natural resource use, revenue distri-
bution will vary enormously from region to region (Brown 1999 in Patlis et
al. 2001). In some parts of Indonesia, up to 86% will go to pay civil service
salaries (MacClellan 2001 in Patlis et al. 2001). Very little thus will probably
go to development projects and resource conservation. Besides, the districts
being largely responsible for their own budget, have a strong incentive to
increase resource extraction as opposed to management. In order to supple-
ment government coffers, district and village governments rush to convert
resource capital into cash. Thorburn (2002) calls this the ‘local revenue ob-
session’ (see also Pye-Smith 2001; Resosudarmo and Dermawan 2001).
Although a lot of progress has been made, the current legal framework is not
(yet) adequate to deal with resource management. The existing legal regime
governing natural resources is sectoral, meaning that they are not managed
as a whole, but as individual elements. At the moment, coastal resources fall
under approximately 20 different acts (Putra 2001 in Patlis et al. 2001). To
make things worse, Indonesian law is characterised by conflicts, gaps and
overlaps: they are vague and broad, there is no consistent application of the
laws, and the rule of interpretation of the acts is extremely weak (Diantha
2001 in Patlis et al. 2001). In coastal management, these issues become even
more apparent. For example, there are conflicts and overlap in definitions,
particularly of terms that define protected areas (Dahuri and Dutton 1999).
There are also conflicting laws with respect to enforcement which thoroughly
complicates its execution as well as prosecution. But a very clear illustration
form the discrepancies between the laws of Fisheries and those of Conser-
vation of Natural Resources: Act No. 9/1985 on fisheries has an extremely
broad definition of ‘fish’ that can be harvested, including sea turtles, ma-
rine mammals, sea cucumber and corals, while Act No. 5/1990 on resource
conservation explicitly states that fish and wildlife that are threatened with
extinction are protected (Patlis et al. 2001).
THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 175
The new role of the central government under Law No. 22/1999 is to devel-
op guidelines and policies, rather than direct management and control. The
question is if the central government can require adherence to these guide-
lines and policies if management authority rests with the regencies? National
policy has little meaning or respect in the regions and with budgetary and fi-
nancial matters being exercised at regional level, national policy is likely to be
given less attention (Patlis et. al. 2001). Additionally, regional interpretations
of the national policy makes consistent enforcement difficult. Therefore, to
increase the effectiveness of a national coastal management program, Patlis
et al. (2001) suggest that it should be voluntary in nature as it would be more
easily accepted by the communities and it would increase the chances of ac-
tually being implemented. This has already been demonstrated in Northern
Sulawesi where people adopted ordinances they themselves drafted (Patlis et
al. 2001). The other advantage of a voluntary program would be that it allows
the various levels of government to delegate different responsibilities and ac-
tivities among each other based on their respective strengths and weaknesses
(Patlis et al. 2001).
To make this work, the national government would have to provide incentives
to the provincial and district level governments to adopt coastal management
programs through financial and technical assistance, advice and training. At
the same time, the provincial and district level governments would have to
meet certain standards and criteria (Patlis et al. 2001). Requirements would
include obligations by international treaties to which Indonesia is a party and
requirements that are in the public interest.
176 CURRENT LEGISLATION AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Aside from their authority in the 4-12 mile coastal zone, provinces have au-
thority to manage cross-jurisdictional issues involving multiple districts.
They are also responsible for the evaluation and analysis of environmental
impact assessments (EIA or AMDAL). Furthermore, the province may act in
place of the district if it does not yet have the capacity to carry out their new
authority or where the district, in mutual agreement, hands it back to the
province. This happens through a formal process.
The provinces are the wild card in the new decentralized regime. On the one
hand they have got a minimum role in the new power structure with funding
nearly completely bypassing them. On the other hand, since the province is
responsible for any activity that involves more than two districts (and it will
be hard to find an issue in natural resource management that does not cross
the jurisdiction of more than one district) they potentially have a broad area
of authority. Yet, to actually enjoy that authority may prove difficult as finan-
cial resources are lacking (Patlis et al. 2001).
As a result, the role of the provinces will, almost as a matter of default, take
on a tone of guidance rather than actual management (Kaimudin 2000).
On cross-boundary issues they may have a stronger hand in shaping poli-
cies, coordinating activities and settling disputes, yet it is doubtful that it will
amount to more than that. As their authority under the regional autonomy
laws is ambiguous, the role of the provinces would need to be defined explic-
itly. Patlis et al. (2001) therefore suggest as the main responsibilities for the
provinces to:
In reality, it is likely that the role of the provinces will be decided on a case-to-
case basis, where strong governors may very well take advantage of the law’s
ambiguity and try to secure significant amounts of authority, while weaker
ones will not be able to resist the general push towards district-level manage-
ment (Patlis et al. 2001).
THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 177
The district government has authority for all decision-making within their
jurisdiction, unless otherwise stipulated by central government regulations
or where the provincial government has authority. Within the framework es-
tablished by the central government, districts should develop the necessary
procedural mechanisms for coordination and collaboration and ensure that
the necessary substantive requirements outlined in the national guidance are
satisfied (Patlis et al. 2001). Unless issues of national interest are violated,
districts can manage coastal resources as they see fit, independent of any
national program.
Compared with central and provincial governments, the district offices are
best positioned to develop coastal management programs tailored to local
contexts, resource supplies, public aspirations and values. District offices are
close enough to the resources and its users at the local level and yet they are
still large enough to coordinate among neighbouring villages (Patlis et al.
2001). The district can also decide to engage in a coastal management pro-
gram sponsored by the central government. Once completed and approved,
the program should be carried out in collaboration with sub-district (kecama-
tan) and village (desa) level.
Of the 332 districts in Indonesia, 245 have a coastline.6 It is hoped that most
will engage in a voluntary coastal management program. In any event, the
number could potentially become enormous, which would create a tremen-
dous logistical challenge for the national government. Here, the provincial
governments may have a potentially important role (Patlis et al. 2001).
6 The number was 360 according to Thorburn (2002), but with the introduction of the new laws
of 1999 which channel funds and resource revenues to the districts the number has gone up to
more than 400 (Schulte Nordholt 2003).
178 CURRENT LEGISLATION AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
more surprising given the role that adat plays in defining Indonesian state
and nationhood […] along with the identification of adat with social justice
and wise resource stewardship […].’
The lack of recognition of customary institutions and adat and the margin-
alisation of the local communities is tackled in decentralisation Law No. 22,
1999. The law grants villages so-called ‘natural autonomy’ and village heads
are no longer civil servants. The LKMD whose primary purpose was to carry
out the state mandated developments programs has been replaced by a Vil-
lage Representative Board (BPD). According to the new law (Section 11, Art.
104) the function of the BPD is ‘to protect local customs and traditions, make
village regulations, gather and channel community aspirations, and super-
vise organisation of village governance.’ Articles 110 and 111 stress that the
district level (kabupaten) must involve the village government and BPD in
planning and that they must acknowledge and respect village rights, customs
and traditions (Thorburn 2002).
9.8 Conclusions
thus destroying its future revenue stream and depriving future generations
of meeting basic needs through these resources. A new requirement in the
law should be that regional governments use a specific percentage of their
revenues for resource conservation and management.
The establishment of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and the
National Maritime Council are the first steps in the development towards set-
ting up new structures (Patlis et al. 2001; Sinaga 2002). The new legislation
encourages horizontal and vertical integration among government agencies.
To further enable lower levels of government to function, authority of district
and provincial governments needs to be clearly demarcated. District govern-
ments also require the provision of technical guidelines on resource manage-
ment and transboundary issues in fisheries (Satria and Matsuda 2004).
To coordinate existing laws and resolve legal discrepancies, Patlis et al. (2001)
identify the need for a new umbrella law in a nationwide coastal management
program. This could also support the growing number of community-based
natural resource management projects in Indonesia and provide formal
guidance to regional governments and communities on the new approach in
managing resources. While regional differences must be accommodated, ba-
sic principles relevant for coastal management in all regions can (and should
be) be applied, including an ongoing adaptive process for resource manage-
ment specifically addressing coordination and integration of different activi-
ties and groups (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998).
10.1 Introduction
*I.H.T. Harkes, Robert S. Pomeroy and Gerard A. Persoon (in prep.) Decentralisation and Coastal
Resource Management in the Philippines and Indonesia.
182 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
World wide, among the major marine fish stocks or groups of stocks for which
information is available, an estimated 26% are underexploited or moderately
exploited, about 48% of stocks are fully exploited and another 16% are over-
exploited. The remaining 10% of stocks have been depleted or are recovering
from depletion (FAO 2001). Approximately 70% of the world production of
food fish is now caught or produced in developing countries (ICLARM 1999)
and the increasing international trade in fishery products is raising questions
about the supply of food fish for poorer people in developing countries.
Since the early 1980s, decentralisation has emerged as a valued political and
economic goal in many developing countries (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Cas-
son 2001). Decentralisation refers to the systematic and rational dispersal of
power, authority and responsibility from the central government to lower or
local level institutions (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). It involves the authority
to make decisions over natural resources and control over resource benefits.
One of the primary arguments for decentralisation is that since local condi-
tions vary, management approaches are required that are more closely tai-
lored to the environmental, socio-economic, and political conditions at the
local level (Lowry 2002). In co-management, which requires a clear com-
mitment on the part of the government to the sharing of authority with local
users and lower government levels, decentralisation is critical.
The assumption is that when people at the local community and local govern-
ment level gain the authority – and therewith the institutional structure, legal
and judicial powers to manage their resources – they will have an incentive
and greater political will to manage resources in a more sustainable way. The
deployment of power and resources to the community will enhance com-
184 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The reasons why powers are often not transferred or decentralisation is in-
complete are various. First of all, there is the unwillingness of politicians to
allow greater democratisation of the political system. They may be reluctant
to relinquish their authority (or part of it) in order to protect their power and
position. Some policy choices that have been made may actually not even con-
stitute decentralisation (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Secondly, there is doubt,
also sometimes within the environmental agencies, about whether resource
users can be trusted or are capable to manage their resources. Sometimes
there is a lack of skills or appropriate institutions to which powers can be suc-
cessfully devolved (Berkes 1989, Lowry 2002; Ribot 2004). But often, people
are simply marginalised, especially where it concerns ethnic groups. Where
on the one hand in Indonesia ethnic diversity is valued, on the other ethnic
groups are perceived as a threat to the unity of the state. Ethnicity is therefore
often turned into folklore and not into the empowerment of people (Schefold
1998; Eindhoven 2005).
At many sites, problems occur because of local elites seizing control (Shack-
leton et al, 2002). It is, however, not right to simply associate the formation
of new elites with the process of decentralisation or expect these elites to not
exist or to not capture control. Experiences from countries like India, which
has faced similar transitions, teach us that so-called identity politics can sim-
ply be viewed as an added level of complexity (van Klinken 2002). Elites have
always played a role in hierarchical systems, either as essential parts of it or
as parasites, depending on which view one takes. In Indonesia, the ‘power-
elite’ just has taken a rather extreme form. If we look at history, we can learn
that modernisation and democratisation are processes that were certainly not
promoted by those who controlled power, but by enlightened middle class
elites (van Klinken 2002).
The ‘new’ elites that currently play a role in Indonesia are local elites who do
not necessarily aspire national leadership, but who want power at the level of
the province. In order to achieve this they have to maintain relations upwards
with representatives in the capital, as well as downwards with their chosen
constituencies (van Klinken 2002). What is new about these elites is that
they build on pre-colonial structures and claim to represent local chiefs, tra-
ditional authorities, and landlords thereby mobilising parts of the population
that were not involved before. The role these local elites play can be extreme
and varies from excessive resource extraction and abuse in some places to the
channelling of funds to their constituents.
Case studies from around the world indicate that the institutional arrange-
ments necessary to bring about decentralisation are rarely established (Ribot
2004). In order to counter the power of local elites, the best candidates to re-
ceive decentralised powers are democratically elected institutions. Elections
give people the opportunity to judge the performance of an institution, and if
elected officials cannot justify their decisions they can be voted out of office
(Dupar and Badenoch 2002). However, elections alone are not sufficient to
GETTING THE INSTITUTIONS RIGHT 187
While ‘getting the institutions right’ probably leads to better outcomes, there
are two major obstructions. The first are the groups that fear losing power
and thus pose strong resistance to adequate policy making and implementa-
tion – the process we described earlier. The second is that sometimes the
institutions chosen to counter the negative effects of decentralisation are in-
appropriate. Institutions imposed from outside, for example, even if they in-
clude democratically elected authorities and restructured political processes,
may have no grounding in the local culture and lack legitimacy (Ribot 2004).
It is therefore important to identify the groups of actors, to assess the power
arena, and to define which local institutions are in place that actually can play
a role in the decentralisation process.
may not be highly equitable, but it definitely makes these institutions highly
effective (Novaczek et al. 2001).
Other means that ensure that the dealings of institutions will be transparent
and responsive to the public interest also need to be considered carefully be-
fore being implemented (World Bank 1999, 2001 in WRI 2003). Open elec-
tions, for example, are considered as a mechanism to ensure accountability.
However, if the structures to prevent this are not in place, elections can be
stage-managed (Crook and Sverrisson 2001 in WRI 2003, see also Novaczek
et al. 2001). In order to enhance transparency and responsiveness it is im-
portant to stimulate open forums and deliberations and to have open media
coverage of events. Local government performance needs to be monitored
and evaluated, people need to have access to legal resources, and financial
records need to be auditable (World Bank 2003 in WRI 2003). Local people
should be able to challenge the rules and decisions, as well as the way they
are implemented and enforced by those who hold the power (Agrawal and
Ribot 1999).
10.6 Approach
Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) distinguish various types and forms of decen-
tralisation that coincide with categories used by various scientists working
on this issue:
Decentralisation thus does not necessarily imply total devolvement of all au-
thority to local and lower government levels. Authority granted may ebb and
flow over time as it is transferred to lower levels and recaptured by higher
government levels. And, in reality, decentralisation often proceeds in a se-
quence from deconcentration to administrative delegation, then to political
devolution and finally, to popular privatisation (Helmsing 1991 in Pomeroy
and Berkes 1997). In a way, decentralisation can thus be seen as a continu-
um.
A third aspect to take into account are the actors, defined as those who ex-
ercise powers over public resources. This can be traditional leaders, the lo-
cal government, NGOs, donors, the private sector, or people’s organisations.
Actors may be differentiated from each other by their beliefs and objectives,
190 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
the internal structure of their organisation, and the laws to which they are
subject (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Shakleton et al. 2002). Each actor is posi-
tioned in particular relations of accountability depending on the historical,
socio-economic and political constitutions of the powers of each actor. As
each actor is positioned at a different level of social action and is part of a
playing field including within-community interests and power relations, it is
relevant to describe the so-called actors’ field.
The four case studies on forestry of Agrawal and Ribot (1999) show that
rarely all types of power are decentralised to the local level. In forestry, de-
centralisation to the local actors included only the transfer of authority over
forest products that are important for subsistence, while the Forest Depart-
ments retained significant control over the commercial benefits from the sale
of timber. In Mali, for example, it is through its influence over forest man-
agement plans and the quota fixing process the Forest Service can set how
much, where, when, how, and with which management obligations exploitation
will take place. In other words, operational rules are delegated to the local
level, while decisions on the collective-choice level remain in the hands of
the government.
Vertical and horizontal ties among branches of government can shape the
relation of accountability between local government actors and their constit-
uencies (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Similarly, relations between customary
authorities and their administrative superiors can shape their downward ac-
countability. Actors can be held downwardly accountable to local constituen-
cies by, for example, electoral processes. However, often elections are not
sufficient. Other mechanisms to increase downward accountability are hear-
ings, procedures for recall, referenda, advisory groups, third party monitor-
ing, controllers, auditing, and the creation of opportunities for community
consultation (Crawford et al. 2003). Aside from these formal mechanisms,
local officials are often in other ways accountable to friends, colleagues, kin
and local citizens (Lowry 2002).
The second legislative measure was the passage of the Fisheries Code of
1998 which incorporated Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) as one of
its policy approaches. It reinforced the active participation of local fisherfolk
and coastal communities through the establishment of municipal Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources Management Councils (FARMCs), (DENR 2001).
The codification of this law facilitates enforcement, local legislation, and
project implementation. New provisions include prohibitions against destruc-
tive fishing. Under this law, enforcement is assigned to LGUs who can ask
REGIONAL CASE STUDIES OF DECENTRALISATION 193
BFAR2 for assistance in the training of a local taskforce or Bantay Dagat. The
municipal government has the right to enact ordinances in accordance with
the National Fisheries Policy. They are further authorised to prohibit or limit
fishing and establish reserves and sanctuaries.3 The law further provides for
coordination and consultation with adjoining municipalities for the manage-
ment of larger resource systems.
Other important acts are the National Integrated and Protected Area System
(NIPAS) act of 1992, which allows the government to identify and segregate
defined areas of land and/or waters and classify them as protected areas for
various purposes (e.g. National Parks, Wildlife Reserves). And the Agricul-
ture and Fisheries Modernisation Act (AFMA) of 1997, which provides an
overall framework for industrialisation of agriculture in the country, includ-
ing fisheries. Under international treaties, such as CITES, local governments
are required to prevent the collection and trade of species listed.
The following sections present two case studies to illustrate how Coastal Man-
agement under a decentralised scheme can actually work out in practice.
The first Stakeholders Conference was held in November 2000 and led to
agreement on approach, cooperation, goals and strategies. A series of meet-
ings led to the forging of a Unified Fisheries Ordinance (UFO) that embodies
policies and acts that provide for the conservation, development and manage-
ment of Murcielagos Bay. The UFO covers a number of activities that are im-
portant in the context of decentralisation: 1) it combines both scientific and
local knowledge for decisions on fisheries management, 2) a Resource Us-
ers Assembly (RUA) revalidates the decisions of the majority of fishers and
thus is an important mechanism for accountability, 3) an Inter-Stakeholder
Conference is a representative body on a higher level which supports deci-
sion-making, 4) fund counterparting and a Technical Working Group (TWG)
are mechanisms to carry out the decisions, 5) lobbyists ensured that the UFO
is passed as a Municipal Ordinance, and 6) the ordinance is implemented
through the resource management organisations and Bantay Dagat.
Naturally, there are disputes and conflicts, but the communication structures
help to reach negotiations. Fish corral owners and dynamite fishers agreed to
use legally prescribed nets. Also the length of the closed season was negoti-
ated and agreed upon through an assembly of resource users. Delays in the
release of the counterpart funds by the bureaucratic systems of the Internal
Revenue Allotment have led the local organisations to pressure the authori-
ties to look for other means to comply with the agreed commitments.5 So
in that respect these organisations are actively involved and do have certain
powers.
There is still tension between fishers and authorities with regard to the power
to decide over specific issues, such as the ban period for fishing. Government
officials insisted on scientifically based limit, while the fishers asserted their
local knowledge. A last point is the fact that those in authority are dominant
in discussions, giving the fishers little opportunity to speak.6 But good facili-
tation and preparation of fishers overcomes this tension. The biggest threat
to the system is external support for the existing institutional arrangements
which are still weak.
5 The scheme for fiscal decentralisation of the government as mandated under the Local Govern-
ment Code allows an Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) sharing that provides little income for less
populated areas, like Murcielagos. Marine resources are not included in the IRA computation,
much less in the local development prioritization of the government.
6 In contrast to Panorel, the document of PIPULI states that fishers find it difficult to assert their
rights because they do not see themselves as active participants in resource management. How-
ever, this information is of an earlier date than that of Panorel.
REGIONAL CASE STUDIES OF DECENTRALISATION 197
The case illustrates that Murcielagos Bay is well on the way to form a decen-
tralised management structure. Major shifts of power have occurred, deci-
sion-making forums and umbrella organisations are established to negotiate
conflicts and enhance accountability and participation. Issues raised by PIP-
ULI in 2002, such as compartmentalised fisheries management and resource
users that were not united and felt disempowered, were dealt with. The proc-
ess was strongly supported by a number of NGOs, academic institutions, and
foreign organisations. Issues currently dealt with have to do with power, but
no longer to the point where the government authorities automatically win.
The local groups assert their rights and defend their knowledge. This is an
important move forward towards integrated management of the fisheries in
Murcielagos Bay and a good example of a local process that includes impor-
tant mechanisms to enhance participation and democratic principles.
7 DENR: Department of Environment and Natural Resources; BFAR: Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources.
8 FARMCs or Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Councils were established under
Executive Order No. 240 to institutionalize participation of fishers in resource management.
198 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
pine decentralisation is the large number and overlap in laws (Van Weerd,
pers. comm. 2004; Plutz, pers. comm. 2004). Again, in these activities all
important government departments and enforcement agencies are actively
involved including the Provincial Board who donated 3 patrol boats. During
2000-2003 a large number of illegal fishing activities were reported and of-
fenders prosecuted.
Of course, there are problem areas too and the most eminent ones, as in
most cases discussed, were inadequate funding, logistics and support from
government agencies and NGOs. Lack of education of the people was also
mentioned as an obstruction. Corruption and lack of assets (equipment and
boasts) undermined enforcement and even when offenders are caught under
capacity leads to weak prosecution. MPA management in the Bohol Sea is
still fragmented.
Factors that enhance success are strong support from political leadership,
community participation and networking among sectors. An important les-
son is that enforcement leads to greater success of community management
of natural resources. Management involves a multi-sectoral and multi-agency
approach that has both a ‘hard’ (actual patrolling) and a ‘soft’ component
including IEC activities (information, education and communication). More
collaboration between LGUs is required and municipal waters need to be
delineated. Finally, municipal ordinances need to be harmonised.
This case study that shows that in the Philippines the process is away from
merely community-based initiatives. There are more horizontal and vertical
linkages established. These linkages are important in creating accountability
structures and forums for appeal. They also help in getting real authority over
resource management as enforcement is in local hands with legal back-up.
favourable policies and allocations, and oppose measures that they consider
detrimental.
The two cases show that the process of decentralisation and transfer of au-
thority to local government and partners is definitely taking shape. In Murcie-
lagos bay, a few important building blocks to local resource management are
in place like representative bodies and umbrella structures as mechanisms to
ensure accountability and representation. Local organisation do have certain
powers that enhance their autonomy. The case of Bohol shows the develop-
ment of a sound organisational and institutional capacity to deal with the
new powers. Standardization of policies will help to counter the overlap of
laws and policies and improve the legal framework that forms the basis for
coastal resource management.
However, despite the sound legal framework and clear commitment of the
Philippine government to empower local communities and support them in
the management of resources, the implementation of policies and laws and
remains weak (PIPULI 2002). This is due to legal and jurisdictional conflicts
which arise from the plethora of legislation and administrative issuances af-
fecting different types of economic activities in the coastal area (DENR 2001).
Conflicting interpretations of these laws and poor dissemination of infor-
mation contribute to difficulties in implementation. Another factor is the
multiplicity of institutions at the national and local levels with mandates in
coastal management as it complicates the lines of authority over resources
and sometimes results in fragmented management initiatives.
At the same time, successful projects move the process forward and are rep-
licated elsewhere or scaled-up there were favourable conditions are in place.
Scaling up of the model for coastal management can take two forms: 1) in
terms of area and population involved, and 2) in kinds of tasks performed or
diversification. Scaling-up requires careful planning, groundwork, and ex-
periments. Important is not to rush the process under the pressure of donors
and funding (Balgos and Ricci 2002). Currently, the process of scaling-up
is taking place in Leyte-Samar (Region 8) covering 6 provinces under the
auspices of Leyte State University, the Philippine Council for Aquatic and
Marine Research and Development and the University of Rhode Island. In
2002, discussions were held involving numerous stakeholders about the role
in terms of support of the provincial government, NGOs and academic insti-
tutions. At this moment, the role of the provinces is being further defined,
as well as that of other (research) institutions. This institutional set-up is
expected to solidify and push forward devolution towards long-term effective-
ness and success (Balgos and Ricci 2002).
200 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
10.8.3 Indonesia
The ‘New Order’ regime of president Suharto (1966-1998) was characterised
by heavy resource extraction for economic development and a weakening
of many local traditional institutions that mediated access and use of local
resources (Thorburn 2002). After the fall of autocratic Suharto regime in
1998 and in response to a greater demand for transparency, honesty and au-
tonomy, a series of laws shifting both the political power and financial control
from the central government to the regional level have been drafted (Casson
2001; Patlis et al. 2001). This so-called ‘post-New Order’ period signals a shift
in the management of natural resources that has profound implications for
the rights and roles of local communities and regional governments. Decen-
tralisation, however, is still in its initial stages and brings with it a host of new
worries and problems that often have roots in the previous regimes (Peluso
2002; Thorburn 2002).
The implications of these legal changes for resource management are pro-
found and entail a larger role for the regional governments (province, district
and sub-district). The province has jurisdiction over the territorial sea up to
12 nautical miles from the coastline (art. 10.2), while the district may estab-
lish jurisdiction over one third of the provincial waters or 4 nautical miles
from the shoreline. There are two exceptions: 1) the territorial sea should not
restrict traditional fishing rights and 2) the seabed underneath the sea terri-
tory still falls under the authority of the central government (Patlis et al. 2001;
Satria and Matsuda 2004). The central government also maintains direct re-
sponsibility over the maritime areas within the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ). In contrast to other resources from which revenues are allotted direct-
ly to the district of origin, benefits from fisheries are redistributed in equal
sums to all regencies throughout Indonesia (Reg. 104/2000, Art. 11(2)). This
highlights the fact that fisheries are regarded as commonly owned (Patlis et
al. 2003).
Instead of direct regulation and control, the role of the central government
has become primarily one of indirect action. However, the central govern-
ment retains authority to develop policy regarding natural resource manage-
ment and to take administrative action against a regional government that
fails to implement existing laws or regulations (Law No. 25/2000, art. 7),
(Patlis et al. 2001). The province is responsible for: a) exploration, exploita-
tion, conservation and management of the sea, b) administrative affairs, and
c) law enforcement. District and municipal governments are now empow-
ered to set resource use and spatial planning policy, and to manage revenues
and budgets. District and provincial assemblies (DPRD) must issue scores of
new regulations and decrees to administer these new responsibilities (Thor-
burn 2002).
After the major problems in various parts of the country and under pressure
of certain groups Wahid (1999-2001) agreed to revise Laws No. 22 and 25 in
order maintain the ‘unitary state’. President Megawati Sukarnoputri was pur-
suing the review, including the reestablishment of the government hierarchy
(Down to Earth 2001). A more powerful standpoint and continuation of the
decentralisation process is expected from the newly elected president, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (cf Maas 2004b, 2004c).
The two following sections describe the process in the field and show recent
developments in coastal resource management in Indonesia.
11
USAID and the Coastal Resources Center of the University of Rhode Island (USA) have been
responsible for a number of long-term field programs that work to build local and national capac-
ity to effectively practice coastal governance. Other sites with field programs are Balikpapan Bay
in East Kalimantan, Lampung Province in South Sumatra, and Bintuni Bay in Papua (see Patlis et
al. 2003). Another project implemented to counter coral reef degradation is COREMAP funded by
the WorldBank, ADB, AusAID and LIPI.
202 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The formulation of the new district law or Perda involved bottom-up com-
munity participation and involvement of the private sector, NGOs and Sam
Ratulangi University (UNSRAT) in Minahasa. It sets out the key principles,
goals, benefits and priorities for community-based management, transpar-
ency, and accountability. It also recognises traditional rights. An Integrated
Coastal Resources Management Board oversees the process of preparing and
approving community plans to integrate the different concerns among stake-
holders – government, private sector and community – as well as the coor-
dination of the different sector interests within the government institutions
themselves. The Minahasa Fisheries and Marine Office has been assigned
the role of providing technical assistance to villages.
FIGURE 10.3 – Capacity building and project activities in Blongko (photo: Brian Crawford)
The drafting of the law was a process that involved local experts who prepared
a ‘white paper’ for discussion. The academic draft that followed was distributed
and discussed in a variety of meetings, also international. Central government
agencies were also consulted, including those of Fisheries and Marine Affairs.
Finally, in 2001, the regulation was submitted to the Minahasa House of Rep-
resentatives to enter the enactment process. The process followed the formal
mechanisms in legislature and included the establishment of a special task
force, public hearings, and final meetings to enact the regulation.
In order to fully utilise or enforce the law, however, it is essential that the con-
stituency which was mobilised to pass the law continues to remain engaged
in the integrated Coastal Resources Management Board in promoting its use
by Minahasa’s villages and evaluating its implementation.
Keys to success were the de-politicization of the process (by inviting repre-
sentatives of all political parties), 2) the signing of letters of intent to enhance
commitment, 3) extensive public participation, 4) sound documentation and
explanation of the process, and 5) a media campaign which increased public
awareness. Important was also that the law is not overambitious. A primary
lesson is the flexibility to adapt to comments and revise the draft Perda as it
went through the process thereby increasing its legitimacy. Shortcomings
were the lack of documentation of initial public consultations, the timing of
the background material, including the ‘white paper’, and the lack of engage-
ment with the administrative offices of the Bupati (district head) until near
the very end of the process.
This case study shows how with adequate support, local resource manage-
ment can become a reality. The case of Minahasa, however, is an exception in
Indonesia and its success is largely due to strong financial and institutional
support of foreign donors for this program. However, the case provides a
possible format for similar initiatives elsewhere in the region and provides
an example of how local autonomy and the development of a sound legal
framework can become a reality.
13 The revival of adat and a second traditional system which creates alliances between villages
called pela are seen as two important building blocks in ensuring stability and peace all over Cen-
tral Maluku (Welsh 2003). In this respect, van Klinken (1999) mentions the restructuring of the
government, i.e. replace the nepotistic connections (often based on religion) for accountable and
transparent structures.
REGIONAL CASE STUDIES OF DECENTRALISATION 205
practices was strongly supported by the local traditional taskforce called ke-
wang and community members. In November 2003, when for the first time
after the period of civil strife sasi was opened again, more participants than
ever came to witness the rituals (Rumaruson 2003).
FIGURE 10.4 – Head of the kewang Elli Kissya with Binny, Meentje and myself in 1998.
Efforts are being made to put into place a national and provincial agenda
to acknowledge sasi as a model for effective community-based governance.
Proposed components of this agenda are: 1) to extend the power of the sasi
authorities (traditional, church or mosque) to a broader level so that they
can deal with outsiders, 2) to provide a legal basis at the provincial and lo-
cal level for customary laws and property rights, and 3) to urge government
officials to open and transparent decision-making, including policy. It is fur-
ther suggested that local traditional authorities participate in seminars and
conferences as to promote this model and improve it. This would provide a
learning forum for indigenous leaders, CBCRM practitioners and facilitators
and could lead to the formation of solidarity groups engaged with effective
community-based governance.
The case of Minahasa illustrates one of the very few successful cases of decen-
tralisation in Indonesia. With strong support and international funding, the
CRMP program has become a showcase that offers opportunities for replica-
tion and inspiration. The program has contributed to the development of a new
district law on integrated coastal zone management, including the principles of
transparency and participation. A similar law is now apparently being drafted
for Maluku. The case of Haruku provides another positive example as it shows
how customary law (adat) and traditional institutions such as the kewang as well
as support of the community can help to sustain local resource management
systems, even after major impacts (Chapter 7). These cases provide important
14 The army (and police) are mentioned as playing an important role in the local power arenas
in Indonesia, especially as the army is represented from national to village level and use security
issues to generate an income. Various experts on Indonesia mention their critical role in decen-
tralization (Schulte Nordholt 2003, Spyer (2005) pers. comm.; Jones 2004) but also in the recent
regional conflicts. This complex issue will not be further dealt with in this paper, but for more
detailed information I recommend to read the above authors.
BOTTLENECKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 207
building stones for the formulation of new laws and the acknowledgement of
local traditional resource management systems such as sasi (Salim 1995).
Aside from a few exceptions such as the Inuit fishery in the Canadian Arctic
and Japanese fisheries (Kearney 2004) most political structures concerning
resource management are in the top down direction. Accountability struc-
tures thus are upward. Most institutions currently being chosen to receive
powers over natural resource management are not accountable to the local
population and therefore susceptible to elite capture, as is currently happen-
ing in Central Kalimantan. It is thus necessary to redirect these structures
208 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The transfer of burdens without resources has not only led to scepticism,
but has also increased the vulnerability of local people. This vulnerability can
increase when property rights are not well-defined. For example, if the com-
munity is required to draft complex management plans to arrange exclusion
while large-scale commercial interests enter and use the resources with per-
mits acquired from the national government (Ribot 2004), decentralisation
is likely to fail. Specified and secure user rights are a prerequisite for local
support for management and the development of a positive attitude towards
conservation and sustainable resource use (Chapter 11). It is the task of the
central government to establish conditions for the specification, legitimiza-
tion and enforcement of property rights and fishers’ rights to organise and
develop rules for management (Pomeroy 2001).
Law itself is one of the foundations of society as it shapes the behaviour and
activities of its citizens, write Patlis et al. (2003). In order to sustain and insti-
tutionalise the concepts of integrated coastal management and good govern-
15 Every year, the International Agricultural Centre (IAC) of the University of Wageningen organ-
izes a training course on Fisheries Co-management. Last year, the course was entitled ‘Fisheries
Management: Perspectives, Information, and Co-management’ (4 Oct-19 Nov 2004). Participants
came from Angola, India, Italy, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tan-
zania, Uganda, and Zambia. My lecture and exercise on co-management and decentralization,
and in particular on accountability structures and obstacles towards decentralization, lead to the
insights written above.
BOTTLENECKS AND OPPORTUNITIES 209
ance, they have to be internalised through the legal system. The drafting of a
law itself is a process that can enhance understanding and support democrat-
ic principles such as participation and transparency and in this way increases
legitimacy. A flexible, consultative process and realistic objectives help in the
adoption and practical application of a new law. The law itself should include
the authority and functions delegated under the existing legal framework,
including developmental, regulatory, revenue generating and other activities
associated with effective coastal management (Knight and Lowry 2003).
Problems with the new legal and institutional arrangements are common.
The laws at the local level are so manifold that they overlap and lead to confu-
sion. Local governments can pass ordinances that are not necessarily in line
with those of neighbouring villages or municipalities. Regulations are also
apt to change as with elections new leaders and parties may very well change
the ordinances again (van Weerd, pers. comm. 2005). If no mechanisms are
in place to halt this or where people are not capable to oppose these changes
– as is the case in remote villages around Murcielagos Bay where people are
not politically aware and depend on authorities – this situation can lead to
insecurity and short-term perspective of local resource users. It is therefore
that political empowerment, capacity building and social preparation as ap-
plied by the MREP program are so significant.
It is also important to study the role and position of the traditional authori-
ties in a community and define to what extent there are possibilities to work
with these institutions under a decentralised regime. Where traditional in-
stitutions exist that are locally supported, legitimate and capable to deal with
resource management responsibility, power should be handed over to tra-
ditional authorities. If a functional, democratic local government is present
this would be the appropriate authority to become engaged in the process.
What we would argue against, is the handing-over of power to newly estab-
lished institutions such as fishing committees that have neither the political
nor cultural grounding to function long-term. Often these organisations lack
the legitimacy that is required or the scope to operate at a wider level. Most
important, however, is the fact that these new structures often provide op-
portunities for local elites and outside powerful actors to play a major role in
resource management.
The Philippines are ahead in scaling-up and dealing with resource manage-
ment at a wider scope than the local community. Coordination of efforts in
the province or region is important as fishermen face similar issues (Caasi in
LeaRN Newsletter 2004). It is important therefore that local structures allow
for scaling-up to province wide or regional management. Fishers’ organisa-
tions or LGUs may therefore not always be the proper institutions as they are
limited in membership and scope. There is more potential in working with
NGOs as they can operate on wider level and often have the financial and
210 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
10.10 Conclusion
cal ideals, such as democracy, do not provide a good standard for evaluating
actual political processes. The risk is that they create a selective and inevitably
negative assessment as they do not measure the actual (past) conditions and
change.’ For Indonesia, the reference to evaluate change should be the op-
pressive and exploitative Suharto regime, its systematic corruption and its
minimal room for political discussion and critique. So what has changed?
In Indonesia, since 2002 at least 15 districts and 30 provinces have drafted dis-
trict and provincial coastal management laws or Perdas.16 At numerous case
study sites (Balgos and Pagdilao 2002; Shakleton et al. 2002; Ribot 2004),
local governments have demonstrated capacity and initiative in natural re-
source management. Local people have been empowered and local councils
increased their revenues from resource use. Marginal and disadvantaged
groups are playing a greater role and are benefiting from newly set-up man-
agement schemes. Both in Indonesia and the Philippines, positive effects are
clear with the local communities taking up responsibility for management,
the drafting of new district laws, the revival of traditional institutions, and the
scaling-up of local efforts to province-wide management.
16 The number of provinces has increased from 26 to 32, and the number of districts from 360
to 450. The reason for this formation is the opportunity to benefit from local resource revenues, as
well as the delivery of central government services. The risk of this development is pemekaran or
administrative fragmentation (Jones 2004).
17 The mapping out of the power arena is an important tool in dealing with these parties and in
setting out strategic moves to undermine their power (Shackleton et al. 2002; Ribot 2004).
212 DECENTRALISATION AND COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
gained by the government and the political will for decentralisation increases
(Pomeroy and Berkes 1997). Mistakes and setbacks are unavoidable, espe-
cially in a country like Indonesia where the process was pushed and decen-
tralisation laws executed at a faster rate than the lower government levels and
local population could handle.
In conclusion, we can say that even though perhaps scattered, there are posi-
tive experiences in the setting up of local resource management systems un-
der decentralisation. A first lesson is to give decentralisation time. Especially
for countries with a history of colonisation and dictatorship, such as Indone-
sia, expectations should be realistic. With a legacy of corruption, nepotism
and fraud power structures, little or no individual responsibility, a large de-
gree of distrust between communities and government, the shift towards a
decentralised and, in the long run, more democratic state is immense and
will take generations. Other countries, such as the Philippines, provide an
inspiring example in achieving this goal.
213
The purpose of this chapter is to present results from the first five-year phase
of the Fisheries Co-management Research project implemented by the In-
ternational Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM)
and the Institute of Fisheries Management (IFM), with national partners in
Asia and Africa. More specifically, the chapter will present results of condi-
tions which affect the success of co-management as identified through the
project’s research activities in Asia. A brief discussion on the data sources for
this chapter is presented in section 3.9. Next, the eighteen conditions identi-
fied as being of high importance for success are presented, grouped into
three categories: supra-community level, community level, and individual
and household level. The chapter will finish with a discussion of policy impli-
cations for fisheries co-management.
11.1 Introduction
Over the last fifteen years, research undertaken at different locations around
the world has documented many cases, both successful and unsuccessful, of
co-management in fisheries and other coastal resources (Jentoft and Kristof-
fersen 1989; Smith and Walters 1991; White et al. 1994; Berkes et al. 1996;
Hoefnagel and Smit 1996; DeCosse and Jayawickrama 1998; Normann et
al. 1998). From the results of this research, conditions are emerging which
are central to developing and sustaining successful co-management arrange-
ments (Pinkerton 1989; Pinkerton 1993; Pinkerton 1994; Pinkerton and
Weinstein 1995). The list is long and varied, and is growing. Research and
practical experience is continuing to reveal more about co-management ar-
rangements and the factors affecting their successful implementation and
performance. It should be noted that these conditions are not absolute or
complete. There can still be successful co-management without having met
all of the conditions. However, consensus is growing that the more of these
conditions that are satisfied in a particular situation, the greater the chances
for successful implementation of co-management.
*Based on: R.S. Pomeroy, B.M. Katon, I.H.T. Harkes (2001) Conditions Affecting the Success of
Fisheries Co-management: Lessons from Asia. Marine Policy 25: 197-208.
214 CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT
If supportive legislation and policies are in place, partners tend to have less
difficulty in asserting their rights and roles, particularly if the judicial system
is fair and objective. The legal basis for the resource user’s participation in re-
source management is vital and must address fundamental concerns, which
include: 1) who has the right to use the resource; 2) who owns the resource;
and 3) what is the legal framework for implementing co-management ar-
rangements. The arrangements may be undermined in the absence of a legal
CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT 215
External agents
External change agents are often needed to expedite the co-management
process. Change agents may come from NGOs, academic or research institu-
tions, religious organisations, government agencies and project teams (Katon
et al. 1997; Baticados and Agbayani 1998; Katon et al. 1998; van Mulekom
and Tria 1999). These external agents assist the community in defining the
problem; provide independent advice, ideas and expertise; provide training
and technical assistance; guide joint problem-solving and decision-making;
and assist in developing management plans. External agents fill a special
role in terms of drawing out insights with a participatory style of facilitation,
processing the insights, and guiding the community in reaching its goals.
Their willingness to live in the community to work with local people, ability
to focus on community objectives and their linkages with donors and other
supportive organisations are among the factors which favor their catalytic
role.
The external agent should be objective and serve a catalytic role in the devel-
opment process. The external agent should not directly interfere in the proc-
ess, but may guide or provide information on how to proceed in the process
or with a policy. Documented experiences underscore the role of external
agents in setting in place a process of discovery and social learning. These
catalysts open the eyes of resource users, stakeholders and partner organisa-
tions to pressing issues, urge them to search for appropriate solutions, and
challenge them to take collective action (Katon et al. 1997; Katon et al. 1998;
Baticados and Agbayani 1998; van Mulekom and Tria 1999). The external
agent should have a temporary relationship with the co-management proc-
ess, serving their particular function and then phasing out. However, the
recruitment of external agents, such as NGOs, may not always be ideal in
216 CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT
establishing co-management. The staff may be young and may not readily be
accepted by traditional societies. Some of them may have ideological views
on development that may not be acceptable to the community or the govern-
ment. Others may be reluctant to involve the government and the business
community even though they are stakeholders in resource management.
They may also lack funds to finance continuing operations.
Group homogeneity
The fisher group or organisation permanently resides near the area to be
managed. There is a high degree of homogeneity, in terms of kinship, ethnic-
CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT 217
ity, religion or fishing gear type, among the group. Group size, in terms of the
number of individuals involved in the management arrangements, is rela-
tively small. There were many communities in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines where successful co-management was dependent on the
high level of socio-economic and cultural homogeneity of the community.
This does not mean, however, that co-management projects cannot succeed
in socio-economically and culturally heterogeneous communities (Pomeroy
et al. 1996). In the Oxbow Lakes of Bangladesh, Muslim and Hindu fishers
were able to work together on the lake fisheries teams (Khan and Apu 1998).
In the village of San Salvador in Zambales, Philippines, successful co-man-
agement occurred despite marked differences in ethnicity and fishing gear
(Katon et al. 1997).
Leadership
Local leadership is a critical condition for success of co-management. Local
leaders set an example for others to follow, set out courses of action, and
provide energy and direction for the co-management process. While a com-
munity may already have leaders, they may not be the correct or appropriate
leaders for co-management. Local elites may be the traditional leaders in a
community, but they may not be the appropriate leaders for a co-manage-
ment effort. Leaders may need to be drawn or developed from the ranks of
the community, including resource users. These individuals may be more ac-
ceptable and respected by their peers. In Bangladesh, the local leaders of the
lakes (baor) were identified and elected by the fishers. Leader’s term of office
were limited so as to give others the chance to gain leadership skills and to
reduce the possibility of corruption (Khan and Apu 1998). Reliance on one
individual as a leader can be a problem. In certain Philippine cases, projects
failed when the leader died, left political office, or left the area because there
was no one to take the leader’s place (Katon et al. 1998). The external change
agents must not act as leaders because the community will become depend-
ent upon them. The community must look inward to develop local leader-
ship itself. Training and education efforts must strive to build and develop
leadership skills among a variety of individuals in the community so that
the co-management activity does not become dependent on any one person.
Documented experiences affirm that locally recruited and trained leaders,
both formal and informal, are a potent force in mobilizing residents for col-
218 CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT
Community organisations
The existence of a legitimate community or people’s organisation is vital
means for representing resource users and stakeholders and influencing the
direction of policies and decision-making. These organisations must have the
legal right to exist and make arrangements related to their needs. They must
be allowed to be autonomous from government. The organisation will need
to be recognized as legitimate by the community members and stakeholders,
not just be a government established organisation, to carry out its mandate.
enforcement. The case studies in the Philippines show that when user rights
are specified and secure (such as with a mangrove certificate of stewardship
contract), there is a change in the behaviour and attitude of the resource user
toward conservation and a much greater chance that the intervention will be
maintained. Without legally supported property rights, resource users have
no standing to enforce their claim over the resource against outsiders. In
most cases, local initiatives require active collaboration with government to
protect and enforce user rights (Pomeroy et al. 1996). Local interventions
were sustained where property rights existed, were clear, and were enforced
(Pomeroy et al. 1996).
Accountability
Co-management means having a process in which business is conducted
in an open and transparent manner. All partners must be held equally ac-
countable for upholding the co-management agreement. The partners have
common access to information. Venues are provided for public discussion of
issues and to reach consensus. There needs to be accepted standards for eval-
uating the management objectives and outcomes. Without strong accounta-
bility, decision-making can become corrupt and arbitrary (Sandalo 1994; Yap
1996). A body outside of the community, such as government or an NGO,
may need to monitor and evaluate the co-management process. This outside
body can serve to provide checks and balances to make the process more
accountable in a formal way. Formal agreements will require a structure for
legal accountability among the partners.
organisations have a good grasp of why they are managing the resource and
what results are envisaged (Katon et al. 1997).
Vigorous, fair and sustained law enforcement requires the participation of all
partners. Enforcement can be carried out separately by an enforcement unit,
or in collaboration between local informal or traditional enforcers (church,
senior fishers, local leaders) and formal enforcers (police, coast guard). Com-
munity sanctions – teaching, example, social pressure – are important and
can be useful in increasing compliance. Local enforcement efforts may need
to be backed up by government enforcement bodies to ensure objectivity. It
may be necessary to have government law enforcement agencies involved in
dealing with outsiders in order to have better cooperation.
The incentive may start as simply as hope for a better tomorrow, but usually
‘matures’ as the individual gains more information and as the process de-
velops over time. It is often easier and faster to implement co-management
arrangements where the resource user recognizes an incentive for participa-
tion on their own and undertakes action rather than when an incentive is
presented to a resource user by an external agent. One method to measure
that an incentive structure for participation and action does exist in a com-
226 CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT
munity is when the community members invest their own resources (labour,
money) in the project.
The conditions discussed in the section above are those that have been iden-
tified from Asian experience for the successful implementation of commu-
nity-based co-management. As mentioned earlier, this is not a comprehen-
sive list. These conditions are meant to serve as a guide in the planning and
implementation of co-management. The conditions must be viewed in the
distinct political, biological, cultural, technological, social and economic con-
text of the Asian region and the individual countries. We need to bear in
mind the role these unique characteristics play in shaping the process and
implementation of co-management in Asia. They are different from those in
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT 227
Western societies and reflect the so-called ‘Asian values.’ Resource manage-
ment systems must be viewed in the context of the complex interactions of
these characteristics that have shaped past and present situations and that
have a capacity for influencing the future. These characteristics include the
small-scale, subsistence based fisheries, the local community traditions, the
social and political structures, the political and economic restructuring that
is occurring in the region, and the need for food security.
None of the conditions exist in isolation, but each supports and links to an-
other to make the complex process and arrangements for co-management
work. In addition, all of the parties (resource users, stakeholders, external
agents, government) have different but mutually supportive roles to play in
co-management. The role of government in co-management is often associ-
ated with the passage of enabling policies and legislation, vigilant and effec-
tive enforcement, arbitration of disputes among partners when these cannot
be resolved by the parties themselves, provision of financial and technical
assistance to sustain co-management activities and promotion of a stable
political and social environment. The role of the external agent involves ini-
tiating a process of discovery and social learning, guiding problem-solving,
building local capabilities and advocating appropriate policies. Resource us-
ers and stakeholders are largely responsible for the day-to-day management
of resources, participation in consultations, design of appropriate resource
management measures and assistance in monitoring and law enforcement.
The fulfilment of these complementary roles is crucial to the operation and
sustainability of co-management.
Within Southeast Asia, the government of the Philippines has been a leader
in decentralising management of natural resources to the local level. Between
1984 and 1994, more than a hundred community-based resource manage-
ment (CBRM) projects were undertaken. According to Pomeroy et al. (1996),
the time, funds, and collective effort put into these projects have allowed
implementers and participants to accumulate valuable knowledge in the area
of CBRM. An overall evaluation by Pomeroy and Carlos (1997) revealed, how-
ever, that less than 20 per cent of these projects were identified as being
successful. The criteria used to evaluate success were that the community
organisation still existed and that at least a single project intervention was
maintained after the project terminated. It may have been that the project
components (alternative livelihood programmes, the installation of a pro-
tected area, or technology for increased fish production) were implemented
at a time when the people were not ready for them, or that for the people the
project components were not relevant, but why the majority of projects failed,
is not clear. It is, however, not the scope of this chapter to discuss project fail-
ure, but to discuss how to measure failure, or, in that respect, project success.
Indeed, a more in-depth study by Pomeroy et al. (1996) showed that while
projects could be unsuccessful in the eyes of the implementers, the project
participants did not necessarily perceive the projects as failures at all.
This chapter is in the form of a review and attempts to shed light on why the
perceptions of project staff and beneficiaries are contradictory, and how we
can revise the methodology of evaluation in order to capture the impacts of a
project from both perspectives. The chapter begins to explain the discrepancy
in project evaluation with an illustration from the above-mentioned study
by Pomeroy et al. (1996). Then it takes a step back in time and explains why
conventional development projects shifted to people-centred resource man-
agement. It explains the difference between the perspectives of the project
participants and those of outsiders, and the consequences of this for percep-
tions of project success. How the ‘inside perspective’ can be measured objec-
tively, and what should be measured and when, is discussed as well as the
methodology. Finally, the chapter describes the obstacles to include the extra
measurement in CBRM and co-management project evaluations.
*Based on: I.H.T. Harkes (2001) Project Success: Different Perspectives, Different Measurements.
In: B. Vira and R. Jeffery (eds.) Analytical Issues in Participatory Natural Resource Management.
Palgrave Publishers, pp 128-144.
230 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
The in-depth analysis by Pomeroy et al (1996) covered nine project sites that
were part of the Central Visayas Regional Project-1 (CVRP-1) and the Coastal
Environmental Programme (CEP) in the Philippines which started in 1984.
The study showed that, while projects could be unsuccessful in the imple-
menters’ eyes, the project participants perceived them as largely successful.
To be more precise, the analysis suggested that the community-based coastal
resource management projects evaluated were successful despite partial or
complete failure (or destruction by natural events) of some project objectives
such as mangrove planting, artificial reefs, fish aggregating devices, and shell-
fish culture.
Illustrative are two cases: Calagcalag and Tiguib, in the municipality of Ay-
ungon region, Negros Oriental. Impacts were measured on two levels: (1) the
independent variables (project variables and context variables) and (2) the
dependent variables (achievement of intermediate objectives and impacts on
‘well-being’ of the coastal ecosystem). The first set of independent variables is
less relevant because these variables are comparable for both cases. The latter
most clearly underline the argument in this chapter. Calagcalag is presented
as a successful case, while Tiguib is classified as being unsuccessful. The first
subset of dependent variables included both material objectives (see above)
and non-material objectives such as training and institution building. The
second subset (well-being of the ecosystem) included both human and ‘natu-
ral’ components. For a more elaborate description see Pomeroy et al. (1996).
12.1.1 Calagacalag
The artificial reefs (ARs) installed as part of the material intermediate project
objectives, were ineffective and partly destroyed by typhoons, as happened
with the Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs) that were installed. However, both
are being reinstalled. Mangrove reforestation was a failure because apparent-
ly an improper species was selected, as was the case with an oyster-farming
project. The goats introduced as alternative livelihood died or were not very
useful –in fact, the very idea of goat milk amused many respondents. From
the intermediate objectives, only the seaweed culture as part of the sea farm-
ing and the installation of a marine sanctuary were successful.
(ten in total) on the ecosystem were positive, except for access, which was
related to removal of fishing area by the installation of a sanctuary.
Pomeroy et al. (1996) suggest that it is important to note that this overall
perception of positive change exists despite partial or complete failure (or
destruction by natural events) of some project objectives. They write further
that the early involvement of the fishing groups in the project gave them a
better understanding of the difficulties that came with the introduction of
new technologies. Additionally, the adaptive nature of the project, the will-
ingness of the project staff to listen to beneficiary complaints and institute
changes in implementation procedures, resulted in the participants’ feeling
that they, in part, influenced project success (ibid.). This was also the case
in less successful projects, where an overall perception of positive change
existed despite partial or complete failure of some project interventions. This
is clear from the next case.
12.1.2 Tiguib
As in Calagcalag, the ARs and FADs in Tiguib were destroyed or deteriorated,
but in contrast to the first case never reinstalled. The fish sanctuary was not
installed at all. The mangrove reforestation survival rate was only ten per cent
and livestock dispersal was limited. Apparently, sea farming was not part of
the project. The Fishermen’s Association has had its ‘ups and downs’, but
at the moment of the evaluation was active – the interest of the members
mainly in mangrove reforestation and access rights to ARs and FADs, despite
the fact that these were reported as destroyed at the time. The Fishermen’s
Association was reactivated as a means of obtaining a milkfish fry collection
concession. In this village there was a clear difference in the understanding
of the use of creating rules, ARs, and FADs, between the members of the
Fishermen’s Association and the non-members.
The Tiguib near shore component of CVRP-1 was considered to be less than
successful by project staff. From the perspective of the fisher households in-
terviewed, however, statistically significant improvements were perceived in
seven of ten impact indicators. The three remaining impacts were perceived
as improving, but were not statistically significant. Again, it is important to
note that this overall perception of positive change exists despite partial or
complete failure of some project interventions. Fisher people noted an in-
creased level of knowledge of project objectives and a high level of participa-
tion in project planning and changes in the project. They may have felt a
sense of empowerment because while the original association failed, a new
association was formed to take advantage of an economic opportunity. This
indicates that when the right circumstances existed, the residents of Tiguib
demonstrated that they can work together.
232 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
From the study it appeared that project staff were focusing more on easily
observable impacts, for example, functioning fishermen’s organisations, area
of mangrove successfully replanted, etc. The fishermen, however, felt a sense
of empowerment and increased knowledge. They had more information with
which to make decisions and improve their life, they had more skills, and
they felt more integrated into the economic and political mainstream. How-
ever, although the general project approach was bottom-up, indicators for
project success were solely defined by the project implementers or outside
evaluators.
The question therefore is: what kind of indicators do reflect project success?
For the answer, we have to look at the structure of CBRM and co-manage-
ment itself. In order to shift from the role of resource users to the role of
resource managers, project participants in CBRM required different skills
and capabilities. A new set of methods were designed, called participatory
234 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
methods, through which the local population would not only have a voice,
but would also be able to participate in all project components.
The Philippine experience shows, as do other cases, that the social prepara-
tion process is time-consuming. It was concluded that for a truly participa-
tory project, the time required for people to master new skills for CBRM
would be at least three to five years, but probably longer (Borrini-Feyerabend
1996, Pomeroy et al. 1996; van Mulekom 1999). In reality, however, many
projects are planned for a shorter time span, even if they do include a social
preparation process! The result is that the material project interventions are
carried out while the beneficiaries are still in the process of developing the
skills needed to actually understand the project interventions, and are not in
a position to implement them. Consequently, at the end of the project life
– which is not necessarily the end of the developments in the field – project
interventions are not (or not fully) implemented or sustained. In these cases,
the project is deemed to be a failure. However, it is entirely possible that if the
participants had been given more time, chances are that in the longer run,
project objectives may have been accomplished.
Not only is the timing to measure project success essential, it is also impor-
tant to know what to measure. The fact is, that even though community-
EMIC AND ETIC 235
From the above, it can be concluded that the reason why projects are often
evaluated as being unsuccessful is because neither the timing of the evalua-
tion, nor the criteria used to measure success are appropriate. Chances are
that the criteria that are measured are those that the project implementers
feel are important, while overlooking those representing the experience of
the participants. The obvious solution to this deficiency is to re-define suc-
cess and to develop new criteria to measure project results. This is, however,
only possible if those who evaluate the projects are aware of their limited
perception of reality, and recognise that the local community may evaluate
project success differently to the researcher or evaluator him- or herself.
The disparity between what is actually measured and the people’s perceived
impacts of the project can perhaps be understood using some theoretical
ideas from Anthropology. Harris (1991) for example writes: ‘The problem
is that both the thoughts and behaviour of the project participants can be
viewed from two perspectives: from that of the participants themselves and
that of the observers. In both instances, scientific, objective accounts of the
mental and behavioural fields are possible. In the first instance, the observers
employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the
participants; in the second instance they employ concepts that are meaning-
ful and appropriate to the observers. The first way of studying culture [or
perceptions of success] is called emics and the second way is called etics.’
Borrowed from linguistics (Pike 1954), phonemic refers to what a sound sig-
nifies in the minds of the users. Phonetic on the other hand refers to scien-
tific descriptions of sound with no reference to meaning, that is, from the
outside. Etic categories are those that the researcher employs for the purpos-
es of scientific classification, analysis, and understanding of human-environ-
mental interactions (Lovelace 1984). Emic is concerned with the elements,
aspects, and interpretations of the belief system as perceived or conceived
by the members of the culture or society under consideration (see also de
Groot 1992 on the use of emic and etic in the perception of environmental
problems).
236 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
The problem is that even though many projects claim to value the participa-
tion of the local people, they tend to neglect emic categories. Project output is
expressed in concrete, technical terms; evaluations focus exclusively on etic
observations. However, strictly etic assessments are inadequate for projects
that have socio-cultural impacts. ‘During the process phase it is meaning-
ful to determine how the people perceive the natural environment, the local
problems, the alternative solutions, their abilities to intervene, but most im-
portantly, their capabilities to do this collectively’ write Pomeroy and Carlos
(1996). In the absence of emic considerations, it is impossible to discover
these local conceptions and perceptions.
This does not mean that etic measurements cannot be used to measure suc-
cess. On the contrary, the physical aspects (that forms part of the etic en-
vironment connected to the values and views of the project implementers)
are important project results. However, they need to be measured in a later
phase. It is essential that the two types of project evaluation take place at the
appropriate time. As long as the social preparation phase is ongoing, there
is no need (or use) to measure material output even though they are part of
project activities. This is the moment for emic considerations. Only after the
project has phased out and when the community has had the time to actually
carry out project interventions, is it appropriate to measure according to etic
standards.
The purpose of the discussion of emic and etic is not only to elucidate the
difference in perspective, it also touches on issues such as objectivity and va-
lidity. What we have seen is that not only the timing, but also the decision of
what to measure is crucial in the evaluation of project success. Until a more
pluralistic approach is widely accepted, what is measured depends for a large
part on the demands and requirements of donors and/or the implementing
agency (see also Anderson et al. 1998). The prevailing positivist mind-frame
of researchers – who often design or are involved in implementation of the
projects – evokes a natural preference for easily observable results that can
be quantified and measured (Leurs 1996). However, it is a false assumption
that only empirical observations lead to valid and objective measurements.
The non-material, subjective, personal experience of the project participants
can also be transformed into observable facts.
In the next phase, the implementation phase, field workers and community
organisers generally conduct meetings to discuss the concept of co-manage-
ment and discuss the project. Baseline data is collected and participatory
research conducted. Once the community feels comfortable with the com-
munity organisers, a community problem-, needs- and opportunity assess-
ment is conducted, information is shared, and management and develop-
ment objectives are defined in a communal process (Pomeroy 1998). This
is, of course, in an ideal situation where there is consensus and where there
is common ground to define the project objectives. If this is the case and the
outcomes are the result of a communal activity, it may be assumed that that
the physical objectives of the project as perceived by the beneficiaries (emic)
and the implementers (etic) coincide. The second measurement of these
physical outcomes, right after the project phases out, thus will represent an
objective, etic perception of project success.
238 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
TABLE 12.1
TABLE 12.2
time and thus prevent possible failures (see also Pollnac 1989). Since the so-
cial preparation process often takes place during the implementation phase
when physical project activities have also started, it maybe an option to in-
clude material and physical project indicators in the preliminary evaluation
(see list below). This evaluation typically focuses on the process of project
development in terms of material achievements. It will show whether the
project goals are appropriate, need to be modified, adapted, or skipped alto-
gether. The advantage of this early measurement of physical indicators is that
it enhances the self-esteem and awareness of participants, and also reveals
the priorities of the project participants. Hence, it further stimulates inter-
nalisation of project objectives, which makes it more likely that the selected
activities are actually carried out.
It is only in the last phase of the project, the post-implementation phase, that
the final etic evaluation of the project takes place. Not only are the physical
outputs of the project measured in a quantitative way, but also the organi-
sational, non-material, success factors are quantified, such as the intensity
of group involvement and the functioning of the management system and
enforcement mechanism, see Table 12.3.
TABLE 12.3
• Success in terms of material output: size of yields; catches per unit effort; hectares of pro-
tected areas; hectares of mangroves/forests replanted; occurrence of destructive prac-
tices by local people.
• Success in terms of human involvement: number of people attending the training; numbers
of participants in project; frequency of staff-meetings; size of the network.
• Success in terms of project benefits: division of benefits; economic opportunities; well-being
in terms of health; well-being in terms of income; flow of investments; education level.
• Success in terms of management structure: management institution designed and active;
management plan and regulations designed and implemented; enforcement structure in
place; conflict solving mechanism in place; leadership.
• Success in terms of participation: type of participation; dimension of participation.
of success for both the implementers and the participants can be expected to
be similar. This final evaluation then, will truly represent project success.
The last question to be answered is: how should project success be measured
and by whom? The emic and etic measurements require a standard meth-
odology that is valid and allows comparison. The core of project evaluation
is people’s perceptions. It is essential to use the right method to measure
these perceptions, especially since for a number of these indicators no base-
line data is available. The measurement of people’s perceptions is complex.
Perceptions cannot simply be measured by asking people ‘what they think’,
as happens in many studies. These kinds of questions do not reflect the com-
plexity of people’s thoughts and the subconscious. Emic indicators (such as
perceptions and attitudes) are non-material and qualitative yet quantifiable
and demand a certain approach in order to be measured (Bernard 1994).
There are various ways to measure project success and to operationalise the
indicators. The methodology to measure people’s perceptions of success de-
pends largely on whether the evaluation is action oriented or is part of an
academic exercise. In the latter case, each indicator needs to be thoroughly
operationalised and studied. This could be done, for example, through an-
thropological fieldwork directed at the development of a set of indicators.
This would lead to scientifically valid outcomes, but can be time-consuming,
especially when it concerns a long list of indicators.
Where time is limited because action is required, or where funds and the
availability of skilled researchers are limited, alternative methods need to be
used. One example of such a method is a visual self-anchoring ladder scale
used in the ICLARM-IFM Fisheries Co-management Project (Pomeroy et al.
1996). This base-line independent method allows for the use of non-para-
metric statistical techniques and makes use of the human ability to make
graded ordinal judgements. Fishermen are asked to answer questions about
the state of the resource, fish-catches, personal well-being, income, occur-
rence of conflicts, collective action etc. by using a picture of a ladder with ten
rungs as a visual aid. The lowest rung represents the worst possible condi-
tion; the highest rung represents the best. In the study, fisher peoples’ per-
ceptions were recorded of past conditions, current conditions and degree of
optimism for the future. The technique deals with variability in perceptions
over time and facilitates analysis of the perceived project impacts.
242 PROJECT SUCCESS : DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES , DIFFERENT MEASUREMENTS
TABLE 12.4 – PRA Techniques (adapted from Jiggins and de Zeeuw 1992; Pido et al. 1996)
1 Visual scoring and ranking systems can be used to measure changes in wealth and well-be-
ing, development of skills, representation of social groups etc.
2 Time lines can be used to represent significant changes in the village, but also on the
individual level.
3 Seasonal patterns can be used to show the relative magnitude of workload, they can also
illustrate project activities and extent of involvement in the project.
4 Venn- and linkage diagrams are useful to represent social relationships or the importance
and influence of different individuals or institutions.
5 Visual estimations and quantification record such things as yields and prices, but can also
be used to measure skills, initiative, commitment etc.
This is only one example to show the use of participatory techniques to meas-
ure project impacts. Other methods, such as participatory evaluation meth-
ods, may also be useful (FAO 1988). These techniques allow a great deal of
input from participants and are very useful for rapid assessment of the local
situation (Chambers 1991, Drijver 1993; Mosse 1994; Blauert and Quinta-
nar 1997). The exercises can be adapted to measure personal change and
development accruing from the project, and outcomes can be quantified and
compared (see Table 12.4). For more easily quantifiable indicators of project
success, relatively straightforward methods could be used, such as observa-
tions, enumeration (census) and surveys.
12.8 Conclusion
Over the last decades, development projects have shifted their approach from
development to a people-oriented approach. An important concern of CBRM
and co-management is the empowerment of groups and social actors. These
approaches require extensive participation and the development of local ca-
pacity. Project participants need to develop the skills required to manage
their resources. However, the personal development of project participants
is often not evaluated and project evaluation remains exclusively focused on
material outputs.
The early emic evaluation has the advantage that it allows the project to adapt
strategies and adjust project goals, and thus prevent possible failures. It also
provides a picture of the performance of the project over time, which may
result in a more accurate assessment of what the project has achieved. In
this way the chances of project success will not only increase, but it is also
more likely that after the project terminates, the participants will continue
the project’s activities.
The fact that the material project goals are defined collectively with the assist-
ance of government, NGOs and donor agencies, leads to the internalisation
of these material project goals by all parties. Since the project outputs are
agreed upon and based on collective decision-making, it is more likely that
the physical objectives of the project as perceived by the beneficiaries and the
implementers will coincide and will be actually carried out. A second meas-
urement at the post-implementation phase, focusing on the material project
outputs, thus can be seen to be objective and would truly represent project
success.
There are three critical points in this discussion: (1) the acknowledgement of
a social preparation process, (2) the need to define project goals communally,
and (3) intermediary measurements of various sets of project indicators. Cur-
rent development structures, however, make no allowance for the extra set
of indicators needed to evaluate project success at the emic level. Targets are
usually set by those outside the community. Only in a few cases do the opin-
ions of the participants play a major role in project design, implementation
and evaluation. Furthermore, in many cases projects are carried over in too
short a time, without a clear or long enough social preparation process, and
with material interventions started too early. Hence, it is not surprising that
the material interventions are either not sustained or never implemented
at all. Consequently, the project fails to measure the non-material successes
that may actually be experienced by the participants.
13.1 Sasi
Sasi in Central Maluku has been in place for over 400 years and indicates
that rules pertaining to gear types, access, closed areas and seasons can be
successfully developed and applied at the local level by villagers independent
of external influences and government intervention. In the place of a science-
based rationale for management, we find an ethic of working together for
the benefit of the community, attachment to a cultural tradition (adat), and
the tendency to comply with sanctions based on religious beliefs. These have
combined to form the basis of a resilient and, within its narrow scope of ap-
plication, demonstrably effective institution.
The most significant outcomes of the sasi study, which was carried out from
1997-98, are on the level of social sustainability. In sasi villages, people expe-
rienced a higher level of communal action and reduced conflicts. In addition
to the perception that sasi is a ‘good thing’, these aspects created important
SASI 247
incentives to comply with the rules. Compliance was further positively af-
fected by a sense of ‘control over access’, i.e control on who was entering
the water. This was particularly the case in sasi villages where people trusted
their leader and felt more involved with management issues. In those vil-
lages people also had a more positive outlook for the future, for example on
fish catches. In terms of efficiency and equity, there were no significant dif-
ferences between sasi and non-sasi villages. Sasi provides effective structures
and decision-making processes that may not be very equitable in the sense
that all villagers are actively participating, but that were, particularly where
traditional authorities were involved, perceived as highly legitimate.
The environmental benefits of sasi were limited as sasi covers only limited
resources and species. Yet, species such as sea cucumber and top shells (Tro-
chus niloticus) only seemed to occur in protected sasi areas, and without sasi
these valuable and commercially interesting species are bound to disappear.
Additional to these aspects, sasi has shown resiliency and the ability to evolve,
even after major impacts.
In Maluku, of the 63 villages studied in 1997-98, 19 had lost the entire sasi
institution. Where some form of sasi persisted there had often been a partial
loss or a change, for example from adat sasi to church sasi. Of the 35 villages
that used to have sasi on marine resources, 17 villages had some form of it
left. Post-World War II social, administrative and economic change, internal
village conflicts, amongst other reasons, caused sasi to break down. Political
instability or weak leadership was an important cause for sasi to become frag-
ile or disappear altogether. Sasi was strongest and most resilient in villages
with fewer than 3000 inhabitants that were relatively remote from large ur-
ban centres. Village homogeneity appeared important as well as institutional
interplay among the governing authorities. Where the new village structures
under Law No. 5/1979 embraced traditional authorities, the sasi institution
was able withstand political changes while collaboration with religious au-
thorities related to the church or mosque made the institution even stronger.
In villages where sasi was still active, people were strongly attached to it and
saw it as an inseparable part of their culture.
The strength of the sasi institution can be accounted to several factors. Berkes
and Folke (1998) explain that there are social mechanisms behind social-
ecological processes that deal with disturbances and so enhance institutional
and ecological resilience. Sasi comprises a number of these practices, such
as temporal restrictions on the harvest (see former section). From our study
REVITALIZATION OF SASI 249
At the time, the potential to collect resource rents through sasi made reviving
the institution very attractive, in particular for the local government. For fish-
ers the incentives to support revitalisation were linked rather to culture than
the conscious decision to manage resources for sustainability. On the con-
trary, the strong market demand coupled with high dependence on the fish-
ery made villagers extremely wary of any management measures that limited
access or imposed catch limits. Only if they would derive direct benefits from
such measures, would fishers support these restrictions. At the same time,
competition pushed artisanal fishers to organize themselves and demand
clear access and withdrawal rights on pelagic fishing grounds. However, by
the end of 1998 the outbreak of the civil strife and subsequent social disrup-
tion severely impacted the fishery and developments towards revitalisation
of sasi as well as province-wide coordination through traditional structures
(Latupati) were put to a halt.
250 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Only now that the situation in Central Maluku has calmed down and villag-
ers are reorganising their lives and livelihoods, there may be room for some
form of management strategy with a potential role for sasi. Information com-
ing from the area defining the extent of breakdown of villages and village
institutions is scattered, but in 2004 at least one village, Haruku, reactivated
its sasi system and has had, for the first time since the disruption, an opening
ceremony for sasi lompa (Rumaruson 2003). In fact, the sasi institution has
played a vital role in resolving conflicts and the process of recovery (Kissya
and Dwisasanti 2004). This example is inspiring and has great significance
as it illustrates the strength of the institution and might be an indicator of
similar processes towards revitalisation and reestablishment of local man-
agement in other parts of Central Maluku.
Sasi has beneficial impacts on marine resource management, but the most
outstanding effect of sasi is on the social level. Jentoft and McCay (2003)
explain how erosion of community qualities like cooperation and solidarity
produces the very conditions under which Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the
commons’ can take place. Interestingly, it is exactly these ‘qualities’ that sasi
enhances. Other aspects that we find in sasi villages, such as trust, represen-
tation and legitimacy, form the primary mechanisms that keep the institu-
tion functional and resilient over time. These mechanisms, including down-
ward accountability, are also highly relevant if not critical in decentralisation
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Additionally, sasi provides and illustrates certain
key conditions for the success of local and/or co-management.
The design principles of Ostrom (1990) and other scientists who have pur-
sued this line of thinking thus are an interesting point of exit, but only partly
explain the success of management institutions. Most of the conditions men-
DECENTRALISATION 251
13.5 Decentralisation
The new legal framework, of which Laws No. 22/1999 and 25/1999 are the
most ground breaking ones, opens a window of opportunities. In some plac-
es fishing communities have regained authority over their traditional fishing
grounds (Down to Earth 2001). This formal acknowledgement is crucial for
well-functioning local management systems (Ostrom 1990). Haruku village,
where villagers with support of traditional institutions and authorities have
reactivated sasi, may take the first steps in getting its traditional management
system acknowledged (Rumaruson 2003; Kissya and Dwisasanti 2004). With
access to information on new legal structures,1 a shift in authority to local
government control including traditional institutions, and with support and
services from NGOs, the district or central government, more villages may
choose to revitalise sasi or establish a new (co-) management system and, on
the longer term, may unite their efforts under a coordinated province-wide
management scheme.
The perpetuation of sasi (as opposed to the introduction of a totally new insti-
tution), especially if it includes religious leaders, has certain advantages over
new institutions. The structures, rules and regulations are already in place
and authority is largely defined. However, there are certain challenges and
limitations:
• The sasi institution in its current form is neither strong nor comprehen-
sive; it covers only a relatively small area and limited species.
• The institution is vulnerable to (political) conflict and highly dependent
on leadership.
• There is poor coordination among local institutions and knowledge of
legal rights and responsibilities is lacking.
• Marginal village economies and declining income encourage destructive
fishing practices.
• The sasi rules are effective in controlling local residents, but less effective
when applied to outsiders.
• Local institutions such as the kewang are not formally recognised, while
supernatural sanctions (wrath of God) are less effective in modern soci-
ety.
• While traditional leaders are growing old, younger generations lose in-
terest in sasi and the knowledge linked to adat – a process we also see in
other parts of Indonesia (Sakai 2002).
FIGURE 13.1 – Children in Haruku of whom some are members of the mini-kewang
local population and in these cases the creation of structures that enhance
participation or representation of the local community is vital in countering
the formation of elites and commercial undertakings that contribute to the
affluence of leaders at the cost of the long-term prosperity of the village.
2 The kepala adat is the traditional village head. Once the formal village structure (desa) was intro-
duced in the 1970s, the elected village head was called kepala desa.
256 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
and the army have played during the civil strife in Central Maluku have re-
inforced existing distrust and local resistance. New decentralised structures
may, however, also include a role for non-adat institutions such as the navy,
police and higher government levels. Their involvement may very well be-
come a sensitive issue and sasi villages need to establish some sort of collabo-
ration between the various actors embedded in a legitimate, locally accepted
structure.
Village level institutions are important in dealing with local resource man-
agement. Cross-boundary problems, however, such as management of pe-
lagic fish stocks, can only be adequately addressed if these local institutions
are nested into a broader network of larger-scale institutions (Anderies et al.
2004). As management measures cover more than one municipality or dis-
trict, it is important that local institutions have horizontal links with neigh-
ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN NON - SASI VILLAGES 257
On the district level too, government officials have a choice between sup-
porting sasi and adat institutions or allowing new elites to attain a power-
ful role. The rich resources of Central Maluku may attract outside investors
with a single interest in extracting resource rents. If and how the regional
governments will use their authority and devise electoral mechanisms to re-
strain these new elites from entering the political arena is an open question.
An important provision of the new law (Regulation No. 25/2000) is that the
provincial government can act in lieu of the district if it does not have suf-
ficient capacity (Patlis et al. 2001). As the authority of the province under Law
No 22/1999 is vague, but potentially very broad, it could perhaps be applied
where a district government proves dysfunctional. In any case, the specifica-
tion and practical implementation of this provision is not yet provided for
and under the current arrangements the provincial governments lack the
funds to adequate carry out this authority.
once people join a program or activity create a feeling of involvement and in-
crease the likelihood of sustaining the activities (Pollnac and Pomeroy 2005).
Also needed are a funding base (part of which could be generated by village
organisations) and a stable management structure that includes, but is not
dependent upon, the village government. Whether or not the institution is
modelled on sasi, the needs and aspirations of the various proponents (fish-
ers, adat leaders, local governments, fisheries managers, and environmental
NGOs) must be successfully accommodated. Local institutions need to be
involved, not only in local monitoring and enforcement, but also as partners
in planning and implementation, stock assessment and allocation, and li-
censing. In addition, to have a place in negotiating access and withdrawal
rights for artisanal fishers in offshore waters, local institutions will need to
engage or be nested in larger institutions operating on district, provincial and
higher levels.
Two important activities in co-management (see Chapter 2 and 10) are em-
powerment and capability building which help individuals to gain greater
social awareness, become more involved in decision-making, increase self-
reliance, and in this way, establish a balance in community power relations.
This last aspect is important as the decentralisation process may have dif-
ferential impacts on the community leading to not a balance of power, but
simply a redistribution of power elites (Pomeroy et al. 2001). Social aware-
ness and other skills that lead to greater autonomy are developed during the
so-called social preparation process that precedes co-management (Pomeroy
1998; Chapter 11). The development of local skills includes value formation,
situation analysis, consensus building, leadership training, conflict manage-
ment, livelihood and enterprise management, networking, and basic biology
and ecology. Especially for the fisheries in Maluku, which are characterised
by high uncertainty, it is important to provide information of good quality on
stocks, flows and processes within the resource systems, as well as the hu-
man impact on it (van Oostenbrugge 2003).
CONCLUSION 259
Building trust and mutual respect is a time consuming process and takes
concerted efforts of partners in management. As trust is a key mechanism in
the functioning (and thus success) of management institutions and political
structures, it is important to be aware of changes in the level of trust during
the time it takes to establish these structures and afterwards. Changes in
actors are a good indicator for the effectiveness of decentralisation (Agraw-
al and Ribot 1999). Like in the co-management projects and processes de-
scribed in Chapter 12, in revitalised sasi systems trust can be measured on
various levels and concerns trust between individuals at the local level as well
as trust between local people and the government, NGOs and other external
agents. Other important indicators for success are the individual perception
of being involved in management, increased knowledge and skills, and the
level of participation in project planning (Pomeroy et al. 2001 and Chp 11).
Evaluations can further include social indicators on the level of the commu-
nity such as the degree of collective action and collaboration. Changes at this
level could include aspects like the activities undertaken by various groups
and changes in collaboration between individuals, neighbourhood groups
and otherwise differentiated groups. It may also be interesting to measure an
increase or decrease in collaboration between formal and informal institu-
tions and government agencies.
13.8 Conclusion
Milton (1996, 53) makes an important point when she says: ‘If the source
of environmental damage is human activity, then an understanding of the
rationale on which damaging activity is based is important as a starting point
for instigating constructive change.’ It is also important to understand what
kinds of cultural interpretations of the world predispose people towards
more environmental friendly practices, if such practices are to be success-
fully adopted and encouraged (see also Zwaal 2003). The identification of
options and motivations is also the starting point of the Problem-in-Context
approach in search for solutions in environmental science.
With fisheries globally under threat and marine resources depleting, it is ob-
vious that more knowledge and more data on fisheries, stocks and yields
are inadequate to manage marine resources. Slowly, the research field of
environmental management, which until recently was the exclusive domain
of biologists and fisheries scientists,3 is being invaded with insights from
other disciplines. Social sciences have gained recognition in identifying the
3 The dominant view at the time was that ‘nature’ is to be exploited for their human benefits.
As a consequence, the conviction was that environmental problems could be solved by technol-
ogy assuming that physical and biological sciences would identify the problems and appropriate
responses (Milton 1996).
262 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In my work and approach of the past years I seem to have combined two
roles. The first is the one of a researcher studying environmental behaviour,
i.e. the key features in Maluku culture relating to their environment of which
sasi is a strong expression. These features were all included in the institu-
tional analysis used in understanding the local dynamics around resource
management. A second role is to clarify that environmental behaviour to the
outside world, thus, the role of the anthropologist as an ‘interpreter’ between
local communities and others (government officials, NGOs, and researchers
from other disciplines).
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Summary
Central questions
The marine resources of Central Maluku are very rich but are under severe
pressure, particularly from destructive fishing techniques. Economic incen-
tives have caused a rapid increase in fishing pressure and catches and now
there is a need for more cautious management. In 1997-98, Indonesian
fisheries management was complex, multi-agency, and top-down. Ultimate
power was retained at the national level and provincial and lower levels were
unable either manage resource exploitation or conserve resources.
In Central Maluku, resource use is governed through a set of rules and regu-
lations called sasi, which is based on adat or traditional law. Traditional man-
agement systems such as sasi, however, were not recognised. Within the con-
text of decentralisation in Indonesia, a relevant question is what role existing
institutions, and sasi in particular, can play within the new legal framework
and whether they form an appropriate basis for modern resource manage-
ment? A study of the institution provides important insights in the revitalisa-
tion or establishment of local management not only in Maluku, but through-
out Indonesia and perhaps even further.
Inventory of sasi
Of the 63 villages in this study, only 41 still retained some form of sasi institu-
tion and only 17 villages had rules pertaining to marine management. Marine
sasi is most prevalent in mid-sized villages (2000-3000 people) distant from
the urban centre of Ambon. In 14 other villages, informants expressed a de-
sire to revitalise sasi.
Sasi practices vary from village to village. Written rules were found in 42% of
the sasi villages and usually went together with the application of sanctions
and the performance of ceremonies, i.e. the opening and closing of harvest
times and fishing grounds. The most elaborate forms of these ceremonies
are found in Nolloth village (Saparua Island) and Haruku village (Haruku
Island).
Villages in the study area range from relatively isolated, highly traditional
rural communities where adat leadership is paramount, to more modern
urban satellite villages where adat leaders lack significant influence. In no
case is management under sasi comprehensive; where it concerns marine
resources, only small areas of shallow water and few species are regulated
(e.g. Trochus niloticus, sea cucumbers and small pelagics). Rules include the
use of gear types and destructive fishing methods, as well as limitations on
the harvest. The existence of sasi means that certain important management
concepts are widely known and valued as part of local culture. Using sasi as
the basis for modern management institutions therefore is considered to be
efficient as it reduces potential costs of public education and enforcement.
Performance of sasi
Control over access in terms of who is allowed to enter the water, is perceived
to be tighter in sasi villages and compliance in these villages is greater. Sasi
has no impact on the economic situation of individual artisanal fishers, prob-
ably because the resources managed under sasi constitute a relatively small
proportion of family income. Sasi also has no effect on distribution of fishing
gears or on economic disparities within the village. In cases where harvest
SUMMARY 289
rights are sold or auctioned and benefits are not distributed fairly or accrue
to outsiders, fishers are inclined to trespass the sasi rules. On the other hand,
where marine resources under sasi are harvested as a communal crop and
distributed among the population, which is the case in Haruku, fishers per-
ceive the system as fair. Also, where decision-makers are respected and use
the proceeds of auctions of fishing rights for community development like in
Nolloth, the arrangement can be very efficient and is perceived as reasonably
equitable.
Sasi is not equitable in the sense that fishers’ voices are not always heard and
women are excluded from decision-making. Common fishers in sasi villages
feel no more involved in decision-making than fishers in non-sasi villages.
However, the ability to make decisions communally is stronger and more sta-
ble in sasi villages. Decisions ‘made by the community’ in reality means ‘by
a person acceptable to the community’ which confirms the significance of
representation and legitimacy. The hierarchical structures in the villages are
thus not equitable, but very efficient and culturally acceptable as long as lead-
ership is strong and legitimate.
The major difference between sasi and non-sasi villages is in terms of social
sustainability. The level of conflict and instable leadership was much higher
in non-sasi villages. Sasi fishers also felt that there was a strong tradition of
collective action and greater discussion of village issues. Social sustainabil-
ity, especially family well-being and income, is also positively influenced by
whether fishers are members of village organisations and satisfied with their
jobs.1 In sasi villages the trends of deterioration on these aspects compared
to the past were also less with a more positive future outlook than in non-sasi
villages.
1 Job satisfaction was also measured during this study. Results and more detail can be found in
Novaczek et al. 2001 and in Pollnac et al. 2001.
290 FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Institutional resilience
Sasi has known periods of decline, revitalisation and stability. In the 1970s
sasi declined as a result of social and political change and rapid economic
growth. The introduction of a new village structure in 1979 has caused in
many villages conflicts between traditional and new formal village authori-
ties leading to political instability. The 1980s was a period of relative stability,
where sasi was alive it remained functional while in other villages sasi was
revitalised. The 1990s was a period of further decline. Generational change
together with, again, rapid changes often captured under the term ‘moderni-
sation’ are most likely the reasons why sasi was lost.
The decline of sasi often coincides with conflict. In the 1990s, the imposition
of the formal village structure still had an impact on the political situation in
the villages and the election system opened up possibilities for opportunists
with vested interests to become the village leader. On the other hand, where
traditional authorities had been able to merge into the new government, adat
and sasi remained important aspects of village life leading to more stability.
The continued presence of sasi was further affected by village size and prox-
imity to a large urban centre, hence the loss of sasi on Ambon Island.
In Christian villages, the church played an important role in land sasi (on
coconuts) and sometimes had a supporting role in marine sasi in cases like
Nolloth and Haruku. In Muslim villages where traditional positions have
been abandoned and religious leaders no longer play a role, sasi has turned
into a more commercial transaction where resource harvesting rights are
auctioned. Close bonds and collaboration between formal and traditional in-
stitutions and religious authorities, however, makes sasi highly resilient. A
redefinition of responsibilities and involvement of non-adat institutions such
SUMMARY 291
as the church, police and higher government levels thus is important (but
needs careful consideration).
Factors that contribute positively to resilience of sasi should be considered
during the process of modernizing local management. For instance, the le-
gitimacy of a village head who descends from the traditional raja line con-
tributes positively to the execution of his authority with regard to sasi. A large
overlap between the traditional and formal authorities in the village govern-
ment is also beneficial. Acknowledgment of the traditional village authorities
within formal government is vital to revitalization of sasi (and feasible under
the new laws) and makes enforcement of sasi regulations more effective. On
the other hand, political instability and weak leadership may seriously ham-
per sasi as well as any revitalization process.
Adat forms the basis of sasi on the constitutional choice level and since
“adat cannot be changed” and is intrinsic to Maluku culture, revitalisation
or adaptation of sasi primarily concerns the operational rules (e.g. harvest
regulations and access) and collective-choice arrangements (e.g. re-establish-
ment of the kewang). The operational rules may be indigenous or may mimic
national legislation and are subject to revision. This adaptivity is important
to the resilience of the institution, but has also led to the development of a
patchwork of marine management efforts lacking a unified purpose and a set
of minimum standards.
As an institution sasi has never been static. It has changed with the times and
been used by different proponents for different economic and social reasons
– thus not simply for resource management. Berkes and Folke (1998) men-
tion various social-ecological practices that enhance institutional and ecologi-
cal resilience, such as harvest restrictions, taboos, ceremonies and intergen-
erational knowledge. This study shows that it are not the practices that make
the sasi institutions strong, but the social mechanisms that link the various
players and components, i.e. legitimacy, trust, collaboration, and transpar-
ency. A shared notion of the relevance of the institution is also needed to
stimulate a common objective to maintain sasi in spite of external influences
and in a situation where the temptation to abuse the system for personal
benefits is strong.
vincial level, here comprehensive operational rules were lacking too. Only at
the local level had some regulations been developed. However, even though
the importance of sasi and local level management was acknowledged and
village heads held de facto management responsibility over local resources
for the benefit of the community, traditional management systems were not
formalised.
Two laws affected Maluku’s fishery (Law No. 9/1985 and Decree No. 607/1976)
that respectively prohibited the use of destructive gear types such as explo-
sives and poisons, and that designated inshore fishing zones. Every year, the
total allowable catch (TAC) was set based on the maximum sustainable yield
(MSY). However, unreliable data obscured the decline in commercial stocks
and a lack of enforcement power contributed to illegal fishing. Besides, un-
clear boundaries of fishing grounds led to conflicts between small-scale arti-
sanal fishers and the motorised commercial fishing fleet.
Economic interests and the development of the fishery had priority over sus-
tainability and management. The regional and provincial planning board
BAPPEDA therefore largely concerned itself with expansion of the fisheries,
rather than with management or conservation. Under BAPPEDA one group
of institutions was directly involved in the fishery activities and dealing with
equipment, vessels and human resources, such as the Marine and Navy. A
second group dealt with marine and fishery problems as a subset of their du-
ties, such as the Environmental Bureau. In addition, there was the national
research institute LIPI which was to provide information to policy makers.
Among these agencies limits of power and responsibility were unclear.
Decentralisation
With the enactment of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999 on admin-
istrative and fiscal decentralisation, regional autonomy is becoming a fast
reality. The new laws create the legal and financial framework for governance
primarily by the district government, with assistance from the provincial and
national governments. Fisheries and coastal management has been boosted
by the created of the National Maritime Council (NMC) and the Ministry of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DKP).
The new laws, however, also create opportunities for abuse. Rampant re-
source exploitation, power struggles, and the formation of new elites form
a potential threat to the process of decentralisation, leading to scepticism
amongst researchers and opponents. A comparison between case studies
in the Philippines and Indonesia show how and under what circumstances
functional local resource management can be achieved. Important is the for-
mation of institutions at the local level that have discrete powers, transparent
processes, and that are downwardly accountable. For this adequate funding
and other forms of support from external agents are required. Empower-
ment, increased knowledge, good leadership and the development of skills
help to create institutions that are strong enough to deal with powerful oppo-
nents and ‘new elites’, and that are capable of generating resource revenues
and carrying out management authority (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Pomer-
oy 2001). Also the establishment of local assemblies, discussion forums and
umbrella organisations is important.
Important on the community level are an appropriate scale and clear bound-
aries. Clearly defined membership is important in defending community
rights. Smaller groups facilitate effective communication and decision-mak-
ing. A high degree of homogeneity also positively influences the co-manage-
ment arrangements, especially where individuals affected by these arrange-
ments are part of the decision-making process. Success is further highly
dependent on respected, legitimate leaders who serve as an example, who set
out the course of action, and who provide energy and direction to the proc-
ess. However, strong dependency on the leaders makes co-management also
vulnerable.
It is important that the objectives of co-management are clear and come from
a well-defined set of issues. The rules need to be simple. A common un-
SUMMARY 295
derstanding of the root issues and solutions helps to choose a strategy and
priorities. The willingness to comply with the rules is determined by the in-
dividual perspective on the fairness and the appropriateness of the laws and
the legitimacy of the authorities charged with implementing the regulations.
Enforcement by formal agents, such as the coast guard and police, is there-
fore if possible coordinated with local traditional enforcers.
The social preparation process often takes longer than the total project span
which is often only 3 to 4 years. So often during the first phase, project in-
terventions are carried out while people are still involved in personal devel-
opment. This is the reason why timing of project success measurement is
important. It is also important that these personal changes are assessed. The
conceptions and perceptions of the local people (emic perspective) can be
translated into indicators and assessed. In a later, more appropriate phase,
physical project output can be measured. The early measurement of people’s
perceptions has advantages. It may stimulate internalisation of project goals,
while increased self-awareness may positively impact the process of project
design and implementation. Where the project objectives and outcomes are
the result of a communal process it may be assumed that: (1) the envisaged
project goals of the implementers and the beneficiaries coincide and thus
that (2) a measurement of these (physical) outcomes at a later stage repre-
sents an objective perception of project success.
296 FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Conclusion
Sasi had (and may still have where present) significant outcomes in terms
of social sustainability and stimulates mechanisms that keep the institution
functional and resilient over time, thereby undermining Hardin’s theory
(1968) that local institutions are incapable of resource management. Social
mechanisms like collaboration, trust, but also downward accountability not
only stimulate local resource management, but also form the basis for decen-
tralised structures. Sasi, however, is vulnerable to political conflict, opportun-
ism of leaders interested in extracting resource rents, and a lack of support
and interest of younger generations. At the same time it are the younger
SUMMARY 297
Many government staff agreed that local institutions are useful and hold a
strategic position close to the resource and to fishers. However, the current
political structures in the villages are still a reflection of centralized and hier-
archical national structures. Because village government leaders are used to
taking orders from above rather than initiating action, future local manage-
ment institutions must initially be supported at higher government levels.
Village leaders will need assistance and incentives to be proactive and crea-
tive in developing new, local level management arrangements. In contrast to
countries like the Philippines, in Indonesia NGOs or environmental organi-
sations outside the government or church are rare. The involvement of these
organisations and outside catalysts, however, is important in empowerment
and capacity building that are part of the social preparation process.
Whatever form the institution takes, needed are a funding base and a stable
management structure that includes, but is not dependent upon, the village
government. Whether or not the institution is modelled on sasi, the needs
and aspirations of the various proponents – fishers, local governments, fish-
eries managers, adat leaders and environmentalists – must be successfully
accommodated. Under the new legal framework, sasi, the kewang and other
management institutions can gain formal recognition and so bring to an end
the isolation from regional, provincial and national management structures.
Local institutions need to be involved, not only in local monitoring and en-
forcement, but also as partners in development planning and implementa-
tion, stock assessment and allocation, and licensing. In addition, to have a
place in negotiating access and withdrawal rights for artisanal fishers in off-
298 FISHERIES CO - MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Onderzoeksvragen
Als respons op een roep voor beter beheer, heeft de nationale overheid van
Indonesië een stap gemaakt richting decentralisatie van autoriteit over be-
heer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen naar regionale en lokale overheden en ge-
meenschappen door de invoering van Wet Nr. 22/1999 en Wet Nr. 25/1999.
Echter, hoewel decentralisatie de toekomst is, zijn er ook valkuilen en hinder-
nissen voortvloeiend corruptie, de opkomst van lokale elites, grootschalige
exploitatie (vooral in bosbouw), overlappende wetten, en een onduidelijke
verdeling van de taken en mandaten binnen de instituties die moeten zorgen
voor beheer. In Indonesië is het proces echter pas begonnen en is het zinvol
vooral te kijken naar de reeds geboekte successen, terwijl er lessen geleerd
kunnen worden van de ervaringen in de Filippijnen die een voortrekkersrol
spelen die waar het co-management en decentralisatie betreft.
Inventarisatie
Van de 63 dorpen in dit onderzoek, hebben er 44 nog een vorm van de sasi in-
stitutie over terwijl 17 dorpen nog regels hebben voor marien beheer. Mariene
sasi komt het meeste voor in middelgrote grote dorpen (2000-3000 mensen)
die ver liggen van het stedelijke gebied rond Ambon. In 14 andere dorpen
werd de wens uitgesproken sasi opnieuw in te voeren.
Sasi praktijken variëren van dorp tot dorp. Van de sasi dorpen heeft 42%
geschreven regels die vaak samengingen met de toepassing van sancties en
het uitvoeren van ceremoniën, dat wil zeggen het openen en sluiten van het
visseizoen en visgronden. De meest uitgebreide vorm van deze ceremoniën
werd gevonden in de dorpen Nolloth (op Saparua eiland) en in Haruku (op
Haruku eiland).
Het grootste verschil tussen dorpen met en zonder sasi is de mate van sociale
duurzaamheid. Het aantal conflicten en instabiel leiderschap was in dorpen
zonder sasi veel hoger dan in sasi-dorpen. Sasi-vissers hadden ook het gevoel
dat er een sterke traditie van collectieve acties was en ook meer discussie
over dorpsgerelateerde zaken. Sociale duurzaamheid, vooral in termen van
familiewelzijn en inkomen, werd verder positief beïnvloed door het feit of
vissers lid waren van een dorpsorganisatie en of ze tevreden waren met hun
beroep.1 In sasi-dorpen was de trend van afnemende scores op deze factoren
vergeleken met vroeger ook minder dan in non-sasi dorpen, terwijl het toe-
komstperspectief positiever was.
1 Het meten van de tevredenheid met hun beroep (job satisfaction) was ook onderdeel van deze
studie. Resultaten en een meer gedetailleerde beschrijving is te vinden in Novaczek et al. 2001 en
in Pollnac et al. 2001.
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Op het gebied van biologische duurzaamheid was er geen bewijs dat sasi
een significant effect heeft op de visstand. Dit komt zonder twijfel omdat
sasi alleen betrekking heeft op kleine kustzonegebieden terwijl de meeste vis
op open zee gevangen wordt. Op regionaal niveau is de staat van de koraal-
riffen ook meer afhankelijk van de bevolkingsdichtheid en visserijdruk dan
van de aan- of afwezigheid van sasi. Op lokaal niveau werd echter duidelijk
dat sasi gebieden minder te lijden hebben van dynamiet-vissen dan omrin-
gende gebieden. Het voordeel van sasi is ook aantoonbaar als het gaat om
de bescherming van commercieel waardevolle schelpen (Trochus niloticus) en
zeekomkommers.
Over het algemeen vinden vissers het belangrijk dat alle belanghebbenden
vertegenwoordigd zijn in besluitvorming. Vissers die het gevoel hebben dat
beslissingen worden genomen op basis van consensus of met instemming
van de meerderheid, hebben een hogere positieve score op alle indicatoren
met betrekking tot de resultaten. Het is dus belangrijk voor een visserij man-
agementsysteem dat het ervaren wordt als alomvattend in de zin dat iedereen
betrokken is. Verder is het belangrijk dat het systeem losgekoppeld is van
politieke schermutselingen. Waar formele en informele leiders nauw samen-
werken en waar leiderschap legitiem is, bloeit sasi.
Institutionele veerkracht
Het verdwijnen van sasi gaat vaak gepaard met conflicten. In de jaren ’90
had de invoering van de nieuwe dorpsstructuur nog steeds een effect op de
politieke situatie in de dorpen terwijl het systeem van verkiezingen mogelijk-
heden bood aan opportunisten die erop uit waren een leiderspositie in te
nemen. Aan de andere kant, in dorpen waar traditionele autoriteiten min of
meer waren opgenomen binnen het nieuwe overheidssysteem vervulden sasi
en adat nog steeds een belangrijke rol wat leidde tot politieke stabiliteit. De
continuïteit van sasi werd verder beïnvloed door de grootte van het dorp en de
SAMENVATTING 303
nabijheid van een groot stedelijk centrum. Vandaar het verdwijnen van sasi
op Ambon eiland.
In christelijke dorpen speelde de kerk een belangrijke rol in land sasi (vooral
met betrekking tot kokosnoten) en verrichtte soms een ondersteunende rol
in mariene sasi zoals in Nolloth en Haruku. In islamitische dorpen waar de
traditionele functies afgeschaft waren en religieuze leiders geen rol meer
speelden, veranderde sasi in een soort commerciële transactie waarbij de
rechten om te vissen geveild werden. Hechte banden en samenwerking tus-
sen formele en traditionele organisaties en religieuze autoriteiten zorgen er
echter voor dat sasi zeer veerkrachtig wordt. Een herdefiniëring van verant-
woordelijkheden en betrokkenheid van niet-adat instituties zoals de kerk,
politie, en hoger overheidsniveau’s is dus belangrijk (maar vereist ook zorg-
vuldige afwegingen).
Factoren die positief bijdragen aan de veerkracht van sasi moeten meegeno-
men worden in het proces van modernisering van lokaal beheer. De legitimi-
teit van het dorpshoofd die van de traditionele raja lijn afstamt, bijvoorbee-
ld, is positief voor de uitvoering van zijn autoriteit met betrekking tot sasi.
Een grote overlap tussen de traditionele en formele autoriteiten binnen de
dorpsoverheid is ook gunstig. De erkenning van traditionele functies binnen
de formele structuren is essentieel voor het opnieuw instellen van sasi (wat
mogelijk is onder de nieuwe wetgeving) en maakt de handhaving van sasi
regels effectiever. Aan de andere kant, politieke instabiliteit en zwak leidersc-
hap ondermijnen sasi en elke poging om het nieuw leven in te blazen.
De basis van sasi, op constitutioneel niveau, is adat en omdat ‘adat niet veran-
derd kan worden’ en een intrinsiek deel uitmaakt van de Molukse cultuur,
bestaat het opnieuw invoeren van sasi in feite vooral uit het instellen van
regels op operationeel niveau, zoals vangstreguleringen en het regelen van
toegang, en op ‘collective-choice level’ ofwel collectief niveau, zoals het op-
nieuw oprichten van de kewang. De operationele regels kunnen zowel tra-
ditioneel zijn als een kopie van de nationale wetgeving en ze kunnen ge-
makkelijk aangepast worden. Deze flexibiliteit is belangrijk met betrekking
tot institutionele veerkracht, maar heeft ook geleid tot een mozaïek van initia-
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Een institutie zoals sasi is nooit statisch. Door de eeuwen heen hebben er
veranderingen plaatsgevonden en werd het door verschillende voorstanders
gebruikt voor allerlei economische en sociale doelen, dus niet alleen voor
het beheer van hulpbronnen. Berkes en Folke (1998) noemen verschillende
socio-economische praktijken die de institutionele en ecologische veerkracht
stimuleren, zoals beperkingen op de vangsten, taboes, ceremoniën, en lokale
kennis die wordt doorgeven van generatie op generatie. Dit onderzoek heeft
aangetoond dat het echter niet de praktijken zijn die de sasi-institutie sterk
maken, maar de sociale mechanismen die de verschillende ‘spelers’ en com-
ponenten bij elkaar houden zoals legitimiteit, vertrouwen, samenwerking,
en transparantie. Een gedeelde overtuiging dat de institutie relevant is, is
ook nodig om tot een gemeenschappelijk besluit te komen sasi te handhaven
ondanks de externe invloeden en in een situatie waar de verleiding om het
systeem te misbruiken voor eigen belang groot is.
Vóór 1999 had Indonesië geen apart departement voor visserij en beheer was
ongeorganiseerd en ineffectief. Visserij- en kustbeheer op nationaal niveau
werd gekarakteriseerd door een grote overlap in wetgeving en vond plaats
onder meer dan 20 ongecoördineerde ministeries. Ook al werd op provinciaal
niveau de ontwikkeling van meer gedetailleerd en lokaal toepasbaar beleid
gestimuleerd, er ontbrak een samenhangend geheel van operationele regels.
Alleen op lokaal niveau waren een aantal regels opgesteld. Maar hoewel het
belang van sasi en lokaal beheer algemeen erkend werd en de dorpshoofden
de facto verantwoordelijkheid hadden over de lokale hulpbronnen ten dien-
ste van de gemeenschap, werden de traditionele management systemen niet
geformaliseerd.
Decentralisatie
Met de invoering van Wet Nr. 22/199 en Wet Nr. 25/1999 met betrekking tot
administratieve en fiscale decentralisatie werd regionale autonomie een rea-
liteit. De nieuwe wetten creëren het wettelijke en financiële raamwerk voor
beheer grotendeels door de districtsoverheid, met een meer ondersteunende
rol van de provinciale en nationale overheid. Visserij- en kustbeheer krijgen
verder een grote impuls door de creatie van een Nationaal Maritieme Raad
(National Maritime Council or NMC) en een Ministerie van Visserij en Mari-
tieme Zaken (DKP).
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De nieuwe wetten laten echter ook ruimte voor misbruik. Grootschalige ex-
ploitatie van hulpbronnen, machtsstrijd, en de formatie van nieuwe elites
vormen een potentiële bedreiging voor het proces van decentralisatie wat
leidt tot scepsis onder wetenschappers en tegenstanders. Een vergelijking
tussen case-studies in de Filippijnen en Indonesië laat zien hoe en onder
welke omstandigheden functioneel lokaal beheer bereikt kan worden. Belan-
grijk hierbij is het opzetten van instituties op lokaal niveau die afzonderlijke
bevoegdheden hebben, die transparant zijn, en die verantwoordelijkheid
moeten afleggen naar beneden toe, dus richting de bevolking. ‘Empower-
ment’, een hoog kennisniveau, adequaat leiderschap, en de ontwikkeling
van vaardigheden helpt om instituties te creëren die sterk genoeg zijn om
met machtige tegenstanders en ‘nieuwe elites’ om te gaan, die in staat zijn
inkomsten te onttrekken uit de hulpbronnen, en die in staat zijn het beheer
uit te voeren (Pomeroy en Berkes 1997; Pomeroy 2001). Daarbuiten is de
oprichting van lokale groeperingen, discussiefora, en overkoepelende organi-
saties belangrijk.
moeten worden, moet duidelijk zijn wie er lid is en wie niet. Een hoge mate
van homogeniteit heeft ook een positieve invloed op de co-management
regelingen, vooral waar de mensen die de gevolgen ondervinden van de af-
spraken, betrokken zijn bij de besluitvorming. Succes is verder in hoge mate
afhankelijk van gerespecteerde, legitieme leiders die een voorbeeldfunctie
vervullen, die bepalen welke actie ondernomen wordt, en die energie en rich-
ting geven aan het proces. Aan de andere kant maakt een grote afhankelijk-
heid van leiders het co-management proces ook kwetsbaar.
ment laat zien dat planning en uitvoering dienen plaats te vinden op verschil-
lende niveau’s. Elke voorwaarde is gerelateerd aan de andere en ze versterken
elkaar om zo het complexe geheel van co-managementregelingen te laten
werken.
Om een goed beeld te vormen van het slagen van een project, is het belang-
rijk de impact van het project te meten vanuit zowel het perspectief van de
insider als dat van de buitenstaander. Om een methodologie te ontwikkelen
zijn de afhankelijke variabelen van twee co-managementcasussen in de Filip-
pijnen geanalyseerd en vergeleken. Bepalend voor het succes van het project
voor de respondenten waren: het idee erbij te horen, toegenomen onafhan-
kelijkheid, toegenomen kennis, en een hoge mate van betrokkenheid in de
project planning, ook in de projecten die door de projectmedewerkers (die
alleen keken naar kwantitatieve tastbare resultaten) als mislukt werden be-
schouwd. De reden voor het verschil in de beoordeling is dat de benadering
van projecten veranderd is van ontwikkeling naar ‘participatie’ en dus meer
gericht op mensen, terwijl de indicatoren om succes te meten hetzelfde zijn
gebleven. Het is dus belangrijk om deze indicatoren aan te passen aan deze
nieuwe benadering.
Zeer bruikbaar voor het meten van projectresultaten zijn participatieve on-
derzoeksmethoden. Mogelijke indicatoren om de individuele veranderingen
van participanten te meten zijn: de mate van betrokkenheid bij het project,
de toename in capaciteiten en vaardigheden, de mate van controle over en
SAMENVATTING 309
Conclusie
Sasi had (en heeft waar nog aanwezig) significante resultaten op het gebied
van sociale duurzaamheid en het stimuleert de mechanismen die ten grond-
slag liggen aan de functionaliteit en veerkracht van de institutie op langere
termijn waarmee Hardin’s theorie (1968), dat lokale gemeenschappen niet
in staat zijn hun hulpbronnen te beheren, weerlegd wordt. Sociale mechanis-
men zoals samenwerking, vertrouwen, maar ook verantwoording naar het
volk stimuleren niet alleen lokaal beheer, maar vormen ook de basis voor
gedecentraliseerde structuren. Sasi is echter ook kwetsbaar voor politieke
conflicten, opportunistische leiders die vooral geïnteresseerd zijn in de ont-
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In welke vorm dan ook, de institutie heeft een basisfinanciering nodig en een
stabiele managementstructuur met daarin een rol van de overheid zonder
daar afhankelijk van te zijn. En of de institutie nu gebaseerd is op sasi of niet,
alle belangen en aspiraties van de verschillende groepen (vissers, adat lei-
ders, lokale overheden, visserijbeheerders op hoger niveau, en milieuorgani-
saties) moeten erin samengebracht worden. Binnen de huidige wetgeving
kunnen sasi en de kewang formele erkenning krijgen waarmee de afscheiding
SAMENVATTING 311
Curriculum Vitae
Ingvild Harkes was born on the 23rd of October 1967 in Boskoop, the Nether-
lands. In 1988 she finished her highschool (VWO) at the Gouwe College in
Gouda and went to Leiden University a year later to study cultural anthropol-
ogy and, after a 6-month period at the University of Edinburgh, environmen-
tal science. This brought her to Cameroon to study fisheries management.
After her graduation in 1995, Ingvild Harkes worked for the Dutch Ministry
of Foreign Affairs as an associate expert and was seconded to respectively the
International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM)
in the Philippines and the Institute for Fisheries Management and Coastal
Resources Management (IFM) in Denmark to work in and study fisheries
co-management systems in Southeast Asia and Africa. In 2000 she returned
to the Netherlands and worked as a consultant at AIDEnvironment in Am-
sterdam. In 2003, the Centre of Environmental Studies in Leiden offered a
part-time position to write her PhD thesis and work in several projects geared
towards park and wildlife management and the establishment of regional
NGO networks in West Africa. At the moment she runs, together with a col-
league, the secretariat of the Pelagic Regional Advisory Committee (RAC)
that was established in 2005 under the European Union in order to enhance
communication and collaboration between the fisheries sector, NGOs and
other stakeholders, and the fisheries managers with the objective to work
towards integrated and sustainable management of fisheries resources.