Topoi (2017) 36:377–391

DOI 10.1007/s11245-015-9358-8

REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification

Published online: 8 December 2015

Abstract This paper shows how a radical approach to Well you can twist and shout
enactivism provides a way of clarifying and unifying dif- Let it all hang out
ferent varieties of enactivism and enactivist-friendly But you won’t fool the children of the revolution
approaches so as to provide a genuine alternative to clas- —Marc Bolan, T-Rex
sical cognitivism. Section 1 reminds readers of the broad
church character of the enactivism framework. Section 2
explicates how radical enactivism is best understood not as 1 Broad Church Enactivism
a kind of enactivism per se but as a programme for radi-
calizing and consolidating the many different enactivist Enactivism sees mind and cognition as irreducibly inter-
offerings. The main work of radical enactivism is to active in character. Active engagement with things and
RECtify, existing varieties of enactivism and other cognate others is held to be the true basis of the psychological and
approaches so as to strengthen and unify them into a single epistemic situation of all cognitive beings, us included.
collective that can rival classical ways of thinking about Reversing a familiar order of explanation, the basic
mind and cognition. Section 3 shows how even seemingly character of cognition is relational and dynamic, and not
non-enactivist explanatory offerings—such as predictive primarily—if at all—a matter of representing features of
processing accounts of cognition—might be RECtified and the world. By enactivist lights, cognition does not stop
brought within the enactivist explanatory fold. Section 4 short of wide-ranging worldly engagements with what is
reveals why, once RECtified, enactivist offerings, broadly being perceived or thought about. Cognition is not pri-
conceived, qualify as genuine and revolutionary alterna- marily a heady, brainbound affair of manipulating repre-
tives to classical ways of understanding cognition. sentations. Perceiving, a paradigm case of cognitive
activity, takes time to unfold and makes direct contact
Keywords Enactivism
Radical enactivism
Predictive with the objects with which it deals, making it a spatially
coding
Mental representations
Mental content and temporally extended business. From this perspective,
understanding cognition cannot be reduced to knowing
what occurs in brains, it also requires knowing what
cognizers are doing with their bodies when adjusting to
and engaging with features of the world that are afforded
to them.
So construed, enactivism is a distinctive philosophical
framework for thinking about minds. It is not a single well-
& Daniel D. Hutto defined empirical theory or even a particular set of such
[email protected] theories. It offers a broad church vision of the nature of
1
mind—one capable of housing a diverse family of
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, School of
Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong,
approaches. Those that adhere to the basic tenets set out
Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia above and which employ explanatory concepts such as,

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autopoiesis, emergence, agency, sensorimotor contingen- AE promotes a thoroughly biological vision of cognition
cies, organism–environment couplings, action-perception grounded in a life-mind continuity thesis. It conceives of
loops, dynamical systems are all clearly in the enactivist mind and cognition as emerging from the self-organizing,
family. self-creating and self-preserving activities of a sub-set of
After several decades since its articulation, the basic living organisms that exhibit agency, understood in a par-
enactivist outlook has taken firm root and is thriving in ticular way. By AE lights, cognition is inescapably bound
various sciences of the mind. Enactivist thinking has up with the world engaging, life-preserving activity of the
launched many constructive—fertile and fecund—research sort in which agents, conceived of as complex assemblies
programmes focusing on an extremely diverse array of of response systems, possess a certain kind of autonomy.
phenomena. This is especially true of those enactivist On the one hand, AE recognizes that the ‘‘environment
approaches that make use of the explanatory apparatus of plays a fundamental role on the constitution of agency,
dynamical systems theory. Notably, these approaches have because processes in which the agent as a whole interacts
provided ‘‘a fresh perspective on many foundational with its outer environment also contribute to the mainte-
problems in cognitive science, including perception–ac- nance of the agent’’ (Heras-Escribano et al. 2014, p. 3). On
tion, memory, word recognition, decision making, learning, the other hand, AE insists that organisms are not slav-
problem solving, and language’’ (Riley and Holden 2012, ishly—or mindlessly—responsive to external factors; they
p. 593).1 do not do so in a fixed or purely mechanical way.
In short, as a general framework, enactivism has proved Agents are shaped by habit but remain responsive to
productive in ways that justify taking its basic philosoph- their current contexts. They always have some greater or
ical outlook quite seriously.2 Indeed, it appears: lesser room for maneuver in any given situation. Conse-
quently, even though an agent’s cognitive activity is always
There is no abating the ever-increasing popularity
world engaging and world relating, it is always to some
and influence of enactivism both in philosophy and
degree flexible and spontaneous, and not determined or
cognitive science. With a steady flow of important
dictated in any direct way by the world. Of course, such
publications and regular conferences it now deserv-
flexibility comes at a price: even minimal freedom incurs
ingly demands serious attention as a theoretical
risk. More or less effective—better or worse—couplings or
alternative to mainstream cognitivist accounts of
engagements, relative to the needs of the agent, are always
mind and cognition. It should then come as no sur-
live possibilities. In acting autonomously in this minimal
prise that with this increase in influence and popu-
sense agents are always in a precarious position as they
larity various distinct yet related takes on enactivism
work to ensure they keep themselves ‘‘unified and distinct’’
have emerged (De Jesus 2015).
(Di Paolo 2005, p. 434; see also De Jaegher and Di Paolo
The most prominent and well-developed versions of 2007).
enactivism are Autopoietic-Adaptive Enactivism (AE) and Fans of AE make much of the fact that organism–en-
Sensorimotor Enactivism (SE). Both have made important vironment couplings can be more or less effective. They
contributions to new ways of thinking about cognition.3 see this as implying the existence of a kind of biological
normativity that goes beyond any norms which can be
1 associated with mere autopoiesis. Arguably, the self-orga-
Riley and Holden (2012) point out that dynamic systems
approaches have been successfully employed in the investigation of nizing, self-sustaining activities of all living beings, as
these many and varied cognitive phenomena. This includes work by exemplified by the metabolic self-production of single-cell
Kelso (1995), Turvey (1990), Beer (2009), Cadez and Heit (2011), organisms, entail the existence of very basic goals tied to
Colangelo et al. (2004), Holden et al. (2009), Rueckl (2002), Wijnants
maintaining continuing identity. Yet it has long been rec-
et al. (2012a, b), Araújo et al. (2006), Busemeyer and Townsend
(1993), McKinstry et al. (2008), Dale et al. (2008), Phattanasri et al. ognized that any biological norms connected with such
(2007), Stephen and Dixon (2009), Elman (1995), Tabor (2002). The continuance are too open-ended to account for the way
list is indicative not exhaustive: it merely scratches the surface. agents target and respond to specific features of their
2
This is surely so if we assume that ‘‘scientists typically know what worlds. Purely autopoietic versions of enactivism need
they’re talking about when they are talking about their science’’
augmenting in order to account for the sort of biological
(Shapiro 2014b, p. 74). Still, there are many important and
philosophically interesting questions to resolve about the scope of normativity that is a hallmark of even the most basic kind
enactivism and the kinds of explanation it offers [For a discussion of of cognition (Di Paolo 2005). The kinds of biological
how dynamical explanations can be thought of as mechanical norms associated with autopoietic activity are simply too
explanations see Zednik (2011)].
3
These varieties of enactivist surely have had the greatest number of
adherents. Proponents of AE include, e.g. Jonas (1968), Maturana and Footnote 3 continued
Varela (1980), Di Paolo (2005), Thompson (2007), Barandiaran et al. e.g. O’Regan and Noë (2001), Noë (2004), Cooke and Myin (2011),
(2009), Barandiaran and Egbert (2013). Proponents of SE include, O’Regan (2011).

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weak and open-ended to capture what makes even the most necessary but not sufficient for perceiving or having per-
primitive forms of cognition normative. Simply put, such ceptual experience—perceiving is ‘‘realized in the active
norms can be satisfied without needing to know more life of the skilful animal’’ (Noë 2004, p. 227). SE’s greatest
precisely how this was achieved. As a result, ‘‘self-con- achievement has been to demonstrate the empirical
stitution of an identity can thus provide us only with the robustness and explanatory power of understanding per-
most basic kind of norm, namely that all events are good ception through its enactivist lens.
for that identity as long as they do not destroy it’’ (Froese
and Di Paolo 2011, p. 8).4
Something stronger than autopoiesis is required in order 2 RECtification
to understand the normativity of cognition. Enactivists of
the AE stripe think adaptivity can do that work. Adaptivity What of radical enactivism then? What kind of enactivism
is the process of agent–environment couplings through is it? What does Radically Enactive Cognition, REC, offer
which certain sensorimotor loops come to be favoured as that differs from other members of the enactivist family?
‘‘more useful for the agent than others, such that those The question is ill posed. REC is not an alternative version
become more salient or meaningful’’ (Heras-Escribano of enactivism with distinct explanatory tools in its own
et al. 2014, p. 3). Importantly, ‘‘adaptive regulation is an right. Technically, Shapiro (2014a) is correct to say that on
achievement of the autonomous system’s internally gener- its own REC does ‘‘little to account for the stunning suc-
ated activity rather than merely something that is simply cesses of cognitive science’’ (p. 214). That is, however, to
undergone by it’’ (Froese and Di Paolo 2011, p. 9, miss the point since REC never stands alone. Its analyses
emphasis added). and arguments are designed to cleanse, purify, strengthen
In sum, although autopoiesis provides a necessary and unify a whole set of existing anti-representational
foundation for agency, it is the capacity of agents to adapt offerings. REC’s aim is to radicalize existing versions of
selectively to specific features of their environment that enactivism and related explanatory accounts through a
puts the real meat on its bones. Perhaps AE’s great process of philosophical clarification.
achievement has been to provide a way of thinking about This is most evident in REC efforts to show that SE is
the basic goal-directed cognition of agents in terms of best and most coherently formulated in non-representa-
biological norms without invoking any of the standard tionalist terms. For example, REC has strived to show that
equipment that cognitivists insist is required for making the embodied know-how of perceivers—their mastery of
sense of that phenomenon (e.g. mental contents, prior sensorimotor contingencies—should not be taken to imply
intentions, directions of fit, and so on). that they or their brains possess and use a neurally-based
SE, by comparison, has focused on understanding a set of rules and representations (Hutto 2005, 2011; Hutto
smaller range of cognitive phenomena: laying stress on the and Myin 2013). Against a conservative reading, REC
integral connection between perception, action and per- promotes a reading of SE according to which the laws of
ceptual experience (Hurley 1998; O’Regan and Noë 2001; perception can be ‘read off’ from the activity of perceptual
Hurley and Noë 2003; Noë 2004, 2009, 2012). SE views systems as they respond to different types of objects while
perception as ‘‘a mode of activity involving practical denying that the work of perceptual systems requires
knowledge about currently possible behaviours and asso- encoding or representing such laws at any level.5
ciated sensory consequences. Visual experience rests on REC aims to show that existing enactivist approaches
know-how, the possession of skills’’ (O’Regan and Noë can account for basic cognition, without residue, by
2001, p. 946, emphases added). In defending this line, SE understanding it in terms of thoroughly relational, inter-
rejects the idea that we form a rich and detailed inner active, dynamically engaged, world-relating activity—ac-
representation when we perceive. Its enactivist commit- tivity that does not involve relating to or manipulating any
ments are clearest when it stresses the ways in which kind of informational or representational content. REC
perceiving strongly supervenes on or is constituted by seeks to clarify the true character of the explanatory
temporally extended, interactive worldly engagements; resources of various enactivist and enactivist-friendly
when it defends the idea that perception ‘‘isn’t something offerings in the sciences of the mind. It aims to show that
that happens in us, it is something we do’’ (Noë 2004, making free use of the notions of information, algorithm,
p. 216). Accordingly, activity in neural substrates is and representation only tends to obfuscate our accounts of
cognition. It recommends that these notions should be

4 5
Or as, Heras-Escribano et al. (2014) put it ‘‘everything that does not In this REC agrees with Burge (2010) when he observes that: ‘‘To
result in a loss of organization could be valued as something good (or perceive, individuals need not represent their own states or opera-
at least ‘not bad’) for the organism’’ (p. 3). tions, even ‘implicitly’’’ (p. 405).

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either eliminated from our explanatory frameworks or This account of target-focused but contentless Ur-in-
otherwise radically reconceived, to a more accurate tentionality provides those working in the enactivist
understanding of the nature and the roles they actually play framework with a powerful tool. It is REC’s major con-
in cognition. tribution: for supplying this tool enables enactivists and
For example, REC’s uncompromising reformist zeal is others to make a clean and radical break with intellectualist
motivated by the recognition that what many philosophers traditions.
and scientists call ‘informational content’ is in fact no kind This type of RECtifying clarification is needed even for
of content at all. This observation is based on two impor- enactivist approaches that most openly set their faces
tant facts: (1) that the only scientifically respectable notion against representationalism. Consider that proponents of
of information is that of nomic covariance of some sort; AE characterize the sort of adaptive responding required
and, (2) that nomic covariance isn’t any kind of content. for basic cognition as a kind of ‘sense making’. Sense
Even diehard representationalists are prepared to admit making is said to occur when an agent treats the pertur-
this, but they fail to draw the full consequences of these bations it ‘‘encounters during its ongoing activity from a
admissions. perspective of significance which is not intrinsic to the
If covariance isn’t any kind of content then any science perturbations themselves’’ (Froese and Di Paolo 2011, p. 9,
of the mind committed to explanatory naturalism that emphasis added). Sense making is characterized as a
employs the notion needs to supply another scientifically ‘‘process of meaning generation in relation to the con-
reputable candidate for informational content. The Hard cerned perspective of the autonomous system’’ (Froese and
Problem of Content must be answered or talk of informa- Di Paolo 2011, p. 7, emphasis added). Sense making ‘‘is
tional content cannot be taken as anything more than the enaction of a meaningful world by an autonomous
convenient façon de parler. If this problem cannot be system’’ (Froese and Di Paolo 2011, p. 7, emphasis added).
addressed then we have no reason to believe anything The so-called intrinsic meaning that is generated
backs up claims that cognitive systems are, in essence, through sense making is neither a feature of external
importantly unlike merely physical interacting systems environment nor something internal to the agent where
because they literally process informational contents (Clark either is understood in isolation. This is famously illus-
2008, p. 26). Moreover, failure to address the Hard Prob- trated by the now familiar example of a bacterium
lem of Content scuppers even the most promising natu- engaging in sense making and thus enacting its world by
ralistic theories of representational content. Close analysis responding in different orientations to a sugar gradient.
reveals that failure to supply a naturalistic account of Having the status of an affordance, the ‘‘sugar’s edibility is
informational content undermines the foundations of such not an intrinsic property: it is only valuable in relation to
theories or forces them to radically reform (See Hutto and the agent that takes advantage of it’’ (Heras-Escribano et al.
Myin 2013, Ch. 4). 2014, p. 4; Thompson 2007, p. 125). This meaningful
REC sees this as a positive opportunity. It seeks to property only comes into being when the agent relates to
salvage some of the core ideas from teleosemantics—the features of its world. Still, even though the meaning in
most promising naturalistic theory of content to date—by question is thoroughly relational, crucially according to
putting them to a different theoretical use within the AE, the relata cannot be individuated or characterized
enactivist framework. The teleosemantic apparatus, REC independently of the agent’s engagements with its world
holds, can be used to explicate a workable account of (Thompson 2007, p. 74).7
contentless basic intentional directedness as opposed to a It is problematic to assume that basic minds are capable
robust semantic theory of content. of ‘sense making’ and ‘meaning generation’ in anything
This, in turn, enables REC to provide an account of like the robust sense implied by the standard connotations
cognition in terms of active, informationally driven, world- of these terms. Although there is no reason to deny cog-
directed engagements, where a creature’s current tenden- nitive status to non-contentful world-directed activities of
cies for active engagement are shaped by its ontogenetic
and phylogenetic history. Basic minds target, but do not Footnote 6 continued
et al. (2014), it does not seek to develop ‘‘new ways of understanding
contentfully represent, specific objects and states of affairs.
informational content’’ (p. 2).
Fundamentally, cognition is a matter of sensitively and 7
Putting all of this together, defenders of AE take it to be
selectively responding to information but it does not ‘‘appropriate to consider adaptive autonomy as the most basic form
involve picking up and processing informational content or of life, and sense-making as the most basic process of living’’ (Froese
the formation of representational contents.6 and Di Paolo 2011, p. 9). Thus: ‘‘If autopoiesis (or autonomy) suffices
for generating a ‘natural purpose’ (Kant 1790), adaptivity reflects the
organism’s capability — necessary for sense making — of evaluating
6
REC shows that enactivists can get by without having to fall back the needs and expanding the means towards that purpose’’ (Froese and
on a notion of informational content. Thus, pace Heras-Escribano Di Paolo 2011, p. 9).

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living creatures—including ourselves—being capable of (Heras-Escribano et al. 2014, p. 1). Nor should RECers shy
detecting, tracking, and interacting with salient features of away from incorporating other enactivist-friendly approa-
an environment alone does not suffice for ‘sense’ or ches within the general enactivist framework. For example,
‘meaning’ making understood in any standard sense. Gibson’s groundbreaking work on affordances—which has
Having a mind that ‘makes sense’ of its world and gener- long provided a positive explanatory basis for a non-repre-
ates meaning about it is not a fundamental biological sentationlist cognitive science, prior to enactivism’s matu-
endowment. That ability requires special forms of scaf- ration—is also ripe for RECtification.8
folded engagement. In particular, it requires participating Ecological psychology makes use of the notions of
in and mastering normative practices that are beyond the direct perception of environmental affordances (Rietveld
reach of simple organisms. 2008; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Kiverstein and Riet-
Thus a standard verdict is that AE, in assuming that the veld 2015; Chemero 2009). Classical ecological psychol-
properties of complex cognitive systems will be found even ogy regards perception as an active, relational
in very simple cognitive systems, ‘‘gets things the wrong phenomenon; organisms as sets ‘‘of abilities’’; and niches
way round’’ (Menary 2015, p. 3). The root problem is that ‘‘as the set of situations in which one or more of [an
the norms for meaning making are not of the biological sort organism’s] abilities can be exercised’’ (Chemero 2009,
AE identifies. Thus AE ‘‘takes normativity to permeate all pp. 147–148). Chemero (2009) seeks to update ecological
biological and cognitive functions. But … this supposed psychology, making it ‘‘dynamical root and branch’’ (p.
normative character of natural reactions fails to satisfy 150). His aim is to provide more refined theoretical tools
some specific requirements for something to be classified that can best serve the experimental and explanatory needs
as normative [in the robust sense required]’’ (Heras- of ecological psychologists. This requires giving pride of
Escribano et al. 2014, p. 8). More precisely, the complaint place to organismic interactions and how they develop
is that the kind of biologically based norms exhibited by cognitive tendencies over time.
active ‘‘regulations with the environment, instead of being Ecological approaches, especially those promoted under
conceptual, are normative but not contentful’’ (Heras- the radically embodied cognition banner, are natural allies for
Escribano et al. 2014, p. 10). For this reason the sort of enactivist approaches. Indeed, it has been suggested that
misalignments and failures of world engagement that can enactivism and ecological psychology have much to gain by
occur at the level of basic cognition do not involve making being brought together within a larger framework. Chemero
errors that are anything like errors of contentful judgement. (2009) noted the theoretical value in such unification and
Failures to engage with the world effectively are not, and suggested some initial steps toward it, although he rightly
are not explained by, failures to describe, depict or say how recognized that ‘‘much more work is required to genuinely
things stand with the world. integrate ecological and enactive approaches’’ (p. 154).
REC’s biosemiotic account of contentless intentionality The REC analysis is that a thoroughgoing integration of
is useful at just this juncture. It provides a way to make ecological dynamical approaches requires, inter alia,
sense of the kind of biological normativity associated with clarifying common talk of the ‘provision’, ‘use’, ‘gather-
basic cognitive activity while at the same time allowing ing’, and ‘pick up’ of information ‘about’ affordances that
that ‘‘the best explanation of the origins of norms [of the is prevalent in the work of some of its leading proponents
sort needed to speak of content] is that they are natural (see Chemero 2009, pp. 154–161). The problem with such
phenomena located at the social level’’ (Heras-Escribano talk is that it suggests an underlying commitment to an
et al. 2014, p. 10; see Hutto and Satne 2015). information-processing story that is inconsistent with non-
This is a shining example in which REC’s alternative representationalist accounts of mind and cognition.9
account of contentless informational sensitivity and tar-
geted intentionality provide a solid means for enactivists to 8
Other E-approaches to mind and cognition—such as Menary’s
put their positive explanatory offerings on a stable theo- (2007, 2015) Cognitive Integration Theory and Malafouris’s (2013)
retical footing. Rather than offering new and different Material Engagement Theory—seem even more amenable to
explanatory tools in addition to those provided by other RECtification.
9
forms of enactivism, REC’s aim has always been to con- Millikan (2005) who also endorses some central Gibsonian ideas
about the active nature of perception falls foul of talk of ‘collecting’,
duct the philosophical work needed for developing and
‘picking up’, ‘applying’ and ‘transmitting’ natural information. She
refining such tools to provide a set of genuine alternatives writes, ‘‘thinking of a substance involves the ability to recognize it, as
to standard explanatory equipment employed by classical, it were, in the flesh, not merely the ability passively to contemplate its
intellectualist cognitive science. properties. We have thoughts of substances in order to be able to
collect information about substances, which information we pick up
RECtification is needed if we are to see a true ‘‘crystal-
on some occasions and apply them on others. To pick up information
lization of enactivism’’ and the full and complete develop- about a substance you must be in a position to interact with the
ment of ‘‘a positive alternative to representationalism’’ substance, other things that are influenced by the substance or that

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RECtification is therefore needed in order to clarify the one philosophical roof to cooperatively provide genuine,
notion of information and the role it plays in ecological complementary alternatives to classical cognitivism.
accounts if they are to be part of a larger non-representa-
tionalist framework.
Van Dijk et al. (2015) acknowledge this tension in the 3 Peace Through Clarification
very heart of Chemero’s work and also in the writings of
other prominent theorists working within the ecological How far can the RECtifying programme go? It might seem
tradition. They admit that it is ‘‘hard to get a contentless that some of cognitive science’s explanatory tools are
reading of even the most progressive ecological theories’’ simply off limits to REC. Yet since appearances can
(Van Dijk et al. 2015, p. 212).10 Even so, they don’t see deceive, it would be a mistake to rush to judgment: careful
this as an intractable problem for ecological accounts investigation is needed on a case-by-case basis.
because, on their assessment, talk of organisms responding Consider what might appear to be a hard case, RECti-
to ‘information about’ affordances and of ‘informational fying the theory of cognition that trades under the names
pick up’ does not reflect a genuine theoretical commitment Predictive Coding, Prediction Error Minimization and
of such approaches. Instead they take such talk to be Predictive Processing (PPC for short). PPC is causing a real
nothing more than a hangover of an unreflective use of stir in philosophy and neuroscience (Clark 2013a, b;
language, thus it is easily revisable. If they are right then Hohwy 2013, 2014; Friston 2010; Friston and Stephan
ecological accounts can be rendered REC-friendly 2007). PPC’s leading idea is that the true, indeed only,
painlessly.11 work of brains—their ceaseless cascade of multi-level,
Once again, what should be abundantly clear at this multi-layered cortical processing—is all part of a singular
point is that REC does not aim to provide distinct effort to predict sensory deliverances.12 PPC represents a
explanatory tools of its own in addition to those supplied dramatic reversal of traditional cognitivist thinking. It
by other varieties of enactivism. For this reason REC does regards the core business of cognition to be making pro-
not see the various members of the enactivist family as active, probabilistic, Bayesian predictions about likely
competing rivals. Rather it aims to sanitize what such sensory perturbations as opposed to constructing internal
enactivist approaches have to offer, removing any residual models of the world that are built upon passively received
vestiges of representationalism: REC seeks to radicalize information furnished by the senses.
them. That is its programme. Its ultimate aim is to clarify Prediction error occurs when there is a mismatch
and unite the various non-representational approaches to between what brains predict and what is supplied to them
cognition, demonstrating how they work together under by the senses. The brain’s aim is to minimize the diver-
gences between what it anticipates and what is sensed. This
can be achieved either by making better guesses or making
Footnote 9 continued
adjustments so as to get more fitting sensory inputs. This is
influence it. Natural information is transmitted in the causal order, and
you have to be in the causal order, with whatever the information is known as the reduction of prediction error or uncertainty.
information about to receive it’’ (Millikan 2005, p. 115). Some deem PPC as heralding a quite profound, radical
10
Van Dijk et al. (2015) propose that a more thoroughgoing analysis sea change in our thinking about the mind. For example,
of Gibson’s views reveals that, even though ‘‘the notion of Clark (2015a) claims, ‘‘Predictive processing plausibly
‘information pick-up’ … takes on a content-carrying connotation
represents the last and most radical step in [the] retreat
from Gibson’s early work, [but it can be] understood in a content-less
sense. Having the sensitivity, or the openness, to ‘resonate’ to the from the passive input-dominated view of neural process-
ambient patterns available, the animal picks up [on] those patterns as ing’’ (p. 2, emphasis added).13 Dramatically, he observes
information for perceiving and acting. Such a reading, we feel, would that if PPC is along the right lines then ‘‘just about every
give a fruitful and more charitable account of ecological theories’’ (p.
detail of the passive forward-flowing model [as promoted
213). Crucially, in RECish spirit, they note ‘‘there need not be any
content involved at all, as information for affordances cannot be by classical cognitivism] is false’’ (Clark 2015a, p. 2).
evaluated as being more or less true or accurately corresponding to an Instead, if PPC is right, cognition has a fundamentally
affordance – there are no conditions to satisfy it being about the
affordances… information can be more or less useful for adapting to
12
the environment, that is all’’ (p. 213). Hohwy (2014) reports that, according to PPC, ‘‘prediction error
11
Following REC’s lead, Van Dijk et al. (2015) realize that minimization is the only principle for the activity of the brain’’ (p. 2,
ecological psychologists need to embrace the notion of ‘information emphasis added).
13
for’ in favour of the notions of ‘information about’ (p. 212). In Clark (2015a) identifies a number of ‘quite radical’ implications of
contrast these authors propose that ‘‘Information needs to be PPC: (1) the core flow of information is top-down—the forward flow
understood ‘teleosemiotically’ … the high level of array-environment of information is replaced by the forward flow of prediction error; (2)
correspondence makes the patterning in the array very useful to the motor control is just top-down sensory prediction; (3) efference
person. But only as these patterns are used, need they be considered copies are replaced by top-down predictions; (4) cost functions are
information for perceiving or acting on affordances’’ (p. 213). absorbed into predictions (p. 3).

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‘‘‘restless’, pro-active, hyperactive and loopy character’’ mind-world schism’’ that entails global scepticism (p. 19).
(Clark 2015a, pp. 1–2). In pressing this line, Hohwy (2014) also rejects a halfway
This last observation might make it seem as if PPC is house approach of the kind Clark offers in which notions of
naturally suited for accommodation within an enactivist coupling are used in order ‘‘to argue in favour of a less
framework.14 It raises the question: might PPC be a suit- secluded, more open mind-world relation’’ (p. 20).
able target for RECtification after all? Exploring this pos- How plausible is the self-evidencing view of PPC?
sibility in full detail requires more careful analysis than can Doubtless sharp-eyed philosophers will observe that having
be provided in the limited space available here. Even so, it a global skeptic forever on one’s back will be hard-going
is worth making some initial, first pass observations to for any creature in the ‘getting it right’ in order to ‘act
establish not only that RECtification isn’t out of the successfully in the world’ business. Even sharper-eyed
question but also why it ought to be welcomed by propo- philosophers will wonder how epistemic states of mind that
nents of PPC. Making this case, even in sketch, both pre- are in principle secluded from the world could ever come to
pares the ground for pursuing the question further and has have contents that refer to, or are about, inaccessible hid-
the added advantage of providing another vivid example of den causes that they putatively represent in the first place.
what RECtification looks like in action. Hohwy’s self-evidencing proposal appears to run straight
into well rehearsed problems about how, say, a brain-in-a-
3.1 Secluded Minds Versus Open Minds vat could possibly form the thought that it is a brain-in-a-
vat, or for that matter, manage to harbor thoughts about any
The prospect of RECtifying PPC is a tantalizing challenge external topics.15
precisely because several recent papers regard PPC as Why on Hohwy’s model isn’t the brain restricted to
absolutely wedded to the idea that the brain trades in thoughts about sense data? There is a great deal of epis-
contentful representations. For example, Hohwy (2014) temic security for the brain if it only makes predictions
assumes that the brain’s predictions about likely sensory about an accessible, sensory world. It can’t be wrong about
input ‘‘necessarily rely on internal representations of hid- the state of the external world if it can’t even think about
den causes in the world (including the body itself)’’ (p. 17). such a world. But this sort of epistemic gain comes at the
Why assume this must be the epistemic predicament of high price of limiting the brain to thinking only about non-
brains? Apparently, it is because it would be an ‘‘ideal but worldly topics.16
impossible design’’ for the brain to make any direct com- Casting PPC in such a restricted epistemic light puts it in
parison between its internal estimates and ‘‘true states of the same boat with those extreme forms of idealism that
affairs in the world’’ (Hohwy 2014, p. 4). As Hohwy call the very idea of an external world into question; those
rightly observes the brain itself is in no position to compare which are at odds with metaphysical realism. As such, it is
what it represents with what is so represented. Given this difficult to understand how Hohwy’s policy of total epis-
access problem, the best a brain can do is make inferences temic seclusion squares with his assumption that the brain
to the best explanation about how things stand with the trades in contentful representations. Prima facie, the idea
world. In the best case, the brain hits on a hypothesis that that brains are hermetically sealed in an epistemic sense
best explains away the occurrence of some evidence and is, conflicts with the idea that the content of neural represen-
thus, self-evidencing. tations can be understood in terms of reference to external
Importantly, Hohwy (2014) notes that ‘‘the notion of items and truth conditional judgments about such items of
self-evidencing appears to be the epistemic cousin to the the sort associated with a standard correspondence theory
dynamic systems theory notions of self-organization and of truth.
self-enabling, which are often used to explain enactivism’’ In sum, ditching a secluded brain reading of PPC has the
(p. 19). The major difference is that in assuming repre- serious advantage of obviating the need to address age-old
sentationalism from the start, Hohwy’s (2014) take on PPC epistemological and pyschosemantic problems (at least at
paints ‘‘a picture of the brain as a secluded inference-ma- the level of basic perception where we make first contact
chine’’ (p. 19). It is because Hohwy assumes representa-
tionalism that he advocates ‘‘decoupling the brain from the 15
As Putnam pointed out, long ago, ‘‘Although the people in that
body and the environment in an epistemic sense’’ (pp. possible world [the brain-in-a-vat world] can think and say, they
18–19). The mind-brain is forever secluded and cut-off cannot … refer to what we can refer to. In particular, they cannot
from knowledge of the world. This is to assume a ‘‘stark think or say that they are brains in a vat (even by thinking ‘we are
brains in a vat)’’ (Putnam 1988, p. 8).
16
The secluded brain hypothesis suffers from the same problem as
14
Indeed Clark (2015b) thinks PPC should be embraced by old fashion theories of AI. They need to supply ‘‘a theory of language-
enactivists because it bears special gifts—namely, it supplies the and-the-world, whereas, in fact, [they provide] only a theory of
explanatory resources to ‘‘cash … enactivist cheques’’ (p. 3). language-and-the-insides-of-the-machine’’ (Fodor 1981, p. 209).

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384 D. D. Hutto

with the world). Developing a credible alternative reading The second player’s role is to speak up and correct those
would require giving a full reply to Hohwy’s (2014) ‘ba- guesses should they go awry and to remain silent other-
sically friendly challenge’ of showing how enactivism wise. Hence if player one says ‘‘There’s a vase of yellow
‘‘can avoid an epistemic, inferential reading in terms of the flowers on the table in front of you’’, the second player will
self-evidencing that entails an evidentiary boundary and either deny this or remain quiet.
thus decoupling’’ (p. 19). Answering that challenge is a job Moving beyond analogy, how should we understand this
for philosophy. Ultimately, RECtification is required. We at the level of theory? When it comes to understanding
will come to that. sense deliverances (represented by the second player’s
contribution), Clark (2015a) tells us that:
in a very real sense, the prediction error signal is not
3.2 Compromise and Collaboration?
a mere proxy for incoming sensory information – it is
sensory information … your ‘error signal’ carried
Clark (2015b) has argued that PPC and enactivism can
some quite specific information … the content might
mutually illuminate each other in a way that could mark the
be glossed as ‘there is indeed a vase of flowers on the
end of the representation wars. His paper predicts, though
table in front of me but they are not yellow’. This is a
does not guarantee, peace in our time. As Clark sees it,
pretty rich message. Indeed, it does not (content-
situating PPC properly ought to provide a long awaited
wise) seem different in kind to the downward-flowing
olive branch for brokering peace between representation-
predictions themselves. Prediction error signals are
alists and enactivists. Why so? Peace is allegedly on the
thus richly informative (p. 5, emphasis added).
cards because although PPC ‘‘openly trades in talk of inner
models and representations, [it only] involves representa- The trouble is that anyone hoping to explain what the
tions that are action-oriented through and through’’ (Clark senses deliver in this way faces a hard choice: Either take
2015b, p. 4). Consequently, the representations of PPC talk of rich informational messages and content seriously
‘‘aim to engage the world rather than depict it in some (and pay for it by answering the Hard Problem of Content)
action neutral fashion’’ (Clark 2015b, p. 4, emphasis or go radical, ditch the idea that the information in question
added). is contentful, and significantly revise this story.
Hence, even though PPC is heavily committed to It might be thought that there is an obvious, better way
internal models, ‘‘instead of simply describing ‘how the to go for those who think representations are action-fo-
world is’, these models—even when considered at those cused through-and-through other than try to solve the Hard
‘higher’ more abstract levels—are geared to engaging Problem of Content directly (by showing how mere
those aspects of the world that matter to us. They are covariation adds up to content). The natural move at this
delivering a grip on the patterns that matter for the inter- juncture would be to make appeal to Action Oriented
actions that matter’’ (Clark 2015b, p. 5, emphases added). Representations, explicating these through the lens of
So, as Clark presents the situation, ‘‘What is on offer is thus Millikan’s teleosemantic theory of content. Action Ori-
just about maximally distant from a passive (‘mirror of ented Representations can be understood as Pushmi-Pullyu
nature’) story about the possible fit between model and representations (for an updated rehearsal of the rationale
world’’ (2015b, p. 4). behind this move see Clowes and Mendonça 2015,
Clark’s plan for peace clearly requires a bit of give and pp. 3–5).
take from both sides—a bit of compromise. Indeed, Clark Notably, Pushmi-Pullyu representations, although prim-
cannot see another way forward. For despite recognizing itive, possess not one but two kinds of content—both
the power of enactivist explanations that he sees lying at descriptive and directive content (see Millikan 2005,
the heart of the PPC story, he has difficulty seeing how to pp. 173–175). This being so to think of Action Oriented
tell that story ‘‘in entirely non-representational terms’’ Representations in such terms is to think of them as only
(Clark 2015b, p. 5). maximally unlike the passive ‘mirror of nature’ representa-
It is easy to see what motivates this assessment. Clark tions in that they are not passive. In other respects they are as
offers an analogy to provide an intuitive sense of the representational as representations can get. Indeed, this is
brain’s situation when making active inferences. He asks us why for Millikan (1993) Pushmi-Pullyu’s provide the
to imagine a game in which one participant attempts to
describe what a second participant is seeing while the latter 17
Of course, none of this should come as any surprise. Millikan’s
moves through a familiar environment—the living room of aim was always to revive Wittgenstein’s so-called Tractarian picture
the first player’s house. The catch is that the first player has theory (see Millikan 2005, Ch. 4). Her aim was to fill in the gaps of
Sellars’ project. Thus she was always pursuing a quite different
no direct access to the visual scene and so can only make philosophical agenda than that of answering the explanatory needs of
best guesses about what the second player is likely to see. cognitive science. See Hutto (2014) for a discussion.

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REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification 385

primitive ground for ‘‘flatfooted correspondence views of What adverting to content does achieve, however, is
representation and truth’’ (p. 12).17 to show how the system connects with its environ-
Understanding the content of such representations by ment: with the real-world objects and properties with
appeal to proper functions is to focus on the effects a which it is interacting, and with the problem space in
device is supposed to or meant to produce. History sets the which it is embedded. The non-semantic description
standard. It is history that determines whether a current of the system’s internal organisation is true of the
state represents correctly or incorrectly. As a consequence, system irrespective of its external environment.
content, understood via biosemantic theory is debarred Content ascriptions help explain how it interacts with
from playing any kind of causal role in the synchronic that environment (p. 498, emphases added).
production of intelligent behavior.
A teleosemantic theory of content cannot answer Shea’s
Representational status is conferred on states by being
question because at most it can only establish that a system
based not on ‘‘what they do but why they work’’ (Millikan
connects to and targets certain features of the environment;
2005, p. 97). Descriptive representations work by bearing a
it is in no position to explain how systems do so. And if it
correspondence to what they represent. On this scheme,
can’t answer Shea’s question then it cannot solve the
representational content is patrician not plebian in char-
problem Clark faces—it cannot explain how content might
acter. In other words, content never gets it hands dirty.
be literally supplied to the brain via the senses. Worse still,
Mental content understood in terms of proper function does
it is open for us to wonder if the connections of which Shea
no mechanistic work. For teleosemanticists, the focus of
(2013) speaks are best characterized in semantic terms
attention is on ultimate as opposed to proximate explana-
anyway, at all. Why should having a bio-history confer
tions, on structuring as opposed to triggering causes
robust semantic status on internal states, even those that
(Dretske 1988, chs. 1 & 2). This is why Millikan’s normal
determinately target particular worldly offerings?19
explanations are concerned to specify the historical con-
RECers have long argued against this supposition. Nor
ditions by which cognitive devices were selected; such
are they alone in thinking that ‘‘Millikan has not provided
explanations do not seek to answer questions about how
an adequate theory of content. Millikan’s technical appa-
such devices operate in the here and now.
ratus does define a relation that can hold between a sys-
Millikan (1993) makes this abundantly clear: ‘‘having a
tem’s mental sate and properties sometimes instantiated in
certain history is not, of course, an attribute that has ‘causal
the environment. But … the relation so defined is not ‘has
powers’ … that a thing has a teleofunction is a causally
as its content that’’’ (Pietroski 1992, p. 268). Others too
impotent fact about it’’ (Millikan 1993, p. 186). To adopt a
think that biological functions can explicate ‘‘an important
teleosemantic account of mental content is to forego the
kind of natural involvement relation … [but] not … rep-
idea that mental contents can possibly feature in the
resentation or anything close to it’’ (Godfrey-Smith 2006,
mechanistic or causal explanations. When we make appeals
p. 60). The intentional directedness of basic cognition need
to content we must focus on what a device is supposed to
not be cashed out in semantic terms but might be under-
do, not what it is disposed to do.
stood, much more weakly, as instantiating ‘‘some kind of
The upshot is that appealing to teleosemantics is at best
privileged relation’’ (Rupert 2011, p. 101).
a means of explaining how Action Oriented Representa-
The punch line is that positing Action Oriented Repre-
tions get their content but it is in direct conflict with the
sentations understood via the lens of teleosemantics rules
demand that representational explanations in cognitive
out the very idea that mental contents might causally drive
science are supposed to ‘‘answer how-questions about
actions. Nor is it obvious there is any ground for thinking
cognitive capacities, and not … why-questions about par-
that these so-called ‘representations’ possess any kind of
ticular behaviors or actions’’ (Gładziejewski 2015a,
content at all. Bringing this back to PPC, for all of these
p. 66).18 This being the case representational content,
reasons there a number of serious problems with Clark’s
understood in teleosemantic terms, cannot do one of most
answer to this question:
basic jobs earmarked for it. In describing that job Shea
(2013) notes: What are the contents of the many states governed by
resulting structured, multi-level, action-oriented,
18 probabilistic generative models? It is … precision-
On the standard view: ‘‘Information processing theories effectively
offer a wiring diagram showing how inputs affect states of the system weight estimates … that drive action … such looping
and, in conjunction with other states of the system, issue in complexities … make it even harder (perhaps
behavioural outputs. What does it add to that wiring diagram to impossible) adequately to capture the contents or the
label various nodes with representational contents? A realist about
mental representation is committed to the reality of the internal
19
particulars described in the theory, and of their contents’’ (Shea 2013, For an extended argument why we should abandon this idea see
p. 498). Hutto and Myin (2013), Ch. 4.

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386 D. D. Hutto

cognitive roles of many key inner states and pro- observing is a tiger, then the hypothesis that the inflow of
cesses using the vocabulary of ordinary daily speech sensory information has been caused by a tiger will gen-
(Clark 2015b, p. 5, emphasis added). erate (on average) a smaller prediction error than alterna-
tive hypotheses—including any that attribute the causal
3.3 Maps and Models origins of the incoming signal to a plush toy or a domestic
cat’’ (Gładziejewski 2015b).
Let us consider one last way of possibly keeping repre- It is clear to see why anyone who understands the role of
sentationalism in play. Despite recognizing the limits of perception in this way will think that PPC necessarily
teleosemantic approaches some authors, such as trades in explanations involving representational content.
Gładziejewski (2015b), insist that the representational The real question is, in the light of previous failed attempts,
pretensions of PPC are entirely justified. Indeed, it has been how does Gładziejewski (2015) intend to pay for the rep-
argued that in the final reckoning PPC might be as repre- resentational content that PPC explanations putatively call
sentational as cognitive-scientific theories get. upon?
Why think so? Gładziejewski (2015b) is very clear that Gładziejewski (2015b) proposes that PCC should pos-
he assumes ‘‘prediction error minimization aims to mini- tulate internal representations whose functional profile is
mize the mismatch between how things are and how the nontrivially similar to the functional profile of cartographic
brain/mind ‘represents’ them as being’’.20 If this is right maps. He identifies four features that qualify such maps as
then PPC must operate with the strong notion of repre- representations: allegedly they represent by: (1) struc-
sentational content—the generic notion that is used at large turally resembling features of some domain; (2) guiding the
in the classical cognitive science literature (for an excep- actions of their users; (3) doing so in detachable ways (e.g.
tionally clear discussion of what this entails see Travis they can be used ‘off-line’); and (4) allowing their users to
2004, esp. pp. 58–59). To understand representational detect representational errors.21 Drawing on work by
content in this way is to subscribe to the idea that repre- O’Brien and Opie (2004), Gładziejewski (2015b) presents
senting the world contentfully is a matter of taking (‘rep- the basic idea in this way maps ‘‘represent in virtue of
resenting’, ‘saying’, ‘asserting’, etc.) that the world is a sharing, to at least some degree, a relational structure with
certain way such that it may or may not be that way. whatever they represent’’.22
Representational content therefore implies correctness Explicating this idea, O’Brien and Opie (2015) conceive
conditions of some kind, which can be variously construed mental representation in structural or analog terms—in
as truth, accuracy or veridicality conditions. terms of physical analogies holding between representa-
The assumption is that the more accurate the brain’s tional content and what they represent. Representational
generative model is in terms of its ‘‘likelihoods, dynamics, contents just are intrinsic structural properties of repre-
and priors’’ the more accurate its hypotheses will be about sentational vehicles. Mental representations are structures
the causal–probabilistic structure of the external world. The that share resemblance properties of some kind with what
assumption motivates thinking that representational con- they represent. The content of an analog representing
tents of a quite traditional kind must play a central part in vehicle is fixed solely by structural resemblances holding
PPC explanations. To illustrate the point, Gładziejewski between its vehicle and its object. The resemblances in
(2015b) imagines a case in which a human brain uses a
less-than-accurate generative model of the world and thus 21
In making this proposal Gładziejewski (2015a, b) hopes to address
‘‘settles on the hypothesis that it is seeing a plush imitation Ramsey’s (2007) job description challenge, and deal with the worry
of a tiger … when what it in fact faces is a live tiger’’. that representational constructs used in the cognitive sciences are
Getting it wrong in this sort of case has fairly obvious often representational in name alone—viz. that representational
terminology too often serves as ‘‘an empty and misleading orna-
costs. And even if the brain has no direct access to tigers
ment’’. As he puts its, ‘‘It is easy to say that representations are
via perception we can expect that when ‘‘what one is in fact component parts of mechanisms that play the functional role of a
representation. But it is much harder to answer the question of what it
20
Rehearsing a view found in countless cognitive science textbooks, means to function as a representation within a mechanism. When are
Rey (2015) reports, ‘‘‘representation’ has come to be used in we justified in attributing the role of a representation to a component
contemporary philosophy and cognitive science as an umbrella term of a neural or computational mechanism? What exactly does a
to include not only pictures and maps, but words, clauses, sentences, component have to do within a mechanism in order to be justifiably
ideas, concepts, indeed, virtually anything that is a vehicle for categorized as a representation?’’ (Gładziejewski 2015a, p. 67).
22
intentionality (i.e. anything that stands for, ‘means’, ‘refers to’, or ‘is Gladziejewski (2015a) identifies Grush’s (1997, 2004) emulator
about something’)’’ (p. 171). Of course, a consequence of adopting theory of representations—which holds motor control perception and
this ‘broad usage’ is that representationalists face the difficult imagery make use of internal emulators of the body and world—as a
problem of ‘‘determining by virtue of what something represents shining example of the sort of theory that posits constructs which
whatever it represents – namely has the representational content that it comfortably satisfies the four criteria required, by his lights, to count
has’’ (Rey 2015, p. 171). as representations (Gladziejewski 2015a, p. 85).

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REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification 387

question are thought to depend only on intrinsic properties resemblances, being actively exploited in systematic ways
of the vehicle and objects. in order to bring actions to bear on teleologically fixed
Going with this sort of structural-resemblance theory targets. The existence of the structural resemblance seems
of representational content will be attractive to anyone all that is needed to do all the work in explaining a sys-
who is convinced that other naturalized theories of con- tem’s adaptiveness—there is no need for content to play
tent face intractable problems. However, notably going any part in this story, and no room for it to do so.
the analog way seems to involve substantially weakening From its inception, REC has exposed the explanatory
the very idea of representational content itself, indeed to hollowness of inflated hyper-intellectualism about cogni-
vanishing point. That’s the rub. For the notion is so tive processes, such as perception (see Hutto 2005; Hutto
reduced that it becomes difficult to see in virtue of why and Myin 2013, ch. 5). Reprising that reasoning and
internal structures need to be thought of as bearing focusing on vision, Orlandi (2014) shows there is a less
contents at all (or indeed, assuming they do have con- expensive way to go in understanding perceptual processes
tents how the contentful properties rather than other than buying into representationalist renderings of PPC
properties of the structures that allegedly bear them play accounts. She reveals that even if we can describe per-
any explanatory role in cognition). Put simply, once we ceptual processes in Bayesian terms there is no need and no
have gone this far it is hard to see why even cheaper advantage in characterizing the brain as literally making
contentless alternative accounts of resembling structures Bayesian inferences in carrying out its work. Orlandi
aren’t better placed to do all of the relevant explanatory (2014) provides a perfect statement of the REC take on this
labour. issue23:
To illustrate the point, assume that for some structure to We can explain the central phenomena that we need to
function as a map certain resemblances must hold between explain by thinking of the visual process as mediated by
the map and the mapped domain. That can be granted functional states and features that are better understood
without assuming that structural resemblances entail the non-representationally, and making reference to environ-
existence of any kind of representational content. Maps can mental conditions, in particular to statistical regularities in
be used to navigate an environment because certain cor- the world with an eye to organismic needs … a system may
respondences hold. But when they are so used it does not have features—for example, wires or constraints—that
follow that the exploitation of map-like correspondences developed, and continue to develop, under evolutionary
for the purposes of navigation entails using the map rep- and environmental pressure. These features have a certain
resentationally such that the successes and failures of such function. They make the system act lawfully; that is, they
effort need to be understood in terms of representational make the system act in a way that is describable by prin-
content. ciples. The principles, however, are in no sense represented
Here thinking about keys and locks is revealing. Let us by the system and encoded within it (p. 3).
assume that every mental structure has its own unique What moral can we draw from this? Perceiving can be
geometry, unique structural properties. Accordingly, the understood as a dynamic, active process based on having a
‘shape’ of such structures and how they interact in the certain history of interactions and information sensitivities
machinery of the mind are what drive cognition. It is easy in the current context through which we can make contact
to see how the analogue properties of a given structure with the world. Even with this use of maps and models
plausibly ‘‘determine the causes and effects of its tokenings employing structural resemblance it does not follow that
in much the way the geometry of a key determines which such maps and models intrinsically represent the world
locks it will open’’ (Fodor 1991, p. 41). It is not obvious contentfully. Maps and models may help us to engage with
how any putative content a structure might bear could do an aspect of the world without our forming hypotheses or
likewise or indeed why such structures should be thought making true or false, accurate or inaccurate ‘claims’ about
of as intrinsically contentful. how things stand with the world. What hold true for us in
Assume that the structural-resemblance notion of ‘rep- this case, holds equally true for our brains.
resentation’ may have explanatory power and applicability.
The money question is why, even assuming structural 3.4 A Lasting Peace
resemblances do important cognitive work, think that they
do it in virtue of being contentful (in the sense of having We are now, finally, in a position to give a stronger reply to
correctness conditions such as truth or accuracy Hohwy’s challenge (see Sect. 3.1). The epistemic reading
conditions)?
In the absence of further details it seems—borrowing 23
Despite agreeing with REC about the nature of perceptual
from Myin and Hutto (2015)—that all the explanatory processes, Orlandi (2014) disagrees with REC in supposing that the
work can be outsourced to less costly employees, structural product of such processes are plausibly representational (p. 5).

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Hohwy (2014) advances is committed to thinking that what an organism expects to experience on some occasion
perceiving involves representational content. But why as being in tension with—or failing to ‘match’—features of
assume this? Why think that perceiving entails the exis- its current sensory experience. This being so, our expec-
tence of perceptual contents with correctness conditions tations can fail to match incoming sensory experience
(truth, accuracy, veridicality conditions)? To assume per- without this activity being construed as an evidence-based
ceiving must involve representational content is bound up operation.
with the idea that any instance of bona fide perceiving must This conclusion follows naturally if the senses do not
involve taking or depicting the world to be a certain way have the job of telling us ‘‘how things stand objectively
such that it might not be that way. The assumption that with the world’’ but rather of trying to ensure—within their
Cognition must Involve Content (CIC) is the very sub-optimal limits—that organismic activity satisfies
assumption that REC denies. specific, narcissistic organismic needs. Satisfying such
To let go of CIC is to let go of the very core of the needs surely involves being sensitive and adjusting to the
orthodox representationalist vision of cognition in a way ‘‘causal–probabilistic structure of the world’’ but such
that spares us the problem of being epistemically cut off adjustments need not be evidence based and representa-
from the world. If perceiving isn’t fundamentally a matter tionally driven.24 Consequently, on this analysis we can
of representing the world then there is simply no question shelve the philosophically confounding talk of the brain
of our perceptions getting things right or wrong in basic making contentfully based ‘predictions’, ‘inferences’ and
cases. How then to make sense of PPC’s error minimiza- ‘hypotheses’.
tion? Perhaps reducing uncertainty and reducing free To return to Clark’s claim that the models in PPC do
energy can be cashed out in non-intellectualist terms—thus more than just describe the world, we can ask why think of
not as a matter of epistemic error—but without loss of models as doing any describing at all? ‘‘Why not simply
explanatory power. ditch the talk of … internal representations and stay on the
Recall that according to PPC, the brain is constantly true path of enactivist virtue?’’ (Clark 2015b, p. 4). Why
seeking to minimize the degree of mismatch between not, indeed! Finding our way to this straight path is not a
internally generated sensory predictions and incoming matter of brokering a theoretical peace through compro-
sensory signals from the external environment. PPC mise, it is a matter of achieving philosophical peace
accounts assume that there are active anticipations groun- through clarification. After all, ‘‘The real discovery … is
ded in structural and functional changes wrought in the the one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer
brain through an organism’s history of interactions (Byrge tormented by questions which bring itself into question’’
et al. 2014; Bruineberg and Rietveld 2014). Even Hohwy (Wittgenstein 1953, §133).
(2014) admits that perception can ‘‘be described as
empirical Bayesian inference, where priors are shaped
through experience, development and evolution, and har-
nessed in the parameters of hierarchical statistical models 24
Going the REC way requires abandoning the all-encompassing
of the causes of the sensory input’’ (p. 4, emphasis added).
vision of standard formulations of PPC which holds that the sole
REC too assumes that prior anticipations and expecta- explanation of adaptive error minimization is the reduction of free
tions are grounded in structural and functional neural energy. While the reduction of free energy principle is central to PPC,
changes wrought through an organism’s history of inter- it should not be regarded as ‘the’ foundational, ultimate explanation
of all adaptive behavior; the one factor that drives it. PPC must
actions. But it takes anticipations and expectations to be
surrender this pretension given that the optimal strategy for reducing
contentless. What we do and how we do it—what we surprise and minimizing predictive error would be, as the ‘dark room’
experience—leads to changes in our neural set up and what objection highlights, to find a stable environment and engage the
we expect to experience. Yet having expectations about world as possible. Clearly, the ‘dark room’ strategy cannot explain
why the world teems with so many diverse forms of adaptive life that
what we will experience sensorily need not be thought of in
employ an incredible variety of adventurous cognitive strategies.
epistemic terms; it involves nothing like making contentful Highlighting the explanatory limitations of relying on a single
claims about the state of the world. Nor need we think of principle to explain all of this, Menary (forthcoming) supplies a
sensory perturbations that surprise as contentful messages compelling argument for relinquishing the ‘isolated brain’ interpre-
tation of PPC in favour of situating the PPC enterprise within a
that contradict the content of prior expectations. Although
broader, more ‘open minded’ and pluralist explanatory framework—
the senses are sensitive to information in the environment, one which assumes that to explain adaptive life and cognition
they can do their action guiding work in a strictly silent demands appeal to a wider set of grounding evolutionary principles
manner (Travis 2004). There are ways of making sense of and not just the idea that organisms seek to minimize free energy.
This argument against the secluded brain formulation of PPC only
the function of the senses in which representational con-
concerns PPC’s official explanatory ambitions. It is, thus, independent
tents play no part (Akins 1996). Yet even on such non- of the epistemic and semantic concerns raised above. Nevertheless,
representationalist construals it is still possible to talk about they fit together as a seamless package.

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REC: Revolution Effected by Clarification 389

4 Revolution in Mind p. 36). Likewise, ‘‘Darwin did not simply pick away at the
creationist conceptual structure: he produced an elaborate
Suppose we go the REC way. How radical is the required alternative edifice that supplanted it as a whole’’ (Thagard
rethink? Enactivism is often heralded as offering a new 1992, p. 36).
paradigm for thinking about cognition (Stewart et al. In a similar spirit, REC aims not merely to adjust certain
2010). On the face of it, this verdict seems justified if it is aspects of the classical cognitivist vision but to supplant
true that enactivism is ‘gradually supplanting’ its tradi- that outlook entirely. For example, in doing away with the
tional cognitivist-computational competitors (Cappuccio idea that content can be found at the basis of cognition,
and Froese 2014, p. 3). The verdict appears justified if it is REC does away with the content/vehicle distinction and
true that enactivism has ‘‘matured and become a viable hence vehicles. REC is a complete game changer—one that
alternative’’ to such approaches, yielding ‘‘methodological opens the door for truly new thinking about the mind that
advances’’ that ‘‘avoid or successfully address many of the can take us beyond business-as-usual cognitive science.
fundamental problems’’ faced by their rivals (Froese and And, like its predecessor conceptual revolutions, once
Ziemke 2009, p. 466). radicalized, enactivism will almost certainly have many
In advocating the PPC-enactivist alliance, Clark (2015a) hard-to-predict scientific and practical ramifications down
too speaks of our conception of mind being turn upside the line.
down, of ‘radical’ conceptual inversions wrought by such Some, like Shapiro (2014a) will doubt that abandoning
conceptual shifts. Indeed, he asks us to appreciate and classical thinking can take enactivism ‘‘to the next step’’ (p.
‘‘savour the radicalism’’ (Clark 2015a, p. 4). Still, the 215). The jury is still out on that question. Yet all parties
proposed revisions of which Clark speaks are still piece- can agree that only a RECtified account of cognition would
meal; they do not constitute a wholesale replacement of be a fundamentally different and genuinely alternative
previous thinking. There is a conservative streak in Clark’s account of mind to that promoted by classical cognitivism.
thinking because he, like many others, continues to assume In this light, perhaps, Shapiro is right to suggest that, once
that the notion of representational content must be retained. RECtified, what we will be looking at will not be ‘‘a more
In contrast, RECtification does not simply challenge some ferocious breed’’ of enactivism, but ‘‘a different animal
very central assumptions of the classical way of thinking altogether’’ (p. 215).
about cognition, it proposes uprooting that conception
completely.
REC seeks to do much more than cast new light on
psychotechtonics: it asks us to do more than rethink the 5 Conclusion
basic architecture of mind or the staging and functioning of
cognitive processes. It asks us to rethink our conception of Philosophical clarity is needed just to find the enactivist
the very nature of basic minds, abandoning altogether the path of virtue, let alone to stay on it. Those who want to
idea that there are contentful mental states at the roots of remain philosophically clean and clear are advised against
cognition. In seeking to clarify the true character of cog- a RECless cognitive science.
nition REC aims to promote truly revolutionary ways of
thinking about mind and cognition.
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