G.R. No.

123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS:

Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during
the 1994 barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered
voters of the barangay, which was approved by the COMELEC. Petition signing was scheduled on 14
October 1995, where at least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. The COMELEC also set the recall election on 13 November 1995, but
which was deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding of
the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (Special
Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF), with the trial court issuing a restraining order. After conducting a
summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting
that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. In a resolution dated 5 January
1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996; hence,
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. The petitioner contends that no
recall can take place within one year preceding a regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan
elections slated on the first Monday of May 1996.He cited Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-
Montejo to support the argument, the Court in which case considered the SK election as a regular
local election.

ISSUE:
Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan election is to be construed as a regular local election in a
recall proceeding.

HELD:
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other
parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit, rather than
the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit
and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot
countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfil its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. In the present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election. The Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be considered a regular election, as this would
render inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. It would be more in keeping with
the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate. The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the petition for having
become moot and academic, as the next regular elections involving the barangay office concerned
were seven months away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order issued on 12 January1996,
enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992

LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,

vs,
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent

FACTS:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for
involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified:
Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the
National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua
believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she
was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A
recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her
position is co-terminus with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the
enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is included from the benefits of
RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

RULING:
Yes. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause of the constitution
if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent’s submission that the benefits of said law are to be
denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.
The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
G. R. No. 96422 February 28, 1994
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO, respondents

FACTS:
The petition questions the withholding of one-half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits.
Petitioner was Chairman of the COA from 1976 to 1986. On December 1985, he applied for and
obtained clearance, which covered the period from 1976 to1985, from all money, property, and
other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. After the EDSA Revolution, he submitted
his resignation and sought second clearance for the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986.
Respondent, who took over as Chairman, created an inventory/audit of all equipment acquired during
the tenure of his 2 predecessors. After the committee recommended Petitioner’s clearance from
accountability and after another special audit, Respondent approved Petitioner’s application for
retirement but added that ½ of the money value of benefits due would be withheld subject to the
findings of the audit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent can authorize that half of Petitioner’s retirement benefits may be
withheld.

RULING:
No. Under Section 4 of RA 1568 providing for life pension to the Auditor General and
members of COMELEC, the benefits granted shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution.
Likewise, under Section 33 of P.D. 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act), the benefits
granted “shall not be subject, among others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes.”
Withholding Petitioner’s benefits is not allowed in this case. Well-settled is the rule that retirement
laws are liberally interpreted in favour of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the
retiree’s well-being.
G.R. No. 51765, March 3, 1997

REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, SR., respondent

FACTS:
On Sept. 18 1961, the Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation (RFRDC)
secured a loan from the Republic Planters Bank in the amount of P120,000. Instead of giving the full
amount of the loan, which is P120,000.00, the Bank lent such amount partially in the form of money
and partially in the form of stock certificates each for 400 shares with a par value of P10.00 per share,
or for P4,000.00 each, for a total of P8,000.00. Said stock certificates were in the name of Adalia F.
Robes and Carlos F. Robes, who subsequently, however, endorsed his shares in favour of Adalia
Robes. On Jan. 31 1979, RFRDC and Robes proceeded against the Bank and filed a complaint
anchored on their alleged rights to collect dividends under the preferred shares in question and to have
the bank redeem the same under the terms and conditions of the stock certificates.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bank can be compelled to redeem the preferred shares issued to RFRDC
and Robes.

RULING:
While the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in
the bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". Thus, except as otherwise
provided in the stock certificate, the redemption rests entirely with the corporation and the stockholder
is without right to either compel or refuse the redemption of its stock. Furthermore, the terms and
conditions set forth therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that
the word "may" denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. The
redemption of said shares cannot be allowed. The directive, in limiting the exercise of a right granted
by law to a corporate entity, may thus be considered as an exercise of police power.
G.R. No. 159149 August 28, 2007
HON.SECRETARY VINCENT S. PEREZ, petitioner
vs.,
LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.

FACTS:
B.P. Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, under delivery, and
underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products
and of underfilled LPG cylinders. The law set the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of
P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.
To implement the law the DOE issued Circular No. 2000-06-010. Respondent LPG Refillers
Association of the Philippines, Inc. (LPG Refillers) asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for
being contrary to law. DOE denied the request.
LPG Refillers then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of the Circular with the
RTC. RTC nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the law
(per RTC: the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed
the maximum penalty under the law).
DOE argued: penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned
by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 8479. LPG Refillers countered: enabling laws do not expressly penalize
the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular. Neither is the Circular supported by R.A. No. 7638
since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders. RTC denied MR. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari to SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOE Circular is void on the ground that it introduced new offences not
punished under B.P. Blg. 33?

RULING:
No. B.P. Blg. 33, provides that the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the
acts foretasted is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular,
the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by
law. However, the Circular is silent as to any maximum penalty for the refillers, marketers, and
dealers. This mere silence, does not amount to violation of the statutory maximum limit. The
mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to
the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
It is B.P. Blg. 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products
and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. The Circular
merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers,
marketers, and dealers.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide
the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant
adulteration and short selling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical
to public interest. To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the
general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders.
G.R. No. 137004. July 26, 2000
ARNOLD V. GUERRERO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents

FACTS:
Guillermo Ruiz filed a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as a candidate for
the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos, Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been
campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a
certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the election, Farinas filed his
certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On
May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz.
After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for
reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Fariñas, since the
latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988,
Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. COMELEC dismissed
the MR on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of Fariñas is already within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?

RULING:
No. While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of
candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the
position by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdiction boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET).Under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House
of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELECs decision to
discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to theHRETs own
jurisdiction and functions. HRET’s jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional qualifications.
Petitioner contended that the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined under Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution is limited only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution. Consequently, he claims that any issue which does not involve these constitutional
qualifications is beyond the realm of the HRET.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a statutory qualification under the Omnibus
Election Code is outside the pale of the HRET, according to him. Petitioner is wrong. The word
"qualifications" cannot be read as qualified by the term "constitutional." There should be no
distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated. For firstly, the drafters of the
fundamental law, in making no qualification in the use of a general word or expression, must have
intended no distinction at all. Secondly, the courts could only distinguish where there are facts or
circumstances showing that the lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the
courts would merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. Jurisdiction is not affected by issue on
validity of proclamation.
Petitioner was wrong in arguing that the HRET assumes jurisdiction only if there is a valid
proclamation of the winning candidate and that where the proclamation is null and void, there is no
proclamation at all and the mere assumption of office by the proclaimed candidate does not deprive
the COMELEC at all of its power to declare such nullity. In an electoral contest where the validity of
the proclamation of winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as
Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-
evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional
bodies, with due regard to the peoples mandate.
G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006

SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent

FACTS:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the

business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was
accessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue the total amount of
P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, among other
deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on SPMC’s sales of crude oil to UNITED Coconut
Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible
oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessments but the Commissioner denied its
protest. SPMC appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) by way of a
petition for review docketed as CTA Case No. 5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules
because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3% tax on its sales of corn and
edible oil as manufactured products. This is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn
and edible oil products were sold to UNICHEM who in turn exports these products and sell them
abroad.
SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same section of the 1987 Tax
Code which provides in part:

“Provided, however, that this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-
product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope,
coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by
the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without
returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured articles or products.”

SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:

1. That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;

2. But the said tax exempt manufacturers who export these edible oil products;
3. That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its
purchaser, who then exports the oil products.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.

RULING:

No. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported
products nor did it mention to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil
products nevertheless, sells said product to a purchaser who does export. The legal maxim
“Expression Unius est Exclusion Alterius” applies – where the law enumerates the subject or
condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mention. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a
meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statue cannot be
placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.
G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,
EMDEN ENCARNACION and HORATIO AYCARDO, respondents

FACTS:

Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. was organized on February 8, 1983 as the
registered sole homeowner’s association for Loyola Grand Villas with the Home Financing
Corporation, which later became Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC). However, the
association was not able to file its corporate by-laws in the prescribed date as stated in the Corporation
Code Sec. 46, Adoption of by-laws, “Every corporation formed under this code must within 1 month
after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by SEC, adopt a code
of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code.”
The LGVHAI officers then tried to register its By-Laws in 1988, but they failed to do so.
They then discovered that there were other homeowners’ organization within the subdivision – the
North and South Association, and upon inquiry by the LGVHAI to HIGC, it was discovered that
LGVHAI was dissolved for its failure to submit its by-laws within the period required by the
Corporation Code. These paved the way for the formation of the two other associations. LGVHAI
then lodged a complaint and questioned the revocation with the HIGC Hearing Officer Javier. Hearing
Officer Javier ruled in favour of LGVHAI and revoked the registration of the North and South
Associations.
Petitioner South Association appealed the ruling, contending that LGVHAI's failure to file its
by-laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation Code effectively automatically
dissolved the corporation. The Appeals Board of the HIGC and the Court of Appeals both rejected the
contention of the Petitioner affirmed the decision of Hearing Officer Javier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not LGVHAI's failure to file its by-laws within the period prescribed by Section
46 of the Corporation Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation.

RULING:
No. Automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the by-laws on time was never the
intention of the legislature. Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not
mandatory. Ordinarily, the word "must" connotes an imposition of duty which must be enforced.
However, the word "must" in a statute, like "shall," is not always imperative. It may be consistent
with an exercise of discretion. If the language of a statute, considered as a whole with due regard to its
nature and object, reveals that the legislature intended to use the words "shall" and "must" to be
directory, they should be given that meaning.
By-laws are indispensable to corporations, since they are required by law for an orderly
management of corporations. However, failure to file them within the period prescribed does not
equate to the automatic dissolution of a corporation.
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959

PAZ FORES, petitioner,

vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent

FACTS:

Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the
vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed, the driver lost control, and the
jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was
charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of
guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of contract of carriage,
contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a
public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same?

HELD:
Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the query in the
affirmative. The ruling should be upheld. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale,
alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any
part thereof of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed
primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service
Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or
operator standing in the records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146),
to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction from being negotiated
or completed before its approval”, means only that the sale without the required approval is still valid
and binding between the parties. (Montoya vs. Ignacio 50 Off. Gaz., No. 1, p. 108). the phrase
“in ordinary course of its business” found in the other proviso “or to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public service of any of its property,” could not have been intended to include the sale of
the vehicle itself but at most may refer only to such property that can be conceivably disposed of by
the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.