PEOPLE VS GATCHALIAN

Gr No L12011-14
FACTS OF THE CASE
On or about August 4, 1951, up to and including December 31, 1953 and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, viz, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, the above named accused,
owner or manager of the New Life Drug Store, a business establishment in the City of
Zamboanga and having under his employ one Expedito Fernandez as salesman in the said
establishment, did then and there willfully, and feloniously, pay and cause to be paid to said
Expedito Fernandez, a monthly salary of P60 to P90 for the period above-mentioned which is
less than that provided for by law, thereby leaving a difference of an unpaid salary to the latter in
the total amount of P1,016.64 for the period above-mentioned.
When arraigned on June 19, 1956, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. On August 29,
1956, his counsel, in his behalf, filed a written motion to dismiss based on two grounds which in
substance merely consist in that the violation charged does not constitute a criminal offense but
carries only a civil liability, and even if it does, the section of the law alleged to have been
violated does not carry any penalty penalizing it. On September 25, 1956, the City Attorney of
Zamboanga filed his answer to the motion to dismiss contending that the law which was violated
by the accused carries with it both civil and criminal liability, the latter being covered by Section
15 which provides for the penalty for all willful violations of any of the provisions of the
Minimum Wage Law. On December 3, 1956, the Court, after hearing the arguments of both
parties, as well as some members of the local bar, issued an order dismissing the informations
with costs de oficio and cancelling the bail bond filed by the accused. The court in the same
order directed the Regional Representative of the Department of Labor to immediately institute a
civil action against the erring employer for the collection of the alleged underpayment of wages
due the employees. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the Government took the
present appeal.
Section 3 explicitly requires every owner of an establishment located outside of Manila
or its environs to pay each of its employees P3.00 a day on the effective date of the Act, and one
year thereafter P4.00 a day, Section 15 imposes both a criminal penalty for a willful violation of
any of the above provisions and a civil liability for any underpayment of wages due an
employee. Counsel for appellee however entertains a different interpretation. He contends that if
Section 15(a) should be interpreted in a manner that would embrace a willful violation of any of
the provisions of the law we would have a situation where even the officials entrusted with its
enforcement may be held criminally liable which is not contemplated in the law.
ISSUE : WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE’s Contention on the construction of the said
provision is correct?
RULING: NO, The Court held in the negative.
the Minimum Wage Law is a social legislation which has been adopted for the benefit of
labor and as such it contains provisions that are enjoined to be observed by the employer. These
provisions are substantive in nature and had been adopted for common observance by the
persons affected. They cannot be eluded nor subverted lest the erring employer runs into the
sanction of the law. On the other hand, the provisions adverted to by counsel are merely
administrative in character which had been adopted to set the machinery by which the law is to
be enforced. They are provisions established for observance by the officials entrusted with its
enforcement. Failure to comply with them would therefore subject them merely to administrative
sanction. Section 3 under which appellee was charged does not state that it shall be unlawfull for
an employer to pay his employees wages below the minimum wage but merely requires that the
employer shall pay wages not below the minimum wage. But failure of such declaration does not
make the non-observance of the provisions less unlawful than otherwise, for such provision
embodies precisely the raison d'etre of the law itself. Indeed, Section 3 is the very provision on
which all the other provisions of the law are built. If these supplementary provisions are mere
safeguards established by the lawmaker to close every avenue to trickery or subversion on the
part of the employer, they cannot be more important and imperative as the central provision
fixing the minimum wage without which the law will have no reason to exist. We cannot
therefore entertain the claim that because said provision was not declared unlawful it cannot be
subject to the penal sanction embodied in Section 15.
The final claim of appellee is that inasmuch as the provisions of the law under which he
was prosecuted are ambiguous and there is doubt as to their interpretation, that doubt should be
resolved in his favor because a penal statute should be strictly construed against the State. It is
stated that that section is clear and unambiguous and covers the provisions embodied in Section
3 of the law, and if such is the case then there is no room for the application of the principle
invoked by appellee.
Antonio Vs Geronimo,
Gr no. 124779
FACTS OF THE CASE
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Antipolo, docketed as Civil Case No. 2223 by Alexander Catolos (private respondent),
who alleged that he was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land situated at Mayamot,
Antipolo, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 243003, 243179, 226192,
and 166965, respectively. The defendants therein were the petitioners, who were occupying the
said properties. Private respondent claimed he allowed petitioners to occupy portions of his land
without requiring them to pay rent, on the condition that the latter would immediately vacate the
same in the event that the former would need the premises. However, when private respondent
did notify petitioners of his need to use the premises, petitioners refused to vacate the land even
after demand. The complaint was resolved in favor of private respondent. In a Decision dated 15
September 1993, respondent judge ordered petitioners to vacate the subject properties and pay
the amount of Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the properties, as well as Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for litigation
expenses and attorney's fees.
On 23 November 1993, private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of
demolition. The lower court granted the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of demolition.
On 28 March 1994, a writ of demolition was issued. Partial demolition had already taken place
by April 1994. Private respondent filed an urgent ex parte motion, seeking the full
implementation of the writ of demolition. This was granted on 24 April 1995, On 20 June 1995,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo, Rizal passed Resolution No. 61-95, authorizing Mayor
Daniel Garcia to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject properties for public
purposes/socialized housing. Lately, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed a resolution
authorizing the Mayor of the town to acquire thru expropriation or purchase the subject
properties for public purposes/socialized housing. Though the writ of demolition had not yet
been fully implemented, the demolition proceeded despite said resolutions of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Petitioners filed a motion to stay invoking the Commonwealth Act No. 538 in asking
respondent judge to suspend the action for ejectment in view of the announced expropriation of
the subject properties
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT a resolution for expropriation by a local government unit can
suspend the writ of execution and demolition in an ejectment case
RULING: No, such resolution is not sufficient for the suspension of the writ of execution and
demolition.
These resolutions cannot partake of a supervening event so as to suspend the writ of
execution in the ejectment proceedings. They merely express at most an intention to expropriate.
Private respondent correctly maintained that there was no positive act of instituting the intended
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a
derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in
the legislative language ' from "resolution" under the BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160
demands a strict construction. And not merely a resolution. The Court citing, Republic of the
Philippines v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., et. al., imposed guidelines for its implementation, such
that an ejectment proceeding cannot be barred or suspended under Republic Act No. 2616 unless
an action for expropriation is actually filed; the government takes possession of the land; and
coetaneous payment of just compensation is made.
SAMSON VS COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. L-43182
FACTS OF THE CASE

The legality of Administrative Order No. 3, issued on January 10, 1972, by the then
mayor Marcial F. Samson, of Caloocan City, one of the petitioners herein, whereby petitioner
mayor summarily terminated the services of the private respondent, Feliciano C. Talens, who
held the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor, on the ground of "lack and loss of
confidence" and appointing in place of the latter Hermogenes Liwag, a co-petitioner in this case.
Cited in support of the challenged administrative order is section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 2260,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of 1959, as amended. The above-cited provision
declares the position of secretaries to city mayors non-competitive and this was interpreted by
herein petitioner Mayor as to include the position of Assistant Secretary to the Mayor. Petitioner
argued that since his job position is assistant secretary, he is included amongst the categories
“Secretaries” and can only be removed under due grounds, being confidential,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Talens is illegally dismissed under the section 5 of the CSC act of
1959.
RULING: NO, the general purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260) is "to
insure and promote the consitutional mandate regarding appointment only according to merit and
fitness, and to provide within the public service a progressive system of personal administration
to insure the maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and courteous civil service in the
Philippines.
As a general rule, position in all branches, subdivisions and instrumentalities of the
governmentalities of the government, including those in government owned or controlled
corporations, belong to the competitive service. The only exceptions are those expressly declared
by law to be in the non-competitive service and those which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical in nature.
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly,
but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the
latter by implication. The exceptions provided for in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260, as
amended should be, therefore, strictly construed. It follows then that on this general governing
principle, the position of assistant secretary to the City Mayor of Caloocan City should be
considered as belonging to the non-competitive service.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
GR NO. 120295

FACTS : Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988. the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldo. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that
he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for
hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask
that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on
the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the
respondents.
ISSUE : Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his
election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in
this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
RULING: Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section
117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He failed to
take such categorical acts. The anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country
while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was
elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer‘s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from
serving as governor of Sorsogon.

BORROMEO VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

GR No. 96032

FACTS OF THE CASE

Should the terminal leave pay of petitioner Borromeo, Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) until his retirement on April 1, 1986, be computed on the basis of the highest
monthly salary plus cost of living allowance (COLA) and representation and transportation
allowance (RATA) or solely on the basis of highest monthly salary without said allowances?
This is the issue that confronts the Court. On August 18, 1988, the petitioner wrote a letter to the
Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, coursed through the CSC Chairman, requesting an
opinion on whether or not the money value of the terminal leave of retired Constitutional
Commission members should include the allowances received at the time of retirement. The
petitioner, in his letter, further stated that while retired members of other Constitutional
Commissions received terminal leave pay computed on the basis of highest monthly salary
including allowances, the former's terminal leave was computed solely on the basis of highest
monthly salary. n a First Indorsement to the COA Chairman on September 1, 1988, the CSC
Chairman recommended the approval of the petitioner's request for payment of the money value
of his terminal leave based on salary plus allowances. On September 28, 1989, the COA
rendered Decision No. 992 (hereinafter referred to as the COA decision) stating that "in line with
the action taken by this Commission in the previous similar cases of former COA
Commissioners Hermogenes P. Pobre and Silvestre D. Sarmiento," the COA "will interpose no
objection" to the petitioner's claim.
Upon the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave differential representing the
unpaid COLA and RATA amounting to P111,229.04, the CSC Chairman informed the petitioner
that the release of the corresponding advice of allotment and cash outlay to cover the payment of
his terminal leave differential had already been requested from the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). he DBM denied the petitioner's request for payment of terminal leave
differential for the following reasons, among others: 1) Computation of the money value of
vacation and sick leave is based on "basic pay" or "basic salary" pursuant to the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No. 1081. 2) Under Section 2(1) of P.D. No.
1146, the term salary refers to the basic pay or salary received by an employee, excluding per
diems, bonuses, overtime pay and allowance. 3) The cases of former COA Commissioners Pobre
and Sarmiento cannot be validly invoked as precedents for purposes of DBM Budgetary action
since said claims were processed without prior involvement of the DBM.
It issued Resolution No. 90-514 dated May 30, 1990 wherein the Commission deemed it
proper not to rule on the issue on "ethical considerations" and "compulsions of delicadeza" and
advised the petitioner to file an action for declaratory relief (sic) on the issue with the Supreme
Court. Petitioner Borromeo sought reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 90-514, reasoning
that neither the CSC Resolution nor the opinion of the DBM Secretary could prevail over the
COA decision which had become final and executory. On October 18, 1990, the CSC issued
Resolution No. 90-945 denying reconsideration of the petitioner's case. Inspite of the CSC
Chairman's earlier approval of the claim for payment, the CSC ruled that the COA decision "has
no sufficient legal mooring and therefore cannot be the basis for allowing payment of the claims.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is correct?

RULING: No, the petition is set aside.

Since terminal leave is applied for by an officer or employee who has already severed
his connection with his employer and who is no longer working, then it follows that the terminal
leave pay, which is the cash value of his accumulated leave credits, should not be treated as
compensation for services rendered at that time. t can not be viewed as salary for purposes which
would reduce it. (supra) There can thus be no "commutation of salary" when a government
retiree applies for terminal leave because he is not receiving it as salary. What he applies for is a
"commutation of leave credits." It is an accumulation of credits intended for old age or
separation from the service. Hence, Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code is not
applicable. It cannot be construed as limiting the basis of the computation of terminal leave pay
to monthly salary only. Since terminal leave pay may also be considered a gratuity, then applying
the rule on liberal interpretation of retirement laws, the basis for its computation in the case of
members of the Judiciary and Constitutional Commissions must be the same as that used in
computing the 5-year lump sum gratuity under RA 910 as amended and Administrative Order
No. 444.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner vs
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until
the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a
certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner
thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 15.When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites
for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage. Plaintiff pleaded not guilty and posit his
defense accordingly, 1.) claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union.
He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his
office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother
to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him
and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Petitioner is correct in his defense?
RULING: NO, The Court held in the negative.
 All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of
Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage
contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. – When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof,
was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should
be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National
Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there
was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record
of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to
the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. Considerations, both logical and
practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains,
for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise.
Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent
marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage
would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior
"voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the
prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy. Since psychological incapacity, upon the other
hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a
valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that
ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely
nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous
marriage.
DE MESA VS MENCIA
GR NO. 24583
FACTS OF THE CASE
Opponents for Mayoralty of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections were Francisco
De Mesa and Maximino Argana. The electorate’s choice, as tallied by the local board of
Canvassers was de Mesa. Elected vice mayor was Loresca. Meanwhile, Argana protested the
election of De Mesa. On March 18, 1964, however, an assassin’s bullet felled De Mesa, and,
forthwith Loresca was, by operation of law, duly installed as his successor. In the election case,
the protestant Argana moved for the constitution of committees on revision of ballots. On May 6,
1964, the court a quo required the protestee’s widow and children to appear within 15 days from
notice in order to be substituted for the said protestee, if they so desired. They did not, however,
comply. The trial court did not order the opposing party to procure the appointment of the legal
representative of the deceased litigant stated under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to
appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.(Rule 3.)
Argana reiterated his move for the appointment of commissioner on revision of
ballots, but this time, without proposing any provision for representation for the protestee whose
widow and children he sought to be declared “non suited”. On June 23, 1964, without notice of
the protestee and / or his legal representative, the trial court granted the motion aforesaid. The
trial court adjudged the protestant Argana as the duly elected Mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the
1963 elections, and taxed the costs of expenses of the protest against the estate of the deceased
protestee De Mesa.
Issue: Whether or not the requirement for the procurement of a legal representative of a deceased
litigant is couched in the permissive term “may” instead of the mandatory character of statutory
provisions.
Rulings:
Where the statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or
public duty, or where it vests a public body, municipality, or public officer with power and
authority to take some actions which concerns the public interests or rights of individuals, the
permissive language will be construed as mandatory and the execution of the power may be
insisted upon as duty. Declaring null and void the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in election case 7924 thereof, dated August 10, 1964, which proclaimed the protestant
Maximino A. Argana the duly elected mayor of Muntinlupa, Rizal in the 1963 elections, for
having been rendered without jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative of the
deceased protestee Francisco de Mesa and all other proceedings taken by said court in said
election case subsequent to the death of the said protestee, Also the The Court Ordering the
protestant Maximino A. Argana, without delay, to vacate the office of the mayor of Muntinlupa,
Rizal and to relinquish the same in favor of Demetrio R. Loresca; and Ordering the Court of First
Instance of Rizal to forthwith appoint the petitioner Demetrio R. Loresca as the legal
representative of the deceased protestee Francisco de Mesa and allow his appearance as such in
substitution of the said deceased for purposes of said election case 7924 of said court, to conduct
a new trial in said election case, and thereafter to render judgment therein as the evidence may
warrant.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983
BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,vs
THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF
THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL,
FACTS OF THE CASE.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested his
case on August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties moved for
time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The trial court granted the motion as
follows. Upon joint motion, the parties are given thirty [30] days to submit their respective
memoranda, simultaneously, and thereafter the case shall be deemed submitted for decision of
the Court. Counsel for petitioner submitted his memorandum in due time, but no memorandum
was filed by the People.
On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his
decision in said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28, 1975. A
certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of the Grace
Park Post Office to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and 011981, addressed to
Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the complaining witness, and Atty,
Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros, Manila, counsel for the accused,
respectively, were posted in said office on December 4, 1975. These notices were received by the
respective addressees on December 8 and 9, 1975. On the date set for promulgation of the
decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss
of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission
thereof for decision. Acceding to counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper
remedial measure to take, the respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January
19, 1976 at 8:30 A. M
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the
promulgation of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the promulgation
to January 26, 1976. Petitioner espouses the thesis that the three-month period prescribed by
Section 11[l] of Article X of the 1973 Constitution, being a constitutional directive, is mandatory
in character and that non-observance thereof results in the loss of jurisdiction of the court over
the unresolved case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the petitioner that the three month period is mandatory
and that non-observance will result in the loss of jurisdiction of the court.
RULING: No, The Court held in the negative.
In statutory construction, The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be
construed as mandatory, unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest."The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general
public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law."
In practice, The Court have assumed a liberal stand with respect to this provision. The
Court had at various times, upon proper application and for meritorious reasons, allowed judges
of inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month period within which to decide cases
submitted to them. The reason is that a departure from said provision would result in less injury
to the general public than would its strict application. To hold that non-compliance by the courts
with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts, through
which conflicts are resolved, the very instruments to foster unresolved causes by reason merely
of having failed to render a decision within the allotted term. Such an absurd situation could not
have been intended by the framers of our fundamental law. courts are not divested of their
jurisdiction for failure to decide a case within the ninety-day period, We here emphasize the rule,
for the guidance of the judges manning our courts, that cases pending before their salas must be
decided within the aforementioned period. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction against the defaulting judge. In fact a certificate to this certificate is
required before judges are allowed Lo draw their salaries.
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. At least, it is
not expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the
rule on constructive notice. In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia
was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting
marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground
that his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription. In the order of 1
October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise
denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial. Petitioner challenged the above orders before
the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Petition contends that his liability
has been obliterated by the prescription period.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT The Petitioner is correct in arguing that such should be made
favorable to him as the accused.
RULING: No, The Court held in the negative.
The Court agrees with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply
in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused.
The appellate court succinctly explains that The Court is of the view that the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy
from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order to
conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage. The non-application to the crime of
bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that
penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive
period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be
said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful
as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person.
The court cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the
marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or
for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no
priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would
subject him to punishment under the Marriage Law. Obviously, petitioner had no intention of
revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any
third party would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the
simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set
into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
G.R. Nos. 74226-27 July 27, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs
MIZPAH R. REYES, respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located in Lipa
City registered in their names under TCT No. T-7471. Both are now deceased, the husband
having died on September 6, 1970 and his wife on August 7, 1977. They were survived by the
following children: the accused Mizpah R. Reyes and the complainants Cristina R. Masikat,
Julieta R. Vergara and Aurora Rizare Vda. de Ebueza.
the complainants allegedly discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa
City that the abovementioned property had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah
Reyes, single, of legal age, Filipino and resident of the City of Lipa, Philippines" under TCT No.
T-9885. They further allegedly discovered that the conveyance was effected through a notarized
deed of sale executed and signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents Julio Rizare and Patricia
Pampo. The deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Lipa City on May 26,
1961. Upon examination of the document, they found that the signature of their parents were
allegedly falsified and that accused also made an untruthful statement that she was single
although she was married to one Benjamin Reyes on May 2, 1950. The document was referred
by the complainants to the National Bureau of Investigation (N.B.I.) for examination of the
signatures of their parents and a report was returned with the finding that the signature of Julio
Rizare was genuine but that of Patricia Pampo was forged. Upon complaint by the sisters of the
accused and after conducting an investigation, the fiscal filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas, Branch XIII, Lipa City on October 18, 1984 two (2) informations both for falsification
of public document, the first in Criminal Case No. V-1163, for allegedly making it appear in the
notarized deed of sale that Patricia Pampo, the mother of the accused, participated in the sale of a
parcel of land by falsifying Pampo's signature, and the second in Criminal Case No. V-1164, for
allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed of sale, more specifically, by stating
that accused was single.
 Dismissing petitioner's appeal is the case of Cabral v. Puno, G.R. No. L-41692, April
30, 1976, 70 SCRA 606, where the Supreme Court made a statement to the effect that in the
crime of falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the
offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered
with the Register of Deeds.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT The petitioner is correct in arguing the rule in prescription is not a
doctrine but an obiter dictum.
RULING: No, The Court ruled in the negative.
The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole
world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. It is
evident that there is merit in petitioner's claim that the law on prescription of civil suits is
founded on different policy considerations from that of the law on prescription of criminal
actions. However, the Court does not subscribe to the conclusion that the presumptions and rules
of interpretation used in the law on prescription of civil suits, including the rule on constructive
notice, can not be applied in criminal actions. the application of the rule on constructive notice in
the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the
accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, from the
time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the
notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for
falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten
(10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's order
quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.
Whereby the Court dismissed the Petition.