From Cadiz To La Liga - Spanish Context of Rizals Political Thought - Aseniero PDF

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From Cádiz to La Liga: The Spanish

Context of Rizal’s Political Thought
George ASENIERO
Independent Researcher
Abstract
José Rizal wrote his major works in the 1880s but the prevailing view
in Rizal scholarship today is that philosophically, his worldview was
firmly rooted in the French Enlightenment; how then could the theories
of the preceding century serve him in confronting the issues of the
19th century, so radically different from those that brought an end to
the ancien régime everywhere? Most commentators say his limited
exposure to 19th-century political economy–evidenced by the absence
in his library of the major works of the period, coupled with the
limitations of his class, being of the ilustrado elite and distant from the
toiling masses–prevented him from understanding fully the
contradictions of his time; hence his politics of reformism and his
rejection of revolutionary practice. Taking a contrary stance, this essay
seeks to understand Rizal’s political thought in relation to the great
political struggles of Spain, from the 1812 Cádiz Constitution of the
original ilustrados, through the 1868 Glorious Revolution of the
liberals, down to the aborted Spanish Republic of 1873/74 of the
republicans, foremost of whom was the socialist-republican Francesc
Pi y Margall, Rizal’s intellectual mentor, political ally, and personal
friend. A reading of Rizal’s major essays in the context of Spain’s
constitutional struggles–the politics of transformation versus the
politics of conservatism–and the revolutionary vision of Pi y Margall
reveals the logic of his emancipatory discourse and displays the
groundings of his political economic program of La Liga Filipina firmly
in early 19th-century mutualist traditions of the European Left.
Key words: Rizal, spanish political thought, Cadiz constitution, Pi y

Margall, La Liga Filipina
1 (2013)
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A POST-REVOLUTIONARY PHILIPPINES, having at long last

liberated herself from a Spain oblivious to her demand for reforms, would
most likely choose for its government “a federal republic,” hypothesizes
José Rizal in Filipinas dentro de cien años (The Philippines a Century
Hence), the “freest of governments” (Rizal 1889–1890, 161).1 Years later,
this stated political preference would be cited by American scholars, in
their re-engineering of Rizal to serve the purposes of the new colonial
order, as an endorsement of the American form of government. What
Rizal expressed, however, was a prise de position within a historically
specific ideological conflict. His ideas had nothing to do with the United
States’ federal republic and had everything to do with the political struggles
in Spain in which his struggle for national emancipation was fully
imbricated.
To be precise, República federal (Federal republic) was the goal of
a political movement in the second half of the 19th century that, like all
the other liberal currents in Spain, had its source in the Cádiz Constitution
of 1812. Spearheading the movement of Repúblicanismo federal (Federal
republicanism) through the convulsions of Spanish politics was a man
unequaled in intellectual depth, moral rigor, and revolutionary fervor:
Francesc Pi y Margall. Spain’s outstanding statesman and political
theoretician of his epoch, and one-time head of the Spanish Government,
he was also the political mentor and personal friend of Rizal.
A prolific writer on subjects ranging from art history to finance
economics, Hegelian in philosophy and Proudhonian in political economy,
Pi y Margall (1824 – 1900) was preeminently a constitutionalist. As such,
he waged a lifetime crusade for a fundamental transformation of Spain
through constitutional change, a quest that has been aptly called
constitucionalismo revolucionario (Jutglar 1970; Hennesy 1962; Bernaus
1966). A new design of the system of governance was called for, one that
would make possible revolutionary change in society. He saw Spain’s
constitutional history as the collective effort of each generation to grapple
with the problems of the day, and saw certain inevitability in the process
of change that moved in the direction of freedom. The opening lines of
ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

From Cádiz to La Liga: The Spanish Context of Rizal’s Political Thought 13
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one of his major works, La reacción y la revolución (Reaction and

Revolution), states this Hegelian premise forcefully.
Facts, says a German philosopher, are nothing else but the realization
of ideas, and these in turn are but the evolution of an ever-generating
and eternal Idea, whose development is that of beings in space, of
events in time, of Spirit in the midst of the human species. Man’s
reason, adds the philosopher, can elevate itself to an understanding
of this idea; but only by searching for it through reality, that is to say,
through Nature and History. Allow me then, […] to start with what
has already been realized, the latest developments (Pi y Margall
[1854] 1982, 67).
The latest developments referred to the immediately preceding

revolutionary events in 1854, which landed him a brief stint in jail as an
agitator at the barricades of Madrid; but the relevant historical context for
his discourse on “la revolución forzosa, ineludible y permanente” (Pi y
Margall [1854] 1982; the inexorable, inevitable, and permanent
revolution) is the dialectical process of constitutional change that began in
Cádiz in 1812 and led to subsequent uprisings, which were but ripples
preceding the big wave that would surely come. The conflicts of the day
—of the century—arise from resistance to change by the entrenched order,
he asserts, and peace will come only at the end of struggle. Then shall
Spain redo herself entirely. “Nuestra revolución no es puramente política;
es social” (ibid.; Our revolution is not purely political; it is social).
Spain’s constitutional history is also the relevant context within which
one can more fully comprehend Rizal’s conceptualization of the movement
for national emancipation which he came to lead. A re-reading of his
works in light of Spain’s constitutional conflicts through the century reveals
the Spanish sources of his political ideas, running from the original
ilustrados (literally, the enlightened) of the Spanish Enlightenment who
constituted the Cortes de Cádiz (1808), through the Glorious Revolution
of 1868, to the aborted Republic and socialist-oriented program of Pi y
Margall (1873).
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These stimuli to strategic political thinking initially translated into a

recasting of Rizal’s reading of Philippine history in terms of the long-
established juridical principles and political traditions of Spain that were
the veritable sources of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812. Rizal turned
around the arguments of Spanish colonial masters and took Spain to task
in terms of her own principles and traditions. This critique culminated in
the drafting of the organizational structure and developmental program
of his own La Liga Filipina. It was the means he proposed so that a viable
nation could emerge and take her stand among others, imbued with
selfhood, autonomous, responsive to the needs of her people, and open
to the future. With the sources of Rizal’s political thought thus traced in a
world-historical context, key concepts of La Liga can be more fully
comprehended as pertaining to a tradition within the European Left, an
ideological affinity barely discussed in the corpus of Rizal scholarship.2
The Sour ces of the Constitution of 1

Sources 812
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The world, not least the Spaniards themselves, was incredulous that
a constitution so advanced in her principles, intentions, and substance
could suddenly arise out of an absolutism so pervasive as that of
inquisitorial Spain at the turn of the 19th century. It was dismissed by the
returning monarch Fernando VII from the moment he had no further
political use of it, seeing it as an invention of Jacobinism and entirely
foreign to the Spanish soul; historians since then have tended to take this
view that “La Pepa”—as it was popularly known—was an import, like so
many other modern institutions, from revolutionary France. Others, equally
critical, regarded it as a throwback to medieval times, when royal authority
was held in check by the feudal privileges—the fueros—of the nobles;
this view was held most notably by clerics, who had early on thrown in
their lot with monarchical absolutism.
Karl Marx, like many others, was deeply impressed by the enigma
of the sudden appearance and disappearance of this “curious
phenomenon” under “circumstances … without parallel in history,” and

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gives his view, “The truth is that the Constitution of 1812 is a reproduction
of the ancient fueros, but read in the light of the French Revolution, and
adapted to the wants of modern society.” He concludes that
on a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we arrive at the

conclusion that, so far from being a servile copy of the French
Constitution of 1791, it was a genuine and original offspring of Spanish
intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions,
introducing the measures of reform loudly demanded by the most
celebrated authors and statesmen of the eighteenth century, making
inevitable concessions to popular prejudice (Marx 1854, Chapter VI).
What were those ancient and national institutions that found their
way into the Cortes of Cádiz? Or, to answer in reverse, what were the
sources of the fundamental principles of the Constitution of 1812?
It could not have been stated more forcefully: sovereignty resides in
the nation, not in the King. The King rules as the executive power but this
authority now emanates from the people, not from his person and not by
divine right. To the sovereign people belongs exclusively the right to
establish fundamental laws through the instrumentality of the Cortes, the
assembly of deputies representing the nation, and elected by universal
male suffrage. With legislative power vested in the Cortes and judicial
power in tribunals independent of the king and Cortes, a separation of
powers is effectively established. The King swears to obey the Constitution
and to respect the civil liberty of the nation and the rights of every
individual, and all contrary acts committed by him are null and void. This
limitation of royal power is the most striking feature of the Cádiz
Constitution and carries an ominous sanction: “If this I do [obey the
Constitution], may God reward and protect me; if not, may it be at my
own peril” (Villa 1997; The Political Constitution, Article 173).
Fernando VII found this right of insurrection at the heart of the
Cádiz Constitution particularly repulsive; he saw it as an intrusion into
the divinely ordained Spanish order, one that came from the infernal world
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of the Jacobins who only recently had killed the French king, Fernando’s
cousin. But in truth, this is the same right as the Privilegio de la unión
(privilege of the union) that can be found in the ancient fueros, or privileges,
of Aragon. From their legendary beginnings, the fueros stood for centuries
on the principle of the rule of law and the precedence of the law to the
king; by oath, the king must accept the fueros in order to govern—if not,
not (Giesey 1968). Similar principles of law can be found in the ancient
Constitution of Castile, as well as in the Kingdom of Navarre, where a
judge or select group (Justicia) stood between nobles and king with the
task to watch over the strict observance of the laws by the king. The king’s
oath in the 1812 Constitution stems from this tradition, just as the
Permanent Committee of the Cortes, which was created to watch over the
strict observance of the Constitution during the prorogation of the Cortes,
was a modern version of Justicia. Meanwhile, the State Council, whose
members were chosen from nominees of the Cortes, was a revival of the
privy royal council.
The cortes themselves emerged in the Middle Ages as an eminently
feudal institution, a “corte” being an advisory council made up of the
most powerful nobles closest to the king. Arguably, the Cortes of the
Kingdom of León, dating from 1188, could claim to be the first
parliamentary body in Europe. With the appearance of cities and the
emergence of a merchant class—burguesía, from burgo, city—who made
their fortune there, membership in the Cortes began to include
representatives of the cities as well, who thus formed the third “estate” in
the heretofore exclusive domain of nobles and prelates. The economic
demands of the Reconquista made the financial resources of the cities
indispensable, compelling the king to concede fueros—grants of autonomy
—to the cities, which effectively gave them a measure of veto power over
him (Braudel 1976).
The union of the kingdoms of Aragon, Castile, and Granada under
the Catholic Kings upheld these ancient institutions of fueros and veritably
became a feudal monarchy, resting on the twin pillars of Spanish liberty:
the Cortes at the courtly level and, throughout the Union, the

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ayuntamientos, municipal self-government with corresponding privileges

dating from Roman times.3 It was this feudal monarchy that the grandson
of the Catholic Kings, Carlos I (Emperor Charles V of the Habsburgs),
turned into an absolute monarchy by force of arms to get his way in all
matters of government.
This provoked the Revolt of the Comuneros (1520), which was, at
bottom, the defense of the liberties of medieval Spain against the
encroachments of modern absolutism. The defeat to the first of the
Habsburgs resulted in the loss of influence of the cities as the third estate
in the Cortes; nobles who declined to finance Carlos’ foreign wars also
saw their influence in the Cortes decline. Spain thus fell into the hands of
absolutism, culminating in that most incompetent of monarchs at the time
of Spain’s greatest national ordeal: the occupation of the realm by
Napoleon. The Cortes of Cádiz, and the constitution they crafted, was the
response of Spain’s ilustrados to seize the reins of power in the name of
the nation, for the survival of the nation (Crow 1985, 243). To move
beyond an antiquated, dysfunctional absolutism towards modern
constitutional monarchy, they went back to the ancient roots of the
kingdom.
The Cádiz Constitution declares that the Spanish nation is the
collectivity of all Spaniards of both hemispheres—the Spanish homeland
in Europe and the Spanish dominions overseas. Españoles are all free
men born and settled in the Spanish dominions and as such have the right
to be represented in the Cortes by deputies chosen by their electors. For
all indigenous peoples ultramar (overseas), political rights are guaranteed,
just as they are for Spaniards in Spain. Thus, both Spaniards and indigenous
peoples are transformed from subjects of an absolute monarch to citizens
of a nation founded on the doctrine that sovereignty resides in them and
all state authority emanates from them.
This was a great conceptual leap, not just in the transformation of
subject into citizen (this had been enshrined in the 1789 Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen by the French) but even more so in the
recognition that colonizer and colonized had equal rights guaranteed by
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the Constitution. This reinstates the principle of the equality of the races
which, modern-sounding as it might be, is a juridical doctrine stemming
from natural law; it received classic formulation in the writings of Spanish
jurists of the Renaissance following the navigational discoveries of the
epoch.
Antonio Pigafetta, Magellan’s Italian chronicler, observed at their
various landings around the world that the indigenous islanders they
encountered were uomini di raggione (rational people). This observation
flows in the tradition of the fundamental premise of the School of
Salamanca, Renaissance Spain’s great contribution to the development of
international law, whose founder, the Dominican theologian Franciscus de
Vitoria (1492–1546), exercised considerable influence in his time and
beyond. Vitoria conceived of a “republic of the whole world” (res publica
totius orbis), affirming that mankind all over the world had the same
rational capacity to direct their lives, establish their customs, and organize
their own communities possessed with their own form of rulership.
“Mankind” had just then been discovered to include a whole new world
with cultures and civilizations of great diversity and of shocking dissimilarity
to the old one, and Vitoria had to work out the legal implications of this
discovery.
De Indis Noviter Inventis (1532), his treatise on “the Indians recently
discovered,” resulted in the invention of a radically new system of
international law that sought to apply the same secular principles (jus
gentium, the law of nations) validly across the races of man. Empirically,
the races recently discovered are rational. Axiomatically, all rational beings
possess dominium, the right of ownership of a thing and all the dispositive
rights thereto. And since all dominium comes from God alone, this right
rests on natural law that no pope can apportion to others at will and no
alien secular power can ignore.
Possessed with volition and dominium and engaged in mutual
relations with others, the peoples of the New World are equally bound
and protected by jus gentium. The dissimilar Spanish and Indian cultures

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thus coexist as equals in a common framework—a system of international

law—whose juridical principles and rules of conduct in mutual relations
must be self-evident to one and all. The doctrinal groundwork has been
laid for the ilustrados of Cádiz to declare three centuries later that all free
peoples born and bred in the Spanish dominions have equal rights as
citizens, including, most significantly, the right to make laws in a
representative government.
Elaborating further Vitoria’s doctrines on jus gentium, another
jurist, Francisco Suárez, SJ (1548–1617), expounded in Tractatus de
legibus ac Deo Legislatore (On the Laws and God the Lawgiver) the
issues of sovereignty of nations and the nature of state authority. Human
beings everywhere, being rational and living in organized collectivities
(comunitas), are manifestly endowed with a natural social nature by the
one and only true God, who is supreme over all. This social nature
includes the potential to make laws for themselves. Axiomatically, all
legislative power is derived from God and the authority of every law
resolves itself into His, but the polities of peoples are made by men and
therefore the governing authority thereof is not of divine but of human
origin. People themselves exercise their rights freely and rationally
provide mutual assistance to create their own political community.
Authority comes into being with the creation of the community, but
sovereignty resides in the people who entrust their natural legislative
potential to the ruler. What is freely given with expected outcomes can
be taken back if expectations are betrayed; ergo, the ruled have the
right to disobey and to rebel. In the language of La Pepa, the king who
acts contrary to the Constitution is warned to “be on [his] own peril”
(The Political Constitution, Article 173).4
Where one political community is dominated by another, the same
duty of the ruler to safeguard and promote the rights of the ruled arises.
Supranational unity is the source of jus gentium, which is a positive law,
customary and consensual in nature, acknowledged by reason, and accepted
by all peoples as the basis for their mutual relations. In conferring
citizenship to the indigenous peoples of the overseas dominions, with
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right to representation in the Cortes, the Cádiz Constitution restates the

doctrines of the School of Salamanca as inherent to the fundamental law
of the land.
The Cádiz Constitution decrees that the nation is obliged to protect
the liberty, property, and all other legitimate rights of every individual. The
king’s oath includes swearing to “respect private property and, above all,
the civil liberty of the nation and rights of every individual.” Amongst the
powers and duties of the Cortes are to promote and encourage industry of
all kinds and to remove obstacles which may stand in their way; to establish
a general plan of public education throughout the whole monarchy; to
approve the regulations for the general health; to provide police security of
the kingdom; and to protect the political liberty of the press.
These provisions cover those reform measures systematically
demanded by the ilustrados of the preceding half-century to transform
Spain into a modern, efficient, and enlightened monarchy. The ministers
of Carlos III, the enlightened monarch, had gone far in arguing for organic
changes in civil society; they had written treatises on the need for public
education as the key to national development under the supervision of
the State and in line with la filosofía moderna; and had attacked exclusive,
prohibitive, and privative feudal privileges and seigniorial jurisdictions
which continued to hamper the growth of what they called “the new
economy,” which was based on private enterprise.
They designed and carried out administrative reforms both in the
peninsula and overseas; and, being the master-planners and part of the
royal council, the ministers established, where they could in Spain and
overseas, the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País (Economic Society
of the Friends of the Country) as centers of reflection, social critique, and
scientific research for the development of agriculture, commerce, and
industry. They clashed with the Church on all fronts. The Church owned
16.5% percent of all lands in the peninsula despite just comprising 1.5%
of the population; the nobility, 51.5%. Two-thirds of all Spain was owned
by only 5% of the population (Maurin 1966).

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The most eminent of the ilustrados, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos,

had proposed an agrarian reform programme that would allow the peasant
class access to the extensive aristocratic and ecclesiastical latifundia by lease
or purchase and to produce therein as demanded by the market (Carill
1993, 741–56). Equally revolutionary demands were the call for public
education nationwide under the authority of the Government and not of
the Church, and for the abolition of the Inquisition as a precondition for
the freedom of political expression. The only concession to the Church
—what Marx, in his Revolutionary Spain, meant by “inevitable concessions
to popular prejudice” (Marx 1854, Chapter VI)—was for the Constitution
to declare Catholicism as the only religion of Spain.
Rizal’s R econstru
Reconstru ction of Mor
econstruction ga’s Su
Morga’s cesos de las Islas Filipinas
Sucesos
Rizal took it upon himself to present “to the Filipinos” the past of
“our native land” by “invok[ing] the testimony of an illustrious Spaniard
who governed the destinies of the Philippines in the beginning of her
new era and witnessed the last moments of our ancient nationality” (Rizal
[1890] 2011, x1vii). He values such testimony because “it is the shadow
of the civilization of our ancestors which the author is now evoking before
you” (vii). The author was Antonio de Morga (1559–1636), Lieutenant
Governor-General and Captain General and later oidor or judge of the
Audiencia, the highest appellate court. A decade younger than Suárez, he
too studied canon law and civil law at the University of Salamanca and
could well have had the Jesuit jurist as his teacher. The book is Sucesos de
la Islas Filipinas (Events of the Philippine Islands), Morga’s account of
the Philippines from “their gentility and after the Spaniards had conquered
them” up to his departure for Mexico in 1603.
Addressing his countrymen in the preface, Rizal thought that the
book would be useful first of all “to awaken your consciousness of our
past, already effaced from your memory, and to rectify what has been
falsified and slandered” (x1vii). What he does not say is that in effect these
are two books in one—Morga’s integral text, unassailable in its loyalty to
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Church and Crown, and his own (Rizal’s) copious annotations running as
footnotes throughout the text, commenting, correcting, commending, and
debating points of fact and interpretation. Employing the methods of
German historiography to arrive at the most rigorous scholarship possible
and making full use of the British Museum to cross-reference all other
books he could find on the history of the Islands, he constantly had in
mind his Spanish readers to whom he would turn the annotated book as a
challenge to Spain’s own constitutional history.
Rizal starts off by ridiculing the partition of the world made by
Pope Alexander VI to the Kings of Castile and Portugal via a demarcation
line drawn across the globe. According to this treaty, Filipinas should have
gone to the Portuguese, but thanks to Magellan’s getting it wrong and thus
transferring to Charles V his offer to explore the Moluccas, the islands
didn’t fall into the wrong hands. However, the papal bull itself was wrong
to begin with because it did not recognize the right of primi occupantis.
Having done so could have avoided “fratricidal struggles” (3n7) (“dragging
the islanders along”[3n7]) amongst the early Spanish and Portuguese
explorers as to who owned what. A pointless exercise it has turned out,
since Protestant nations now possess India and the Moluccas in total
disregard of the bull. The School of Salamanca argued that war was justified
if the motive was for the good of the natives, for the historical realization
of their ontological potential, or for turning them into Christians. Rizal
affirms flatly that in all the Spanish incursions into neighboring countries
out of Manila, at great cost of lives and resources, the motivation was
greed and the ambition to dominate (3n7)—and nothing at all to do with
the spread of Christianity (75n54).5
Morga recounts the history of colonization begun by Miguel López
de Legazpi and the first settlement on Cebu where he “established the
City of the Most Holy Name of Jesus” (12). Rizal adds that Legazpi
“founded it with all the rights and privileges of the Spanish cities and
political communities” (12n23). The factual premise is laid for the extension
of the privilegio de la unión to the settlements established in the Philippine
archipelago. Then comes Morga on the city of Manila.

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Many changes and novel things have been the result of the arrival of
the Spaniards in these Islands, and their pacification and conversion
of the people and the change in the system of their Government, as
well as what His Majesty has accomplished for their welfare, since the
year fifteen hundred and sixty-four, as usually happens in kingdoms
and provinces which are made to change their law and rulers. And the
first thing that happened to them was that, besides acquiring the
name of Philippine Islands which they received from the first day of
their conquest, the entire Islands now constitute a new kingdom and
domain, which our master, His Majesty Philip II has named the Kingdom
of New Castile of which, in view of her Royal privileges, the City of
Manila was made its capital (296-297).
The text has deep resonance in Spanish medieval history. The

emergence of España as a unified kingdom came as a matter of adhesion
and accretion, as over the centuries, the Reconquista freed one part of the
peninsula after another and Moorish Spain steadily shrank as Christian
Spain correspondingly grew. Having existed separately, these had been
kingdoms unto themselves, and their eventual union under the Catholic
Kings preserved their traditional privileges. The Reconquista expanded
into la Conquista in the Americas, and the nations that were subjugated
there became new kingdoms in turn: Nueva España, Nueva Granada, and
now, in Asia, as Rizal highlights, el Reyno de Nueva Castilla (The Kingdom
of New Castille).
What were these collectivities before? Morga writes that
[t]hroughout these islands, there were neither kings nor lords to rule
them in the same manner as in kingdoms and provinces elsewhere.
Instead, in every island and province many principales were known
among the natives, some being more important and outstanding than
others, each having their own followers and henchmen, forming barrios
and families who obeyed and respected them. Those principal men
used to have friendship and relationship with each other, and
sometimes even wars and differences with each other (274–275).
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Morga describes the principalia as based on succession and kinship,

with the leaders duty-bound to govern and rule their subjects, and attend
to their problems and needs; in exchange, the subjects would render them
respect and esteem, and give their support in wars, expeditions, and all
other laboring activities needed to sustain collective existence. These recall
the premises of Vitoria and Suárez regarding the consistency of such political
communities with the precepts of natural law. Morga observes the customs,
religious beliefs, routines of daily life, social relations, sexual mores, cultural
expressions, etc. as an anthropologist today would, or as a jurist from the
School of Salamanca then would, upholding thereby the applicability of
its doctrines to the Islanders and the consistency with jus gentium of their
mutual relations with other communities.
Morga notes that in war and in other matters, any principal who
stood out above others acquired more privileges and a greater following,
“and he governed other people, even principales themselves, while
retaining for himself his own authority over his particular Barangai or
clan” (276). Rizal Europeanizes the interrelationships to lay down another
premise for an argument building up: “They for med a kind of
confederation, like the states of the Middle Ages, with their barons, counts,
dukes who elected the bravest to lead them or they accepted the authority
of the most important of them” (276n104). Morga elaborates on these
mutual relations.
Their laws throughout the Islands were along similar lines following
the tradition and customs of their ancients in accordance with the
unwritten statutes. In some provinces, there were different customs in
certain things, although generally speaking, they had uniform usages
and procedure through the Islands (278).
Rizal agrees and, after commenting that custom as unwritten law

may in fact be more effective than written law for being internalized and
stable, suggests further that

15
this agreement of the laws at bottom and this general uniformity

prove that the relations of the islands among themselves were very
strong and the bonds of friendship were more common than wars
and differences. Perhaps a confederation existed, for we know through
the first Spaniards that the ruler of Manila was a generalissimo of the
Sultan of Borneo. Moreover there exist other documents of the XII
century that attest this (278n111).
What is his point? Bearing in mind the legal and traditional sources
of the Cádiz Constitution, Rizal builds his case that this was the jus gentium
sustained in practice by these pre-Hispanic communities amongst
themselves and also with their foreign trading partners. Whilst Legazpi
and his successors might think that they were extending Spain’s legal
principles to govern the new relations established by them with the
indigenous inhabitants of the Archipelago, the latter could equally
understand this development as the extension of their jus gentium to the
foreigners.
At the heart of the matter is the pact. The communities entered into
mutual relations with each other with clear expectations of mutual rights
and obligations to be respected and preserved; even if they were to elect
the strongest to rule over them all, it was still an agreement of one and all.
If relations of friendship, symbolized by the traditional blood compacts
between chiefs, carried with them a host of expectations of mutual benefits
for their respective communities, so did those entered into by a local chief
and a foreign captain. This was the famous accord between Legazpi and
Sikatuna of Bohol, an agreement formalized precisely by the ritual of a
blood compact. Morga notes that in the customary contracts of the natives,
each party has to look out for himself that the terms are complied with by
the other party; Rizal comments, “So are the contracts of all nations and
of all people, and so also is and was the spirit of the contracts of the first
Spaniards with the Filipino chiefs and God grant they might have always
adhered to the letter of those contracts!” (286n134).
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16 G. ASENIERO
Morga describes the hierarchical structure of the “commonwealth”

as consisting of three social stations: principales, timawas or freemen/
plebeians, and slaves (278). Rizal remarks that this structure is the same as
can be found in all kingdoms and republics: the ruling class (the head), the
productive class (the social body), and at bottom the servant class (whether
slaves or not, but workers all the same). He takes it that these class divisions,
exploitative as any other vertically structured collectivity, have their
consequent class antagonisms, and speculates that because of these social
differences, it had been relatively easy for Spaniards to colonize the
archipelago. Colonization was done primarily not because of conquest, but
more generally because of a people’s pervasive sense of dissatisfaction with
their abusive ruling classes and a consequent unwillingness to defend them.
Thanks to [the Filipinos’] social condition and to their number at that

time, Spanish rule encountered little resistance and the Filipino chiefs
easily lost their independence and liberty. The people, accustomed
to bondage, would not defend them against the invader nor would
they fight; for the people it was just a change of masters. The nobles,
accustomed to tyrannize by force, had to accept foreign tyranny when
they found it to be stronger than theirs, and not finding either love or
lofty sentiments among the enslaved masses, found themselves
without arms and without strength (280n118).6
The pressing reality of the “social condition” of the Filipinos of

that time should not be any less grievous than the “social question” that
class-conscious intellectuals in Rizal’s time grappled with (in addition to
the “political question” which referred primarily to the form of
government). That all class societies are beleaguered by contradictory class
interests is axiomatic to socialism in its broadest acceptation, and as we
shall see later in the discussion on Pi y Margall’s influence on Rizal, both
men saw clearly that la cuestión social (the social issue) was inseparable
from la cuestión política (the political issue). In Morga, Rizal theorizes
that rule by the elite is tyrannical in nature, and speculates that with the
arrival of superior foreign forces, the people (the masses) made their choice

17
logically enough. Defend the abusive ruling class whose interest is to

perpetuate class exploitation? Why not try out the new masters instead?
(Ibid. and Rizal 1889–1890, 137).
The “new masters” that held the hopes high for the Filipinos were
personalized in Miguel López de Legazpi, a man of honour and true
leadership, and especially his grandson, Juan de Salcedo, “who, through
his astuteness, excellent qualities, talents, and personal valor won the
sympathy of the Filipinos. He […] inclined them to peace and amity
with the Spaniards. […] (Rizal [1890] 2011, 12n24). “[H]e is the only
one we know who made the Indios of his encomienda of Bigan the
heirs of the greater part of his estate” (Ibid.). Exemplars like this held
great promise. The old political order, proven unsatisfactory, gave way
to the new. With this basic narrative structure, Rizal began Filipinas dentro
de cien años.
The ancient lords, who had sought only to conquer for themselves the
fear and submission of their subjects, whom they inured to servitude,
fell like leaves from a dried-up tree, and the people, who had no love
for them nor knowledge of what liberty was, easily changed masters,
hoping perhaps to gain something from the new. Then began a new
era for the Filipinos (Rizal 1889–1890, 137).
This accord was not to last for long. Colonialism revealed itself to
be utterly other. Upon Legazpi’s death, “the Malay Filipinos began little
by little to get undeceived and finding the yoke heavy, tried in vain to
shake it off ” (139). If they had willingly submitted themselves to Spanish
rule, they could just as well withdraw from the union now. But this was
no longer possible for the people, who were “disillusioned by force of
sad experience,” and who “saw everywhere discord and disorder, apathy
and brutalization in the lower classes, discouragement and disunion in
the upper” (139). The new order destroyed the old. Three centuries
passed, “the neck had grown used to the yoke, and each new generation,
begotten in chains, adapted itself further each time to the new order of
things”(139).
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18 G. ASENIERO
The new order of things is colonial domination, unmitigated though

dissimulated. Having given up their freedom, Filipinos have been led to
believe ever since that they should be forever grateful for the two great
gifts of religion and traditions that lock them in humble devotion and
proud fealty to Mother Spain. By Rizal’s time, when demands for reform
were continuously building up, this had become the dominant discourse:
be grateful for what had been generously given to you and do not demand
reforms. La Voz de España (The Voice of Spain), a Manila newspaper,
argues that the only ties that bind the Islands to the Peninsula are religion
and tradition; and that no common administration system, no economic
progress, no juridical reforms, not even the diffusion of the Spanish
language, even less the power of arms, can make these spiritual bonds
stronger than they already are (Ibid., 87–88). In short, stop asking for
reforms; they will just disrupt the union.
In an explosive essay, Como se engaña a la patria (How the
Fatherland is Deceived), Rizal turns the tables around and reminds one
and all of the fundamental premise of that relationship.
[D]ecir que “los únicos vínculos propiamente sociales que unen a

Filipinas con la Península son la religión católica y los respetos
tradicionales,” es ofender al acendrado patriotismo y la lealtad de
los filipinos, que desde Legazpi se han unido con España, no por
razones de religión ni de tradicionalismo, sino, al principio, por las
de la alta conveniencia política, y después, por amor, por cariño a la
madre pátria (Rizal 1889, 88; [t]o say that the only proper social ties
that unite the Philippines with the Peninsula are the Catholic faith and
traditional considerations is to offend the pure patriotism and loyalty
of the Filipinos, who, since Legazpi, have united themselves with Spain,
not for religious reasons or tradition, but from the beginning for a
political accord of the highest import, and only then for love, for
affection for the Mother Country; italics mine).
The Filipinos since Legazpi’s time have united themselves with Spain
not for religious reasons nor for tradition, but for a political accord of the

19
highest import, the free meeting of the minds on a mutually beneficial

political order. The time has come for a fundamental redefinition of the
relationship, and this demand shall be made on the basis of rights and
contractual obligations which tie Spain to the Philippines: Spain must
answer to herself.
If not, not. If this is the essence of rule by consent, as enshrined in
Spain’s constitutional theory, if this is the very same principle which ties
Spain and Filipinas to each other, and if after three centuries this is no
longer so, then the Filipinos have the right to separate from Spain, by
arms if necessary. The thrust of Rizal’s argument fell on deaf ears in Spain,
but reverberated in the Philippines. This line of thought, asserts Cesar
Adib Majul, was absorbed by the Katipunan as the rationale for revolution.
“It was a daring step for the Katipunan to take when it resorted to force in
order to recapture those rights believed to have been granted by Nature
— when all other means were believed to have been futile. The Katipunan
in maintaining that Spanish rule in the Philippines was historically based
on an original ‘Blood Compact,’ presented a technique utilized for justifying
a revolt against Spain. The justification was that not only did the Spanish
government not fulfill the terms of the compact but actually violated it by
its tyranny” (Majul 1967, 192).
Spain in Rizal’s Time: The Perspectivee of Pi y Mar

Perspectiv
erspectiv gall
Margall
It was a constitutional monarchy that governed Spain when the 21-
year-old student Rizal arrived there in 1882. Seven decades had passed
since Cádiz 1812, a convoluted period which saw Spain move from one
constitutional dispensation to another. There also was one military uprising
after another, and the country alternated between liberal-moderate and
clerico-monarchical absolutist alliances before experiencing an indecisive
Carlist War for monarchical succession. There had been the Glorious
Revolution of 1868—the most important of nineteenth-century
revolutions (Carr 1980, 1)—that ousted the monarch, reinstituted the
constitutional principles of Cádiz and, like the 1968 global upheaval with
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20 G. ASENIERO
Paris as its epicenter, reverberated across the world with the exhilaration
that freedom was possible now. A non-Spanish monarch had been found
to rule by the Constitution but he gave up soon enough, finding the
Kingdom “ungovernable.”
Thus was a republic suddenly thrust onto stage, faute de mieux,
besieged in conflict from all sides from start to finish, and it was finished
before it could get started by yet another military pronunciamiento.
Constitutional monarchy in the person of the dethroned Queen’s son was
reinstalled by La Restauración, with a two-party system that took turns in
government via parliamentary elections, with the party leaders—Antonio
Cánovas del Castillo (1828–1897) and Práxedes Mateo Sagasta (1827–
1903)—oscillating in office as head of state. Into this political system
stepped the Filipino ilustrados, with their demands for reform, starting
with representation in the Cortes, which had been granted as a matter of
political right to Filipinos under the Constitution of 1812. It was granted
twice but definitively abrogated in 1837.
Within a few months of his arrival in Spain, Rizal met Pi y Margall.
Thirty-seven years older, the Catalan statesman had been out of
government since 1874 when he resigned from the impossible position of
President of the Republic of Spain amidst the total chaos. This experience
of heading government and his analysis of the political failure resulted in
La república de 1873 (The 1873 Republic). This was followed by Las
nacionalidades (The Nationalities) in 1876, where the influence of the
German philosophers Hegel and Herder on Margall’s concept of the nation
is most apparent. The book also drew on Proudhon’s ideas on federalism.
Later on, Pi y Margall also wrote Las luchas de nuestros días (The Struggles
of our Times), a sustained discourse on philosophical matters of enduring
significance, which would be enthusiastically reviewed by Rizal in La
Solidaridad in 1890.
Years later in exile in Dapitan, Rizal revealed to the Spanish
commandant there that he learned a whole lot about what was happening
in the Philippines from Pi y Margall from their earliest meetings onwards

31
(Rizal in Retana 1907).7 With greater reason, it can be supposed that the
student also learned about Spanish political history and contemporary
developments from the veteran, whose home in Madrid he frequented. It
would therefore be quite significantly from Pi y Margall’s influential
perspective of Spanish politics that Rizal would plot his own course of
action for the emancipation of his people.
As statesman, political theoretician, and founder of the Republican
Federal Party, Pi y Margall consistently identified himself as all at once a
liberal, socialist, and anarchist. All these ideological positions belong to
the family of Liberalism, says Pi y Margall. Liberalism is the progenitor
of socialism and anarchism, its logical extensions.
“Como idea ¿qué hombre de espiritu recto y libre de preocupaciones
puede rechazar el anarquismo? Sin quererlo ni advertirlo, vamos los
liberales realizándolo (Pi y Margall quoted in Trias Vejerano 2001, 1; as
an idea, what right-thinking man who is free from fear can reject anarchism?
Without wanting or taking notice of it, we liberals are on our way to
achieving it). Anarchism awaits at the end of the liberal historical trajectory,
whether liberals want it or not. Thus he could affirm, “Yo soy anarquista,
sábelo, hace muy cerca de medio siglo” (Pi y Margall, 1982, 270–271; I
have been anarchist, let it be known, for nearly half a century now). That
is, from the time he joined the liberals in the barricades of 1854 and
wrote La reacción y la revolución, where he asserts, “El trabajo y el capital
están ya en abierta y decidida lucha” (Pi y Margall 1982, 270–271; Labor
and Capital are now in open and decisive conflict).
Equating liberalism with “democracy,” he asserts the same
relationship with socialism.
“La democracia fue la generadora del socialismo, y se comprende
fácilmente la causa. Proclamada la emancipación política de las últimas
clases del pueblo, no podía menos de surgir la idea de su emancipación
social... Salió el socialismo de la democracia, como la consecuencia de su
premisa....” (Pi y Margall 1864, quoted in Trias Vejerano 2001, 96;
Democracy was the progenitor of socialism, and one easily understands
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32 G. ASENIERO
why. Once the political emancipation of the last of the popular classes has
been proclaimed, the idea of their social emancipation cannot but follow
suit…..Socialism emerges from democracy as the consequence of its
premise). In the beginning is liberalism.
As the political expression of modernity, liberalism has its intellectual
origins in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The word itself,
however, came a bit later; it was in the political clashes in the Cortes de
Cádiz that the Spanish word “liberal” was first coined. One was liberal in
contrast to being conservador. It was a prise de position on the acceptability
of political change. Those who benefited from the ancien régime—the
nobility and the clergy, both estates in support of monarchic absolutism
—did all they could to prevent change, while the rising class, the
bourgeoisie, did all they could to bring it about. It was understood by all
that only through a change in government was any change possible at all.
Immanuel Wallerstein sums up liberalism as an advocacy of two new
worldviews: that political change was normal and not exceptional and
that sovereignty resided in the “people” and not in a sovereign (Wallerstein
1994, 5).
This was exactly what the Constitution of 1812 declared, which
drastically cut royal power and, appropriating law-making power for the
representatives of the people endowed with civil liberties, was determined
to bring about change. The return of Fernando VII to absolute power, as
with the restoration of all the other anciens régimes elsewhere in Europe
following Napoleon’s defeat, could not push back the wave of liberalism
in Spain any more than the Restoration could in France and elsewhere;
nor could any power prevent it from spreading to the colonies. As it
triumphed after setbacks in one country after another through the rest of
the century, Liberalism became the legitimating geoculture (Wallerstein
1994, 5) of a historical system that was all along sustained and promoted
in its worldwide development by this Weltanschauung, capitalism. The
political struggles that ensued in so many arenas resulted, in Eric
Hobsbawm’s pithy encapsulation, “in the triumph of bourgeois-liberal
capitalism” by the time that “long century” came to an end in 1914
(Hobsbawm 1987, 8–9).

33
The strategic goal of Pi y Margall’s political struggles was for Spain

to adopt a federal republican form of government, in contrast to the
constitutional monarchy that was the intention of the Cádiz Constitution.
This was also in contrast to a unitary republican form which would have
simply replicated the highly centralized bureaucratic structure imposed by
the Bourbons across diverse regions. Federalism, argued Pi y Margall,
offered the best guarantees for the effective autonomy of each of the
regions – “nations” – comprising Spain, and provided the workable
mechanisms to empower all social groups by assuring them of some control
of local politics (Pi y Margall [1877] 2009; Berlanga 2004).
Only through a federal republic could Spain address the most urgent
matters facing her: the political question (autonomy for the nations/regions
in a multi-national framework of government, decentralization of the
ineffective administrative structure), the colonial question (national
autonomy within a Spanish republican federal framework, or nationalist
separatism; Cuba had just broken into open rebellion against the
metropolis and demands for reform were beginning to be heard in Puerto
Rico and in distant Philippines), and the social question (land reform,
amelioration of the living conditions of the working classes, regulation of
capital-labour relations, etc.) (ibid.).
In September 1868, a military coup dethroned Isabel II and a
Constituent Cortes was elected to draft a new constitution. Pi y Margall
returned from self-exile in Paris, was elected diputado, and as such sat as
one of the framers of the 1869 Constitution. It appeared to be a worthy
successor to La Pepa as the framework for a constitutional monarchy (which
Pi y Margall naturally opposed, but he was on the losing side in the voting),
with representation in the Cortes based on universal male suffrage. It was
the first secular constitution of Spain, effecting the separation of Church
and State. But it did not recognize the rights to parliamentary representation
of the Empire’s last three remaining colonies, leaving them instead under
Leyes de Indias (Laws of the Indies), akin to martial law, which was declared
in 1837. All the same, the Revolution of 1868, a triumph of liberalism by
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34 G. ASENIERO
any measure, set into motion a revolution of rising expectations in these

far-flung islands.8
In Spain, chaos ensued. The Constitution required a king, and they
found one, but the unresolved political conflicts of the century came to a
head and the national economy went into a spin-dive. In 1873, two years
into his throne, Amadeo I abdicated in despair, elections were quickly
held, and with huge abstentions by the conservative parties who were in
total disarray, the Republicans found themselves in power—but without
power. It was their turn to find out, like the hapless monarch before them,
that Spain was indeed a country impossible to govern. The most prominent
republicans took quick turns at being president, Pi y Margall being the
second.
He presented to the Cortes a resolutely transformative program
never seen before. The aims included putting into effect the separation of
Church and State, enactment of laws to bolster regional autonomy in the
Peninsula and ultramar, reorganization of the military; establishment of
mixed commissions of capital and labor to regulate working conditions
and fix the minimum wage, support for the enhancement of labor and
capital relations by institutionalizing circuits of negotiation, reduction of
the working day to nine hours; regulation of child labor, sale through
agrarian reform of uncultivated latifundia and State lands to peasant
communities, the promotion of free and obligatory public education, etc.
(Trias Vejerano 2001, 116).
The pronounced socialist orientation in this political programme
was the singular influence of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1803–1865). In
the context of the evolving history of socialism,9 it was pre-1848 socialism,
dominated by the French and with Proudhon as the dominant theoretician,
which Pi y Margall imbibed in Paris. He found in Proudhon’s socio-
economic analysis a powerful key to understanding the economic and
political realities of Spain. Capitalism in Spain, he had noted earlier in
La reacción y la revolución, was weak and highly localized in a few areas,
and he thought the social question was less grave in “backward” Spain

25
with her slow-paced industrialization than in the advanced economies of

France and England, “….gracias a nuestro mismo atrazo y a lo poco
extendido que está la industria manufacturera” (Pi y Margall 1968, 272;
thanks to our own backwardness and to the limited growth of our
manufacturing industry).
Pi y Margall also translated Proudhon’s Du principe fédératif into
Spanish and found in it a systematically worked-out material basis for his
own theory of federalism. More than just a particular structure of
government, federalism for Proudhon has its organic place within civil
society , a system of autonomous local communities and industrial
associations which relate to each other by contract and mutuality of interest
rather than by laws. In cases of conflict, it takes recourse to arbitration
rather than courts of justice. Administration is carried out by workers’
management rather than by bureaucracy. The network that emerges from
these social building blocks will constitute a natural social unity where
government will function organically, not as an authority based on coercion
in the Hobbesian sense (of having monopoly of violence) but as an
authority based on cooperation. Authority itself, decentralized in mutually
bound (voluntarily federated) communes (towns, provinces, regions) and
industrial associations (factories, workshops, cooperatives) making
autonomous decisions at their respective levels, will eventually dissolve.
Authority was rendered unnecessary in the widening recognition of mutual
interests of these diverse and pluralistic social units. In a federalist system
of government, the State gradually gives way to—dissolves itself in—civil
society (Proudhon 1868; Caglao 2008).
If federalism is Proudhon’s answer to the political question (what
form of government?), his answer to the social one is “mutualist socialism.”
Solution du problème social (also translated by Pi y Margall) explains the
concept: this is a programme of mutual financial cooperation amongst
workers aimed at returning the control of the productive process back to
themselves. This is to be accomplished by ensuring possession of their
own means of production, assisted by reforms of credit and exchange.
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36 G. ASENIERO
“Organization of credit” is vital, Proudhon argues; exploitation would be

abolished if associated groups of workers could produce and exchange
under conditions of interest-free loans.
Equally crucial is “possession”—the right of a worker or group of
workers to control the land or workshop or tools of their trade necessary
for production—as the guarantee of freedom. Property as possession of
the means of livelihood means freedom; but, in the hands of the landlord
or capitalist who thereby exploits the labour of farmhands and workers
bereft of their means of production, “property is theft.” Mutualist socialism
envisions an egalitarian society of independent peasants and artisans, with
factories and utilities run by workers’ associations, which are in turn
supported by a system of mutual credit founded on people’s banks. Only
federalism as the form of government can make this socio-economic
programme possible; hence, the political question and the social question
are necessarily one and the same; to settle the political at the sacrifice of
the social was unacceptable (Proudhon 1868).
Proudhon had another name for “mutualist socialism.” He called it
“anarchism,” and declared himself an anarchist, giving it a new meaning:
one who seeks social order without authoritarian government. “As man
seeks justice in equality, so society seeks order in anarchy.” With the eventual
dissolution of authority a natural social order emerges. “Anarchy – the
absence of a master, of a sovereign – such is the form of government to
which we are everyday approximating” (Proudhon 1840).
In Idée générale de la révolution au XIXe siècle (The General Idea
of Revolution in the 19 th Century), Proudhon situates his concepts of
federalism and mutualist socialism within the historical trends of his epoch.
He sees in actual developments the inevitable historical progression toward
greater liberty and equality, a process he calls “revolution.” This is also
the permanent revolution that Pi y Margall sees for Spain with his
constitucionalismo revolucionario.
What would have been a real transformative revolution in 1873
ended in chaos instead. The unresolved problems broke out in open

27
conflict; Carlists joined forces with Basque separatists in the north; peasants
wrought destruction in the south; workers went on a general strike that brought
the economy to a halt; and cantons, declaring themselves autonomous, went
into an uprising that swept across the peninsula. Pi y Margall was paralyzed,
his socialist program in shambles. Rather than order, as President, the military
onslaught against the cantonalist rebels, he resigned.
Looking back years later, and one can imagine the young Rizal
intently listening to the elderly statesman who had taken him in, Pi y
Margall saw how hopeless it was from the start, because in truth there was
no start, “una república que nace muerta” (a republic that was born dead),
i.e., stillborn.
Rizal’s La Liga Filipina

It took almost a decade for Pi y Margall to reorganize his Partido
repúblicano federal pactista and have his political programme and draft
of a new federal constitution approved by the party congress. Never
promulgated because the party never had a chance at government, this
draft of the Spanish Constitution of 1883 manifests his unique theory of
a federal republic; a comparison with the Federal Constitution of 1873
shows the differentia specifica.
The Federal Constitution of 1873, also unpromulgated because it
was undone by the coup d’état before it could be acted upon, begins by
listing the sixteen states (estados ) that comprise the Spanish Nation,
including Cuba and Puerto Rico. Filipinas falls under Article 2 —“territories
which as they progress may be elevated to States by public authorities”—
together with Fernando Poo, Annobón, Corisco, and colonies in Africa.
By contrast, Pi y Margall’s constitution of 1883 starts not by defining
Spain as a listing of geographical entities comprising the nation nor by
affirming the union of “dominions of both hemispheres” as in the Cádiz
Constitution, but by recognizing the volition of regions to come together
of their own accord to compose the Spanish Federation and to work
together to achieve their common objectives. Article 1 declares that
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38 G. ASENIERO
La Federación española, constituida por las expresadas regiones,

tiene por objeto: asegurar la democracia y la República en todo el
territorio federal, mantenerlo íntegro e independiente, defenderlo
contra todo ataque exterior, sostener en él la tranquilidad y el orden
interiores y aumentar su propio bienestar y su progreso (Constitución
Española de 1883; The Spanish Federation, constituted by the
manifesting regions, has as objectives: to ensure democracy and the
Republic in the entire federal territory, to keep it one and independent,
to defend it against all external attack, to safeguard internal peace
and order, and promote its own well-being and progress).
In Pi y Margall’s theory of federalism, “expresadas regiones” refers

to regions which have duly promulgated their respective Constitutions as
a precondition for the union and have now formally expressed their will
to join the Federation. They are not geographical parts of a broader entity
nor administrative divisions of a bureaucracy, but are veritable nations
entire unto themselves, with their traditions, customs and practices, their
socio-economic structures, and natural endowments; with their specific
culture and history; and now with the intention (expresión) to unite with
others to work for common goals.
It is therefore perfectly consistent for Pi y Margall to support the
autonomy of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines for their full entry
into the Federal Republic if they so desire, or to support their drive for
independence if that is the will of their people. In the end, Pi y Margall
was alone amidst Spanish politicians in supporting the independence of
the last remaining colonies (and, as a logical consequence of his position,
in opposing the Spanish-American War).
Rizal was already in Madrid and had come to know Pi y Margall
personally when the Catalan was writing up the 1883 Constitution. No
doubt Rizal was aware of this constitution and understood fully its
philosophy. What would have been clear to him is that, whether or not the
Philippines was going to be an autonomous member in the Federation, it
must be a nation first. Put in the reverse order, the Philippines, having

39
become a nation, will decide for herself if she wants to join the Spanish
Federation as an autonomous region thereof, or alternatively, to become
an independent sovereign state. Another option was to be an autonomous
region now within the Federation and then separate as an independent
state later. Each of these options had several good rationales and required
specific political conditions, but however which way, it was her (the
Philippines’) decision, and hers alone, to make. This choice would have
been possible under the 1883 Constitution of Pi y Margall.
But Pi y Margall’s constitution was a vision, a hope for the future,
perhaps even a chimera in the end; the stark reality of the present was the
dominating force of the Constitution of 1876. Making a categorical
distinction between el territorio español (i.e., the Iberian Peninsula) and
las provincias de ultramar (overseas provinces), this law declares that
Spaniards are persons born in territorio español and the child(ren) of a
Spanish parent even if born outside Spain. It is only in Article 89 of Del
gobierno de las provincias de ultramar (On the Governing of Overseas
Provinces) that the declaration is made that the overseas provinces of Cuba
and Puerto Rico shall be represented in the Cortes as shall be determined
by a special law. No mention is made of Filipinas.
It was in this juridical framework that the Filipino ilustrados waged
their propaganda movement in Spain to gain parliamentary representation
for their country and to work for the much-needed reforms. Their hope
was to win the support of a sufficient number of diputados to sponsor bills
in the Cortes for these ends. Of the two parties that alternated in power, it
was Sagasta’s Liberals that would raise the hopes of Filipinos up some
notches, but when it was the turn at the next election for Cánovas del
Castillo’s Conservatives, those hopes would be dashed again. And so it
went on and on, hope and desperation taking turns in sync with the turno
of politics in the Restauración.10
Rizal posed the Filipinos’ demands to Spain as a constitutional—
contractual—matter: does she recognize Filipinas as a province to be
represented in the Cortes, an integral part of Spain, with all the civil rights
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accorded to the Filipino people, as she had done before with the
Constitution of Cádiz? By Spain’s own constitutional traditions since 1812
and centuries earlier, the Filipinos now pressed their demands as a matter
of right. Spain’s nonperformance of contractual obligations brought about
the colony’s decline in the following three centuries. Now she must repair
the damage and grant all the reforms that the people are clamoring for.
This was the powerful message of Filipinas dentro de cien años: Spain has
to answer to that obligation. And she must live up to her answer.
Recall Rizal’s summation to Carnicero of what their goals were:
grant representation in the Cortes to the country; secularize the friars, thus
removing their influence over government and country; reform the
Administration in all its branches; promote primary education freed from
all intervention by the friars; share in halves the country’s governmental
posts between peninsulares and insulares; clean up the Administration;
and create schools of arts and trades in all provincial capitals with more
than 16,000 people (Retana 1907, 274). These reforms were perfectly
consistent with the principles and goals of Spain’s noblest statesmen from
the ilustrados of the Enlightenment to the federalistas of the day.
But those who held the reins of power in Madrid and in Manila
were not of this persuasion, so the reformists, after years of hard work and
sacrifice, were going nowhere. Listen to two voices of frustration in their
letters to Rizal three years apart. In his letter to Rizal, from Madrid on 16
March 1887, Lopez-Jaena writes that
the reason why the government does not want us to have

representation in the Cortes is that the friars have intimidated it. In
proof of that, Sagasta, Balaguer and Moret have called diputado la
Guardia, who has initiated it, telling him that they would expel him
from the majority if he continued supporting the three bills he has
introduced in the Cortes in favor of the Philippines. Sagasta threatened
Cañamaque also of expulsion if he carried out his plan to interpellate
on Mindanao. The government has begged and requested [Cuban
diputado] Labra to desist from interpellating on the general policy
on the Philippines.

41
Meanwhile, José Basa in his letter to Rizal from Hongkong on 4

August 1890, writes that with the new ministry in Spain we have gone
fifteen years backward.
Then Rizal himself says, in his letter to Marcelo del Pilar from
Brussels on 4 April 1890, that
I am assiduously studying what’s happening in the country. I believe

that nothing can redeem us except our brains: materialiter vel idealiter
sumptum. […] Representation will bind the Philippines [to Spain] for
a long time. If our compatriots are of a different mind, we should
decline representation, but as we are now, with the indifference of
our fellow countrymen, it is good enough. At least it’s better to have
the feet tied than the elbows. What can we do?
But then, he wrote to Mariano Ponce from Brussels on 18 July 1890,

saying that
I want to return to the Philippines and though this might be rashness

or imprudence, what does it matter? The Filipinos are all too prudent
and that is why our country is thus, and it seems to me that we are not
getting along well on the path of prudence. I am going to look for
another.
People were eager to listen to the famous novelist upon his return
to Manila in 1892 on what they could all do under his leadership. Rizal
came with his Estatuto de la Liga Filipina. We have no record of what he
said at those gatherings—though always well-attended, we are told—where
he presented his proposal for an organization, so all we have is the
publication itself.
The manuscript stands alone; no explanation, theoretical or practical,
accompanies the text, no scholarly footnotes, no subsequent essay written.
The text must speak for itself.
One is immediately struck by the language. It is austere, even severe,
devoid of exhortations of any kind, so unlike Rizal. Solemn and grave, as
Volume 49:1 (2013)

32
42 G. ASENIERO
organizational statutes generally are, it is bereft of those powerful emotive

words that Rizal deploys so effectively in his writings. Pátria (country;
father land) is mentioned only once—not as that sacred home that stirs the
passion of everyone—but simply a concern to be borne in mind, along
with one’s family and loved ones, by all members of the Liga, who are
entreated to sacrifice personal interest in total obedience to the mandates
of their superiors. “Filipinas” appears only in the name of the organization
itself and disappears in the text as simply “Archipielago.” “Pueblo”—
never absent in all of Rizal’s writings—is this time nowhere; everywhere it
is just afiliados (members, literally, affiliated) and no credentials are asked
of them other than they be morally upright. There is also no mention of
“government,” except in relation to a stern stipulation that no dispute
between members should ever be taken to judicial or governmental
authorities, under pain of severe punishment. “España,” in whatever role,
as metropolis or colonizer, never mind as “mother-country,” is not to be
found. Colonialism is not once mentioned. “State” is absent tout court.
La Liga Filipina is all about Civil Society.
As statutes of an association, shorn of any historic particularity, this
document could well have been written by another person, from another
country, of another epoch. Consider France, 1840s, Proudhon. It will be
seen that La Liga is at bottom a mutualist association; its goal: to create a
compact, vigorous and homogeneous Civil Society.
The basic unit, the building block out of which Civil Society is to
be constructed, is the people’s council (consejo popular) to be established
at the local level all over the country. The councils are to be as numerous
as possible and must regenerate themselves continuously. Most of all, they
are all integrated within a pyramidal structure of councils from the ground
level of consejo popular (popular council) through the consejo provincial
(provincial council) up to the consejo supremo (supreme council), which
is the highest level and situated at the capital of the Archipelago. Each
council functions as a mutualist association where the members (afiliados)
relate to each other in mutually beneficial ways which are well spelt out in
the Statutes. The nature of these interrelationships both within and outside

33
a particular council and the Liga as a whole is summed up in the last

article of the Statute, Article 15 of General Provisions.
“Beyond the confines of the council and in all matters not affecting
generally the rule of conduct of la Liga Filipina, all members from the
highest supreme chief (gefe supremo) to the last member shall in all social
dealings regard themselves as brothers in blood; for such fraternal reason
are all obliged to defend mutually the interests of all members, to console
and comfort them in misfortune; let it be understood that what a member
suffers from and endures is also what all the others suffer from and endure”
(Ibid.). The last embodies all. The Liga’s motto: Unus instar Omnium
(One is equal to all.)
The basic economic principle at work in the Liga, as Proudhon
advocated in his mutualist socialism, is the organization of credit. The
associated workers—artisans, peasants, workers, professionals—are
enabled to produce and exchange on the basis of loans made available
to them by the association itself; with the loans, they can invest in capital
goods—their means of production, the tools of their trade—and working
capital.
THE RIGHTS OF THE MEMBERS OF LA LIGA

( Estatuto , Derechos del A*)
1. Every member who fully justifies his need has the right
to receive moral, material and pecuniary aid from his
council and from the Liga.
2. Every member may demand that business preference be
given to him in his trade or profession by all members
for so long as he can make the same guarantees as the
others. In his travels, whether for the Liga or for his own
account, every member can count on assistance from his
council or other councils at all levels, for his protection
and need for contacts.
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34
44 G. ASENIERO
3. Every member may invoke the help of La Liga in every

want, injury or injustice [This article repeats the second
and third goals of the Liga: mutual protection in every
want and necessity, and defence against all violence and
injustice].
4. Every member may demand capital loan for any
enterprise whatsoever, if the council has sufficient and
disposable funds.
5. Every member may demand rebate for merchandise or
services provided by establishments or professional
services supported directly by the Liga.
6. No member may be judged without previously being
granted defence.
Note that all the rights of the members of the Liga are economic in
nature, designed to promote and facilitate the growth of productive
enterprises and professional services through the extension of credit,
discount on purchases and services, and other forms of support including
protection and defence against injury or injustice. The last includes defence
against accusation within the council itself. No mention is made of interest
on loans; recall that in the Proudhonian system, credit is interest-free and
is based on mutual lending via a people’s bank. Liga members are to pay
dues—one-time entry and monthly quotas—and are expected to make,
as contributions to the council, an undertaking, an idea, a study, or a new
applicant for membership. Thus the Liga grows in assets and strengths.
The Statute of La Liga dedicates an entire section, Inversión de los
Fondos, on the investment of its funds:
1. To support a member or his son who, lacking means,
demonstrates application and strong aptitudes for work
and study
2. To support an impoverished member in his rights
against someone “powerful”

45
3. To assist a member who has suffered loss

4. To lend capital to a member who needs it for any
industrial or agricultural undertaking
5. To promote the introduction into the country of new
machinery and industries
6. To open [coop] shops, warehouses and establishments
where members can be accommodated more
economically than elsewhere
7. The supreme chief has ample authority to dispose of
the funds in cases of urgency, so long as accounting is
made afterwards in the supreme council.
The investment funds are the means by which Goal 4 of the Liga —
“development of education, agriculture and commerce”—is to be
achieved. With these funds the Liga functions as a people’s bank or as a
development agency directly involved with the members as they strive to
develop their businesses. Those impoverished members who demonstrate
particularly positive aptitudes for entrepreneurship or study are to be
supported financially. The Liga also functions as a social support system, a
social net ready to help out a member who has suffered losses, or to protect
one who is under some form of oppression by “a powerful one;” given
the urgency of such cases, the head of the council is pre-authorized to
disburse the necessary funds outside the usual procedures. Defence of the
rights of a member from being trampled upon has its corresponding
obligation: members should not submit themselves to any humiliation,
nor should they treat others with arrogance and disrespect. Cooperative
stores and establishments are to be set up where members can obtain
goods and services more cheaply than elsewhere.11 Given the rapid advance
of science, technology and industry in the western world, the economy is
to be modernized by importing advanced technology and introducing new
industries financed by the Liga’s investment funds.
Amongst the duties of the members stands out a particular obligation
which carries a definite sanction: in all their daily transactions, members
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36
46 G. ASENIERO
must always give preference to the businesses of the other members; they
must not buy from any store other than that of a member, or if one is
selling to another member, he or she must do so with rebate. All things
being equal, members shall always favour members. Otherwise comes the
sanction, “Toda infraccíon de este artículo será severamente castigada”
(Deberes de los A*, 5; All violations of this rule will be severely punished).
This is a matter of discipline and total commitment to the common cause;
the mutualist association can function and thrive only if all members
dutifully comply with their obligations of reciprocity, mutuality, and
cooperation “en todos los actos de la vida” (Estatuto, Deberes de los A*,
5; literally, “in all life activities”).
Another duty is equally necessary: any member in a position to
help but refuses to extend assistance to another in danger or in dire need
shall be punished with the same burden that the other has suffered from.
Should conflict arise between members, it is for the council itself to resolve
their dispute based on the principles of mutualism; members who take
their dispute to judicial or governmental authorities instead shall be
“severely punished.”
The rest of the duties of the members have to do with the security
of La Liga itself. There is an unsaid presumption in Rizal’s statutes that La
Liga has to grow and survive in a hostile environment, and must protect
itself at all moments. Hence the dictatorial command and communication
structure of the organization: top-to-bottom channels of communication;
immediate implementation of orders without question; absolute secrecy
of everyone on everything; information on a need-to-know basis only;
the use of pseudonyms and codes for members and councils; constant and
systematic reporting of any signs of trouble; no horizontal sharing of
information but bottom-to-top flow only; and readiness to replace any
post or part of La Liga which may be rendered disabled for any reason
whatsoever (Estatuto, Disposiciones generales).

37
Emphatically,
“the member must guard in absolute secrecy from all outsiders, even
if these may be his parents, brothers, sons, etc. at the cost of his own
life, all facts, acts and decisions of his council and of the Liga Filipina in
general, this being the means by which the member can attain that
which he loves most in life” (Estatuto, Deberes de los A*, 4).
Here, La Liga appears as a conspiratorial or revolutionary

organization, like a Leninist vanguard party or, as it happened subsequently,
as the revolutionary organizational structure of Katipunan, inheritor of
La Liga. The argument could well be advanced: from the start La Liga is
already designed to act as a revolutionary party if and when the moment
comes: La Liga awaits Ang Katipunan.
So what then was La Liga as conceived by Rizal? Historians have
battled each other for decades on their answers. A separatist organization,
and therefore Rizal was revolutionary? Or an assimilationist programme,
and therefore Rizal was a reformist? Because La Liga aimed at “the study
and application of reforms,” was it therefore premised on gradualism and
dependent on Spain’s pace in granting those reforms? Was Ang Katipunan
a repudiation of La Liga?
Rather than ask what the appropriate label is to attach to La Liga
from the outside, and retrospectively, why not ask what La Liga aimed to
do from the inside, there and then? The fact is that La Liga aimed to
create the Civil Society that still was not there—“to unite the entire
Archipelago into one compact, vigorous and homogeneous body”(Fines,
1). Majul made a good case of showing that the unification of the
archipelago that had been done by the Spaniards—political integration as
a colony of Spain, religious integration as a Catholic community—was
not satisfactory for the purposes of the emerging nationalist movement.
Thus, Rizal aimed for a third integration, which is that of a viable national
community centered on itself (Majul 1959).
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48 G. ASENIERO
But how is this “nation” to come to life? If it is dormant from the

past, how then to awaken it? If it is yet to be born, how then to conceive
it? In Morga, Rizal had dug up the past, to make his countrymen “recall”
their nationhood from before the impact of colonialism. In Cien Años, he
had looked into the future, based on decisions taken or not taken today by
both Spain and the Philippines. There he declared that should the Islands
break away from Spain, they would choose a “federal republic” for their
government. So if this is the answer to the political question, what is the
answer to the social question?
Rizal’s answer is La Liga itself. Its architectural structure rests on an
integration of building blocks, people’s councils spread all over the country,
mutualist associations of producers and consumers united on the basis of
cooperation and reciprocity. La Liga Filipina is at the national level an
association of associations, vertically integrated but self-managing at all
levels. Through the organization of credit and mutual help, the association
aims to promote individual and cooperative entrepreneurship, a step
towards the ideal of a non-exploitative social order because workers and
peasants can possess their means of production, and each identifies his
interests in relation to the whole.
Thus is Civil Society created, the realm of economic activities and
social relations that comprise the material basis wherefrom the State arises.12
That state, theoretically, could be a federal republic such as that envisioned
by Pi y Margall for “la Federación española” in his Constitution of 1883,
the union of autonomous regions, each with their own constitution, with
the Philippines among them as a compact, vigorous, and homogeneous
body the equal of any. Or it could be an independent federal republic
with its own regions from Mindanao to Luzon united into one compact,
vigorous and homogeneous body. Theoretically. But Rizal already knew,
before he conceived of La Liga, that the autonomous union with Spain
would never happen because it would have required as a precondition
the transformation of Spain herself into a federation, and the balance of
forces was against that. The only course of action, therefore, was to work

39
for the independence of the Philippines. Rizal came back to his country
for that, and, organizationally and conceptually, La Liga Filipina was to
be the first step to freedom.
Notes
1
All translations of Spanish texts in this essay are mine except those from Rizal’s
Annotations to Morga’s Sucesos de la Islas Filipinas.
2
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Filipino-Spanish Conference on the
200th Anniversary of the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 held at the University of the
Philippines in June 2012, a rare occasion for scholars from both countries to revisit the
intellectual and political ties between Spanish and Filipino political movements in the
19th century.
3
See Braudel 1976, Part Two, Chapter V: “Societies,” pp. 704 –756 for the political
system of 16th-century Spain.
4
Rejecting the divine right of kings and the social-contract theories of Hobbes and Locke,
Suárez has been described as “the first convinced and avowed republican” (Villa 1997).
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnv9.htm
5
Rizal’s footnote: “The conversion of the Philippines into the Christian faith was the only
excuse that gave the kings the right to the possession of the Islands, in the opinion of all
men then, military as well as civilians and theologians…” But this was not true of the
Philippines, as of so many other peoples, “the Catholic Faith [being but] a Palladian
pretext to give an honest appearance to the rule” (Morga [1890] 2011, 342n261).
6
Rizal may have felt that he was conceding too much for his line of argumentation. In
several footnotes he qualifies his own assertion: “these slaves were not always in such
dismal condition […] but tyrants and brutal men who abused their authority were not
lacking, though they could not have surpassed the encomenderos […]” Rizal repeatedly
cites sources to prove that the pre-existing class structure was not more tyrannical here
than elsewhere, in Europe and in history (Morga [1890] 2011, 276n106).
7
Rizal, quoted verbatim by Ricardo Carnicero, Military Commandant of Dapitan, in his
Report to Gov. Gen. Eulogio Despujol. Reproduced in Retana 1907, 274.
8
In the Philippines, La Gloriosa led to the Cavite Mutiny of 1872 after the liberal Gov.
Gen. Carlos Ma. de la Torre was recalled and replaced by another who, under clerical
pressure, promptly revoked the reformist measures initiated by his predecessor, setting
into motion this revolt, a milestone in Philippine revolutionary history. Because of the
martyrdom of the three priests inculpated in the mutiny, this was a milestone too in
Rizal’s life. “Without 1872, Rizal would now be a Jesuit, and instead of writing Noli me
tangere, would have written the contrary…” Rizal’s letter to Mariano Ponce, 18 April
1889.
Volume 49:1 (2013)

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40 G. ASENIERO
9
That is to say, pre-Marxist socialism, taking the publication of The Communist Manifesto
in 1848 as the milestone and that of Marx’s critique of Proudhon in The Poverty of
Philosophy the year before. Marx had said of the three currents of French socialism, and
of Proudhon in particular, back in 1842 that “writings such as those of Leroux,
Considérant, and above all Proudhon’s penetrating work, can be criticized only after long
and deep study” (Karl Marx. 1842. “Communism and the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung”
in Rheinische Zeitung, 16 October, Number 289. http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1842/10/16.htm).
10
This part of Philippine history is well-researched, the best single volume being Schumacher
1997.
11
Rizal had a chance to establish a cooperative of producers and consumers whilst on exile
in Dapitan. This is discussed in the memoirs (unpublished) of José Aseniero, one of
Rizal’s students in Dapitan. For an exposition of Rizal’s initiatives in Dapitan in relation
to contemporary issues of development, see Quibuyen 2011, 1–29.
12
The question will be asked: would Rizal’s “development strategy” have been viable had
it been given a chance? Avoiding counterfactual historiography, it should be borne in mind
that premonopoly capitalism was very different in its structure and in the opportunities it
presented to entrepreneurs from how it has developed since, and many cooperatives in
19th-century Western Europe had grown into significant business concerns, contributing
substantially to economic development. And some of the utopian socialists like Robert
Owen made great fortunes starting out with a small credit.
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efee rrences
ences
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Social and Legal Studies 5 (3).
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http://saavedrafajardo.um.es/WEB/archivos/respublica/hispana/DOC0004-JVB.pdf
Bernaus, A.J. 1966.Federalismo y revolución: las ideas sociales de Pi y Margall. Madrid:
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Braudel, Fernand. 1976. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip
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//ccec.revues.org/1443.

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Constitución Española de 1883 (no promulgada). Proyecto de Constitución Federal de 1883

Redactada por Francesco Pi y Margall. http://es.wikisource.org/wiki
/Constituci%C3%B3n_espa%C3%B1ola_de_1883_%28no_promulgada%29.
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Giesey, Ralph E. 1968. If Not, Not: The Oath of the Aragonese and the Legendary Laws of
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Hobsbawm, Eric. 1987. The Age of Empire 1875-1914. New York: Pantheon Books.
Hennessy, C.A. M. 1962.The Federal Republic in Spain: Pi y Margall and the Federal Republican
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Quibuyen, Floro. (1999) 2008. A Nation Aborted: Rizal, American Hegemony, and Philippine
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11

From Cádiz to La Liga: The Spanish

Key words: Rizal, spanish political thought, Cadiz constitution, Pi y

A POST-REVOLUTIONARY PHILIPPINES, having at long last

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

one of his major works, La reacción y la revolución (Reaction and

The latest developments referred to the immediately preceding

Volume 49:1 (2013)

These stimuli to strategic political thinking initially translated into a

The Sour ces of the Constitution of 1

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

on a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we arrive at the

Volume 49:1 (2013)

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

ayuntamientos, municipal self-government with corresponding privileges

Volume 49:1 (2013)

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

thus coexist as equals in a common framework—a system of international

Volume 49:1 (2013)

right to representation in the Cortes, the Cádiz Constitution restates the

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

The most eminent of the ilustrados, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos,

Volume 49:1 (2013)

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

The text has deep resonance in Spanish medieval history. The

Volume 49:1 (2013)

Morga describes the principalia as based on succession and kinship,

Rizal agrees and, after commenting that custom as unwritten law

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

this agreement of the laws at bottom and this general uniformity

Volume 49:1 (2013)

Morga describes the hierarchical structure of the “commonwealth”

Thanks to [the Filipinos’] social condition and to their number at that

The pressing reality of the “social condition” of the Filipinos of

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

logically enough. Defend the abusive ruling class whose interest is to

Volume 49:1 (2013)

The new order of things is colonial domination, unmitigated though

[D]ecir que “los únicos vínculos propiamente sociales que unen a

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

highest import, the free meeting of the minds on a mutually beneficial

Spain in Rizal’s Time: The Perspectivee of Pi y Mar

Volume 49:1 (2013)

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

Volume 49:1 (2013)

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

The strategic goal of Pi y Margall’s political struggles was for Spain

Volume 49:1 (2013)

any measure, set into motion a revolution of rising expectations in these

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

with her slow-paced industrialization than in the advanced economies of

Volume 49:1 (2013)

“Organization of credit” is vital, Proudhon argues; exploitation would be

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia

Rizal’s La Liga Filipina

Volume 49:1 (2013)

La Federación española, constituida por las expresadas regiones,

In Pi y Margall’s theory of federalism, “expresadas regiones” refers

ASIAN STUDIES: Journal of Critical Perspectives on Asia