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Studies i n Contemporary G e r m a n Social Thought (partial listing) O n the Pragmatics of Communication

T h o m a s McCarthy, general editor

James B o h m a n , Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy


James B o h m a n and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's
Cosmopolitan Ideal
Craig C a l h o u n , editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere
Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy
Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics
Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Sotial Sciences
Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jürgen Habermas
Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action
Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate
Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures edited by Maeve Cooke
Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles
Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays
Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication (edited by Maeve Cooke)
Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society
Jürgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age"
Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Sotial Theory
Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Sotial Conflicts
Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Haber-
mas 's T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Action
Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul-
tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo-
sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished
Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on T h e Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
E r n s t Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination
Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity
Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmod-
ernism

T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , M a s s a c h u s e t t s
Contents

©1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Editor's Acknowledgments vii

T h i s volume is published by arrangement with Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a m Main, Introduction


Germany. T h e sources on which the translations are based are listed i n the acknowl-
Maeve Cooke 1
edgments.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced i n any form or by any 1 What I s U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics? (1976) 21
electronic or mechanical means, (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n 105
(1981)
T h i s book was set i n Baskeryille by Wellington Graphics and was printed a n d bound
in the United States of America
3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meaning a n d Action (1986) 183

Habermas, Jürgen. 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated


O n the pragmatics of communication / Jürgen Habermas : edited by Maeve Cooke.
p. c m . — (Studies i n contemporary G e r m a n social thought) I n t e r a c t i o n s , a n d the L i f e w o r l d ( 1 9 8 8 ) 215
Essays translated from German.
Includes bibliographical references a n d index. 5 C o m m e n t s on J o h n Searle's "Meaning, Communication,
I S B N 0-262-08265-9 (alk. paper)
a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " (1988) 257
1. Pragmatics. I . Cooke, Maeve. I I . Title. I I I . Series
B831.5.H33 1998
193—dc21 98-18171 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g ( 1 9 8 8 ) 277
CIP
7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t of
Communicative Rationality (1996) 307

8 R i c h a r d R o r t / s Pragmatic T u r n (1996) 343

9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d Communicative
U s e s of Language (1985) 383
vi
Contents

403
10 Q u e s t i o n s a n d C o u n t e r q u e s t i o n s ( 1 9 8 5 )
Editor's Acknowledgments
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y a n d F u r t h e r Reading 435

Index 447

I w o u l d like to t h a n k T h o m a s M c C a r t h y f o r i n i t i a t i n g this u n d e r t a k -
i n g , f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h e r o l e o f series e d i t o r i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n n e r ,
a n d for considerable h e l p over a n d above his e d i t o r i a l duties w i t h
r e g a r d t o t r a n s l a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . M y t h a n k s a r e also d u e t o J ü r g e n
Habermas for encouraging the project, for replying p r o m p t l y to m y
m a n y queries, a n d f o r his u n f a i l i n g cordiality. R o n a l d B ö h m e h e l p e d
with the proofreading, with financial assistance f r o m t h e D e p a r t -
m e n t o f G e r m a n , U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e D u b l i n , a n d h e also c o m p i l e d
the index. H e r e , too, I a m very grateful. Thanks, finally, to M a r t i n
Sauter, n o t j u s t f o r h i s p a i n s t a k i n g h e l p i n c h e c k i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s b u t
f o r h i s l o v e a n d s u p p o r t o v e r t h e m a n y years i t t o o k t o p u t t h i s b o o k
together.
T h e t r a n s l a t i o n s o f m a n y o f t h e c h a p t e r s have b e e n b a s e d on
e a r l i e r p u b l i s h e d t r a n s l a t i o n s , as f o l l o w s :
A translation o f chapter 1 by T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Communication and the Evolution of Society, © 1 9 7 9
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 2 b y T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Theory of Communicative Action, v o l . 1 , © 1 9 8 4
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 3 b y J e r e m y G a i n e s a n d D o r i s L . J o n e s was
first p u b l i s h e d i n Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's
T h e T h e o r y o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , e d i t e d by A x e l H o n n e t h a n d
H a n s J o a s , © 1 9 9 1 b y P o l i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .
viii
Editor's Acknowledgments

A p a r t i a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 4 was p u b l i s h e d i n Philosophical Prob-


lems Today, e d i t e d b y G u t t o r m F l 0 i s t a d , © 1 9 9 4 b y K l u w e r A c a d e m i c Introduction
Publishers, Dordrecht.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 5 was p u b l i s h e d i n John Searle and His Critics,
Maeve Cooke
edited by Ernest Lepore a n d R o b e r t Van Gulick, ©1991 by Basil
Blackwell, O x f o r d , U.K.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 6 b y W i l l i a m M . H o h e n g a r t e n was p u b l i s h e d
i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , Postmetaphysical Thinking, ©1992 by Massachu-
setts I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 9 b y F r e d e r i c k G . L a w r e n c e was p u b l i s h e d
i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, ©1985
b y M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass.
A translation of chapter 10 b y J a m e s B o h m a n was p u b l i s h e d i n
Habermas and Modernity, e d i t e d b y R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n , © 1 9 8 5 b y P o l i t y
T h i s a n t h o l o g y b r i n g s t o g e t h e r f o r t h e first t i m e , i n revised o r n e w
Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .
t r a n s l a t i o n , t e n essays t h a t p r e s e n t t h e m a i n c o n c e r n s o f H a b e r m a s ' s
C h a p t e r s 7 a n d 8 a n d t h e f i n a l p a r t o f c h a p t e r 4 have b e e n t r a n s l a t e d
p r o g r a m i n f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . I t s a i m is t o c o n v e y a sense o f t h e
by Maeve C o o k e a n d appear i n E n g l i s h f o r the first t i m e .
overall p u r p o s e o f his linguistic investigations, w h i l e i n t r o d u c i n g t h e
r e a d e r t o t h e i r specific d e t a i l s . H a b e r m a s ' s f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s f u l f i l l s
t w o m a i n f u n c t i o n s . F i r s t , i t serves as t h e t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g
f o r h i s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w h i c h is a c r u c i a l e l e m e n t
i n h i s t h e o r y o f society. S e c o n d , i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o o n g o i n g p h i l o -
sophical discussion o f p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g t r u t h , rationality, a c t i o n ,
and m e a n i n g . Correspondingly, the a i m o f the present anthology
is t w o f o l d . F i r s t , i n p r o v i d i n g b e t t e r access t o essays b y Habermas
t h a t focus e x p l i c i t l y o n language, i t may h e l p those interested i n
s o c i a l t h e o r y t o assess c r i t i c a l l y t h e l i n g u i s t i c basis f o r his a c c o u n t s
o f communicative action a n d communicative rationality. Second, i t
may h e l p those interested i n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b -
lems to u n d e r s t a n d a n d to appreciate Habermas's treatment of
them.

H a b e r m a s ' s o r i g i n a l t e r m f o r h i s l i n g u i s t i c r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m was
" u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . " T h e a d j e c t i v e " u n i v e r s a l " was m e a n t t o i n d i -
cate t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r o j e c t a n d o t h e r p r a g -
m a t i c analyses o f l a n g u a g e . W h e r e a s e a r l i e r p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o
l a n g u a g e h a d t e n d e d t o analyze p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t s o f l a n g u a g e use,
H a b e r m a s set o u t t o r e c o n s t r u c t u n i v e r s a l f e a t u r e s o f u s i n g l a n -
guage. T h i s explains the title o f h i s p r o g r a m m a t i c essay, " W h a t
3
2
Introduction
Introduction

Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? , " first p u b l i s h e d i n 1976. However, i n a a c t i o n o f t h i s s o r t is " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , " a n d h i s analysis o f i t t u r n s o n

f o o t n o t e t o t h e 1979 E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , H a b e r m a s expresses d i s - t h e thesis t h a t e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n with

satisfaction w i t h the label "universal" a n d a preference f o r the t e r m v a l i d i t y . M o r e precisely, l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s as t h e y are u s e d in

" f o r m a l pragmatics." O n e advantage o f the latter t e r m i n o l o g y , i n his e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d as claims t o

view, is t h a t i t r e m i n d s us t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is r e l a t e d t o f o r m a l v a l i d i t y . F r o m h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n is p r i -

s e m a n t i c s . A s w e s h a l l see, t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p is p a r t i c u - m a r i l y a m a t t e r o f r a i s i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to validity claims. Haber¬

larly crucial i n Habermas's accounts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h . mas d o e s a l l o w f o r o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n , s u c h as


strategic, figurative, or symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t he contends that
W h a t is m e a n t b y u n i v e r s a l or, as w e s h o u l d n o w say, f o r m a l p r a g -
these a r e p a r a s i t i c o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n .
matics? H a b e r m a s ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t is t h a t f o r m a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e
s h o u l d n o t b e r e s t r i c t e d t o s e m a n t i c analysis, f o r f o r m a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n I n its s i m p l e s t t e r m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is a c t i o n w h o s e success
o f t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n s o f l a n g u a g e is e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e and d e p e n d s o n t h e h e a r e r ' s r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e validity claim r a i s e d b y
i m p o r t a n t . By the "pragmatic" dimensions o f language, Habermas t h e s p e a k e r w i t h a "yes" o r a " n o . " H e r e , H a b e r m a s i d e n t i f i e s t h r e e
m e a n s t h o s e p e r t a i n i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e employment o f s e n t e n c e s i n basic types o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t a r e r a i s e d b y a speaker w i t h h e r
u t t e r a n c e s . H e m a k e s c l e a r t h a t " f o r m a l " is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n a s p e e c h act: a claim t o t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is s a i d o r p r e s u p p o s e d , a
t o l e r a n t sense t o r e f e r t o t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f general claim t o t h e normative Tightness o f t h e s p e e c h a c t i n t h e given
i n t u i t i o n s o r c o m p e t e n c i e s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e n , a i m s a t a sys- context or of the u n d e r l y i n g n o r m , a n d a claim to the truthfulness
tematic reconstruction of the intuitive linguistic knowledge of com- o f t h e speaker. I n u s i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n communicatively, t h e
p e t e n t subjects, t h e i n t u i t i v e " r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s " t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r raises a l l t h r e e o f these c l a i m s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I n a t y p i c a l
s p e a k e r has o f h e r o w n l a n g u a g e . I t a i m s t o e x p l i c a t e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , j u s t o n e o f t h e c l a i m s is r a i s e d
knowledge o f a g e n e r a l s o r t , as o p p o s e d t o t h e c o m p e t e n c i e s o f explicitly; the other two r e m a i n implicit presuppositions o f under-
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h u s calls t o s t a n d i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e . T h e t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are d e s c r i b e d as
mind the unavoidable presuppositions that guide l i n g u i s t i c ex- " u n i v e r s a l " b y H a b e r m a s , i n t h e sense o f b e i n g r a i s e d w i t h every
c h a n g e s b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s i n e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m - c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y u s e d s p e e c h act.
m u n i c a t i o n i n a n y l a n g u a g e . I t m a k e s us a w a r e t h a t , as speakers a n d T h e three universal validity claims—to t r u t h , normative lightness,
h e a r e r s , t h e r e are c e r t a i n t h i n g s w e m u s t — a s a m a t t e r o f n e c e s s i t y — a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — p r o v i d e a basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts. T h u s ,
always a l r e a d y h a v e p r e s u p p o s e d i f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o b e success- c o m m u n i c a t i v e utterances can be d i v i d e d i n t o three b r o a d catego-
f u l . I n focusing o n the f o r m a l properties o f speech situations i n r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t h e y raise: c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
general, Habermas's p r o g r a m may thus be distinguished f r o m e m - are c o n n e c t e d i n t h e first instance w i t h t r u t h claims, regulative
pirical pragmatics—for example, sociolinguistics—which looks p r i - s p e e c h acts w i t h claims to n o r m a t i v e lightness, a n d expressive
m a r i l y a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use. s p e e c h acts w i t h c l a i m s t o t r u t h f u l n e s s .

Habermas's f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c investigations i n t o everyday linguis- T h e thesis o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r


t i c p r a c t i c e s i n m o d e r n societies a r e a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e b o t h language t h e o r y a n d social t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t is
u n i v e r s a l c o m p e t e n c i e s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d w h e n social a c t o r s i n t e r a c t m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts
w i t h the a i m o f achieving m u t u a l understanding {Verständigung)} t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e proposals o f A u s t i n a n d his followers o r t h e
C o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is c r u c i a l f o r H a b e r m a s ' s s o c i a l t h e o r y , m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d t y p o l o g i e s o f Searle a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s .
w h i c h is b a s e d o n t h e thesis t h a t a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g On the other h a n d , i t proposes that language has an in-built
u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t y p e o f social a c t i o n . H i s n a m e f o r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , t h e r e b y g i v i n g rise t o a p a r t i c u l a r
4 5
Introduction Introduction

conception o f s o c i a l o r d e r as r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e
a i m o f reaching agreement w i t h r e g a r d to the validity o f the disputed
action. v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h a t n o f o r c e e x c e p t t h a t o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is
I n s h o w i n g t h a t everyday l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n r a i s i n g e x e r t e d , t h a t n o c o m p e t e n t parties have b e e n e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e
a n d r e c o g n i z i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , H a b e r m a s p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e o f so- discussion, that no r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t has k n o w i n g l y b e e n sup-
c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p r e s s e d , t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s are u s i n g t h e s a m e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s
h a v e t w o s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h e y a r e , first, c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a - i n t h e s a m e way, a n d so o n . T h e s e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s r e f e r b o t h
tionships o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d responsibility: participants i n c o m m u - t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t o its o u t c o m e . F o r H a b e r m a s ,
n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n undertake t o b e h a v e i n c e r t a i n ways, a n d t h e the various idealizing suppositions unavoidably g u i d i n g a r g u m e n -
success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e cooperation o f b o t h p a r t i e s t a t i o n a r e w h a t give m e a n i n g t o t h e i d e a s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e as
involved. Second, the relationships of m u t u a l recognition charac- ideas t h a t t r a n s c e n d a l l l o c a l c o n t e x t s o f validity. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
t e r i s t i c f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n h a v e a n i n h e r e n t rational d i m e n - t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y processes o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n
sion: the communicative actor undertakes a n o b l i g a t i o n to provide have a c o n n e c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h possible v i n d i c a t i o n i n dis-
r e a s o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s h e raises w i t h h i s u t t e r a n c e s , course, they have a n i n h e r e n t c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t power. This
w h i l e his c o u n t e r p a r t i n a c t i o n may e i t h e r accept the proffered power is t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l b u i l t i n t o e v e r y d a y processes of
r e a s o n s o r c h a l l e n g e t h e m o n t h e basis o f b e t t e r reasons. I n t h i s communication.
sense, e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n v o l v e s a r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c -
H a b e r m a s ' s p i c t u r e o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h u s has
t i c e o f " a r g u m e n t a t i o n . " F u r t h e r m o r e , these e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s of
i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r critical social theory. F o r one t h i n g , i n
g i v i n g reasons f o r a n d against c o n t r o v e r s i a l validity claims—some-
p r e s e n t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f c o o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o m -
t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o b y H a b e r m a s as n a i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action—
m i t m e n t a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t o p p o s e s m o d e l s o f social o r d e r t h a t
p o i n t t o w a r d the possibility o f other, m o r e d e m a n d i n g f o r m s of
t a k e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects as f u n d a m e n -
a r g u m e n t a t i o n , w h i c h h e calls " d i s c o u r s e . " E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e
tal, for example, models g r o u n d e d i n decision o r game theory. For
a c t i o n n o r m a l l y operates o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e reasons sup-
another, i n the context-transcendent p o t e n t i a l o f the validity claims
p o r t i n g t h e validity claims raised are g o o d ones. W h e n this back-
r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes, i t l o c a t e s a basis f o r a
g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is s h a k e n — a s will happen more frequently i n
" p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y a n d , ac-
posttraditional societies—communicative action cannot continue
cordingly, a standard f o r critique. As that conception refers t o a
r o u t i n e l y . P a r t i c i p a n t s t h e n have t h r e e o p t i o n s : they can switch t o
p o t e n t i a l already b u i l t i n t o everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i t situ-
strategic a c t i o n ; they can b r e a k o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether; o r
ates r e a s o n i n e v e r y d a y l i f e : t h e ideas o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e t o w a r d
they can r e c o m m e n c e t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity at a d i f f e r e n t ,
w h i c h i t p o i n t s are g r o u n d e d i n i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that are p a r t
m o r e reflective level—namely, argumentative speech. I n the proc-
o f e v e r y d a y h u m a n activity. M o r e o v e r , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is
esses o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n k n o w n as d i s c o u r s e s , c e r t a i n i d e a l i z i n g s u p -
n o t reducible to the standards o f validity p r e v a i l i n g i n any local
positions already operative i n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are
c o n t e x t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity. R a t h e r , t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i -
f o r m a l i z e d . T h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a r e u n a v o i d a b l e i n t h e sense t h a t
tions o n w h i c h i t rests p r o v i d e s t a n d a r d s f o r c r i t i c i z i n g l o c a l p r a c t i c e s
t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e v e r y m e a n i n g o f w h a t i t is t o t a k e p a r t i n a r g u -
o f justification, b o t h w i t h regard to the outcomes o f the agreements
m e n t a t i o n ; t h e y are i d e a l i z i n g i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y a r e t y p i c a l l y
reached a n d w i t h r e g a r d to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n themselves.
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a n d w i l l n o t as a r u l e b e s a t i s f i e d m o r e t h a n a p p r o x i -
T h u s t h e i d e a o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a
mately. T h u s , H a b e r m a s claims, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n nec-
postmetaphysical alternative to traditional conceptions of t r u t h a n d
essarily s u p p o s e , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e y share t h e common
j u s t i c e t h a t nonetheless avoids value-relativism.
7
6
Introduction
Introduction

F r o m a m o r e s t r i c t l y l i n g u i s t i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view, H a b e r - language games a n d p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s o f life. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

mas's f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s offers a n a p p r o a c h t o questions o f m e a n i n g p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t h a t have a t t e m p t e d t o a v o i d such a r e d u c -

a n d t r u t h t h a t radicalizes t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o - tion—Habermas m e n t i o n s Searle's s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y — t y p i c a l l y h a v e

p h y . I n h i s view, t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o m e a n i n g succumbed t o t h e cognitivist abstraction, i n t e r p r e t i n g validity t o o

have b e e n g u i l t y o f t h r e e k i n d s o f a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies: a s e m a n t i c i s t n a r r o w l y as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . H a b e r m a s sees h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c

abstraction, a cognitivist abstraction, a n d a n objectivist o n e . T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as a n a t t e m p t t o c o m b i n e t h e p r o d u c t i v e i n s i g h t s

s e m a n t i c i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t t h e analysis o f l i n g u i s t i c o f existing formal-semantic a n d pragmatic approaches to m e a n i n g

m e a n i n g c a n c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o t h e analysis o f sentences, a b s t r a c t i n g w h i l e a v o i d i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e weaknesses. H e r e g a r d s s p e e c h - a c t

f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . t h e o r y as a f r u i t f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i n s u f f i c i e n t as i t stands, a n d

T h e c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t a l l m e a n i n g c a n b e t r a c e d attempts t o b u i l d i n t o i t the formal-semantic emphasis o n t r u t h o r

back to the propositional content o f utterances, thus indirectly re- a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s . I n a sense, t h e n , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e -

d u c i n g m e a n i n g t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e o b j e c - o r y o f m e a n i n g c a n b e r e g a r d e d as t h e p r o p o s e d h a p p y m a r r i a g e o f

tivist a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t m e a n i n g is t o b e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s A u s t i n a n d Searle w i t h F r e g e a n d D u m m e t t .

o f objectively ascertainable truth c o n d i t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t h e F r o m t h e s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y o f A u s t i n a n d Searle ( w h o m h e praises


knowledge o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c a n b e i m p u t e d t o speakers o r f o r r e n d e r i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y m o r e p r e c i s e ) , H a b e r m a s takes o v e r
hearers. F o r H a b e r m a s , p r a g m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g have t h e t h e e m p h a s i s o n u t t e r a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s as t h e c e n t r a l u n i t
a d v a n t a g e t h a t t h e y f o c u s n o t o n s e n t e n c e s b u t o n u t t e r a n c e s ( h e is o f analysis. H e also associates h i m s e l f w i t h t h e i r m o v e b e y o n d t h e
t h i n k i n g here primarily o f t h e use-oriented theories o f m e a n i n g t r a d i t i o n a l n a r r o w focus o n assertoric a n d descriptive m o d e s o f l a n -
suggested b y t h e later w o r k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d g u a g e use t o i n c l u d e — p o t e n t i a l l y o n a n e q u a l f o o t i n g — o t h e r ways
t h e w o r k o f A u s t i n a n d Searle, o n t h e o t h e r ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , p r a g - o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , s u c h as acts o f p r o m i s i n g , r e q u e s t i n g , w a r n i n g , o r
m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g d o n o t emphasize o n l y t h e assertoric o r c o n f e s s i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , h e finds f r u i t f u l s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y ' s e m p h a -
descriptive m o d e s o f language use; they d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m u l - sis o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f u t t e r a n c e s , t h a t is, o n t h e f a c t t h a t a
tiplicity o f m e a n i n g f u l ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e . F i n a l l y , s u c h t h e o r i e s s p e a k e r i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g also does s o m e t h i n g . H o w e v e r , i t m a y b e
stress t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f u t t e r a n c e s a n d s o c i a l helpful here to notice Habermas's distinctive conception o f illocu-
practices; they draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e institutions a n d conventions t i o n a r y f o r c e , w h i c h goes b e y o n d A u s t i n ' s i n a n u m b e r o f s i g n i f i c a n t
o f t h e f o r m s o f l i f e i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i v i t y is always e m - respects. A u s t i n u s e d t h e n o t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n t o r e f e r t o t h e act o f
bedded. u t t e r i n g sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . F o r h i m , t h e force o f
a n u t t e r a n c e consists i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — i n t h e a t t e m p t t o
I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, h o w e v e r , e x i s t i n g p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o
reach a n u p t a k e ; h e contrasted t h e force o f a n utterance w i t h its
m e a n i n g h a v e weaknesses c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o t h o s e o f f o r m a l s e m a n -
m e a n i n g , c o n c e i v e d as a p r o p e r t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d . H a b e r -
tics. T h e g r e a t s t r e n g t h o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s h a s b e e n i t s a t t e m p t t o
mas's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s is t h r e e f o l d : first, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
r e t a i n a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions
f o r c e a n d m e a n i n g o v e r l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t u t t e r a n c e s have a m e a n -
a n d some n o t i o n o f context-transcendent validity. I n t h e m a i n p r a g -
i n g d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences they employ; second,
matic approaches, however, this c o n n e c t i o n e i t h e r slips f r o m v i e w
i t is c o n n e c t e d w i t h a p r o b l e m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o
c o m p l e t e l y o r is i n t e r p r e t e d t o o n a r r o w l y i n a c o g n i t i v i s t way. F o r
constatives a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e s , w h e r e b y i n i t i a l l y , f o r A u s t i n , o n l y c o n -
e x a m p l e , use t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e l a t e r w o r k o f
statives a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; t h i r d , i t n e g l e c t s t h e r a -
W i t t g e n s t e i n have i n effect r e n o u n c e d a context-transcendent n o -
tional f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force. By contrast, Habermas
tion o f validity by r e d u c i n g i t t o t h e prevailing validity o f local
8 9

Introduction Introduction

p r o p o s e s a n a c c o u n t o f u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g t h a t brings together t h e w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are s a t i s f i e d . S u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n , he


c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g a n d f o r c e ; h e extends t h e n o d o n o f i l l o c u t i o n - argues, i m p l i c i t l y relies o n a n e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f knowledge that
a r y force t o a l l utterances t h a t are used c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y ; a n d h e regards t h e simple predicative sentences o f a n observational l a n -
e m p h a s i z e s t h e rational f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e . A s w e s h a l l guage as fundamental. Habermas then follows Dummett, who
see, H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y gives a n a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g suggests r e p l a c i n g t h e e m p h a s i s o n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h a c o n s i d -
o f u t t e r a n c e s as i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e a c t o f u t t e r i n g t h e m , a n d e r a t i o n o f w h a t i t is f o r a s p e a k e r t o know when the truth conditions
d e f i n e s u t t e r a n c e s as acts o f r a i s i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . H i s d e f i n i t i o n o f w o u l d b e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is w h a t h e r e f e r s t o as D u m m e t t ' s e p i s t e m i c
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s : i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e consists i n a t u r n ; h e , however, wants to t u r n even f u r t h e r . As H a b e r m a s reads i t ,
s p e e c h act's c a p a c i t y t o m o t i v a t e a h e a r e r t o act o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g has t w o m a i n s h o r t c o m i n g s t h a t p r e -
t h e c o m m i t m e n t s i g n a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t . O n t h i s vent his developing fully the i n h e r e n t potentials o f the epistemic
c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is b o u n d u p w i t h t h e speaker's as- t u r n . T h e f i r s t is a p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s o v e r o t h e r k i n d s o f
s u m p t i o n o f a warranty, i f c h a l l e n g e d , t o p r o v i d e reasons i n s u p p o r t validity claims: D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility conditions accords
o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s she raises. So u n d e r s t o o d , i l l o c u t i o n a r y p r i o r i t y t o assertoric utterances. I n o r d e r t o m a k e r o o m o n a n e q u a l
f o r c e is a r a t i o n a l f o r c e , f o r i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, t h e s p e a k e r f o o t i n g f o r n o n a s s e r t o r i c u t t e r a n c e s s u c h as p r o m i s e s , i m p e r a t i v e s ,
u n d e r t a k e s t o s u p p o r t w h a t she says w i t h reasons, i f necessary. T h u s , o r avowals, H a b e r m a s p r e f e r s t o s p e a k o f acceptability c o n d i t i o n s . T h e
a l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s acknowledges s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y as t h e most s e c o n d is t h a t D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s is i n -
f r u i t f u l p o i n t o f departure for his p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics, he s u f f i c i e n t l y p r a g m a t i c : i t r e m a i n s o n t h e s e m a n t i c l e v e l o f analysis
e n g a g e s w i t h i t c r i t i c a l l y , m a k i n g use o f s o m e o f its c e n t r a l c a t e g o r i e s i n a s m u c h as i t r e l i e s o n a n i d e a l o f v a l i d i t y t h a t is c o n c e p t u a l l y
i n d i s t i n c t i v e ways. i n d e p e n d e n t o f discursive practices o f r e d e e m i n g validity claims.
T h i s last o b j e c t i o n takes us t o t h e h e a r t o f H a b e r m a s ' s pragmatic
F r o m the p o i n t o f view o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l p r a g m a t -
theory of meaning.
ics, t h e m a i n w e a k n e s s o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is its f a i l u r e t o c o n n e c t
all c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used utterances w i t h validity claims t h a t are i n B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g i t , however, i t m a y be h e l p f u l to clarify t h e
principle context-transcendent. He attempts to make good this status o f t h e t h e o r y . B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , i t seems p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n -
deficiency by d r a w i n g o n M i c h a e l D u m m e t t ' s account of under- g u i s h b e t w e e n t w o a c c o u n t s o f its status. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e first, a
standing m e a n i n g i n terms o f k n o w i n g assertibility conditions. I n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is m e r e l y a n e x t e n s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i -
a n a l o g y w i t h D u m m e t t ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s i n t h e sense t h a t i t b r o a d e n s its f o c u s . O n t h i s view,
m e a n i n g o f a n assertoric e x p r e s s i o n , H a b e r m a s p r o p o s e s t h a t w e H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y leaves t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e f o r m a l - s e m a n -
u n d e r s t a n d a n utterance w h e n we k n o w w h a t makes i t acceptable. tic a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i n t a c t , w h i l e e x p a n d i n g its
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics r u n s i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s w h e n i t explains range, first, t o i n c l u d e nonassertoric l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s a n d , sec-
t h e m e a n i n g o f sentences i n t e r m s o f t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h o u t o n d , t o e m b r a c e utterances as w e l l as s e n t e n c e s . H i s e a r l i e r essay
m e d i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e knowledge t h e s p e a k e r o r h e a r e r m a y h a v e o f " W h a t I s U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? " suggests t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e tasks o f
such conditions. T h u s Habermas adopts D u m m e t t ' s "epistemic t u r n " a pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . However, i n most o f his later writ-
a n d criticizes D o n a l d Davidson f o r o f f e r i n g an objectivist r e a d i n g o f i n g s , h e seems t o o f f e r a m o r e r a d i c a l a c c o u n t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s , a
F r e g e ' s a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s thesis t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is pragmatic theory of meaning undercuts the formal-semantic ap-
t o k n o w w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . H e r e j e c t s t h i s o b j e c t i v i s t r e a d i n g p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g . T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n c h a p t e r s
as t a c i t l y a s s u m i n g t h a t f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r every 2 a n d 3 i n the present volume, where D u m m e t t ' s assertibility-condi-
assertoric sentence, p r o c e d u r e s are available f o r effectively d e c i d i n g tional t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is c r i t i c i z e d f o r f a i l i n g t o c a r r y t h r o u g h
10 11
Introduction Introduction

completely the move f r o m the semantic to the pragmatic level o f


r e m a i n s u n c l e a r , h o w e v e r , i n w h a t sense s u c h a t h e o r y is p r a g m a t i c .
analysis. I n a r e c e n t response to objections raised by Herbert
A s i n d i c a t e d , i n h i s e a r l i e r essay o n u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , H a b e r m a s
Schnadelbach (see c h a p t e r 7 ) , H a b e r m a s c l a r i f i e s t h e status o f h i s
h a d j u s t i f i e d his preference for the category o f acceptability c o n d i -
p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g i n a w a y t h a t suggests t h a t b o t h of
t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , o n t h e g r o u n d s
t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are c o r r e c t . S t a r t i n g f r o m a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h a t i t avoids t h e p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f the assertoric m o d e o f language
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , h e ac-
use i m p l i c i t i n t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r i e s . I n t h e s e l a t e r w r i t i n g s , h o w e v e r ,
knowledges that epistemically used p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences and
h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s seems t o g o beyond
t e l e o l o g i c a l l y u s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s have a m e a n i n g content
t h i s . T h e y a r e s a i d t o rest o n f a u l t y p i c t u r e s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n
t h a t is i n s o m e sense i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n w h i c h
t h a t f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e i n t e r n a l , c o n c e p t u a l l i n k s w i t h pragmatic contexts
t h e y c a n b e e m b e d d e d . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sen-
of justification a n d t h u s r e m a i n t r a p p e d i n a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies o f a
t e n c e s t h a t s e r v e p u r e l y t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s o r facts, i t is
c o g n i t i v i s t a n d s e m a n t i c i s t k i n d . I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, v a l i d i t y a n d
sufficient.to k n o w their t r u t h conditions. I n order to u n d e r s t a n d
j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a n d h e n c e utterance m e a n i n g — a r e inescapably p r a g -
i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s t h a t serve t o c a l c u l a t e a c t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s
matic notions. T h e y cannot be explicated i n d e p e n d e n d y o f discur-
m o n o l o g i c a l l y — w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a s e c o n d p e r s o n — i t is s u f f i -
sive processes o f r e d e e m i n g d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W h i l e
c i e n t t o k n o w t h e i r success c o n d i t i o n s . S u c h s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h a r e
D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility c o n d i t i o n s pushes i n the d i r e c t i o n
used noncommunicatively, can be analyzed exhaustively w i t h the
o f a p r a g m a t i c a c c o u n t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d validity, i t does n o t q u i t e
t o o l s o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s . H o w e v e r , t h e y are s p e c i a l cases o f l a n -
arrive t h e r e ; i t r e m a i n s a semantic t h e o r y t o t h e e x t e n t that i t fails
g u a g e use, d u e t o a f e a t o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t s u s p e n d s t h e i r p r a g m a t i c
t o e x p l i c a t e these n o t i o n s as conceptually l i n k e d t o discursive p r o c -
d i m e n s i o n : t h e possible c o m m u n i c a t i v e situations i n w h i c h a speaker
esses o f r e d e e m i n g d i s p u t e d — a s s e r t o r i c a n d n o n a s s e r t o r i c — v a l i d i t y
w o u l d assert t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p," o r d e c l a r e t h e i n t e n t i o n "p," w i t h
claims.
t h e a i m o f f i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n addressee a r e a b s t r a c t e d f r o m .
As a r u l e , however, p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen- H a b e r m a s proposes t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a speech

t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t i o n s act w h e n w e k n o w w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . W e k n o w w h a t m a k e s a

and announcements. The m e a n i n g o f assertions and announce- s p e e c h a c t a c c e p t a b l e w h e n w e k n o w t h e kinds o f reasons t h a t a

m e n t s , w h i c h are p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , c a n b e speaker can offer, i f challenged, i n o r d e r to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g

e x p l i c a t e d o n l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y . F r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h a t H a b e r m a s w i t h a hearer c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity o f t h e d i s p u t e d c l a i m . I n every-

does n o t reject the f o r m a l semantic approach to m e a n i n g , f o r he d a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a h e a r e r

a c k n o w l e d g e s its a b i l i t y t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f noncommu- m u s t k n o w i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e are c i r c u m -

nicatively used p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sentences. A t t h e same s c r i b e d c o n t e x t u a l l y . L e t us i m a g i n e a r e q u e s t t o a passenger b y a n

time, he does challenge the claims o f formal-semantic theories to a i r l i n e steward to stop s m o k i n g . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d this request,

e x p l a i n t h e m e a n i n g o f utterances s u c h as assertions a n d announce- t h e p a s s e n g e r has t o b e a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t

m e n t s , o r m o r e generally, o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expres- the a i r l i n e steward c o u l d p r o v i d e i n o r d e r to justify his request, i f

sions. M o r e o v e r , i f f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g c a n a c c o u n t necessary. T h e s e r e a s o n s m i g h t i n c l u d e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t s m o k i n g

only for the noncommunicative use o f language, t h e n their re- is u n p l e a s a n t f o r o t h e r passengers o r t h a t i t is a g a i n s t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s

s t r i c t e d s c o p e suggests t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g is i t s e l f l i m i t e d . o f t h e a i r l i n e o r against a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l code o f a i r l i n e practice.


T h e s e r e a s o n s a r e o f c e r t a i n k i n d s . I f o t h e r k i n d s o f responses w e r e
W e h a v e a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is r e q u i r e d t o e x p l i - o f f e r e d as r e a s o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t is r a i n i n g o u t s i d e , o r t h a t
cate t h e m e a n i n g o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expressions. I t Finnegans Wake is J a m e s J o y c e ' s best b o o k , o r t h a t t h e r e a r e n o snakes
13
12
Introduction
Introduction

in I r e l a n d — t h e context i n question w o u l d render t h e m irrelevant a d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i t is e q u a l l y i n t h e

a n d , i n d e e d , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h t h e set o f r e a s o n s c o n s t i - interest o f all affected. Therefore, agreement reached i n discourse—

t u t i n g a g i v e n kind o f reasons is always i n p r i n c i p l e o p e n - e n d e d , i n i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y — c o n t r i b u t e s c o n s t r u c t i v e l y t o t h e va-

everyday contexts of communication contextual considerations l i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s . I t is c l e a r f r o m t h i s t h a t H a b e r m a s c o n c e i v e s

a c t as a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o m o r a l v a l i d i t y as i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d t o t h e i d e a o f d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d

justification. consensus a n d hence to pragmatic contexts o f justification.

T h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y has t o k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h e s p e a k e r H a b e r m a s also p r o p o s e s a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f t r u t h . Discussion

c o u l d a d d u c e i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e , h e has t o k n o w h o w t h e s p e a k e r o f t h i s is c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y a m e n d e d the

m i g h t use t h e m i n o r d e r t o e n g a g e i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w i t h a h e a r e r a c c o u n t h e o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d i n t h e 1973 essay, " W a h r h e i t s t h e o ¬

c o n c e r n i n g the validity o f a d i s p u t e d c l a i m . T h i s focus o n k n o w i n g r i e n , " w i t h o u t subsequently p r e s e n t i n g a fully revised version. H o w -

h o w t h e s p e a k e r m i g h t use r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a d i s p u t e d v a l i d i t y ever, a r e c e n t essay o n R i c h a r d R o r t y ' s n e o p r a g m a t i s m (included

claim clearly recalls D u m m e t t ' s epistemic turn. Like Dummett, h e r e as c h a p t e r 8 ) c a n b e seen as a n a t t e m p t t o r e c t i f y t h i s d e f i c i e n c y .

H a b e r m a s also stresses t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e reasons c a n n e v e r i n F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w h a t is m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t these r e -

p r i n c i p l e be d e c i d e d once a n d for a l l . Rather, t h e i r validity m u s t be c e n t r e m a r k s is t h e i r c o n t i n u e d i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e

c o n s t r u e d f a l l i b i l i s t i c a l l y , t h a t is, as always i n p r i n c i p l e s u b j e c t to o f t r u t h . H a b e r m a s associates h i m s e l f w i t h R o r t y ' s a i m o f r a d i c a l i z i n g

revision i n l i g h t o f new a r g u m e n t s based o n new evidence and the linguistic t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y by m o v i n g to a p r a g -

i n s i g h t s . T h i s is o n e sense i n w h i c h t h e q u e s t i o n o f v a l i d i t y is tied t o m a t i c l e v e l o f analysis. H e c r i t i c i z e s h i m , h o w e v e r , f o r d r a w i n g t h e

pragmatic contexts o f justification, a n d i t constitutes a f u r t h e r rea- w r o n g conclusions f r o m his c r i t i q u e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language.

son for describing Habermas's theory of meaning (and, indeed, R o r t y reduces t r u t h to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , thus losing sight o f

D u m m e t t ' s ) as p r a g m a t i c . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is a s e c o n d , p o s s i b l y m o r e the p o t e n t i a l power o f validity claims to e x p l o d e actual contexts of

contentious sense, i n w h i c h H a b e r m a s ties v a l i d i t y t o pragmatic j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , by contrast, wants t o h o l d o n t o t h e m o m e n t

c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n t h i s s e c o n d sense, v a l i d i t y is n o t o n l y o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y t h a t is p a r t o f t h e i d e a o f t r u t h , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g

always s u b j e c t i n p r i n c i p l e t o d i s c u r s i v e r é é v a l u a t i o n , i t is in itself an internal relation between t r u t h a n d justifiability. His aim, i n other

p r a g m a t i c . T h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g a t t a c h e d t o w o r d s , is t o w o r k o u t a t h e o r y o f t r u t h t h a t is i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c

t h e i d e a o f v a l i d i t y e x t e r n a l l y , as i t w e r e ; r a t h e r , i t is i n t e r n a l t o t h e yet retains t h e idea o f a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m t h a t reaches b e y o n d

v e r y c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t sees i t s e l f as a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us a t a n y g i v e n t i m e . W h a t w o u l d s u c h

p r a g m a t i c i n t h i s s t r o n g e r sense m u s t t h e r e f o r e o f f e r a p r a g m a t i c a t h e o r y l o o k l i k e ? I n t h e 1980s, H a b e r m a s d e f e n d e d a v i e w n o t

a c c o u n t o f v a l i d i t y itself. T o t h i s e x t e n t , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o - unlike Hilary Putnam's conception o f t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l

ries o f t r u t h ( e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l validity) a n d justice ( m o r a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y : a p r o p o s i t i o n was s a i d t o b e t r u e i f i t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d

v a l i d i t y ) — a n d , i n d e e d , his accounts o f e t h i c a l a n d aesthetic v a l i d - u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a n i d e a l s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n . T r u t h , o n t h i s ac-

i t y — a r e crucial ingredients o f his pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . c o u n t , is a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a n i n f i n i t e r a t i o n a l


c o n s e n s u s . I n t h e r e c e n t essay, h o w e v e r , Habermas acknowledges
H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l v a l i d i t y has b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f e x t e n - convincing objections to this earlier c o n c e p t i o n . O n e set o f o b j e c -
sive c o m m e n t a r y a n d c r i t i c i s m . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e t h e o r y t i o n s is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s o m e c o n c e p t u a l difficulties w i t h the very
o f m e a n i n g , o u r q u e s t i o n is t h e f o l l o w i n g : h o w is t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n o t i o n o f a n ideal speech situation, i n particular, the paradox i n -
m o r a l v a l i d i t y i t p r o p o s e s i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h processes o f volved i n a i m i n g for "complete" o r "conclusive knowledge." The
d i s c u r s i v e l y r e d e e m i n g v a l i d i t y claims? A n o r m o r p r i n c i p l e is m o r - o b j e c t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t w o u l d b e p a r a d o x i c a l
a l l y v a l i d ( r i g h t o r j u s t ) , f o r H a b e r m a s , i f i t is t h e p o s s i b l e o b j e c t o f
14 15
Introduction Introduction

f o r h u m a n b e i n g s t o strive t o r e a l i z e a n i d e a l , t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f satisfied o n l y i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i r satisfaction o r nonsatisfaction


w h i c h w o u l d b e t h e e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . A n o t h e r set o f objections is n o t i t s e l f a n e p i s t e m i c f a c t . W h e r e a s , as w e have seen, i d e a l i z e d
draws a t t e n t i o n to the difficulties involved i n conceptualizing the r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y constitutes t h e v a l i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s , i t m e r e l y
connection between t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i e d acceptability. O n t h e one indicates t h e t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e
h a n d , i f t h e r e is a n u n b r i d g e a b l e g a p b e t w e e n d e f a c t o a n d i d e a l f o r e g o i n g t h a t , o n H a b e r m a s ' s a c c o u n t , t h e concept o f t r u t h m u s t b e
a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e i d e a o f a n i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s seems so f a r u n p a c k e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y ; w e have n o access t o t r u t h e x c e p t b y w a y o f
r e m o v e d f r o m a c t u a l h u m a n p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as t o u n d e r - a concept o f validity explicated i n terms o f h o w we talk about t r u t h ,
m i n e the regulative role ascribed to i t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such a t h a t is, i n t e r m s o f a n i d e a l i z e d p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n .
g a p seems t o b e necessary i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t
A f u r t h e r c o n c e r n o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics
t r u t h has a m o m e n t o f context-transcendence.
is t o a r g u e t h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s is
I n t h e face o f these a n d o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s , H a b e r m a s n o longer t h e basic m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use o n w h i c h o t h e r m o d e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,
c o n c e i v e s t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . H e n o w focuses o n strategic o r fictional ones, are parasitic. O t h e r w i s e , i n i g n o r i n g these
t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s g u i d i n g t h e process o f r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n - o t h e r modes, t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n that everyday communicative ac-
t a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s m a r k i n g its outcome. t i o n has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n with context-transcendent validity
T h e f o r m e r idealizations p e r t a i n to the c o n d u c t o f discourse r a t h e r c l a i m s w o u l d b e s e r i o u s l y l i m i t e d . I n a r g u i n g f o r t h e d e r i v a t i v e status
than to the agreement to w h i c h participants i n discourse aspire. o f t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e , H a b e r m a s i n i t i a l l y d r e w o n A u s t i n ' s
T h e y i n c l u d e t h e i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that p a r t i c i p a n t s are m o t i - d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s (see c h a p t e r 2 ) . I n
vated only by the force o f the better a r g u m e n t , that all c o m p e t e n t response to criticisms o f his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this d i s t i n c t i o n , how-
parties are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e o n equal terms i n discussion, t h a t ever, H a b e r m a s subsequendy m o d i f i e d and c l a r i f i e d his under-
n o r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t is s u p p r e s s e d o r e x c l u d e d , a n d so o n . I t is s t a n d i n g o f A u s t i n ' s c a t e g o r i e s (see chapters 3, 4, a n d 7) while
f r o m such idealizations, w h i c h g u i d e t h e process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c o n
t h a t t h e i d e a o f t r u t h d r a w s its p o w e r as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . T h i s p o w e r t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under-
is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e i d e a t h a t a c l a i m , i f t r u e , c o u l d w i t h s t a n d a l l s t a n d i n g . H i s a r g u m e n t f o r t h e p a r a s i t i c status o f t h e s y m b o l i c , t h e
a t t e m p t s t o refute i t u n d e r i d e a l discursive c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i d e a o f figurative, and the fictional m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use is t h a t t h e e v e r y -
t r u t h has a " d e c e n t e r i n g " f u n c t i o n t h a t serves t o r e m i n d us t h a t w h a t d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e f u l f i l l s i n d i s p e n s a b l e problem-
is c u r r e n d y r e g a r d e d as r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e m a y c o n c e i v a b l y be solving functions that require idealizing suppositions not demanded
c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e , as t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o u r c u r r e n t b y t h e w o r l d - c r e a t i n g a n d w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g use o f l a n g u a g e charac-
understanding of argumentation become apparent. t e r i s t i c f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e a l m . T h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s of, f o r
I t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e t o b e w a r e o f c o n f u s i n g H a b e r m a s ' s explica- example, consistency o f m e a n i n g or a shared o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
t i o n o f the idea o f t r u t h w i t h an explanation o f what makes a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g are s u s p e n d e d i n t h e fictional use o f l a n -
p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . T h e thesis t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n , i f t r u e , c a n s t a n d u p guage, a n d w i t h these, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g p o w e r
to attempts to refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f r a t i o n a l o f e v e r y d a y s p e e c h acts (see c h a p t e r s 9 a n d 1 0 ) .
a r g u m e n t a t i o n e x p l i c a t e s t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h . I t is n o t ,
Finally, Habermas's pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g attempts to d o
however, a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h a t makes t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . As to
justice to t h e relations between utterances a n d t h e situations a n d
t h e l a t t e r , H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n is t h e s t a n d a r d o n e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n
c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e y are e m b e d d e d . F o r t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r -
is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. A l t h o u g h w e
a n c e is always t o u n d e r s t a n d i t as a n u t t e r a n c e i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n ,
c a n establish w h e t h e r t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a g i v e n p r o p o s i t i o n a r e
w h i c h i n t u r n may be p a r t o f m u l t i p l e , e x t e n d e d contexts. Here,
17
16
Introduction
Introduction

r o u g h c h r o n o l o g y i n o r d e r t o show d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revisions; t h e
H a b e r m a s draws a t t e n t i o n to various k i n d s o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l -
r e a d e r is e n c o u r a g e d t o l o o k o u t f o r t h e m .
edge: f o r instance, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker's p e r s o n a l h i s t o r y o r
I n c h a p t e r 1 w e a r e i n t r o d u c e d t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a r e s e a r c h
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e ( c u l t u r a l l y specific) contexts i n w h i c h a given
program aimed a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis of
t o p i c is n o r m a l l y discussed. These kinds o f knowledge, although
speech. T h e procedure of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is elucidated
u s u a l l y o n l y i m p l i c i t i n acts o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , are r e l a t i v e l y close t o
t h r o u g h reference b o t h to empirical-analytic approaches a n d to
the f o r e g r o u n d a n d can be r e n d e r e d explicit w i t h o u t difficulty. T h u s
K a n t i a n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis. T h i s is f o l l o w e d b y a s k e t c h o f a
they can be contrasted w i t h the deep-seated, prereflective, taken-for-
t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h d i v e r g e s f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's
g r a n t e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t , as a h o r i z o n o f
t h e o r i e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects, a n d i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e
shared, u n p r o b l e m a t i c convictions, c a n n o t be s u m m o n e d to con-
characterized i n terms o f claims to validity.
sciousness a t w i l l o r i n its e n t i r e t y . T h i s b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of
the lifeworld forms the indispensable context for the communicative C h a p t e r s 2, 3, 4, a n d 6, t h o u g h s i t u a t i n g f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s i n

use o f l a n g u a g e ; i n d e e d w i t h o u t i t , m e a n i n g o f a n y k i n d w o u l d b e r e l a t i o n t o H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , focus o n t h e

i m p o s s i b l e . I t also f u n c t i o n s t o a b s o r b t h e r i s k o f social d i s i n t e g r a - t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h e c o o r d i n a t i n g p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts is e x -

tion t h a t arises w h e n a s o c i a l o r d e r is r e p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h plained t h r o u g h an account of understanding utterance meaning i n

m e c h a n i s m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I t is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y c o m p l e - terms o f k n o w i n g acceptability conditions. T h i s pragmatic theory o f

m e n t to Habermas's theories o f m e a n i n g a n d communicative action m e a n i n g is p r e s e n t e d as a n a t t e m p t t o o v e r c o m e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f

(see, i n p a r t i c u l a r , c h a p t e r s 2, 4, a n d 8 ) . semantic theories t h r o u g h d r a w i n g o n K a r l Buhler's schema o f lan-


g u a g e f u n c t i o n s a n d o n speech-act t h e o r y . I n a d d i t i o n , a t y p o l o g y o f
T h e essays c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s a n t h o l o g y w e r e s e l e c t e d w i t h t h e a i m
s p e e c h acts b a s e d o n t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l
o f p r o v i d i n g g e n e r a l access t o H a b e r m a s ' s t r e a t m e n t o f f o r m a l p r a g -
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is set u p i n c h a p t e r 2, f o r m i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d f o r
m a t i c s , f r o m h i s e a r l i e s t p r o g r a m m a t i c essay ( c h a p t e r 1) t o h i s m o s t
H a b e r m a s ' s discussion i n subsequent chapters. T h e c o n c e p t o f life-
r e c e n t a t t e m p t s t o resolve s o m e p e r c e i v e d p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s ac-
w o r l d as a k i n d o f d e e p - s e a t e d , i m p l i c i t , b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is
counts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h (chapters 7 a n d 8). Whereas, i n the
also i n t r o d u c e d i n c h a p t e r 2 a n d d e v e l o p e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n c h a p t e r
process o f translating, revising e x i s t i n g translations, a n d retranslat-
4. H a b e r m a s stresses t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s c o n c e p t , o n t h e one
i n g , e v e r y e f f o r t has b e e n m a d e t o ensure t e r m i n o l o g i c a l consis-
h a n d , as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g u t t e r a n c e meaning
tency, n o a t t e m p t has b e e n m a d e to impose consistency on the
a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , as a r i s k - a b s o r b i n g c o u n t e r p o i s e t o t h e p o t e n t i a l l y
a r g u m e n t s as t h e y a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e v a r i o u s essays. W e h a v e s e e n ,
d i s i n t e g r a t i v e effects o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under-
f o r instance, that Habermas's earliest proposal for a pragmatic the-
standing. Further, Austin's distinction between illocutions a n d per-
o r y o f m e a n i n g differs i n s o m e respects f r o m his subsequent propos-
l o c u t i o n s is a t h r e a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h these c h a p t e r s , a n d is u s e d b y
als, a n d that he h i m s e l f has modified his d i s t i n c t i o n between
H a b e r m a s t o s u p p o r t h i s thesis t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c m o d e o f l a n g u a g e
i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s as i n i t i a l l y d r a w n . I n l a t e r w r i t i n g s (see
use is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use. T h i s i n v o l v e s h i m i n
c h a p t e r 7) h e i n t r o d u c e s a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f Ver-
discussion a b o u t t h e status o f s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s ( f o r example,
stdndigung b e t w e e n a w e a k a n d s t r o n g o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s ,
t h r e a t s ) , w h i c h as a t y p e o f u t t e r a n c e n o t a p p a r e n t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h
a n d (see c h a p t e r 8 ) h e takes o n b o a r d o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n
validity claims, seem to u n d e r m i n e his c l a i m t h a t strategic utterances
o f t r u t h h i n t e d at i n c h a p t e r 3 o f t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e . W i t h the
h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status.
e x c e p t i o n o f t h e last t w o p i e c e s , w h i c h a r e n o t d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d
w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g , t h e a n t h o l o g y p r e s e n t s t h e essays i n C h a p t e r 5 is a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f Searle's t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as
d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e l a t e 1970s o n w a r d s . H a b e r m a s exposes s o m e
18 19
Introduction Introduction

problems attached t o Searle's view, w h i c h h e r e a d s as a modified Note


i n t e n t i o n a l i s t o n e , a r g u i n g t h a t h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is b e t t e r
able to a c c o u n t for the m e a n i n g of, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i m p e r a t i v e s and 1. Verständigung ( n . ) : "reaching understanding," "mutual understanding," or "com-
promises. munication. T h e corresponding verb is sich verständigen. As Habermas acknowl-
edges, this term is ambiguous even in G e r m a n . Although it embraces linguistic
Chapter 7 responds to Herbert Schnadelbach's criticisms of comprehension (Verstehen), it goes beyond this to refer to the process of reaching
Habermas's concept of communicative rationality. Accepting understanding, in the sense of reaching an agreement with another person or per-
sons. However, despite having previously used the two terms interchangeably, Haber-
S c h n a d e l b a c h ' s c r i t i c i s m t h a t h e has h i t h e r t o a c c o r d e d i t a p r i v i - mas now distinguishes between Verständigung a n d Einverständnis, agreement or
leged position, Habermas now identifies three core structures of consensus in the strict sense (see chapter 7). Finally, Verständigung can also be used
as a synonym for "communication"; thus, for example, communicative rationality is
r a t i o n a l i t y ; t h i s leads h i m t o m a k e s o m e n e w d i s t i n c t i o n s between
occasionally rendered by Habermas as Verständigungsrationaätät.
d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use. O n e n o t e w o r t h y modification
h e r e is h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a c t i o n oriented
toward reaching understanding i n a w e a k e r sense a n d a c t i o n ori-
e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t i n t h e s t r i c t sense a n d , correspondingly,
between weak and strong communicative action. Some implications
o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s f o r t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a r e also discussed.
Chapter 8 examines Richard Rorty's neopragmatism, interpreted
b y H a b e r m a s as a n a t t e m p t t o c a r r y t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n t h r o u g h t o
its c o n c l u s i o n , a n d c r i t i c i z e s i t f o r its a s s i m i l a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s t o
j u s t i f i e d assertibility.
C h a p t e r 9 focuses o n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e fictional or poetic
use o f l a n g u a g e a n d l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a -
tive a c t i o n ; i t criticizes D e r r i d e a n s for faulty accounts o f everyday
a n d poetic language, for a consequent problematic leveling o f the
distinction between literature and communicative action, and for a
failure to appreciate the distinctive m e d i a t i n g roles o f p h i l o s o p h y
and literary criticism.
I n c h a p t e r 10, H a b e r m a s r e s p o n d s t o several c r i t i c i s m s o f his
t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. Against Rorty, he defends his view
o f p h i l o s o p h y as g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n , w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t t h i s
r o l e m u s t b e d e f i n e d i n a n e w way. H e t h e n c l a r i f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h
respect to m o d e r n art a n d the validity claims c o n n e c t e d w i t h i t ,
reaffirms his position t h a t interpretive u n d e r s t a n d i n g inescapably
i n v o l v e s e v a l u a t i o n , c l a r i f i e s h i s i d e a o f t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n as a n
interplay o f validity dimensions, a n d concludes w i t h a discussion o f
t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t his t h e o r y concentrates o n justice at t h e expense
o f happiness.
1
What Is Universal Pragmatics? (1976)

T h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is t o i d e n t i f y a n d r e c o n s t r u c t u n i -
v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). 1

I n o t h e r c o n t e x t s , o n e also speaks o f " g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of


c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " b u t I p r e f e r to speak o f g e n e r a l presuppositions of
communicative a c t i o n because I t a k e t h e t y p e o f a c t i o n a i m e d a t
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o be f u n d a m e n t a l . T h u s I start f r o m t h e
assumption (without u n d e r t a k i n g to demonstrate it here) that other
f o r m s o f s o c i a l a c t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , c o n f l i c t , c o m p e t i t i o n , strategic
a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l — a r e derivatives o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e l a n g u a g e is t h e
specific m e d i u m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at t h e sociocultural
stage o f e v o l u t i o n , I w a n t t o g o a step f u r t h e r a n d s i n g l e o u t e x p l i c i t
speech actions f r o m o t h e r forms o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I shall
ignore n o n v e r b a l actions a n d bodily expressions. 2

T h e V a l i d i t y Basis o f S p e e c h

Karl-Otto A p e l proposes the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n i n regard to the


g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts: t o i d e n t i f y s u c h
presuppositions w e m u s t , h e t h i n k s , leave t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of the
o b s e r v e r o f b e h a v i o r a l facts a n d c a l l t o m i n d " w h a t w e m u s t n e c e s -
sarily always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e i n r e g a r d t o o u r s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s as
22 23
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

n o r m a t i v e conditions o f the possibility o f reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; a n c e t h a t is r i g h t (richtig) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s a n d v a l u e s


a n d i n t h i s sense, w h a t w e m u s t necessarily always a l r e a d y have so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e , a n d b o t h s p e a k e r a n d
a c c e p t e d . " A p e l h e r e uses t h e a p r i o r i s t i c p e r f e c t (immer schon: always
3
h e a r e r c a n , i n t h e u t t e r a n c e , t h e r e b y agree with one another w i t h
a l r e a d y ) a n d a d d s t h e m o d e o f necessity i n o r d e r t o e x p r e s s t h e respect to a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . Moreover, commu-
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t t o w h i c h w e , as speakers, are s u b j e c t as n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n c o n t i n u e u n d i s t u r b e d o n l y as l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i -
s o o n as w e p e r f o r m o r u n d e r s t a n d o r r e s p o n d t o a s p e e c h act. I n o r p a n t s s u p p o s e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h e y r e c i p r o c a l l y raise are
a f t e r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h i s act, w e c a n b e c o m e a w a r e t h a t w e h a v e raised justifiably.
i n v o l u n t a r i l y m a d e c e r t a i n a s s s u m p t i o n s , w h i c h A p e l calls " n o r m a - T h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is t o b r i n g
tive c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h e a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) t h a t t e r m i n a t e s i n t h e i n t e r s u b -
a d j e c t i v e " n o r m a t i v e " m a y g i v e rise t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O n e can jective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension, shared knowledge,
say, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e — i n t h i s sense t r a n - m u t u a l t r u s t , a n d a c c o r d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . A g r e e m e n t is b a s e d o n
scendental—conditions o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g have a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e four corresponding v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : comprehensi-
normative content w h e n one thinks n o t only o f the validity d i m e n - b i l i t y , t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. W e c a n see t h a t t h e word
sion o f n o r m s o f action o r evaluation, o r even o f the validity d i m e n - "Verständigung" is a m b i g u o u s . I n its n a r r o w e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s
s i o n o f r u l e s i n g e n e r a l , b u t also o f t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h across t h a t t w o s u b j e c t s u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e same way;
its e n t i r e s p e c t r u m . As a p r e l i m i n a r y , I w a n t t o i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y w h a t i n its b r o a d e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a n a c c o r d exists b e t w e e n t w o
I m e a n b y t h e " v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . " subjects concerning t h e Tightness o f a n utterance i n relation t o a
I s h a l l d e v e l o p t h e thesis t h a t a n y o n e a c t i n g communicatively mutually recognized normative background. I n a d d i t i o n , the partici-
m u s t , i n p e r f o r m i n g a n y s p e e c h act, raise u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s pants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n can reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about s o m e t h i n g
a n d s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y c a n b e v i n d i c a t e d (einlösen). I n s o f a r as she i n the w o r l d , a n d they can make their i n t e n t i o n s understandable to
wants to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , she one another.
c a n n o t avoid raising the f o l l o w i n g — a n d i n d e e d precisely t h e follow- I f f u l l a g r e e m e n t , e m b r a c i n g a l l f o u r o f these c o m p o n e n t s , were
i n g — v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . She c l a i m s t o b e a n o r m a l state o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i t w o u l d n o t b e neces-
sary to analyze t h e process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the
a. u t t e r i n g s o m e t h i n g intelligibly,
dynamic perspective o f bringing about a n a g r e e m e n t . T h e typical
b . g i v i n g ( t h e h e a r e r ) something t o u n d e r s t a n d , states a r e i n t h e g r a y areas b e t w e e n , on the one h a n d , lack of
c. m a k i n g herself t h e r e b y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , a n d understanding and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary
d . c o m i n g t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another person. untruthfulness, concealed and open discord, and, on the other
h a n d , p r e e x i s t i n g o r a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s . R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is
T h e s p e a k e r m u s t c h o o s e a n i n t e l l i g i b l e (verständlich) e x p r e s s i o n t h e process o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t o n the presupposed
so t h a t s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r c a n comprehend one another. T h e s p e a k e r basis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t are m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d . I n e v e r y d a y l i f e ,
m u s t have t h e i n t e n t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g a t r u e (wahr) p r o p o s i t i o n we start f r o m a b a c k g r o u n d consensus p e r t a i n i n g t o those i n t e r p r e -
(or a prepositional content, the existential presuppositions o f w h i c h t a t i o n s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s . A s s o o n as t h i s c o n -
a r e satisfied) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n share the knowledge o f t h e speaker. sensus is s h a k e n , a n d as s o o n as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y
T h e s p e a k e r m u s t w a n t t o e x p r e s s h e r i n t e n t i o n s truthfully (wahr- c l a i m s a r e satisfied ( o r c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d ) is s u s p e n d e d i n t h e case
haftig) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n find the utterance o f the speaker o f a t least o n e o f t h e f o u r c l a i m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n n o t be
credible (can trust h e r ) . Finally, the speaker m u s t choose a n u t t e r - continued.
25
24
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e task o f m u t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n , is t o a c h i e v e a n e w d e f i n i - i n t u i t i o n s a n d experiences or t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s a n d action conse-


t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s can share. I f this a t t e m p t quences, justifies the claim's worthiness to be r e c o g n i z e d a n d b r i n g s
f a i l s , o n e is b a s i c a l l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s o f s w i t c h i n g t o a b o u t a s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f its v a l i d i t y . I n accepting a v a l i d -
strategic a c t i o n , b r e a k i n g o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether, o r recom- i t y c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker, t h e h e a r e r r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y o f
m e n c i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a d i f f e r - the symbolic s t r u c t u r e s ; t h a t is, h e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a s e n t e n c e is
ent level, the level of argumentative speech (for purposes of grammatical, a statement true, an i n t e n t i o n a l expression t r u t h f u l , or
discursively e x a m i n i n g the p r o b l e m a t i c validity claims, w h i c h are an u t t e r a n c e correct. T h e validity o f these symbolic s t r u c t u r e s is
n o w r e g a r d e d as h y p o t h e t i c a l ) . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I s h a l l t a k e i n t o justified b y v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y satisfy c e r t a i n a d e q u a c y c o n d i -
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts, l e a v i n g aside b o t h d i s - t i o n s ; b u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e v a l i d i t y consists i n t h e i r worthiness t o
course a n d strategic a c t i o n . b e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t is, i n t h e g u a r a n t e e t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i -
I n communicative action, participants presuppose that they k n o w tion can be b r o u g h t about u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s . 4

w h a t m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f reciprocally raised validity claims means. I have p r o p o s e d t h e n a m e " u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s " f o r t h e r e s e a r c h


5

I f i n a d d i t i o n they can rely o n a shared d e f i n i t i o n o f the situation program aimed a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis of


a n d t h e r e u p o n act consensually, t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus i n c l u d e s speech. 6
I w o u l d n o w like to d e l i m i t t h e t h e m e o f this research
the f o l l o w i n g : p r o g r a m i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way. T h u s b e f o r e p a s s i n g o n ( i n p a r t I I )
t o t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, I s h a l l p r e f i x a f e w g u i d i n g r e m a r k s
a. S p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r k n o w i m p l i c i t l y t h a t e a c h o f t h e m has t o r a i s e
dealing w i t h (i) an initial d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the object d o m a i n o f the
t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i f t h e r e is t o b e communication
proposed p r o g r a m o f universal pragmatics; (ii) an elucidation o f the
a t a l l ( i n t h e sense o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under- procedure o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o a n e m p i r i c a l -
standing) . a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense; ( i i i ) a f e w methodological
b . B o t h r e c i p r o c a l l y s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y d o satisfy t h e s e p r e - d i f f i c u l t i e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s c l a i m s t h e status o f
suppositions o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h a t t h e y j u s t i f i a b l y raise a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e ; a n d finally ( i v ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
t h e i r validity claims. p r o p o s e d u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s assumes t h e status o f a t r a n s c e n d e n -

c. T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e r e is a c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a n y v a l i d i t y tal t h e o r y o f r e f l e c t i o n o r t h a t o f a n e m p i r i c a l l y substantive r e c o n -

c l a i m s r a i s e d e i t h e r are a l r e a d y v i n d i c a t e d , as i n t h e case o f the structive science. I shall restrict myself t o g u i d i n g r e m a r k s because,

c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e s u t t e r e d , or, as i n t h e case o f w h i l e these questions are f u n d a m e n t a l a n d deserve t o be examined

t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness, c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e independently, they f o r m only the c o n t e x t o f the topic I shall treat


a n d must thus remain i n the background.
s e n t e n c e s , p r o p o s i t i o n s , e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s , a n d u t t e r a n c e s satisfy
t h e corresponding a d e q u a c y c o n d i t i o n s .
Preliminary Delimitation of the Object D o m a i n
T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e conditions f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a g r a m m a t i -
cal sentence, t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h f u l i n t e n t i o n a l expression, or
I n several o f h i s w o r k s , A p e l has p o i n t e d t o t h e a b s t r a c t i v e f a l l a c y
n o r m a t i v e l y c o r r e c t u t t e r a n c e a p p r o p r i a t e t o its c o n t e x t f r o m ( i i )
that u n d e r l i e s the a p p r o a c h to the logic o f science favored by c o n -
the claims w i t h w h i c h s p e a k e r s d e m a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n
t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y . T h e l o g i c a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e t h a t
7

for the well-formedness o f a sentence, t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h -


o r i g i n a t e d w i t h C a r n a p focuses p r i m a r i l y o n s y n t a c t i c a n d s e m a n t i c
f u l n e s s o f a n i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , a n d Tightness o f a s p e e c h act,
properties o f linguistic formations. L i k e structuralist linguistics, i t
as w e l l as f r o m ( i i i ) t h e vindication o f j u s t i f i a b l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
d e l i m i t s its o b j e c t d o m a i n b y first a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c
V i n d i c a t i o n means that the p r o p o n e n t , whether t h r o u g h appeal to
26 27

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

properties o f language, a n d subsequentiy i n t r o d u c i n g the pragmatic o f s i g n s ) . I f t h e s p e a k i n g p r o c e s s is c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n t h i s way, t h e


d i m e n s i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n n e c t i o n between f u n d a m e n t a l question o f universal pragmatics concerning the gen-
t h e g e n e r a t i v e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d e r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)
acting, o n the one h a n d , a n d the general structures o f speech, o n c a n n o t b e p o s e d i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e i n t e r s u b -
t h e o t h e r , c a n n o t c o m e i n t o view. I t is c e r t a i n l y l e g i t i m a t e t o d r a w j e c t i v i t y o f m e a n i n g s t h a t a r e i d e n t i c a l f o r a t least t w o speakers d o e s
a n a b s t r a c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e as s t r u c t u r e a n d speak- n o t e v e n b e c o m e a p r o b l e m ( i ) i f t h e i d e n t i t y o f m e a n i n g s is reduced
i n g as p r o c e s s . A l a n g u a g e w i l l t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a system o f t o e x t e n s i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t classes o f b e h a v i o r a l p r o p e r t i e s , as is
rules f o r g e n e r a t i n g expressions, such t h a t a l l w e l l - f o r m e d expres- d o n e i n l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r i s m , o r ( i i ) i f i t is p r e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e
9

sions (e.g., sentences) m a y c o u n t as e l e m e n t s o f t h i s l a n g u a g e . On a n a l y t i c l e v e l t h a t t h e r e exists a c o m m o n c o d e a n d s t o r e o f signs


t h e o t h e r h a n d , subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g c a n e m p l o y s u c h ex- b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d receiver, as is d o n e i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y .
pressions as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; f o r i n - I n a d d i t i o n t o e m p i r i c i s t a p p r o a c h e s t h a t issue, i n o n e w a y o r
s t a n c e , t h e y c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s as w e l l as u n d e r s t a n d t h e m a n d another, f r o m the semiotics o f M o r r i s , t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g ap-
r e s p o n d t o t h e m . T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f language f r o m t h e use o f l a n - p r o a c h e s t o t h e l o g i c a l analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h a n d
g u a g e i n speech (langue versus parole), w h i c h is m a d e i n b o t h t h e a c t i o n . T h e f o l l o w i n g analyses c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r i b u t i o n s
l o g i c a l a n d t h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t analysis o f l a n g u a g e , is m e a n i n g f u l . a l o n g t h e way t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . B a r - H i l l e l p o i n t e d o u t q u i t e
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l step is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r t h e e a r l y t h e necessity f o r a p r a g m a t i c e x t e n s i o n o f l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s . 10

view that the pragmatic d i m e n s i o n o f language from which one A l s o o f n o t e a r e t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a deontic logic ( H a r e , H . v o n W r i g h t ,
abstracts is b e y o n d f o r m a l ( o r l i n g u i s t i c ) analysis. A n a b s t r a c t i v e N . Rescher) 1 1
and corresponding a t t e m p t s at a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f
f a l l a c y arises i n t h a t t h e successful, o r a t least p r o m i s i n g , r e c o n s t r u c - s p e e c h acts s u c h as assertions a n d q u e s t i o n s ( A p o s t e l ) ; 1 2
approaches
t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c r u l e systems is seen as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s t r i c t i n g to a logic o f nondeductive a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( T o u l m i n , Botha) b e l o n g
f o r m a l analysis t o t h i s o b j e c t d o m a i n . T h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e t w o h e r e as w e l l . 1 3
F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p r e -
a n a l y t i c levels, language a n d speech, s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e i n s u c h a way suppositions (Kiefer, Petöfi), conversational postulates (Grice, L a k -
14

t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e is l e f t t o e x c l u s i v e l y e m - off), 1 5
s p e e c h acts (Ross, M c C a w l e y , W u n d e r l i c h ) , 1 6
and dialogues
p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s — t h a t is, t o e m p i r i c a l sciences s u c h as p s y c h o l i n g u i s - a n d texts ( F i l l m o r e , P o s n e r ) 1 7
lead to a consideration of the prag-
tics a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e f r o m a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p o i n t o f view.

I w o u l d l i k e t o d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t n o t o n l y l a n g u a g e b u t s p e e c h T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n semantic t h e o r y ( L y o n s , Katz) p o i n t i n the same

t o o — t h a t is, t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s — i s accessi- direction. 1 8


F r o m t h e side o f formal semantics, i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e d i s -

b l e t o f o r m a l analysis. L i k e t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f l a n g u a g e (sen- cussion—going back to Frege and Russell—of the structure of

tences), the elementary units o f speech (utterances) can be analyzed propositions, o f referential terms a n d predicates (Strawson) 1 9
is sig-

f r o m t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l stance o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e . n i f i c a n t f o r a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . T h e s a m e h o l d s f o r analytic action


theory ( D a n t o , H a m p s h i r e , S c h w a y d e r ) 2 0
a n d f o r t h e discussion t h a t
Approaches to a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n have been
has a r i s e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e l o g i c o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f i n t e n -
d e v e l o p e d f r o m the semiotics o f Charles M o r r i s . I n t h e i r f r a m e w o r k
8

tional a c t i o n ( W i n c h , Taylor, v o n W r i g h t ) . 2 1
T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n -
o f f u n d a m e n t a l concepts they integrate the m o d e l o f linguistic be-
ing introduced b y W i t t g e n s t e i n has u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c aspects
haviorism (the symbolically m e d i a t e d behavioral reaction o f the
(Alston), 2 2
as d o e s t h e a t t e m p t b y G r i c e t o t r a c e t h e m e a n i n g of
stimulated individual organism) with the model of information
s e n t e n c e s b a c k t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers ( B e n n e t t , Schif-
transmission (encoding a n d decoding signals b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d
fer). 2 3
As the most p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for a universal
r e c e i v e r f o r a g i v e n c h a n n e l a n d a n a t least p a r t i a l l y c o m m o n store
28 29

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

pragmatics, I shall draw p r i m a r i l y o n t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts a m n o t u s i n g f o r m a l analysis i n a sense t h a t r e f e r s , say, t o t h e s t a n -


i n i t i a t e d b y A u s t i n (Searle, W u n d e r l i c h ) , 2 4
d a r d p r e d i c a t e l o g i c o r t o a n y s p e c i f i c l o g i c . T h e t o l e r a n t sense i n
These approaches developed f r o m logic, linguistics, a n d t h e ana- which I understand formal analysis can best be characterized
lytic p h i l o s o p h y o f language have t h e c o m m o n g o a l o f c l a r i f y i n g t h r o u g h the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l attitude we a d o p t i n the rational recon-
processes o f l a n g u a g e use f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f f o r m a l analysis. s t r u c t i o n o f concepts, criteria, rules, a n d schemata. T h u s we speak
H o w e v e r , i f o n e evaluates t h e m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h e y of the explication o f meanings a n d c o n c e p t s , o f t h e analysis of
m a k e t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e i r weaknesses also b e c o m e a p p a r - presuppositions a n d r u l e systems, a n d so f o r t h . O f c o u r s e , recon-
e n t . I n m a n y cases I see a d a n g e r t h a t t h e analysis o f c o n d i t i o n s of s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s a r e also i m p o r t a n t f o r e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c r e -
p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is f o r e s h o r t e n e d , e i t h e r s e a r c h , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r e x p l i c a t i n g f r a m e w o r k s o f basic c o n c e p t s ,
for f o r m a l i z i n g assumptions initially f o r m u l a t e d i n ordinary lan-
a. b e c a u s e these a p p r o a c h e s d o n o t g e n e r a l i z e r a d i c a l l y e n o u g h a n d
guage, for clarifying deductive relations a m o n g particular hypothe-
d o n o t p u s h t h r o u g h the level o f f o r t u i t o u s contexts to general a n d
ses, f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g r e s u l t s o f m e a s u r e m e n t , a n d so o n . N o n e t h e l e s s ,
unavoidable presuppositions—as is t h e case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h m o s t r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s are n o t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f sciences t h a t d e -
o f the linguistic investigations o f semantic a n d pragmatic presuppo- velop n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses a b o u t d o m a i n s o f observable objects
sitions; o r a n d events; r a t h e r , these p r o c e d u r e s a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h o s e sci-
b . because they restrict themselves to t h e i n s t r u m e n t s d e v e l o p e d i n e n c e s t h a t systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent
logic a n d g r a m m a r , even w h e n these are i n a d e q u a t e f o r c a p t u r i n g subjects.
p r a g m a t i c relations—as, f o r e x a m p l e , i n syntactic e x p l a n a t i o n s of I n clarifying the distinction between empirical-analytic and recon-
the performative character o f speech acts; 25
or s t r u c t i v e sciences, I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
c. b e c a u s e t h e y m i s l e a d o n e i n t o a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e o r observation a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o r
t h a t have n o t b e e n satisfactorily analyzed—as c a n , i n m y view, b e understanding ( Verstehen). O b s e r v a t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d p e r c e p t i b l e
s h o w n i n t h e case o f t h e l o g i c s o f n o r m s w h i c h t r a c e n o r m s o f a c t i o n t h i n g s a n d events ( o r states); u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e
back to commands; or finally meaning of utterances. 2 7
I n e x p e r i e n c i n g , t h e o b s e r v e r is i n p r i n c i -
p l e a l o n e , e v e n i f t h e c a t e g o r i a l n e t i n w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s are o r g a n -
d . b e c a u s e t h e y start from the model o f the isolated, purposive-
i z e d as e x p e r i e n c e s l a y i n g c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y is always a l r e a d y s h a r e d
rational actor a n d thereby fail—as do, for instance, Grice and
b y several ( o r e v e n a l l ) i n d i v i d u a l s . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e i n t e r p r e t e r w h o
L e w i s — t o r e c o n s t r u c t i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way t h e s p e c i f i c m o m e n t
2 6

u n d e r s t a n d s m e a n i n g u n d e r g o e s h e r e x p e r i e n c e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y as
o f mutuality i n the understanding o f identical meanings or i n the
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e
r e c o g n i t i o n o f intersubjective validity claims.
r e l a t i o n established t h r o u g h symbols w i t h o t h e r individuals, even i f
I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts is l a r g e l y f r e e o f she is i n f a c t a l o n e w i t h a b o o k , a d o c u m e n t , o r a w o r k o f a r t . I s h a l l
t h e s e a n d s i m i l a r weaknesses. n o t h e r e analyze t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g any further; I w o u l d like to direct attention to j u s t
Some Remarks o n the Procedure o f Rational Reconstruction o n e aspect o f this: t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n level b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i b l e reality
a n d the understandable m e a n i n g o f a symbolic f o r m a t i o n . Sensory
I have b e e n e m p l o y i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " f o r m a l analysis" i n o p p o s i - e x p e r i e n c e is r e l a t e d t o s e g m e n t s o f r e a l i t y w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n , c o m -
t i o n t o e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e s ( i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense) w i t h - m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y m e d i a t e l y , as i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e d i a g r a m
o u t p r o v i d i n g a d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s is, a t least, m i s l e a d i n g . I below:
31
30
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e two pairs o f concepts—"perceptible r e a l i t y " versus " s y m b o l i -


Level 1 O b s e r v a b l e events Observation (Observer)
cally prestructured reality" and "observation" versus "under-
A
I Understanding s t a n d i n g " — c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a n o t h e r p a i r : " d e s c r i p t i o n " versus
Level 2 '- - O b s e r v a t i o n sentence p )
( I n t e r r e t e r
" e x p l i c a t i o n . " W i t h the aid o f a sentence that represents a n observa-
t I tion, I c a n describe t h e o b s e r v e d a s p e c t o f r e a l i t y . W i t h t h e a i d o f a
Level 3 i Interpretation
sentence t h a t represents an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a sym-
b o l i c f o r m a t i o n , I c a n explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e .
T h i s d i a g r a m represents three d i f f e r e n t relationships: N a t u r a l l y , o n l y w h e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n is u n -

a. E p i s t e m i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n e x p e r i e n t i a l acts a n d t h e i r o b j e c t s . I n clear does the e x p l i c a t i o n n e e d t o b e set o f f as a n independent

t h i s sense, t h e act o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e l a t e s t o t h e s y m b o l i c expres- a n a l y t i c step. I n r e g a r d t o s e n t e n c e s t h a t w e use t o d e s c r i b e o b j e c t s

s i o n ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w t h e a n d events, t h e r e c a n b e a l a c k o f c l a r i t y a t v a r i o u s levels. D e p e n d i n g


o n the level, we d e m a n d explications o f d i f f e r e n t kinds. I f the p h e -
act o f o b s e r v a t i o n relates t o t h e o b j e c t s a n d events observed.
n o m e n o n d e s c r i b e d is i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n , w e d e m a n d a n e x p l i -
b . Relations o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a n aspect o f reality i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l
cation that makes clear how reality operates and how the
s e n t e n c e . I n t h i s sense, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e s e m a n t i c
phenomenon i n question comes about. I f , by contrast, the descrip-
c o n t e n t ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w
tion i t s e l f is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , we demand an explication that
t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e r e p r e s e n t s c e r t a i n o b j e c t s a n d events.
makes clear w h a t t h e observer m e a n t by his u t t e r a n c e a n d h o w t h e
c. R e l a t i o n s o f e x p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n a l acts. I n t h i s sense, t h e u n d e r - symbolic expression i n need o f elucidation comes about. I n the first
standing ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e case, a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l i c a t i o n w i l l h a v e t h e f o r m o f a n e x p l a n a t i o n
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , j u s t as t h e o b s e r v a t i o n w e u n d e r t a k e w i t h t h e a i d o f a causal h y p o t h e s i s . I n t h e s e c o n d case,
is expressed in the propositional content of the observation we speak o f e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g . ( O f course, explications of
sentence. m e a n i n g n e e d n o t be l i m i t e d t o descriptive sentences; any m e a n i n g -
fully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n can be subjected to the operation of
A p a r t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h r e e types o f r e l a t i o n s i m p l y p o i n t t o
meaning explication.)
f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , t h e r e is a n a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y i n s p e c i f y i n g
t h e precise differences b e t w e e n the epistemic r e l a t i o n s o f t h e ob- D e s c r i p t i o n s a n d e x p l i c a t i o n s h a v e d i f f e r e n t r a n g e s ; t h e y c a n be-
server a n d t h e i n t e r p r e t e r to t h e i r respective objects a n d between g i n o n t h e surface a n d p u s h t h r o u g h to u n d e r l y i n g structures. We
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l relations o f t h e observation sentence to reality, are f a m i l i a r w i t h this fact f r o m t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m -
o n the one h a n d , a n d t h a t o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n sentence to (sym- e n a — t h e m o r e general t h e theories are w i t h w h i c h we e x p l a i n n a t u -
bolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d ) reality, o n the other. T h i s specification ral phenomena, the more penetrating the corresponding theoretical
w o u l d require a comparison between observation and interpreta- d e s c r i p t i o n s . T h e same is t r u e o f e x p l i c a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g . O f c o u r s e ,
tion, between description a n d explication. For the time being, the i n t h e case o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n s , t h e r a n g e o f e x p l i c a t i o n d o e s
d i a g r a m is i n t e n d e d m e r e l y t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e t w o levels o f r e a l i t y t o n o t d e p e n d o n the level o f generality o f theoretical knowledge a b o u t
w h i c h sensory a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience respectively relate. t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f a n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y accessible t o o b s e r v a t i o n b u t
T h e difference i n level between p e r c e p t i b l e a n d symbolically p r e - on knowledge of the deep structures o f a r e a l i t y accessible to
structured r e a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d i n the gap between direct access understanding—a reality of symbolic formations produced ac-
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n of r e a l i t y a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y m e d i a t e d access c o r d i n g to rules. T h e explication o f natural p h e n o m e n a pushes
t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e concerning reality. in a different direction f r o m the explication o f the meaning of
expressions.
32 33

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

F u r t h e r m o r e , I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o levels o f e x p l i c a t i o n of f o r m a t i o n — p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h its s u r f a c e , as i t w e r e — i n o r d e r t o
m e a n i n g . I f the m e a n i n g o f a w r i t t e n sentence, action, gesture, w o r k d i s c o v e r t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h i s s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n was
o f a r t , t o o l , t h e o r y , c o m m o d i t y , t r a n s m i t t e d d o c u m e n t , a n d so o n is p r o d u c e d ( i n o u r example, the rules according to w h i c h the lexicon
u n c l e a r , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g is d i r e c t e d first t o t h e s e m a n t i c o f a l a n g u a g e is c o n s t r u c t e d ) . T h e o b j e c t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o
c o n t e n t o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n . I n t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d its c o n - l o n g e r t h e content o f a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h a t specific a u t h o r s
t e n t , w e t a k e u p t h e same p o s i t i o n as t h e " a u t h o r " a d o p t e d w h e n h e m e a n t b y i t i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s b u t r a t h e r t h e i n t u i t i v e rule conscious-
w r o t e the sentence, p e r f o r m e d the gesture, used the t o o l , a p p l i e d ness t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has o f h i s o w n language.
t h e t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h . O f t e n , t o o , w e m u s t g o b e y o n d w h a t was F o l l o w i n g a suggestion m a d e by R y l e , 2 9
we can d i s t i n g u i s h between
m e a n t a n d i n t e n d e d by the a u t h o r a n d take i n t o consideration a know-how, t h e a b i l i t y o f a c o m p e t e n t s u b j e c t w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h o w t o
c o n t e x t o f w h i c h h e was n o t c o n s c i o u s . 2 8
T y p i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the un- p r o d u c e o r a c c o m p l i s h s o m e t h i n g , a n d know-that, t h e e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
derstanding of content p u r s u e s c o n n e c t i o n s t h a t l i n k t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c - e d g e o f h o w i t is t h a t h e is a b l e t o d o so. I n o u r case, w h a t t h e a u t h o r
tures o f t h e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e surface structures m e a n s b y a n u t t e r a n c e a n d w h a t a n i n t e r p r e t e r u n d e r s t a n d s o f its
o f other, familiar f o r m a t i o n s . T h u s , linguistic expressions can be c o n t e n t are a first-level k n o w - t h a t . T o t h e e x t e n t that his utterance
e x p l i c a t e d t h r o u g h paraphrase i n t h e same language or through is c o r r e c t l y f o r m e d a n d t h u s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , the author produced
t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o e x p r e s s i o n s o f a n o t h e r l a n g u a g e ; i n b o t h cases, c o m - i t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n r u l e s o r o n t h e basis o f c e r t a i n s t r u c -
p e t e n t speakers d r a w o n i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t t u r e s . H e k n o w s h o w t o use t h e system o f r u l e s o f h i s l a n g u a g e a n d
o b t a i n w i t h i n the l e x i c o n o f one language o r between t h e léxica o f u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i r c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n ; h e has a p r e t h e o r e t i -
two languages. cal k n o w l e d g e o f t h i s r u l e system, w h i c h is a t least s u f f i c i e n t t o
I f she c a n n o t a t t a i n h e r e n d i n t h i s way, t h e i n t e r p r e t e r m a y find enable h i m to produce the utterance i n question. This implicit r u l e
i t n e c e s s a r y t o a l t e r h e r a t t i t u d e . She t h e n e x c h a n g e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a k n o w - h o w . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r , i n t u r n , w h o n o t o n l y
understanding content (directed t o w a r d surface structures)—in shares b u t w a n t s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o m -
w h i c h she, as i t w e r e , l o o k s t h r o u g h s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d p e t e n t speaker, m u s t t r a n s f o r m t h i s k n o w - h o w i n t o e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d — f o r a n a t t i t u d e i n w h i c h she e d g e , t h a t is, i n t o a s e c o n d - l e v e l k n o w - t h a t . T h i s is t h e task of
focuses o n t h e g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . r e c o n s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n i n t h e
T h e i n t e r p r e t e r t h e n attempts to explicate the m e a n i n g o f a sym- sense o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s u n d e r l y i n g
bolic f o r m a t i o n w i t h the help o f the rules according to w h i c h the the p r o d u c t i o n o f symbolic f o r m a t i o n s . Since t h e r u l e consciousness
a u t h o r m u s t have p r o d u c e d i t . I n n o r m a l p a r a p h r a s e a n d t r a n s l a - t o b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d is a c a t e g o r i a l k n o w l e d g e , the reconstruction
tion, the i n t e r p r e t e r draws o n semantic m e a n i n g relations (for i n - d e p e n d s first o f a l l o n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f c o n c e p t u a l e x p l i c a t i o n .
stance b e t w e e n the different words o f a language) i n an ad hoc
Carnap p u t f o r w a r d four requirements that the explication o f a
m a n n e r , so t o speak, i n t h a t she s i m p l y a p p l i e s a k n o w l e d g e shared
c o n c e p t m u s t f u l f i l l i n o r d e r to be adequate:
w i t h c o m p e t e n t speakers o f t h a t l a n g u a g e . I n t h i s sense, t h e r o l e o f
interpreter can ( u n d e r suitable conditions) be attributed to the i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d b e similar t o t h e e x p l i c a n d u m , t h a t is, f r o m
a u t h o r h i m s e l f . T h e a t t i t u d e c h a n g e s , h o w e v e r , as s o o n as t h e i n t e r - n o w o n the explicans s h o u l d be able to be used i n place o f the
p r e t e r t r i e s n o t o n l y t o apply t h i s i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f s p e a k e r s b u t e x p l i c a n d u m i n a l l r e l e v a n t cases.
t o reconstruct i t . She t h e n t u r n s away f r o m t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e o f i i . R u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o v i d e d t h a t f i x t h e use o f t h e e x p l i c a n s (in
t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n ; she n o l o n g e r l o o k s t h r o u g h i t intentione c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s ) i n a n exact m a n n e r .
recta t o t h e w o r l d . She a t t e m p t s i n s t e a d t o p e e r i n t o t h e symbolic
i i i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d p r o v e t o b e fruitful w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f o r m u l a t i o n o f general statements.
34 35

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

iv. ( P r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t r e q u i r e m e n t s i - i i i c a n b e m e t ) t h e e x p l i e a n s particular competencies of individual groups (e.g., t h e a b i l i t y t o


s h o u l d b e as simple as p o s s i b l e . 30
u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a L o w - G e r m a n d i a l e c t o r t o solve p r o b l e m s i n
q u a n t u m physics) or, i n d e e d , t o t h e a b i l i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s
W u n d e r l i c h s u m s u p h i s r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e status o f c o n c e p t e x p l i -
(e.g., t o w r i t e a n e x e m p l a r y Entwicklungsroman even i n the m i d d l e o f
c a t i o n as f o l l o w s :
the twentieth c e n t u r y ) . W h e n the pretheoretical knowledge to be
Explication always proceeds ( i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h Carnap's requirements r e c o n s t r u c t e d expresses a u n i v e r s a l c a p a b i l i t y , a g e n e r a l c o g n i t i v e ,
i - i v ) -with regard to theories; either such c e n t r a l concepts (as "meaning") are linguistic, or interactive competence (or subcompetence), then what
explicated that entire theories correspond to t h e m as explieans, o r d i f f e r e n t b e g i n s as a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g a i m s a t t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
concepts are explicated interconnectedly.
species c o m p e t e n c i e s . I n s c o p e a n d status, these r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s c a n
We explicate always with regard to clear cases, so as to be able ( i n c o n n e c t i o n
be c o m p a r e d w i t h general t h e o r i e s . 3 2

w i t h these) to replace our i n t u i t i o n s w i t h exact arguments. However, the


t h e o r y can t h e n also provide answers to b o r d e r l i n e cases; o r we explicate I t is t h e g r e a t m e r i t o f C h o m s k y t o h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h i s i d e a i n t h e
separately what a clear b o r d e r l i n e case is. case o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y ( f o r t h e first time i n Syntactic Structures,
T h e language o f explication is at the same level as the e x p l i c a n d u m lan- 1 9 5 7 ) . R o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , i t is t h e task o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y t o
guage (e.g., o r d i n a r y language o r a standardized version derived f r o m i t ) .
r e c o n s t r u c t the intuitive r u l e consciousness c o m m o n to all compe-
Accordingly, i t is n o t a question here o f a descriptive language o r a metalan-
t e n t speakers i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n
guage relative to the language o f the e x p l i c a n d u m (the explieans does n o t
describe the explicandum) . 31 r e p r e s e n t t h e system o f r u l e s t h a t p e r m i t s p o t e n t i a l speakers, i n a t
least o n e l a n g u a g e L , t o a c q u i r e t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o p r o d u c e a n d t o
I n these r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s , o n e point u n d e r s t a n d a n y s e n t e n c e s t h a t c o u n t as g r a m m a t i c a l i n L , as w e l l as
s t r i k e s m e as i n s u f f i c i e n t l y w o r k e d o u t — t h e evaluative accomplishments t o d i s t i n g u i s h these s e n t e n c e s w e l l - f o r m e d i n L f r o m u n g r a m m a t i c a l
of rule consciousness. R e c o n s t r u c t i v e proposals are d i r e c t e d t o w a r d sentences. 33

d o m a i n s o f p r e t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, t h a t is, n o t t o j u s t a n y i m p l i c i t
o p i n i o n , b u t to a proven intuitive preknowledge. T h e r u l e conscious-
R e c o n s t r u c t i v e versus E m p i r i c i s t L i n g u i s t i c s
ness o f c o m p e t e n t speakers f u n c t i o n s as a c o u r t o f e v a l u a t i o n , f o r
i n s t a n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences. W h e r e a s t h e
I h o p e I have sufficiently c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n t e n t is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n y u t t e r a n c e w h a t e v e r ,
of sciences t h a t t r a n s f o r m a p r a c t i c a l l y m a s t e r e d pretheoretical
reconstructive u n d e r s t a n d i n g refers o n l y to symbolic objects charac-
k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - h o w ) o f c o m p e t e n t subjects i n t o a n o b j e c t i v e a n d
t e r i z e d as " w e l l f o r m e d " b y c o m p e t e n t subjects t h e m s e l v e s . T h u s , f o r
e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - t h a t ) , so t h a t i t is c l e a r i n w h a t sense I a m
e x a m p l e , syntactic t h e o r y , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c , t h e t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e ,
using the expression " f o r m a l analysis." B e f o r e m e n t i o n i n g some
a n d ethics start w i t h syntactically w e l l f o r m e d sentences, c o r r e c t l y
methodological difficulties w i t h reconstructive linguistics, I w o u l d
fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, a n d m o r a l l y u n -
like t o contrast, i n b r o a d strokes, two versions o f linguistics, o n e
objectionable resolutions o f n o r m conflicts, i n order to reconstruct
e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a n d o n e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e . ( W u n d e r l i c h speaks o f a n
t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h these f o r m a t i o n s c a n b e p r o d u c e d . To
empirical-descriptive and an empirical-explicative linguistics. ) I will 3 4

t h e e x t e n t t h a t , as i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s , u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
compare b o t h approaches u n d e r f o u r headings.
( t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences, t h e consistency of propositions,
t h e t r u t h o f h y p o t h e s e s , t h e Tightness o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n ) u n d e r l i e
Data
i n t u i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n s , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s relate t o p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis is s u p p o s e d t o b e secured
e d g e o f a g e n e r a l sort, t o universal capabilities, a n d n o t m e r e l y t o
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n a l o n e , t h e d a t a o f l i n g u i s t i c s consist o f m e a s -
36 37

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

u r e d v a r i a b l e s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r . B y c o n t r a s t , i n s o f a r as recon- Theory and Everyday Knowledge


s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r m i t t e d , t h e d a t a a r e p r o v i d e d b y t h e T h e r e is y e t a n o t h e r p e c u l i a r i t y a r i s i n g f r o m these d i f f e r e n d y o r i -
r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t speakers, m a i e u t i c a l l y a s c e r t a i n e d ented conceptualizations. A n empirical-analytic theory i n the n a r r o w
(i.e., t h r o u g h suitable q u e s t i o n i n g w i t h t h e a i d o f systematically or- sense c a n ( a n d as a r u l e w i l l ) r e f u t e t h e e v e r y d a y k n o w l e d g e o f a n
d e r e d examples). T h u s t h e data are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i f y o u w i l l , accord- o b j e c t d o m a i n t h a t w e i n i t i a l l y possess p r i o r t o s c i e n c e a n d r e p l a c e
i n g t o t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l : a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r is p a r t o f it w i t h a correct theoretical knowledge r e g a r d e d p r o v i s i o n a l l y as
p e r c e p t i b l e reality, a n d r u l e consciousness p o i n t s to t h e p r o d u c t i o n true. A proposal for reconstruction, by contrast, can represent pre-
o f s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d a b o u t r e a l i t y . 3 5
t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e m o r e o r less e x p l i c i t l y a n d a d e q u a t e l y , b u t i t
F u r t h e r m o r e , o b s e r v a t i o n s always m e a n a k n o w l e d g e o f s o m e t h i n g c a n n e v e r falsify i t . A t m o s t , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t u i -
particular, whereas r u l e consciousness contains categorical k n o w l - tion c a n p r o v e t o b e false, b u t n o t t h e i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f . 3 7
T h e latter
edge. Finally, observational data are selected o n l y f r o m t h e analytic belongs to the data, a n d data can be e x p l a i n e d b u t n o t criticized. A t
v i e w p o i n t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t , w h e r e a s , i n t h e o t h e r case, competent m o s t , d a t a c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d as b e i n g u n s u i t a b l e , t h a t is, e i t h e r e r r o -
s p e a k e r s t h e m s e l v e s evaluate a n d p r e s e l e c t p o s s i b l e d a t a f r o m t h e neously gathered or w r o n g l y selected f o r a specific theoretical
p o i n t o f view o f t h e i r g r a m m a t i c a l well-formedness. purpose.
T o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s m a k e a n essentialist c l a i m . O n e
Theory and Object Domain c a n say, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s "correspond" (if
A s l o n g as n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s c o u n t as t h e o b j e c t o f l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p - t r u e ) t o c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s o f r e a l i t y i n t h e s a m e sense as recon-
tion a n d n o t as t h e f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e structions "bear a likeness" ( i f correct) to t h e deep structures e x p l i -
p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o - c a t e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e asserted c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n a
m a i n as a causal-analytic t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r y a n d its o b j e c t a d m i t s m a n y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l inter-
o f linguistic reality w i t h the aid o f n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses. I f , o n the p r e t a t i o n s a p a r t f r o m t h e r e a l i s t i c (e.g., i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t o r c o n v e n -
c o n t r a r y , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is s u p p o s e d t o serve t o r e c o n s t r u c t p r e - tionalist) ones. Rational reconstructions, by contrast, can reproduce
theoretical knowledge, t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n as a n t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e y e x p l i c a t e o n l y i n a n essential-
e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g t o its e x p l i c a n d u m . W h e r e a s i n t h e e m p i r i - ist sense; i f t h e y a r e t r u e , t h e y have t o c o r r e s p o n d precisely to t h e
cist v e r s i o n t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o t h e l a n g u a g e t o b e r u l e s t h a t a r e o p e r a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n — t h a t is, t o
e x p l a i n e d is basically i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t b e t w e e n theory t h e r u l e s t h a t a c t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f surface s t r u c -
a n d r e a l i t y i n o t h e r n o m o l o g i c a l sciences, i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e v e r s i o n tures. 3 8
T h u s Chomsky's correlation assumption, according to w h i c h
t h e l i n g u i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o b j e c t necessitates a r e l a t i o n t h a t c a n l i n g u i s t i c g r a m m a r is r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r b y a

h o l d o n l y between d i f f e r e n t linguistic expressions: the r e l a t i o n be- m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s e x a c t l y t o i t , is, a t least i n t h e first

tween explication a n d e x p l i c a n d u m , whereby the language o f expli- instance, consistent.

cation ( t h a t is, t h e c o n s t r u c t l a n g u a g e o f l i n g u i s t i c s , w h i c h is a
standardized version o f o r d i n a r y language) belongs i n p r i n c i p l e to Methodological Difficulties
t h e same l e v e l as t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e t o b e e x p l i c a t e d . ( N e i t h e r i n T o be sure, serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulties have arisen i n c o n -
t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o r i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e case o f t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n c a n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C h o m s k i a n p r o g r a m f o r a g e n e r a l science o f l a n -
t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n b e c o n c e i v e d as g u a g e as t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . I
that of metalanguage to object language. ) 3 6 w o u l d l i k e t o consider, f r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective, two o f
39
38
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

the problem complexes t h a t have developed. O n e concerns the o f the grammaticality o f linguistic expressions. T h e object o f recon-
status a n d r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e t e n t speak- s t r u c t i o n is t h e p r o c e s s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h o s e sentences h e l d b y
ers; t h e o t h e r , t h e a f o r m e n t i o n e d relation between linguistic a n d c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s t o b e l o n g t o t h e set o f g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s .
mental grammar. By c o n t r a s t , t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speak-
T h e r e h a v e b e e n t w o p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t c h o o s i n g speak- ers e v a l u a t e t h e s e n t e n c e s p u t b e f o r e t h e m a r e n o t t h e o b j e c t o f
e r s ' i n t u i t i o n s as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t h e o r y f o r m a - reconstruction b u t part of the data gathering.
tion. 39
F i r s t , t h e q u e s t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d w h e t h e r a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e ii. B e c a u s e o f t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , speak-
linguistics can ever a r r i v e a t a t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ; i n g a b o u t w h a t has b e e n s p o k e n , direct or indirect mention of
w h e t h e r o n t h e c h o s e n d a t a basis i t is n o t l i m i t e d t o d e v e l o p i n g , a t speech c o m p o n e n t s , b e l o n g s t o t h e n o r m a l l i n g u i s t i c process of
b e s t , a t h e o r y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t c o m p e t e n t speak- reaching understanding. T h e expression "metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s "
ers have o f t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e . S i n c e t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c use o f o n e ' s i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e a b o u t s e n t e n c e s o f t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e suggests
o w n o r d i n a r y language, to w h i c h a science t h a t appeals t o speakers' a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l t h a t d o e s n o t e x i s t . I t is o n e o f t h e m o s t i n t e r -
j u d g m e n t s m u s t have r e c o u r s e , is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e d i r e c t e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s t h a t t h e y c a n b e u s e d as t h e i r
use o f l a n g u a g e ( a n d is p r o b a b l y s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t l a w s ) , a g r a m - own languages o f explication. ( I shall c o m e back to this p o i n t

m a t i c a l t h e o r y o f t h e C h o m s k i a n type can at best r e c o n s t r u c t t h a t below.)

special p a r t o f linguistic c o m p e t e n c e t h a t regulates the m e t a l i n g u i s - Hi. H o w e v e r , i t seems t o m e t h a t t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g lies, a b o v e


tic use; i t c a n n o t r e c o n s t r u c t t h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t d i r e c d y u n d e r l i e s all, i n Levelt's considering t h e recourse to speakers' i n t u i t i o n s i n
speaking a n d understanding a language. abstraction f r o m the u n d e r l y i n g research paradigm. Only i f one
p r e s u p p o s e s a n e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h ( i n t h e n a r r o w sense) t o
T h e e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t u i t i o n s
the reality o f a natural language a n d the utterances i n i t can one
is i d e n t i c a l w i t h a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f h u m a n l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . . . .
view speaking a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g language, o n the one h a n d , a n d
C h o m s k y h a s n o d o u b t as to t h i s identity. . . . T h e t h e o r y o f o n e k i n d o f
l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , n a m e l y m e t a l i n g u i s t i c j u d g m e n t o n s u c h t h i n g s as g r a m - j u d g m e n t s i n a l a n g u a g e a b o u t t h a t l a n g u a g e , o n t h e o t h e r , as t w o
m a t i c a l i t y a n d p a r a p h r a s e , w o u l d t h e n as a w h o l e b e b u i l t i n t o t h e o r i e s o n d i f f e r e n t object d o m a i n s . I f one chooses a reconstructive approach,
o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r s u c h as s p e a k i n g a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . . then one thereby c h o o s e s a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f the object d o m a i n
I f w e w i s h to t h i n k i n t e r m s o f p r i m a r y a n d d e r i v e d f o r m s o f v e r b a l b e h a v i o r , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the linguistic k n o w - h o w o f a c o m p e t e n t speaker
t h e s p e a k i n g a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e fall p r e c i s e l y i n t o t h e
is a t t h e r o o t o f t h e s e n t e n c e s she p r o d u c e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f (and
category o f p r i m a r y forms, while metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s will be consid-
e r e d h i g h l y d e r i v e d , artificial f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , w h i c h m o r e o v e r
o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p of) this k n o w - h o w . W h i l e this research paradigm
a r e a c q u i r e d late i n d e v e l o p m e n t . . . . T h e e m p i r i c a l p r o b l e m i n t h e psy- m a y p r o v e to be u n f r u i t f u l , this c a n n o t be s h o w n at the level o f a
c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e is i n t u r n d i v i d e d i n two, t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p s y c h o - c r i t i q u e that already presupposes a c o m p e t i n g p a r a d i g m ; i t may be
logical factors in primary language usage, and the psychological s h o w n o n l y i n t e r m s o f t h e success o r f a i l u r e o f t h e t h e o r i e s and
investigation o f linguistic i n t u i t i o n s . 4 0

e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e c o m p e t i n g r e s e a r c h p a r a d i g m s m a k e possible.

I t h i n k t h i s o b j e c t i o n is b a s e d o n a c o n f u s i o n o f t h e t w o r e s e a r c h T h e s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f i n t u i -
paradigms elucidated above, the empirical-analytic a n d the recon- tively f o u n d e d s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s , f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists i m p r e s s i v e
structive. I wish to make three c o m m e n t s i n this regard: empirical evidence. 4 1
Nonetheless, i t seems t o m e h e r e t h a t o n c e
i. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t e s t o a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e - again a n e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f speakers' j u d g m e n t s stimulates
t e n t s p e a k e r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n false e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d suggests t h e w r o n g r e m e d i e s . T h e e x p r e s s i o n
o f sentences i n a n a t u r a l language a n d , o n the other, i n the appraisal " i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e " s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g t h a t a
40 41

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

speaker's p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e about the grammaticality of a u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t , i n t h e o p i n i o n o f Bever, W a t t , a n d o t h e r s , b e


sentence (about the r i g o r o f a derivation, about the cogency o f a e x p l a i n e d i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r y , t h a t is, o f a
t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h ) is t h e k i n d o f d i r e c t l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n t u i t i o n reconstructively o r i e n t e d linguistics. I a m n o t very certain h o w to
t h a t is i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e j u d g e t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y ; b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o suggest t w o p o i n t s o f v i e w
i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e has t o b e b r o u g h t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h r o u g h t h e t h a t h a v e n o t , so f a r as I c a n see, b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t
choice o f suitable examples a n d counterexamples, t h r o u g h contrast i n t h e discussion.
a n d s i m i l a r i t y r e l a t i o n s , t h r o u g h t r a n s l a t i o n , p a r a p h r a s e a n d so o n — i. H o w s t r o n g d o t h e essentialist a s s e r t i o n s o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e
t h a t is, t h r o u g h a w e l l - t h o u g h t - o u t , m a i e u t i c m e t h o d o f i n t e r r o g a - l i n g u i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g t h e p s y c h i c r e a l i t y o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d systems o f
t i o n . A s c e r t a i n i n g t h e so-called i n t u i t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r is a l r e a d y t h e r u l e s h a v e t o be? C h o m s k y ' s m a t u r a t i o n i s t a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t g r a m -
f i r s t step t o w a r d t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e procedure matical t h e o r y represents exactly the i n n a t e dispositions that enable
p r a c t i c e d b y C h o m s k y a n d m a n y o t h e r s seems t o m e t o m a k e sense t h e c h i l d to develop the hypotheses t h a t d i r e c t language acquisition
a n d t o b e a d e q u a t e . O n e starts w i t h c l e a r cases, i n w h i c h t h e r e a c - a n d t h a t process t h e l i n g u i s t i c data i n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t — s e e m s to
t i o n s o f t h e subjects c o n v e r g e , i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p - me too s t r o n g . 4 4
W i t h i n t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e
t i o n s o n t h i s basis; t h e n , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s g a i n e d , o n e m o r e plausible assumption that g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y represents the
a t t e m p t s t o r e n d e r t h e less c l e a r cases m o r e p r e c i s e i n s u c h a w a y l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e o f t h e a d u l t s p e a k e r is s u f f i c i e n t . T h i s c o m p e -
t h a t t h e process o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n can l e a d to a n adequate clarifica- t e n c e i n t u r n is t h e r e s u l t o f a l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s t h a t m a y e v e n — i n a
tion o f these cases as w e l l . I d o n o t see a n y t h i n g w r o n g i n this m a n n e r similar to cognitive development or the development of
c i r c u l a r p r o c e d u r e ; every research process moves i n such a circle m o r a l consciousness—follow a rationally reconstructible p a t t e r n . 4 5

between theory formation and a more precise rendering of the A s B e v e r suggests, e v e n t h i s thesis c a n b e w e a k e n e d to allow for
object d o m a i n . 4 2
restrictions placed o n the acquisition a n d application o f grammati-
T h e s e c o n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n is m o r e d i f f i c u l t . I t is o n e cal rule-knowledge by n o n l i n g u i s t i c p e r c e p t u a l mechanisms or n o n -
t h a t has b e e n t r e a t e d as a n e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n i n t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s - l i n g u i s t i c e p i s t e m i c systems i n g e n e r a l , w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e
tics o f t h e p a s t d e c a d e , a n d as s u c h has i n s p i r e d a g r e a t a m o u n t o f categorial framework o f a competence theory.
r e s e a r c h : i t asks w h e t h e r t h e r e is a d i r e c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n ii. I t is n o t c l e a r t o m e t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c c r i t i q u e
t h e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y o f g r a m m a r a n d t h e m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t is, so o f t h e a d m i t t e d l y essentialist i m p l i c a t i o n s o f C h o m s k y ' s c o m p e t e n c e
t o speak, " i n t h e m i n d " o f t h e s p e a k e r . 43
According to the correlation t h e o r y can be traced back to a confusion o f research paradigms. T h i s
hypothesis, linguistic reconstructions are not simply l u c i d and c o u l d be adequately discussed o n l y i f t h e r e w e r e clarity a b o u t t h e
economical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c d a t a ; i n s t e a d , t h e r e is a w a y i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r i e s c a n b e t e s t e d a n d , as t h e case m a y
psychological complexity of the actual p r o d u c t i o n process that be, falsified. I have the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t psycholinguistic investiga-
corresponds, supposedly, to the transformational complexity that tions p r o c e e d e m p i r i c a l l y a n d a n a l y t i c a l l y , a n d n e g l e c t a limine t h e
c a n be r e a d o f f t h e s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f linguistic expressions. I distinction between competence a n d performance. 4 6

c a n n o t deal w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l research projects a n d the various


i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h e r e . A p p a r e n t l y , i n p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e is a g r o w - U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s versus T r a n s c e n d e n t a l H e r m e n e u t i c s
i n g t e n d e n c y t o m o v e away f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l c o r r e l a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s ;
the m e n t a l g r a m m a r that underlies the psychologically demonstra- H a v i n g p r e s e n t e d t h e idea o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e science a n d b r i e f l y
ble p r o d u c t i o n o f language and the corresponding processes o f elucidated i t t h r o u g h a consideration o f reconstructive linguistics
42 43

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

( a n d t w o o f its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s ) , I w o u l d l i k e t o t o u c h o n F r o m this weaker i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , consequences ensue that are


o n e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n : W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c scarcely c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l p r o g r a m . W e c a n n o longer
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f possi- e x c l u d e t h e possibility t h a t o u r c o n c e p t s o f objects o f possible expe-
b l e processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n r i e n c e c a n b e a p p l i e d successfully o n l y u n d e r c o n t i n g e n t b o u n d a r y
t h a t has, s i n c e K a n t , b e e n c a l l e d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis? K a n t t e r m s conditions that have, for example, heretofore regularly been
" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t i d e n t i f i e s a n d analyzes t h e a fulfilled by natural constants. 5 0
Further, we can n o longer exclude
p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e u n d e r l y i n g i d e a is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e basic c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i -
clear: i n a d d i t i o n to the e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t relates to objects e n c e has d e v e l o p e d p h y l o g e n e t i c a l l y a n d arises a n e w i n e v e r y n o r -
o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e is, s u p p o s e d l y , a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l k n o w l e d g e o f m a l ontogenesis, i n a process t h a t c a n be analyzed e m p i r i c a l l y . 5 1
We
concepts o f objects i n g e n e r a l t h a t p r e c e d e experience. T h e m e t h o d c a n n o t even exclude the possibility that a n a p r i o r i o f experience
b y w h i c h these a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l c a n b e s h o w n t h a t is r e l a t i v i z e d i n t h i s sense is v a l i d o n l y f o r s p e c i f i c , a d m i t t e d l y
t o b e v a l i d c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e is less clear. T h e r e is a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l y deep-seated, b e h a v i o r a l systems, e a c h o f w h i c h
a l r e a d y d i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e thesis: " [ T ] h e m a k e s p o s s i b l e a specific s t r a t e g y f o r o b j e c t i v a t i n g reality. T h e t r a n -
a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l a r e a t t h e same s c e n d e n t a l l y o r i e n t e d p r a g m a t i s m i n a u g u r a t e d b y C. S. P e i r c e a t -
t i m e c o n d i t i o n s o f the possibility o f objects o f e x p e r i e n c e . " 4 7
t e m p t s t o s h o w t h a t t h e r e is s u c h a s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
T h e analytic r e c e p t i o n o f t h e K a n t i a n p r o g r a m (Strawson's w o r k experience and instrumental a c t i o n ; 5 2
the hermeneutics stemming
is a w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e ) 4 8
leads t o a m i n i m a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f r o m D i l t h e y a t t e m p t s — o v e r against this a p r i o r i o f e x p e r i e n c e — t o
the transcendental. Every coherent experience is o r g a n i z e d i n a do justice to an additional a priori of understanding or communica-
c a t e g o r i a l n e t w o r k ; t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e d i s c o v e r t h e same i m p l i c i t tive e x p e r i e n c e . 5 3

c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e i n any c o h e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e whatsoever, we m a y F r o m the perspective o f a t r a n s f o r m e d transcendental p h i l o s o p h y


c a l l t h i s basic c o n c e p t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e " t r a n s c e n - ( i n A p e l ' s sense), t w o f u r t h e r r e n u n c i a t i o n s called f o r b y t h e analytic
dental." This conception renounces the claim that Kant w a n t e d to r e c e p t i o n o f K a n t seem precipitate: the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the concept
v i n d i c a t e w i t h h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n ; i t gives u p a l l c l a i m t o o f the constitution o f experience a n d the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f an explicit
a p r o o f o f t h e objective validity o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible t r e a t m e n t o f t h e p r o b l e m o f validity. I n m y o p i n i o n , the reservation
experience i n general. 4 9
T h e strong apriorism of Kantian philosophy r e g a r d i n g a s t r o n g a p r i o r i s m i n n o way d e m a n d s l i m i t i n g oneself t o
gives w a y t o a w e a k e r v e r s i o n . F r o m n o w o n , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i - a logical-semantic analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s . I f
g a t i o n m u s t r e l y o n t h e c o m p e t e n c e o f k n o w i n g subjects w h o j u d g e we s u r r e n d e r the c o n c e p t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject—the subject
w h i c h experiences may be called coherent experiences i n o r d e r t h e n that accomplishes t h e synthesis a n d t h a t , t o g e t h e r w i t h its k n o w l -
t o analyze t h i s m a t e r i a l w i t h a v i e w t o finding g e n e r a l a n d necessary e d g e - e n a b l i n g s t r u c t u r e s , is r e m o v e d f r o m a l l e x p e r i e n c e — t h i s d o e s
c a t e g o r i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . E v e r y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a basic c o n c e p - n o t m e a n t h a t w e have t o r e n o u n c e t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis
t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e has t o b e r e g a r d e d as a h y p o t h e t i - o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible experience,
c a l p r o p o s a l t h a t c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n e w e x p e r i e n c e s . A s l o n g as t h a t is, r e n o u n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e . 5 4
It
t h e a s s e r t i o n o f i t s necessity a n d u n i v e r s a l i t y has n o t b e e n r e f u t e d , is j u s t as l i t t l e a c o n s e q u e n c e o f g i v i n g u p t h e p r o j e c t o f a t r a n s c e n -
we t e r m " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " t h e c o n c e p t u a l structure r e c u r r i n g i n a l l dental d e d u c t i o n that one must h a n d over p r o b l e m s o f validity to
c o h e r e n t experiences. I n this weaker version, the c l a i m that this o t h e r d o m a i n s o f investigation, f o r instance, t o t h e t h e o r y o f science
s t r u c t u r e c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d a p r i o r i is d r o p p e d . o r o f t r u t h . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f possi-
44 45

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

ble experience a n d the t r u t h o f propositions looks different t h a n i t u t t e r a n c e s . C o n c e p t s s u c h as m e a n i n g a n d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e a b i l i t y


d o e s u n d e r K a n t i a n p r e m i s e s . A p r i o r i d e m o n s t r a t i o n is r e p l a c e d b y t o speak a n d act (agency), i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d t h e l i k e ,
transcendental investigation o f the conditions for argumentatively w o u l d b e l o n g to this conceptual f r a m e w o r k .
r e d e e m i n g t h e validity claims t h a t l e n d themselves to possible discur- T h e expression "situation o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " that,
sive v i n d i c a t i o n . 5 5
f r o m t h i s p o i n t o f view, w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n "object
T o b e s u r e , i n m y view t h e q u e s t i o n is m o r e t h a n s i m p l y t e r m i - o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , " a l r e a d y shows, h o w e v e r , t h a t a c q u i r i n g t h e
n o l o g i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g w h e t h e r we may still call such investigations e x p e r i e n c e s w e have i n processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is s e c o n d a r y t o
of general and unavoidable presuppositions of communication t h e g o a l o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e s e processes serve. T h e
"transcendental" ( i n t h i s case, p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of argumentative g e n e r a l structures o f speech m u s t t h e r e f o r e first be investigated
s p e e c h ) . I f w e w a n t t o s u b j e c t processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the perspective o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d n o t f r o m that
( " s p e e c h " ) t o a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis o r i e n t e d t o g e n e r a l a n d u n - o f e x p e r i e n c e . A s s o o n as w e a d m i t t h i s , h o w e v e r , t h e p a r a l l e l s w i t h
avoidable presuppositions i n t h e s a m e w a y as has b e e n d o n e for transcendental philosophy (however conceived) recede i n t o the
cognitive processes, 56
then the m o d e l of transcendental philosophy b a c k g r o u n d . T h e idea u n d e r l y i n g transcendental philosophy i s — t o
u n d e n i a b l y suggests i t s e l f — a l l t h e m o r e so since t h e t h e o r y o f l a n - o v e r s i m p l i f y — t h a t we constitute experiences by objectivating reality
g u a g e a n d a c t i o n has n o t ( d e s p i t e H u m b o l d t ) f o u n d its K a n t . N a t u - f r o m i n v a r i a n t p o i n t s o f view. T h i s o b j e c t i v a t i o n shows i t s e l f i n t h e
r a l l y , r e c o u r s e t o t h i s m o d e l is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e o n l y i f o n e has i n v i e w o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l t h a t necessarily a r e p r e s u p p o s e d i n e v e r y c o h e r e n t
o n e o f t h e weaker versions o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y m e n t i o n e d e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s e o b j e c t s i n t u r n c a n b e a n a l y z e d as a system o f basic
a b o v e . I n t h i s sense, A p e l — i n o r d e r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e h i s approach concepts. However, I do n o t find any correspondent to this idea
programmatically—speaks of "transcendental hermeneutics" or u n d e r w h i c h t h e analysis o f g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f communica-
"transcendental pragmatics." I w o u l d like to m e n t i o n two reasons f o r t i o n m i g h t be carried out. Experiences a r e , i f w e f o l l o w t h e basic
h e s i t a t i n g t o a d o p t t h i s usage. K a n t i a n idea, constituted; utterances are, at most, generated. A t r a n -

a. S o m e t h i n g l i k e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f processes o f s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t r a n s p o s e d t o processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g seems p l a u s i b l e t o m e as l o n g as w e v i e w s t a n d i n g w o u l d t h u s have t o be g u i d e d b y another m o d e l — n o t the

t h e s e u n d e r t h e aspect o f processes o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is i n t h i s sense epistemological m o d e l o f the constitution o f experience b u t perhaps

t h a t I speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience; i n understanding the the m o d e l o f d e e p a n d surface s t r u c t u r e .

u t t e r a n c e o f a n o t h e r s p e a k e r as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a c o m m u n i c a t i o n b. M o r e o v e r , a d o p t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " m i g h t c o n -
process, t h e h e a r e r (like t h e o b s e r v e r w h o perceives a s e g m e n t o f c e a l t h e b r e a k w i t h a p r i o r i s m t h a t has b e e n m a d e i n t h e m e a n t i m e .
r e a l i t y ) has a n e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h i s c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , con- K a n t h a d t o s h a r p l y separate e m p i r i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis.
crete utterances w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to e m p i r i c a l objects, a n d u t t e r - I f w e n o w u n d e r s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h e sense o f a
ances i n g e n e r a l t o o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l ( i n t h e sense o f o b j e c t s o f reconstruction o f general a n d unavoidable presuppositions o f expe-
p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ) . J u s t as w e c a n analyze o u r a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f riences t h a t c a n lay c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e n t h e r e c e r t a i n l y r e m a i n s
o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a n y c o h e r e n t a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c analysis.
experience whatsoever—we w o u l d also b e able to analyze o u r a Against this, the distinction between d r a w i n g o n a p r i o r i knowledge
p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f u t t e r a n c e s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e basic c o n c e p t s and drawing o n a posteriori knowledge becomes b l u r r e d . O n the
o f s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g {Verständigung), t h e o n e h a n d , t h e r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is f o r t h e m
c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t e n a b l e s us t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n c o r r e c t a n a p r i o r i knowledge; o n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this
46 47

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

k n o w l e d g e calls f o r i n q u i r i e s u n d e r t a k e n w i t h e m p i r i c a l s p e a k e r s — select a n d discuss these ideas leads, h o w e v e r , t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n


the linguist procures for herself a knowledge a posteriori. T h e i m - t h a t d i v e r g e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's
plicit knowledge o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f speech-act t h e o r y , w h i c h r e m a i n s a s e m a n t i c a l l y
explicit f o r m o f linguistic description that the individual linguist determined one.
c a n n o t rely o n reflection o n h e r o w n speech intuitions. T h e proce-
dures e m p l o y e d i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a n d testing hypotheses, i n apprais- T h r e e Aspects o f Universal Pragmatics
i n g c o m p e t i n g reconstructive proposals, i n g a t h e r i n g a n d selecting
d a t a , a r e i n m a n y ways l i k e t h e p r o c e d u r e s c u s t o m a r i l y u s e d i n t h e T h e basic u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c i n t e n t i o n o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is e x -
n o m o l o g i c a l sciences. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t c a n b e t r a c e d pressed i n t h e fact that i t thematizes t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f speech
b a c k t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f d a t a ( o b s e r v a b l e events versus ( u t t e r a n c e s ) f r o m a stance s i m i l a r t o t h a t f r o m w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c s
c o m p r e h e n s i b l e signs) a n d t o d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f thematizes the units o f language (sentences). T h e goal of recon-
laws a n d r u l e s d o n o t s u f f i c e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o b a n i s h l i n g u i s t i c s f r o m s t r u c t i v e l a n g u a g e analysis is a n e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r u l e s t h a t
t h e sphere o f e m p i r i c a l science. a competent speaker m u s t master i n o r d e r to f o r m g r a m m a t i c a l
T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e f o r o n t o g e n e t i c t h e o r i e s t h a t , l i k e P i a g e t ' s s e n t e n c e s a n d t o u t t e r t h e m i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way. T h e t h e o r y o f
cognitivist d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology, c o n n e c t t h e structural descrip- s p e e c h acts shares t h i s task w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s . W h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r starts
t i o n o f c o m p e t e n c i e s (as w e l l as o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d p a t t e r n s o f d e v e l - f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e v e r y a d u l t s p e a k e r possesses a r e c o n ¬
o p m e n t o f these c o m p e t e n c i e s ) w i t h a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c a u s a l structible i m p l i c i t knowledge i n w h i c h his linguistic rule compe-
mechanisms. 5 7
T h e paradigms i n t r o d u c e d by C h o m s k y a n d Piaget tence (to produce sentences) is expressed, speech-act theory
have p r o m p t e d a type o f research d e t e r m i n e d by a p e c u l i a r c o n n e c - postulates a corresponding communicative rule competence,
t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a l a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis r a t h e r t h a n b y t h e i r n a m e l y t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts. I t is
classical s e p a r a t i o n . T h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , " w i t h w h i c h w e f u r t h e r a s s u m e d t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e has j u s t as u n i v e r -
associate a c o n t r a s t t o e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , is t h u s u n s u i t e d t o c h a r a c - sal a c o r e as l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . A g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts
t e r i z i n g , w i t h o u t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a l i n e o f r e s e a r c h s u c h as u n i - w o u l d t h u s d e s c r i b e p r e c i s e l y t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l system o f r u l e s t h a t
versal p r a g m a t i c s . B e h i n d t h e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n can be f o u n d a d u l t speakers m a s t e r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y c a n f u l f i l l the conditions
t h e systematic q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e as-yet i n s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, n o m a t t e r t o w h i c h
status o f n o n n o m o l o g i c a l e m p i r i c a l sciences o f t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e t h e sentences m a y b e l o n g a n d i n w h i c h r a n d o m
t y p e . I s h a l l have t o leave t h i s q u e s t i o n aside h e r e . I n a n y case, t h e contexts the utterances may be embedded.
attempt to play d o w n the interesting methodological differences that T h e p r o p o s a l t o i n v e s t i g a t e l a n g u a g e use i n competence-theoretic
arise h e r e , a n d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m away i n t h e sense o f t h e u n i f i e d t e r m s calls f o r a r e v i s i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f c o m p e t e n c e a n d p e r f o r -
s c i e n c e p r o g r a m , seems t o h a v e l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f s u c c e s s . 58
m a n c e . C h o m s k y i n i t i a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s these c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way
t h a t i t m a k e s sense t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e p h o n e t i c , s y n t a c t i c , a n d
II s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s be i n v e s t i g a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y w i t h i n
the framework o f a reconstruction o f linguistic competence a n d that
T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts has g i v e n rise t o ideas the p r a g m a t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f utterances be left to a t h e o r y o f linguis-
o n w h i c h the f u n d a m e n t a l assumptions o f universal pragmatics can tic p e r f o r m a n c e . 6 0
T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n gives rise t o t h e q u e s t i o n
be based. 5 9
T h e universal-pragmatic p o i n t o f view f r o m w h i c h I shall o f w h e t h e r " c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e " is n o t a h y b r i d c o n c e p t . I
49
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W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

have, to b e g i n w i t h , based the d e m a r c a t i o n o f linguistics f r o m u n i - at t h e s a m e t i m e f u l f i l l i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s specific t o speech.


versal pragmatics o n t h e c u r r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d T h i s can be m a d e clear by l o o k i n g at t h e relations to reality i n w h i c h
utterances. T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f sentences a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e s o f e v e r y s e n t e n c e is first e m b e d d e d t h r o u g h t h e a c t o f u t t e r a n c e . I n
g r a m m a r is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n a c c o r d a n c e b e i n g u t t e r e d , a s e n t e n c e is p l a c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o (a) t h e e x t e r n a l
w i t h pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure o f speech situ- reality o f that w h i c h can be perceived, (b) the i n t e r n a l reality o f that
a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . B u t t h i s raises t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o q u e s t i o n s , (i) w h i c h a s p e a k e r w o u l d l i k e t o e x p r e s s as h e r i n t e n t i o n s , a n d (c) t h e
C o u l d n o t t h e u n i v e r s a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h — w h a t is c o m m o n t o a l l n o r m a t i v e r e a l i t y o f t h a t w h i c h is s o c i a l l y a n d c u l t u r a l l y recognized.
utterances independendy of their particular contexts—be ade- I t is t h e r e b y s u b j e c t e d t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t i t n e e d n o t a n d c a n n o t
quately d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h universal sentential structures? I n this f u l f i l l as a n o n s i t u a t e d s e n t e n c e , as a p u r e l y g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n .
case, w i t h h i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e , A c h a i n o f s y m b o l s " c o u n t s " as a s e n t e n c e o f a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , L ,
the s p e a k e r w o u l d also b e equipped for mastering situations o f i f i t is w e l l f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e system o f g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s , GL.
p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung), f o r t h e g e n e r a l task T h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f a sentence means ( f r o m a pragmatic perspec-
o f u t t e r i n g sentences; a n d t h e p o s t u l a t e o f a g e n e r a l communicative t i v e ) t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e , w h e n u t t e r e d b y a speaker, is comprehensible
competence distinguishable f r o m linguistic competence c o u l d not t o a l l h e a r e r s w h o h a v e m a s t e r e d GL. C o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y is t h e o n l y
b e j u s t i f i e d . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n ( i i ) w h e t h e r t h e u n i v e r s a l c l a i m t h a t is t o b e f u l f i l l e d i m m a n e n t l y t o l a n g u a g e that
s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s ( o r w o r d s ) m a y n o t , i n t h e sense o f can be raised by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to a
the use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , b e e x p l i c a t e d i n a n y case o n l y w i t h sentence. T h e validity o f a stated p r o p o s i t i o n , by contrast, d e p e n d s
reference to situations o f possible typical e m p l o y m e n t . T h e n the o n w h e t h e r the p r o p o s i t i o n represents a fact o r experience (or o n
d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d utterances w o u l d be i r r e l e v a n t , at whether the existential presuppositions o f the m e n t i o n e d proposi-
least t o s e m a n t i c t h e o r y (so l o n g as s u f f i c i e n t l y t y p i c a l c o n t e x t s of tional c o n t e n t h o l d ) ; the validity o f an expressed i n t e n t i o n depends
u t t e r a n c e w e r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) . A s s o o n as t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o n w h e t h e r i t c o r r e s p o n d s t o w h a t is a c t u a l l y i n t e n d e d b y the
b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e p r a g m a t i c a n a l y - speaker; a n d t h e validity o f the speech act p e r f o r m e d d e p e n d s o n
sis o f u t t e r a n c e s b e c o m e s hazy, h o w e v e r , t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n o f u n i - whether this action conforms to a recognized normative back-
v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is also i n d a n g e r o f b e c o m i n g b l u r r e d . g r o u n d . W h e r e a s a g r a m m a t i c a l sentence f u l f i l l s t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e -
h e n s i b i l i t y , a successful utterance m u s t satisfy t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y
W i t h r e g a r d to the first question, I w o u l d agree, w i t h c e r t a i n
c l a i m s : i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u e f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s o f a r as i t r e p r e -
qualifications, 6 1
t h a t a speaker, i n transposing a well-formed sen-
sents s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d ; i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u t h f u l i n s o f a r as i t
t e n c e i n t o a n act o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m e r e l y
expresses s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r ; a n d i t m u s t c o u n t as
actualizes w h a t is i n h e r e n t i n t h e s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . B u t t h i s is n o t
r i g h t i n s o f a r as i t c o n f o r m s t o s o c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d expectations.
to deny the difference between the production of a grammatical
s e n t e n c e a n d t h e use o f t h a t s e n t e n c e i n a s i t u a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e We can, o f course, i d e n t i f y features i n t h e surface structures o f
m u t u a l understanding, or the difference between the universal pre- s e n t e n c e s t h a t have a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e t h r e e g e n e r a l p r a g -
s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has t o f u l f i l l i n e a c h case. I n m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f t h e utterance: t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g , to express
o r d e r to u t t e r a sentence, the speaker m u s t f u l f i l l general presuppo- an i n t e n t i o n , to establish an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Sentences
s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . E v e n i f she f u l f i l l s t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t are used to represent a n experience o r a
i n c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y g i v e n w i t h t h e sen- state o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o r e f e r t o these i n d i r e c t l y ) ; i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s -
t e n c e e m p l o y e d , she m a y v e r y w e l l f o r m t h e s e n t e n c e i t s e l f w i t h o u t sions, m o d a l f o r m s , a n d so o n a r e u s e d t o e x p r e s s t h e s p e a k e r ' s
50 51
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

i n t e n t i o n s ; p e r f o r m a t i v e phrases are used t o establish i n t e r p e r s o n a l d o m a i n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s has b e e n p u r s u e d w i t h i n a n a l y t i c p h i -


relations between speaker a n d hearer. T h u s , the general structures losophy f r o m Frege to D u m m e t t . 6 2
T h a t t h i s is a m a t t e r o f u n i v e r s a l -
o f s p e e c h a r e also r e f l e c t e d a t t h e l e v e l o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e . B u t p r a g m a t i c investigation can be seen i n t h e fact t h a t the t r u t h value
i n s o f a r as w e c o n s i d e r a s e n t e n c e as a g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n , t h a t o f p r o p o s i t i o n s is systematically t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . T h e t h e o r y o f
is, i n d e p e n d e n d y o f speech situations i n w h i c h i t can be u t t e r e d , p r e d i c a t i o n d o e s n o t i n v e s t i g a t e s e n t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l (as d o e s l i n -
t h e s e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s are n o t y e t " o c c u p i e d . " I n o r d e r g u i s t i c s ) b u t s e n t e n c e s i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts. A n a l y -
to p r o d u c e a grammatical sentence—as an example, say, f o r lin- sis is d i r e c t e d a b o v e a l l t o t h e l o g i c o f u s i n g p r e d i c a t e s a n d t h o s e
g u i s t s — a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r n e e d satisfy o n l y t h e c l a i m t o compre- expressions t h a t e n a b l e us t o r e f e r t o objects. T o be sure, this p a r t
h e n s i b i l i t y . H e has t o have m a s t e r e d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g system of o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r a t h e o r y o f
g r a m m a t i c a l rules; this we call his l i n g u i s t i c ability, a n d i t can be communication. The analysis o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e d i s c u s s i o n of
a n a l y z e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s avowals, a n d t h e d e b a t e o n p r i v a t e s p e e c h , i n so f a r as t h e y c l e a r t h e
a b i l i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t e ; t h i s is s u s c e p t i b l e o n l y t o p r a g m a t i c analysis. way t o a u n i v e r s a l pragmatics o f t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f u t t e r -
By " c o m m u n i c a t i v e competence," I understand the ability o f a ances, a r e o n l y b e g i n n i n g s . 6 3
Finally, speech act t h e o r y provides a
speaker o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g to e m b e d a w e l l - useful p o i n t o f departure for the p a r t o f universal pragmatics related
f o r m e d s e n t e n c e i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y — t h a t is, to the interpersonal f u n c t i o n o f utterances.

W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n r a i s e d a b o v e , o n e m i g h t see a
i . t o c h o o s e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n s u c h a way t h a t e i t h e r t h e
further difficulty with my proposal for conceptualizing universal
t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f the p r o p o s i t i o n stated o r the existential presup-
p r a g m a t i c s i n t h e f a c t t h a t f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s d o e s n o t fit w e l l i n t o
positions o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m e n t i o n e d are supposedly
the distinction between a l i n g u i s t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h sen-
f u l f i l l e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n s h a r e t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s p e a k e r ) ;
t e n c e s a n d a p r a g m a t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h u t t e r a n c e s . T h e r e is
i i . T o e x p r e s s h i s i n t e n t i o n s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s - a b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f different approaches to semantic theory. Lin-
s i o n r e p r e s e n t s w h a t is i n t e n d e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n t r u s t t h e guistically oriented theories of meaning * 6
t r y t o g r a s p systematically t h e
speaker); a n d s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f trans-
i i i . T o p e r f o r m t h e s p e e c h a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t i t c o n f o r m s to formational grammar, e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s o f sen-
r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s o r t o a c c e p t e d self-images (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n tences e i t h e r start w i t h semantic d e e p structures o r rely o n semantic
be i n a c c o r d w i t h the speaker i n shared value o r i e n t a t i o n s ) . p r o j e c t i o n s i n t o s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h leads as a r u l e
t o a c o m b i n a t o r y system, c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g e l e m e n t a r y sentences,
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t these decisions d o not depend o n particular
o f g e n e r a l s e m a n t i c m a r k e r s . Lexical semantics p r o c e e d s i n a s i m i l a r
epistemic presuppositions and changing contexts b u t cause sen-
m a n n e r ; i t clarifies t h e m e a n i n g structures o f a given l e x i c o n by way
t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l t o assume t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s of
o f a f o r m a l analysis o f m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s . T h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e s e
representation, expression, and the production of interpersonal
l i n g u i s t i c a p p r o a c h e s lies i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a c c o m m o d a t e t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e m is p r e c i s e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a -
p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s o n l y i n a n a d h o c way.
tive c o m p e t e n c e f o r w h i c h I a m p r o p o s i n g a universal-pragmatic H o w e v e r , t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e w o r k o f
investigation. W i t t g e n s t e i n has p r o v i d e d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e m e a n -
T h e p a r t o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is f u r t h e s t d e v e l o p e d is t h a t i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c expressions can be i d e n t i f i e d o n l y w i t h reference to
related to the representational f u n c t i o n o f utterances, for example situations o f possible e m p l o y m e n t .
to the use of elementary p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences. This classic
52 53

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

F o r t h e i r p a r t , pragmatic theories of meaning 65


are faced w i t h the I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o s u m u p t h e d i f f e r e n t levels o f analysis a n d
difficulty o f d e l i m i t i n g a linguistic expression's typical situations o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g object d o m a i n s o f semiotics.
e m p l o y m e n t f r o m contexts t h a t h a p p e n b y c h a n c e t o have a d d i -
tional meaning-generating power b u t d o n o t affect t h e semantic Sentences versus Utterances
core o f the linguistic expression. A c c o r d i n g to w h i c h criteria may we I f w e s t a r t w i t h c o n c r e t e s p e e c h acts e m b e d d e d i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s
e x t r a p o l a t e t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r f r o m a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r ? Reference a n d t h e n d i s r e g a r d a l l aspects t h a t t h e s e u t t e r a n c e s o w e t o t h e i r
semantics, 66
w h e t h e r f r a m e d as a t h e o r y o f e x t e n s i o n a l o r o f i n t e n - p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s , we are left w i t h linguistic expressions. Whereas
sional d e n o t a t i o n , determines the m e a n i n g o f a n expression by the t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t o f s p e e c h is t h e s p e e c h act, t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t
class o f o b j e c t s t o w h i c h i t c a n b e a p p l i e d i n t r u e s e n t e n c e s . O n t h i s o f l a n g u a g e is t h e s e n t e n c e . T h e d e m a r c a t i o n is o b t a i n e d b y a t t e n d -
premise, one can explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f expressions that appear i n g to c o n d i t i o n s o f validity: a grammatically w e l l - f o r m e d sentence
i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I d o n o t see, however, satisfies t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y ; a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y successful
w h y semantic t h e o r y s h o u l d m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y single o u t the r e p r e - speech act r e q u i r e s , b e y o n d t h e c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the l i n g u i s t i c
sentational f u n c t i o n o f language a n d neglect t h e specific mean- expression, t h a t the participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be p r e p a r e d to
ings that language d e v e l o p s i n its expressive a n d interpersonal r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h a t t h e y raise c l a i m s t o t r u t h , t r u t h f u l -
functions. ness, a n d Tightness, a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y i m p u t e t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n . S e n -
These p r e l i m i n a r y reflections are i n t e n d e d merely to s u p p o r t t h e t e n c e s a r e t h e o b j e c t o f linguistic analysis, s p e e c h acts o f p r a g m a t i c
c o n j e c t u r e t h a t s e m a n t i c t h e o r y c a n n o t f r u i t f u l l y b e d e v e l o p e d as a analysis.
u n i f i e d t h e o r y . B u t i f i t is h e t e r o g e n e o u s l y composed, no objection
t o t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e analysis o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c - Individual Languages versus Language in General
tures f r o m that o f utterance structures can be i n f e r r e d f r o m the T h e f i r s t task o f l i n g u i s t i c s is t o d e v e l o p a g r a m m a r f o r e a c h i n d i v i d -
difficulties o f d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m pragmatics (difficulties u a l l a n g u a g e so t h a t a s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h
t h a t are equally present i n d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m syntax). T h e any sentence o f the language. O n the o t h e r h a n d , general g r a m m a t i -
analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h c a n i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h g e n - c a l t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system that
e r a l s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . H o w e v e r , i t is d i r e c t e d t o f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s u n d e r l i e s t h e ability o f a subject to generate w e l l - f o r m e d sentences
o f sentences o n l y f r o m t h e perspective o f the possibility o f using i n a n y l a n g u a g e whatsoever. G r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y claims to recon-
sentences as e l e m e n t s o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , e x p r e s - s t r u c t t h e u n i v e r s a l l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y o f a d u l t speakers. ( I n a strong
sive, a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l f u n c t i o n s . U n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t o o , c a n b e version, this linguistic competence means the ability to develop hy-
u n d e r s t o o d as s e m a n t i c analysis. B u t i t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r p o t h e s e s t h a t g u i d e l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n o n t h e basis o f a n i n n a t e
theories o f m e a n i n g i n that the meanings o f linguistic expressions disposition; i n a weaker version, linguistic competence represents
a r e r e l e v a n t o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s a r e u s e d i n s p e e c h acts t h e r e s u l t o f l e a r n i n g processes i n t e r p r e t e d c o n s t r u c t i v i s t i c a l l y i n
t h a t satisfy t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s o f t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d n o r m a t i v e Piaget's sense.)
l i g h t n e s s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d
f r o m e m p i r i c a l pragmatics, f o r example, sociolinguistics, i n that the Aspects of Linguistic Analysis
m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions comes u n d e r consideration only Every linguistic expression c a n be c o n s i d e r e d f r o m a t least t h r e e
i n s o f a r as i t is d e t e r m i n e d b y formal p r o p e r t i e s o f s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n s a n a l y t i c v i e w p o i n t s . P h o n e t i c s e x a m i n e s l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s as i n -
i n g e n e r a l , a n d n o t b y p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use. s c r i p t i o n s i n a n u n d e r l y i n g m e d i u m ( i . e . , as f o r m a t i o n s o f sound).
54 55
Chapter 1 What Is Universal Pragmatics?

S y n t a c t i c t h e o r y investigates l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e e x a m i n e s i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n s o f a r as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n first-per-
f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n s o f the smallest m e a n i n g f u l units. Semantic t h e - s o n s e n t e n c e s . F i n a l l y , t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts e x a m i n e s i l l o c u t i o n -
o r y examines the m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f linguistic expressions. Evi- ary force f r o m the viewpoint of the establishment o f legitimate
dendy, only phonetic and syntactic theory are self-sufficient i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. These semiotic d i s t i n c t i o n s are s u m m a r i z e d
linguistic theories; semantic t h e o r y , by contrast, c a n n o t be con- i n the f o l l o w i n g table:
d u c t e d solely i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n o f l a n g u a g e , t h a t is,
T h e o r e t i c a l level Object domain
i n d i s r e g a r d o f p r a g m a t i c aspects.
Linguistics Sentences
Particular versus Universal Aspects of Speech Acts Grammar Sentences o f an i n d i v i d u a l
T h e task o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s consists, t o b e g i n w i t h , i n d e s c r i b -
language
i n g s p e e c h acts t y p i c a l o f a c e r t a i n m i l i e u , w h i c h c a n i n t u r n be
Grammatical theory Rules f o r generating
analyzed f r o m sociological, ethnological, a n d psychological points o f
sentences i n any language
view. G e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is c o n c e r n e d
w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e a b i l i t y o f a whatever

s u b j e c t t o u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a n y r e l e v a n t s i t u a t i o n whatsoever. Uni- A s p e c t s o f l i n g u i s t i c analysis

v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h e r e b y raises t h e c l a i m t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e a b i l i t y Phonetic theory Inscriptions (language


o f a d u l t speakers to e m b e d sentences i n r e l a t i o n s to r e a l i t y i n such sounds)
a way t h a t they can take o n the general pragmatic functions of Syntactic t h e o r y Syntactical rules
representation, expression, a n d establishing legitimate interpersonal
Semantic theory Lexical units
r e l a t i o n s . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is e x p r e s s e d i n t e r a l i a i n
Pragmatics S p e e c h acts
those accomplishments t h a t h e r m e n e u t i c s stylizes t o a n a r t (Kunst¬
lehre), n a m e l y p a r a p h r a s i n g u t t e r a n c e s b y m e a n s o f c o n t e x t - s i m i l a r Empirical pragmatics C o n t e x t - b o u n d s p e e c h acts
u t t e r a n c e s o f t h e same l a n g u a g e o r t r a n s l a t i n g t h e m i n t o c o n t e x t - Universal pragmatics R u l e s f o r u s i n g sentences
comparable utterances i n a f o r e i g n language. i n utterances
Aspects o f universal-pragmatic
Universal-Pragmatic Aspects
analysis
T h e three general pragmatic functions o f an utterance—to repre-
Theory of elementary Acts o f reference a n d
sent something i n the w o r l d u s i n g a sentence, to express the
propositions predication
speaker's i n t e n t i o n s , a n d to establish l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-
tions—are t h e basis o f a l l t h e p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s t h a t a n u t t e r a n c e Linguistic expression o f
Theory of first-person sentences
c a n assume i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h o s e general intentions
f u n c t i o n s is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r u t h , t r u t h - Establishment of
f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. T h u s e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d f r o m T h e o r y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts interpersonal relations
the corresponding analytic viewpoints. F o r m a l semantics examines
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e acts o f r e f e r e n c e For a theory of communicative a c t i o n , t h e t h i r d aspect o f u t t e r -

a n d p r e d i c a t i o n . A s t i l l scarcely d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ances, n a m e l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f legitimate interpersonal rela-


tions, is c e n t r a l . I s h a l l t h e r e f o r e t a k e t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as
my point of departure.
57
56
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

T h e Standard F o r m o f the Speech Act—Searle's Principle o f p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , s u g g e s t i o n , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h u s t h e g e n e r a t i v e


Expressibility p o w e r consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e speaker, i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h
act, c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e h e a r e r i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e l a t t e r c a n t a k e
T h e p r i n c i p a l task o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is t o c l a r i f y t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e up an interpersonal relation with her. 6 8
I t c a n , o f c o u r s e , be s a i d o f
status o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s . A u s t i n a n a l y z e d t h e sense i n w h i c h I e v e r y i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d n o t o n l y o f s p e e c h acts, t h a t t h e y e s t a b l i s h
c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts as t h e illocutionary force o f s p e e c h i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y have a n e x p l i c i t l y l i n -
acts. I n u t t e r i n g a p r o m i s e , a n a s s e r t i o n , o r a w a r n i n g , I s i m u l t a n e - g u i s t i c f o r m , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d t o a c o n t e x t o f ac-
ously execute an action w i t h the c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences: I t r y t o tion norms a n d values. W i t h o u t t h e normative background of
make a p r o m i s e , t o put forward a n a s s e r t i o n , t o issue a w a r n i n g — I d o routines, roles, h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — i n short, conventions—

t h i n g s by saying s o m e t h i n g . A l t h o u g h t h e r e are o t h e r m o d e s of the individual action w o u l d remain indeterminate. A l l communica-

employing language—Austin mentions, a m o n g others, w r i t i n g po- tive actions satisfy or violate normative social expectations or

e m s a n d t e l l i n g j o k e s — t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y use seems t o b e t h e f o u n - conventions. Satisfying a c o n v e n t i o n i n a c t i n g means t h a t a subject

dation on w h i c h these o t h e r k i n d s o f e m p l o y m e n t rest. T o be c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n


w i t h a t least o n e o t h e r s u c h s u b j e c t . T h u s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n
u n d e r s t o o d i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , e v e r y u t t e r a n c e m u s t a t least i m p l i c -
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n is a c r i t e r i o n t h a t is n o t selective e n o u g h for
i t l y e s t a b l i s h a n d give e x p r e s s i o n t o a c e r t a i n relation b e t w e e n the
o u r purposes. I emphasized at t h e start t h a t I a m r e s t r i c t i n g m y
s p e a k e r a n d h e r c o u n t e r p a r t . W e c a n also say t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
analysis t o p a r a d i g m a t i c cases o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e x p l i c i t a c t i o n t h a t is
f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n f i x i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n
oriented toward reaching understanding. This restriction must now
o f the content uttered.
b e d r a w n s o m e w h a t m o r e precisely. I n d o i n g so, w e c a n b e g i n w i t h
T h e current distinction between the content and the relational
t h e s t a n d a r d e x a m p l e s f r o m w h i c h s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y was d e v e l o p e d .
aspects o f a n u t t e r a n c e has, t o b e g i n w i t h , a t r i v i a l m e a n i n g . 6 7
I t says
T h e f o l l o w i n g are typical speech-act f o r m s : 6 9

t h a t , i n b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h e s e n t e n c e u s e d is e m b e d d e d i n a c o n t e x t ,
m o r e precisely, i n s p e c i f i c i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I n a c e r t a i n way,
"I . . . you that...
e v e r y e x p l i c i d y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e b o t h establishes a n d r e p r e -
[verb] [sentence]
sents a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t least t w o s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e
e.g., " I ( h e r e b y ) p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l c o m e t o m o r r o w . "
o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n . T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e is t r i v i a l so l o n g as u n d e r
t h e r e l a t i o n a l aspect we m e r e l y c o n t r a s t t h e u t t e r a n c e c h a r a c t e r of "You are . . . ... ."
s p e e c h w i t h its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . I f n o t h i n g m o r e w e r e m e a n t b y t h e [verb] [p. part.] [sentence]
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act, t h e c o n c e p t " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " c o u l d e.g., " Y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d t o s t o p s m o k i n g . "
s e r v e a t best t o e l u c i d a t e t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s h a v e t h e
" I ••. ... you that ...
c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n s , t h a t is, a r e s p e e c h actions. T h e p o i n t o f t h e
[auxiliary verb] [verb] [sentence]
c o n c e p t c a n n o t l i e t h e r e i n . I find i t r a t h e r i n t h e p e c u l i a r l y g e n e r a -
e.g., " I c a n assure y o u t h a t i t w a s n ' t I . "
tive p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts.
I t is t o t h i s g e n e r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t I t r a c e t h e f a c t t h a t a s p e e c h a c t I shall h o l d to the f o l l o w i n g t e r m i n o l o g i c a l rules. A n explicit
c a n s u c c e e d ( o r f a i l ) . W e c a n say t h a t a s p e e c h a c t succeeds i f a s p e e c h a c t satisfies t h e standard form i n its s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e i f i t is
r e l a t i o n between the speaker a n d hearer comes to pass—the r e l a t i o n m a d e u p o f a n illocutionary a n d a propositional c o m p o n e n t . T h e i l l o -
i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r — a n d i f t h e h e a r e r c a n understand and accept c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t consists i n a n illocutionary a c t c a r r i e d o u t w i t h
t h e c o n t e n t u t t e r e d b y t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e sense i n d i c a t e d (e.g., as a t h e a i d o f a performative sentence. T h i s s e n t e n c e is f o r m e d i n t h e
58 59

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e , a f f i r m a t i v e , a n d has as its l o g i c a l s u b j e c t t h e first t o state s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e w o r l d , e i t h e r d i r e c d y i n t h e f o r m o f a n


person a n d as its l o g i c a l (direct) object the second person; the a s s e r t i o n o r i n d i r e c d y , i n n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h r o u g h m e n -
predicate, constructed w i t h the help of a performative expression, tioning a propositional content.
permits i n general the particle "hereby." 7 0
This performative compo- E x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts always have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t i n
n e n t needs to be c o m p l e t e d by a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n - w h i c h a state o f a f f a i r s is e x p r e s s e d . N o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s n o r m a l l y
structed with the help of a sentence w i t h propositional content. lack this c o m p o n e n t ; thus they cannot fulfill representational func-
W h e n e v e r i t is u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h t i o n s . S i g n a l i n g t o a t a x i so t h a t I c a n b e g i n w o r k i n m y o f f i c e b y
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t takes t h e f o r m o f a propositional sentence (Aus- eight i n the m o r n i n g , reacting to the news o f m y child's miserable
sagesatz) . I n its e l e m e n t a r y f o r m , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c o n t a i n s school grades w i t h a desperate look, j o i n i n g a d e m o n s t r a t i o n m a r c h ,
(i) a n a m e or a r e f e r r i n g expression, with the aid of w h i c h the expressing n o n a c c e p t a n c e o f an i n v i t a t i o n by n o t s h o w i n g u p , shak-
s p e a k e r d e n o t e s a n o b j e c t a b o u t w h i c h she w a n t s t o assert s o m e - i n g a c a n d i d a t e ' s h a n d a f t e r h e has passed t h e e x a m , a n d so o n a n d
t h i n g ; a n d (ii) a predicate expression for the general specification so f o r t h , I o b s e r v e o r v i o l a t e c o n v e n t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y , these n o r m a t i v e
t h a t the speaker wants to g r a n t o r d e n y to the object. I n n o n c o n s t a - expectations have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ; however, the proposi-
tive s p e e c h acts, t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is n o t s t a t e d , b u t men- tional content m u s t a l r e a d y be k n o w n to the participants i f the
tioned, i n t h i s case, p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c o i n c i d e s w i t h w h a t is e x p r e s s e d b e h a v i o r is t o be c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as a r r i v i n g at w o r k , a
usually called the unasserted p r o p o s i t i o n . ( T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h be- p a r e n t ' s r e a c t i n g , t a k i n g p a r t i n a d e m o n s t r a t i o n — i n s h o r t as a n
t w e e n t h e n o m i n a l i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n " t h a t p," w h i c h expresses a state action. T h e nonverbal utterance itself cannot b r i n g the proposi-
o f affairs, a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n w h i c h represents a fact a n d w h i c h t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m t o e x p r e s s i o n because i t
owes its assertoric f o r c e t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t i t is e m b e d d e d i n cannot take o n representational functions. I t can, o f course, be
a s p e e c h act o f t h e t y p e " a s s e r t i o n , " a n d is t h e r e b y c o n n e c t e d w i t h understood as a n i n d i c a t o r t h a t calls t o m i n d t h e propositional

a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f asserting. I n f o r m a l logic, o f course, we treat content o f the presupposed n o r m .

p r o p o s i t i o n s as a u t o n o m o u s u n i t s . O n l y t h e t r u t h v a l u e w e assign t o O w i n g to their representational function, propositionally differen-


"jf>" i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o " t h a t p" is a r e m i n d e r o f t h e embedding t i a t e d speech acts a l l o w t h e a c t o r a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f f r e e d o m in
o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i n s o m e c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act, a n e m b e d d i n g that f o l l o w i n g n o r m s . I f w o r k b e g i n s a t e i g h t i n t h e m o r n i n g , t h e r e is t h e
is systematically n e g l e c t e d . ) 7 1
o p t i o n o n l y o f a p p e a r i n g o r n o t a p p e a r i n g ; i n t h e f o r m e r case, t o b e
I s h a l l c a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t h a v e t h i s s t r u c t u r e propositionally differ- o n t i m e o r t o b e l a t e ; i n t h e l a t t e r case, t o b e e x c u s e d o r n o t e x c u s e d ,
entiated. T h e y are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c - a n d so o n . N o n v e r b a l a c t i o n s are o f t e n t h e r e s u l t o f s u c h " t r e e s " o f
t i o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , a s h o u t o f " F i r e ! " t h a t releases complementary "yes" o r " n o " d e c i s i o n s . B u t i f t h e a c t o r c a n e x p r e s s h e r s e l f v e r b a l l y ,
a c t i o n s , assistance o r f l i g h t — i n t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r s i t u a t i o n is rich w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s . She can express t h e same
s p e e c h is u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, so t h a t ( i ) t h e p r o - s p e e c h act, say a c o m m a n d , i n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d way; she w i l l
p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can b e h e l d i n v a r i a n t across c h a n g e s i n i l l o c u t i o n - f u l f i l l t h e s a m e r o l e s e g m e n t , say t h a t o f a n E n g l i s h t e a c h e r d u r i n g
ary potential, and (ii) the holistic m o d e of speech, i n which class d i c t a t i o n , w i t h v e r y d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts. I n s h o r t , p r o p o s i t i o n -
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , expression, a n d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n are still one, a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h leaves t h e a c t o r m o r e d e g r e e s o f freedom
can be r e p l a c e d by d i f f e r e n t i a l m o d e s o f speech. I shall r e t u r n to i n r e l a t i o n t o a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d t h a n does a n o n -
t h i s p o i n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . F o r t h e p r e s e n t , i t suffices t o linguistic interaction.
p o i n t o u t t h a t t h i s l e v e l o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f s p e e c h is a p r e c o n d i t i o n O f c o u r s e , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t always
f o r a n a c t i o n ' s a b i l i t y t o t a k e o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s , t h a t is, h a v e a l i n g u i s t i c f o r m , as is s h o w n b y t h e e x a m p l e o f a g r a m m a t i c a l -
60 61

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

ized sign language, for instance, the standardized language o f the contrast, c o m m a n d s o r advice o r questions d o n o t represent i n s t i t u -
d e a f a n d m u t e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t also m e n t i o n p o i n t i n g tions b u t types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n fit v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s .
g e s t u r e s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a n e q u i v a l e n t f o r t h e use o f r e f e r e n t i a l T o be sure, t h e c r i t e r i o n o f b e i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d does n o t
terms, thereby s u p p l e m e n t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l speech. O n the o t h e r always p e r m i t a n u n a m b i g u o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . C o m m a n d s can exist
h a n d , t h e r e a r e also s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e n o t p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r - wherever relations o f a u t h o r i t y are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ; a p p o i n t m e n t s
e n t i a t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h acts s u c h as presuppose special, bureaucratically d e v e l o p e d organizations; and
" H e l l o ! " as a g r e e t i n g f o r m u l a , o r " C h e c k ! " a n d " C h e c k m a t e ! " as m a r r i a g e s r e q u i r e a s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n ( w h i c h is, h o w e v e r , t o b e f o u n d
p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r m o v e s i n a g a m e o f chess a n d t h e i r u n i v e r s a l l y ) . B u t this does n o t devalue t h e usefulness o f the analytic
c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is v i e w p o i n t . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y h a v e
l a c k i n g places t h e s e v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s o n a l e v e l w i t h n o r m a l n o n - a n y r e g u l a t i v e m e a n i n g a t a l l , r e f e r t o g e n e r a l aspects o f action
v e r b a l a c t i o n s ; w h i l e t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n s d o refer t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l n o r m s ; they are n o t , however, d e f i n e d by p a r t i c u l a r institutions.
c o n t e n t o f a p r e s u p p o s e d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e y d o n o t represent i t . We can n o w define t h e d e s i r e d a n a l y t i c u n i t s as propositionally
A s a first step i n d e l i m i t i n g t h e p r a g m a t i c u n i t s o f analysis, w e c a n differentiated a n d institutionally unbound speech acts. T o b e s u r e , o n l y
specify—out o f t h e set o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions t h a t rest o n the t h o s e w i t h a n e x p l i c i t l y linguistic f o r m a r e s u i t a b l e f o r analysis. F r e -
consensual f o u n d a t i o n o f reciprocally raised a n d recognized validity q u e n t l y , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts are e m b e d d e d
c l a i m s — t h e subset o f propositionally differentiated speech acts. B u t e v e n makes standard linguistic f o r m s superfluous; for example, w h e n the
t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n is n o t y e t selective e n o u g h ; f o r a m o n g t h e s e u t t e r - p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is d e t e r m i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e c o n t e x t of
a n c e s w e find s u c h s p e e c h acts as " b e t t i n g , " " c h r i s t e n i n g , " " a p p o i n t - u t t e r a n c e ; o r w h e n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is m e r e l y i n d i c a t e d ,
i n g , " a n d so o n . D e s p i t e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e n t t h a t is, e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h i n f l e c t i o n , p u n c t u a t i o n , w o r d p o s i t i o n , o r
(betting o n / f o r . . . , christening as/with . . . , appointing to . . . ) , p a r t i c l e s s u c h as " i s n ' t i t ? , " " r i g h t ? , " " i n d e e d , " " c l e a r l y , " "surely," a n d
they are b o u n d to a single i n s t i t u t i o n (or to a narrowly circum- similar expressions.
s c r i b e d set o f i n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; t h e y c a n t h e r e f o r e b e seen as t h e e q u i v a - F i n a l l y , w e s h a l l e x c l u d e t h o s e e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d
l e n t o f actions that fulfill presupposed n o r m s , either n o n v e r b a l l y o r f o r m t h a t a p p e a r i n c o n t e x t s t h a t p r o d u c e shifts o f m e a n i n g . T h i s is
i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d way. T h a t t h e s e s p e e c h acts a r e the case w h e n the pragmatic meaning of a context-dependent
institutionally bound c a n b e seen i n ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) t h e f a c t t h a t speech act diverges f r o m the m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences used i n i t
the permissible p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents are n a r r o w l y l i m i t e d by t h e ( a n d f r o m t h e i n d i c a t e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have t o
normative meaning of betting, christening, appointing, marrying, b e f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e t y p e o f s p e e c h act i n q u e s t i o n ) . Searle's " p r i n c i p l e
a n d so o n . O n e bets f o r stakes, c h r i s t e n s w i t h n a m e s , a p p o i n t s t o o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y " takes t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i n t o a c c o u n t : a s s u m i n g t h a t
o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , m a r r i e s a p a r t n e r , a n d so o n . W i t h i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t h e s p e a k e r expresses h i s i n t e n t i o n precisely, e x p l i c i d y , a n d l i t e r a l l y ,
b o u n d s p e e c h acts, s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n always b e s p e c i f i e d . W i t h i t is p o s s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act c a r r i e d o u t o r c a p a b l e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, o n l y g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i - o f b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t to be specified unequivocally by a complex
tions can be specified—conditions that typically m u s t be m e t for a sentence.
c o r r e s p o n d i n g act t o s u c c e e d . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts e x -
K a n n g i e s s e r has g i v e n t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m : " F o r e v e r y
press a s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e s a m e u n m e d i a t e d w a y t h a t p r o p o -
m e a n i n g x, i t is t h e case t h a t , i f t h e r e is a s p e a k e r S i n a l a n g u a g e
sitionally nondifferentiated and nonverbal actions express a
c o m m u n i t y P w h o m e a n s (meint) x, t h e n i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e b e
p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m . T o e x p l a i n w h a t acts o f b e t t i n g o r c h r i s t e n i n g
a n e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y P w h i c h is a n e x a c t e x p r e s -
m e a n , I must refer to the institutions o f betting or christening. By
s i o n o f x." 72
For o u r purposes, we can weaken this postulate to
63
62
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

r e q u i r e that i n a given language, f o r every interpersonal r e l a t i o n that I have n o t e l u c i d a t e d t h e e m b e d d i n g of communicative action


a speaker wants to take u p e x p l i c i t l y w i t h a n o t h e r m e m b e r o f his ( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) i n o t h e r types o f
language c o m m u n i t y , a suitable p e r f o r m a t i v e expression is e i t h e r a c t i o n . I t seems t o m e t h a t strategic action ( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
a v a i l a b l e o r , i f necessary, c a n b e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e a c t o r ' s success" s u c h as c o m p e t i t i v e b e h a v i o r o r c o m b a t g a m e s —
available expressions o r newly i n t r o d u c e d . W i t h this m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n general, modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian m o d e l
we can take i n t o a c c o u n t reservations t h a t have b e e n expressed o f p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l a c t i o n ) as w e l l as t h e s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n d y a n a l y z e d
c o n c e r n i n g Searle's p r i n c i p l e . 7 3
I n a n y case, t h e h e u r i s t i c m e a n i n g c a t e g o r y o f symbolic action ( s u c h as a c t i o n m a n i f e s t e d i n a c o n c e r t o r
is c l e a r — i f t h e p o s t u l a t e o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y is v a l i d , analysis c a n be a d a n c e — i n general, m o d e s o f a c t i o n t h a t are b o u n d to n o n p r o p o -

l i m i t e d t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d s i t i o n a l systems o f s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n ) differ f r o m communicative

form. a c t i o n i n that i n d i v i d u a l validity claims are suspended ( i n strategic


action, truthfulness, i n symbolic action, t r u t h ) . 7 4
M y previous analy-
T h e f o l l o w i n g d i a g r a m sums u p t h e v i e w p o i n t s f r o m w h i c h I have
ses o f " l a b o r " a n d " i n t e r a c t i o n " h a v e n o t y e t a d e q u a t e l y c a p t u r e d t h e
d e l i m i t e d t h e class o f s p e e c h acts basic f o r analysis.
m o s t g e n e r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d so-
D e r i v a t i o n o f the Analytic U n i t s o f t h e T h e o r y o f Speech Acts cial (or c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) action. I c a n n o t pursue this here.
I n s t r u m e n t a l actions Social actions

O n the D o u b l e Structure o f Speech


S y m b o l i c actions C o m m u n i c a t i v e actions Strategic actions
I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n n o w t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c double structure t h a t
c a n b e r e a d o f f f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f s p e e c h acts. O b v i o u s l y ,
N o t propositionally Propositionally
the two components, the illocutionary a n d the propositional, can
differentiated differentiated
vary independently o f one another. We can h o l d a propositional
c o n t e n t i n v a r i a n t vis-a-vis t h e d i f f e r e n t types o f s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h
i t o c c u r s . I n t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e as-
Nonverbal Verbal Nonverbal Verbal serted p r o p o s i t i o n , a f u n d a m e n t a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f o u r language
(illocutionarily is e x p r e s s e d . P r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t -
abbreviated s e l f t h e r e i n f r o m t h e s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n we c a n a l -
speech acts) Institutionally Institutionally ready observe a m o n g p r i m a t e s . 7 5
A n y n u m b e r o f examples o f the
bound unbound invariance of propositional content d e s p i t e v a r i a n c e i n s p e e c h act m o d e
can be p r o v i d e d — f o r instance, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "Peter's
s m o k i n g a p i p e , " t h e r e are t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Implicit Explicit
" I assert t h a t P e t e r s m o k e s a p i p e . "

" I beg y o u (Peter) to smoke a p i p e . "


Context- Context-
" I ask y o u ( P e t e r ) , d o y o u s m o k e a p i p e ? "
dependent independent
" I w a r n y o u (Peter) against s m o k i n g a p i p e . "

Analytic units
64 65

Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?

I n a genetic perspective, t h e speech-act invariance o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l m a d e . B u t t h e c o n c e p t o f a h i e r a r c h y o f l a n g u a g e was i n t r o d u c e d


c o n t e n t s a p p e a r s as a n uncoupling of the illocutionary and propositional f o r f o r m a l languages, i n w h i c h j u s t that reflexivity o f o r d i n a r y l a n -
components i n t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. T h i s g u a g e is l a c k i n g . M o r e o v e r , i n a m e t a l a n g u a g e o n e always r e f e r s t o
u n c o u p l i n g is a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c - a n object language i n the objectivating a t t i t u d e o f someone asserting
t u r e o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t w o c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels facts o r o b s e r v i n g events; o n e f o r m s m e t a l i n g u i s t i c statements. B y
o n w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r m u s t simultaneously c o m e t o a n u n d e r - c o n t r a s t , o n t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l e v e l o f s p e e c h , i t is p r e c i s e l y
standing i f they want to c o m m u n i c a t e their intentions to one an- statements t h a t are n o t possible. I n s t e a d , at this level, one chooses
o t h e r . I w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e level of intersubjectivity o n w h i c h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o be
s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, e s t a b l i s h t h e r e l a - used; a n d this m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e
tions that p e r m i t t h e m to come to an understanding w i t h one an- s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o b e e m p l o y e d r e q u i r e s a
o t h e r , a n d ( i i ) t h e level of propositional content a b o u t w h i c h t h e y w i s h p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o n the p a r t o f those c o m m u n i c a t i n g . Thus, the
to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the communicative f u n c t i o n specified i n p e c u l i a r r e f l e x i v i t y o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e rests in the first instance o n t h e
( i ) . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e r e l a t i o n a l a n d t h e c o n t e n t aspects, f r o m combination of a communication of content—effected i n an objec-
t h e p o i n t o f view o f w h i c h every u t t e r a n c e can be analyzed, t h e r e are tivating a t t i t u d e — w i t h a m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n concerning the rela-
(in the standard f o r m ) the illocutionary a n d the propositional com- tional aspect—effected i n a performative a t t i t u d e — f r o m the p o i n t
p o n e n t s o f t h e s p e e c h act. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act fixes t h e sense i n o f v i e w o f w h i c h t h e c o n t e n t is t o b e understood.
w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is e m p l o y e d , a n d t h e act-comple- O f c o u r s e , p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i a l o g u e n o r m a l l y have t h e o p t i o n o f
m e n t d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n t e n t t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d "as s o m e t h i n g ..." o b j e c t i f y i n g e v e r y i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t p e r f o r m e d as t h e c o n t e n t o f a
i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n s p e c i f i e d . ( T h e h e r m e n e u t i c "as" c a n further (constative) s p e e c h act. T h e y c a n a d o p t a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g
b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o n b o t h c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels. W i t h a p r o p o s i t i o n attitude t o w a r d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f a n already per-
"p," a n i d e n t i f i a b l e o b j e c t w h o s e e x i s t e n c e is p r e s u p p o s e d c a n be f o r m e d speech act a n d shift this c o m p o n e n t t o t h e level o f p r o p o s i -
characterized "as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . , as a " r e d , " " s o f t , " o r "ideal," tional c o n t e n t s . N a t u r a l l y , t h e y c a n d o so o n l y b y p e f o r m i n g a n e w
object. I n connection w i t h a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, t h a t is, t h r o u g h speech act t h a t contains, i n t u r n , a n o n o b j e c t i f i e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -
b e i n g e m b e d d e d i n a s p e e c h act, t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c a n , i n p o n e n t . T h e d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t m e n t i o n o f speech standardizes this
t u r n , b e uttered "as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . , as a c o m m a n d o r a s s e r t i o n ) . possibility o f r e n d e r i n g explicit the reflexivity o f natural language.
A basic f e a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e is c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h i s d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e T h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t takes p l a c e o n t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b -
o f s p e e c h , n a m e l y , its i n h e r e n t r e f l e x i v i t y . T h e s t a n d a r d i z e d p o s s i b i l i - j e c t i v i t y i n a s p e e c h act tn c a n b e d e p i c t e d o n t h e l e v e l o f p r o p o s i -
ties f o r d i r e c d y a n d i n d i r e c t l y m e n t i o n i n g s p e e c h m e r e l y m a k e ex- t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n a f u r t h e r ( c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h act tn+1. O n t h e o t h e r
p l i c i t a self-reference t h a t is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y s p e e c h act. h a n d , i t is n o t p o s s i b l e simultaneously t o p e r f o r m a n d t o o b j e c t i f y a n
In filling o u t the double structure o f speech, participants i n dialogue illocutionary act. 7 6

c o m m u n i c a t e o n t w o levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h e y c o m b i n e commu- T h i s o p t i o n is s o m e t i m e s t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a d e s c r i p t i v i s t f a l l a c y t o
nication of a content with "metacommunication"—communication w h i c h e v e n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r i e s f a l l p r e y . W e c a n analyze t h e s t r u c -
a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e c o m m u n i c a t e d c o n t e n t is u s e d . The tures o f speech, j u s t like every o t h e r object, o n l y i n a n objectivating
expression " m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n " m i g h t be m i s l e a d i n g h e r e because a t t i t u d e . I n d o i n g so, t h e r e l e v a n t a c c o m p a n y i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -
it c o u l d be associated w i t h metalanguage a n d suggest a n i d e a of p o n e n t c a n n o t , as w e saw a b o v e , b e c o m e uno acto t h e o b j e c t . T h i s
l a n g u a g e levels s u c h t h a t , a t e v e r y h i g h e r l e v e l , m e t a l i n g u i s t i c state- circumstance misleads m a n y language theorists i n t o the view that
ments about the object language o f t h e n e x t lower level can be c o m m u n i c a t i o n processes t a k e p l a c e a t a s i n g l e l e v e l , n a m e l y t h a t o f
66 67
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

t r a n s m i t t i n g c o n t e n t (i.e., i n f o r m a t i o n ) . F r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the as f u n c t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s ) , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o t h e
r e l a t i o n a l a s p e c t loses its i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-à-vis t h e c o n t e n t aspect; p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts is n o t p l a u s i b l e . O b v i o u s l y ,
the communicative r o l e o f a n u t t e r a n c e loses its c o n s t i t u t i v e sig- t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s also h a v e a m e a n i n g i n a l i n g u i s t i c
n i f i c a n c e a n d is c o u n t e d as p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t . The sense. I n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t l y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e , t h e p e r -
pragmatic operator of the statement, w h i c h i n formalized presenta- formative verb employed has a l e x i c a l m e a n i n g , a n d t h e perfor-
tions (e.g., d e o n t i c l o g i c s ) r e p r e s e n t s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t m a t i v e s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h its h e l p has a m e a n i n g i n a m a n n e r
o f a n u t t e r a n c e , is t h e n n o l o n g e r i n t e r p r e t e d as a s p e c i f i c m o d e o f similar t o t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t o n i t .
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s b u t falsely as " W h a t A u s t i n calls t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e is t h a t
p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d . I d o n o t w i s h t o analyze this a s p e c t o f its m e a n i n g w h i c h is e i t h e r c o n v e y e d b y its e x p l i c i d y p e r -
fallacy here; I merely p o i n t to o n e o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s : t h a t t h e f o r m a t i v e p r e f i x , i f i t has o n e , o r m i g h t h a v e b e e n so c o n v e y e d b y
c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h is n e g l e c t e d t h e use o f s u c h a n expression." 7 7

i n theoretical approaches.
T h i s p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t n e g l e c t s , h o w e v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t f o r c e is
A s o p p o s e d t o t h i s , I c o n s i d e r t h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t o s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i n a s p e c i f i c sense, b e l o n g s o n l y t o u t t e r a n c e s a n d
be the r a t i o n a l reconstruction o f the double structure o f speech. n o t t o s e n t e n c e s . T h u s , o n e m i g h t first h i t u p o n t h e i d e a o f r e s e r v i n g
T a k i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ( i n "force" for the meaning content that accrues to the sentence
t h e n e x t t w o sections) I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o r e n d e r t h i s task m o r e t h r o u g h its b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h a t is, e m b e d d e d i n s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h .
precise i n r e l a t i o n to the p r o b l e m s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity. We can qertainly distinguish the p h e n o m e n o n of meaning that
comes about t h r o u g h the e m p l o y m e n t o f a sentence i n an utterance
Universal-Pragmatic Categories o f M e a n i n g f r o m the phenomenon o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g . W e c a n speak i n a
p r a g m a t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e , as we d o in a
A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts set o f f a l i n g u i s t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e . T h u s A l s t o n has t a k e n
b r o a d discussion t h a t has also b r o u g h t s o m e c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o the t h e fact t h a t t h e same speech act can be p e r f o r m e d w i t h v e r y d i f f e r -
theory o f meaning. Austin reserved t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r the e n t s e n t e n c e s as a r e a s o n f o r g r a n t i n g p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g a c e r t a i n
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , w h i l e he used t h e p r i o r i t y o v e r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c o n s i s t e n t use
c o n c e p t force o n l y f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o f u t t e r i n g s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , h e suggests t h a t s e n t e n c e ( a n d w o r d ) meanings
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s leads t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t e l l a t i o n s : a r e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h t h e y a r e
"principally" used. 7 8
T h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l is t h a t i t d o e s
M e a n i n g : sense a n d r e f e r e n c e , l o c u t i o n a r y act
n o t a d e q u a t e l y t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f sen-

Force: a t t e m p t t o reach a n u p t a k e , i l l o c u t i o n a r y act tence meanings i n relation to the c o n t i n g e n t changes o f m e a n i n g


that a sentence can u n d e r g o w h e n used i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. M o r e -
A u s t i n c o u l d p o i n t to t h e fact t h a t sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o - over, t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is o b v i o u s l y less d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c o u l d b e u t t e r e d i n s p e e c h acts o f d i f f e r e n t types, i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e s p e a k e r t h a n is t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e .
t h a t is, w i t h d i f f e r i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o r i n d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y
E v e n i f a s e n t e n c e is v e r y o f t e n u s e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e n t i o n s a n d
m o d e s . Nevertheless, t h e p r o p o s e d d i s t i n c t i o n is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I f
i n a c o n t e x t t h a t p r a g m a t i c a l l y shifts m e a n i n g , its l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g
one i n t r o d u c e s m e a n i n g solely i n a l i n g u i s t i c sense, as s e n t e n c e
d o e s n o t have t o c h a n g e . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n c e r t a i n s o c i a l
m e a n i n g ( w h e r e b y e i t h e r s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g is c o n c e i v e d as a f u n c -
roles prescribe t h a t c o m m a n d s be u t t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f requests,
t i o n o f w o r d m e a n i n g s or, w i t h F r e g e , w o r d m e a n i n g s a r e c o n c e i v e d
t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e u t t e r a n c e (as a c o m m a n d ) i n n o w a y
68 69
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

a l t e r s t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d (as a r e q u e s t ) . (1') " I hate you."


T h i s is a n a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n f o r s i n g l i n g o u t t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s
instead o f to the sentence
u n d e r w h i c h the p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n e x p l i c i t speech act c o i n -
cides w i t h t h e linguistic m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences e m p l o y e d i n i t . (2') " H e hates her."
Precisely i n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act i n s t a n d a r d f o r m ,
O n l y b e c a u s e a n d so l o n g as t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f m e a n i n g is
however, t h e categorial d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e ex-
b i a s e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i z e d f o r m s (2 o r 2') is i t n e c e s s a r y
pressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences, o n t h e one
to supplement t h e m e a n i n g o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences w i t h the
h a n d , a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s (as w e l l as o f ex-
m e a n i n g o f the illocutionary force o f an utterance (and the inten-
p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s ) , o n t h e o t h e r , c o m e s i n t o view. T h i s shows t h a t
t i o n o f the speaker). N o d o u b t this circumstance m o t i v a t e d A u s t i n
i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o e x p l i c a t e t h e c o n c e p t s " m e a n i n g " versus
to draw his d i s t i n c t i o n between m e a n i n g a n d force. To m y m i n d , i t
"force" w i t h reference to the distinction between the linguistic m e a n -
w o u l d be b e t t e r to start w i t h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f a n expression,
i n g o f a sentence a n d the pragmatic m e a n i n g o f an utterance.
as o p p o s e d t o t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; t h e l i n g u i s t i c
T h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g t e n d s t o a b s t r a c t f r o m
m e a n i n g o f expressions w o u l d t h e n be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to
c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y i n t o w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is p u t as s o o n as i t
t h e u n i v e r s a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n s p e e c h acts ( a n d a c c o r d -
is u t t e r e d a n d f r o m t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n d e r w h i c h i t is t h e r e b y
ing to the corresponding validity claims), w i t h reference to the
p l a c e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c o n s i s t e n t analysis o f m e a n i n g is n o t
o r i g i n a l o c c u r r e n c e o f such expressions. B u t w h a t does " o r i g i n a l "
p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t s o m e r e f e r e n c e t o s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e use. E v e r y
m e a n i n t h i s c o n t e x t ? L e t us c o n s i d e r t w o s e n t e n c e s as e x a m p l e s :
linguistic expression can be used to f o r m statements. Even i l l o c u -
t i o n a r y phrases ( a n d o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions) can be ob- (3) " I ' m t e l l i n g y o u t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . "
j e c t i f i e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f a f u r t h e r s t a t e m e n t . T h i s suggests t h a t i t
m a k e s sense t o secure a c e r t a i n u n i f o r m i t y f o r t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis (4) " I ' m a s k i n g y o u , is f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r y e l l o w ? "

o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s b y r e l a t i n g i t i n e v e r y case U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t w o ( d i f f e r e n t ) i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts is t i e d t o
t o t h e possibilities f o r u s i n g these expressions i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . B u t o t h e r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r ( c o n c o r d a n t ) pro-
t h i s m a k e s sense o n l y f o r s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s as c a n a p p e a r exclusively p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e c o m e s p e r c e p t i b l e as s o o n as
i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f speech. By contrast, the m e a n i n g o f one r e t u r n s to the conditions that m u s t be f u l f i l l e d by situations i n
p e r f o r m a t i v e expressions s h o u l d be clarified by r e f e r r i n g to the w h i c h s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n o t k n o w E n g l i s h m i g h t l e a r n (i.e., o r i g i -
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( a n d t h e m e a n i n g nally understand) the meanings. A hearer can understand the mean-
o f o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions by r e f e r r i n g to the possibilities i n g o f the sentence w i t h the propositional content "the being yellow
f o r u s i n g t h e m t o express i n t e n t i o n s d i r e c d y ) . T h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p l i - o f f a t h e r ' s c a r " o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o c o r r e c d y use t h e
cation o f the m e a n i n g o f "to p r o m i s e " should o r i e n t itself a r o u n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence:
t h e possibilities f o r using the sentence
(5) " F a t h e r ' s n e w car is y e l l o w "
(1) " I hereby promise you that ..."
i n order, f o r e x a m p l e , t o express a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e , i n this
a n d n o t a r o u n d the possibilities f o r using the sentence case h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . T h e a b i l i t y t o
make this or a similar observation must be presupposed, for a p r o p e r
(2) " H e promises her t h a t . . . "
use o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n ( 5 ) d e m a n d s a t least t h e f o l l o w -
Correspondingly, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f "to hate" should i n g o f t h e speaker:
refer to the sentence
70 71

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

a. T h e e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n : t h a t t h e r e is o n e a n d o n l y one Understanding (5) presupposes the possibility of sensory ex-


object to w h i c h the designation "father's new car" applies. periences (experiences of the type, observation); by contrast,
b. T h e presupposition o f identifiability: that the (denotatively em- u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( 6 ) a n d ( 7 ) i t s e l f represents a c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i -
ployed) prepositional content contained i n the designation "father's ence (an experience o f the type, p a r t i c i p a t o r y observation): i l l o c u -

n e w c a r " is a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n , i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , f o r a h e a r e r t o t i o n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n e x p e r i e n c e m a d e p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h

select t h e ( a n d o n l y t h e ) o b j e c t t o w h i c h t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a p p l i e s . communication.
T h e difference between originally illocutionary a n d originally pro-
c. T h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n : t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " y e l l o w " c a n b e a t t r i b -
p o s i t i o n a l m e a n i n g s ( " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " i n A u s t i n ' s sense) c a n
u t e d t o t h e o b j e c t t h a t is d e s i g n a t e d .
be traced back to differences i n possible l e a r n i n g situations. We
Correspondingly, understanding the meaning of the prepositional l e a r n t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n l y i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e
sentence c o n t a i n e d i n (5) d e m a n d s o f t h e hearer t h a t h e a t t i t u d e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s p e e c h acts. B y c o n t r a s t , w e l e a r n t h e
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n t h e n o n p e r f o r -
a', s h a r e t h e speaker-presupposition,
mative—objectivating—attitude o f observers w h o correctly repre-
b'. fulfill the speaker-presupposition, t h a t is, a c t u a l l y i d e n t i f y t h e sent their experiences i n propositional sentences. 79
We acquire
object designated, a n d originally illoctionary meanings i n connection with communicative
c'. u n d e r t a k e f o r his p a r t t h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n . e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t w e have i n e n t e r i n g t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
establishing an interpersonal relation. We learn originally proposi-
I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r so f a r as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f
tional meanings t h r o u g h r e p o r t i n g experiences w i t h objects a n d
u t t e r a n c e s ( 3 ) a n d (4) a r e c o n c e r n e d . A h e a r e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e
events i n t h e w o r l d .
m e a n i n g o f n o t i f y i n g o r a s k i n g o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this d i f f e r e n c e , meanings learned in a perfor-
t a k e p a r t i n successful s p e e c h acts o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :
m a t i v e a t t i t u d e c a n , o f c o u r s e , also o c c u r i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o s i -
(6) " I ( h e r e b y ) n o t i f y y o u t h a t . . ." tional content:

(7) " I ( h e r e b y ) ask y o u w h e t h e r . . ." (8) " I assure y o u t h a t h e n o t i f i e d m e y e s t e r d a y t h a t . . ."

T h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, has l e a r n e d t o a s s u m e b o t h t h e r o l e o f the (9) " I ' m r e p o r t i n g t o y o u t h a t she asked m e yesterday w h e t h e r . . ."
( a c t i n g ) s p e a k e r as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e ( c o o p e r a t i n g ) hearer. The
T h i s fact may e x p l a i n why the i n d i c a t e d difference between the two
performance o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t c a n n o t serve t o r e p o r t a n o b -
c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g is o f t e n n o t n o t i c e d . I n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o -
s e r v a t i o n as t h e use o f a p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c a n ; n o r m u s t t h e
sitional c o n t e n t , however, we can d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m e a n i n g s o f expres-
a b i l i t y t o have p e r c e p t i o n s e s s e n t i a l l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d h e r e . R a t h e r ,
sions t h a t m a y be used i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e f r o m t h e w o r d
conversely, t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a s p e e c h a c t is a c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y
meanings t h a t — l i k e the n o m i n a l a n d predicative expressions i n
o f a n experience, n a m e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience that the
( 5 ) — a r e p e r m i t t e d only as m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t s i n sentences w i t h
h e a r e r has w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a t t e m p t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n utterances like (8) a n d ( 9 ) , " n o t i f y " a n d
speech act and enters into an interpersonal relation with the
"ask" b e a r a s h a d e o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p o w e r t h a t t h e y have
speaker, a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n o n e w h o n o t i f i e s o r i n f o r m s a n d o n e w h o
o n l y i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y roles—as i n (6) a n d ( 7 ) .
r e c e i v e s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n — o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , takes u p
We can retain Austin's distinction between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g "
the relation between a person w h o questions a n d a person who
i n t h e sense o f t h e s e t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . " F o r c e " t h e n stands
answers.
72 73

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t are o r i g i n a l l y u s e d i n c o n n e c - a b o u t basic types o f s p e e c h acts a n d basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use has


tion w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a n d " m e a n i n g " f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x - also t a k e n t h i s p a i r o f c o n c e p t s as i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . A t f i r s t A u s t i n
pressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h propositions. T h u s we w a n t e d to draw the b o u n d a r y i n such a way that "the p e r f o r m a t i v e
d i s t i n g u i s h " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " as t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g t h a t s h o u l d b e d o i n g s o m e t h i n g as o p p o s e d t o j u s t s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g ; a n d
arise w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f communica- t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e is h a p p y o r u n h a p p y as o p p o s e d t o t r u e and
tion: the establishment o f interpersonal relations, o n the one h a n d , false." 8 2

a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( r e p o r t i n g o f facts o r states o f a f f a i r s ) , o n t h e
F r o m this the f o l l o w i n g correlations resulted:
o t h e r . ( I s h a l l h e r e leave t o o n e side t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f expression, t h a t is, t o t h e d i s c l o - L o c u t i o n a r y acts: constatives, t r u e / u n t r u e
s u r e o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse), a l t h o u g h reflections simi-
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: p e r f o r m a t i v e s , happy/unhappy
l a r t o t h o s e c a r r i e d o u t f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a p p l y t o i n t e n t i o n a l
s e n t e n c e s as w e l l . ) B u t t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c o u l d n o t
be m a i n t a i n e d w h e n i t became a p p a r e n t that a l l speech acts—the
I w o u l d like t o h o l d o n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g results:
constatives included—contain a locutionary component (in the
a. I t is n o t advisable t o r e s e r v e t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r t h e p r e p o - f o r m o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content) a n d an i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f a speech act a n d t o characterize t h e m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t ( i n the f o r m o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence) , 8 3
What Austin
o f an illocutionary c o m p o n e n t only by a pragmatic operator (which h a d i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d as t h e l o c u t i o n a r y act was n o w r e p l a c e d b y
d e s i g n a t e s a specific i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ) . (a) t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y e x p l i c i t s p e e c h

b . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t is also u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e act, a n d ( b ) a s p e c i a l class o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — c o n s t a t i v e speech

m e a n i n g o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e i n e x a c d y t h e s a m e w a y as t h e acts—that i m p l y the validity claim o f t r u t h . A u s t i n himself later

m e a n i n g o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content; the i l l o c u t i o n a r y r e g a r d e d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as o n l y o n e a m o n g several d i f f e r e n t


classes o f s p e e c h acts. T h e t w o s e n t e n c e s
c o m p o n e n t o f a s p e e c h a c t n e i t h e r expresses a p r o p o s i t i o n nor
mentions a propositional content. 8 0

(1) " I assert t h a t . . . "


c. I t is e q u a l l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o e q u a t e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h t h e
(2) " I ' m warning you t h a t . . . "
m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t that accrues to the m e a n i n g o f a sentence
t h r o u g h t h e act o f u t t e r i n g i t i n a given context. equally express i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. 84
B u t t h i s has t h e i n t e r e s t i n g c o n -
d . R a t h e r , f r o m a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f view, t h e m e a n i n g o f s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m c o n t a i n e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
linguistic expressions can be categorically d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o ( t r u t h / f a l s i t y ) r e p r e s e n t s m e r e l y a s p e c i a l case a m o n g t h e v a l i d i t y
w h e t h e r they may appear o n l y i n sentences that take o n a r e p r e - c l a i m s t h a t speakers, i n s p e e c h acts, raise a n d o f f e r f o r v i n d i c a t i o n
s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o r w h e t h e r t h e y c a n s e r v e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o estab- vis-à-vis h e a r e r s .
lish i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations o r t o express speaker i n t e n t i o n s . 8 1

I n general we may say this: w i t h b o t h statements (and, for example, descrip-


tions) a n d warnings, etc., the question o f whether, g r a n t i n g that y o u d i d
Thematization o f Validity Claims a n d Modes o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n w a r n a n d h a d the r i g h t to w a r n , d i d state o r d i d advise, y o u were right to
state or to w a r n o r advise, can arise—not i n the sense o f whether i t was
A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts has be- o p p o r t u n e or expedient, b u t whether, o n the facts a n d y o u r knowledge o f
c o m e i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y f o r the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ; the discussion the facts a n d the purpose for w h i c h y o u were speaking, a n d so o n , this was
the p r o p e r t h i n g to say. 85
74 75

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

I n t h i s passage, A u s t i n e m p h a s i z e s t h e c l a i m t o be right, o r c l a i m t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s ; t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is


t o validity, t h a t w e raise w i t h a n y ( a n d n o t j u s t w i t h c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h p r e s u p p o s e d i n a c e r t a i n way b y s p e e c h acts o f every t y p e . T h e m e a n -
acts. B u t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s e o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y f r o m t h e g e n e r a l i n g o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l content m e n t i o n e d i n nonconstative speech
c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s — r e s t r i c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o speech-act t y p e — t h a t acts c a n b e m a d e e x p l i c i t t h r o u g h t r a n s f o r m i n g a s e n t e n c e o f p r o p -
l i k e w i s e m u s t be f u l f i l l e d i f a s p e e c h act is t o s u c c e e d ( t h a t is, f r o m o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , " t h a t />," i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e and
happiness/unhappiness c o n d i t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ) . I t is t r u e o f asser- t h e t r u t h c l a i m b e l o n g s essentially t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
tions, i n t h e same way as i t is o f w a r n i n g s , pieces o f a d v i c e , p r o m i s e s , thereby expressed. T r u t h claims are thus a type o f validity c l a i m b u i l t
a n d so f o r t h , t h a t t h e y c a n s u c c e e d o n l y i f both c o n d i t i o n s are i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e s p e e c h i n g e n e r a l . T r u t h is a u n i v e r s a l
f u l f i l l e d : (a) t o b e i n o r d e r , a n d ( b ) t o b e r i g h t . v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; its u n i v e r s a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f
speech.
B u t t h e r e a l c o n c l u s i o n m u s t s u r e l y be t h a t we n e e d . . . to e s t a b l i s h w i t h
L o o k i n g b a c k , A u s t i n assures h i m s e l f o f w h a t h e o r i g i n a l l y h a d i n
r e s p e c t to e a c h k i n d o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — w a r n i n g s , e s t i m a t e s , v e r d i c t s ,
m i n d w i t h h i s c o n t r a s t o f c o n s t a t i v e a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts
s t a t e m e n t s , a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s — w h a t i f a n y is t h e s p e c i f i c way i n w h i c h t h e y
a r e i n t e n d e d , first to b e i n o r d e r o r n o t i n o r d e r , a n d s e c o n d , to b e " r i g h t " ( c o n s t a t i v e s versus p e r f o r m a t i v e s ) :
o r " w r o n g ; " w h a t t e r m s o f a p p r a i s a l a n d d i s a p p r a i s a l a r e u s e d for e a c h a n d
W i t h the constative utterances, we abstract f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y . . . as-
w h a t t h e y m e a n . T h i s is a w i d e f i e l d a n d c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t l e a d to a s i m p l e
pects o f the speech act, a n d we concentrate o n the locutionary; moreover,
d i s t i n c t i o n o f t r u e a n d false; n o r w i l l it l e a d to a d i s t i n c t i o n o f s t a t e m e n t s
we use an oversimplified n o t i o n o f correspondence w i t h the facts. . . . We
f r o m t h e rest, for stating is o n l y o n e a m o n g v e r y n u m e r o u s s p e e c h acts o f
a i m at the ideal o f what w o u l d be r i g h t to say i n all circumstances, for any
the illocutionary c l a s s . 8 6

purposes, to any audience, etc. Perhaps this is sometimes realized. W i t h the


S p e e c h acts c a n b e i n o r d e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t y p i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d performative we a t t e n d as m u c h as possible to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f the
utterance, a n d abstract f r o m the d i m e n s i o n o f correspondence w i t h facts. 87

c o n t e x t s ( a ) ; b u t t h e y c a n b e v a l i d (gültig) o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t A f t e r h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e p r e s e n t o n l y o n e
( b ) . I s h a l l c o m e b a c k t o b o t h o f t h e s e classes o f c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t o f several types o f s p e e c h acts, A u s t i n gave u p t h e aforementioned
b e f u l f i l l e d i n o r d e r f o r s p e e c h acts t o s u c c e e d . A t t h i s p o i n t I a m c o n t r a s t i n f a v o r o f a set o f u n o r d e r e d f a m i l i e s o f s p e e c h acts. I a m
interested only i n the fact that the comparison between constative o f t h e o p i n i o n , however, t h a t w h a t h e i n t e n d e d w i t h the contrast
a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts t h r o w s l i g h t o n t h e v a l i d i t y basis t h a t " c o n s t a t i v e " versus " p e r f o r m a t i v e " c a n b e a d e q u a t e l y reconstructed.
m a n i f e s t l y u n d e r l i e s all s p e e c h a c t i o n s .
W e h a v e seen t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n l a n g u a g e c a n t a k e p l a c e o n l y
T o be sure, this does i n i t i a l l y clarify t h e special p o s i t i o n o f consta- when the participants, i n communicating with one another about
t i v e s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s d o n o t d i f f e r f r o m o t h e r types o f s p e e c h s o m e t h i n g , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e n t e r t w o levels o f communication—the
acts i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a t i v e / p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , n o r do level o f intersubjectivity o n w h i c h they take u p i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-
they d i f f e r by v i r t u e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , f o r these v a r y tions a n d t h e level o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents. However, i n speaking,
i n a t y p i c a l way f o r a l l s p e e c h a c t i o n s ; b u t t h e y d o differ f r o m we can m a k e e i t h e r t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
( a l m o s t ) a l l o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts i n t h a t t h e y p r i m a f a c i e i m p l y content more c e n t r a l l y t h e m a t i c ; i n so d o i n g , w e m a k e a more
a n u n m i s t a k a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a c l a i m t o t r u t h . I t is u n d e n i a b l e t h a t i n t e r a c t i v e o r a m o r e c o g n i t i v e use o f o u r l a n g u a g e . I n t h e interactive
o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts also i m p l y some or other v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; b u t use of language, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e r e l a t i o n s i n t o w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d
i n d e t e r m i n i n g exacdy w h a t validity c l a i m they imply, we seldom hearer enter—as a warning, promise, r e q u e s t — w h i l e we merely
e n c o u n t e r such a clearly d e f i n e d a n d universally recognized validity m e n t i o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s . I n t h e cognitive
c l a i m as " t r u t h " ( i n t h e sense o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ) . I t is easy t o see use of language, b y c o n t r a s t , w e t h e m a t i z e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e
76 77
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

as a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t is h a p p e n i n g i n t h e w o r l d ( o r J u s t as o n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e
t h a t c o u l d b e t h e case), w h i l e w e e x p r e s s t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n use o f l a n g u a g e , so f o r t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e o n l y t h o s e
o n l y i n d i r e c d y . T h i s i n c i d e n t a l character can be seen, f o r example, s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t h a t
i n the fact that i n E n g l i s h the e x p l i c i t f o r m o f assertion ("I am speaker a n d hearer can adopt to the n o r m a t i v e contexts o f t h e i r
a s s e r t i n g ( t o y o u ) t h a t . . . " ) , a l t h o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , is r a r e a c t i o n . I c a l l t h e s e regulative s p e e c h a c t s . 88
W i t h the illocutionary
in comparison to the short f o r m that disregards the i n t e r p e r s o n a l f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m — l i g h t n e s s o r a p -
relation. propriateness (Richtigkeit, Angemessenheit)—is b u i l t j u s t as u n i v e r s a l l y
A s t h e c o n t e n t is t h e m a t i z e d i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o n l y i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h as t h e t r u t h c l a i m . B u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m
s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s c a n assume t h e e x p l i c i t o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e x p l i c i t i y i n v o k e d o n l y i n r e g u l a t i v e
f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a r e p e r m i t t e d . W i t h these c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( i n c o m m a n d s a n d a d m o n i t i o n s , i n p r o h i b i t i o n s a n d
s p e e c h acts, w e raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted. I n r e f u s a l s , i n p r o m i s e s a n d a g r e e m e n t s , n o t i f i c a t i o n s , excuses, r e c o m -
t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , i n w h i c h t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n m e n d a t i o n s , a d m i s s i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e t r u t h r e f e r e n c e o f t h e
is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed, w e r e f e r i n v a r i o u s ways t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e m e n t i o n e d propositional content remains, by contrast, merely i m -
n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e s p e e c h act. p l i c i t ; i t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o its e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Conversely,
F o r t h i s l a t t e r use, t h e ( a u t h o r i z e d ) c o m m a n d has a p a r a d i g m a t i c i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m , t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e a s s e r t i o n f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e use of n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t , a l t h o u g h these too (e.g.,
language. T r u t h is m e r e l y t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s — n o t t h e only— reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, a n d
validity c l a i m reflected i n the f o r m a l structures o f speech. T h e i l l o - so f o r t h ) m u s t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a t i o n s —
c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s a l e g i t i m a t e ( o r t h a t is, t h e y m u s t b e covered by a recognized normative back-
illegitimate) interpersonal relation between t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , is d e - g r o u n d — i f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations i n t e n d e d w i t h t h e m are to
r i v e d f r o m t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e (bindende Kraft) o f r e c o g - c o m e t o pass.
nized n o r m s o f action (or o f evaluation); to the extent that a speech I t seems t o m e t h a t w h a t A u s t i n h a d i n m i n d w i t h his (later
a c t is a n a c t i o n , i t actualizes a n a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a - a b a n d o n e d ) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o c o n s t a t i v e versus p e r -
tions. T h e validity o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f institutions, roles, f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s is c a p t u r e d i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o g -
s o c i o c u l t u r a l l y h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — t h a t is, o f conventions—is n i t i v e a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e uses o f l a n g u a g e . I n t h e cognitive use of
always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e d . T h i s b y n o m e a n s h o l d s t r u e o n l y f o r language, w i t h t h e h e l p o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b e t t i n g , g r e e t i n g , c h r i s t e n - p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; i n t h e interactive use of lan-
i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , e a c h o f w h i c h satisfies a specific n o r m guage, w i t h t h e h e l p o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e k i n d
o f a c t i o n ( o r a n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d class o f n o r m s ) . I n p r o m i s e s , o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n established. T h e difference i n thematiza-
too, i n recommendations, prohibitions, prescriptions, a n d the like, tion r e s u l t s f r o m stressing o n e o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n i v e r s a l l y i n h e r -
w h i c h are n o t r e g u l a t e d f r o m t h e outset by i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e speaker e n t i n s p e e c h , t h a t is, f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use of
i m p l i e s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t m u s t , i f t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t o s u c c e e d , l a n g u a g e w e raise t r u t h c l a i m s f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e
b e c o v e r e d b y e x i s t i n g n o r m s , a n d t h a t m e a n s b y ( a t least) d e facto use o f l a n g u a g e w e lay c l a i m t o ( o r c o n t e s t ) t h e v a l i d i t y o f a n o r m a -
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the claim that these norms rightfully exist. T h i s i n t e r n a l tive b a c k g r o u n d f o r i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A u s t i n h i m s e l f d i d n o t
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d i n s p e e c h acts d r a w this c o n s e q u e n c e because, o n t h e o n e h a n d , h e t o o k o n l y o n e
a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e universal validity claim i n t o consideration, namely, propositional
i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , j u s t as is t h e t r u t h c l a i m i n t h e c o g n i t i v e t r u t h interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h ;
use o f language. b u t he w a n t e d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , to m a k e this single validity c l a i m
78 79

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

c o m p a t i b l e w i t h m a n y types o f s p e e c h acts ( a n d n o t j u s t c o n s t a t i v e to t h e case); legal verdicts, r e p r i m a n d s , a n d o r d e r s can only be p a r t


s p e e c h a c t s ) . I n h i s w o r d s : " I f , t h e n , w e l o o s e n u p o u r ideas o f t r u t h o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . A u s t i n h i m s e l f o n c e c o n s i d e r e d t h e
a n d f a l s i t y w e s h a l l see t h a t s t a t e m e n t s , w h e n assessed i n r e l a t i o n t o o b j e c t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e a t w o r k i n these cases:
t h e facts, a r e n o t so d i f f e r e n t a f t e r a l l f r o m p i e c e s o f a d v i c e , w a r n -
A l l o w i n g that, i n d e c l a r i n g t h e a c c u s e d guilty, y o u h a v e r e a c h e d y o u r v e r d i c t
i n g s , v e r d i c t s a n d so o n . " 8 9
T o b e s u r e , t h i s l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas p r o p e r l y a n d i n g o o d faith, it still r e m a i n s to a s k w h e t h e r t h e v e r d i c t was
o f t r u t h a n d falsity i n favor o f a b r o a d d i m e n s i o n o f e v a l u a t i o n , i n j u s t , o r fair. A l l o w i n g t h a t y o u h a d t h e r i g h t to r e p r i m a n d h i m as y o u d i d ,
w h i c h a n a s s e r t i o n c a n j u s t as w e l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as exaggerated a n d t h a t y o u h a v e a c t e d w i t h o u t m a l i c e , o n e c a n still a s k w h e t h e r y o u r
o r p r e c i s e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e as t r u e o r false, r e s u l t s , o n t h e o t h e r r e p r i m a n d w a s d e s e r v e d . . . . T h e r e is o n e t h i n g t h a t p e o p l e will be p a r t i c u -
larly t e m p t e d to b r i n g u p as a n o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t a n y c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n
h a n d , i n the assimilation o f all validity claims to the universal validity
this s e c o n d k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m a n d t h e k i n d a p p r o p r i a t e to s t a t e m e n t s , a n d
c l a i m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . "We see t h a t , w h e n w e have a n o r d e r
t h a t is this: a r e n ' t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g g o o d , o r j u s t , o r
o r a w a r n i n g o r a p i e c e o f a d v i c e , t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s fair, o r d e s e r v e d e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d ?
is r e l a t e d t o f a c t w h i c h is n o t p e r h a p s so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e k i n d o f T h a t , surely, is a v e r y s i m p l e b l a c k - a n d - w h i t e b u s i n e s s ; e i t h e r t h e u t t e r a n c e
q u e s t i o n t h a t arises w h e n w e discuss h o w a s t a t e m e n t is r e l a t e d t o c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e facts o r it d o e s n ' t , a n d that's t h a t . 9 1

fact." 9 0
I t seems t o m e that A u s t i n confuses the validity c l a i m o f
I n compressing the universal validity claim o f t r u t h together w i t h
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , w h i c h c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e first i n s t a n c e i n
a h o s t o f p a r t i c u l a r e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a i n t o a s i n g l e class, A u s t i n
t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s t a t e m e n t s a n d facts, w i t h t h e
b l u r r e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between the clear-cut universal validity claims
v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, w h i c h c a n n o t i n a n y w a y b e
o f propositional t r u t h and normative lightness (and truthfulness).
interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h .
B u t t h i s p r o v e s t o b e u n n e c e s s a r y i f i n a g i v e n s p e e c h act we d i s t i n -
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w a r n i n g s o r p i e c e s o f a d v i c e rest o n p r e d i c t i o n s ,
guish a m o n g
t h e y a r e p a r t o f a c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . W h e t h e r t h o s e i n v o l v e d
w e r e r i g h t t o u t t e r c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s o r pieces o f a d v i c e i n a g i v e n a. t h e i m p l i c i t l y p r e s u p p o s e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s ,
s i t u a t i o n d e p e n d s i n t h i s case o n t h e t r u t h o f t h e corresponding b. t h e specific m e a n i n g o f the i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n to be estab-
p r e d i c t i o n s . A s p a r t o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , w a r n i n g s a n d lished, a n d
p i e c e s o f a d v i c e c a n also have a n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g . T h e n t h e r i g h t
c. t h e i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m .
t o issue c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s a n d a d v i c e d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e p r e -
s u p p o s e d n o r m s t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r a r e v a l i d ( t h a t is, a r e i n t e r s u b - W h e r e a s a. a n d b . fix t h e d i s t i n c t classes ( d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t
j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) o r n o t ( a n d , a t a n e x t stage, o u g h t o r o u g h t n o t l a n g u a g e s ) o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts, c. d e t e r m i n e s t h e u n i v e r s a l
t o b e v a l i d , t h a t is, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) . modes o f communication, t h a t is, m o d e s i n h e r e n t i n s p e e c h i n
M o s t types o f s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e general.
m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use. W h e t h e r a n e s t i m a t e is g o o d o r b a d c l e a r l y B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o a. a n d b . , I w o u l d l i k e a t least t o r e m a r k t h a t
d e p e n d s o n t h e t r u t h o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g statement; estimates usu- the Austinian starting p o i n t o f the distinction between performative
a l l y a p p e a r i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . L i k e w i s e , w h e t h e r t h e a n d constative utterances provides a n overly n a r r o w view; the validity
verdict o f a court, the r e p r i m a n d o f a person, or the c o m m a n d o f a s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e t w o m o d e s o f c o m m u n i -
superior to a subordinate w i t h r e g a r d to certain behavior are "justly" cation that I developed f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n . Naturally, there can be
pronounced, "deservedly" delivered, o r " r i g h t f u l l y " given d e p e n d s no mode of communication i n which the comprehensibility of an
j u s t as c l e a r l y o n w h e t h e r a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m has b e e n c o r r e c d y u t t e r a n c e is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed; f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act m u s t f u l f i l l
a p p l i e d t o a g i v e n case ( o r w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t n o r m has b e e n a p p l i e d t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f comprehensibility i n t h e s a m e way. I f i n s o m e
80 81

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e r e is a b r e a k d o w n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , t h e r e q u i r e - s p e a k e r m u s t , i n a t r i v i a l sense, t r u t h f u l l y e x p r e s s h i s t h o u g h t s , o p i n -
m e n t o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y c a n b e m a d e t h e m a d c o n l y t h r o u g h pass- i o n s , a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ; h o w e v e r , i n a s s e r t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n ,
i n g over to a h e r m e n e u t i c discourse, a n d t h e n i n c o n n e c t i o n with w h a t m a t t e r s is n o t t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n s b u t t h e t r u t h
t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c system. T h e truthfulness w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e
expresses h e r i n t e n d o n s c a n , h o w e v e r , b e e m p h a s i z e d a t t h e l e v e l o f s p e a k e r expresses t h e i n t e n t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g , r e p r i m a n d i n g , r e f u s -
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e s a m e way as t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ; b u t i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
a n d the lightness (or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relation. w i t h a h e a r e r , t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n is o n l y a necessary
Truthfulness guarantees the transparency o f a subjectivity r e p r e - c o n d i t i o n , w h e r e a s w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t t h e a c t i o n fit a r e c o g -
s e n t i n g i t s e l f i n l a n g u a g e . I t is e s p e c i a l l y e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e expressive nized normative context.
use of language. T h e p a r a d i g m s a r e f i r s t - p e r s o n s e n t e n c e s i n w h i c h T h u s w e have t h e f o l l o w i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s :
t h e s p e a k e r ' s wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , etc. ( w h i c h a r e e x p r e s s e d
i n c i d e n t a l l y i n e v e r y s p e e c h act) a r e t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h , d i s c l o s i n g Type o f

s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s s u c h as Mode of speech Thematic


communication act Theme validity claim
(3) " I long for you."
Cognitive Constatives Propositional Truth
(4) " I wish that ..." content

Interactive Regulatives Interpersonal Rightness,


I t is u n u s u a l f o r s u c h s e n t e n c e s t o b e e x p l i c i t l y e m b e d d e d i n a n
relation appropriateness
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act:
Expressive Avowals Speaker's Truthfulness
(3') " I h e r e b y express t o y o u t h a t I l o n g f o r y o u . "
intention
T h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n , w h i c h can take o n t h e f u n c t i o n of
N.B.: T h e m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d f r o m one
s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is n o t t h e m a t i c i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e
another o n l y paradigmatically. I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t h a t every se-
a n d thus n e e d be m e n t i o n e d o n l y i n situations i n w h i c h the presup-
q u e n c e o f s p e e c h acts c a n b e u n e q u i v o c a l l y classified u n d e r t h e s e
p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s t r u t h f u l n e s s is n o t t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d ; f o r
v i e w p o i n t s . I a m c l a i m i n g o n l y t h a t e v e r y c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has i n
t h i s , avowals are t h e p a r a d i g m : p r i n c i p l e the possibility o f unequivocally selecting one mode be-

(5) " I m u s t confess t o y o u that..." cause w i t h e v e r y s p e e c h act she must raise f o u r u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y


c l a i m s , so t h a t she can s i n g l e o u t o n e o f three universal validity
(6) " I d o n ' t w a n t t o c o n c e a l f r o m y o u t h a t . . ." claims i n o r d e r to thematize a c o m p o n e n t o f speech.

F o r t h i s r e a s o n , expressive s p e e c h acts s u c h as d i s c l o s i n g , concealing,


r e v e a l i n g , a n d t h e l i k e c a n n o t b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i v e use T h e Rational F o u n d a t i o n o f I l l o c u t i o n a r y Force

o f language ( w h i c h c a n , i n a way, d i s p e n s e w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts)


i n t h e same m a n n e r as c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts are c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e H a v i n g e l u c i d a t e d t h e m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f basic

c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e i n t e r - types o f s p e e c h acts, I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n , i n w h a t

a c t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t r u t h f u l n e s s , t o o , is a u n i v e r s a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f d o e s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e consist? A t t h i s stage, w e

s p e e c h , as l o n g as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n k n o w o n l y w h a t i t results i n i f t h e speech act succeeds—in b r i n g i n g

g e n e r a l a r e n o t s u s p e n d e d . I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e the a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n . A u s t i n a n d Searle a n a l y z e d i l l o c u -


82 83

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

t i o n a r y f o r c e b y l o o k i n g f o r c o n d i t i o n s o f success o r f a i l u r e o f s p e e c h tions o f acceptability that lie w i t h i n the institutionally unbound


acts. A n u t t e r e d c o n t e n t receives a s p e c i f i c c o m m u n i c a d v e f u n c t i o n speech act itself.
t h r o u g h the fact that the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r the c o m i n g a b o u t Searle analyzed the conventional presuppositions of different
o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n are f u l f i l l e d . W i t h the types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t m u s t b e f u l f i l l e d i f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e
i l l o c u d o n a r y act, t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a n o f f e r t h a t c a n b e a c c e p t e d is t o b e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d a c c e p t a b l e . U n d e r t h e t i d e " p r e p a r a -
o r rejected. T h e a t t e m p t a speaker makes w i t h a n i l l o c u d o n a r y act t o r y r u l e s , " h e specifies g e n e r a l i z e d o r r e s t r i c t e d contexts f o r p o s s i b l e
m a y f o u n d e r f o r c o n t i n g e n t reasons o n t h e refusal o f t h e addressee types o f s p e e c h acts. A p r o m i s e , f o r e x a m p l e , is n o t a c c e p t a b l e i f t h e
t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p r o f f e r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s case is o f n o i n t e r e s t f o l l o w i n g conditions, a m o n g others, are n o t fulfilled: (a) H (the
i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . W e s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e o t h e r case, h e a r e r ) p r e f e r s S's ( t h e s p e a k e r ' s ) d o i n g A (a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n ) t o h i s
i n w h i c h t h e speaker h i m s e l f is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e n o t d o i n g A, a n d S m o r e o v e r believes t h i s t o b e t h e case; ( b ) i t is n o t
s p e e c h act because t h e u t t e r a n c e is u n a c c e p t a b l e . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r obvious to b o t h S a n d H that S w o u l d d o A anyhow i n the n o r m a l
makes a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t m a n i f e s d y contains n o serious offer, he course o f events. 93
I f c o n v e n t i o n a l presuppositions o f this k i n d are
c a n n o t c o u n t o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d by h i m c o m i n g about. n o t f u l f i l l e d , t h e a c t o f p r o m i s i n g is p o i n d e s s , t h a t is, t h e a t t e m p t b y
I s h a l l speak o f t h e success o f a s p e e c h act o n l y w h e n t h e h e a r e r a s p e a k e r t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t a n y w a y m a k e s n o sense
n o t o n l y u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d b u t also a n d is c o n d e m n e d t o f a i l u r e f r o m t h e o u t s e t . 9 4

a c t u a l l y e n t e r s i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d b y t h e speaker. A n d I T h e general contextual conditions for institutionally u n b o u n d


s h a l l analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e success o f s p e e c h acts i n t e r m s s p e e c h acts a r e t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p p l y i n g
o f t h e i r "acceptability." Since I have restricted m y e x a m i n a t i o n f r o m established n o r m s o f a c t i o n . 9 5
T h e t w o sets o f c o n d i t i o n s o f a p p l i c a -
t h e o u t s e t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n — t h a t is, a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d tion, t h o s e f o r types o f s p e e c h acts a n d t h o s e f o r e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m s
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s p e e c h a c t c o u n t s as a c c e p t a b l e o n l y i f o f a c t i o n , m u s t vary (largely) i n d e p e n d e n d y o f one another i f (insti-
t h e speaker n o t m e r e l y feigns b u t sincerely makes a serious o f f e r . 9 2
t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d ) s p e e c h acts a r e t o r e p r e s e n t a r e p e r t o r y f r o m
A serious offer d e m a n d s a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e w h i c h t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t , w i t h t h e h e l p o f a finite n u m b e r o f types,
speaker. B u t b e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h i s , I w o u l d l i k e t o m e n t i o n a d d i - can p u t t o g e t h e r any n u m b e r o f n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e actions.
tional r e a s o n s f o r t h e u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f i l l o c u d o n a r y acts. T o be s u r e , t h e p e c u l i a r f o r c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y — w h i c h i n t h e
Austin developed his d o c t r i n e o f "infelicities" p r i m a r i l y o n the case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d directly
basis o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts; f o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e e x a m - f r o m the validity o f established n o r m s o f a c t i o n — c a n n o t be ex-
p l e s o f " m i s f i r e s " (i.e., m i s i n v o c a t i o n s , m i s e x e c u t i o n s , m i s a p p l i c a - p l a i n e d by means o f t h e speech-act-typical c o n t e x t u a l restrictions. I t
t i o n s ) a r e t y p i c a l f o r a l l p o s s i b l e cases o f r u l e v i o l a t i o n . T h u s , t h e is p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h i s f o r c e o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s p e c i f i c
u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts c a n s t e m f r o m t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f u n - presuppositions t h a t Searle i n t r o d u c e s u n d e r t h e t i d e " e s s e n t i a l
d e r l y i n g n o r m s o f a c t i o n . I f i n a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y a priest recites r u l e s . " I n d o i n g so, h e a d m i t t e d l y a p p e a r s t o a c h i e v e n o m o r e t h a n
the prescribed marriage f o r m u l a i n c o r r e c d y or n o t at a l l , the mis- a paraphrase o f the m e a n i n g o f the corresponding performative
t a k e lies a t t h e same l e v e l as, l e t us say, t h e c o m m a n d o f a u n i v e r s i t y v e r b s ( f o r e x a m p l e , r e q u e s t s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o g e t Hto d o A;"
l e c t u r e r i n class t o o n e o f h e r s t u d e n t s , w h o c a n r e p l y t o h e r ( r i g h t l y , o r q u e s t i o n s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o e l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m H"). I t
l e t us a s s u m e ) : "You c a n i n d e e d request a favor o f m e , b u t y o u is i n t e r e s t i n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t c o m m o n t o these c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n s is t h e
cannot command me." The c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability are not s p e c i f i c a t i o n , " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t . . . . " T h e e s s e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i -
f u l f i l l e d ; b u t i n b o t h cases, these c o n d i t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e tion f o r t h e success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t consists i n t h e s p e a k e r ' s
presupposed n o r m s o f a c t i o n . W e a r e l o o k i n g , b y c o n t r a s t , f o r c o n d i - t a k i n g o n a s p e c i f i c commitment (Engagement), so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n
84 85
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

r e l y o n h i m . A n u t t e r a n c e c a n c o u n t as a p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , r e q u e s t , h e r s e l f i n a s p e c i f i c w a y a n d takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n
q u e s t i o n , o r avowal i f a n d o n l y i f t h e speaker makes a n offer t h a t he c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a c t i o n ; I c a n e s t a b l i s h a t b e s t w h e t h e r t h e r e are
is r e a d y t o m a k e g o o d i n s o f a r as i t is a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r . The sufficient indicators for the conjecture that the offer w o u l d w i t h -
s p e a k e r m u s t c o m m i t h i m s e l f , t h a t is, i n d i c a t e t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u - stand testing.
ations he w i l l draw c e r t a i n consequences f o r a c t i o n . T h e type of T h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is
o b l i g a t i o n d e t e r m i n e s t h e content o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t , f r o m w h i c h w i l l i n g t o e n t e r w i t h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act s i g n i f i e s
t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d . 9 6
This condi- a g u a r a n t e e t h a t , i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f h e r u t t e r a n c e , she w i l l f u l f i l l
t i o n , i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle as t h e " s i n c e r i t y r u l e , " m u s t always b e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , r e g a r d a q u e s t i o n as s e t d e d w h e n
fulfilled i n t h e case o f a c t i o n oriented toward reaching under- a s a t i s f a c t o r y a n s w e r is g i v e n ; d r o p a n a s s e r t i o n w h e n i t p r o v e s t o be
standing. T h u s , i n w h a t follows I shall, i n speaking o f t h e speaker's false; f o l l o w h e r o w n a d v i c e w h e n she f i n d s h e r s e l f i n t h e s a m e
c o m m i t m e n t , p r e s u p p o s e b o t h t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t has a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n as t h e h e a r e r ; p l a c e e m p h a s i s o n a r e q u e s t w h e n i t is n o t
c o n t e n t a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s i n c e r e l y is w i l l i n g t o t a k e o n his c o m p l i e d w i t h ; act i n accordance w i t h an i n t e n t i o n disclosed by a n
c o m m i t m e n t . So f a r as I c a n see, p r e v i o u s analyses o f s p e e c h acts a v o w a l , a n d so o n . Thus, the illocutionary force of an acceptabk speech act
h a v e b e e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , as t h e y h a v e n o t c l a r i f i e d t h e c o m m i t m e n t consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical
o f t h e speaker o n w h i c h t h e acceptability o f his utterance specifically obligations of the speaker. B u t i f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e has m o r e t h a n a
depends. m e r e l y suggestive i n f l u e n c e , w h a t c a n m o t i v a t e t h e h e a r e r t o base
T h e discernible a n d sincere readiness o f t h e speaker t o e n t e r i n t o his action o n the premise t h a t t h e speaker seriously i n t e n d s t h e
a specific k i n d o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p c o m m i t m e n t she indicates? W h e n i t is a q u e s t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
has, c o m p a r e d with the general contextual conditions, a peculiar b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h e c a n p e r h a p s r e l y o n t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
status. T h e r e s t r i c t e d c o n t e x t s t h a t s p e c i f i c types o f s p e e c h acts p r e - f o r c e o f a n e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m o f a c t i o n . I n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
s u p p o s e m u s t (a) exist a n d ( b ) b e s u p p o s e d t o e x i s t b y t h o s e i n - u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n n o t be t r a c e d
volved. Thus, the following two statements must hold: (a) a b a c k directly t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . I
s t a t e m e n t to t h e effect t h a t c e r t a i n contexts o b t a i n , i n d e e d those w o u l d t h u s l i k e t o p r o p o s e t h e thesis t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h
r e q u i r e d b y t h e type o f s p e e c h a c t i n q u e s t i o n ; a n d ( b ) a s t a t e m e n t w h i c h t h e speaker, i n c a r r y i n g o u t h e r s p e e c h act, i n f l u e n c e s the
to t h e effect t h a t speaker a n d h e a r e r suppose these contexts to hearer can be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y if, over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l speech
o b t a i n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o analyze t h e specific acts, w e t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e "yes" o r " n o " responses o f t h e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t i n t h e same way, t h a t h e a r e r t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d a t least i m p l i c i d y b y t h e speaker.
is, so t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o s t a t e m e n t s w o u l d h o l d : (a) a s t a t e m e n t W i t h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r raise v a l i d i t y
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e is a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e claims a n d d e m a n d that they be recognized. B u t this r e c o g n i t i o n
speaker; a n d (b) a statement t o t h e effect that t h e h e a r e r supposes n e e d n o t f o l l o w i r r a t i o n a l l y , s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have a c o g n i t i v e
this c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to o b t a i n . O n e could character a n d can be tested. I w o u l d l i k e , t h e r e f o r e , to d e f e n d the
c h o o s e t h i s strategy o f analysis; b u t I r e g a r d i t as u n s u i t a b l e . I t w o u l d f o l l o w i n g thesis: In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily
suggest t h a t w e speak o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t influence the hearer, and vice versa, because speech-act-typical obligations are
o f a s p e a k e r i n t h e s a m e sense as w e s p e a k o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of connected with cognitively testable validity claims—that is, because t h e
restricted contexts. I can ascertain i n an appropriate manner r e c i p r o c a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p has a r a t i o n a l basis.
t h r o u g h observation or questioning whether certain contexts ob- T h e speaker w h o c o m m i t s herself n o r m a l l y connects the specific
t a i n ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n o n l y test w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r c o m m i t s sense i n w h i c h she w o u l d l i k e t o t a k e u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n -
86 87
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

s h i p w i t h a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m a n d t h e r e b y c h o o s e s d i s p e l a n a d h o c d o u b t , w e c a n pass o v e r t o t h e l e v e l o f discourse,


a specific mode of communication. Thus, the content of the i n t h i s case, p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n s u c h a d i s c o u r s e , however, the
s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y b o t h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : s u b j e c t o f d i s c u r s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n is n o t t h e Tightness c l a i m d i r e c t l y
c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, b u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f t h e u n d e r l y -
• t h e s p e c i f i c m e a n i n g o f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o be
i n g norm. F i n a l l y , i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r also
established, a n d
enters into a s p e e c h - a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation, namely, t h e obligation
• a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m . to prove trustworthy (Bewahrungsverpflichtung)—that is, t o s h o w i n t h e
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h i s a c t i o n t h a t h e has e x p r e s s e d j u s t t h a t i n t e n t i o n
I n t h i s way, assertions, d e s c r i p t i o n s , classifications, e s t i m a t e s , p r e -
t h a t a c t u a l l y g u i d e s h i m . I n case t h e i m m e d i a t e assurance e x p r e s s i n g
d i c t i o n s , o b j e c t i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e h a v e , respectively, s p e c i f i c m o d a l
w h a t is evident t o t h e s p e a k e r h i m s e l f c a n n o t d i s p e l a d h o c doubts,
m e a n i n g s ; b u t t h e c l a i m p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l
t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e can be c h e c k e d o n l y against t h e
r e l a t i o n s is, o r is b a s e d o n , t h e t r u t h o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g propositions
consistency o f his subsequent behavior. I n the consequences o f his
o r o n t h e ability o f a subject t o have cognitions. Correspondingly,
a c t i o n , t h e o b l i g a t i o n t a k e n o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h a c t i t s e l f is p r o v e n
requests, orders, a d m o n i t i o n s , promises, agreements, excuses, a d -
t o h a v e b e e n m e t — a n d n o t t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c l a i m t h a t , as i n t h e case
m i s s i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e have a s p e c i f i c m o d a l m e a n i n g ; b u t t h e c l a i m
o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , is a n c h o r e d o u t s i d e o f t h e u t t e r a n c e .
p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s is, o r r e -
fers t o , t h e lightness o f n o r m s o r to t h e ability o f a subject to assume Every speech-act-immanent o b l i g a t i o n can be m a d e g o o d at two

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W e m i g h t say t h a t i n d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts t h e c o n t e n t levels, namely, direcdy, in the context of utterance—whether

o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is determined by a specific way of appealing t h r o u g h recourse to an experiential certainty, t h r o u g h indicating a

to the same, thematically stressed, universal validity claim. A n d , s i n c e as a c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , o r t h r o u g h assurance o f w h a t

result o f this appeal to universal validity claims, the speech-act-typical is s u b j e c t i v e l y e v i d e n t — a n d i n d i r e c t l y , i n d i s c o u r s e o r i n t h e s e q u e l

obligations take o n t h e character o f obligations to p r o v i d e grounds o f consistent a c t i o n s . B u t o n l y i n t h e case o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s to

o r to prove trustworthy, the hearer can be rationally m o t i v a t e d by g r o u n d a n d t o prove trustworthy, i n t o w h i c h we e n t e r w i t h constative

t h e speaker's signaled c o m m i t m e n t t o accept t h e latter's offer. I a n d w i t h e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, d o w e r e f e r — o n b o t h l e v e l s — t o t h e

w o u l d like to elucidate this for each o f the three modes o f c o m m u - same t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m . T h e o b l i g a t i o n t o j u s t i f y , i n t o

nication. w h i c h w e e n t e r w i t h r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, r e f e r s d i r e c t l y t o t h e
c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act p e r f o r m e d fits a n e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k -
I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r p r o f f e r s a s p e e c h -
g r o u n d ; whereas w i t h the e n t r a n c e i n t o practical discourse, the topic
a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation to provide grounds (Begründungsverpflichtung).
o f discussion is t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o r m itself f r o m w h i c h the
C o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e o f f e r t o r e c u r i f n e c e s s a r y t o t h e
s p e a k e r ' s l i g h t n e s s c l a i m is m e r e l y d e r i v e d .
experiential source f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r d r a w s t h e certainty t h a t h i s
O u r r e f l e c t i o n s have l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n a l results:
s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . I f t h i s i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g d o e s n o t d i s p e l a n a d
hoc d o u b t , the persistently p r o b l e m a t i c t r u t h c l a i m can b e c o m e the a. A s p e e c h a c t succeeds, t h a t is, i t b r i n g s a b o u t t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l
s u b j e c t o f a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , r e l a t i o n t h a t 5 i n t e n d s w i t h i t , i f i t is:
the speaker proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide
• comprehensible a n d acceptable, a n d
justification (Rechtfertigungsverpflichtung). O f course, regulative speech
acts c o n t a i n o n l y t h e o f f e r o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r t o i n d i c a t e , i f • accepted by the hearer.

necessary, t h e normative context t h a t gives h i m t h e conviction t h a t h i s b. T h e acceptability o f a speech act d e p e n d s o n (among other
u t t e r a n c e is r i g h t . A g a i n , i f t h i s i m m e d i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n d o e s n o t things) the f u l f i l l m e n t o f two pragmatic presuppositions:
88 89
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

. t h e existence o f speech-act-typical r e s t r i c t e d contexts ( p r e p a r a t o r y He claims t r u t h f o r t h e stated p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t or f o r the


rule); and existential presuppositions of a mentioned propositional content.
• a recognizable c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to enter H e c l a i m s r i g h t n e s s ( o r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ) f o r n o r m s ( o r values) t h a t ,
i n t o c e r t a i n speech-act-typical obligations (essential r u l e , s i n c e r i t y i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , j u s t i f y a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o be
rule). established performatively. Finally, he claims truthfulness f o r the
s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) e x p r e s s e d . O f c o u r s e , i n d i v i d u a l
c. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n its c a p a c i t y t o
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c a n b e t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed: t h e t r u t h o f t h e p r o p o s i -
m o v e a h e a r e r t o act u n d e r t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t sig-
tional c o n t e n t c o m e s t o t h e f o r e i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f language,
n a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t :
the rightness (or appropriateness) o f the interpersonal relation i n
• i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n
t h e i n t e r a c t i v e , a n d t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e expressive.
borrow this force directly f r o m the obligating force o f existing B u t i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h e system o f a l l f o u r
norms; v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c o m e s i n t o p l a y ; t h e y m u s t always b e r a i s e d simultane-
• i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n ously a n d r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d , a l t h o u g h t h e y c a n n o t a l l b e t h e -
d e v e l o p this f o r c e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e h e a r e r t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of m a t i c at t h e same time.
validity claims. T h e universality o f the validity claims i n h e r e n t i n the structure o f
d. Speaker a n d hearer can reciprocally motivate one another to s p e e c h c a n p e r h a p s b e e l u c i d a t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e systematic
recognize validity claims because t h e c o n t e n t o f the speaker's c o m - p l a c e o f l a n g u a g e . L a n g u a g e is t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h speakers
m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y a s p e c i f i c w a y o f a p p e a l i n g t o a t h e m a t i - a n d hearers realize certain f u n d a m e n t a l demarcations. T h e subject
c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m , w h e r e b y t h e speaker, i n a t e s t a b l e way, d e m a r c a t e s h e r s e l f ( i ) f r o m a n e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t she o b j e c t i f i e s i n
assumes: the third-person attitude o f an observer; (ii) f r o m an e n v i r o n m e n t
t h a t she c o n f o r m s t o o r deviates f r o m i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e
• w i t h a t r u t h claim, obligations to provide grounds;
o f a p a r t i c i p a n t ; ( i i i ) f r o m h e r o w n s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t she expresses o r
• w i t h a rightness claim, obligations to provide justification; a n d
conceals i n the first-person attitude; and finally (iv) f r o m t h e m e -
• w i t h a truthfulness claim, obligations to prove trustworthy. d i u m o f l a n g u a g e itself. F o r these d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y I have p r o p o s e d
t h e s o m e w h a t a r b i t r a r i l y c h o s e n t e r m s external nature, society, internal
A M o d e l of Linguistic C o m m u n i c a t i o n nature, and language. T h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n a v o i d a b l y i m p l i e d i n
every speech act show t h a t i n speech o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n -
The analysis o f w h a t A u s t i n c a l l e d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f an d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s e f o u r r e g i o n s m u s t always s i m u l t a n e o u s l y appear. I
u t t e r a n c e leads us b a c k t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y shall characterize t h e way i n w h i c h these regions appear w i t h a few
u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts o w e t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e t o a c l u s t e r o f phenomenological indications.
validity claims that m u s t be raised reciprocally by speaker a n d hearer, B y external nature I m e a n t h e o b j e c t i v a t e d s e g m e n t o f r e a l i t y t h a t
a n d be r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m as j u s t i f i e d , i f g r a m m a t i c a l ( t h a t is, the a d u l t subject ( e v e n i f o n l y i n d i r e c d y ) is a b l e t o p e r c e i v e a n d
comprehensible) s e n t e n c e s a r e t o b e e m p l o y e d i n s u c h a w a y as t o m a n i p u l a t e . T h e subject can, o f course, a d o p t a n objectivating atti-
r e s u l t i n successful c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n t u d e n o t o n l y t o w a r d i n a n i m a t e n a t u r e b u t t o w a r d a l l objects a n d
acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y u n d e r states o f a f f a i r s t h a t a r e d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y accessible t o s e n s o r y
the condition that, i n e m p l o y i n g comprehensible sentences, he e x p e r i e n c e . Society d e s i g n a t e s t h a t s y m b o l i c a l l y p r e s t r u c t u r e d seg-
raises w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way. m e n t o f reality t h a t the a d u l t subject can u n d e r s t a n d i n a n o n o b j e c -
90 91

Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, as o n e a c d n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y (as a p a r t i c i - T h e social reality o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n a n d values e n t e r s s p e e c h b y way


p a n t i n a system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) . L e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a - o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts ( p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h
tions belong here, as do sentences and actions, institutions, t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f t h e s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , as i t w e r e ) as a
t r a d i t i o n s , c u l t u r a l values, o b j e c t i v a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l w i t h a s e m a n t i c slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d reality. I n t h e s a m e m a n n e r , t h e internal nature
c o n t e n t , as w e l l as t h e s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects t h e m s e l v e s . We o f t h e s u b j e c t s i n v o l v e d m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n s p e e c h b y way o f speakers'
can replace this p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e w i t h a n objectivating a t t i t u d e i n t e n t i o n s as a f u r t h e r slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o
t o w a r d society; conversely, w e c a n s w i t c h t o a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e p r o p o s e t h e t e r m s " n o r m a t i v i t y " a n d "subjectivity" f o r the way i n
i n domains i n w h i c h (today) we n o r m a l l y behave objectivatingly— w h i c h n o n o b j e c t i f i e d s o c i e t y or, as t h e case m a y b e , nonobjectified
f o r e x a m p l e , i n r e l a t i o n t o a n i m a l s a n d p l a n t s . I class as internal i n n e r n a t u r e a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . " R i g h t n e s s " is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h
nature a l l wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h t o w h i c h a n "I" w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; " t r u t h f u l n e s s "
has p r i v i l e g e d access a n d c a n e x p r e s s as its o w n s u b j e c t i v e experi- is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n e x p r e s s e d
ences. I t is p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s e x p r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e " I " knows i n t h a t u t t e r a n c e . I n t h i s way, t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h e n s u r e
i t s e l f n o t o n l y as s u b j e c t i v i t y b u t also as a n a u t h o r i t y t h a t has always n o t o n l y a r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y , t h e y e q u a l l y o p e n u p space
already transcended the b o u n d s o f m e r e subjectivity i n c o g n i t i o n , f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s as w e l l as t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e
language, a n d i n t e r a c t i o n simultaneously. T o be sure, i f t h e subject i n t e n t i o n s e x p r e s s e d t h e r e i n . F i n a l l y , I use t h e t e r m " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v -
a d o p t s a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e t o w a r d h e r s e l f , t h i s d i s t o r t s t h e sense i t y " t o r e f e r t o t h e c o m m o n a l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n subjects c a p a b l e
i n w h i c h i n t e n t i o n s c a n b e e x p r e s s e d as my i n t e n t i o n s . 9 7
o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n b y way o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i d e n t i c a l
F i n a l l y , I i n t r o d u c e d t h e m e d i u m o f o u r u t t e r a n c e s as a r e g i o n o f meanings a n d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f universal claims. W i t h respect to
its o w n ; p r e c i s e l y because language ( i n c l u d i n g n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l s y m - i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , t h e c l a i m f o r w h i c h v a l i d i t y is asserted is c o m p r e -
b o l systems) r e m a i n s i n a p e c u l i a r h a l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e i n t h e p e r f o r - h e n s i b i l i t y — t h i s is t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s p e c i f i c t o s p e e c h .
m a n c e o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions a n d expressions, i t presents We can examine e v e r y u t t e r a n c e t o see w h e t h e r i t is t r u e o r
itself t o t h e speaker a n d actor ( p r e c o n s c i o u s l y ) as a s e g m e n t of u n t r u e , j u s t i f i e d o r u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l because
reality sui generis. A g a i n , this does n o t p r e c l u d e o u r b e i n g able to i n s p e e c h , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e e m p h a s i s , g r a m m a t i c a l sentences a r e
a d o p t , i n r e g a r d t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s o r systems o f s y m b o l s , e i t h e r e m b e d d e d i n relations t o reality i n such a way t h a t i n an acceptable
an objectivating attitude directed to the material substratum or a s p e e c h a c t s e g m e n t s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e
p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude directed to the semantic content o f i l l o c u t i o n - always a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . L a n g u a g e i t s e l f also a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h ,
a r y acts. f o r s p e e c h is a m e d i u m i n w h i c h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h a t a r e e m -
T h e m o d e l i n t u i t i v e l y i n t r o d u c e d h e r e is t h a t o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n p l o y e d i n s t r u m e n t a l l y are also r e f l e c t e d . I n s p e e c h , s p e e c h sets i t s e l f
i n w h i c h g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d , b y way o f u n i v e r s a l o f f f r o m t h e r e g i o n s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e
validity claims, i n t h r e e r e l a t i o n s t o reality, t h e r e b y assuming the as a r e a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s , as s o o n as t h e s i g n - s u b s t r a t u m , m e a n i n g , a n d
corresponding pragmatic functions o f representation, establishing d e n o t a t i o n o f a linguistic utterance can be distinguished.
i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, a n d expressing one's o w n subjectivity. T h e f o l l o w i n g table represents schematically the correlations that
External nature r e f e r s t o e v e r y t h i n g t h a t c a n b e e x p l i c i t l y asserted obtain for
as t h e c o n t e n t o f s t a t e m e n t s . H e r e , " o b j e c t i v i t y " m i g h t d e s i g n a t e t h e
a. t h e d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y t o w h i c h e v e r y s p e e c h a c t takes u p r e l a t i o n ,
w a y i n w h i c h o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . A n d " t r u t h " is t h e
c l a i m w i t h w h i c h we assert v a l i d i t y f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g proposition. b. the attitudes o f the speaker p r e v a i l i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r m o d e s of
communication,
92 93
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

c. t h e v a l i d i t y claims u n d e r w h i c h t h e r e l a t i o n s t o reality are estab- 2. [Added to 1979 English translation:] I shall focus on a n idealized case of commu-
lished, and nicative action, namely, "consensual interaction," i n which participants share a tradi-
tion and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they
d. t h e g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n s t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l sentences assume i n t h e i r start from the same definition of the situation a n d do not disagree about the claims
to validity that they reciprocally raise. T h e following schema locates the extreme case
r e l a t i o n s to reality.
of consensual interaction in a system of different types of social action. Underlying

Modes of General Social action


Domains of communication: Validity functions of
reality Basic a t t i t u d e s claims speech

'The" world Cognitive: Truth Representation


Action oriented toward Consensual Openly strategic Latently strategic
of external Objectivating o f facts
reaching understanding action action action

/\
nature attitude

"Our" world Interactive: Rightness Establishment


Action Discourse Manipulation Systematically
o f society Conformative of legitimate
distorted
attitude interpersonal communication
relations this typology is the question of which categories of validity claims participants are
supposed to raise a n d react to.
"My" world Expressive: Truthfulness Disclosure of
These action types can be distinguished by virtue of their relations to the validity basis
of internal Expressive speaker's of speech:
nature attitude subjectivity
a. Communicative versus Strategic Action. I n communicative action, a basis of mutually
Language Comprehen- recognized validity claims is presupposed; this is not the case in strategic action. I n
the communicative attitude, it is possible to reach a direct mutual understanding
sibility oriented toward validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast, only an indirect
mutual understanding via determinative indicators is possible.

Acknowledgment b. Action Oriented toward Reaching Understanding versus Consensual Action. I n consen-
sual action, agreement about implicitly raised validity claims can be presupposed as a
background consensus by reason of common definitions of the situations; such
I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k E. T u g e n d h a t a n d G. G r e w e n d o r f f o r their agreement is supposed to be arrived at in action oriented toward reaching under-
standing. I n the latter case strategic elements may be employed under the proviso
helpful c r i t i c i s m s o f a f i r s t d r a f t o f t h i s essay. T h e y w i l l h a v e their
that they are meant to lead to a direct mutual understanding.
d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h i s r e v i s e d v e r s i o n as w e l l . J. H .
c. Action versus Discourse. I n communicative action, it is naively supposed that i m -
plicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way
Notes of question and answer). I n discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for
statements a n d norms are hypothetically bracketed a n d thematically examined. As
in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude.
1. [Added to 1979 English translation:] Hitherto the term "pragmatics" has referred
to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction d. Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication. Whereas in sys-
of universal features of using language (or o f employing sentences in utterances). T o tematically distorted communication at least one o f the participants deceives himself
mark this contrast, I introduced a distinction between "empirical" a n d "universal" about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparendy being maintained,
pragmatics. I a m no longer happy with this terminology; the term "formal pragmat- the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic
i c s " — a s an extension of "formal semantics"—would serve better. "Formalpragmatik" is attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.
the term preferred by F. Schütze, Sprache Soziologisch Gesehen, 2 vols. (Munich, 1975);
cf. the summary, pp. 911-1024. 3. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d transzendentale Sprachpragmatik—zur Frage
ethischer N o r m e n , " in K . - 0 . Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt,
1976), pp. 10-173.
94 95
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?

4. I n the framework of Southwest G e r m a n Neo-Kantianism, E m i l Lask has earlier strative inference" in R. P. Botha, The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses (The Hague,
reconstructed the concept of "transsubjective validity"—in connection with the
meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of statements, and the beauty of works
of t — a s worthiness to be recognized. Lask's philosophy of validity combines motifs
a r 14. F. Kiefer, " O n Presuppositions," in F. Kiefer and N . Ruwet, eds., Generative Gram-
from Lotze, Bolzano, Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. "Valid value (geltender Wert) is mar in Europe (Dordrecht, 1973), pp. 218-242; K. H . Ebert, "Präsuppositionen im
worthiness to be recognized, recognition-value, that which deserves devotion, that to Sprechakt," in A. ten-Cate and P. Jordens, eds., Papers from the Seventh Linguistic
which devotion is due, thus that which demands or requires devotion. To be valid is Colloquium at Nijmegen (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 45-60; F. Petöfi, Präsuppositionen in
value, demand, norm. . . . All such terms as 'worthiness,' 'deserve,' 'be due,' 'de- Linguistik und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1974).
m a n d ' are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior corresponding to
validity: worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way—this demands a certain 15. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax
behavior." E . Lask, " Z u m System der Logik," Ges. Schriften, vol. 3 (Tubingen, 1924), and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974); and D . G o r d o n and G . Lakoff, "Conversational
p. 92. Postulates" MS (1973).

5. [Editor's note:] Cf. note 1 above. 16. J . R. Ross, " O n Declarative Sentences," i n j . Rosenbaum, ed., Readings in English
Transformational Grammar (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 222-277; J . D. MacCawley,
6. Y Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this i n his critique " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic ' T h e Role of Semantics in a Grammar," in E . B a c h and T. Harms, eds., Universals in
Philosophy of Language," Synthese26 (1973): 1-12. His critique is based on a paper Linguistic Theory (New York, 1968), pp. 125-170; D . Wunderlich, "Sprechakte," i n
I characterized as provisional. "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der U . Maas and D . Wunderlich, Pragmatik und sprachliches Handeln (Frankfurt, 1972),
kommunikativen Kompetenz," in J . Habermas and N . L u h m a n n , Theorie der Gesell¬ pp. 69-188, and " Z u r Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wunderlich,
schaft oder Sozialtechnobgie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101-141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, mis- ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 11-58.
understood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail. I
only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly programmatic) 17. C . J . Fillmore, "Pragmatics and the Description of Discourse," in P. Cole, ed.,
approach clear even to readers who are aggressively inclined and hermeneutically Radical Pragmatics (New York, 1981); G . Posner, Textgrammatik (Frankfurt, 1973).
not especially open.
18. J . Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (New York, 1968); J . J . Katz, Semantic
7. E . g . , K - O . Apel, Transformation derPhilosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 406ff, Theory (New York, 1972).
and "Programmatische Bemerkungen zur Idee einer transzendentalen Sprachprag¬
matik," in Annates Universitatis Tukuensis Sarja, Series B, O s a Tom, 126 ( T u k u , 1973), 19. P. F. Strawson, Logico-LinguisticPapers ( L o n d o n , 1971).
pp. 11-35.
20. A. C . Danto, Analytic Philosophy of Action (Cambridge, 1973); S. Hampshire,
8. Charles Morris, "Foundations of the T h e o r y of Signs," i n Encylopedia of Unified Thought and Action ( L o n d o n , 1960); D. S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour
Science, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago, 1938), and Signs, Language, Behavior (New York, 1955). ( L o n d o n , 1965); Care and Landesman, eds., Readings in the Theory of Action ( L o n d o n ,
1968).
9. Cf. my remarks on Morris in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen
and G . A . Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 63ff. 21. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London, 1958);
C. Taylor, " E x p l a i n i n g Action," Inquiry 13 (1973): 54-89; H . von Wright, Explanation
10. Y Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," in Aspects of Language (Jerusalem, 1970), and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1971), and " O n the Logic and Epistemology of the
pp. 69-88, and "Semantics and Communication," in H . Heidrich, Semantics and Com- Causal Relation," in P. Suppes, ed., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, vol. 4
munication (Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 1-36. Taking Bar-Hillel as his point of departure, (Stanford, 1973), pp. 239-312.
A . Kasher has proposed a formal representation embedding linguistic expressions in
extralinguistic contexts. " A Step Forward to a T h e o r y of Linguistic Performance," in 22. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
Y Bar-Hillel, ed., Pragmatics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht, 1971), pp. 84-93; cf.
also R. C . Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," i n D. Davidson and G . H a r m a n , Semantics of Natural 23. J . Bennett, ' T h e Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations of Language 10
Language (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 380-387. (1973): 141-168; S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).

11. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952); G . H . von Wright, Norm and 24. Cf. the bibliography by E . von Savigny, in J . L . Austin, Zur Theorie aer Sprechakte
Action ( L o n d o n , 1963); N. Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht, 1968). (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 203ff.

12. L . Apostel, " A Proposal on the Analysis of Questions," in Logique et Analyse 12 25. G . Grewendorf, "Sprache ohne Kontext," in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Prag-
(1969): 376-381; W. K u h l m a n n , Reflexion zzvischen Theorie und Kritik (Frankfurt, 1975). matik, pp. 144-182.

13. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1974); W. C . Salmon, The Founda- 26. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388, and "Utterer's
tion of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1967); cf. the summary chapter on "nondemon- Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," reprinted in Grice, Studies in the
96 97
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?

Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 117ff.; D. K. Lewis, Convention (Cam- 41. Ibid., pp. 14ff.
bridge, 1969).
42. I n responding to the doubts that Botha raises against the "clear case principle"
27. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, pp. 89ff. (Justification, p. 224), I would like to reproduce an argument that J . J . Katz and T. G .
Bever have brought against similar doubts in a paper critical of empiricism, " T h e Fall
28. H . - G . Gadamer emphasizes this in Truth and Method (New York, 1975). and Rise of E m p i r i c i s m , " in T. G. Bever, J . J . Katz, and D. T. Langendoen, eds., An
Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability (New York, 1976):
29. G . Ryle, The Concept of Mind ( L o n d o n , 1949); cf. the interpretation of E . von
Savigny in Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 91ff. Such a theory . . . seeks to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of
phonological properties in terms of a theory of the phonological component, to
30. R. Carnap and W. Stegmüller, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wien, 1959), explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of syntactic properties in terms
p. 15. of a theory of the syntactic component, and to explicate intuitions about the
interconnectedness of semantic properties in terms of a theory of the semantic
31. D . Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), p. 209. component. T h e theory of grammar seeks finally to explicate intuitions of relat-
edness among properties of different kinds in terms of the systematic connections
32. For an analysis of what explication in the sense of rational reconstruction means, expressed in the model of a grammar that welds its components in a single
cf. H . Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt, 1977), the chapter on " E x p l i - integrated theory of the sound-meaning correlation in a language.
kativer Diskurs," pp. 277-336.
These remarks are, of course, by way of describing the theoretical ideal. But as the
33. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). theory of grammar makes progress toward this ideal, it not only sets limits on the
construction of grammars and provides a richer interpretation for grammatical struc-
34. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 210-218. tures but it also defines a wider and wider class of grammatical properties and
relations. I n so doing, it marks out the realm of the grammatical more clearly,
35. Botha, Justification, pp. 75ff., speaks i n this connection of external versus internal distinctly, and securely than could have been done on the basis of the original
linguistic evidence. intuitions. As Fodor has insightfully observed, such a theory literally defines its own
subject matter in the course of its progress:
36. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, p. 216. I f I understand him correctly, H . Schnelle gives
an empirical interpretation to the model-theoretic version of linguistics in Sprachphi- T h e r e is then an important sense in which a science has to discover what it is
losphie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 82-114. about; it does so by discovering that the laws and concepts it produced in order
to explain one set of phenomena can be fruitfully applied to phenomena of other
37. Botha, Justification, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only report correct sorts as well. It is thus only in retrospect that we can say of all the phenomena
linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false linguistic intuitions; but the con- embraced by a single theoretical framework that they are what we meant, for
struct of pretheoretical knowledge does nor permit this possibility. I think it makes example, by the presystematic term "physical event," "chemical interaction," or
sense to assume that linguistic intuitions can be "false" only if they come from "behavior." To the extent that such terms, or their employments, are neologistic,
incompetent speakers. Another problem is the interplay of grammatical and non- the neologism is occasioned by the insights that successful theories provide into
grammatical (for example, perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse the deep similarities that underlie superficially heterogeneous events. (J. A. Fodor,
judgments about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating Psychological Explanation [New York, 1968], pp. 10-11.)
expressions of grammatical rule consciousness or, as the case may be, of isolating
genuinely linguistic intuitions. Cf. T. G . Bever, ' T h e Ascent of the Specious," in 43. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, Psycholinguistik (Frankfurt, 1973), and
D. C o h e n , ed., Explaining Linguistic Phenonema (New York, 1974), pp. 173-200. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie (Frankfurt,
1974); H . Leuninger, "Linguistik u n d Psychologie," in R. Bartsch and T. Vennemann,
38. I n this connection, U . Oevermann points out interesting parallels with Piaget's eds., Linguistik und Nachbarwissenschaften (Kronberg, 1973), pp. 225-241.
concept of reflecting abstraction (cf. J . Piaget, The Principles of Genetic Epistemohgy
(New York, 1972)): perhaps the procedure of rational reconstruction is merely a 44. E . H . Lenneberg, Biologische Grundlagen der Sprache (Frankfurt, 1972), and " E i n
stylized and, as it were, controlled form of the reflecting abstraction the child carries Wort unter u n s , " in Leuninger, Miller, and Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie,
out when, for example, she "reads off" her instrumental actions the schema that pp. 53-72.
underlies them.
45. L . Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D . Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization
39. W. J . M. Levelt, Formal Grammars in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics, vols. 1-3 Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969), and " F r o m Is to Ought," in T. Mischel, ed.,
(Amsterdam, 1974). Cognitive Development and Epistemohgy (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236.

40. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5-7. 46. O n this point, cf. U . Oevermann, "Kompetenz u n d Performanz" (Max-Planck¬
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).
98 99
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?

47. I . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York, 1961), p. 138. in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 614-628, "Austin on
Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts," Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 405-424, re-
48. B. Stroud, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Journal of Philosophy 9 (1968): 241-254; printed in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, pp. 262-275, Speech Acts (Cambridge,
J . Hintikka, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 6 (1972): 174-281; and M. S. G r a m , 1969), and "Linguistik u n d Sprachphilosophie," in Bartsch and Vennemann, Linguis-
"Categories and Transcendental Arguments," Man and World 6 (1973): 252-269, and tik und Nachbarwissenschaften, pp. 111-126.
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 5 (1971): 15-26. O t h e r sources include: W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1964), and "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964): 138-146; L . J .
49. R. Bittner, T r a n s z e n d e n t a l , " i n Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 5 (Mu- C o h e n , " D o Illocutionary Forces Exist?," Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964): 118-137,
nich, 1974), pp. 1524-1539. reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 580-598, and "Speech Acts," Current
Trends in Linguistics 12 (1970); R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical
50. F o r example, the reception of Kant by the Erlangen school assumes a transcen- Review 79 (1970): 3-24, and "Austin's Distinction between Locutionary and Illocu-
dental status for the basic concepts of protophysics only in a limited sense; cf. the tionary Acts," in R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences ( L o n d o n , 1972); D. Holdcroft, "Per-
discussion volume edited by G . Böhme, Protophysik (Frankfurt, 1975). formatives and Statements," Mind 83 (1974): 1-18; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and
Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 439-460, reprinted in
51. Piaget's Kantianism is typical of this approach. Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 599-613; S. T h a u , T h e Distinction between
Rhetic and Illocutionary Acts," Analysis 32 ( 1 9 7 1 / 7 2 ) : 177-183; C. Travis, "A Genera-
52. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel's introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of C . S. Peirce's Schriften tive T h e o r y of Speech Acts," in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 629-644; G . J .
(Frankfurt, 1967 and 1970). Warnock, " H a r e on Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 80-84;
Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 309-352.
53. Cf. my "Postscript," in Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston,
1971); cf. also R. Bubner, Transzendentale Hermeneutik," in R. Simon-Schäfer and 60. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3ff.
C. W. Zimmerli, eds., Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften (Hamburg, 1975),
pp. 57-70. 61. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle's principle of
expressibility.
54. F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur (Frankfurt, 1968).
62. P. F. Strawson, Individuals ( L o n d o n , 1959); M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Lan-
55. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitsfheorien," in Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen, guage ( L o n d o n , 1973); E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A.
1973), pp. 211-265, reprinted i n Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des G o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982).
kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
63. O n the analysis of intentionality and the expression of intentions, cf. W. Sellars,
56. W. Seilars, "Presupposing," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 197-215; P. F. Strawson, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of M i n d , " in Metaphysics ( L o n d o n , 1968); W. Sellars
" A Reply to Mr. Seilars," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 216-231. and R. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental," i n Minnesota Studies, vol. 1 (Min-
neapolis, 1963), pp. 507-539; W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London, 1968);
57. U . Oevermann, T h e o r i e der individuellen Bildungsprozesse" (Max-Planck¬ E . Tugendhat, "Phänomenologie u n d Sprachanalyse," in Festschrift für Gadamer, vol. 2
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974). (Tübingen, 1970), pp. 3 - 2 4 ; J . Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief(Ithaca, 1962); C . Taylor,
"Explaining Action," Inquiry 13 (1970): 54-89. O n the analysis of expressive speech
58. O n this point, cf. the controversy between Q u i n e and Chomsky: N . Chomsky, acts, cf. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chs. 7-9.
"Quine's Empirical Assumptions," and W. V. O. Q u i n e , "Replies," both in D. Davidson
and J . Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 53-68 and 292-352; 64. Cf. D . Steinberg and L . Jakobovits, eds., Semantics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 157¬
W. V. O . Quine, "Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory," in 484; H . E . Boekle, Semantik (Munich, 1972).
Davidson and H a r m a n , eds., Semantics of Natural Language. H . Schnelle, Sprachphiloso-
phie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973) is also typical of methodological behaviorism i n 65. T h e work of P. W. Alston is a good example.
linguistics.
66. F. von Kutschera, Sprachphilosophie (Munich, 1971), pp. 117-161; Schnelle, Sprach-
59. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962); cf. the bibliography on philosophie und Linguistik, pp. 190-240; Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 238-273.
the theory of speech acts compiled by E . von Savigny for the G e r m a n edition of this
work (see note 24 above), pp. 204-209; J . L . Austin, "Performative Utterances," i n 67. P. WatzlawickJ. H . Beavin, and D. D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication
his Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970), pp. 233-252, and "Performative-Constative," (New York, 1967).
in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22-33.
Additional Austin bibliography can be found in von Savigny, Die Philosophie der nor- 68. A communication theory that is supposed to reconstruct conditions of action
malen Sprache, pp. 162-166. oriented toward reaching understanding does not necessarily require as its basic unit
See also J . R. Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America of analysis pairs of complementary speech acts—that is, reciprocally performed and
(Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239, reprinted i n j . Rosenberg and C . Travis, eds., Readings accepted speech acts; but it does require, at least, a speaker's utterance that can not
101
100
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1

only be comprehended but can also be accepted by at least one other subject capable 78. W. P. Alston, "Meaning and U s e , " in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, p. 412:
" I can find no cases in which sameness of meaning does not hang on sameness of
of speech and action.
illocutionary act."
69. D . Wunderlich, "Zur Konventionalitât von Sprechhandlungen," in Wunderlich,
ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, p. 16; cf. also the linguistic characterization of the stan- 79. F o r ontogenetic studies, a combination of a Piagetian theory of meaning for the
dard form given there (which I do not deal with h e r e ) , and Wunderlich's analysis of cognitive schemata developed in connection with manipulated objects (cf. H . G .
advising in Grundlagen, pp. 349ff. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969)) and a Meadian theory of
meaning for the concepts developed in connection with interactions (cf. Arbeits¬
70. Exceptions are avowals that, when rendered explicit, can also take on a negative gruppe Bielefelder Soziologen, eds., Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirk¬
form, for example, " I do not want (hereby) to conceal from you that. . . ." lichkeit, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1973)) seems promising to me.

71. Deviating from a widespread practice, I do not think it advisable to distinguish 80. B. Richards argues against this in "Searle o n Meaning and Speech Acts," Founda-
propositions (Aussagen) from assertions (Behauptungen) in such a way that, although tions of Language 7 (1971): 536: "Austin argued that sentences such as R a (I promise
a proposition is embedded i n a specific speech situation through being asserted, it that I shall pay within one year) never assert anything that is either true or false, i.e.,
does not receive its assertoric force therefrom. I am of the opinion, rather, that the never assert propositions. H e r e we agree; but this in no way upsets the claim that R a
assertoric force of a proposition cannot be reconstructed except through reference nevertheless expresses a proposition . . . viz. the proposition that R a . " Richards does
to the validity claim that anyone i n the role of a competent speaker raises for it in not equate the prepositional content of the speech act, R a , with the prepositional
content of the dependent sentence: " I shall pay within one year," but with the content
asserting it. Whether this claim can, if necessary, be discursively vindicated, that is,
of the objectified speech act, Ra, which must, however, then be embedded in a
whether the proposition is 'Valid" (true), depends on whether it satisfies certain truth
further speech act, Rv; for example, " I tell you, I promised him that I shall pay within
conditions. We can, to be sure, view propositions monologically, that is, as symbolic
one year." I regard the confusion of performative sentences with the assertoric
formations with an abstract truth value without reference to a speaker; but then we
reporting of their content as a category mistake (which, incidentally, diminishes the
are abstracting precisely from the speech situation i n which a prepositional content,
value of Richards's argument against Searle's principle of expressibility, in particular
owing to the fact that it is asserted as a proposition, receives a relation to reality, that
against his proposal to analyze the meaning of speech acts in standard form in terms
is, fulfills the precondition of being true or false. T h i s abstraction naturally suggests
of the meaning of the sentences used in the speech acts).
itself (and often remains hidden even from the logician) because the truth claim
raised by the speaker is universaUst—that is, precisely of such a nature that, although
it is raised i n a particular situation, it could be defended at any time against anyone's 81. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic subtheories,
doubts. that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory of elementary sentences
(and that of intentional expressions) can make its specific contribution to the theory
of meaning. I n Austin's choice of the terms " m e a n i n g " and "force," the descriptivist
72. S. Kanngiesser, "Aspekte zur Semantik u n d Pragmatik," Linguistische Berichte 24
prejudice continues to resonate; it is a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of
(1973): 1-28, here p. 5.
date since Wittgenstein at the latest, if not since Humboldt, according to which the
theory of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can claim
73. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 337ff.
a monopoly on the theory of meaning. ( O f course, this prejudice also keeps refer-
ence semantics alive.)
74. Cf. the schema in note 2 above.

75. I . Dornbach, "Primatenkommunikation" MS., (1975). O n the relatively early 82. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 132.
differentiation of different types of speech acts in the linguistic development of the
child, see the pioneering dissertation of M. Miller, "Die Logik der frûhen Spra¬ 83. Ibid., pp. 147-148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64ff.
chentwicklung" (University of Frankfurt, 1975).
84. Austin, "Performative Utterances," p. 248.
76. I n a letter to me, G. Grewendorf cites the following counterexample: signing a
contract, petition, and so forth, while simultaneously objectifying the corresponding 85. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144.
illocutionary act. But only the following alternative seems possible: either the con-
tract signing is carried out, in such a way that it has legal force, with the help of a 86. Ibid., pp. 145ff. Cf. also Austin, "Performative-Constative," p. 31:
performative utterance—in which case there is no objectification—or the nonverbal
contract signing is accompanied by a statement: " S signs contract x"—in which case T o begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance is not
it is a question of two independent illocutionary acts carried out parallel to one unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in all sincerity,
that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all criticism. It may always
another (in such a way that there is, normally, a division of roles: the statesman signs,
be criticized in a different dimension. L e t us suppose that I say to you " I advise
the reporter reports the signing).
you to do it;" and let us allow that all the circumstances are appropriate, the
conditions for success are fulfilled. I n saying that, I actually do advise you to do
77. C o h e n , "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?," p. 587.
102 103
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

i t — i t is not that I state, truely or falsely, thatl advise you. It is, then, a performative 95. D. Holdcroft ignores this distinction, "Performatives and Statements," Mind 83
utterance. T h e r e does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good (1974): 1-18, and thus comes to the false conclusion that only the speech acts that
or bad? Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your we call institutionally bound are subject to conventional regulations in the sense of
interest; but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? O r the sentence: " A sentence type is a performative if and only if its literal and serious
again—though perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out, utterance can consütute the performance of an act which is done in accordance with
in your interest? T h e r e is confrontation of my utterance with the situation i n , and a convention, which convention is not merely a grammatical or semantical one."
the situation in respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but
was I right? 96. I n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (see Grundlagen, p. 350), his conditions
B 4-6 make up the content of the obligations.
87. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144-145.
97. H . Delius, " Z u m Wahrheitscharakter egologischer Aussagen," in Brockman and
88. Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen," pp. l l f f . Hofer, eds., Die Wirklichkeit des Unverständlichen ( T h e Hague, 1974), pp. 38-77.

89. Austin, "Performative Utterances," pp. 250-251.

90. Ibid., p. 251.

91. Austin, "Performative-Constative," pp. 31-32.

92. [Added i n 1983:] I n casually mentioning this restriction, I was unaware of the
problems connected with i t What I took at the time to be trivial is in fact in need of
careful justification: the thesis that the use of language oriented toward reaching
understanding represents the original mode of language use. Cf. chapter 2 i n the
present volume, pp. 122ff.

93. Searle, Speech Acts, p. 63.

94. O n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.) the general con-
textual conditions would be as follows:

(A) S makes it understood in a conventional manner that (that is, S should give the
advice only if these conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they
obtain):

1. S knows, believes, or assumes (depending on preceding communication) that

a. H finds himself i n an unpleasant situation Z;

b. H wants or desires to reach some other, more pleasant situation Z' ^ Z;

c. H does not know how Z' can be reached;

d. H is in a position to do a.

2. S believes or assumes that

e. H does not already want to do a;


f. H can reach a more pleasant situation Z " (relative optimum) with a than with any
alternative action a'.
3. T h e following obligations are established for H :
(7) if one of the subconditions listed under (a) through (f) does not obtain (or,
more precisely, i f H knows, believes, or assumes that it does not obtain), then H will
make this understood to S in a conventional manner.
2
Social Action, Purposive Activity, and
Communication (1981)

I f w e f o l l o w W e b e r ' s s t u d i e s i n t h e s o c i o l o g y o f r e l i g i o n , i t is a n
e m p i r i c a l — a n d thus to begin w i t h an o p e n — q u e s t i o n why all three
rationality complexes differentiated o u t after the disintegradon o f
t r a d i t i o n a l w o r l d v i e w s have n o t f o u n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l embodiment
t o a n e q u a l e x t e n t i n t h e o r d e r s o f l i f e o f m o d e r n societies, a n d w h y
they d o n o t d e t e r m i n e the c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life
e a c h t o t h e same d e g r e e . T h r o u g h h i s basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a s s u m p -
tions, h o w e v e r , W e b e r p r e j u d i c e d t h i s q u e s t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t
processes o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n c o u l d c o m e i n t o v i e w o n l y f r o m
the standpoint o f purposive rationality. I w o u l d like, therefore, to
discuss t h e c o n c e p t u a l b o t d e n e c k s i n h i s t h e o r y o f a c t i o n a n d t o use
t h i s c r i t i q u e as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y z i n g f u r t h e r t h e c o n c e p t
of communicative action.

I n this sketch I shall n o t be d e a l i n g w i t h the analytic t h e o r y o f


a c t i o n d e v e l o p e d i n t h e A n g l o - S a x o n w o r l d . T h e studies c a r r i e d o u t
1

u n d e r t h i s title ( t h e r e s u l t s o f w h i c h I h a v e d r a w n u p o n e l s e w h e r e ) 2

b y n o m e a n s r e p r e s e n t a u n i f i e d a p p r o a c h . W h a t t h e y d o have i n
c o m m o n is t h e m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis a n d a r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m . A n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y is f r u i t f u l for
c l a r i f y i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y . H o w e v e r , i t is l i m i t e d
to the atomistic m o d e l o f action by a n isolated actor a n d neglects
the mechanisms for coordinating action t h r o u g h which interper-
sonal relations c o m e about. I t conceptualizes action o n the o n t o l o g i -
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f e x a c t l y o n e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s
106 107
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a n d n e g l e c t s t h o s e a c t o r - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s t h a t are essential t o s o c i a l I n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e i d e a t h a t
i n t e r a c t i o n . As actions are r e d u c e d t o purposive i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a symbolic expression X c a n be traced
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n s stands i n t h e b a c k t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f s p e a k e r S t o give h e a r e r H
f o r e g r o u n d . F i n a l l y , a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y u n d e r s t a n d s its task t o b e t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y m e a n s o f a s i g n . I n t h i s way, a d e r i v a t i v e
a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s ; i t is n o t c o n c e r n e d m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o w h i c h s p e a k e r s c a n have r e -
w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l usefulness o f basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c assumptions c o u r s e i f t h e d i r e c t r o a d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is
a n d t h u s is scarcely c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n i n t h e social o b s t r u c t e d , is s t y l i z e d i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e o f r e a c h i n g under-
sciences. I t g e n e r a t e s a set o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t are too s t a n d i n g . T h e a t t e m p t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s t o base t h e m e a n -
unspecific f o r the purposes o f social theory. i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n X o n w h a t S m e a n s (mdnt) b y X, o r
O n the field o f a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y , e m p i r i c i s m is r e p e a t i n g i n d i r e c t l y gives t o u n d e r s t a n d b y X, m i s c a r r i e s . F o r a h e a r e r to
batdes l o n g since f o u g h t . O n c e again t h e r e are debates c o n c e r n i n g u n d e r s t a n d w h a t S m e a n s b y X — t h a t is, t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) of
t h e r e l a t i o n o f m i n d a n d b o d y ( i d e a l i s m versus m a t e r i a l i s m ) , c o n - X — a n d f o r h i m t o b e a w a r e o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is p u r s u i n g i n
c e r n i n g r e a s o n s a n d causes ( f r e e w i l l versus d e t e r m i n i s m ) , c o n c e r n - u s i n g X — t h a t is, t h e p u r p o s e t h a t S w a n t s t o a c c o m p l i s h w i t h h e r
ing behavior and action (objectivistic versus nonobjectivistic a c t i o n — a r e t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . S w i l l o n l y t h e n have c a r r i e d o u t
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a c t i o n ) , c o n c e r n i n g t h e l o g i c a l status o f e x p l a n a t i o n s successfully her intention of inducing i n H a meaning-intention
o f a c t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g causality, i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d so o n . T o p u t t h e (Bedeutungsintention) i f H r e c o g n i z e s S"s i n t e n t i o n t o communicate
m a t t e r i n a p o i n t e d way: a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y t r e a t s t h e v e n e r a b l e w i t h h i m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s what S m e a n t (gemeint hat) i n c a r r y i n g o u t
p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r e - K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness i n a n e w h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n . H, i f h e k n o w s o n l y t h e communica-
p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h o u t p u s h i n g t h r o u g h t o t h e basic q u e s t i o n s of a tive i n t e n t i o n o f S, w i l l n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t Smeans (mdnt), t h a t is,
sociological t h e o r y o f action. that concerning which she w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h i m . 9

F r o m a sociological p o i n t o f view, i t m a k e s sense t o b e g i n with For a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , o n l y those analytic theories


c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . ' T h e necessity f o r c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n g e n e r - o f m e a n i n g are i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t start f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e o f linguistic
ates i n s o c i e t y a c e r t a i n n e e d f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h m u s t b e m e t expressions r a t h e r t h a n f r o m speakers' i n t e n t i o n s . T h e theory, h o w -
i f i t is t o b e p o s s i b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e ever, m u s t k e e p i n v i e w t h e p r o b l e m o f h o w t h e a c t i o n s o f several
o f satisfying n e e d s . " A n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n -
3
actors can be l i n k e d up with one another with the help of the
i n g a t its c o r e , d o e s o f f e r a p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r a t h e o r y mechanism o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, h o w t h e y c a n be
o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h a t p l a c e s l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g i n t e r l a c e d i n s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s . T h e o r g a n o n model
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sprachliche Verständigung), as t h e m e c h a n i s m f o r co- o f K a r l B ü h l e r is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c l i n e
o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a t t h e f o c a l p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t . T h i s is less t r u e o f o f i n q u i r y . B ü h l e r starts f r o m t h e s e m i o t i c m o d e l o f a l i n g u i s t i c s i g n
t h e a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g t h e o r y t h a t stands closest t o a c t i o n t h e o r y used by a speaker (sender) w i t h t h e a i m o f c o m i n g to an u n d e r -
i n o n e respect, namely, t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics 4
t h a t goes b a c k s t a n d i n g w i t h a h e a r e r ( r e c e i v e r ) a b o u t o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . 1 0

t o s t u d i e s b y G r i c e , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d b y L e w i s , a n d l a t e r was
5 6
H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e use o f signs: t h e c o g n i t i v e
w o r k e d o u t by S c h i f f e r 7
and Bennett. This nominalistic theory of
8
f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f
m e a n i n g is n o t s u i t a b l e f o r c l a r i f y i n g t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g mechanism m a k i n g k n o w n s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f t h e speaker, a n d
o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n b e c a u s e i t analyzes t h e a c t o f t h e a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f d i r e c t i n g r e q u e s t s t o addressees. F r o m
reaching understanding according to a m o d e l o f action o r i e n t e d t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e l i n g u i s t i c s i g n f u n c t i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as s y m -
t o w a r d consequences. b o l , s y m p t o m , a n d s i g n a l . " I t is a symbol i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g c o r r e l a t e d
108 109
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

w i t h o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a symptom ( i n d i c a t i o n , i n d e x ) i n T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g was finally e s t a b l i s h e d as a f o r m a l s c i e n c e


v i r t u e o f its d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e sender, w h o s e i n w a r d n e s s i t ex- o n l y w i t h t h e step f r o m r e f e r e n c e semantics to t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l
presses, a n d a signal i n v i r t u e o f its a p p e a l t o t h e h e a r e r , w h o s e semantics. T h e semantics f o u n d e d by Frege a n d d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h
e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l b e h a v i o r i t steers l i k e o t h e r t r a f f i c s i g n s . " 11
t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D a v i d s o n a n d D u m m e t t gives c e n t e r stage
T h e r e is n o n e e d h e r e t o g o i n t o t h e r e c e p t i o n a n d c r i t i q u e o f t h i s t o t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e a n d state o f a f f a i r s , b e t w e e n l a n -
m o d e l o f language i n linguistics a n d psychology 1 2
since t h e decisive guage a n d the w o r l d . 1 5
W i t h this o n t o l o g i c a l t u r n , semantic t h e o r y
d e v e l o p m e n t s o f i t have c o m e , w i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n , 1 3
f r o m the ana- disengaged itself f r o m t h e view t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n
l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . A t least t h e t h r e e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a n a - c a n be c l a r i f i e d o n t h e m o d e l o f n a m e s t h a t d e s i g n a t e objects. The
lytic theories o f m e a n i n g can be w o r k e d i n t o B i d d e r ' s m o d e l i n such m e a n i n g o f sentences, a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentence m e a n i n g s ,
a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y is f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d f r o m w i t h i n — cannot be separated f r o m language's i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n to the validity
t h r o u g h t h e f o r m a l analysis o f r u l e s f o r u s i n g l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s - o f s t a t e m e n t s . Speakers a n d h e a r e r s u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a
sions—and n o t f r o m w i t h o u t — t h r o u g h a cybernetic r e f o r m u l a t i o n s e n t e n c e w h e n t h e y k n o w u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s i t is t r u e . C o r r e -
o f t h e transmission process. T h i s m e a n i n g - t h e o r e t i c l i n e o f develop- spondingly, they u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d w h e n they k n o w
m e n t o f t h e o r g a n o n m o d e l l e a d s u s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v i s t i c w h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n that w o r d makes to t h e capacity for t r u t h o f a
c o n c e p t i o n o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as i n f o r m a t i o n s e n t e n c e f o r m e d w i t h its h e l p . T h u s , t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s
flows b e t w e e n senders a n d r e c e i v e r s 1 4
a n d i n the direction o f the d e v e l o p e d t h e thesis t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is d e t e r m i n e d
f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t o f i n t e r a c t i o n a m o n g subjects c a p a b l e o f b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e mean-
s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g , i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h acts o f ing o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s e n t e n c e f o r m e d
reaching understanding. w i t h its h e l p was first w o r k e d o u t , t h e n , f o r t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e

L i n k i n g u p w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i s t t h e o r y o f signs i n t r o d u c e d b y l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s .

Peirce a n d developed by M o r r i s , C a r n a p m a d e the symbolic com- T o b e s u r e , t h i s t h e o r y is c o m m i t t e d t o a n a l y z i n g a l l s e n t e n c e s o n


p l e x , w h i c h B ü h l e r h a d f i r s t c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f u n c t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y , ac- t h e m o d e l o f assertoric sentences. T h e l i m i t s o f this a p p r o a c h be-
cessible t o a n i n t e r n a l l y d i r e c t e d analysis o f l a n g u a g e f r o m s y n t a c t i c c o m e v i s i b l e as s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s are
a n d s e m a n t i c p o i n t s o f view. T h e c a r r i e r s (Träger) o f m e a n i n g are brought under formal consideration. Frege had already distin-
n o t i s o l a t e d signs b u t e l e m e n t s o f a l a n g u a g e system, t h a t is, sen- g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e assertoric o r i n t e r r o g a t i v e f o r c e o f assertions o r
t e n c e s w h o s e f o r m is d e t e r m i n e d b y s y n t a c t i c r u l e s a n d w h o s e se- questions a n d the s t r u c t u r e o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences e m p l o y e d
m a n t i c c o n t e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e r e f e r e n c e t o d e s i g n a t e d o b j e c t s in these utterances. A l o n g the line f r o m the later Wittgenstein
o r states o f a f f a i r s . W i t h C a r n a p ' s l o g i c a l syntax a n d t h e basic as- t h r o u g h A u s t i n t o Searle, t h e f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s o f s e n t e n c e s was
s u m p t i o n s o f r e f e r e n c e s e m a n t i c s , t h e w a y was o p e n e d f o r a f o r m a l extended t o s p e e c h acts. I t is n o longer limited to the repre-
analysis o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e . O n t h e o t h e r s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e b u t is o p e n t o a n u n b i a s e d analysis
h a n d , C a r n a p c o n s i d e r e d t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s o f o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g
l a n g u a g e as p r a g m a t i c aspects o f l a n g u a g e use t h a t s h o u l d b e l e f t t o m a k e s t h e p r a g m a t i c aspects o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t o o , acces-
e m p i r i c a l analysis. O n t h i s view, t h e p r a g m a t i c s o f l a n g u a g e is n o t sible t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis. T h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h e n m a r k s
d e t e r m i n e d b y a g e n e r a l system o f r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e r u l e s i n s u c h a t h e first s t e p t o w a r d a f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t e x t e n d s t o n o n c o g n i -
w a y t h a t i t c o u l d b e o p e n e d u p t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis l i k e s y n t a x a n d tive m o d e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , as t h e a t t e m p t s a t a
semantics. s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n o f speech-act classes f r o m S t e n i u s t h r o u g h K e n n y t o
110 111

Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Searle show, i t r e m a i n s t i e d t o t h e n a r r o w o n t o l o g i c a l presupposi- w h e n they c o m e to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another about some-


tions o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g can t h i n g i n o n e w o r l d , t h e y base t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n a c o m m o n l y
attain t h e level o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n theory that s u p p o s e d system o f w o r l d s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n I h a v e p r o p o s e d t h a t
B u h l e r a d v a n c e d i n a p r o g r a m m a t i c way o n l y i f i t is a b l e t o p r o v i d e we differentiate the external w o r l d i n t o an objective w o r l d a n d a
a systematic g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s s o c i a l w o r l d , a n d t h a t w e i n t r o d u c e t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d as a c o m p l e -
o f language ( a n d p e r h a p s also f o r t h e " p o e t i c " f u n c t i o n , r e l a t e d t o m e n t a r y concept to the external w o r l d . T h e corresponding validity
t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h is e m p h a s i z e d byjakobson), c l a i m s o f t r u t h , Tightness, a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhafiigkeit) c a n t h e n
i n t h e s a m e way t h a t t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s has d o n e f o r t h e s e r v e as a g u i d e i n t h e c h o i c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s f o r j u s t i f y -
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I have t a k e n t h i s p a t h w i t h m y r e f l e c t i o n s i n g t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, o r f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e , a n d
o n universal pragmatics. 1 6
classifying the speech acts t h a t v a r y w i t h individual languages.
Buhler's t h e o r y o f language functions c o u l d be c o n n e c t e d w i t h B u h l e r ' s a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n w o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y have t o b e s p l i t u p
the m e t h o d s a n d insights o f t h e analytic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d be i n t o r e g u l a t i v e a n d i m p e r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . I n t h e r e g u l a t i v e use of
m a d e the centerpiece o f a theory o f communicative action oriented l a n g u a g e , p a r t i c i p a n t s raise n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n v a r i o u s ways
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i f we c o u l d generalize the c o n c e p t a n d relate t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e i r shared social w o r l d ; i n the i m p e r a -
o f validity beyond the t r u t h of propositions a n d identify validity tive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e y r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ,
c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r o n l y o n t h e semantic level, f o r sentences, b u t w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r raises a c l a i m t o p o w e r vis-a-vis t h e addressee i n
o n the pragmatic level, f o r utterances. For this purpose, the para- o r d e r t o g e t h i m t o a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d state o f a f f a i r s
d i g m c h a n g e i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e t h a t was i n t r o d u c e d b y comes i n t o existence. A t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o r k e d o u t a l o n g
A u s t i n ( a n i l l u m i n a t i n g h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t o f w h i c h has b e e n g i v e n these lines i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t e r m s c o u l d be m a d e f r u i t f u l f o r a
by A p e l ) 1 7
m u s t be radicalized i n such a way t h a t the b r e a k w i t h t h e sociological t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i f we c o u l d show h o w communicative
" l o g o s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e , " t h a t is, w i t h t h e p r i v i l e g i n g o f a c t s — t h a t is, s p e e c h acts o r e q u i v a l e n t n o n v e r b a l expressions—take
its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , also has c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e c h o i c e o n the function of coordinating action a n d make their contribution
o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e . I t is n o t to the construction o f interactions.
m e r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f a d m i t t i n g o t h e r m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use o n a n
Finally, c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n situational con-
e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h t h e a s s e r t o r i c ; w e have t o e s t a b l i s h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
texts, w h i c h i n t u r n represent segments o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f t h e p a r -
a n d w o r l d r e l a t i o n s f o r t h e s e o t h e r m o d e s as was d o n e f o r the
ticipants i n i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e c o n n e c t i o n o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t o t h e basic
assertoric m o d e . 1 8
I t is w i t h t h i s i n m i n d t h a t I have p r o p o s e d t h a t
concepts o f social t h e o r y can be r e n d e r e d secure o n l y by m e a n s o f
we d o n o t oppose the i l l o c u t i o n a r y role to the propositional c o m p o -
t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d ; t h i s c a n b e i n t r o d u c e d as a c o m p l e m e n -
n e n t , s e e i n g t h e f o r m e r as a n i r r a t i o n a l f o r c e a n d t h e l a t t e r as t h a t
t a r y c o n c e p t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n v i a t h e analyses o f b a c k g r o u n d
w h i c h g r o u n d s validity; rather, we s h o u l d conceive the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
k n o w l e d g e s t i m u l a t e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n . 1 9

r o l e as t h e c o m p o n e n t t h a t specifies which v a l i d i t y c l a i m a s p e a k e r is
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f these i n t e r m e d i a t e r e f l e c t i o n s , I c a n a t
r a i s i n g w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , how she is r a i s i n g i t , a n d f o r what.
best h o p e t o m a k e this p r o g r a m plausible. S t a r t i n g f r o m two versions
W i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f a n utterance, a speaker can m o t i - o f W e b e r ' s a c t i o n t h e o r y , I w o u l d l i k e first t o m a k e c l e a r t h e c e n t r a l
vate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n h e r s p e e c h a c t a n d i m p o r t a n c e o f the p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. F o l l o w i n g this,
t h e r e b y t o e n t e r i n t o a rationally motivated binding and bonding rela- I shall t r y to make Austin's distinction between illocutionary a n d
tionship (Bindung). This conception presupposes that acting and p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r u i t f u l f o r d e m a r c a t i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
s p e a k i n g subjects c a n r e l a t e t o m o r e t h a n o n l y o n e w o r l d , a n d t h a t r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. O n
113
112
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

t h e basis o f t h i s , I s h a l l e x a m i n e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d - f r o m a t e l e o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f a c t i o n a n d specifies "subjective mean-


i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f t h e o f f e r s c o n t a i n e d i n s p e e c h acts a n d t h e i n g " as a ( p r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) a c t i o n i n t e n t i o n . A n actor can e i t h e r
r o l e o f criticizable validity claims. A discussion o f c o m p e t i n g p r o p o s - p u r s u e h i s o w n i n t e r e s t s , s u c h as a c q u i r i n g p o w e r o r w e a l t h , o r h e
als f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts w i l l s e r v e t o c o n f i r m m y views. F i n a l l y , c a n a t t e m p t t o l i v e u p t o values s u c h as p i e t y o r h u m a n d i g n i t y , o r
I w a n t t o s h o w a few o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n s f r o m t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c h e c a n seek s a t i s f a c t i o n i n l i v i n g o u t affects a n d desires. T h e s e utili-
l e v e l o f analysis t o e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , a n d , o n t h e basis o f t h e tarian, value-related, o r affectual g o a l s , w h i c h a r e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o
relation between the literal a n d context-dependent meanings of situation-specific purposes, are f o r m s o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g t h a t
s p e e c h acts, t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has a c t i n g subjects c a n c o n n e c t w i t h t h e i r g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y . 22

t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . S i n c e W e b e r starts f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d m o d e l o f ac-
t i o n , h e is u n a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f " s o c i a l a c t i o n " b y w a y
T w o Versions of Weber's T h e o r y o f Action o f a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g . I n s t e a d , h e has to
e x p a n d t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y w i t h t w o f u r t h e r specifica-
W e b e r i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e s " m e a n i n g " (Sinn) as a basic c o n c e p t o f t i o n s so t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n a r e satisfied: (a) a n
a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d , w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h i s c a t e g o r y , d i s t i n g u i s h e s ac- o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r a c t i n g subjects, a n d ( b ) a
t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r : "We s h a l l speak o f ' a c t i o n ' i n s o f a r r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n o t h e r o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f several
as t h e a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l a t t a c h e s a s u b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t o h i s b e h a v - i n t e r a c t i n g subjects. T o be s u r e , W e b e r v a c i l l a t e s as t o w h e t h e r h e
i o r — b e i t overt o r covert, omission o r acquiescence." 20
Weber does s h o u l d r e g a r d c o n d i t i o n (a) as s u f f i c i e n t f o r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n o r
n o t rely here o n a theory of m e a n i n g b u t o n an intentional theory s h o u l d also r e q u i r e ( b ) . I n s e c t i o n 1 o f Economy and Society h e says
o f consciousness. H e does n o t elucidate " m e a n i n g " i n connection m e r e l y : " A c t i o n is ' s o c i a l ' i n s o f a r as its s u b j e c t i v e meaning takes
w i t h the m o d e l o f linguistic m e a n i n g s a n d does n o t relate i t to the a c c o u n t o f t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r s a n d is t h e r e b y o r i e n t e d i n its
linguistic m e d i u m o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t to the course." 2 3
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n s e c t i o n 3 W e b e r stresses t h a t t h e
beliefs a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f a n a c t i n g subject, w h o is p r e s e n t e d in a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t o b e reciprocally r e l a t e d t o
i s o l a t i o n t o b e g i n w i t h . A t t h i s first s w i t c h p o i n t , W e b e r p a r t s c o m - o n e a n o t h e r : " T h e t e r m 'social r e l a t i o n s h i p ' w i l l be used t o d e n o t e
p a n y w i t h a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . W h a t c o u n t s as f u n d a - t h e b e h a v i o r o f a p l u r a l i t y o f a c t o r s i n s o f a r as, i n its m e a n i n g f u l
mental is n o t the interpersonal relation between a t least two c o n t e n t , t h e a c t i o n o f e a c h takes a c c o u n t o f t h a t o f t h e o t h e r s a n d
speaking a n d a c t i n g subjects—a r e l a t i o n t h a t refers back to l i n g u i s t i c is o r i e n t e d i n t h e s e t e r m s . " 2 4

processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — b u t t h e p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f For the construction o f a t h e o r y o f action, another decision is


a s o l i t a r y a c t i n g subject. A s i n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s , t h e p r o c e s s even m o r e i m p o r t a n t . S h o u l d Weber i n t r o d u c e the rationalizable
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n l a n g u a g e is c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e aspects o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n m o d e l , or
m o d e l o f i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects r e c i p r o c a l l y i n f l u e n c i n g o n e s h o u l d t h e c o n c e p t o f social i n t e r a c t i o n serve as a basis f o r t h a t
a n o t h e r . " A l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y is r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i d e a l - t y p i c a l , p u r p o s e ? I n t h e first case, W e b e r has t o l i m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e r a t i o n -
' p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l ' l i m i t case b y n u m e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l acts . . . w h i c h a l i z a b l e aspects y i e l d e d b y t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t h a t is, t o
are o r i e n t e d to the expectation of gaining 'understanding' (Ver- t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s a n d e n d s . I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e q u e s t i o n
stdndnis') f r o m others for an i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g . " 2 1
Reaching under- arises w h e t h e r t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n s of
s t a n d i n g c o u n t s as a d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n o n t h a t is t o b e construed a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h u s also a d d i t i o n a l aspects u n d e r w h i c h
w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p r i m i t i v e c o n c e p t o f i n t e n t i o n . T h u s , W e b e r starts actions can be rationalized.
114 115
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

T h e Official Version Table 2.1


The official typology of action

Weber distinguishes between p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l , v a l u e - r a t i o n a l , af- Types of action in Subjective meaning covers these elements:
f e c t u a l , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h i s t y p o l o g y is b a s e d o n c a t e g o r i e s descending order
of rationality Means Ends Values Consequences
o f a c t i o n goals t o w a r d w h i c h a n actor can o r i e n t herself i n her
purposive activity: u t i l i t a r i a n , value-related, a n d affectual goals. T h e n Purposive-rational + + + +
" t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n " f o l l o w s as a r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y t h a t is, t o begin Value-rational + + + -
w i t h , n o t f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n e d . T h i s t y p o l o g y is o b v i o u s l y g u i d e d b y
Affectual + + - -
Traditional + - - -
a n i n t e r e s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e d e g r e e s t o w h i c h a c t i o n is r a t i o n -
a l i z a b l e . H e r e , W e b e r d o e s n o t s t a r t f r o m t h e social r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e
r e g a r d s as r a t i o n a l i z a b l e o n l y t h e m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n o f ideologi-
r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ; i n a f f e c t u a l a c t i o n , t h i s is t r u e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
cally conceived, m o n o l o g i c a l action. I f one adopts this perspective,
a n d t h e values; i n a c t i o n t h a t is m e r e l y h a b i t u a l i z e d , o f t h e e n d s as
t h e o n l y aspects o f a c t i o n o p e n t o o b j e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l are t h e effective-
well (table 2.1).
ness o f a causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a n e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e truth
O f course, Weber can a c c o m m o d a t e "value-rational" action i n this
o f the e m p i r i c a l statements t h a t u n d e r l y the m a x i m or the p l a n o f
c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y by attaching to i t a restrictive m e a n i n g . T h i s type
a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f a b o u t a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l o r -
can i n c l u d e o n l y action o r i e n t a t i o n s o f a n ethics o f c o n v i c t i o n and
g a n i z a t i o n o f m e a n s . T h u s W e b e r c h o o s e s p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l (zweck-
n o t o f a n ethics o f responsibility. Moreover, i t does n o t take i n t o
rationat) a c t i o n as t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r h i s t y p o l o g y :
a c c o u n t t h e p r i n c i p l e d c h a r a c t e r o n t h e basis o f w h i c h t h e P r o t e s -
Social action, like all action, may be o r i e n t e d i n f o u r ways. I t may be: (1) t a n t e t h i c , f o r e x a m p l e , q u a l i f i e s as a f r a m e w o r k f o r a m e t h o d i c a l
instrumentally rational [zweckrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by expectations as c o n d u c t o f life. T h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l structures o f consciousness t h a t
to the behavior o f objects i n the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o f other h u m a n beings; W e b e r finds i n e t h i c a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d w o r l d v i e w s c a n n o t , o n a n a l y t i c
these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the a t t a i n m e n t
grounds a l o n e , b e i n c l u d e d i n a n a c t i o n t y p o l o g y t h a t rests o n a
o f the actor's own rationally pursued a n d calculated ends; (2) value-rational
(wertrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by a conscious belief i n the value f o r its c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f nonsocial a c t i o n s ; f o r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is r e l a t e d
o w n sake o f some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other f o r m o f behavior, t o t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n o f interpersonal c o n f l i c t s o f a c t i o n .
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its prospects o f success; (3) affectual (especially emotional),
that is, d e t e r m i n e d by the actor's specific affects a n d feeling states; (4) T h e Unofficial Version
traditional, that is, d e t e r m i n e d by i n g r a i n e d h a b i t u a t i o n . 25

If one follows an interpretation advanced by Wolfgang W h e n W e b e r a t t e m p t s t o set u p a t y p o l o g y o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l level

Schluchter, 2 6
this typology can be r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance w i t h o f s o c i a l a c t i o n , h e e n c o u n t e r s a d d i t i o n a l aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y

t h e f o r m a l properties o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . A n actor behaves o f a c t i o n . Social actions can be distinguished according to the

p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l l y w h e n she c h o o s e s ends f r o m a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d mechanisms f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l actions, f o r instance, ac-

h o r i z o n o f values a n d o r g a n i z e s s u i t a b l e means i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r a social r e l a t i o n is b a s e d o n interest positions a l o n e

a l t e r n a t i v e consequences. I n t h e series o f types o f a c t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y o r also o n normative agreement. I n t h i s way, W e b e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e

W e b e r , t h e r a n g e o f w h a t t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h e e r f a c t i c i t y o f a n e c o n o m i c o r d e r f r o m t h e social v a l i d i t y o f a l e g a l

n a r r o w s step b y step. I n v a l u e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e o r d e r . I n t h e o n e case, social r e l a t i o n s g a i n s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h a f a c t u a l

screened o u t o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g a n d thus w i t h d r a w n f r o m i n t e r m e s h i n g o f interest positions; i n the other, t h r o u g h the recog-


n i t i o n o f n o r m a t i v e validity claims. T o be sure, c o o r d i n a t i o n of
117
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Table 2.2
actions secured, to begin w i t h , merely t h r o u g h a c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f
An alternative typology of action
interests can be superimposed n o r m a t i v e l y by the a d d i t i o n o f "valid-
ity-based a g r e e m e n t , " t h a t is, b y " d e f e r e n c e t o c o n v e n t i o n o r l e g a l Degree of rationality of action

norms." 2 7
W e b e r elucidates this i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the development Coordination Low High
o f t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " c u s t o m " (Sitte) t o "convention":
Through interest positions De facto customary Strategic action.
" I t is b y way o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s t h a t m e r e l y f a c t u a l r e g u l a r i t i e s o f action (Sitte) ( Interessenhandeln)
a c t i o n , i.e., usages, are f r e q u e n d y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o b i n d i n g n o r m s , Through normative agreement Conventional action Postconventional action
g u a r a n t e e d p r i m a r i l y by psychological coercion." 2 8 based on agreement based on agreement
( Gemeinschaftshandeln) ( Gesellschaftshandeln)
I n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n complementarity of interests exists n o t o n l y i n
t h e f o r m o f c u s t o m — t h a t is, o f d u l l , i n s e n s i b l e h a b i t u a t i o n — b u t also
at t h e level o f r a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e behavior, f o r e x a m p l e i n m o d e r n meinschaftshandeln) n o t t h r o u g h the purposive-rational action orien-
c o m m e r c e , i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s have f o r m e d a clear consciousness tations o f the participants, b u t t h r o u g h the higher, postconventional
o f t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y as w e l l as o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t stage o f m o r a l - p r a t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . B e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t d o t h i s , a
p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n normative consen- specific c o n c e p t o f v a l u e - r a t i o n a l i t y c a n n o t g a i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e for
sus d o e s n o t o n l y take t h e f o r m o f t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d , c o n v e n t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t i t w o u l d have t o b e a c c o r d e d i f t h e e t h i c a l r a t i o n -
a c t i o n ; t h u s , t h e m o d e r n l e g a l system is d e p e n d e n t o n a n e n l i g h t - a l i z a t i o n t h a t W e b e r e x a m i n e d a t t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s is t o
e n e d belief i n legitimacy, w h i c h r a t i o n a l n a t u r a l l a w — w i t h the idea b e g r a s p e d i n t e r m s o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r systems o f social a c t i o n .
o f a basic c o n t r a c t a m o n g f r e e a n d e q u a l s — t r a c e s b a c k t o p r o c e - W e b e r was n o t a b l e t o m a k e his u n o f f i c i a l typology o f action
d u r e s o f r a t i o n a l w i l l - f o r m a t i o n . I f o n e p u r s u e s these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , f r u i t f u l f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . T h e official ver-
t h e n i t m a k e s sense t o c o n s t r u e types o f social a c t i o n (a) according s i o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is so n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d t h a t w i t h i n its
to the k i n d of coordination involved, and (b) according to the f r a m e w o r k social a c t i o n c a n b e assessed o n l y u n d e r t h e aspect o f
d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (see t a b l e 2 . 2 ) . purposive rationality. F r o m this conceptual perspective, the r a t i o n -
T h e r e a r e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t i n g s u c h a t y p o l o g y i n Economy a l i z a t i o n o f a c t i o n systems has t o b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
and Society, 29
t h e r e is r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g e v i d e n c e f o r i t i n t h e essay a n d d i f f u s i o n o f types o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s p e c i f i c t o subsys-
"Some Categories o f Interpretive S o c i o l o g y . " 1 shall n o t pursue this
3 0
t e m s . I f processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a r e t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d in
h e r e , h o w e v e r , because W e b e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y c a r r y t h r o u g h , a t t h e their entire breadth, o t h e r a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s are r e q u i r e d .
level o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s themselves, the interesting distinc- I w o u l d like therefore to take u p o n c e again the concept o f c o m -
tion between social r e l a t i o n s m e d i a t e d by interest positions and municative action e x p o u n d e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n 3 1
a n d , by d r a w i n g
those m e d i a t e d by n o r m a t i v e agreement. ( I shall r e m e d y this b e l o w upon speech-act theory, to a n c h o r i n its c o n c e p t u a l foundations
i n t h e s e c t i o n b e g i n n i n g o n p a g e 119.) M o r e s e r i o u s is t h e f a c t t h a t t h o s e r a t i o n a l i z a b l e aspects o f a c t i o n n e g l e c t e d i n W e b e r ' s o f f i c i a l
w h i l e W e b e r does distinguish between t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d a n d r a t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y . I n t h i s way, I h o p e t o c a p t u r e i n a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c t e r m s
a g r e e m e n t , h e e x p l a i n s t h i s r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t i n a d e q u a t e l y , as w e t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t W e b e r d i d e m p l o y i n his
have seen above, u s i n g t h e m o d e l o f a r r a n g e m e n t s a m o n g subjects c u l t u r a l analyses. I s h a l l b e s t a r t i n g f r o m a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n
o f p r i v a t e law. A t a n y r a t e , h e d o e s n o t t r a c e i t b a c k t o t h e m o r a l - that relies o n t h e u n o f f i c i a l version o f Weber's a c t i o n t h e o r y insofar
practical foundations of discursive will-formation. Otherwise it as social a c t i o n s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o t w o a c t i o n o r i e n t a -
would have b e c o m e clear at this p o i n t that action in society tions, corresponding to the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f action t h r o u g h interest
(Gesellschaftshandeln) is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c t i o n i n c o m m u n i t y (Ge- positions and t h r o u g h normative agreement (see t a b l e 2.3).
118
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Chapter 2
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Table 2.3
Types of action t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n is a n essential c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e
accomplishments required for communicative action.
Action orientation

Oriented toward Oriented toward reaching Orientation toward Success versus Orientation toward Reaching
Action situation success understanding
Understanding
Nonsocial Instrumental action —
Social Strategic action Communicative action I n i d e n t i f y i n g s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as types, I
a m assuming that concrete actions can be classified f r o m these
p o i n t s o f view. I use t h e t e r m s " s t r a t e g i c " a n d " c o m m u n i c a t i v e " n o t
T h e m o d e l o f purposive-rational a c t i o n takes as its p o i n t o f d e p a r -
m e r e l y t o d e s i g n a t e t w o a n a l y t i c aspects u n d e r w h i c h o n e a n d t h e
t u r e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e a c t o r is p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a t t a i n i n g a n
same a c t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d — o n t h e o n e h a n d , as a r e c i p r o c a l
e n d ( w h i c h has b e e n r e n d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e i n t e r m s o f p u r -
i n f l u e n c i n g o f o n e a n o t h e r by agents a c t i n g i n a purposive-rational
p o s e s ) , t h a t h e selects m e a n s t h a t s e e m t o h i m a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e
m a n n e r a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
given situation, and that he calculates other forseeable conse-
s t a n d i n g a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a l i f e w o r l d . Rather, social actions c a n
q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n as s e c o n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f success. Success is
be distinguished according to w h e t h e r the participants adopt either
d e f i n e d as t h e o c c u r r e n c e i n t h e w o r l d o f a d e s i r e d state, w h i c h c a n ,
a success-oriented a t t i t u d e or one o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , be causally e f f e c t e d b y g o a l - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n o r
s t a n d i n g . A n d , u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s , these attitudes s h o u l d be
o m i s s i o n . T h e effects o f a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r c o m p r i s e t h e results o f
i d e n t i f i a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f the partici-
a c t i o n ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e set p u r p o s e has b e e n a c h i e v e d ) , the
p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s . T o b e g i n w i t h , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f
consequences o f action ( w h i c h t h e actor foresaw a n d i n t e n d e d , o r
t h e t w o a t t i t u d e s is r e q u i r e d .
m a d e a l l o w a n c e f o r ) , a n d t h e side-effects ( w h i c h t h e a c t o r d i d n o t
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c t i o n t h e o r y , c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f t h e
f o r e s e e ) . W e c a l l a n a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success instrumentalwhen
t w o a t t i t u d e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l task. I t is n o t
we c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r the aspect o f f o l l o w i n g t e c h n i c a l r u l e s o f a c t i o n
m y a i m to characterize behavioral dispositions empirically, b u t to
a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a c o m p l e x
g r a s p g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
o f circumstances a n d events. W e call an action o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
f r o m w h i c h conditions f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n can be derived that may be
success strategic w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r t h e aspect o f f o l l o w i n g
characterized formally. To e x p l a i n w h a t I m e a n by "an attitude o r i -
r u l e s o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f its
e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " I have t o analyze t h e c o n -
i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f a r a t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t i n action. I n s t r u -
cept o f "reaching understanding" (Verständigung). T h i s is n o t a
m e n t a l actions can be c o n n e c t e d w i t h social i n t e r a c t i o n s ; strategic
q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s a n o b s e r v e r uses w h e n d e s c r i b i n g p r o c -
a c t i o n s a r e themselves s o c i a l a c t i o n s . B y c o n t r a s t , I s h a l l s p e a k o f
esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t o f t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
communicative action, whenever the plans o f action o f the actors
edge of competent speakers, who can themselves distinguish
involved are c o o r d i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h egocentric calculations of
intuitively situations i n w h i c h they are e x e r t i n g a n i n f l u e n c e upon
success b u t t h r o u g h acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o m m u n i c a -
others f r o m those i n w h i c h they are c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
tive a c t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e i r o w n
with t h e m , a n d w h o f u r t h e r k n o w w h e n t h e i r a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g
i n d i v i d u a l successes; t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l goals o n c o n d i t i o n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g f a i l . I f w e w e r e a b l e t o specify e x p l i c i t l y t h e s t a n d a r d s
t h a t t h e y c a n h a r m o n i z e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f c o m -
o n w h i c h t h e speakers i m p l i c i t l y base t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s , we w o u l d b e
m o n situation definitions. To this extent the negotiation o f d e f i n i -
i n a position to explain the concept o f reaching understanding.
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Reaching understanding (Verständigung) is c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a w i t h a communicative intent. T h e concepts o f speaking a n d reaching


p r o c e s s o f a c h i e v i n g u n i t y (Einigung) a m o n g speaking and acting u n d e r s t a n d i n g reciprocally i n t e r p r e t one another. For this reason,
subjects. H o w e v e r , a g r o u p o f p e r s o n s c a n f e e l at o n e i n a m o o d t h a t we can analyze t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c features o f the attitude o r i -
is so d i f f u s e t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o specify t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t or ented toward reaching understanding i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the m o d e l
t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t t o w h i c h i t is d i r e c t e d . S u c h a c o l l e c t i v e like- of the attitude o f participants i n communication, one of w h o m — i n
m i n d e d n e s s (Gleichgestimmtheit) d o e s n o t satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n s for t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e — c a r r i e s o u t a s p e e c h act, t o w h i c h t h e o t h e r takes
t h e t y p e o f a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) i n w h i c h a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n ( e v e n t h o u g h u t t e r a n c e s i n t h e communica-
u n d e r s t a n d i n g t e r m i n a t e w h e n t h e y a r e successful. A communica- tive p r a c t i c e s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e u s u a l l y d o n o t h a v e a s t a n d a r d l i n g u i s -
tively a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , o r o n e t h a t is m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d i n tic f o r m a n d o f t e n h a v e n o v e r b a l f o r m at a l l ) .
communicative a c t i o n , is p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . O w i n g to I f w e a p p r o a c h t h e task o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
this linguistic structure, i t c a n n o t m e r e l y be i n d u c e d t h r o u g h o u t - success f r o m a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y way
side i n f l u e n c e ; i t has t o b e a c c e p t e d ( o r p r e s u p p o s e d ) as v a l i d b y t h e o f a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts, w e e n c o u n t e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t y .
participants. T o this extent i t can be distinguished f r o m merely de O n t h e o n e h a n d , w e are r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, w i t h t h e
f a c t o a c c o r d (Übereinstimmung). Processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g h e l p o f w h i c h speakers a n d hearers c o m e t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
a i m at a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t m e e t s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l l y m o t i - s o m e t h i n g , as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. T h e c o n c e p t
v a t e d assent (Zustimmung) to the content o f an utterance. A commu- of communicative a c t i o n is p r e s e n t e d i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e acts o f
n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t has a r a t i o n a l basis; i t c a n n o t be reaching understanding, w h i c h l i n k the teleologically structured
i m p o s e d by e i t h e r party, w h e t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l l y t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n - plans o f action o f different participants a n d thereby first combine
tion in the situation directly, or strategically through exerting i n d i v i d u a l acts i n t o a n i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p l e x , c a n n o t t h e m s e l v e s b e
i n f l u e n c e o n t h e d e c i s i o n s o f o n e p a r t y o n t h e basis o f a c a l c u l a t i o n reduced to teleological actions. T o this extent, the paradigmatic
o f success. A g r e e m e n t c a n i n d e e d o b j e c t i v e l y be o b t a i n e d b y f o r c e ; c o n c e p t o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a
b u t w h a t c o m e s t o pass manifestly t h r o u g h o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e o r t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g that, like i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, tries to c o n c e p -
use o f v i o l e n c e c a n n o t s u b j e c t i v e l y c o u n t as a g r e e m e n t . Agreement t u a l i z e r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as t h e s o l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m o f co-
rests o n c o m m o n convictions. T h e s p e e c h act o f o n e p e r s o n succeeds o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g subjects a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
o n l y i f t h e o t h e r accepts t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n i t b y t a k i n g ( h o w e v e r O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o t e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is
i m p l i c i d y ) a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t is i n an example of action oriented toward reaching understanding.
p r i n c i p l e c r i t i c i z a b l e . B o t h E g o , w h o raises a v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h h i s W i t h o u t d o u b t , t h e r e are c o u n t l e s s cases o f i n d i r e c t m u t u a l u n d e r -
u t t e r a n c e , a n d A l t e r , w h o r e c o g n i z e s o r r e j e c t s i t , base t h e i r d e c i s i o n s s t a n d i n g (indirekte Verständigung), w h e t h e r w h e r e o n e s u b j e c t , i n g i v -
o n p o t e n t i a l reasons. i n g a n o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h signals, i n d i r e c d y gets
h i m t o f o r m a c e r t a i n o p i n i o n o r t o a d o p t c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s by way
I f we were n o t i n a p o s i t i o n to refer to the m o d e l o f speech, we
o f an inferential processing o f perceptions o f the situation, or where
c o u l d n o t even b e g i n t o analyze w h a t i t m e a n s f o r two subjects t o
one subject, o n t h e basis o f a l r e a d y h a b i t u a l i z e d e v e r y d a y c o m -
come to an understanding with one another. Reaching under-
m u n i c a t i v e practices, i n c o n s p i c u o u s l y harnesses a n o t h e r f o r h e r o w n
s t a n d i n g is t h e i n h e r e n t t e l o s o f h u m a n l a n g u a g e (Sprache). T o be
p u r p o s e s , t h a t is, i n d u c e s h i m t o b e h a v e i n a d e s i r e d way b y m a n i p u -
s u r e , l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t r e l a t e d t o one
latively e m p l o y i n g linguistic means, thereby i n s t r u m e n t a l i z i n g h i m
a n o t h e r as m e a n s t o e n d . B u t w e c a n e x p l a i n t h e c o n c e p t o f r e a c h -
f o r h e r o w n success. S u c h e x a m p l e s o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y i f w e specify w h a t i t m e a n s t o use s e n t e n c e s
122 123

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d consequences seem t o decrease t h e value of i n g o n l y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h e i r a u t h o r is p u r s u i n g

s p e e c h acts as t h e m o d e l f o r a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r - a n d t h e e n d s h e w a n t s t o r e a l i z e . J u s t as the meaning of what is said is

standing. c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, the intention of the actor is c o n s t i t u -

T h i s w i l l t u r n o u t n o t t o b e t h e case o n l y i f i t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t tive f o r t e l e o l o g i c a l actions.

t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e W h a t A u s t i n calls perlocutionary effects arise f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o -

original mode o f l a n g u a g e use u p o n w h i c h i n d i r e c t l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r - c u t i o n a r y acts t a k e o n a r o l e i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t o f a c t i o n .

standing, giving to understand something or letting something be S p e e c h acts, l i k e a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l , c a n p r o d u c e s i d e effects t h a t t h e

u n d e r s t o o d — i n g e n e r a l , t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l use o f l a n g u a g e — i s p a r a - a c t o r d i d n o t f o r e s e e ; these a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects i n a t r i v i a l

s i t i c . I n m y view, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o - sense, w h i c h I s h a l l n o t c o n s i d e r h e r e . Less t r i v i a l a r e t h e p e r l o c u -

cutions accomplishes j u s t that. t i o n a r y effects t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts s o m e -


t i m e s t a k e o n r o l e s i n c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e s e effects
A s is w e l l k n o w n , A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n l o c u t i o n a r y , i l l o c u -
e n s u e w h e n e v e r a s p e a k e r acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success
tionary, a n d perlocutionary acts. 32
H e applies the t e r m " l o c u t i o n a r y "
a n d , i n d o i n g so, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n n e c t s s p e e c h acts w i t h i n t e n -
t o t h e c o n t e n t o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s ("/>") o r o f n o m i n a l i z e d
tions a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e s t h e m f o r purposes t h a t are o n l y c o n t i n -
p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences ( " t h a t p"). Through locutionary acts, t h e
g e n d y r e l a t e d t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d .
s p e a k e r expresses states o f a f f a i r s ; she says s o m e t h i n g . T h r o u g h illo-
cutionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p e r f o r m s a n a c t i o n b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g .
T h e r e yet is a f u r t h e r sense i n w h i c h to p e r f o r m a locutionary act, a n d
The i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e establishes the m o d e o f a sentence (Mp) t h e r e i n an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, may also be to p e r f o r m an act o f another k i n d .
employed as a s t a t e m e n t , p r o m i s e , c o m m a n d , a v o w a l , o r t h e l i k e . Saying s o m e t h i n g w i l l often, or even normally, produce certain consequen-
U n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s , t h e m o d e is e x p r e s s e d b y m e a n s o f a tial effects u p o n the feelings, thoughts, or actions o f the audience, or o f the
p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b i n t h e first p e r s o n p r e s e n t ; t h e a c t i o n m e a n i n g speaker, or o f o t h e r persons: a n d i t may be d o n e w i t h the design, i n t e n t i o n ,
or purpose o f p r o d u c i n g t h e m ; a n d we may t h e n say, t h i n k i n g o f this, that
c a n b e seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e f a c t t h a t " h e r e b y " c a n b e a d d e d to
the speaker has p e r f o r m e d an act i n the n o m e n c l a t u r e o f w h i c h reference
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act: " I h e r e b y promise is made either only obliquely . . . or even . . . n o t at all, to the performance
y o u ( c o m m a n d y o u , c o n f e s s t o y o u ) t h a t p." F i n a l l y , t h r o u g h perlocu- o f the l o c u t i o n a r y or i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. We shall call the performance o f an
tionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s a n e f f e c t u p o n the hearer. By act o f this k i n d the performance o f a perlocutionary act or perlocution. 3i

c a r r y i n g o u t a s p e e c h act she b r i n g s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d .
T h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts has
T h u s , t h e t h r e e acts t h a t A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s c a n b e characterized
g i v e n rise t o a n e x t e n d e d c o n t r o v e r s y . 35
F r o m i t have e m e r g e d f o u r
w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g phrases: t o say something; t o act by s a y i n g s o m e -
criteria o f demarcation.
t h i n g ; t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g through a c t i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g .
a. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m a speaker pursues w i t h an utterance
A u s t i n makes his conceptual incisions i n such a way t h a t the
f o l l o w s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g — c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r s p e e c h a c t s — o f w h a t is
s p e e c h a c t (Mp), composed of an illocutionary and a prepositional
s a i d i t s e l f ; s p e e c h acts a r e , i n t h i s sense, s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g . W i t h t h e
3 6

component, is p r e s e n t e d as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t act t h a t t h e s p e a k e r
h e l p o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, a s p e a k e r lets i t b e k n o w n t h a t she w a n t s
always p e r f o r m s w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t , t h a t is, w i t h t h e a i m
w h a t she says t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a g r e e t i n g , c o m m a n d , w a r n i n g ,
t h a t a hearer may u n d e r s t a n d a n d accept his u t t e r a n c e . 3 3
T h e self-
e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . H e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t does n o t go
s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e s p e e c h a c t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense t h a t
beyond w a n t i n g the hearer to understand the manifest content of
the c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e speaker a n d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m
t h e s p e e c h act. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a speaker, l i k e
h e is p u r s u i n g f o l l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . I t
t h e e n d s p u r s u e d w i t h g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , does n o t f o l -
is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s . W e i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e a n -
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t c o n t e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act; t h i s a i m c a n be (3) T h r o u g h i n f o r m i n g H t h a t she h a d g i v e n n o t i c e t o h e r firm,


i n f e r r e d o n l y b y way o f t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , a h e a r e r S gave H a f r i g h t (as she i n t e n d e d t o d o ) .
w h o u n d e r s t a n d s a r e q u e s t d i r e c t e d t o h i m c a n j u s t as l i t t l e k n o w
F r o m t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e
t h e r e b y w h a t else t h e s p e a k e r h a s i n v i e w i n u t t e r i n g i t as a n o b s e r v e r
a s s e r t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n (1) is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c h i e v i n g
w h o sees a n a c q u a i n t a n c e h u r r y i n g a l o n g t h e s t r e e t c a n k n o w w h y
a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t , t h e h e a r e r c o u l d j u s t as
h e is i n a h u r r y . T h e addressee c o u l d a t best i n f e r t h e speaker's
w e l l react t o t h e same u t t e r a n c e w i t h relief. T h e same holds f o r
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y aims f r o m the c o n t e x t . 3 7
T h e three r e m a i n i n g crite-
ria h a v e t o d o w i t h t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h (4) H m a d e S uneasy w i t h his w a r n i n g against g i v i n g notice to
acts. her firm.
b. F r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a s p e e c h act, as i n (1) a n d ( 2 ) below,
I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t t h e same w a r n i n g c o u l d j u s t as w e l l s t r e n g t h e n S
we can deduce the conditions for the corresponding i l l o c u t i o n a r y
i n h e r r e s o l v e , f o r i n s t a n c e i f S h a r b o r s a s u s p i c i o n t h a t H does n o t
success o f t h e speaker, b u t n o t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
w i s h h e r w e l l . T h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects m u s t t h e r e -
success t h a t a speaker a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success
f o r e r e f e r t o a c o n t e x t o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n t h a t goes beyond t h e
m i g h t w a n t t o a c h i e v e , o r d i d a c h i e v e , i n a g i v e n case b y c a r r y i n g
speech a c t . 3 8

o u t t h i s s p e e c h act. I n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , as i n ( 3 ) a n d
c. F r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , A u s t i n c o n c l u d e d t h a t i l l o c u -
( 4 ) b e l o w , k i n d s o f success a r e i n c l u d e d t h a t g o b e y o n d t h e m e a n i n g
t i o n a r y success s t a n d s i n a conventionally r e g u l a t e d o r internal c o n n e c -
o f w h a t is s a i d a n d t h u s b e y o n d w h a t a n addressee c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d
t i o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects r e m a i n
directly.
e x t e r n a l t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . T h e p o s s i b l e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
(1) 5 a s s e r t e d t o / / t h a t she gave n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . effects o f a s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d o n f o r t u i t o u s c o n t e x t s a n d , u n l i k e t h e
success o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a r e n o t fixed by c o n v e n t i o n s . 3 9
Of
S w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
course, o n e m i g h t use (4) as a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . O n l y i f t h e a d -
s e n t e d b y ( 1 ) i f H u n d e r s t a n d s h e r a s s e r t i o n a n d a c c e p t s i t as t r u e .
dressee takes t h e w a r n i n g s e r i o u s l y is u n e a s e a p l a u s i b l e r e a c t i o n ,
T h e same h o l d s f o r
a n d o n l y i f she d o e s n o t t a k e i t s e r i o u s l y is a f e e l i n g o f reassurance
(2) / / w a r n e d S n o t to give n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . p l a u s i b l e . I n s o m e cases, t h e m e a n i n g c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e a c t i o n
p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e f o r m e d e x c l u d e c e r t a i n
H w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
classes o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. N o n e t h e l e s s , these effects are c o n -
s e n t e d b y ( 2 ) i f S u n d e r s t a n d s h i s w a r n i n g a n d accepts i t as t r u e o r
n e c t e d w i t h s p e e c h acts n o t m e r e l y i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way. W h e n a
r i g h t — d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t i t has m o r e t h e
h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n a s s e r t i o n b y S as t r u e , a c o m m a n d as r i g h t , a n
sense o f a p r o g n o s i s o r o f a m o r a l a p p e a l . I n a n y case, a c c e p t i n g t h e
a d m i s s i o n as t r u t h f u l , h e t h e r e w i t h i m p l i c i d y d e c l a r e s h i m s e l f r e a d y
u t t e r a n c e described i n (2) provides g r o u n d s f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n
to b i n d his f u r t h e r action to c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l obligations. By
a c e r t a i n way o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a d d r e s s e e a n d f o r c o r r e s p o n d i n g
contrast, t h e f e e l i n g o f unease w h i c h a f r i e n d arouses i n S w i t h a
e x p e c t a t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e speaker. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e ex-
w a r n i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r takes s e r i o u s l y is a state t h a t m a y o r m a y n o t
p e c t e d s e q u e l o f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y c o m e s t o pass has n o e f f e c t o n t h e
ensue.
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e speaker. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , S d o e s n o t give
d. S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t e d S t r a w s o n t o r e p l a c e t h e
n o t i c e , t h i s is n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r i l y a c h i e v e d e f f e c t b u t t h e c o n s e -
criterion of conventionality with another criterion of demarcation. 4 0

quence o f a communicatively achieved agreement and thus the


A speaker, i f she w a n t s t o b e successful, m a y n o t l e t h e r p e r l o c u t i o n -
f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e addressee t o o k u p o n h i m s e l f
a r y a i m s b e k n o w n , w h e r e a s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y
w i t h h i s "yes" t o a s p e e c h a c t o f f e r . C o n s i d e r n o w :
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Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2

s t a n d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t w h e n these a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic
t h r o u g h b e i n g expressed. E l o c u t i o n s are expressed openly; p e r l o c u -
interactions. W h a t we m e a n by r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d an
tions m a y n o t b e " a d m i t t e d " as s u c h . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n also b e s e e n
a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , has t o b e c l a r i f i e d
i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e
solely i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. A n a t t e m p t a t r e a c h i n g
d e s c r i b e d ( t o give a f r i g h t t o , t o cause u n e a s e , t o p l u n g e i n t o d o u b t ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t a k e n w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s p e e c h act succeeds
to p u t someone i n a bad m o o d , to mislead, to offend, to infuriate,
w h e n a s p e a k e r achieves h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n A u s t i n ' s sense.
t o h u m i l i a t e , a n d so f o r t h ) c a n n o t a p p e a r a m o n g t h o s e predicates
F r o m t h i s i t also f o l l o w s t h a t w e c a n n o t e x p l a i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success
used t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h
i n t e r m s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p u r p o s i v e l y a c h i e v e d success o f a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d . P e r l o c u t i o n -
teleological a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims are d i f f e r e n t f r o m those p u -
a r y acts c o n s t i t u t e t h a t subclass o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s t h a t c a n be
poses t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d under the description o f s o m e t h i n g t o b e
c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e a g e n t
brought about i n the world.
d o e s n o t d e c l a r e o r a d m i t t o h e r a i m s as s u c h .
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects, l i k e t h e successful r e s u l t s o f teleological
W h e r e a s t h e sense o f t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n -
a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as states i n t h e w o r l d b r o u g h t
a r y acts is t o separate t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e m o d e o f
a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r l d . By contrast, i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s p e e c h acts as a n a l y t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t aspects, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
successes a r e a c h i e v e d at t h e level o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations on
t h e s e t w o types o f acts, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts,
which participants i n communication c o m e to an understanding
o n t h e o t h e r , is b y n o m e a n s a n a l y t i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y
w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h i s sense, t h e y
effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n l y i f t h e l a t t e r
a r e n o t i n n e r w o r l d l y , b u t e x t r a m u n d a n e . A t m o s t , successful i l l o c u -
a r e incorporated as means i n t o t e l e o l o g i c a l , s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n s .
tionary acts o c c u r w i t h i n t h e l i f e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts are a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f s p e e c h
communication belong and that forms the background for their
acts i n t o c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y a r e p a r t o f t h e i n -
processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y c a n n o t b e i n t e n d e d u n -
t e n d e d sequel o f a c t i o n o r o f t h e results o f a teleological a c t i o n t h a t
d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f causally p r o d u c e d effects. T h i s m o d e l o f ac-
an actor undertakes w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f i n f l u e n c i n g a hearer i n a
tion oriented toward reaching understanding, which I develop
c e r t a i n w a y w i t h t h e h e l p o f successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. T o b e s u r e ,
b e l o w , is o b s c u r e d r a t h e r t h a n i l l u m i n a t e d b y A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n
s p e e c h acts c a n serve t h i s nonillocutionary aim of influencing hearers
between illocutions and perlocutions.
o n l y i f they are suited to achieving i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims. I f t h e h e a r e r
f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e s p e a k e r was s a y i n g , a ideologically F r o m the f o r e g o i n g i t appears that we can conceive perlocutions
a c t i n g , success-oriented speaker w o u l d n o t be able to b r i n g the as a s p e c i a l class o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n s a r e
h e a r e r , b y m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, t o b e h a v e i n t h e d e s i r e d employed as m e a n s i n t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n . A s S t r a w s o n
way. T o t h i s e x t e n t , w h a t w e i n i t i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d as " t h e use o f l a n - has shown, this employment is s u b j e c t to certain provisos. A
g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " is n o t a n o r i g i n a l i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g s p e a k e r has t o a c h i e v e h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m —
use o f l a n g u a g e b u t t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t h a t serve i l l o - t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d a n d e n t e r i n t o t h e o b l i g a -
c u t i o n a r y a i m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. tions c o n n e c t e d w i t h the acceptance o f the offer contained i n the
speech a c t — w i t h o u t b e t r a y i n g his p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m . T h i s proviso
A s s p e e c h acts b y n o m e a n s always f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r ,
lends to perlocutions the peculiarly asymmetrical character of
i t m u s t also b e p o s s i b l e t o c l a r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u -
c o n c e a l e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n s . T h e s e are i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least
n i c a t i o n w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e activity. T h e
one o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y , w h i l e h e deceives
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t o r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success is n o t c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r
o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is not satisfying t h e
the successful a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of processes o f reaching under-
128 129
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

presuppositions u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u d o n a r y aims n o r m a l l y can be f e e l d e c e i v e d a n d a d o p t i n t u r n a s t r a t e g i c a t t i t u d e , b r e a k i n g away


a c h i e v e d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n also, t h i s t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t s u i t a b l e f r o m action o r i e n t e d toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O f course, i n
as t h e m o d e l f o r a n analysis t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o e x p l a i n t h e l i n g u i s d c c o m p l e x a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , a s p e e c h a c t t h a t is p e r f o r m e d and ac-
mechanism o f coordinating action w i t h the help o f the illocutionary cepted directly according to the presuppositions o f communicative
b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r t h i s p u r p o s e i t w o u l d a c t i o n c a n a t t h e same t i m e have a s t r a t e g i c status a t other levels o f
b e advisable t o select a t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is n o t b u r d e n e d w i t h i n t e r a c t i o n , t h a t is, c a n have p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n third parties.
t h e a s y m m e t r i e s a n d p r o v i s o s o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . I have c a l l e d t h e t y p e T h u s , I c o u n t as c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h o s e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -
o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a r m o n i z e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l ated interactions i n w h i c h all participants pursue i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims,
p l a n s o f a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d t h u s unreservedly p u r s u e t h e i r a n d only i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s , w i t h t h e i r s p e e c h acts. O n t h e other
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims "communicative action." h a n d , I r e g a r d as l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n t h o s e i n t e r -
A u s t i n , t o o , analyzes s p e e c h acts i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I t is a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w a n t s t o p r o d u c e
precisely the p o i n t o f his a p p r o a c h to work out the performative p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n h i s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts.
character o f linguistic utterances on t h e basis o f institutionally A u s t i n d i d n o t k e e p these t w o cases s e p a r a t e as d i f f e r e n t types of
b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b a p t i z i n g , b e t t i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i o n , b e c a u s e h e was i n c l i n e d t o i d e n t i f y s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is,
like, i n w h i c h the obligations issuing f r o m the performance o f the acts o f r e a c h i n g understanding—with the linguistically mediated
speech act are u n a m b i g u o u s l y r e g u l a t e d by a c c o m p a n y i n g institu- i n t e r a c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . H e d i d n o t see t h a t s p e e c h acts f u n c t i o n as
tions o r n o r m s o f action. However, A u s t i n confuses t h e p i c t u r e by a coordinating mechanism f o r other a c t i o n s . T h e y m u s t be disen-
n o t t r e a t i n g t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h h e analyzes gaged f r o m such contexts o f communicative action before they can
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, as differ- b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s . A n d t h i s is p o s s i b l e i n
ent in type f r o m t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t u r n o n l y because s p e e c h acts h a v e a r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e i n r e l a -
o c c u r . S o m e o n e w h o m a k e s a b e t , a p p o i n t s a n o f f i c e r as s u p r e m e t i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said
c o m m a n d e r , gives a c o m m a n d , a d m o n i s h e s o r w a r n s , m a k e s a p r e - always p o i n t s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f i n t e r a c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o m -
d i c t i o n , tells a story, m a k e s a c o n f e s s i o n , reveals s o m e t h i n g , a n d so municative action. T h e difference between a s p e e c h act a n d the
f o r t h is a c t i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d c a n n o t , at the same level of inter- c o n t e x t o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h r o u g h its a c t i o n - c o o r d i -
action, p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects a t a l l . A s p e a k e r c a n pursue nating accomplishments can be r e c o g n i z e d m o r e easily i f , u n l i k e
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o n l y w h e n h e deceives h i s c o u n t e r p a r t c o n c e r n - A u s t i n , one does n o t r e m a i n fixated o n the m o d e l o f institutionally
i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y — w h e n , f o r e x a m p l e , he b o u n d speech acts. 41

gives t h e c o m m a n d t o a t t a c k i n o r d e r t o g e t h i s t r o o p s t o r u s h i n t o
a trap, o r w h e n he proposes a bet o f $3,000 i n o r d e r to embarrass
M e a n i n g a n d Validity
s o m e o n e , o r w h e n h e tells a s t o r y late i n t h e e v e n i n g i n o r d e r to
d e l a y a guest's d e p a r t u r e , a n d so o n . I t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n
O n t h e basis o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action u n i n t e n d e d consequences may o c c u r at any
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t w h i l e s p e e c h acts
time; b u t as s o o n as t h e r e is a d a n g e r t h a t t h e s e w i l l b e a t t r i b u t e d t o
c a n i n d e e d b e e m p l o y e d strategically, t h e y h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n -
t h e s p e a k e r as i n t e n d e d effects, t h e l a t t e r f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r
i n g o n l y f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
explanations a n d denials, a n d i f n e e d be, apologies, i n o r d e r to
strategic a c t i o n by t h e fact t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s unreservedly pursue
d i s p e l t h e false i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e s e side effects a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n o r d e r to arrive at an agreement that provides
effects. O t h e r w i s e , h e has t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l
t h e basis f o r a c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l l y p u r s u e d p l a n s
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

o f action. I n w h a t follows I w o u l d like to explicate the conditions d i r e c d y f r o m t h e social validity o f n o r m s (as i t is i n t h e case o f
t h a t have t o b e satisfied b y a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d agreement i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts) n o r o w e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y a v a i l -
t h a t is t o f u l f i l l t h i s f u n c t i o n o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . I n d o i n g so, I a b l e r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s (as i t is i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e
s h a l l t a k e as m y m o d e l e l e m e n t a r y p a i r s o f u t t e r a n c e s , e a c h o f w h i c h expressions o f will)? F r o m the perspective o f a hearer to w h o m a n
consists o f t h e s p e e c h a c t o f a s p e a k e r a n d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e u t t e r a n c e is a d d r e s s e d , w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels o f r e a c t i o n t o
o f a hearer. Consider the f o l l o w i n g examples: 4 2 a ( c o r r e c d y p e r c e i v e d ) s p e e c h act: t h e h e a r e r understands t h e u t t e r -
a n c e , t h a t is, h e grasps t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d ; w i t h h i s "yes" o r
(1) I (hereby) promise y o u that I shall come a r o u n d t o m o r r o w . " n o " t h e h e a r e r takes a position o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h
act, t h a t is, h e a c c e p t s o r rejects t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r ; a n d i n c o n s e -
(2) You are requested to stop s m o k i n g .
quence o f an achieved agreement, t h e h e a r e r d i r e c t s his a c t i o n
(3) I confess t o y o u t h a t I find y o u r a c t i o n s loathsome. a c c o r d i n g t o conventionally fixed obligations to act in a certain way. T h e
pragmatic l e v e l o f t h e a g r e e m e n t e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n c o n n e c t s
(4) I can predict (to you) that the vacation w i l l be spoiled by
t h e semantic l e v e l o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n i n g w i t h t h e empirical l e v e l
rain.
of further developing—in a manner dependent o n the context—the
W e c a n r e c o g n i z e i n e a c h case w h a t a n a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e w o u l d a c c o r d relevant to t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . H o w this connection
m e a n a n d w h a t k i n d o f i n t e r a c t i o n sequel i t w o u l d g r o u n d . comes a b o u t can be e x p l a i n e d by means o f the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ;
admittedly, for this purpose, the formal-semantic approach limited
(1') Yes, I s h a l l d e p e n d o n i t .
t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e n t e n c e s has t o b e expanded. 4 3

(2') Yes, I s h a l l c o m p l y . The formal-pragmatic approach to m e a n i n g t h e o r y begins w i t h


the q u e s t i o n o f what it means to understand an utterance—that is, a
(3') Yes, I b e l i e v e y o u d o .
sentence e m p l o y e d communicatively. F o r m a l semantics makes a c o n -
(4') Yes, w e ' l l have t o t a k e t h a t i n t o a c c o u n t . c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) o f a sentence
a n d t h e m e a n i n g (Meinung) o f t h e speaker, w h o , w h e n she uses t h e
W i t h h i s "yes," t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s a s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r a n d g r o u n d s a n
s e n t e n c e i n a s p e e c h act, c a n say s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t i t
a g r e e m e n t ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n s t h e content of the utterance o n t h e
literally means. B u t this distinction cannot be developed i n t o a m e t h -
o n e h a n d , a n d o n t h e o t h e r c e r t a i n guarantees immanent to speech acts
o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f o r m a l analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n -
a n d c e r t a i n obligations relevant for the sequel of interaction. T h e a c t i o n
i n g s a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l analysis o f s p e a k e r s ' m e a n i n g s e x p r e s s e d i n
p o t e n t i a l t y p i c a l o f a s p e e c h act finds e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e c l a i m t h a t
utterances; for the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence cannot be ex-
t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r w h a t she s a y s — i n a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h a c t w i t h
p l a i n e d a t a l l a p a r t f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r its c o m m u n i c a -
the h e l p o f a performative verb. I n acknowledging her claim, the
tive employment. To be s u r e , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s m u s t also t a k e
h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n o f f e r m a d e w i t h t h e s p e e c h act. T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y
p r e c a u t i o n s t o e n s u r e t h a t i n t h e s t a n d a r d case w h a t is m e a n t d o e s
success is r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i o n i n s o f a r as a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
n o t d e v i a t e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n ,
b e t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r is t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t is e f f e c t i v e
o u r analysis is l i m i t e d t o s p e e c h acts c a r r i e d o u t under standard
f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n , t h a t o r d e r s t h e p o s s i b l e scope o f a c t i o n a n d se-
conditions. T h i s is i n t e n d e d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s (meint)
quels o f i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d t h a t opens u p to the hearer possible points
n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t she says.
o f c o n n e c t i o n b y way o f g e n e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r a c t i o n .
I n a d i s t a n t a n a l o g y t o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l
T h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises, f r o m w h e r e d o s p e e c h acts d r a w t h e i r
semantics, I n o w w a n t to trace back u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n utterance to
p o w e r t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s , w h e n t h i s a u t h o r i t y is n e i t h e r b o r r o w e d
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r m a y a c c e p t i t . We u t t e r a n c e t h a t S is a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t h i m t o p e r f o r m a n a c t i o n a. 4 7

understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. F r o m t h e H o w e v e r , t h i s v i e w fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g of


s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e speaker, t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y a r e i d e n t i - s u c h i m p e r a t i v e s . I n u t t e r i n g a n i m p e r a t i v e , a s p e a k e r says what H is
c a l t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. A c c e p t a b i l i t y is t o d o . T h i s direct form o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e n d e r s s u p e r f l u o u s
n o t d e f i n e d h e r e i n a n o b j e c t i v i s t i c sense, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a speech act by means o f w h i c h t h e speaker c o u l d i n d i r e c d y get a
observer, b u t i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m - hearer to p e r f o r m a certain action. T h e illocutionary meaning
m u n i c a t i o n . A s p e e c h a c t m a y b e c a l l e d " a c c e p t a b l e " i f i t satisfies t h e o f imperatives can better be described through the following
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e necessary i n o r d e r f o r t h e h e a r e r t o t a k e a "yes" paraphrases: 48

p o s i t i o n o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t
(5a) S t o l d H t h a t h e s h o u l d t a k e c a r e t o see t h a t "p" c o m e s t o
be satisfied one-sidedly, e i t h e r relative to the speaker o r to the
pass.
h e a r e r . T h e y a r e r a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e intersubjective recognition o f
a l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , w h i c h , i n a w a y t y p i c a l o f a g i v e n class o f s p e e c h (5b) S s i g n i f i e d t o / / t h a t h e s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
acts, g r o u n d s a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i e d content concerning
obligations relevant for the sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . (5c) T h e request (demand) u t t e r e d b y S is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n
t h e sense t h a t / / s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
F r o m the standpoint o f a sociological t h e o r y o f action, m y p r i m a r y
interest m u s t be to m a k e clear t h e m e c h a n i s m relevant to the coor- H e r e "p" d e s i g n a t e s a state i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t , r e l a t i v e t o t h e
d i n a t i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s p e e c h acts. T o t h i s e n d I s h a l l c o n c e n - time o f t h e u t t e r a n c e , lies i n t h e f u t u r e a n d t h a t , o t h e r conditions
trate o n t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r is m o t i v a t e d t o r e m a i n i n g constant, can come i n t o existence t h r o u g h an i n t e r v e n -
a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n a s p e e c h act, a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e l i n g u i s - t i o n o r o m i s s i o n b y t h e a d d r e s s e e — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e state o f n o t
tic expressions e m p l o y e d are g r a m m a t i c a l l y w e l l f o r m e d a n d t h a t t h e s m o k i n g that H brings about by p u t t i n g o u t his l i t cigarette.
g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s typical f o r a given type o f speech act A h e a r e r accepts t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) by r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o
are satisfied. 44
A hearer understands the meaning o f an utterance
it with:
w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n to grammatical conditions o f well-formedness and
general contextual conditions, 4 5
h e k n o w s t h o s e essential conditions (5') Yes, I s h a l l d o w h a t is r e q u e s t e d o f m e .
u n d e r w h i c h he c o u l d be m o t i v a t e d by a speaker t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e
I f we restrict ourselves t o c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability i n the n a r r o w e r
response. 4 6
T h e s e acceptability conditions in the narrower sense r e l a t e t o
sense, t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h H a c c e p t s ( 5 ) f a l l i n t o t w o c o m -
t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e t h a t S i n t h e s t a n d a r d case
ponents.
expresses w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r e d i c a t e .
a. T h e h e a r e r s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g of
B u t l e t us l o o k first a t a g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t i m p e r a t i v e sen- i m p e r a t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t h e c o u l d p a r a p h r a s e t h i s m e a n i n g
t e n c e , f o r m u l a t e d as a n i m p e r a t i v e u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t u a l w i t h sentences l i k e (5a), ( 5 b ) , o r (5c) a n d c o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e p r o -
conditions: p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t o s t o p s m o k i n g " as a n i m p e r a t i v e d i r e c t e d t o
h i m . I n fact, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) i f he k n o w s
(5) I (hereby) request y o u to stop s m o k i n g .
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h "p" w o u l d o c c u r a n d i f h e k n o w s w h a t
I m p e r a t i v e s are o f t e n u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y h e h i m s e l f w o u l d have t o d o o r n o t t o d o i n t h e g i v e n circumstances
acts, as a t t e m p t s b y a n a c t o r S t o g e t i f t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . i n o r d e r t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s be satisfied. As o n e m u s t k n o w t h e
O n t h i s view, S p e r f o r m s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e o n l y w h e n she t r u t h conditions of a proposition i n order to understand i t , one
connects with her utterance the i n t e n t i o n that H infer f r o m the
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

must, i n order to understand an imperadve, k n o w the conditions T h i s p i c t u r e is c o m p l i c a t e d i n a n i n s t r u c t i v e way w h e n w e pass


u n d e r w h i c h i t w o u l d c o u n t as satisfied. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a f r o m g e n u i n e o r simple i m p e r a t i v e s t o normatively authorized i m p e r a -
p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , t h e s e conditions of satisfaction—formu- tives o r c o m m a n d s . L e t us c o m p a r e ( 5 ) w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g — a v a r i a n t
lated to begin w i t h i n semantic t e r m s — a r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f of (2):
obligations relevant for the sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer u n d e r -
(6) I (hereby) d i r e c t y o u to stop s m o k i n g .
stands a n i m p e r a t i v e i f he k n o w s w h a t he m u s t d o o r n o t d o i n o r d e r
t o b r i n g a b o u t a state "p" d e s i r e d b y S; h e t h e r e b y also k n o w s how T h i s utterance presupposes recognized n o r m s (for example, the
h e c o u l d l i n k u p h i s a c t i o n s w i t h t h o s e o f S. safety r e g u l a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r t r a v e l ) a n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l
b. A s s o o n as w e c o n c e p t u a l i z e the understanding o f imperatives f r a m e w o r k a u t h o r i z i n g t h o s e h o l d i n g c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s (e.g., f l i g h t
f r o m this perspective, b r o a d e n e d to include the context o f interac- attendants) u n d e r certain conditions (e.g., p r e p a r i n g t o l a n d ) to
tion, i t b e c o m e s clear t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f " s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s " is d i r e c t a c e r t a i n class o f p e r s o n s ( h e r e , t h e passengers) t o s t o p s m o k -
n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r k n o w i n g w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e is a c c e p t a b l e . A sec- i n g by appealing to certain regulations.
o n d c o m p o n e n t is l a c k i n g , n a m e l y , k n o w l e d g e o f the conditions of the O n c e again, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g can be specified initially
agreement t h a t first grounds adherence t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h r o u g h the conditions mentioned under ( a ) , b u t i n t h e case o f
the sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer fully understands the i l l o c u - d i r e c t i v e s (Anweisungen), the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g does n o t o n l y
tionary m e a n i n g o f the imperative only i f he knows w h y t h e speaker point t o c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) , w h i c h have t o b e c o m p l e t e d o n t h e basis o f
e x p e c t s t h a t she c a n i m p o s e h e r w i l l o n h i m . W i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e , t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s p e e c h act; r a t h e r , t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g
t h e s p e a k e r raises a claim t o p o w e r , t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r , i f h e a c c e p t s t h e l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , a n d t h u s f o r a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n S a n d H, result
it, yields. I t belongs to t h e m e a n i n g o f a n i m p e r a t i v e t h a t the speaker from t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act itself. I n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s
h a r b o r s a justified e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t she w i l l b e a b l e t o c a r r y t h r o u g h o f w i l l , S has g o o d r e a s o n s t o e x p e c t t h a t / / w i l l y i e l d t o h e r w i l l o n l y
h e r c l a i m to power; a n d this holds only u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n that S i f she has a t h e r d i s p o s a l s a n c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h she c a n , i n a r e c o g -
k n o w s t h a t h e r addressee has r e a s o n s t o y i e l d t o h e r p o w e r c l a i m . n i z a b l e m a n n e r , t h r e a t e n o r e n t i c e H. So l o n g as S d o e s n o t a p p e a l
S i n c e , t o b e g i n w i t h , w e have u n d e r s t o o d i m p e r a t i v e s as s h e e r e x - to the validity o f n o r m s , i t makes n o difference w h e t h e r the reservoir
p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l , these r e a s o n s c a n n o t l i e i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n - o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s is d e j u r e o r d e f a c t o . F o r so l o n g as S u t t e r s
ing o f t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f ; t h e y c a n r e s i d e o n l y i n a r e s e r v o i r of a g e n u i n e ( s i m p l e ) i m p e r a t i v e , t h a t is, expresses n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is e x t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act. h e r o w n w i l l , she i n f l u e n c e s H's m o t i v e s i n a m e r e l y e m p i r i c a l way
T h u s the conditions of satisfaction have to be supplemented with conditions by t h r e a t e n i n g h i m w i t h h a r m o r by o f f e r i n g h i m rewards. The
of sanction i n o r d e r t o c o m p l e t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y . g r o u n d s f o r accepting expressions o f w i l l are r e l a t e d to motives o f
the hearer t h a t t h e speaker can i n f l u e n c e o n l y empirically, i n the
A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s a n i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n -
final i n s t a n c e b y m e a n s o f v i o l e n c e o r g o o d s . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n a d d r e s s e e c a n b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d state
w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as c o m m a n d s a n d d i -
(not smoking) a n d (b) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S has good
rectives. I n c o n t r a s t t o ( 5 ) , w i t h (6) t h e speaker appeals to the
reasons to expect that H w i l l feel c o n s t r a i n e d to y i e l d to the w i l l o f
v a l i d i t y o f safety r e g u l a t i o n s a n d , i n i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s , raises a c l a i m
S ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t h r e a t o f p e n a l t i e s f o r v i o l a t i n g safety r e g u l a -
to validity.
tions). O n l y b y k n o w i n g b o t h c o m p o n e n t s (a) a n d ( b ) does the
h e a r e r k n o w w h a t c o n d i t i o n s have t o b e m e t i f a h e a r e r is t o b e a b l e R e g i s t e r i n g a validity claim is n o t t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c o n t i n g e n t
t o r e s p o n d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , as i n ( 5 ' ) , t o t h e i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) . I n k n o w i n g w i l l ; a n d r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o a v a l i d i t y c l a i m is n o merely
these c o n d i t i o n s , he k n o w s w h a t makes t h e u t t e r a n c e acceptable. e m p i r i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d d e c i s i o n . B o t h acts, p u t t i n g f o r w a r d a n d rec-
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o g n i z i n g a validity c l a i m , are subject to c o n v e n t i o n a l restrictions, I n a l l cases i n w h i c h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e expresses n o t a power


because such a c l a i m can be rejected o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f c r i t i c i s m claim b u t a validity claim, the place o f the empirically m o t i v a t i n g
a n d can be d e f e n d e d against a criticism o n l y i n the f o r m o f a force o f a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions ( c o n t i n g e n t l y l i n k e d w i t h
r e f u t a t i o n . S o m e o n e w h o resists a d i r e c t i v e is r e f e r r e d t o p r e v a i l i n g s p e e c h acts) is t a k e n b y t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f the
regulations a n d n o t to t h e penalties that can be e x p e c t e d i f they are speaker's assuming a w a r r a n t y f o r validity claims.
n o t followed. A n d one w h o doubts the validity o f the u n d e r l y i n g T h i s h o l d s n o t o n l y f o r r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , b u t
n o r m s has t o give reasons—whether challenging the legality o f the also f o r e x p r e s s i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 3 ) a n d ( 4 ) . J u s t
r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l a w f u l n e s s o f its s o c i a l v a l i d i t y , o r as w i t h (1) a s p e a k e r produces a n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r her
c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, its c l a i m t o b e i n t e n t i o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a d e s i r e d state, a n d j u s t as w i t h ( 2 ) she raises
r i g h t o r j u s t i f i e d i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l sense. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e inter- a normative validity claim for her imperative that H b r i n g about a
nally c o n n e c t e d w i t h r e a s o n s . T o t h i s e x t e n t , t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state d e s i r e d b y S, so w i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l -
acceptability o f directives can be t a k e n f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n - ness f o r a d i s c l o s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis), and
i n g o f a s p e e c h act itself; t h e y d o n o t n e e d t o b e c o m p l e t e d by w i t h ( 4 ) a t r u t h c l a i m f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n . I n ( 3 ) i t is t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f
additional c o n d i t i o n s o f s a n c t i o n . a previously c o n c e a l e d e m o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e , i n (4) the p u t t i n g f o r -
T h u s a h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e d i r e c t i v e (6) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e w a r d o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r assumes
c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n addressee c o u l d b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d a w a r r a n t y i n m a k i n g a confession (3) o r a p r e d i c t i o n (4). T h u s a
state ( n o t s m o k i n g ) , a n d ( b ) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S c o u l d h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e a v o w a l (3) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s
have c o n v i n c i n g reasons t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t u n d e r w h i c h a p e r s o n c o u l d e x p e r i e n c e l o a t h i n g f o r "p," a n d ( b ) t h e
(a) as v a l i d — t h a t is, as n o r m a t i v e r / j u s t i f i e d . T h e c o n d i t i o n s (a) c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S says w h a t she m e a n s a n d t h e r e b y takes o n
p e r t a i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n w a y t h a t arise o u t o f a n a w a r r a n t y f o r the consistency o f h e r f u r t h e r behavior w i t h this
a g r e e m e n t based o n the intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e a v o w a l . A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s (4) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t
validity c l a i m raised f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g imperative. 4 9
The condi- w o u l d make the p r e d i c t i o n true, a n d (b) the conditions u n d e r w h i c h
tions (b) p e r t a i n to t h e acceptance o f t h e validity c l a i m itself. We S c o u l d have c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g a s t a t e m e n t w i t h t h e
have t o d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e b e t w e e n t h e validity o f a n a c t i o n o r o f t h e c o n t e n t (a) t o b e t r u e .
n o r m u n d e r l y i n g i t , t h e claim t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s v a l i d i t y a r e
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e also i m p o r t a n t a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s t h e c o n d i -
s a t i s f i e d , a n d t h e redemption o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d , t h a t is, t h e
tions m e n t i o n e d u n d e r (a) d o not, i n t h e cases o f expressive a n d
justification (of the claim) that the conditions for the validity o f an
c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e (3) a n d ( 4 ) , h a v e t o d o w i t h o b l i g a t i o n s
a c t i o n o r o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m are satisfied. W e a r e n o w i n a
to act i n a c e r t a i n way r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n
p o s i t i o n t o say t h a t a s p e a k e r c a n rationally motivate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t
o f the validity claims i n question; they relate only to u n d e r s t a n d i n g
h e r s p e e c h act o f f e r b e c a u s e — o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n
the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a first-person s e n t e n c e o r a n assertoric
between validity, validity c l a i m , a n d the r e d e m p t i o n o f a validity
s e n t e n c e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a -
c l a i m — s h e c a n assume t h e w a r r a n t y (Gewähr) f o r p r o v i d i n g , i f n e c -
tive s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e c o n d i t i o n s (a) l i k e w i s e r e l a t e
essary, c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t w o u l d s t a n d u p t o a h e a r e r ' s c r i t i c i s m
to understanding the propositional content o f an intention or i m -
o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . T h u s a s p e a k e r owes t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
perative sentence for w h i c h the speaker produces o r claims n o r m a -
f o r c e o f h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success n o t t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d
tive v a l i d i t y ; b u t h e r e t h e c o n t e n t simultaneously c i r c u m s c r i b e s the
b u t t o the coordinating effect of the warranty t h a t she o f f e r s — a w a r r a n t y
o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t arise f o r t h e
t o r e d e e m , i f necessary, t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h h e r s p e e c h act.
hearer f r o m acceptance o f the validity claim.
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Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

I n g e n e r a l , obligations t o act i n a c e r t a i n way result f r o m t h e whereas i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a c q u i r e a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y role only


m e a n i n g o f expressive s p e e c h acts o n l y i n t h e sense t h a t t h e s p e a k e r t h r o u g h being transformed i n t o declarations o f i n t e n t i o n or an-
specifies a c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h h e r b e h a v i o r m a y n o t b e inconsistent. nouncements. W h e r e a s i m p e r a t i v e s have i n t h e m s e l v e s a n i l l o c u t i o n -
T h a t a s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t she says c a n b e m a d e c r e d i b l e o n l y i n ary force—albeit one that calls for supplementation by
t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f w h a t she d o e s a n d n o t t h r o u g h p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s . s a n c t i o n s — i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h h a v e , so t o speak, lost t h e i r
T h u s , addressees w h o h a v e a c c e p t e d a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s c a n i m p e r a t i v e f o r c e in foro interno, c a n r e g a i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e
e x p e c t a c o n s i s t e n c y o f b e h a v i o r i n c e r t a i n respects; h o w e v e r , this t h r o u g h b e i n g c o n n e c t e d w i t h validity claims, w h e t h e r i n the f o r m
expectation follows f r o m the conditions given u n d e r (b). O f course, o f e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e
c o n s e q u e n c e s also arise f r o m t h e w a r r a n t i e s o f f e r e d w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m s i n r e g u l a t i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, b u t t h e s e validity- (7) I c o n f e s s t o y o u t h a t i t is m y i n t e n t i o n t o . . .
related o b l i g a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e , i f necessary, j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r n o r m s o r
o r i n t h e f o r m o f n o r m a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e
g r o u n d i n g for propositions have relevance for action only o n a
m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level. O n l y those obligations to prove t r u s t w o r - (8) I (hereby) declare to y o u m y i n t e n t i o n to . . .
t h y {Bewdhrungsverpflichtungen) t h a t t h e s p e a k e r takes o n w i t h ex-
W i t h a n n o u n c e m e n t s like (8) the speaker enters i n t o a weak n o r m a -
pressive s p e e c h acts have d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f
tive b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t o w h i c h t h e addressee c a n
i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y c o n t a i n a n offer to the hearer to check against the
a p p e a l i n a s i m i l a r w a y as t o a p r o m i s e .
c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s s e q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n w h e t h e r she m e a n s
T h e n o r m a t i v i z a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s c a n serve as a m o d e l
w h a t she says. 50

for grasping the transformation o f simple imperatives into n o r m a -


I n g e n e r a l , n o special o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n a c e r t a i n way f o l l o w f r o m tively a u t h o r i z e d imperatives, o r o f sheer imperatives i n t o com-
t h e m e a n i n g o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e mands. The imperative (5), by b e i n g boosted w i t h a n o r m a t i v e
s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f r o m t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y validity c l a i m , can be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e directive (6). W i t h this,
c o n d i t i o n s stated u n d e r (a) a n d (b) o n l y i n s o f a r as s p e a k e r a n d the c o m p o n e n t o f the acceptability conditions given u n d e r (b)
h e a r e r o b l i g a t e themselves t o base t h e i r a c t i o n o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f changes; the c o n d i t i o n s o f sanction s u p p l e m e n t i n g the imperative
s i t u a t i o n s t h a t d o n o t c o n t r a d i c t t h e s t a t e m e n t s a c c e p t e d as t r u e . p o w e r c l a i m are replaced by t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r
We have distinguished genuine (or simple) imperatives, with accepting a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . B e c a u s e these conditions
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s a c l a i m t o p o w e r , f r o m s p e e c h acts w i t h can be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e itself, n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r raises a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . W h e r e a s v a l i d i t y rized imperatives gain an autonomy t h a t is m i s s i n g f r o m simple
claims are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h reasons a n d a c c o r d a r a t i o n a l l y imperatives.
m o t i v a t i n g force t o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e , p o w e r claims have to be
T h i s m a k e s i t c l e a r o n c e a g a i n t h a t o n l y t h o s e s p e e c h acts w i t h
covered by a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions i f they are to be capable
w h i c h a speaker connects a criticizable validity c l a i m can, by v i r t u e
o f b e i n g c a r r i e d t h r o u g h . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e s a d m i t o f a secondary
of their own power a n d o w i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f l i n g u i s t i c
normativization. T h i s can be illustrated by the r e l a t i o n that holds
communication oriented toward reaching understanding, motivate
between i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a n d declarations o f i n t e n t i o n . I n t e n -
a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a speech-act o f f e r , a n d t h e r e b y b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e
t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s b e l o n g i n t h e s a m e c a t e g o r y as t h e i m p e r a t i v e sen-
as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . 5 2

tences with which imperatives are formed. We can interpret


F o l l o w i n g these reflections, t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
i n t e n t i o n a l sentences as i n t e r n a l i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s a d d r e s s e d b y t h e
w h i c h w e have i n t r o d u c e d i n a p r o v i s i o n a l way, n o w n e e d s t o be
speaker to herself. 51
O f c o u r s e , i m p e r a t i v e s are i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts,
r e n d e r e d m o r e precise. We b e g a n by i n c l u d i n g i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e
141
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

action all interactions i n w h i c h those involved coordinate t h e i r i n d i - r e s p o n s e , t h e addressee c o n t e s t s t h e l i g h t n e s s o f ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e


v i d u a l p l a n s u n r e s e r v e d l y o n t h e basis o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d t r u t h f u l n e s s o f ( 3 ) , a n d t h e t r u t h o f ( 4 ) . T h i s p i c t u r e is i n c o m p l e t e ,
agreement. W i t h the specification "unreservedly p u r s u i n g i l l o c u t i o n - h o w e v e r , i n a s m u c h as e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n t e s t e d ( t h a t is,
a r y a i m s , " w e m e a n t t o e x c l u d e cases o f l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , i n r e j e c t e d as i n v a l i d ) u n d e r m o r e t h a n o n e aspect.
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r inconspicuously e m p l o y s successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y L e t us assume t h a t a s e m i n a r p a r t i c i p a n t u n d e r s t a n d s t h e f o l l o w -
acts f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y p u r p o s e s . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s o f i n g imperative addressed to h i m by the professor
w i l l a r e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r openly d e c l a r e s h e r
(9) Please b r i n g m e a glass o f w a t e r .
a i m o f i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f her opposite n u m b e r , whereby
she has t o r e l y f o r t h e success o f h e r p o w e r c l a i m o n supplementary n o t as a n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f w i l l b u t as a s p e e c h a c t
sanctions. For this reason, w i t h g e n u i n e imperatives o r nonnorma- carried out i n an attitude oriented toward reaching understanding.
tively a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s , s p e a k e r s c a n u n r e s e r v e d l y p u r s u e i l l o - T h e n he can i n p r i n c i p l e reject this request u n d e r three validity
c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d n o n e t h e l e s s a c t strategically. aspects. H e c a n e i t h e r c o n t e s t t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f t h e u t t e r -
N o t a l l s p e e c h acts a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , b u t ance:

o n l y those w i t h w h i c h the speaker connects criticizable validity


(9') N o . You can't treat m e like one o f y o u r employees.
c l a i m s . I n t h e o t h e r cases, w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g undeclared
a i m s w i t h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a i m s w i t h r e g a r d t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r o r h e c a n contest t h e subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e :
c a n t a k e n o p o s i t i o n a t a l l , o r w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g i l l o c u -
(9") N o . You really only want to p u t m e i n a b a d light i n f r o n t o f
tionary aims r e g a r d i n g w h i c h the hearer c a n n o t take a grounded
the other seminar participants.
p o s i t i o n , as i n r e l a t i o n t o i m p e r a t i v e s , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a b i n d i n g
a n d b o n d i n g relationship m o t i v a t e d by i n s i g h t i n t o reasons—a po- or he can deny that certain existential presuppositions obtain:
tential that is always contained in linguistic communication—
(9"') N o . T h e n e a r e s t w a t e r t a p is so f a r away t h a t I c o u l d n ' t g e t
remains unexploited.
b a c k b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e session.

Validity C l a i m s I n t h e f i r s t case, w h a t is c o n t e s t e d is t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e p r o f e s s o r
is r i g h t i n t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; i n t h e s e c o n d , t h a t t h e
Having distinguished communicative actions f r o m all o t h e r social p r o f e s s o r m e a n s w h a t she says b e c a u s e she w a n t s t o a c h i e v e a c e r t a i n
actions t h r o u g h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect, i t p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect; i n t h e t h i r d , p r o p o s i t i o n s are contested whose
m a k e s sense t o o r d e r t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts a c c o r d - t r u t h t h e p r o f e s s o r has t o p r e s u p p o s e i n t h e g i v e n circumstances.
i n g t o types o f s p e e c h acts. A n d t o g u i d e o u r classifying o f s p e e c h W h a t we have s h o w n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h this e x a m p l e holds t r u e
acts w e m a y use t h e o p t i o n s o p e n t o a h e a r e r o f t a k i n g a r a t i o n a l l y f o r all s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o n -
m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker. I n texts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , s p e e c h acts c a n always b e rejected
o u r previous examples, we have assumed t h a t the speaker raises u n d e r each o f t h r e e aspects: t h e a s p e c t o f t h e l i g h t n e s s t h a t t h e
precisely one validity c l a i m w i t h h e r utterance. W i t h the p r o m i s e (1), speaker claims f o r h e r action i n r e l a t i o n to a n o r m a t i v e context (or,
she c o n n e c t s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n ; w i t h t h e d i r e c - i n d i r e c t l y , f o r these n o r m s themselves); t h e aspect o f t h e t r u t h f u l -
tive ( 2 ) , a validity c l a i m f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e ; w i t h t h e avowal ( 3 ) , a ness t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i -
validity claim for the expression o f a feeling; a n d w i t h the p r e d i c t i o n ences t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d f i n a l l y , t h e aspect o f
(4), a validity claim for a statement. Correspondingly, w i t h a "no" t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker, w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , c l a i m s f o r a s t a t e m e n t
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

(or for the existential presuppositions o f the context o f a n o m i n a l - takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s ;


i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n ) . T h i s s t r o n g thesis c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n u m e r o u s ( b ) t o m a k e m a n i f e s t s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s — t h a t is, t o r e p r e s e n t
cases a n d m a d e p l a u s i b l e b y r e f l e c t i o n s t h a t t a k e us b a c k t o B i d d e r ' s oneself—whereby t h e s p e a k e r takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n
m o d e l o f the functions o f language. t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d (c) to
T h e t e r m " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ("Verständigung") m e a n s , a t r e p r e s e n t ( o r p r e s u p p o s e ) states a n d e v e n t s , w h e r e b y t h e speaker
t h e m i n i m u m , t h a t at least t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f
u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n a n i d e n t i c a l way. T h e m e a n i n g a f f a i r s . C o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t is m e a s u r e d against
o f an elementary expression consists i n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t i t precisely t h r e e criticizable validity claims, because actors, i n c o m i n g
m a k e s t o t h e m e a n i n g o f a n a c c e p t a b l e s p e e c h act. A n d t o u n d e r - to an understanding about something with one another and thereby
s t a n d w h a t a s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h s u c h a n act, t h e h e a r e r has t o making themselves understood, cannot avoid embedding each
k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t can be accepted. T o this e x t e n t , speech act i n precisely t h r e e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s a n d c l a i m i n g validity f o r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständnis) a n e l e m e n t a r y e x p r e s s i o n a l r e a d y p o i n t s i t u n d e r e a c h o f these aspects. S o m e o n e w h o r e j e c t s a c o m p r e h e n -
beyond t h e m i n i m a l m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m Verständigung. W h e n a sible s p e e c h a c t c o n t e s t s a t least o n e o f these validity claims. I n
h e a r e r accepts a speech-act o f f e r , a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) r e j e c t i n g a s p e e c h a c t as ( n o r m a t i v e l y ) w r o n g o r u n t r u e o r u n t r u t h -
c o m e s a b o u t b e t w e e n ( a t least) t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d f u l , t h e h e a r e r w i t h h i s " n o " gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
a c t i o n . However, this does n o t rest o n l y o n the intersubjective recog- u t t e r a n c e d o e s n o t f u l f i l l its f u n c t i o n s o f s e c u r i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l
n i t i o n o f a single, thematically emphasized validity c l a i m . Rather, a n r e l a t i o n s h i p , o f m a n i f e s t i n g subjective experiences, or of repre-
agreement o f t h i s s o r t is a c h i e v e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a t t h r e e levels. s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s — t o t h e f a c t t h a t i t is n o t i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h
T h e s e m a y easily b e i d e n t i f i e d i n t u i t i v e l y i f w e b e a r i n m i n d t h a t i n our w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e l y o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , o r w i t h t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a s p e a k e r selects a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e l i n g u i s t i c speaker's w o r l d o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s o r w i t h the w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g
e x p r e s s i o n o n l y i n o r d e r t o r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g with a h e a r e r states o f a f f a i r s .
about s o m e t h i n g a n d t h e r e b y t o m a k e herself u n d e r s t o o d . I t b e l o n g s A l t h o u g h s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e
t o t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e s p e a k e r (a) t h a t she p e r f o r m a always i n v o l v e d i n t h i s way i n a c o m p l e x n e t o f w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s , t h e
s p e e c h act t h a t is right i n r e s p e c t t o t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t , so illocutionary r o l e — u n d e r standard conditions, the meaning of the
t h a t a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e m a y illocutionary component—determines t h e aspect o f validity u n d e r
c o m e a b o u t b e t w e e n h e r a n d t h e h e a r e r ; ( b ) t h a t she e x p r e s s truth- w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s h e r u t t e r a n c e t o b e u n d e r s t o o d first and
fully h e r b e l i e f s , i n t e n t i o n s , f e e l i n g s , wishes, a n d t h e l i k e , so t h a t t h e foremost. W h e n she m a k e s a s t a t e m e n t , asserts, n a r r a t e s , e x p l a i n s ,
h e a r e r w i l l give c r e d e n c e t o w h a t is s a i d ; a n d (c) t h a t she m a k e a true r e p r e s e n t s , p r e d i c t s , discusses s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , she is s e e k i n g
s t a t e m e n t ( o r correct e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ) , so t h a t t h e h e a r e r a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e h e a r e r based o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a t r u t h c l a i m .
m a y a c c e p t a n d share t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker. T h e f a c t t h a t W h e n t h e speaker utters a first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence, dis-
the intersubjective c o m m o n a l i t y of a communicatively achieved closes, reveals, confesses, m a n i f e s t s s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e -
a g r e e m e n t exists a t t h e levels o f n o r m a t i v e a c c o r d , m u t u a l t r u s t i n m e n t c a n c o m e a b o u t o n l y o n t h e basis o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c l a i m
s u b j e c t i v e s i n c e r i t y , a n d s h a r e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e c a n b e ex- t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r gives a n o r d e r o r m a k e s a p r o m -
plained i n t u r n t h r o u g h the functions o f reaching understanding i n ise, a p p o i n t s o r w a r n s s o m e b o d y , b a p t i z e s o r w e d s s o m e b o d y , b u y s
language. s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e m e n t d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r those i n -

A s t h e m e d i u m f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s p e e c h acts s e r v e (a) v o l v e d a c c e p t t h e a c t i o n as r i g h t . T h e s e basic m o d e s a p p e a r in

t o establish a n d renew i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, w h e r e b y t h e speaker g r e a t e r p u r i t y t h e m o r e c l e a r l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is o r i e n t e d


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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

toward only one d o m i n a n t validity claim. Consideradons of expedi- T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a m o n g e x a c d y t h r e e basic m o d e s o f u s i n g l a n -


e n c y suggest b e g i n n i n g analysis w i t h i d e a l i z e d o r pure cases of speech guage w i t h an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d be
acts. I a m t h i n k i n g h e r e o f g r o u n d e d o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f a n e l a b o r a t e d t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts.
I c a n n o t c a r r y o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y analyses h e r e , b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o
• c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary propositional (assertoric)
take u p a few p r i m a facie objections to t h e p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m .
sentences a r e u s e d ;
L e i s t has f o r m u l a t e d m y basic thesis as f o l l o w s : " F o r a l l S a n d a l l
• e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary experiential sentences ( i n
H, i n a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t b e l o n g t o a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
the first person present) appear; a n d o f
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h i c h are i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y dif-
• r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h e i t h e r elementary imperative sentences f e r e n t i a t e d a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , i t is m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t
(as i n c o m m a n d s ) o r elementary intentional sentences (as i n p r o m i s e s ) t h e s p e a k e r is r e q u i r e d t o s p e a k i n t e l l i g i b l y , t o b e t r u t h f u l , t o t a k e
appear. h i s u t t e r a n c e as t r u e , a n d a n o r m r e l e v a n t t o h i s a c t as r i g h t . " 5 4
To
begin w i t h , this f o r m u l a t i o n requires t h e e x p l a n a t o r y c o m m e n t that,
I n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e is a n e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e o n e a c h o f
f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the t h e o r y o f i n t e r a c t i o n , I d e l i m i t speech
these complexes. H e r e , i n s t r u m e n t s have b e e n d e v e l o p e d a n d analy-
acts " o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " f r o m s p e e c h acts t h a t
ses c a r r i e d o u t t h a t m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y
a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , e i t h e r because t h e
c l a i m s t o w a r d w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is o r i e n t e d a n d t o characterize
latter, l i k e g e n u i n e imperatives, are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h power
m o r e p r e c i s e l y t h e basic a t t i t u d e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r t h e r e b y a d o p t s . I
c l a i m s a n d t h u s p r o d u c e n o i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g ef-
a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e objectivating attitude i n w h i c h a n e u t r a l
f e c t o n t h e i r o w n , o r because t h e s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
o b s e r v e r behaves t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a p p e n s i n t h e w o r l d ; t o
a i m s w i t h s u c h u t t e r a n c e s . N e x t , I w o u l d n o t use t h e expression
t h e expressive attitude i n w h i c h a s u b j e c t i n r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f r e -
" m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e , " w h i c h comes f r o m i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, b u t
veals t o a p u b l i c s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n h i m t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d
speak r a t h e r o f " c o m m o n s u p p o s i t i o n s . " F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t e r m " r e -
access; a n d finally, t o t h e norm-conformative attitude i n w h i c h a m e m -
q u i r e d " suggests a n o r m a t i v e sense; I w o u l d r a t h e r — d e s p i t e the
b e r o f s o c i a l g r o u p s satisfies l e g i t i m a t e b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . To
weak transcendental connotations—speak o f "general conditions"
e a c h o f these f u n d a m e n t a l a t t i t u d e s t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s a c o n c e p t o f
t h a t have to be satisfied i f a c o m m u n i c a t i v e agreement is t o be
"world."
a c h i e v e d . F i n a l l y , I find l a c k i n g h e r e a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r between
L e t Mp r e p r e s e n t any e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act, w h e r e " M " stands f o r t h e the well-formedness o r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the linguistic expres-
i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t a n d "p" f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l component; 5 3

s i o n as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
and let M c d e s i g n a t e t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , M e the expres- the claims to truthfulness, propositional t r u t h , a n d normative Tight-
sive, a n d M r t h e r e g u l a t i v e . W e c a n t h e n , o n t h e basis o f t h e a f o r e - ness, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d . T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f these c l a i m s brings
m e n t i o n e d basic a t t i t u d e s , d i s t i n g u i s h i n t u i t i v e l y t h e senses i n w h i c h about an agreement between S a n d H that grounds obligations that
t h e speaker wants the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r speech act t o are relevant f o r t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m these
b e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t y p e M p, c "p" s i g n i f i e s a the w a r r a n t y assumed by the speaker to r e d e e m t h e validity c l a i m he
state o f a f f a i r s t h a t exists i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; i n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e raises, as w e l l as t h e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r t a k e s
o f t h e t y p e M p, e "p" s i g n i f i e s a s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is m a n i - w i t h the negation o f a validity claim.
f e s t e d a n d a s c r i b e d t o t h e internal world o f t h e speaker; a n d i n a v a l i d
u t t e r a n c e o f t h e type M p, "p" s i g n i f i e s a n a c t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d R e s e r v a t i o n s have b e e n e x p r e s s e d m a i n l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e a s s u m p -
r

as l e g i t i m a t e i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d . t i o n s (a) t h a t w i t h every s p e e c h a c t o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g exactly three v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are r a i s e d ; ( b ) t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y
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c l a i m s c a n b e adequately distinguished f r o m o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d (c) t h a t T h e s i t u a t i o n is s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y


v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have t o b e a n a l y z e d i n formal-pragmatic terms, t h a t is, o f t h e c l a i m t o Tightness. I t m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t n o r e l a t i o n t o
o n t h e level o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f sentences. n o r m a t i v e contexts can be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f nonregu¬
a. C a n w e m a i n t a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h , e v e n lative speech acts. 56
However, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are sometimes " i n a p -
t h o u g h w e o b v i o u s l y c a n n o t raise a t r u t h c l a i m w i t h nonconstative propriate," reports "out of place," confessions "embarrassing,"
speech acts? 55
I t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w e c a n raise t h e c l a i m t h a t disclosures " h u r t f u l . " T h e fact that they can go w r o n g u n d e r this
a n asserted p r o p o s i t i o n "p" is t r u e o n l y w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. aspect is b y n o m e a n s e x t r i n s i c t o n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts; r a t h e r
B u t a l l o t h e r s p e e c h acts also c o n t a i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l component, i t n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e i r c h a r a c t e r as s p e e c h acts. F r o m t h e i r
n o r m a l l y i n the f o r m o f a n o m i n a l i z e d propositional sentence "that i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t w e c a n see t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also e n t e r s i n t o
p." T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also r e l a t e s t o states o f a f f a i r s w i t h i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o n s t a t i v e a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts;
n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, n o t d i r e c d y t o b e s u r e — t h a t is, n o t i n t h e a n d w h e t h e r o r n o t these r e l a t i o n s f i t t h e e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t
p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e o f o n e w h o t h i n k s o r is o f t h e o p i n i o n , k n o w s , i n q u e s t i o n , t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e (social) o r d e r s .
o r b e l i e v e s t h a t "/>" is t h e case. T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s o f s p e a k - T h e r e have also b e e n o b j e c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s
ers w h o employ first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences i n expressive o f t h e table o f validity claims. I f o n e compares this w i t h the conver-
s p e e c h acts a n d i m p e r a t i v e o r i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s i n r e g u l a t i v e sational postulates p r o p o s e d by G r i c e , 5 7
f o r example, one finds not
s p e e c h acts a r e o f a n o t h e r k i n d . T h e y a r e i n n o way d i r e c t e d t o t h e o n l y c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s b u t also c e r t a i n a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s , t h e r e is n o
e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m - c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e p o s t u l a t e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s h o u l d always m a k e a
p o n e n t . H o w e v e r , i n saying w i t h a n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h a c t t h a t she c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e t o p i c t h a t is r e l e v a n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e g i v e n
desires o r detests s o m e t h i n g , t h a t she w a n t s t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e - conversation. A p a r t f r o m the fact that such a c l a i m to the relevance
t h i n g o r see i t b r o u g h t a b o u t , t h e s p e a k e r presupposes t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n is r a i s e d b y t h e h e a r e r a n d r e l a t e d
o f other, n o t m e n t i o n e d , states o f a f f a i r s . I t b e l o n g s t o t h e c o n c e p t o f t o a t e x t ( r a t h e r t h a n t o a n i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h a c t ) — t h a t is, c a n n o t
a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t states o f a f f a i r s a r e l o c a t e d i n a n e x u s a n d d o b e s u b j e c t e d t o a "yes" o r " n o " t e s t — t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f s u c h a r e -
n o t h a n g i s o l a t e d i n t h e air. T h e r e f o r e , t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s existen- q u i r e m e n t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t to establish. T h e r e are obviously situ-
tial presuppositions w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r s p e e c h ations—informal social gatherings, for example, or even entire
act; i f n e e d b e , t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n b e r e n d e r e d e x p l i c i t i n t h e c u l t u r a l m i l i e u s — i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n r e d u n d a n c y o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s is
f o r m o f a s s e r t o r i c sentences. T o t h i s e x t e n t , n o n c o n s t a t i v e speech nearly m a n d a t o r y . 5 8

acts, t o o , have a r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h .
b. R e s e r v a t i o n s have also b e e n e x p r e s s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o s -
Moreover, this holds n o t only for propositionally differentiated sibility o f sharply d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between claims to t r u t h a n d claims
s p e e c h acts; i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h a c t s — f o r e x a m p l e , a t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . Is i t n o t t h e case t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o t r u t h f u l l y u t t e r s
" h e l l o " u t t e r e d as a g r e e t i n g — a r e u n d e r s t o o d as s a t i s f y i n g n o r m s t h e o p i n i o n "p" m u s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p"? I t
f r o m w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e speech act c a n be a p p e a r s t o b e i m p o s s i b l e " t o e x p e c t o f S t h a t h e is s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h
s u p p l e m e n t e d — f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e case o f a g r e e t i n g , t h e w e l l - b e i n g i n a n y o t h e r sense t h a n t h a t S w a n t s t o s p e a k t h e t r u t h — a n d t h i s
o f t h e addressee o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s social status. T h e e x i s - m e a n s n o t h i n g else t h a n t o b e t r u t h f u l . " 5 9
This objection is n o t
tential presuppositions o f a greeting include, a m o n g other things, r e l e v a n t t o t h e class o f expressive s p e e c h acts i n its e n t i r e t y b u t o n l y
t h e presence o f a person f o r w h o m t h i n g s can go w e l l o r badly, his to those utterances i n whose p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t a c o g n i t i o n
m e m b e r s h i p i n a social g r o u p , a n d so f o r t h . verb i n the first person present ( s u c h as I t h i n k , k n o w , believe,
149
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Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2

suspect, a m o f t h e o p i n i o n " t h a t p") o c c u r s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e r e Wittgenstein's private language a r g u m e n t i n o r d e r to show that t h e

is also a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n these p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s , s a m e a s s e r t o r i c v a l i d i t y c l a i m is c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h first-person


e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s as
w h i c h can be expressed by means o f c o g n i d o n verbs, a n d constadve
s p e e c h acts. W h e n s o m e o n e asserts o r a s c e r t a i n s o r d e s c r i b e s "p" she (11) I am i n pain.
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y is o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t , k n o w s , o r b e l i e v e s " t h a t p."
M o o r e already p o i n t e d o u t the paradoxical character o f utterances (12) I am afraid of being raped.

like
as w i t h a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t :
(10+) I t is r a i n i n g n o w , b u t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t i t is r a i n i n g n o w . 6 0

(13) H e is i n p a i n .

Despite these i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n s , however, a h e a r e r can be reject-


(14) S h e is a f r a i d o f b e i n g r a p e d .
i n g t w o different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s w i t h h i s r e j e c t i o n o f
w h e r e b y t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s i n t h e first a n d t h i r d
(10) I t is r a i n i n g n o w . person a r e s u p p o s e d t o have t h e s a m e r e f e r e n c e . I f Tugendhat's

I n t a k i n g a negative position, he can m e a n b o t h a s s i m i l i a t i o n thesis is c o r r e c t , t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 1 ) o r (12) has t h e


same sense as t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 3 ) o r ( 1 4 ) . I t w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t
(10') N o , that isn't true. to postulate a truthfulness claim alongside the claim to t r u t h .
F o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n , T u g e n d h a t takes as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n
and
expressive g e s t u r e , t h e c r y " o u c h , " a n d i m a g i n e s t h a t t h i s l i n g u i s t i -
(10") N o , y o u d o n ' t m e a n w h a t y o u are saying. cally r u d i m e n t a r y c r y o f p a i n is r e p l a c e d b y a n expressive u t t e r a n c e
r e p r e s e n t e d at t h e semantic level by t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence (11).
I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s ( 1 0 ) as a c o n s t a d v e u t t e r -
W i t t g e n s t e i n denies to such e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences t h e character o f
a n c e , i n t h e s e c o n d , as a n e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e . O b v i o u s l y , t h e n e g a -
statements. 6 2
H e assumes t h a t a c o n t i n u u m exists b e t w e e n b o t h n o n -
tion o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p" j u s t as l i t t l e i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e
cognitive f o r m s o f expressing p a i n , the gesture a n d the sentence. For
b e l i e f " t h a t p" as, conversely, ( 1 0 " ) i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e p o s i -
T u g e n d h a t , b y c o n t r a s t , t h e c a t e g o r i a l d i f f e r e n c e consists i n t h e f a c t
t i o n t a k e n i n ( 1 0 ' ) . T o b e s u r e , t h e h e a r e r m a y s u p p o s e t h a t whenever
t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e c a n b e false, b u t n o t t h e g e s t u r e . H i s
S asserts "p" she also b e l i e v e s " t h a t p." B u t t h i s d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e
analysis leads t o t h e r e s u l t t h a t w i t h t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c r y
f a c t t h a t t h e t r u t h c l a i m r e l a t e s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s
i n t o a n e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence w i t h the same m e a n i n g , "an expression
w h e r e a s t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m has t o d o o n l y w i t h t h e m a n i f e s -
is p r o d u c e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h i t is u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e same r u l e as
t a t i o n o f t h e o p i n i o n o r t h e b e l i e f " t h a t p." A m u r d e r e r w h o makes
t h e c r y , is t r u e w h e n i t is u s e d c o r r e c t l y ; a n d t h u s t h e r e arises t h e
a c o n f e s s i o n c a n m e a n w h a t h e says a n d y e t , w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o
s i n g u l a r case o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s w h i c h c a n b e t r u e o r false b u t
so, b e s a y i n g w h a t is u n t r u e . H e c a n also, w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o
w h i c h are nonetheless n o t c o g n i t i v e . " 6 3
For this reason, experiential
so, s p e a k t h e t r u t h a l t h o u g h , i n c o n c e a l i n g his k n o w l e d g e of the
sentences like (11) a r e not s u p p o s e d t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m
facts o f t h e case, h e is l y i n g . A j u d g e w h o h a d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e a t
assertoric sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t l i k e (13)
h e r d i s p o s a l c o u l d c r i t i c i z e t h e t r u t h f u l u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u e i n t h e
o n t h e basis o f t h e c r i t e r i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a d m i t o f t r u t h .
o n e case, a n d t h e t r u e u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u t h f u l i n t h e o t h e r .
B o t h c a n b e t r u e o r false. O f c o u r s e , e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s e x h i b i t
As against this, Ernst T u g e n d h a t tries to m a k e d o w i t h a single
t h e p e c u l i a r i t y t h a t they express a n " i n c o r r i g i b l e k n o w l e d g e ; " t h u s ,
validity c l a i m . 6 1
H e takes u p t h e e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h
150 151

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s t h e y must b e true. w h e r e b y t h e p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e first p e r s o n i n (15) a n d t h e


Between t h e sentences ( 1 1 ) and (13) t h e r e exists a ' V e r i f i c a t o r y p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n i n ( 1 6 ) a r e t o have t h e s a m e
s y m m e t r y , " i n t h e sense t h a t ( 1 3 ) is t r u e w h e n e v e r ( 1 1 ) is u s e d i n reference. I t b e c o m e s c l e a r a t a g l a n c e t h a t i f ( 1 5 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e
c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the rules. s p e a k e r is d e c e i v i n g t h e h e a r e r , w h e r e a s i f ( 1 6 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e s p e a k e r
T u g e n d h a t explains this c o n n e c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e special proper- is t e l l i n g t h e h e a r e r s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o t t r u e , a l t h o u g h she n e e d
ties o f the singular t e r m " I , " w i t h w h i c h the speaker designates n o t i n t e n d t o d e c e i v e h i m . T h u s i t is l e g i t i m a t e t o p o s t u l a t e for
h e r s e l f w i t h o u t a t t h e same t i m e t h e r e b y i d e n t i f y i n g h e r s e l f . E v e n i f e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts a different v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a n f o r constative
h i s thesis is c o r r e c t , h o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t solve t h e p r o b l e m of s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e same m e a n i n g . W i t t g e n s t e i n c o m e s v e r y close
e x p l a i n i n g h o w a sentence can have a n assertoric character a n d t h u s t o t h i s i n s i g h t a t o n e p o i n t i n h i s Philosophical Investigations, where
a d m i t o f t r u t h a n d yet n o t a d m i t o f b e i n g e m p l o y e d cognitively, t h a t h e is s h o w i n g , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p a r a d i g m case o f a c o n f e s s i o n ,
is, f o r r e p r e s e n t i n g e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s . t h a t e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t have a d e s c r i p t i v e s e n s e — t h a t is,
I n g e n e r a l , t h e r u l e s f o r e m p l o y i n g a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s indicate a d o n o t a d m i t o f t r u t h — a n d y e t c a n be valid or invalid.
c o g n i t i o n ; o n l y i n t h e case o f expressive s e n t e n c e s is t h e correct
T h e criteria for the t r u t h o f the confession that I t h o u g h t such-and-such are
e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n also s u p p o s e d t o guarantee
n o t the criteria f o r a t r u e description o f a process. A n d the importance o f the
its t r u t h . B u t a h e a r e r w h o w a n t s t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r is t r u e confession does n o t reside i n the fact that i t is a reliable r e p o r t o f a
d e c e i v i n g h i m w i t h t h e s e n t e n c e ( 1 1 ) has t o test w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e certain process. I t resides rather i n the special consequences w h i c h can be
s e n t e n c e ( 1 3 ) is t r u e . T h i s shows t h a t expressive s e n t e n c e s i n t h e drawn f r o m a confession whose t r u t h is guaranteed by the special criteria
f i r s t p e r s o n d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f e x p r e s s i n g cogni- o f truthfulness. * 6

t i o n s , t h a t a t m o s t t h e y derive t h e t r u t h c l a i m a s c r i b e d t o t h e m f r o m
c. W i t h t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n t h e t h i r d
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g assertoric s e n t e n c e s i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n ; f o r o n l y
g r o u p o f o b j e c t i o n s , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c
t h e l a t t e r c a n represent t h e state o f a f f a i r s t o w h o s e e x i s t e n c e t h e t r u t h
approach t o t h e analysis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e s e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ,
c l a i m refers. T h u s T u g e n d h a t falls i n t o t h e d i l e m m a o f h a v i n g to
f o l l o w i n g t h e m o d e l o f l e g a l c l a i m s , have t o d o w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e -
characterize i n a c o n t r a d i c t o r y way w h a t a speaker means w i t h expe-
tween persons a n d are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n .
riential s e n t e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o b e a m a t t e r
T h e y are raised f o r t h e validity o f symbolic expressions, i n the stan-
o f k n o w l e d g e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f
d a r d case f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t have
t h a t is d e p e n d e n t on an illocutionary component. I t thus makes
t h e status o f a c o g n i t i o n , f o r c o g n i t i o n s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y i n
sense t o r e g a r d a v a l i d i t y c l a i m as a c o m p l e x a n d d e r i v a t i v e p h e -
a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e c o n t e s t e d as u n t r u e . B u t
nomenon that can be traced back to t h e u n d e r l y i n g phenomenon
t h i s d i l e m m a arises o n l y i f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s — w h i c h
o f t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sentences. B u t
is analagous t o t r u t h — i s identified with t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h e d i -
t h e n s h o u l d we n o t l o o k f o r these c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e semantic level
l e m m a dissolves as s o o n as o n e shifts f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c to the
o f a n a l y z i n g assertoric, e x p e r i e n t i a l , i m p e r a t i v e , a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen-
p r a g m a t i c l e v e l a n d c o m p a r e s s p e e c h acts r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s .
tences, r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f t h e e m p l o y m e n t of
Consider
s u c h s e n t e n c e s i n c o n s t a t i v e , expressive, a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts?
Is n o t p r e c i s e l y a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h h o p e s t o e x p l a i n t h e
(15) I have t o confess ( t o y o u ) t h a t I ' v e b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.
i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect t h r o u g h a w a r r a n t y o f f e r e d
(16) I c a n r e p o r t ( t o y o u ) t h a t h e ' s b e e n i n p a i n f o r days. b y t h e s p e a k e r f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t she says, a n d t h r o u g h a
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corresponding r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f the hearer, de- arises b e c a u s e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e is f u l l o f s e n t e n c e s w h i c h a r e n o t


p e n d e n t o n a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t e x p l a i n s f o r its p a r t u n d e r w h a t e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d a b l e , o n e s f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists n o effective p r o c e -
c o n d i t i o n s t h e sentences e m p l o y e d a r e v a l i d ? dure for d e t e r m i n i n g whether or n o t their t r u t h conditions are
A t issue i n t h i s d e b a t e a r e n o t q u e s t i o n s o f t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s fulfilled." 6 7

o r o f n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n s b u t w h e t h e r t h e concept of the validity o f a B e c a u s e k n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s is


s e n t e n c e c a n b e c l a r i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e concept of redeeming the p r o b l e m a t i c i n m a n y , i f n o t i n m o s t cases, D u m m e t t stresses t h e
validity claim r a i s e d t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f t h e s e n t e n c e . I a m difference between k n o w i n g the conditions that make a sentence
d e f e n d i n g t h e thesis t h a t t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e . S e m a n t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s true a n d k n o w i n g the grounds t h a t e n t i d e a s p e a k e r t o assert a
o f d e s c r i p t i v e , expressive, a n d n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s , i f o n l y t h e y a r e s e n t e n c e as t r u e . R e l y i n g o n basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f i n t u i t i o n i s m , h e
c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y e n o u g h , f o r c e us t o c h a n g e t h e l e v e l o f goes o n t o r e f o r m u l a t e t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as f o l l o w s : " [ A ] n
analysis. T h e v e r y analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sen- u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t consists i n a c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i z e
t e n c e s itself c o m p e l s us t o analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c ¬ w h a t e v e r is c o u n t e d as v e r i f y i n g i t , i.e., as c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h i n g i t
tive r e c o g n i t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y claims. A n e x a m p l e o f this as t r u e . I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t w e s h o u l d have a n y m e a n s o f d e c i d i n g
can be found in Dummett's development of truth-conditional the t r u t h o r falsity o f t h e statement, o n l y t h a t we be capable of
fit*
r e c o g n i z i n g w h e n its t r u t h has b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . " 6 8

semantics. D

I t is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s e n t e n c e t h a t w e are c a p a b l e of
D u m m e t t starts f r o m t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t
r e c o g n i z i n g grounds t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e claim t h a t its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s
a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e has t o satisfy t o b e t r u e a n d t h e knowledge
a r e s a t i s f i e d could be redeemed. T h u s , t h i s t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g
t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o asserts t h e s e n t e n c e as t r u e has o f t h e s e t r u t h
o f a s e n t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f its
c o n d i t i o n s — c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a t t h e same t i m e d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n -
v a l i d i t y , b u t d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g g r o u n d s t h a t are objectively
i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e . K n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s consists i n know-
available to a speaker f o r r e d e e m i n g a t r u t h c l a i m .
ing how one ascertains w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e satisfied i n a g i v e n case.
N o w a speaker m i g h t still p r o d u c e such g r o u n d s a c c o r d i n g to a
T h e o r t h o d o x version o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, w h i c h tries t o
p r o c e d u r e t h a t can be a p p l i e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y ; t h e n even an explana-
e x p l a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f k n o w -
tion o f t r u t h conditions i n terms o f g r o u n d i n g a t r u t h claim w o u l d
i n g its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , is b a s e d o n t h e u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
n o t m a k e i t necessary t o m o v e f r o m t h e semantic level o f sentences
f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r e v e r y assertoric s e n t e n c e , p r o c e -
to t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f u s i n g sentences communicatively. D u m m e t t
d u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t its t r u t h
stresses, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is b y n o m e a n s a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e
c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n rests t a c i d y o n a n e m p i r i c i s t
the r e q u i r e d verifications i n a deductively c o m p e l l i n g m a n n e r on
t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t ascribes a f u n d a m e n t a l status t o t h e s i m p l e
t h e basis o f r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e . T h e set o f g r o u n d s available i n a n y
p r e d i c a t i v e sentences o f a n o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e . B u t n o t e v e n t h e
g i v e n i n s t a n c e is c i r c u m s c r i b e d b y i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f a u n i v e r s e o f
a r g u m e n t a t i o n game t h a t T u g e n d h a t postulates f o r v e r i f y i n g such
linguistic structures that can be surveyed only argumentatively. D u m -
s e e m i n g l y e l e m e n t a r y s e n t e n c e s consists i n a d e c i s i o n procedure
m e t t p u r s u e s t h i s i d e a so f a r t h a t i n t h e e n d h e gives u p e n t i r e l y t h e
t h a t c o u l d b e a p p l i e d l i k e a n a l g o r i t h m , t h a t is, i n s u c h a w a y t h a t
basic i d e a o f v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m .
f u r t h e r d e m a n d s for g r o u n d i n g are e x c l u d e d in principle. 6 6
I t is
e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n t h e case o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , u n i v e r s a l e x i s t e n t i a l
A verificationist t h e o r y comes as close as any plausible t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g
sentences, a n d sentences w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x — i n g e n e r a l , any can do to e x p l a i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f the grounds o n
s e n t e n c e s r e f e r r i n g t o p l a c e s a n d t i m e s t h a t are a c t u a l l y inaccessi- w h i c h i t may be asserted; i t must o f course distinguish a speaker's actual
b l e — t h a t effective d e c i s i o n p r o c e d u r e s a r e l a c k i n g . ' T h e difficulty grounds, w h i c h may n o t be conclusive, or may be i n d i r e c t , from the k i n d
154 155
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

o f direct, conclusive grounds i n terms o f w h i c h the m e a n i n g is given, b e e n d i v i d i n g s p e e c h acts i n t o t h r e e classes: r e g u l a t i v e , expressive,


particularly for sentences, like those i n the future tense, for w h i c h the
a n d constative. I w o u l d n o w like t o justify this classification by way
speaker c a n n o t have grounds o f the latter k i n d at the time o f utterance. B u t
o f a critical e x a m i n a t i o n o f o t h e r classificatory schemes.
a falsificationist theory . . . links the c o n t e n t o f an assertion w i t h the c o m -
m i t m e n t that a speaker undertakes i n m a k i n g that assertion; an assertion is A s is w e l l k n o w n , a t t h e e n d o f h i s series o f l e c t u r e s o n " H o w t o
a k i n d o f gamble that the speaker w i l l n o t be proved w r o n g . 69
D o T h i n g s w i t h Words," A u s t i n t r i e d his h a n d at a typology o f speech
acts. H e o r d e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n t h e basis o f p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b s
I see t h i s as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e f a l l i b i l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d i s -
a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d f i v e types ( v e r d i c t i v e s , e x e r c i t i v e s , commissives,
cursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f validity claims. I c a n n o t go i n t o t h e details o f
behabitives, a n d expositives), w i t h o u t d e n y i n g the provisional char-
D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g h e r e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is o n l y t h a t
acter o f this classification. 72
I n f a c t , i t is o n l y f o r t h e class o f c o m m i s -
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c l a i m t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a sen-
sives t h a t A u s t i n gives us a c l e a r c r i t e r i o n o f d e m a r c a t i o n : with
t e n c e b e c r i t i c i z a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e . I n a n y case, t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l se-
p r o m i s e s , t h r e a t s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , vows, c o n t r a c t s , a n d t h e l i k e , t h e
m a n t i c s i n its r e v i s e d f o r m takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t
speaker c o m m i t s h i m s e l f t o c a r r y i n g o u t c e r t a i n actions i n t h e f u -
t r u t h conditions cannot be explicated independently f r o m k n o w i n g
t u r e . T h e speaker enters i n t o a n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t
how to redeem a corresponding truth claim. To understand an
o b l i g e s h i m t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. T h e r e m a i n i n g classes a r e n o t
a s s e r t i o n is t o k n o w w h e n a s p e a k e r has g o o d r e a s o n s t o assume a s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e f i n e d , e v e n i f o n e takes i n t o a c c o u n t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e
w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e asserted s e n t e n c e character o f the classification. T h e y d o n o t m e e t the r e q u i r e m e n t s
are satisfied. o f distinctness a n d disjunctiveness; 7 3
A u s t i n ' s classificatory scheme
A s i n t h e case o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s , i t c a n also d o e s n o t r e q u i r e us always t o assign d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a to dif-
be s h o w n f o r expressive a n d n o r m a t i v e sentences t h a t semantic f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s n o r t o assign e a c h p h e n o m e n o n to at m o s t one
analysis p u s h e s b e y o n d i t s e l f . T h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has a r i s e n f r o m category.
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analysis o f e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s m a k e s c l e a r t h a t t h e
T h e class o f v e r d i c t i v e s c o m p r i s e s utterances w i t h w h i c h ' j u d g -
c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h expressions is g e n u i n e l y a d d r e s s e d t o others.
m e n t s " o r " v e r d i c t s " — i n t h e sense o f a p p r a i s a l s a n d assessments—
The m e a n i n g o f t h e expressive a n d declarative f u n c t i o n already
are m a d e . A u s t i n does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e between j u d g m e n t s w i t h
suggests a p r i m a r i l y c o m m u n i c a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f such expres-
d e s c r i p t i v e c o n t e n t a n d t h o s e w i t h n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t . T h u s t h e r e is
sions. 7 0
T h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f n o r m s is e v e n
s o m e o v e r l a p w i t h b o t h t h e e x p o s i t i v e s a n d t h e e x e r c i t i v e s . T h e class
c l e a r e r . H e r e , t o o , a n analysis t h a t starts w i t h s i m p l e p r e d i c a t e s f o r
o f e x e r c i t i v e s c o m p r i s e s , t o b e g i n w i t h , a l l d e c l a r a t i v e s , t h a t is e x p r e s -
s e e m i n g l y subjective e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s t o v i o l a t i o n s o r impair-
sions f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y — f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , l e g a l l y — a u t h o r i z e d d e c i -
m e n t s o f p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y leads step-by-step t o t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ,
sions (such as sentencing, adopting, appointing, nominating,
i n d e e d t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e , m e a n i n g o f basic m o r a l c o n c e p t s . 7 1

r e s i g n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e r e is o v e r l a p n o t o n l y w i t h v e r d i c t i v e s
( s u c h as n a m i n g a n d a w a r d i n g ) b u t also w i t h b e h a b i t i v e s ( s u c h as
O n the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f S p e e c h A c t s
p r o t e s t i n g ) . T h e s e b e h a b i t i v e s i n t u r n f o r m a class t h a t is p r e t t y
h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n c o m p o s i t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o verbs f o r standardized
I f o u r thesis h o l d s t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d e x p r e s s i o n s o f f e e l i n g ( s u c h as c o m p l a i n t s a n d c o m m i s e r a t i o n s ) , i t
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be contested u n d e r precisely t h r e e u n i - contains expressions f o r institutionally b o u n d utterances ( c o n g r a t u -
v e r s a l aspects, w e m i g h t c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a system o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s l a t i o n s , curses, toasts, e x p r e s s i o n s o f w e l c o m e ) as w e l l as e x p r e s s i o n s
also u n d e r l i e s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f types o f s p e e c h acts. I f so, t h e f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n s ( a p o l o g i e s , t h a n k s , a l l sorts o f m a k i n g g o o d ) . F i n a l l y ,
u n i v e r s a l i t y thesis w o u l d also h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a t t e m p t s t o class- t h e class o f e x p o s i t i v e s d o e s n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n constatives,
ify s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view. T h u s f a r I h a v e t a c i d y
156 157
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

w h i c h s e r v e t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , w h i c h Searle's s h a r p e n e d v e r s i o n o f A u s t i n ' s s p e e c h - a c t t y p o l o g y m a r k s


(like asking, replying, addressing, c i t i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) r e f e r to t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has d e v e l o p e d i n t w o d i f f e r e n t
s p e e c h itself. A l s o t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e s e a r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n s d i r e c t i o n s . T h e first is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y Searle's o w n e f f o r t s t o p r o -
w i t h w h i c h w e d e s i g n a t e t h e e x e c u t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s ( s u c h as d e d u c - v i d e a n o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e five types o f s p e e c h acts; t h e
i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, a n d t h e l i k e ) . o t h e r is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e a t t e m p t t o d e v e l o p t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of
S e a r l e has a t t e m p t e d t o s h a r p e n A u s t i n ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 74
He no s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s so as t o
l o n g e r orients h i m s e l f t o w a r d a list o f p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs d i f f e r e n t i - m a k e i t f r u i t f u l f o r t h e analysis o f s p e e c h - a c t s e q u e n c e s i n e v e r y d a y
a t e d w i t h i n a specific l a n g u a g e , b u t t o w a r d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n - communication.
t i o n s o r a i m s t h a t speakers p u r s u e w i t h v a r i o u s types o f s p e e c h acts,
I t is a l o n g t h i s l a t t e r p a t h t h a t w e find the w o r k o f linguists a n d
independendy o f the f o r m s i n w h i c h they are realized i n i n d i v i d u a l
s o c i o l i n g u i s t s s u c h as W u n d e r l i c h , C a m p b e l l , a n d K r e c k e l . 7 5
For em-
languages. H e arrives at a clear a n d i n t u i t i v e l y c o n v i n c i n g classifica-
p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , social l i f e - c o n t e x t s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s as c o m m u -
t i o n o f s p e e c h acts: assertive ( o r c o n s t a t i v e ) , c o m m i s s i v e , d i r e c t i v e ,
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s t h a t i n t e r m e s h i n social spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s .
d e c l a r a t i v e , a n d expressive. T o s t a r t w i t h , Searle i n t r o d u c e s assertive
T h e patterns o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces realized i n p a r t i c u l a r languages
( c o n s t a t i v e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) s p e e c h acts as a w e l l d e f i n e d class. F r o m
r e f l e c t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f these n e t w o r k s o f a c t i o n s . T h e l i n g u i s t i c
A u s t i n h e f u r t h e r takes o v e r t h e class o f c o m m i s s i v e s a n d c o n t r a s t s
possibilities f o r p e r f o r m i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts—whether i n the fixed
these w i t h t h e directives. W h e r e a s w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e speaker c o m -
f o r m o f grammatical modes or i n the more flexible forms of perfor-
m i t s h e r s e l f t o a n a c t i o n , w i t h t h e l a t t e r she t r i e s t o m o t i v a t e t h e
mative verbs, sentence particles, sentence i n t o n a t i o n s , a n d the l i k e —
h e a r e r t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . A m o n g t h e d i r e c t i v e s , Searle
provide schemata for establishing interpersonal relations. The
c o u n t s o r d i n a n c e s , requests, i n s t r u c t i o n s , i m p e r a t i v e s , i n v i t a t i o n s , as
i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces constitute the knots i n the n e t w o r k o f commu-
w e l l as q u e s t i o n s a n d entreaties. H e r e , h e does n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e
n i c a t i v e s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaflung); t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e x i c o n is,
b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s — s u c h as p e t i t i o n s , r e p -
as i t w e r e , t h e s e c t i o n a l p l a n e o n w h i c h t h e l a n g u a g e a n d t h e i n s t i -
r i m a n d s , c o m m a n d s , a n d t h e l i k e — a n d s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , t h a t is,
t u t i o n a l o r d e r o f a society i n t e r p e n e t r a t e . T h i s s o c i e t a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e
n o n a u t h o r i z e d expressions o f w i l l . F o r this reason, the d e l i m i t a t i o n
o f l a n g u a g e is i t s e l f i n f l u x ; i t varies i n d e p e n d e n c e o n i n s t i t u t i o n s
o f d i r e c t i v e s f r o m d e c l a r a t i v e s is also n o t v e r y s h a r p . I t is t r u e t h a t
a n d f o r m s o f l i f e . B u t t h e s e v a r i a t i o n s also e m b o d y a l i n g u i s t i c c r e a -
f o r d e c l a r a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d t o se-
t i v i t y t h a t gives n e w f o r m s o f e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n n o v a t i v e m a s t e r y o f
c u r e t h e n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of, f o r i n s t a n c e , a p p o i n t i n g ,
unforeseen situations. 7 6

a b d i c a t i n g , d e c l a r i n g war, a n d g i v i n g n o t i c e ; b u t t h e i r n o r m a t i v e
Indicators that relate to general dimensions o f the speech situ-
m e a n i n g is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f c o m m a n d s a n d d i r e c t i v e s . T h e last class
a t i o n a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r a p r a g m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts.
c o m p r i s e s expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e s e a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e i r a i m —
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e temporal dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r
namely, that w i t h t h e m , t h e speaker sincerely brings to expression
p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e o r i e n t e d m o r e t o w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t h e past, o r t h e
h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s . B u t S e a r l e is u n c e r t a i n i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n
p r e s e n t , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t e m p o r a l l y n e u t r a l . W i t h
o f t h i s c r i t e r i o n ; t h u s , t h e e x e m p l a r y cases o f avowals, disclosures,
r e g a r d t o t h e social dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o b l i -
a n d r e v e l a t i o n s are m i s s i n g . A p o l o g i e s a n d e x p r e s s i o n s o f j o y a n d
g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f o r t h e speaker,
s y m p a t h y a r e m e n t i o n e d . E v i d e n d y , Searle has a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e
t h e h e a r e r , o r f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . A n d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e dimension of
l e d astray b y A u s t i n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f b e h a b i t i v e s a n d has t a c k e d
objectivity (die sachliche Dimension) t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
o n t o t h i s class i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts l i k e c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s
t h e m a t i c e m p h a s i s lies m o r e o n t h e o b j e c t s , t h e a c t i o n s , o r t h e a c t o r s
a n d g r e e t i n g s as w e l l .
t h e m s e l v e s . K r e c k e l uses these i n d i c a t o r s t o p r o p o s e a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
158 159

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d Communication

o n w h i c h she bases h e r analyses o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n (see Table 2.4


Classification according to three paradigmatic indicators
table 2.4).
C e r t a i n l y , t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s a n d s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s consists Speaker (S) Hearer (H)

i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y p r o v i d e us w i t h a g u i d e l i n e f o r ethnolinguistic Cognition oriented (C) Cognition oriented (C)


a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p d v e systems; t h e y a r e b e t t e r a b l e t o c o p e Does the speaker indicate that he Does the speaker try to
w i t h t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f n a t u r a l settings t h a n are typologies t h a t start has taken up the hearer's message? influence the hearer's view of
the world?
f r o m illocutionary intentions a n d aims rather t h a n f r o m features o f
Present
s i t u a t i o n s . B u t t h e y pay f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e i n t u i - Examples: agreeing Examples: asserting, arguing,
tively evident character o f classifications t h a t l i n k u p w i t h semantic acknowledging, rejecting declaring

analyses a n d t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e Person oriented (P) Person oriented (P)


( s u c h as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e e x p r e s s i o n of Does the speaker refer to himself Does the speaker refer to the
a n d / o r his past action? person of the hearer a n d / o r his
experiences, and the establishment o f interpersonal relations). The
past action?
classes o f s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e a r r i v e d a t i n d u c t i v e l y a n d c o n s t r u c t e d
Past
i n accordance w i t h pragmatic indicators do not consolidate into Examples: justifying, defending, Examples: accusing, criticizing,
i n t u i t i v e l y e v i d e n t types; t h e y l a c k t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p o w e r t o i l l u m i n a t e lamenting teasing

our intuitions. Action oriented (A) Action oriented (A)

Searle m a k e s t h e m o v e t o w a r d a theoretically motivated typology of Does the speaker commit himself Does the speaker try to make
to future action? the hearer do something?
speech acts b y g i v i n g a n o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n -
Future
ary intentions a n d the p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes that a speaker pursues Examples: promising, refusing, Examples: advising, challenging,
o r a d o p t s w h e n she p e r f o r m s assertive ( c o n s t a t i v e ) , d i r e c t i v e , c o m - giving in ordering
missive, declarative, a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts. I n d o i n g so, he Source: M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared Knowledge in Natural Discourse (London,
d r a w s u p o n t h e f a m i l i a r m o d e l t h a t d e f i n e s t h e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y 1981), p. 188.
o f e x i s t i n g states o f affairs, sets u p t h e s p e a k e r / a c t o r as a n a u t h o r i t y
outside o f this w o r l d , a n d allows f o r precisely two linguistically m e -
w h e r e b y C stands f o r c o g n i t i o n s o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes of
diated relations between actor a n d w o r l d : the cognitive relation o f
t h i n k i n g , b e i n g o f t h e o p i n i o n , b e l i e v i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d I stands
a s c e r t a i n i n g facts, a n d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r e l a t i o n o f r e a l i z i n g a g o a l
for intentions or the propositional attitudes o f wanting, wishing,
o f a c t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n t i o n s may t h e n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n
i n t e n d i n g , a n d t h e l i k e . T h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t S raises a
t e r m s o f t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts a r e s u p p o s e d t o
truth claim for vis-à-vis H; t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r t h e
b e b r o u g h t i n t o a c c o r d . T h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g d o w n w a r d s (-1) says t h a t
a g r e e m e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e facts (-1); t h e i m p e r a -
t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e s u p p o s e d t o f i t t h e facts; t h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g u p -
tive f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t 5 raises a p o w e r c l a i m vis-à-vis / / f o r s e e i n g t o
w a r d s (T) says t h a t t h e facts a r e t o b e f i t t e d t o t h e s e n t e n c e s . T h u s ,
it that " / / b r i n g s about t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r h a v i n g
t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e imperative
t h e facts b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e (Î).
f o r c e o f d i r e c t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r as f o l l o w s :
I n d e s c r i b i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces by means o f the r e l a t i o n between
l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d , Searle has r e c o u r s e t o c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e
Constative h ^C(p)
v a l i d i t y o f a s s e r t o r i c a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . H e finds h i s t h e o r e t i -
Directive! tl(H b r i n g s a b o u t p) c a l s t a n d p o i n t f o r classifying s p e e c h acts i n t h e dimension of validity.
161
160
S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2

B u t h e restricts h i m s e l f to t h e perspective o f the speaker a n d disre- I t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a d e c l a r a t i o n o f war, a


gards the dynamics of the n e g o d a d o n a n d intersubjecdve recogni- r e s i g n a t i o n , t h e o p e n i n g o f a session, t h e r e a d i n g o f a b i l l , o r t h e
tion o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s — t h a t is, consensus-formation. T h e m o d e l o f t w o l i k e c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g to the scheme o f two directions

linguistically mediated relations between a solitary actor a n d the one o f fit. I n p r o d u c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts, a s p e a k e r d o e s n o t at a l l r e f e r

o b j e c t i v e w o r l d has n o p l a c e f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; r a t h e r h e acts i n a c c o r d a n c e

participants i n communication w h o come to an understanding with w i t h t h e l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s o f t h e social w o r l d a n d a t t h e same t i m e

one another about something i n the world. W h e n worked out, i n i t i a t e s n e w i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t is p u r e l y o u t o f embarrass-


m e n t t h a t Searle s y m b o l i z e s t h i s m e a n i n g , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o another
Searle's o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n p r o v e s t o b e t o o n a r r o w .
w o r l d , by a d o u b l e a r r o w c o i n e d i n respect to the objective w o r l d :
The c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts s e e m a t first t o fit easily i n t o t h e
m o d e l . W i t h a s p e e c h act o f t h i s t y p e , S assumes a w a r r a n t y vis-à-vis
declarative D X (p)
H f o r b r i n g i n g t h e facts i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e n -
tence u t t e r e d ( Î ) : w h e r e b y n o special p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes are supposed to be r e -
q u i r e d . T h i s e m b a r r a s s m e n t r e c u r s o n c e a g a i n i n t h e case o f e x p r e s -
Commissive C Î I ( 5 b r i n g s a b o u t p)
sive s p e e c h acts, w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n j u s t as l i t d e be
However, i n analyzing the use of i n t e n t i o n a l sentences i n an- characterized i n terms o f an actor's relations to t h e w o r l d o f existing
nouncements, w e saw t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f commissive states o f a f f a i r s . Searle is c o n s i s t e n t e n o u g h t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e
s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f satisfac- inapplicability o f his scheme t h r o u g h a n e i t h e r / n o r sign:
tion f o r t h e a n n o u n c e d i n t e n t i o n t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. I t is o n l y
e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts E 0 (p)
t h e l a t t e r t h a t is m e a n t b y ( Î ) . R a t h e r , w i t h c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts,
t h e s p e a k e r binds h e r w i l l i n t h e sense o f a normative obligation; a n d w h e r e b y a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a t a l l is p o s s i b l e .
t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e reliability of a declaration o f i n t e n t i o n a r e of W e c a n a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f Searle's a t t e m p t a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,
q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t s o r t t h a n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r satisfies w h i l e r e t a i n i n g his f r u i t f u l t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h , i f we start f r o m t h e
w h e n she, as a n actor, realizes h e r i n t e n t i o n . Searle w o u l d h a v e t o f a c t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o f s p e e c h acts a r e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h
d i s t i n g u i s h c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f r o m c o n d i t i o n s o f success. t h e intersubjecdve r e c o g n i t i o n o f claims to p o w e r a n d validity, a n d
I n a s i m i l a r way, w e d i s t i n g u i s h e d n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a - i f we f u r t h e r i n t r o d u c e n o r m a t i v e Tightness a n d s u b j e c t i v e truthful-
tives s u c h as d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , o r d i n a n c e s , a n d the like f r o m ness as v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n a l a g o u s t o t r u t h a n d i n t e r p r e t t h e m t o o i n
s h e e r i m p e r a t i v e s ; w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e s p e a k e r raises a n o r m a t i v e terms o f a c t o r / w o r l d relations.
validity claim, with the latter an externally sanctioned claim to T h i s revision yields the f o l l o w i n g classification:
power. For this reason, n o t e v e n t h e i m p e r a t i v e sense o f simple
• W i t h imperatives t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o a d e s i r e d state i n t h e o b j e c -
imperatives can be e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r satisfying
tive w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o g e t H t o b r i n g
the imperative sentences e m p l o y e d t h e r e i n . Even i f that were
a b o u t t h i s state. I m p e r a t i v e s c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d o n l y f r o m t h e s t a n d -
s u f f i c i e n t , Searle w o u l d h a v e d i f f i c u l t y r e s t r i c t i n g t h e class o f d i r e c -
p o i n t o f w h e t h e r t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d c a n b e c a r r i e d o u t , t h a t is,
tives t o t h e class o f g e n u i n e i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e m a r c a t i n g t h e f o r m e r
o n t h e basis o f c o n d i t i o n s o f success. H o w e v e r , r e j e c t i n g i m p e r a t i v e s
f r o m directives a n d c o m m a n d s , since his m o d e l does n o t allow f o r
n o r m a l l y m e a n s r e j e c t i n g a c l a i m t o p o w e r ; s u c h r e j e c t i o n is n o t
c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e validity ( o r f o r t h e satisfaction) o f n o r m s . T h i s
b a s e d o n c r i t i c i s m b u t i t s e l f expresses a will.
l a c k is especially n o t i c e a b l e w h e n S e a r l e t r i e s t o a c c o m m o d a t e d e -
c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n h i s system. • W i t h constative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o r e p r e s e n t a
162 163
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

state o f a f f a i r s . T h e n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H u n d e r t h e s a m e class o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O n e c a n see f r o m t h i s


contests t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h r a i s e d b y S f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted. t h a t t h e basic m o d e s a r e i n n e e d o f f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h e y
• With regulative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a c a n n o t b e u s e d f o r t h e analysis o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n t i l w e
c o m m o n social w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e to s u c c e e d i n d e v e l o p i n g t a x o n o m i e s f o r t h e whole spectrum of illocution-
e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e . T h e ary forces d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a -
n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H contests t h e n o r m a t i v e r i e s o f a s p e c i f i c basic m o d e . O n l y v e r y f e w i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — l i k e
l i g h t n e s s c l a i m e d by S f o r his a c t i o n . asserting a n d ascertaining, p r o m i s i n g a n d c o m m a n d i n g , confessing
a n d disclosing—are so g e n e r a l t h a t t h e y c a n c h a r a c t e r i z e a basic
• W i t h expressive speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n h i s
m o d e as s u c h . N o r m a l l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f e x p r e s s i o n standardized
subjective w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o reveal t o a
i n p a r t i c u l a r languages characterize n o t o n l y the r e l a t i o n i n general
p u b l i c a n e x p e r i e n c e t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d access. T h e n e g a -
t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , b u t t h e way i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r lays c l a i m t o t r u t h ,
tion o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H doubts t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y S
Tightness, o r t r u t h f u l n e s s f o r a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . P r a g m a t i c i n d i -
to t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f his self-representation.
cators—such as t h e d e g r e e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e p e n d e n c e o f s p e e c h
Communicatives c o n s t i t u t e a f u r t h e r class o f s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n acts, t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d past a n d f u t u r e , t h e speaker/hearer
also b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h a t subclass o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h a c t s — q u e s - o r i e n t a t i o n , t h e t h e m a t i c f o c u s , a n d so f o r t h — c a n h e n c e f o r t h help
tioning a n d answering, addressing, objecting, a d m i t t i n g , a n d the us t o g r a s p systematically the illocutionary modifications of validity
l i k e — t h a t serve t h e organization of speech, i t s a r r a n g e m e n t i n t o t o p i c s claims. O n l y a n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is t h e o r e t i c a l l y g u i d e d w i l l
a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f conversational roles, t h e r e g u - b e a b l e t o d e v e l o p speech-act t a x o n o m i e s t h a t are i n f o r m a t i v e , t h a t
lation o f turn-taking i n conversation, a n d the l i k e . 7 7
B u t i t makes is, n e i t h e r b l i n d n o r e m p t y .
m o r e sense t o r e g a r d t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s r a t h e r as a n i n d e p e n d e n t H o w e v e r , t h e p u r e types o f l a n g u a g e use o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g
class a n d t o d e f i n e t h e m t h r o u g h t h e i r reflexive relation to the process u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s u i t a b l e as g u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g t y p o l o g i e s
of communication; f o r t h e n w e c a n also i n c l u d e t h o s e s p e e c h acts t h a t o f linguistically mediated interaction. I n communicative action, the
either refer directly to validity claims ( a f f i r m i n g , denying, assuring, plans o f a c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s are c o o r d i n a t e d by m e a n s
c o n f i r m i n g , a n d the l i k e ) o r t h a t refer to h o w validity claims are o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r
dealt w i t h argumentatively ( g r o u n d i n g , justifying, r e f u t i n g , suppos- this reason, we m i g h t conjecture that constative, regulative, a n d
i n g , p r o v i n g , a n d the like). e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts also c o n s t i t u t e c o r r e s p o n d i n g types o f l i n g u i s -
F i n a l l y , t h e r e is t h e class o f operatives, t h a t is, s p e e c h a c t s — s u c h as t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . T h i s is o b v i o u s l y t r u e o f r e g u l a t i v e a n d
i n f e r r i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, c o u n t i n g , p r e d i c a t i n g , e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h are c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u -
a n d t h e l i k e — t h a t designate t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f constructive rules ( o f l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n , respectively. A t first g l a n c e t h e r e
l o g i c , g r a m m a r , m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d t h e l i k e ) . O p e r a t i v e s p e e c h acts seems t o b e n o t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d i n a s i m i l a r
have a p e r f o r m a t i v e sense b u t no genuine communicative sense; t h e y w a y t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n
s e r v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o describe w h a t o n e d o e s i n c o n s t r u c t i n g s y m - t h a t d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f c a r r y i n g o u t c o m m u n i c a -
bolic expressions i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h r u l e s . 7 8 t i v e l y h a r m o n i z e d p l a n s o f a c t i o n ( t h a t is, p u r p o s i v e activities) b u t
I f o n e takes t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as basic, c o m m i s s i v e s a n d d e c l a r a - themselves m a k e c o m m u n i c a t i o n possible a n d stabilize i t — f o r i n -
tives, as w e l l as i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts ( b e t t i n g , m a r r y i n g , stance, c h a t t i n g , c o n v e r s i n g , a n d a r g u i n g — i n g e n e r a l , c o n v e r s a t i o n
o a t h - t a k i n g ) a n d satisfactives ( w h i c h r e l a t e t o excuses a n d a p o l o g i e s t h a t i n a c e r t a i n c o n t e x t b e c o m e s a n e n d i n itself. I n s u c h cases, t h e
f o r v i o l a t i n g n o r m s , as w e l l as t o r e p a r a t i o n s ) , m u s t a l l b e subsumed p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e i n s t r u m e n -
164 165
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

t a l r o l e o f s e r v i n g as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a n d t h e
communicative n e g o t i a t i o n o f topics gains i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d be-
c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . I s h a l l speak o f " c o n v e r s a -
tion" whenever t h e w e i g h t is s h i f t e d i n t h i s way f r o m purposive
V
ja'
a c t i v i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; a r g u m e n t a t i o n is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m - O
3
CO
p o r t a n t special case o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . A s i n t e r e s t i n t h e t o p i c s n e g o -
tiated is p r e d o m i n a n t h e r e , w e c o u l d p e r h a p s say t h a t constative S
S
'u
s p e e c h acts have c o n s t i t u t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r conversations.
a
T h u s o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts c a n serve t o i n t r o d u c e t h r e e '•B •3 •5
a a
1
bJO

p u r e t y p e s — o r b e t t e r , limit cases—of communicative action: conver- 3

sation, normatively regulated action, a n d dramaturgical action. I f we


f u r t h e r take i n t o account t h e i n t e r n a l relations between strategic
bo bo
a c t i o n a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts o r i m p e r a t i v e s , w e a r r i v e a t t h e clas- C a
•a •a c
s i f i c a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t a b l e 2.5. o
I a
x
F o r m a l and Empirical Pragmatics o o
z
E v e n i f t h e p r o g r a m f o r a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t I h a v e here
m e r e l y o u d i n e d w e r e c a r r i e d o u t i n d e t a i l , o n e m i g h t ask w h a t w o u l d
be gained for a useful sociological t h e o r y o f action by such a f o r m a l -
p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h . T h e q u e s t i o n arises, a t least, w h y w o u l d n o t a n < o
empirical-pragmatic a p p r o a c h be better f o r this, an a p p r o a c h that
d i d n o t dwell o n the r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f isolated, h i g h l y ide-
C 2
a l i z e d s p e e c h acts b u t s t a r t e d a t o n c e w i t h e v e r y d a y communicative o e O .¡3

p r a c t i c e s . F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r i b u -
bo 3
S
'D it
C fa
•s 53 c a
t i o n s t o t h e analysis o f stories a n d t e x t s , 7 9
f r o m sociology c o n t r i b u - .a fcr-3 V

tions to conversational analysis, 80


f r o m anthropology contributions as S B <" Sa
Pi VI
W.S £ in
to the ethnography o f speaking, 8 1
a n d f r o m psychology investiga-
tions i n t o t h e pragmatic variables o f linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n . 8 2
By c o m - a
p a r i s o n , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s — w h i c h , i n its r e c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t e n t i o n a «
" JS
( t h a t is, i n t h e sense o f a t h e o r y o f c o m p e t e n c e ) is d i r e c t e d t o t h e M O 4>
o
conditions under which reaching understanding is possible — 8 3 fi .5 U
seems t o b e h o p e l e s s l y r e m o v e d f r o m a c t u a l l a n g u a g e u s e . 8 4
Under c
o
these circumstances, d o e s i t m a k e a n y sense t o i n s i s t o n a f o r m a l - •a u
•5b
pragmatic grounding for a theory of communicative action? a g
'bo a v
I w o u l d l i k e t o r e s p o n d t o t h i s q u e s t i o n b y first (a) enumerating c B §
o c-g
the methodological steps t h r o u g h w h i c h f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s c a n be o zs O rt
166 167
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h e m p i r i c a l pragmatics; t h e n I shall (b) i d e n t i f y the • I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e l e v e l o f processes o f r e a c h i n g understanding


p r o b l e m s t h a t m a k e i t necessary t o clarify the r a t i o n a l foundations ( t h a t is, s p e e c h ) , w e b r i n g i n t h e l e v e l o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ( t h a t
o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; f i n a l l y , I w o u l d l i k e (c) to is, t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n t h r o u g h a g r e e m e n t o f the plans o f action of
take u p a strategically i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t , c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h for- individual participants).
m a l p r a g m a t i c s has t o l e a r n f r o m e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s i f i t is t o • Finally, i n a d d i t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, we include i n o u r
avoid locating the p r o b l e m o f rationality i n the w r o n g place—that analysis t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d knowledge ( t h a t is, l i f e -
is, n o t i n a c t i o n - o r i e n t a t i o n s , as is s u g g e s t e d b y W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f worlds) f r o m w h i c h participants nourish their interpretations.
action, b u t rather i n the general structures o f the lifeworlds to w h i c h
a c t i n g subjects b e l o n g . These extensions a m o u n t to d r o p p i n g the methodological provi-

a. T h e p u r e types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n c a n step sions t h a t w e i n t e n d e d i n i t i a l l y w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s t a n d a r d

b y step b e b r o u g h t c l o s e r t o t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f n a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n s s p e e c h acts. I n t h e s t a n d a r d case, t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n -

w i t h o u t sacrificing theoretical perspectives f o r analyzing the c o o r d i - t e n c e s u t t e r e d c o i n c i d e s w i t h w h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s (meint) w i t h

n a t i o n o f a c t i o n . T h i s task consists i n r e v e r s i n g i n a c o n t r o l l e d m a n - her speech a c t . 8 6


However, t h e m o r e t h a t w h i c h t h e speaker means

ner the strong idealizations to which we owe the concept of w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e is m a d e t o d e p e n d o n a b a c k g r o u n d knowledge

communicative action: that remains i m p l i c i t , the m o r e the context-specific meaning of the


u t t e r a n c e c a n d i v e r g e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said.
• I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e basic m o d e s , w e a d m i t t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f t h e W h e n one drops the idealization o f a complete a n d literal repre-
concretely shaped i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces that f o r m the culture-specific sentation o f the m e a n i n g o f utterances, the resolution o f another
n e t w o r k o f possible i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations standardized i n each p r o b l e m is also m a d e e a s i e r — n a m e l y , d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a n d i d e n t i f y i n g
individual language. i n n a t u r a l situations between actions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching u n -
• I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f s p e e c h acts, w e a d m i t o t h e r d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. H e r e w e m u s t t a k e
f o r m s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i z a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. i n t o consideration that n o t only d o illocutions occur i n contexts of
strategic a c t i o n b u t p e r l o c u t i o n s appear i n contexts o f communica-
• I n a d d i t i o n t o e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts, w e admit elliptically fore-
tive a c t i o n as w e l l . C o o p e r a t i v e i n t e r p r e t i v e processes r u n t h r o u g h
shortened, extraverbally supplemented, i m p l i c i t utterances, the u n -
d i f f e r e n t phases. A s a r u l e , t h e i r i n i t i a l p h a s e is d e f i n e d b y t h e f a c t
d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h i c h is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e h e a r e r ' s k n o w l e d g e of
that the participants' interpretations o f the situation do n o t overlap
nonstandardized, contingent contextual conditions.
sufficiently f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. I n this phase,
• I n a d d i t i o n t o d i r e c t s p e e c h acts, w e a d m i t i n d i r e c t , n o n l i t e r a l , a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s have e i t h e r t o shift to t h e level o f metacommunication
a m b i g u o u s u t t e r a n c e s , t h e m e a n i n g o f w h i c h has t o b e i n f e r r e d f r o m or to employ means of indirectly c o m i n g to an understanding.
the context. Reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g indirectly proceeds according to the m o d e l
• T h e f o c u s is e n l a r g e d f r o m i s o l a t e d s p e e c h acts ( a n d "yes" o r "no" of i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics: through perlocutionary effects the
r e s p o n s e s ) t o s e q u e n c e s o f s p e e c h acts, t o t e x t s , o r t o conversations, s p e a k e r gives t h e h e a r e r t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g t h a t she cannot
so t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s c a n c o m e i n t o view. (yet) c o m m u n i c a t e d i r e c t l y . I n t h i s p h a s e , t h e n , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts

• I n a d d i t i o n to the objectivating, norm-conformative, a n d expres- have to be e m b e d d e d i n contexts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. These

sive basic a t t i t u d e s , w e a d m i t a n o v e r a r c h i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e strategic elements within a use of language oriented toward reaching under-

t o take a c c o u n t o f the fact t h a t w i t h every speech act p a r t i c i p a n t s i n standing can nonetheless be distinguished from strategic actions

c o m m u n i c a t i o n relate simultaneously to s o m e t h i n g i n the objective, t h r o u g h the fact that the entire sequence o f a segment o f speech

s o c i a l , a n d subjective w o r l d s . 8 5
168 169

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

stands—on the part o f all participants—under the presuppositions explanation of phenomena that are i d e n t i f i e d initially o n l y o n t h e
o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . basis o f a n i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a t u r e d b y c l i n i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
b. A n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t d i d n o t e n s u r e f o r i t s e l f a f o r m a l - S u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n p a t h o l o g i e s c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f as t h e r e s u l t
p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w o u l d n o t have a t its d i s p o s a l the of a confusion between actions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching under-
c o n c e p t u a l i n s t r u m e n t s n e e d e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e r a t i o n a l bases o f s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. I n s i t u a t i o n s o f l a t e n t
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e c o n f u s i n g c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e every- s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s b e h a v e s w i t h a n o r i e n t a -
d a y scenes o b s e r v e d . I t is o n l y i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s tion t o w a r d success, b u t leaves o t h e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l t h e p r e s u p -
t h a t we can secure f o r ourselves a n idea o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a r e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is t h e case o f
t h a t c a n g u i d e e m p i r i c a l analysis i n t o c h a l l e n g i n g problems—such m a n i p u l a t i o n that we m e n t i o n e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h perlocutionary
as t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t levels o f society, t h e acts. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e k i n d o f u n c o n s c i o u s d e a l i n g w i t h c o n f l i c t s t h a t
manifestations o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n pathologies, or the development psychoanalysis explains i n terms o f defense mechanisms leads t o
of a decentered understanding of the world. disturbances o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n b o t h the intrapsychic a n d inter-

T h e l i n g u i s t i c demarcation of the levels of reality o f " p l a y " a n d " s e r i - p e r s o n a l levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 8 8


I n s u c h cases, a t least o n e o f t h e

ousness," t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a fictitious reality, w i t a n d p a r t i e s is d e c e i v i n g h e r s e l f a b o u t t h e f a c t t h a t she is a c t i n g w i t h a n

irony, nonliteral and paradoxical uses of language, puns and a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success a n d is m e r e l y k e e p i n g u p t h e a p -

allusions, a n d t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y w i t h d r a w a l o f validity claims at a p e a r a n c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e p l a c e o f s u c h systematically

m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l e v e l — a l l t h e s e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s rest o n i n t e n - distorted communication within the framework of a theory of action

t i o n a l l y confusing modalities o f existence. For the clarification o f the can be seen below.

mechanisms o f d e c e p t i o n t h a t a s p e a k e r has t o m a s t e r i n o r d e r t o
Social actions
do this, f o r m a l pragmatics can c o n t r i b u t e m o r e t h a n even the most
precise e m p i r i c a l description o f the p h e n o m e n a to be explained.
W i t h t r a i n i n g i n t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, t h e g r o w i n g c h i l d
gains t h e ability to demarcate by h i m s e l f the subjectivity o f his o w n Communicative action Strategic a c t i o n
experiences f r o m the objectivity o f o b j e c t i f i e d reality, f r o m t h e n o r -
m a t i v i t y o f society, a n d f r o m t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e m e d i u m o f
language. I n l e a r n i n g to deal hypothedcally w i t h the corresponding
L a t e n t strategic M a n i f e s t strategic
validity claims, he practices d r a w i n g t h e categorial d i s t i n c t i o n s be-
action action
tween essence a n d a p p e a r a n c e , e x i s t e n c e a n d i l l u s i o n , "is" a n d
" o u g h t , " sign a n d m e a n i n g . W i t h these m o d a l i t i e s o f b e i n g , he h i m -
s e l f gets a g r i p o n t h e d e c e p t i v e p h e n o m e n a that initially spring
f r o m t h e i n v o l u n t a r y c o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n his o w n subjectivity, o n t h e Unconscious Conscious
one h a n d , a n d the domains o f the objective, the n o r m a t i v e , a n d the deception deception
intersubjective, o n the other. H e n o w knows h o w one can master the (systematically (manipulation)
confusions, produce de-differentiations intentionally, and employ distorted
t h e m i n fiction, w i t , i r o n y , a n d t h e l i k e . 8 7
communication)

T h e s i t u a t i o n is s i m i l a r w i t h m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f systematically distorted I n the present context, the m a i n advantage o f a f o r m a l pragmatics


communication. H e r e , too, f o r m a l pragmatics can c o n t r i b u t e to the is t h a t i t h i g h l i g h t s , b y m e a n s o f t h e p u r e types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
170 171
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

mediated i n t e r a c d o n , precisely t h o s e aspects u n d e r w h i c h social ( s o l v e d i n t h e r a p e u t i c d i a l o g u e b y a r g u m e n t a t i v e m e a n s . Expressive


a c t i o n s e m b o d y d i f f e r e n t sorts o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e t h e o r y o f c o m m u - | k n o w l e d g e c a n b e e x p l i c a t e d i n t e r m s o f t h o s e values t h a t u n d e r l i e
n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n m a k e g o o d t h e weaknesses w e f o u n d i n W e b e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f needs, a n d o f desires a n d e m o t i o n a l attitudes.
a c t i o n theory, to the extent that i t does n o t r e m a i n fixated on Value standards are d e p e n d e n t i n t u r n o n i n n o v a t i o n s i n t h e d o m a i n
p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y as t h e o n l y a s p e c t u n d e r w h i c h a c t i o n c a n be o f evaluative expressions. These are r e f l e c t e d i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n -
c r i t i c i z e d a n d i m p r o v e d . D r a w i n g o n t h e types o f a c t i o n i n t r o d u c e d ner i n works of art. The aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c t i o n are
a b o v e , I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o c o m m e n t b r i e f l y o n d i f f e r e n t aspects o f s u m m a r i z e d i n t a b l e 2.6.
the rationality o f action. c. T h i s c o m p l e x o f a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s , types o f k n o w l e d g e , and
Teleological actions c a n b e j u d g e d u n d e r t h e aspect o f effectiveness. f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is, o f c o u s e , i n s p i r e d b y W e b e r ' s i d e a t h a t
The rules of action embody technically and strategically usable i n European modernity, with the development o f science, m o r a l i t y ,
knowledge, which can be criticized t h r o u g h reference to truth a n d a r t , stores o f e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m
claims a n d can be i m p r o v e d t h r o u g h a feedback r e l a t i o n to the one another. These flow i n t o various domains o f institutionalized
g r o w t h o f e m p i r i c a l - t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h i s k n o w l e d g e is s t o r e d e v e r y d a y a c t i o n a n d , so t o speak, s u b j e c t t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f r a t i o n a l i -
i n t h e f o r m o f t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d strategies. zation certain action orientations that h a d previously been deter-
Constative speech acts, w h i c h n o t o n l y e m b o d y k n o w l e d g e b u t e x p l i c - m i n e d i n a t r a d i t i o n a l i s t m a n n e r . T h e aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f
i d y represent i t a n d make conversations possible, can be criticized a c t i o n t h a t can be r e a d o f f f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s h o u l d now
u n d e r t h e a s p e c t o f t r u t h . I n cases o f m o r e o b s t i n a t e controversy p e r m i t us t o g r a s p processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n across t h e i r
concerning t h e t r u t h o f s t a t e m e n t s , t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e o f f e r s its w h o l e b r e a d t h , a n d n o l o n g e r solely f r o m t h e selective v i e w p o i n t o f
services as a c o n t i n u a t i o n , w i t h d i f f e r e n t m e a n s , o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d the institutionalization of purposive-rational action.
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W h e n d i s c u r s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n loses I n posing the p r o b l e m i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r , t h e role of implicit
its a d h o c c h a r a c t e r a n d e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e is systematically c a l l e d knowledge is n o t g i v e n its d u e . I t r e m a i n s u n c l e a r w h a t t h e h o r i z o n o f
i n t o q u e s t i o n , w h e n q u a s i - n a t u r a l l e a r n i n g processes a r e guided everyday a c t i o n , i n t o w h i c h the e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e of cultural ex-
t h r o u g h t h e sluice gates o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , c u m u l a t i v e effects r e s u l t .
T h i s k n o w l e d g e is s t o r e d i n t h e f o r m o f t h e o r i e s .
Table 2.6
Normatively regulated actions e m b o d y m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l knowledge Aspects of the rationality of action
a n d can be contested u n d e r t h e aspect o f rightness. L i k e claims t o
Model of
t r u t h , controversial claims to rightness can be m a d e t h e m a t i c a n d Type of knowledge Form of transmitted
e x a m i n e d discursively. I n case o f d i s t u r b a n c e i n t h e r e g u l a t i v e use o f Type of action embodied argumentation knowledge

language, p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e o f f e r s its services as a c o n t i n u a t i o n , Teleological action: Technically and Theoretical Technologies,


w i t h other means, of consensual action. I n moral-practical a r g u m e n - (instrumental, strategic) strategically useful discourse strategies
knowledge
t a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n test b o t h t h e rightness o f a given action i n
Constative speech acts Empirical-theoretical Theoretical Theories
r e l a t i o n to a given n o r m a n d , at the n e x t level, the rightness o f such (conversation) knowledge discourse
a n o r m itself. T h i s k n o w l e d g e is h a n d e d d o w n i n t h e f o r m o f l e g a l Normatively regulated Moral-practical Practical Legal and moral
action knowledge discourse representations
a n d m o r a l ideas.
Dramaturgical action Aesthetic-practical Therapeutic Works of art
Dramaturgical actions e m b o d y a k n o w l e d g e o f t h e a c t o r ' s o w n s u b - knowledge and aesthetic
j e c t i v i t y . T h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d as u n t r u t h f u l , t h a t is, critique

r e j e c t e d as d e c e p t i o n s o r s e l f - d e c e p t i o n s . S e l f - d e c e p t i o n s c a n b e d i s -
172 173
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

p e r t s is i n j e c t e d , l o o k s l i k e , a n d h o w e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a d v e prac- b u t h e d o e s d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f a n e x p r e s -
tices a c t u a l l y c h a n g e w i t h t h i s i n f l u x . T h e c o n c e p t o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d s i o n is r e l a t i v e t o a b a c k g r o u n d o f v a r i a b l e i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e t h a t
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g has t h e a d d i t i o n a l — a n d q u i t e d i f f e r - p a r t i c i p a n t s n o r m a l l y r e g a r d as t r i v i a l a n d o b v i o u s .
ent—advantage o f t h r o w i n g l i g h t o n this b a c k g r o u n d o f i m p l i c i t T h e sense o f t h i s r e l a t i v i t y thesis is n o t t o r e d u c e t h e m e a n i n g o f
k n o w l e d g e t h a t e n t e r s a tergo i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e processes o f i n t e r p r e - a speech act to w h a t a speaker means by i t i n a c o n t i n g e n t context.
t a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n takes p l a c e w i t h i n a l i f e w o r l d t h a t Searle is n o t m a i n t a i n i n g a s i m p l e r e l a t i v i s m o f t h e m e a n i n g of
r e m a i n s a t t h e backs o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t is p r e s e n t linguistic expressions; f o r t h e i r m e a n i n g i n n o w a y c h a n g e s as w e
to t h e m o n l y i n the prereflective f o r m o f taken-for-granted back- pass f r o m o n e c o n t i n g e n t c o n t e x t t o t h e n e x t . R a t h e r , w e discover
g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d n a i v e l y m a s t e r e d skills. the relativity o f the literal m e a n i n g o f a n expression only t h r o u g h a
I f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f t h e last d e c a d e i n socio-, e t h n o - , a n d psy- s o r t o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n t h a t is n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y u n d e r our
c h o l i n g u i s t i c s c o n v e r g e i n a n y o n e r e s p e c t , i t is o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n — c o n t r o l . I t e m e r g e s as a r e s u l t o f p r o b l e m s t h a t o c c u r o b j e c t i v e l y a n d
demonstrated i n various ways—that the collective background have a n u n s e t t l i n g effect o n o u r n a t u r a l w o r l d v i e w . T h i s f u n d a m e n -
k n o w l e d g e a n d c o n t e x t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f speakers a n d h e a r e r s d e t e r - tal b a c k g r o u n d knowledge, w h i c h m u s t tacidy supplement our
mines the interpretation o f their explicit utterances to an e x t r a o r d i - knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically stan-
n a r i l y h i g h d e g r e e . Searle has t a k e n u p t h i s d o c t r i n e o f e m p i r i c a l dardized utterances i f hearers are to be able to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r
p r a g m a t i c s . H e c r i t i c i z e s t h e l o n g - d o m i n a n t v i e w t h a t s e n t e n c e s ac- l i t e r a l m e a n i n g s , has r e m a r k a b l e f e a t u r e s : I t is a n implicit k n o w l e d g e
q u i r e literal meaning solely b y v i r t u e o f t h e r u l e s f o r u s i n g t h e e x p r e s - t h a t c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n a finite n u m b e r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s ; i t is
sions c o n t a i n e d i n t h e m . 8 9
So far, I t o o h a v e c o n s t r u e d t h e m e a n i n g a holistically structured k n o w l e d g e , t h e basic e l e m e n t s o f w h i c h d e f i n e
o f s p e e c h acts as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g i n t h i s sense. C e r t a i n l y , l i t e r a l o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d i t is a k n o w l e d g e t h a t does not stand at our disposal,
m e a n i n g c o u l d n o t be c o n c e i v e d a t a l l i n d e p e n d e n d y o f c o n t e x t u a l to the extent that we cannot make i t conscious a n d place i t i n d o u b t
c o n d i t i o n s ; f o r e a c h t y p e o f s p e e c h a c t t h e r e are general c o n t e x t u a l as w e p l e a s e . W h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s n e v e r t h e l e s s seek t o d o so, t h e n
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e m e t i f t h e s p e a k e r is t o b e a b l e t o a c h i e v e that k n o w l e d g e appears i n the shape o f c o m m o n s e n s e certainties i n
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. B u t these g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s are i n w h i c h M o o r e , for instance, took an i n t e r e s t , 9 0
a n d to w h i c h W i t t g e n -
t u r n s u p p o s e d t o be d e r i v a b l e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f t h e l i n - s t e i n r e f e r s i n h i s r e f l e c t i o n s On Certainty.
g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s e m p l o y e d i n t h e s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts. A s a m a t t e r
W i t t g e n s t e i n calls these c e r t a i n t i e s e l e m e n t s o f a w o r l d v i e w t h a t
o f f a c t , i f f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t o lose its o b j e c t , k n o w l e d g e of
a r e " a n c h o r e d i n a l l m y questions and answers, so a n c h o r e d t h a t I
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s p e e c h a c t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d
cannot touch [them}." 9 1
O n l y t h o s e b e l i e f s t h a t d o n o t fit s u c h
c a n n o t d e p e n d completely o n c o n t i n g e n t b a c k g r o u n d knowledge.
convictions—convictions t h a t are as b e y o n d q u e s t i o n as t h e y a r e
H o w e v e r , Searle has s h o w n — o n t h e basis o f s i m p l e a s s e r t i o n s s u c h f u n d a m e n t a l — a p p e a r t o be a b s u r d . " N o t t h a t I c o u l d d e s c r i b e the
as ' T h e c a t is o n t h e m a t " a n d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as " G i v e m e a system o f these c o n v i c t i o n s . Yet m y c o n v i c t i o n s d o f o r m a system, a n
h a m b u r g e r " — t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s edifice." 9 2
W i t t g e n s t e i n characterizes the dogmatism of everyday
o f t h e assertoric a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y e d t h e r e i n c a n n o t b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d skills i n a w a y s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h
be specified i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e c o n t e x t . O n c e we b e g i n to vary Schütz describes t h e m o d e o f taken-for-grantedness i n w h i c h t h e
relatively deep-seated a n d trivial b a c k g r o u n d assumptions, we n o t i c e l i f e w o r l d is p r e s e n t as a p r e r e f l e x i v e b a c k g r o u n d : ' T h e c h i l d l e a r n s
that the seemingly context-invariant validity conditions change their t o b e l i e v e a h o s t o f t h i n g s . I . e . , i t l e a r n s t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o these
m e a n i n g a n d are t h u s b y n o m e a n s a b s o l u t e . Searle d o e s n o t g o so b e l i e f s . B i t b y b i t t h e r e f o r m s a system o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d , a n d i n
f a r as t o d e n y t o s e n t e n c e s a n d u t t e r a n c e s a n y l i t e r a l m e a n i n g a t a l l ; t h a t system s o m e t h i n g s s t a n d u n s h a k a b l y fast a n d s o m e o r more
174 175

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a r e less l i a b l e t o s h i f t . W h a t s t a n d s fast d o e s so, n o t b e c a u s e i t is T. Farrell, "Language Action. A Paradigm for Communication," Quarterly Journal of
Communication 62 (1976): 333-334.
i n t r i n s i c a l l y o b v i o u s o r c o n v i n c i n g ; i t is r a t h e r h e l d fast b y w h a t l i e s
around it." 9 3
4. J . H e a l , " C o m m o n Knowledge," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978): 116ff.; G. Meggle,
Literal meanings, t h e n , are relative to a deep-seated, implicit ed., Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation (Berlin, 1981).

knowledge, about which w e normally know n o t h i n g b e c a u s e i t is 5. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388. See also "Utterer's
simply u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d does n o t reach i n t o the d o m a i n o f c o m - Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning," a n d "Utterer's Meaning a n d I n -
tentions," both reprinted in H . P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass.,
m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d . " I f t h e t r u e is w h a t
is g r o u n d e d , t h e n t h e g r o u n d is n o t t r u e , n o r y e t f a l s e . " 9 4

6. D . Lewis, Conventions (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).


Searle u n c o v e r s this layer o f w o r l d v i e w k n o w l e d g e functioning in
everyday life as t h e b a c k g r o u n d with which a hearer has to be 7. S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).
f a m i l i a r i f h e is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f s p e e c h acts a n d
8. J . Bennett, Linguistic Behaviour (Cambridge, 1976).
t o a c t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y . H e t h e r e b y d i r e c t s o u r gaze t o a c o n t i n e n t
t h a t r e m a i n s h i d d e n so l o n g as t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n analyzes s p e e c h acts 9. Cf. J . Habermas, "Intentionalistische Semantik," i n Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 307ff.; A . Leist, "Über
f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e speaker w h o relates w i t h h e r utterances einige Irrtümer der intentionalen Semantik," Linguistic Agency, University of Trier,
t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e , s o c i a l , a n d s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s . I t is o n l y Series A, Paper No. 51 (1978). O n the critique of linguistic nominalism, see also K . - 0 .
Apel, "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to T h i n g s , " i n H . Parret and J . Bou-
in t u r n i n g back to the c o n t e x t - f o r m i n g horizon of the lifeworld,
veresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin, 1981), a n d " T h r e e Dimensions of
f r o m within which participants i n communication come to an u n - Understanding and Meaning in Analytic Philosophy," Philosophy and Social Criticism 7
(1980): 115-142.
derstanding with one another about something, that our field of
v i s i o n c h a n g e s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t w e c a n see t h e p o i n t s o f connection 10. K. Bühler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934).
between the theory of action and social theory; the concept of
11. Ibid., p. 28.
s o c i e t y has t o be linked up t o a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t is
c o m p l e m e n t a r y to the concept o f communicative action. T h e n c o m - 12. W. Busse, "Funktionen u n d Funktion der Sprache," i n B . Schlieben-Lange,. ed.,
Sprachtheorie (Hamburg, 1975), p. 207; G . Beck, Sprechakte und Sprachfunktionen
m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b e c o m e s i n t e r e s t i n g p r i m a r i l y as a p r i n c i p l e of
(Tübingen, 1980).
socialization {Vergesellschaftung); a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e , p r o c e s s e s o f
societal rationalization acquire a d i f f e r e n t status. T h e y take place 13. R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A . Sebeok, ed., Style in Language (New
York, 1960), pp. 350-377.
primarily more within the implicitly k n o w n structures o f the life-
world than in explicitly k n o w n action orientations, as Weber 14. P. Watzlawick, J . H . Beavin, and D . D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication
(New York, 1962); H . Hörmann, Psychologie der Sprache (Heidelberg, 1967), and Mei-
suggested. nen und Verstehen (Frankfurt, 1976).

15. K . - 0 . Apel, Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dordrecht,


Notes 1967); see also S. Davis, "Speech Acts, Performance a n d Competence," Journal of
Pragmatics 3 (1979): 497ff.
1. M. B r a n d and D. Walton, eds., Action Theory (Dordrecht, 1976); A . Beckermann,
16. J . Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 i n the present volume.
ed., Analytische Handlungstheorie. Handlungserklarungen (Frankfurt, 1977); G . Meggle,
ed., Analytische Handlungsbeschreibungen (Frankfurt, 1977).
17. K . - 0 . Apel, "Zwei paradigmatische Antworten a u f die Frage nach der L o -
gosauszeichnung der Sprache," in Festschrift für W. Perpeet ( B o n n , 1980).
2. See J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1984), pp. 96ff.
18. See Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 98ff.
3. S. Kanngiesser, "Sprachliche Universalien u n d diachrone Prozesse," i n K . - O . Apel,
19. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans. D . Paul a n d G . E . M . Anscombe (Oxford,
ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt, 1976), p. 278. See also T. Frentz a n d
1969).
176 177

Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

20. M. Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C . Wittich, eds., 2 vols. (Berkeley, 41. Cf. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 in the present volume:
1978), p. 4. Hereafter cited as ES.
With institutionally bound speech acts, specific institutions can always be spe-
21. M. Weber, "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology," Sociological Quarterly 22 cified. With institutionally unbound speech acts, only general contextual condi-
(1981): 151-180. tions . . . typically must be met for a corresponding act to succeed. . . . To explain
what acts of betting or christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting
22. H . Girndt, Das soziale Handeln als Grundkategorie der erfahrungswissenschaftlichen or christening. By contrast, commands or advice or questions do not represent
Soziologie (Tübingen, 1967). institutions but types of speech acts that can fit very different institutions. T o be
sure, the criterion of being institutionally bound does not always permit an
23. ES, p. 4. unambiguous classification. Commands can exist wherever relations of authority
are institutionalized; appointments presuppose special, bureaucratically devel-
oped organizations; and marriages require a single institution (which is, however,
24. ES, p. 26.
to be found universally). But this does not devalue the usefulness of the analytic
viewpoint. Institutionally unbound speech acts, insofar as they have any regulative
25. ES, pp. 24-25.
meaning at all, refer to general aspects of action norms; they are not, however,
defined by particular institutions (pp. 6 0 - 6 1 ) .
26. W. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus (Tübingen, 1979),
p. 192.
42. Cf. D. Wunderlich, " Z u r Konventionalitat von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wun¬
27. £5, p. 327. derlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 16-17; Here, Wunderlich
also provides a linguistic characterization of speech acts in standard form.
28. £5, p. 326.
43. Even the use theory of meaning stemming from the later work of Wittgenstein—
29. ES, pp. 26-36; pp. 319-333. see W. P. Alston, The Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964); Ernst
Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. Gorner (Cambridge,
30. See note 21. 1982)—remains fixated on the solitary employment of sentences. Like Frege's theory
of meaning, it takes its orientation from the noncommunicative use of assertoric
31. [Editor's note:] Habermas's introduction to his Theory of Communicative Action, sentences in foro interno; it abstracts from the interpersonal relations between speak-
vol. 1. ers and hearers who reach understanding with one another about something i n the
world with the aid of communicative acts. Tugendhat justifies this self-limitation of
32. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962). semantics with the argument that the communicative use of language is constitutive
only for special linguistic expressions, in particular for the performative verbs and
33. I shall leave aside the development that speech-act theory underwent i n the for the speech acts formed with them; in the areas essential to semantics, however,
hands of Austin himself [see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 i n the language can be employed in a monological train of thought. T h e r e is in fact an
present volume] and take as my point of departure the interpretation that Searle has intuitively easily accessible distinction between thinking in propositions i n abstraction
given to this theory. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969); D . Wunderlich, from speaker-hearer relations and making interpersonal relations present in the
Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976). imagination. I n imagining stories in which the " I " — a s imagining subject—accords
itself a place in a context of interaction, the roles of participants in communication
34. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 101. in the first, second, and third person—however internalized—remain constitutive for
the sense of what is thought or represented. But solitary thinking in propositions is
35. B. Schieben-Lange, Linguistische Pragmatik (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 86ff. also discursive i n more than a figurative sense. T h i s becomes evident as soon as the
validity, and thereby the assertoric force, of a proposition becomes problematic and
36. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 287ff. the solitary thinker has to move from inferring to devising a n d weighing up hypothe-
ses. H e then finds it necessary to assume the argumentative roles of proponent and
37. M. Meyer, Formale und handlungstheoretische Sprachbetrachtungen (Stuttgart, 1976). opponent as a communicative relation in his thought—as the daydreamer takes up
the narrative structure of speaker-hearer relations when she recalls scenes from
38. M. Schwab, Redehandeln (Königstein, 1980), pp. 28ff. everyday life.

39. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 118. 44. If, for example, a promise were to take the form

40. P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1+) I promise you that I was in H a m b u r g yesterday.
(1964): 439ff.
178 179
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

one of the conditions of grammatical well-formedness would be violated. By contrast, 58. F o r other objections of this kind, see J . T h o m p s o n , "Universal Pragmatics," in
if S uttered the correct sentence (1) in a situation in which it was presupposed that
J . T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., Habermas: Critical Debates ( L o n d o n , 1982), pp. 116-
H could count on a visit from 5 in any case, one of the contextual conditions typically
presupposed for promises would be violated.
59. Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," p. 102; K. G r a h a m , "Belief and the Limits
45. Contributions to speech-act theory from philosophy and linguistics are chiefly of Irrationality," Inquiry 17 (1974): 315ff.
concerned with analyzing these conditions. D. Wunderlich analyzes speech acts of
the type "advising," from the theoretical perspective developed by Searle, in Grund-
60. Searle refers to this argument in Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983), p. 9.
lagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), pp. 349ff.
61. E . Tugendhat, Self Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge,
46. R. Bartsch, too, speaks in this sense of "acceptability conditions" in contrast to Mass., 1986), lectures 5 and 6.
conditions of correctness or validity, in "Die Rolle von pragmatischen Korrekt-
heitsbedingungen bei der Interpretation von Äußerungen," in G . Grewendorf, ed., 62. L . Wittgenstein, Zettel, G . E . M. Anscombe and G . H . von Wright, eds. (Berkeley,
Sprechakttheorie und Semantik (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 217ff. 1970), § § 4 0 4 , 5 4 9 .

47. Surprisingly, Searle also comes close to this view of intentionalist semantics in 63. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, p. 114.
Speech Acts, p. 66. Cf. Schiffer, Meaning.
64. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G . E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
48. Schwab, Redehandeln, p. 65. 1958), p. 222. Cf. S. Hampshire, Feeling and Expression ( L o n d o n , 1961); B. Aune, " O n
the Complexity of Avowals," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America (London, 1965),
49. I n the case of commands or directives, principally for the addressee; in the case pp. 35ff.; D. Gustafson, " T h e Natural Expression of Intention," Philosophical Forum 2
of promises or announcements, principally for the speaker; in the case of agreements (1971): 299ff., and, "Expressions of Intentions," Mind 83 (1974): 321ff.; N. R. Nor-
or contracts, symmetrically for both parties; in the case of advice (with a normative rick, "Expressive Illocutionary Acts," Journal of Pragmatics 2 (1978): 277ff.
content) or warnings, for both sides, but asymmetrically.
65. M. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans and J . McDowell, eds.,
50. O n these speech-act immanent obligations, see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," Truth and Meaning (Oxford, 1976), pp. 67ff.
chapter 1 in the present volume, pp. 85ff.
66. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy.
51. See J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), pp. 31ff. 67. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," p. 81.

52. Because Schwab distinguishes neither between simple and normatively autho- 68. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
rized imperatives—that is, between imperative and c o m m a n d — n o r between
monologically and communicatively employed intentional sentences—that is, be- 69. Ibid., p. 126.
tween intentions and declarations of intention—he draws a mistaken parallel be-
tween imperatives and declarations of intention and distinguishes both from 70. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chaps. 8 and 9.
constative speech acts by virtue of the separation, and hierarchical ordering, of two
types of success: success in the sense of validity and success in the sense of satisfaction. 71. A convincing example of this is P. F. Strawson's analysis of the resentment called
Redehandeln, pp. 72-73, 74ff., 95ff. forth by moral violations, in Freedom and Resentment ( L o n d o n , 1974).

53. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1967): 254ff; cf. D. Folles- 72. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150ff.
dal, "Comments o n Stenius's 'Mood and Language G a m e , ' " Synthese 17 (1967): 275ff.
73. O n e should not, however, make the requirements as strong as T. Ballmer does
54. A . Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5 / 6 (1977): in "Probleme der Klassifikation von Sprechakten," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie
93. und Semantik, pp. 247ff.

55. Ibid., pp. 97-98. 74. J . Searle, " A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts," in Expression and Meaning pp. Iff.

56. Ibid., p. 109. 75. D. Wunderlich, "Skizze zu einer integrierten Theorie der grammatischen u n d
pragmatischen Bedeutung," in Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 51ff.,
57. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax "Was ist das für ein Sprechakt?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie und Semantik,
and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974), pp. 41ff.; A. P. Martinich, "Conversational pp. 275ff., "Aspekte einer Theorie der Sprechhandlungen," in H . Lenk, ed., Hand-
Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems," Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980): 215ff. lungstheorien, vol. 3 (Munich, 1980), pp. 381ff.; B. G . Campbell, "Toward a Workable
180 181
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

Taxonomy of Illocutionary Forces and Its Implication to Works of Imaginative Lit- reaching understanding can succeed only if each speaker undertakes a regulated—
erature," Language and Style 8 (1975): 3ff.; M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared that is, rationally controlled—transition from one attitude (be it objectivating, norm-
Knowledge in Natural Discourse ( L o n d o n , 1981). conformative, or expressive) to the others. S u c h transformations rely on intermodal
invariances of validity. T h i s area of the logic of speech acts has scarcely been studied.
76. O n e measure of the flexibility of a society is the share of the totality of available Why, for example, may we infer from the validity of an expressive speech act M p, e

illocutionary possibilities for linking up action that is made up by institutionally the validity of a corresponding speech act of the form Mcp? I f Peter truthfully
more-or-less bound, idiomatically fixed, ritualized speech acts. T h u s Wunderlich confesses to loving Frances, we feel entitled to accept as true the assertion that Peter
distinguishes speech acts according to whether they depend more o n action norms loves Frances. A n d if, conversely, the assertion that Peter loves Frances is true, we feel
or on action situations (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 86ff.). For this Campbell uses the entitled to accept as truthful Peter's confession that he loves Frances. This transition
dimensions "institutional vs. vernacular" and "positional vs. interactional" (Campbell, could be justified according to the rules of propositional logic only if we could
"Workable Taxonomy"). In this regard, the dimension "initiative vs. reactive" is also assimilate expressive to constative speech acts or (first person) experiential sentences
relevant (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 59ff.). to assertoric sentences. Since we cannot, we have to look for formal-pragmatic rules
for the connections between such speech acts, which appear with the same proposi-
77. O n the speech acts that serve to organize speech, see E . Schegloff, G . Jefferson, tional content in different modes. Table 2.7 is meant merely to illustrate which
and H . Sacks, " A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of T u r n T a k i n g for transitions we intuitively regard as permissable (+) and which not ( - ) . These phe-
Conversation," Language 50 (1974): 696ff., which draws on the work of Harvey Sacks; nomena cannot be explained satisfactorily by the familiar modal logics. However, on
see also Wunderlich, Studien zur Sprechakttheorie, pp. 330ff. the constructivist approach to a pragmatic logic, see C . F. Gethmann, ed., Theorie des
wissenschaftlichen Argumentierens (Frankfurt, 1980), part 3, pp. 165-240; C. E Geth-
mann, Protologik (Frankfurt, 1979).
78. T h e thesis that S, with an illocutionary act, informs the hearer of the execution
of this act, or tells h i m that the act is being executed, could be applied most easily
to this class of speech acts. For a critique of this thesis (which has been advanced by 86. T h i s is the methodological meaning of Searle's "principle of expressibility"; cf.
L e m m o n , Hedenius, Wiggins, D . Lewis, Schiffer, Warnock, Cresswell, and others), Speech Acts, pp. 87-88. Compare T. Binkley, ' T h e Principle of Expressibility," Philoso-
see G . Grewendorf, "Haben explizit performative Äußerungen einen Wahrheit- phy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1979): 307ff.
swert?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie, pp. 175ff. It is, of course, wrong to
assimilate operatives, which express the bringing about of constructive accomplish- 87. J . Habermas, "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der Ich-Abgren-
ments, to constative speech acts. With the former, the speaker connects a claim not zungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation, Interaktion,
to propositional truth but to constructive well-formedness or intelligibility. Identität (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 332ff., "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics,"
Theory and Society 3 (1976): 155-167. See also the empirical study by M. Auwärter and
79. W. Kummer, Grundlagen der Texttheorie (Hamburg, 1975); M. A. K. Halliday, System E . Kirsch, "Die konversationeile Generierung von Situationsdefinitionen im Spiel 4-
and Function in Language: Selected Papers (Oxford, 1976); K. Bach and R. M. H a n i s c h , bis 6-jähriger Kinder," i n W. Schulte, ed., Soziologie in der Gesellschaft (Bremen, 1981),
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, Mass., 1979). pp. 584ff.

80. 'M. Coulthard, An Introduction into Discourse Analysis ( L o n d o n , 1977); L . C h u r c h i l l , 88. J . M. Ruskin, " A n Evaluative Review of Family Interaction Research," Family Process
Questioning Strategies in Sodolinguistics (Rowley, Mass., 1978); J . Schenken, ed., Studies 11 (1972): 365ff. J . H . Weakland, ' T h e Double B i n d Theory: A Reflexive Hindsight,"
in the Organization of Conversational Interaction (New York, 1978); S. Jacobs, "Recent Family Process 13 (1974): 269ff.; S. S. Kety, " F r o m Rationalization to Reason," American
Advances in Discourse Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 450ff. Journal of Psychiatry 131 (1974): 957ff.; D . Reiss, ' T h e Family and Schizophrenia,"
American Journal of Psychiatry 133 (1976): 181ff.
81. D. Hymes, ed., Language in Culture and Society (New York, 1964) and "Models of
the Interactions of Language and Social L i f e , " in J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes, eds.,
Directions in Sodolinguistics (New York, 1972), pp. 35ff.
Table 2.7
Intermodal transfer of validity between speech acts with the same propositional content
82. R. Rommetveit, On Message-Structure (New York, 1974).
To
83. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d tranzendentale Sprachpragmatik," in Apel,
ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, pp. lOff.; Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmat- Constative Expressive Regulative
ics?" speech speech acts speech acts
From acts (truth) (truthfulness) (lightness)
84. See the critical appraisal of the formal-pragmatic approaches of Allwood, Grice,
and myself i n Kreckel, Communicative Acts, pp. 14ff. Constative speech acts (truth) X + -
85. Classification into constative, regulative, and expressive speech acts means that
Expressive speech acts (truthfulness) + X
-X
in each case we attribute one dominant basic attitude to the speaker. I n allowing for
a performative attitude, we take account of the fact that complex processes of
Regulative speech acts (lightness)
- +
182
Chapter 2

3
89. J . Searle, "Literal meaning," in Expression and Meaning, pp. 117ff. See also R. D.
Van Valin, "Meaning and Interpretation," Journal of Pragmatics 4 (1980): 213ff. Communicative Rationality and the Theories of
90. G . E . Moore, "Proof of an External World," Proceedings of the British Academy Meaning and Action (1986)
( L o n d o n , 1939).

91. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §103, p. 16.

92. Ibid., §102, p. 16 [amended translation].

93. Ibid., §144, p. 21.

94. Ibid., §205, p. 28.

O n the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

Charles Taylor's objections to my theory should be seen i n the


c o n t e x t o f his o w n t h e o r y o f language, w h i c h follows i n the t r a d i t i o n
o f W i l h e l m v o n H u m b o l d t ' s w o r k i n t h e same a r e a . 1
. . . [Taylor]
reconstructs m y c o n c e p t i o n o f language accurately f r o m the perspec-
tive o f H u m b o l d t ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
the structure o f language (the linguistic structure or organism of
l a n g u a g e ) a n d p r a c t i c e s o f l a n g u a g e usage ( t h e l i v i n g p r o c e s s o f
s p e e c h ) — i n other words, H u m b o l d t ' s distinction between language
as ergon a n d as energeia—has, o f course, b e e n taken u p by more
r e c e n t t h e o r i e s o f l a n g u a g e (langue v e r s u s parole, l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e -
t e n c e vs. l i n g u i s t i c p e r f o r m a n c e ) . I n t h e p r o c e s s , h o w e v e r , l a n g u a g e
has b e e n d e p r i v e d o f a decisive d i m e n s i o n : the intersubjectivity o f
possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). U n l i k e H u m b o l d t , 2

n e i t h e r Saussure n o r C h o m s k y c o n c e i v e s o f d i a l o g u e (Gespräch ) as 3

t h e c e n t r a l p o i n t o f language. Taylor correctly perceives t h a t t h e


theory of communicative a c t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n a t t e m p t t o
develop a theory o f society f r o m precisely this approach to the
t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e . Yet t h e r e is a t e n s i o n i n H u m b o l d t ' s w r i t i n g s
b e t w e e n t h e basic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s w i t h w h i c h h e w o r k s , w h i c h a r e
g r o u n d e d i n a t h e o r y o f intersubjectivity, a n d the figures of thought
i n w h i c h these are c o u c h e d , w h i c h are t a k e n f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f
t h e s u b j e c t . M y t h e o r y is d r a w n m o r e t o w a r d t h e o n e p o l e , T a y l o r ' s
184 185

Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

m o r e t o w a r d t h e o t h e r . T h i s is t h e s o u r c e o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l does language attain its final d e t e r m i n a t i o n . N o one person


us. B e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g f u r t h e r , t h e r e f o r e , a b r i e f r e v i e w o f t h e issues thinks w i t h a given w o r d exacdy w h a t a n o t h e r person thinks, a n d this
variation, n o matter how slight i t is, skitters t h r o u g h the entire language like
i n v o l v e d is a d v i s a b l e .
concentric ripples over water. A l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is thus simultaneously a
H u m b o l d t c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e status o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m o f n o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g , all agreement i n ideas a n d feelings is simultaneously a
reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n a m a n n e r similar to divergence. I n the m a n n e r i n w h i c h language is m o d i f i e d i n each individual,
H e g e l ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e s p i r i t . L a n g u a g e acts u p o n t h e there is revealed, i n contrast to its previously e x p o u n d e d potency, the power
s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t as a n i n c i s i v e l y m o l d i n g a n d s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e f o r c e o f m a n over i t . 5

w i t h o u t c o n f r o n t i n g h e r as s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y e x t e r n a l — a s is t h e
O f c o u r s e , H u m b o l d t is n o t a n e m p i r i c i s t w h o r o b b e d t h e p r o c e s s
case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h t h e c o n t i n g e n t i n f l u e n c e o f n a t u r e . The
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the rails o n w h i c h i t r u n s a n d a l l o w e d
s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e m a i n t a i n s a n d r e n e w s i t s e l f solely t h r o u g h t h e
the identity o f linguistic meanings to emanate f r o m the i n t e n t i o n s —
linguistic c o m m u n i t y ' s practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e l a n -
arbitrarily iterated a n d reciprocally superseding one another—of
g u a g e system m a k e s s p e e c h acts p o s s i b l e t h a t , i n t u r n , r e p r o d u c e t h e
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l speakers. F o r h i m , t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a c o m -
l a n g u a g e a n d , i n so d o i n g , m a k e i n n o v a t i v e c h a n g e s i n i t , h o w e v e r
m o n p e r s p e c t i v e d o e s n o t dissolve, f o r e x a m p l e , i n t o a series of
i m p e r c e p t i b l e these m a y b e . 4
E v e r y t h i n g else d e p e n d s on which
isolated I-perspectives t h a t are r e f l e c t e d m e r e l y i n o n e another;
m o d e l H u m b o l d t adopts w h e n conceiving o f the m e d i a t i n g u n i t y o f
r a t h e r i t arises e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y (gleichursprunglich) with the inter-
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e a n d s p e e c h p r a c t i c e s . Is l a n g u a g e as a
subjective validity o f linguistic expressions t h a t are identical i n m e a n -
w h o l e a self-referential subject t h a t h o l d s t o g e t h e r t h e l i v i n g process
i n g . B u t H u m b o l d t is n o less adverse t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g l a n g u a g e as
o f l a n g u a g e b y m e a n s o f i t s s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s , o r is t h i s
a t o t a l i t y t h a t w o u l d have t o p r e j u d g e t h e i n i t i a t i v e s a n d "yes" o r " n o "
synthesis a c c o m p l i s h e d solely i n t h e f o r m s t a k e n b y t h e f r a c t u r e d
p o s i t i o n s o f a u t o n o m o u s a n d u n i q u e subjects t h r o u g h a p r e d e t e r -
intersubjectivity o f dialogue (Gespräch)? Humboldt did not com-
m i n e d — f a t e f u l , as i t w e r e — p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H u m b o l d t w a n t s t o
pletely r e l i n q u i s h the m o d e l o f t h e self-referentiality o f t h e active,
d o j u s t i c e t o b o t h aspects: first, to the at once unavoidable a n d
k n o w i n g s u b j e c t . H i s n o t i o n o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r g a n i s m c l e a r l y s t i l l
counterfactual supposition that, i n a given instance, all participants
b e a r s t h e R o m a n t i c t r a i t s o f l a n g u a g e as a n expressive w h o l e t h a t
use t h e same e x p r e s s i o n s i n a s e m a n t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l way, f o r w i t h o u t
e x t e r n a l i z e s its essential p o w e r s a n d assures i t s e l f o f its c r e a t i v e s u b -
this i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n they w o u l d n o t even be able to enter i n t o
j e c t i v i t y b y c o n t e m p l a t i n g these o b j e c t i v a t i o n s . H u m b o l d t ' s c o n c e p -
a d i a l o g u e ; a n d s e c o n d , t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers
tion o f language appears s i m p l y t o be a v a r i a t i o n o n Hegel's c o n c e p t
invariably deviate f r o m the standard m e a n i n g s o f the expressions
o f t h e c o n c r e t e u n i v e r s a l : l a n g u a g e as s u c h r e l a t e s t o t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y
u s e d a n d t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e casts i t s s h a d o w o v e r e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
o f n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e s , a n d these i n t u r n r e l a t e t o c o n c r e t e s p e e c h
achieved agreement.
acts as t h e m o m e n t s o f t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h e p a r t i c u l a r , a n d t h e i n d i v i d -
u a l i n t h e processual web o f relations o f an i n d i v i d u a l totality. I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t T a y l o r d o e s n o t p a y s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n t o
this d i f f e r e n c e . Certainly, " I " a n d "We" perspectives are supposed to
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , H u m b o l d t is not a b l e t o a r t i c u l a t e i n t h e s e c o m p l e m e n t one another; b u t i n Taylor's w o r k the latter ends u p
basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t a k i n g p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e f o r m e r . T a y l o r speaks o f t e m p o r a r y
was o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e t o h i m , b o t h as t h e l i b e r a l p h i l o s o - b r e a c h e s i n a p r o c e s s u a l l y s e c u r e d c o n s e n s u s , so t h a t t h e b r e a k s t h a t
p h e r o f a bourgeois individualism a n d i n his philosophy o f language. h a v e o c c u r r e d w o u l d have t o b e s e a l e d o v e r b y processes o f r e a c h i n g
F o r h e is c o n v i n c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e c a n d e t e c t signs o f t h e R o m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n of
l a n g u a g e i n t h i s view, f o r w h i c h t h e s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d
t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a l a n g u a g e is o n l y s u c h by c o m p a r i s o n , b u t t h a t its
t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y r e s i d e s o n l y i n t h e g i v e n s p e a k e r at a g i v e n t i m e . O n l y i n t h e u n i f y i n g p r o d u c t i v e activities o f a self-referentially o p e r a t i n g
186 187

Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

S p i r i t o f L a n g u a g e are a f i r s t p r i n c i p l e . T h e organic life o f the T h i n g s a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e basic c o n f i g u r a t i o n


linguistic totality branches o u t by way o f t h e s t r u c t u r a l differences o f i n t h e t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h is o n e o f subjects c a p a b l e o f
n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e s i n t o t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f s p e e c h acts, y e t asserts speech a n d action reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g about something i n the
itself w i t h i n these d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s as t h e superordinated universal. w o r l d . W h a t is c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h i s c o n f i g u r a t i o n is t h e r e l a t i o n o f a n
Against this totalizing c o n c e p t i o n o f language, Humboldt righdy " I " t o a n equiprimordial A l t e r E g o . Space o p e n s u p b e t w e e n t h e t w o
brings i n t o play the fractured intersubjectivity o f a m u t u a l u n d e r - for an intersubjectively shared lifeworld; participants i n communica-
s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) t h a t p e r m i t s t h e divergence, w i t h i n t h e suc- t i o n are situated w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f this l i f e w o r l d w h e n they refer
cessfully a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t i t s e l f , o f i n d i v i d u a l l y n u a n c e d t h o u g h t s t o o b j e c t s o r states o f affairs i n t h e w o r l d : " I n o r d e r t o d e s i g n a t e t h i s ,
and feelings. a s e n s u o u s c o n c e p t t h a t n o n e t h e l e s s abstracts f r o m a l l q u a l i t a t i v e
Objective a g r e e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d — t h a t is, a g r e e - differences m u s t be used; a c o n c e p t t h a t embraces the " I " a n d t h e
m e n t , t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h is o p e n t o q u e s t i o n — i s dependent on "You" i n one sphere a n d yet allows f o r a m u t u a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g
b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n intersubjective r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e s p e a k e r d i v i s i o n w i t h i n t h i s s p h e r e . T h e n o t i o n o f space ( r e f e r r i n g t o p e r -
a n d at least o n e h e a r e r c a p a b l e o f a d o p t i n g a c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 6
The s o n a l p r o n o u n s ) is s u c h a c o n c e p t . " T h e s o c i a l space o f a l i f e w o r l d
9

m o d e l o f d i a l o g u e (Gespräch), t a k e n f r o m t h e i d e a l o f P l a t o n i c d i a - i n h a b i t e d i n c o m m o n that opens u p i n the course o f dialogue p r o -


logue, 7
suggests a n o t i o n o f d i a l o g i c synthesis t h a t n o l o n g e r e n - vides t h e key to t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f society p r o p o s e d by t h e t h e o r y o f
sures—in the manner o f the reflexive force of an " I think"—a communication. H u m b o l d t already u n d e r s t o o d s p e e c h acts as c o n -
m o n o l o g i c u n i t y w i t h i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f ideas. R a t h e r , t h e c o m m u - n e c t i n g u p f o r i n t e r a c t i o n ; he conceives o f r e a c h i n g understanding
nicatively achieved consensus relies b o t h o n t h e i d e a l i z i n g supposi- as t h e g e n e r a t i v e mechanism o f socialization (Vergesellschaftung)—
tion of the identity o f linguistic meanings and o n the power of first as t h e m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n ,
negation a n d autonomy of unique, irreplaceable (unvertretbar*) sub- b u t t h e n also as t h e m e d i u m b o t h o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d f o r t h e c o n -
jects f r o m w h o m intersubjective agreement to criticizable validity tinuation o f cultural traditions. Language, worldview, and f o r m of
c l a i m s has t o b e obtained—to be won—in e v e r y case. E v e r y dis- life are e n t w i n e d .
cursively a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s rests o n the power of negation of I h a v e r e c a l l e d these i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e c a u s e o f m y i n t e r e s t i n
independent subjects w h o , i n e n t e r i n g i n t o a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a - a p o i n t m a d e by H u m b o l d t w h o thereby p r e e m p t e d George H e r b e r t
tionship, recognize one another reciprocally as a c c o u n t a b l e s u b - M e a d i n c e r t a i n respects b y a h u n d r e d years. F o r H u m b o l d t a l r e a d y
j e c t s — w h e r e b y a c c o u n t a b i l i t y (Zurechnungsfähigkeit) m e a n s t h a t t h e y c o n c e i v e s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as a m e c h a n i s m t h a t socializes
o r i e n t t h e i r action toward validity claims. a n d individuates i n o n e act. I n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f f r a c t u r e d i n t e r s u b -
Even w h e n a p p l i e d t o l i n g u i s t i c p h e n o m e n a , self-consciousness— j e c t i v i t y — w h i c h d e m a n d o f c o m p e t e n t speakers t h a t they master t h e
t h e basic figure of thought o f the philosophy of the subject—does system o f p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s — s i n g u l a r i z a t i o n is j u s t as
1 0
impossible
n o t offer a s o u n d basis f o r a t h e o r y o f society. I f t h e s u b j e c t , i n w i t h o u t t h e i n e x o r a b l e c o m p u l s i o n t o u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n as is socializa-
k n o w i n g its o b j e c t s , relates a t t h e s a m e t i m e t o itself, i t e n c o u n t e r s tion without concomitant i n d i v i d u a t i o n . Language contains "the
i t s e l f i n a d o u b l e p o s i t i o n : b o t h as a s i n g l e e m p i r i c a l e n t i t y i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i v e r s a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( Verständnis ) w i t h i n t h e s h e l l
11

w o r l d a n d as t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t f a c i n g t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . o f the most i n d i v i d u a l expression;" " i n singling out, it connects." O n


I t e n c o u n t e r s i t s e l f as o n e a m o n g m a n y a n d as o n e a g a i n s t a l l ( H e n - the o t h e r h a n d , the person w h o communicates w i t h others will, i n
rich). B e t w e e n these t w o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e s u b j e c t t h e r e is n o space o r d e r t o step b e y o n d t h e d i v i d i n g b o u n d a r i e s o f h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y , a t
left for the symbolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d , linguistically constituted do- t h e s a m e t i m e also " i n c r e a s e h i s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i n t h i s m o r e elevated
m a i n s o f c u l t u r e , society, a n d s o c i a l i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s . struggle." 1 2
A n d w h a t h o l d s t r u e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s h o l d s to a n even
188 189

Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

g r e a t e r d e g r e e f o r n a t i o n s : " I n its c a p a c i t y f o r d i v i d i n g p e o p l e s , e n m e s h e d w i t h t h e substantive contents o f a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f life,


language unifies the difference between individualities w i t h o u t de- w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r v i s i o n o f t h e g o o d life?
t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e m i n a n y way, b y m e a n s o f t h e m u t u a l u n d e r - T h i s q u e s t i o n l e a d s us b a c k t o t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t , signs o f w h i c h
standing of foreign speech." 1 3
Language compels the i n d i v i d u a t i o n a r e a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t i n H u m b o l d t ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e , a t least
o f peoples a n d i n d i v i d u a l persons, " b u t i n such a w o n d e r f u l way that, o n a r e a d i n g t h a t s t r i c d y takes t h e v i e w p o i n t o f a t h e o r y o f i n t e r s u b -
precisely i n d i v i d i n g , i t awakens a f e e l i n g o f u n i t y ; i t appears i n d e e d jectivity. A c c o r d i n g to such a r e a d i n g , the m o m e n t s o f the universal,
as a m e a n s o f c r e a t i n g u n i t y , a t least as a n i d e a . " 1 4
the particular, a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l are n o l o n g e r b o u n d u p w i t h t h e
T h e i d e a t o w h i c h H u m b o l d t is a l l u d i n g h e r e gives e x p r e s s i o n to o n g o i n g p r o c e s s o f s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f a h i g h e r - l e v e l subjectivity. R a t h e r ,
t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, t o t h e telos i n h e r e n t i n t h e they are released f r o m t h e i r r e l a t i o n to a totality a n d are conceived
v e r y process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h language. T h i s goal o f as e q u i p r i m o r d i a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s o f a p r o c e s s o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n
o f r e a c h i n g u n i v e r s a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g has t o b e c o n v e y e d as a t e n - that moves o u t w a r d radially i n three directions. As a mechanism of
d e n c y o f s o c i e t y as a w h o l e b e c a u s e , a n d i n so f a r as, s o c i e t y m a k e s s o c i a l i z a t i o n , t h e first a c t o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i t s e l f sets i n
use o f t h e m e c h a n i s m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f o r its o w n c o o r - m o t i o n a dialectic o f universalization, particularization, a n d i n d i -
d i n a t i n g purposes. v i d u a l i z a t i o n , a d i a l e c t i c t h a t leaves only t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d particular

Taylor objects at this p o i n t t h a t m y e x p l a n a t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n the p o s i t i o n o f a n i n d i v i d u a l totality. W i t h i n t h e structures o f t h e

r a t i o n a l i t y is false because I e x p l a i n i t i n t e r m s o f a f o r m a l i s t a n d f r a c t u r e d intersubjectivity o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , general

c o g n i t i v i s t e t h i c s , a l t h o u g h h e i n n o way d e n i e s t h a t i t is a p o t e n t i a l structures o f the l i f e w o r l d , collective f o r m s o f life, a n d i n d i v i d u a l life

c o n t a i n e d i n r a t i o n a l s p e e c h . H e r e , T a y l o r is t o o q u i c k t o i n t r o d u c e h i s t o r i e s arise a n d a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . T h e "I" is

p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics i n t o t h e debate. I n m y o p i n i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e r e b y f o r m e d e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y as a s u b j e c t i n g e n e r a l , as a t y p i c a l

r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y its m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l c o m p o n e n t . Every- m e m b e r o f s o c i a l c o l l e c t i v e s , a n d as a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l . T h e u n i v e r -

day c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices e x t e n d across a w i d e r s p e c t r u m of sal, p a r t i c u l a r , a n d i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s r a d i a l l y , as i t

v a l i d i t y ; c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness c o n s t i t u t e o n l y o n e among w e r e , a n d n o l o n g e r as i n t e r l o c k i n g m o m e n t s w i t h i n a t o t a l i t y . T h i s

several aspects o f v a l i d i t y . M o r a l issues arise o n l y w h e n c o n f l i c t s of b e c a m e c l e a r t o H u m b o l d t as a r e s u l t o f h i s s t u d i e s o f t h e c u l t u r a l

a c t i o n are to be resolved w i t h t h e consensus o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s f r o m development o f civilized peoples. 1 5

t h e p o i n t o f view o f this o n e aspect a l o n e . P h i l o s o p h y m a y take m o r a l H e r e , i n d i v i d u a l l a n g u a g e , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f ideas, a n d n a t i o n a l


q u e s t i o n s as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e i n o r d e r t o e x p l a i n t h e m o r a l character are e n t w i n e d i n such a way t h a t i n t e r n a l correspondences
p o i n t o f view, f r o m w h i c h s u c h q u e s t i o n s c a n b e a n s w e r e d ration- obtain between the linguistic worldviews a n d the sociocultural forms
a l l y — t h a t is, b y p r o v i d i n g g o o d r e a s o n s . S u c h a n e t h i c s cannot, o f l i f e o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . H o w e v e r , t h e same n a t i o n a l l a n -
however, exhaust t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f everyday communicative guages n o t o n l y constitute t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f a f o r m o f life, they
p r a c t i c e s b u t c a n o n l y g r a s p i t i n t e r m s o f o n e o f its aspects; m o r e - s e r v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as a m e d i u m t h a t traverses t h e s e b o u n d a r i e s ; a
over, i t c a n o n l y d o t h i s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y . m e d i u m i n w h i c h d i f f e r e n t t o t a l i t i e s — e a c h o n e o f w h i c h is t h e S p i r i t
Taylor c o u l d agree t o these reservations a n d insist nonetheless t h a t o f a P e o p l e — m e e t a n d w h e r e they, f r o m t h e i r o w n respective s t a n d -
his objections can be raised n o t o n l y against a p r o c e d u r a l ethics b u t points, c o m e to an agreement w i t h each other about the w o r l d o f all
a g a i n s t p r o c e d u r a l r a t i o n a l i t y as a w h o l e . T h e case T a y l o r makes t h a t is k n o w a b l e " w h i c h lies i n t h e m i d d l e . " 1 6
Thus, national lan-
a g a i n s t a p r o c e d u r a l e t h i c s is also d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e u n i t y o f c o m - g u a g e s , as f o r m - g i v i n g p r i n c i p l e s g u i d i n g t h e s h a p e t a k e n b y t h e
m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y as w h o l e , w h e n t h i s u n i t y is u n d e r s t o o d m e r e l y individual totality o f each particular worldview a n d o f each particular
p r o c e d u r a l l y . D o e s n o t every c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y have t o r e m a i n way o f l i f e , c o m e i n t o t h e i r o w n o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t , b y v i r t u e o f
191
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Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

their universalist core, they b o t h enable translations to be made a t t h e s a m e time a t t e m p t t o r e c o n n e c t t h e u n i v e r s a l c o r e o f m o r a l i t y


f r o m each language i n t o every o t h e r language a n d d e t e r m i n e the t o t h e e t h i c a l l i f e (Sittlichkeit) o f c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f l i f e . 2 0

p o i n t of convergence toward w h i c h all cultural developments move. O f c o u r s e , t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o u r i s h e d t h r o u g h


In t h i s r e s p e c t , H u m b o l d t speaks o f t h e " c o n s t a n t and uniform the contributions o f communicative action, while the latter simulta-
w o r k " o f the Spirit: "The p u r p o s e o f t h i s w o r k is understanding n e o u s l y is n o u r i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e r e s o u r c e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . H o w -
( Verständnis). T h u s , n o b o d y m a y s p e a k t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n i n a m a n - ever, t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , characterized
n e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m that i n w h i c h the latter, u n d e r identical c o n d i - b y a f r a c t u r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , p r o h i b i t us f r o m i n t u r n i n f l a t i n g t h i s
tions, w o u l d have s p o k e n t o h i m . " 1 7 c i r c u l a r process i n t o a totality. T o t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n
B y p u t t i n g i t t h i s way, H u m b o l d t has a l r e a d y g i v e n a n o r m a t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o l o n g e r m e r e l y c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m
twist t o w h a t , i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t e r m s , is d i s c e r n i b l e — o n t h e basis of action oriented toward reaching understanding but, with the
o f t h e necessarily i d e a l i z i n g suppositions o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action— i n c r e a s i n g r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , is a burden p l a c e d o n t h e
as t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f s p e e c h . O f c o u r s e , t h e grammatically interpretive achievements o f the actors themselves, the universal
regulated worldviews a n d f o r m s o f life appear only i n the p l u r a l ; structures o f the lifeworld stand o u t increasingly sharply f r o m the
h o w e v e r , t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t o t a l i t i e s o v e r w h i c h t h e r e is n o t s o m e f u r - particular c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f f o r m s o f l i f e t h a t s i m p l y o v e r l a p w i t h o n e
ther, overarching supertotality b u t that rather c o r r e s p o n d to one another. I n t h e face o f such totalities, w h i c h i t reduces to a m e r e l y
a n o t h e r i n t h e i r f o r m a l a n d m o s t g e n e r a l structures. Because a l l e m p i r i c a l status, t h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n b y t h e t h e o r y o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v -
lifeworlds have to r e p r o d u c e themselves t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of ity restores to favor the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a n d c o n t e n t dis-
action o r i e n t e d toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the general charac- c r e d i t e d by H e g e l . 2 1

ter o f communicative r a t i o n a l i t y asserts i t s e l f i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r i n s i g h t o f H u m b o l d t ' s t h a t T a y l o r m a y


concrete f o r m s o f life. indeed use a g a i n s t m e j u s t i f i a b l y . I n The Theory of Communicative
If moral philosophy appeals to this universalist p o t e n t i a l of Action, I f a i l e d t o t r e a t p r o p e r l y t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g {welterschliefiend)
s p e e c h — a n d H u m b o l d t d i d i n f a c t use i t as a basis f o r d e r i v i n g f u n c t i o n o f language. I n contrast to theories o f m e a n i n g oriented
s o m e t h i n g like a c o s m o p o l i t a n ethics o f r e a c h i n g understanding — 1 8 t o w a r d i d e a s o f d e n o t a t i o n a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , T a y l o r h i m s e l f has
t h e n i t can develop n o m o r e t h a n a f o r m a l o r p r o c e d u r a l ethics f r o m d e v e l o p e d a n expressivist t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e t h a t goes b a c k t o t h e
i t . I n so d o i n g , m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y has t o a c c e p t t h e f a c t t h a t , w i t h t h e work of Herder, H a m a n n , and H u m b o l d t . 2 2
H e frees t h e l i n g u i s t i c
c o n c e p t o f m o r a l i t y , o n l y o n e o f several g e n e r a l aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y c o n s t i t u t i o n o f worldviews f r o m a f o r e s h o r t e n i n g t h r o u g h a semantic
i n h e r e n t i n linguistically structured forms o f life can be recon- o n t o l o g y i n t e r e s t e d solely i n a g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d preunder-
s t r u c t e d — a n d this only f r o m the reflexive attitude o f a p a r t i c i p a n t standing of r e a l i t y as a w h o l e . Using Humboldt's work, Taylor
i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o considers n o r m a t i v e validity claims h y p o t h e t i - demonstrates h o w every language opens u p a grammatically p r e -
cally. S u c h a n e t h i c s m u s t also c o n c e d e t h a t i t c a n e x p l a i n o n l y t h e s t r u c t u r e d space, h o w i t a l l o w s w h a t is w i t h i n t h e w o r l d t o a p p e a r
formal conditions of valid m o r a l judgments, but not the empirical t h e r e i n a c e r t a i n way, a n d also a t t h e s a m e time makes possible
conditions u n d e r w h i c h m o r a l insights can be p u t i n t o practice. legitimate orders o f interpersonal relationships a n d the spontaneous
E v e r y u n i v e r s a l i s t m o r a l i t y is d e p e n d e n t o n s t r u c t u r a l l y a n a l o g o u s self-presentation o f creative-expressive subjects. "World-disclosure"
f o r m s o f life to c o m p l e m e n t a n d supplement i t . T h e circumstances m e a n s f o r T a y l o r , as f o r H u m b o l d t , t h a t l a n g u a g e is t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e
u n d e r w h i c h i t c a n c o u n t o n t h i s is less a m a t t e r f o r m o r a l philoso- o r g a n n o t o n l y o f t h o u g h t , b u t also o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s a n d o f e x p e -
p h y t h a n f o r social t h e o r y . 1 9
One c a n n o t , h o w e v e r , as T a y l o r pro- r i e n c e , o f t h e f o r m a t i o n o f ego a n d g r o u p i d e n t i t i e s . A n d yet T a y l o r
poses, d e v e l o p a n e t h i c s o f l a n g u a g e o n a H u m b o l d t i a n p l a n e and here again tends to totalize this world-disclosing function of lan-
192 193
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

g u a g e . I n so d o i n g , h e s u c c u m b s t o a n e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! p e r s p e c t i v i s m h a v e b e e n l e d , t h r o u g h o v e r g e n e r a l i z i n g t h e s p e c i a l case o f a c t i o n
t h a t H u m b o l d t h i m s e l f avoids. o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n t o c a r r y i n g t h e social
H u m b o l d t c o n c e i v e s o f t h e d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d v i e w s as con- aspect o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d validity i n t o t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
verging rays t h a t i l l u m i n a t e o n e a n d t h e s a m e w o r l d as " t h e s u m o f a n d falsely m a k i n g i t i n t o t h e c e n t r a l a s p e c t o f l a n g u a g e i t s e l f . 2 5

t h e k n o w a b l e . " T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e is p o s s i b l e due to i n n e r w o r l d l y Z i m m e r m a n n f a i l s t o see t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s p r o v i d e s s o l u t i o n s


l e a r n i n g processes i n w h i c h t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f o r c e o f a n i n t e r - t o p r o b l e m s t h a t have arisen i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l t r a d i t i o n d a t i n g b a c k
p r e t i n g language has first to prove its worth w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . O f t o F r e g e . I f m y p r o p o s a l s a r e c o n c e i v e d o f as a n i n t e r n a l l y m o t i v a t e d
c o u r s e , as t h e system o f r u l e s f o r a g i v e n l a n g u a g e c h a n g e s , so too d e v e l o p m e n t o f f o r m a l semantics, this m i g h t h e l p t o o v e r c o m e cer-
d o t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f validity f o r t h e sentences that can be f o r m u - tain barriers to their being understood and accepted. 2 6
I shall sub-
lated i n that language. B u t w h e t h e r such conditions o f validity are s e q u e n d y discuss a d i f f i c u l t y i n t h e analysis o f i m p e r a t i v e s t h a t has
actually satisfied t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t t h e sentences can f u n c t i o n i n the m e a n t i m e p r o m p t e d m e to a m e n d my theory.
w i t h i n t h e i r language games d e p e n d s n o t o n l y o n the world-disclos-
T o start w i t h , a few key w o r d s c o n c e r n i n g the most i m p o r t a n t
i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e b u t also o n t h e i n n e r w o r l d l y effects o f t h e
stages o n t h e p a t h f r o m f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . 2 7

p r a c t i c e s t h a t i t f o r its p a r t m a k e s p o s s i b l e . Because a l l o t h e r f u n c -
T h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e is F r e g e ' s t h e o r y , w h i c h e m e r g e s o u t o f a
t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e ( t h a t is, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e
d o u b l e c r i t i q u e o f psychologism a n d reference semantics. M e a n i n g s
t a k i n g u p o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d t h e expressive self-pres-
a r e t o b e a n a l y z e d o n t h e basis o f t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e i r
entation o f speakers) are i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h criticizable
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as s o m e t h i n g o b j e c t i v e a n d p u b l i c l y accessible.
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — a n d also t h e c u l -
I t is n o l o n g e r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t b y a n a m e t h a t is t h e
tures o f experts that emerge o u t o f t h e m — c a n develop an i n d e -
m o d e l f o r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n sen-
p e n d e n t l o g i c (Eigensinn) that transcends all local boundaries. T h u s ,
t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e s e n t e n c e f o r m s t h e
the m o d e s o f action constituted by a linguistic worldview operate i n
m o s t e l e m e n t a r y u n i t c o n s t i t u t i n g m e a n i n g . T h e decisive step t h e n
the l i g h t o f a communicative rationality that imposes o n the partici-
is t o l i n k m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f t r u t h (Wahrheitsgel¬
p a n t s a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d i n t h i s way t r i g g e r s
tung). T a k i n g a s i m p l e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e , F r e g e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis
l e a r n i n g processes w i t h p o s s i b l e r e a c t i v e effects o n t h e antecedent
f u n d a m e n t a l f o r t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics: o n e understands the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . T a y l o r is w r o n g t o a l l o w t h i s p r o b l e m -
m e a n i n g o f a sentence i f one knows the conditions u n d e r w h i c h the
solving capacity o f language t o d i s a p p e a r b e h i n d its c a p a c i t y for
s e n t e n c e is t r u e . I n t h i s r e g a r d , F r e g e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e assertoric
w o r l d disclosure. 2 3

force that makes a sentence a n assertion f r o m t h e p r e p o s i t i o n a l


c o n t e n t o f w h a t is s t a t e d i n i t . What h a s b e e n asserted c a n b e c o m -
P r o b l e m s i n the T h e o r i e s o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n pletely explicated w i t h reference to the t r u t h conditions; all the
a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e a d d s t o t h i s is that t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e considered
P r o p o n e n t s o f f o r m a l semantics are challenged by the p r o p o s i t i o n t o b e s a t i s f i e d . T h e p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e "p" expresses b o t h a t
that reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n language terminates i n the intersub¬ once.
j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n d is t h e r e f o r e a F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e analysis o f l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s c a n confine
phenomenon t h a t c a n n o t b e g r a s p e d b y a s e m a n t i c analysis o f t h e itself t o a n a l y z i n g sentences a n d can abstract f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c
m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s , b u t r a t h e r necessitates a p r a g m a t i c analysis o f r u l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s s e m a n t i c
successful u t t e r a n c e s . R o l f Z i m m e r m a n n has c r i t i c i z e d t h e t h e o r y o f a b s t r a c t i o n , F r e g e also m a k e s a less c o n s p i c u o u s c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c -
communicative action f r o m this p o i n t o f view. 2 4
H e believes t h a t I tion, whereby he reduces all meanings to prepositional contents
194 195
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality and the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

and, i n d i r e c d y , t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric sentences o r p r o p o s i - abstraction, let alone the semantic one. For the verificationist proce-
tions. A t h i r d a b s t r a c t i o n is d u e t o t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , d u r e t h a t h e proposes i n o r d e r to establish t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s can be
w h i c h Davidson w i l l later e x p l a i n w i t h t h e h e l p o f Tarski's t h e o r y o f c a r r i e d o u t m o n o l o g i c a l l y a n d is g e a r e d solely t o t h e t r u t h c o n d i -
t r u t h , s t r i p p i n g i t o f the Platonist c o n n o t a t i o n s prevalent i n Frege's tions o f assertoric sentences. V e r i f i c a t i o n c a n n o t yet be e q u a t e d w i t h
w o r k . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h are c o n s t r u e d p u r e l y semantically, the intersubjective p u t t i n g i n t o effect o f a discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f
e x p l a i n w h a t makes a sentence t r u e , a n d d o n o t , f o r instance, e x t e n d different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
epistemically to a knowledge o f t r u t h conditions attributable to a T h e post-Wittgensteinian m o d a l theories that nonetheless l i n k u p
s p e a k e r o r a h e a r e r . As a r e s u l t o f these a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e s p h e r e of w i t h F r e g e ' s ideas, s u c h as t h o s e p u t f o r w a r d b y S t e n i u s , K e n n y ,
a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is i n i t i a l l y p r e t t y r e s t r i c t e d . 2 8
The T u g e n d h a t , a n d o t h e r s , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x t h e
f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is d r i v e n f o r w a r d b y c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n : t h e i n t e n t i o n h e r e is t o m a k e accessible t h e
a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x these abstractions a n d ultimately to overcome " f o r c e s " — n o w u n d e r s t o o d as i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s — t o a p u r e l y se-
t h e m . L e t m e r e m i n d y o u ( i n reverse o r d e r ) o f D u m m e t t ' s v e r i f i c a - m a n t i c analysis. T h e s i m p l e o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f A u s t i n ' s t w o " d i r e c -
t i o n i s t t h e o r y , w h i c h gives u p t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o a n o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p - tions o f fit" u n d e r l i e s t h i s a p p r o a c h ; t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s
tion o f t r u t h , o f t h e m o d a l theories f r o m Stenius to Searle, w h i c h t h e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a n d t h e i m -
e x p a n d Frege's a p p r o a c h t o i n c l u d e t h e analysis o f nonassertoric p e r a t i v e f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s t h e a d j u s t m e n t o f states o f a f f a i r s t o fit
forces, a n d o f A u s t i n ' s speech-act theory, w h i c h d r o p s t h e semantic s e n t e n c e s . T h i s m o d e l has t h e a d v a n t a g e o f i n t r o d u c i n g e a c h o f t h e
abstraction once a n d f o r all. Finally, I u n d e r s t a n d f o r m a l pragmatics f u n d a m e n t a l modes w i t h reference to "conditions o f satisfaction."
as a t h e o r y t h a t succeeds i n o v e r c o m i n g e v e n t h e b a r r i e r s o f t h e H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h these c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t e r m s
empiricist ontology within w h i c h all three o f the aforementioned o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d success c o n d i t i o n s , respectively, t h e y n o n e -
developments o f f o r m a l semantics still move. theless c o n t i n u e t o b e b a s e d o n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
D u m m e t t links t r u t h conditions to the knowledge that speakers l a n g u a g e as a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d , a n d t h u s r e m a i n r e s t r i c t e d t o
a n d h e a r e r s have o f t h e m . T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d r e m a i n i n e f f e c - t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . O n
tive f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i f t h e y w e r e n o t this c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces d o n o t have to be conceived o f
k n o w n as s u c h c o n d i t i o n s . N o w , t h i s t u r n away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e as m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s , t h a t is, p r a g m a t i c a l l y , w i t h t h e r e s u l t
c o n d i t i o n s that make a sentence t r u e i n favor o f the epistemic con- that the semantic a b s t r a c t i o n r e m a i n s u n t o u c h e d . T h i s also, of
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker a n d h e a r e r are able t o i d e n t i f y a n d course, explains the l i m i t e d e x p l a n a t o r y p o t e n t i a l o f this approach.
r e c o g n i z e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is s u p p o s e d n o t o n l y t o e x p l a i n t h e u n - F o r t h e w h o l e b r e a d t h o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s c a n i n n o way be
d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences. I t is i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o e x t e n d derived f r o m the assertoric-imperative double m o d e . Even the most
the s p h e r e o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s t o i n c l u d e types o f elaborately w o r k e d o u t t a x o n o m y 2 9
does n o t succeed i n e m b r a c i n g
s e n t e n c e s t h a t h a d h i t h e r t o e l u d e d analysis. I f , n a m e l y , t h e r e a s o n s e v e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o d e s o r classes o f s p e e c h act: n o r m a t i v e
t h a t t h e speaker can p r o v i d e f o r t h e possible t r u t h o f a sentence are obligations, orders, a n d declarations a l l evade—as d o expressive
c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r its m e a n i n g , a n d i f i n t h i s w a y t h e m e a n i n g o f a u t t e r a n c e s — a n a t t e m p t at classification t h a t operates using exactly
s e n t e n c e is l i n k e d b y w a y o f p o t e n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o its v a l i d i t y , i n t w o r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n so
t h e sense o f t r u t h , t h e n c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s , m o d a l i z e d state- d o i n g , r e m a i n s b o u n d to the l o g o c e n t r i s m o f Frege's semantics. 30

m e n t s , s t a t e m e n t s w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x , a n d so f o r t h a r e a l l o p e n e d I n t h e e n d i t is A u s t i n w h o , f o l l o w i n g t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , takes
u p to an investigation based o n t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. With t h e decisive step t o w a r d a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts a n d o v e r c o m e s t h e
t h i s m o v e , D u m m e t t has n o t y e t d o n e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o g n i t i v i s t semantic abstraction. H e resolutely replaces t r u t h semantics w i t h a
197
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Chapter 3 Communicadve Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d r e p l a c e s t h e analysis o f s e n t e n c e s w i t h interest i n t h e o r y ; despite this, however, i t r e m a i n e d e n t r e n c h e d i n


a n analysis o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . T h i s p r o v i d e s h i m the framework o f an empirical pragmatics, w h i c h could not match
w i t h t h e scope to u n c o u p l e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces f r o m the p r o t o - the insights p r o v i d e d by f o r m a l semantics o r linguistic p h e n o m e n o l -
t y p i c a l case o f a n assertoric s e n t e n c e . A u s t i n b e g i n s t o f r e e h i m s e l f ogy. L a n g u a g e g a m e s , a n d s p e e c h acts as t h e i r e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s ,
f r o m an ontology t h a t is g e a r e d e x c l u s i v e l y t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e c o u l d b e s u b j e c t e d o n c e a g a i n t o f o r m a l analysis o n l y w h e n a p o i n t
w o r l d as a t o t a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d t h a t r e s u l t s i n o f r e f e r e n c e was successfully s e c u r e d f o r s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y t h a t was
special emphasis b e i n g p l a c e d o n assertoric sentences a n d p r o p o s i - as o b j e c t i v e as t h a t a t t a i n e d b y f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s w i t h its l i n k i n g o f
t i o n a l t r u t h . H i s c o n c e p t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o p e n s u p t h e entire m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f t r u t h . Searle r e t u r n e d t o f o r m a l
s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h t o l i n g u i s t i c analysis. W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s thesis t h a t s e m a n t i c s f o r t h i s r e a s o n . A s w e h a v e s e e n , a n a l t e r n a t i v e is a v a i l a b l e
m e a n i n g is t o b e s o u g h t n o t i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e s t o s o m e - t o us i f w e f o l l o w H u m b o l d t ' s t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e c o n s t i t u -
t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d , b u t r a t h e r i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d use o f t i o n o f language, for this retains the idea o f a r e l a t i o n between the
t h e s e s e n t e n c e s h a d d i r e c t e d t h e a t t e n t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c analysts t o various linguistically constituted worldviews a n d an objective w o r l d .
t h e w e a l t h o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s t h a t r e g u l a t e " g r a m m a t i c a l l y " t h e use I n h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r a g m a t i c s , K a r l - O t t o A p e l has always e n e r g e t i -
o f s e n t e n c e s i n t h e c o n t e x t o f f o r m s o f l i f e . Yet, t h i s l i b e r a t i n g t u r n cally a r t i c u l a t e d this universalist core i n t h e face o f t h e p l u r a l i s m o f
away f r o m t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s b a c k t o t h e c o n t e x t s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s language games.
o f t h e l i f e w o r l d d i d n o t o n l y p u s h t o o n e side a l l t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s o f T a k i n g A p e l as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e , I t h e n f o r g e d a l i n k t o
Frege-Davidsonian semantics; i n g i v i n g u p the reference to t h e ob- A u s t i n ( a n d t h e early Searle) by
j e c t i v e w o r l d , i t also r e n o u n c e d a n y internal r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n mean-
i n g a n d v a l i d i t y — o r rather, i t assimilated a f o r m o f validity that h a d a. p r o v i d i n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r B i d d e r ' s l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s i n t e r m s o f

b e e n e q u a t e d w i t h v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , t o t h e social v a l i d i t y a theory o f validity;

o f c u l t u r a l practices. T h a t m a y have b e e n sufficient f o r a n investiga- b. generalizing the objective c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h conditions to an


tion m o t i v a t e d solely b y a t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e r e s t . Yet a n y o n e w h o m a i n - i d e a o f v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ( i n c l u d i n g n o r m a t i v e Tightness
tained a n interest i n explanation a n d wished to elaborate a use a n d s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit)), while renouncing the
t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g i n t h e f o r m o f a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts w i t h o u t a t ontology of one world;
t h e s a m e time s u r r e n d e r i n g l i n g u i s t i c analysis t o t h e task o f e t h n o l i n -
c. t a k i n g f u r t h e r t h e epistemic turn inaugurated by Dummett
guistic description o f family resemblances—in t h e w i d e r sense o f
t h r o u g h c o n n e c t i n g these c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y w i t h a n intersubjec¬
ethnolinguistic—was faced w i t h the objection that, f o r every sen-
tive c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t a t i o n ; i n order
tence, t h e r e are i n n u m e r a b l e c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t ways o f u s i n g i t .
finally to
B e c a u s e A u s t i n d i d n o t i n a n y way w i s h t o sacrifice t o c o n t e x t u a l i s m
d . r e c o g n i z e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f s p e e c h acts as t h e l i n -
t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e o r y , h e h a d to search f o r a systematically
guistic expression o f the raising o f validity claims that can be re-
m o t i v a t e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h a c t s — f o r general r u l e s f o r t h e t y p i -
d e e m e d i n discourse.
c a l use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . W i t h t h i s , t h e p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l
p r a g m a t i c s was b o r n , a t least. I have e l a b o r a t e d this idea i n t h e shape o f a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y
of meaning.
A d m i t t e d l y , A u s t i n ' s o w n analyses o f types o f l a n g u a g e use, w h i c h
I t proceeds f r o m the simple n o t i o n t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d a speech
he carried o u t inductively, d i d n o t lead to theoretical generaliza-
act i f w e k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e i t a c c e p t a b l e . W h a t is a t issue
t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e systematics o f l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s , d e v e l o p e d
h e r e are objective c o n d i t i o n s o f validity t h a t may n o t be i n f e r r e d
b y R o m a n J a k o b s o n f o l l o w i n g K a r l B u h l e r , was m o t i v a t e d b y an
199
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Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

directly f r o m t h e semantic c o n t e n t o f t h e linguistic expressions used, "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n — a r e able t o t a k e o n f u n c t i o n s o f a c t i o n c o o r -


b u t o n l y as m e d i a t e d b y t h e e p i s t e m i c c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker d i n a t i o n i n t h e first place. W h a t distinguishes t h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n by
for the validity o f her utterance i n the performance o f her illocu- f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s f r o m t h a t o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is t h e i n s i g h t i n t o
tionary act. T h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m rests o n a r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l r e a - the internal connection between understanding (Verstehen) and
sons w i t h w h i c h i t c a n , i f necessary, b e r e d e e m e d i n d i s c o u r s e . The r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). T h i s does n o t m e a n , how-
reasons i n t e r p r e t the validity c o n d i t i o n s a n d , to this e x t e n t , are ever, as J e f f r e y A l e x a n d e r has c o n t e n d e d , 3 1
that I i n anyway confuse
themselves part of the conditions that render the validity claim l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a n d a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis).
w o r t h y o f intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n a n d make a corresponding To u n d e r s t a n d a n expression, however, means t o k n o w h o w one
u t t e r a n c e acceptable. O n l y w i t h t h i s step is t h e t u r n away f r o m c a n m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e
formal semantics to p r a g m a t i c s — i n i t i a t e d by Wittgenstein and a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . O n e c a n a l r e a d y see f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r un-
A u s t i n — t r u l y effected, a n d f u r t h e r m o r e i n such a way t h a t t h e cog- derstanding l i n g u i s t i c expressions t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n be
nitivist a n d objectivist abstractions, too, can be overcome completely. c a r r i e d o u t w i t h the h e l p o f such expressions are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
T h i s i n t u r n necessitates a r e v i s i o n o f t h e basic o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s reaching understanding, t h a t is, t o w a r d a c h i e v i n g a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i -
t h a t have b e c o m e established i n p h i l o s o p h y , b u t I d o n o t w a n t t o go vated agreement between participants i n communication about
i n t o this here. s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . O n e w o u l d h a v e u t t e r l y f a i l e d t o grasp w h a t
T h i s b r i e f review o f the h i s t o r y o f the t h e o r y o f language was i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e i f o n e d i d n o t k n o w
i n t e n d e d merely to show that t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c ex- t h a t t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o serve t h e p u r p o s e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
pressions already requires a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d validity claims a n d a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , t h a t is, o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a g r e e m e n t — a n d the
t h a t a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e is a l r e a d y i n h e r e n t i n l i n g u i s t i c c o n c e p t o f a g r e e m e n t i n v o l v e s its " b e i n g v a l i d " f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s .
processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as s u c h . I f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a T h e d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . I r e g a r d Z i m m e r -
s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d s o n k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r its a c c e p t a b i l i t y , m a n n ' s v i e w t h a t t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is carried into
t h e n t h e speaker's i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d p o i n t s t o the g e n u i n e sphere o f speaking a n d linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m
t h e f u r t h e r a i m t h a t t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d accept h e r speech-act offer. t h e d o m a i n o f s o c i a l a c t i o n as a n e m p i r i c i s t m i s c o n c e p t i o n . 3 2
The
A c c e p t a n c e o r a g r e e m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e h e a r e r is e q u i v a l e n t t o o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s
r e c o g n i t i o n o f a v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. I t is b a s e d o n of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f under-
t h e g o o d reasons t h a t t h e speaker offers i n o r d e r to r e d e e m the s t a n d i n g language itself.
validity c l a i m i n discourse ( o r else o n a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y issued b y S o m e o n e t r a i n e d i n f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is l i k e l y t o p r e s e n t s i m p l e
t h e s p e a k e r t h a t she c o u l d p r o v i d e s u c h reasons, i f n e c e s s a r y ) . A n d i m p e r a t i v e s as a n i n c i s i v e e x a m p l e d i s p r o v i n g m y thesis. F o r i t a p -
t h e h e a r e r , w i t h h i s "yes" t o a v a l i d i t y c l a i m h e has a c c e p t e d as w o r t h y p e a r s t o b e t h e case t h a t a f o r e i g n e r w h o has j u s t a r r i v e d i n t o w n
o f r e c o g n i t i o n — t h a t is, w i t h h i s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e speech-act o f f e r — already understands a child's (begging) request, "Give m e some
also takes u p o n h i m s e l f , as a r u l e , c e r t a i n o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e money," i f he knows the conditions u n d e r w h i c h the action re-
s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n , s u c h as o b l i g a t i o n s t o m e e t a r e q u e s t , t o t r u s t quested w o u l d be c a r r i e d o u t successfully. 33
I t l o o k s as t h o u g h a
a confession, to believe a statement, t o rely o n a p r o m i s e , o r t o obey n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is n o t i n v o l v e d h e r e a t a l l , o r r a t h e r t h a t i t
a n order. F o r this does have consequences f o r t h e f u r t h e r course o f o n l y t h e n comes i n t o play w h e n we take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p r a g m a t i c
t h e i n t e r a c t i o n — w h e t h e r w i t h t h e speaker o r w i t h o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h e s p e e c h a c t — s e m a n t i c a l l y a n a l y z a b l e as a
o r p e r s o n s a f f e c t e d ; a n d i t e x p l a i n s w h y l i n g u i s t i c acts o f r e a c h i n g request—can b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y as b e g g i n g . 3 4
Against
u n d e r s t a n d i n g — w h i c h have as t h e i r c o r e a speech-act o f f e r a n d a s u c h a c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e r e a d i n g I w a n t t o s t i c k b y t h e analysis c a r r i e d
200 201
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality and the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

o u t i n The Theory of Communicative Action? 5


Knowledge o f the condi- M y m i s t a k e was t o t r e a t t h i s l i m i t case o f a p u r e i m p e r a t i v e b a c k e d
tions o f success, w h i c h a r e t o b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l u p b y p o w e r as a class o f s p e e c h acts i n its o w n right. I n d o i n g so, as
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e i n q u e s t i o n , is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n o r d e r Z i m m e r m a n n , T u g e n d h a t , a n d Skjei p o i n t o u t , I g o t caught u p i n
t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g , t h a t is, t h e specifically c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . I have already revised this p o s i t i o n i n m y r e p l y t o
imperative character o f the request. Rather, the hearer must u n d e r - Skjei: 3 7
I now regard simple or normatively nonauthorized impera-
stand t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t authorizes t h e speaker to m a k e t h e tives as a p a r a s i t i c a l c a s e . 38
A s a s o c i o l o g i s t I o u g h t t o have k n o w n
d e m a n d , t h e r e b y l e g i t i m a t i n g h e r e x p e c t a t i o n i n t h e first p l a c e t h a t t h a t a c o n t i n u u m o b t a i n s b e t w e e n p o w e r t h a t is m e r e l y e s t a b l i s h e d
t h e addressee has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d o f h i m . as a m a t t e r o f f a c t a n d p o w e r t h a t has b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o n o r -
O t h e r w i s e t h e h e a r e r lacks a n y k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h i s m a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , all i m p e r a t i v e s t o w h i c h we a t t r i b -
a g r e e m e n t ; i t is t h i s a g r e e m e n t w h i c h first j u s t i f i e s h i s t a k i n g o n o f ute a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y force can be analyzed a c c o r d i n g to the m o d e l
o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n — i n t h i s case, h a n d - o f n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d imperatives. W h a t I w r o n g l y t o o k to be a
i n g o v e r " s o m e m o n e y . " A k n o w l e d g e o f (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success difference i n category n o w shrinks to a difference i n degree. T h e
m u s t be a c c o m p a n i e d by a k n o w l e d g e o f (b) the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r b a n k robber's imperative, sanctioned by his " H a n d s U p ! , " belongs to
w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r has r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d as v a l i d ( t h a t is, as n o r m a - t h o s e limit cases o f a m a n i f e s t i y s t r a t e g i c use o f s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h
tively j u s t i f i e d ) a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t (a)—for example, t h e m i s s i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is r e p l a c e d b y a n a p p e a l t o a r e s e r v o i r
t h a t c h i l d r e n a r e a l l o w e d t o b e g f r o m f o r e i g n e r s i n t h e streets o f o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s . T h i s m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use is p a r a s i t i c a l t o
Lima. 3 6
the e x t e n t t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e e c h act o f t h i s k i n d involves
N o w , w h a t is decisive h e r e is t h a t w e c a n n o t c o n c e i v e o f any c o n d i t i o n s that are d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h n o r m a -
s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a r e q u e s t w o u l d b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e as s u c h w i t h - tively a u t h o r i z e d , n o n d e g e n e r a t e imperatives can be used. 3 9

out i t being authorized or backed u p b y some kind of n o r m a t i v e I n g e n e r a l , t o b e s u r e , t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts f u n c -


b a c k g r o u n d , h o w e v e r w e a k t h i s m a y b e ; e v e n i f i t is o n l y t h e a u t h o - t i o n s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f l a t e n d y strategic a c t i o n : t h e speaker m a y
rizing n o r m that one should help people or c h i l d r e n i n distress—or n o t " a d m i t t o " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t h e wishes t o trigger i n t h e
h u m a n b e i n g s as s u c h — w h e r e b y " b e i n g i n n e e d o f h e l p " is i t s e l f o n e hearer i n the f o r m o f obligations relevant f o r the sequel o f interac-
o f the pragmatic presuppositions u n d e r l y i n g a request. A d m i t t e d l y tion, as t h e side effects o f a c o n s e n s u s t h a t is s e e m i n g l y achieved
t h e r e is t h e l i m i t case o f n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s , communicatively. However, the objections raised by A l e x a n d e r i n his
s u c h as t h a t o f t h e b a n k r o b b e r who threatens the b a n k teller, essay h a v e s h o w n m e y e t a g a i n t h a t m y use o f A u s t i n ' s t e r m s " p e r l o -
c o m m a n d i n g h e r t o h a n d o v e r m o n e y . I n s u c h cases, t h e c o n d i t i o n s c u t i o n a r y " a n d " i l l o c u t i o n a r y , " d i v e r g i n g as i t d o e s f r o m e s t a b l i s h e d
o f n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y m u s t b e replaced b y s a n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s that p h i l o s o p h i c a l usage, leads t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h i s p r o m p t s m e
complete the acceptability conditions. T h e robber's "Hands U p ! , " to provide some terminological clarifications.
e x c l a i m e d w h i l e p o i n t i n g a r e v o l v e r , s h o w s t h a t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m has
To begin with, I want to distinguish more clearly between the
b e e n r e p l a c e d b y a p o w e r c l a i m a n d t h a t t h e i m p e r a t i v e is t o be
immediate i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m (or, as t h e case m a y b e , success) o f t h e
u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense o f a f a c t u a l e x p r e s s i o n o f w i l l , w h e r e b y one
speaker—namely, that the hearer understands her utterance—and
p e r s o n ' s w i l l is s i m p l y i m p o s e d o n t h e w i l l o f a n o t h e r . I n t h i s case,
t h e m o r e far-reaching a i m t h a t t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s h e r u t t e r a n c e as
the reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions contingendy linked with the
v a l i d a n d t h e r e b y takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l of
i m p e r a t i v e p r o v i d e s t h e s p e a k e r w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e has
i n t e r a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y success i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense consists i n
g o o d reasons t o c o n f o r m .
understanding (Verstehen), whereas i l l o c u t i o n a r y success i n the
202 203

Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

broader sense consists i n a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t has a c o o r d i n a t i n g o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s t e r m i n o -


e f f e c t , t h a t is, i n t h e success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n . I h a d h i t h e r t o t e r m e d l o g i c a l r e v i s i o n , i t is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e t o assign all p e r f o r a t i o n s t o
o n l y t h o s e effects " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " t h a t are n o t r e l a t e d i n t e r n a l l y t o t h e class o f l a t e n d y strategic a c t i o n s . 4 1
Against Jeffrey Alexander,
t h e m e a n i n g o f the sentences u t t e r e d , whereas this t e r m usually h o w e v e r , I w a n t t o e m p h a s i z e t h a t the distinction between communicative
a p p l i e s t o a l l t h o s e effects t h e s p e a k e r has o n t h e h e a r e r t h a t go and strategic action is n o t i n f l u e n c e d b y t h i s r e v i s i o n .
beyond t h e m e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e act. G i v e n I define c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i n t e r alia, by stating that a c t i o n
t h a t , as w e have seen a b o v e , t h e d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is a l r e a d y c o o r d i n a t i o n m u s t satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n o f a n a g r e e m e n t reached
i n h e r e n t i n l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t w o u l d appear advisable to communicatively, w i t h o u t reservation. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that illocu-
c o u n t n o t j u s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e ( o n t h e basis o f k n o w i n g t i o n a r y a i m s b e p u r s u e d " w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n " is i n t e n d e d p r e c i s e l y
its a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s ) as p a r t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m (or, as t o e x c l u d e cases o f l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n . I n s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , l i n -
t h e case m a y b e , success) o f t h e speaker, b u t also t o i n c l u d e t h e g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e ( g e n e r a l l y ) n o t u s e d
a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d w i t h t h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, t h e h e a r e r ' s a c c e p t a n c e as a m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n . H e r e , we can n o longer
o f t h e speech-act offer. T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n t h e b r o a d e r sense explain the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f different plans o f action t h r o u g h refer-
is also a c h i e v e d solely t h r o u g h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y ence to conditions for a communicatively achieved agreement that
act. I w a n t t o h o l d o n t o t h i s . H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r t o b r i n g m y t e r m i - culminates i n the intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f criticizable validity
n o l o g y m o r e i n t o l i n e w i t h e s t a b l i s h e d usage, I n o w w a n t t o c a l l a l l claims; instead, we may appeal o n l y to t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the recip-
effects t h a t g o b e y o n d t h i s " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y . " F o r e x a m p l e , t h e c o n - rocal influence that opponents, a c t i n g i n a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l way
v i c t i o n t h a t f o r m s i n a h e a r e r w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h a t a s t a t e m e n t is a n d o r i e n t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o w a r d t h e i r o w n success, a t t e m p t t o e x e r t
t r u e c o u l d j u s t as easily b e p r o m p t e d b y a l i e ; i n t h i s case i t w o u l d u p o n o n e a n o t h e r . M y c r i t i c s have o n o c c a s i o n o v e r l o o k e d t h e f a c t
r e p r e s e n t precisely the type o f effect t h a t a speaker w i t h a strategic t h a t both m o d e l s o f a c t i o n a t t r i b u t e t o t h e a c t o r s a c a p a c i t y f o r s e t t i n g
i n t e n t i o n wishes t o a c h i e v e . T h i s t e r m i n o l o g i c a l c o n c e s s i o n necessi- goals a n d f o r g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n , as w e l l as a n i n t e r e s t i n e x e c u t i n g
tates a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n t h e class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects: be- their o w n plans o f a c t i o n . 4 2
O t h e r c r i t i c s , i t is t r u e , a c k n o w l e d g e t h e
t w e e n effects t h a t , i n t h e c o u r s e o f o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l f a c t t h a t i n b o t h m o d e l s a t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n is p r e s u p -
o f i n t e r a c t i o n , r e s u l t f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f w h a t is s a i d , a n d posed; however, they i d e n t i f y the p u r s u i t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims w i t h -
t h o s e effects t h a t o c c u r c o n t i n g e n t l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f g r a m m a t i c a l l y o u t r e s e r v a t i o n (as w e l l as t h e p u r s u i t o f t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s t h a t
r e g u l a t e d contexts. W i t h this I wish to correct the mistake I m a d e o f a r e m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y success), as
equating this distinction w i t h i n the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g w i t h the envisaged i n the m o d e l o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w i t h the egocentric
distinction w i t h i n the theory o f action between strategically a n d p u r s u i t o f o n e ' s o w n i n t e r e s t s a n d a i m s , as p e r m i t t e d i n t h e m o d e l
n o n s t r a t e g i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. o f teleological o r strategic a c t i o n , i n such a way t h a t one model
merges with the other. 4 3
A n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s k i n d is n o t p e r m i s -
I t e r m t h o s e effects s t r a t e g i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d t h a t c o m e a b o u t o n l y
s i b l e , e v e n i f t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f b o t h cases is b a s e d o n t h e s a m e
i f they are n o t declared o r i f they are b r o u g h t a b o u t by deceptive
teleological language game o f goal-setting actors w h o pursue aims,
s p e e c h acts t h a t m e r e l y p r e t e n d t o b e v a l i d . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects
a c h i e v e r e s u l t s , a n d t r i g g e r effects. F o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y " a i m s " o f
o f t h i s t y p e i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h -
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t be d e f i n e d w i t h o u t reference to the
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g has b e e n p u t a t t h e s e r v i c e o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c -
linguistic means o f reaching understanding: the m e d i u m o f lan-
tions. I have r e f e r r e d t o t h i s as " t h e use o f language with an
g u a g e a n d t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n h e r e n t w i t h i n i t
o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " — a speaker's one-sided a n d lat-
4 0

c o n s t i t u t e o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l l y . T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m is
e n d y u n d e r t a k e n s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t o conditions
204 205
Chapter 3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

n o t one o f ends a n d means. For this reason, the "aims" that a n actor r e s p e c t t o s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f
p u r s u e s in l a n g u a g e a n d c a n r e a l i z e o n l y i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a n - successful s p e e c h acts is r e q u i r e d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , i n c o m m u n i c a -
o t h e r a c t o r c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as t h o u g h t h e y r e s e m b l e d condi- tive a c t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
t i o n s t h a t w e c a n b r i n g a b o u t b y i n t e r v e n i n g causally i n t h e w o r l d . r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is s u p e r i m p o s e d o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t e l e -
F o r t h e actor, t h e a i m s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o w a r d success o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n a n d subjects t h e a c t o r s t o p r e c i s e l y s u c h
a n d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s i t u a t e d o n d i f f e r e n t levels: c o n s t r a i n t s as c o m p e l t h e m to adopt a performative attitude—an
e i t h e r i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d or, b e y o n d a l l e n t i t i e s , i n t h e l i n g u i s t i - a t t i t u d e t h a t is m o r e l a d e n w i t h p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is t h e o b j e c t i -
c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d l i f e w o r l d . I d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y t h a t s p e a k i n g is a v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c actor. I n t e r a c t i o n m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t a c t i o n t h a t bears its p u r p o s e w i t h i n i t s e l f a n d t h a t m u s t acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x h i b i t s b o t h a r i c h e r a n d a m o r e
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m actions a i m e d at purposes e x t e r n a l to t h e m . restrictive s t r u c t u r e t h a n does strategic a c t i o n .
N o n e t h e l e s s , w e m u s t i n b o t h cases d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e o n t o l o g i - A s g a m e t h e o r y has s h o w n , s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n has h a d t h e e f f e c t o f
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s as w e l l as b e t w e e n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d a t t i t u d e s g e n e r a t i n g m o d e l s . I f o n e is n o t l e d astray b y a s e m a n t i c i s t t h e o r y o f
o f t h e a c t o r s ; w e m u s t i n e a c h case c o n c e i v e o f t h e a i m s a n d t h e m e a n i n g , t h a t is, i f o n e d o e s n o t s p l i t o f f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g
r e a l i z a t i o n o f these p u r p o s e s i n a d i f f e r e n t way. a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t (Bindungswirkung) f r o m t h e s p e e c h act, r e l e g a t -
F o r t h e speaker a n d h e a r e r i n v o l v e d , i n r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n g t h i s e f f e c t t o c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , o n e w i l l
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h one another, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims o f u n d e r - h a v e n o d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o g n i z i n g t w o l i m i t cases o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e
s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a n d a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) l i e beyond t h e a c t i o n i n t h e t w o o t h e r m o d e l s o f a c t i o n k n o w n t o us f r o m s o c i o l o g i -
w o r l d i n w h i c h a purposively acting individual intervenes i n o r d e r to c a l t h e o r y . J u s t as t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d expressive m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e
achieve his goal. I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims can, f r o m the perspective o f t h e use c o r r e s p o n d t o o n e f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e respectively, so t o o a r e
participants, be achieved o n l y w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f world-disclos- n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n t a i l o r e d t o fit o n e
i n g l a n g u a g e itself, a n d i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e specific a s p e c t o f v a l i d i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y : i n t h e f i r s t case, t h e l e g i t i m a c y
r e c o g n i t i o n o f disputable validity claims depends o n the autono- o f t h e p e r m i s s i b l e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d , i n t h e s e c o n d case,
m o u s a g r e e m e n t o f a s u b j e c t w h o is h e l d t o b e a c c o u n t a b l e . Illocu- the authenticity o f self-presentation. T h e above-mentioned models
t i o n a r y success c a n t h u s b e a c h i e v e d o n l y c o o p e r a t i v e l y a n d is n e v e r , r e p r e s e n t l i m i t cases ( a n d n o t , as I h a d i n c o r r e c t l y asserted, " p u r e
as i t w e r e , a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f a n i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n i n t e r a c t i o n . types") 4 4
o f action o r i e n t e d toward reaching understanding, to the
S t r a t e g i c a c t i o n is also s u b j e c t t o c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n - e x t e n t t h a t i n these cases t h e d y n a m i c s o f r e c i p r o c a l l y t a k i n g a
gency o f actors e q u i p p e d w i t h f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e . Yet these p u r - p o s i t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , w h i c h is essential
posive actors, w h o c o n d i t i o n o n e a n o t h e r w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r o w n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , is s u s p e n d e d : i n t h e o n e case, b y m e a n s o f
r e s p e c t i v e successes, are accessible f o r o n e a n o t h e r o n l y as e n t i t i e s a presupposed value consensus a n d , i n t h e other, by a n e m p i r i c i s t
in the world. T h e y have t o a t t r i b u t e successes a n d f a i l u r e s s o l e l y t o r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as i m p r e s s i o n m a n a g e m e n t , of self-presentation
t h e m s e l v e s , n a m e l y , as t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e i r o w n causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n oriented toward reaching understanding. 4 5

the supposedly l a w - g o v e r n e d n e x u s o f innerworldly processes. T h e


I n t h e l i g h t o f these p h i l o s o p h i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , a n u m b e r o f t h e
s a m e also h o l d s , o f c o u r s e , f o r c o l l e c t i v e a c t o r s w h o are o n l y c o n s t i -
general misgivings raised by Alexander, Berger, Dux.Joas, a n d others
t u t e d as s u c h i n t h e first p l a c e t h r o u g h t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m y t h e o r y o f a c t i o n c a n b e
actors.
d i s p o s e d of. I i n n o way i d e n t i f y t h e p r a c t i c e o f s p e e c h w i t h t h a t o f
F u r t h e r m o r e , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d strategic a c t i o n d o n o t d i f f e r social a c t i o n . I d o n o t fail to r e c o g n i z e t h a t social i n t e r a c t i o n s o f a l l
p r i m a r i l y i n t e r m s o f t h e attitudes o f t h e actors b u t r a t h e r w i t h types a r e m e d i a t e d b y l a n g u a g e a n d t h a t e v e n s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s
207
206
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

r e q u i r e d e m a n d i n g feats o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H o w - c l a i m s . A p e l uses t h e v i v i d i m a g e o f t h e i n t e r l o c k i n g o f t h e i d e a l a n d
ever, b e c a u s e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d the real communication c o m m u n i t y ; b u t this sounds almost too
reaching understanding imposes certain attitudes a n d perspectives Kantian. The d o c t r i n e o f t h e " t w o r e a l m s " has b e e n completely
o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actor t h a t are i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e x e r t i n g a o v e r c o m e . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e oriented toward
causal i n f l u e n c e o v e r a n o p p o n e n t , w h i c h is o r i e n t e d directly^ t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g demands idealizing suppositions on the
o n e ' s o w n success, I d o n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o n t r o v e r s i a l p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors; however, these suppositions f u n c -
types o f a c t i o n solely f r o m a n a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t o f view. T h e sociologi- tion as s o c i a l facts a n d a r e , as is l a n g u a g e i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e
c a l o b s e r v e r , t o o , is i n p r i n c i p l e i n a p o s i t i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n f o r m i n w h i c h s o c i o c u l t u r a l l i f e r e p r o d u c e s itself.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s t h a t , Alexander maintains that, i n the concept o f communicative ac-
f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e actor, p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e a l t e r n a t i v e . 4 7
tion, I conflate "ideological" questions w i t h m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d e m -
T h i s i d e a l - t y p i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , t h a t is, o n e w h i c h is m a d e o n the p i r i c a l ones. I a m supposed t o have tacidy smuggled in "value
basis o f c r i t e r i a u n a m b i v a l e n t f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e p r a g m a t - postulates" by way o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
ics o f l a n g u a g e , a n d w h i c h is b y n o m e a n s m e r e l y a n a l y t i c , d o e s n o t action oriented toward reaching understanding, instead o f declaring
i n any way r o b t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f social cooperation—what them openly. The identification of linguistic understanding
M a r x t e r m e d " l a b o r " — o f its r e l e v a n c e : s o m e t h i n g t h a t is i m p o r t a n t (Sprachverstehen) w i t h a communicatively achieved agreement sup-
i n s o c i a l r e a l i t y m u s t n o t also b e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t u a l l y . More- p o s e d l y serves t h i s p u r p o s e . E v e n i f w e leave t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
over, t h e d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n c a n v a r y ; seen aside, h o w e v e r , w h a t A l e x a n d e r o v e r l o o k s is t h e p o i n t o f t h e e n t i r e
empirically, i t rarely meets the demands o f game t h e o r y a n d decision p r o j e c t . I w o u l d n e v e r have t a c k l e d a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c reconstruc-
theory. tion o f the r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f speech i f I h a d n o t h a r b o r e d the
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t I w o u l d i n this way be able to o b t a i n a c o n c e p t o f
I t s h o u l d n o w also b e c l e a r t h a t a p p r o a c h i n g a n analysis o f a c t i o n
communicative rationality f r o m the normative content o f the univer-
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the vantage p o i n t o f
sal a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e noncircumventable p r a c t i c e
speech-act t h e o r y by n o m e a n s i m p l i e s a n assimilation o f this a c t i o n
o f e v e r y d a y processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is n o t a m a t t e r
to the m o d e l of discourses—which serve t o r e l i e v e a c t i o n . 4 8
Action
o f this o r that preference, o f " o u r " or " t h e i r " n o t i o n s o f rational life;
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y is n o t (as D u x b e l i e v e s ) a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e
r a t h e r , w h a t is a t issue h e r e is t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a v o i c e o f r e a s o n ,
t r e a t m e n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have become
a voice t h a t we have n o c h o i c e b u t t o a l l o w to speak i n everyday
p r o b l e m a t i c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I w a n t t o h o l d o n t o t h e thesis t h a t , w i t h
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — w h e t h e r w e w a n t t o o r n o t . P e r h a p s I have
the action-coordinating role o f factually raised a n d recognized valid-
d e v i o u s l y o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h d e f i n i t i o n s w h a t I c l a i m t o have f o u n d
ity claims, a m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y enters i n t o everyday c o m -
t h r o u g h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s — t h i s , a t a n y r a t e , is t h e c l a i m o n w h i c h
m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . C r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are J a n u s - f a c e d : as
criticism s h o u l d focus.
c l a i m s t h e y t r a n s c e n d , a t least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i -
pants, all merely local agreements a n d r e l y o n a subversive, ever- Those w h o reproach me for neglecting materialist components
flexible reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l , disputable reasons; o n the other suspect m e o f a n o t h e r type o f i d e a l i z a t i o n . T h i s o b j e c t i o n occurs i n
h a n d , t h e y m u s t b e r a i s e d here and now w i t h i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s , w i t h several v e r s i o n s . J o h a n n e s B e r g e r suspects t h a t l u r k i n g b e h i n d m y
coverage p r o v i d e d by a n u n q u e s t i o n e d cultural background, and c o n c e p t u a l s t r a t e g y is t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d i v i d e u p , as D u r k h e i m d i d ,
accepted (or rejected) with regard to nonreversible action se- all social actions i n t o m o r a l a n d i m m o r a l actions f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
q u e n c e s — t h e social r e a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d consists o f s u c h a c t i o n view o f a l t r u i s m a n d egoism. Johannes Weiss also m a i n t a i n s t h a t
s e q u e n c e s , w h i c h are i n t e r m e s h e d b y way o f c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n owes its i n t e g r a t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s i n t h e first
208 209
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n

instance to the m o r a l force o f normative validity claims. 4 9


Apart from
i n t u i t i v e l y p r e s e n t , p r e r e f l e x i v e l y k n o w n f o r m o f l i f e t h a t is p r e s u p -
a n y t h i n g else, these r e s e r v a t i o n s d o n o t a p p l y f o r t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n
p o s e d as u n p r o b l e m a t i c — f e a t u r e s t h a t have b e c o m e c u l t u r a l l y h a b i -
t h a t I i n t r o d u c e n o r m a d v e l y r e g u l a t e d a c d o n m e r e l y as a l i m i t case
tualized for the participants i n communication a n d i n t o w h i c h they
of communicative action: the rationally motivating b i n d i n g and
have b e e n socialized. Subjects a c t i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , i n t h e i r su-
b o n d i n g e f f e c t o f s p e e c h acts s p r e a d s across t h e w h o l e s p e c t r u m of
perficially autonomous achievements i n reaching understanding,
i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces, w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e par-
are d e p e n d e n t o n the resources o f a b a c k g r o u n d knowledge of the
ticular language involved, and appear i n different constellations
l i f e w o r l d t h a t is n o t at t h e i r d i s p o s a l . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e is t h e
d e p e n d i n g o n the particular linguistic worldview a n d f o r m o f life. I t
double—philosophical a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l — p o i n t o f view i n t e r m s of
is p r e c i s e l y t h i s i n t e r n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e s p e c t r u m o f v a l i d i t y
w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d c a n b e a n a l y z e d m o r e accurately. I t is n o t I w h o
and the interplay of cognitive, expressive, a n d aesthetic v a l i d i t y
b l e n d b o t h a n a l y t i c a l levels " i n t o o n e a n o t h e r i n a w a y t h a t is, f o r a l l
claims w i t h conventional, m o r a l , a n d legal ones t h a t accords every-
the convergence of approaches to the problem, inadmissible"
d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s t h e i r a u t o n o m y vis-à-vis ( a n d t h e i r c l e a r
(Weiss). 5 3

distinction from) normative contexts (which, moreover, comprise


only one o f three components of the background o f the lifeworld).
Notes
Weiss a n d o t h e r s have r e n d e r e d t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s m o r e s p e c i f i c i n
that they argue that the concept o f communicative a c t i o n suggests 1. [Editor's note:] Charles Taylor, "Language and Society," in A. Honneth and
the rationalist illusion that language could engender f r o m within H . Joas, eds., Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1991).

i t s e l f i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects; t h e y m a i n t a i n t h a t , 2. Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," in
i n fact, t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts c a n Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie. Werke, vol. 3 (Darmstadt, 1963), p. 81: " A lively, engaged
conversation i n which the speakers truly exchange ideas, feelings, and perceptions is
arise o n l y " i f c e r t a i n s o c i a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n s as w e l l as in itself the central point of language, as it were, the essence of which can only be
p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e p r e s u p p o s e d ; " a n d " i t is t o w a r d t h e s e conceived as both echo and re-echo, as address and response, which, in its origins as
in its transformations, never belongs to one but always to all, and which lies in the
empirical conditions for the development and b i n d i n g character o f
lonely depths of each person's spirit yet comes to the fore only in sociality."
rationality that the explanations o f f e r e d by a n e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y of
society m u s t be d i r e c t e d . " 5 0
T h i s is p r e c i s e l y m y c o n t e n t i o n . H o w e v e r , 3. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Gespräch" implies not only dialogue or discussion but
also conversation. I have translated it here as "dialogue" because Habermas himself
the pragmatic concept o f language permits another, nonempiricist focuses o n these more structured forms of speech rather than on conversations.
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e same t h i n g . I have n e v e r l e f t a n y r o o m f o r d o u b t Nonetheless, it may be useful to bear in m i n d that Gespräch has a broader interpre-
tation than I have given it here.
that the concept of action oriented toward reaching understanding
developed i n "Intermediate Reflections: Social A c t i o n , Purposive 4. W. von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus u n d
Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n " 5 1
m u s t be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o m p l e - ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts," Werke, vol. 3,
p. 438: "Language has an objective effect and is independent precisely in so far as it
m e n t a r y c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as e l a b o r a t e d i n "Intermediate is subjectively effected and dependent. . . . Its dead part, as it were, must always be
R e f l e c t i o n s : System a n d L i f e w o r l d . " 5 2
I t w o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y i m p o s - generated anew in thought, become alive in speech or understanding (Verständnis)
and therefore completely merge with the subject. . . . I n this manner it o n each
sible to explain how e v e r y d a y processes o f c o n s e n s u s formation occasion experiences the full influence of the individual upon it; yet this influence
r e p e a t e d l y s u c c e e d i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e h u r d l e p o s e d b y t h e risk o f is already i n itself bounded by what it (language as a system) effects and has effected."

disagreement b u i l t i n t o practices o f reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the


5. Ibid., p. 439.
f o r m o f criticizable v a l i d i t y claims were we n o t able to take i n t o
a c c o u n t t h e massive preunderstanding o f participants i n communica- 6. W. von Humboldt, "Über den Dualis," Werke, vol. 3, pp. 138f.:

tion; this p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g resides i n t h e self-evident features o f a n A n unalterable dualism resides in the original essence of language, a n d the
possibility of speech is determined by someone speaking and someone replying.
T h o u g h t itself is already substantially accompanied by a proclivity for social exist-
210 211

Chapter 3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c d o n

ence, a n d human beings long for . . . a You that accords with the I ; concepts can follow from valid insight. . . . Aristotie insists that the eudaimonia of a successful
appear to them [human beings] to become determinate and certain only by being life is not the object of intersubjectively mediated knowledge but is rather the final
reflected back by an alien capacity for thought. . . . T h e objectivity appears even horizon of meaningful practices that is given directly with the h u m a n disposition to
more perfected, however, if this division does not occur solely within the subject, act." I have attempted to show why this position, which Bubner has since developed
but rather when the person imagining can truly perceive the thought outside him, fully in Geschichtsprozesse und Handlungsnormen (Frankfurt, 1984), is inconsistent if one
which is possible only if perceived in another being imagining a n d thinking like attempts to follow it through: see my essay i n H . Schnädelbach, ed., Rationalität
himself. T h e r e is, however, n o mediator other than language between one capac- (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 218ff.
ity for thought a n d another.
21. Cf. J . Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam-
7. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, pp. 80f. bridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 341ff.

8. [Editor's note:] T h e word "unvertretbar" expresses a particular interpretation of 22. C . Taylor, 'Theories of Meaning," i n his Human Agency and Language (Philosophical
the idea of irreplaceability—the idea that only I can speak on behalf of myself, in Papers, vol. 1) (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 215ff.
other words, the idea of unrepresentability; for a brief discussion of this, see M. Cooke,
"Selfhood a n d Solidarity," Constellations 1 (1995): 3. 23. I have put forward this argument with respect to Heidegger, Derrida, and Cas-
toriadis in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 153ff., 179ff. (see chapter 9 below),
9. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 208. and 318f., respectively.

10. Von Humboldt, "Über den Dualis," pp. 113ff., a n d "Über die Verschiedenheit des 24. Rolf Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie-Rationalität-Politik (Freiburg, 1985).
menschlichen Sprachbaus," pp. 191ff., in particular, pp. 200ff.
25. Cf. also M . Bartels, "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n . Eine Auseinandersetzung mit
11. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Verständnis" has connotations beyond mere compre- Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 36 (1982):
hension, suggesting that two or more people see the world (or some aspect of it) in 226-233.
the same way.
26. Cf. E . Tugendhat, " J . Habermas on Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß a n d
12. Von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit," p. 60. R. Tuomela, eds., Social Action (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 179ff.

13. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 150. 27. H e r e I draw on some of James Bohman's reflections; cf. the second chapter in
his doctoral dissertation Language and Social Criticism (Boston University, 1985),
14. Ibid., p. 160. pp. 139ff.

15. Von Humboldt, "Über d e n Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," Werke, vol. 3, 28. Davidson himself lists the categories of sentences that cannot initially be analyzed
pp. 64ff. by means of the theory. Cf. T r u t h and Meaning," in Synthese (1967): 310.

16. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 20: " [ T ] h e sum of all that is knowable, as the 29. Cf. J o h n Searle's 'Taxonomy of IUocutionary Acts" in his Expression and Meaning
field to be processed by the h u m a n spirit, lies i n the middle . . . between all lan- (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1-29; cf. also J . Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of
guages." Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 1985).

17. Ibid., p. 419. 30. Cf. my critique of Searle in chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 156ff.

18. Ibid., pp. 147-148: " I f there is one idea visible throughout history that has gained 31. [Editor's note:] J . Alexander, "Habermas a n d Critical Theory: Beyond the Marx-
ever increasing validity . . . then it is the endeavor to overcome all barriers that ian Dilemma?," in Honneth a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, pp. 49ff.
prejudices a n d one-sided views of all sorts inimically erect between humans, a n d to
treat all humanity, without consideration of religion, nation, a n d colour, as one great, 32. Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie, p. 373: "Habermas hereby expands his conceptualization
almost fraternal tribe." of the illocutionary sense of speech acts in such a way that it already includes an
understanding of their social function."
19. Cf. J . Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t
a n d S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 105f., 175f. 33. See Tugendhat's example in "Habermas on Communicative Action," p. 184.

20. Cf. a similar argument by Rüdigier Bubner in "Rationaliät als Lebensform. Z u 34. Z i m m e r m a n n speaks of the "social deployment" of the same illocutionary forces
J . Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns," in Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft in different contexts. Here, the illocutionary meaning of a normative prescription is
(Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 295ff. O n p. 312: " I t is precisely this, however, which practical "superimposed" on the illocutionary meaning of the request.
philosophy has always regarded as a major problem, namely how consistent behavior
212 213
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d Action

35. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 131ff. 47. T h i s does not exclude combinations such as those considered by Max Weber
under the heading "Social Action": in the case of economic action regulated by civil
36. T h a t this second set of conditions belongs to the very meaning of the request law, for example, the conflicting action orientations are situated at a level different
that has been uttered can be seen from what it would mean to turn down the request. from the normative consensus regarding the framework of legal conditions involved.
With his " n o , " the foreigner can negate the existential presuppositions on which the It equally does not exclude hybrid forms such as a politician's rhetorical behavior,
propositional component rests ("I have no money o n me") or the sincerity of the which cannot be analyzed point by point in terms of the model of latently strategic
speaker ("You must be j o k i n g " ) , that is, the implicit claims to truth or truthfulness. action. Overall, indeed, the hierarchization of levels of action must be taken into
But only with a " n o " that challenges the normative context ("People should no account whenever both types of action are entwined. Communicative action is always
longer be begging in this day and age") does the hearer dispute the validity of the embedded in the teleological action contexts of the individuals respectively partici-
explicitly raised claim. pating in it. Admittedly, the situation of someone guilelessly pursuing a random
action goal, or one not declared explicitly due to specific circumstances, must be
37. J . Habermas, "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and distinguished from the situation of someone cunningly pursuing a deliberately con-
Proposition in Habermas's T h e o r y of C o m m u n i c a t i o n , ' " Inquiry, 28 (1985): 87-122. cealed (because it could not be declared openly) action goal that, as the likely side
effect of a communicatively achieved consensus, he strives for with a strate- gic inten-
38. [Editor's note:] See also chapters 4 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 223ff. and tion. Conversely, the strategic deployment of communicative means can be subordi-
301ff., respectively. nated to the goal of consensus formation if, for example, the situation permits no
more than a "giving the other person to understand something" (Zu- Verstehen-Geben)
39. Formal semantics is able to stylize this limit case as the normal case all the more in an indirect way. I assume that the corresponding attitudes of the actors similarly
easily because imperatives, in the course of ontogenesis, are learned initially as simple can form a hierarchy; attitudes oriented respectively toward success and reaching
understanding are incompatible only with reference to one and the same level of
imperatives reinforced by sanctions, and only later as imperatives that have normative
action.
"backing."

40. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 126ff. 48. [Editor's note:] F o r a discussion of the various "relief mechanisms" that compen-
sate for the ever-increasing complexity of communicative action in developed socie-
41. See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 125ff. and p. 164. ties, see J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), esp. pp. 179ff.
42. Misunderstandings may have been caused by the fact that, in earlier publications,
I introduced action types first in terms of criteria for the action orientations ascribed 49. J . Weiss, "Verständigungsorientierung u n d Kritik," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie
to the actor, and not from the sociological standpoint of the combination of actor und Sozialpsychologie 1 (1983): 108ff.
attitudes (orientation toward success vs. orientation toward reaching understanding)
with types of coordination of different plans of action (influence vs. consensus). T h e 50. Ibid., p. 113.
fundamental teleological structure of all action, including all social interactions, was
thus lost from view. 51. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 105ff.

43. F o r example, M. Baurmann, "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Under- 52. [Editor's note:] I n Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 113ff.
standing," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Soda! Action, pp. 187ff. Cf. also J . Berger,
' T h e Linguistification of the Sacred and the Delinguistification of the Economy," in 53. Weiss, 'Verständigungsorientierung," p. 113.
H o n n e t h a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, p. 172. " O n e can reach an understanding
successfully and achieve success in an understanding manner (verständnisvoll). T h e
two figures of action cannot be disentangled as easily as Habermas imagines."

44. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 i n the present volume, p. 164.

45. Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie, p. 379, nonetheless raises the justifiable objection that


"conversation" cannot be construed as a limit case of communicative action from the
same point of view as are, respectively, normativety regulated and dramaturgical
action. T h e fact that, in conversation, the interest in communication gains inde-
pendence from the interest in pursuing one's own plans of action suggests that it
should rather be considered from a functional point of view as a special case.

46. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n word here is unvermittelt, which literally means


"without mediation."
4

Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated


Interactions, and the Lifeworld (1988)

I t will facilitate a perspicuous overview o f the m u l t i p l e interconnec-


t i o n s b e t w e e n a c t i o n a n d s p e e c h i f w e s t a r t w i t h t h e clearest a n d
simplest examples possible. 1
I shall e x e m p l i f y " a c t i o n " by means o f
e v e r y d a y o r p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s s u c h as r u n n i n g , h a n d i n g t h i n g s over,
h a m m e r i n g , o r sawing; I shall e x e m p l i f y "speech" by means of
s p e e c h acts s u c h as c o m m a n d s , avowals, a n d s t a t e m e n t s . I n b o t h
cases w e m a y s p e a k o f " a c t i o n s " i n a b r o a d e r sense. H o w e v e r , so as
n o t to b l u r t h e differences t h a t are i m p o r t a n t f o r m y a r g u m e n t , I
shall choose f r o m the outset two d i f f e r e n t descriptive models. First,
I shall describe actions i n the n a r r o w e r sense—simple n o n l i n g u i s t i c
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s o r t — a s p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t i e s (Zweck-
tätigkeiten) ; w i t h t h e s e , t h e a c t o r i n t e r v e n e s i n t h e w o r l d i n o r d e r t o
a c h i e v e h i s i n t e n d e d goals t h r o u g h t h e c h o i c e a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
o f a p p r o p r i a t e means. Second, I shall describe linguistic utterances
as acts b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a s p e a k e r w i s h e s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g
(sich verständigen) w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n about something i n the
world.

D e s c r i p t i o n s o f linguistic utterances are possible f r o m the perspec-


tive o f t h e a c t o r , t h a t is, i n t h e f i r s t p e r s o n . T h e y m a y b e c o n t r a s t e d
w i t h descriptions f r o m the perspective o f a t h i r d person w h o ob-
serves h o w a n a c t o r , b y m e a n s o f p u r p o s i v e activity, a t t a i n s a g o a l o r
h o w h e , b y m e a n s o f a speech act, reaches u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t
s o m e t h i n g w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n . I n t h e case o f s p e e c h acts, d e s c r i p -
t i o n s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n a r e always p o s s i b l e
216 217
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

( " Y o u o r d e r m e ( h e o r d e r s m e ) t o d r o p m y w e a p o n " ) ; i n t h e case o f g u n , t h e n I k n o w f a i r l y w e l l w h a t a c t i o n she h a s c a r r i e d o u t : she has


p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t i e s , s u c h d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e possible only w h e n the u t t e r e d t h i s specific c o m m a n d . T h i s a c t i o n d o e s n o t r e m a i n i n n e e d
activities are i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o contexts o f c o o p e r a t i o n ("You h a n d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n t h e same sense as d o e s t h e r u n n i n g past o f m y
over (he hands over) the w e a p o n to m e " ) . h u r r y i n g f r i e n d . F o r i n t h e s t a n d a r d case o f l i t e r a l m e a n i n g , a
speech act makes t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker k n o w n ; a hearer can
Speech versus Action infer f r o m the semantic c o n t e n t o f the utterance h o w the sentence
u t t e r e d is b e i n g u s e d , t h a t is, w h a t t y p e o f a c t i o n is b e i n g p e r f o r m e d
T o b e g i n w i t h , one can appeal to the difference between descriptive w i t h i t . S p e e c h acts i n t e r p r e t t h e m s e l v e s ; t h e y h a v e a s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l
p e r s p e c t i v e s i n o r d e r t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e t w o types o f n o n l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y e l e m e n t establishes, as a k i n d o f p r a g -
a n d l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s r e s p e c t i v e l y r e l y o n specific c o n d i t i o n s o f u n - m a t i c c o m m e n t a r y , t h e sense i n w h i c h w h a t is s a i d is b e i n g u s e d .
d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen). W h e n I o b s e r v e a f r i e n d h u r r y i n g past a t a A u s t i n ' s i n s i g h t t h a t o n e d o e s s o m e t h i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g has a
r u n o n t h e o t h e r side o f t h e r o a d , I c a n , o f c o u r s e , i d e n t i f y h e r reverse side t o i t : b y p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, o n e also says w h a t o n e
h u r r y i n g past as a n a c t i o n . F o r s o m e p u r p o s e s , t h e s e n t e n c e "She is d o i n g . A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s p e r f o r m a t i v e sense o f a s p e e c h act reveals
h u r r i e s d o w n t h e r o a d " w i l l also suffice as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n ; i t s e l f o n l y t o a p o t e n t i a l h e a r e r w h o , i n a d o p t i n g t h e stance o f a
w i t h t h i s , w e a t t r i b u t e a n i n t e n t i o n t o t h e actor, n a m e l y , t h a t she s e c o n d p e r s o n , has g i v e n u p t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n o b s e r v e r i n f a v o r
wishes t o g e t t o s o m e w h e r e d o w n t h e r o a d as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e . B u t o f t h a t o f a p a r t i c i p a n t . O n e has t o s p e a k t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e a n d , as
w e c a n n o t infer t h i s i n t e n t i o n f r o m t h e o b s e r v a t i o n ; r a t h e r w e p r e - it were, enter the intersubjectively shared l i f e w o r l d o f a linguistic
suppose a general context that justifies o u r conjecture o f such an c o m m u n i t y i n order to benefit f r o m the peculiar reflexivity o f natu-
i n t e n t i o n . T o be sure, even t h e n t h e a c t i o n remains curiously i n n e e d r a l l a n g u a g e a n d t o b e a b l e t o base t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a n a c t i o n
o f f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t m i g h t b e t h e case t h a t o u r f r i e n d d o e s carried out with words o n understanding the implicit self-commen-
n o t w a n t t o miss h e r t r a i n , d o e s n o t w a n t t o b e l a t e f o r a l e c t u r e , o r t a r y o f t h i s s p e e c h act.
w a n t s t o k e e p a n a p p o i n t m e n t ; i t m i g h t e q u a l l y be t h e case t h a t she S p e e c h acts d i f f e r f r o m s i m p l e n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s n o t o n l y b y
t h i n k s she is b e i n g f o l l o w e d a n d is f l e e i n g , t h a t she has j u s t e s c a p e d v i r t u e o f t h i s r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f s e l f - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b u t also b y
a t t a c k a n d is r u n n i n g away, t h a t she has p a n i c k e d f o r s o m e o t h e r v i r t u e o f t h e k i n d o f goals that can be i n t e n d e d t h r o u g h speaking,
r e a s o n a n d is s i m p l y w a n d e r i n g a b o u t , a n d so f o r t h . A l t h o u g h , f r o m as w e l l as t h e k i n d o f successes t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d . C e r t a i n l y , a t a
t h e perspective o f the observer, we can i d e n t i f y a n a c t i o n , we c a n n o t g e n e r a l l e v e l , all a c t i o n s , l i n g u i s t i c a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c o n e s , c a n be
d e s c r i b e i t w i t h c e r t a i n t y as t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a specific p l a n o f a c t i o n ; c o n c e i v e d o f as g o a l - o r i e n t e d activity. H o w e v e r , as s o o n as we w i s h t o
f o r t o d o so, w e w o u l d h a v e t o k n o w t h e i n t e n t i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n action oriented toward reaching understanding a n d
a c t i o n . W e c a n , b y m e a n s o f i n d i c a t o r s , d e d u c e w h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n is purposive activity, w e m u s t h e e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e
a n d attribute i t hypothetically to the actor; i n o r d e r to be c e r t a i n o f g a m e i n w h i c h a c t o r s p u r s u e goals, a r e successful, and produce
i t , h o w e v e r , w e w o u l d have t o b e a b l e t o t a k e u p t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of r e s u l t s takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n t h e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e t h a n
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t . N o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y d o e s n o t o f i t s e l f a f f o r d us s u c h i t d o e s i n t h e t h e o r y o f a c t i o n — t h e s a m e basic c o n c e p t s a r e i n t e r -
a n i n s i g h t i n a n y w a y — i t d o e s n o t of its own accord m a k e i t s e l f k n o w n p r e t e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways. F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , i t suffices to
as t h e a c t i o n t h a t i t is p l a n n e d t o b e . S p e e c h acts, b y c o n t r a s t , d o d e s c r i b e p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y i n a g e n e r a l w a y as a g o a l - o r i e n t e d a n d
satisfy t h i s c o n d i t i o n . causally e f f e c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . C o r r e s p o n d i n g
I f I understand the c o m m a n d t h a t m y g i r l f r i e n d gives m e (or t o t h e g o a l , w h i c h is s e l e c t e d f r o m a s t a n d p o i n t t h a t is v a l u e l a d e n ,
s o m e o n e else) w h e n she t e l l s m e ( o r t h a t o t h e r p e r s o n ) t o d r o p m y is a state i n t h e w o r l d t h a t is t o be b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e t h r o u g h
218 219
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

the choice a n d application o f apparendy appropriate means. U n d e r - n o t c o n s t i t u t e i n n e r w o r l d l y states. P e r s o n s a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y en-


l y i n g t h e p l a n o f a c t i o n h e r e is a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n counter one a n o t h e r solely as e n t i t i e s i n t h e w o r l d , d e s p i t e the
w h i c h t h e g o a l o f a c t i o n is d e t e r m i n e d (a) i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e freedom o f choice they m u t u a l l y a t t r i b u t e to each o t h e r ; they are
m e a n s o f i n t e r v e n t i o n ( b ) as a state t o b e b r o u g h t a b o u t causally (c) accessible f o r o n e a n o t h e r o n l y as o b j e c t s o r o p p o n e n t s . S p e a k e r a n d
i n the objective w o r l d . I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t s p e e c h acts hearer, by contrast, adopt a p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude i n w h i c h they
c a n n o t be subsumed w i t h o u t difficulty u n d e r this m o d e l of pur- e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r as m e m b e r s o f t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d
posive activity; at any rate, t h e speaker h i m s e l f c a n n o t i n t e n d his l i f e w o r l d o f t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y , t h a t is, i n t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n .
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n t e r m s o f this d e s c r i p t i o n ( a - c ) . I n reaching an understanding with one another about something i n
I f w e c o n c e i v e o f a s p e e c h act as a m e a n s w h o s e e n d is r e a c h i n g the w o r l d , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims they pursue reside, f r o m their
understanding (Verständigung) a n d d i v i d e u p t h e g e n e r a l a i m of perspective, b e y o n d the w o r l d to w h i c h they can refer i n the objec-
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t o t h e s u b c a t e g o r i e s of, first, t h e a i m t h a t tivating attitude o f an observer a n d i n w h i c h they can intervene
t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d understand t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said a n d , sec- p u r p o s i v e l y . T o t h i s e x t e n t , t h e y also r e m a i n i n a transmundane
o n d , t h e a i m t h a t she s h o u l d recognize the validity o f t h e u t t e r a n c e , position for one another.
t h e n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f h o w t h e speaker can p u r s u e these aims does
W e h a v e d i s t i n g u i s h e d s p e e c h acts f r o m s i m p l e n o n l i n g u i s t i c ac-
n o t f u l f i l l any o f the three c o n d i t i o n s m e n t i o n e d above.
tivities o n t h e basis o f t w o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : first, t h a t t h e f o r m e r a r e
a. I l l o c u t i o n a r y goals c a n n o t b e d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n d y of the self-interpreting actions w i t h a reflexive structure; a n d second, that
linguistic means o f reaching understanding. Grammatical utterances t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d i l l o c u t i o n a r y g o a l s t h a t c a n n o t have t h e
do n o t constitute instruments for reaching understanding i n the status o f a p u r p o s e t o b e a c h i e v e d i n a n i n n e r w o r l d l y way, c a n n o t b e
s a m e w a y as, f o r e x a m p l e , the operations c a r r i e d o u t by a c o o k realized w i t h o u t the freely given c o o p e r a t i o n a n d agreement o f an
constitute means for p r o d u c i n g enjoyable meals. Rather, t h e me- addressee, a n d can be e x p l a i n e d o n l y w i t h recourse t o the c o n c e p t
d i u m o f n a t u r a l language a n d t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is i n h e r e n t i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m
interpret one another reciprocally: the one cannot be explained itself. T h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g b o t h types o f a c t i o n a r e
w i t h o u t recourse to the other. d i f f e r e n t , as a r e t h e basic c o n c e p t s i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e actors
b. T h e s p e a k e r c a n n o t i n t e n d t h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g themselves c o u l d describe t h e i r goals.
as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is t o b e b r o u g h t a b o u t causally, b e c a u s e t h e k i n d T h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e s e t w o types o f a c t i o n is also
o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t goes b e y o n d mere understanding of c o n f i r m e d b y t h e d i f f e r e n t r e s p e c t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r success. P u r p o s i v e
w h a t is s a i d d e p e n d s o n t h e h e a r e r ' s r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t . i n t e r v e n t i o n s a n d s p e e c h acts satisfy d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n -
T h e h e a r e r m u s t , as i t w e r e , o f h e r o w n f r e e w i l l give a p p r o v a l t o ality. R a t i o n a l i t y has less t o d o w i t h t h e possession o f k n o w l e d g e t h a n
a g r e e m e n t o n a given m a t t e r by r e c o g n i z i n g (the validity of) a c r i t i - w i t h h o w subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n use k n o w l e d g e . N o w ,
cizable validity c l a i m . I l l o c u t i o n a r y goals can be a t t a i n e d o n l y c o o p - i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is e m b o d i e d in
e r a t i v e l y ; t h e y a r e n o t , u n l i k e causally p r o d u c e d effects, at the n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s j u s t as m u c h as i t is i n s p e e c h acts. I t is t h e
disposal o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A speaker s p e c i f i c w a y i n w h i c h s u c h k n o w l e d g e is u s e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t d e t e r -
c a n n o t a t t r i b u t e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success to himself m t h e s a m e w a y t h a t m i n e s t h e sense o f r a t i o n a l i t y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e success o f t h e
s o m e o n e a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y is a b l e t o a t t r i b u t e t o h i m s e l f t h e r e s u l t a c t i o n is assessed. I f w e t a k e as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e n o n c o m -
o f h i s i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e n e x u s o f i n n e r w o r l d l y processes. m u n i c a t i v e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e i n teleological actions,
c. F i n a l l y , f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e p r o c e s s o f we encounter a concept o f purposive r a t i o n a l i t y — a s i t has been
c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d t h e r e s u l t t o w h i c h t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o l e a d d o e l a b o r a t e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . I f we start w i t h the
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c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e i n s p e e c h acts, w e o t h e r purposively t h a t the specifically l i n g u i s t i c b i n d i n g a n d b o n d -


e n c o u n t e r a c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (Verstdndigungs- i n g e n e r g i e s (Bindungsenergien) r e m a i n unused.
rationalitdt) t h a t c a n be e x p l i c a t e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g w i t h t h e A n i n t e r a c t i o n m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m
h e l p o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts. I n t u i t i v e l y o f h o w t h e a c t i o n p l a n s o f several a c t o r s c a n b e c o o r d i n a t e d i n s u c h
u n d e r l y i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is t h e e x p e r i - a way t h a t t h e a c t i o n s o f A l t e r c a n b e c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h t h o s e of
ence o f the noncoercively unifying, consensus-promoting force of E g o . H e r e , " c o n n e c t i n g u p " m e a n s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e m e r e l y t h e
a r g u m e n t a t i v e speech. Whereas purposive rationality refers to t h e r e d u c t i o n i n scope o f c o n t i n g e n d y c o l l i d i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r c h o i c e
c o n d i t i o n s f o r causally e f f e c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t - to a d e g r e e t h a t makes possible t h e r a d i a l i n t e r l o c k i n g o f topics a n d
i n g states o f a f f a i r s , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r - a c t i o n s i n s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l time. I f w e a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c -
s t a n d i n g is assessed w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s between tive o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , t h e n e e d f o r c o n n e c t i o n a l r e a d y arises o u t
(a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f o r s p e e c h acts, ( b ) t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s o f t h e i n t e r e s t e a c h has i n p u r s u i n g h e r o w n a c t i o n p l a n s . A t e l e -
r a i s e d w i t h s p e e c h acts, a n d (c) t h e r e a s o n s p r o v i d e d f o r t h e v i n d i - o l o g i c a l a c t i o n c a n b e d e s c r i b e d as t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a p l a n t h a t
c a t i o n o f these c l a i m s i n d i s c o u r s e . T h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y relies o n the actor's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e situation. I n c a r r y i n g o u t
o f successful s p e e c h acts a r e o f a d i f f e r e n t c a l i b e r t h a n t h e c o n d i - a p l a n , the actor comes to grips w i t h a situation, whereby the action
t i o n s f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f successful p u r p o s i v e activity. situation forms a segment o f the e n v i r o n m e n t interpreted by the

These observations a r e i n t e n d e d m e r e l y t o serve as i n i t i a l e v i - actor. T h i s s e g m e n t is c o n s t i t u t e d i n l i g h t o f t h e o p t i o n s f o r a c t i o n

dence i n favor o f the m o r e far-reaching c o n t e n t i o n that purposive c o n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t b y t h e a c t o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e success o f a p l a n .

a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality m a y n o t be substituted f o r o n e an- T h e p r o b l e m o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n o c c u r s as s o o n as a n a c t o r c a n

other. O n this premise, I r e g a r d purposive activity a n d a c t i o n o r i - c a r r y o u t h e r p l a n o n l y i n t e r a c t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e

e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as e l e m e n t a r y types o f a c t i o n , a c t i o n o f a t least o n e o t h e r a c t o r ( o r o f h i s r e f r a i n i n g f r o m a c t i o n ) .

n e i t h e r o f w h i c h may be r e d u c e d to the other. I n the f o l l o w i n g , D e p e n d i n g o n h o w A l t e r ' s plans a n d actions are c o n n e c t e d u p to

w e s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e associations into which both of t h o s e o f E g o , d i f f e r e n t types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s

these types o f a c t i o n e n t e r i n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . result.

W h a t I call communicative action emerges out o f one of these T h e t w o types o f i n t e r a c t i o n c a n , t o b e g i n w i t h , b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d


associations. f r o m o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to the respective m e c h a n i s m o f a c t i o n
c o o r d i n a t i o n — i n particular, according to whether natural language
C o m m u n i c a t i v e v e r s u s Strategic A c t i o n is e m p l o y e d solely as a m e d i u m f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o r
w h e t h e r i t is also m a d e use o f as a s o u r c e o f s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . I n
I use t h e t e r m "social a c t i o n " o r " i n t e r a c t i o n " as a c o m p l e x concept t h e first case I r e f e r t o s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d i n t h e s e c o n d t o c o m m u -
t h a t can be analyzed w i t h the a i d o f the e l e m e n t a r y concepts o f n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I n t h e l a t t e r case, t h e c o n s e n s u s a c h i e v i n g f o r c e o f
a c t i o n a n d speech. I n linguistically m e d i a t e d interactions ( a n d o u r l i n g u i s t i c processes o f reaching understanding (Verständigung)—that is,
d i s c u s s i o n w i l l d e a l o n l y w i t h these f r o m n o w o n ) , b o t h these types t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g e n e r g i e s o f language itself-becomes effec-
o f a c t i o n are e n t w i n e d . T o be sure, they o c c u r i n d i f f e r e n t constel- tive f o r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o r m e r case, b y c o n t r a s t ,
lations, d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces o f speech the c o o r d i n a t i n g effect remains d e p e n d e n t o n the influence—func-
acts a s s u m e a n a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g r o l e , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts t i o n i n g v i a n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s — e x e r t e d b y t h e actors o n the
f o r t h e i r p a r t are s u b o r d i n a t e d i n such a way t o the e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n a n d o n each other. Seen f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e
dynamics o f t h e e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e o f actors w h o affect o n e a n - participants, the two mechanisms—that o f reaching understanding,
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w h i c h motivates convictions, a n d that o f e x e r t i o n o f influence, w h i c h T o b e s u r e , speech-act o f f e r s c a n d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g


i n d u c e s b e h a v i o r — m u s t b e m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . S p e e c h acts c a n n o t e f f e c t o n l y b e c a u s e t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act
be carried out w i t h the simultaneous intentions of reaching an t h a t is b o t h u n d e r s t a n d a b l e a n d has b e e n a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r
a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n addressee w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g a n d o f e x e r - also e x t e n d s t o t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t
c i s i n g a causal i n f l u e n c e o n h i m . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f s p e a k e r s result f r o m the semantic content o f the u t t e r a n c e — w h e t h e r asym-
a n d hearers, agreement c a n n o t b e i m p o s e d f r o m w i t h o u t , t h a t is, metrically f o r t h e hearer o r speaker o r symmetrically for b o t h par-
c a n n o t b e f o r c e d u p o n o n e side b y t h e o t h e r , e i t h e r b y d i r e c t i n t e r - ties. W h o e v e r a c c e p t s a c o m m a n d feels h e r s e l f o b l i g e d t o c a r r y i t
vention i n the action situation or indirect exertion o f influence o u t ; w h o e v e r m a k e s a p r o m i s e feels h i m s e l f b o u n d t o m a k e i t c o m e
( a g a i n , c a l c u l a t e d i n t e r m s o f o n e ' s o w n success) o n t h e proposi- t r u e i f n e e d be; w h o e v e r accepts a n assertion believes i t a n d w i l l
t i o n a l attitudes o f one's o p p o n e n t . W h a t comes about manifestly d i r e c t h e r behavior accordingly. I have s u b s u m e d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h r o u g h gratification o r threat, suggestion or deception, cannot a n d a c c e p t a n c e o f s p e e c h acts u n d e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success; a l l g o a l s
c o u n t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y as a n a g r e e m e n t ; a n i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h i s s o r t a n d effects t h a t g o b e y o n d t h i s a r e t o b e t e r m e d " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y . " I
violates the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces arouse c o n - n o w w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s ] , w h i c h arise
victions a n d b r i n g about "connections." f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h act, a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect^,
Because c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e use o f l a n - w h i c h d o n o t arise as g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e g u l a t e d effects f r o m w h a t has
g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i t has t o f u l f i l l m o r e b e e n s a i d i t s e l f b u t r a t h e r o c c u r i n a c o n t i n g e n t way, a l t h o u g h t h e y
s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g actors a t t e m p t to a t t u n e t h e i r a r e c o n d i t i o n a l o n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g e x -
r e s p e c t i v e p l a n s cooperatively w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f a s h a r e d l i f e w o r l d ample: H understands ( i l l o c u t i o n a r y successi) a n d accepts ( i l l o c u -
a n d o n t h e basis o f c o m m o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . F u r - tionary success2) t h e r e q u e s t t h a t she g i v e Y s o m e m o n e y . H gives Y
t h e r m o r e , t h e y a r e p r e p a r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e s e i n d i r e c t goals o f d e f i n - " s o m e m o n e y " ( p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t i ) a n d t h u s gives p l e a s u r e t o F s
i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d h a r m o n i z i n g t h e i r aims i n the r o l e o f speakers w i f e ( p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2). T h i s l a t t e r s o r t o f e f f e c t , w h i c h is n o t
a n d h e a r e r s via processes of reaching understanding—that is, b y p u r s u - regulated by grammar, usually w i l l be a p u b l i c c o m p o n e n t o f t h e
i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims w i t h o u t reservation. Reaching understanding i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n , o r a t least w i l l b e o f a k i n d t h a t c o u l d
linguistically f u n c t i o n s i n such a way t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c - be d e c l a r e d o p e n l y w i t h o u t i m p a i r i n g the course o f t h e action. T h i s
tion come to an agreement with one another about the validity is n o t t h e case i f t h e s p e a k e r b y m e a n s o f h i s r e q u e s t wishes t o g e t
c l a i m e d f o r t h e i r s p e e c h acts or, as a p p r o p r i a t e , t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a - t h e addressee t o e n a b l e Y t o m a k e p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a b u r g l a r y w i t h
t i o n disagreements t h a t h a v e b e e n a s c e r t a i n e d . W i t h s p e e c h acts, t h e m o n e y h e has r e c e i v e d , w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r assumes t h a t H
criticizable validity claims are raised t h a t have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n w o u l d n o t a p p r o v e o f s u c h a c r i m i n a l act. H e r e , c a r r y i n g o u t t h e
t o w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . A speech-act o f f e r g a i n s a b i n d - p l a n n e d c r i m i n a l a c t w o u l d b e a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect3, w h i c h w o u l d
i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e i n t h a t t h e speaker, i n r a i s i n g a v a l i d i t y c l a i m , n o t c o m e a b o u t i f t h e s p e a k e r w e r e t o d e c l a r e i t as h i s a i m f r o m t h e
issues a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y t h a t h e w o u l d b e a b l e t o r e d e e m t h i s c l a i m beginning.
w i t h t h e r i g h t s o r t o f reasons, i f r e q u i r e d . C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n
T h i s case o f latently strategic action is a n e x a m p l e o f h o w t h e m e c h a -
thus be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m strategic a c t i o n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g respect:
nism of reaching understanding works i n the construction o f inter-
t h e successful c o o r d i n a t i o n o f a c t i o n d o e s n o t r e l y o n t h e p u r p o s i v e
a c t i o n s t h a t is d e f i c i e n t i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g way: t h e a c t o r c a n r e a c h h i s
r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e respective i n d i v i d u a l plans o f a c t i o n b u t r a t h e r o n
strategic a i m o f a i d i n g a n d a b e t t i n g a c r i m i n a l act i n t h e f o r m o f a
t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g p o w e r o f feats o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
n o n p u b l i c p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n l y i f h e a c h i e v e s i l l o c u t i o n a r y
t h a t is, o n a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a
success w i t h h i s r e q u e s t . H e w i l l , i n t u r n , s u c c e e d i n t h i s o n l y i f t h e
rationally motivated agreement.
f
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Chapter 4

(1) S.T r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give Y s o m e m o n e y .


s p e a k e r professes t o b e p u r s u i n g u n r e s e r v e d l y t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m
o f h i s s p e e c h act, t h a t is, i f h e leaves t h e h e a r e r i n t h e d a r k as t o t h e U n d e r the presuppositions o f communicative action, the person to
actual violation of the presuppositions of action oriented toward w h o m a n o r d e r o r a d e m a n d is a d d r e s s e d m u s t k n o w t h e n o r m a t i v e
reaching understanding by one o f the parties involved. T h e latendy c o n t e x t t h a t authorizes the speaker to m a k e his d e m a n d , thereby
s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e lives p a r a s i t i c a l l y o n n o r m a l l a n g u a g e usage j u s t i f y i n g t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t
b e c a u s e i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y i f a t least o n e o f the parties involved the required action. Knowledge o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success (for
assumes t h a t l a n g u a g e is b e i n g u s e d w i t h a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o - h a n d i n g o v e r t h e m o n e y ) , w h i c h c a n b e i n f e r r e d from t h e p r e p o s i -
w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s d e r i v a t i v e status p o i n t s t o t h e tional c o n t e n t o f ( 1 ) , d o e s n o t suffice i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e
independent logic u n d e r l y i n g linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a logic i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s s p e e c h a c t — t h a t is, its specific c h a r a c -
t h a t is e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t subjects t e r qua i m p e r a t i v e . K n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success m u s t b e
t h e purposive activities o f t h e actors t o c e r t a i n constraints. supplemented by knowledge o f those conditions u n d e r w h i c h the
O f course, even i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h e teleologically struc- s p e a k e r c a n h a v e r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d r e q u e s t ( 1 ) as a v a l i d i m p e r a t i v e ,
t u r e d sequences o f a c t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l actors p e r v a d e t h e p r o c - w h i c h m e a n s i n t h i s case, as n o r m a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d : f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
esses o f reaching understanding; i t is, a f t e r a l l , t h e purposive S is a d d r e s s i n g a f r i e n d , a c o l l e a g u e k n o w n t o b e g e n e r o u s i n m o n e y
activities o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t are l i n k e d u p w i t h m a t t e r s , a c r e d i t o r , o r a n a c c o m p l i c e . F o r i t is o f c o u r s e also a
one a n o t h e r via the m e d i u m o f language. However, the linguistic n o r m a t i v e validity c l a i m t h a t t h e addressee m a y reject for some
m e d i u m c a n f u l f i l l t h i s l i n k i n g - u p f u n c t i o n o n l y i f i t interrupts t h e reason or other.
plans o f a c t i o n — e a c h respectively m o n i t o r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e actor's
o w n success—and t e m p o r a r i l y changes the m o d e o f a c t i o n . T h i s (1') H: N o , y o u h a v e n o right t o ask t h a t o f m e .
c o m m u n i c a t i v e s h i f t b y w a y o f s p e e c h acts p e r f o r m e d unreservedly
I n c o n t e x t s o f m a n i f e s d y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n i t is p r e c i s e l y these v a l i d i t y
subjects t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d a c t i o n c o u r s e s — e g o c e n t r i c a l l y
c l a i m s — c l a i m s t o p r e p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d t o
geared toward the requirements o f each actor i n v o l v e d — t o the
s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit)—that are u n d e r m i n e d . The
structural constraints o f an intersubjectively shared language. These
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is s u s p e n d e d
constraints force t h e actors to c h a n g e t h e i r perspective: they must
here.
shift perspective f r o m the objectivating a t t i t u d e o f a n actor o r i e n t e d
A b a n k r o b b e r ' s cry o f "Hands u p ! " w h i l e p o i n t i n g a g u n at a
t o w a r d success w h o w a n t s t o r e a l i z e s o m e p u r p o s e i n t h e w o r l d , t o
cashier w h o m he orders to h a n d over m o n e y demonstrates in a
the p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude o f a speaker w h o wants to reach under-
drastic fashion that, i n such a situation, the c o n d i t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e
standing with a second person with regard to something i n the
validity have b e e n replaced by sanction c o n d i t i o n s . T h e acceptability
w o r l d . W i t h o u t t h i s s w i t c h t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e use o f language
c o n d i t i o n s f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e t h a t has b e e n s t r i p p e d o f a n y n o r m a t i v e
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e actors w o u l d be de-
b a c k i n g m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d b y s u c h s a n c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s . So too
n i e d access t o t h e p o t e n t i a l i n h e r e n t i n t h e b i n d i n g a n d bonding
i n t h e case o f r e q u e s t ( 1 ) . I f t h e l a w - a b i d i n g addressee k n o w s t h a t Y
e n e r g i e s o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s is w h y a l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n f a i l s as
w i s h e s t o use t h e m o n e y she is t o give h i m i n o r d e r t o m a k e p r e p a -
s o o n as t h e addressee d i s c o v e r s t h a t h e r c o u n t e r p a r t has o n l y a p p a r -
r a t i o n s f o r a c r i m e , t h e n S w i l l have t o s u p p l e m e n t his request by
e n t l y b r o k e n o f f h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
p o i n t i n g t o p o s s i b l e s a n c t i o n s . H e may, f o r e x a m p l e , say:
T h e constellation o f speech a n d a c t i o n changes i n strategic a c t i o n .
H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g forces wane; language (2) S: I r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y — o t h e r w i s e I will tell
s h r i n k s t o a m e d i u m o f i n f o r m a t i o n . W e c a n see t h i s c l e a r l y i f w e t h e p o l i c e h o w d e e p l y y o u are already i n v o l v e d i n t h e w h o l e affair.
l o o k at t h e e x a m p l e j u s t m e n t i o n e d :
226 227
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

T h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is s h o w n sympto- p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s e r v i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o i n s t i l l f e a r
matically i n the " i f - t h e n " s t r u c t u r e o f the threat, w h i c h replaces the a n d t e r r o r i n t h e addressee.
validity claims presupposed i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action with power The concept of communicative action provisionally introduced
c l a i m s ; f r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h e c h a n g e d c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f s p e e c h a n d h e r e is b a s e d o n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g
a c t i o n . I n manifestly strategic action, t h e s p e e c h acts ( w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i t has t o b e d e v e l o p e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e o r i e s o f
a r y f o r c e s have b e e n w e a k e n e d ) r e l i n q u i s h t h e r o l e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g m e a n i n g . I cannot a t t e m p t to do this i n detail here. Nonetheless,
a c t i o n , passing i t o n t o f o r m s o f e x e r t i n g i n f l u e n c e t h a t are e x t e r n a l I w i s h a t least t o i n t r o d u c e a n d e x p l i c a t e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n of
t o l a n g u a g e . S t r i p p e d i n t h i s w a y o f its p o t e n c y , l a n g u a g e n o w f u l f i l l s the f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , w h i c h refers to the i n t e r -
o n l y t h o s e i n f o r m a t i o n f u n c t i o n s r e m a i n i n g o n c e l i n g u i s t i c feats n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y . T h i s , as y e t , says n o t h -
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g have b e e n r o b b e d o f t h e i r consensus- i n g about the fruitfulness o f such a theoretical approach for the
f o r m i n g f u n c t i o n , and once the validity o f utterances—now sus- s o c i a l sciences. T h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n m u s t p r o v e
p e n d e d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n — c a n be d e d u c e d only indirectly. Speech its w o r t h w i t h i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is s u p -
a c t ( 2 ) is a r e q u e s t o n l y o n t h e s u r f a c e ; i t is i n f a c t a t h r e a t : p o s e d t o e x p l a i n h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e
analysis o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of communicative action may be
(2a) S: I f y o u d o n o t give Y m o n e y , I w i l l t e l l t h e p o l i c e t h a t . . .
h e l p f u l . I t opens u p the d i m e n s i o n o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the life-
T h r e a t s a r e e x a m p l e s o f s p e e c h acts t h a t p l a y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e w o r l d , w h i c h e n m e s h e s a n d stabilizes i n t e r a c t i o n s t o f o r m h i g h e r -
i n contexts o f strategic a c t i o n , h a v e f o r f e i t e d t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y level aggregates.
force, a n d derive their i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g f r o m other contexts o f
e m p l o y m e n t i n w h i c h t h e s a m e s e n t e n c e s are n o r m a l l y u t t e r e d w i t h T h e P r a g m a t i c T u r n i n the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
a n o r i e n t a t i o n toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Acts o f this k i n d —
acts t h a t have b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — a r e not T h e concept o f communicative action develops the i n t u i t i o n that the
i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a t a l l , f o r t h e y a r e n o t a i m e d a t t h e r a t i o n a l l y t e l o s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . Reaching
m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n o f a n a d d r e s s e e . T h i s c a n b e seen f r o m t h e way u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n o r m a t i v e l y l a d e n c o n c e p t t h a t goes b e y o n d t h e
i n w h i c h t h r e a t s are r e p u d i a t e d : m e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a g r a m m a t i c a l expression. A speaker reaches
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another w i t h regard to some matter. Such an
(2a') H: N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
agreement (Einverständnis) c a n b e a c h i e v e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s o n l y i f
The " n o " refers to e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the t h r e a t t h e y a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e s i n v o l v e d as c o r r e c t (sachgemäß). A g r e e -
a l o n e c o u l d a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect. T h e hearer m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g is m e a s u r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i n t e r s u b ¬
contests t h e reasons t h a t w e r e s u p p o s e d t o m o t i v a t e h e r to act i n t h e j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y (Gültigkeit) o f a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t c a n
m a n n e r p r e d i c t e d b y S. U n l i k e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, t h r e a t s d o n o t r e l y i n p r i n c i p l e be criticized. O f course, u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f
o n g e n e r a l , addressee-independent reasons t h a t c o u l d c o n v i n c e any- a linguistic expression a n d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g about something
one. Their "then-component" p o i n t s r a t h e r to p a r t i c u l a r reasons w i t h t h e h e l p o f a n utterance h e l d to be v a l i d are two d i f f e r e n t
t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e s p e c i f i c addressees i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s things; an equally sharp distinction must be m a d e between an utter-
w i t h a n e m p i r i c a l m o t i v e t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. a n c e t h a t is h e l d t o b e v a l i d a n d o n e t h a t is v a l i d . Nonetheless,
L i k e s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , i n s u l t s , t o o , o f t e n have a n ambiguous q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s -
character. T h e y may have n o r m a t i v e b a c k i n g , a n d express, f o r i n - tions o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g theory—namely,
stance, m o r a l c o n d e m n a t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e y m a y also b e c o m e i n d e - w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n — c a n -
228 229

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

n o t be isolated f r o m the question of the context i n w h i c h this i n g t h a t a r e b u n d l e d t o g e t h e r , as i t w e r e , i n t h e f o c a l p o i n t of


expression m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . O n e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w language; each a p p r o a c h t h e n aims to e x p l a i n the entire spectrum
w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i f o n e o f m e a n i n g i n t e r m s o f this single f u n c t i o n o f language. I n t e n t i o n -
d i d n o t know how one c o u l d m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o reach alist s e m a n t i c s ( f r o m G r i c e t o B e n n e t t a n d S c h i f f e r ) takes as f u n d a -
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . O n e c a n see from mental what the speaker means (meint), or wishes t o give to
the very c o n d i t i o n s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistic expressions t h a t the u n d e r s t a n d , w i t h an expression used i n a given situation; f o r m a l
s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n be f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n - s e m a n t i c s ( f r o m F r e g e v i a t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D u m m e t t ) takes
tation toward a rationally motivated agreement with regard to what as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is
is s a i d . T o t h i s e x t e n t , a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b l e v a l i d i t y o f t r u e (or, as t h e case m a y b e , r e n d e r e d t r u e ) ; a n d t h e use t h e o r y o f
u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s , n o t j u s t f o r r e a c h i n g m e a n i n g i n a u g u r a t e d by the later W i t t g e n s t e i n refers e v e r y t h i n g i n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t , p r i o r to this, f o r l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself. the final instance to the habitualized contexts o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h
I n language, the d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity are i n t e r n a l l y l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s f u l f i l l p r a c t i c a l f u n c t i o n s . E a c h o f these t h r e e
connected. c o m p e t i n g theories o f m e a n i n g c o n n e c t s u p w i t h precisely o n e as-
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics has m a d e use o f t h i s i n s i g h t ever p e c t o f t h e process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y wish to e x p l a i n
since Frege: o n e u n d e r s t a n d s a n assertoric sentence i f o n e knows the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression either f r o m the perspective
w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . I t is, h o w e v e r , n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t i t is o f w h a t is m e a n t as i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of
a sentence a n d n o t a speech act—moreover, a propositional sen- w h a t is said as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f its use i n
t e n c e r a t h e r t h a n a n o n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e — t h a t serves h e r e as t h e i n t e r a c t i o n as u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g . T h e s t y l i z a t i o n i n e a c h case o f
p r o t o t y p e . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s t h e o r y , t h e p r o b l e m o f v a l i d i t y is l o c a t e d just one o f t h e t h r e e aspects s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t a k e n a c c o u n t o f i n
e x c l u s i v e l y i n t h e r e l a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e t o t h e w o r l d c o n c e i v e d as t h e B i d d e r ' s s c h e m a o f l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s has l e d t o b o t t l e n e c k s t h a t I
t o t a l i t y o f facts. Because v a l i d i t y is e q u a t e d w i t h a s s e r t o r i c t r u t h , a c a n n o t g o i n t o h e r e . T h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts (as d e v e l o p e d b y
r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e m e a n i n g a n d t h e validity o f l i n g u i s t i c ex- Searle, f o l l o w i n g A u s t i n ) c a m e o n t h e scene i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e s e
p r e s s i o n s is p r o d u c e d o n l y i n t h e m o d e s o f s p e e c h i n w h i c h facts difficulties.
a r e e s t a b l i s h e d . H o w e v e r , as K a r l B u h l e r a l r e a d y o b s e r v e d , t h e r e p - Speech-act t h e o r y accords the speaker's i n t e n t i o n a p r o p e r place
r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is o n l y o n e o f t h r e e e q u i p r i m o r d i a l (gleich- w i t h o u t , as i n G r i c e a n s e m a n t i c s , s i m p l y r e d u c i n g l i n g u i s t i c p r o c -
ursprunglich) functions of language. Sentences that are used esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) t o strategic a c t i o n .
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y serve s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o express t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r I n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t , speech-act t h e o r y also
s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f a speaker, t o r e p r e s e n t states o f takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e f e r e n c e o f s p e e c h , as
affairs (or s o m e t h i n g o c c u r r i n g i n t h e w o r l d ) , a n d to e n t e r i n t o w e l l as its c h a r a c t e r as a c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , i t d o e s so w i t h o u t , as i n
r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n addressee. T h e t h r e e basic aspects o f a s p e a k e r Wittgensteinian pragmatics, e x c l u d i n g all validity claims that p o i n t
reaching understanding/with another/about something are beyond the provincial h o r i z o n o f particular, i n p r i n c i p l e equally
r e f l e c t e d i n t h e s e t h r e e f u n c t i o n s . A t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n exists be- l e g i t i m a t e language games. F o r w i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f satisfaction c o n -
t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d (a) w h a t is intended d i t i o n s , s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y also u l t i m a t e l y respects t h e r e l a t i o n b e -
(gemeint) w i t h i t , ( b ) w h a t is said i n i t , a n d (c) t h e way in which it is t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d w o r l d , b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e a n d states o f a f f a i r s .
used in a speech act. By v i r t u e o f t h i s o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n o f v a l i d i t y as t h e satis-
Curiously e n o u g h , each o f the t h r e e best-known approaches to faction of conditions o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , however, speech-act
m e a n i n g t h e o r y p r o c e e d s f r o m j u s t o n e o f these t h r e e rays o f m e a n - t h e o r y r e m a i n s b o u n d t o t h e c o g n i t i v i s m o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l se-
230 231
Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

m a n t i c s . I t is p r e c i s e l y h e r e t h a t I see t h e d e f i c i t t h a t has t o b e m a d e (1") H: N o , y o u d o n ' t m e a n t h a t s e r i o u s l y — y o u a r e p u l l i n g m y


g o o d as s o o n as o n e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a l l l a n g u a g e functions, and leg.
n o t o n l y t h e f u n c d o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , are i m b u e d w i t h validity
( 1 " ' ) H: N o , I w o n ' t b e m e e t i n g F a n d w i l l h a v e n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o
claims.
h a n d over m o n e y to h i m .
T h e s e n t e n c e " I give F s o m e m o n e y " is a m b i g u o u s w i t h r e g a r d t o
its m o d e ; t h i s a m b i g u i t y d i s a p p e a r s w h e n , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , T h e s a m e h o l d s t r u e mutatis mutandis f o r c o n s t a t i v e a n d expressive
t h e s e n t e n c e f u n c t i o n s as a p r o m i s e , as a c o n f e s s i o n , o r e v e n as a s p e e c h acts. W h e t h e r a n u t t e r a n c e f u l f i l l s i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c -
prediction: tion is m e a s u r e d , o f c o u r s e , i n t e r m s o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; b u t t h e
f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i v e a n d e x p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e is
(3) S: I p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l g i v e F s o m e m o n e y .
assessed i n t e r m s o f t r u t h - a n a l o g o u s c o n d i t i o n s o f a u t h o r i z a t i o n a n d
(4) S: I w o u l d l i k e t o d i v u l g e t o y o u t h a t I a m g o i n g t o give Y t r u t h f u l n e s s . E v e r y speech-act c a n , as a w h o l e , always b e c r i t i c i z e d as
some money. i n v a l i d f r o m t h r e e p o i n t s o f v i e w : as u n t r u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
statement made (or the existential presuppositions o f its p r o p o s i -
(5) S: I c a n p r e d i c t t o y o u t h a t X ( a n o t h e r p e r s o n ) w i l l g i v e Y
tional c o n t e n t ) ; as i n c o r r e c t w i t h r e s p e c t t o e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m a t i v e
some money.
c o n t e x t s ( o r t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e n o r m s p r e s u p p o s e d ) ; o r as l a c k i n g
T h e type o f validity c l a i m t h a t a speaker connects w i t h promises, i n t r u t h f u l n e s s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . L e t us assume
confessions, a n d p r e d i c t i o n s emerges f r o m the c o r r e s p o n d i n g nega- f o r the m o m e n t that this t r i c h o t o m o u s extension o f the concept o f
t i o n s w i t h w h i c h t h e h e a r e r c o u l d r e j e c t t h e s e speech-act o f f e r s : validity, here merely sketched, c o u l d be developed i n detail. W h a t
w o u l d b e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s f o r t h e basic q u e s t i o n a d d r e s s e d b y
(3') H: N o , y o u ' v e always b e e n u n r e l i a b l e i n s u c h m a t t e r s . meaning theory?

(4') H: N o , y o u j u s t w a n t t o l e a d m e u p t h e g a r d e n p a t h . D u m m e t t a l r e a d y takes t h e first s t e p t o w a r d a p r a g m a t i c r e i n t e r ¬


p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f validity. H e demonstrates that t r u t h -
(5') H: N o , h e d o e s n ' t have a n y m o n e y .
c o n d i t i o n a l semantics can abstract f r o m t h e circumstances i n w h i c h

W i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r raises t h e n o r m a t i v e c l a i m t h a t h e is e n t e r i n g a h e a r e r is i n a p o s i t i o n t o recognize w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n

into an obligation, with (4) t h e c l a i m to subjective truthfulness a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e h a v e b e e n satisfied a t t h e v e r y m o s t o n l y i n t h e

(Wahrhaftigkeit)—to m e a n w h a t h e says, w i t h (5) a c l a i m t o p r o p o s i - case o f s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n sentences. Relying o n the

tional t r u t h . M o r e o v e r , a s p e e c h a c t m a y b e n e g a t e d f r o m several pragmatic distinction between " t r u t h " a n d "assertibility"—between

p o i n t s o f view a n d n o t j u s t f r o m t h e aspect o f validity d o m i n a n t i n a t h e t r u t h o f a sentence a n d t h e e n t i t l e m e n t t o m a k e a n assertion by

given situation. The imperative means o f that s e n t e n c e — D u m m e t t replaces knowledge o f the t r u t h


c o n d i t i o n s w i t h a n i n d i r e c t sort o f knowledge. T h e hearer must
(1) S.T r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y . k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d , i f necessary,
r e d e e m h e r c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s have b e e n s a t i s f i e d .
can be t u r n e d d o w n n o t only w i t h
O n e understands a propositional sentence i f one knows what kinds
(1') H: N o , y o u have n o right t o d o so. o f r e a s o n s a s p e a k e r w o u l d have t o p r o v i d e i n o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a
h e a r e r t h a t she is e n t i t l e d t o raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h a t s e n t e n c e .
b u t also b y c a s t i n g d o u b t o n t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r o r o n
T h e c o n d i t i o n s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as t h e y h a v e t o b e satisfied i n
the existential presuppositions o f the propositional content:
233
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Chapter 4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, and L i f e w o r l d

everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, thus p o i n t to the supposition o f t h e c l a i m . T h e reasons i n t e r p r e t t h e validity c o n d i t i o n s a n d t o this


a g a m e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e speaker, as t h e proponent, e x t e n t are themselves p a r t o f the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e a n utterance
m i g h t c o n v i n c e t h e h e a r e r , as t h e o p p o n e n t , t h a t a p o s s i b l y p r o b l e m - acceptable. I n this, the acceptability c o n d i t i o n s p o i n t to the holistic
a t i c v a l i d i t y c l a i m is j u s t i f i a b l e . F o l l o w i n g t h i s epistemic turn i n t r u t h - c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s ; e v e r y s i n g l e s p e e c h a c t is l i n k e d v i a
c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e validity o f a sentence can logical-semantic t h r e a d s t o n u m e r o u s o t h e r , p o t e n t i a l s p e e c h acts
n o l o n g e r b e c o n s i d e r e d as a q u e s t i o n — d e t a c h e d f r o m the process t h a t c o u l d take o n t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f reasons. K n o w l e d g e o f a
o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n — o f the objective r e l a t i o n between language a n d l a n g u a g e is t h e r e f o r e e n t w i n e d w i t h k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t is a c t u a l l y
the world. t h e case i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d i s c l o s e d w o r l d . P e r h a p s k n o w l e d g e of
T h i s suggests, however, t h a t t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h s h o u l d n o longer t h e w o r l d m e r e l y hangs o n a l o n g e r c h a i n o f reasons t h a n does
be defined semantically a n d solely f r o m the perspective of the knowledge o f a language. T h a t each c a n n o t sharply be distinguished
speaker. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s c o n s t i t u t e t h e p o i n t o f c o n v e r g e n c e f o r i n - f r o m t h e o t h e r c o n f i r m s t h e basic i d e a f r o m w h i c h w e s t a r t e d : t o
tersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n by a l l those involved. T h e y play a p r a g m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d a n e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e c a n m a k e use o f i t i n
r o l e i n t h e dynamics o f speech-act offer a n d t h e hearer's t a k i n g a order to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h someone w i t h regard to some-
p o s i t i o n w i t h h i s "yes" o r " n o . " T h i s pragmatic turn i n t r u t h - c o n d i - thing.
t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s calls f o r a r é é v a l u a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f " i l l o c u t i o n - I f this a p p r o a c h to a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g can be
ary force." Austin conceived of this force as the irrational elaborated sufficiently, a n d r e n d e r e d plausible, t h e n i t provides an
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act, t h e a c t u a l l y r a t i o n a l p a r t b e i n g mo- e x p l a n a t i o n f o r w h y the m e d i u m o f n a t u r a l language can draw o n a
n o p o l i z e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . O n a p r a g m a t i c a l l y e n l i g h t - r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e s t h a t c a n be u s e d
ened reading, the m o d a l c o m p o n e n t determines the validity claim f o r p u r p o s e s o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n . I n t h a t a speaker, w i t h his
t h a t , i n t h e s t a n d a r d case, t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h t h e h e l p o f a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , issues a w a r r a n t y t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s f o r t h e
p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t thereby be- v a l i d i t y o f t h e s p e e c h act, i f necessary, t h e h e a r e r — w h o k n o w s t h e
c o m e s t h e l o c u s o f a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as a s t r u c t u r a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h u s u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t has b e e n s a i d — i s
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n between validity conditions, validity claims that re- c h a l l e n g e d to take u p a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n ; i f t h e hearer
f e r t o these, a n d reasons b y m e a n s o f w h i c h t h e y m a y b e v i n d i c a t e d r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h e r e b y a c c e p t i n g t h e speech-act offer,
in discourse. Thus, the conditions o f validity n o longer remain she assumes h e r s h a r e o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f
fixated o n the propositional component; r o o m is m a d e f o r t h e i n - i n t e r a c t i o n a r i s i n g f o r a l l t h o s e i n v o l v e d f r o m w h a t is said.
t r o d u c t i o n o f f u r t h e r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t are n o t d i r e c t e d t o w a r d
c o n d i t i o n s o f t r u t h ( o r success), t h a t is, t h a t are n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d F r o m S o c i a l A c t i o n to S o c i a l O r d e r
t h e r e l a t i o n between language a n d the objective w o r l d .

O n c e p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h has b e e n s u p p l e m e n t e d b y n o r m a t i v e I have t r e a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n as t w o v a r i a n t s o f
Tightness a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s , i t is p o s s i b l e , i n a f i n a l s t e p , t o linguistically mediated interaction. I t holds only for communicative
generalize D u m m e t t ' s explanation. We u n d e r s t a n d a speech act action t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d
w h e n we k n o w t h e k i n d s o f reasons t h a t a speaker c o u l d p r o v i d e i n l a n g u a g e i m p e l t h e a c t o r s — i n t h e sense o f a w e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a h e a r e r t h a t h e is e n t i d e d i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m - necessity—to step o u t o f t h e e g o c e n t r i c i t y o f a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l
stances t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s u t t e r a n c e — i n s h o r t , w h e n w e k n o w o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e i r o w n respective success a n d t o s u r r e n d e r
what makes it acceptable. A speaker, w i t h a v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a p p e a l s t o a themselves to the public criteria of communicative rationality.
reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l reasons t h a t he c o u l d p r o d u c e i n s u p p o r t o f T h e t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f l a n g u a g e t h u s suggest a basis f o r
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

answering, f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f action theory, the classical this e x t e n t , media-steered interactions n o l o n g e r e m b o d y an i n s t r u -
q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . m e n t a l reason located i n the purposive rationality o f decision m a k -
T h e a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t o f strategic a c t i o n d o e s n o t i t s e l f p r o v i d e us ers, b u t r a t h e r a f u n c t i o n a l i s t r e a s o n i n h e r e n t i n self-regulating
w i t h a n y e q u i v a l e n t answer. I f i t n o n e t h e l e s s is t o serve as t h e basic systems. T h i s a p p r o a c h , however, w h i c h is e l a b o r a t e d i n e c o n o m i c s
c o n c e p t i n a s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , t h e n i t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y , covers o n l y s p e c i f i c d o m a i n s o f a c t i o n ; i t
h o w c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t e m e r g e solely f r o m t h e r e c i p r o c a l d o e s n o t m e e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f a n e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y t h a t w o u l d be
e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e u p o n o n e a n o t h e r o f s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d actors s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e r a l i n scope t o e x p l a i n s o c i a l a c t i o n as a w h o l e i n
can establish themselves as stable o r d e r s . E v e r since H o b b e s , t h e t e r m s o f strategic a c t i o n . Since behavior-steering communication
a t t e m p t has r e p e a t e d l y b e e n m a d e t o e x p l a i n h o w n o r m s w i t h t r a n s - m e d i a s u c h as m o n e y m e r e l y b r a n c h o f f as s p e c i a l c o d e s f r o m a m o r e
subjectively b i n d i n g n o r m a t i v e validity claims can develop o u t o f the r i c h l y s t r u c t u r e d everyday language, m e d i a t h e o r y p o i n t s t o w a r d t h e
interest positions a n d i n d i v i d u a l p r o f i t calculations o f actors who broader framework o f a theory o f language (cf. m y The Theory of
m a k e d e c i s i o n s i n a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l way a n d w h o e n c o u n t e r e a c h Communicative Action, v o l . 2, p p . 2 5 6 f f ) .
o t h e r o n l y haphazardly. Today, this " H o b b e s i a n p r o b l e m " (Parsons) T h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t r e m a i n s is t o d i s p e n s e w i t h a n y a t t e m p t
is b e i n g t a c k l e d u s i n g g a m e t h e o r y . H o w e v e r , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t I t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t o f social o r d e r i n g e n e r a l f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
have b e e n able t o f o l l o w t h e d e b a t e s ( f r o m A m a r t y a S e n t o J o n view o f a c t i o n theory. T h e transsubjective structures o f language
E l s t e r ) , 1 have n o t g a i n e d t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w e n t w i n e d w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s are r e p l a c e d i n t h e w o r k o f Parsons
social o r d e r can e m e r g e f r o m t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n g e n c y o f actors w h o a n d L u h m a n n b y boundary-maintaining and autopoetic systems i n t r o -
m a k e decisions i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one a n o t h e r can be answered m o r e d u c e d at a m o r e g e n e r a l level t h a n are actors a n d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
convincingly today t h a n by H o b b e s i n his t i m e . mediated interactions. Actions a n d interactions can t h e n for their
M o r e p r o m i s i n g t h a n the a t t e m p t to renew w i t h m o d e r n means p a r t b e u n d e r s t o o d as p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d social systems t h a t f o r m
t h e classical c o n c e p t o f a n i n s t r u m e n t a l o r d e r is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f environments for a n d reciprocally observe one another. I n c u t t i n g
a m e d i u m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h behavior-steering infor- l o o s e f r o m a c t i o n t h e o r y , however, systems t h e o r y m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e
m a t i o n f l o w s are c o n d u c t e d . I n s o f a r as t h i s c o n c e p t is d e f i n e d ac- f o r its o b j e c t i v i s t i c a p p r o a c h . Systems f u n c t i o n a l i s m cuts i t s e l f o f f
cording to the m o d e l o f a m a r k e t exchange steered by money, f r o m t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d its m e m b e r s . H e r -
s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c a n be r e t a i n e d as t h e m e n e u t i c access t o t h i s r e s e r v o i r o f k n o w l e d g e p r o c e e d s b y way o f
conception o f action suitable f o r a steering m e d i u m . For example, ( a t least v i r t u a l ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices.
i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed via the m o n e y code c o n d i t i o n s — o n account O f c o u r s e , i n t h e f a c e o f c o m p l e x societies, t h e s o c i a l sciences m u s t
o f a built-in structure o f preferences—decisions r e g a r d i n g actions be prepared to extract even c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e insights f r o m their
w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o m o r e d e m a n d i n g a n d h i g h e r - r i s k feats o f c o m - o b j e c t d o m a i n . Yet society, w o v e n f r o m w e b s o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -
m u n i c a t i o n t h a t are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e a c t o r as- a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s , s i m p l y is n o t e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f a n e x t e r -
s u m e s a s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a t t i t u d e — i n t h e e x t r e m e case, a p u r p o s i v e n a l n a t u r e accessible o n l y t o o b s e r v a t i o n . The meaning t h a t is
r a t i o n a l o n e . H o w e v e r , f o r t h e actor, t h e s w i t c h t o media-steered inter- sedimented i n society's s y m b o l i c contexts a n d self-interpretations
actions results i n a n o b j e c t i v e i n v e r s i o n o f s e t t i n g goals a n d c h o o s i n g discloses i t s e l f o n l y t o a h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o a c h . W h o e v e r does n o t
means. T h e m e d i u m itself n o w transmits the system-maintenance w a n t t o b l o c k o f f t h i s p a t h f o r h i m s e l f , b u t wishes r a t h e r t o o p e n u p
i m p e r a t i v e s o f t h e system i n q u e s t i o n ( h e r e t h e m a r k e t s y s t e m ) . T h i s t h e s o c i o c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t o f l i f e from within, has t o t a k e as h i s p o i n t
i n v e r s i o n o f m e a n s a n d e n d s is e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e actor, as M a r x o f d e p a r t u r e a c o n c e p t i o n o f society t h a t c a n be c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h
o b s e r v e d , as t h e r e i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r o f o b j e c t i f i e d social processes. T o the perspectives o n a c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t i v e efforts o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s
236 237
Chapter 4 i Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

i n i n t e r a c t i o n . F o r t h i s f i r s t step, t h e c o n c e p t o f lifeworld, w h i c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e d i m e n t e d i n a deep-seated s t r a t u m o f things that


f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e are t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d , o f c e r t a i n t i e s , a n d o f u n q u e s t i o n e d assump-
action already comes u p o n p r i o r to all sociological t h e o r i z i n g , pre- tions, c o u l d e x p l a i n h o w the risk o f disagreement i n h e r e n t i n l i n -
sents i t s e l f . g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n {Verständigung)—and l u r k i n g everywhere—is
T h a t social o r d e r is s u p p o s e d t o p r o d u c e a n d r e p r o d u c e i t s e l f b y a b s o r b e d , r e g u l a t e d , a n d k e p t i n c h e c k i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . A s is
w a y o f processes o f c o n s e n s u s f o r m a t i o n m i g h t s e e m a t f i r s t g l a n c e well k n o w n , H u s s e r l i n his l a t e r w o r k , u n d e r the heading of
t o b e a t r i v i a l n o t i o n . T h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f t h i s i d e a b e c o m e s clear, "lifeworld," endeavored to explore the terrain o f the immediately
h o w e v e r , as s o o n as o n e r e m i n d s o n e s e l f t h a t e v e r y c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y familiar and the unquestionably certain. H e attempted with pheno-
achieved agreement depends o n the taking u p o f " y e s " / " n o " posi- m e n o l o g i c a l means to shed l i g h t o n this r e a l m o f i m p l i c i t k n o w l -
t i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . I n t h e case o f c o m - edge, o f the prepredicative a n d the precategorial, o f the f o r g o t t e n
m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n g e n c y t h a t has t o b e absorbed f o u n d a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g u n d e r l y i n g everyday life-practices a n d w o r l d
b y a l l i n t e r a c t i o n f o r m a t i o n takes t h e p a r t i c u l a r l y p r e c a r i o u s s h a p e experience. H e r e , I shall neither go i n t o Husserl's m e t h o d n o r the
o f a n e v e r - p r e s e n t r i s k o f d i s a g r e e m e n t t h a t is b u i l t i n t o t h e c o m m u - c o n t e x t i n w h i c h h e i n t r o d u c e d his c o n c e p t o f the l i f e w o r l d ; rather,
n i c a t i v e m e c h a n i s m itself, w h e r e b y e v e r y d i s a g r e e m e n t has a h i g h I s h a l l a p p r o p r i a t e t h e m a t e r i a l c o n t e n t o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s b y as-
cost. I n t h i s r e g a r d , v a r i o u s o p t i o n s are a v a i l a b l e : s i m p l e r e p a i r w o r k ; s u m i n g t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t o o , is e m b e d d e d i n a l i f e w o r l d
leaving o p e n or bracketing controversial validity claims w i t h the t h a t p r o v i d e s r i s k - a b s o r b i n g c o v e r a g e i n t h e f o r m o f a massive b a c k -
result that the c o m m o n g r o u n d o f shared convictions shrivels; t h e g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s . T h e e x p l i c i t feats o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n a c h i e v e d b y
t r a n s i t i o n t o discourses costly i n t e r m s o f t i m e a n d e f f o r t , w i t h u n - c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors take place w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f shared, u n -
c e r t a i n o u t c o m e s a n d d i s r u p t i v e effects; b r e a k i n g o f f communica- p r o b l e m a t i c c o n v i c t i o n s ; t h e d i s q u i e t t h a t arises t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e
t i o n ; o r finally, s w i t c h i n g over to strategic a c t i o n . I f o n e considers a n d c r i t i q u e crashes a g a i n s t t h e — a s i t s e e m s — b r o a d a n d i m p e r -
t h a t e v e r y e x p l i c i t a g r e e m e n t t o a s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r rests o n a d o u b l e turbable rock projecting out f r o m the deep of agreed-upon interpre-
n e g a t i o n , n a m e l y t h e r e p u d i a t i o n o f t h e (always p o s s i b l e ) r e j e c t i o n tive p a t t e r n s , l o y a l t i e s , a n d p r o f i c i e n c i e s .
o f i t , t h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes o p e r a t i n g b y way o f c r i t i -
W i t h h i s c o n c e p t o f u n t h e m a t i c k n o w l e d g e , H u s s e r l has also a l -
c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s h a r d l y r e c o m m e n d t h e m s e l v e s as r e l i a b l e r a i l s
r e a d y i n d i c a t e d a p a t h a l o n g w h i c h w e c a n u n c o v e r these founda-
along w h i c h social integration m i g h t r u n . Rational motivation,
tions o n w h i c h m e a n i n g rests. H e r e , h o w e v e r , w e m u s t t a k e t w o
w h i c h rests o n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n say " n o , " c o n s t i t u t e s a
delimitations i n t o account. T h e prereflective knowledge that accom-
m a e l s t r o m o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n t h a t makes linguistic consensus f o r -
p a n i e s processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o u t i t s e l f b e i n g t h e -
m a t i o n appear m o r e like a disruptive m e c h a n i s m . For the risk o f
m a t i z e d m u s t first be distinguished f r o m the knowledge t h a t is
d i s a g r e e m e n t receives ever n e w s u s t e n a n c e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e s . Expe-
concomitantly thematized i n s p e e c h acts. I n a s p e e c h act Mp, t h e p r e p -
r i e n c e s d i s r u p t t h e r o u t i n i z e d a n d t a k e n - f o r - g r a n t e d aspects o f l i f e
o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e s e n t e n c e is t h e c a r r i e r (Träger) f o r t h e m a t i c
a n d constitute a wellspring o f contingency. Experiences frustrate
k n o w l e d g e . T h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e gives e x p r e s s i o n t o a v a l i d i t y
expectations, r u n counter to habitual modes of perception, trigger
c l a i m a n d specifies i n w h i c h sense t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e b e i n g u s e d . T h i s
s u r p r i s e s , m a k e us c o n s c i o u s o f n e w t h i n g s . E x p e r i e n c e s a r e always
self-referential commentary is d e c l a r e d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y — t h r o u g h
new experiences a n d provide a counterbalance to everything w i t h
t h e c a r r y i n g - o u t o f a n a c t i o n — a n d is n o t , as i n t h e case o f t h e
w h i c h w e have g r o w n f a m i l i a r .
commented-upon prepositional content, presented e x p l i c i t l y as
W i t h t h i s we have g a i n e d a f i r s t p o i n t e r i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e knowledge. I n order to make the merely concomitantly thematized
c o m p l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n a o f the surprising a n d the familiar. A p r e - m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act a v a i l a b l e i n t h e same way as t h e
239
238
Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

t h e m a t i c k n o w l e d g e , Mp has t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h i s is e m b e d d e d . W h a t is a t issue h e r e is

o f Mp: the c o n c r e t e k n o w l e d g e o f language a n d the w o r l d that dwells per-


sistently i n t h e p e n u m b r a of the prepredicative and the precate-
(1) S: I r e q u e s t t h a t y o u give F s o m e m o n e y , gorial a n d that forms the unproblematic g r o u n d for all thematic and

m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d as concomitantly thematized knowledge.


T o be sure, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d suggests a
(la) I n u t t e r i n g ( 1 ) , 5 has r e q u e s t e d H t o d o "p." conception of w o r l d constitution borrowed f r o m epistemology that

Unthematic knowledge is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m m e r e l y concomi- c a n n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y be t a k e n over i n t o sociology. I n o r d e r to

tantly thematized knowledge o n t h e basis t h a t i t c a n n o t b e m a d e acces- a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h social p h e n o m e n o l o g y , social


t h e o r y m u s t f r o m the very outset detach itself f r o m a c o n s t i t u t i o n
sible through a simple transformation of the participant's
theory of knowledge a n d allow itself to be g u i d e d by a p r a g m a t i c
perspective i n t o the observer's perspective; unthematic knowledge
theory o f language that applies itself i n t r i n s i c a l l y to linguistically
r e q u i r e s , r a t h e r , a n analysis o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . F o r w h a t is u n t h e -
m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . " L i f e w o r l d " s h a l l t h e r e f o r e b e i n t r o d u c e d as
m a t i c are those presuppositions t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a -
a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t to c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. However, a for-
t i o n m u s t m a k e i f a s p e e c h act i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n is t o b e a b l e t o
m a l - p r a g m a t i c investigation, w h i c h investigates t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
t a k e o n a specific m e a n i n g a n d i f i t is t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g v a l i d
t h e l i f e w o r l d b y way o f a n analysis o f p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , is c a r r i e d o u t
o r i n v a l i d at all.
f r o m the reconstructively obtained perspective of a participating
N o t all unthematic knowledge is c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r a particular life-
speaker. T h e use o f t h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d i n t h e social sciences
w o r l d , however. O f n o r e l e v a n c e i n t h i s r e s p e c t is t h e u n i v e r s a l
requires a switch over i n m e t h o d f r o m the (performative) attitude
g e n e r a t i v e k n o w l e d g e t h a t e n a b l e s c o m p e t e n t speakers t o use g r a m -
o f the [first and] second person to the (theoretical) attitude o f the
m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s p r o p e r l y i n t h e first p l a c e . E q u a l l y
t h i r d person.
i r r e l e v a n t is t h e k n o w l e d g e o f h o w o n e f u l f i l l s t h e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c
presuppositions of communicative action—for example, the knowl-
edge o f h o w one orients oneself t o w a r d validity claims a n d recipro- T h e Formal-Pragmatic Concept of Lifeworld
cally i m p u t e s a c c o u n t a b i l i t y t o o n e another; how one identifies
objects, thus establishing contact between language a n d t h e w o r l d ; I n The Crisis of European Sciences, H u s s e r l i n t r o d u c e d t h e c o n c e p t o f
how one distinguishes between illocutionary and perlocutionary lifeworld w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a c r i t i q u e o f reason. F r o m beneath
a i m s ; h o w o n e separates t h e s u b j e c t i v e a n d t h e social w o r l d s f r o m t h e r e a l i t y t h a t t h e n a t u r a l sciences t a k e as t h e o n l y o n e , h e p u l l s o u t
the objective w o r l d ; h o w one moves f r o m action to a r g u m e n t a t i o n . the antecedently e x i s t i n g c o n t e x t o f prereflective life-practices and
A l l o f t h i s is i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e t h a t is m a s t e r e d o n l y i n t u i t i v e l y a n d w o r l d e x p e r i e n c e as t h e o u s t e d foundation of meaning. To this
requires the reflexive w o r k o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n o r d e r to be extent, the l i f e w o r l d f o r m s a c o u n t e r c o n c e p t to those idealizations
transformed from a "know-how" into a "know-that." t h a t first c o n s t i t u t e t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n o f t h e n a t u r a l sciences. I n
opposition to the idealizations o f measurement, i m p u t e d causality,
H o w e v e r , t h i s universal, prereflexive unthematic knowledge—which is
a n d m a t h e m a t i c i z a t i o n , as w e l l as t o t h e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d technolo-
p a r t o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e — s e r v e s t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f s p e e c h acts
g i z a t i o n o p e r a t i v e w i t h i n these, H u s s e r l sues f o r t h e r e c o v e r y o f t h e
i n g e n e r a l ; i t g e n e r a t e s c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b u t d o e s n o t serve t o
l i f e w o r l d as t h e i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t r e a l m o f o r i g i n a r y a c c o m p l i s h -
complement and supplement i t . I n the r e m a i n i n g section I shall
ments; f r o m the perspective o f the l i f e w o r l d , he criticizes the ideali-
focus o n that o t h e r sort o f u n t h e m a t i c knowledge that complements,
zations—oblivious of their own existence—of natural scientific
supplements, a n d accompanies communicative action a n d provides
240 241

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

o b j e c t i v i s m . H o w e v e r , since t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t is b l i n d t o specific horizontal knowledge (Horizontwissen) and (b) a topic-


the independent logic (Eigensinn) of linguistic intersubjectivity, dependent contextual knowledge.
H u s s e r l is n o t a b l e t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e v e r y g r o u n d o f everyday a. T h e p e r c e i v e d e n v i r o n m e n t , w h i c h is e m b e d d e d i n c o n c e n t r i -
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s i t s e l f rests o n i d e a l i z i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . cally a r r a n g e d s p a t i o t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n s t h a t a r e n o t p e r c e i v e d , c o n -
W i t h validity claims that transcend a l l merely local standards o f stitutes t h e center o f t h e speech s i t u a t i o n . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m a y
evaluation, the tension between transcendental presuppositions a n d usually suppose t h a t they i n t e r p r e t , f r o m c o o r d i n a t e d perspectives,
e m p i r i c a l facts n o w m o v e s i n t o t h e f a c t i c i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d itself. the m o r e trivial components o f the speech situation a n d o f their
The theory of communicative action detranscendentalizes Kant's surroundings (becoming ever m o r e d i f f u s e t h e m o r e d i s t a n t t h e y
r e a l m o f the I n t e l l i g i b l e by r e v e a l i n g the i d e a l i z i n g force o f a n t i c i p a - are) more o r less i n t h e s a m e way. T h e y also assume t h a t t h e i r
tion i n the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions o f s p e e c h acts, d i v e r g e n t perspectives, resulting f r o m t h e i r d i f f e r i n g life-histories,
t h a t is, a t t h e h e a r t o f e v e r y d a y communicative practices them- converge here a n d n o w a n d , at most, a c c o r d d i f f e r e n t relevance to
selves—idealizations that simply e m e r g e m o r e visibly i n the extraor- a s h a r e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h i s horizontal knowledge is
dinary forms of c o m m u n i c a t i o n that argumentations constitute. T h e a c t u a l i z e d c o n c o m i t a n t i y yet i m p l i c i t l y w h e n s o m e t h i n g is s a i d ; i t
idea o f vindicating criticizable validity claims requires idealizations r e n d e r s a n u t t e r a n c e u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d l e n d s s u p p o r t t o its a c c e p t -
that, h a v i n g descended f r o m t h e transcendental heavens d o w n to ability. I f I m e n t i o n i n t h e course o f small talk i n a p a r k i n F r a n k f u r t
t h e e a r t h o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , d e v e l o p t h e i r effectiveness i n t h e m e d i u m t h a t i t is s n o w i n g i n C a l i f o r n i a , m y p a r t n e r i n c o n v e r s a t i o n will
o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e ; t h e p o w e r o f resistance o f a — c u n n i n g l y o p e r - r e f r a i n f r o m q u e s t i o n i n g m e f u r t h e r o n l y i f h e k n o w s t h a t I have
a t i n g — c o m m u n i c a t i v e reason to the cognitive-instrumental defor- j u s t r e t u r n e d f r o m San F r a n c i s c o or, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t I w o r k as a
m a t i o n s o f selectively m o d e r n i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e is also m a n i f e s t e d i n meteorologist.
these i d e a l i z a t i o n s .
b. A n e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n s t a b i l i z i n g v a l i d i t y is p l a y e d b y t h e
Since t h e idealizations are d u e to a linguistic c o m p e t e n c e that t h e topic-dependent contextual knowledge t h a t a s p e a k e r c a n presuppose
s p e a k e r s possess p r e r e f l e c t i v e l y i n t h e f o r m o f a n i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e , w i t h i n the framework o f a c o m m o n language, t h e same c u l t u r e ,
the conflict between, o n the one h a n d , the explicit knowledge de- s i m i l a r s c h o o l i n g , a n d so f o r t h — t h a t is, w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a
p e n d e n t o n idealizations a n d , o n the other h a n d , the risk-absorbing c o m m o n m i l i e u o r h o r i z o n o f subjective e x p e r i e n c e . T h e speaker
b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e takes p l a c e within t h e d o m a i n o f u n t h e m a t i c w h o addresses a p a r t i c u l a r t o p i c i m p l i c i t l y s u m m o n s u p f a c t u a l c o n -
k n o w l e d g e — i t d o e s n o t a p p e a r o n l y f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , as H u s s e r l t e x t s i n t h e l i g h t o f w h i c h w h a t is said a p p e a r s as t r i v i a l o r s u r p r i s i n g ,
maintained, i n the competition between the expert knowledge of i n f o r m a t i v e o r i m p l a u s i b l e . F r o m this c o n c o m i t a n t l y present contex-
t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences a n d p r e t h e o r e t i c a l e v e r y d a y c o n v i c t i o n s . M o s t tual knowledge, i n f o r m a t i o n a n d r e a s o n s c a n be m o b i l i z e d as r e -
o f w h a t is said i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s r e m a i n s u n p r o b - q u i r e d . T h i s w i l l b e necessary w h e n e v e r the supposition that the
l e m a t i c , escapes c r i t i c i s m , a n d avoids t h e p r e s s u r e o f s u r p r i s e ex- u n t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n c u r r e n t k n o w l e d g e is i n t e r s u b j e c t i v c l y s h a r e d a n d
e r t e d by critical experiences, because i t draws i n advance o n the agreed u p o n t u r n s o u t to be w r o n g . M y a t t e m p t to i n t r o d u c e the
validity o f antecedently agreed-upon certainties, i n other words, the c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h e o r y o f c o m m u -
certainties o f the lifeworld. n i c a t i o n i n t h e way t h a t I a m d o i n g h e r e w i l l p r o v o k e different
The b u r d e n o f r e n d e r i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s p l a u s i b l e is a s s u m e d questions a n d objections f r o m an audience o f academic colleagues
p r i m a facie b y a n u n t h e m a t i c a l l y c o n c u r r e n t , r e l a t i v e l y foregrounded i n M a d r i d o r Paris t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , i n B e r k e l e y .
knowledge o n w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e l y i n t h e f o r m o f p r a g m a t i c This sort of unthematic knowledge easily gets d r a w n i n t o t h e
a n d s e m a n t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . W h a t is a t issue h e r e is (a) a s i t u a t i o n - maelstrom o f problematization. T h e h o r i z o n o f the situation, or the
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

topic, n e e d only shift marginally. I f I exceed the usual l e n g t h o f a t h e y s t a r t e d t o use c e r t a i n t o o l s f o r s u r v i v a l ; y e t t h e l a w o f levers was
l e c t u r e by even t e n m i n u t e s o r digress t o a n i m p e n d i n g h o l i d a y t r i p d i s c o v e r e d as a l a w a n d g i v e n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o n l y i n
w h e n dealing w i t h the topic o f l i f e w o r l d i n an academic context, t h e c o u r s e o f m e t h o d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y m o d e r n science o f our
t h e n a t t e n t i o n will focus o n the violated pragmatic presuppositions pretheoretical knowledge.
t h a t w e h a d u n t i l t h e n t a c i t l y s h a r e d . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e (a) situ- H o w e v e r , t h e m e t h o d o f free v a r i a t i o n o f u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i -
ation-related horizontal knowledge a n d (b) topic-dependent contex- t i o n s s o o n m e e t s its l i m i t s . T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is j u s t
tual knowledge are t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m (c) the background as l i t t l e a t o u r d i s p o s a l as we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o s u b j e c t a b s o l u t e l y
knowledge of the lifeworld. T h e l a t t e r is s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s e v e r y t h i n g t o a b s t r a c t d o u b t . R a t h e r , C h a r l e s S. P e i r c e , w i t h his
o f thematization. I t c a n n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y be b r o u g h t to conscious- p r a g m a t i c d o u b t a b o u t t h i s C a r t e s i a n d o u b t , has r e m i n d e d us t h a t
ness i n t h e same way as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e f i r s t t w o , a n d i t f o r m s a p r o b l e m s t h a t severely u n s e t t l e l i f e w o r l d c e r t a i n t i e s c o m e t o m e e t us
deep stratum of unthematized knowledge i n w h i c h the situation- w i t h the objective power o f historical contingencies. Husserl h i m s e l f
related horizontal knowledge and topic-dependent contextual h a d a l r e a d y l i n k e d h i s analysis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h t h e crisis m o t i f .
k n o w l e d g e — w h i c h are b o t h still relatively i n t h e foreground—have I t is a crisis a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m o d e r n science t h a t
their roots. shakes H u s s e r l o u t o f a state o f o b j e c t i v i s t i c o b l i v i o n o f b o t h w o r l d
c. T h i s deep-seated background knowledge has a g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y since a n d self. T h e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g p r e s s u r e b r o u g h t t o b e a r by s u c h crisis
i t is t o a l a r g e e x t e n t i m m u n e t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n situations, w h e t h e r o f a w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l o r a life-historical type, ob-
e x e r t e d b y c o n t i n g e n c y - g e n e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s . T h i s c a n b e seen b y jectively transforms the conditions for thematization, and only thus
t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s l a y e r o f e l l i p t i c a l a n d always already-presupposed creates a n i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s t a n c e f r o m w h a t is m o s t f a m i l i a r a n d m o s t
k n o w l e d g e c a n b e e x t r i c a t e d f r o m t h e inaccessible m o d e o f p r o v i d - t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . A n e x a m p l e o f t h i s is t h e t h r u s t t o w a r d m o r a l
i n g a n u n q u e s t i o n e d b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e m a t i z e d o n l y b y methodical u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t sets i n w i t h t h e p r o p h e t i c w o r l d r e l i g i o n s , d i s r u p t -
effort a n d , even t h e n , o n l y p i e c e b y p i e c e . H u s s e r l p r o p o s e d t h a t a i n g naive f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the substantive e t h i c a l life (Sittlichkeit)—
p r o c e d u r e o f eidetic v a r i a t i o n be used f o r this purpose, namely, t h e c o m m a n d i n g reverence f r o m those w i t h i n i t — o f t h e clan o r t r i b a l
unrestrained i m a g i n i n g o f modifications o f the w o r l d or the project- a s s o c i a t i o n , a t h r u s t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t has s p a r k e d o f f so m a n y r e -
i n g o f c o n t r a s t i n g w o r l d s , w h i c h sheds l i g h t o n o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of g r e s s i o n s t h a t i t h a d t o be r e n e w e d a t i n t e r v a l s r i g h t u p u n t i l t h i s
n o r m a l i t y — a s u n c o n s c i o u s as t h e y a r e u n s h a k a b l e a n d u n a v a i l a b l e — c e n t u r y — u n t i l the d e a t h camps o p e n e d t h e i r doors.
a n d w h i c h may b r i n g to l i g h t h o w t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f o u r everyday Like all unthematic knowledge, the b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld
p r a c t i c e s d e p e n d o n a Weltanschauung. J o h n Searle's e x a m p l e s also is i m p l i c i t l y a n d p r e r e f l e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t . I t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , first, b y
r e c a l l H u s s e r l ' s m e t h o d . W i t h t h e h e l p o f these e x a m p l e s , Searle its m o d e o f immediate certainty. T h i s l e n d s a p a r a d o x i c a l c h a r a c t e r t o
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s p e e c h acts r e m a i n s i n d e t e r m i - this k n o w l e d g e f r o m w i t h i n w h i c h — w i t h o u t any distance—we live
n a t e u n t i l t h e i r s e m a n t i c a l l y fixed v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s h a v e b e e n s u p - o u r lives, u n d e r g o e x p e r i e n c e s , speak, a n d act. T h e i n s i s t e n t y e t a t
p l e m e n t e d by i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n , i m p l i c i t b a c k g r o u n d assumptions t h e same t i m e i m p e r c e p t i b l e p r e s e n c e o f t h i s b a c k g r o u n d appears
t h a t r e m a i n u n t h e m a t i c a n d are p r e s u m e d t o be c o m p l e t e l y u n p r o b - as a n i n t e n s i f i e d , a l t h o u g h n o n e t h e l e s s deficient, f o r m of knowl-
l e m a t i c . T h u s , Searle t r a n s p o s e s " t h e cat is o n t h e m a t " i n t o o u t e r e d g e . S u c h b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e lacks a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e
space i n o r d e r t o m a k e us a w a r e b y m e a n s o f t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n t h a t , possibility o f b e c o m i n g problematic f o r i t comes i n t o contact w i t h
n o r m a l l y , w h e n we i m a g i n e a b o d y u p o n some surface, we i m a g i n e criticizable validity claims, thereby b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o fallible
i t o n l y as a f f e c t e d b y t h e f o r c e o f g r a v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , H o m o sapiens k n o w l e d g e , o n l y a t t h e m o m e n t i n w h i c h i t is e x p r e s s e d i n l a n g u a g e .
m u s t h a v e h a d a n i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f h o w levers w o r k ever since Absolute certainties r e m a i n unshakable u n t i l they suddenly disinte-
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d L i f e w o r l d

g r a t e ; for, i n l a c k i n g f a l l i b i l i t y , t h e y d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e k n o w l e d g e i n t h i n g s o n w h i c h w e r e l y a n d t h e t h i n g s w i t h w h i c h w e are f a m i l i a r ,
t h e s t r i c t sense at a l l . t h e t h i n g s t h a t m o v e us, a n d t h e t h i n g s t h a t w e c a n d o — a l l o f w h i c h
T h i s deep-seated b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , sec- are i n t e r m e s h e d i n this b a c k g r o u n d knowledge—are prereflective
o n d l y , b y its totalizing power. T h e l i f e w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e s a t o t a l i t y w i t h a p r é f i g u r a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t m u s t first b e t h e m a t i z e d i n s p e e c h
center a n d indeterminate, porous borders that recede rather t h a n acts b e f o r e i t c a n b r a n c h o u t a n d t a k e o n t h e m e a n i n g o f proposi-
p e r m i t themselves to be transcended. T h e two o t h e r f o r m s o f u n t h e - tional knowledge, of an interpersonal relationship produced
matic knowledge m e n t i o n e d — w h i c h are, relatively speaking, i n the t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y means, o r o f the speaker's i n t e n t i o n .
foreground—derive their w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g f u n c t i o n , i n the d i m e n - T h e three attributes o f immediacy, totalizing power, a n d holistic
sion o f perception as w e l l as i n t h a t o f m e a n i n g , f r o m t h e b a c k - constitution belonging to this unthematically presupposed k n o w l -
g r o u n d i n w h i c h t h e y are r o o t e d . T h e c o m m o n s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n edge may perhaps explain the lifeworld's paradoxical f u n c t i o n as
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c e n t e r — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , m y b o d y , as a n a n t h r o - " g r o u n d " (Boden): h o w i t keeps c o n t i n g e n c y i n c h e c k t h r o u g h p r o x -
pologizing p h e n o m e n o l o g y has claimed—in which social spaces i m i t y t o e x p e r i e n c e . U s i n g sureties t h a t w e o b t a i n o n l y f r o m e x p e r i -
(staggered concentrically according to d e p t h a n d w i d t h ) a n d histori- e n c e , t h e l i f e w o r l d erects a w a l l a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e s t h a t t h e m s e l v e s
cal times (arranged three-dimensionally) converge p r i o r to any ob- o r i g i n a t e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . I f k n o w l e d g e o f t h e w o r l d is d e f i n e d on
jectivation through measuring operations. The spaces a n d times t h e basis t h a t i t is a c q u i r e d a p o s t e r i o r i , w h e r e a s l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l -
e x p e r i e n c e d are t h e c o o r d i n a t e s o f our respective shared world; these edge, relatively speaking, represents a n a p r i o r i knowledge, t h e n the
c o o r d i n a t e s are always c o n c r e t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d o r e m b o d i e d , f o r i n - p a r a d o x may be e x p l a i n e d by the fact that, i n the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
s t a n c e , as v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t y , r e g i o n , state, n a t i o n , w o r l d society, a n d l i f e w o r l d , k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r l d a n d k n o w l e d g e o f language are
so f o r t h , o r as t h e succession o f g e n e r a t i o n s , e p o c h s , w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l integrated.
ages, l i f e - h i s t o r i e s i n d i v i d u a t e d i n t h e eyes o f G o d , a n d so f o r t h . I , The p r o b l e m a t i z i n g f o r c e o f c r i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s separates t h e
i n m y b o d y , a n d I , as m y b o d y , f i n d m y s e l f always a l r e a d y o c c u p y i n g b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld f r o m the f o r e g r o u n d . Such experiences
a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d w o r l d , w h e r e b y these c o l l e c t i v e l y inhab- are t h e m s e l v e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a r i o u s ways i n w h i c h
i t e d lifeworlds telescope i n t o each other, overlap, a n d e n t w i n e l i k e w h a t is e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e w o r l d — t h i n g s a n d events, p e r s o n s , a n d
text and context. stories i n w h i c h p e o p l e are i n v o l v e d — i s d e a l t w i t h p r a c t i c a l l y . T h e
A t h i r d f e a t u r e , c o n n e c t e d w i t h i m m e d i a c y a n d t o t a l i z a t i o n , is t h e world of things (Zeugtvelt) a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f e x p l a n a t i o n are
holism o f t h i s k i n d o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e l a t t e r ' s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r h a n d l i n g o f t h i n g s a n d events; t h e solidary
a p p a r e n t t r a n s p a r e n c y , r e n d e r s i t i m p e n e t r a b l e ; t h e l i f e w o r l d m a y be world a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g a r e c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r
d e s c r i b e d as a " t h i c k e t . " C o m p o n e n t s are f u s e d t o g e t h e r h e r e t h a t interactive dealings w i t h persons to w h o m we r e l a t e — t h e former
can be split u p i n t o d i f f e r e n t categories o f k n o w l e d g e o n l y u n d e r the within the framework of communities o f cooperation, the latter
pressure o f p r o b l e m a t i z i n g experiences. I n d e e d , the formal-prag- w i t h i n the framework o f linguistic communities. Ontogenedcally, the
m a t i c analyst casts h i s gaze b a c k i n t o t h e l i f e w o r l d f r o m t h e v a n t a g e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i n w h i c h we d e a l w i t h e x t e r n a l n a t u r e i n a t e c h n i -
p o i n t of a thematic k n o w l e d g e already differentiated into facts, c a l - p r a c t i c a l way separates o n l y g r a d u a l l y f r o m t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h w e
n o r m s , a n d subjective e x p e r i e n c e s . O n l y t h e r i c o c h e t i n g o f t h i s d i f - d e a l w i t h o t h e r s w i t h i n society i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l way. F i n a l l y , e x p e -
f e r e n t i a t i n g gaze leads h i m t o c o n c l u d e t h a t , i n t h e background riences w i t h o u r i n n e r nature, w i t h o u r body, needs, a n d feelings
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g are a l l o y e d are o f a n i n d i r e c t k i n d ; t h e y are reflected a g a i n s t o u r e x p e r i e n c e s o f
w i t h a relying-on-something, with a being-moved-by-something, with the external w o r l d . W h e n experiences of inner nature then gain
a knowing-how-to-do-something. T h e t h i n g s we simply assume, the independence as aesthetic experiences, the ensuing works of
247
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

a u t o n o m o u s a r t t a k e o n t h e r o l e o f o b j e c t s t h a t o p e n o u r eyes, t h a t s i m p l y by f u l f i l l i n g precisely one l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n . S p e e c h acts


p r o v o k e n e w ways o f s e e i n g t h i n g s , n e w a t t i t u d e s , a n d n e w m o d e s o f serve g e n e r a l l y to c o o r d i n a t e actions t h r o u g h m a k i n g possible a
behavior. Aesthetic experiences are n o t f o r m s o f everyday practice; r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n several a c t o r s ; t h e t w o o t h e r
t h e y d o n o t r e f e r t o c o g n i t i v e - i n s t r u m e n t a l skills a n d m o r a l ideas, functions of language—representation a n d e x p r e s s i o n — a r e also i n -
w h i c h d e v e l o p i n i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes, b u t r a t h e r are v o l v e d i n t h i s . T h e v i e w p o i n t o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n is t h u s s i t u a t e d
b o u n d u p with the world-constituting, world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f at a m o r e abstract level t h a n the actor's d i r e c t l y i n t e n d e d estab-
language. lishing of a particular interpersonal relationship. Action coordina-
T h i s s t r u c t u r i n g o f e x p e r i e n c e reflects the architecture o f the t i o n i n g e n e r a l serves t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e social i n t e g r a t i o n o f a
l i f e w o r l d i n s o f a r as i t is l i n k e d t o t h e t r i c h o t o m o u s c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i f e w o r l d s h a r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y b y its m e m b e r s . T o b e s u r e , s u c h a
s p e e c h acts a n d o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f the lifeworld. To d e s c r i p t i o n already presupposes the shift i n perspective t h a t allows

b e s u r e , these g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b e c o m e v i s i b l e o n l y us t o p o s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e ac-

w h e n we shift perspective w i t h r e g a r d to m e t h o d . T h e terminology t i o n s t o t h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . O n c e w e have methodo-

o f "background," "foreground," a n d "situationally relevant segment logically c a r r i e d o u t this shift i n perspective, we can m a k e a s i m i l a r

o f t h e l i f e w o r l d " is m e a n i n g f u l o n l y so l o n g as w e a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c - o b s e r v a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t is
said o r w i t h r e g a r d to the socialization o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g persons;
tive o f a s p e a k e r w h o w i s h e s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e
t h e s e r o l e s , t o o , are f u l f i l l e d b y s p e e c h acts i n a l l t h e i r f u n c t i o n s .
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d a n d , i n t h i s , c a n base t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y
F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y serve t o
o f h e r speech-act o f f e r o n a mass o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d , u n t h e -
transmit a n d f u r t h e r develop cultural knowledge; f r o m the p o i n t
matic knowledge. T h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e c o m e s i n t o v i e w only
o f view o f socialization, they serve to f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n p e r s o n a l
w h e n w e , as i t w e r e , s t a n d b e h i n d t h e b a c k o f t h e a c t o r a n d v i e w
identities.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as a n e l e m e n t o f a c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s i n w h i c h
t h e a c t o r n o l o n g e r a p p e a r s as t h e i n i t i a t o r b u t r a t h e r as t h e p r o d u c t O n e can n o w imagine the c o m p o n e n t s o f the l i f e w o r l d — c u l t u r a l
o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h she is s i t u a t e d , o f s o l i d a r y g r o u p s t o paradigms, legitimate orders, a n d personality structures—as con-
w h i c h she b e l o n g s , o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g processes t o w h i c h d e n s e d f o r m s of, a n d s e d i m e n t s d e p o s i t e d by, t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c -
she is s u b j e c t e d . O n l y a f t e r t h i s i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v a t i n g step d o e s t h e esses that operate by way of communicative action: reaching
network of communicative actions constitute the m e d i u m t h r o u g h understanding, action coordination, a n d socialization. W h a t e n t e r s i n t o
w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d r e p r o d u c e s itself. c o m m u n i c a t i v e action f r o m the resources o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
l i f e w o r l d , f l o w s t h r o u g h t h e s l u i c e gates o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n , a n d p e r -
S o c i e t y as S y m b o l i c a l l y S t r u c t u r e d L i f e w o r l d mits the mastery o f situations, constitutes the stock o f knowledge
preserved w i t h i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices. T h i s stock o f knowledge
E v e r y s p e e c h act w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r r e a c h e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g / w i t h solidifies, a l o n g paths o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t o i n t e r p r e t i v e paradigms
a n o t h e r p e r s o n / w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g situates t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x - t h a t are h a n d e d d o w n ; the k n o w l e d g e becomes compressed, i n t h e
p r e s s i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e speaker, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h e a r e r , a n d i n n e t w o r k o f i n t e r a c t i o n s o f social g r o u p s , i n t o values a n d n o r m s ; a n d
r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f c o n s t r u c t i n g i n t e r - i t c o n d e n s e s , b y way o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n processes, i n t o a t t i t u d e s , c o m -
a c t i o n s , w e have b e e n c o n c e r n e d a b o v e a l l w i t h t h e s e c o n d o f these petencies, modes o f perception, a n d identities. T h e c o m p o n e n t s o f
three aspects—the interpersonal relationship. W i t h t h e i r speech t h e l i f e w o r l d result f r o m a n d are m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h the c o n t i n u -
acts, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a c c o m p l i s h feats o f c o o r d i n a t i o n b y ation o f valid knowledge, the stabilization o f g r o u p solidarities, a n d
establishing such relationships. However, they d o n o t achieve this t h e f o r m a t i o n o f accountable actors. T h e w e b o f everyday commu-
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s e x t e n d s across t h e s e m a n t i c field o f s y m b o l i c con- t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f h i s respective l i f e w o r l d b e h i n d h i m a n d t h e i n s t i -


t e n t s j u s t as m u c h as i n t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f social space a n d h i s t o r i c a l t u t i o n s o r p e r s o n s w i t h i n his l i f e w o r l d b e f o r e h i m , b u t i n e a c h case
t i m e , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h c u l t u r e , society, a n d t h e i r s h a p e has b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d . T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e l i f e w o r l d
personality structures develop a n d are r e p r o d u c e d . is n e u t r a l i z e d i n a p e c u l i a r w a y i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t t h e m a s t e r y o f
Culture is w h a t I c a l l t h e s t o c k o f k n o w l e d g e f r o m w h i c h the s i t u a t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n s u b j e c t e d t o t h e i m p e r a t i v e s o f success-ori-
participants i n communication, i n reaching understanding w i t h one e n t e d a c t i o n ; i t loses its a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g p o w e r as a r e s o u r c e t h a t
a n o t h e r w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g , s u p p l y themselves w i t h i n t e r p r e - guarantees consensus. A n d like a l l o t h e r entities i n t h e ( n o w no
t a t i o n s . Society consists o f t h e l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s b y way o f w h i c h t h e longer intersubjectively shared) lifeworld, the o t h e r participants i n
participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n regulate their affiliations to social i n t e r a c t i o n are n o w also e n c o u n t e r e d o n l y as social facts—as o b j e c t s
g r o u p s a n d s a f e g u a r d s o l i d a r i t y . I n t h e c a t e g o r y o f personality struc- that the actor can i n f l u e n c e ( i f n e e d be w i t h the h e l p o f p e r l o c u t i o n -
tures, I i n c l u d e a l l m o t i v e s a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s t h a t e n a b l e a s u b j e c t t o a r y e f f e c t s ) , as o b j e c t s i n w h i c h h e c a n s p a r k o f f p a r t i c u l a r r e a c t i o n s .
s p e a k a n d act a n d t h e r e b y t o s e c u r e h e r o w n i d e n t i t y . W h e r e a s for H o w e v e r , i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g stance o f t h e s t r a t e g i c actor, h e c a n n o
t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors c u l t u r e constitutes t h e c o n e o f l i g h t w i t h i n l o n g e r r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h t h e m as h e c a n w i t h a s e c o n d
w h i c h entities can e n c o u n t e r one a n o t h e r a n d can be represented person.
o r d e a l t w i t h as s o m e t h i n g , s u c h a c t o r s e n c o u n t e r n o r m s a n d s u b - F o r t h e social s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v e r , t h e r e f o r e , s e q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n
j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s as s o m e t h i n g i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d o r s o m e t h i n g i n ( a n d , i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , systems o f a c t i o n ) c a n o c c u r i n t h e
a s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e y c a n r e f e r , respectively, i n a n o r m - l i f e w o r l d she analyzes t h a t a r e i n t e g r a t e d n o t b y way o f values,
conformative o r expressive attitude. I n order to prevent a wide- n o r m s , a n d processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g b u t , a t m o s t , b y w a y
spread misunderstanding, I now want to e x p l a i n why, i n the o f the reciprocal e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e — f o r instance, t h r o u g h m a r -
transition f r o m communicative t o strategic a c t i o n , this scenario ket or power relations. I t t h e n remains an empirical question
c h a n g e s a l l a t o n c e f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects, a l t h o u g h n o t f o r w h e t h e r t h i s a p p r o a c h b a s e d o n t h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d is m o r e
t h e social s c i e n t i s t w h o uses t h i s c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d . realistic t h a n a n a p p r o a c h o f the H o b b e s i a n type. A t first glance,
I f w e c o n s i d e r society i n t h e b r o a d e r sense as a s y m b o l i c a l l y s t r u c - t h e r e a r e a n u m b e r o f p o i n t s i n t h e f o r m e r ' s favor. M a r k e t a n d
t u r e d l i f e w o r l d , i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t society d e v e l o p s a n d r e p r o - p o w e r r e l a t i o n s , t o o , are n o r m a t i v e l y — a s a r u l e , l e g a l l y — r e g u l a t e d ,
duces itself o n l y via c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I t does n o t f o l l o w f r o m t h a t is, t h e y are set w i t h i n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k . E v e n m i l i t a r y
this, however, that f o r t h e social scientific observer n o strategic i n - conflicts r e m a i n e m b e d d e d w i t h i n n o r m a t i v e contexts. Civil w a r s —
t e r a c t i o n s c a n o c c u r i n l i f e w o r l d s c o n s t i t u t e d i n t h i s way. T o b e s u r e , a n d g e n o c i d e e v e n m o r e s o — l e a v e b e h i n d t h e m traces o f m o r a l
s u c h i n t e r a c t i o n s have a d i f f e r e n t status h e r e t h a n t h e y h a v e for distress t h a t s u p p o r t t h e v i e w t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d l i f e w o r l d s
H o b b e s o r i n game t h e o r y . These theories conceive o f strategic c o n s t i t u t e t h e indispensable g r o u n d even f o r strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s .
a c t i o n as a m e c h a n i s m f o r t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f society as a n i n s t r u m e n - The components o f t h e l i f e w o r l d — c u l t u r e , society, a n d p e r s o n a l -
tal order. F r o m the vantage point of communication theory, by ity s t r u c t u r e s — f o r m c o m p l e x contexts o f m e a n i n g that c o m m u n i -
contrast, strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s can o c c u r o n l y w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f cate w i t h o n e another, a l t h o u g h they are e m b o d i e d i n different
l i f e w o r l d s a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d e l s e w h e r e , m o r e precisely, as a n a l t e r - s u b s t r a t a . C u l t u r a l k n o w l e d g e is e m b o d i e d i n symbolic f o r m s — i n
n a t i v e o p t i o n i n case o f t h e f a i l u r e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s . T h e y objects o f utility a n d technologies, i n words a n d theories, i n books
o c c u p y , r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , as i t w e r e , s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s — a n d d o c u m e n t s — j u s t as m u c h as i n a c t i o n s . Society is e m b o d i e d i n
segments w i t h i n dimensions o f an already existing l i f e w o r l d consti- i n s t i t u t i o n a l orders, i n legal n o r m s , o r i n webs o f n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u -
t u t e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e s t r a t e g i c actor, t o o , k e e p s l a t e d p r a c t i c e s a n d c u s t o m s . F i n a l l y , p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s are e m -
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Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts. Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

b o d i e d — i n a literal sense—in the substratum o f h u m a n organisms. T h e concept o f lifeworld thus explicated does n o t only provide an
W h a t is t h u s e m b o d i e d a r e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s t h a t c a n also b e l i q u i - a n s w e r t o t h e classical q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . W i t h
dated a n d p u t into circulation i n the currency o f n o r m a l language. the idea o f the i n t e r m e s h i n g o f the l i f e w o r l d c o m p o n e n t s , this con-
A l l m e a n i n g comes together i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e o f everyday c o m m u - c e p t also answers t h e o t h e r q u e s t i o n o f classical social t h e o r y : t h a t
nicative practices. Nonetheless, t h e various c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e life- o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d society. T h e lifeworld
w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e d i s t i n c t q u a n t i t i e s ; t h i s c a n b e seen o n t o l o g i c a l l y does not constitute an environment against whose contingent
f r o m t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l aspects o f t h e i r e m b o d i m e n t s . i n f l u e n c e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l has t o assert h e r s e l f . I n d i v i d u a l a n d society
C u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a r e d i f f u s e d across t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f c o l l e c t i v i - d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e systems e x i s t i n g i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t s
ties a n d l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d i n t h e i r l i f e s p a n a r e n o t t i e d t o t h a t w o u l d r e l a t e t o o n e a n o t h e r e x t e r n a l l y as o b s e r v e r s . E q u a l l y ,
t h e i d e n t i t y o f societies, l e t a l o n e p e r s o n s . T h e w o r l d r e l i g i o n s a r e h o w e v e r , t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o t s o m e k i n d o f receptacle i n w h i c h i n d i -
t h e best e x a m p l e o f t h i s . S o c i e t i e s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , o c c u p y a l a r g e r v i d u a l s m i g h t be c o n t a i n e d l i k e p a r t s o f a w h o l e . T h e l a t t e r figure o f
s o c i a l space a n d l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s t h a n a p e r s o n a n d h e r t h o u g h t , w h i c h c o m e s f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , is j u s t as
l i f e - h i s t o r y , b u t have less d i f f u s e a n d m o r e n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d d e f i c i e n t as t h a t o f systems t h e o r y .
b o u n d a r i e s t h a n traditions. Finally, personality structures, w h i c h ad- F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , society has
h e r e to t h e i r organic substrata, are d e f i n e d most sharply f r o m a b e e n c o n c e i v e d o f as a w h o l e c o m p o s e d o f p a r t s , w h e t h e r as t h e state
s p a t i o t e m p o r a l p o i n t o f view. F o r i n d i v i d u a l s , c u l t u r e a n d society m a d e u p o f p o l i t i c a l c i t i z e n s o r as t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f f r e e p r o d u c e r s .
a p p e a r first o f a l l i n t h e shape o f a n o v e r a r c h i n g g e n e r a t i o n a l i n t e r - T h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d also b r e a k s w i t h t h i s figure o f t h o u g h t . F o r
relationship. c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s o c i a l i z e d subjects w o u l d n o t b e subjects w i t h o u t
N o n e t h e l e s s , these c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d s h o u l d n o t be t h e n e t w o r k o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s a n d o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f society
c o n c e i v e d o f as systems c o n s t i t u t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t s f o r o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d c u l t u r e . O f c o u r s e , c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects e x p e r i e n c e
they r e m a i n e n t w i n e d w i t h one a n o t h e r via the c o m m o n m e d i u m o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i f e w o r l d s as a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d t o t a l i t y i n
e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e . So l o n g as n o s p e c i a l c o d e s s u c h as m o n e y o r t h e b a c k g r o u n d . B u t this totality, w h i c h w o u l d have to disintegrate
administrative power b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d split o f f f r o m this for them a t t h e m o m e n t o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n a n d h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n , is c o n -
m e d i u m — c o d e s b y w a y o f w h i c h , i n t u r n , f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c sys- s t i t u t e d b y t h e m o t i v e s a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s o f s o c i a l i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s as
t e m s o f a c t i o n b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e society m u c h as b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d g r o u p s o l i d a r i t i e s . T h e l i f e w o r l d
component o f the lifeworld—everyday language ( w h i c h is always is s t r u c t u r e d b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s n o m o r e
m u l t i f u n c t i o n a l ) sets a l i m i t t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . a n d n o less t h a n i t is by i d e n t i t i e s t h a t arise o u t o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n
E v e n systems o f a c t i o n t h a t a r e s p e c i a l i z e d t o a h i g h d e g r e e i n processes. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e l i f e w o r l d d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n o r -
c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n (school) o r social i n t e g r a t i o n (law) o r sociali- g a n i z a t i o n t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s b e l o n g as m e m b e r s , n o r a n associa-
z a t i o n ( f a m i l y ) d o n o t o p e r a t e o n t h e basis o f s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n s . V i a t i o n i n w h i c h individuals j o i n together, n o r a collective comprised o f
t h e c o m m o n c o d e o f e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e t h e y also c o n c u r r e n t l y f u l f i l l i n d i v i d u a l participants. Rather, t h e everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
t h e o t h e r respective f u n c t i o n s alongside t h e i r o w n p a r t i c u l a r ones, tices i n w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d is c e n t e r e d a r e n o u r i s h e d b y m e a n s o f
thus m a i n t a i n i n g a relation to the totality o f the lifeworld. The a n interplay o f c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n , social i n t e g r a t i o n , a n d s o c i a l i -
l i f e w o r l d , as a s y m b o l i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d c o n t e x t o f m e a n i n g t h a t ex- z a t i o n t h a t is i n t u r n r o o t e d i n these p r a c t i c e s .
t e n d s t h r o u g h these v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s a n d f o r m s o f e m b o d i m e n t ,
O r g a n i s m s fall u n d e r the d e s c r i p t i o n o f persons o n l y if, a n d to the
c o m p r i s e s t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s entwined with one another in an equipri-
e x t e n t t h a t , t h e y a r e s o c i a l i z e d , t h a t is, i n v e s t e d w i t h a n d s t r u c t u r e d
mordial way.
252 253

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

b y social a n d c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g . P e r s o n s are s y m b o l i c
structures, whereas the symbolically s t r u c t u r e d n a t u r e - l i k e substra-
t u m , a l t h o u g h e x p e r i e n c e d as o n e ' s o w n b o d y , n o n e t h e l e s s , as n a -
t u r e , r e m a i n s j u s t as e x t e r n a l t o i n d i v i d u a l s as d o e s t h e m a t e r i a l
n a t u r a l basis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e . W h e r e a s i n t e r n a l and
external nature constitute external boundaries—delimitations with
respect to an e n v i r o n m e n t — f o r socialized individuals a n d t h e i r life-
w o r l d s , these persons r e m a i n i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d — v i a g r a m m a t i c a l re-
l a t i o n s h i p s — w i t h t h e i r c u l t u r e a n d t h e i r society.
The content of culturally handed-down t r a d i t i o n s is always a
k n o w l e d g e a c q u i r e d by persons; w i t h o u t the h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o p r i a -
tion and further development of cultural knowledge t h r o u g h per-
sons, n o t r a d i t i o n s c a n d e v e l o p o r b e m a i n t a i n e d . T o t h i s e x t e n t ,
persons accomplish s o m e t h i n g f o r c u l t u r e b y way o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e - Figure 4.1
tive achievements. However, c u l t u r e f o r its p a r t also r e p r e s e n t s a Entwining of personality structures with culture a n d society

r e s o u r c e f o r p e r s o n s . F o r p e r s o n s are n o t " c a r r i e r s " (Träger) f o r


t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e o r g a n i c substratum can be a n d social i n n o v a t i o n s a n d find expression i n the forces o f pro-
d e s c r i b e d as a c a r r i e r f o r p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s . E v e r y c u l t u r a l t r a d i - d u c t i o n o r structures o f m o r a l consciousness. These i n n e r w o r l d l y
t i o n is a t t h e same t i m e a p r o c e s s o f e d u c a t i o n (Bildung) f o r subjects l e a r n i n g processes a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h p r o b l e m s o f m a t e r i a l r e p r o -
c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n w h o a r e f o r m e d w i t h i n t h i s , j u s t as d u c t i o n , w i t h w h i c h we are n o t c o n c e r n e d i n t h e p r e s e n t context.
m u c h as t h e y f o r t h e i r p a r t k e e p c u l t u r e alive. S i t u a t e d a t a n o t h e r level t h a n these i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes
I n a corresponding manner, n o r m a t i v e orders, whether they solid- are processes w h e r e b y t h e l i f e w o r l d i t s e l f is s t r u c t u r a l l y d i f f e r e n t i -
i f y i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n s o r r e m a i n f r e e f l o a t i n g as f l e e t i n g c o n t e x t s , are a t e d . T h e d y n a m i c h e r e can b e e x p l a i n e d , f r o m a n i n t e r n a l p e r s p e c -
always o r d e r s o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . T h e n e t w o r k s o f i n t e r - tive, in terms of an interaction between innovative linguistic
a c t i o n o f m o r e o r less socially i n t e g r a t e d , o f m o r e o r less u n i t e d processes o f w o r l d d i s c l o s u r e a n d i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes.
g r o u p s , a r e c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e feats o f c o o r d i n a t i o n of To conclude, I w o u l d like to consider once m o r e , w i t h the help o f a
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects. B u t , o n c e a g a i n , i t w o u l d b e w r o n g language-pragmatic reminder, the logic o f this interplay.
t o d e s c r i b e p e r s o n s as " c a r r i e r s " f o r these n e t w o r k s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . F r o m the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , we are already a c q u a i n t e d w i t h the
O n c e a g a i n , society a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t i t u t e o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p - internal connection b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y : we understand
r o c a l l y . E v e r y process o f social i n t e g r a t i o n o f a c t i o n c o n t e x t s ¿5 s i m u l - t h e m e a n i n g o f a s p e e c h act i f w e k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h
t a n e o u s l y a process o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n f o r subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h i t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . S e m a n t i c r u l e s t h u s lay d o w n t h e c o n d i -
a n d a c t i o n w h o are f o r m e d i n t h i s p r o c e s s a n d w h o f o r t h e i r p a r t i n t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f o r t h e sentences o r s p e e c h acts p o s s i b l e i n a l i n g u i s -
e q u a l m e a s u r e r e n e w a n d s t a b i l i z e society as t h e t o t a l i t y o f l e g i t i - tic system. W i t h s u c h c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g language opens u p a
m a t e l y o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (cf. figure 4.1). h o r i z o n o f possible actions a n d experiences f o r those w h o b e l o n g t o
Processes o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d e d u c a t i o n are l e a r n i n g processes t h e l i n g u i s t i c system. W o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g l a n g u a g e , as H e i d e g g e r says,
t h a t are d e p e n d e n t o n p e r s o n s . T h e y m u s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e a l l o w s s o m e t h i n g t o be e n c o u n t e r e d as s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I t is
s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e l e a r n i n g effects t h a t m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s as c u l t u r a l a d i f f e r e n t q u e s t i o n , however, w h e t h e r t h e s e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o j e c t e d
254 255

Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld

p o s s i b i l i t i e s also prove their worth (sich bewähren) 2


i n their inner- well. I f the initially hermeneutically appropriated lifeworld, made
w o r l d l y dealings. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e semantically established c o n d i - accessible f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t a n d r e c o n s t r u c t i v e l y
t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y a r e a c t u a l l y satisfied t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e s g r a s p e d i n its g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s , is t o b e o b j e c t i f i e d o n e f u r t h e r t i m e
a n d u t t e r a n c e s p o s s i b l e i n a g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c system find t h e i r place i n t h e s h a p e o f a b o u n d a r y - m a i n t a i n i n g system, t h e n t h e p r o f i t
w i t h i n f u n c t i o n i n g language games does n o t only d e p e n d o n the y i e l d e d f o r social s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y t h r o u g h a n analysis o f t h e l i f e -
w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e ; i t also d e p e n d s o n t h e success w o r l d s h o u l d n o t b e g a m b l e d away i n t h e p r o c e s s . I n o r d e r t o a v o i d
o f i n n e r w o r l d l y practices t h a t are, however, m a d e possible t h r o u g h a c o n f u s i o n o f p a r a d i g m s , I have e l s e w h e r e a t t e m p t e d ( i n The Theory
t h e l i n g u i s t i c system. C r e a t i v e i n n o v a t i o n s i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d v i e w of Communicative Action, v o l . 2 ) t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d
s h o u l d n o t b e h y p o s t a s i z e d , as H e i d e g g e r a n d F o u c a u l t have d o n e , t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f systems t h e o r y , g u i d e d b y t h e t h r e a d o f t h e t w i n
as a c r y p t i c h i s t o r y — d a t i n g b a c k t o t i m e i m m e m o r i a l — o f o n t o l o g y c o n c e p t s o f social i n t e g r a t i o n a n d system i n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s model
or forms o f knowledge. As t h e linguistic h o r i z o n of meaning p e r m i t s e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h y systemic e l e m e n t s e m e r g e o n l y as t h e
c h a n g e s , o n l y t h e conditions f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s c h a n g e w i t h r e s u l t o f h i s t o r i c a l processes. T h e d y n a m i c s o f dissociation from
i t ; a n a l t e r e d p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m u s t prove its truth (sich bewähren) i n c o m p l e x e n v i r o n m e n t s , w h i c h c h a r a c t e r i z e s s o c i e t y as a w h o l e i n its
its d e a l i n g s w i t h w h a t is a c t u a l l y e n c o u n t e r e d w i t h i n t h e n o w s h i f t e d c a p a c i t y as system, e n t e r s i n t o t h e v e r y interior o f society o n l y w i t h
h o r i z o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e s p e c t r u m o f validity claims i n s c r i b e d i n the media-steered subsystems.
communicative action provides f o r the feedback o f l e a r n i n g proc-
esses t o i n n e r w o r l d l y p r a c t i c e s . T h e w o r l d v i e w s t r u c t u r e s t h a t m a k e Notes
i n n e r w o r l d l y practices possible t h r o u g h a p r e e x i s t i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o f m e a n i n g d o n o t r e n e w themselves only by virtue o f a poetic 1. T h e absence of references is due to the nature of this essay, which is meant to
provide a rough sketch of my pragmatic approach to language.
b e s t o w i n g o f m e a n i n g ; t h e y also i n t u r n r e a c t u p o n t h e l e a r n i n g
processes t h a t t h e y have m a d e p o s s i b l e a n d w h o s e r e s u l t s find e x - 2. [Editor's note:] See my note 52 to chapter 8, p. 380.
pression i n changes i n worldview structures.

O n the other h a n d , neither should the restrictions o n the envi-


r o n m e n t — c o n t i n g e n t a n d e x e r t i n g influences e x t e r n a l l y — t h a t be-
c o m e visible w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g pressure b r o u g h t
t o b e a r b y c r i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s b e h y p o s t a s i z e d as a n a l l - d o m i n a t i n g
i m p e r a t i v e o f t h e self-assertion o f systems i n o v e r - c o m p l e x e n v i r o n -
m e n t s . I n t h i s way, systems f u n c t i o n a l i s m g r a n t s i n d e p e n d e n c e t o a
s i n g l e aspect, o n e t h a t is i n i t s e l f l e g i t i m a t e . V i e w e d as systems,
societies p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s m e r e l y f r o m t h e side o f w h a t M a r x
r e f e r r e d t o m e t a p h o r i c a l l y as t h e m e t a b o l i s m b e t w e e n s o c i e t y a n d
e x t e r n a l n a t u r e . T h e c o n s t i t u t i v e f e a t u r e o f system f o r m a t i o n is t h e
differentiation between an internal a n d an external perspective,
w h e r e b y t h e system is a t t r i b u t e d w i t h t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s y s t e m -
e n v i r o n m e n t d i f f e r e n c e as its o w n a c h i e v e m e n t . H o w e v e r , t h i s a t t r i -
bution should n o t be undertaken from t h e perspective o f an
o b s e r v e r w h o n o w s u p e r i m p o s e s a systems m o d e l o n t h e l i f e w o r l d as
5
Comments on John Searle's "Meaning,
Communication, and Representation" (1988)

Every analysis of l i n g u i s t i c processes of communication (Ver-


ständigung) is g u i d e d b y i n t u i t i o n s . W e t h i n k w e k n o w w h a t i t m e a n s
t o p e r f o r m a s p e e c h act successfully. M y c o m m e n t s serve i n d i r e c t l y
to c o m p a r e two i n t u i t i o n s o f this k i n d .
T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t v i e w assumes t h a t a s p e a k e r S successfully per-
f o r m s a g i v e n s p e e c h act i f , w i t h t h e a i d o f a s i g n x, h e gets a n
a d d r e s s e e A t o r e c o g n i z e a n i n t e n t i o n o r a m e a n i n g (Meinung) in-
t e n d e d b y h i m ( i n t e n t i o n i ) . S achieves h i s g o a l b y m a k i n g t h i s c o m -
municative intention ( i n t e n t i o n s ) , t o o , k n o w n t o A. T h e model
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a n a l y z e d is t h a t
o f t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f ideas possessed b y S t o a n addressee w h o is t o
a c q u i r e possession o f t h e m w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s i g n x e m p l o y e d b y S
w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t : 5 gives A t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y
m e a n s o f x.
T h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t v i e w assumes t h a t S successfully p e r f o r m s a
s p e e c h act i f h e r e a c h e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sich verständigen) w i t h a n
addressee a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . H e r e , the i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
description is r e p l a c e d n o t o n l y by a m o r e complex (and thus
v a g u e r ) c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , b u t b y a different o n e . W i t h a n u t t e r a n c e
x, S a l l o w s a n addressee t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n w i t h a
"yes" o r a " n o " t o s o m e t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h h e wishes t o r e a c h
a g r e e m e n t w i t h her. T h e m o d e l i n t h i s case is n o t t h a t o f t r a n s m i t t i n g
258 259
Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

ideas b u t t h a t o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a c o n s e n s u s w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e ( i n c u t e d s p e e c h act a r e satisfied i n t h e g i v e n i n s t a n c e . U n d e r s t a n d i n g


p r i n c i p l e , d i s p u t e d ) m a t t e r . L a n g u a g e is n o t c o n c e i v e d as a m e a n s a speech act r e q u i r e s k n o w l e d g e o f these c o n d i t i o n s .
f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g subjective c o n t e n t s b u t as a m e d i u m i n w h i c h t h e Searle a t t h a t t i m e h a d a n a l y z e d s u c h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h t h e h e l p o f
p a r t i c i p a n t s intersubjectively share a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a given m a t - t h e s e n t e n c e s u s e d i n s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts; t o t h i s e x t e n t , h e presup-
ter. T h e s i g n x is n o t a t o o l t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l c a n use, a n d w i t h w h i c h posed t h a t S a n d A s p e a k t h e same l a n g u a g e — t h a t is, t h a t t h e y a l r e a d y
5 gives A t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y p r o m p t i n g h e r t o r e c o g n i z e have a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l a p r i o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e same l a n g u a g e .
h i s m e a n i n g o r i n t e n t i o n ; r a t h e r , t h e s i g n x is a n e l e m e n t of a However, since t h e n he holds the view t h a t he can dispense w i t h this
repertoire used i n c o m m o n that p e r m i t s the participants to u n d e r - s t r o n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a n d c a n t r e a t t h e c o m m o n l a n g u a g e i t s e l f as
s t a n d t h e same m a t t e r i n t h e s a m e way. the p h e n o m e n o n i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n . For this reason, he renews
T h e intentionalist can, w i t h m o r e sparing assumptions, offer the t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a p p r o a c h ; i n d o i n g so, h o w e v e r , h e d o e s n o t i n a n y
p r o s p e c t o f a m o r e e l e g a n t e x p l a n a t i o n because h e w a n t s t o t r a c e way reverse t h e — i n i t i a l l y s e m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d — u n c o u p l i n g o f t h e
back the p h e n o m e n o n o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r t a n d i n g ( Verständigung) to m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression f r o m the speaker's i n t e n t i o n . T o 4

g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e success o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n s . I f h e can a l l a p p e a r a n c e s , Searle r a d i c a l i z e s h i s e a r l i e r c r i t i q u e o f G r i c e by


s h o w h o w a s p e a k e r realizes h i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f m a k i n g h i s tracing the concept of m e a n i n g back to cognitive intentions, w h i c h
i n t e n t i o n s k n o w n to a hearer, t h e n he can h o p e to e x p l a i n some- a r e n o t o n l y p r e l i n g u i s t i c b u t are also i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e s i t u a t i o n
t h i n g t h a t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s i n his o f i n t e r a c t i o n . L i k e H u s s e r l , h e c o n c e i v e s o f " m e a n i n g " as t h e c o n -
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e s s : t h a t is, t h e l i n g u i s t i c r u l e t e n t o f a m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung). T o b e s u r e , i n c o n t r a s t
system, w h i c h establishes t h e m e a n i n g o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l l y produced t o H u s s e r l , m e a n i n g s f o r Searle a r e a n a l y z e d i n t e r m s o f s o - c a l l e d
expression. I c a n n o t deal w i t h t h e c r i t i q u e o f this p r o g r a m o f expla- s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s , because t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n w h i c h m e a n -
nation here. 1
I a m interested o n l y i n the fact that J o h n Searle— i n g s are r o o t e d a r e t a i l o r e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f
despite his earlier c r i t i c i s m o f G r i c e — d o e s n o t w a n t to r e l i n q u i s h states o f a f f a i r s , t h a t is, t h e y have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . T h i s
t h e e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a p p r o a c h . H e has i n t h e mentalist conception o f m e a n i n g a l l o w s Searle to retain Grice's
m e a n t i m e g i v e n h i s speech-act t h e o r y a n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t t u r n . 2
model in a modified form.

T h e s p e a k e r has t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f g e t t i n g a n addressee t o r e c o g -
2 n i z e h i s i n t e n t i o n i w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s i g n x. A c c o r d i n g t o Searle's
revision, however, the i n t e n t i o n ] has the structure of a repre-
Searle h a d s h o w n i n 1969 t h a t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f a s p e e c h act sentation (Vorstellung) "p," w h i c h is t r u e i f "jb" exists. T h u s , the
c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . A s p e e c h act c a n n o t
3
speaker can i m p o s e o n the sign x the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the existence o f
a d e q u a t e l y be a n a l y z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y a state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d a f o r t i o r i ; h e c a n m e a s u r e t h e success
b e c a u s e t h e m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f w h a t t h e s p e a k e r wishes t o give a n o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e ad-
a d d r e s s e e t o u n d e r s t a n d is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e s u b j e c t i v e content dressee, w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i m p o s e d o n x, r e c o g -
o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o l l o w i n g A u s t i n , Searle h a d d e s c r i b e d the nizes t h e state o f affairs r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e speaker.
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s p e e c h a c t as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y g o a l t h a t results F r o m m y p o i n t o f view, by c o n t r a s t , a s p e e c h act, w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r
p r i m a r i l y f r o m w h a t is said i t s e l f a n d n o t f r o m t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n - uses i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n addressee a b o u t s o m e -
t i o n . T h e g o a l i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r consists i n t h e addressee t h i n g , expresses s i m u l t a n e o u s l y (a) t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n , (b) a
recognizing that the conditions for the validity o f a correctly exe- state o f a f f a i r s , a n d (c) a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . A c c o r d i n g t o
260 261

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

t h e o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n a l i s t view, t h i s w h o l e process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o Searle's r e c e n t analysis o f p e r f o r -


is s u p p o s e d t o be a b l e t o be e x p l a i n e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e matives (section 6 ) .
s p e a k e r a n d h i s i n t e n t i o n , t h a t is, i n s u c h a way t h a t (c) a n d ( b ) are
r e d u c e d t o ( a ) . Searle e x p a n d s t h i s m o d e l because h e sees t h a t w i t h 3
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , a r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d a n d a
d i m e n s i o n o f validity come i n t o play a n d provide the criteria for the T h e s e n t e n c e " T h e c r a n k s h a f t o f t h i s e n g i n e is b r o k e n " r e p o r t s t h e
successful e x e c u t i o n o f a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . state o f a f f a i r s t h a t t h e c r a n k s h a f t o f t h i s e n g i n e is b r o k e n . T h i s
W h i l e r e t a i n i n g the i n t e n t i o n a l i s t c l a i m to be able to e x p l a i n m e a n - l i n g u i s t i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
i n g , Searle m o d i f i e s t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t strategy o f e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f affairs i n a s i m i l a r
e f f e c t t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e success is n o w t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e success- way t o h o w t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d s e n t e n c e c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s — w h i c h m e a n s t h a t (c) a n d (a) a c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r uses t h i s s e n t e n c e w i t h a
a r e r e d u c e d t o ( b ) . T h i s strategy r e q u i r e s , i n t e r a l i a , t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t . Searle n o w suggests r e p l a c i n g t h e a s s e r t o r i c

o f t w o i m p o r t a n t theses: sentence by a drawing, thereby replacing the linguistic repre-


s e n t a t i o n b y a g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e s a m e state o f a f f a i r s . H e
1. T h e m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s is, i n t h e sense o f imagines t h a t a m o t o r i s t w h o does n o t k n o w the language o f the
a n analysis o f c o n d i t i o n s , m o r e p r i m o r d i a l (ursprünglicher) t h a n t h e c o u n t r y i n w h i c h he finds h i m s e l f c o u l d i n t h i s way c o n v e y t o a
l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s . mechanic w h i c h p a r t o f h i s car n e e d s t o b e repaired. Now the
2. E l o c u t i o n a r y types c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e k i n d o f d r a w i n g t h a t r e p r e s e n t s a b r o k e n c r a n k s h a f t c a n also b e completed
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g propositional w i t h o u t any i n t e n t i o n o f using i t f o r the purpose o f conveying this
a t t i t u d e s o f t h e speaker. k i n d o f i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e graphic representation o f the object can
be c o m p l e t e q u i t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f any c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n o r
I s h a l l use o n e o f Searle's o w n e x a m p l e s i n o r d e r t o discuss t h e
use, p r o v i d e d o n l y t h a t i t is a c c u r a t e e n o u g h t o p e r m i t r e c o g n i t i o n
first thesis: t h a t l i n g u i s t i c n o t i o n s c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t e r m s o f i n t e n -
o f the represented state o f a f f a i r s . T h e same h o l d s g o o d w h e n S
t i o n a l n o t i o n s . W i t h t h i s r e d u c t i o n i s t thesis, Searle w a n t s t o g r o u n d
r e p l a c e s h i s d r a w i n g w i t h o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n s , f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h ges-
the t h e o r y o f language i n the philosophy of m i n d . The question
t u r e s o r w o r d s y m b o l s : "We m a y say t h a t w h e n e v e r 5 p r o d u c e s x w i t h
h e r e is w h e t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l c o n t e n t is p r i o r t o l a n g u a g e or
t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s a state o f a f f a i r s A, t h e n i t m u s t be
w h e t h e r i t i n t u r n b o r r o w s its o w n p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e f r o m t h e
t h e case t h a t S p r o d u c e s x w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t a c r i t e r i o n o f
g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f assertoric sentences (section 3 ) . I shall t h e n
success o f h i s a c t i o n s h o u l d b e t h a t A o b t a i n s , i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e
p r o c e e d w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s e c o n d thesis: t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f
u t t e r i n g " (p. 215).
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y provides a conceptual f r a m e f o r the classification of
s p e e c h acts. T h e q u e s t i o n h e r e is w h e t h e r t h e m e a n i n g o f a s p e e c h O f c o u r s e , Searle w o u l d n o t have c h o s e n t h e e x a m p l e o f a g r a p h i c

act is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s o f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l representation i f he were c o n c e r n e d only w i t h the trivial c o n t e n t i o n

c o n t e n t i m p o s e d o n t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h e t h e r i t has t o b e t h a t w e c a n also c o n c e i v e o f a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e state o f a f f a i r s

e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are d e t e r m i n e d by a i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a c t u a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s . C l e a r l y , t h e ex-

process o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t e r m i n a t i n g i n the intersubjective recog- a m p l e is s u p p o s e d t o s u p p o r t t h e less t r i v i a l c o n t e n t i o n t h a t w e c a n

nition of corresponding validity claims (section 4). This will be m a k e p r e s e n t a state o f affairs t o o u r s e l v e s in mente w i t h o u t u s i n g a n y

followed by a b r i e f exposition of an alternative approach (sec- language—whether for purposes o f representation or communica-

tion 5 ) . Finally, I shall elucidate this intersubjectivist view of t i o n . T h e s i s ( 1 ) c a n t h e n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t we


262 263

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

are a b l e t o d o t h i s n o t o n l y w h e n w e d o n o t use a n y l a n g u a g e b u t 4
e v e n w h e n w e have n o command o f a n y l a n g u a g e . However, the
conclusion drawn i n the excerpted passage d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a n y E v e n i f , c o n t r a r y t o t h e f o r e g o i n g r e f l e c t i o n s , i t p r o v e d possible to
a r g u m e n t i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s thesis. F o r h e r e , Searle a l r e a d y p r e s u p - defend thesis ( 1 ) , t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t e x p l a n a t o r y p r o g r a m w o u l d
poses t h a t S p r o d u c e s ( o r c h o o s e s ) h i s d r a w i n g ( o r s o m e o t h e r x) r e q u i r e t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f thesis ( 2 ) . B e c a u s e t h e success o f a s p e e c h
w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t s h o u l d p e r m i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c e r t a i n state act u l t i m a t e l y is s u p p o s e d t o b e m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n d i -
o f a f f a i r s , A. A n d , i n d e e d , t h e d r a w i n g o f a b r o k e n c r a n k s h a f t c a n t i o n s f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s
be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way b y a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o f i c i e n t observer. o f s p e e c h acts m u s t be a n a l y z a b l e as j u s t so m a n y ways o f r e f e r r i n g
D r a w i n g s , h o w e v e r , d o n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s . As to the satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s f o r — o r i g i n a l l y m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d —
Searle h i m s e l f observes, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e p i c t e d object states o f a f f a i r s : " D i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y
a n d t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f is o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d . T h e d r a w i n g r e p r o d u c e s h a v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , c a n b e r e g a r d e d as d i f f e r e n t m o d e s i n
a broken c r a n k s h a f t ; its usefulness depends on whether i t is w h i c h u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t reality. . . . I f w e see t h e basic f o r m o f t h e
s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r t o t h e o b j e c t b e i n g d e p i c t e d . S i m i l a r i t y is, h o w - i l l o c u t i o n a r y act as F(p) . . . t h e n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t s w i l l d e t e r -
ever, m e r e l y a necessary a n d n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e i n t e r - mine t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n w h i c h p's a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e w o r l d "
pretation in question—namely, that the depicted crankshaft (p. 219).
expresses t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . O n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t utterances owe t h e i r m e a n i n g s to t h e
C o n s i d e r e d o n its o w n t e r m s , t h e r e l a t i o n o f s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , o n e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r e d sen-
the representation a n d the original fulfills, perhaps, the role o f a tence i f one knows the conditions that make i t true. This holds to
d e i c t i c g e s t u r e o r a d e s i g n a t i o n . I t p o i n t s t o a c e r t a i n object, s e r v i n g b e g i n w i t h f o r assertoric sentences t h a t a r e u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h
to h i g h l i g h t this p a r t i c u l a r object a m i d s t t h e m u l t i t u d e o f all possible acts. H o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f m o s t s p e e c h acts, w h a t is at issue is n o t
objects, a n d thereby to i d e n t i f y i t . However, the d r a w i n g does n o t o f the existence o f states o f a f f a i r s . I f , n o n e t h e l e s s , the relation o f
its o w n a c c o r d r e p r e s e n t a state of affairs. I t is n o t e q u i v a l e n t t o a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is s u p p o s e d t o be c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e m e a n i n g of
s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h c o u l d b e t r u e o r false. T h e c a r t o g r a p h i c r e p r e - n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y types m u s t b e
s e n t a t i o n o f a m o u n t a i n r a n g e m a y b e m o r e o r less a c c u r a t e ; b u t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s a d o p t e d i n e a c h case b y
o n l y t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t w e base o n o u r r e a d i n g o f t h e m a p — t h e s p e a k e r t o t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s , as w e l l as o n t h e basis
t h a t w e i n f e r f r o m i t , so t o s p e a k — a r e t r u e o r false, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t o f t h e sense in which his u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g : " T h e basic
t h e m o u n t a i n r a n g e s are s e p a r a t e d b y w i d e valleys o r t h a t t h e h i g h e s t i d e a h e r e is t h e o l d o n e , t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t is s o m e h o w
p e a k lies 3,000 m e t e r s a b o v e sea l e v e l . I n t h e same way, w e c a n infer g i v e n b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a c o m m a n d is g i v e n by
f r o m the drawing o f a b r o k e n crankshaft the proposition that the its o b e d i e n c e c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a p r o m i s e is g i v e n b y its
r e p r e s e n t e d c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . H o w e v e r , o n l y a n i n t e r p r e t e r w h o f u l f i l l m e n t c o n d i t i o n s , a.s.o." ( p . 2 2 0 ) .
k n o w s in advance w h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s m e a n s T h u s , t h e m o d e o f a s p e e c h act c h a n g e s w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
i n g e n e r a l is a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b r o k e n a t t i t u d e o f t h e speaker a n d w i t h the type o f satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s
c r a n k s h a f t as a d e s i g n a t i o n w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t t h a t t h e f o r t h e state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l component.
c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r c o u l d n o t e v e n see t h a t t h e H o w e v e r , t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l l o w s o n l y t w o specifica-
d r a w i n g , b y i m i t a t i n g a c e r t a i n o b j e c t , r e p r e s e n t s a state o f a f f a i r s i f t i o n s i n t h e sense o f A u s t i n ' s " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit": t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e
he d i d n o t already have c o m m a n d o f a language a n d k n o w , o n the satisfied w h e n t h e w o r d s (Worte) fit t h e asserted states o f a f f a i r s ( o r
basis o f h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s , h o w states o f a f f a i r s are r e p r e s e n t e d t h e w o r l d ) (-1), a n d success c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d w h e n t h e d e s i r e d
linguistically. 5
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t h e w o r l d ) are m a d e t o fit t h e w o r d s (T). Searle
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Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s on Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

t h e r e f o r e e x p l a i n s t h e f i r s t t h r e e o f h i s five basic m o d e s as f o l l o w s : trast t o (1)—can no longer be inferred f r o m the illocutionarily


An u t t e r a n c e x b e l o n g s t o t h e class o f "assertives," " d i r e c t i v e s , " o r w e a k e n e d p r e c e d i n g clause. (2) has t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n i n d i r e c t
"commissives" i f its success is m e a s u r e d according to whether the s p e e c h act w h o s e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g expresses a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g
state o f a f f a i r s "p" r e p r e s e n t e d b y x f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n deviates. T h e threat actually
i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r w o u l d have t o b e c o n v e y e d l i t e r a l l y r o u g h l y
• exists e v e n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e s p e a k e r a n d h i s u t t e r a n c e , a n d
in the following f o r m :
• c o m e s i n t o e x i s t e n c e o n t h e basis o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r o r
his a d d r e s s e e r e g a r d x at least i n p a r t as a r e a s o n f o r b r i n g i n g a b o u t (2a) I f y o u d o n ' t h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y, I
> " will notify the police that . . .

I w o u l d l i k e t o s h o w b y way o f a f e w c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s that propo- I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t , i n t h e case o f


s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a n d d i r e c t i o n o f fit ( t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n t o (1) a n d ( 2 ) (where (2) is i n t e r p r e t e d as ( 2 a ) ) , w e are c l e a r l y n o t
s p e a k e r a n d t o t h e h e a r e r ) d o n o t suffice t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i l l o c u - d e a l i n g w i t h s p e e c h acts o f t h e same t y p e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y b o t h
tionary t y p e . L e t us c o n s i d e r first o f a l l a n i m p e r a t i v e w h i c h , d e p e n d - m e e t t h e same c o n d i t i o n s s p e c i f i e d b y Searle f o r d e t e r m i n i n g i l l o c u -
i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a r e q u e s t , s u p p l i c a t i o n , t i o n a r y t y p e . T h e y satisfy t h e same success c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" (with
c o m m a n d , a n d so f o r t h ( b u t also, as w e s h a l l see, as a t h r e a t ) : t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n o f fit) a n d r e q u i r e t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i -
t u d e o f t h e speaker; n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e y d o n o t have t h e same i l l o c u -
(1) I r e q u e s t y o u t o h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y. tionary meaning. As we s h a l l see, threats do not have proper
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e a t a l l . Searle m i g h t o b j e c t t h a t o r d e r s as w e l l as
6

W h o e v e r understands (1) can paraphrase t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g


imperatives deprived o f their n o r m a t i v e backing a n d threats do be-
o f t h i s s p e e c h act r o u g h l y as f o l l o w s : S gives t h e addressee t o u n d e r -
l o n g t o t h e same class o f d i r e c t i v e s a n d t h a t t h e y are d i s t i n g u i s h e d
s t a n d t h a t she s h o u l d m a k e sure t h a t "p" o c c u r s . H o w e v e r , f o r t h i s i t
o n l y b y h a v i n g d i f f e r e n t m o d e s o f a c h i e v i n g t h e same i l l o c u t i o n a r y
is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e d e s i r e d state
purpose. 7
W h i l e orders appeal to a p o s i t i o n o f a u t h o r i t y or to some
"/>" w o u l d be b r o u g h t a b o u t . T h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s p e e c h act
(intersubjectively recognized) normative context, naked imperatives
o n l y w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n t o these success c o n d i t i o n s , she also k n o w s
a n d e x p l i c i t threats i n v o k e sanctions. G r a n t i n g this m u c h , i t s h o u l d
the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t authorize t h e s p e a k e r t o issue h i s i m p e r a t i v e so
b e clear, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e is s t i l l a d i f f e r e n c e in illocutionary
t h a t h e m a y e x p e c t t h e addressee t o c a r r y o u t t h e r e q u i r e d a c t i o n .
m e a n i n g . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a n o r d e r "p" is t h a t t h e h e a r e r , i n
T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t already follows f r o m the fact that a speaker w h o
recognizing the corresponding c o n d i t i o n s o f success, realizes t h a t
u t t e r s ( 1 ) w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e , i n h i s r o l e as s u p p l i c a n t , f r i e n d , n e i g h -
she is s u p p o s e d t o b r i n g a b o u t "/>" i n a s p e c i f i c way, n a m e l y , t h r o u g h
b o r , o r c o m m a n d e r , t o r e l y o n any n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t whatsoever m u s t
obeying, w h i c h means meeting the normative expectation of the
instead draw o n a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions i n o r d e r to replace
speaker. F o r h i m , t h e e x p e c t e d b e h a v i o r f a l l s u n d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n
t h e m i s s i n g n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h a p o w e r c l a i m . I n t h e case
o f " f o l l o w i n g a previously established a n d intersubjectively recog-
o f negative sanctions, the imperative turns, for example, into a
n i z e d n o r m . " I n t h e case o f n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e s o r t h r e a t s t h e ex-
threat:
p e c t e d b e h a v i o r d o e s n o t fit t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , a t least n o t f r o m t h e
(2) I request you to h a n d over the r e q u i r e d sum o f m o n e y to Y— v i e w p o i n t o f t h e actor. I t has q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g : t h a t of
otherwise I will notify the police that . . . a v o i d i n g n e g a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t t h e h e a r e r w o u l d have t o s u f f e r
otherwise.
T h e sanction conditions specified i n the appositive expression now
take the place o f t h e missing a u t h o r i z a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s t h a t — i n con- W i t h Searle we m a y say t h a t t h e h e a r e r is i n t e n t i o n a l l y c a u s e d t o
p e r f o r m t h e r e q u i r e d a c t i o n b y o r d e r s as w e l l as by i m p e r a t i v e s a n d
266 267
Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

t h r e a t s ; b u t t h e n i n e a c h case w e m e a n s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t b y is n o c l a i m t o v a l i d i t y associated w i t h t h e m b u t r a t h e r a p o w e r c l a i m ;
" i n t e n t i o n a l c a u s a t i o n . " I t is t r u e t h a t i n b o t h cases s p e e c h acts they are o r i e n t e d n o t t o w a r d t h e possibility o f c o m m o n agreement
c o n s t i t u t e f o r t h e h e a r e r at least p a r t i a l l y a r e a s o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a b u t t o w a r d t h e causal effect o f t h e speaker's influence on the
c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s , b u t t h e types o f reasons t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a r e hearer. 8

d i s t i n c t i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g way. T h e r e a s o n s v i n d i c a t i n g t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h a n o r d e r a r e r e a s o n s f o r e v e r y b o d y , o r a t least f o r 5
all the parties w h o recognize the a u t h o r i z i n g n o r m s or institutions.
B y c o n t r a s t , reasons f o r s u b m i t t i n g t o a p o w e r c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h B e f o r e d r a w i n g s o m e c o n c l u s i o n s , l e t us r e t u r n t o t h e issue o f clas-
n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e s o r t h r e a t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o t h i s set o f g e n e r a l s i f i c a t i o n . T h e analysis t h a t I have p r o p o s e d f o r n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -
reasons; t h e y are specific i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y c o u n t as r e a s o n s o n l y r i z e d d i r e c t i v e s also a p p l i e s t o c o m m i s s i v e s .
f o r t h e m o r e o r less r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n with
(3) I p r o m i s e y o u I w i l l h a n d over the r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y
particular preferences i n a particular situation. T h i s difference be-
t o Y.
c o m e s o b v i o u s w h e n t h e h e a r e r r e j e c t s t h e r e s p e c t i v e speech-acts. I n
t h e case o f a n o r d e r , a h e a r e r w h o r e j e c t s t h e speech-act o f f e r d i s - A n a d d r e s s e e c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r o m i s e o n l y w h e n
p u t e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is a u t h o r i z e d t o e x p e c t t h e b e h a v i o r com- she knows the conditions under which an accountable
m a n d e d o f her: (zurechnungsfähig) a c t o r c a n b i n d h i s o w n w i l l — t h a t is, t a k e o n a n
obligation to do s o m e t h i n g . H e r e , t o o , t h e n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e is
(1') N o , you cannot order me to do anything.
a i m e d a t these a u t o n o m y c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h , as i n ( 1 ) , s u p p l e m e n t
I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e h e a r e r c h a l l e n g e s o n l y c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r "p." F o r i n s t a n c e :
presuppositions p e r t a i n i n g to t h e reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions o n
(3') N o , y o u are far too u n r e l i a b l e f o r m e to take such a promise
w h i c h t h e speaker d r a w s :
seriously.
(2') N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a d i r e c t i v e o r c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h act, t h e
Whereas g e n e r a l reasons can facilitate a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t be- h e a r e r m u s t k n o w n o t o n l y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state
t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , specific r e a s o n s , i n t h e sense i l l u s t r a t e d o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n i t , b u t also t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t
b y t h e l a t t e r case, m e d i a t e a n i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r e x e r t s o n c a n b e r e g a r d e d as l e g i t i m a t e o r as b i n d i n g . T h i s v i e w is d u e t o a
the attitude o f the hearer. f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a basic i n s i g h t o f t r u t h - c o n d i -
T o t h i s o b j e c t i o n Searle c o u l d r e s p o n d b y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o h i s t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . T h i s is a l l t h e m o r e r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t i t m a y b e
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n successful a n d successful b u t d e f e c t i v e speech c o n f i r m e d t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l .
acts. E v e r y t h i n g t h e n h i n g e s o n w h a t k i n d o f d e f i c i e n c y w e m e a n . I f I n t h i s r e s p e c t , h o w e v e r , a n a s y m m e t r y is i n i t i a l l y s t r i k i n g : t h e
w e d e s c r i b e t h e l a c k o f a u t h o r i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s as a f a i l u r e i n p r e p a r a - v a l i d i t y o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r s t o d e p e n d only on the
t o r y c o n d i t i o n s , as Searle has s u g g e s t e d , w e w o u l d miss t h e p o i n t . s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e "p"
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o w e t h e i r m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u s e d i n i t ; b y c o n t r a s t , however, as o u r analysis so f a r has s h o w n , t h e
t h e y c a r r y , since these c l a i m s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — a r e c a p a b l e of s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g success c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state o f
b e i n g intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d to the e x t e n t that they are based a f f a i r s " t h a t p" e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is i n f a c t
o n r e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t as r e a s o n s f o r a l l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . N a k e d n o t sufficient for the validity o f orders o r promises. T h i s asymmetry
imperatives a n d threats are d e p r i v e d o f this i l l o c u t i o n a r y force; there d i s a p p e a r s as s o o n as o n e realizes t h a t , e v e n i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e
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s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r m u s t i n t e n d s o m e t h i n g m o r e a n d s o m e - M y m a i n p o i n t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h e i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e
t h i n g d i f f e r e n t t h a n w h a t is e x p e c t e d f r o m h i m o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . I t c o n d e m n s t h e h e a r e r t o a p e c u l i a r passivity.
r e a d i n g , namely, to get the hearer to recognize that he holds to I t d e p r i v e s h e r o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a k i n g t h e speaker's utterance
b e t r u e ( i n t e n t i o n ^ a n d t h a t h e wishes t o l e t h e r k n o w t h i s ( i n t e n - seriously—that is, o f a c c e p t i n g i t as v a l i d o r o f r e j e c t i n g i t as i n v a l i d .
t i o n s ) . T h e speaker w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e t o t h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y t h e W i t h o u t t h e possibility o f t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n w i t h a "yes" o r "no,"
i n t e n t i o n i t h a t he has ( t h a t h e b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"), b u t h e also w a n t s however, the process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n r e m a i n s i n c o m p l e t e .
to communicate t o h e r t h e f a c t "/>" (so t h a t t h e addressee herself W i t h a s p e e c h act, t h e speaker n o t o n l y p r o v i d e s t h e h e a r e r w i t h
b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"). T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m d o e s n o t c o n s i s t s i m p l y i n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e c o m e aware o f h i s o w n i n t e n t i o n ; h e f u r t h e r
t h e addressee b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n (Meinung); c l a i m s t o h a v e r e a s o n s t h a t c a n m o v e t h e h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a n asser-
r a t h e r , she h e r s e l f is s u p p o s e d t o a r r i v e a t t h e same v i e w as t h a t o f t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , o r — a s I
w h i c h t h e speaker is c o n v i n c e d . I n s h o r t , t h e addressee is s u p p o s e d w o u l d l i k e t o a d d a t t h i s p o i n t — a n a v o w a l as s i n c e r e . T h e speaker
t o a c c e p t t h e speaker's a s s e r t i o n as v a l i d . T h i s is w h a t t h e c o m m u n i - c a n n o t achieve his i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f c o n v e y i n g a fact, g i v i n g a n
c a t i o n o f facts is a l l a b o u t . T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n a c c o r d i n g order, m a k i n g a request or a promise, or revealing a subjective
t o w h i c h t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o p r o d u c e i n t h e h e a r e r t h e b e l i e f t h a t experience (Erlebnis) i f h e does n o t a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e k n o w n
t h e s p e a k e r is c o m m i t t e d t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h h i s u t t e r a n c e c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d ;
c o m e s close t o a d i s t o r t i o n . I n o r d e r t o achieve h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d , i n d e e d , h e m u s t d o so i n s u c h a w a y t h a t , i n c l a i m i n g t h a t these
a i m , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r i m p o s e truth conditions c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d , h e i m p l i c i d y also o f f e r s t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s
f o r a m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s o n a s i g n x a n d t h a t h e i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c l a i m , i f necessary. T h e h e a r e r m u s t b e a b l e t o
m a k e s t h e addressee a w a r e o f these b y u t t e r i n g x ( t h e assertoric h a v e r e a s o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g a n a s s e r t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i -
s e n t e n c e ) , w h i c h is i m p r e g n a t e d , as i t w e r e , w i t h t h e t r u t h c o n d i - m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , a n a v o w a l as a u t h e n t i c o r s i n c e r e (or,
t i o n s . R a t h e r , t h e s p e a k e r m u s t c o n f r o n t t h e addressee w i t h h i s claim alternatively, f o r q u e s t i o n i n g such claims). T h e hearer does not
t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e asserted s e n t e n c e t r u e a r e i n d e e d u n d e r s t a n d t h e s p e e c h act i f she d o e s n o t k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r
satisfied. t a k i n g s u c h a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f

J u s t as w i t h o r d e r s a n d p r o m i s e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h e s p e a k e r w i t h a a n assertion, an order, a promise, o r avowal remains concealed f r o m

c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act also raises a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t t h e t h e h e a r e r i f she b e c o m e s aware o n l y t h a t t h e s p e a k e r has a c e r t a i n

h e a r e r is s u p p o s e d t o a c c e p t . I n c o n t r a s t t o n o n c o n s t a t i v e speech i n t e n t i o n a l state: t h a t h e believes " t h a t p"; t h a t h e w a n t s t h e h e a r e r

acts, h o w e v e r , t h i s c l a i m r e f e r s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s to b r i n g about o r t h a t h e h i m s e l f has t h e i n t e n t i o n o f b r i n g i n g

t h a t m a k e t h e assertoric s e n t e n c e e m p l o y e d t r u e . A g a i n s t t h i s , t h e a b o u t "jb"; o r t h a t h e w a n t s t o r e v e a l t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a

v a l i d i t y c l a i m s l i n k e d t o o r d e r s a n d p r o m i s e s r e f e r directly t o t h e b e l i e f , a f e e l i n g , a d e s i r e , a n i n t e n t i o n , a n d so f o r t h .

normative conditions that entitle one party to expect that the other
p a r t y w i l l b r i n g a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s . T h e c l a i m t o 6
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h refers t o t h e existence o f a state o f a f f a i r s , i n
o t h e r w o r d s to t h e f a c t "p." By contrast, the c l a i m to n o r m a t i v e Understanding t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is c e r t a i n l y n o t
validity refers to the legitimacy o f t h e expectation that one o r o t h e r t h e s a m e as reaching understanding a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h t h e h e l p o f
o f t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t a r e p r e s e n t e d state o f an u t t e r a n c e h e l d to be valid. A n equally clear d i s t i n c t i o n m u s t be
a f f a i r s " t h a t p." m a d e b e t w e e n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e a n d o n e t h a t is m e r e l y h e l d t o b e
270 271

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's " M e a n i n g , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m - t h e s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e f u t u r e . A n y i l l o c u t i o n a r y act a t a l l c a n be
p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
9 c h a l l e n g e d f r o m t h e p o i n t s o f v i e w o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, t r u t h f u l -
u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n n o t be iso- ness (Wahrhaftigkeif), a n d t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , a n i m p e r a t i v e s u c h as
lated f r o m the question o f the context i n w h i c h this expression can (1) can be n e g a t e d n o t only w i t h respect to t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f the
be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . O n e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w w h a t i t is t o s p e a k e r b u t also w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e speaker's i n t e n -
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression i f one d i d n o t t i o n expressed i n i t , o r w i t h respect to t h e t r u t h o f t h e existential
k n o w h o w o n e could m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g presuppositions o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i t expresses. 11

w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . I t c a n b e seen f r o m t h e v e r y c o n d i - I f o n e c o n s i d e r s Searle's analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r s p e e c h acts


tions f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistic expressions t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts as a w h o l e , t h e t h r e e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c a n be f o u n d
that can be f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d i n h i s s c h e m a o f analysis u n d e r a d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n . I n a discus-
a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t is said. T o t h i s e x t e n t , s i o n , Searle p r o p o s e d a n a l y z i n g t h e c l a i m t o n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s i n
t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b l e v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f terms o f his " p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s , " the c l a i m to truthfulness i n
the pragmatic conditions not just for reaching understanding but, terms o f his "sincerity c o n d i t i o n s , " a n d the c l a i m to t r u t h i n terms
p r i o r to this, o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself. I n o f h i s " e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n s . " T h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a t r a n s l a t i o n is p o s -

language, the dimensions o f m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y are internally sible speaks f o r t h e sharpness a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f Searle's analyses.

connected. J o h n Searle was t h e f i r s t t o g r a s p c l e a r l y t h e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h acts.

I f we start f r o m this intersubjectivist c o n c e p t i o n o f language, i l l o - However, his p i o n e e r i n g insights p o i n t b e y o n d a f r a m e w o r k o f analy-

c u t i o n a r y types m a y b e i d e n t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s sis t h a t is b a s e d o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . T h e c o n c e p t o f a v a l i d i t y
c l a i m w o u l d lose its p o i n t i f i t w e r e b r o u g h t b a c k i n s i d e t h a t m o d e l .
associated w i t h t h e m . 1 0
I n o r d e r to identify the validity claims t h e m -
T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s are semantic concepts
selves, t h e f o l l o w i n g h e u r i s t i c q u e s t i o n m a y b e u s e f u l : I n w h a t sense
f o r w h i c h m e n t a l i s t c o r r e l a t e s m a y also b e s p e c i f i e d . H o w e v e r , p r i -
c a n t h e s p e e c h act as a w h o l e b e n e g a t e d ? W e a r r i v e a t p r e c i s e l y
vate access t o v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s — w h e t h e r p r e l i n g u i s t i c o r s i m p l y
three validity claims i f we consider f r o m w h i c h p o i n t s o f view a n
m o n o l o g i c a l — c a n b e d e f e n d e d o n l y a t t h e p r i c e o f w h a t I r e g a r d as
i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a m b i g u o u s s e n t e n c e s u c h as
an untenable correspondence t h e o r y o f t r u t h . I propose, therefore,
(4) I w i l l h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y. that validity c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d be considered n o t i n isolation f r o m ,
b u t i n p r a g m a t i c c o n n e c t i o n w i t h , validity claims a n d p o t e n t i a l rea-
can be negated.
sons f o r t h e v i n d i c a t i o n o f s u c h c l a i m s .
(4') N o , y o u are f a r t o o u n r e l i a b l e i n s u c h m a t t e r s . C r i t i c i z a b l e validity claims, w h i c h have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o -

(4") N o , y o u d o n ' t r e a l l y m e a n w h a t y o u say. w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n , are n e c e s s a r y f o r a s p e e c h act t o


a c h i e v e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f t h e speaker.
(4"') N o , i t will never c o m e to this. I n a recent paper o n performatives, 1 2
S e a r l e c o m e s f a i r l y close t o
r e c o g n i z i n g the intersubjective n a t u r e o f m e a n i n g a n d validity. T h e
I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r o m i s e
analysis o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s leads t o t h e v e r y c e n t e r o f a t h e o r y t h a t
a n d d i s p u t e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is s u f f i c i e n t l y a u t o n o m o u s t o u p h o l d
takes as its s t a r t i n g p o i n t A u s t i n ' s i n s i g h t i n t o t h e p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r
s u c h a n o b l i g a t i o n . I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e
o f a s p e e c h act w h e r e b y we d o s o m e t h i n g b y s a y i n g i t . I n t h e s t a n -
u t t e r a n c e as a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a n d d o u b t s t h e seriousness
d a r d f o r m o f a s p e e c h act F(/>), t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e m a k e s
o r s i n c e r i t y o f t h e i n t e n t i o n u t t e r e d . I n t h e t h i r d case, t h e h e a r e r
explicit the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force F o f an utterance c o n t a i n i n g "p."
u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r e d i c t i o n a n d d i s p u t e s t h e t r u t h o f
272 273
Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's "Meaning, C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

W i t h r e g a r d to the question o f h o w performatives w o r k we f i n d two i n g a sentence such as " I h e r e b y o r d e r y o u to leave" functions,


c o m p e t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . O n e o f these t r e a t s p e r f o r m a t i v e s as s i m - a c c o r d i n g t o Searle, "as a p e r f o r m a t i v e , a n d h e n c e as a d e c l a r a t i o n
ple statements, while the other maintains that performatives do n o t because (a) t h e v e r b ' o r d e r ' is a n i n t e n t i o n a l v e r b , ( b ) o r d e r i n g is
a d m i t o f t r u t h a n d falsity a n d t h e r e f o r e lack m e a n i n g i n any p r o p e r s o m e t h i n g y o u c a n d o by m a n i f e s t i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d o i t , a n d (c)
sense. B o t h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are s t r o n g l y c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e . t h e u t t e r a n c e is b o t h s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l a n d e x e c u t i v e , as i n d i c a t e d b y
P e r f o r m a t i v e sentences such as " I state t h a t . . .," " I p r o m i s e the w o r d 'hereby.'" 1 3

you . . .," o r " I confess t h a t . . . " i n f a c t c o n s t i t u t e p e r f o r m a n c e s that W i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o detail, I shall n o w e x p l a i n — a n d q u e s t i o n — t h e


can n e i t h e r be c o n f i r m e d n o r falsified like fully fledged assertions. d e c l a r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f p e r f o r m a t i v e s . Searle has i n t r o d u c e d d e c l a -
T h e y d o n o t o p e r a t e b y way o f a c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h i s is r e v e a l e d b y ratives as s p e e c h acts t h a t b o t h e x p r e s s a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t a n d
t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y first have t o u n d e r g o a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e make i t true. I n concluding a contract or closing a meeting, I let
speaker's first-person ( p e r f o r m a t i v e ) perspective [toward a second w h a t I say b e t h e case b y saying i t . W i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f t h i s m o d e l ,
p e r s o n ] i n t o the t h i r d - p e r s o n perspective o f an observer before they Searle s o m e w h a t p a r a d o x i c a l l y p o s t u l a t e s o f d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t t h e y
t h e m s e l v e s c a n b e t r u e o r false. T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n shows, h o w e v e r , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y satisfy b o t h d i r e c t i o n s o f fit: t h e y b o t h state a f a c t a n d
t h a t p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences have a m e a n i n g , too. Obviously, the p r o d u c e i t . T h e p a r a d o x disappears w i t h t h e observation o f h o w t h e
f o l l o w i n g sentences a u t h o r i z i n g o r l e g i t i m i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f c o n t r a c t law o r business
p r o c e d u r e s n o r m a t i v e l y b a c k these s p e e c h acts. I t is because o f t h i s
(5) I order you to come.
l e g a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l — i n any case n o r m a t i v e — b a c k g r o u n d t h a t d e c -
(5') H e orders her to come. larations can p r o d u c e a change i n the d o m a i n o f legitimate inter-
personal relationships and thereby create new social facts.
h a v e t h e s a m e m e a n i n g , i f r e f e r e n c e s a r e p r e s e r v e d . B u t , a t t h e same
C o m p a r e d w i t h d i r e c t i v e s a n d c o m m i s s i v e s , d e c l a r a t i v e s d i s p l a y fea-
t i m e , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e switches o v e r i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
t u r e s o f b o t h types: l i k e o r d e r s t h e y r e l y o n a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t a n d
c o n t e n t a n d t h e r e b y loses, i f n o t its m e a n i n g , a t least its f o r c e : i t is
l i k e promises they d r a w f r o m t h e n o r m a t i v e resource o f the speaker's
included i n the topic o f another—constative—speech act. U t t e r e d
responsibility.
i n the first-person attitude [toward a second person], performative
s e n t e n c e s have a m e a n i n g (a) o n l y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s o m e o t h e r Searle, h o w e v e r , makes a f u r t h e r m o v e ; he n o w interprets the

proposition or propositional content, a n d (b) o n l y as a k i n d of p e r f o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f a l l classes o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n l i g h t o f

e s c o r t i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is a r t i c u l a t e d i n a n u n t h e m a t i c a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f d e c l a r a t i o n s . T h i s p r o p o s a l faces t w o m a j o r

i m p l i c i t way. T h e s e a n d o t h e r f e a t u r e s c a n be e x p l a i n e d as s o o n as difficulties. First, i t explodes the a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e classification o f

we realize that p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences (like o t h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n d i - s p e e c h acts; t h i s is because d e c l a r a t i o n s w o u l d lose t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e

c a t o r s ) are s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l a n d e x e c u t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r t h e act o f place w i t h i n this classification i f they were to e x p l a i n the p e r f o r -

raising a validity claim for a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f all s p e e c h acts. O f g r e a t e r i n t e r e s t is t h e s e c o n d

Searle states t h e p r o b l e m clearly. T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t o w h i c h h i s o w n difficulty. Since m a n y performatives d o n o t appeal to o r rely o n a

p r o p o s a l r u n s are i n s t r u c t i v e ; t h e y disclose a n u n d e r l y i n g i n t u i t i o n n o r m a t i v e backing, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f declarations would

close t o m y o w n . lose its specificity. C o n s e q u e n t l y , Searle is p u s h e d i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f


r e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f declaratives. A p a r t
Searle e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s , t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of
f r o m "extralinguistic declaratives"—such as p r o n o u n c i n g a c o u p l e
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e act t h e y say t h e y a r e , t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o
h u s b a n d a n d w i f e o r d e c l a r i n g w a r — S e a r l e i n t r o d u c e s a n o t h e r cate-
d e c l a r a t i o n s — a class o f s p e e c h acts w e have n o t yet discussed. U t t e r -
g o r y o f "linguistic declarations," w h i c h are n e i t h e r attached to par-
274 275

Chapter 5 C o m m e n t s o n Searle's " M e a n i n g , C o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d Representation"

7. I am grateful to Chris Latiolais for indicating this to me.


ticular institutions like m a r r i a g e o r warfare n o r s u p p o r t e d by some
i n f o r m a l v a l u e c o n s e n s u s i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d . H o w e v e r , o n c e all i l l o - 8. Naked imperatives a n d threats are examples of perlocutionary acts that play an
c u t i o n a r y acts g a i n a d e c l a r a t i v e f o r c e so t h a t t h i s f o r c e e x t e n d s to instrumental role i n the context of success-oriented acts. T h e y have lost their illocu-
tionary force a n d derive their illocutionary meaning from other contexts of use in
r e q u e s t s , p r o m i s e s , a n d avowals as w e l l as s t a t e m e n t s , w h a t m e a n i n g which the utterance of the same sentences is mainly determined by communicative
t h e n remains for the force o f such "linguistic declarations"? Strictly goals. Such speech acts, which have gained perlocutionary independence, are not
oriented toward the rationally motivated attitude of an addressee; insofar as they are
speaking, there c a n n o t be any d e c l a r a t i o n w i t h o u t d e p e n d e n c e on
not motivated in this way, they do not rely on a reservoir of potential reasons that
authorizing or legitimizing conditions of the sort that have the are unspecific with regard to the addressee.
p o w e r t o create n e w social facts. I f , n o n e t h e l e s s , h i s analysis l e a d s
9. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Wahrheit u n d normative Gultigkeit," in
Searle t o r e f e r to some declarative f o r c e i n h e r e n t i n speech itself, Archivio diFilosofia 55 (1987): 51ff.
the i n t u i t i o n b e h i n d this peculiar force m i g h t well m a t c h w h a t I
10. Cf. my classificatory schema in chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 154ff.
prefer to call the rationally m o t i v a t i n g force o f validity claims that
are i n n e e d o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . Searle elucidates t h e i n - 11. I f the class of expressive speech acts is demarcated from the point of view of the
claim to truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) raised by the speaker for the expression of a
trinsically linguistic force o f the v e r y act o f raising a validity c l a i m
subjective experience to which he has privileged access, avowals present themselves
t h r o u g h t h e f o r c e o f a n i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t e n a b l e s a speaker, v i a h i s as the prototype. Unlike avowals, acts such as saying "thank you," congratulating, or
making excuses are not expressive speech acts, for these can succeed even when the
social roles, literally to call s o m e t h i n g i n t o existence. I n order to
speaker does not mean what he says. As i n the case of bets and christenings, the
t u r n t h e e l u c i d a t i o n i n t o a n e x p l a n a t i o n , S e a r l e has t o a s s i m i l a t e illocutionary meaning of such regulative speech acts is determined by a normative
l a n g u a g e t o i n s t i t u t i o n s . L a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , is a n i n s t i t u t i o n o n l y i n context. I f this normative context is not violated, an act of saying "thank you" can be
valid, for instance, even when it does not come from the heart.
a metaphorical sense. T h u s Searle's e x p l a n a t i o n of how perfor-
matives w o r k reaches n o f u r t h e r t h a n this m e t a p h o r . 12. J . Searle, "How Performatives Work," Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (1989): 535¬
558.

13. Ibid., p. 552.


Notes

1. Cf. chapter 6 in this volume, pp. 286ff., especially notes 18 and 19, p. 305.

2. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel, "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?" in E . L e -


pore and R. Van Gulick, eds.,fohn Searle and His Critics (Oxford, 1993), pp. 31-55.

3. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 49ff.

4. I n the following I refer to J . Searle, "Meaning, Communication, a n d Repre-


sentation," in R. E . Grandy a n d R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality
(Oxford, 1986). Page references i n the text refer to this essay. Searle worked out his
conception i n Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983).

5. T h e history of the philosophy of consciousness from Descartes to Husserl teaches


us that it is no coincidence that the basic concepts of mentalism were oriented toward
the representation of objects, that is, toward the subject-object relation. It was the
linguistic turn initiated by Frege that first led to the insight that, analagous to
sentences, our representations (Vorstellungen), too, have a propositional structure; cf.
E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A . G o r n e r (Cambridge,
1982).

6. J . Searle, "Intentionality and Method," Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 720-733.


6
Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning
(1988)

T h r e e A p p r o a c h e s to a T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g s h o u l d a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w e l l - f o r m e d symbolic expression. I n
1934, K a r l Bùhler p r o p o s e d a s c h e m a o f language f u n c t i o n s that
placed the linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n s t o t h e speaker, t o t h e
w o r l d , a n d to the hearer (figure 6.1). This schema o f how linguistic
1

signs a r e u s e d p r o v e s u s e f u l i f o n e releases i t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e
s p e c i f i c p s y c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h i t arose, e x t e n d s t h e s e m i -
otic approach, a n d gives a c h a r i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e t h r e e
f u n c t i o n s m e n t i o n e d . T h e d i a g r a m t h e n yields the general thesis
that language represents a m e d i u m — B ù h l e r spoke o f the o r g a n o n
m o d e l o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y serves t h r e e d i f f e r e n t , a l -
t h o u g h i n t e r n a l l y related, functions. Expressions that are employed
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s e r v e t o express t h e i n t e n t i o n s ( o r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e -
riences (Erlebnisse)) o f a speaker, t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s (or
s o m e t h i n g the speaker encounters i n t h e w o r l d ) , a n d to establish
r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n addressee. T h e t h r e e aspects o f a speaker r e a c h i n g
understanding/with another person/about something are reflected
h e r e . I n l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h r e e c o n v e r g i n g rays o f m e a n i n g a r e
f o c u s e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i o n c o n n e c t s
u p w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t , as w e l l as w i t h t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h
i t s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e exists a t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d w h a t is intended (gemeint)
278 279

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

c o n c a t e n a t i o n s o f signs p r o d u c e d b y h i m as a v e h i c l e f o r i n f o r m i n g
OBJECTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
v > his addressee a b o u t his beliefs o r i n t e n t i o n s . I n this c o n c e p d o n , the
11 I I I i ' I I I
p r e m i s e s o f t h e m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s are s t i l l p r e s u p -
• I 11 ; I 1111
i 111 ' I ' i| j Representation p o s e d as u n p r o b l e m a t i c . The representing subject (das vorstellende Sub¬
jekt) stands o v e r a n d against a w o r l d o f t h i n g s a n d events, a n d asserts
at t h e s a m e t i m e h i s s o v e r e i g n t y i n t h e w o r l d as a p u r p o s i v e l y acting
subject. F r o m t h e same p e r s p e c t i v e , h e e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r subjects
w h o , i n t u r n , assert themselves. A s s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e o f a c t i o n , t h e y
i n f l u e n c e e a c h o t h e r i n t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y g e n e r a l l y intervene
causally i n i n n e r w o r l d l y processes. T h a t t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e m e d i -
a t e d b y l a n g u a g e a p p e a r s as s o m e t h i n g s e c o n d a r y i n c o m p a r i s o n t o
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a n d p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l subjects.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) connect u p w i t h the substratum of
Figure 6.1
Bùhler's schema of language functions l i n g u i s t i c signs i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way, so as t o b e c a p a b l e o f e m e r g i n g
f r o m the inwardness o f a particular i n d i v i d u a l subjectivity a n d t a k i n g
o n e x t e r n a l f o r m . I n t u r n , t h e signs, as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r i n f l u e n c i n g
b y i t , w h a t is said i n i t , a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h i t is used i n t h e s p e e c h
a n a l i e n s u b j e c t i v i t y , are a c c o r d e d a p l a c e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of
act. N o r m a l l y , l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g is n o t e x h a u s t e d by any o n e of
teleological action.
these t h r e e r e l a t i o n s . 2

Despite this, intentionalist semantics ( f r o m Grice to B e n n e t t a n d O n c e l a n g u a g e has b e e n a s s i m i l a t e d i n s u c h a way t o t h e p h y s i c a l


Schiffer) 3
treats as f u n d a m e n t a l o n l y w h a t t h e s p e a k e r i n t e n d s b y t h e means o f purposive interventions, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f
expression he employs i n a given situation; f o r m a l semantics ( f r o m l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s c a n be t r e a t e d as a s p e c i a l task w i t h i n a g e n e r a l
Frege via t h e early W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D u m m e t t ) 4
begins w i t h the con- t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . A speaker S i n t e n d s to call f o r t h an effect r i n a
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is t r u e ; a n d t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n - hearer H by u t t e r i n g "x" i n a p a r t i c u l a r context, whereby "x" does
ing ( i n a u g u r a t e d by t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n ) 5
has r e c o u r s e t o the n o t y e t h a v e a c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d m e a n i n g c o n t e n t b u t has its
h a b i t u a l i z e d contexts o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h linguistic expressions m e a n i n g conferred b y S i n t h e g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i n a w a y r e c o g n i z a b l e
serve practical f u n c t i o n s . O n c e l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r i s m ( f r o m Bloom- f o r H. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r o p o s a l o f H . R G r i c e , t h e e f f e c t i n t e n d e d
field v i a M o r r i s t o S k i n n e r ) h a d f a i l e d t o e x p l a i n t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l
6 b y t h e s p e a k e r r e s i d e s i n t h e h e a r e r ' s b e i n g i n d u c e d by t h e u t t e r a n c e
p h e n o m e n a — n a m e l y , the i d e n t i t y o f linguistic meanings, the situ-
7 o f "x" to r e c o g n i z e t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker a n d to accept i t (at
a t i o n - i n d e p e n d e n c e o f the m e a n i n g o f expressions e m p l o y e d w i t h least i n p a r t ) as a r e a s o n e i t h e r f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t S i n t e n d s (meint)
r e f e r e n c e t o specific s i t u a t i o n s , a n d t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e c o m p e -
8 s o m e t h i n g specific o r f o r r e g a r d i n g t h e fact t h a t S i n t e n d s s o m e t h i n g
t e n c e t o g e n e r a t e i n n u m e r a b l e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s — t h e discus- s p e c i f i c as o c c a s i o n i n g h e r ( t h e h e a r e r ' s ) i n t e n t i o n t o d o something
s i o n has essentially b e e n d o m i n a t e d b y t h e s e t h r e e t h e o r i e s , f o r e a c h s p e c i f i c . T h e e f f e c t r, w h i c h is p r o d u c e d b y " x " a n d t r i g g e r e d i n H
9

o f t h e m has b e e n a b l e t o a p p e a l t o a f u n d a m e n t a l i n t u i t i o n . B u h l e r by S, is a s p e c i f i c b e l i e f (Meinung) or the i n t e n t i o n to carry o u t a


b r i n g s these i n t u i t i o n s t o g e t h e r i n h i s t h r e e f o l d s c h e m a o f l a n g u a g e specific a c t i o n . T w o f u n c t i o n s o f t h e sign t h a t B u h l e r h a d separated,
functions. n a m e l y , e x p r e s s i o n a n d a p p e a l , fuse c o n s i s t e n t l y i n t o o n e a n d t h e
same a c c o m p l i s h m e n t : to allow a hearer to infer the i n t e n t i o n o f the
a. I n t e n t i o n a l i s m shares w i t h B u h l e r a c o n c e p t i o n i n w h i c h l a n -
speaker a n d thereby to motivate h e r to f o r m the corresponding
g u a g e has t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a t o o l . T h e s p e a k e r uses t h e signs a n d
belief or intention.
280 281

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

T h e p o i n t o f t h i s strategy o f e x p l a n a t i o n is t h a t w h a t is m e a n t the emphasis o n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p be-


(gemeint) is i n n o way d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t is said. T h e m e a n i n g o f tween language a n d the w o r l d , b e t w e e n a n assertoric sentence a n d
a n u t t e r a n c e "x" b y S is s u p p o s e d t o b e e x p l a i n e d solely b y t h e a state o f a f f a i r s , m o v e s t o t h e c e n t e r o f analysis. O n l y w i t h s e n t e n c e s
i n t e n t i o n w i t h w h i c h 5 utters the expression "x" i n a given context. is a s p e a k e r a b l e t o say s o m e t h i n g specific or, a c c o r d i n g t o F r e g e , t o
T h i s s t r a t e g y is g u i d e d b y t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t l a n g u a g e usage is o n l y e x p r e s s a " t h o u g h t . " O n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o a s e n t e n c e a n d its t h o u g h t
o n e specific m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l s o v e r e i g n t y o f p u r p o s i v e l y is a h e a r e r a b l e t o t a k e a p o s i t i o n w i t h a "yes" o r " n o . " W h e n t h e
acting subjects—a sovereignty that, w i t h respect to the m e d i u m o f c r o u p i e r says " r e d " a f t e r t h e b a l l has c o m e t o a s t o p , t h e w o r d takes
l a n g u a g e , reveals itself, f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e f a c t t h a t w e c a n assign t o o n a specific sense o n l y i f t h e r o u l e t t e p l a y e r , o n t h e basis o f t h e
o b j e c t s a n y n a m e s w e c h o o s e , as w e l l as a r b i t r a r i l y b e s t o w m e a n i n g s c o n t e x t , t a c i t l y e x p a n d s i t t o t h e s e n t e n c e " R e d has w o n . "
o n signs. U n d e r t h e same p r e m i s e s d r a w n f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f T h e a p p r o a c h o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l semantics revolutionizes the o l d e r
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , H u s s e r l was a b l e t o s p e a k i n t h i s c o n t e x t o f m e a n i n g - a n d l o n g - d o m i n a n t v i e w p o i n t o f reference semantics, a c c o r d i n g to
c o n f e r r i n g acts. I f l a n g u a g e d e r i v e s its m e a n i n g e x c l u s i v e l y f r o m t h e w h i c h l a n g u a g e is r e l a t e d t o r e a l i t y as a n a m e is r e l a t e d t o its o b j e c t .
i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e p u r p o s i v e users o f l a n g u a g e , t h e n i t loses t h e T h e relation o f the signified (the meaning) to the signifier (the
a u t o n o m y o f h a v i n g its o w n i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e . s i g n ) was t h o u g h t t o be e x p l i c a b l e i n t e r m s o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e
b. F o r m a l s e m a n t i c s f o l l o w s a d i f f e r e n t i n t u i d o n . I t a t t e n d s t o t h e s y m b o l ( t h e m e a n i n g f u l sign) t o t h e d e s i g n a t u m ( t h e s i g n i f i e d o b -
g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s a n d ascribes t o l a n g u a g e j e c t ) . T h i s basic s e m i o t i c n o t i o n was s u i t e d t o t h e object-centered
a status i n d e p e n d e n t of the intentions and ideas of speaking t h e o r y o f knowledge i n the philosophy o f consciousness. 10
I n fact,
subjects. I n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e r u l e system o f l a n g u a g e i t s e l f , t h e names o r d e s i g n a t i o n s , i n d e e d a l l t e r m s t h a t w e use t o i d e n t i f y
p r a c t i c e o f l a n g u a g e usage a n d t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f l i n g u i s t i c u n d e r - o b j e c t s , d o , as i t w e r e , establish c o n t a c t b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d r e a l i t y .
s t a n d i n g o c c u p y a status t h a t is m e r e l y s e c o n d a r y . First o f a l l , the A false p i c t u r e arises, h o w e v e r , i f t h i s p a r t is t a k e n f o r t h e w h o l e . I n
o b j e c t o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is c o n s t i t u t e d b y l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s - t h e case o f a s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e s e n t e n c e , a s i n g u l a r t e r m m u s t first
sions a n d n o t b y t h e p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r - be e x p a n d e d to a sentence by means o f a universal predicate expres-
ers t h a t c a n b e r e a d o f f f r o m t h e p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e s i o n b e f o r e w e c a n r e p r e s e n t a n e l e m e n t a r y state o f a f f a i r s . T h e
c o r r e c t use a n d c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a n e x p r e s s i o n d o n o t r e s u l t p r e d i c a t e s h o u l d "apply" to the object f o r w h i c h the subject expres-
f r o m t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f the speaker o r f r o m the conventions agreed s i o n " s t a n d s . " B u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h e w h o l e s e n t e n c e t o t h e state
u p o n b y users o f l a n g u a g e , b u t f r o m t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e o f a f f a i r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n i t m a y n o t t h e n b e c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g
e x p r e s s i o n s themselves a n d t h e r u l e s w h e r e b y t h e y are c o n s t i t u t e d . t o t h e m o d e l o f " s t a n d i n g f o r a n o b j e c t . " A n d i f assertoric s e n t e n c e s
I n t h i s way, t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is d e t a c h e d f r o m a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c are representative o f language as a w h o l e , t h e n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
c o n t e x t s a n d r e s e r v e d f o r l i n g u i s t i c analysis i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense. between language a n d the w o r l d m u s t be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a
A d i m e n s i o n is t h e r e b y r e v e a l e d that B u h l e r failed to take i n t o m o d e l d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f t h e r e l a t i o n t o a n o b j e c t : i t is facts t h a t
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n his semiotically f o r e s h o r t e n e d m o d e l : that o f the make a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s true.
logical-semantic c o n s t r u c t i o n o f language. Admittedly, f r o m B i i h l e r ' s T h i s , t h e n , is t h e k e y t o a n s w e r i n g t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f
p o i n t o f view, f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s pays f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e b y l i m i t i n g its t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . I f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n assertoric s e n t e n c e is
analysis t o t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e . t h e state o f a f f a i r s t h a t i t r e p r e s e n t s , a n d i f t h i s s e n t e n c e is t r u e
T h i s explains b o t h the methodological abstraction o f the m e a n i n g p r e c i s e l y w h e n t h e e x p r e s s e d state o f a f f a i r s exists o r is t h e case, t h e n
o f the sentence f r o m the m e a n i n g o f the utterance a n d the choice we u n d e r s t a n d t h e sentence o n l y i f we k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r
o f t h e s e n t e n c e as t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t o f s e m a n t i c analysis. For, w i t h w h i c h i t is t r u e . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e serve
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Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

as a n e x p l a n a n s f o r its m e a n i n g : "To understand a proposition zation o f his i n t e n t i o n s . T h e w o r d s a p p e a r to derive t h e i r m e a n i n g


m e a n s t o k n o w w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . " 1 1
f r o m t h e p u r p o s e s a n d t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e s p e a k i n g subjects.
T h i s crucial insight by Frege i n t o the i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between F o r m u l a t i o n s s u c h as, "To u n d e r s t a n d a l a n g u a g e m e a n s t o be
m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y is b a s e d u p o n a n i n t u i t i o n t h a t , t o a n t i c i p a t e , m a s t e r o f a t e c h n i q u e , " c o m e close t o t h e v i e w p o i n t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t
can be elucidated f r o m a p r a g m a t i c perspective, w h i c h Frege h i m s e l f semantics. 15
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e r e is a d e c i s i v e d i f f e r e n c e . W i t t g e n s t e i n
d i d n o t adopt. Participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n reach understanding conceives o f the practice o f the language game, w h i c h determines
(sich verständigen) b y u s i n g s e n t e n c e s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e use o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , n o t as t h e r e s u l t o f i n d i v i d u a l
i f , h o w e v e r , t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e s u t t e r e d by t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f i s o l a t e d , p u r p o s i v e subjects b u t as
n o t b e j u d g e d by t h e h e a r e r , t h e y w o u l d b e c o m p l e t e l y inadequate the " c o m m o n behavior o f m a n k i n d . " 1 6
" L a n g u a g e g a m e " is h i s n a m e
as t h e s m a l l e s t u n i t s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Ver- for the totality o f the i n t e r m e s h e d linguistic utterances a n d n o n l i n -
ständigung) w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t e s t e d e x i s t e n c e o f states o f a f f a i r s g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s . I t is t h e p r i o r a g r e e m e n t i n a n intersubjectively
c a n be r e a c h e d by p a r t i c i p a n t s o n l y o n t h e basis o f t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f shared f o r m o f life or the p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o m m o n practices
s e n t e n c e s t h a t are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t r u e . r e g u l a t e d by i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d c u s t o m s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e i n t e r r e l a -
c. Yet a d i f f e r e n t i n t u i t i o n u n d e r l i e s t h e use t h e o r y o f meaning, t i o n s h i p o f a c t i v i t i e s a n d s p e e c h acts. L e a r n i n g t o m a s t e r a l a n g u a g e
w h i c h Wittgenstein developed f r o m his critique o f the t r u t h - c o n d i - o r l e a r n i n g h o w expressions i n a language s h o u l d be understood
tional semantic c o n c e p t i o n he h i m s e l f once shared. Wittgenstein r e q u i r e s h a b i t u a l i z a t i o n i n t o a f o r m o f l i f e . T h e f o r m o f l i f e antece-
uncovers the action character o f linguistic utterances. 1 2
From his dently r e g u l a t e s t h e use o f w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s w i t h i n a n e t w o r k o f
perspective, the representational f u n c t i o n , amidst the multiplicity of possible purposes a n d possible actions.
ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , loses its p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . T h e m e d i u m o f U n l i k e the intentionalist approach, the use-theoretical approach
l a n g u a g e d o e s n o t serve first a n d f o r e m o s t t o d e s c r i b e o r e s t a b l i s h does n o t emphasize the t o o l character o f language b u t r a t h e r the
facts; i t e q u a l l y serves t o issue c o m m a n d s , solve r i d d l e s , t e l l j o k e s , i n t e r m e s h i n g o f language w i t h interactive practices i n w h i c h a f o r m
give t h a n k s , c u r s e , s e n d g r e e t i n g s , a n d p r a y . 1 3
L a t e r o n , A u s t i n uses o f l i f e is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e f l e c t e d a n d r e p r o d u c e d . W i t h this, the
these p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs to analyze t h e d u a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d o f linguistic expressions retreats once again,
s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h a speaker, i n saying s o m e t h i n g , simultane- t h i s t i m e b e h i n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n speakers a n d hearers.
ously does something. 1 4
T h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are n o t i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y f r o m t h e
W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s f o r m u l a — t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a w o r d is its use i n p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e s p e a k e r b u t as r e f l e c t i o n s o f a n t e c e d e n t l y estab-
t h e l a n g u a g e — i s a d m i t t e d l y i n n e e d o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , f o r t h e fa- l i s h e d h a b i t u a l i z e d practices. W i t h t h e g r a m m a r o f l a n g u a g e games,
m o u s e x a m p l e o f t h e b u i l d e r s i n t h e s e c o n d p a r a g r a p h o f Philosophi- the d i m e n s i o n o f an intersubjectively shared b a c k g r o u n d knowledge
cal Investigations suggests a n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t r e a d i n g . T h e assistant o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t c a r r i e s (trägt) t h e m u l t i p l e f u n c t i o n s o f l a n -
l e a r n s t o b r i n g " p i l l a r s , " "slabs," a n d " b e a m s " t o t h e m a s t e r w h e n h e g u a g e is d i s c l o s e d .
calls; as s o o n as t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r t h e c o o p e r a t i v e T h e e x a m p l e o f t h e b u i l d e r s seems t o l e n d i t s e l f r a t h e r t o c o n c e a l -
c o n t e x t , t h e y c a n assign o b j e c t s t o w o r d s t h r o u g h i m p l i c i t d e f i n i - i n g t h e r e a l p o i n t o f t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g : i n a competently
t i o n s . T h e h a b i t u a l i z e d w o r k p r a c t i c e s a r e t h e r e b y d e t e r m i n e d by t h e m a s t e r e d l a n g u a g e g a m e , t h e s p e e c h acts carry (tragen) interactive
p u r p o s e o f b u i l d i n g a h o u s e as w e l l as by t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a u t h o r - practices i n a completely d i f f e r e n t way t h a n t h e a c t i v i t i e s t h a t a r e
ity between the master a n d the apprentice. For the speaker who coordinated t h r o u g h t h e m i n the first place. Communicative acts
issues t h e d i r e c t i v e s , t h e w o r d s t h a t are c a l l e d o u t a n d t h e feats o f owe this p r i m a c y to a p r o p e r t y to w h i c h A u s t i n d r e w a t t e n t i o n w i t h
c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t are s t e e r e d by t h e m f u n c t i o n as t o o l s f o r t h e r e a l i - his investigation o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y character o f s p e e c h acts. A n
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Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

o b s e r v e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d a n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n o n l y w h e n she k n o w s s u c h a way t h a t strategic a c t i o n c a n s e r v e as a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t


t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o b e satisfied b y m e a n s o f i t . S p e e c h f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g linguistically. Given this p r e l i m i n a r y de-
acts, b y c o n t r a s t , i d e n t i f y t h e m s e l v e s . 17
B e c a u s e t h e speaker, i n car- cision, however, o n l y such p h e n o m e n a c a n c o m e i n t o v i e w as a r e
r y i n g o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y says w h a t h e is doing, categorially d i f f e r e n t f r o m those supposedly to be reconstructed.
a h e a r e r w h o u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said c a n s t r a i g h t - For, e v e n i n t h e m o s t c o m p l e x cases, w h a t is r e c o n s t r u c t e d is o n l y
f o r w a r d l y i d e n t i f y t h e p e r f o r m e d a c t as s o m e specific a c t i o n . T h u s , the m e a n i n g o f an utterance "x" by S that, o n the presupposition
t h e u s e - t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h is a l r e a d y b a s e d o n a n i n t u i t i o n , t h e f u l l t h a t a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e is n o t a v a i l a b l e , is c a p a b l e o f inducing H
i m p o r t o f w h i c h has b e e n r e c o g n i z e d o n l y since W i t t g e n s t e i n . T h e t o b e l i e v e o r t o i n t e n d t o d o s o m e t h i n g s p e c i f i c — t h a t is, t o under-
acts c a r r i e d o u t i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e are always s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l . T h e y stand something indirectly b y way o f i n f e r e n c e s . But giving someone
say b o t h h o w w h a t is said is t o b e u s e d a n d h o w i t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d . s o m e t h i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d i n d i r e c t l y is a b o r d e r l i n e case t h a t , f o r its

T h i s reflexive structure o f everyday language becomes tangible i n p a r t , r e f e r s b a c k t o t h e n o r m a l case o f r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g

t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h act. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y d i r e c t l y i n a c o m m o n language by way o f utterances t h a t i d e n t i f y

c o m p o n e n t establishes t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t themselves.

is b e i n g u s e d a n d t h e s o r t o f a c t i o n as w h i c h t h e u t t e r a n c e s h o u l d T h i s p a r a s i t i c status reveals i t s e l f i n t h e t y p e o f counterexamples


be understood. i n t r o d u c e d b y S t r a w s o n a n d d e a l t w i t h b y S. R. S c h i f f e r , i n w h i c h S
c a n a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d e f f e c t o n l y so l o n g as t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t His
T h e Limits of Semantics a n d o f Speech-Act T h e o r y s u p p o s e d t o t a k e as S"s i n t e n t i o n d o e s n o t c o i n c i d e w i t h t h e s t r a t e g i c
u l t e r i o r i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is a c t u a l l y p u r s u i n g . 1 8
T h r o u g h t h i s asym-
E a c h o f t h e t h r e e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g takes u p e x a c t l y m e t r y , h o w e v e r , a n i n f i n i t e regress is set i n m o t i o n t h a t c o u l d be
o n e a s p e c t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y seek t o p r e v e n t e d o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w e r e a l l o w e d t o have r e c o u r s e t o
e x p l a i n the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression f r o m the perspective s h a r e d k n o w l e d g e , i n d e e d i n t h e final i n s t a n c e t o t h e n a t u r a l m e a n -
o f w h a t is m e a n t (as i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g ) , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of i n g o f signals e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h a causal c h a i n ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t
w h a t is s a i d (as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g ) , o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f use (as s m o k e m e a n s fire). Yet t h i s r e c o u r s e f u n c t i o n s o n l y o n t h e c o n d i t i o n
u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g ) . B y i n t r o d u c i n g e a c h o f these t h e o r i e s as styliza- t h a t b o t h sides, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , a l r e a d y u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r a l
t i o n s o f j u s t o n e o f t h e aspects t h a t B i d d e r ' s s c h e m a o f language m e a n i n g o f s u c h a s i g n a l i n a way a n a l o g o u s t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g l a n -
f u n c t i o n s takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n simultaneously, I have a l r e a d y i m - g u a g e , t h a t is, i n t h e m a n n e r o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y k n o w n , n o n n a t u -
p l i c i t l y suggested t h e i r one-sidedness. I n o w w a n t to go t h r o u g h the ral m e a n i n g o f a conventionally regulated sign. Schiffer makes an
t h e o r i e s o n c e m o r e i n o r d e r (a) t o discuss t h e l i m i t s o f w h a t t h e y i l l e g i t i m a t e leap f r o m the n a t u r a l evidence o f a signal like smoke
are c a p a b l e o f a c h i e v i n g a n d t h e n ( b ) t o test t h e problemsolving (accessible f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n o b s e r v e r ) t o t h e comprehen-
p o t e n t i a l o f a f o u r t h a p p r o a c h , namely, that o f the t h e o r y o f speech sion (possible o n l y i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e ) o f a communica-
acts. t i v e l y u s e d s i g n ( t h a t is, o n e r e c o g n i z a b l y u s e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e of
i m p a r t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n ) with the corresponding propositional con-
a. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t p r o g r a m sets i t s e l f t h e task o f t r a c i n g t h e
tent that smoke means fire. 19
H e thereby smuggles i n precisely w h a t
conventional meaning of a random g r a m m a t i c a l expression "x"
is s u p p o s e d t o b e e x p l a i n e d , n a m e l y , t h e r e f l e x i v i t y o f a s e l f - i d e n t i f y -
( x - m e a n i n g timeless) b a c k t o t h e n o n c o n v e n t i o n a l m e a n i n g o f t h e
i n g utterance a n d the intersubjective knowledge m a d e possible by
speaker's i n t e n t i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h the utterance o f "x" i n a p a r t i c u -
the comprehension of that utterance. Certainly, interactions a m o n g
lar c o n t e x t (S-meaning o c c a s i o n a l ) . G r i c e selects h i s p r e m i s e s in
p u r p o s i v e l y a c t i n g subjects ( w h i c h a r e m e d i a t e d solely t h r o u g h o b -
s u c h a way t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n be e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e
s e r v a t i o n s , t h e s t r a t e g i c d e p l o y m e n t o f signs, a n d i n f e r e n c e s ) can
p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l i n f l u e n c e o f S u p o n H. T h e m o d e l is set u p i n
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Chapter 6 T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

lead to the reciprocally reflected attribution o f proposidonal atti- f o r c e o f i m p e r a t i v e s c a n n o t be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a d e q u a t e l y f r o m t h e


tudes a n d contents; they c a n n o t , however, lead to s o m e t h i n g like f o r c e o f assertions o n t h e basis o f t h e o p p o s e d " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit" i n
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e i n t h e s t r i c t sense. w h i c h a s p e a k e r takes u p , w i t h i m p e r a t i v e s o r assertions, respectively,
T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics allows the rationality a n d internal a r e l a t i o n t o ( t h e s a m e ) state o f a f f a i r s f r o m d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s .
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e linguistic m e d i u m , d i s r e g a r d e d by t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t A h e a r e r is a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d a s e n t e n c e qua i m p e r a t i v e o n l y w h e n
a p p r o a c h , t o c o m e i n t o its o w n . T h e c l e a r a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h o u g h t s she k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r m a y e x p e c t t h a t
a n d i n t e n t i o n s is m a d e p o s s i b l e o n l y t h r o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l a n g u a g e , he c o u l d impose his w i l l u p o n a hearer, even a r e l u c t a n t one. T h e
w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s a r e a l i t y o f its o w n k i n d a n d w i t h its o w n d i g n i t y ; sense o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e d e m a n d f o r c o m p l i a n c e c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d
states o f a f f a i r s can b e m i r r o r e d o n l y i n sentences. Yet t h i s also i n t e r m s o f t h e s e m a n t i c a l l y a n a l y z a b l e k n o w l e d g e o f success c o n d i -
bestows a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n o n t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f t i o n s ; i t c a n be e x p l a i n e d o n l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y , s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h r e f e r -
a s s e r t o r i c sentences. T h e d i v e r s e f u n c t i o n s s e r v e d b y l a n g u a g e a r e ence to the authority standing b e h i n d i t . 2 1

susceptible t o analysis o n l y b y way o f t h e f o r m o f t h e s e n t e n c e s A d m i t t e d l y , a p u r e l y s e m a n t i c a p p r o a c h t o analysis m e e t s its l i m i t s


e m p l o y e d , u l t i m a t e l y , i n d e e d , o n l y b y way o f t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t o r i c e v e n i n t h e case o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s t h e m s e l v e s . I n its classical
s e n t e n c e s t h a t serve r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . F o r e v e n t h e m e a n - f o r m , t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics believed i t possible to i g n o r e alto-
i n g o f n o n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s is e l u c i d a t e d t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o t h e g e t h e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r ¿5 in a position to
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e assertoric sentences t r u e . Frege h i m s e l f h a d recognize w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e a r e satisfied i n a
a l r e a d y d i v i d e d a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s i n t o t w o c o m p o n e n t s : t h e asser- g i v e n case. B u t t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is, a t m o s t , u n -
toric force o r the m o d e o f assertion m u s t j o i n u p w i t h the proposi- p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i n t h e case o f s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e o b s e r v a t i o n sen-
t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t h a t p" i n o r d e r t o y i e l d t h e s t a t e m e n t "p," w h e r e b y tences, w h o s e t r u t h c a n be t e s t e d i n easily s u r v e y a b l e c o n t e x t s w i t h
" t h a t p" s i g n i f i e s a state o f a f f a i r s a n d "p" s i g n i f i e s a f a c t , t h a t is, a n t h e h e l p o f r e a d i l y accessible p e r c e p t u a l e v i d e n c e . A t a n y r a t e , t h e r e
e x i s t i n g state o f a f f a i r s . O n l y t h e m o d a l c o m p o n e n t distinguishes a r e n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y s i m p l e tests f o r p r e d i c t i o n s , c o u n t e r f a c t u a l
i m p e r a t i v e a n d i n t e r r o g a t i v e s e n t e n c e s f r o m assertoric sentences c o n d i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , n o m o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , a n d so f o r t h . Asser-
w i t h t h e same c o n t e n t . t o r i c s e n t e n c e s o f these k i n d s q u a n t i f y d i m e n s i o n s t h a t a r e i n f i n i t e

I n o r d e r to explicate such distinctions between modes i n terms o f or are inaccessible to observation. Michael D u m m e t t correctly

t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s , S t e n i u s a n d K e n n y m a k e use o f a n i d e a p o i n t s o u t t h a t s i m p l e r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n f o r these a n d s i m i l a r

o f Austin's, w h o h a d assumed two o p p o s i n g " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit" b e - s e n t e n c e s a r e n o t a t o u r d i s p o s a l . I t is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o

t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . 2 0
T h e y begin w i t h statements r e n d e r t h e F r e g e a n thesis m o r e p r e c i s e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t o n e u n d e r -

a n d i m p e r a t i v e s as t h e t w o basic m o d e s , w h e r e b y t r u e s t a t e m e n t s stands a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w h e n o n e k n o w s its r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a -

r e p r e s e n t e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d i m p e r a t i v e s r e q u i r e t h a t states tion. Relying o n the pragmatic distinction between "truth" and

o f a f f a i r s b e b r o u g h t i n t o e x i s t e n c e . T h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e state- " a s s e r t i b i l i t y " — t h a t is, b e t w e e n t h e t r u t h o f a s e n t e n c e a n d t h e e n t i -

ments true correspond to the conditions u n d e r w h i c h imperatives t l e m e n t to m a k e a n assertion w i t h t h a t s e n t e n c e — D u m m e t t replaces

a r e successfully c a r r i e d o u t . I n b o t h cases, w h a t is at issue a r e t h e knowledge o f the t r u t h conditions (or knowledge o f the verification

c o n d i t i o n s f o r states o f a f f a i r s , e i t h e r f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f r e c o g n i z e d rules o f a justification game geared toward observation situations ) 2 2

states o f a f f a i r s o r f o r t h e b r i n g i n g a b o u t o f d e s i r e d states o f a f f a i r s . w i t h i n d i r e c t k n o w l e d g e : t h e h e a r e r m u s t k n o w t h e k i n d s o f reasons

H o w e v e r , t h i s strategy o f analysis f o u n d e r s o n t h e a s y m m e t r y be- w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d , i f necessary, v i n d i c a t e h i s c l a i m t h a t

t w e e n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d success c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a s s e r t o r i c a n d p a r t i c u l a r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are satisfied. I n s h o r t , one understands

i m p e r a t i v e sentences, respectively, a r e s u p p o s e d t o "satisfy." F o r t h e an assertoric sentence w h e n o n e k n o w s t h e k i n d s o f reasons a


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Chapter 6

speaker m u s t p r o v i d e i n o r d e r to convince a h e a r e r that the speaker t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is j u s t o n e a m o n g m a n y o t h e r f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e

is e n t i t l e d t o raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e s e n t e n c e . 2 3
t h a t h a v e d e v e l o p e d , as i t w e r e , as p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r y o f a
diversity o f i n t e r l o c k i n g ( a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , equally legitimate) l a n -
J u s t as D u m m e t t i m p l i c i t l y m a k e s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e g a m e o f a r g u -
guage games.
m e n t a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r qua p r o p o n e n t is a b l e t o c o n v i n c e
a h e a r e r qua o p p o n e n t o f t h e e n t i t l e m e n t f o r h i s t r u t h c l a i m , so b. F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n i n v e s t i g a t e d

W i t t g e n s t e i n comes u p o n the presuppositions u n d e r l y i n g a similar m o r e closely, o n t h e basis o f i n d i v i d u a l i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, h o w l a n -

d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r o l e s i n h i s analysis o f t h e c o n c e p t o f f o l l o w i n g a g u a g e is b o u n d u p w i t h i n t e r a c t i v e p r a c t i c e s i n a f o r m o f l i f e . I n

rule. 2 4
F o l l o w i n g a r u l e m e a n s f o l l o w i n g t h e same r u l e i n e a c h case; a d d i t i o n , however, a n d u n l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n does n o t w a n t t o

t h e m e a n i n g o f a r u l e is i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e use o f t h e w o r d " s a m e . " i g n o r e the r e l a t i o n s h i p b r o u g h t o u t by t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics

A c a n n o t be c e r t a i n w h e t h e r she is f o l l o w i n g a r u l e a t a l l u n l e s s a between language a n d the objective w o r l d , between a sentence a n d

s i t u a t i o n exists i n w h i c h she e x p o s e s h e r c o n d u c t t o t h e j u d g m e n t a state o f a f f a i r s . A u s t i n takes t h e f i r s t steps e n r o u t e t o a t h e o r y o f

o f a c r i t i c B w h o is a b l e t o a s c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n s f r o m t h e r u l e . I d e n - s p e e c h acts t h a t c o m b i n e s t h e i n s i g h t s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s

tical m e a n i n g a n d the validity o f a r u l e are conceptually connected. w i t h t h o s e o f l a n g u a g e - g a m e p r a g m a t i c s . A t f i r s t , t h i s leads h i m t o a

F o r t h e i d e n t i t y o f a r u l e i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f its r e a l i z a t i o n s d o e s d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n t h a t i n a g e n e r a l w a y o p p o s e s i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts

n o t r e s t u p o n observable i n v a r i a n c e s b u t u p o n t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c r i t e - t o t h e a s c e r t a i n i n g o f facts. I n s o - c a l l e d c o n s t a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , asser-

r i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h r u l e - c o n f o r m a t i v e behavior can be j u d g e d . t o r i c s e n t e n c e s a r e u s e d t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s . A u s t i n also

R u l e - g u i d e d c o n d u c t is f a l l i b l e a n d t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s t w o s i m u l t a - speaks o f l o c u t i o n a r y acts h e r e : t h e s p e a k e r uses l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n

n e o u s , i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e r o l e s : o n e f o r A, w h o f o l l o w s a r u l e a n d o r d e r t o say s o m e t h i n g (say w h a t is t h e case). A g a i n s t t h i s , i l l o c u t i o n -

t h e r e b y seeks t o a v o i d m i s t a k e s , a n d o n e f o r B, w h o is a b l e c r i t i c a l l y a r y acts as s u c h a r e n o t s u p p o s e d t o h a v e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,

to j u d g e t h e correctness o f the r u l e - g u i d e d c o n d u c t o f A. T h e p o i n t n o t e v e n a m e a n i n g . W i t h s u c h a n act, t h e s p e a k e r does n o t say

o f t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n h a v e a n a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d b e t r u e o r false b u t i n s t e a d p e r f o r m s a s o c i a l

i d e n t i c a l m e a n i n g o n l y f o r a s u b j e c t w h o is c a p a b l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h a t a c t i o n . " H e l l o ! " d o e s n o t mean a n y t h i n g ; r a t h e r , i t ¿5 a g r e e t i n g ,

least o n e o t h e r s u b j e c t , o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t is v a l i d for both of them. w h i c h t h e speaker can p e r f o r m w i t h this expression. O f course, such

A m o n a d i c a l l y i s o l a t e d s u b j e c t c a n n o m o r e use a n e x p r e s s i o n i n a a n act c a n b e i n f e l i c i t o u s , i f , f o r e x a m p l e , i t is c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e

way t h a t m a i n t a i n s i d e n t i t y o f m e a n i n g t h a n a r u l e can be f o l l o w e d w r o n g words, i n an inappropriate context, or without the correct

privately. e m p h a s i s . I n s t e a d o f h a v i n g a m e a n i n g , a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act gives


expression to a particular force—a power o f a k i n d w i t h the b i n d i n g
I n t h i s way, W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t r o d u c e s t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n be- c h a r a c t e r o f p r o m i s e s . W h i l e l o c u t i o n a r y acts m a k e p o s s i b l e a c o g -
tween m e a n i n g a n d validity i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f language's relation to n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is, as i t w e r e , t u r n e d t o w a r d t h e w o r l d ,
the w o r l d ; he t h e r e f o r e does n o t l i n k u p the rules f o r the m e a n i n g speakers a n d h e a r e r s a r e a b l e t o e s t a b l i s h r e l a t i o n s a m o n g each
o f w o r d s w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f sentences. I n s t e a d , o t h e r w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts; t h e l a t t e r serve t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f
he compares the validity o f m e a n i n g conventions with the prevailing language.
s o c i a l v a l i d i t y o f c u s t o m s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d assimilates t h e g r a m -
m a t i c a l r u l e s o f l a n g u a g e g a m e s t o social n o r m s o f a c t i o n . O f c o u r s e , I n i t i a l l y A u s t i n p r o p o s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g classifications:

he thereby surrenders any r e l a t i o n to validity that transcends the Locutionary Act—Assertoric Sentence—Meaning—True/False
c o n t e x t o f a given language g a m e . U t t e r a n c e s are v a l i d o r i n v a l i d
o n l y a c c o r d i n g to the standards o f the language game to w h i c h they Illocutionary Act—Performative Sentence—Force—Felicitous/
b e l o n g . T h u s , almost i m p e r c e p t i b l y , even t h e r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h of Infelicitous
f a c t - a s c e r t a i n i n g s p e e c h is lost. F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e r e p r e s e n t a -
290 291
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

T h i s d u a l i s m c o u l d n o t be m a i n t a i n e d . 2 5
A u s t i n saw f r o m t h e b e g i n - w h e t h e r i t is " i n o r d e r . " 2 6
T o be s u r e , A u s t i n d o e s n o t f i l l t h e d i m e n -
n i n g , o f c o u r s e , t h a t m o s t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d o n o t a p p e a r inde- s i o n o f " r i g h t n e s s " — t o w h i c h t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f
pendently but incorporate clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o w g e n e r a l i z e d — w i t h a s p e c i f i c n u m b e r o f
g e n e r a l , t h e s p e a k e r c a r r i e s o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act b y s a y i n g some- w e l l - d e f i n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; r a t h e r , h i s " l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas o f
thing. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t establishes o n l y t h e m o d e o f a t r u t h a n d f a l s i t y " is s u p p o s e d t o o p e n u p a w h o l e s p e c t r u m o f aspects
s e n t e n c e t h a t is u s e d as a p r o m i s e , a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , a n a v o w a l , o f validity, r a n g i n g f r o m p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h via goodness a n d a p p r o -
a n d so f o r t h . T h e n o t a t i o n Mp i n d i c a t e s t h a t w e e x e c u t e t w o acts i n priateness to n o r m a t i v e rightness. O u t o f a wealth o f evaluative
o n e , acts t h a t c a n be s e p a r a t e d o n l y a n a l y t i c a l l y . B u t t h e n i t is n o v i e w p o i n t s , t h e l i n g u i s t i c analyst is s u p p o s e d i n e a c h case t o b e a b l e
l o n g e r clear w h y the contrast between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g , " f a m i l - t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i o n o f assessment a n d t o c a p t u r e i t
iar f r o m t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semandcs, o u g h t to be r e t a i n e d i n a the- d e s c r i p t i v e l y . B y c o n t r a s t , Searle w a n t s t o a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t
o r y o f s p e e c h acts. P e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s o b v i o u s l y have j u s t as necessarily r e s u l t f r o m t h i s k i n d o f s u b s u m p t i o n o f v a l i d i t y , i n t h e
c l e a r a m e a n i n g as assertoric s e n t e n c e s . A n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts sense o f t r u t h , a n d n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y u n d e r a d i v e r s i t y o f "values."
e x h i b i t t h e same i l l o c u t i o n a r y - p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e as a l l I n t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts, h e a d m i t s o n l y t h e
o t h e r s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s , d e s c r i p d o n s , or narratives can, c o m - o n e clear-cut universal validity c l a i m that h a d already been p r i v i l e g e d
p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r t r u t h v a l u e , be i n f e l i c i t o u s i n a way b y t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , Searle takes a step
s i m i l a r t o o t h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: o n e c a n m a k e s u c h a mess o f b a c k w a r d f r o m A u s t i n a n d the later W i t t g e n s t e i n to Frege.
t e l l i n g a t a l e t h a t " i t is n o l o n g e r a g o o d s t o r y , " o r discuss a d e l i c a t e
W e a r e n o n e t h e l e s s i n d e b t e d t o Searle f o r t h e v e r s i o n o f s p e e c h -
m a t t e r so b l u n t l y t h a t t h o s e p r e s e n t " w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e a n y f u r t h e r
act t h e o r y t h a t has b e e n m o s t p r e c i s e l y e x p l i c a t e d u p t o n o w . 2 7
He
discussion o f i t . "
takes A u s t i n ' s c o n d i t i o n s o f f e l i c i t y a n d r e n d e r s t h e m m o r e p r e c i s e
I f , h o w e v e r , all s p e e c h acts c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r m Mp, t h e n as " p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s ; " these r e f e r t o s t a n d a r d i z e d contexts
l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose t h e s p e c i a l status t h a t was i n i t i a l l y c l a i m e d f o r t h a t m u s t o b t a i n i f c e r t a i n k i n d s o f s p e e c h acts a r e t o be performed
t h e m . T h e y a r e , so t o speak, a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m - m e a n i n g f u l l y a n d w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f success. H e t h e n a d d s c o m -
p o n e n t o f a n y a n d e v e r y s p e e c h act, a n d h a n d o v e r t h e i r monopoly p r e h e n s i b i l i t y a n d sincerity c o n d i t i o n s ; these r e f e r o n t h e o n e h a n d
o n t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h t o a p a r t i c u l a r class o f s p e e c h acts, t h e c o n s t a - to the availability o f a c o m m o n linguistic m e d i u m a n d the suitability
t i v e . T h i s t h e n gives rise t o t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o n l y o f the speech situation, a n d o n the o t h e r h a n d to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
constative s p e e c h acts c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d ( t r u e o r false) or i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker. H e f u r t h e r specifies c o n d i t i o n s f o r the
w h e t h e r o t h e r s p e e c h acts, t o o , m i g h t e x h i b i t a n e q u i v a l e n t d i m e n - s e m a n t i c f o r m t h a t t h e clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m u s t obey,
s i o n f o r t h a t o f t r u t h . I f t h e l a t t e r w e r e t h e case, w e w o u l d h a v e t o and finally faces t h e task o f s p e c i f y i n g t h e "essential conditions"
work out a conception o f language t h a t a t t r i b u t e s n o essential i m - a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces o r m o d e s o f using
p o r t a n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t w h a t is said i n a l a n g u a g e always t r a n s c e n d s l a n g u a g e c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d . T h e five basic m o d e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y
the boundaries o f that language a n d refers to s o m e t h i n g i n the Searle ( c o n s t a t i v e , d i r e c t i v e , c o m m i s s i v e , expressive, a n d d e c l a r a t i v e
w o r l d . B u t b o t h A u s t i n a n d Searle give a n a f f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r t o t h i s s p e e c h acts) a r e o p e n t o m o r e p r e c i s e s u r f a c e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s u s i n g
question, albeit significantly d i f f e r e n t ones. p r a g m a t i c c r i t e r i a ( s u c h as t h e d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t o f t h e s p e a k e r
A u s t i n c o r r e c t s his p o s i t i o n t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e n o w u n d e r s t a n d s a n d hearer, the degree o f intensity i n b r i n g i n g o u t the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
the two dimensions o f evaluation, w h i c h he had initially correlated, p o i n t , o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l ties o f t h e s p e e c h a c t ) .
respectively, w i t h l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( t r u t h vs. suc- However, the differentiation of t h e basic m o d e s themselves—
cess) , as aspects t h a t are m e r e l y a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e . Every s p e e c h m o r e o v e r , i n a v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n g e a r e d solely t o w a r d p r o p o s i t i o n a l
act can be evaluated a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r i t is " r i g h t " as w e l l as t r u t h ( w h i c h p e r m i t s v a r i a t i o n o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit
292 293

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d ) — i s t h e p r o b l e m o n w h i c h Searle n o r s i g n i n s u c h cases i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e t h e i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e
labors i n vain. I n b o t h directions ( f r o m " w o r d to w o r l d " a n d f r o m p e r s p e c t i v e o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n expressive s p e e c h acts,
"world to w o r d " ) , the relation o f language to the objective w o r l d a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) comes i n t o play—a claim,
p r o v i d e s a basis t h a t is t o o n a r r o w f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e five p r o - m o r e o v e r , t h a t Searle has a l r e a d y e m p l o y e d i n a n u n s p e c i f i c way f o r
p o s e d classes o f s p e e c h acts. I n d e e d , f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s i n c e r i t y c o n d i t i o n t h a t all c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h acts are s u p -
the r i c h variety o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t to o r d e r p o s e d t o satisfy. A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n c a n b e m a d e t o h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f
f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics h a d already b e e n the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f declarative speech acts. 29

a sufficient reason f o r g i v i n g u p a l l a t t e m p t s at classification i n favor T h e s e p r o b l e m s are a v o i d e d w h e n o n e d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o t h e


o f describing an u n o r d e r e d collection o f language-game grammars. validity problems bequeathed b y A u s t i n i n t h e way Searle does—
O n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d — a n d only par- n a m e l y , w i t h a t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l - s e m a n t i c w e a k e n i n g o f speech-act
t i a l l y — a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts c a n t h e o r y — b u t instead interprets Btihler's language functions i n terms
be b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t . 2 8
Assertoric force means t h a t 5 presents o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity claims.
t o Ha t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p" a n d t h e r e b y issues a w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e t r u t h
c o n d i t i o n s o f "p" are s a t i s f i e d — o r , s i m p l y , t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n fits S p e e c h A c t s , C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , a n d Strategic I n t e r a c t i o n
t h e facts.

E v e n t h e i l l o c u d o n a r y f o r c e o f a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s is i n c a p a b l e A n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Bidder's schema o f language functions f r o m the


o f b e i n g e x p l a i n e d solely t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of p o i n t o f v i e w o f a t h e o r y o f v a l i d i t y suggests i t s e l f as a way o u t o f t h e
success c o n d i d o n s , t h a t is, i n t e r m s o f H e f f e c t i n g t h a t "p" b e c o m e s difficulties o f speech-act t h e o r y because i t does j u s t i c e to all t h r e e
t r u e . H u n d e r s t a n d s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e as a c o m m a n d , direc- aspects of a speaker r e a c h i n g understanding/with another per-
tive, a request, o r t h e l i k e o n l y w h e n k n o w l e d g e o f t h e success s o n / a b o u t something. I t i n c o r p o r a t e s w i t h i n i t s e l f t h e t r u t h c o n t a i n e d
c o n d i t i o n s ( g i v e n i n t h e clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) is a u g - i n t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d a t t h e same t i m e o v e r c o m e s t h e
m e n t e d by knowledge o f those conditions (contained i n the i l l o c u - specific one-sidedness o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t a n d f o r m a l semantics, respec-
t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t ) u n d e r w h i c h S c o u l d justify why he regards an tively. T h e r e s u l t i n g f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f s p e e c h acts p r o -
i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t "p" as l e g i t i m a t e o r e n f o r c e a b l e . W i t h vides a basis for the concept of communicative action.
t h i s , a v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f a n o r m a t i v e k i n d , w h i c h c a n n o t be reduced C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e t o strategic a c t i o n ,
t o a t r u t h c l a i m , c o m e s i n t o play. T h e s a m e h o l d s f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n - yet i t r e m a i n s l i n k e d to the teleology o f t h e various i n d i v i d u a l plans
ary force o f commissive s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r b i n d s of action that come together i n it.
h i s o w n w i l l i n t h e sense o f a n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n . T h e conditions a. F o l l o w i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c t o t h e p r a g m a t i c
f o r t h e b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o f o b l i g a t i n g d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n are p o i n t o f view, t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s e n t e n c e n o longer
o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d f r o m t h e success c o n d i d o n s , w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r poses i t s e l f as a q u e s t i o n — d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e process o f c o m m u n i -
f u l f i l l s as s o o n as h e t r a n s l a t e s his i n t e n t i o n i n t o a c t i o n — t h a t is, cation—about the objective relation between language and the
makes i t c o m e true. w o r l d . N o r can t h e validity c l a i m , w i t h w h i c h t h e speaker refers to
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f expressive s p e e c h acts, w i t h w h i c h S t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f h i s u t t e r a n c e , b e d e f i n e d solely f r o m t h e
expresses a subjective e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis) t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i - p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e speaker. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s h a v e a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n
l e g e d access, c a n b e defined neither t h r o u g h the cognitive nor t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n by speaker a n d hearer; they can
t h r o u g h the i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t i c r e l a t i o n o f a subject to the w o r l d o f b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y w i t h reasons, t h a t is, discursively, a n d t h e h e a r e r
e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s . Searle is t h u s c o n s i s t e n t i n u s i n g a n e i t h e r - reacts t o t h e m w i t h r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n s . T h e
294 295

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

s m a l l e s t i n d e p e n d e n t u n i t o f e x p l i c i t l y l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h - t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t o t h e addressee. A n d e a c h o f t h e t h r e e
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c o m p o s e d o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y s p e e c h a c t Mp, t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g discussed i n t h e f o r e g o i n g c l a i m e d t h a t i t c o u l d
w i t h w h i c h S raises a t least o n e criticizable validity claim for her explain the comprehensibility of linguistic expressions through
u t t e r a n c e , a n d o f t h e "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r s o m e o n e o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s — w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e f u n c t i o n o f ex-
H u n d e r s t a n d s a n d accepts t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r f r o m S. R e a c h i n g p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n s , o r o f r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s , o r o f a c t u a l -
u n d e r s t a n d i n g aims at consensus f o r m a t i o n . T h e a t t e m p t by S to i z i n g a n d e s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e r a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . W h a t w e are l o o k i n g
reach understanding w i t h H about something i n the w o r l d termi- f o r is a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t takes a c c o u n t o f t h e k e r n e l o f t r u t h
nates i n t h e a g r e e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t b e t w e e n t h e m ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t i n a l l t h r e e o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . H o w e v e r , f r o m Searle's
is t h e n s e a l e d by t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h act. F o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i t has o n c e a g a i n b e c o m e a p p a r e n t t h a t
t h i s r e a s o n , u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a s p e e c h act a l r e a d y p o i n t s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s c o n c e i v e s t h e i n t e r n a l
t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p o s s i b l e a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) a b o u t w h a t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d m e a n i n g is too specialized.
is said. C e r t a i n l y , w h e t h e r o r n o t a n u t t e r a n c e f u l f i l l s its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
O f course, the pragmatic r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f valid- f u n c t i o n is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; however, t h e f u l f i l l -
i t y also r e q u i r e s a c o m p l e t e r é é v a l u a t i o n o f w h a t was o r i g i n a l l y m e n t o f t h e expressive a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e f u n c t i o n s is also m e a s u r e d
m e a n t b y t h e " i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e " o f a s p e e c h act. A s we saw, A u s t i n a g a i n s t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are analogous to truth. I t h e r e f o r e w a n t t o
h a d c o n c e i v e d o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e as t h e l i t e r a l l y i r r a t i o n a l i n t r o d u c e s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness as t r u t h -
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s the rational content was a n a l o g o u s c o n c e p t s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts. T h e r e l a t i o n s o f
m o n o p o l i z e d by t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e ( o r its n o m i - t h e s p e e c h act t o speakers' i n t e n t i o n s a n d t o addressees c a n also b e
nalized form). Meaning and u n d e r s t a n d i n g were concentrated conceived i n t e r m s o f the m o d e l o f a r e l a t i o n to the objective w o r l d .
solely o n t h i s r a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t . By c o n t r a s t , t h e c o n s i s t e n t e x e c u - T h a t is, t h e r e exists s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a r e l a t i o n t o t h e subjective w o r l d
t i o n o f t h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n m a k e s v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t o t h e stewards o f ( o f t h e s p e a k e r ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) t o w h i c h
a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f h e has p r i v i l e g e d access, a n d a r e l a t i o n t o t h e s o c i a l w o r l d ( o f t h e
v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r e f e r r i n g t o these c o n d i t i o n s , a n d speaker, t h e h e a r e r , a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f i n t e r p e r -
reasons f o r the v i n d i c a t i o n o f these validity claims. T h e individual sonal relations h e l d to be legitimate. These world-concepts formed
s p e e c h act is b o u n d t o t h i s s t r u c t u r e p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h its m o d a l through analogy m u s t n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d as p a r t i a l
component. T h a t is, t h e m o d e is d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f r e g i o n s ( i n P o p p e r ' s sense) o f t h e o n e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . 3 0
T h e subjec-
c l a i m raised by the speaker w i t h h e r m i s l e a d i n g l y n a m e d " i l l o c u t i o n - tive e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t S e x t e r n a l i z e s i n e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o -
a r y " act, i n t h e s t a n d a r d case t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a p e r f o r - t y p i c a l l y i n avowals a n d r e v e l a t i o n s ) s h o u l d n o m o r e b e understood
m a t i v e clause ( a n d also a c c o r d i n g t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h i s v a l i d i t y as a p a r t i c u l a r class o f entities ( o r i n n e r e p i s o d e s ) t h a n s h o u l d t h e
c l a i m is r e f e r r e d t o ) . T h e l o c u s o f r a t i o n a l i t y is t h e r e b y t r a n s f e r r e d norms l e g i t i m a t i n g an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p established be-
f r o m the p r o p o s i t i o n a l to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t , a n d at the t w e e n 5 a n d H b y m e a n s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o t y p i c a l l y
same t i m e the validity c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r r e m a i n fixated o n the t h r o u g h commands a n d promises). F r o m the perspective of the
p r o p o s i t i o n . R o o m is t h u s m a d e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f v a l i d i t y participants, the first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences e m p l o y e d in
c l a i m s t h a t a r e not d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t is, a r e n o t expressive s p e e c h acts c a n b e u t t e r e d truthfully o r untruthfully, ac-
geared t o w a r d the r e l a t i o n o f language to the objective w o r l d . c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t h e says. B u t t h e y c a n n o t
b e t r u e o r false unless e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s are t o b e a s s i m i l a t e d
Bühler's schema o f language functions h a d already placed the
t o a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s . I n t h e s a m e way, t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s
linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker, t o
297
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Chapter 6

(commands o r requests) o r i n t e n t i o n a l sentences (promises) that o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n


are e m p l o y e d i n the attitude o f the first person [toward a second be generalized. We u n d e r s t a n d a speech act w h e n we k n o w w h a t
p e r s o n ] i n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts c a n b e right o r not right, a c c o r d i n g makes i t acceptable. O f c o u r s e , t h i s is a m a t t e r o f o b j e c t i v e condi-
t o w h e t h e r t h e y satisfy o r v i o l a t e r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s tions o f validity that the hearer cannot infer directly f r o m the seman-
o r w h e t h e r t h e y have a b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o r m e r e l y c r e a t e t h e i l l u - tic c o n t e n t o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s u s e d , b u t o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h t h e
s i o n o f b e i n g b i n d i n g . B u t they, t o o , c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false. W i t h e p i s t e m i c c l a i m t h a t t h e speaker raises f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f h i s u t t e r -
t h e i r s p e e c h acts, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g a n c e i n p e r f o r m i n g his i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. W i t h h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h e
i n t h e subjective w o r l d o r t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e social w o r l d i n ways speaker appeals t o a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l reasons that c o u l d be
t h a t are different f r o m t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g i n p r o v i d e d i n s u p p o r t o f i t . T h e reasons i n t e r p r e t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f
t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . T h a t these w o r l d - c o n c e p t s s h o u l d b e u s e d o n l y validity, a n d to this e x t e n t they themselves are p a r t o f the c o n d i t i o n s
i n an analogous sense is s h o w n b y these d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e type of that m a k e an utterance acceptable. I n t h i s way, t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y
reference: o b j e c t s are i d e n t i f i e d i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n subjective c o n d i t i o n s p o i n t to t h e holistic c o n s t i t u t i o n o f n a t u r a l languages. I n
e x p e r i e n c e s ( w h i c h , i n a n expressive a t t i t u d e , I r e v e a l o r disguise as a l a n g u a g e , e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h act is c o n n e c t e d b y way o f l o g i -
" i n e a c h case m i n e " ) , a n d also i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n t h e n o r m s c a l - s e m a n t i c t h r e a d s t o m a n y o t h e r p o t e n t i a l s p e e c h acts, w h i c h c a n
a c k n o w l e d g e d i n e a c h case " b y u s " ( w h i c h , i n a n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e t a k e o n t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f reasons. N a t u r a l l y , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e
a t t i t u d e , we f o l l o w o r c o n t r a v e n e ) . s t r u c t u r e a n d c o n t e n t o f a s p e e c h act, t h e r e a s o n s s t a n d i n g l a t e n t l y
at t h e r e a d y a n d s u i t a b l e f o r t h e d i s c u r s i v e v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y
F u r t h e r m o r e , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Buhler's schema o f language
c l a i m r a i s e d i n t h a t s p e e c h act w i l l be m o r e o r less c o m p l e x as
f u n c t i o n s f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a t h e o r y o f v a l i d i t y leads t o t h e
regards type a n d scope. W h e n the speaker makes a n assertion w i t h
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t , w i t h a s p e e c h act Mp, S r e l a t e s simultaneously t o
a simple predicative observation sentence i n the present indicative,
s o m e t h i n g i n the objective w o r l d , to s o m e t h i n g i n the subjective
t h e r e a s o n s t h a t i n t e r p r e t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s e n t e n c e are
w o r l d , a n d t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s h a r e d social w o r l d . E v e r y s p e e c h act
n o r m a l l y easy t o survey. By c o n t r a s t , w h e n a c o u r t passes j u d g m e n t
as a w h o l e c a n always be c r i t i c i z e d as i n v a l i d f r o m t h r e e p e r s p e c t i v e s :
o n a c o m p l i c a t e d m a t t e r o r w h e n a physicist explains a n a t u r a l event
as u n t r u e w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s t a t e m e n t m a d e ( o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
w i t h the help o f an empirical theory, the evaluation o f the validity—
e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) , as
a n d t h u s also t h e comprehension—of t h e c o u r t v e r d i c t o r o f the scien-
u n t r u t h f u l w i t h respect to the expressed i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker,
tific explanation will require knowledge of more demanding kinds
a n d as n o t r i g h t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t (or
o f reasons. O t h e r w i s e w e s i m p l y d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d — n o t
w i t h respect to t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e p r e s u p p o s e d norms them-
e v e n i f w e w e r e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l w o r d s because t h e y
selves) . T o be sure, n o m o r e t h a n o n e o f these t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
have o c c u r r e d f r e q u e n t l y p r i o r t o t h i s i n other s e n t e n c e s .
c a n b e e m p h a s i z e d t h e m a d c a l l y i n a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act. F i n a l l y , i t
is i n t e r m s o f these t h e m a t i z e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ( m o d i f i e d o n t h e basis W e u n d e r s t a n d a s p e e c h act w h e n w e k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s
o f surface distinctions according to the particular language and t h a t a s p e a k e r c o u l d p r o v i d e i n o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a h e a r e r t h a t she
c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n ) t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s are d e f i n e d ; these is e n t i t l e d i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h e r u t t e r -
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s m u s t be c a p a b l e o f b e i n g t r a c e d b a c k t o t h r e e a n c e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , k n o w l e d g e o f a l a n g u a g e is b o u n d u p w i t h
basic m o d e s : t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e class o f e i t h e r c o n s t a t i v e , expressive, k n o w l e d g e o f w h a t is a c t u a l l y t h e case i n t h e ( l i n g u i s t i c a l l y d i s c l o s e d )
o r r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts. w o r l d . Perhaps knowledge o f the w o r l d merely hangs u p o n a longer

N o w , i f e v e r y s p e e c h act is t h e m a t i c a l l y l i n k e d w i t h s o m e one c h a i n o f reasons t h a n k n o w l e d g e o f language. T h a t they c a n n o t be

validity claim, then D u m m e t t ' s proposal for explicating the m e a n i n g separated sharply f r o m one a n o t h e r becomes plausible w h e n one
298 299

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

realizes t h e basic i d e a o f t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e a n - c a n n o t be u n d e r t a k e n w i t h the d u a l i n t e n t i o n o f r e a c h i n g an agree-


i n g (already contained w i t h i n Bidder's schema). To u n d e r s t a n d an m e n t about something with a participant i n interaction and simulta-
e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e c a n m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h n e o u s l y causally e x e r t i n g s o m e e f f e c t o n h i m . F r o m t h e perspective
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e b o d y a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . T h e r e f o r e , i t can o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s , a n agreement c a n n o t be i m p o s e d f r o m w i t h o u t ,
already be discerned f r o m the c o n d i t i o n s f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g l i n g u i s - c a n n o t be foisted by one party u p o n the o t h e r — w h e t h e r i n s t r u m e n -
tic e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t t h e s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n b e p e r f o r m e d w i t h t h e i r tally, t h r o u g h d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o t h e a c t i o n s i t u a t i o n , o r s t r a t e -
h e l p have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , that gically, t h r o u g h i n d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e ( a g a i n , c o n c e r n e d o n l y w i t h o n e ' s
is, t o w a r d a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t a b o u t w h a t is s a i d . O n e o w n success) o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s o f t h e o t h e r actor. W h a t -
s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a n ever m a n i f e s t l y c o m e s a b o u t t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e (gratifica-
utterance i f one d i d n o t k n o w that the utterance can a n d should tion or threat, suggestion or deception) cannot count
s e r v e t o b r i n g a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t ; m o r e o v e r , i t is p a r t o f t h e c o n - i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y as a n a g r e e m e n t ; a n i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h i s s o r t f o r f e i t s
cept of agreement that it "holds" (gilt) f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e its effectiveness f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n .
d i m e n s i o n o f v a l i d i t y is t h u s i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . T h e o r i e n t a t i o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e o r strategic a c t i o n is r e q u i r e d w h e n a n a c t o r c a n
t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e c a r r y o u t h i s p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n l y i n t e r a c t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e h e l p
mutual understanding (Verständigung)—and of linguistic under- o f t h e actions o f a n o t h e r actor (or o f his r e f r a i n i n g f r o m a c t i o n ) .
s t a n d i n g (Sprachverstehen) itself. Over a n d above this, c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n co-
b. W i t h t h e c o n c e p t o f a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r i e n t e d t o w a r d operative a n d communicative conditions:
validity claims, f o r m a l pragmatics finds a c o n n e c t i o n with action
a. T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g a c t o r s m u s t c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s cooperatively
t h e o r y , a l b e i t i n a way c o m p l e t e l y different f r o m the attempt of
a n d a t t e m p t to h a r m o n i z e t h e i r plans w i t h one a n o t h e r ( w i t h i n the
i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics t o e x p l a i n processes o f r e a c h i n g under-
horizon of a shared lifeworld) on the basis of common (or
standing using concepts o f action theory. A teleological action can
sufficiently overlapping) interpretations o f the situation.
b e d e s c r i b e d as t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a p l a n o f a c t i o n t h a t is b a s e d o n
t h e actor's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the s i t u a t i o n . By c a r r y i n g o u t a p l a n o f b . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g actors m u s t be p r e p a r e d t o a c h i e v e t h e i n d i r e c t
a c t i o n , an actor comes to grips w i t h a s i t u a t i o n , whereby the action goals o f a c o m m o n d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d o f a c t i o n coordi-
s i t u a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a s e g m e n t f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t as i n t e r p r e t e d n a t i o n i n t h e r o l e s o f speakers a n d h e a r e r s b y way o f processes o f
b y t h e actor. T h i s s e g m e n t is c o n s t i t u t e d i n l i g h t o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, b y way o f t h e u n r e s e r v e d a n d s i n -
a c t i o n t h a t t h e a c t o r r e g a r d s as r e l e v a n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e success cere p u r s u i t o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims.
o f h e r p l a n . T h e p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n arises w i t h r e g a r d
T h i s means specifically that:
to i n t e r a c t i o n between several actors: h o w can Alter's plans and
a c t i o n s b e " l i n k e d u p " w i t h E g o ' s p l a n s a n d actions? T y p e s o f i n t e r - • T h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts
a c t i o n can be distinguished a c c o r d i n g to the various m e c h a n i s m s f o r in a performative attitude, which demands an orientation toward
t h i s l i n k i n g - u p . I speak e i t h e r o f " c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n " o r o f " s t r a - reciprocally raised, criticizable validity claims.
tegic a c t i o n , " d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e actions o f d i f f e r e n t actors
• I n d o i n g t h i s , t h e y m a k e use o f t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects
are c o o r d i n a t e d b y way o f " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " o r "exerting
(Bindungseffekte) o f speech-act o f f e r s , w h i c h c o m e a b o u t w h e n the
i n f l u e n c e , " respectively. 31
F r o m the perspective of the participants,
speaker, w i t h h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m , issues a c r e d i b l e w a r r a n t y f o r t h e
these t w o m e c h a n i s m s a n d t h e i r c o r r e s p o n d i n g types o f a c t i o n m u -
v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is said.
tually exclude one a n o t h e r . Processes o f r e a c h i n g understanding
300 301
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g

. The binding and bonding effect o f a comprehensible a n d ac- sion, these sentences r e q u i r e p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs; f o r the subject
c e p t e d s p e e c h act is c a r r i e d o v e r t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e expression, t h e y r e q u i r e t h e first p e r s o n i n t h e p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e ;
sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n arising o u t o f the semantic content of the for the position o f the direct object, they require the second person.
s p e e c h a c t — w h e t h e r a s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r t h e h e a r e r o r t h e speaker, This grammatical f o r m o f the performadve sentence m i r r o r s the
o r s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r b o t h sides. a t t i t u d e o f a s p e a k e r w h o takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n w i t h a
hearer i n order to reach understanding w i t h her about something,
T h u s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f f r o m s t r a t e g i c ac-
w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r is r e f l e x i v e l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
t i o n t h r o u g h t h e f a c t t h a t successful a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n c a n n o t be
t h e h e a r e r m a y d i s p u t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d . S u c h a performative
traced back to the purposive r a t i o n a l i t y o f action o r i e n t a t i o n s b u t to
attitude o f a n a c t o r o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n be
t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f a c h i e v i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is,
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n c e p t u a l l y f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f a suc-
to a r a t i o n a l i t y that manifests itself i n the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c o m m u -
cess-oriented actor o n t h e basis o f t h e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s t h a t e a c h
n i c a t i v e l y r e a c h e d a g r e e m e n t . T h e way i n w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c processes
p e r m i t s : w i t h o u r s p e e c h acts, w e simultaneously r e l a t e , w i t h v a r y i n g
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f u n c t i o n as a m e c h a n i s m f o r coordinat-
t h e m a t i z a t i o n s , to s o m e t h i n g i n t h e objective, t h e subjective, a n d t h e
i n g a c t i o n is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a g r e e a b o u t the
social w o r l d s , w h e r e a s i n a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y w e i n t e r v e n e solely i n
v a l i d i t y c l a i m e d f o r t h e i r s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is, t h e y r e c o g n i z e c r i t i -
the objective w o r l d .
c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . W h a t gives r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t -
i n g f o r c e t o speech-act o f f e r s is, i n t u r n , t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n If, however, the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d that

between the meaning o f an utterance o n the one h a n d , and o n the o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success are n o t m e r e l y t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o n e

o t h e r its v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d , a n o t h e r a n a l y t i c a l l y , b u t r a t h e r c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o d i f f e r e n t types o f

a n d t h e r e a s o n s t h a t c a n be m o b i l i z e d f o r t h e discursive v i n d i c a t i o n i n t e r a c t i o n , t h e n f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e actors themselves they

o f this c l a i m . m u s t b e m u t u a l l y exclusive. A g a i n s t t h i s , t h e o b j e c t i o n has been


r a i s e d t h a t ( i ) a n y s p e e c h act w h a t s o e v e r c a n also b e s t r a t e g i c a l l y
L i k e a l l a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is p u r p o s i v e . B u t h e r e , t h e
d e p l o y e d , a n d t h a t ( i i ) s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , w h i c h are n o t e m b e d d e d
teleology o f the i n d i v i d u a l action plans a n d o f the operations for
i n n o r m a t i v e contexts, do n o t express validity claims b u t r a t h e r
c a r r y i n g t h e m o u t is interrupted b y t h e a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g mecha-
power claims, a n d therefore fall i n t o the category—paradoxical on
n i s m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O r i e n t a t i o n s a n d a c t i o n processes
o u r a c c o u n t — o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t a r e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h a n o r i -
are i n i t i a l l y e g o c e n t r i c a l l y g e a r e d t o w a r d a p a r t i c u l a r actor, b u t t h e
e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e " s w i t c h " b y w a y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c a r r i e d o u t w i t h -
i. W h e t h e r conventionally regulated or not, perlocutionary ef-
o u t r e s e r v a t i o n places t h e m u n d e r t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f a n
fects t h a t are s t r i v e n f o r openly w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m m o n
intersubjectively shared language. The telos o f r e a c h i n g under-
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n are o f a k i n d t h a t , mutatis mutandis, could
standing i n h e r e n t i n the structures o f language compels the c o m m u -
also b e e f f e c t e d t h r o u g h p u r p o s i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n alone. B u t such
nicative actors to alter t h e i r perspective; this shift i n perspective finds
n o n l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o d u c e d effects c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as p e r l o c u -
e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e necessity o f g o i n g f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e
t i o n a r y effects b e c a u s e t h e l a t t e r are always i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y m e d i a t e d .
o f t h e s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d actor, w h o seeks t o effect s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
A d m i t t e d l y , t h e r e is t h e case o f t h e l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c s p e e c h act t h a t
w o r l d , t o t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f a speaker, w h o seeks t o reach
a i m s at p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t a r e n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d .
understanding with a second person about something. 3 2

T h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c o m e a b o u t o n l y i f t h e s p e a k e r d o e s n o t
I n t h e i r s t a n d a r d f o r m , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts are c a r r i e d o u t u s i n g
declare his aims to the hearer w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m m o n
p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences. F o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e e x p r e s -
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , a speaker w h o wants
303
302
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

t o p e r s u a d e h i s a u d i e n c e o f s o m e t h i n g p r o c e e d s i n t h i s way, p e r h a p s addressee o f a c o m m a n d o r a r e q u e s t m u s t as a r u l e b e f a m i l i a r w i t h
b e c a u s e i n t h e g i v e n s i t u a t i o n h e lacks c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s . Such the n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t that authorizes a speaker to make her de-
n o n p u b l i c p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y p a r a s i t i c a l l y , m a n d , a n d that thereby legitimates h e r expectation that the ad-
n a m e l y , o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e s p e a k e r f e i g n s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f unre- dressee has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d . Knowledge
servedly p u r s u i n g h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d leaves t h e h e a r e r i n t h e o f success c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
d a r k as t o h i s a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of action ori- c o m p o n e n t "p" o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e Ip, is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n o r d e r to
ented toward reaching understanding. 3 3
T h e l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s s p e e c h act, t h a t is, its
l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c because i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y w h e n a t least o n e p a r t y s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r as a n i m p e r a t i v e . K n o w l e d g e o f t h e success c o n d i -
assumes t h a t l a n g u a g e is b e i n g u s e d w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t i o n s (a) m u s t b e a u g m e n t e d b y k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s (b)
reaching understanding. Whoever acts s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n this way u n d e r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r has r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h
must violate the sincerity condition of communicative action t h e c o n t e n t (a) as v a l i d , t h a t is, n o r m a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d — f o r e x a m p l e ,
inconspicuously. t h a t c h i l d r e n i n t h e streets o f L i m a m a y b e g f r o m v i s i t i n g f o r e i g n -

T h e use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is m a n i f e s t l y strategic also has a d e r i v a - ers. 3 5


O f c o u r s e , t h e s p e a k e r m a y c o n n e c t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h Ip o n l y

tive status; i n this case, a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e a w a r e t h a t r e a c h i n g u n - so l o n g as she k n o w s h e r i m p e r a t i v e t o b e s e c u r e d b y some or other

derstanding l i n g u i s t i c a l l y is subject to conditions of strategic n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t , be t h i s ever so w e a k .

action—and therefore remains deficient. They know and reckon F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r , t h e r e is a c o n t i n -


w i t h the fact that they must s u p p l e m e n t the i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y m e d i a t e d uum between m e r e l y de facto habitualized power relations and
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o f t h e i r s p e e c h acts w i t h e m p i r i c a l effects t h a t p o w e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t have b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o n o r m a t i v e a u t h o r -
a r e t r i g g e r e d p u r p o s i v e l y . For, i n t h e e n d t h e y r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t o n ity. H o w e v e r , f r o m t h e perspective of participants i n communica-
i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n : o n l y t h e p r o v e r b i a l s h o t across t h e b o w s is tion—so l o n g as t h e i r l i f e w o r l d s are s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r w o v e n — i t is
a b l e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o d e m o n s t r a t e t o a n o p p o n e n t t h e seriousness o f p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d all i m p e r a t i v e s ( a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of
a threat. such an intersubjectively shared lifeworld) according to the model

T h i s case o f t h e m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f language is t o be o f n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d imperatives. Even strangers w h o e n c o u n -

d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i n t u r n , f r o m cases o f a n i n d i r e c t c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t ter one a n o t h e r i n f o r e i g n lands w i l l , i n emergencies, expect f r o m

r e m a i n s subordinated t o t h e a i m o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I n u n s t r u c - each o t h e r a readiness to help. Even such weak n o r m a t i v e contexts

t u r e d p r e l i m i n a r y situations, a c o m m o n d e f i n i t i o n of the situation are s u f f i c i e n t t o a u t h o r i z e a s p e a k e r t o e x p e c t a c e r t a i n k i n d of

is f i r s t o f a l l c o n s t r u c t e d , as, f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n i n a n accidental behavior, w h i c h t h e hearer can criticize i f n e e d be. O n l y i n the

m e e t i n g i n a bar, a y o u n g m a n i n d i r e c t l y gives a n a t t r a c t i v e y o u n g b o r d e r l i n e case o f m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n d o e s t h e n o r m a t i v e

w o m a n t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I n t h e same way, t h e p e d a g o g i c a l l y validity c l a i m shrivel i n t o a pure power c l a i m based u p o n a reservoir

sensitive t e a c h e r i n s t i l l s s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e i n h e r p u p i l b y m e a n s of o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is c o n t i n g e n t a n d is n o l o n g e r convention-

compliments, so t h a t t h e p u p i l l e a r n s t o t a k e h i s o w n ideas s e r i - ally r e g u l a t e d o r g r a m m a t i c a l l y r e a d a b l e . T h e " H a n d s u p ! " o f a b a n k

ously. 34
I n cases s u c h as t h e s e , i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has r o b b e r w h o at p i s t o l p o i n t d e m a n d s o f t h e t h r e a t e n e d b a n k teller

f i r s t o f a l l t o establish its o w n presuppositions step b y step, the t h a t she h a n d s o v e r t h e m o n e y d e m o n s t r a t e s i n a d r a s t i c way t h a t

terminus ad quern is a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t is u l t i m a t e l y also communica- the c o n d i t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e validity have b e e n r e p l a c e d by sanction

tively available, a n d n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect t h a t w o u l d be de- conditions.

stroyed by being a d m i t t e d or declared. T h e dissolution o f the n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d appears i n a symp-


ii. I analyze s i m p l e o r n o n a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t o m a t i c way i n t h e " i f - t h e n " s t r u c t u r e o f t h e t h r e a t , w h i c h i n s t r a t e g i c
model o f t h e d e r i v a t i v e m a n i f e s t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e . The a c t i o n takes t h e p l a c e o f t h e s i n c e r i t y o r e a r n e s t n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r
304 305

Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g

p r e s u p p o s e d i n the case o f communicative action. Imperatives or 12. K . - 0 . Apel, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Hermeneutic Understanding," in
Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London, 1980),
t h r e a t s t h a t are d e p l o y e d p u r e l y strategically and robbed of their
pp. Iff.
n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are n o t i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — t h a t is, acts w i t h
13. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
a built-in orientation toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a t all. They
1958), §§23ff.
r e m a i n p a r a s i t i c i n s o f a r as t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y m u s t b e derived
f r o m the e m p l o y m e n t c o n d i t i o n s for normatively secured i l l o c u t i o n - 14. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962).

ary acts. 15. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §199.


I n l a t e n t l y strategic a c t i o n , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects are depend-
16. Ibid., §206.
ent u p o n the i l l o c u t i o n a r y effects o f a use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is o r i -
ented toward reaching understanding, however m u c h i t may be 17. D. S. Shwayder, Stratification of Behavior ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 47ff.
feigned on one side. I n m a n i f e s d y strategic a c t i o n , illocutionarily
18. S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972); cf. J . Habermas, "Intentionalistische
w e a k e n e d s p e e c h acts, i f t h e y a r e t o b e comprehensible, continue to Semantik," in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns
(Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 332ff.
refer to the m e a n i n g t h e y owe t o a use o f l a n g u a g e t h a t is a n t e c e -
dently habitualized and originally oriented toward reaching under- 19. T h i s argument is developed by C . B. Christensen, " O n the Mechanism of C o m -
standing. munication," Ms. (Frankfurt, 1987).

20. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1964), pp. 254ff.; A. Kenny,
Notes Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford, 1975); cf. also Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical
Philosophy, pp. 398ff.

1. K, Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), p. 28. 21. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Bos-
ton, 1984), pp. 298ff.
2. K . - 0 . Apel, Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico
(Bonn, 1963). 22. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, pp. 207ff.

3. G . Meggle, ed., Handlung, Kommunikation und Bedeutung (Frankfurt, 1979).


23. M. Dummett, "What Is a Theory of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDowell, eds.,
Truth and Meaning (Oxford, 1976), pp. 67ff.
4. M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language ( L o n d o n , 1973).
24. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§380ff.; cf. P. W i n c h , The Idea of a Social
5. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). Science ( L o n d o n , 1958); Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans.
T. McCarthy (Boston, 1987) pp. 15ff.
6. C . W. Morris, Signs, Language, Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1946).
25. O n the development of Austin's position, see chapter 1 i n the present volume,
7. N. Chomsky, "A Review of B. F. Skinner's 'Verbal Behaviour,'" in J . Fodor and J . especially pp. 72ff.
Katz, eds., The Structure of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp. 547ff.
26. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 145ff., and "Performative-Constative," in
8. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. G o r n e r (Cambridge, C. E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22—33.
1982), pp. 163ff.
27. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), Expression and Meaning (Cambridge,
9. H . P. Grice, "Utterer's Meanings and Intentions," in Studies in the Ways of Words 1979), Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983), and Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge,
(Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 86ff., "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Mass., 1984).
Word-Meaning," in ibid., pp. 117ff., and "Meaning Revisited," in ibid., pp. 283ff.
28. For the following, cf. chapter 2, pp. 157ff. and chapter 5 in the present volume.
10. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, pp. 207ff.
29. Searle's own explanation already makes it apparent that the use of a double
11. L . Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuin- arrow to characterize the declarative mode expresses an embarrassment: Searle,
ness ( L o n d o n , 1961), 4.024. Expression and Meaning, p. 19. Cf. also chapter 5 in the present volume.
306
Chapter 6

7
30. Cf. the discussion of Popper's doctrine of three worlds in Theory of Communicative
Action, vol. 1, pp. 76ff.
Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of
31. J . Habermas, "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß Communicative Rationality (1996)
and R. Tuomela, eds., Soaal Action (Dordrecht, 1985).

32. I n "Communicative Competence and Normative Force," New German Critique 35


(1985): 133ff., J . Culler claims that through a tendentious choice of examples, I
smuggle a normatively laden conception of "reaching understanding" (Verständigung)
into the analysis: "When I a m reading the instructions for my word processing
program I assume that statements are correct descriptions of the system's capabilites
and that the manual has been checked for errors, but there seems no interesting
sense in which I presuppose the sincerity of any individual communicator" (p. 140).
T h e impersonal form of the written instructions for the use of a computer is,
however, no obstacle to drawing o n the model of face-to-face communication in
order to analyze the illocutionary m e a n i n g — a n d the obligations arising out of it—of
such technical instructions. T h r o u g h the conditions of the sales contract, a norma-
tive context is established that appears to justify the normative expectation, men-
tioned by Culler, that the user has toward the computer firm.
H e r b e r t Schnadelbach has r a i s e d a s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n t o m y a t t e m p t
33. 3. Cf. chapter 3 in the present volume pp. 203ff. I n an incisive article ("Haber-
to analyze t h e c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n t e r m s o f t h e j u s t i f i a b i l i t y a n d
mas's Defence of Rationalism," New German Critique 25 (1985): 145ff.), Allen Wood
has criticized my attempt to justify the primacy of the use of language oriented toward criticizability o f expressions, a n d to t h e r e b y a t t r i b u t e a key r o l e to
reaching understanding with the help of the opposition between illocutionary a n d the procedural rationality embodied i n a r g u m e n t a t i v e practices. As
perlocutionary acts. I admit that (in Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, see
pp. 119ff. i n this volume) I over-hastily conflated this meaning-theoretic distinction h e sees i t , o n e m a y c o n c e d e t h a t a l l r a t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s
with the action-theoretic distinction between action oriented toward reaching under-
standing and action oriented toward success. It is sufficient to justify the primacy of can i n p r i n c i p l e be d e f e n d e d i n response to queries ( t h r o u g h l i n k i n g u p
the use of language oriented toward reaching understanding through the theory of argumentatively w i t h t h e i r linguistic m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) ; i t doesn't
meaning as proposed here, a n d to distinguish communicative from strategic action
f o l l o w f r o m this, however, that that w i t h w h i c h the a r g u m e n t a t i o n links u p
on the basis of the fact that the former is mediated by illocutionary acts that are
carried out without reservation, a n d is therefore subject to the performative con- must itself take the f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n o r d e r f o r i t to be capable o f
straints of the action-coordinating mechanism of reaching understanding. This b e i n g d e e m e d r a t i o n a l ; argumentative o r discursive rationality (Habermas)
mechanism interrupts, as it were, the teleology of the individual chains of action that is simply one component o f reason. T h e fixation o n the j u s t i f i c a t o r y m o d e l
are connected up by way of consensus formation, whereas the speech acts that are o f r a t i o n a l i t y seduces us i n t o r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g as i r r a t i o n a l so l o n g as i t
instrumentalized for strategic action are robbed of their illocutionary binding and
is n o t completely argumentatively or discursively v i n d i c a t e d — w h i c h means
bonding power. Perlocutionary effects, which are intially demarcated from illocution-
ary effects in purely meaning-theoretic terms, can then be described in various ways t h a t the f i e l d o f the i r r a t i o n a l w o u l d assume j u s t about gigantic p r o p o r t i o n s .
in action-theoretic terms, depending o n whether they appear openly and as suscep- O t h e r r a t i o n a l capacities i n c l u d e the capacity f o r testing reality ( F r e u d ) , f o r
tible to consensus within the framework of c o m m o n situation definitions or whether l e a r n i n g f r o m mistakes a n d errors ( P o p p e r ) , f o r solving p r o b l e m s i n feed-
they are pursued strategically and may not be declared. b a c k - c o n t r o l l e d action contexts ( G e h l e n ) , f o r purposively selecting means
( W e b e r ) — m a n y o t h e r p r o m i n e n t examples c o u l d be added to the list; those
34. T h e example is taken from Wood, "Habermas's Defence of Rationalism," p. 161.
I have m e n t i o n e d simply cannot be a c c o m m o d a t e d i n a schema o f 'justifica-
35. Cf. the example in E . Tugendhat, " J . Habermas o n Communicative Action," in t i o n " o r o f "the discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f validity claims" ( H a b e r m a s ) . 1

Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action, pp. 179ff. (referred to i n chapter 3 of the
present volume pp. 199f). Schnadelbach h i m s e l f u n d e r s t a n d s r a t i o n a l i t y as a d i s p o s i t i o n f o r
reason on t h e p a r t o f subjects c a p a b l e o f k n o w l e d g e , speech, a n d
a c t i o n t h a t c a n b e c a p t u r e d d e s c r i p t i v e l y . W h a t h e sets u p
2
against
d i s c u r s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t s i m p l y a ( g e n e r i c a l l y a s c r i b e d ) rational-
308 309

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

ity o f the person, identifiable with the help of corresponding cause, i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e o f k n o w l e d g e , i n t h e t e l e o l o g i -


expressions, b u t rather the "reflexive character" 3
o f these e x p r e s - cal s t r u c t u r e o f action, and i n the communicative structure of
s i o n s . For, o f c o u r s e , w h a t w e k n o w , d o , a n d say is r a t i o n a l o n l y i f we s p e e c h , we c o m e u p o n various roots of rationality. T h e s e d o n o t f o r
are a t least i m p l i c i t l y aware o f w h y o u r b e l i e f s are t r u e , o u r actions t h e i r p a r t a p p e a r t o have c o m m o n r o o t s , a t least n o t i n t h e d i s c u r s i v e
right, a n d o u r linguistic utterances valid (or showing promise of s t r u c t u r e o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices, n o r i n t h e reflexive s t r u c t u r e o f
success f r o m a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t o f view, o r effective f r o m a p e r - t h e s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f a s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n d i s c o u r s e s . I t is m o r e
locutionary one): " [ T ] h e t r o p e o f ' r e f l e x i v i t y ' as t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b a b l y t h e case t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f d i s c o u r s e establishes a n i n -
characteristic o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n general, can thus be r e n d e r e d more terrelation a m o n g the entwined structures o f rationality (the struc-
precise w i t h the h e l p o f the self-referential t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f . . . tures o f knowledge, a c t i o n , a n d s p e e c h ) by, i n a sense, bringing
p e r f o r m a n c e s i n the perspective o f the first person singular or p l u - together t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l , t e l e o l o g i c a l , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e r o o t s . A c -
r a l ; o n l y she w h o is c a p a b l e o f saying T o r 'we,' a n d o f t h e m a t i z i n g c o r d i n g t o s u c h a m o d e l o f intermeshed c o r e s t r u c t u r e s , d i s c u r s i v e
w h a t she is o r d o e s , a n d o f a t t r i b u t i n g i t t o h e r s e l f , is r a t i o n a l . " W i t h
4
r a t i o n a l i t y owes its special p o s i t i o n n o t t o its f o u n d a t i o n a l b u t t o its
t h i s S c h n à d e l b a c h places h i m s e l f i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f t h e philosophy integrative role.
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S i n c e t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h o w e v e r , w e have g o o d
If, to b e g i n w i t h , we allow ourselves to be g u i d e d by this p i c t u r e ,
reasons f o r f o l l o w i n g a suggestion o f G. H . M e a d a n d e x p l a i n i n g the
a n o t e w o r t h y consequence results. Since a r g u m e n t a t i v e practices
s e l f - r e l a t i o n o f t h e k n o w i n g , a c t i n g , a n d s p e a k i n g s u b j e c t — t h a t is,
a r e , so t o speak, a r e f l e x i v e f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, the
the relation o f the first person "to h e r s e l f ' — o n t h e basis o f the
j u s t i f i c a t o r y r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n d i s c o u r s e d o e s i n d e e d rest t o a
a d o p t i o n o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a second p e r s o n " o n m e . " Correspond-
c e r t a i n e x t e n t o n the c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n every-
i n g l y , t h e reflected s e l f - r e l a t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y S c h n à d e l b a c h as t h e
day a c t i o n ; n o n e t h e l e s s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality remains on a
f u n d a m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f r a t i o n a l i t y w o u l d be d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
level w i t h epistemic a n d teleological rationality. C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a -
r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n : t h e r e w o u l d be
t i o n a l i t y d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e overarching s t r u c t u r e o f r a t i o n a l i t y
n o r e f l e c t i o n t h a t c o u l d n o t b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d as a n i n n e r d i s c o u r s e .
b u t r a t h e r one o f three core structures that are, however, i n t e r w o v e n
T h e r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e t o o n e ' s o w n e x p r e s s i o n s takes p l a c e a c c o r d -
w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b y way o f t h e d i s c u r s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t e m e r g e s
i n g to the m o d e l o f the a t t i t u d e o f o t h e r participants i n a r g u m e n t a -
o u t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. T h i s p i c t u r e s h o u l d n o t , however,
t i o n to the p r o b l e m a t i c validity o f one's expressions. Reflection, too,
be m i s u n d e r s t o o d i n a m e n t a l i s t way. J u s t as c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n -
is d u e t o a p r i o r d i a l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n a n d d o e s n o t f l o a t i n t h e v a c u u m
ality may n o t be equated w i t h linguistically e m b o d i e d r a t i o n a l i t y i n
o f an inwardness constituted free f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 5
T h e discur-
g e n e r a l , e p i s t e m i c a n d t e l e o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y are n o t o f a p r e l i n g u i s -
sive t h e m a t i z a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y
tic n a t u r e .
o f o u r e x p r e s s i o n s is m e a s u r e d , a n d t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f these
I would first o f all like to elucidate this c o m p l e x o f rationality
expressions stand i n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n : t h e y refer to one an-
s t r u c t u r e s , w h i c h I have i n t r o d u c e d i n a n i n t u i t i v e way, b y m e a n s o f
other. I d o n o t c o n s i d e r t h e p r o p o s a l t o r e d u c e r a t i o n a l i t y t o a d i s p o -
some f u r t h e r remarks. I will t h e n e x p l a i n h o w various rationality
sition o f rational persons p r o m i s i n g .
structures i n t e r m e s h w i t h i n the linguistic m e d i u m t h r o u g h refer-
However, this does n o t invalidate Schnàdelbach's o b j e c t i o n t o m y e n c e t o d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use a n d t o corresponding
p r i v i l e g i n g o f the discursive r a t i o n a l i t y e m b o d i e d i n a r g u m e n t a t i v e types o f a c t i o n . F i n a l l y , I w i l l d e a l w i t h t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
practices. I w i l l accept Schnàdelbach's p o i n t o f c r i t i c i s m a n d , i n the language a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. As a n a p p e n d i x , I w i l l i n d i -
f o l l o w i n g , assume t h a t w e use t h e p r e d i c a t e "rational" i n the first cate t w o i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t r e s u l t
instance to refer to beliefs, actions, a n d linguistic utterances be- f r o m these considerations.
311
310
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

T h r e e Roots of Rationality F r e e d o m is d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i f f e r e n t s e l f - r e l a t i o n s
o f t h e k n o w i n g a n d a c t i n g s u b j e c t . R e f l e x i v e f r e e d o m i n t h e sense
I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a p r o v i s i o n a l o v e r v i e w , I w i l l discuss t h e c o m p l e - o f c o g n i t i v e o p e n n e s s ( Unbefangenheit) requires liberation f r o m the
m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n discursive s t r u c t u r e a n d r e f l e c t i o n (or egocentric perspective o f a p a r t i c i p a n t deeply involved i n action
s e l f - r e f e r e n c e as a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p e r s o n s ) , p r o c e e d - c o n t e x t s ; t h i s is t h e f r e e d o m w e t r a d i t i o n a l l y associate w i t h t h e t h e o -
ing t h e n t o deal w i t h the r a t i o n a l core structures o f knowledge, retical stance. F r e e d o m o f c h o i c e {Willkurfreiheit) consists i n t h e
p u r p o s i v e activity, a n d communication. c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l l y c h o o s i n g t o a c t i n o n e way o r a n o t h e r , o r f o r
m a k i n g a n e w start i n t h e c h a i n o f events. W i t h K a n t , we refer to t h e

Discursive Rationality a n d Reflection c a p a c i t y f o r b i n d i n g o n e ' s o w n w i l l o n t h e basis o f m o r a l i n s i g h t as


f r e e d o m o f w i l l (Willensfreiheit), or autonomy. Finally, ethical free-

T h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a p e r s o n is p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o h i s e x p r e s s i n g h i m s e l f d o m makes possible a deliberate life-project a n d the stabilization o f

r a t i o n a l l y a n d t o h i s a b i l i t y t o give a c c o u n t f o r h i s e x p r e s s i o n s i n a a n e g o - i d e n t i t y . C e r t a i n l y , these f o r m s o f f r e e d o m a r e dispositions

r e f l e x i v e stance. A p e r s o n expresses h i m s e l f r a t i o n a l l y i n s o f a r as h e t h a t can be ascribed to a p e r s o n ; b u t the a c c o m p a n y i n g self-relations

is o r i e n t e d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : we say t h a t h e n o t are d u e i n e a c h case t o t h e a d o p t i o n and internalization of the

o n l y b e h a v e s r a t i o n a l l y b u t is h i m s e l f r a t i o n a l i f h e c a n give a c c o u n t perspective o n me o f other participants i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n : i n the

f o r h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W e also c a l l t h i s k i n d o f e p i s t e m i c s e l f - r e l a t i o n a n d i n t h e v a r i o u s p r a c t i c a l s e l f - r e l a t i o n s I , as

r a t i o n a l i t y accountability (Zurechnungsfdhigkeit). a first p e r s o n , a d o p t the second-person perspective i n w h i c h i n t e r -


l o c u t o r s — t h a t is, o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s i n ( e m p i r i c a l o r theoretical,
Accountability presupposes a reflected self-relation o n the p a r t o f
p r a g m a t i c , m o r a l , or ethical) discourses—focus o n m y expressions.
t h e p e r s o n t o w h a t she b e l i e v e s , says, a n d d o e s ; t h i s c a p a c i t y is
T h u s , i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f the r a t i o n a l p e r s o n w h o distances h i m s e l f
e n t w i n e d w i t h the rational core structures o f knowledge, purposive
f r o m himself, the rationality i n h e r e n t i n the structure a n d i n the
activity, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n by way o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g self-rela-
p r o c e d u r e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is mirrored i n a g e n e r a l way. H o w e v e r , i t
tions. T h e epistemic self-relation implies a reflexive attitude o n the
b e c o m e s c l e a r at t h e same t i m e t h a t o n the integrative level of
p a r t o f the k n o w i n g subject to h e r o w n beliefs a n d convictions;
reflection a n d discourse, the three r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p o n e n t s — k n o w -
the technical-practical self-relation implies a reflexive attitude o n the
i n g , a c t i n g , a n d s p e a k i n g — c o m b i n e , t h a t is, f o r m a syndrome.
p a r t o f t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t t o h i s o w n p u r p o s i v e activity, b e i t t o his
own i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the objective w o r l d or to his
s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d d e a l i n g s w i t h o t h e r s u b j e c t s e n c o u n t e r e d as o p p o - Epistemic Rationality
n e n t s i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . ( I u n d e r s t a n d " o b j e c t i v e w o r l d " as t h e
totality o f entities c o n c e r n i n g w h i c h t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s are possible.) O u r k n o w l e d g e is b u i l t u p f r o m p r o p o s i t i o n s o r judgments—those
T h e moral-practical self-relation o f the communicatively acting actor e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s t h a t c a n be t r u e o r false; o n a c c o u n t o f its p r o p o -
d e m a n d s a reflexive attitude to h e r o w n n o r m - r e g u l a t e d actions; the s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , k n o w l e d g e is i n t r i n s i c a l l y o f a l i n g u i s t i c n a t u r e .
existential self-relation requires f r o m the actor a reflexive attitude to T h i s s t r u c t u r e c a n be a n a l y z e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n -
her o w n life-project i n the context o f an i n d i v i d u a l life-history w h i c h tences. However, I w i l l n o t deal h e r e w i t h t h e semantics o f proposi-
is, o f c o u r s e , i n t e r w o v e n w i t h p r e g i v e n c o l l e c t i v e f o r m s o f l i f e . M o r e - t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s o r w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f acts o f r e f e r e n c e
over, a p e r s o n ' s a b i l i t y t o d i s t a n c e h i m s e l f i n t h i s way i n these v a r i o u s and predication.
d i m e n s i o n s f r o m h i m s e l f a n d h i s e x p r e s s i o n s is a necessary c o n d i - I n order to k n o w something i n a n e x p l i c i t sense, i t is n o t , of
t i o n o f h i s freedom. course, sufficient m e r e l y to be f a m i l i a r w i t h facts t h a t c o u l d be
312 313

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

r e p r e s e n t e d i n t r u e j u d g m e n t s . W e know facts a n d have a k n o w l e d g e supporting s t r u c t u r e . I t is t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f w h a t is


o f t h e m a t o u r disposal o n l y w h e n w e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y k n o w w h y t h e k n o w n , a n d t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h a reality against
c o r r e s p o n d i n g j u d g m e n t s a r e t r u e . O t h e r w i s e we speak o f i n t u i t i v e w h i c h a j u s t i f i e d e x p e c t a t i o n c a n s h a t t e r , t h a t first m a k e i t p o s s i b l e
o r i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e — o f a " p r a c t i c a l " k n o w l e d g e o f h o w o n e does t o d e a l w i t h k n o w l e d g e i n a r a t i o n a l way.
something. O n e can k n o w very well h o w to do s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t O n t h e o n e h a n d , we can deal w i t h o u r k n o w l e d g e operatively—
k n o w i n g w h a t i t is t h a t goes t o m a k e u p these c o m p e t e n c i e s . By t h a t is, r e n d e r i t m o r e precise, e l a b o r a t e i t , r e c o n s t r u c t i t , systema-
c o n t r a s t , t h e e x p l i c i t " k n o w i n g w h a t " is b o u n d u p i m p l i c i t l y w i t h a tize i t , test i t f o r c o n s i s t e n c y a n d c o h e r e n c e — o n l y i f i t takes o n a
" k n o w i n g w h y " a n d insofar points toward potential justifications. shape t h a t can be grasped symbolically. ( O n the reflexive level o f
W h o e v e r believes t h a t h e has k n o w l e d g e a t his d i s p o s a l assumes t h e s c i e n c e , w h e r e i t is a m a t t e r o f c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e o r i e s , t h e necessity
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g t r u t h c l a i m s . f o r o r g a n i z i n g k n o w l e d g e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y — a s t h e case m a y b e , u s i n g a
P u t d i f f e r e n t l y , i t is p a r t o f t h e g r a m m a r o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n " k n o w i n g " formal language—is s t r i k i n g . ) O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as P e i r c e a n d
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g we k n o w c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d a n d j u s t i f i e d . p r a g m a t i s m c o r r e c t l y e m p h a s i z e , w e have t o m a k e use o f o u r k n o w l -
T h i s does n o t m e a n , o f course, t h a t r a t i o n a l beliefs o r convictions edge i n practices, i m p l e m e n t i n g it i n goal-directed actions con-
always consist o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s . W h o e v e r shares views t h a t t u r n o u t t r o l l e d i n t e r m s o f success, i n o r d e r t o b e a b l e t o l e a r n f r o m n e g a t i v e
t o b e u n t r u e is n o t eo ipso i r r a t i o n a l . S o m e o n e is i r r a t i o n a l i f she p u t s experiences. We l e a r n f r o m d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s by processing surprises
f o r w a r d h e r b e l i e f s d o g m a t i c a l l y , c l i n g i n g t o t h e m a l t h o u g h she sees by m e a n s o f abductive j u d g m e n t , a n d by revising t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t
t h a t she c a n n o t j u s t i f y t h e m . I n o r d e r t o q u a l i f y a b e l i e f as r a t i o n a l , has b e e n r e n d e r e d p r o b l e m a t i c . ( O n t h e r e f l e x i v e l e v e l o f s c i e n c e ,
i t is s u f f i c i e n t t h a t i t c a n b e h e l d t o b e t r u e o n t h e basis o f g o o d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s o f this sort, w h i c h are t o be processed productively,
r e a s o n s i n t h e r e l e v a n t c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n — t h a t is, t h a t i t c a n be are g e n e r a t e d m e t h o d i c a l l y ; t h e r e l a t i o n to a c t i o n o f the falsifying
a c c e p t e d r a t i o n a l l y . I n p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l societies, o r u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s e v i d e n c e — t h a t is, o f t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s — i s r e v e a l e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , all k n o w l e d g e — f r o m t h e stance o f a in experimental action.) 7

t h i r d p e r s o n — i s d e e m e d f a l l i b l e ( t h i s , t o o , is p a r t o f t h e g r a m m a r
o f the w o r d " k n o w i n g " nowadays), even t h o u g h i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e Teleological Rationality
stance, t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t , w e c a n n o t a v o i d
unconditionally r e g a r d i n g t h e asserted k n o w l e d g e as t r u e . D e s p i t e t h i s A l l a c t i o n is i n t e n t i o n a l ; a n a c t i o n m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d as c a r r y i n g
"Platonic" n a t u r e o f knowledge, the rationality o f a j u d g m e n t does o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a f r e e l y c h o o s i n g a n d d e c i d i n g actor. A c t i o n has
n o t i m p l y its t r u t h b u t m e r e l y its j u s t i f i e d a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n a g i v e n a t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , f o r every a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n aims at the r e a l i -
context. z a t i o n o f a set g o a l . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a n a c t i o n is
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s w o u l d n o t be p r o p o r t i o n a t e n o t t o w h e t h e r t h e state a c t u a l l y o c c u r r i n g i n t h e
p o s s i b l e i f w e c o u l d n o t represent o u r k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is, i f w e c o u l d w o r l d as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e i n t e n d e d state a n d
n o t e x p r e s s i t i n sentences, a n d i f we c o u l d n o t c o r r e c t i t a n d e x p a n d satisfies the corresponding conditions o f success, b u t r a t h e r to
i t ; a n d t h i s m e a n s : i f w e w e r e n o t a b l e also t o learn f r o m o u r p r a c t i c a l w h e t h e r t h e a c t o r has achieved t h i s r e s u l t o n t h e basis o f t h e d e l i b e r -
d e a l i n g s w i t h a r e a l i t y t h a t resists us. T o t h i s e x t e n t , e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n - a t e l y s e l e c t e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d m e a n s (or, i n a c c u r a t e l y perceived
a l i t y is entwined w i t h a c t i o n a n d t h e use o f l a n g u a g e . 6
I speak o f a n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d n o r m a l l y have d o n e s o ) . A successful a c t o r has
epistemic core s t r u c t u r e because t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e is d e - a c t e d r a t i o n a l l y o n l y i f h e ( i ) k n o w s w h y h e was successful ( o r w h y
p e n d e n t o n its e m b o d i m e n t i n s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n : i t is n o t a self- h e c o u l d have r e a l i z e d t h e set g o a l i n n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) and if
314 315
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

( i i ) t h i s k n o w l e d g e m o t i v a t e s t h e a c t o r ( a t least i n p a r t ) i n s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l
way t h a t h e c a r r i e s o u t h i s a c t i o n f o r r e a s o n s t h a t c a n a t t h e same s e n t e n c e s , so t o o is i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n essentially d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
time e x p l a i n its p o s s i b l e success. use o f i n t e n t i o n a l sentences.
I n t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that can simultaneously
justify a n d motivate a r a t i o n a l action take the f o r m o f a practical Communicative Rationality
inference. Given certain preferences, A intends i n situation S to
b r i n g a b o u t t h e state p; i n g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s A r e g a r d s t h e i m p l e - T h e r e is a p e c u l i a r r a t i o n a l i t y , i n h e r e n t n o t i n l a n g u a g e as s u c h b u t
m e n t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n s M as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n e c e s s a r y — o r e v e n i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h a t c a n b e r e -
sufficient—condition i n order to b r i n g about p with a certain prob- d u c e d n e i t h e r to the epistemic rationality o f knowledge (as classical
ability; for this reason A carries o u t the action that deploys the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics supposes) n o r t o the p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l -
selected means. 8
W e have seen t h a t k n o w l e d g e i n t h e s t r i c t sense i t y o f a c t i o n (as i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s a s s u m e s ) . T h i s communicative
requires a reflexive " h a v i n g " o f knowledge that refers to possible rationality is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e u n i f y i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h o r i e n t e d t o -
justifications; correspondingly, purposive-rational action requires a w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h secures f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g
reflexive " h a v i n g " — s u i t a b l e f o r possible j u s t i f i c a t i o n s — o f the deci- speakers a n intersubjectively shared l i f e w o r l d , t h e r e b y securing at
sive a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n , t h a t is, a c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e success o f the t h e same t i m e t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e c a n r e f e r t o o n e
a c t i o n . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f m u t u a l r e f e r e n c e b e - a n d t h e same o b j e c t i v e w o r l d .
tween the rationality o f the action a n d the f o r u m o f a discourse i n
T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s serves n o t o n l y
w h i c h a n a c t o r ' s decisive r e a s o n s f o r m a k i n g h i s decision—deter-
t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r b u t also t o r e p r e s e n t
m i n e d ex ante—could b e t e s t e d . T h e t h e o r y o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e deals
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o p r e s u p p o s e t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ) a n d t o e s t a b l i s h
w i t h t h o s e aspects o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o b l e m s o f a c t i n g s u b -
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h a s e c o n d p e r s o n . H e r e , t h e t h r e e aspects
j e c t s , w h o are g u i d e d i n a n e g o c e n t r i c way b y t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e per-
o f (a) a n a c t o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( b ) w i t h s o m e o n e (c) about
s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s o f success, t h a t c a n b e u s e d t o
s o m e t h i n g a r e r e f l e c t e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h an
construct models.
e x p r e s s i o n is c o n n e c t e d b o t h w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t a n d w i t h
T h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t o o , is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e t w o t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h i t s h o u l d b e understood. Thus, a threefold
o t h e r core structures o f knowledge a n d speech. F o r t h e p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n exists b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n and
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a r a t i o n a l p l a n o f a c t i o n is c a r r i e d (a) w h a t is intended (gemeint) b y i t , ( b ) w h a t is said i n i t , a n d (c) the
o u t are d e p e n d e n t on the i n p u t of reliable i n f o r m a t i o n (about way in which it is used i n t h e s p e e c h act. W i t h h i s s p e e c h act, t h e
e x p e c t e d events i n t h e w o r l d , o r a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o r a n d t h e i n t e n - speaker pursues his a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a hearer
tions o f other actors)—even if, i n g e n e r a l , the actors a c t i n g i n a a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m , as w e w i l l r e f e r t o i t , is
p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l way h a v e t o b e satisfied w i t h h i g h l y i n c o m p l e t e t w o - t i e r e d : t h e s p e e c h act is first o f a l l s u p p o s e d t o b e understood
i n f o r m a t i o n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such i n f o r m a t i o n can be processed b y t h e h e a r e r a n d t h e n — s o f a r as p o s s i b l e — a c c e p t e d . T h e r a t i o n a l -
i n t e l l i g e n t l y — t h a t is, r e f e r r e d t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m a x i m s a n d goals i t y o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t have b e e n s e l e c t e d i n l i g h t o f p e r s o n a l prefer- t h e n d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts are s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e -
e n c e s — o n l y i n t h e m e d i u m o f l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s is o b - hensible a n d acceptable f o r the speaker to achieve i l l o c u t i o n a r y
vious in the case of the theoretical treatment of complex success w i t h t h e m ( o r f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o d o so i n n o r m a l c i r c u m -
decision-making problems. But elementary action-intentions and stances) . O n c e a g a i n , w e d o n o t c a l l o n l y v a l i d s p e e c h acts r a t i o n a l
s i m p l e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s , t o o , are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d . J u s t as b u t rather all comprehensible s p e e c h acts f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c a n
316 317

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

t a k e o n a credible w a r r a n t y i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o t h e e f f e c t these c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied, a n d (c) t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e w a r r a n t y


t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d c o u l d , i f necessary, be v i n d i c a t e d dis- issued b y t h e s p e a k e r t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e c o u l d , i f necessary, d i s c u r -
cursively. T h u s h e r e , t o o , t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between sively v i n d i c a t e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m .
t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a s p e e c h act a n d its p o s s i b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . O n l y i n I n o r d e r to cover the e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f possible validity claims,
a r g u m e n t a t i o n s can the validity claims i m p l i c i t l y raised w i t h a speech i t m a k e s sense t o s t a r t b y p o s i n g t h e h e u r i s t i c q u e s t i o n : i n w h a t sense
a c t be t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h a n d t e s t e d w i t h reasons. c a n s p e e c h acts be n e g a t e d as a whole? I n a n s w e r i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n w e
I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims may n o t be described as states t h a t c a n be hit upon precisely t h r e e sorts o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : t r u t h c l a i m s i n
b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the objective w o r l d . For this r e g a r d t o facts t h a t w e assert w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t s i n t h e o b j e c -
reason, we s h o u l d n o t conceive o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims o f r e a c h i n g tive w o r l d ; c l a i m s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o f u t t e r a n c e s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( w h i c h a r e , so t o speak, i m m a n e n t t o l a n g u a g e ) as t h a t m a k e m a n i f e s t subjective e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) to w h i c h the
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects t h a t t h e s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s i n t h e h e a r e r w i t h s p e a k e r has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d finally, c l a i m s t o t h e Tightness o f
h e r s p e e c h act b y w a y o f a causal e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e . H e r e , I w o u l d norms and commands t h a t are r e c o g n i z e d i n an intersubjectively
like to m a k e three observations. First, t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims c a n n o t shared social w o r l d . 9

be d e f i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f the linguistic means o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -


s t a n d i n g ; as W i t t g e n s t e i n m a d e clear-, t h e telos o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r - Modalities o f Language U s e
s t a n d i n g is i n h e r e n t i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m i t s e l f . S e c o n d , t h e
s p e a k e r c a n n o t i n t e n d h e r a i m as s o m e t h i n g t o b e e f f e c t e d causally, T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f a s p e e c h a c t is p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o t h e
b e c a u s e t h e "yes" o r " n o " o f t h e h e a r e r is a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n accorded to the validity claim raised w i t h
position; participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n enjoy the f r e e d o m o f being i t . H e r e , a c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n is p r e s u p p o s e d i n w h i c h the
a b l e t o say " n o . " F i n a l l y , speakers a n d h e a r e r s c o n f r o n t o n e a n o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s can take o n the respective roles o f speaker a n d h e a r e r
i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e as first a n d s e c o n d p e r s o n s , n o t as o p p o - ( a n d , i f n e e d b e , t h e r o l e o f a t h i r d p a r t y p r e s e n t ) — t h a t is, c a n t a k e
n e n t s o r as o b j e c t s w i t h i n t h e w o r l d o f e n t i t i e s about w h i c h t h e y are o n t h e r o l e s o f t h e first, s e c o n d , a n d t h i r d p e r s o n . T h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n
speaking. I n wanting to reach understanding with one another o f r o l e s , w h i c h is b u i l t i n t o t h e l o g i c o f t h e system o f personal
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , their i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims lie beyond the objective p r o n o u n s , is e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y embodied
w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e y c a n i n t e r v e n e p u r p o s i v e l y as o b s e r v i n g a c t o r s . i n processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e c a n see t h i s c l e a r l y i f w e
A s events t h a t are l o c a l i z a b l e i n t i m e a n d space, h o w e v e r , s p e e c h acts compare t h e use o f language oriented toward reaching under-
are simultaneously p a r t o f t h e objective w o r l d i n w h i c h , like all s t a n d i n g w i t h a use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t is n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s , t h e y c a n also b r i n g t h i n g s a b o u t , t h a t is, t h e y c a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n between the
also p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , I w i l l u n -
dertake differentiations i n the concept of "reaching understanding"
T h e s p e a k e r w o u l d l i k e t h e a d d r e s s e e t o a c c e p t w h a t is s a i d as
(Verständigung) i t s e l f .
v a l i d ; t h i s is d e c i d e d b y t h e addressee's "yes" o r " n o " t o t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m f o r w h a t is said t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h his s p e e c h act.
W h a t m a k e s t h e speech-act o f f e r a c c e p t a b l e a r e , u l t i m a t e l y , t h e r e a - T h e C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e o f L a n g u a g e versus t h e N o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e
sons t h a t t h e speaker c o u l d p r o v i d e i n t h e g i v e n c o n t e x t f o r t h e Use
v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is said. T h e r a t i o n a l i t y i n h e r e n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
t h u s rests o n t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s T h e e p i s t e m i c a n d t e l e o l o g i c a l uses o f l a n g u a g e a r e n o t dependent
t h a t m a k e a s p e e c h act v a l i d , ( b ) t h e c l a i m r a i s e d by t h e s p e a k e r t h a t o n an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between speaker a n d hearer i n a
318 319

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n . Elocutionary acts—and the validity claims I t is a s i m i l a r m a t t e r w i t h i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s u s e d f o r p l a n n i n g


c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e m , w h i c h have a built-in orientation toward intersub¬ action monologically. O n e u n d e r s t a n d s i n t e n t i o n a l sentences t h a t
jective recognition—do n o t play a f u n d a m e n t a l role ei t h er i n the s t r u c t u r e p u r p o s i v e activities i f o n e k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success,
epistemic use of language, w h i c h serves p r i m a r i l y t o represent t h a t is, i f o n e k n o w s u n d e r w h i c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e y are m a d e t r u e .
k n o w l e d g e , o r i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f a c t i o n effects; i n these cases, t h e C o n d i t i o n s o f success are t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a n
language users are n o t p u r s u i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s . A l t h o u g h i n a c t o r - r e l a t i v e way. As i n t h e case o f e p i s t e m i c a l l y u s e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l
e v e r y case l a n g u a g e has t o b e a c q u i r e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , t h e l i n g u i s - sentences, t h e r e l a t i o n o f the sentences to s o m e t h i n g i n the objective
tic e x p r e s s i o n s can be u s e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y i n s u c h i n s t a n c e s — t h a t is, w o r l d — t h a t is, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s a n d d i r e c t i o n o f
w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a s e c o n d p e r s o n . T h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c aspects fit—is sufficient f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g such pragmatically used inten-
a r e n o t r e l e v a n t i n t h e case o f t h e p u r e l y e p i s t e m i c o r teleological t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s . A n i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is n o t a l r e a d y c o n n e c t e d
use o f l a n g u a g e is clear f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l w i t h these p e r se; t h e y a c q u i r e t h i s f o r c e o n l y w h e n t h e a c t o r an-
s e n t e n c e s a n d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s essentially u s e d i n e a c h . U n l i k e , nounces h e r i n t e n t i o n s i n a c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n , t h a t is, w h e n
f o r example, questions or imperatives, p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l the actor utters her intentions w i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f having
s e n t e n c e s a r e n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y t i e d t o addressees; t h e i r m e a n i n g o t h e r s t a k e t h e m seriously a n d c o u n t o n t h e i r b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t .
c o n t e n t is i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n w h i c h t h e y c a n H o w e v e r , t h e n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e f o r p u r p o s e s o f
be e m b e d d e d — w h i c h is w h y t h e y c a n b e a n a l y z e d e x h a u s t i v e l y w i t h pure representation or for a plan o f action played t h r o u g h mentally
t h e tools o f f o r m a l semantics. 10
is d u e t o a f e a t o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t m e r e l y s u s p e n d s t h e reference—
One understands epistemically used p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences i f w h i c h is always present virtually—of propositions to t r u t h , or of i n t e n -
o n e k n o w s t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, i f o n e k n o w s w h e n t h e y are t i o n s t o t h e seriousness o f w h a t is r e s o l v e d . T h i s is e v i d e n t as s o o n
t r u e ; t h i s is t h e s p e c i a l case t o w h i c h t h e thesis o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o r p l a n s o f a c t i o n a r e c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . W h e n
s e m a n t i c s a p p l i e s . M o r e o v e r , i t m a k e s sense h e r e t o speak o f assign- t h i s h a p p e n s , t h e a u t h o r is e x p e c t e d t o j u s t i f y to others d i s c u r s i v e l y
i n g " t r u t h v a l u e s " (as is c u s t o m a r y i n l o g i c ) , because t h e a s s e r t o r i c w h a t she has c o n s i d e r e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y — t h a t is, i n t h e p u b l i c f o r u m
f o r c e o f acts o f a s s e r t i o n is n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h such o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Certainly, such a r g u m e n t a t i o n s , too, can be c o n -
monologically employed sentences. F o r purposes o f p u r e repre- d u c t e d in foro interno, s i m i l a r t o t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h w e c a n d i r e c t
s e n t a t i o n w e a b s t r a c t f r o m h o w t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence is e m b e d - i m p e r a t i v e s t o ourselves. H o w e v e r , a r g u m e n t s a n d i m p e r a t i v e s are b y
ded i n a s p e e c h act; i n o t h e r w o r d s , w e d i s r e g a r d t h e possible t h e i r very n a t u r e pragmatic a n d f o r this reason, u n l i k e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
c o m m u n i c a t i v e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r w o u l d assert t h e p r o p o - a n d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , c a n be i n t e r n a l i z e d o n l y together with t h e
s i t i o n "p" w i t h t h e a i m o f f i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n a d d r e s s e e . 11
An i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s t h a t are i n h e r e n t t o t h e i r m e a n i n g . P r o p o s i -
e p i s t e m i c a l l y u s e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e serves t o r e p r e s e n t a state t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s c a n be d i v e s t e d o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f
o f a f f a i r s o r a fact. F o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s s o r t o f representation, i t is acts o f a s s e r t i n g a n d a n n o u n c i n g w i t h o u t l o s i n g t h e i r meaning,
s u f f i c i e n t i f t h e a u t h o r gives ( w h o m e v e r ) to understand t h a t h e is w h e r e a s e v e n in foro interno a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y
c o n s i d e r i n g "p" o r h o l d s i t t o b e t r u e . B y c o n t r a s t , w i t h t h e assertion c o m p o n e n t w o u l d n o longer be a n i m p e r a t i v e (for even here, I , i n
o f a f a c t , a c o m m u n i c a t i n g s p e a k e r w o u l d n o t m e r e l y w i s h t o have t h e r o l e o f t h e first p e r s o n , d i r e c t a n i m p e r a t i v e t o m y s e l f as a fictive
a n addressee k n o w t h a t h e h i m s e l f h o l d s "p" t o b e t r u e ; r a t h e r , h e s e c o n d p e r s o n ) . C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is first e m b o d i e d o n l y i n
w o u l d p u r s u e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f h a v i n g t h e o t h e r acknowledge a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t o p e r a t e s b y way o f v a l i d i t y
t h a t "p" is t r u e . claims w h e n e v e r speaker a n d hearer, i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e d i -
320 321

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

r e c t e d to second persons, (want to) reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . Agree-


a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . T h e difference between this ment i n t h e s t r i c t sense is a c h i e v e d o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s are a b l e
a n d t h e n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e r e s u l t s f r o m t h e a d d i - t o a c c e p t a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r t h e same reasons, w h i l e mutual under-
t i o n o f a v a l i d i t y c l a i m with which the speaker confronts a hearer. H e r e , standing ( Verständigung) c a n also c o m e a b o u t w h e n o n e p a r t i c i p a n t
h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m d o e s n o t c o n s i s t i n l e t t i n g t h e addressee k n o w sees t h a t t h e o t h e r , i n l i g h t o f h e r p r e f e r e n c e s , has g o o d r e a s o n s i n
h i s d o u b l e i n t e n t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t h e ( i n t e n t i o n i ) h o l d s "p" t o b e t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s f o r h e r d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n — t h a t is, r e a s o n s
t r u e ( o r w o u l d l i k e t o b r i n g a b o u t "p") a n d t h a t h e wishes h e r t o t h a t are g o o d for her—without h a v i n g to m a k e these reasons his o w n
k n o w this ( i n t e n t i o n s ) ; rather, h e wishes to c o m m u n i c a t e t h e fact (or in l i g h t o f his preferences. A c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t reasons p e r m i t a
t h e i n t e n t i o n ) "p" t o t h e addressee i n s u c h a way t h a t she h e r s e l f is stronger m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a n actor-relative rea-
convinced " t h a t p" ( o r takes s e r i o u s l y t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n "to sons. I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I w i l l c o m p a r e (i) declarations o f i n t e n t i o n
b r i n g a b o u t p"). T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e is n o t a n d s i m p l e imperatives w i t h ( i i ) promises, declaratives, a n d c o m -
t h a t t h e h e a r e r s h o u l d t a k e n o t e o f Ss b e l i e f ( o r i n t e n t i o n ) b u t mands i n order to make a differentiation w i t h i n the communicative
r a t h e r t h a t she s h o u l d c o m e t o h o l d t h e same v i e w as S ( o r t h a t she use o f l a n g u a g e b e t w e e n a " w e a k " a n d a " s t r o n g " m o d e o f r e a c h i n g
s h o u l d t a k e s e r i o u s l y ^s a n n o u n c e m e n t ) . F o r 5 t o achieve h i s i l l o c u - understanding.
t i o n a r y a i m , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r H t o k n o w t h e t r u t h conditions i . A s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h a n act o f a s s e r t i o n
( o r t h e success c o n d i t i o n s ) o f "/>;" His also s u p p o s e d t o u n d e r s t a n d f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n "p" achieves i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o n l y i f a l l
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f assertions (or declarations o f inten- p a r t i c i p a n t s are c o n v i n c e d " t h a t p" f o r t h e s a m e reasons. So l o n g as
tion) a n d , so f a r as p o s s i b l e , accept the c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity t h e s p e a k e r a n d addressee a c c e p t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p" as t r u e f o r
claims. d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s respectively, a n d b o t h k n o w w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
I n t h e case o f a n a s s e r t i o n , t h e s p e a k e r raises a t r u t h c l a i m f o r o t h e r t h a t these r e a s o n s c o n s t i t u t e g o o d r e a s o n s o n l y f o r t h e o n e o r
w h a t is s a i d . T h e h e a r e r w i l l t a k e a n a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h i s ( n o t h e o t h e r o f t h e m , t h e t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p," w h i c h is d e p e n d e n t
m a t t e r h o w i m p l i c i t l y ) o n l y i f h e h o l d s w h a t is said t o b e j u s t i f i e d or, o n intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , is n o t a c c e p t e d as such. S i n c e a discur-
at least, r e g a r d s t h e speaker's w a r r a n t y as c r e d i b l e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t sive c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t has, f o r c o n c e p t u a l reasons,
she c o u l d , i f necessary, c o n v i n c e t h e h e a r e r o f t h e asserted f a c t o n a g r e e m e n t a n d n o t c o m p r o m i s e as its g o a l , t h e d i s c u r s i v e v i n d i c a t i o n
t h e basis o f g o o d reasons. I n t h e case o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is l e f t o p e n u n t i l actor-independent reasons m a k e
a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n , t h e h e a r e r w i l l take seriously t h e an- the contested t r u t h c l a i m rationally acceptable i n p r i n c i p l e for all
n o u n c e d i n t e n t i o n i f h e is c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t participants. I t is a different matter with the one-sided an-
she says a n d has good reasons f o r w a n t i n g to make her an- n o u n c e m e n t o f a n a c t i o n b a s e d o n a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e ( " I w i l l leave
nouncement t r u e : h e p r e s u m e s t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e is s e r i o u s i f h e t o m o r r o w " ) o r w i t h s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s ( " S i t d o w n " ) . A l t h o u g h these
h o l d s S's i n t e n t i o n t o b e j u s t i f i e d ( f r o m h e r p o i n t o f v i e w ) . u t t e r a n c e s a r e , w i t h o u t d o u b t , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, i t w o u l d b e coun-
t e r i n t u i t i v e to suppose that a speaker wishes t o b r i n g a b o u t any k i n d
o f "consensus" w i t h t h e m . T h e speaker c a n n o t r e c k o n w i t h agree-
T h e U s e o f L a n g u a g e O r i e n t e d t o w a r d A g r e e m e n t versus t h e Use
m e n t for one-sided expressions o f w i l l . N o n e t h e l e s s i n s u c h cases,
o f Language Oriented toward Reaching Understanding
t o o , i t is p e r m i s s i b l e t o speak i n a w e a k e r sense o f " m u t u a l u n d e r -
standing" between participants. For here, too, validity claims are
Now, o f course, it makes a difference w h e t h e r agreement (Einver-
involved that one p a r t i c i p a n t raises a n d t h e o t h e r c a n a c c e p t o r
ständnis) c o n c e r n i n g a f a c t exists b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s o r w h e t h e r
reject.
t h e y b o t h merely r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sich verständigen) w i t h o n e
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Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

I n t h e case o f a n n o u n c e m e n t s o r d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n , t h e has g o o d r e a s o n s f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e addressee has reasons n o t


a c t o r c a n g a i n assent b y s h o w i n g t h e i n t e n d e d a c t i o n t o b e o n e t h a t t o o p p o s e h e r i m p e r a t i v e . T h e s e a d d i t i o n a l reasons, t o o , a r e a c t o r -
is rational i n l i g h t o f h i s p r e f e r e n c e s ( i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d r e l a t i v e : i n t h i s case, o n e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r ( p o s s i b l y w r o n g l y ) a t t r i b -
w i t h the given means). For this sort o f m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i d e - utes t o t h e a d d r e s s e e as g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h i m ; t h e s p e a k e r assumes
o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y takes o n a m e d i a t i n g r o l e . I n s u c h cases, t h e the availability e i t h e r o f sanctions, s h o u l d the desired a c t i o n fail to
h e a r e r has g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t a k i n g t h e a n n o u n c e m e n t seriously, b e c a r r i e d o u t , o r o f r e w a r d s , i f i t is c a r r i e d o u t . As w i t h d e c l a r a t i o n s
e v e n i f she does n o t adopt as her own t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e c l a r e d o f i n t e n t i o n , i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e acts, t o o , t h e r a t i o n a l l y e x p e c t -
i n t e n t i o n . I n general, one understands the propositional content o f a b l e a c t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s c o u n t as p a r t o f t h e a c t o r - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s
a n a n n o u n c e m e n t i f o n e k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r "p"; t h a t speak f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f s u c h u t t e r a n c e s ( a l t h o u g h n o w t h e y
however, one u n d e r s t a n d s its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o n l y i f one a r e assessed p o s i t i v e l y o r n e g a t i v e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e
k n o w s w h y o n e s h o u l d t a k e t h e d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n s e r i o u s l y as a n hearer).
a n n o u n c e m e n t , t h a t is, w h y o n e s h o u l d c o u n t o n its b e i n g c a r r i e d A n n o u n c e m e n t s a n d imperatives d o n o t a i m at a g r e e m e n t ( i n t h e
out. Certainly, a hearer, i n a given case, m a y accept the an- strict sense). Nonetheless, they m o v e w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f a m u t u a l
nouncement as a n u t t e r a n c e t o b e t a k e n s e r i o u s l y f o r t h e same u n d e r s t a n d i n g based o n validity claims a n d t h u s still w i t h i n the
r e a s o n s as t h e a c t o r ; h o w e v e r , i t is a s s u m e d t h a t these a r e actor-relative d o m a i n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y
reasons t h a t show t h e a n n o u n c e d a c t i o n to be r a t i o n a l f o r t h e actor o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is m e d i a t e d v i a t h e p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t
from his point of view—and therefore, f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h e resolve o r t h e d e c i s i o n has f o r t h e a c t o r w h o s e a t t i t u d e is success
addressee, likely t o be c a r r i e d o u t . T h e r e can be n o q u e s t i o n o f o r i e n t e d ; h o w e v e r , t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success is i n t u r n m e a s u r e d i n
" a g r e e m e n t " h e r e because t h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t e r m s o f c l a i m s t o t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s e v e n i f t h i s is o n l y w i t h
t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n c a n q u a l i f y as g o o d r e a s o n s o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o reference to the preferences o f the speaker (or i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h
premises t h a t are v a l i d f o r t h e a c t o r b u t n o t f o r his addressee. We t h e preferences a t t r i b u t e d by t h e speaker to t h e h e a r e r ) . T h e h e a r e r
m i g h t call such reasons—to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m f r o m generally accept- assumes t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t she says a n d h o l d s i t t o b e t r u e .
a b l e r e a s o n s — " p u b l i c l y i n t e l l i g i b l e " reasons. W h a t a r e g o o d r e a s o n s For this reason, declarations o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives charac-
f o r t h e actor to i n t e n d to c a r r y o u t a n a c t i o n are g o o d reasons f o r t e r i s t i c a l l y c a n b e c h a l l e n g e d u n d e r t h e t w o aspects o f t r u t h f u l n e s s
t h e addressee n o t t o d o u b t h i s i n t e n t i o n . ( c o m p a r e 1 ' a n d 2') a n d t h e a c c u r a c y o r t r u t h o f e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p -
I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r a g a i n — t h o u g h i n e f f e c t , s i m i l a r — w i t h i m - positions (compare 1 " a n d 2 " ) .
p e r a t i v e s . T h e r e is n o n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f i m p e r a t i v e sen-
(1) I w i l l sign the contract t o m o r r o w i n Tokyo.
tences, f o r i m p e r a t i v e s a r e i n t r i n s i c a l l y o f a p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e . T h e i r
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o (1') You are p u l l i n g m y leg.
m o t i v a t e a n a d d r e s s e e — t h a t is, another person—to b r i n g a b o u t "jt>."
O n e understands the propositional content o f an imperative i f one (1") Y o u c o u l d n ' t possibly b e i n T o k y o b y t o m o r r o w ( d u e t o t h e

k n o w s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i o n ; i n time difference).


o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g , h o w e v e r , o n e has t o
(2) Give m e the m o n e y I n e e d now.
k n o w (as i n t h e case o f d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n ) w h y t h e s p e a k e r
s i n c e r e l y m e a n s w h a t she says a n d , o v e r a n d a b o v e t h i s , w h y she (2') Y o u a r e n ' t basically l o o k i n g f o r m o n e y a t a l l b u t f o r s o m e -
b e l i e v e s she m a y e x p e c t t h e a d d r e s s e e t o c o m p l y w i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e . t h i n g quite different (namely affection).
A n i m p e r a t i v e is r a t i o n a l o n l y i f ( a p a r t f r o m its v i a b i l i t y ) t h e a c t o r
(2") I c o u l d n ' t g e t t h a t a m o u n t o f m o n e y t o g e t h e r so q u i c k l y .
324 325

Chapter 7 Some F u r t h e r Clarifications of the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

i i . O f c o u r s e , t h e m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use w o u l d have t o c h a n g e as b e h a v i o r b u t — a s i n t h e case o f a s s e r t i o n s — a c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t rea-


s o o n as t h e t r u t h of t h e assertions presupposed with such an- sons; h o w e v e r , u n l i k e t h e reasons f o r a s s e r t i o n s , t h e y are n o t reasons
n o u n c e m e n t s o r i m p e r a t i v e s is i t s e l f t h e m a t i z e d . S u c h a c h a n g e i n f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f states o f a f f a i r s b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f
topic would necessitate transition to an orientation toward an n o r m a t i v e l y b i n d i n g expectations. C o n n e c t e d w i t h regulative speech
" a g r e e m e n t " t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " S u c h acts s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s is a v a l i d i t y c l a i m
a s w i t c h f r o m t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r - t h a t has a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v i n d i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c a l d i s -
s t a n d i n g t o o n e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t m a y also be i l l u s t r a t e d courses. I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s
i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e e x a m p l e s g i v e n , f o r i n e a c h s o r t o f s p e e c h act, o n e has t o k n o w t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t that
case t h e r e is a f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y i n w h i c h i t c a n be negated. e x p l a i n s w h y a n a c t o r feels a u t h o r i z e d o r o b l i g e d to p e r f o r m a
c e r t a i n a c t i o n o r w h y , as f a r as t h e a d d r e s s e e is c o n c e r n e d , she m a y
(1"') Y o u lack the g o o d w i l l necessary t o take o n such a s t r e n u - r e c k o n w i t h h i s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e . I n s o f a r as t h e p a r -
ous c o m m i t m e n t . ticipants intersubjectively recognize a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d (for
example, w i t h i n the framework o f a shared l i f e w o r l d ) , they can
(1"") Y o u d o n ' t have the legal a u t h o r i t y f o r that.
a c c e p t r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts as v a l i d f o r t h e same reasons.
(2"') N o , I d o n ' t owe y o u a n y t h i n g . I n contrast to a n epistemically achieved consensus, however, this
n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d less as a r e s u l t t h a n as
H e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e s p e e c h acts a r e p r e s u m e d t o h a v e a d i f f e r e n t
a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, the
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g . For, n o w , t h e n e g a t i o n o f (1) a n d (2) r e f e r s
p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d a g r e e m e n t serves as a r e s e r v o i r
t o normative v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t c o m e i n t o p l a y o n l y w h e n i n t e n t i o n a l
f o r s h a r e d reasons, w h e r e a s i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e
and i m p e r a t i v e sentences are " e m b e d d e d " i n n o r m a t i v e contexts
reasons themselves serve as a v e h i c l e for achieving a rationally
and are "authorized" by a normative background. The an-
motivated agreement. A t a n y r a t e , t h i s is h o w i t is w i t h a v a l u e
n o u n c e m e n t o f the s i g n i n g o f the c o n t r a c t c o u l d be a commissive
consensus e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f t r a d i t i o n s h a n d e d d o w n i n
speech a c t — f o r instance, a promise w i t h w h i c h the actor c o m m i t s
a q u a s i - n a t u r a l way. H o w e v e r , a c e r t a i n a n a l o g y w i t h a n achieved
h e r s e l f t o s o m e t h i n g — o r else a d e c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h act, w i t h w h i c h
e p i s t e m i c a g r e e m e n t is e s t a b l i s h e d o n t h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l l e v e l o f
t h e s p e a k e r d i s c h a r g e s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l task ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e d u t y
j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h e r e a consensus o f t h e above k i n d can n o l o n g e r be
o f a representative o f the B o a r d to i n f o r m the p u b l i c ) . T h e i m p e r a -
taken for granted, w i t h the result that the justifying n o r m s t h e m -
t i v e t o h a n d o v e r t h e m o n e y c o u l d i m p l y a f r i e n d ' s r e q u e s t , a supe-
selves r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . (At this p o i n t , I w o u l d like simply to
r i o r ' s c o m m a n d , a c r e d i t o r ' s d e m a n d , a n d so f o r t h .
m e n t i o n that w h a t we n o r m a l l y deal w i t h u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g "prac-
T h r o u g h backing o f this k i n d , declarations o f i n t e n t i o n a n d i m -
t i c a l r e a s o n " is n o t a n e l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n o n b u t r a t h e r goes
p e r a t i v e s are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o normatively authorized e x p r e s s i o n s of
b a c k t o a n e n t w i n e m e n t — e f f e c t e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f social
w i l l s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s . W i t h t h i s , t h e
i n t e r a c t i o n s — o f epistemic a n d teleological rationality w i t h commu-
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s change.
nicative rationality.)
N o r m a t i v e reasons d o n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e p r u d e n t i a l assessments o f
arbitrarily choosing d e c i s i o n m a k i n g subjects; t h e y d e t e r m i n e r a t h e r
t h e d e c i s i o n s o f subjects w h o bind their wills a n d are t h u s a b l e t o e n t e r C o m m u n i c a t i v e v e r s u s Strategic A c t i o n

i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e case o f " n a k e d " d e c l a r a t i o n s o f


i n t e n t i o n s a n d " s i m p l e " i m p e r a t i v e s , n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n s are not I have c o m p a r e d " n a k e d " o r " s i m p l e " a n n o u n c e m e n t s a n d i m p e r a -

actor-relative reasons f o r one's o w n ( o r a n o t h e r ' s ) p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l tives w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y e m b e d d e d o n e s i n o r d e r t o u n d e r t a k e a d i f -


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Chapter 7 Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to Tightness c l a i m s as w e l l ; i n t h e case o f s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,


cast l i g h t o n t w o k i n d s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use. W e n o w have n o t j u s t a r b i t r a r y f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e b u t a u t o n o m y i n t h e sense o f
t o see h o w t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n affects t h e f u n c t i o n o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a - t h e c a p a c i t y t o b i n d o n e ' s w i l l o n t h e basis o f n o r m a t i v e i n s i g h t s is
t i o n . U p t o n o w we have c o n s i d e r e d o n l y s p e e c h acts, t h a t is, l i n g u i s - presupposed.
tic expressions, i n c l u d i n g t h e a s p e c t f r o m w h i c h t h e y themselves I n t h e case o f b o t h o f t h e e x a m p l e s c o n s i d e r e d o f e x p r e s s i o n s of
r e p r e s e n t actions. However, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y embod- w i l l that are n o t e m b e d d e d normatively, i n t e n t i o n a l a n d i m p e r a t i v e
i e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts e x t e n d s b e y o n d v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s t o social s e n t e n c e s are a l r e a d y b e i n g u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e
a c t i o n s o r i n t e r a c t i o n s as w e l l . ( A s p e c i a l class o f t h e s e — n o r m a t i v e l y illocutionary a i m o f b r i n g i n g the hearer to a rationally motivated
r e g u l a t e d social a c t i o n s — h a s a l r e a d y b e e n l o o k e d a t a n y h o w i n c o n - agreement. I n s u c h cases, h o w e v e r , t h e a c t o r s , w h o are o r i e n t e d
n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts.) W i t h t o w a r d success, c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o n l y i f o n e o f t h e m ac-
M a x W e b e r , w e c a n d e f i n e social a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y as a c t i o n s w h e r e b y cepts t h e seriousness o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r i m p e r a t i v e s u t t e r e d b y t h e
a c t o r s , i n p u r s u i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f a c t i o n , are also g u i d e d b y o t h e r (as w e l l as t h e truth o f t h e b e l i e f s i m p l i e d b y t h e m ) . T w o
t h e e x p e c t e d a c t i o n o f o t h e r s . W e w i l l speak o f communicative action v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e i n v o l v e d : t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e resolve o r t h e d e c i -
w h e r e actors c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f a c t i o n w i t h one a n o t h e r by s i o n , a n d t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d . On this level, r e a c h i n g
way o f l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, i n s u c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t yet e x t e n d t o n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
a way that they d r a w o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d bonding C h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense o f a n o r i e n -
p o w e r s (Bindungskrdfte) o f s p e e c h acts f o r t h i s c o o r d i n a t i o n . I n stra- t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f t h e
tegic a c t i o n , this p o t e n t i a l f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e m a i n s a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h c a n n o t be r e a c h e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e m o t i v a t i n g
u n e x p l o i t e d , even w h e r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d . i n t e n t i o n s a n d preferences themselves, b u t m e r e l y w i t h r e g a r d to
Because t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n strategic a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f t h e i r purposive rationality. I n this respect, r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b y way o f a r e c i p r o c a l e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e , here means merely that the hearer understands the content o f the
l a n g u a g e is u s e d n o t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , i n t h e sense e l u c i d a t e d , b u t d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r i m p e r a t i v e a n d d o e s n o t d o u b t its s e r i -
w i t h a n orientation toward consequences. F o r analysis o f t h e l a t t e r use o f ousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) . T h e basis f o r t h e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ef-
l a n g u a g e , so-called p e r l o c u t i o n s p r o v i d e a s u i t a b l e key. fective i n a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n is solely t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c l a i m
to t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r f o r a n i m p e r a -
tive, t o w h i c h t h e d i s c e r n i b l e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e resolve o r o f t h e
T w o Sorts o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n
d e c i s i o n attests.

I w i l l s p e a k o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n in a weak sense w h e n e v e r r e a c h - This common basis r e s t r i c t s t h e f r e e c h o i c e o f t h e actors a c t i n g


i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p p l i e s t o facts a n d t o a c t o r - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success o n l y i n s o f a r
one-sided e x p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l ; I w i l l speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as t h e y e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o r e n o u n c e a l l i n t e n t i o n s to deceive
in a strong sense as s o o n as r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x t e n d s t o t h e ( w h i c h a r e p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n ) . I n weak communicative
n o r m a t i v e reasons f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goals t h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e action t h e a c t o r s d o n o t as yet e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o b e g u i d e d b y
l a t t e r case, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e f e r t o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d v a l u e c o m m o n n o r m s o r values a n d t o r e c o g n i z e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . I
orientations that—going beyond their personal preferences—bind w i l l s p e a k o f strong communicative action o n l y w h e n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y
t h e i r wills. I n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the actors are o r i e n t e d act c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e g a r d t o a l l t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , r e g a r d l e s s
solely t o w a r d c l a i m s t o t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s ; i n s t r o n g c o m m u n i - o f w h e t h e r t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is r a i s e d e x p l i c i t l y , as i n
cative a c t i o n t h e y are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( c o m m a n d s , p r o m i s e s ) , o r r e m a i n s u n t h e m a -

i
328 329
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

t i z e d . E v e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s , w i t h w h i c h e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t o as m u c h as i t is i n t h e case o f n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ; s t a t e m e n t s o f
t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s are r a i s e d , c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o f a c t a n d " o u g h t " s e n t e n c e s have t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g m a d e i n t e l -
t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e as " o u t o f p l a c e , " "brazen," l i g i b l e f o r a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r t h e s a m e reasons. H o w e v e r , a c o g n i t i v e
" e m b a r r a s s i n g , " a n d so o n — i n s h o r t , as n o r m a t i v e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e . a g r e e m e n t a b o u t facts r e q u i r e s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
I n s u c h cases, t h e y v i o l a t e t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l o n l y t o t a k e these a g r e e d - u p o n facts i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e s u b -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a social w o r l d to w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u - sequent course o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t t o a n o r m a t i v e agree-
nication belong. m e n t , a c o g n i t i v e a g r e e m e n t d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e way i n w h i c h t h e
F r o m n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s s u c h as t h e s e , r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts a c t o r s select a n d p u r s u e t h e i r a c t i o n goals; i t d o e s n o t a f f e c t w h e t h e r
derive the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker may r e g a r d h i m s e l f t h e y a r e g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e i r p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s o r w h e t h e r
as a u t h o r i z e d f o r d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , imperatives, advice, re- t h e y a r e also g u i d e d b y b i n d i n g n o r m s ( a n d values h e l d i n e s t e e m
quests, p r o m i s e s , c o n t r a c t s , n e g o t i a t i o n s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , and so by a l l m e m b e r s ) . Whereas i n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n o n l y c o n -
f o r t h . T o t h i s e x t e n t l i g h t n e s s c l a i m s , w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts stative s p e e c h acts a n d n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s i o n s of
o f t h i s s o r t are c o n n e c t e d , r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n a social w o r l d i n a w i l l c o m e i n t o play, s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d e m a n d s a use o f
m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h c l a i m s c o n n e c t e d l a n g u a g e t h a t also r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s o c i a l w o r l d . I n c i d e n t a l l y ,
w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h i s also h o l d s f o r t h o s e expressive s p e e c h acts t h a t — u n l i k e d e c l a r a -
( e v e n i f n o r m s are " c o n t r o v e r s i a l " i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n facts a n d tions o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives—do n o t refer to (future) actions,
a r e b y n o m e a n s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a c t i n g subjects i n t h e s a m e way f o r e x a m p l e , expressions o f feeling.
as t h e e n t i t i e s t o w h i c h w e r e f e r w h e n w e state facts a b o u t t h e m ) . A t
any rate, u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , claims to
P e r l o c u t i o n s , t h e Use o f Language O r i e n t e d t o w a r d Consequences,
t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f u t t e r a n c e s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — m a y be
a n d Strategic A c t i o n
d i s c u r s i v e l y v i n d i c a t e d , w h i c h m e a n s o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s t h a t are
t h e same reasons f o r a l l m e m b e r s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n q u e s t i o n . T h e
C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e m b o d i e d i n l a n g u a g e g a m e s i n w h i c h
a i m i n s u c h cases is a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t ; u n l i k e a m u t u a l u n d e r -
the participants take a position o n criticizable validity claims. I n the
s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f r e s o l u t i o n s
" w e a k " f o r m s o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i -
a n d decisions, such a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t extends n o t o n l y to the
cative a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e p u r -
a c t o r - r e l a t i v e p r e m i s e s o f t h e p u r s u i t o f a c t i o n goals s e l e c t e d o n t h e
posive rationality of actors in an attitude oriented toward
basis o f a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e , b u t also t o t h e actor-independent
success—although still i n such a way that t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims
m o d e o f s e l e c t i n g l e g i t i m a t e goals. I n s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
dominate t h e " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " effects t h a t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s p r e s u m e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e y are g u i d e d b y facts a n d
m a y b e s t r i v e n f o r as w e l l . " P e r l o c u t i o n a r y " is, o f c o u r s e , t h e n a m e
say w h a t t h e y h o l d t o b e t r u e a n d w h a t t h e y m e a n , b u t also t h a t t h e y
w e give t o t h e effects o f s p e e c h acts t h a t , i f n e e d b e , c a n also b e
pursue their action plans only w i t h i n the boundaries o f n o r m s a n d
b r o u g h t a b o u t causally b y n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I
values d e e m e d to be v a l i d .
a m i n t e r e s t e d i n ( i ) t h o s e s p e e c h acts a n d ( i i ) t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n
U n d e r l y i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense is t h e p r e s u p - w h i c h the relationship o f dependency n o r m a l l y existing between
p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t is t h e same f o r a l l ; i n s t r o n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d effects is r e v e r s e d . I n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s over a n d above this c o u n t o n s u c h cases, c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e t r e a t s , l e a v i n g gaps t h a t c o n -
a s o c i a l w o r l d t h a t is s h a r e d b y t h e m i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . C e r t a i n l y , stitute a k i n d o f contrast o r foil f o r the peculiar b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
a g r e e m e n t is r e c k o n e d w i t h i n t h e case o f assertoric s t a t e m e n t s j u s t p o w e r o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts.
331
330
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

i . I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h r e e classes o f p e r l o c u - i n g as a d e t e r r e n t o v e r s h a d o w s its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g as a n a n -
d o n a r y effects. P e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s i r e s u l t g r a m m a t i c a l l y f r o m t h e n o u n c e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , a t h r e a t s u c h as
c o n t e n t o f a successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — a s w h e n a v a l i d c o m m a n d
(4) I f y o u d o n ' t give Peter t h e m o n e y I ' l l i n f o r m y o u r s u p e r i o r
is e x e c u t e d , a p r o m i s e is k e p t , a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n is r e a l i z e d , o r
that . . .
w h e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y fit w i t h t h e s u b s e q u e n t
course o f the i n t e r a c t i o n . H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims r u l e the per- may be challenged not only as a literally meant "naked" an-
l o c u t i o n a r y o n e s . B y c o n t r a s t , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effectS2 a r e g r a m m a t i - n o u n c e m e n t f r o m the two points o f view o f the lack o f truthfulness
c a l l y n o n r e g u l a t e d , t h a t is, c o n t i n g e n t , c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a s p e e c h act o f the declaration o f intention a n d the lack o f t r u t h o f the existential
t h a t , h o w e v e r , o c c u r o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success—as p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ; i t c a n also be c h a l l e n g e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e x -
w h e n a p i e c e o f news, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , d e l i g h t s o r startles t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i n t e n d e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2. (4) m a y be
t h e receiver, o r w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e e n c o u n t e r s r e s i s t a n c e , a c o n f e s - n e g a t e d n o t o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s expressly r a i s e d
s i o n a w a k e n s d o u b t , a n d so f o r t h . F i n a l l y , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s 3 can w i t h t h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, as i n
be achieved o n l y i n a m a n n e r t h a t is inconspicuous as f a r as t h e
(4') You d o n ' t really m e a n w h a t y o u are saying.
addressee is c o n c e r n e d ; t h e success o f t h i s k i n d o f strategic a c t i o n — a
k i n d t h a t r e m a i n s l a t e n t f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y — i s also d e p e n d e n t on (4") Y o u d o n ' t h a v e a n y t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
t h e m a n i f e s t success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act.
I n a d d i t i o n , the context presupposed b y t h e speaker, w i t h i n w h i c h
T h e so-called perlocutions c o n s t i t u t e a s p e c i a l case t h a t is i n t e r e s t -
(4) first b e c o m e s a t h r e a t f o r a specific a d d r e s s e e , c a n also b e con-
i n g f o r a n a l y t i c p u r p o s e s . T h e s e , t o o , r e q u i r e successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y
tested:
acts as t h e i r v e h i c l e ; h o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , e v e n t h e
apparent d o m i n a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m — s t i l l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e (4"') Y o u c a n ' t t h r e a t e n m e w i t h t h a t — h e has a l r e a d y k n o w n i t
last class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t I mentioned—disappears. 1 2
for a long time.
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f a s s e r t i n g
I n s u c h a case t h e s p e e c h act is n o t s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g contested; r a t h e r
(3) You are behaving like a swine. i t is s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d w h y t h e i n t e n d e d e f f e c t w i l l n o t o c c u r a n d w h y
t h e p e r l o c u t i o n r e m a i n s ineffective. O n l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t c a n
takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e openly p u r s u e d p e r l o c u -
b e valid o r invalid m a y b e contested.
t i o n a r y a i m o f o f f e n d i n g t h e h e a r e r , f o r t h e n t h e a s s e r t i o n c o u n t s as
(However, p e r l o c u t i o n s o f this k i n d can be r e - e m b e d d e d in a
s l a n d e r , o r as a r e p r o a c h , o r as a n i n s u l t . I n a s i m i l a r way, a n y
n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t i n a s e c o n d a r y way b e c a u s e , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n -
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h a t s o e v e r c a n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t e x t , c o u n t as
d e m n a t i o n o f m i s d e m e a n o r s i n a m o r a l o r a l e g a l sense a p p e a l s t o
a n expression o f m o c k e r y o r d e r i s i o n because t h e literally expressed
a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s a n d t o t h i s e x t e n t , d e s p i t e its
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g is b l o t t e d o u t a n d r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e set
p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a -
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f s h o w i n g u p t h e addressee ( o r b y t h e a l r e a d y
s o n , s u c h normatively embedded r e p r o a c h e s — u n l i k e a c t i o n s t h a t do
o c c u r r i n g effect o f t h i s ) .
n o t r e a l l y a i m t o say a n y t h i n g b u t , i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g , a i m t o o f f e n d
T h r e a t s represent a special sort o f p e r l o c u t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s o m e o n e — c a n b e r e j e c t e d o n t h e basis o f reasons. S o m e t h i n g s i m i -
a c t o f a n n o u n c i n g a c o n d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n a c q u i r e s t h e sense
l a r t o w h a t h o l d s f o r m o r a l r e p r o a c h e s , c o n d e m n a t i o n s , a n d so o n
o f a threat t h r o u g h the explicit reference to the i n t e n d e d perlocu-
also h o l d s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l e g a l t h r e a t s o f p u n i s h m e n t ; d u e t o t h e
t i o n a r y effects o f d e t e r r i n g t h e addressee. I t s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -
332 333

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s of t h e C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

l e g i t i m a t i n g b a c k g r o u n d consensus a b o u t the n o r m s o f p u n i s h m e n t ever, t h e t r u t h values t h a t g u i d e e a c h o f t h e m f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w


themselves, the threatened punishment is r e g a r d e d as a conse- o f t h e i r respective personal p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals are n o t t r a n s -
q u e n c e o f a l e g a l system f o r w h i c h a g r e e m e n t is p r e s u p p o s e d ) . f o r m e d i n t o t r u t h claims, w h i c h h a v e a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
i i . I n strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ac- i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d w h i c h t h e y t h e r e f o r e raise p u b l i c l y ,
c o r d i n g to the p a t t e r n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . H e r e , linguistic c o m m u n i c a - w i t h a c l a i m to discursive v i n d i c a t i o n . (We are f a m i l i a r w i t h this f o r m
tion is subordinated t o t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . of indirect communication f r o m diplomatic intercourse between
Strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s are d e t e r m i n e d by the decisions o f actors i n m u t u a l l y mistrustful parties or f r o m m i l i t a r y contexts: i n the C u b a n
a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success w h o reciprocally observe o n e an- m i s s i l e crisis, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o v e r b i a l s h o t across t h e b o w s [ o f
other. They confront one another u n d e r conditions o f d o u b l e con- t h e Russian ships] h a d to replace t h e missing i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f
t i n g e n c y as o p p o n e n t s w h o , i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f the verbal announcement w i t h a signal f r o m w h i c h the o p p o n e n t
a c t i o n , exert influence o n o n e a n o t h e r ( n o r m a l l y o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o u l d i n f e r t h e seriousness o f A m e r i c a n i n t e n t i o n s . )
attitudes o f the o t h e r ) . They suspend the performative attitudes o f
p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e y t a k e o n t h e p a r t i c i p a t - C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d L i n g u i s t i c W o r l d - D i s c l o s u r e
i n g speaker a n d hearer roles f r o m the perspective o f t h i r d persons.
F r o m t h e l a t t e r v a n t a g e p o i n t , i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s are n o w r e l e v a n t A g l a n c e at t h e results o f o u r reflections so f a r shows t h a t the
o n l y as c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. T h u s , u n l i k e i n t h e relationship between communicative rationality and language
communicative use o f l a n g u a g e , strategically a c t i n g subjects who s h o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u e d over-eagerly. N o t e v e r y use o f l a n g u a g e is
communicate with one another do n o t pursue their illocutionary c o m m u n i c a t i v e (see t h e first e n t r y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) a n d n o t
aims unreservedly. every linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n serves t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g on
W i t h t h i s , even t h e n a r r o w basis o f r e c i p r o c a l l y a s s u m e d t r u t h f u l - t h e basis o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s (see t h e last
ness n o w d i s a p p e a r s : all s p e e c h acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y line of the schema):
b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g power. N o t only—as i n weak communicative
E x e m p l a r y types Modes o f language use
a c t i o n — a r e the shared n o r m a t i v e contexts a n d the corresponding
c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness l a c k i n g h e r e ; e v e n t h e c l a i m s t o t r u t h Propositional and intentional Noncommunicative
a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d w i t h n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts are n o l o n g e r sentences used " m e n t a l l y "
a i m e d d i r e c t l y at t h e r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r b u t a t g e t t i n g ("pure" representation and
t h e addressee t o d r a w h i s conclusions f r o m w h a t t h e s p e a k e r i n d i r e c t l y "monological" action planning)
gives h i m t o u n d e r s t a n d . N a t u r a l l y , t h i s is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i -
N o r m a t i v e l y n o n e m b e d d e d ex- Oriented toward reaching
p a n t s u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r , t h a t is, i f t h e y f e e d p a r a s i t i c a l l y o n a
pressions o f w i l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)
c o m m o n linguistic knowledge ( t h a t they have l e a r n e d i n contexts o f
C o m p l e t e l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts Oriented toward agreement
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ) . Because t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f communica-
(expressive, n o r m a t i v e , consta- (Einverständnis)
tive a c t i o n are s u s p e n d e d , h o w e v e r , t h e y n o w m a k e use o f t h i s c o m -
p e t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c t l y t o give e a c h o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e y tive)

b e l i e v e o r w a n t . C e r t a i n l y , s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects p r e s u m e o f Perlocutions O r i e n t e d t o w a r d consequences


e a c h o t h e r t h a t , i n s o f a r as t h e y m a k e d e c i s i o n s r a t i o n a l l y , t h e y base (indirect mutual
t h e i r d e c i s i o n s o n b e l i e f s t h a t t h e y themselves h o l d t o be t r u e . H o w - u n d e r s t a n d i n g — Verständigung)
335
334
S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
Chapter 7

T h e m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use specify, i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a r i o u s c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d . W e speak o f " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " n o t o n l y ( l i k e F r e u d )


a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e s , f o u r d i f f e r e n t types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d ac- i n t h e sense o f a r e t r o s p e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f wishes a n d a c t i o n s b u t

t i o n o f w h i c h , however, o n l y t w o e m b o d y c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y (like Weber) w i t h respect to the l i f e - c o n d u c t o f persons a n d the

(see t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d e n t r i e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) . f o r m s o f life o f collectives. Such f o r m s o f life consist o f practices a n d


a web o f traditions, institutions, customs, a n d competencies that may
Types o f a c t i o n / a c t o r ' s b e c a l l e d " r a t i o n a l " t o t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e y a r e conducive t o t h e
Modes o f language attitude s o l u t i o n o f p r o b l e m s t h a t arise. T o t h i s e x t e n t , a l t h o u g h f o r m s o f l i f e
use Objectivating Performative q u a l i f y as c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e t e r m " r a t i o n a l , " t h e y d o so o n l y i n t h e
i n d i r e c t sense t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e m o r e o r less " c o n g e n i a l " b a c k -
Nonsocial Intentional —
g r o u n d f o r establishing discursive p r o c e d u r e s and for developing
action Noncommunicative action
r e f l e x i v e c a p a c i t i e s . I n t h i s way, t h e y c a n p r o m o t e capacities for
Oriented toward — Weak p r o b l e m s o l v i n g t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t enable r a t i o n a l beliefs, actions,
reaching communicative and communication.
understanding action W i t h its c a t e g o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d g r a m m a t i c a l p r e s t r u c t u r i n g
(Verständigung) o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e m a k e s a
Social c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s enabling o f r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . I n r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the objective w o r l d ,
interactions Oriented toward — Strong
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s always a l r e a d y o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f
agreement communicative
their lifeworld. N o m a t t e r h o w h i g h they c l i m b , the h o r i z o n retreats
(Einverständnis) action
before t h e m , w i t h the result that they can never b r i n g the lifeworld
as a luhole before them—as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d — a n d
Oriented toward Strategic — s u r v e y i t as a w h o l e . I t is n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h i s B e i n g - i n - t h e - W o r l d ,
consequences interactions as a n a l y z e d b y H e i d e g g e r , c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e s t r a n g e s e m i t r a n -
s c e n d e n c e o f a l a n g u a g e t h a t , a l t h o u g h w e c a n use i t as a m e a n s o f
Clearly, the linguistic m e d i u m extends f u r t h e r t h a n c o m m u n i c a -
c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is n o n e t h e l e s s n e v e r a t o u r d i s p o s a l : w e always o p -
tive r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h t h e e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n a l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e , the
erate t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of language a n d can never perfor-
teleological rationality o f action, a n d the communicative rationality
m a t i v e l y — s o l o n g as we s p e a k — o b j e c t i f y i t as a w h o l e . I n t h i s way,
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g we have b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h r e e
t h e l i f e w o r l d , w h i c h is i t s e l f a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e ,
a u t o n o m o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t a r e i n t e r w o v e n b y way o f t h e
o p e n s u p f o r its m e m b e r s a n i n t e r p r e t i v e h o r i z o n f o r e v e r y t h i n g t h a t
common m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , these c o r e s t r u c t u r e s a r e
they experience i n the world, about w h i c h they reach under-
i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s ( a n d , as S c h n a d e l b a c h cor-
standing, a n d f r o m w h i c h they can learn.
rectly emphasizes, to a c o r r e s p o n d i n g reflexivity o f the consciously
c o n d u c t e d life o f persons). T h e i r r e l a t i o n to the level o f a r g u m e n - W e h a v e p r e s u m e d u p t o n o w t h a t l a n g u a g e has a s t r u c t u r e - f o r m -
t a t i o n a n d r e f l e c t i o n is as c o r r o b o r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s . B u t w h a t d o e s i n g p o w e r w i t h r e g a r d to beliefs, actions, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r -
l a n g u a g e as such h a v e t o d o w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f b e l i e f s , a c t i o n s , ances. H o w e v e r , s u c h a g l o b a l r e f e r e n c e t o " l a n g u a g e " c o n c e a l s t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , a n d persons? g e n u i n e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t l a n g u a g e m a k e s w i t h its w o r l d - d i s c l o s -
ing productivity. 1 3
Certainly, the epistemic core structure o f the
A f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t these expressions
p r o p o s i t i o n is p a r t o f t h e l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . T h e
a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a l i f e w o r l d t h a t is i n t u r n l i n g u i s t i -
336 337

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

propositional attitudes o f the c o m p e t e n t speaker constitute the a - r a t i o n a l . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is i r r a t i o n a l . E v e n a l i n g u i s t i -


structural core o f rational action. Moreover, communicative ration- cally c r e a t i v e r e n e w a l o f o u r v i e w o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e t h a t a l l o w s
a l i t y is e x p r e s s e d i n p r a c t i c e s o f s p e e c h t h a t , w i t h t h e i r d i a l o g u e r o l e s us t o see o l d p r o b l e m s i n a c o m p l e t e l y n e w l i g h t d o e s n o t f a l l o u t o f
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e presuppositions, are geared t o w a r d the i l l o c u - t h e b l u e — i t is n o " D e s t i n i n g o f B e i n g " (Seinsgeschick). For world-
d o n a r y a i m o f intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f validity claims. The d i s c l o s i n g i n t e r p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e m u s t c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o v e its t r u t h ;
v a r i o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r e g o i n g are reflected i n i t m u s t p u t a c t i n g subjects i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o m e t o g r i p s w i t h w h a t
linguistic structures. However, this entire rationality complex, on happens t o t h e m i n the w o r l d , a n d t o l e a r n f r o m mistakes. O n t h e
w h i c h a society's c a p a c i t i e s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g i n a l l its o t h e r h a n d , the retrospectively p r o d u c e d revisions o f this w o r l d -
d i m e n s i o n s d e p e n d , o b v i o u s l y d o e s n o t , as i t w e r e , s t a n d o n its o w n i n t e r p r e t i n g l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a r e j u s t as l i t t l e a n a u t o m a t i c r e s u l t
t w o f e e t b u t r a t h e r n e e d s a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d w h o s e substance is o f successful p r o b l e m s o l v i n g . I t is m o r e a m a t t e r o f stimulating t h e
articulated i n the m e d i u m o f language: a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d that linguistic i m a g i n a t i o n — P e i r c e spoke o f abductive f a n t a s y — t h r o u g h
f o r m s m o r e o r less s u i t a b l e c o n t e x t s , a n d p r o v i d e s r e s o u r c e s , f o r f a i l e d a t t e m p t s t o solve p r o b l e m s a n d f a l t e r i n g l e a r n i n g processes.
a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t o solve p r o b l e m s . T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e is n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l nor
T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense i n w h i c h f o r m s o f l i f e c a n be " r a t i o n a l " i r r a t i o n a l ; as a n e n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r i t is i t s e l f
d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s t h a t takes p l a c e b e t w e e n , o n a-rational. T h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y this a-rational char-
the one h a n d , the linguistically p r i o r interpretive knowledge that a c t e r has r e p e a t e d l y f a i l e d t o b e r e c o g n i z e d . A t a n y r a t e , p h i l o s o p h i -
discloses t h e w o r l d f o r a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y i n a m o r e o r less cal i d e a l i s m f r o m Plato t h r o u g h K a n t to H e i d e g g e r has always
p r o d u c t i v e way a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m o r e o r less i n n o v a t i v e d i s c e r n e d Logos a t w o r k i n t h e t o t a l i z i n g p o w e r o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes t h a t a r e m a d e possible b y m e a n s o f linguistic interpretation o f the w o r l d . Philosophical idealism singled
this, t h r o u g h w h i c h knowledge o f t h e w o r l d is a c q u i r e d a n d ex- o u t this "reason" (Vernunft) as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r k n o w l e d g e of the
p a n d e d , a n d i m p e t u s is g i v e n f o r r e v i s i o n o f t h e a n t e c e d e n t inter- t o t a l i t y a n d a c c o r d e d i t a n overriding i m p o r t a n c e vis-à-vis " u n d e r -
p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e . H e r e w e s h o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels: t h e level s t a n d i n g " (Verstand), c o n c e i v e d as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r d e a l i n g r a t i o n a l l y
o f l i n g u i s t i c a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d , t h e level o f w i t h p r o b l e m s t h a t are p o s e d f o r us i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l
practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n such an intersubjectively p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n was d e e m e d t o be t h e c a p a c i t y f o r c o n t e m p l a t i v e l y
shared lifeworld, a n d the level o f the objective w o r l d , f o r m a l l y pre- g r a s p i n g t h e o r d e r o f b e i n g as a w h o l e . O n t h e K a n t i a n r e a d i n g o f
s u p p o s e d b y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n c o n t i n u e d t o b e seen as t h e c a p a c i t y
e n t i t i e s a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is s a i d . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r ideas, a l t h o u g h t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g p o w e r o f these ideas was
world-disclosure a n d i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes—an interac- n o w c o n c e i v e d as t h e t o t a l i z i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n -
t i o n t h a t expands k n o w l e d g e a n d alters meanings—takes place o n t a l s u b j e c t . H o w d i f f i c u l t i t is, e v e n i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m , t o
t h e m i d d l e level w h e r e , w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d , c o m - b r e a k f r e e f r o m i d e a l i s m , c a n be seen i n t h e case o f H e i d e g g e r w h o
m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o n e another still conceived epochal world-disclosures as the "Happening of
about something i n the world. Truth" (Wahrheitsgeschehen). O n l y a soberly conducted, pragmatic-

T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a l l o w s us t o see e v e r y - l i n g u i s t i c t u r n p e r m i t s us t o r e l i e v e t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g a n d a r t i c u -

t h i n g t h a t we e n c o u n t e r i n t h e w o r l d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f l a t i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e o f t h e b u r d e n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge.

v i e w o f specific aspects a n d r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s b u t also as e l e m e n t s L i n g u i s t i c w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e stands i n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n t o


o f a w h o l e , as p a r t s o f a c a t e g o r i a l l y o r g a n i z e d t o t a l i t y . A l t h o u g h i t t h e r a t i o n a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s u b j e c t s i n t h e w o r l d w h o are f a l -
d o e s h a v e a relation t o r a t i o n a l i t y , i t i t s e l f is, i n a c e r t a i n sense, l i b l e , t h o u g h c a p a b l e o f l e a r n i n g . S e e n i n t h i s way, r e a s o n can
338 339

Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

w i t h d r a w i n t o the idealizations o f validity claims a n d the f o r m a l - p r a g - • A s p e a k e r a n d a n addressee w h o h a v e c o m m a n d o v e r a c o m m o n


matic presupposition o f worlds; i t renounces every f o r m o f totalizing language (or w h o c o u l d establish a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e b y way o f
knowledge, n o matter h o w concealed, w h i l e nonetheless requiring translation)
o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s — s e t i n their c o n t i n g e n t life- • A s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t c a n be s c r u t i n i z e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s
w o r l d contexts—a universalist a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a m u t e d "transcen-
• A n intersubjectively shared (or sufficiently "overlapping") back-
dence f r o m w i t h i n " that does justice to the irrefutably u n c o n d i t i o n a l
ground understanding
c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t is h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e a n d w h a t o u g h t - t o - b e .
• A l o c a l l y s i t u a t e d u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker, w i t h a "yes" o r "no"
p o s i t i o n o n i t b y a n addressee
A p p e n d i x o n a Pragmatic T h e o r y o f Meaning
To e x p l a i n this I rely o n two assumptions:
Some implications for a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g result f r o m
1. L i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n essentially exists i n o r d e r f o r o n e p e r -
the distinction between the above-mentioned different modalities o f
son to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e
l a n g u a g e use. S u c h a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g m o d i f i e s t h e basic thesis o f
world.
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s as d e v e l o p e d b y F r e g e a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n
i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way: o n e u n d e r s t a n d s a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h e n o n e 2. R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g implies that the hearer recognizes a
k n o w s w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s thesis starts f r o m t h e p r e m i s e validity c l a i m raised by the speaker f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n .
t h a t t h e addressee's r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t
These specifications o f e x p l a n a n d u m a n d explanans lead to the
is s a i d is t o b e w o n b y m e a n s o f a n a c c e p t a b l e speech-act o f f e r , so
explanation:
t h a t she is b r o u g h t t o a c c e p t t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f as v a l i d . 1 4
At first
glance, however, expressions o f w i l l t h a t are n o t e m b e d d e d n o r m a - • T o u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e could
tively, s u c h as i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n (also s p e e c h use i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e -
acts specific t o c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s ) , p r e s e n t t h i n g i n the w o r l d .
counterexamples. C l e a r l y , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o f t h i s k i n d h a v e no
built-in o r i e n t a t i o n toward a consensual acceptance. I n d e e d , the N a t u r a l l y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is n o t t h e s a m e as
a s s u m p t i o n that l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n aims f u n d a m e n t a l l y at reaching understanding about something with the help of an utter-
a g r e e m e n t seems c o m p l e t e l y c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e f o r , i f t h a t w e r e t h e a n c e h e l d t o b e v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , as has a l r e a d y b e e n o b s e r v e d b y
case, i t w o u l d have t o b e p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, i n language t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g
use o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r i g i n a l m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use, w h e r e a s a l l a n d v a l i d i t y are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d ; m o r e o v e r , t h e y are c o n n e c t e d
i n d i r e c t f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n w h i c h o n e p a r t y gives a n o t h e r i n such a way t h a t one understands a speech act w h e n o n e knows
t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g , w o u l d h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status. I w a n t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . A n o r i e n t a -
( i ) b e g i n b y r e c a l l i n g t h e basic f e a t u r e s o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n t i o n t o w a r d t h e possible v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c
o f m e a n i n g , a n d t h e n (ii) u n d e r t a k e two revisions. conditions n o t just o f reaching understanding b u t o f linguistic u n -
d e r s t a n d i n g itself. ( I n c i d e n t a l l y , this e x p l a i n s w h y we can l e a r n to
i . T h e p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g sets o u t t o e x p l a i n w h a t i t is
speak o n l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h a t is, i n
t o u n d e r s t a n d a s p e e c h act. I n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f s p e e c h acts,
p r a c t i c e s f r o m w h i c h i t emerges w h e n t h e g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y
sentences are used w i t h " c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t . " I n o r d e r f o r this
accepts w h a t as v a l i d . )
i n t e n t i o n to be realized, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,
a t least, m u s t be satisfied:

i
340 I 341

Chapter 7 j Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

N o t " t r u t h " b u t an epistemically inflected, generalized concept o f t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e speakers i n a n a t t i t u d e


" v a l i d i t y " i n t h e sense o f " r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y " is t h e k e y c o n c e p t oriented t o w a r d success ( a n d , t h u s , f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e ) . Even
for a pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h i s a p p r o a c h has, o f c o u r s e , perlocutions, w h i c h r i d e o n t h e b a c k s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, c a n be
t h e c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f a s p e e c h act are criticized f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t r u t h o f the assumptions
i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h the h e l p o f t h e reasons t h a t , u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i - i m p l i e d i n a g i v e n case ( a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s f o r context-dependent
tions, c a n serve t o v i n d i c a t e a c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m . K n o w i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s ) . O f c o u r s e , s i n c e p e r l o c u t i o n s as such d o not
t h e kinds of reasons w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d v i n d i c a t e t h e v a l i d i t y ! r e p r e s e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a n d a r e n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l ac-
c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e e c h act. ceptability, this k i n d o f negation can h a v e t h e sense o n l y o f an
( T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e h o l i s t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e as explanation as t o w h y t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d i n
w e l l as t h e i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a n d k n o w l e d g e the given circumstances.
of the world.)
i i . Previously, I h a d p r e s u m e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts Notes
d e p e n d s o n the k n o w l e d g e o f reasons t h a t justify an illocutionary
success a n d c a n r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s p e a k e r 1. H . Schnädelbach, " U b e r Rationalität u n d Begründung," in Zur Rehabilitierung des
animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), p. 63.
a n d h e a r e r . I n o w h a v e t o revise t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i n v i e w o f my
differentiation w i t h i n the concept o f reaching understanding, and 2. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie als Theorie der Rationalität," in Zur Rehabilitierung,
pp. 47f.
i n v i e w o f t h e status o f s p e e c h acts s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s .
To understand a s p e e c h act is t o k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the 3. [Editor's note:] Schnädelbach (as quoted by Habermas) speaks of the "reflexive
having" of expressions, knowledge, actions, intentions, utterances, and so on. Since
i l l o c u t i o n a r y o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c a n a c h i e v e it is not possible in English to speak of "having" expressions, actions, or utterances,
w i t h i t ( w i t h t h i s , w e t a k e a c c o u n t o f p e r l o c u t i o n s w h o s e success, "reflexive character" or "reflexivity" has been used as appropriate.
h o w e v e r , p r e s u p p o s e s c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act em-
4. Schnädelbach, Zur Rehabilitierung, p. 76.
p l o y e d i n a g i v e n case).
5. J . Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking
O n e knows the c o n d i t i o n s for the i l l o c u t i o n a r y or perlocutionary
trans, by W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 149-204.
success o f a s p e e c h act w h e n one knows the kinds of actor-inde-
p e n d e n t o r actor-relative reasons w i t h w h i c h the speaker c o u l d v i n - 6. T h i s explains the wealth of ways of using the term "rational" in academic lan-
guage; cf. the various "types of rationality" identified in H . L e n k and H . E Spinner,
d i c a t e h e r v a l i d i t y c l a i m discursively. M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g between "Rationalitätstypen, Rationalitätskonzepte u n d Rationalitätstheorien im Uberblick,"
a c t o r s i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success is also p o s s i b l e ( i n a in H . Stachowiak, ed., Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens (Hamburg, 1989), pp. 1-31.

w e a k sense) i f t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f a n a n n o u n c e m e n t
7. H . I . Brown, Rationality (London, 1988); cf. also the early work of H . Schnädel-
or an imperative (or threat) can be p r o v e n w i t h the h e l p o f actor- bach, " U b e r den Realismus," Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 111 (1972):
relative reasons for t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g resolve. H e r e , 88ff.

those reasons "relative to a given a c t o r " are v a l i d that, f r o m t h e p o i n t 8. G . H . von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1991), pp. 83-132.
o f v i e w o f t h e addressee, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as g o o d - r e a s o n s - f o r - t h e -
9. See chapter 5 in the present volume, pp. 270ff.
given-actor.
T h e s e r e v i s i o n s take a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h acts a r e i l l o - 10. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam-
bridge, 1982), pp. 391ff.
c u t i o n a r y acts e v e n w h e n they are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h claims to
t r u t h a n d truthfulness, a n d w h e n t h e s e c l a i m s t o t h e seriousness 11. Cassirer assigned the "meaning function" to the epistemic use of language, which
in science is specified as the mathematical representation of regularities or as
(and viability) of intentions and decisions can be j u s t i f i e d only

i
342
Chapter 7

8
Fregean "thoughts;" see E . Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, trans.
R. Manheim (New Haven, 1957), pp. 279ff. Richard Rorros Pragmatic Turn (1996)
12. F. Hundschnur, "Streitspezifische Sprechakte," Protosouologie 4 (1993): 140ff.

13. O n the world-disclosing function of language, cf. Cristina Lafont, "Welt-


erschließung u n d Referenz," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (1993): 491-505; also
Martin Seel, "Über Richtigkeit u n d Wahrheit," ibid.: 509-524.

14. See chapters 2 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 116ff. and pp. 278-306, respec-
tively.

I n " T r o t s k y a n d t h e W i l d O r c h i d s " R i c h a r d R o r t y casts a r o m a n t i c


eye b a c k o v e r h i s d e v e l o p m e n t as a p h i l o s o p h e r . 1
Using the f o r m o f
a "narrative o f m a t u r a t i o n , " he presents his intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t
as a p r o g r e s s i v e d i s t a n c i n g o f h i m s e l f f r o m h i s a d o l e s c e n t d r e a m ; t h i s
was t h e d r e a m o f f u s i n g i n a s i n g l e i m a g e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b e a u t y
of wild orchids a n d the liberation f r o m profane suffering of an
e x p l o i t e d society: t h e d e s i r e " t o h o l d r e a l i t y a n d j u s t i c e i n a s i n g l e
v i s i o n " (Yeats). T h e e x i s t e n t i a l b a c k g r o u n d to Rorty's neopragma-
t i s m is h i s r e b e l l i o n against t h e false p r o m i s e s o f p h i l o s o p h y : a p h i -
l o s o p h y t h a t p r e t e n d s t o be a b l e t o satisfy a e s t h e t i c a n d m o r a l n e e d s
i n s a t i s f y i n g t h e o r e t i c a l ones. O n c e u p o n a t i m e , m e t a p h y s i c s w a n t e d
t o i n s t r u c t its p u p i l s i n s p i r i t u a l exercises i n v o l v i n g a p u r i f y i n g c o n -
t e m p l a t i o n o f the g o o d i n the beautiful. B u t the y o u t h f u l Rorty, w h o
h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o be filled w i t h enthusiasm by Plato, Aristotle,
a n d T h o m a s A q u i n a s , p a i n f u l l y comes to realize t h a t the prospect o f
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y h e l d o u t by theory—a
c o n t a c t at o n c e desirable a n d reconciliatory—although possibly a t t a i n -
able i n t h e m o r e d e f i n i t e f o r m s o f prayer, c a n n o t be achieved a l o n g
the p a t h o f philosophy. As a r e s u l t , R o r t y r e m e m b e r s Dewey—
s c o r n e d by M c K e o n , L e o Strauss, a n d M o r t i m e r A d l e r — w h o h a d n o t
yet b e e n c o m p l e t e l y forgotten i n t h e C h i c a g o o f t h e 1940s. The
realization t h a t everyday reality conceals n o h i g h e r reality, n o r e a l m
o f b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f t o be d i s c l o s e d ecstatically, a n d t h a t e v e r y d a y p r a c -
tices leave n o r o o m f o r a redemptory v i s i o n , c u r e s t h e s o b e r e d R o r t y
344 345

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

o f h i s P l a t o n i c sickness. T o b e s u r e , t h e m e m o r y o f t h e e x o t i c s i g h t o f a d e f l a t i o n a r y strategy as r e g a r d s t h e p r o b l e m o f t r u t h o r t h r o u g h
a n d the overpowering smell o f the w i l d orchids i n the mountains of a n i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f . O n t h e o n e h a n d ,
h i s c h i l d h o o d i n t h e n o r t h w e s t o f N e w Jersey c a n n o t b e e x t i n g u i s h e d I w i l l t a k e issue w i t h t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t r e l i e s o n a s e m a n -
completely. tic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , e m p h a s i z i n g i n s t e a d t h e advantages of a
I t is r o u g h l y t h u s i n t e r m s o f h i s o w n l i f e - h i s t o r y t h a t R o r t y t o d a y pragmatic viewpoint. O n the o t h e r h a n d , again f r o m a pragmatic
e x p l a i n s t o us t h e m o t i v e s f o r h i s v i e w o f t h e d u a l d o m i n a n c e of perspective, I w i l l criticize a k i n d o f epistemization o f the idea of
D e w e y a n d H e i d e g g e r d e v e l o p e d i n Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. t r u t h t h a t I m y s e l f o n c e p r o p o s e d . I n d o i n g so I w i l l d e v e l o p a n
Strangely e n o u g h , this self-presentation contains n o reference to the a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e l i q u i d a d o n o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m s t o t r u t h . I t is
p a r a m o u n t role played by W i t t g e n s t e i n , the t h i r d party i n the alli- t h i s l i q u i d a t i o n t h a t has u l t i m a t e l y c o m p e l l e d R o r t y t o e f f e c t a p r o b -
ance. Rorty's r e p o r t o n t h e experiences o f his o w n philosophical lematic n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i f i e d r e a s o n — o r , at any rate, o n e
d e v e l o p m e n t b r e a k s o f f w i t h h i s r e a d i n g o f H e g e l as h i s s t u d e n t days that leads to f u r t h e r p r o b l e m s .
i n Yale d r a w t o a close a n d h i s w o r k as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r is
o n l y a b o u t to begin. H i s t r a i n i n g i n analytic p h i l o s o p h y w i t h his real A Platonicalfy M o t i v a t e d Anti-Platonist
t e a c h e r , W i l f r i d Sellars, h i s basic c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h o f p h y s i c a l -
i s m , h i s successful c a r e e r as a y o u n g a n a l y t i c philosopher—these R i c h a r d R o r t y is o n e o f t h e m o s t o u t s t a n d i n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ,
steps i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a r e n o t m e n t i o n e d at a l l . H o w e v e r , i t is c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u i n g i n a n i n f o r m e d a n d a s t u t e way. B u t h i s p r o g r a m
solely h i s a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d t h e t r a d i t i o n o f analytic p h i l o s o p h y — f o r a p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is t o d o away w i t h a l l p h i l o s o p h y seems t o
t h e o n l y t r a d i t i o n i n w h o s e l a n g u a g e R o r t y has l e a r n e d t o a r g u e a n d spring m o r e f r o m the melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician,
using w h i c h he continues to e x p o u n d his e x c i t i n g teachings bril- d r i v e n o n b y n o m i n a l i s t spurs, t h a n f r o m t h e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m o f a n
l i a n t l y — t h a t c a n e x p l a i n w h y h e a t t r i b u t e s a c u l t u r a l l y c r i t i c a l sig- e n l i g h t e n e d a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r w h o wishes t o c o m p l e t e t h e l i n -
n i f i c a n c e t o h i s a n t i - P l a t o n i c t u r n , a s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o g u i s t i c t u r n i n a p r a g m a t i s t way. I n 1 9 6 7 , w h e n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y
e x t e n d far b e y o n d his o w n person a n d his private switch o f p h i l o - ( i n b o t h its v e r s i o n s ) h a d a c h i e v e d w i d e s p r e a d r e c o g n i t i o n c o m p a -
sophical allegiance. r a b l e to t h a t e n j o y e d by N e o - K a n t i a n i s m i n the p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e
I w i l l deal briefly w i t h this m o t i v a t i o n f o r a k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g F i r s t W o r l d War, R o r t y e d i t e d a r e a d e r w i t h t h e d e m a n d i n g l y l a c o n i c
t h a t w a n t s t o b i d f a r e w e l l t o i t s e l f as s u c h b e f o r e c o n f i n i n g m y s e l f t o t i t l e , The Linguistic Turn. T h i s r e a d e r , as w e c a n see i n r e t r o s p e c t ,
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e n e o p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n itself. m a r k s a b r e a k i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t . T h e texts c o l l e c t e d
F r o m the pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n Rorty ob- i n t h e r e a d e r are m e a n t t o serve a d o u b l e p u r p o s e . I n s u m m i n g u p
tains a nonrealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f knowledge. I n order to test a t r i u m p h a n t progression, t h e y are i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o
w h e t h e r h e r a d i c a l i z e s t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n t h e r i g h t way, I w i l l t h e n s i g n a l its e n d . A t a n y r a t e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s l a u d a t o r y g e s t u r e , t h e
compare the contextualist approach with the epistemological doubt m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l distance f r o m w h i c h the e d i t o r c o m m e n t s o n the
o f t h e m o d e r n s k e p t i c . I n d o i n g so I w i l l r e c a l l a p r o b l e m t h a t was t e x t s b e t r a y s t h e H e g e l i a n message t h a t e v e r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t
always c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o h e r e n c e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h : t h e p r o b l e m t h a t a c h i e v e s m a t u r i t y is c o n d e m n e d t o d e c l i n e . A t t h a t t i m e R o r t y
o f h o w t r u t h is to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . I n gave t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n a l t o a d i s c o u r s e t h a t has s i n c e g i v e n i t s e l f t h e
r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ways. n a m e " p o s t a n a l y t i c . " I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e r e a d e r , h e speculates
W h e r e a s R o r t y assimilates t r u t h t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e of o n t h e " f u t u r e " o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y — a f u t u r e t h a t relegates i t t o
everyday realist i n t u i t i o n s , o t h e r s a t t e m p t to take a c c o u n t o f these t h e past tense. I n t h e face o f a s t i l l i n t a c t o r t h o d o x y , R o r t y p o i n t s t o
i n t u i t i o n s even w i t h i n the linguistic p a r a d i g m , w h e t h e r w i t h the h e l p three approaches that concur i n their contradiction of the general
346 347
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

basic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " t h e r e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h s s t i l l w a i t i n g t o even today, s o m e t h i n g o f a " d o c t r i n e , " s o m e t h i n g o f t h a t i n i m i t a b l e


be d i s c o v e r e d t h a t c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n t h e basis o f a r g u m e n t s . " R o r t y c o m b i n a t i o n o f w i l d o r c h i d s a n d T r o t s k y : h i s i m i t a t i o n o f t h e ges-
l i n k s these anti-Platonic approaches w i t h the names Heidegger, t u r e , a t least, o f i n s i g h t t h a t is at o n c e stimulating a n d rich in practical
W i t t g e n s t e i n , a n d W a i s m a n n (whose p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o g r a m Rorty consequence. H o w e v e r , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l n e e d t o l i b e r a t e p h i l o s o p h y
even t h e n described i n terms similar to his later d e s c r i p t i o n of f r o m the sterility o f a pusillanimous postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g can
Dewey's p r a g m a t i s m ) . n o w be satisfied o n l y postmetaphysically. T h e f a r e w e l l to analytic
T h i s d i s t a n c e d gaze o n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y i n n o way c o n c e a l s t h e p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t lead back to a devalued metaphysics. For this
i m m e n s e r e s p e c t o f t h e i n i t i a t e w h o h e r e steps o u t s i d e o f h i s own r e a s o n , t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g o p t i o n is t o d r a m a t i z e t h e f a r e w e l l t o
t r a d i t i o n : " L i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , o v e r t h e last t h i r t y years, has suc- p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l . O n l y i f t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g i t s e l f w e r e t o
ceeded in putting the entire philosophical tradition, f r o m Par- release a s h o c k a n d i n t e r v e n e i n t o e v e r y d a y l i f e w o u l d p h i l o s o p h y
m e n i d e s t h r o u g h Descartes a n d H u m e t o B r a d l e y a n d W h i t e h e a d , "at t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l " b e a b l e t o a c q u i r e a m o r e t h a n p u r e l y
o n t h e d e f e n s i v e . I t has d o n e so b y c a r e f u l a n d t h o r o u g h s c r u t i n y o f a c a d e m i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . B u t h o w is a s e p a r a t i o n f r o m a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o -
t h e ways i n w h i c h t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e u s e d l a n g u a g e i n t h e p h y c a r r i e d o u t w i t h analytic means s u p p o s e d to achieve significance
f o r m u l a t i o n of their problems. This achievement is s u f f i c i e n t t o o f a k i n d that w o u l d allow analytic t h o u g h t to be i l l u m i n a t e d one
p l a c e t h i s p e r i o d a m o n g t h e g r e a t ages o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o - last t i m e i n t h e b r i l l i a n c e o f its g r e a t t r a d i t i o n ? A s I u n d e r s t a n d h i s
phy." 2
O n l y t h e i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y ' s a r g u m e n t s ex- naturalistically refracted impulse toward great philosophy, Rorty
p l a i n s R o r t y ' s real g r i e f . T h i s i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y leads h i m t o b i d f a r e w e l l w a n t s t o give a n a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n .
t o t h e a l l u r i n g p r o m i s e s o f m e t a p h y s i c s so i r r e v o c a b l y t h a t , e v e n post
R o r t y b e g i n s b y s h o w i n g t h a t a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y shares a f u n d a -
analytic philosophy, there can be n o alternative to postmetaphysical
m e n t a l p r e m i s e w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n i t has d e v a l u e d . T h i s is t h e c o n -
t h i n k i n g . N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y , t h e n as n o w , is i n search o f s o m e m o d e
viction that "there are philosophical truths still w a i t i n g to be
o f t h i n k i n g t h a t , as A d o r n o p u t s i t a t t h e e n d o f Negative Dialectics,
discovered." T h a n k s to a very G e r m a n idea that he borrows f r o m
shows s o l i d a r i t y w i t h m e t a p h y s i c s a t t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l . T h e r e is
3

H e i d e g g e r , R o r t y t h e n a t t r i b u t e s a d r a m a t i c w e i g h t i n e s s t o t h i s proton
m e l a n c h o l y i n the s t r a i n e d i r o n y p r o p a g a t e d today by Rorty: "Rorty's
pseudos o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s H e i d e g g e r i a n t h e -
p o s t - p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l is i r o n i c b e c a u s e h e realizes t h a t t r u t h
sis, t h e p r o f a n e d e s t i n i e s o f t h e West a r e s u p p o s e d t o have b e e n
is n o t a l l h e w o u l d l i k e i t t o b e . I r o n y d e p e n d s essentially o n a k i n d
f u l f i l l e d o n l y w i t h i n t h e scope o f a n e p o c h a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g ;
o f nostalgie de la vérité." E v e n t h e r o m a n t i c d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r b e t w e e n
4

m o r e o v e r , o n e g o v e r n e d by m e t a p h y s i c s . O f c o u r s e , u n l i k e H e i d e g -
i r o n y a n d seriousness, H e i d e g g e r a n d Dewey, c a n n o t ease t h e p a i n .
ger, R o r t y c a n n o l o n g e r stylize p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g p o s t a n a -
B e c a u s e m e t a p h y s i c s has c o m m a n d o n l y o v e r t h e l a n g u a g e o f k n o w l -
l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y as a sacral " C o m m e m o r a t i o n o f B e i n g " (Andenken
e d g e , t h e a e s t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f its c l a i m t o t r u t h a m o u n t s t o a n anaes-
des Seins). Rorty understands the deconstruction o f the history o f
t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n as m e r e c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e .
m e t a p h y s i c s as a d e f l a t i o n a r y d i a g n o s i s i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s sense. A n t i -
T h e r e a l i t y o f t h e ideas w i t h w h i c h P l a t o n i c t h e o r y p r o m i s e d t o b r i n g
P l a t o n i s m d r a w s its e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o n l y f r o m t h e
us i n t o c o n t a c t is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y a p p e a l o f aes-
severity o f t h e sickness t h a t i t is s u p p o s e d t o c u r e . T h e u n m a s k i n g
thetic experience. W h a t once aspired to be " t r u e " i n an e m p h a t i c
o f P l a t o n i s m is a i m e d , b e y o n d s c h o l a s t i c i s m , a t a c u l t u r e t h a t is
sense c a n n o t b e p r e s e r v e d i n t h e m o d e o f t h e " e d i f y i n g . " I n f o r f e i t -
a l i e n a t e d f r o m i t s e l f p l a t o n i s t i c a l l y . I f , finally, t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g
i n g t h e b i n d i n g p o w e r o f its j u d g m e n t s , m e t a p h y s i c s also loses its
is n o t t o e x h a u s t i t s e l f i n n e g a t i o n , R o r t y has t o o p e n a p e r s p e c t i v e
substance. 5

that w i l l enable a new self-understanding that can take the place o f


W h e n o n e is f a c e d w i t h t h i s d i l e m m a i t is possible t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e o l d , d e f l a t e d o n e . W i t h t h i s e n d i n view, h e a d a p t s D e w e y ' s
the move Rorty finally m a k e s i n o r d e r t o give b a c k t o p h i l o s o p h y , H e g e l i a n i s m f o r h i s o w n p u r p o s e s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t a p e r s p e c t i v e is
348 349

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

o p e n e d o n everyday practices t h a t are n o l o n g e r d i s t o r t e d by P l a t o n - j e c t s . F o r classical e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e r e is a c o n s t i t u t i v e s e p a r a t i o n


ist p r e j u d i c e s . I n t h i s way, l i k e H e g e l , e v e n t h e "last" p h i l o s o p h e r s between i n n e r a n d o u t e r — a d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d b o d y — t h a t ap-
capture their own time once more i n thought. peals t o t h e p r i v i l e g e d access o f t h e first p e r s o n t o h e r o w n e x p e r i -
Rorty knows, o f course, that such m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections ences. T h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n is s u s t a i n e d by t h e
cannot transform the self-understanding of philosophy o n their wellsprings o f three paradigm-constituting assumptions:
o w n . H e cannot get outside o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t using p h i l o s o p h y
6

1. t h a t w e k n o w o u r o w n m e n t a l states b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g else;
t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s t h o u g h t s . R o r t y w o u l d n o t be t h e s c r u p u l o u s
a n d sensitive, suggestive, a n d s t i m u l a t i n g p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t h e is w e r e 2. t h a t k n o w i n g takes place e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g
h e t o i n s i s t solely o n t h e r h e t o r i c a l r o l e o f t h e r e e d u c a t o r . The objects; a n d
d i a g n o s i s o f a false s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o o , r e m a i n s a m a t t e r f o r 3. t h a t t h e t r u t h o f j u d g m e n t s rests o n e v i d e n c e t h a t v o u c h e s f o r
t h e o r y . R o r t y has t o p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s i f h e is t o c o n v i n c e his their certainty.
colleagues that the "Platonic" d i s t i n c t i o n between " c o n v i n c i n g " a n d
Analysis o f t h e linguistic f o r m o f o u r experiences a n d t h o u g h t s
" p e r s u a d i n g " m a k e s n o sense. H e has t o p r o v e t h a t e v e n a n a l y t i c
discovers i n these assumptions three c o r r e s p o n d i n g m y t h s — t h e
p h i l o s o p h y r e m a i n s captivated by t h e spell o f the metaphysics against
m y t h o f t h e g i v e n , t h e m y t h o f t h o u g h t as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t h e
w h i c h i t is b a t t l i n g .
m y t h o f t r u t h as c e r t a i n t y . I t is s h o w n t h a t we c a n n o t c i r c u m v e n t t h e
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as t h e m e d i u m f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o m -
T h e Pragmatic T u r n
m u n i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e are n o u n i n t e r p r e t e d experiences
(Erfahrungen) t h a t a r e accessible o n l y p r i v a t e l y a n d e l u d e p u b l i c
R o r t y ' s i m p o r t a n t b o o k Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
assessment a n d c o r r e c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , k n o w l e d g e o f o b j e c t s is n o t a n
p u r s u e s a n u m b e r o f a i m s . B y c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u s i o n t h e
adequate m o d e l for the knowledge o f propositionally structured
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness, he wants to c o m -
states o f a f f a i r s . F i n a l l y , t r u t h is a p r o p e r t y o f c r i t i c i z a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s
p l e t e a n o t yet c o m p l e t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n such a way t h a t t h e
t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t ; i t c a n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s —
Platonist self-misunderstanding deeply r o o t e d i n o u r culture be-
it cannot be authenticated o n the basis of the genesis of
c o m e s o b v i o u s . M y d o u b t s r e l a t e t o t h e s e c o n d step. D o e s t h e p r a g -
representations.
m a t i c t u r n , w h i c h R o r t y r i g h t l y d e m a n d s i n t h e face o f s e m a n t i -
Rorty, o f course, connects this critique o f m e n t a l i s m w i t h the m o r e
cally f i x a t e d a p p r o a c h e s , r e q u i r e a n anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
far-reaching a i m o f radicalizing t h e linguistic t u r n . H e wants to show
knowledge?
"what philosophy o f language comes to w h e n p u r i f i e d o f attempts to
a. T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e sub-
i m i t a t e e i t h e r K a n t o r H u m e . " So l o n g as t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n
7

j e c t has, f r o m P e i r c e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d H e i d e g g e r , b e e n s u b j e c t e d
is p r o j e c t e d m e r e l y o n t o t h e s e n t e n c e - f a c t relation, the resulting
to a relendess critique. R o r t y draws o n c o n t e m p o r a r y a r g u m e n t s
s e m a n t i c answers r e m a i n t i e d t o t h e m e n t a l i s t m o d e o f q u e s t i o n i n g .
( a m o n g o t h e r s t h o s e o f Sellars, Q u i n e , a n d D a v i d s o n ) i n o r d e r t o
So l o n g as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung) o f states o f a f f a i r s — l i k e
e x p o s e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m e n t a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y w i t h a v i e w
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) o f o b j e c t s — i s c o n c e i v e d as a t w o -
8

t o a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e i d e a s o f "self-consciousness" a n d "sub-
p l a c e r e l a t i o n , t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n leaves t h e " m i r r o r o f n a t u r e " — a s
j e c t i v i t y " i m p l y t h a t t h e k n o w i n g s u b j e c t c a n disclose f o r i t s e l f a
metaphor for knowledge of the world—intact.
p r i v i l e g e d s p h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y accessible a n d a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n
R o r t y w a n t s t o m a k e f u l l use o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l scope t h a t has b e e n
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) w h e n i t d o e s n o t f o c u s d i r e c t l y o n o b j e c t s b u t
o p e n e d u p by t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . W i t h Peirce he replaces
r a t h e r r e f l e x i v e l y o n i t s o w n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) o f ob-
350 351
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

the two-place r e l a t i o n between r e p r e s e n t i n g subject a n d r e p r e s e n t e d r e a l i s m " i n m i n d . P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l r e a l i s m " stresses t h a t t h e c o n -


object w i t h a three-place relation: the symbolic expression, w h i c h d i t i o n s f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e c a n b e a n a l y z e d o n l y in
a c c o r d s v a l i d i t y to a state o f a f f a i r s , f o r a n i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m m u n i t y . connection with t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a m u t u a l
T h e o b j e c d v e w o r l d is n o l o n g e r s o m e t h i n g t o be r e f l e c t e d b u t is u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is s a i d . O n R o r t y ' s view, " b e i n g
s i m p l y t h e c o m m o n reference p o i n t f o r a process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t o u c h w i t h r e a l i t y " has t o b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e j a r g o n o f " b e i n g
(Verständigung) b e t w e e n m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y i n t o u c h w i t h a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y " i n such a way that the realist
w h o come to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another w i t h regard to i n t u i t i o n , to w h i c h m e n t a l i s m w a n t e d to d o j u s t i c e w i t h its M i r r o r o f
s o m e t h i n g . T h e c o m m u n i c a t e d facts c a n n o m o r e be s e p a r a t e d f r o m N a t u r e a n d its c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d r e p r e -
the p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a n t h e supposition o f a n o b j e c t i v e sented object, disappears completely. F o r Rorty, every k i n d o f r e p r e -
w o r l d can be separated f r o m t h e intersubjectively shared i n t e r p r e t i v e s e n t a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d is a d a n g e r o u s i l l u s i o n .
h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n always a l - Now, i t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w i t h the pragmatic t u r n the
ready operate. Knowledge n o longer coincides w i t h the correspon- epistemic a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n singular, w h o inspects h e r
d e n c e o f s e n t e n c e s a n d facts. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , o n l y a l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n n e r self, is d i s p l a c e d b y t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l , b y t h e " w e " o f a
t h a t is r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e d t o i t s c o n c l u s i o n c a n , i n o v e r c o m i n g m e n - c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y i n f r o n t o f w h i c h every person justifies
t a l i s m , also o v e r c o m e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f t h e M i r r o r o f h e r views. H o w e v e r , i t is o n l y t h e e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s n e w
Nature. a u t h o r i t y t h a t leads R o r t y t o e q u a t e " k n o w l e d g e " w i t h w h a t is ac-
b. I a m i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r R o r t y p e r f o r m s t h i s c e p t e d as " r a t i o n a l " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f o u r r e s p e c t i v e
plausible pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n i n the right communities.
way. I f w e n o l o n g e r r e f e r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s o n l y t o l a n g u a g e J u s t as L o c k e a n d H u m e r e f e r r e d t h e i r m e n t a l i s t r e f l e c t i o n s t o t h e
as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung), relating consciousness o f e m p i r i c a l persons, K a n t r e f e r r e d his to t h e c o n -
t h e m i n s t e a d t o l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , a n a d d i t i o n a l sciousness o f subjects " i n g e n e r a l . " L i n g u i s t i c r e f l e c t i o n s , t o o , c a n b e
d i m e n s i o n is o p e n e d u p . T h i s is t h e d i m e n s i o n o f i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d r e f e r r e d to c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s " i n g e n e r a l . " B u t Rorty, t h e
t r a d i t i o n s — t h e p u b l i c space o f a l i f e w o r l d s h a r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y n o m i n a l i s t , stands i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n a n d refers epistemic
b y t h e l a n g u a g e users. T h i s e x p a n d e d p e r s p e c t i v e allows t h e e n t w i n - a u t h o r i t y t o t h e r e c e i v e d social p r a c t i c e s o f " o u r " r e s p e c t i v e c o m m u -
i n g o f the epistemological a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f the socialized i n d i - n i t i e s . H e r e g a r d s t h e u r g e " t o see s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as
v i d u a l s w i t h t h e i r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o m o r e t h a n j u s t such practices" 11
as n o n s e n s i c a l . R o r t y h i m s e l f m a k e s
b e c o m e visible: "Once conversation replaces c o n f r o n t a t i o n [ o f per- the c o n n e c t i o n between, o n the one h a n d , the contextualist inter-
sons w i t h states o f a f f a i r s ] , t h e n o t i o n o f t h e m i n d as M i r r o r of p r e t a t i o n o f the pragmatic t u r n a n d the anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g
N a t u r e can be discarded." T h e " c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l " o f k n o w l -
9
o f knowledge a n d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , the rejection o f a Kantian
e d g e h i g h l i g h t s t h e p o i n t t h a t w e h a v e n o u n f i l t e r e d access t o e n t i - strategy o f analysis: 12
" I f we see k n o w l e d g e as a m a t t e r o f c o n v e r s a -
ties in the world, independent of our practices of reaching t i o n a n d o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , r a t h e r t h a n as a n a t t e m p t t o m i r r o r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the linguistically constituted context o f o u r life- n a t u r e , w e w i l l n o t b e l i k e l y t o envisage a m e t a p r a c t i c e w h i c h w i l l b e
w o r l d : " E l e m e n t s o f w h a t w e c a l l ' l a n g u a g e ' o r ' m i n d ' p e n e t r a t e so the c r i t i q u e o f all possible f o r m s o f social p r a c t i c e . " 1 3
For Rorty, such
deeply i n t o w h a t we call 'reality' t h a t t h e v e r y p r o j e c t o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c a t t e m p t w o u l d be a relapse i n t o f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .
o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g ' m a p p e r s ' o f s o m e t h i n g ' l a n g u a g e - i n d e p e n d e n t ' I n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
is f a t a l l y c o m p r o m i s e d f r o m t h e s t a r t . " 1 0
self-consciousness h a d , w i t h " t h e m e n t a l " a n d " i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " r e -
T h i s is a q u o t a t i o n f r o m H i l a r y P u t n a m w i t h w h i c h R o r t y agrees. spectively, s e c u r e d f o r p h i l o s o p h y — w h i c h a t t h a t t i m e h a d t o find a
N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y has s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l new place alongside t h e n e w physics—an object d o m a i n a n d a
352 353

Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m e t h o d o f its o w n . A s a r e s u l t , p h i l o s o p h y was a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d k n o w i n g d o n o t offer a n s w e r s , g o o d o r b a d , to L o c k e ' s q u e s t i o n s , any m o r e


t h a n L o c k e ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t l a n g u a g e offer a n s w e r s to F r e g e ' s . 1 6

i t s e l f as a f o u n d a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e t h a t c h e c k e d a n d j u s t i f i e d t h e
f o u n d a d o n s o f all o t h e r disciplines. R o r t y n o w holds t h e view that T h i s discontinuity m e a n s t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s are n o t s e t t l e d
t h i s same f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g takes possession o f t h e through finding t h e r i g h t answers; r a t h e r , t h e y f a l l i n t o disuse o n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e w h e n i t stops s h o r t o f a c o n t e x t u a l i s t u n d e r - t h e y h a v e lost t h e i r m a r k e t v a l u e . T h i s also h o l d s f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f
standing of knowledge a n d justification. Universalist approaches the objectivity o f knowledge.
within the philosophy of language—such as R o r t y d i s c e r n s i n D u m - On t h e m e n t a l i s t view, o b j e c t i v i t y is e n s u r e d when the repre-
m e t t a n d others—come u n d e r suspicion here. s e n t i n g s u b j e c t r e f e r s t o h i s o b j e c t s i n t h e r i g h t way. H e c h e c k s t h e
subjectivity o f his representations against the objective w o r l d : "'sub-
C o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d S k e p t i c i s m as P r o b l e m s S p e c i f i c to P a r t i c u l a r j e c t i v e ' c o n t r a s t s w i t h ' c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o w h a t is o u t t h e r e , ' a n d t h u s
Paradigms m e a n s s o m e t h i n g l i k e ' a p r o d u c t o n l y o f w h a t is i n h e r e . ' " 1 7
O n the
l i n g u i s t i c view, t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f b e l i e f s is n o l o n g e r c h e c k e d d i r e c t l y
W h e n R o r t y r e g a r d s c o n t e x t u a l i s m as t h e necessary c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h r o u g h confrontation with the w o r l d b u t rather t h r o u g h public
a f u l l y e x e c u t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h e is r i g h t i n o n e r e s p e c t : c o n t e x t u - agreement achieved i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y : "a ' s u b j e c -
a l i s m d e s i g n a t e s a p r o b l e m t h a t c a n o c c u r o n l y w h e n we r e c k o n on t i v e ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n is o n e w h i c h has b e e n , o r w o u l d b e , o r s h o u l d b e ,
a r e a s o n e m b o d i e d i n l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . B u t h e is w r o n g t o see set aside b y r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s a n t s . " 18
W i t h this, the intersubjectivity o f
c o n t e x t u a l i s m at t h e s a m e time as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . T h i s r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g replaces t h e objectivity o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e
v i e w has its r o o t s , i f I a m c o r r e c t , i n a p r o b l e m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e - w o r l d relation becomes d e p e n d e n t o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be-
philosophical paradigms. tween speakers a n d hearers. T h e v e r t i c a l w o r l d - r e l a t i o n o f repre-
L i k e , for example, A p e l a n d T u g e n d h a t , Rorty regards the history s e n t a t i o n s of s o m e t h i n g , o r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about s o m e t h i n g , is b e n t
of philosophy as a succession o f t h r e e p a r a d i g m s . H e speaks o f b a c k , as i t w e r e , i n t o t h e h o r i z o n t a l l i n e o f t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of
metaphysics, epistemology, a n d the philosophy of language. 1 4
Of participants i n communication. The intersubjectivity of the life-
course, the philosophy o f language has d e t a c h e d i t s e l f o n l y h a l f - w o r l d , w h i c h subjects i n h a b i t i n c o m m o n , displaces t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
h e a r t e d l y f r o m m e n t a l i s m . R o r t y believes t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n can a w o r l d t h a t a solitary subject confronts: "For pragmatists, the desire
b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y t o its c o n c l u s i o n o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f f o r o b j e c t i v i t y is n o t t h e desire t o escape t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o n e ' s
a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n t h a t takes its leave o f p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . 1 5
I t is c o m m u n i t y , b u t s i m p l y t h e d e s i r e f o r as m u c h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a g r e e -
n o t j u s t t h e p r o b l e m s b u t t h e way o f p o s i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t c h a n g e s m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " 1 9
R o r t y w a n t s t o say: t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t t r a n s f o r m s
w i t h the leap f r o m one p a r a d i g m to the next: p e r s p e c t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s as s u c h a r e
passé.
T h i s p i c t u r e o f a n c i e n t a n d m e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y as c o n c e r n e d w i t h things,
t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h t h r o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s w i t h T h e contextualist understanding o f the linguistic t u r n f r o m which
ideas, a n d t h e e n l i g h t e n e d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e n e w i t h words h a s t h i s a n t i - r e a l i s m e m e r g e s goes b a c k t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e rise a n d
c o n s i d e r a b l e plausibility. B u t this s e q u e n c e s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t o f as fall o f paradigms that excludes c o n t i n u i t y o f theme between para-
o f f e r i n g t h r e e c o n t r a s t i n g views a b o u t w h a t is p r i m a r y , o r w h a t is f o u n d a - d i g m s as w e l l as l e a r n i n g processes t h a t e x t e n d across p a r a d i g m s . I n
tional. I t is n o t that A r i s t o d e t h o u g h t t h a t o n e c o u l d best e x p l a i n i d e a s a n d
f a c t , t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h we u n d e r t a k e a c o m p a r i s o n of paradigms
w o r d s i n t e r m s o f t h i n g s , w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s a n d R u s s e l l r e a r r a n g e d the
reflect o u r hermeneutic starting p o i n t — a n d , thus, our own para-
o r d e r o f e x p l a n a t i o n . It w o u l d b e m o r e c o r r e c t to say that A r i s t o t l e d i d n o t
h a v e — d i d n o t feel the n e e d o f — a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h a t D e s c a r t e s d i g m . T h a t R o r t y selects f o r h i s c o m p a r i s o n the frame of reference
a n d L o c k e d i d not have a theory of m e a n i n g . Aristotle's r e m a r k s about o f o b j e c t i v i t y , s u b j e c t i v i t y , a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e basic
354 355
Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

c o n c e p t u a l perspective f r o m w h i c h we n o w describe the linguistic tained the ontological paradigm: the idea that the t r u t h o f j u d g -
t u r n o f mentalism. O n the other h a n d , the picture o f a contingent ments is g u a r a n t e e d by a correspondence with r e a l i t y t h a t is
succession o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s d o e s n o t i n a n y w a y fit g r o u n d e d i n r e a l i t y itself. T h i s " r e s i d u a l " i n t u i t i o n , as i t w e r e , w h i c h
w i t h this description. Rather, f r o m the perspective o f t h a t f r a m e of h a d l o s t n o n e o f its suggestive p o w e r w i t h t h e s w i t c h o f p a r a d i g m ,
r e f e r e n c e , a s u b s e q u e n t p a r a d i g m a p p e a r s as a n a n s w e r t o a p r o b l e m j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h t h e n e w s k e p t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r — a n d i f so,
b e q u e a t h e d t o us b y t h e d é v a l u a t i o n o f a p r e c e d i n g p a r a d i g m . C o n - how—the agreement between representation a n d represented ob-
t r a r y t o w h a t R o r t y supposes, p a r a d i g m s d o n o t f o r m a n a r b i t r a r y j e c t is t o b e g r o u n d e d o n t h e basis o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f o u r subjective
sequence b u t a dialectical relationship. e x p e r i e n c e s . I t is t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t first p r o v o k e s t h e epistemological
N o m i n a l i s m r o b b e d t h i n g s o f t h e i r i n n e r n a t u r e o r essence a n d quarrel between Idealism and E m p i r i c i s m . 2 0
However, i n light o f this
d e c l a r e d g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s t o b e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f a finite m i n d . S i n c e g e n e a l o g y i t b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t — a n d t h i s is m y m a i n p o i n t here—
then, comprehending t h a t w h i c h is (das Seiende) i n t h o u g h t has t h a t c o n t e x t u a l i s m is b u i l t i n t o t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c
lacked a foundation i n the conceptual constitution o f beings them- p a r a d i g m j u s t as s k e p t i c i s m is b u i l t i n t o m e n t a l i s m . A n d o n c e a g a i n ,
selves. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f m i n d w i t h n a t u r e c o u l d n o l o n g e r b e t h e i n t u i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t r u t h t h a t c a r r y o v e r o r s t i c k w i t h us f r o m
c o n c e i v e d as a n o n t o l o g i c a l relation, the rules of logic n o longer the preceding paradigms lead to an intensification of these
r e f l e c t e d t h e laws o f r e a l i t y . Pace R o r t y , m e n t a l i s m r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s problems.
challenge by reversing the o r d e r o f explanation. I f the knowing
J u s t as t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t u n i v e r s a l s at t h e e n d o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s
subject can n o l o n g e r derive the standards f o r k n o w l e d g e f r o m a
c o n t r i b u t e d to the devaluation o f objective reason, the critique of
d i s q u a l i f i e d n a t u r e , i t has t o s u p p l y t h e s e s t a n d a r d s f r o m a r e f l e x i v e l y
i n t r o s p e c t i o n a n d p s y c h o l o g i s m at t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n -
d i s c l o s e d s u b j e c t i v i t y itself. R e a s o n , o n c e e m b o d i e d o b j e c t i v e l y i n t h e
t u r y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e shaking u p o f subjective reason. W i t h the
o r d e r o f n a t u r e , retreats to subjective spirit. W i t h this, the b e i n g - i n -
d i s p l a c e m e n t o f reason f r o m the consciousness o f t h e k n o w i n g sub-
i t s e l f (das Ansich) o f t h e w o r l d is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
j e c t t o l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a c t i n g subjects
a w o r l d t h a t is g i v e n f o r us, t h e s u b j e c t s — a w o r l d o f represented
c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one another, the o r d e r o f explanation changes
o b j e c t s o r phenomena. Whereas u p to t h e n , the constitution of the
o n c e m o r e . E p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y passes o v e r f r o m t h e k n o w i n g s u b -
w o r l d o f being-in-itself h a d enabled a correspondence o f thought
ject, w h i c h supplies f r o m w i t h i n herself the standards for the objec-
with reality—true judgments—the truth of judgments is n o w sup-
tivity o f experience, to the j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices o f a linguistic
p o s e d to be measured against the certainty o f evident subjective
c o m m u n i t y . U p to t h e n the intersubjective v a l i d i t y o f beliefs h a d
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse). R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h o u g h t leads t o o b j e c t i v e
resulted f r o m the subsequent convergence o f thoughts or repre-
k n o w l e d g e i n s o f a r as i t c o m p r e h e n d s t h e p h e n o m e n a l world.
sentations. I n t e r p e r s o n a l agreement h a d b e e n e x p l a i n e d by the o n -
T h e c o n c e p t o f subjectivity i n t r o d u c e d a dualism between i n n e r tological a n c h o r i n g o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s o r by the shared psychological
a n d outer that seemed to c o n f r o n t the h u m a n m i n d w i t h the pre- o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e n d o w m e n t s o f k n o w i n g subjects. F o l l o w i n g t h e
c a r i o u s task o f b r i d g i n g a c h a s m . W i t h t h i s , t h e way was c l e a r e d f o r linguistic t u r n , however, all explanations take the p r i m a c y o f a c o m -
s k e p t i c i s m i n its m o d e r n f o r m . T h e p r i v a t e c h a r a c t e r o f m y p a r t i c u - mon l a n g u a g e as t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t . D e s c r i p t i o n o f states and
l a r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s , o n w h i c h m y a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y is b a s e d , events i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , l i k e t h e s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of experi-
simultaneously p r o v i d e s r e a s o n t o d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as i t ences t o w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t has p r i v i l e g e d access, is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
a p p e a r s t o us is n o t i n f a c t a n i l l u s i o n . T h i s s k e p t i c i s m is a n c h o r e d i n t e r p r e t i n g use o f a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e t e r m
i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n c e p t s o f t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m . A t t h e same " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e " n o l o n g e r r e f e r s t o t h e r e s u l t o f a n observed c o n v e r -
t i m e i t c o n j u r e s u p m e m o r i e s o f t h e c o m f o r t i n g i n t u i t i o n t h a t sus- gence o f the thoughts or representations o f various persons, b u t to
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Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

the p r i o r commonality of a linguistic preunderstanding or horizon m e n t t h a t w o u l d e n s u e i f we did have t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e o n e t o t h e


o f the l i f e w o r l d — w h i c h , f r o m the perspective of the participants o t h e r . I t m a k e s us aware o f a p r o b l e m t o w h i c h c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s m
t h e m s e l v e s , is presupposed—within which the members of a c o m m u - p r e s e n t s a s o l u t i o n t h a t is false b e c a u s e i t c o n t a i n s a p e r f o r m a t i v e
nication community find themselves before they reach under- self-con tradic t i o n .
s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the w o r l d . Finally, the
c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n , w h i c h s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e epis- T r u t h and Justification
t e m o l o g i c a l d o u b t o f skepticism, results f r o m this p r i m a c y o f the
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f s h a r e d b e l i e f s o v e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h r e a l i t y (a Even i n the comprehension o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t states
r e a l i t y t h a t is always a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d ) . o r events i n t h e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e a n d reality interpenetrate i n a
T h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n leaves n o r o o m f o r d o u b t as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e m a n n e r t h a t f o r us is indissoluble. T h e r e is n o n a t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f
o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descriptions. Rather, f r o m Peirce to isolating the constraints o f reality that m a k e a statement t r u e f r o m
W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e i d l e C a r t e s i a n d o u b t has b e e n r e j e c t e d as a p e r f o r - t h e s e m a n t i c r u l e s t h a t lay d o w n t h e s e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . W e can
mative contradiction: " I f you tried to d o u b t everything you w o u l d e x p l a i n w h a t a f a c t is o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h o f a s t a t e m e n t
n o t g e t as f a r as d o u b t i n g a n y t h i n g . T h e g a m e o f d o u b t i n g i t s e l f o f f a c t , a n d w e c a n e x p l a i n w h a t is r e a l o n l y i n t e r m s o f w h a t is t r u e .
p r e s u p p o s e s c e r t a i n t y . " O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l k n o w l e d g e is f a l l i b l e
2 1 B e i n g , as T u g e n d h a t says, is v e r i t a t i v e b e i n g . 2 4
Since the t r u t h of
a n d , w h e n i t is p r o b l e m a t i z e d , d e p e n d e n t o n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A s s o o n beliefs o r sentences can i n t u r n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f
as t h e s t a n d a r d f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e passes f r o m p r i v a t e o t h e r b e l i e f s a n d sentences, w e c a n n o t b r e a k f r e e f r o m t h e m a g i c
certainty to p u b l i c practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " t r u t h " becomes a three- circle o f o u r language. T h i s f a c t suggests a n a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t
p l a c e c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . T h e v a l i d i t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are f a l l i b l e conception o f knowledge and a holistic conception of justification.
i n p r i n c i p l e is s h o w n t o b e v a l i d i t y t h a t is j u s t i f i e d for a p u b l i c . 2 2 B e c a u s e w e c a n n o t c o n f r o n t o u r s e n t e n c e s w i t h a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t
M o r e o v e r , because i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m t r u t h s are accessible i t s e l f a l r e a d y s a t u r a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , n o basic p r o p o s i t i o n s c a n be
o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises o f d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t w o u l d be p r i v i l e g e d i n b e i n g a b l e t o l e g i t i m a t e
h o w i n t h a t case t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n s t i l l b e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e m s e l v e s , t h e r e b y s e r v i n g as t h e basis f o r a l i n e a r c h a i n o f j u s t i f i c a -
t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t is j u s t i f i e d . U n e a s e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s p r o b - t i o n . R o r t y r i g h t l y e m p h a s i z e s " t h a t n o t h i n g c o u n t s as j u s t i f i c a t i o n
l e m b r i n g s o l d e r i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t t r u t h o n t o t h e scene. I t a w a k e n s unless b y r e f e r e n c e t o w h a t we a l r e a d y a c c e p t , " c o n c l u d i n g f r o m t h i s
m e m o r y o f a correspondence between t h o u g h t a n d reality or o f a " t h a t t h e r e is n o way t o g e t o u t s i d e o u r b e l i e f s a n d o u r l a n g u a g e so
c o n t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y t h a t is s e n s o r i a l l y c e r t a i n . T h e s e i m a g e s , w h i c h as t o find s o m e test o t h e r t h a n c o h e r e n c e . " 2 5

a r e s t i l l suggestive d e s p i t e h a v i n g l o s t t h e i r b e a r i n g s , are b e h i n d t h e T h i s does n o t m e a n , o f course, t h a t the c o h e r e n c e o f o u r beliefs


q u e s t i o n o f h o w the fact t h a t we c a n n o t transcend t h e linguistic is s u f f i c i e n t t o c l a r i f y t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h — w h i c h
h o r i z o n o f j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t r u e has n o w b e c o m e c e n t r a l . C e r t a i n l y , w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m ,
p r o p o s i t i o n s fit t h e facts. I t is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e contemporary t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o l o n g e r be c o n c e i v e d as c o r r e s p o n -
r a t i o n a l i t y debates circle a r o u n d t h e concepts o f t r u t h a n d refer- d e n c e w i t h s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d , f o r o t h e r w i s e w e w o u l d have t o
ence. 2 3
J u s t as s k e p t i c i s m d o e s n o t s i m p l y a s s i m i l a t e b e i n g t o a p p e a r - be able to "get outside o f language" w h i l e u s i n g language. Obviously,
a n c e b u t r a t h e r gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e uneasy f e e l i n g t h a t w e might we c a n n o t c o m p a r e linguistic expressions w i t h a piece o f u n i n t e r -
b e u n a b l e t o separate t h e o n e f r o m t h e o t h e r c o n v i n c i n g l y , n e i t h e r p r e t e d o r " n a k e d " r e a l i t y — t h a t is, w i t h a r e f e r e n c e t h a t e l u d e s o u r
does contextualism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , equate t r u t h w i t h j u s t i f i e d linguistically b o u n d inspection. 2 6
Nonetheless, the correspondence
a s s e r t i b i l i t y . C o n t e x t u a l i s m is r a t h e r a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e e m b a r r a s s - i d e a o f t r u t h was a b l e t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect o f t h e
358 359
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m e a n i n g of the truth predicate. This aspect—the n o t i o n o f uncon- n o t be u n d e r s t o o d i n analogy to the inwardness o f a r e p r e s e n t i n g


d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y — i s swept u n d e r t h e c a r p e t i f t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i - s u b j e c t w h o is as i f c u t o f f f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d o f r e p r e s e n t a b l e
t i o n is c o n c e i v e d as c o h e r e n c e w i t h o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s o r as j u s t i f i e d objects. T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between j u s t i f i a b i l i t y a n d t r u t h , a l t h o u g h
a s s e r t i b i l i t y w i t h i n a n i n t e r c o n n e c t e d system o f assertions. Whereas i n n e e d o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n , signals n o g u l f b e t w e e n i n n e r a n d o u t e r , n o
w e l l - j u s t i f i e d assertions c a n t u r n o u t t o b e false, we u n d e r s t a n d t r u t h d u a l i s m t h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e bridged a n d t h a t c o u l d give rise t o t h e
as a p r o p e r t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t . " C o h e r e n c e d e - s k e p t i c a l d o u b t as t o w h e t h e r o u r w o r l d as a whole is a n i l l u s i o n . T h e
p e n d s o n practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t l e t themselves be g u i d e d by p r a g m a t i c t u r n p u l l s t h e r u g f r o m u n d e r t h i s s k e p t i c i s m . T h e r e is a
standards that change f r o m t i m e to time. T h i s accounts f o r the s i m p l e r e a s o n f o r t h i s . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w e c a n n o t use l a n g u a g e
q u e s t i o n : " W h y does t h e f a c t t h a t o u r b e l i e f s h a n g t o g e t h e r , s u p p o s - w i t h o u t acting. S p e e c h i t s e l f is e f f e c t e d i n t h e m o d e o f s p e e c h acts
i n g t h e y d o , give t h e least i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y are t r u e ? " 2 7
t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t are e m b e d d e d i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n a n d
T h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e 2 8
shows t h a t , w i t h t h e e n t w i n e d w i t h i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n s . A s a c t o r s , t h a t is, as i n t e r a c t i n g
t r u t h o f propositions, we c o n n e c t an u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m that p o i n t s a n d i n t e r v e n i n g subjects, we are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s
beyond a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e a b o u t w h i c h we can m a k e statements. L a n g u a g e games a n d practices
e v i d e n c e t h a t we b r i n g t o b e a r i n o u r c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n has t o a r e interwoven. " A t some p o i n t . . . w e h a v e t o leave t h e r e a l m o f
be s u f f i c i e n t t o e n t i t l e us t o raise t r u t h c l a i m s . A l t h o u g h t r u t h c a n - s e n t e n c e s ( a n d t e x t s ) a n d d r a w u p o n a g r e e m e n t i n a c t i o n a n d ex-
n o t b e r e d u c e d t o c o h e r e n c e a n d j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e r e has t o perience (for instance, i n using a p r e d i c a t e ) . " 3 1
F r o m the point of
be a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H o w , o t h e r - view o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language, Husserl's phenomenological
w i s e , w o u l d i t be p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f "p" suc- conclusion t h a t w e "are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s " is
cessful a c c o r d i n g t o o u r s t a n d a r d s , p o i n t s i n f a v o r o f t h e t r u t h o f "p," confirmed.
a l t h o u g h t r u t h is n o t a n a c h i e v e m e n t t e r m a n d d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n as t o t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n be-
h o w w e l l a p r o p o s i t i o n can be j u s t i f i e d . M i c h a e l W i l l i a m s describes tween justification a n d t r u t h — a connection that explains why we
t h e p r o b l e m as a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n two equally reasonable ideas: may, i n l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us, raise a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l
" F i r s t , t h a t i f we are t o h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e t r u t h c l a i m t h a t a i m s b e y o n d w h a t is j u s t i f i e d — i s n o t a n e p i s t e m o -
t r u t h o f w h a t we b e l i e v e a b o u t t h e w o r l d m u s t be i n d e p e n d e n t of l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . I t is n o t a m a t t e r o f b e i n g o r a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t is
o u r b e l i e v i n g i t ; a n d s e c o n d , t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m a t t e r at stake is n o t t h e c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f r e a l i t y b u t everyday
o f s u p p o r t i n g b e l i e f s b y o t h e r b e l i e f s , h e n c e i n t h i s m i n i m a l sense a practices t h a t m u s t n o t fall a p a r t . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t unease betrays a
matter of coherence." 2 9
T h i s leads t o t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n : w o r r y a b o u t the s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g o f language games a n d prac-
"Given o n l y knowledge o f w h a t we believe a b o u t the w o r l d , a n d h o w tices. R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t f u n c t i o n u n l e s s t h e p a r t i c i -
o u r b e l i e f s fit t o g e t h e r , h o w c a n w e s h o w t h a t these b e l i e f s a r e l i k e l y pants refer to a single objective w o r l d , thereby stabilizing the
to be t r u e ? " 3 0
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d p u b l i c space w i t h w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is
T h i s q u e s t i o n s h o u l d n o t , however, be u n d e r s t o o d i n a skeptical m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e c a n be c o n t r a s t e d . 3 2
T h i s supposition o f an objec-
sense, f o r t h e c o n c e p t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h w e , as s o c i a l i z e d i n d i - tive w o r l d t h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s f u l f i l l s a f u n c t i o n a l
v i d u a l s , always a l r e a d y find ourselves w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y dis- r e q u i r e m e n t o f o u r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
closed horizon of our lifeworld implies an unquestioned W i t h o u t t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n , e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h rest o n t h e ( i n a
b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions, proven true i n c e r t a i n sense) P l a t o n i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b e l i e v i n g a n d k n o w i n g
p r a c t i c e , w h i c h m a k e s n o n s e n s e o f t o t a l d o u b t as t o t h e accessibility unreservedly, w o u l d c o m e apart at t h e s e a m s . 33
I f i t were to t u r n o u t
o f t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e , w h i c h w e c a n n o t "get o u t s i d e o f , " s h o u l d t h a t w e c a n n o t i n a n y way m a k e this d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e r e s u l t w o u l d b e
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Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

more of a pathological self-misunderstanding than an illusionary o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n r e m o v e d f r o m everyday practices remains w i t h i n


u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . W h e r e a s s k e p t i c i s m suspects a n e p i s t e - the reach o f "our" practices. 35

m o l o g i c a l mistake, c o n t e x t u a l i s m supposes a faulty c o n s t r u c t i o n i n


t h e way w e l i v e . T h e S e m a n t i c C o n c e p t i o n o f T r u t h a n d the P r a g m a t i c P e r s p e c t i v e
C o n t e x t u a l i s m t h u s raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a n d , as t h e case
m a y b e , h o w t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t w e c a n i n p r i n c i p l e d i s t i n g u i s h be- T a r s k i ' s C o n v e n t i o n T — " ' / > ' is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f p"—relies on a
t w e e n w h a t - i s - t r u e a n d w h a t - i s - h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e c a n be b r o u g h t i n t o d i s q u o t a t i o n a l use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e t h a t c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d , f o r
t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m . T h i s i n t u i t i o n is n o t " r e a l i s t " i n a n e p i s t e m o - instance, by the example o f c o n f i r m i n g a n o t h e r person's statements:
l o g i c a l sense. E v e n w i t h i n p r a g m a t i s m t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f ways w i t h " E v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e witness said y e s t e r d a y is t r u e . " W i t h t h i s , t h e
r e g a r d to this question. Some are pragmatist e n o u g h to take seri- s p e a k e r m a k e s h i s o w n " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t was s a i d , " i n s u c h a way t h a t
ously realist everyday i n t u i t i o n s a n d t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between he could repeat the corresponding a s s e r t i o n s i n t h e stance o f t h e
c o h e r e n c e a n d t r u t h t o w h i c h t h e y attest. O t h e r s r e g a r d t h e a t t e m p t first p e r s o n . T h i s use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e is n o t e w o r t h y i n t w o
t o c l a r i f y t h i s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n as h o p e l e s s , t r e a t i n g e v e r y d a y r e a l i s m respects. F o r o n e t h i n g , i t p e r m i t s a g e n e r a l i z i n g r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t
as a n i l l u s i o n . R o r t y w a n t s t o c o m b a t t h i s i l l u s i o n b y r h e t o r i c a l m e a n s m a t t e r t h a t is m e n t i o n e d b u t n o t e x p l i c i t l y r e p r o d u c e d . T a r s k i uses
a n d p l e a d s f o r reeducation. W e o u g h t t o g e t u s e d t o r e p l a c i n g t h e this p r o p e r t y i n o r d e r to construct a t h e o r y o f t r u t h that generalizes
desire for objectivity w i t h the desire f o r solidarity a n d , w i t h W i l l i a m a b o u t a l l i n s t a n c e s o f "T." F o r a n o t h e r , t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e w h e n
J a m e s , t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g " t r u t h " as n o m o r e t h a n t h a t i n w h i c h i t is u s e d i n t h i s way establishes a r e l a t i o n o f e q u i v a l e n c e between two
g o o d for "us"—the liberal members of Western culture or Western linguistic expressions—the w h o l e p o i n t o f t h e T a r s k i a n strategy o f
s o c i e t i e s — t o b e l i e v e . " [ P r a g m a t i s t s ] s h o u l d see themselves as w o r k - e x p l a n a t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h i s . For, t h r o u g h e x p l o i t i n g t h e d i s q u o t a -
i n g a t t h e i n t e r f a c e b e t w e e n t h e c o m m o n sense o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y , t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , t h e inaccessible " r e l a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " b e -
a c o m m o n sense m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y G r e e k m e t a p h y s i c s a n d by tween language a n d w o r l d o r sentence a n d fact can, i t appears, be
p a t r i a r c h a l m o n o t h e i s m . . . . T h e y s h o u l d see t h e m s e l v e s as i n v o l v e d reflected o n t o the tangible semantic r e l a t i o n between the expres-
i n a l o n g - t e r m a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e t h e r h e t o r i c , t h e c o m m o n sense, sions o f a n o b j e c t l a n g u a g e a n d t h o s e o f a m e t a l a n g u a g e . N o m a t t e r
a n d self-image o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y . " 3 4
h o w o n e conceives o f the representational f u n c t i o n o f statements,
w h e t h e r as " s a t i s f a c t i o n " o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o r as " f i t t i n g " t h e facts
Before I deal w i t h this proposal, I w o u l d like to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r
t o t h e s e n t e n c e s , w h a t is e n v i s a g e d i n e v e r y case a r e p i c t u r e s of
t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s are as h o p e l e s s as R o r t y assumes. A r e t h e r e not
relations that extend beyond language. I t n o w seems p o s s i b l e t o
p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n
c l a r i f y t h e s e p i c t u r e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t are internal
o u r justificatory context points i n favor o f the context-independent
to language. T h i s i n i t i a l i d e a a l l o w s us t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y w e a k r e a l i s t
t r u t h o f the j u s t i f i e d proposition? I a m interested above a l l i n two
c o n n o t a t i o n s are c o n n e c t e d w i t h the semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h —
attempts at explanation: a d e f l a t i o n a r y one, w h i c h disputes that
e v e n i f i t is c l e a r t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n c a n n o t s u s t a i n a s t r o n g e p i s t e -
" t r u t h " has a n y n a t u r e a t a l l t h a t c o u l d be explicated; a n d an
mological realism i n the manner o f Popper. 3 6

epistemic one, w h i c h inflates the idea o f a j u s t i f i e d assertion to such


an extent that t r u t h becomes the l i m i t concept o f the justificatory N o w , i t was a l r e a d y n o t i c e d a t a n e a r l y stage t h a t t h e semantic
p r o c e s s . O f c o u r s e , d e f l a t i o n i s m is p e r m i t t e d t o d e - t h e m a t i z e the conception o f t r u t h c a n n o t v i n d i c a t e its c l a i m t o b e a n e x p l i c a t i o n
c o n c e p t o f t r u t h o n l y to t h e e x t e n t that this c o n c e p t can continue o f the full m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate. 3 7
T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s is
t o s u s t a i n r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s , w h i l e t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t i o n is a l l o w e d t h a t t h e d i s q u o t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e b e -
t o i d e a l i z e t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t its i d e a cause i t a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . One
362 363

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f C o n v e n t i o n T w h e n o n e k n o w s w h a t is o f science, f o r r e n d e r i n g the f u n c t i o n i n g o f o u r practices o f i n q u i r y


meant (gemeint) w i t h t h e r i g h t - h a n d side o f t h e b i c o n d i t i o n a l . T h e t r a n s p a r e n t , this w o u l d still n o t dissipate t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t . For
m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate i n the sentence " E v e r y t h i n g that the this d o u b t extends n o t only to the c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d selection of
w i t n e s s s a i d yesterday is t r u e " is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e assertoric m o d e o f theories, i n d e e d , n o t o n l y to practices o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n general:
t h e witness's assertions. B e f o r e a n a s s e r t i o n c a n be q u o t e d i t m u s t w i t h respect to the pretheoretical o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h i n h e r e n t
b e " p u t f o r w a r d . " T h i s p r e s u p p o s e d assertoric m e a n i n g c a n b e a n a - i n everyday practices, a semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h simply does n o t
l y z e d i n a n e x e m p l a r y way b y l o o k i n g a t t h e "yes" a n d " n o " positions h e l p us a t a l l .
o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o raise o r r e f u t e o b j e c t i o n s ; i t W h a t is a t issue i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f a J a n u s -
c a n also b e seen i n t h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e , w h i c h faced n o t i o n o f t r u t h that mediates between behavioral certainty a n d
recalls t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t even d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertibility. I n t h e n e t w o r k o f e s t a b l i s h e d prac-
p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t have b e e n j u s t i f i e d c o n v i n c i n g l y c a n t u r n o u t t o b e tices, i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have b e e n a c c e p t e d a g a i n s t
false. a b r o a d b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions consti-
The truth-predicate belongs—though n o t exclusively—to the lan- tute the rails a l o n g w h i c h behavioral certainties r u n . However, as
g u a g e g a m e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n its m e a n i n g c a n be s o o n as t h e s e c e r t a i n t i e s lose t h e i r h o l d i n t h e c o r s e t o f s e l f - e v i d e n t
e l u c i d a t e d ( a t least p a r t l y ) a c c o r d i n g t o its f u n c t i o n s i n t h i s l a n g u a g e beliefs, they are j o l t e d o u t o f t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a
g a m e , t h a t is, i n t h e pragmatic dimension o f a p a r t i c u l a r e m p l o y m e n t corresponding n u m b e r o f questionable topics that thereby b e c o m e
o f the predicate. Whoever confines herself to the semantic dimen- subject to debate. I n m o v i n g f r o m a c t i o n to r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e , 3 9

sion o f sentences a n d o f m e t a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m e n t a r i e s o n sentences w h a t is i n i t i a l l y n a i v e l y h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e is r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e m o d e o f


c o m p r e h e n d s only the reflection o f a p r i o r linguistic practice that, b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t y a n d assumes t h e f o r m o f a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o -
as r e m a i n s t o be s h o w n , e x t e n d s e v e n i n t o e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . How- s i t i o n w h o s e v a l i d i t y is l e f t o p e n f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e d i s c o u r s e .
ever, t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y t r e a t m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h , t h r o u g h its T h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n takes t h e f o r m o f a c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r
s e m a n t i c d i m m i n g o f t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h , has t h e a d - a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r of, o r against, c o n t r o v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d
vantage o f a v o i d i n g discussions a b o u t the " n a t u r e " o f t r u t h w i t h o u t serves t h e c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h . 4 0

h a v i n g to f o r f e i t a m i n i m a l o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the d i s t i n c t i o n be- W i t h this d e s c r i p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices g u i d e d by t h e idea


tween k n o w i n g and believing, between being-true a n d being-held-to- o f t r u t h , h o w e v e r , t h e p r o b l e m is p o s e d a n e w o f h o w t h e systematic
be-true. This strategy aims at uncoupling these elementary m o b i l i z a t i o n o f g o o d reasons, w h i c h a t b e s t l e a d t o j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s ,
distinctions from the dispute about substantial epistemological is s u p p o s e d n o n e t h e l e s s t o b e a d e q u a t e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d i s c r i m i -
views. I f i t c a n be s h o w n t h a t t h e s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h is n a t i n g between j u s t i f i e d a n d unjustified t r u t h claims. To begin w i t h ,
s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n t h e u s u a l m e t h o d s o f i n q u i r y a n d t h e o r y selec- I s i m p l y w a n t to k e e p h o l d o f t h e p i c t u r e o f a c i r c u l a r process t h a t
t i o n — t h a t is, s u f f i c i e n t also t o e x p l a i n w h a t c o u n t s as "success" o r p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t o us f r o m a p e r s p e c t i v e e x p a n d e d by means o f the
"growth i n knowledge" i n the scientific enterprise—we c a n rescue t h e o r y o f a c t i o n : shaken-up b e h a v i o r a l certainties are t r a n s f o r m e d
t h e weak realist supposition o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descrip- on the level o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o controversial validity claims
tions w i t h o u t boosting u p the concept o f t r u t h i n an epistemologi- raised f o r h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s ; these claims are tested discur-
cal-realist way. 38
s i v e l y — a n d , as t h e case m a y b e , v i n d i c a t e d — w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , science is n o t t h e o n l y s p h e r e — a n d n o t e v e n discursively accepted t r u t h s can r e t u r n t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n ; w i t h
t h e p r i m a r y o n e — i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e has a use. E v e n i f a t h i s , b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s (as t h e case m a y b e , n e w o n e s ) , w h i c h r e l y
d e f l a t i o n a r y c o n c e p t o f t r u t h were sufficient f o r e l u c i d a t i n g the fact o n beliefs u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y h e l d t o be t r u e , are p r o d u c e d o n c e
364 365

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m o r e . W h a t still r e m a i n s t o be e x p l a i n e d is t h e m y s t e r i o u s p o w e r o f T h e Epistemic Conception of Truth in a Pragmatic Perspective


t h e d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t t h a t authorizes t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s
in a r g u m e n t a t i o n , i n t h e role o f actors, to accept unreservedly T h e stubborn p r o b l e m o f the relation between t r u t h and justifica-
j u s t i f i e d assertions as t r u t h s . F o r i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n f r o m t i o n makes understandable the a t t e m p t to distinguish " t r u t h " f r o m
t h e p o i n t o f view o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n c a n f u l f i l l t h e "rational acceptability" t h r o u g h an idealization o f the conditions o f
r o l e o f troubleshooter w i t h r e g a r d t o b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t have j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s a t t e m p t p r o p o s e s t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d ac-
b e c o m e p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i f i t is g u i d e d b y t r u t h i n a c o n t e x t - i n d e - c o r d i n g t o " o u r " s t a n d a r d s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n
p e n d e n t — t h a t is, unconditional—sense. i n t h e s a m e way t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t is
A l t h o u g h w h e n w e a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e we k n o w t h a t a l l d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a p r o p o s i t i o n that c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d i n any c o n -
knowledge is f a l l i b l e , i n e v e r y d a y l i f e w e c a n n o t s u r v i v e w i t h h y - t e x t . A p r o p o s i t i o n is " t r u e " i f i t c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d u n d e r ideal
p o t h e s e s a l o n e , t h a t is, i n a p e r s i s t e n t l y f a l l i b i l i s t way. T h e organized epistemic conditions (Putnam) 4 1
or could win argumentatively
f a l l i b i l i s m o f scientific i n q u i r y can deal hypothetically w i t h c o n t r o - reached agreement i n an ideal speech situation ( H a b e r m a s ) 4 2
or in
v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n d e f i n i t e l y because i t serves t o b r i n g a b o u t an ideal c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y ( A p e l ) . 4 3
W h a t is t r u e is w h a t
a g r e e m e n t s t h a t are uncoupled f r o m a c t i o n . T h i s m o d e l is n o t s u i t a b l e may be a c c e p t e d as r a t i o n a l u n d e r i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s . Convincing
f o r t h e l i f e w o r l d . Certainly, we have t o m a k e decisions i n t h e life- objections have b e e n r a i s e d t o t h i s p r o p o s a l , w h i c h dates b a c k t o
w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n ; m o r e o v e r , e x i s t e n t i a l Peirce. The objections are directed i n p a r t against conceptual
risks s u c h as t h e loss o f t h o s e closest t o us, sickness, o l d age, and d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e i d e a l state a d o p t e d ; i n p a r t t h e y s h o w t h a t a n
d e a t h are t h e m a r k o f h u m a n l i f e . H o w e v e r , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these i d e a l i z a t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t a c h i e v e its g o a l be-
u n c e r t a i n t i e s , everyday r o u t i n e s rest o n a n u n q u a l i f i e d t r u s t i n the cause i t e i t h e r distances t r u t h t o o f a r f r o m j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y o r
knowledge o f lay p e o p l e as m u c h as e x p e r t s . W e w o u l d step o n no n o r far enough.
b r i d g e , use n o car, u n d e r g o n o o p e r a t i o n , n o t e v e n eat a n e x q u i s i t e l y The first k i n d o f objection draws a t t e n t i o n to the paradoxical
p r e p a r e d m e a l i f we d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e k n o w l e d g e used to be nature o f the n o t i o n of "complete" or "conclusive" knowledge—
safeguarded, i f we d i d n o t h o l d t h e assumptions e m p l o y e d i n the fixed as a l i m i t c o n c e p t — t h a t , w h e n its i n c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d f a l l i b i l i t y
p r o d u c t i o n a n d e x e c u t i o n o f o u r a c t i o n s t o be t r u e . A t a n y r a t e , t h e is t a k e n away f r o m i t , w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e (human) knowledge. 4 4

performative need for behavioral certainty rules out a reservation i n P a r a d o x i c a l , t o o , is t h e i d e a o f a final consensus o r definitive l a n -
p r i n c i p l e w i t h r e g a r d t o t r u t h , e v e n t h o u g h we k n o w , as s o o n as t h e guage that w o u l d b r i n g to a standstill all f u r t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n or
naive p e r f o r m a n c e o f a c t i o n s is i n t e r r u p t e d , t h a t t r u t h c l a i m s c a n a l l f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t w h a t is meant as a
b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y d i s c u r s i v e l y — t h a t is, o n l y w i t h i n t h e relevant s i t u a t i o n o f i d e a l m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t a n d s r e v e a l e d as a s i t u -
c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T r u t h may be assimilated n e i t h e r to behav- a t i o n b e y o n d t h e necessity f o r ( a n d t h e p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d w i t h )
i o r a l certainty n o r to j u s t i f i e d assertibility. Evidently, o n l y s t r o n g l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 4 5
T h i s o b j e c t i o n is
conceptions of knowledge a n d t r u t h — o p e n to the accusation of d i r e c t e d n o t j u s t a g a i n s t a n i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t h y p o s t a t i z e s f i n a l states
Platonism—can do justice to the unity o f the illocutionary m e a n i n g as attainable states i n t h e w o r l d . E v e n i f t h e i d e a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s a r e
o f assertions, w h i c h t a k e o n d i f f e r e n t r o l e s i n t h e r e a l m s o f a c t i o n u n d e r s t o o d as a i m s t h a t are n o t a t t a i n a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , o r a t t a i n a b l e
a n d d i s c o u r s e respectively. W h e r e a s i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s "truths" only approximately, i t remains "paradoxical t h a t we would be
p r o p u p behavioral certainties, i n discourses they p r o v i d e t h e refer- o b l i g e d t o strive f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a n i d e a l w h o s e r e a l i z a t i o n
ence p o i n t f o r t r u t h claims that are i n p r i n c i p l e fallible. w o u l d be the e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . " 4 6
As a regulative idea, the
366 367

Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

critical p o i n t o f the o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h becomes clear only is, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y as w e a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h i t : " I c a n -


w h e n t h e f o r m a l o r p r o c e s s u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d not n o t see w h a t ' i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y ' c a n m e a n e x c e p t 'ac-
its aims, are i d e a l i z e d . c e p t a b i l i t y t o a n i d e a l c o m m u n i t y . ' N o r c a n I see, g i v e n t h a t n o s u c h
T h e s e c o n d k i n d o f o b j e c t i o n leads t o t h e same c o n c l u s i o n . T h e s e c o m m u n i t y is g o i n g t o have a G o d ' s eye view, t h a t t h i s i d e a l c o m m u -
objections are d i r e c t e d n o t a g a i n s t t h e i n c o h e r e n t r e s u l t s o f t h e n i t y c a n b e a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n us as w e s h o u l d l i k e t o b e . N o r c a n
i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t e d states b u t a g a i n s t t h e o p e r a t i o n o f i d e a l i - I see w h a t ' u s ' c a n m e a n h e r e e x c e p t : us e d u c a t e d , sophisticated,
z a t i o n itself. N o m a t t e r h o w t h e v a l u e o f t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n d i t i o n s is t o l e r a n t , w e t l i b e r a l s , t h e p e o p l e w h o a r e always w i l l i n g t o h e a r t h e
enhanced t h r o u g h i d e a l i z a t i o n s , e i t h e r t h e y satisfy t h e uncondi- o t h e r side, t o t h i n k o u t a l l t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , e t c . " 4 9

t i o n a l character o f t r u t h claims by means o f requirements that cut O f course, i t can be objected to this that an idealization o f the
o f f a l l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f a m i l i a r t o us, o r j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s does n o t i n a n y way have t o t a k e t h e " t h i c k "
else t h e y r e t a i n t h e c o n n e c t i o n t o p r a c t i c e s f a m i l i a r t o us b y p a y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o n e ' s o w n c u l t u r e as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; r a t h e r ,
the price that r a t i o n a l acceptability does n o t exclude the possibility it can start w i t h the f o r m a l a n d processual characteristics o f justifica-
o f e r r o r e v e n u n d e r these i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, d o e s n o t s i m u l a t e t o r y p r a c t i c e s i n g e n e r a l t h a t , a f t e r a l l , a r e t o b e f o u n d i n all c u l -
a p r o p e r t y " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t " : " I t w o u l d be a p p a r e n t e i t h e r t h a t t u r e s — e v e n i f n o t b y a n y m e a n s always i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m . T h e
t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o r t h a t t h e y a r e so fact that the practice o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n compels the participants
i d e a l as t o m a k e n o use o f t h e i n t e n d e d c o n n e c t i o n with human themselves to make pragmatic assumptions w i t h a counterfactual
abilities." 4 7
c o n t e n t fits i n w e l l w i t h t h i s . W h o e v e r e n t e r s i n t o d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e

I n h i s d e b a t e s w i t h P u t n a m , A p e l , a n d m e , R o r t y m a k e s use of serious i n t e n t i o n o f b e c o m i n g convinced o f s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h d i a -

these objections n o t i n o r d e r to d i s c r e d i t t h e e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t r u t h l o g u e w i t h o t h e r s has t o p r e s u m e performatively that the partici-

b u t i n o r d e r t o r a d i c a l i z e i t . W i t h h i s o p p o n e n t s h e shares t h e view p a n t s a l l o w t h e i r "yes" o r " n o " t o b e d e t e r m i n e d solely b y t h e f o r c e

that the standards f o r the r a t i o n a l acceptability o f propositions, al- o f the better a r g u m e n t . However, w i t h this they assume—normally

t h o u g h t h e y c h a n g e h i s t o r i c a l l y , d o n o t always d o so a r b i t r a r i l y . A t i n a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l w a y — a s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t satisfies i m p r o b a b l e

least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s c o n d i t i o n s : openness to the p u b l i c , inclusiveness, equal rights to

are o p e n t o c r i t i q u e a n d c a n b e " r e f o r m e d , " t h a t is, i m p r o v e d o n t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i m m u n i z a t i o n against e x t e r n a l o r i n h e r e n t c o m p u l -

basis o f g o o d reasons. U n l i k e P u t n a m , h o w e v e r , R o r t y d o e s n o t w a n t s i o n , as w e l l as t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t o f l e a r n i n g processes b y c o n c e d i n g t h a t s t a n d i n g ( t h a t is, t h e s i n c e r e e x p r e s s i o n of utterances). 5 0


I n these

j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices are g u i d e d by a n idea o f t r u t h t h a t transcends u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i n t u i t i o n is ex-

t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n . H e c o m p l e t e l y rejects i d e a l i z i n g p r e s s e d t h a t t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e s i s t a n t t o spatially, socially, a n d

l i m i t concepts a n d interprets the difference between justification t e m p o r a l l y u n c o n s t r a i n e d a t t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m . W h a t we h o l d t o

a n d t r u t h i n s u c h a way t h a t a p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d i n a g i v e n case b e t r u e has t o b e d é f e n d a b l e o n t h e basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s n o t m e r e l y

t o d e f e n d h e r views n o t o n l y h e r e a n d n o w b u t e v e n i n f r o n t o f i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t b u t i n a l l p o s s i b l e c o n t e x t s , t h a t is, a t a n y t i m e

a n o t h e r a u d i e n c e . W h o e v e r is o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t r u t h i n t h i s sense is a n d against anybody. T h i s provides t h e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r the discourse

w i l l i n g "to justify his convictions i n f r o n t o f a c o m p e t e n t audience" t h e o r y o f t r u t h : a p r o p o s i t i o n is t r u e i f i t w i t h s t a n d s a l l a t t e m p t s t o

o r " t o i n c r e a s e t h e size o r d i v e r s i t y o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a l commu- refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f rational discourse. 51

nity." 4 8
O n R o r t y ' s view, e v e r y i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t goes b e y o n d t h i s w i l l H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is also t r u e for this reason. A
founder on the p r o b l e m t h a t i n i d e a l i z i n g we m u s t always take t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" says t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" are
s o m e t h i n g f a m i l i a r as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; u s u a l l y i t is " u s , " t h a t satisfied. W e have n o o t h e r way o f a s c e r t a i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s
368 369

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

is t h e case e x c e p t b y way o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , f o r d i r e c t access t o t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f a c t t h a t , w h e n w e p u t f o r w a r d t h e a s s e r t i o n "p" i n


u n i n t e r p r e t e d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is d e n i e d t o us. B u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e , we have t o b e l i e v e t h a t "p" is t r u e u n c o n d i -
t r u t h c o n d i d o n s are satisfied d o e s n o t i t s e l f b e c o m e a n epistemic t i o n a l l y e v e n t h o u g h , w h e n we a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e , w e cannot
f a c t j u s t because w e c a n o n l y establish w h e t h e r these c o n d i t i o n s are r u l e o u t t h a t t o m o r r o w , o r s o m e w h e r e else, r e a s o n s a n d e v i d e n c e
satisfied b y way o f discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e t r u t h claim—whereby c o u l d e m e r g e t h a t w o u l d i n v a l i d a t e "/>." H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t y e t
w e have a l r e a d y h a d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i n l i g h t o f t h e e x p l a i n w h y we a r e permitted t o r e g a r d a t r u t h c l a i m e x p l i c i t l y r a i s e d
r e l e v a n t sorts o f r e a s o n s f o r t h e c l a i m i n q u e s t i o n . f o r "p" as v i n d i c a t e d as s o o n as t h e p r o p o s i t i o n is r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d
A consistently epistemic r e a d i n g o f the discourse-theoretical expla- u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . W h a t d o e s i t m e a n t o say t h a t
n a t i o n o f t r u t h already founders o n the p r o b l e m that n o t all o f the t r u t h c l a i m s c a n b e " v i n d i c a t e d " discursively?
processual properties m e n t i o n e d retain a "connection with human
abilities." Nonetheless, w i t h regard to the argumentative presuppo- The Pragmatic Conception o f T r u t h
sitions o f g e n e r a l inclusiveness, e q u a l rights t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f r e e d o m
f r o m repression, a n d o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we I t is s t i l l u n c l e a r what i t is t h a t authorizes us t o r e g a r d as t r u e a
c a n i m a g i n e in the present w h a t a n a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l s a t i s f a c t i o n p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t is p r e s u m e d t o b e j u s t i f i e d i d e a l l y — w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s
w o u l d l o o k like. T h i s does n o t h o l d f o r a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the f u t u r e , o f o f finite m i n d s . W e l l m e r speaks i n t h i s r e g a r d o f a " s u r p l u s " r e s i d i n g
future corroboration (Bewährung) . 5 2
T o be sure, the o r i e n t a t i o n to- i n the " a n t i c i p a t i o n o f f u t u r e c o r r o b o r a t i o n . " Perhaps i t w o u l d be
w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t o o , essentially has t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t o f r e m i n d i n g us b e t t e r t o say t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o c o n v i n c e t h e m -
of the ethnocentric l i m i t a t i o n a n d the fallibility o f every actually selves o f the justification of a controversial validity claim have
a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , n o m a t t e r h o w r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d ; t h a t is, i t r e a c h e d a p o i n t w h e r e they have b e e n b r o u g h t by t h e u n c o n s t r a i n e d
serves as a r e m i n d e r t o us o f t h e p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r d e c e n t e r i n g o f t h e f o r c e o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t t o a c e r t a i n shift in perspective. W h e n , i n
p e r s p e c t i v e o f o u r j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . T i m e , h o w e v e r , is a c o n - t h e course o f a process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s attain t h e
straint o f a n o n t o l o g i c a l k i n d . Because a l l r e a l discourses, c o n d u c t e d conviction that, having taken o n b o a r d all relevant i n f o r m a t i o n a n d
i n a c t u a l t i m e , are l i m i t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e f u t u r e , w e c a n n o t k n o w h a v i n g w e i g h e d u p all the relevant reasons, they have exhausted t h e
w h e t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are r a t i o n a l l y acceptable today w i l l , even reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l possible o b j e c t i o n s to t h e n all motives for
u n d e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , assert t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t a t - c o n t i n u i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n have b e e n , as i t w e r e , u s e d u p . A t a n y r a t e
t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m i n t h e f u t u r e as w e l l . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h i s t h e r e is n o l o n g e r a n y r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r retaining a h y p o t h e t i c a l
very limitedness condemns o u r finite m i n d s to be content with a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" b u t t e m p o r a r i l y l e f t
r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y as sufficient proof o f t r u t h : " W h e n e v e r w e raise o p e n . F r o m the perspective o f actors w h o have t e m p o r a r i l y a d o p t e d
t r u t h c l a i m s o n t h e basis o f g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d c o n v i n c i n g evi- a reflexive a t t i t u d e i n o r d e r to restore a partially d i s t u r b e d back-
d e n c e w e presume . . . t h a t n o n e w a r g u m e n t s o r e v i d e n c e w i l l c r o p ground understanding, the de-problematization of the disputed
u p i n the future that w o u l d call o u r t r u t h claim i n t o q u e s t i o n . " 5 3
t r u t h c l a i m m e a n s t h a t a l i c e n s e is issued f o r r e t u r n t o t h e a t t i t u d e

I t is n o t so d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a - o f a c t o r s w h o a r e i n v o l v e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d m o r e naively.

t i o n , as subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n , have t o b e h a v e i n t h i s As s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n o p i n i o n a r e r e s o l v e d b e t w e e n " u s " a n d

way i f w e l o o k a t a p r a g m a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e i r d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h " o t h e r s " w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is t h e case, " o u r " w o r l d c a n m e r g e o n c e

a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e l i f e w o r l d . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , as w e have more with "the" world.

seen, socialized i n d i v i d u a l s are d e p e n d e n t o n b e h a v i o r a l certainties, W h e n t h i s s h i f t takes p l a c e w e , w h o as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a -


w h i c h r e m a i n c e r t a i n t i e s o n l y so l o n g as t h e y a r e s u s t a i n e d b y a t i o n a c c e p t t h e t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p" as j u s t i f i e d , r e a p p o i n t t h e state o f
knowledge t h a t is a c c e p t e d u n r e s e r v e d l y . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s is a f f a i r s " t h a t p"—problematized u p t o n o w — w i t h its r i g h t s as a n
370 371

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

a s s e r t i o n Mp t h a t c a n b e r a i s e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of the first c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Conversely,


p e r s o n . A n a s s e r t i o n t h a t has b e e n disposed of a r g u m e n t a t i v e l y i n t h i s t h i s f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s also reacts b a c k u p o n e v e r y d a y practices
w a y a n d r e t u r n e d t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n takes its p l a c e i n a n i n t e r - w i t h o u t thereby destroying the dogmatism of the lifeworld. For
subjectively shared l i f e w o r l d f r o m w i t h i n whose h o r i z o n we, the actors, w h o as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n have learned that
a c t o r s , r e f e r t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . I t is a m a t t e r no c o n v i c t i o n is p r o o f a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m , d e v e l o p i n t h e l i f e w o r l d ,
h e r e o f a formal s u p p o s i t i o n , n o t o n e t h a t p r e j u d g e s s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t too, r a t h e r less d o g m a t i c attitudes toward their problematized
n o r o n e t h a t suggests t h e g o a l o f t h e " c o r r e c t p i c t u r e o f t h e n a t u r e convictions.
o f t h i n g s " t h a t R o r t y always c o n n e c t s w i t h a r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n . B e c a u s e T h i s stereoscopic p e r c e p t i o n o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n and
a c t i n g subjects have t o c o p e w i t h " t h e " w o r l d , t h e y c a n n o t avoid c o m m u n i c a t i o n , layered a c c o r d i n g t o a c t i o n - c o n t e x t s a n d d i s c o u r s e s ,
b e i n g realists i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d . M o r e o v e r , t h e y are a l l o w s us r e c o g n i z e t h e embeddedness o f d i s c o u r s e s i n t h e l i f e w o r l d .
a l l o w e d t o b e realists b e c a u s e t h e i r l a n g u a g e g a m e s a n d p r a c t i c e s , so Convictions play a d i f f e r e n t role i n a c t i o n t h a n i n discourse a n d
l o n g as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n a w a y t h a t is p r o o f a g a i n s t d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , " p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n t h e f o r m e r t h a n i n t h e l a t t e r .
" p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " (sich bewähren) i n b e i n g c a r r i e d o n . I n everyday practices, a prereflexive " c o p i n g w i t h the w o r l d " decides
This pragmatic authority responsible for c e r t a i n t y — i n t e r p r e t e d i n w h e t h e r convictions " f u n c t i o n " o r are d r a w n i n t o t h e m a e l s t r o m o f
a r e a l i s t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d — p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i t d e p e n d s solely on
is s u s p e n d e d o n t h e r e f l e x i v e l e v e l o f d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h are r e l i e v e d reasons w h e t h e r controversial validity claims deserve r a t i o n a l l y m o -
of the burdens o f action and where only arguments count. Here, our tivated r e c o g n i t i o n . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a -
gaze t u r n s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h poses i t s e l f o n l y o n t h e r e f l e x i v e
we e x p e r i e n c e i n o u r d i r e c t dealings w i t h i t , to focus exclusively o n level; however, o n l y the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n actions a n d discourses
o u r c o n f l i c t i n g interpretations o f the w o r l d . I n this intersubjective p e r m i t s a n answer t o this q u e s t i o n . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t cannot
dimension o f contested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , an assertion " p r o v e s its b e d i s s i p a t e d so l o n g as w e p e r s i s t i n r e m a i n i n g o n t h e l e v e l of
t r u t h " solely o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s , t h a t is, w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d neglect the transformation—secured by per-
a u t h o r i t y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o s s i b l e r e f u t a t i o n , n o t f o r p r a c t i c a l l y ex- s o n a l u n i o n , as i t w e r e — o f t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e w h o act i n t o t h e
p e r i e n c e d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . H e r e , however, the fallibilist conscious- knowledge o f those w h o argue, w h i l e equally neglecting the transfer
ness t h a t w e c a n e r r e v e n i n t h e case o f w e l l - j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s d e p e n d s o f knowledge i n the opposite direction. O n l y the e n t w i n i n g o f the
o n an o r i e n t a t i o n toward t r u t h whose roots e x t e n d i n t o the realism two d i f f e r e n t p r a g m a t i c roles played by t h e Janus-faced c o n c e p t o f
o f everyday practices—a realism n o l o n g e r i n force w i t h i n discourse. t r u t h i n action-contexts a n d i n r a t i o n a l discourses respectively can
T h e orientation toward unconditional t r u t h , which compels partici- e x p l a i n w h y a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n a l o c a l c o n t e x t p o i n t s i n f a v o r
pants i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n to presuppose ideal justificatory conditions of the context-independent t r u t h o f t h e j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f . J u s t as, o n
a n d requires o f t h e m an ever-increasing decentering o f the justifica- t h e o n e h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h allows t r a n s l a t i o n o f shaken-up
t i o n c o m m u n i t y , is a r e f l e x o f t h a t o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e — r e q u i r e d i n t h e b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s i n t o p r o b l e m a t i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n s , so t o o , on
l i f e w o r l d — b e t w e e n believing a n d k n o w i n g ; this d i s t i n c t i o n relies o n the o t h e r h a n d , does the firmly retained orientation toward truth
t h e s u p p o s i t i o n , a n c h o r e d i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o f p e r m i t t h e translation back o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertions into
a single objective w o r l d . 5 4
I n t h i s way, t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h its s t r o n g , reestablished behavioral certainties.
a c t i o n - r e l a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d k n o w l e d g e projects i n t o dis-
T o e x p l a i n t h i s w e have o n l y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r i n t h e r i g h t way t h e
course a n d provides the reference p o i n t — t r a n s c e n d i n g justifica-
p a r t i a l statements assembled h e r e u p t o now. I n t h e l i f e w o r l d actors
tion—that keeps alive among participants in argumentation a
depend o n b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s . T h e y have t o c o p e w i t h a w o r l d
372 373

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

presumed t o be o b j e c t i v e a n d , f o r t h i s r e a s o n , operate with the edge o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h reflexive experiences i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o


distinction between believing and k n o w i n g . 5 5
There is a practical h a r m o n y w i t h the everyday realism ascribed to t h e l i f e w o r l d . I f t h e
necessity t o r e l y i n t u i t i v e l y o n w h a t is u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y held-to-be- actors i n the l i f e w o r l d — t e m p o r a r i l y — c a n n o t a v o i d b e i n g "realists,"
t r u e . T h i s m o d e o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y h o l d i n g - t o - b e - t r u e is r e f l e c t e d o n so m u c h t h e w o r s e f o r t h e m . I n t h a t case i t is u p t o t h e philosophers
t h e d i s c u r s i v e level i n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s o f t r u t h claims that p o i n t to r e f o r m the misleading commonsense c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h .
b e y o n d the given context o f justification a n d require the supposition T o be sure, d e f l a t i o n i s m , o p e r a t i n g a l o n g t h e lines o f Michael
o f ideal justificatory c o n d i t i o n s — w i t h a resulting decentering o f the W i l l i a m s w i t h a s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , is s t i l l t o o s t r o n g f o r
j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . F o r this reason, the process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h i s p u r p o s e . I n s t e a d , R o r t y r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e s t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u -
c a n be g u i d e d by a n o t i o n o f t r u t h t h a t transcends justification al- s i o n a n e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h . Because t h e r e is
t h o u g h i t is always already operatively effective in the realm of action. T h e n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a n d because n o t h i n g follows f o r t h e
f u n c t i o n o f the validity o f statements i n everyday practices explains t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n f r o m its j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e c o n c e p t o f
w h y t h e discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s m a y at t h e s a m e t i m e t r u t h is superfluous. " T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h
b e i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a p r a g m a t i c n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a - is o n e w h i c h makes n o difference except for the r e m i n d e r that
t i o n . T h i s n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h sets i n t r a i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a - j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o o n e a u d i e n c e is n o t j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o a n o t h e r . " 5 6
Even
t i o n o f shaken-up behavioral certainties i n t o problematized validity t h e o n l y n o n r e d u n d a n t use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e — t h e " c a u t i o n a r y "
c l a i m s , c a n b e satisfied o n l y b y a t r a n s l a t i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d one—requires r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t is a m a t t e r o f i n v e n t i n g a n d i m -
beliefs back i n t o behavioral t r u t h s . p l e m e n t i n g a new vocabulary that does w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t o f t r u t h
B e c a u s e i t is, i n t h e e n d , t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t dissipates t h e c o n - a n d e l i m i n a t e s r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s ( s u c h as t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b -
textualist d o u b t about everyday realist intuitions, the objection j e c t i v e w o r l d , t a l k o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts, a n d so f o r t h ) : "We s i m p l y
seems l i k e l y t h a t t h e w h o l e d i s p u t e is p r e j u d i c e d b y m y t e n d e n t i o u s refuse t o t a l k i n a c e r t a i n way, t h e P l a t o n i c way. . . . O u r e f f o r t s a t
description o f the e m b e d d i n g o f discourses i n the l i f e w o r l d . Rorty p e r s u a s i o n m u s t t a k e t h e f o r m o f g r a d u a l i n c u l c a t i o n o f n e w ways o f
w o u l d certainly n o t deny the c o n n e c t i o n between r a t i o n a l discourse speaking, rather t h a n of straightforward argumentation w i t h old
a n d a c t i o n . H e w o u l d also a g r e e w i t h o u r e s t a b l i s h i n g o f a c o n n e c - ways o f speaking." 5 7

tion between the two perspectives: between the perspective of the


p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o seek t o c o n v i n c e e a c h o t h e r of T h e Naturalization o f Linguistified R e a s o n
the correctness o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a n d the perspective o f a c t i n g
subjects i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r language games a n d practices. However, R o r t y ' s p r o g r a m o f r e e d u c a t i o n has p r o v o k e d q u e s t i o n s a n d o b j e c -
R o r t y w o u l d n o t d i s t i n g u i s h these perspectives f r o m each o t h e r i n tions. 5 8
I n t h e first i n s t a n c e , R o r t y h i m s e l f m u s t s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n
s u c h a way t h a t t h e o n e is r e l a t i v i z e d a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . F o r the o f p r o o f f o r h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o leave t h e l a n g u a g e of common
p u r p o s e o f his d e s c r i p t i o n , he b o r r o w s f r o m the perspective o f par- sense as i t is. A s a r u l e , p r a g m a t i s t s m a k e s u b s t a n t i a l a l l o w a n c e s f o r
ticipants i n argumentation the i m p r i s o n m e n t i n dialogue that pre- t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e basis t h a t t h e i r views a r e a t o n e w i t h common
v e n t s us f r o m b r e a k i n g f r e e f r o m c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; at the sense. S t r a n g e l y e n o u g h , n e o p r a g m a t i s t s b o a s t o f t h e i r r o l e as " a t h e -
same t i m e , he borrows f r o m the perspective o f actors t h e m o d e o f ists i n a n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y r e l i g i o u s c u l t u r e . " T h e i r t h e r a p y is s u p -
c o p i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d . I t is t h r o u g h t h e blending into one another o f posed to reach through the pathological language games of
these opposing perspectives that the ethnocentric certainty is p h i l o s o p h e r s t o t h e d i s t o r t i o n s f o r w h i c h P l a t o n i s m is r e s p o n s i b l e i n
formed—a c e r t a i n t y t h a t p r o m p t s R o r t y t o ask t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h y d a i l y l i f e itself. I n o r d e r t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e P l a t o n i s m ' s i d e a l i s t v i o -
w e s h o u l d i n t h e first p l a c e a t t e m p t t o b r i n g t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t k n o w l - l e n c e , R o r t y has t o l e t h i m s e l f i n f o r a d i a g n o s i s o f t h e h i s t o r y o f
374 375
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s as a h i s t o r y o f d e c l i n e . H o w e v e r , w h a t H e i d e g - i n g size a n d e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g d i v e r s i t y — t h a t is, c o n d i t i o n s t h a t h a m -
g e r o r D e r r i d a , f o r e x a m p l e , have t o say i n t h e i r o w n f a i r l y m e t a - p e r t h e p o s s i b l e success o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n c e r t a i n , n o t c o m p l e t e l y
p h y s i c a l ways about the critique of metaphysics is, o n Rorty's a r b i t r a r y , ways.
e s t i m a t i o n , m o r e p a r t o f t h e " e d i f y i n g " l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o R o r t y c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h i s i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e success o f a r g u m e n -
b e r e s e r v e d f o r p r i v a t e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e self a n d c a n n o t , a t a n y r a t e , t a t i o n t h a t is u n n e c e s s a r y f r o m a f u n c t i o n a l p o i n t o f view. W i t h t h e
serve t h e p u b l i c c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t e d l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s . 5 9
o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d "more a n d m o r e , " "larger a n d larger," a n d " i n -
O f course, m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the m o t i v a t i o n f o r this enterprise creasingly diverse" audiences, R o r t y b r i n g s a weak idealization i n t o
is t h e q u e s t i o n o f its v i a b i l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o c o n c l u d e w i t h j u s t t w o p l a y t h a t , o n h i s p r e m i s e , is f a r f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t . A s s o o n as t h e
questions i n this regard: concept of truth is e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o r o f a context-dependent
epistemic validity-for-us, the n o r m a t i v e reference p o i n t necessary t o
a. Is t h e e n v i s a g e d r e v i s i o n o f o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g compatible
e x p l a i n w h y a p r o p o n e n t s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o seek a g r e e m e n t f o r "p"
w i t h t h e f a c t o f a n a b i l i t y t o l e a r n t h a t is n o t a l r e a d y c o n s t r i c t e d a
beyond the boundaries of her own group is m i s s i n g . T h e i n f o r m a d o n t h a t
priori? t h e a g r e e m e n t o f a n i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e a u d i e n c e gives us i n c r e a s i n g l y
b . W h a t is t o h a p p e n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r e a s o n , a n d h o w less r e a s o n to fear that we w i l l be r e f u t e d presupposes the v e r y
c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e is t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i s t s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n of i n t e r e s t t h a t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d : t h e d e s i r e f o r "as m u c h i n t e r s u b -
r a t i o n a l beings? j e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " I f s o m e t h i n g is " t r u e " i f a n d o n l y i f i t
is r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d "by u s " b e c a u s e i t is g o o d " f o r u s , " t h e r e is
a. T h e p r o g r a m o f a r a t i o n a l r e v i s i o n o f d e e p l y r o o t e d P l a t o n i c
n o rational motive for e x p a n d i n g the circle o f members. N o reason
p r e j u d i c e s presumes we are capable o f a l e a r n i n g process t h a t n o t
exists f o r t h e d e c e n t e r i n g e x p a n s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y
o n l y can take place w i t h i n a given vocabulary a n d a c c o r d i n g to the
e s p e c i a l l y since R o r t y d e f i n e s " m y o w n e t h n o s " as t h e g r o u p i n f r o n t
s t a n d a r d s p r e v a i l i n g i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t b u t t h a t seizes h o l d o f t h e
o f w h i c h I f e e l o b l i g e d t o give a n a c c o u n t o f myself. T h e r e is, h o w -
v o c a b u l a r y a n d standards themselves. T h i s reason alone requires
ever, n o n o r m a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a n y f u r t h e r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
R o r t y to p r o v i d e a suitable equivalent f o r an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h
the a g r e e m e n t o f "strangers," m e r e l y an e x p l a n a t o r y p o i n t e r t o w a r d
t h a t aims b e y o n d the p r e v a i l i n g c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f , however,
t h e a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s o f a " l i b e r a l W e s t e r n c u l t u r e " i n w h i c h "we
the d i s t i n c t i o n between " t r u e " a n d ' j u s t i f i e d " shrinks to the fact that
i n t e l l e c t u a l s " a d o p t a m o r e o r less u n d o g m a t i c a t t i t u d e . B u t even w e
t h e p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d t o d e f e n d "p" e v e n i n f r o n t o f a different
a r e a s s u r e d b y R o r t y t h a t , "we m u s t , i n p r a c t i c e , p r i v i l e g e o u r o w n
a u d i e n c e , t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r s u c h a n a n t i c i p a t i o n [ o f t r u t h ] is
g r o u p , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e c a n be n o n o n c i r c u l a r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for
missing. R o r t y counters this o b j e c t i o n by conceding a cautious ide-
d o i n g so." 61

alization o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s . H e allows t h a t w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y
was c a l l e d t h e " p u r s u i t o f t r u t h " m i g h t j u s t as w e l l be d e s c r i b e d as b. I n l o s i n g t h e r e g u l a t i v e i d e a o f t r u t h , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a -
the "pursuit o f intersubjective, u n f o r c e d agreement a m o n g larger t i o n loses t h a t p o i n t o f o r i e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s o f w h i c h s t a n d a r d s o f
a n d larger g r o u p s o f i n t e r l o c u t o r s " : "We h o p e to j u s t i f y o u r b e l i e f to j u s t i f i c a t i o n are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " c u s t o m a r y " n o r m s . T h e sociolo-
as m a n y a n d as l a r g e a u d i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e . " 6 0
R o r t y , i t is t r u e , d o e s g i z i n g o f the practice o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n means a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f rea-
n o t w a n t t h i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d a n "ever- s o n . A s a r u l e , social n o r m s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e
r e t r e a t i n g g o a l , " t h a t is, as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . E v e n t h e l a r g e r a u d i - p o i n t o f v i e w o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r b u t also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e
ence a n d the o v e r a r c h i n g c o n t e x t are supposed to be n o m o r e t h a n o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n l i g h t o f t h e s t a n d a r d s t h e y h o l d t o be t r u e . W i t h o u t
a different audience a n d a different context. Nonetheless, Rorty a reference t o t r u t h o r reason, however, t h e standards themselves
adds to this description the qualifications m e n t i o n e d : ever-expand- w o u l d n o l o n g e r have any p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n a n d w o u l d
376 377

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

t h u s f o r t h e i r p a r t f o r f e i t t h e status o f n o r m s capable o f being entiation between the perspectives o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t a n d the ob-


j u s t i f i e d . I n this respect, they w o u l d n o l o n g e r even be customary server. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h i c h a r e o w e d t o t h e i n t e r s u b -
n o r m s . T h e y w o u l d b e nothing more than social facts, a l t h o u g h t h e y j e c t i v e possession o f a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e , a r e a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e p a t t e r n
w o u l d c o n t i n u e to c l a i m v a l i d i t y " f o r u s , " t h e r e l e v a n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f adaptive behavior (or i n s t r u m e n t a l a c d o n ) . A c o r r e s p o n d i n g de-
c o m m u n i t y . If, despite t h i s , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n is n o t to differentiation between the strategic a n d t h e nonstrategic use of
c o l l a p s e , a n d i f t h e p r e d i c a t e " r a t i o n a l " is n o t t o lose its n o r m a t i v e language, between a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success a n d a c t i o n ori-
c h a r a c t e r — t h a t is, i f b o t h are t o c o n t i n u e t o be a b l e t o f u n c t i o n — ented toward reaching understanding, robs Rorty o f the conceptual
t h e r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s v a l i d f o r us h a v e t o b e , i f n o t j u s t i f i e d , t h e n means for d o i n g justice to the intuitive distinctions between convinc-
at least e x p l a i n e d . i n g a n d p e r s u a d i n g , b e t w e e n m o t i v a t i o n t h r o u g h r e a s o n s a n d causal
F o r t h i s R o r t y falls b a c k o n a n a t u r a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f human e x e r t i o n o f influence, between learning and indoctrinadon. The
b e i n g s as o r g a n i s m s t h a t d e v e l o p t o o l s i n o r d e r t o a d a p t t h e m s e l v e s c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e m i n g l i n g o f t h e o n e w i t h t h e o t h e r has t h e u n p l e a s -
o p t i m a l l y t o t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h t h e a i m o f satisfying t h e i r n e e d s . a n t c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t we lose t h e c r i t i c a l s t a n d a r d s o p e r a t i n g i n
L a n g u a g e , t o o , is s u c h a t o o l — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a m e d i u m f o r e v e r y d a y l i f e . R o r t y ' s n a t u r a l i s t strategy leads t o a c a t e g o r i a l l e v e l - i n g
r e p r e s e n t i n g r e a l i t y : " N o m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e t o o l is a h a m m e r o r a o f d i s t i n c t i o n s o f s u c h a k i n d t h a t o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s lose t h e i r sensitivity
g u n o r a b e l i e f o r a s t a t e m e n t , t o o l - u s i n g is p a r t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n f o r differences t h a t d o make a difference i n everyday practices. 63

o f t h e o r g a n i s m w i t h its e n v i r o n m e n t . " 6 2
W h a t a p p e a r s t o us as t h e
normative dimension of the linguistically constituted h u m a n m i n d Notes
m e r e l y gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n s are
functional f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a species t h a t , t h r o u g h a c t i n g , m u s t 1. R. Rorty, 'Trotsky a n d the Wild O r c h i d s , " Common Knowledge 3 (1992): 140-153.

" c o p e " w i t h reality. T h i s n e o - D a r w i n i s t self-description d e m a n d s an 2. R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago,
i r o n i c p r i c e . F o r Rorty, i n r e p l a c i n g t h e " c o r r e c t d e s c r i p d o n o f facts" 1970), p. 33.
w i t h "successful a d a p t a t i o n t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , " m e r e l y e x c h a n g e s
3. T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans, by E . B. Ashton ( L o n d o n , 1973), p. 408
one k i n d o f objectivism for another: the objectivism o f "represented" (amended translation).
reality f o r the objectivism o f i n s t r u m e n t a l l y "mastered" reality. A l -
4. M. Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Princeton, N.J., 1996), p. 365 (n. 51). Cf. also
t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y , w i t h t h i s , t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit f o r i n t e r a c t i o n R. Rorty, "Is Derrida a Quasi-Transcendental Philosopher?," Contemporary Literature
between h u m a n b e i n g s a n d w o r l d is c h a n g e d , w h a t r e m a i n s the (1995): 173-200.

s a m e is t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y o f 5. Cf. T h e exchange between T. McCarthy and R. Rorty in Critical Inquiry 16 (1990):


e v e r y t h i n g t h a t we c a n , i n t h e o n e case, " r e p r e s e n t , " i n t h e o t h e r , 355-370, 633-641.
"deal w i t h . "
6. Rorty, Linguistic Turn, p. 39.
The pragmatic t u r n was supposed to replace the representa-
7. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 261.
t i o n a l i s t m o d e l o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l t h a t sets
successful i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n 8. [Editor's note:] Habermas notes that in English the word "representation" is used
to refer to both Darstellung and Vorstellung.
t h e p l a c e o f a c h i m e r i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is, h o w e v e r ,
p r e c i s e l y t h i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d i m e n s i o n t h a t is i n t u r n c l o s e d o f f i n 9. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 170.
a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n and com-
10. H . Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 28; R. Rorty,
m u n i c a t i o n t h a t c a n b e g r a s p e d as s u c h o n l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of "Putnam and the Relativist Menace, "Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 443.
p a r t i c i p a n t s . R o r t y uses a j a r g o n t h a t n o l o n g e r p e r m i t s a n y d i f f e r -
11. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 390.
378 379
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

12. Ibid., p. 179: " [ T h e contexualist view] threatens the n e o K a n t i a n image of phi- 29. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 266.
losophy's relation to science and to culture. T h e urge to say that assertions and
actions must not only cohere with other assertions and actions but 'correspond' to 30. Ibid., p. 249.
something apart from what people are saying and doing has some claim to be called
the philosophical urge." 31. F. Kambartel, "Universalität richtig verstanden," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
44 (1996): 249.
13. Ibid., p. 171.
32. It is no accident that I introduced the formal-pragmatic concept of the gram-
14. Cf. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie," in E . Martens and H . Schnädelbach, eds., matical supposition of an objective world in the context of the theory of action. Cf.
Grundkurs Philosophie (Hamburg, 1985), pp. 37-76. J . Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston,
1984), pp. 75-101; vol. 2 (Boston, 1987), pp. 119ff.
15. [Editor's note:] Habermas remarks that the subtitle to the G e r m a n translation
of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is A Critique of Philosophy (Eine Kritik der Philoso- 33. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 238: "All that is involved in the idea of an
phie) . objective world as 'what is there anyway' is that an objective proposition's being true
is one thing and our believing it to be true, or being justified in believing it to be
16. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 263. true, something else again."

17. Ibid., p. 339. 34. R. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly
45 (1995): 281-300 (here, p. 300).
18. Ibid.
35. D. Davidson pursues a third strategy that could be called "theoreticist" or, as he
19. R. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge, 1991), himself proposes, "methodological;" cf. D. Davidson, " T h e Folly of Trying to Define
p. 23. T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263-278. Davidson uses the semantic concep-
tion of truth, understood in a nondeflationary way, as the undefined basic concept
20. Only the empiricists were prepared to call "objective" the experience (Erfahrung) for an empirical theory of language. Both the concept of truth, which is used as a
that "corresponds to what is there outside" (Rorty). T h e transcendental idealists, by theoretical term in his theory of language, and the theory itself, which is supposed
contrast, reduce even the objectivity of experience to necessary subjective conditions to explain the comprehension of linguistic expressions, can prove their truth (sich
of possible experience. bewähren) at one and the same time. For this reason, Davidson's implicit "theory of
truth" can be discussed only in connection with his theory as a whole. I n general, I
21. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans, by D. Paul and G . E . M. Anscombe (Oxford, see the following difficulty: on the one hand, Davidson disputes that the concept of
1969), §115, p. 125. truth has a content capable of being explicated, to this extent allying himself with
the deflationist polemic against attempts to explain the meaning of truth; on the
22. H . Schnädelbach, " T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Zur Rehabilitierung other hand, he has to secure for the truth-predicate, over and above its disquota-
des animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 104—115. tional function, a certain content as far as the theory of rationality is concerned in
order to explain the veridical nature of beliefs. To this extent he joins forces with
23. With respect to a critique of Rorty's approach, I will confine myself in the Putnam and Dummett, who insist that Tarski's Convention T says nothing about the
following to the problem of truth. However, I would like to indicate, at least, that we actual meaning of truth. Standing between these two positions, Davidson, instead of
would not be able to explain the possibility of learning processes without reference merely using the concept, sees himself compelled to write learned treatises on a
to the capacity for recognizing the same entities under different descriptions. concept he declares to be "indefinable"—treatises in which he does, at least, in a
metacritical way, isolate the realist intuitions bound up with truth. Cf. D. Davidson,
24. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam- " T h e Structure and Content of T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279-328.
bridge, 1982), pp. 50ff. Davidson holds onto the idea that we can know something of an objective world
"which is not of our own making." This view separates him from Rorty who attempts
25. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 178. in vain to pull Davidson over to his own side of an abolitionist understanding of truth.
Cf. D. Davidson, " A Coherence Theory of T r u t h and Knowledge," in A. Malachowski,
26. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 232: "We need only ask whether or not the ed., Reading Rorty (Oxford, 1990), pp. 120-139; cf. also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson,
'direct' grasping of facts on which such comparison depends is supposed to be a and T r u t h . " For a comparison of Davidson's and my own approaches to the theory
cognitive state with propositional content. I f it isn't, it can have no impact on of language, see B. Fultner, Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action (Ph.D. dis-
verification. But if it is, all we have been given is another kind of belief." sertation, Northwestern University, 1995).

27. Ibid, p. 267. 36. K. R. Popper, ' T r u t h , Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge," in
Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963), pp. 215-250.
28. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and T r u t h , " in E . Lepore, ed., Truth and Inter-
pretation (Oxford, 1986), p. 343.
380 381

Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

37. E . Tugendhat, "Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit," Philosophische 53. Wellmer, "Wahrheit," p. 163; cf. the corresponding reflections on "superasserti-
Rundschau 8 (1960): 131-159, reprinted in his Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt, bility" in C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
1992), pp. 179-213.
54. Cf. Lafont "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," p. 1021: "Only the presupposition
38. I refer here to positions held bv P. Horwich and A. Fine; cf. M. Williams, " D o We of a single objective world . . . permits [us] to make the unconditional validity of
(Epistemologists) Need a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 223-242. truth compatible with a fallible understanding of knowledge."

39. I introduced this distinction in the Christian Gauss Lectures on founding sociol- 55. I cannot in the present context deal with moral and other normative validity
ogy in the theory of language (1971); cf. J . Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur claims that have a built-in orientation toward discursive vindication. They lack the
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 1-126, esp. pp. 104ff. property of "transcending justification" that accrues to truth claims through the
supposition of a single objective world built into the communicative use of language.
40. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 22-42. Normative validity claims are raised for interpersonal relationships within a social
world that is not independent of "our making" in the same way as is the objective
41. H . Putnam, "Introduction," in Realism and Reason (Cambridge, 1983). world. T h e discursive treatment of normative claims is, however, "analogous to truth"
insofar as the participants in practical discourse are guided by the goal of a com-
42. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur manded, permitted, or forbidden "single right answer." T h e social world is intrinsi-
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. cally historical, that is, ontologically constituted in a different way than the objective
world. F o r this reason, in the case of the social world, the idealization of the justi-
43. K . - 0 . Apel, "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbegründung," ficatory conditions cannot include an "anticipation of future corroboration
in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 116¬ (Bewährung)," in the sense of an anticipated refutation of future objections (Win-
211. gert) , but only in the critical sense of a proviso concerning approximation, that is, a
proviso concerning the justification community's actually achieved state of decenter-
44. C . Lafont, "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie ing. T h e discursive vindication of a truth claim says that the truth conditions, inter-
42 (1994): 1007-1023; Williams, Unnatural Doubts, pp. 233ff. preted as assertibility conditions, are satisfied. I n the case of a normative validity
claim, the discursively achieved agreement grounds the corresponding norm's wor-
45. A. Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," in The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley thiness to be recognized; to this extent the agreement itself contributes to the
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 175 (amended translation). satisfaction of the norm's conditions of validity. Whereas rational acceptability merely
indicates the truth of a proposition, it provides a constructive contribution to the
46. A. Wellmer, "Wahrheit, Kontingenz, Moderne," in Endspiele (Frankfurt, 1993), validity of norms.
p. 162. English translation as Endgames: Essays and lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature
of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). 56. Rorty, " I s T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 300.

47. Davidson, " T h e Structure a n d Content of T r u t h , " p. 307. 57. R. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," Ms. (1995), p. 5.

48. R. Rorty, "Sind Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeitschrift für 58. T. McCarthy, "Philosophy and Social Practice: Richard Rorty's 'New Pragma-
Philosophie & (1994): 982f. tism,'" in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 11-34.

49. Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," pp. 451f. 59. R. Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy," Revue Interna-
tionale de Philosophie 49 (1995), 437-460; cf. my reply in ibid., pp. 553-556.
50. J . Habermas, "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Justification and Application, trans.
C. C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 30ff, pp. 58f. 60. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 298.

51. L . Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt, 1993), p. 277. 61. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I, p. 29.

52. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n term "sich bewähren" and its cognates have generally 62. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," pp. 1 If.
been rendered here as "prove to be true" (in the sense of "turn out to be t r u e " ) , so
as to preserve in translation its connection with "wahr" true. Sich bewähren is proving 63. T h e same objectivism and the same kind of insensitivity could be shown through
to be true in the sense of standing the test, withstanding critical scrutiny. However, reference to Rorty's egocentric or ethnocentric description of processes of interpre-
because it is the term that Albrecht Wellmer used to render "corroboration" in his tation, for example, of hard cases of intercultural understanding (Verständigung).
influential discussion of Popper, where the reference is clearly to Wellmer's idea of Unlike Gadamer, Rorty does not have recourse to the symmetrical conditions for an
"anticipating future Bewährung" "corroboration" is used. See A. Wellmer, Critical adoption of perspectives learned by speakers and hearers in learning the system of
Theory of Society, trans. J . C u m m i n g (New York, 1974). personal pronouns and making possible a reciprocal convergence of interpretive
382
Chapter 8

9
horizons that, initially, are far apart. Instead, he takes as his starting point an asym-
metrical relationship between " u s " and "them," so that we have to judge their utter- O n the Distinction between Poetic and
ances according to our standards and assimilate their standards to ours; cf.
J . Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., Communicative Uses of Language (1985)
1992), pp. 135ff. This assimilatory model of understanding (Verstehen) partially coin-
cides with Davidson's model of interpretation. However, what for Davidson is the
result of a methodological decision to view the interpretation of linguistic expressions
as the application of the hypotheses of an empirically turned theory of truth, results
for Rorty from the decision (of strategic significance for his theory) in favor of a
naturalist descriptive vocabulary.

1
F r o m this c o m p l e x discussion [between Jacques D e r r i d a a n d J o h n
S e a r l e ] , J o n a t h a n C u l l e r selects as t h e c e n t r a l issue t h e q u e s t i o n o f
1

w h e t h e r J o h n A u s t i n succeeds i n m a k i n g w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e a t o t a l l y
harmless, provisional, and purely methodological move. Austin
w a n t s t o a n a l y z e t h e r u l e s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r e d by c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t y p i c a l s p e e c h acts c a n b e executed
successfully. H e b e g i n s t h i s analysis by f o c u s i n g o n s e n t e n c e s f r o m
normal e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d s e r i o u s l y a n d u s e d as simply
and literally as p o s s i b l e . T h u s , t h e u n i t o f analysis, t h e standard
s p e e c h act, is t h e r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t i o n s . T h e t h e o r e t i c i a n of
s p e e c h acts d i r e c t s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a s a m p l e o f n o r m a l linguistic
utterances f r o m w h i c h all complex, derivative, parasidc, a n d deviant
cases h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n is a c o n c e p -
tion of "customary" or n o r m a l linguistic practice—a concept of "or-
d i n a r y l a n g u a g e " w h o s e h a r m l e s s n e s s a n d c o n s i s t e n c y D e r r i d a calls
i n t o q u e s t i o n . A u s t i n ' s i n t e n t i o n is c l e a r : h e w a n t s t o analyze t h e
u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s of, f o r e x a m p l e , " p r o m i s e s " w i t h r e s p e c t t o cases
i n w h i c h the u t t e r a n c e o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences actually functions
as a p r o m i s e . N o w , t h e r e are c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h s u c h s e n t e n c e s lose
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a p r o m i s e . S p o k e n b y a n a c t o r o n t h e stage,
as p a r t o f a p o e m , o r e v e n w i t h i n a m o n o l o g u e , a p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n
tells us, b e c o m e s " p e c u l i a r l y n u l l a n d v o i d . " T h e same h o l d s f o r a
384 385

Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

p r o m i s e t h a t o c c u r s i n a q u o t a t i o n , o r f o r o n e t h a t is m e r e l y m e n - is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e q u o t e d p r o m i s e t h r o u g h t h e f o r m o f i n d i r e c t
t i o n e d . I n such contexts, t h e r e is n o serious o r binding use, and s p e e c h : i t is t h e r e b y t a k e n o u t o f t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t " f u n c t i o n s , "
s o m e t i m e s n o t e v e n a literal use, o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g performative t h a t is, i n w h i c h i t c o o r d i n a t e s t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s
s e n t e n c e , b u t r a t h e r a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c use. As Searle repeats i n i n t e r a c t i o n a n d gives rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n .
insistently, fictional o r s i m u l a t e d o r i n d i r e c t m o d e s o f use are " p a r a - O n l y t h e s p e e c h a c t a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e is effective
s i t i c " i n t h e sense t h a t l o g i c a l l y t h e y p r e s u p p o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a as action; t h e p r o m i s e m e n t i o n e d i n q u o t a t i o n , o r r e p o r t e d , d e p e n d s
s e r i o u s , l i t e r a l , a n d b i n d i n g use o f t h e s e n t e n c e s g r a m m a t i c a l l y a p - g r a m m a t i c a l l y u p o n t h i s . S u c h a s e t t i n g d e p r i v i n g i t o f its i l l o c u t i o n -
p r o p r i a t e f o r p r o m i s e s . C u l l e r e x t r a c t s essentially t h r e e objections ary force constitutes the bridge between quotation and fictional
f r o m D e r r i d a ' s texts; these a r e a i m e d a t s h o w i n g t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . E v e n a c t i o n o n t h e stage rests o n a basis o f e v e r y d a y
s u c h a use o f l a n g u a g e a n d a r e m e a n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e u s u a l actions ( o n t h e p a r t o f t h e actors, d i r e c t o r , stageworkers, a n d t h e a t e r
d i s t i n c t i o n s between serious a n d s i m u l a t e d , l i t e r a l a n d m e t a p h o r i c a l , employees); i n the context o f this f r a m e w o r k , promises can f u n c t i o n
everyday a n d fictional, a n d c u s t o m a r y a n d parasitic m o d e s o f speech in a different way t h a n t h e y d o " o n stage," g i v i n g rise t o o b l i g a t i o n s
collapse. relevant f o r the sequel o f a c t i o n . D e r r i d a makes no attempt to

a. W i t h h i s i n i t i a l a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a p o s i t s a n o t v e r y i l l u m i n a t - " d e c o n s t r u c t " this distinctive f u n c t i o n a l m o d e o f everyday language

i n g l i n k between quotability a n d iterability, o n the one h a n d , a n d within communicative action. I n the illocutionary binding and

fictionality, o n t h e o t h e r . T h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e is o n l y a p p a r - b o n d i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s , A u s t i n d i s c o v e r e d

ently something secondary i n comparison with a directly made a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n t h a t subjects n o r m a l s p e e c h —

promise, for the indirect r e p o r t i n g of a performative utterance i n a s p e e c h t h a t is p a r t o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s — t o constraints different

q u o t a t i o n is a f o r m o f r e p e t i t i o n , a n d as q u o t a b i l i t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e f r o m those o f fictional speech, s i m u l a t i o n , a n d i n t e r i o r m o n o l o g u e .

p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p e t i t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a r u l e , t h a t is, c o n v e n - T h e c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n -

t i o n a l i t y , i t b e l o n g s t o t h e essence o f e v e r y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g e n e r a t e d c o o r d i n a t i n g f o r c e a n d give rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n

u t t e r a n c e — a n d t h u s also t o t h a t o f p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s — t h a t i t d e f i n e t h e d o m a i n o f " n o r m a l " l a n g u a g e . T h e y c a n b e a n a l y z e d as

c a n b e q u o t e d a n d , i n t h e b r o a d e r sense, fictionally reproduced: " I f those i d e a l i z i n g suppositions t h a t we have to m a k e i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e

i t w e r e n o t possible f o r a character i n a play to m a k e a p r o m i s e , t h e r e action.

c o u l d be n o promises i n real life, f o r w h a t makes i t possible to b. T h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t r a i s e d b y C u l l e r , w i t h D e r r i d a , a g a i n s t


p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n tells us, is t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e - A u s t i n a n d Searle relates t o j u s t s u c h i d e a l i z a t i o n s . A n y g e n e r a l i z i n g
dure, o f formulas one can repeat. For m e t o be a b l e t o m a k e a analysis o f s p e e c h acts has t o b e a b l e t o specify g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l
p r o m i s e i n 'real life,' there m u s t be iterable p r o c e d u r e s o r f o r m u l a s c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts.
s u c h as a r e u s e d o n stage. ' S e r i o u s ' b e h a v i o r is a s p e c i a l case o f S e a r l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , has t a k e n o n t h i s t a s k . L i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s ,
3

role-playing. " 2
however, change their meanings depending o n shifting contexts;
I n this a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a obviously already presupposes w h a t he moreover, c o n t e x t s are so c o n s t i t u t e d as t o be o p e n t o e v e r - w i d e r -
wants to prove: that every c o n v e n t i o n t h a t p e r m i t s t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f r e a c h i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n . I t is o n e o f t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f o u r language
e x e m p l a r y a c t i o n s i n t r i n s i c a l l y possesses n o t m e r e l y a s y m b o l i c b u t t h a t w e c a n release u t t e r a n c e s f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t s a n d t r a n s -
also a fictional c h a r a c t e r . B u t i t w o u l d first have t o b e s h o w n that p l a n t t h e m i n t o d i f f e r e n t o n e s — D e r r i d a speaks o f " g r a f t i n g . " I n t h i s
conventions r e l a t i n g t o p l a y u l t i m a t e l y are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m m a n n e r , we c a n , i n r e l a t i o n t o a s p e e c h a c t s u c h as a " m a r r i a g e v o w , "
n o r m s o f a c t i o n . A u s t i n uses t h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e as a n e x a m - t h i n k o f ever-new a n d m o r e i m p r o b a b l e contexts; t h e specification
p l e o f a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c f o r m because t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s does n o t r u n u p against any n a t u r a l
386 387
Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

limits: "Suppose that the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a m a r r i a g e ceremony p o s i t i o n s ; b u t these i d e a l i z a t i o n s are n o t l o g o c e n t r i c , a r b i t r a r y acts


were m e t b u t that one o f the partners were u n d e r hypnosis, o r again that theoreticians b r i n g to bear o n u n m a n a g e a b l e contexts i n order
t h a t t h e c e r e m o n y w e r e i m p e c c a b l e i n a l l respects b u t h a d b e e n t o give t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f m a s t e r i n g t h e m ; r a t h e r , t h e y are p r e s u p -
c a l l e d a ' r e h e a r s a l , ' o r f i n a l l y , t h a t w h i l e t h e s p e a k e r was a m i n i s t e r positions that the participants themselves have to make i f c o m m u n i -
licensed to p e r f o r m weddings and the couple had obtained a l i - cative a c t i o n is t o b e p o s s i b l e at a l l .
cense, the t h r e e o f t h e m were o n this occasion a c t i n g i n a play that, c. T h e r o l e o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n also b e c l a r i f i e d i n c o n -
coincidentally, included a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y " 4
Such a v a r i a t i o n o f n e c t i o n w i t h s o m e o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s s a m e state o f a f f a i r s .
contexts p r o d u c i n g changes i n m e a n i n g c a n n o t i n p r i n c i p l e be ar- Because c o n t e x t s are changeable a n d can be expanded in any
r e s t e d o r c o n t r o l l e d , because c o n t e x t s c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d , t h a t is, d i r e c t i o n whatsoever, t h e same t e x t c a n b e o p e n t o d i f f e r e n t r e a d -
t h e y c a n n o t b e m a s t e r e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y o n c e a n d f o r a l l . C u l l e r shows i n g s ; i t is t h e t e x t i t s e l f t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e its u n c o n t r o l l a b l e effec-
c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t A u s t i n c a n n o t escape t h i s d i f f i c u l t y e v e n b y t a k i n g tive history (Wirkungsgeschichte). However, Derrida's deliberately
refuge i n the i n t e n t i o n s o f speakers a n d hearers. I t is n o t the p a r a d o x i c a l s t a t e m e n t t h a t e v e r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m i s i n -
thoughts o f bride, b r i d e g r o o m , or priest that decide the validity o f t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d every u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , does n o t
the ceremony, b u t their actions a n d the circumstances u n d e r w h i c h follow f r o m this venerable h e r m e n e u t i c insight. Culler justifies the
t h e y are c a r r i e d o u t . " W h a t c o u n t s is t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e d e s c r i p - s t a t e m e n t " A l l r e a d i n g s are m i s r e a d i n g s " as f o l l o w s : " I f a t e x t c a n b e
t i o n o f the circumstances: w h e t h e r the features o f the c o n t e x t ad- u n d e r s t o o d , i t can i n p r i n c i p l e be u n d e r s t o o d repeatedly, by d i f f e r -
d u c e d create a frame that alters t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f the ent readers i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances. T h e s e acts o f r e a d i n g or
utterances." 5
u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t , o f course, i d e n t i c a l . T h e y involve modifica-
Searle has r e a c t e d t o t h i s d i f f i c u l t y b y i n t r o d u c i n g a q u a l i f i c a t i o n tions a n d differences, b u t d i f f e r e n c e s w h i c h are d e e m e d n o t to
to the effect that the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence does n o t c o m - m a t t e r . W e c a n t h u s say . . . t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a special case o f
p l e t e l y fix t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act i n w h i c h i t is misunderstanding, a particular deviation or determination of misun-
employed; r a t h e r , i t d e p e n d s o n t a c i t s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n b y a system d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h o s e misses d o n o t m a t t e r . " 6

o f b a c k g r o u n d assumptions r e g a r d i n g the n o r m a l i t y o f general con- H o w e v e r , C u l l e r leaves o n e t h i n g o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e produc-


d i t i o n s i n the w o r l d . These prereflective b a c k g r o u n d certainties are tivity o f the process o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c only
o f a h o l i s t i c n a t u r e ; t h e y c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d by a c o u n t a b l y finite so l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s r e t a i n h o l d o f t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a
set o f s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . Sentence-meanings, n o m a t t e r h o w w e l l ana- p o s s i b l e , a c t u a l l y r e a c h e d , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n
l y z e d , t h u s are v a l i d o n l y r e l a t i v e t o a s h a r e d b a c k g r o u n d knowledge w h i c h t h e same u t t e r a n c e s are a s s i g n e d t h e same m e a n i n g . A s G a d a -
t h a t is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . How- mer has s h o w n , even the h e r m e n e u t i c endeavor, w h i c h aims to
ever, Searle m a k e s c l e a r t h a t p o s i t i n g s u c h a r e l a t i o n b y n o m e a n s b r i d g e t e m p o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l distances, r e m a i n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e
b r i n g s w i t h i t t h e m e a n i n g - r e l a t i v i s m t h a t D e r r i d a a i m s t o show. So idea o f a possible, actually achieved, agreement.
l o n g as l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e f u n c t i o n i n g a n d t h e p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g U n d e r t h e pressure to make decisions i n h e r e n t i n everyday c o m -
c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d has not broken down, participants municative practices, participants are dependent on an action-
r e c k o n w i t h c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d — a n d clearly, r i g h t l y s o — t h a t coordinating agreement. The more removed i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are
a r e a s s u m e d as " n o r m a l " i n t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . A n d i n cases f r o m this k i n d o f "serious s i t u a t i o n , " t h e m o r e they can free t h e m -
where individual background convictions do become problematic, selves f r o m t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n a c h i e v a b l e c o n s e n s u s .
t h e y f u r t h e r assume t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a r a t i o n a l l y B u t they can never w h o l l y free themselves f r o m t h e idea t h a t m i s i n -
m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t . B o t h are s t r o n g , t h a t is t o say, i d e a l i z i n g s u p - t e r p r e t a t i o n s w o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e have to be criticizable i n terms o f
388 389

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

a n a g r e e m e n t a i m e d f o r i n a n i d e a l way. T h e i n t e r p r e t e r d o e s n o t functions, i t has t o p r o d u c e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -


impose this idea o n her object; rather, i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude s i o n a n d speaker, h e a r e r , a n d state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d . Buhler
o f a p a r t i c i p a t i n g o b s e r v e r , she takes i t o v e r f r o m t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g c o n c e p t u a l i z e d t h i s i n h i s s e m i o t i c s c h e m a as t h e s i g n f u n c t i o n s of
d i r e c t l y w h o c a n act communicatively only on the presupposition of inter- expression, appeal, a n d representation. To the extent that language 8

subjectively identical ascriptions of meaning. Thus, I do n o t wish to f u l f i l l s a p o e t i c f u n c t i o n , h o w e v e r , i t d o e s so i n t h e r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n


m a r s h a l a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n positivism o f language games against D e r - o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n t o itself. C o n s e q u e n t l y , r e f e r e n c e t o a n
r i d a ' s thesis. I t is n o t a n y g i v e n h a b i t u a l i z e d p r a c t i c e t h a t d e c i d e s j u s t object, i n f o r m a t i o n a l content, and truth-value—validity conditions
w h a t m e a n i n g is a t t r i b u t e d t o a t e x t o r a n u t t e r a n c e . 7
Rather, lan- in general—are e x t r i n s i c t o p o e t i c l a n g u a g e ; a n u t t e r a n c e is p o e t i c
g u a g e g a m e s w o r k o n l y because t h e y p r e s u p p o s e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t is d i r e c t e d t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m itself, t o its
transcend any p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e g a m e , idealizations that—as a own linguistic f o r m . Roman Jakobson integrated this specification
necessary c o n d i t i o n o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g — g i v e rise t o i n t o an e x p a n d e d schema of language functions. I n addition to the
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t is o p e n t o c r i t i c i s m o n t h e basis basic f u n c t i o n s , w h i c h g o b a c k t o B u h l e r — e x p r e s s i n g the speaker's
o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . A l a n g u a g e o p e r a t i n g u n d e r these k i n d s o f c o n - intentions, establishing interpersonal relations, and representing
s t r a i n t s is s u b j e c t t o a n o n g o i n g test. E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac- states o f a f f a i r s — a n d t w o f u r t h e r f u n c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o m a k i n g c o n -
tices, i n w h i c h a c t o r s h a v e t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t something t a c t a n d t o t h e c o d e , h e ascribes t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s a p o e t i c
i n the w o r l d , stand u n d e r the n e e d to prove t h e i r w o r t h ; such a p r o o f f u n c t i o n , w h i c h d i r e c t s o u r a t t e n t i o n t o " t h e message as s u c h . " 9
We
o f w o r t h is m a d e p o s s i b l e i n t h e first p l a c e by these i d e a l i z i n g s u p - a r e less c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i t h a c l o s e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e p o e t i c
p o s i t i o n s . I t is o n t h e basis o f t h i s n e e d f o r e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c p r a c - f u n c t i o n ( i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u i v a l e n c e is
tices t o p r o v e t h e i r w o r t h t h a t o n e m a y d i s t i n g u i s h , w i t h A u s t i n a n d p r o j e c t e d f r o m t h e axis o f s e l e c t i o n t o t h e axis o f c o m b i n a t i o n ) than
S e a r l e , b e t w e e n " c u s t o m a r y " a n d " p a r a s i t i c " uses o f language. w i t h a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t is i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r problem

U p t o t h i s p o i n t I have c r i t i c i z e d D e r r i d a ' s t h i r d a n d f u n d a m e n t a l o f d e l i m i t i n g n o r m a l ( f r o m o t h e r k i n d s of) speech: "Any a t t e m p t to

a s s u m p t i o n only to the e x t e n t t h a t (against Culler's reconstruction reduce the sphere o f poetic f u n c t i o n to poetry or to confine poetry

o f D e r r i d i a n arguments) I have d e f e n d e d t h e possibility o f demar- t o p o e t i c f u n c t i o n w o u l d be a delusive oversimplification. Poetic

c a t i n g n o r m a l l a n g u a g e f r o m derivative f o r m s . I have n o t y e t s h o w n f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e sole f u n c t i o n o f v e r b a l a r t , b u t o n l y its d o m i n a n t ,

how fictional speech can be d e m a r c a t e d f r o m t h e n o r m a l ( t h a t is, d e t e r m i n i n g f u n c t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a l l o t h e r v e r b a l a c t i v i t i e s i t acts as

e v e r y d a y ) use o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s a s p e c t is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o n e f o r a s u b s i d i a r y , accessory c o n s t i t u e n t . T h i s f u n c t i o n , b y p r o m o t i n g t h e

Derrida. I f "literature" and "writing" constitute the m o d e l for a p a l p a b i l i t y o f signs, d e e p e n s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i c h o t o m y o f signs

universal insurmountable textual context within which all genre a n d objects. H e n c e , w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h poetic f u n c t i o n , linguistics

d i s t i n c t i o n s u l t i m a t e l y dissolve, t h e y c a n n o t b e s p l i t o f f f r o m other c a n n o t l i m i t i t s e l f t o t h e field o f p o e t r y . " 1 0


Poetic speech, therefore,

d i s c o u r s e s as a n a u t o n o m o u s r e a l m o f fiction. For the l i t e r a r y critics is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d o n l y by v i r t u e o f t h e p r i m a r y a n d s t r u c t u r e -

w h o f o l l o w D e r r i d a i n t h e U n i t e d States, t h e thesis o f t h e autonomy f o r m i n g f o r c e o f a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n t h a t is always f u l f i l l e d together

o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t is u n a c c e p t a b l e f o r t h e f u r t h e r r e a s o n with other language functions.

t h a t t h e y w a n t t o set t h e m s e l v e s o f f f r o m t h e f o r m a l i s m o f New Richard O h m a n n m a k e s use of Austin's approach i n order to


C r i t i c i s m a n d f r o m s t r u c t u r a l i s t aesthetics. e x a m i n e t h e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s o f p o e t i c l a n g u a g e i n t h i s sense. F o r
The Prague Structuralists originally tried to distinguish poetic h i m , t h e p h e n o m e n o n i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e fictionality of
from o r d i n a r y language w i t h respect to the relation o f each to t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t , t h a t is, t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c a p p e a r -
e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y . I n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e o c c u r s i n communicative a n c e (Schein), w i t h w h i c h a s e c o n d a r e n a , s p e c i f i c a l l y r e m o v e d f r o m
390 391

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses o f Language

r e a l i t y , is o p e n e d u p o n t h e basis o f o n g o i n g e v e r y d a y practices. p e n d e n c e o f t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k o f a r t i n D e r r i d a ' s sense. She d o e s n o t


W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s p o e t i c l a n g u a g e is its " w o r l d - g e n e r a t i n g " capac- consider nctionality, the bracketing o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force, a n d the
i t y : " A l i t e r a r y w o r k creates a w o r l d . . . b y p r o v i d i n g t h e r e a d e r w i t h u n c o u p l i n g o f poetic language f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
impaired a n d i n c o m p l e t e s p e e c h acts w h i c h h e c o m p l e t e s by s u p p l y - tices t o b e decisive selective c r i t e r i a , b e c a u s e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s of
ing the appropriate circumstances." 11
T h e p e c u l i a r disempowerment o f l a n g u a g e s u c h as j o k e s , i r o n y , fantasies, s t o r i e s , a n d p a r a b l e s p e r v a d e
s p e e c h acts, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s f i c t i o n s , consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h o u r everyday discourse a n d i n n o way constitute an autonomous
acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , r e t a i n i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y universe c u t o f f f r o m "the w o r l d ' s business." Conversely, w o r k s o f
m e a n i n g s o n l y as r e f r a c t e d b y i n d i r e c t r e p o r t i n g o r q u o t a t i o n : " A n o n f i c t i o n , m e m o i r s , t r a v e l r e p o r t s , h i s t o r i c a l r o m a n c e s , e v e n romans
l i t e r a r y w o r k is a d i s c o u r s e w h o s e s e n t e n c e s l a c k t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a clef o r t h r i l l e r s t h a t , l i k e T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s In Cold Blood, a d a p t a
f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d n o r m a l l y a t t a c h t o t h e m . I t s i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is factually d o c u m e n t e d case i n n o way c r e a t e an unambiguously
m i m e t i c . . . . Specifically, a l i t e r a r y w o r k p u r p o r t e d l y i m i t a t e s a series f i c t i o n a l w o r l d , e v e n t h o u g h we o f t e n c o u n t these p r o d u c t i o n s , f o r
o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h i n f a c t h a v e n o o t h e r e x i s t e n c e . B y d o i n g so, i t t h e m o s t p a r t a t least, as " l i t e r a t u r e . " P r a t t uses t h e r e s u l t s o f studies
leads t h e r e a d e r t o i m a g i n e a speaker, a s i t u a t i o n , a set o f a n c i l l a r y i n sociolinguistics by W. L a b o v 1 6
to prove that natural narratives, that
events, a n d so o n . " 1 2
T h e bracketing o f illocutionary force virtualizes is, t h e " s t o r i e s " t o l d s p o n t a n e o u s l y o r o n r e q u e s t i n e v e r y d a y l i f e ,
t h e r e l a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e s p e e c h acts a r e i n v o l v e d o b e y t h e s a m e r h e t o r i c a l laws o f c o n s t r u c t i o n as, a n d e x h i b i t s i m i l a r
t h a n k s t o t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , a n d releases t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n structural characteristics to, literary narratives. "Labov's data m a k e
interaction f r o m an o b l i g a t i o n to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about some- it necessary t o a c c o u n t f o r n a r r a t i v e r h e t o r i c i n t e r m s that are n o t
t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s u c h a exclusively l i t e r a r y ; t h e fact that Active o r m i m e t i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d
way t h a t t h e y c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n a n d t h u s e n t e r utterances can o c c u r i n almost any r e a l m o f e x t r a l i t e r a r y discourse
i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h e s e q u e l o f a c t i o n : " S i n c e t h e quasi¬ requires that we d o t h e same f o r A c t i v i t y o r m i m e s i s . I n o t h e r
s p e e c h acts o f l i t e r a t u r e are n o t carrying on the world's business—de- w o r d s , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a w o r k ' s A c t i v i t y a n d its l i t e r a r i n e s s is
scribing, u r g i n g , contracting, etc.—the reader may well attend to indirect." 1 7

them i n a nonpragmatic way." 1 3


Neutralizing their b i n d i n g and
Nonetheless, the fact that n o r m a l language is p e r m e a t e d with
b o n d i n g f o r c e relieves t h e d i s e m p o w e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r o m t h e
fictional, narrative, metaphorical—in general, with rhetorical—ele-
pressure to make decisions i n t r i n s i c to everyday communicative
m e n t s does n o t yet speak against t h e a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n t h e a u t o n -
practices, removes t h e m f r o m the sphere o f n o r m a l speech, a n d
o m y o f the linguistic w o r k o f art by the b r a c k e t i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y
thereby empowers t h e m for the playful creation of new worlds—or,
f o r c e s . For, a c c o r d i n g to Jakobson, n c t i o n a l i t y is a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
rather, for the u n m i t i g a t e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the world-disclosing
feature s u i t e d to d e m a r c a t i n g l i t e r a t u r e f r o m everyday discourses
force o f innovative linguistic expressions. T h i s specialization i n the
only to the extent that the world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f language
world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f language explains the peculiar self-
predominates over the other linguistic functions a n d determines the
referentiality o f poetic language to w h i c h Jakobson refers a n d that
s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t . I n a c e r t a i n respect, i t is t h e
p r o m p t s G e o f f r e y H a r t m a n t o p o s e t h e r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n : "Is n o t
r e f r a c t i o n a n d p a r t i a l s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung) o f illocutionary validity
literary language the n a m e we give to a d i c t i o n whose f r a m e of
c l a i m s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s t o r y f r o m t h e eyewitness statement,
r e f e r e n c e is s u c h t h a t t h e w o r d s s t a n d o u t as w o r d s ( e v e n as s o u n d s )
t e a s i n g f r o m i n s u l t i n g , i r o n y f r o m m i s l e a d i n g , h y p o t h e s i s f r o m asser-
r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g , at once, assimilable meanings?" 1 4

t i o n , f a n t a s y f r o m p e r c e p t i o n , t h e t r a i n i n g m a n e u v e r f r o m t h e act o f
M a r y L . Pratt refers to O h m a n n ' s s t u d i e s 1 5
i n order to r e f u t e — a d - warfare, a n d the i m a g i n e d scenario f r o m t h e r e p o r t o n an actual
m i t t e d l y by means o f speech-act t h e o r y — t h e thesis o f t h e i n d e - c a t a s t r o p h e . B u t i n n o n e o f these cases d o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose
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Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e

t h e i r action-coordinating b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g force. Even i n the m a t i c a n a l y s t o f l a n g u a g e stalks l i t e r a r y t e x t s f r o m o u t s i d e , as i t w e r e .


cases a d d u c e d f o r t h e sake o f c o m p a r i s o n , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e func- O f c o u r s e , t h e l a t t e r have to satisfy a final c o n d i t i o n ; i n t h e case o f
t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act r e m a i n i n t a c t i n s o f a r as t h e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s literary texts, tellability must gain p r e d o m i n a n c e over other func-
c a n n o t be detached f r o m contexts o f life-practice. T h e world-disclos- t i o n a l characteristics: " I n the e n d , tellability can take p r e c e d e n c e
i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e d o e s n o t g a i n i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-a-vis t h e over assertibility itself." 2 0
O n l y i n t h i s case d o the f u n c t i o n a l de-
expressive, r e g u l a t i v e , a n d i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . By c o n t r a s t , p r e - m a n d s a n d s t r u c t u r a l constraints o f everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
cisely t h i s m a y be t h e case i n T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s l i t e r a r y t r e a t m e n t o f tices (which Pratt defines by means of Grice's conversational
a p a r t i c u l a r event, n o t o r i o u s i n legal circles a n d carefully researched; p o s t u l a t e s ) lose t h e i r f o r c e . T h a t e v e r y o n e is c o n c e r n e d t o p r e s e n t
f o r w h a t g r o u n d s t h e primacy a n d t h e s t r u c t u r i n g f o r c e o f t h e p o e t i c h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the conversation i n f o r m a t i v e l y , to be relevant,
f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e d e v i a t i o n o f a f i c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m t h e straightforward, a n d to avoid obscure, ambiguous, a n d l o n g w i n d e d
d o c u m e n t a r y r e p o r t o f a n e v e n t , b u t t h e e x e m p l a r y way o f d e a l i n g u t t e r a n c e s a r e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s o f normal language i n c o m m u -
w i t h i t t h a t takes t h e case o u t o f its c o n t e x t a n d m a k e s i t t h e o c c a s i o n nicative action, b u t n o t o f poetic speech: " O u r tolerance, indeed
for an innovative, world-disclosing, a n d eye-opening representation p r o p e n s i t y , f o r e l a b o r a t i o n w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t e l l a b l e suggests
i n w h i c h the rhetorical means of representation depart f r o m com- that, i n G r i c e a n terms, the standards o f quantity, quality, a n d m a n n e r
m u n i c a t i v e r o u t i n e s a n d take o n a life o f t h e i r o w n . f o r d i s p l a y t e x t s d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e G r i c e suggests f o r declarative

I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o see h o w P r a t t is c o m p e l l e d to w o r k o u t this speech i n his m a x i m s . " 2 1

p o e t i c f u n c t i o n against h e r w i l l . H e r sociolinguistic counterproposal I n t h e e n d , t h e analysis leads t o a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e thesis t h a t


b e g i n s w i t h a n analysis o f t h e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t p o e t i c s p e e c h i t w o u l d like to refute. To the degree that the poetic, world-disclosing
shares w i t h o t h e r d i s c o u r s e s — t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y a n a r r a t o r f u n c t i o n o f language gains p r i m a c y a n d s t r u c t u r e - f o r m i n g f o r c e ,
o r l e c t u r e r t u r n s t o a p u b l i c a n d calls its a t t e n t i o n t o a t e x t . T h e t e x t l a n g u a g e escapes t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c -
is s u b j e c t e d t o c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e s o f p r e p a r a t i o n a n d s e l e c t i o n be- t i o n s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h e space o f fiction, w h i c h is o p e n e d u p w h e n
f o r e i t is r e a d y f o r d e l i v e r y . F i n a l l y , b e f o r e a t e x t c a n lay c l a i m t o t h e linguistic f o r m s o f expression b e c o m e reflexive, results f r o m t h e fact
p a t i e n c e a n d capacity f o r j u d g m e n t o f t h e a u d i e n c e , i t has t o satisfy that the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g forces b e c o m e ineffec-
c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n c e : i t has to be worth telling. T h e r e l i a b i l i t y is t i v e — a s d o t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t m a k e p o s s i b l e a use o f language
assessed i n t e r m s o f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t e x e m p l a r y oriented toward reaching understanding, thereby enabling a coordi-
e x p e r i e n c e . I n its c o n t e n t , a t e l l a b l e t e x t r e a c h e s b e y o n d t h e l o c a l n a t i o n o f plans o f action that operates via the intersubjective recog-
c o n t e x t o f t h e i m m e d i a t e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n a n d is o p e n t o f u r t h e r n i t i o n o f criticizable validity claims. O n e c a n also r e a d D e r r i d a ' s
e l a b o r a t i o n : "As m i g h t b e e x p e c t e d , t h e s e t w o f e a t u r e s — c o n t e x t u a l d e b a t e w i t h A u s t i n as a d e n i a l o f t h i s d o m a i n o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i -
detachability and susceptibility to elaboration—are equally i m p o r - cative p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h is s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o a l o g i c o f its o w n ;
tant characteristics o f l i t e r a r y u t t e r a n c e s . " 1 8
O f course, l i t e r a r y texts the d e n i a l o f such a d o m a i n corresponds to t h e d e n i a l o f an a u t o n o -
share these characteristics w i t h "display texts" i n g e n e r a l . T h e latter mous realm of fiction.
are characterized w i t h respect to t h e i r special c o m m u n i c a t i v e func-
t i o n s : t h e y are d e s i g n e d t o s e r v e "a p u r p o s e I have d e s c r i b e d as t h a t 2
o f v e r b a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h are
h e l d t o b e u n u s u a l o r p r o b l e m a t i c i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e addressee Because D e r r i d a d e n i e s b o t h o f t h e a b o v e , h e is a b l e t o analyze a n y
will respond a f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e i n t e n d e d way, a d o p t t h e i n t e n d e d given discourse i n accordance w i t h the m o d e l o f poetic language,
e v a l u a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t a k e p l e a s u r e i n d o i n g so, a n d g e n e r - a n d d o so as t h o u g h l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l w e r e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e
a l l y find t h e w h o l e u n d e r t a k i n g w o r t h i t . " 1 9
O n e sees h o w t h e p r a g - p o e t i c use o f l a n g u a g e specialized i n world-disclosure. F r o m this
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Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e

v i e w p o i n t , l a n g u a g e as s u c h c o n v e r g e s w i t h l i t e r a t u r e o r i n d e e d w i t h t e r m i n e s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y , science
" w r i t i n g . " T h i s aestheticizing of language, which is purchased with the a n d m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s a n d p o l i t i c s , a r e at t h e m e r c y o f a p r o c e s s
twofold denial of the independent logics of normal and poetic speech, also of language-creating p r o t u b e r a n c e s i n just the same way as a r t a n d
e x p l a i n s D e r r i d a ' s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o w a r d t h e t e n s i o n - f i l l e d p o l a r i t y be- philosophy. L i k e K u h n i a n history o f science, the f l u x o f i n t e r p r e t a -
t w e e n t h e p o e t i c , w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d its p r o - tions flows r h y t h m i c a l l y between the r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g a n d n o r m a l i z a -
saic, i n n e r w o r l d l y f u n c t i o n s ; t h e s e f u n c t i o n s a r e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t tion of language. Rorty observes this b a c k - a n d - f o r t h movement
by a m o d i f i e d version o f B u h l e r ' s schema o f language f u n c t i o n s . 2 2
between two situations i n all d o m a i n s o f c u l t u r a l life:
L i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes s u c h as t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l -
O n e is t h e sort o f s i t u a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d w h e n p e o p l e pretty m u c h a g r e e o n
edge, the transmission o f culture, the f o r m a t i o n of personal identity,
w h a t is w a n t e d , a n d a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h o w best to get it. I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n
socialization, and social i n t e g r a t i o n involve mastering problems
t h e r e is n o n e e d to say a n y t h i n g t e r r i b l y u n f a m i l i a r , for a r g u m e n t is typically
p o s e d i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e y owe t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f l e a r n i n g p r o c - a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f a s s e r t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t t h e utility o f v o c a b u l a r i e s .
esses, w h i c h D e r r i d a c a n n o t a c k n o w l e d g e , t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c s T h e c o n t r a s t i n g s i t u a t i o n is o n e i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g is u p for grabs at
o f these p r o b l e m s a n d t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m t a i l o r e d t o deal w i t h o n c e — i n w h i c h t h e motives a n d t h e t e r m s o f d i s c u s s i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l
t h e m . F o r D e r r i d a , l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes i n t h e w o r l d are subject of argument. . . . I n s u c h p e r i o d s p e o p l e b e g i n to toss a r o u n d o l d
w o r d s i n n e w s e n s e s , to t h r o w i n t h e o c c a s i o n a l n e o l o g i s m , a n d t h u s to
e m b e d d e d i n a world-constituting context that prejudices everything;
h a m m e r o u t a n e w i d i o m w h i c h i n i t i a l l y attracts a t t e n t i o n to itself a n d o n l y
t h e y a r e f a t a l i s t i c a l l y at t h e m e r c y o f t h e h a p p e n i n g s o f t e x t c r e a t i o n
later gets p u t to w o r k . 2 3

b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l , o v e r w h e l m e d by the poetic-creative transfor-


mation of a background designed by archewriting, a n d c o n d e m n e d O n e n o t i c e s h o w t h e N i e t z s c h e a n p a t h o s o f a Lebensphilosophie that
t o be t e m p o r a l l y a n d s p a t i a l l y l i m i t e d . A n a e s t h e t i c contextualism has m a d e t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n b e c l o u d s t h e s o b e r i n s i g h t s o f pragma-
b l i n d s h i m to the fact t h a t everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, by t i s m ; i n t h e p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by R o r t y , t h e r e n o v a t i v e p r o c e s s o f l i n -
v i r t u e o f t h e i r b u i l t - i n idealizations, m a k e possible l e a r n i n g p r o c - guistic world-disclosure n o l o n g e r has a counterpoise i n t h e processes
esses i n t h e w o r l d , i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g power o f c r i t i c a l t e s t i n g t h a t are p a r t o f i n n e r w o r l d l y p r a c t i c e s . T h e "yes"
o f i n t e r p r e t i n g l a n g u a g e has t o prove its worth. T h e s e l e a r n i n g p r o c - and "no" of communicatively a c t i n g a c t o r s is p r e j u d i c e d a n d r h e t o -
esses d e v e l o p a n i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c t h a t t r a n s c e n d s a l l l o c a l b a r r i e r s rically o v e r d e t e r m i n e d by t h e i r linguistic contexts to such a degree
because experiences a n d j u d g m e n t s are f o r m e d o n l y i n the l i g h t o f t h a t t h e a n o m a l i e s o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e phases o f e x h a u s t i o n are
criticizable validity claims. D e r r i d a neglects the p o t e n t i a l f o r nega- p r e s e n t e d o n l y as s y m p t o m s o f w a n i n g v i t a l i t y , as a g i n g processes, as
tion i n h e r e n t i n t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g processes a n a l o g o u s t o n a t u r a l o n e s — a n d a r e n o t seen as t h e r e s u l t
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h e allows t h e c a p a c i t y t o solve p r o b l e m s t o d i s a p p e a r o f unsuccessful s o l u t i o n s t o p r o b l e m s a n d invalid answers.
b e h i n d the world-creating capacity o f language; the f o r m e r capacity I n n e r w o r l d l y linguistic practices d r a w t h e i r p o w e r o f negation
is possessed by l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h t h o s e a c t i n g f r o m v a l i d i t y claims t h a t go b e y o n d t h e h o r i z o n s o f the c u r r e n t l y
communicatively enter i n t o relations to the w o r l d w h e n e v e r they given context. B u t the contextualist c o n c e p t i o n o f language, laden
reach understanding with one another about something i n the ob- as i t is w i t h Lebensphilosophie, is i n s e n s i t i v e t o t h e a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g
jective w o r l d , i n t h e i r c o m m o n social w o r l d , o r i n the subjective force o f the counterfactual, w h i c h makes itself felt i n the idealizing
w o r l d s t o w h i c h e a c h has p r i v i l e g e d access. presuppositions o f communicative action. For this reason, D e r r i d a

R i c h a r d R o r t y c a r r i e s o u t a s i m i l a r act o f l e v e l i n g . U n l i k e D e r r i d a , a n d R o r t y also f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e t h e p e c u l i a r status o f d i s c o u r s e s ,

h o w e v e r , h e does n o t r e m a i n i d e a l i s t i c a l l y fixated u p o n the history w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n and tailored

o f m e t a p h y s i c s as a t r a n s c e n d e n t h a p p e n i n g (Ubergeschehen) t h a t d e - t o a single v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n ( t r u t h o r n o r m a t i v e Tightness), t h a t is,


397
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O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e
Chapter 9

to a single c o m p l e x o f p r o b l e m s (questions o f t r u t h or justice). I n exoteric respect, c r i t i c i s m accomplishes a process o f t r a n s l a t i o n o f a

modern societies, t h e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w have u n i q u e k i n d . I t draws the e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n t e n t o f the w o r k o f a r t i n t o

c r y s t a l l i z e d a r o u n d these f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e c o r r e s p o n d - n o r m a l language; the innovative potential o f art a n d literature for

i n g c u l t u r a l systems o f a c t i o n a d m i n i s t e r problemsolving capacities i n a t h e f o r m s o f life a n d life-histories t h a t r e p r o d u c e themselves via

way s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h t h e e n t e r p r i s e s o f a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action can be unleashed o n l y i n this m a i e u -

a d m i n i s t e r capacities for world-disclosure. Because D e r r i d a o v e r g e n e r a l - tic way. T h i s innovative potential then finds expression in the

izes t h i s o n e l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n — t h e p o e t i c — h e n o l o n g e r n o t i c e s c h a n g e d c o m p o s i t i o n o f a n evaluative v o c a b u l a r y — i n t h e r e n o v a t i o n

the complex relation between the n o r m a l language of everyday of value-orientations a n d n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s — w h i c h alters the

p r a c t i c e s a n d t h e t w o n o n e v e r y d a y s p h e r e s , w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , tincture o f modes o f life t h r o u g h altering modes o f perception.

as i t w e r e , i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s . T h e p o l a r t e n s i o n b e t w e e n w o r l d - Like literary criticism, philosophy, t o o , takes u p a p o s i t i o n w i t h


d i s c l o s u r e a n d p r o b l e m s o l v i n g is h e l d t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t h e c l u s t e r o f t w o f r o n t s — o r a t least t h i s is t r u e o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h n o
f u n c t i o n s o f everyday language; b u t a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e , o n t h e one longer promises to vindicate the claims o f r e l i g i o n i n the n a m e o f
h a n d , a n d science, m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n t h e other, specialize i n t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of
experiences a n d k i n d s o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t develop a n d can be w o r k e d s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w a n d a t t a c h e s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m s t o its state-
o u t w i t h i n t h e c a t c h m e n t a r e a o f j u s t one l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n a n d one ments. I t distinguishes itself by posing p r o b l e m s w i t h a universalist
dimension o f v a l i d i t y , respectively. D e r r i d a h o l i s t i c a l l y levels these t h r u s t a n d b y its s t r o n g t h e o r e t i c a l strategies, t h e r e b y m a i n t a i n i n g
complicated relations i n order to equate philosophy w i t h literature a n i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sciences. A n d yet p h i l o s o p h y is n o t
a n d c r i t i c i s m . H e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e special status t h a t b o t h p h i - simply an esoteric c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f experts. I t maintains
l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , e a c h i n its o w n way, assume as m e d i a - j u s t as i n t i m a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d
tors between the cultures o f experts a n d t h e everyday w o r l d . w i t h s o u n d c o m m o n sense, e v e n i f i t r e l e n t l e s s l y a n d subversively
shakes u p t h e c e r t a i n t i e s o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . I n t h e face o f systems
O n the one h a n d , literary criticism, institutionalized i n Europe
of knowledge differentiated according to particular dimensions of
since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t
validity, p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g represents t h e lifeworld's interests i n
[ f r o m o t h e r v a l u e s p h e r e s ] . I t reacts t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g a u t o n o m y of
the totality o f f u n c t i o n s a n d structures t h a t are clustered together
l i n g u i s t i c w o r k s o f a r t b y m e a n s o f d i s c o u r s e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n ques-
and combined i n communicative action. Admittedly, it maintains
t i o n s o f taste. I n s u c h d i s c o u r s e s , t h e c l a i m s w i t h w h i c h l i t e r a r y texts
t h i s r e l a t i o n t o t o t a l i t y by m e a n s o f a r e f l e x i v i t y l a c k i n g i n t h e l i f e -
a p p e a r a r e s u b m i t t e d t o e x a m i n a t i o n — c l a i m s t o " a r t i s t i c t r u t h , " aes-
w o r l d ' s b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is p r e s e n t i n t u i t i v e l y .
thetic h a r m o n y , e x e m p l a r y validity, innovative power, a n d authentic-
ity. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m is s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r m s of I f o n e b e c o m e s aware o f this ( h e r e m e r e l y sketched) t w o - f r o n t
a r g u m e n t a t i o n specializing in propositional truth and normative p o s i t i o n o f [ l i t e r a r y ] criticism a n d p h i l o s o p h y — t o w a r d the everyday
r i g h t n e s s , t h a t is, t o t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l discourses. I t is, h o w - w o r l d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t o w a r d t h e special cultures o f a r t a n d
ever, n o t m e r e l y a n e s o t e r i c c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f e x p e r t s b u t , l i t e r a t u r e , s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n t h e o t h e r — i t b e c o m e s c l e a r
o v e r a n d above t h i s , has t h e task o f m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e c u l t u r e s what the leveling o f the genre distinction between philosophy and
o f experts a n d the everyday w o r l d . literature, a n d the assimilation o f philosophy to literature and of
l i t e r a t u r e t o p h i l o s o p h y (as c o n t e n d e d a b o v e ) , m e a n . S u c h a l e v e l i n g
T h i s bridging function o f a r t c r i t i c i s m is m o r e c l e a r l y e v i d e n t w i t h
mixes u p the constellations i n w h i c h the rhetorical elements of
r e g a r d t o m u s i c a n d t h e p l a s t i c arts t h a n w i t h r e g a r d t o l i t e r a r y
l a n g u a g e t a k e o n entirely different roles. T h e r h e t o r i c a l e l e m e n t o c c u r s
w o r k s , w h i c h are, o f course, already f o r m u l a t e d i n the m e d i u m of
i n its pure form o n l y i n t h e s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y o f p o e t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t h a t
l a n g u a g e , e v e n i f i t is a p o e t i c , s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l o n e . I n t h i s s e c o n d ,
398 399

Chapter 9 O n the D i s d n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f f i c t i o n , w h i c h specializes i n w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e . a c h i e v e m e n t . Conversely, the l i t e r a r y - c r i d c a l capacity f o r judgment


T h e n o r m a l l a n g u a g e o f e v e r y d a y l i f e , t o o , is i n e r a d i c a b l y r h e t o r i c a l ; loses its p o t e n c y w h e n , as e n v i s i o n e d by D e r r i d a ' s d i s c i p l e s i n l i t e r a -
b u t h e r e , w i t h i n the cluster of m u l t i p l e language functions, the ture departments, i t switches f r o m appropriating the content of
r h e t o r i c a l elements recede. I n the routines o f everyday practices, the a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a c r i t i q u e o f m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e false assimi-
world-constituting linguistic framework is n e a r l y paralyzed. The l a t i o n o f o n e enterprise to the o t h e r robs b o t h o f t h e i r substance.
s a m e h o l d s f o r t h e s p e c i a l i z e d l a n g u a g e s o f science a n d t e c h n o l o g y , A n d so w e r e t u r n t o t h e issue w i t h w h i c h w e s t a r t e d . W h o e v e r t r a n s -
law, m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , a n d so f o r t h . T h e y , too, poses t h e r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n i n t o t h e d o m a i n o f r h e t o r i c i n
a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r o f m e t a p h o r i c a l t r o p e s ; b u t o r d e r t o d e f u s e t h e p a r a d o x o f s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y also d u l l s t h e s w o r d
the rhetorical e l e m e n t s — a l t h o u g h by no means exterminated—are o f t h e c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e false p r e t e n s i o n o f eliminating the
tamed, as i t w e r e , a n d e n l i s t e d f o r s p e c i a l p u r p o s e s o f problem- g e n r e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a t u r e c a n n o t l e a d us
solving. o u t o f this a p o r i a . 2 4

The rhetorical dimension plays a d i f f e r e n t a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t


r o l e i n t h e l a n g u a g e s o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y . B o t h are Notes
f a c e d w i t h tasks t h a t are p a r a d o x i c a l i n s i m i l a r ways. T h e y a r e s u p -
posed to feed the contents o f e x p e r t cultures, i n each o f which 1. [Editor's note]: Habermas is here referring to the 1970s debate between Jacques
Derrida and J o h n Searle. In his essay "Signature Event Context," in Margins of
k n o w l e d g e is a c c u m u l a t e d u n d e r j u s t o n e aspect o f v a l i d i t y , i n t o Philosophy (Chicago, 1982), pp. 307-330, Derrida devotes the last section to a discus-
everyday linguistic practices i n w h i c h the various language functions sion of Austin's theory. Searle refers to this in "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply
to D e r r i d a , " Glyph 1 (1977): 198-208 (Derrida's essay also appeared in Glyph 1).
a n d aspects o f v a l i d i t y r e m a i n i n t e r m e s h e d , f o r m i n g a s y n d r o m e . A t Derrida's response appeared in Glyph 2 (1977): 162-254, under the tide "Limited I n c
t h e s a m e t i m e l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y are s u p p o s e d to abc. . . . " I n his discussion of Derrida, Habermas draws on J . Culler, On Deconstruction
(Ithaca, N . Y , 1982).
a c c o m p l i s h t h i s task o f m e d i a t i o n u s i n g m e a n s o f e x p r e s s i o n t a k e n
f r o m p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n q u e s t i o n s o f taste o r t r u t h . 2. Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 119.
T h e y c a n resolve t h i s p a r a d o x o n l y by r h e t o r i c a l l y e x p a n d i n g a n d
3. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), and Expression and Meaning (Cambridge,
enriching t h e i r special languages to the e x t e n t r e q u i r e d to link 1979).
u p — i n a targeted way—indirect c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h manifest pro-
4. Culler, On Deconstruction, pp. 121ff.
positional contents. This explains the strong rhetorical strain char-
acteristic of studies by l i t e r a r y critics and philosophers alike. 5. Ibid., p. 123.
E m i n e n t c r i t i c s a n d m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e also w r i t e r s o f s t a t u r e .
6. Ibid., p. 176.
I n their rhetorical accomplishments, literary criticism and philoso-
p h y have a family r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h l i t e r a t u r e — a n d to this extent, 7. Cf. ibid., pp. 130ff.

w i t h o n e a n o t h e r as w e l l . H o w e v e r , t h e i r f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p d o e s n o t 8. K. Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), pp. 24ff.


e x t e n d b e y o n d t h i s . For, i n e a c h o f these e n t e r p r i s e s , the tools o f
9. R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in Language
rhetoric are subordinated r e s p e c d v e l y t o t h e d i s c i p l i n e o f a different
(Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 350-377, here p. 356.
form of argumentation.
10. Ibid.
If, following Derrida's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , philosophical thinking
w e r e to be relieved o f the d u t y o f solving p r o b l e m s a n d m a d e to 11. R. O h m a n n , "Speech-Acts and the Definition of Literature," Philosophy and Rheto-
ric^ (1971): 17.
assume t h e f u n c t i o n o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , i t w o u l d b e r o b b e d not
m e r e l y o f its seriousness, b u t also o f its p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d c a p a c i t y f o r 12. Ibid., p. 14.
400 401

Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

13. Ibid., p. 17. answers to have. Today, however, it is evident that the scope of universalist ques-
tions—for instance, the question of the necessary conditions for the rationality of
14. G . Hartman, Saving the Text (Baltimore, 1981), p. xxi. utterances, or of the general pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and
argumentation—does indeed have to be reflected in the grammatical form of uni-
15. Cf. also R. O h m a n n , "Speech, Literature and the Space Between," New Literary versal propositions; it does not, however, have to be reflected in any unconditional
History 5 (1974): 34ff. validity or "ultimate foundations" claimed for such universalist propositions or for
their theoretical framework. T h e fallibilist consciousness of the sciences has long
16. W. Labov, Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia, 1972). since caught up with philosophy as well.
With this kind of fallibilism, we, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, do not
17. M. L . Pratt, A Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, 1977), p. 92. I in any way dispense with truth claims. Such claims cannot be raised in the perfor-
am grateful to Jonathan Culler for drawing my attention to this interesting book. mative attitude of the first person in any other way than as claims that—qua c l a i m s —
transcend space and time. But we are also aware that there is no zero-context for
18. Ibid., p. 148. truth claims. T r u t h claims are raised here and now and have a built-in orientation
toward criticism. H e n c e we reckon with the trivial possibility that they will be revised
19. Ibid. at some future date or in some other context. Just as it always has, philosophy
understands itself as the guardian of rationality in the sense of a claim of reason
20. Ibid., p. 147. endogenous to our form of life. I n its work, however, philosophy prefers a combina-
tion of strong propositions with weak status claims; this is so little totalitarian that
there is no call for a totalizing critique of reason against it. O n this point cf. J . Haber-
21. Ibid.
mas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and Communi-
cative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
22. Cf. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1984), pp. 273ff.

23. R. Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," in his Philosophical Papers II: Essays
on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 85-107, here p. 88, and Consequences
of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982), esp. the introduction and chapters 6, 7, and 9.

24. At any rate, our reflections have brought us to the point from where we can see
why Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida get into this aporia at all. T h e y continue to
defend themselves as though, like the first generation of Hegelian disciples, they were
still living in the shadow of the "last" philosopher. They are still battling against the
"strong" conceptions of theory, truth, and system that have in fact belonged to the
past for over a century and a half. T h e y still think they have to arouse philosophy
from what Derrida calls "the dream of its heart." They believe they have to tear
philosophy away from the delusion of expounding a theory that has the last word.
Such a comprehensive, closed, and definitive system of propositions would have to
be formulated in a language that is self-explicating, that neither needs nor permits
further commentary, and that thereby brings to a standstill the effective history
(Wirkungsgeschichte) in which interpretation is heaped upon interpretation endlessly.
Rorty speaks of the demand for a language "which can receive no gloss, requires no
interpretation, cannot be distanced, cannot be sneered at by later generations. It is
the hope for a vocabulary which is intrinsically and self-evidently final, not only the
most comprehensive and fruitful vocabulary we have come up with so far" (Rorty,
Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 93f.).
I f reason were bound, under penalty of demise, to hold on to these classical goals
of metaphysics, pursued from Parmenides to Hegel; if reason as such (even after
Hegel) stood before the alternative of either insisting on the strong conceptions of
theory, truth, and system as they were customary in the great tradition or of renounc-
ing itself, then an adequate critique of reason would have to be so very radical that it
could scarcely avoid the paradox of self-referentiality. Nietzsche saw the matter in this
way. A n d , unfortunately, Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, too, still seem to confuse
the universalist posing of questions that continues to be part of philosophy with the
long since abandoned claims to universalist status that philosophy once alleged its
10
Questions and Counterquestions (1985)

I a m happy to accept the editor's invitation to r e s p o n d to the articles


b y R i c h a r d R o r t y , M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e -
book. 1
T h o u g h c r i t i c a l , t h e i r f r i e n d l y s p i r i t reveals t h a t w e a r e a l l
concerned, i f n o t w i t h t h e same p r o b l e m s , t h e n a t least w i t h t h e
same t h e m e s . A t t h e same t i m e , i t is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e
is s o m e d i f f e r e n c e between us, f o r i n s t a n c e , b e t w e e n Rorty and
m y s e l f . T h e gaps b e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e be-
c o m e so w i d e a t t i m e s t h a t t h e m i x t u r e o f r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,
s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s s u d d e n l y also serves t o r e v e a l
residual unconscious presuppositions, implications, a n d b a c k g r o u n d
assumptions. A l l this a m o u n t s to the q u i t e n o r m a l confusion i n
c o n v e r s a t i o n a m o n g f r i e n d s w h o have sufficiently d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f
view.
T h e c o n f u s i o n o f l i n e s o f a r g u m e n t is m u c h m o r e d r a s t i c i n c o n -
t r o v e r s i e s a m o n g adversaries w h o , f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r i d e n t i t y is t h r e a t -
ened by the others' fundamental convictions, struggle with
r h e t o r i c a l w e a p o n s . Scarcely a n y o n e w o u l d d i s a g r e e t h a t s u c h d i s -
t a n c e s a n d o p p o s i t i o n s have i n c r e a s e d a n d i n t e n s i f i e d i n t h e m o d e r n
age, w h i c h has i t s e l f b e c o m e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o p i c o f t h e first r a n k
since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n d i v i d u a l s , g r o u p s , a n d n a t i o n s h a v e
d r i f t e d f a r a p a r t as r e g a r d s t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d s o f b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d
s o c i o c u l t u r a l experience. T h i s p l u r a l i z a t i o n o f d i v e r g i n g universes o f
405
404
Questions and Counterquestions
C h a p t e r 10

s t r a i g h t j a c k e t o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , R i c h a r d R o r t y has u n d e r t a k e n
d i s c o u r s e is p a r t o f s p e c i f i c a l l y m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s h a t t e r i n g o f
the most ambitious project: he wants to destroy the t r a d i t i o n o f the
n a i v e c o n s e n s u s is t h e i m p e t u s f o r w h a t H e g e l calls " t h e e x p e r i e n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — f r o m its C a r t e s i a n b e g i n n i n g s — w i t h
o f r e f l e c t i o n . " W e c a n n o t n o w s i m p l y w i s h t h i s e x p e r i e n c e away; we
t h e a i m o f s h o w i n g t h e pointlessness o f t h e e n t i r e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
c a n o n l y n e g a t e i t . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f o u r c u l t u r e , i n v e s t e d as i t is
foundations and limits of knowledge. H e concludes that philoso-
with r e f l e c t i o n , t h e t h r u s t o f t h i s e x p e r i e n c e has t o be worked
p h e r s , t o be r i d o f t h e p r o b l e m , n e e d o n l y r e c o g n i z e t h e h y b r i d
t h r o u g h n o t o n l y p o l i t i c a l l y b u t also p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T o d a y w e can
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e s a n d give t h e field o v e r t o t h e p r a c t i -
s u r v e y t h e s p e c t r u m o f answers g i v e n b y p h i l o s o p h e r s : r o u g h l y speak-
tioners o f science, politics, a n d daily life. L i k e the later W i t t g e n s t e i n ,
i n g , i t e x t e n d s a l l t h e way f r o m h i s t o r i c i s m t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m .
R o r t y sees p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f as t h e sickness w h o s e s y m p t o m s i t p r e -
O n t h e o n e h a n d , D i l t h e y , W e b e r , Jaspers, a n d K o l a k o w s k i t a k e a n
v i o u s l y a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d t o c u r e . B u t R o r t y is s t i l l e n o u g h of
a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e g r o w i n g p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s "
a p h i l o s o p h e r t o give a r e a s o n f o r h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t w e a v o i d
(Glaubensmachte), existential m o d e s o f b e i n g , myths, value attitudes,
t h e Holzweg of philosophical justification; one shouldn't scratch
a n d metaphysical o r r e l i g i o u s worldviews. A p h i l o s o p h y t h a t treats
w h e r e i t d o e s n ' t i t c h . I t is j u s t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " i t d o e s n ' t i t c h "
f o r m s o f t r u t h i n t h e p l u r a l is s u p p o s e d t o leave t o t h e sciences t h e
t h a t I find p r o b l e m a t i c .
j o b o f p r o v i d i n g an adequate reservoir o f consensual knowledge. O n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , p h i l o s o p h e r s s u c h as H u s s e r l , t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n , F o r m s o f l i f e a r e t o t a l i t i e s t h a t always e m e r g e i n t h e p l u r a l . T h e i r

P o p p e r , a n d A p e l a l l a t t e m p t t o m a i n t a i n , a t a h i g h e r l e v e l o f abstrac- c o e x i s t e n c e m a y cause f r i c t i o n , b u t t h i s difference d o e s n o t a u t o m a t -

t i o n , t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n , e v e n i f o n l y i n a p r o c e d u r a l sense. T h e y i c a l l y r e s u l t i n t h e i r incompatibility. S o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r is t h e case f o r

distill t h e c o m m o n characteristics o f r a t i o n a l activity that m u s t i m - t h e p l u r a l i s m o f values a n d b e l i e f systems. T h e c l o s e r t h e p r o x i m i t y

p l i c i t l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d i n t h e p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s " a n d i n w h i c h c o m p e t i n g "gods a n d d e m o n s " h a v e t o l i v e w i t h e a c h o t h e r

i n t h e a r g u m e n t a t i v e collisions b e t w e e n universes o f discourse. In i n political c o m m u n i t i e s , the m o r e tolerance they d e m a n d ; b u t they

t h i s way, t h e r e arise w h a t R o r t y calls " m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " t h a t is, t h e are n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e . C o n v i c t i o n s c a n c o n t r a d i c t o n e a n o t h e r o n l y

theories o f rationality that are supposed to a c c o u n t f o r why, a n d i n w h e n t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r o b l e m s d e f i n e t h e m i n a s i m i l a r way,

w h a t sense, we c a n s t i l l c o n n e c t o u r c o n v i c t i o n s as w e l l as o u r de- b e l i e v e t h e m t o r e q u i r e r e s o l u t i o n , a n d w a n t t o d e c i d e issues o n t h e

scriptive, n o r m a t i v e , a n d evaluative statements w i t h a t r a n s c e n d i n g basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s .

v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e l y l o c a l c o n t e x t s . T o b e s u r e , i t is also a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f m o d e r n i t y t h a t w e have


g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d t o l i v i n g w i t h d i s a g r e e m e n t i n t h e r e a l m o f ques-
T h e s e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l answers t o t h e unavoidable e x p e r i e n c e o f
tions t h a t a d m i t o f " t r u t h ; " we simply p u t controversial validity claims
m o d e r n i t y ; w h e n t h e y are s h a r p e n e d i n t o t h e o p p o s i t i o n between
t o o n e side " f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . " N o n e t h e l e s s , w e p e r c e i v e this p l u -
r e l a t i v i s m a n d a b s o l u t i s m , a n unmediated c o n f r o n t a t i o n e m e r g e s be-
r a l i s m o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n v i c t i o n s as a n i n c e n t i v e f o r l e a r n i n g p r o c -
tween pure historicism a n d pure transcendentalism. A t that p o i n t ,
esses; w e l i v e i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f future r e s o l u t i o n s . As l o n g as w e
t h e f a i l u r e s o f b o t h p o s i t i o n s b e c o m e c l e a r : t h e o n e side c a r r i e s t h e
retain the perspective o f participants a n d d o n o t merely l o o k over
b u r d e n o f self-referential, pragmatic contradictions a n d paradoxes
o u r o w n s h o u l d e r s as h i s t o r i a n s a n d e t h n o g r a p h e r s , w e m a i n t a i n
t h a t v i o l a t e o u r n e e d f o r c o n s i s t e n c y ; t h e o t h e r side is b u r d e n e d w i t h
precisely the distinctions that Rorty wants to retract: between valid
a f o u n d a d o n a l i s m t h a t conflicts w i t h o u r consciousness o f t h e falli-
a n d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t e d views, b e t w e e n g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d t h o s e t h a t
b i l i t y o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . N o o n e w h o reflects o n this s i t u a t i o n
a r e m e r e l y successful f o r a c e r t a i n a u d i e n c e a t a c e r t a i n t i m e .
w o u l d w a n t t o be l e f t i n t h i s b i n d .
I n believing t h a t he can consistently replace the i m p l i c i t l y n o r m a -
I n the c o n t e x t o f o u r discussion h e r e , this r e a d i n g o f t h e present
tive c o n c e p t i o n o f " v a l i d a r g u m e n t s " w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t o f
s i t u a t i o n is n o t r e a l l y i n d i s p u t e , a l t h o u g h R o r t y , B e r n s t e i n , a n d I
" a r g u m e n t s h e l d t o b e t r u e f o r us a t t h i s t i m e , " R o r t y c o m m i t s a n
r e a c t t o i t i n d i f f e r e n t ways. F o r c e f u l l y f r e e i n g h i m s e l f f r o m the
406 407

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

o b j e c t i v i s t fallacy. We c o u l d n o t e v e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of Rorty absolutizes the perspective o f the observer, Bernstein remains


w h a t w e d e s c r i b e f r o m a t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e as a r g u m e n t a t i v e w i t h i n the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t a n d enters i n t o a debate
c o n d u c t i f we h a d n o t already l e a r n e d the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f t h a t t o d a y leads b e y o n d t h e m i s t a k e n a l t e r n a t i v e s o f h i s t o r i c i s m a n d
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h a t is, w h a t i t m e a n s f r o m the transcendentalism, a debate g o i n g o n between Gadamer, A r e n d t ,
p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e f i r s t p e r s o n t o raise a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t p o i n t s Rorty, a n d m e , a m o n g others. 3
B e r n s t e i n does n o t e n d his s p l e n d i d
b e y o n d t h e p r o v i n c i a l a g r e e m e n t s o f t h e specific local c o n t e x t . O n l y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e diverse p a t h s o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n — a d i s c u s s i o n
t h i s c a p a c i t y gives o u r opinions t h e c h a r a c t e r o f convictions. ( T h i s is t h a t has n o t y e t c o m e t o a c l o s e — w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r a t h e o r e t i c a l
n o less t r u e f o r e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s t h a n f o r a r g u m e n - solution; he ends i t rather w i t h a practical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n : we
tative d i s p u t e s a b o u t t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l i d i t y o f s t a t e m e n t s . ) Any ought t o act u n d e r the presupposition o f the u n i f y i n g power of
mutual understanding produced in communication and reproduced communicative reason. I n order to make this a r g u m e n t m o r e i n t e l -
i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is b a s e d o n a r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l r e a s o n s t h a t m a y ligible, let me c i t e a thesis o f H e r b e r t S c h n a d e l b a c h w i t h w h i c h
be c h a l l e n g e d , reasons t h a t f o r c e us t o t a k e a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d B e r n s t e i n w o u l d probably agree: " t h a t the difference between what
p o s i t i o n o f "yes" o r " n o . " T h i s calls f o r a different t y p e o f a t t i t u d e f r o m w e always c l a i m f o r o u r r a t i o n a l i t y a n d w h a t w e a r e a c t u a l l y a b l e t o
t h a t w h i c h w e b r i n g t o t h e c l a i m s o f m e r e l y i n f l u e n t i a l ideas. F r o m explicate as r a t i o n a l c a n i n p r i n c i p l e n e v e r b e eliminated." 4
If I
the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t , a m o m e n t o f unconditionality is u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f h i s b o o k c o r r e c d y , i t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n
b u i l t i n t o t h e conditions o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g under- t h a t B e r n s t e i n f r o m the start locates t h e m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y
s t a n d i n g . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e first p e r s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n of b u i l t i n t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i s t v a l i d i t y claims o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e j u s t i f i e d is a q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e b a s e d o n tices i n t h e h o r i z o n o f practical r e a s o n ; h e finds i n t h e communica-
g o o d r e a s o n s ; i t is n o t a f u n c t i o n o f l i f e - h a b i t s t h a t e n j o y s o c i a l tive i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a p r a c t i c a l p o s t u l a t e , o n e t h a t is
c u r r e n c y i n s o m e places a n d n o t i n o t h e r s . d i c t a t e d b y r e a s o n itself. H e refuses t o r e g a r d t h e p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y
o f r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n the historical a n d c u l t u r a l m u l t i p l i c i t y o f stan-
A n d because i n t h e m o d e r n age t h e gaps b e t w e e n competing
dards o f r a t i o n a l i t y as a q u e s t i o n t h a t is accessible t o theoretical
convictions reach deep i n t o the d o m a i n of questions that " a d m i t o f
treatment.
t r u t h , " t h e r e exists, c o n t r a r y t o R o r t y , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t " t o see
s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as m o r e t h a n j u s t s u c h practices." 2
I s u s p e c t t h a t b e h i n d B e r n s t e i n ' s a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategy t h e r e lies
T h e stubbornness with w h i c h philosophy clings to the role o f the a n a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t t h a t is c o m p l e -
" g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n " c a n h a r d l y be d i s m i s s e d as a n i d i o s y n c r a s y of m e n t a r y t o R o r t y ' s a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h a t o f t h e o b s e r v e r . I d o n o t see
self-absorbed intellectuals, especially i n a p e r i o d in which basic why one c o u l d n o t , at least i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way, e x p l o r e a third
i r r a t i o n a l i s t u n d e r c u r r e n t s are b e i n g t r a n s m u t e d o n c e a g a i n i n t o a path—one t h a t I have e m b a r k e d u p o n w i t h m y t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i -
d u b i o u s f o r m o f p o l i t i c s . I n m y o p i n i o n , i t is p r e c i s e l y t h e n e o c o n - cative a c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s a p p r o a c h , p h i l o s o p h y s u r r e n d e r s its
servatives w h o a r t i c u l a t e , intensify', a n d s p r e a d t h i s m o o d o f t h e t i m e s c l a i m to be t h e sole r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n matters o f rationality and
v i a t h e mass m e d i a — w i t h s u c h a n e f f e c t t h a t " i t i t c h e s . " enters i n t o a nonexclusive division o f labor w i t h the reconstructive
sciences. I t has t h e a i m o f c l a r i f y i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the
2 r a t i o n a l i t y o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t m a y b e p r e -
s u m e d t o b e u n i v e r s a l because t h e y a r e u n a v o i d a b l e . T h e n philoso-
I n h i s latest b o o k , R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n gives us a n o t h e r a n s w e r : i n - p h y shares w i t h t h e sciences a f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h a t its
stead o f b i d d i n g farewell to p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h e artificially a l i e n a t e d strong universalist suppositions require confirmation i n an inter-
viewpoint o f an ethnologist, he turns i t toward the practical. W h i l e play w i t h e m p i r i c a l theories. 5
This revisionary self-understanding of
408 409

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

the r o l e o f p h i l o s o p h y m a r k s a b r e a k w i t h t h e aspirations o f first b e m a i n t a i n e d i f p h i l o s o p h y w e r e t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n s u c h a way


philosophy (Ursprungsphilosophie) i n a n y f o r m , e v e n t h a t o f t h e t h e - as t o e n a b l e i t t o c o p e w i t h t h e e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f aspects o f r a t i o n -
o r y o f knowledge; b u t i t does n o t m e a n that p h i l o s o p h y abandons a l i t y — a n d w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a t e o f a r e a s o n t h a t has b e e n a r r e s t e d
its r o l e as t h e g u a r d i a n o f r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h its s e l f - i m p o s e d modesty a g a i n a n d a g a i n , i d e o l o g i c a l l y m i s u s e d a n d d i s t o r t e d , b u t t h a t also
o f m e t h o d , a p h i l o s o p h y s t a r t i n g f r o m f o r m a l pragmatics preserves s t u b b o r n l y raises its v o i c e i n e v e r y i n c o n s p i c u o u s act o f successful
the possibility o f speaking o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n the singular. U n l i k e the c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f p h i l o s o p h y
sciences, i t has t o a c c o u n t r e f l e c t i v e l y f o r its o w n c o n t e x t o f e m e r - does n o t r e m a i n fixated o n t h e n a t u r a l sciences. H a d R o r t y not
gence and thus for its o w n place i n history. 6
For this reason, shared this fixation, he m i g h t have e n t e r t a i n e d a m o r e flexible a n d
" m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " i n t h e sense o f f o u n d a t i o n a l " u l t i m a t e g r o u n d i n g s " accepting relationship to the philosophical t r a d i d o n . Fortunately,
o r t o t a l i z i n g p h i l o s o p h i e s o f h i s t o r y , c o u l d n e v e r e v e n arise. n o t all p h i l o s o p h i z i n g can be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the p a r a d i g m o f the
The most i m p o r t a n t achievement o f such an approach is t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness.
possibility o f clarifying a concept o f communicative rationality that R o r t y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e n e e d i n t h e m o d e r n age f o r self-reassur-
escapes t h e snares o f W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m . Instead o f following a n c e is a c a p r i c i o u s p r o b l e m c r e a t e d b y i n t e l l e c t u a l s — i n d e e d , e v e n
Nietzsche's p a t h o f a totalizing a n d self-referential critique o f reason, a t y p i c a l l y G e r m a n p r o b l e m . I n h i s v i e w i t arises f r o m t h e e s o t e r i c
w h e t h e r i t be via H e i d e g g e r to D e r r i d a , o r via Bataille to F o u c a u l t , 7
Weltschmerz o f s m a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , f r o m t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n with
a n d t h r o w i n g t h e b a b y o u t w i t h t h e b a t h w a t e r , i t is m o r e p r o m i s i n g a w o r l d t h a t was lost a l o n g w i t h t h e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s o f t h e i r f a t h e r s .
t o seek t h i s e n d t h r o u g h t h e analysis o f t h e already o p e r a t i v e poten- B u t does i t n o t r e m a i n a n o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t the socially
tial f o r r a t i o n a l i t y c o n t a i n e d i n everyday practices o f communica- integrative powers o f religious t r a d i t i o n t h a t have b e e n shaken up
t i o n . H e r e the validity dimensions o f propositional t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e b y e n l i g h t e n m e n t c a n find a n e q u i v a l e n t i n t h e u n i f y i n g , c o n s e n s u s -
r i g h t n e s s , a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o r a u t h e n t i c i t y c r e a t i n g p o w e r o f reason? T h i s was i n d e e d t h e m o d v a t i o n behind
are e n t w i n e d w i t h each other. F r o m this n e t w o r k o f a b o d i l y a n d G e r m a n I d e a l i s m ; t h i s type o f i d e a l i s m has f o u n d e q u a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l
interactively shaped, historically situated reason, o u r philosophical proponents i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f P e i r c e , R o y c e , M e a d , a n d Dewey, i n
t r a d i t i o n has s e l e c t e d o u t o n l y t h e s i n g l e t h r e a d o f propositional w h i c h R o r t y p r e f e r s t o p l a c e h i m s e l f . W h a t is p e r h a p s specifically
t r u t h a n d t h e o r e t i c a l reason a n d stylized i t i n t o the m o n o p o l y o f German is t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l concept of alienation, b o t h i n the
humanity. T h e c o m m o n g r o u n d that unites b o t h von H u m b o l d t and H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s t version a n d i n the early R o m a n t i c version taken u p
p r a g m a t i s m w i t h t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d A u s t i n is t h e i r o p p o s i - b y N i e t z s c h e . T h e same t h e m e r e s o n a t e s n o t o n l y i n p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s t
t i o n t o t h e ontological p r i v i l e g i n g o f t h e w o r l d o f e n t i t i e s , t h e episte- F r a n c e ; s i n c e t h e 1960s, a n d I n e e d n o t r e m i n d R o r t y o f t h i s , t h e
mological p r i v i l e g i n g o f c o n t a c t w i t h o b j e c t s o r e x i s t i n g states of d i s c u s s i o n o f m o d e r n i t y i n c o n f l i c t w i t h i t s e l f has n o w h e r e b e e n so
a f f a i r s , a n d t h e semantic p r i v i l e g i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s a n d p r o - l i v e l y as i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — a d m i t t e d l y , m o r e so a m o n g social
positional t r u t h . Logocentrism means neglecting the complexity o f scientists a n d p s y c h o l o g i s t s t h a n a m o n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . Carl
reason effectively o p e r a t i n g i n t h e l i f e w o r l d , a n d r e s t r i c t i n g reason S c h o r s k e e v e n t h o u g h t h e c o u l d see i n t e l l e c t u a l a f f i n i t i e s b e t w e e n
t o its c o g n i t i v e - i n s t r u m e n t a l d i m e n s i o n (a d i m e n s i o n , w e m i g h t a d d , t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n scene a n d W e i m a r G e r m a n y . W h i l e t h e
t h a t has b e e n n o t i c e a b l y p r i v i l e g e d a n d selectively u t i l i z e d i n p r o c - e x p r e s s i o n " p o s t m o d e r n " was n o t i n v e n t e d b y A m e r i c a n n e o c o n s e r -
esses o f c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n ) . vatives, t h e y a t least p o p u l a r i z e d i t .

R o r t y takes W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e e x h a u s - D o n o t these a n d s i m i l a r signs i n d i c a t e t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r t i c u l a t e


t i o n o f o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d as a r e a s o n t o b i d f a r e w e l l shifts i n m o o d , w h i c h t h e y i n n o way i n v e n t b u t w h i c h h a v e i n s t e a d
t o p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . T h i s way o f r e a d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n c o u l d not p a l p a b l e social a n d o f t e n e c o n o m i c causes? A s a g o o d p r a g m a t i s t , I
410 411

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

hold t h e view that a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s capacity to create problems M a r c u s e . I n The Theory of Communicative Action, m y d i s c u s s i o n o f M a x
t h r o u g h i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n c i t i n g d o u b t is q u i t e l i m i t e d . I share Peirce's Weber's t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e a n d his diagnosis o f t h e times r e q u i r e d
d o u b t a b o u t any type o f Cartesian d o u b t . P r o b l e m s e m e r g e i n situ- understanding the autonomous art that emerged i n m o d e r n Europe
a t i o n s o v e r w h i c h we a r e n o t i n c o n t r o l ; t h e y a r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t ( t o g e t h e r w i t h a r t c r i t i c i s m i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d since t h e e i g h t e e n t h
o b j e c t i v e l y h a p p e n s t o us. T h e s l o g a n t h a t l e f t i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e t h e c e n t u r y ) as t h e p r o d u c t o f a d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d as t h e r e s u l t o f a
cause o f t h e m i s e r y t h e y analyze has b e e n b a n d i e d a b o u t f o r t o o l o n g process o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . W e b e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of
a m o n g r i g h d s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n G e r m a n y t o b e c r e d i b l e . I t is n o m o r e w o r l d v i e w s as a p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o s i t i o n and differentiation. On
c r e d i b l e i n t h e a t t r a c t i v e p a c k a g i n g o f a t h e o r y o f t h e n e w class. t h e o n e h a n d , t h e basic s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t h e w o r l d
T o m e , t h e n o t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l " v a l u e e l i t e s " is a b s o l u t e l y w o r t h - orders o f "salvation h i s t o r y " a n d c o s m o l o g y were c o n s t r u c t e d have
less. L i k e R o r t y , I have f o r a l o n g t i m e i d e n t i f i e d m y s e l f w i t h t h e d i s s o l v e d ; w i t h t h i s d i s s o l u t i o n , o n t i c , m o r a l , a n d expressive aspects
r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e n t a l i t y t h a t is p r e s e n t i n t h e best A m e r i c a n are n o l o n g e r fused i n t o o n e a n d t h e same c o n c e p t . W i t h o u t t h e
traditions a n d articulated i n A m e r i c a n pragmatism. This mentality possibility o f recourse t o G o d a n d t h e c o s m i c o r d e r as a n o r i g i n ,
takes s e r i o u s l y w h a t a p p e a r s t o s o - c a l l e d r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s as so m u c h t h e o l o g i c a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l f o r m s o f g r o u n d i n g lose t h e i r c r e d i b i l -
r e f o r m i s t naïveté. Dewey's " a t t e m p t t o c o n c r e t i z e c o n c e r n s w i t h t h e ity. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o f a n e f o r m s o f " k n o w l e d g e " that are
d a i l y p r o b l e m s o f o n e ' s c o m m u n i t y " expresses b o t h a p r a c t i c e a n d relatively i n d e p e n d e n t o f o n e a n o t h e r have arisen alongside a sub-
a n a t t i t u d e . I t is a m a x i m o f a c t i o n a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n f a c t s u p e r f l u - jectivized " f a i t h . " Philosophy, forced i n t o the position o f mediator,
ous t o p h i l o s o p h i z e . becomes dependent o n these. A s d o c u m e n t e d i n the division o f

Rorty puts i n question the entire u n d e r t a k i n g o f the theory of K a n t ' s t h r e e Critiques, questions o f t r u t h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m

c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. As o p p o s e d t o this f o r m o f q u e s t i o n i n g , the q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e a n d these i n t u r n f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f taste.

r e s e r v a t i o n s o f M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e b o o k O r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i d e a l i s t aesthetics s t r i c t l y
c o n c e r n p a r t i c u l a r steps i n its e x e c u t i o n . T h e s e a u t h o r s d i r e c t t h e i r d i s t i n g u i s h e d aesthetic pleasure f r o m o t h e r " e m p i r i c a l " f o r m s of
attention to complications i n m y a t t e m p t to w o r k o u t the concept of s a t i s f a c t i o n ; t h a t is, i t s e p a r a t e d t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , o n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . Jay p o i n t s o u t a n u n d e r - i l l u m i n a t e d as- the one h a n d , f r o m the useful a n d the desirable, o n the other. A r t
p e c t ; M c C a r t h y t o u c h e s u p o n a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y ; W h i t e b o o k deals e m e r g e s w i t h its o w n p r o p e r c l a i m , as d o s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , l a w
w i t h a p r o b l e m t h a t e m e r g e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e t h e o r y . W i t h i n a n d m o r a l i t y . M a x W e b e r speaks o f t h e i n t e r n a l o r i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c
the f r a m e w o r k o f a b r i e f reply, I can r e s p o n d o n l y by a l l u d i n g to h o w (Eigensinn) o f e a c h o f these t h r e e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s p h e r e s , w h i c h a r e
I have d e a l t w i t h s o m e o f these p r o b l e m s i n t h e past a n d h o w I w o u l d also s e p a r a t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n t h e f o r m o f f u n c -
l i k e t o w o r k o n o t h e r s i n t h e f u t u r e . A n a d d e d d i f f i c u l t y h e r e is t h a t t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i e d systems o f a c t i o n . S i n c e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f A r -
o n l y M c C a r t h y directs his r e m a r k s to m y m o r e recent works. n o l d H a u s e r i n t o t h e social h i s t o r y o f m o d e r n a r t , t h i s institutional
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t has f r e q u e n t l y b e e n a n a l y z e d . 8

3 T h e r e is n o n e e d here to go i n t o t h e e x t e r n a l aspects o f t h e
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the forms o f p r o d u c t i o n o f art, the purposes to
W i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f h e r m e n e u t i c sensitivity, M a r t i n Jay has c o l l e c t e d w h i c h i t was p u t , o r t h e m o d e s o f its r e c e p t i o n i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m
a n d i n t e r p r e t e d m y scattered r e m a r k s o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f aesthetic sacrally b o u n d a r t , t h r o u g h t h e a r t o f t h e c o u r t a n d p a t r o n , t o
m o d e r n i t y . I n e v e r y case these r e m a r k s h a d a s e c o n d a r y character b o u r g e o i s c o m m e r c i a l i z e d a r t . W h a t is i n d i s p u t e a r e t h e i n t e r n a l
9

t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y arose o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o t h e r t o p i c s a n d aspects o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t since t h e e i g h t -


always i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e discussions a m o n g A d o r n o , B e n j a m i n , a n d e e n t h c e n t u r y . O n e o f t h e t w o q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y M a r t i n Jay is t h e
412
413
C h a p t e r 10
Questions and Counterquestions

e x t e n t t o w h i c h o n e c a n speak o f a n a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l rationality, o r
m o r a l , is m i r r o r e d i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e e a r l y R o m a n t i c period
e v e n o f a learning process, i n t h i s s p h e r e .
(especially i n F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's w o r k ) , i n the aestheticism of
T h e r e is a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a c e r t a i n type
B a u d e l a i r e a n d t h e S y m b o l i s t s , i n t h e p r o g r a m o f I'art pour I'art, i n
o f " k n o w i n g " is o b j e c t i f i e d i n a r t w o r k s , a l b e i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n
the surrealistic celebration o f i l l u m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h s h o c k effects,
i n t h e o r e d c a l discourse or i n legal o r m o r a l representations. These
w i t h its a m b i v a l e n c e o f a t t r a c t i o n a n d r e p u l s i o n , o f b r o k e n c o n t i n u -
objectivations o f spirit, too, are f a l l i b l e a n d hence criticizable. A r t
ity, o f t h e s h u d d e r o f p r o f a n i z a t i o n , o f a g i t a t e d d i s g u s t — i n s h o r t , i n
c r i t i c i s m arose a t t h e same t i m e as t h e a u t o n o m o u s w o r k o f a r t ; a n d ,
the r e f l e c t i o n o f those m o m e n t s i n w h i c h the bewildered subject
since t h e n , i t has b e c o m e a n e s t a b l i s h e d i n s i g h t t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t
"transgresses h i s b o u n d a r i e s , " as B a t a i l l e p u t s i t . W h a t is r e f l e c t e d i n
calls f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n , a n d e v e n " l i n g u i s t i f i c a t i o n "
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d declarations is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the
(Versprachlichung) o f its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . A r t c r i t i c i s m has d e v e l o p e d
f o r m o f aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i n d u c e d by avant-garde a r t itself, i n t h e
f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t specifically d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t f r o m the
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e c e n t e r i n g a n d u n b o u n d i n g o f subjectivity. A t the
argumentative forms of theoretical and moral-practical discourse. 1 0

same t i m e , this d e c e n t e r i n g indicates a n increased sensitivity t o w h a t


As d i s t i n c t f r o m merely subjective p r e f e r e n c e , the fact that we l i n k
remains unassimilated i n the interpretive achievements o f prag-
j u d g m e n t s o f taste t o a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m p r e s u p p o s e s n o n a r -
matic, epistemic, a n d m o r a l mastery o f the demands a n d challenges
b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e j u d g m e n t o f a r t . A s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l dis-
o f e v e r y d a y s i t u a t i o n s ; i t effects a n o p e n n e s s t o t h e e x p u r g a t e d ele-
c u s s i o n o f " a r t i s t i c t r u t h " reveals, w o r k s o f a r t raise c l a i m s with
m e n t s o f the unconscious, the fantastic, a n d the m a d , the m a t e r i a l
regard to their unity or h a r m o n y (Stimmigkeit), their authenticity,
a n d t h e b o d i l y — t h u s t o e v e r y t h i n g i n o u r speechless c o n t a c t w i t h
a n d t h e success o f t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n s , a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e y m a y be
r e a l i t y t h a t is so fleeting, so c o n t i n g e n t , so i m m e d i a t e , so i n d i v i d u a l -
assessed a n d i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y m a y f a i l . F o r t h i s r e a s o n I b e l i e v e
i z e d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y so f a r a n d so n e a r t h a t i t escapes o u r n o r m a l
t h a t a p r a g m a t i c l o g i c o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is t h e m o s t appropriate
categorical grasp.
g u i d i n g t h r e a d w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h t h e " a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l " type
B e n j a m i n c a l l e d t h i s style o f e x p e r i e n c e " c o n c e n t r a t e d distrac-
o f r a t i o n a l i t y can b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o v e r a n d against o t h e r types o f
t i o n " a n d set i t o f f f r o m t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e
rationality.
characteristics a n d tendencies o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f avant-garde art,
W h e n we r e f e r t o l e a r n i n g processes, i t is t h e w o r k s o f a r t t h e m - a n a l y z e d r e p e a t e d l y since B e n j a m i n a n d A d o r n o , p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c -
selves, a n d n o t t h e d i s c o u r s e s a b o u t t h e m , t h a t are t h e l o c u s o f t i o n o f t h e f o r m e r style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e loss o f a u r a a n d t h e
directed and c u m u l a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . As M c C a r t h y correctly i m p o r t a n c e o f a l l e g o r y are c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e
notes, w h a t accumulates are n o t epistemic contents b u t , rather, the o r g a n i c a l l y u n i f i e d w o r k o f a r t a n d its p r e t e n d e d t o t a l i t y o f m e a n i n g ;
effects o f t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t logic, o f a o n e can t h i n k h e r e o f the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e ugly, o f the negative
s p e c i a l s o r t o f e x p e r i e n c e : p r e c i s e l y t h o s e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e s o f as s u c h . B y t r e a t i n g m a t e r i a l s , m e t h o d s , a n d t e c h n i q u e s reflectively,
w h i c h o n l y a d e c e n t e r e d , u n b o u n d s u b j e c t i v i t y is c a p a b l e . A u t h e n t i c t h e a r t i s t o p e n s u p a space f o r e x p e r i m e n t a n d p l a y a n d t r a n s f e r s
e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h i s type a r e p o s s i b l e o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e g e n i u s t o "free c o n s t r u c t i o n " (freie Arbeit) . n
Forced
categories o f the p a t t e r n e d expectations o f organized daily experi- n o v e l t y , d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e latest t r e n d s , a n d t h e a c c e l e r a t e d p a c e
ence collapse, that the r o u t i n e s o f daily action a n d conventions of o f fads p e r p e t u a t e t h e creative b r e a k w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a n d s e r v e t o
o r d i n a r y l i f e are d e s t r o y e d , a n d t h e n o r m a l i t y o f f o r e s e e a b l e a n d m a k e a l l stylistic m e a n s e q u a l l y accessible. A r t b e c o m e s a l a b o r a t o r y ,
a c c o u n t a b l e c e r t a i n t i e s are s u s p e n d e d . T h e e v e r - m o r e r a d i c a l u n - the critic an expert, the development o f art the m e d i u m o f a learn-
c o u p l i n g o f this p o t e n t i a l for experience, the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f the i n g p r o c e s s — h e r e , n a t u r a l l y , n o t i n t h e sense o f a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f
aesthetic f r o m admixtures o f the cognitive, the useful, a n d the epistemic contents, o f a n aesthetic " p r o g r e s s , " w h i c h is p o s s i b l e o n l y
414 415

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

i n i n d i v i d u a l d i m e n s i o n s , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s i n t h e sense o f a c o n c e n - interpretadons a n d normative expectations a n d transforms the to-


trically e x p a n d i n g , progressive e x p l o r a t i o n o f a r e a l m o f possibilities t a l i t y i n w h i c h these m o m e n t s are r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r . I n t h i s
structurally opened u p w i t h the autonomization of art. ( I do not r e s p e c t , m o d e r n a r t h a r b o r s a Utopia t h a t b e c o m e s a r e a l i t y t o t h e
k n o w w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e results o f Piaget's g e n e t i c p s y c h o l o g y are degree that the m i m e t i c powers sublimated i n the w o r k o f art find
as a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h i s " l e v e l o f l e a r n i n g " as t h e y resonance i n the mimetic relations o f a balanced a n d undistorted
a r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h e stages o f p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f intersubjectivity i n everyday life. However, this does n o t r e q u i r e t h e
law a n d morality. I t e n d to be r a t h e r skeptical.) liquidation o f a n a r t set o f f f r o m l i f e i n t h e m e d i u m o f aesthetic
M a r t i n Jay's o t h e r q u e s t i o n concerns the relation between the appearance, b u t r a t h e r a changed constellation o f a r t a n d t h e l i f e w o r l d .
i n d e p e n d e n c e of art i n a culture o f experts a n d the cultural impov- I d e v e l o p e d these ideas e a r l i e r a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f A l b r e c h t W e l l -
e r i s h m e n t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . J a y asks w h y I d o n o t unambiguously mer. 1 3
I n t h e m e a n t i m e , W e l l m e r has e l a b o r a t e d t h e m i n such an
decide between A d o r n o a n d Benjamin—between the esotericism of i n g e n i o u s way t h a t I can here be content simply to refer to his
t h e exclusive, often h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed avant-garde w o r k o f a r t , a n d treatment. 1 4
I d o n o t wish to retrace W e l l m e r ' s subtle l i n e o f a r g u -
t h e h o p e s f o r p r o f a n e i l l u m i n a t i o n i n e x o t e r i c mass a r t . H e n o t e s m e n t b u t o n l y t o r e p e a t h i s m a i n thesis i n o r d e r t o o f f e r i t as a n
t h a t I s e e m t o find s o m e t r u t h i n b o t h p o s i t i o n s . a n s w e r t o M a r d n Jay's q u e s t i o n . T h e f a c t t h a t w e c a n d i s p u t e t h e
P e t e r B ü r g e r takes a n u n a m b i g u o u s p o s i t i o n . I n h i s view, the r e a s o n s f o r e v a l u a t i n g a w o r k o f a r t i n a e s t h e t i c d i s c o u r s e is, as w e
i m p u l s e o f several a v a n t - g a r d e m o v e m e n t s t o r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e i n s t i - said, a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t i o n f o r a validity c l a i m i n h e r e n t i n
t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f a r t , a g a i n s t its b e i n g s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e l i f e w o r l d , w o r k s o f a r t . T h e aesthetic "validity" o r " u n i t y " t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o a
was c o r r e c t d e s p i t e the failure o f the surrealist r e v o l t . 1 2
I do not w o r k r e f e r s t o its s i n g u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r t o o p e n o u r eyes t o
differ w i t h this j u d g m e n t p e r se. T h e intention of redeeming a w h a t is s e e m i n g l y f a m i l i a r , t o disclose a n e w a n a p p a r e n d y f a m i l i a r
p r o m i s e o f h a p p i n e s s , w h o s e s u p e r a b u n d a n c e r a d i a t e s b e y o n d a r t , is reality. T h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m a d m i t t e d l y stands f o r a potential f o r " t r u t h "
p a r t o f a r t itself. B u t t h i s i n t e n t i o n c a n n o t b e r e a l i z e d i n t h e way i n that can be released only i n the w h o l e c o m p l e x i t y o f life experience;
w h i c h the surrealists w a n t e d , t h r o u g h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n o f aesthetic therefore, this " t r u t h p o t e n t i a l " may n o t be c o n n e c t e d to (or even
a p p e a r a n c e (Schein) as t h e m e d i u m o f a r t i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s identified w i t h ) j u s t one of the three validity claims constitutive for
false s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung) o f art i n t o life certainly does n o t pre- communicative a c t i o n , as I have p r e v i o u s l y b e e n i n c l i n e d t o m a i n -
clude the possibility o f a correct m e d i a t i o n o f art w i t h the l i f e w o r l d . t a i n . T h e o n e - t o - o n e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t exists b e t w e e n t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e
A n aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is n o t s i m p l y t o b e t r a n s p o s e d into validity o f a n o r m a n d the n o r m a t i v e validity claims raised i n r e g u -
j u d g m e n t s o f taste b y t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l a r b i t e r s , t h a t is n o t m e r e l y t o l a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o t a p r o p e r m o d e l f o r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e
circulate i n the realm o f art alone, w o u l d entail a change i n the potential for t r u t h o f works o f art a n d the transformed relations
status o f a n , as i t w e r e , e x p e r i m e n t a l l y u n b o u n d subjectivity. b e t w e e n self a n d w o r l d s t i m u l a t e d b y a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e .

I f a e s t h e d c e x p e r i e n c e is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e x t o f i n d i v i d -
N e i t h e r t r u t h n o r t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) m a y be a t t r i b u t e d u n m e t a -
u a l l i f e - h i s t o r i e s , i f i t is u t i l i z e d t o i l l u m i n a t e a s i t u a t i o n a n d t o t h r o w p h o r i c a l l y to w o r k s o f a r t , i f o n e u n d e r s t a n d s " t r u t h " a n d " t r u t h f u l n e s s " i n
l i g h t o n i n d i v i d u a l l i f e - p r o b l e m s — i f i t a t a l l c o m m u n i c a t e s its i m - the sense of a pragmatically differentiated, everyday c o n c e p t of truth. We
pulses t o a c o l l e c t i v e f o r m o f l i f e — t h e n a r t e n t e r s i n t o a language c a n e x p l a i n t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — a n d e v e n n o r m a t i v e
g a m e t h a t is n o l o n g e r t h a t o f a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m b u t b e l o n g s r a t h e r t i g h t n e s s — a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i n t e r l a c e d i n w o r k s o f a r t o n l y by a p p e a l i n g
to t h e fact t h a t the w o r k o f art, as a s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n w i t h a n aesthetic
t o e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . I t t h e n n o l o n g e r affects o n l y
validity c l a i m , is at the s a m e t i m e o b j e c t o f a n experience, i n w h i c h t h e t h r e e
o u r evaluative language o r m e r e l y renews the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f needs
d i m e n s i o n s o f validity a r e unmetaphorically i n t e r m e s h e d . 1 5

that color o u r perceptions; rather, i t reaches i n t o o u r cognitive


416 417
C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

4 t o " o u r s , " so t h a t i n t h e case o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w e e i t h e r revise o u r


preconceptions o r relativize " t h e i r " standards o f rationality against
Thomas M c C a r t h y raises t w o sorts o f o b j e c t i o n s : first, against m y "ours."
systematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s ; a n d sec- T h e s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s d o i n d e e d l e a d t o t h e r a t h e r " s t r o n g " thesis
o n d , a g a i n s t m y analysis o f i n t e r p r e t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S i n c e I b e - t h a t w e cannot u n d e r s t a n d reasons w i t h o u t a t least i m p l i c i t l y evaluat-
lieve t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d b y M c C a r t h y b e t w e e n t h e t w o ing t h e m . M c C a r t h y argues t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n is false, since, e v e n
p r o b l e m s is a r t i f i c i a l , I w i l l first d e a l s e p a r a t e l y w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f i f i t is t h e case t h a t i t is necessary t o t a k e u p a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d
the objectivity of understanding. "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n reasons i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m , t h e
I n t h e field o f m e a n i n g t h e o r y , I h o l d t h e v i e w t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d i n t e r p r e t e r c a n n o t o n l y a g r e e o r d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e m b u t c a n also
a literally m e a n t speech act w h e n we k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s under p r a c t i c e a k i n d o f a b s t e n t i o n ; h e has t h e o p t i o n o f " l e a v i n g t o o n e
w h i c h i t c o u l d be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d b y a h e a r e r . T h i s p r a g m a t i c a l l y side" t h e question o f the validity o f " t h e i r " rationality standards ( a n d
e x t e n d e d v e r s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s is s u p p o r t e d b y t h e h e n c e o f the reasons themselves). However, I t h i n k t h a t such a n
f a c t t h a t w e c o n n e c t t h e e x e c u t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t o v a r i o u s v a l i d i t y a b s t e n t i o n is also a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n , j u s t as m u c h as a
claims: claims to the t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s (or o f the existential "yes" o r a " n o , " a n d i n n o way relieves us o f t h e necessity o f t a k i n g
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) , c l a i m s t o t h e Tight- a p o s i t i o n . A b s t e n t i o n i n this c o n t e x t does n o t really signify a t r u e
ness o f a n u t t e r a n c e ( w i t h r e s p e c t t o e x i s t i n g n o r m a d v e contexts), d e c l a r a t i o n o f n e u t r a l i t y b u t o n l y signals t h a t we a r e p u t t i n g off
a n d c l a i m s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o f a n e x p r e s s e d i n t e n - problems for the time being a n d wish to suspend o u r interpretive
t i o n . W i t h these c l a i m s w e issue, as i t w e r e , a w a r r a n t y f o r their e f f o r t s . F o r e x a m p l e , so l o n g as w e are u n a b l e t o see a p e r s p i c u o u s
v i n d i c a t i o n , s h o u l d t h i s b e n e c e s s a r y — a b o v e a l l b y o f f e r i n g , a t least internal relation between the categorial frameworks o f Aristotelian
i m p l i c i t l y , reasons f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f o u r s p e e c h acts. A h e a r e r k n o w s a n d N e w t o n i a n physics, we d o n o t k n o w p r e c i s e l y i n w h a t sense
t h e c o n t e n t o f w h a t is said w h e n h e k n o w s w h a t r e a s o n s ( o r w h a t Aristotle, i n contrast to N e w t o n , w a n t e d to " e x p l a i n " n a t u r a l proc-
sorts o f r e a s o n s ) t h e s p e a k e r w o u l d give f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f h e r s p e e c h esses. S i m p l y n o t i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n various paradigms
act ( u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r ( e v e n the c o m e s close t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r s t a n d t h e physics
social scientific i n t e r p r e t e r w h o deals w i t h linguistically formed a n d m e t a p h y s i c s o f A r i s t o t l e as w e l l as w e d o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s
data), does n o t u n d e r s t a n d symbolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d objects ( i n a b o u t n a t u r e i n classical mechanics.
t h e n o r m a l case, c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s ) i f h e d o e s n o t also
T h e r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h G a d a m e r always
u n d e r s t a n d t h e reasons p o t e n t i a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
e m p h a s i z e d , b e c o m e s especially c l e a r i n e x t r e m e cases s u c h as, f o r
N o w t h e i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t is t h a t r e a s o n s a r e o f a special n a t u r e . example, the interpretation o f mythical narratives. U n d e r c u t t i n g or
T h e y c a n always b e e x p a n d e d i n t o a r g u m e n t s t h a t w e t h e n u n d e r - l e a v i n g t o o n e side ( o r m e r e l y s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d w h i l e a c c e p t i n g )
s t a n d o n l y w h e n we recapitulate (nachvolhiehen) them i n the light of t h e totalisdc categories of a worldview within w h i c h the narrative
some standards of rationality. T h i s " r e c a p i t u l a t i o n " requires a recon- i n t e r w e a v i n g a n d (as i t a p p e a r s t o us) t h e c a t e g o r i c a l c o n f u s i o n of
s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t y i n w h i c h we b r i n g i n t o p l a y o u r o w n s t a n d a r d s o f s u r f a c e p h e n o m e n a lay c l a i m t o e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r m e r e l y i n d i c a t e
r a t i o n a l i t y , a t least i n t u i t i v e l y . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t , that we are p u t t i n g o f f — p r e m a t u r e l y b r e a k i n g o f f — t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e
h o w e v e r , o n e ' s o w n s t a n d a r d s o f r a t i o n a l i t y m u s t always c l a i m g e n - p r o c e s s . T h i s is t a n t a m o u n t t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r -
eral validity, w h i c h can be restricted o n l y subsequently f r o m the stand the p o i n t o f mythical m o d e s o f t h o u g h t . We u n d e r s t a n d t h e m
perspective o f a t h i r d person. I n short, the interpretive reconstruc- o n l y w h e n w e c a n say w h y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h e i r
t i o n o f reasons requires t h a t we place " t h e i r " standards i n r e l a t i o n c o n f i d e n c e i n t h i s type o f e x p l a n a t i o n . B u t i n o r d e r t o achieve this
418 419

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

d e g r e e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have t o e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n 5
between " t h e i r " s o r t o f e x p l a n a t i o n a n d t h e k i n d we a c c e p t as c o r -
r e c t . W e m u s t be a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e successful a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l I first w a n t t o isolate t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e t h a t
l e a r n i n g processes t h a t s e p a r a t e " u s " f r o m " t h e m ; " b o t h m o d e s o f I a p p r o p r i a t e d i n t o m y o w n view ( a ) . I n so d o i n g , w e t h e n e n c o u n t e r
e x p l a n a t i o n have t o b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e same u n i v e r s e o f dis- M c C a r t h y ' s c o n c e r n f o r t h e costs o f a p r o c e s s o f disenchantment
c o u r s e . So l o n g as t h i s is n o t a c h i e v e d , t h e f e e l i n g r e m a i n s t h a t o n e t h a t n o w leaves o p e n o n l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y o f
d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I t is t h i s p e r p l e x i t y t h a t finds its reason cutting across different forms of argumentation (b).
appropriate expression i n the suspension of one's interpretive McCarthy finally treats t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e synthesis o f t h e d i f f e r e n -
efforts. t i a t e d m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n u n d e r t h r e e q u i t e d i s t i n c t aspects. H e lists
B u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e sciences t h a t m u s t estab- three problems t h a t c a n n o t b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e same a n a l y t i c
lish h e r m e n e u t i c access t o t h e i r o b j e c t d o m a i n also h a v e t o re- perspective ( t h a t is, t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e v a r i o u s basic a t t i t u d e s
nounce the objectivity of knowledge. I have criticized this t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e social, a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s ) (c).
hermeneutist position i n various ways. 16
I n principle, I do not see a. T o b e g i n w i t h , l e t m e t u r n t o w h a t I h a v e a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m
any difficulty i n achieving some theoretical knowledge even i n those W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e . I n W e b e r ' s view, t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a d i f f e r -
domains o f r e a l i t y w i t h w h i c h w e have c o n t a c t p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h e n t i a t i o n o f " v a l u e s p h e r e s " e a c h w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t logic—
n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e o r expressive a t t i t u d e s . M y r e s e r v a t i o n s c o n c e r n w h i c h was i n s p i r e d b y t h e n e o - K a n t i a n s E m i l L a s k a n d H e i n r i c h
o n l y those theoretical positions that i g n o r e the h e r m e n e u t i c d i m e n - R i c k e r t — c a n plausibly be d e f e n d e d i n r e g a r d to m o d e r n E u r o p e o n
sion of access t o the object d o m a i n entirely. 1 7
I f the sentence t w o levels: first, o n t h e level o f ideas t h a t c a n b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n
M c C a r t h y c r i t i c i z e s is t o b e r e a d as r e p o r t i n g m y o w n view, " t h a t traditions (scientific theories, m o r a l a n d legal beliefs, as w e l l as
n o t h i n g c a n be l e a r n e d i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t inner a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t i o n s ) ; b u t also, s e c o n d , o n t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l a c t i o n
n a t u r e qua s u b j e c t i v i t y , " 18
t h e n i t may be u n d e r s t o o d only i n the systems, i n w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d i n g " d i s c o u r s e s " a n d a c t i v i t i e s a r e g i v e n
sense o f a r e j e c t i o n o f purely o b j e c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h e s t o p s y c h o l o g y . professionally and institutionally organized f o r m . T h e differentia-
M c C a r t h y is f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n of whether the t i o n o f value spheres corresponds to a d e c e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s t h a t have b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n m o d e r n t i m e s t h e w o r l d , w h i c h is a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p r o f e s -
a n d h a v e a c h i e v e d a c e r t a i n a u t o n o m y d o n o t , as i t w e r e , also c o m - sionalized t r e a t m e n t o f cultural traditions separated i n t o questions
m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d h a v e t h e i r r o o t s i n o n e a n d t h e same o f t r u t h , j u s t i c e , a n d taste. T h i s m o d e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d
r e a s o n . I n m y view, t h i s t o p i c c a n b e t r e a t e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f the makes possible a hypothetical a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n a a n d e x p e r i -
problem of interpretive understanding. For this purpose, the ences, w h i c h a r e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f l i f e w o r l d c o n t e x t s
schema reproduced b y M c C a r t h y is n o t r e a l l y a f r u i t f u l p o i n t of a n d a n a l y z e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l l y v a r i e d c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is e q u a l l y
d e p a r t u r e . I t s p u r p o s e was o n l y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n t e n t o f Max t r u e f o r t h e states o f a n o b j e c t i f i e d n a t u r e , f o r n o r m s a n d m o d e s o f
W e b e r ' s f a m o u s Zwischenbetrachtung} 9
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n response to a c t i n g , a n d f o r t h e reflective experiences o f a n " u n b o u n d " subjectiv-
earlier objections, I m a d e the mistake o f r e f e r r i n g to this schema i n i t y (set f r e e f r o m t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e ) . The
a systematic w a y . 20
A n d M c C a r t h y does the same here. M y previous w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e by c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology
carelessness t h u s m a k e s i t necessary i n w h a t f o l l o w s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between s t r u c t u r a l l y d e f i n e d levels o f l e a r n i n g , o n t h e o n e hand,
more carefully between my interpretation of Weber and my own a n d the l e a r n i n g o f contents, o n the other, certainly may n o t be
views. a p p l i e d i n t h e same way t o s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t ,
my f o r m u l a t i o n s were not careful enough.
420 421
C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

Compared to the g r o w t h o f theoretical knowledge, described by o b j e c t i v a t i n g , n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e , a n d expressive attitudes t o w a r d


M c C a r t h y as t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s across p a r a d i g m shifts, t h r e e d i f f e r e n t w o r l d s (objective, social, o r s u b j e c t i v e — i n short, to
the trends i n the development o f a r t (discussed m o r e extensively states o f a f f a i r s , n o r m s , o r subjective e x p e r i e n c e s ) ; i t also a l l o w s us t o
a b o v e ) d o n o t so m u c h s i g n i f y a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s as t h e v a r y t h e s e a t t i t u d e s i n r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n d t h e same w o r l d . I f w e k e e p
progressive c o n s t i t u t i o n o f a specific d o m a i n o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d t o t h e s c h e m a i n figure 10.1 ( o r i g i n a l l y figure 11 i n v o l u m e 1 o f The
aesthetic experience p u r i f i e d o f cognitive and m o r a l admixtures; Theory of Communicative Action), b u t leave aside its a p p l i c a t i o n t o
t h e y also s i g n i f y e x p a n d i n g e x p l o r a t i o n s t h a t i l l u m i n a t e m o r e and W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s a n d p u r s u e i n s t e a d a systematic l i n e
m o r e o f t h i s r e a l m o f e x p e r i e n c e . Yet t h i s c o n c e n t r i c e x p a n s i o n is o f t h o u g h t , the three forms of argumentation corresponding to the
n o t a c c o m p a n i e d by the f a m i l i a r effect o f a d e v a l u a t i o n o f f o r m e r l y m o d e r n c o m p l e x e s o f r a t i o n a l i t y c a n , to begin with, b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h
h e l d i n s i g h t s t h a t is t y p i c a l f o r c u m u l a t i v e l e a r n i n g processes. M o r a l t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a l o n g t h e d i a g o n a l ( 1 . 1 , 2.2, 3 . 3 ) .
a n d legal theories occupy a m i d d l e position. H e r e , too, we can
b. B a s e d o n r e f l e c t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , I t a k e as m y
observe the constitution o f a d o m a i n o f autonomous morality and
s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h e v i e w t h a t facts, n o r m s , a n d s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s
m o r a l u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t d i s t i l l s a class o f r a t i o n a l l y solvable problems
have t h e i r primary l o c u s i n " t h e i r " c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r l d s (objective,
u n d e r t h e s i n g l e aspect o f j u s t i c e o u t o f t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c o n -
s o c i a l , o r s u b j e c t i v e ) , a n d in the first instance a r e accessible, o r i d e n -
t e x t s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . L e a r n i n g processes i n t h i s s p h e r e are s i m i l a r t o
tifiable, o n l y f r o m the perspective o f a n actor w h o adopts a c o r r e -
a t h e o r e t i c a l progress achieved w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f a single para-
sponding attitude (be it objectivating, norm-conformative, or
d i g m . T h u s , i n t h e m o d e r n age, t h e e x p l i c a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f
e x p r e s s i v e ) . I t is i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s l i n e a r o r d e r i n g t h a t t h e first
m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s m a k e a c e r t a i n " p r o g r e s s " t h a t is n o t e x h a u s t e d i n
o f t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s M c C a r t h y t r e a t s a t t h e e n d o f h i s a r t i c l e arises.
ever-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e same m o r a l p r i n c i p l e .
H o w is i t t h a t w e c a n t a l k i n a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t s o m e -
H o w e v e r , t h e thesis t h a t c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n c a n b e grasped t h i n g i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e o r social w o r l d s , t h a t is, a b o u t t h o s e e l e m e n t s
as a selective a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y p o t e n t i a l c o n t a i n e d i n t h a t w e first e x p e r i e n c e as s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e o r t h a t w e first e n -
m o d e r n structures o f consciousness requires the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l sup- c o u n t e r as s o m e t h i n g n o r m a t i v e ? I n t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e ( f o r i n -
p o s i t i o n o f a nonselective m o d e l o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . I n this 2 1
stance, s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e ) w e c a n i n c o r p o r a t e these e l e m e n t s o n l y
c o n n e c t i o n , I have s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r t h e v a l u e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e , i f w e t h e m a t i z e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d n o r m s as states o f a f f a i r s
m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t i n m o d e r n E u r o p e "we s h o u l d be a b l e t o demon- after h a v i n g t r a n s f o r m e d t h e m i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f the objective
strate p l a u s i b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s w i t h t y p i c a l f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a - w o r l d . I n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n we c e r t a i n l y succeed, w i t h o u t
t i o n , e a c h o f w h i c h is s p e c i a l i z e d i n a c c o r d w i t h a u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y m u c h t r o u b l e , i n t r a n s f o r m i n g expressive utterances (or sentences
claim." 2 2
T h u s , t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f is p u t o n t h e t h e o r y o f a r g u m e n - i n t h e first p e r s o n ) i n t o e q u i v a l e n t s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e t h i r d person,
t a t i o n ; l e a v i n g aside e x p l i c a t i v e d i s c o u r s e a n d t h e r a p e u t i c c r i t i q u e , or i n accurately r e p o r t i n g the c o n t e n t o f n o r m a t i v e utterances or
t h i s has t o d i s t i n g u i s h a n d c l a r i f y t h e systematic c o n t e n t o f t h r e e imperatives f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h i r d person. O n the level
different forms of argumentation: empirical-theoretical discourse, o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e , however, t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y t o d e l i m i t t h e
m o r a l discourse, a n d aesthetic c r i t i q u e . 2 3
I t was d u e t o t h e c o n t e x t o b j e c t d o m a i n s of, f o r e x a m p l e , p s y c h o l o g y o r s o c i o l o g y b y n e g l e c t -
o f Weber's diagnosis o f the times t h a t I d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e t h e three i n g t h e i r h e r m e n e u t i c dimensions i n such a way t h a t t h e c o m p o -
r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s v i a a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h e o r y b u t b y way o f a n e n t s o f t h e s o c i a l o r subjective w o r l d s are n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y a s s i m i l a t e d
s c h e m a t h a t was s u p p o s e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a d e - t o p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s o r t o o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r . I n e a c h case, t h e y a r e
centered understanding o f the w o r l d . Indeed, the m o d e r n under- m a d e i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , i n h e r e n t l y accessible
standing o f the w o r l d structurally opens u p the possibility o f taking o n l y i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e ; t h a t is, t h e y a r e f o r c e d i n t o t h e
422 423

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f physicalism o r b e h a v i o r i s m . As op-


\ Worlds
p o s e d t o t h i s n a t u r a l i s t r e d u c t i o n , t h e p o i n t h e r e is s i m p l y t o d e -
1 2 3 1 fend nonobjectivist approaches in psychology and the social
Objective Social Subjective Objective sciences.
Basic \
Mutatis mutandis, t h e same q u e s t i o n s arise f o r m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l d i s -
attitudes \
course a n d , i n d i r e c t l y , f o r aesthetic c r i t i c i s m . T h e s e f o r m s o f a r g u -
m e n t a t i o n a r e also i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d t o c o m p o n e n t s o f o n e s p e c i f i c

3 Art w o r l d , t h e social o r t h e subjective. H e r e , t o o , e l e m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r


Expressive t w o w o r l d s m u s t b e b r o u g h t i n t o p l a y i n s u c h a w a y as t o a v o i d t h e
d a n g e r s of, respectively, moralism a n d aestheticism, j u s t as p r e v i o u s l y
t h e d a n g e r o f objectivism h a d t o b e a v o i d e d . W e c a n t h u s o b s e r v e t h a t
A Cognitive-instrumental s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t have n o t o n l y b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from one
rationality another, t h e y also c o m m u n i c a t e with one another. B u t w i t h i n the
1 1 X
boundaries o f each expert culture, the d i f f e r e n t m o m e n t s o f reason
1
Objectivating
Science j | Social c o m e i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n s u c h as w a y as t o a v o i d v i o l a t i n g
Technology ,technologies t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f t h e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n spe-
c i a l i z e d e i t h e r i n t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, o r a e s t h e t i c u n i t y . T h i s
Moral-practical is o n e c o n c e r n o f t h e last c h a p t e r o f The Theory of Communicative
2 rationality Action} 4

Norm- X
A t this p o i n t the motivation b e h i n d McCarthy's criticism becomes
conformative Law |^ Morality
clear: a n interest i n the q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e m o m e n t s o f reason can
retain their u n i t y w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d o f h o w this u n i t y can be
T Aesthetic-practical a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m y
3 X ' rationality schematic presentation o f Weber's diagnosis of the times leads
Expressive M c C a r t h y to conflate three quite distinct questions u n d e r a single
Eroticism j Art v i e w p o i n t . A s has j u s t b e e n s h o w n , f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s p l a y a
1 r o l e i n t h e analysis o f these i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n the cognitive,
1
m o r a l , a n d expressive m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n . B u t t h e o t h e r t w o q u e s -
Figure 10.1 t i o n s r e a l l y have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m : first, t h e q u e s t i o n
Rationalization complexes o f h o w the k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c e d i n e x p e r t cultures can be m e d i a t e d
w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s ( w h i c h I have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n a b o v e
i n r e l a t i o n to the constellation " a r t a n d l i f e " ) ; a n d second, the ques-
t i o n o f w h e t h e r we can provide an e q u i v a l e n t f o r the m e a n i n g of
traditional worldviews—for their meaning-bestowing function.
c. W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d science, p r o b l e m s
o f m e d i a t i o n a r i s e — s u c h as t h e r e l a t i o n o f a r t a n d l i f e , o r o f t h e o r y
a n d practice. Since Hegel, a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r o b l e m has e m e r g e d
424 425

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

t h a t has t o d o w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e (Sitt¬ w o r l d v i e w b u t o n l y o n t h i s side o f t h e e x p e r t c u l t u r e s , i n t h e n o n -


lichkeit). This problem has less t o d o w i t h a n expressive a t d t u d e r e i f i e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life. I n d e e d , i n a c e r t a i n
t o w a r d t h e social w o r l d t h a n w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n s i g h t s o f a way, t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n is a tergo always a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d i n c o m m u -
postconventional m o r a l i t y w o u l d r e m a i n w i t h o u t any i m p a c t o n real nicative action—namely, i n s u c h a way t h a t w e h a v e a n i n t u i t i v e
l i f e u n l e s s m o r a l i t y is a n c h o r e d i n c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . T h e knowledge o f it. A philosophy that wants to b r i n g this i n t u i t i o n to a
deontological ethics d e v e l o p e d i n t h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n d o indeed c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l m u s t r e t r i e v e t h e s c a t t e r e d traces o f r e a s o n i n c o m -
offer a s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; they show h o w to m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s themselves, n o m a t t e r h o w m u t e d t h e y m a y b e .
choose between controversial n o r m s o f a c t i o n w i t h g o o d reasons ( i n However, i t c a n n o t simply repeat t h e a t t e m p t , l o n g since discredited,
l i g h t o f w h a t c o u l d be w i l l e d b y a l l ) . B u t t h e y d o n o t o f f e r any t o p r o j e c t s o m e t h e o r e t i c a l p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e .
solution for two resultant problems: first, t h a t o f t h e application o f I t h i n k I have l e a r n e d f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n o f H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s m ,
j u s t i f i e d n o r m s t h a t are g e n e r a l a n d a b s t r a c t e d f r o m a n y content; f r o m t h e h i s t o r y o f c r i t i c a l social t h e o r y f r o m M a r x t o B e n j a m i n ,
a n d s e c o n d , t h a t o f t h e efficacy o f p u r e m o r a l i n s i g h t s t h a t h a v e b e e n Bloch, Marcuse, a n d A d o r n o , that any a t t e m p t to e m b e d the per-
g a i n e d u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n o f abstracting f r o m available m o t i v a - spective o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y o f n a t u r e , h o w -
t i o n s . A u t o n o m o u s m o r a l i t y owes its g a i n i n r a t i o n a l i t y t o t h e t r a n s - ever i n d i r e c t l y i t is d o n e , m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e o f d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
f o r m a t i o n o f q u e s t i o n s o f t h e g o o d l i f e i n t o p r o b l e m s o f j u s t i c e . As f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e b e h i n d whose categorial distinctions we can n o
a consequence of this deontological abstraction, i t can provide only l o n g e r r e t r e a t i n g o o d c o n s c i e n c e . A l l t h i s is n o t r e a l l y a n a r g u m e n t
answers t o q u e s t i o n s l a c k i n g s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h i s n e c e s s a r y d i s r e - b u t m o r e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f s k e p t i c i s m i n t h e face o f so m a n y f a i l e d
gard for the complexity o f concrete forms o f life, i n w h i c h m o r a l a t t e m p t s t o h a v e o n e ' s cake a n d eat i t t o o : t o r e t a i n b o t h K a n t ' s
m o m e n t s a r e always i n t e r l a c e d w i t h e v a l u a t i v e , c o g n i t i v e , a n d e x p r e s - i n s i g h t s a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , t o r e t u r n t o t h e " h o m e " (Behausung)
sive m o m e n t s , calls f o r s p e c i f i c c o m p e n s a t i o n s t h a t m a k e g o o d t h e from which these same i n s i g h t s h a v e d r i v e n us. But, perhaps,
deficits w i t h regard to the a p p l i c a t i o n a n d realization o f m o r a l i n - M c C a r t h y or others will someday succeed i n f o r m u l a t i n g the c o n t i -
sights. I a m n o t a b l e t o g o f u r t h e r i n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n here. 2 5
n u i t i e s b e t w e e n h u m a n h i s t o r y a n d n a t u r a l h i s t o r y so c a r e f u l l y t h a t
T h e discussions o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e , o f t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e , they are weak e n o u g h to be plausible a n d yet s t r o n g e n o u g h to
a n d o f a r t a n d life all center a r o u n d the idea o f n o n r e i f i e d everyday p e r m i t us t o r e c o g n i z e h u m a n b e i n g s ' p l a c e i n t h e c o s m o s (Scheler),
c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, a f o r m o f life w i t h structures o f a n u n d i s - at least i n b r o a d o u t i i n e s .
t o r t e d intersubjectivity. Such a possibility m u s t today be w r u n g f r o m
t h e professional, specialized, self-sufficient cultures o f experts and 6
f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s o f state a n d e c o n o m y t h a t d e s t r u c -
t i v e l y i n v a d e b o t h t h e e c o l o g i c a l basis o f l i f e a n d t h e communicative T h e philosophical purpose b e h i n d Joel Whitebook's attempt to op-
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of o u r l i f e w o r l d . T h i s s a m e i n t u i t i o n is e x p r e s s e d i n pose to " l i n g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m " t h e t r u t h o f t h e materialist t r a d i t i o n
M a r x ' s Utopian perspective o n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y : to the f r o m Feuerbach t h r o u g h M a r x a n d F r e u d to the later F r a n k f u r t
e x t e n t that the reason expressed i n Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y can be em- S c h o o l accords w i t h M c C a r t h y ' s a r g u m e n t s against b a n n i n g a l l sub-
b o d i e d i n the forms of life o f an emancipated society, philosophy stantive m o m e n t s f r o m the c o n c e p t o f a p r o c e d u r a l rationality. T h e
s o m e h o w b e c o m e s p o i n t i e s s . F o r M a r x , p h i l o s o p h y r e a l i z e d is p h i - theoreticians o f Western M a r x i s m were relentless i n t h e i r search f o r
l o s o p h y s u b l a t e d (aufgehoben). The theory of communicative action some A r c h i m e d i a n p o i n t between K a n t a n d H e g e l f r o m w h i c h they
gives t h i s i d e a a n o t h e r r e a d i n g : t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n c a n n o t b e rees- m i g h t retrieve the materialist tradition w i t h o u t surrendering the
tablished o n t h e level o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s i n terms o f a substantive justificatory achievements of formalist t h o u g h t , o n the one h a n d , or
426 427

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

the meaning-bestowing capacity o f holistic t h o u g h t , o n the other. p l a i n s t h e c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e a n d i n d i v i d u a t i n g effects o f t h e O e d i -


T h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e i n a g r e e m e n t o n t h e g o a l ; t h e y d i f f e r e d as p a l c o n f l i c t t h a t r e m a i n s decisive f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s t r u c -
t o h o w t o a t t a i n i t since t h e y c o u l d n o t a v o i d p a y i n g s o m e p r i c e f o r t u r e o f p e r s o n a l i t y . S t r u c t u r a l l y d e s c r i b e d levels o f i n t e r a c t i o n serve
it, w h e t h e r excising part o f Kant, o r H e g e l , or M a r x . M c C a r t h y a n d h e r e as a c o n c e p t u a l b r i d g e c o n n e c t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t a l l o g i c a n d
W h i t e b o o k chastise m e e i t h e r f o r c u t t i n g t o o m u c h f r o m H e g e l a n d developmental dynamics. 2 8
( i v ) F i n a l l y , s u c h a r e a d i n g o f f e r s a cate-
totalizing forms of thought (McCarthy), or too m u c h f r o m M a r x and gorial f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h metapsychology can be connected up
m a t e r i a l i s m ( W h i t e b o o k ) . I n t h e i r c o m m o n diagnosis o f too m u c h w i t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f r e s e a r c h o n s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d t h e f a m i l y . 2 9

K a n t i a n i s m , b o t h a g r e e w i t h R o r t y , w h o is d i s t u r b e d less b y t h e I n Parson's version, t h e vocabulary o f a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d


l a t t e r ' s f o r m a l i s m t h a n b y its s u p p o s e d f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m . i n t e r m s o f e n e r g y loses its c u r r e n c y h e r e .
W h i t e b o o k ' s analysis sheds l i g h t o n t h e r e c e p t i o n o f F r e u d i a n i d A s I see i t , n o t h i n g o f s i g n i f i c a n c e is l o s t i n t h i s r e a d i n g . T h e
p s y c h o l o g y b y H o r k h e i m e r , M a r c u s e , a n d A d o r n o , as w e l l as o n t h e i r h y d r a u l i c m o d e l a n d its r e l i a n c e o n a m e c h a n i c s o f i n s t i n c t u a l e n -
c r i t i q u e o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y a n d t h e f a m o u s thesis o f t h e " e n d o f t h e e r g y has o n l y a m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r , e v e n f o r F r e u d h i m s e l f . I n
i n d i v i d u a l . " W h i t e b o o k h i m s e l f r e t a i n s a m o r e o r less o r t h o d o x i n - a n y case, o n e c a n n o t have b o t h t h e a n a l y t i c i n s t r u m e n t o f a d e p t h
t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d ; f r o m a clinical perspective, he regards the h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d i n quasi-physicalist
c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y m o r e as s u p p l e m e n t s t o t h e classical concepts. T h e F r e u d o - M a r x i s m o f the earlier F r a n k f u r t School c o u l d
F r e u d . I n m y view, h o w e v e r , t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f H e i n z H a r t m a n n conceptually integrate psychology a n d sociology only t h r o u g h the
a n d h i s allies lies i n h a v i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e n e e d t o revise m e t a - m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n ; b u t , as W h i t e b o o k shows, t h i s r e -
psychology; the revision itself s h o u l d c o m e rather f r o m cognitive sults i n a false a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e d o m a i n o f t h e o r g a n i s m ,
d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology. Piaget's a p p r o a c h c a n s u p p l e m e n t as- w h i c h is d e s c r i b e d i n b i o l o g i c a l t e r m s , a n d t h e d o m a i n o f t h e social
sumptions about the psychodynamic development o f the child with apparatus, w h i c h invades the i n d i v i d u a l f r o m t h e outside. I t c e r t a i n l y
h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s , so as t o m a k e s m o r e sense t o a t t e m p t t o i n t e g r a t e b o t h d i s c i p l i n e s f r o m t h e
give us a h a n d l e o n , a n d m a k e e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t a b l e , t h e i m p l i c i t l y b e g i n n i n g w i t h i n t h e same c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k . S u c h a f r a m e w o r k
n o r m a d v e c o n t e n t o f s u c h c o n c e p t s as "ego s t r e n g t h , " "conscious w o u l d p e r m i t us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e r s o n a l i t y as
c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , " a n d "the r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f drives." I have p r o - s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaftung), a n d t o u n d e r s t a n d s o c i a l i z a t i o n as
posed a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f approaches de- individualization.
r i v i n g f r o m P i a g e t a n d F r e u d . T o m y m i n d , t h i s p r o p o s a l has a
If one is c l e a r a b o u t t h e p u r e l y methodological c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s
n u m b e r o f advantages: ( i ) I t creates a c o m m o n ground between
decision, one n e e d n o t fear t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s W h i t e b o o k has i n
Freud's therapeutic a n d metapsychological writings, by c o n n e c t i n g
m i n d . I t is o n l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a r e i f y i n g t h e o r y o f d r i v e s
t h e s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l o f i d , ego, a n d superego w i t h the experiences
that the extralinguistic referent o f b o t h the structure and autonomy
gained i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between patient a n d analyst. 2 6
(ii)
o f " i n n e r n a t u r e " gets l o s t a l o n g w i t h t h e v o c a b u l a r y o f i n s t i n c t a n d
T h i s version conceptualizes clinical intuitions about deviant and
d r i v e e n e r g y , c a t h e x i s , d i s p l a c e m e n t , a n d so f o r t h . B u t t h e e s s e n t i a l
successful processes o f e g o d e v e l o p m e n t b y m a k i n g d e f e n s e m e c h a -
d i f f e r e n c e a c t u a l l y consists o n l y i n r e p l a c i n g " d r i v e e n e r g i e s " w i t h
n i s m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as i n n e r - p s y c h i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i s t u r b a n c e s
" i n t e r p r e t e d needs" a n d d e s c r i b i n g "instinctual vissicitudes" f r o m
and by relating the extremes of overly defined/deficient ego
t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f i d e n t i t y f o r m a t i o n a n d processes o f i n t e r a c t i o n .
boundaries (isolation/diffusion) to the pragmatic presuppositions
O n this r e a d i n g , i n s p i r e d by the t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n n e r
o f intact intersubjectivity a n d u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 2 7
(iii)
n a t u r e is n o t i n a n y way v a p o r i z e d i n t o a c u l t u r a l i s t h a z e . 3 0
I t does
R e a d i n g psychoanalysis i n t e r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y also e x -
n o t d e t e r m i n e i n a d v a n c e t h a t t h e s u b s t r a t u m o f i n n e r n a t u r e has
428 429

C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions

to f i t h a r m o n i o u s l y i n t o linguistic structures, a n d even be utterly structures o f rationality, b o t h i n the development of the individual
a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e m . B u t such a categorial f r a m e w o r k does d e c i d e i n a n d i n social e v o l u t i o n . I s h a l l l i m i t m y s e l f h e r e t o t h e m o r a l a n d
favor o f t h e perspective o f a l i f e w o r l d intersubjectively shared by l e g a l d i m e n s i o n , since b o t h W h i t e b o o k a n d M c C a r t h y , e a c h i n h i s
p a r t i c i p a n t s . O n e d o e s give u p b i o l o g i c a l o r p h y s i c a l i s t t h i r d - p e r s o n o w n way, r e n e w t h e c r i t i q u e o f e t h i c a l f o r m a l i s m ( a n d b o t h w i t h
descriptions o f the organic substratum. This change i n perspective r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e passage i n m y essay o n B e n j a m i n ) .
d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n n e r n a t u r e as a n e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c First o f a l l , I have t o p o i n t o u t t h a t I have revised m y earlier
referent. interpretation 3 2
o f t h e p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l stage o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t . 3 3

Whitebook is l e d astray b y s o m e o f m y r e m a r k s t h a t b e l o n g t o Even i f the a p p r o a c h o f a discourse ethics favored by A p e l a n d myself


another context. They were made apropos the question of whether were to be accepted i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions, i t w o u l d o n l y have
a theory of natural evolution could be projected f r o m such an achieved an adequate description of the conditions o f p r i n c i p l e d
i n t e r n a l perspective. N a t u r a l l y , I a m e n o u g h o f a materialist to take m o r a l j u d g m e n t as s u c h . Previously, I was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r a b o u t
as m y s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t K a n t is r i g h t o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t h i s t h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a c o m p e t e n c e f o r j u d g m e n t d o e s n o t eo ipso p r e -
s t a t e m e n t s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h D a r w i n . I have n e v e r h a d a n y d o u b t s s u p p o s e a f l e x i b l e e g o i d e n t i t y , e v e n i f i t n o l o n g e r accepts as g i v e n
a b o u t the primacy o f n a t u r a l history over the history o f the h u m a n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f n e e d s (as d o e s K a n t i a n e t h i c s ) b u t r a t h e r (as
species. N o n e t h e l e s s , i t is b e t t e r n o t t o t r y t o resolve a l l p r o b l e m s i n discourse ethics) opens t h e m to a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d intersubjective
w i t h t h e same t h e o r y , o r e v e n w i t h t h e o r i e s o f t h e same t y p e . T h e process o f w i l l f o r m a t i o n . T h e cognitive capacity to j u s t i f y m o r a l
n e o - D a r w i n i a n t h e o r y o f e v o l u t i o n has a d i f f e r e n t status a n d f o r m a c t i o n s a n d n o r m s has t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d i f i t is t o b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e
f r o m N e w t o n i a n physics, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d R o m a n t i c theories i n the c o n t e x t o f ethical life. O n l y a capacity f o r j u d g m e n t ( i n f o r m e d
o f n a t u r e , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t h r e e t h e o r i e s are n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h by p r a c t i c a l reason) makes possible a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f abstract a n d
t h e s a m e " n a t u r e . " " I n s t i n c t u a l n a t u r e " as d e a l t w i t h , respectively, i n g e n e r a l n o r m s t h a t is a p p r o p r i a t e t o p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s ; o n l y m o -
e t h o l o g y a n d psychoanalysis is j u s t as d i s t i n c t . I t seems t o m e t h a t t h e tivational resources a n d structures o f i n n e r c o n t r o l makes possible
s i n g l e m o s t i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n h e r e is w h e t h e r t h a t " i n n e r n a t u r e " a c t i o n s t h a t are i n a c c o r d w i t h m o r a l i n s i g h t . W i t h o u t t h e c a p a c i t y
w h o s e f a t e f u l e n t w i n e m e n t i n l i f e - h i s t o r i e s is t h e o b j e c t o f p s y c h o - for j u d g m e n t a n d motivation, the psychological conditions for trans-
analysis c a n b e b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h i n t e r a c t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o r l a t i n g m o r a l i t y i n t o e t h i c a l l i f e are m i s s i n g ; w i t h o u t t h e c o r r e s p o n d -
t h r o u g h concepts w i t h m o r e strongly physicalist o r biological c o n n o - i n g p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t is, w i t h o u t " f i t t i n g "
t a t i o n s . T h e v a l u e o f a t h e o r y is s u r e l y a m a t t e r o f e m p i r i c a l f r u i t f u l - f o r m s o f l i f e t o e m b o d i e d m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e social c o n d i t i o n s f o r
ness a n d n o t a m a t t e r o f t h e s p e c u l a t i v e c o n t e n t o f its f u n d a m e n t a l t h e i r c o n c r e t e e x i s t e n c e are m i s s i n g . T h i s is t h e s u b s t a n c e o f H e g e l ' s
concepts. 3 1 c r i t i q u e o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y , a c r i t i q u e t h a t has always b e e n
r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e c r i t i c a l t h e o r y o f society. A u t o n o m y i n Kant's
I t is, h o w e v e r , q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e t o ask h o w i t is t h a t I c a n h o l d o n t o
sense, w i t h t h e s t r i c t s e p a r a t i o n o f d u t y a n d i n c l i n a t i o n a n d w i t h o u t
t h o s e m a t e r i a l i s t m o t i f s t h a t F r e u d o - M a r x i s m d r e w o n i n its t h e o r y
t h e awareness o f t h e ego's c o m m u n i c a t i v e access t o its o w n i n n e r
o f d r i v e s . W h i t e b o o k suspects t h a t a t h e o r y o f society t h a t n o longer
n a t u r e , also s i g n i f i e s u n f r e e d o m ; A d o r n o d e v e l o p e d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s
takes o v e r i n t a c t t h e F r e u d i a n t h e o r y o f d r i v e s necessarily truncates
o f t h i s i n t h e t h i r d p a r t o f h i s Negative Dialectics. I n psychological
an i m p o r t a n t normative d i m e n s i o n , namely, that o f happiness. At
t e r m s , t h i s m e a n s t h a t i n n e r n a t u r e is n o t t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e
t h e same t i m e , h e also sees a n excess o f u t o p i a n i s m b u i l t i n t o " l i n -
perspective o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n m e r e l y t h r o u g h t h e capacity o f m o r a l
g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m . " T h e " c o n c e r n f o r h a p p i n e s s " seems necessarily to
judgment (as i t is r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n terms o f a discourse ethics).
b e c o m e s e c o n d a r y t o t h e " p a s s i o n f o r j u s t i c e " i n a t h e o r y t h a t gets
R a t h e r , s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e is a t t a i n e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f
i n v o l v e d w i t h g e n e t i c s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o g e n e r a l
430 431

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

a n e g o - i d e n t i t y m a k i n g p o s s i b l e "a f r e e d o m t h a t l i m i t s i t s e l f i n t h e happiness. S u c h speculations are surely idealist i n the b a d sense


intention of reconciling, if not of identifying, worthiness with given the o v e r w h e l m i n g experience of individual unhappiness and
happiness." 3 4
c o l l e c t i v e s u f f e r i n g , a n d i n v i e w o f s o c i a l c a t a s t r o p h e s t h a t are so
I n t h e t h e o r y o f society, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l t e r r i b l e because, f o r all t h e i r quasi-naturalness, they do n o t arise
life can be f o u n d i n the contrast b e t w e e n general structures o f the f r o m n a t u r a l necessity. O v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n , t h e necessary c o n d i -
l i f e w o r l d t h a t are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g r a t i o n a l i z e d , o n t h e o n e hand, t i o n s f o r a " g o o d l i f e " are carelessly a n d a r b i t r a r i l y v i o l a t e d . I t is f r o m
a n d t h e p l u r a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g l i f e w o r l d s i n t h e i r specific, c o n c r e t e this experience that the t r a d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t that unites M a r x a n d
historical totalities, o n the other. Particular f o r m s o f life a n d life-his- F r e u d d r a w s its i n s p i r a t i o n . I a m i n f u l l a g r e e m e n t w i t h W h i t e b o o k
t o r i e s f o r m a c o n t e x t t h a t r e m a i n s i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d a n d is e x p e r i - i n m y d e s i r e n o t t o give u p this f o r m o f m a t e r i a l i s m .
e n c e d by us o n l y as a h o r i z o n ; t h i s c o n t e x t c a n n o t b e o b j e c d v a t e d I n c o n c l u s i o n , I d o n o t w a n t t o pass o v e r i n s i l e n c e t h e f a c t t h a t
in toto. C e r t a i n l y , d i f f e r e n t l i f e w o r l d s m a y b e c o m p a r e d u n d e r d i f f e r - M c C a r t h y a n d W h i t e b o o k t o u c h u p o n a basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem
e n t a b s t r a c t p o i n t s o f view; b u t o n l y a f e w s u c h aspects a r e so g e n e r a l t h a t , i f I a m c o r r e c t , s t i l l awaits a n a d e q u a t e r e s o l u t i o n t h i s side o f
t h a t t h e y c a n b e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l p a r a d i g m s o f a specific H e g e l i a n l o g i c : H o w is i t p o s s i b l e t o w e a k e n t h e c l a i m s o f statements
l i f e w o r l d . T h i s is t r u e , f o r i n s t a n c e , o f p r o b l e m s o l v i n g c a p a c i t i e s t h a t a b o u t t o t a l i t i e s so t h a t t h e y m a y b e j o i n e d t o g e t h e r w i t h stronger
can be m e a s u r e d against the s t a n d a r d o f universal validity claims statements a b o u t general structures?
( s u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h a n d n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s ) a n d t h a t c a n
a c c u m u l a t e i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e forces o f p r o d u c t i o n , i n the Note
g r o w t h o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , as w e l l as i n p r o g r e s s i n t h e stages
of moral judgment. However, happiness, u n l i k e justice or knowl- 1. [Editor's note:] T h e reference is to the following essays in R. Bernstein, ed.,
Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1985): R. Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard
e d g e , is n o t a c o n c e p t t h a t relates t o o n l y o n e o f these d i m e n s i o n s
on Postmodernity;" M. Jay, "Habermas and Modernism;" T. McCarthy, "Reflections
a n d t o g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . I t is r e l a t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r on Rationalization in The Theory of Communicative Action;" J . Whitebook, "Reason and
Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical T h e o r y . "
constellations o f lived practices, value orientations, traditions, a n d
c o m p e t e n c i e s as a w h o l e . I t s o b j e c t is always a h i s t o r i c a l l y u n i q u e 2. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 390.
c o n f i g u r a t i o n . We d o i n d e e d h a v e m o r e o r less d e f i n i t e feelings
3. R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia, 1983).
a b o u t t h e success o f m o d e s o f l i f e a n d — w i t h less d e c e p t i o n — a b o u t
t h e i r f a i l u r e . B u t e n o r m o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s s t a n d i n t h e way o f c o n c e p - 4. H . Schnadelbach, in W. Kuhlmann and D. Bohler, eds., Kommunikation und Reflex-
ion (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 361.
t u a l i z i n g , as we c a n d o i n t h e case o f m o r a l i t y , these clinical i n t u i t i o n s
a b o u t t h e " g o o d l i f e " i n a u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g way, a l t h o u g h t h i s was 5. J . Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and
o n c e t h e a i m o f classical e t h i c s . O n e has t o b e satisfied w i t h r e c o g - Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.,
1990).
n i z i n g necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c h a l i f e .
6. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston,
M a n y o f those w h o have b e e n raised i n a Protestant m i l i e u t e n d 1987), pp. 398ff.
toward the p r e s u m p t i o n that the balance o f happiness, overall a n d
7. I have never used the term "neoconservative" in this connection. I did once, in
i n the l o n g r u n , c a n n o t be drastically altered. B u t even this goal passing, compare the critique of reason in Foucault and Derrida to the "Young
w o u l d n o t b e a c h i e v e d i f e v e r y g e n e r a t i o n d i d n o t set other g o a l s f o r Conservatives" of the Weimar Republic. Usually Hans Freyer, A r n o l d G e h l e n , Martin
Heidegger, Ernst Junger, and Carl Schmitt are numbered among this group. T h e y all
t h e m s e l v e s a n d u n d e r t a k e a n e w Utopian e f f o r t s t o c h a n g e t h e b a l - take from Nietzsche the radical gesture of a break with modernity and a revolutionary
a n c e o f h a p p i n e s s . P e r h a p s i t is a r e m n a n t o f t h e o d i c y t o assume t h a t renewal of premodern energies, most often reaching back to archaic times. Like any
comparison, it has its weaknesses, but in the G e r m a n context it does illuminate
e v e r y f o r m o f l i f e i n h e r e n t l y possesses t h e same c h a n c e t o find its
432 433

C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions

intellectual affinities that, notwithstanding the politically contrasting positions, stem conviction and the more pronounced consideration of hedonistic motives bring the
from the authority of Nietzsche (see my essay "Modernity versus Postmodernity," New perspectives of the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play
German Critique 22 (1981): 3-22). within universalistic ethics, perspectives that lie within the cognitive and expressive
validity domains; in this way, materialistic ideas can also be given their due, without
8. Cf. P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis, 1983). Cf. also his "Institution endangering the autonomy of the moral perspective. Finally, post-avant-garde art is
Kunst," in Vermittlung, Rezeption, Funktion (Frankfurt, 1979), and Kritik der idealistischen characterized by the simultaneous presence of realistic and 'committed' (engagiert)
Ästhetik (Frankfurt, 1983). tendencies along with the authentic continuation of classical modernity, out of which
the independent logic of the aesthetic sphere was distilled. With realistic and 'com-
9. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, mitted' art, cognitive and moral-practical moments enter once again into art, at the
1984), pp. 157ff. level of the wealth of form set free by the avant-garde" (Theory of Communicative Action,
vol. 2, pp. 396ff.).
10. Ibid., pp. 40ff., and the references given there.
25. Cf. Habermas, "Über Moralität und Sittlichkeit: Was macht eine Lebensform
11. Bürger, Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, pp. 104ff. rational?," in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 31ff.

12. Cf. also P. Bürger, "Das Altern der Moderne," i n j . Habermas and L . von Friede- 26. T h i s was, in any case, my intention in the F r e u d chapter of my Knowledge and
berg, eds., Adorno Konferenz 1983 (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 177ff. Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston, 1971). I do not find any basis in F r e u d for
the strict separation between a clinically justified theory of neurosis and a metapsy-
13. Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," pp. 12ff. chological superstructure that Adolf Grünbaum proposes in "Freud's Theory: T h e
Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
14. See A. Wellmer, ' T r u t h , Semblance, Reconciliation," in The Persistence of Moder- Philosophical Association 57, no. 6 (1983). T h i s separation completely obscures the
nity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D . Midgely (Cambridge, specific roots of Freudian theory in the experiences of the analytic dialogue. Such
Mass., 1991). an operation may be useful for the argumentative purpose of assimilating Freudian
theory to the standard model of unified science, only to reject it then for failing to
15. Ibid., p. 165. measure up to its standards. At the same time, it expresses the decision not to
consider the hermeneutic character of this science.
16. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 120ff. and 130ff.; and " I n -
terpretative Social Science and Hermeneuticism," in N. H a n n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, 27. Cf. J . Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in On the Logic of the
and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 251-270. Social Sciences, and "Überlegungen zur Kommunikationspathologie," in Vorstudien und
Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
17. J . Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A.
Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). 28. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Moral Con-
sciousness and Communicative Action.
18. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 237.
29. R. Döbert, J . Habermas, and G. Nunner-Winkler, Entwicklung des Ichs (Köln,
19. Ibid., p. 238. 1977), pp. 9ff.

20. J . Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in J . B. T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., 30. K. H o r n expresses similar reservations in "Geheime kulturalistische Tendenzen
Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 248ff. der modernen psychoanalytischen Orthodoxie," in Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft
(Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 93ff.'
21. O n this "rather risky model," cf. my Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1,
pp. 239ff. 31. With respect to the empirical questions, I would like to point out that my
reflections on the change in symptoms typical of our times and on the significance
22. Ibid. of the adolescent crisis are quite similar to those of Whitebook. Cf. Theory of Commu-
nicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 386ff.
23. Cf. my excursus on argumentation theory, ibid., pp. 18-42.
32. Cf. J . Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and
24. " I n each of these spheres, the process of differentiation is accompanied by a the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1979), pp. 78ff.
countermovement that always re-incorporates the other two, initially excluded validity
aspects under the primacy of the dominant one. I n this way, nonobjectivist approaches 33. Cf. Habermas, " A Reply to My Critics." See also the essays in Habermas, Moral
to the human sciences also bring into play the perspectives of moral and aesthetic Consciousness and Communicative Action.
critique, while not endangering the primacy of the question of truth; only in this way
is a critical theory of society possible. T h e discussion of an ethics of responsibility or 34. Cf. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity."
Selected Bibliography and Further Reading

This bibliography is meant to lead readers further into the literature related to
Habermas's program of formal pragmatics. I have included mainly secondary discus-
sions of Habermas's writings rather than the sources that he cites (these are docu-
mented in the notes to the various chapters). T h e exception is where Habermas
mentions a particular writer repeatedly or deals in detail with her or his work. F o r
Habermas's work itself, I have included only those primary texts evidently relevant
to formal pragmatics or deemed by h i m to be correlative. English translations have
been cited where available.

Agger, B e n , 1981. "A Critical Theory of Dialogue," Humanities in Society 4: 7-30.

Ajzner, J a n , 1994. "Some Problems of Rationality, Understanding, and Universalistic


Ethics in the Context of Habermas's T h e o r y of Communicative Action," Philosophy of
the Social Sciences 24(4): 466-484.

Aladjem, Terry K., 1995. " O f Truth and Disagreement: Habermas, Foucault and
Democratic Discourse," History of European Ideas 2 0 ( 4 - 6 ) : 909-914.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1967. Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dor-
drecht: Reidel).

Apel, Karl-Otto, ed., 1976a. Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1976b. "Sprechakttheorie u n d uranszendentale Sprachpragmatik—


zur Frage ethischer N o r m e n , " in Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic, pp. 10¬
173.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980a. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G . Adey and


D. Frisby ( L o n d o n : Routledge and Kegan Paul).

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980b. "Hermeneutic Philosophy of Understanding as a Heuristic


Horizon for Displaying the Problem-Dimension of Analytic Philosophy of Meaning,"
Philosophy and Social Criticism 7: 241-259.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980c. " T h r e e Dimensions of Understanding Meaning in Analytic


Philosophy: Linguistic Conventions, Inventions, and Reference to Things," Philosophy
and Social Criticism 7: 115—142.
437
436
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981a. " C . S. Peirce a n d the Post-Tarskian Problem of an Adequate Bernstein, Richard, 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Practice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
Explication of the Meaning of T r u t h , " Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18:
3-17.
Bernstein, Richard, ed., 1985. Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
Press).
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981b. "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to Things," in
H . Parret and J . Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter).
Berten, André, 1989. "L'éthique et la Politique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 87:
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987a. "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Wahrheit und normative 74-96.
Gültigkeit," Archivio di Filosofa 55 (1987): 51ff.
Bogen, David E . , 1989. "Reappraisal of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action in
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987b. "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbe- Light of Detailed Investigations of Social Praxis," journal for the Theory of Sodal Behav-
iour 19: 47-77.
gründung," in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp), pp. 116-211.
Bohman, James, 1985. Language and Social Crititism, P h . D . Dissertation, Boston U n i -
versity.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992a. "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?," in
E . Lepore a n d R. Van Gulick, eds., fohn Searle and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell),
pp. 31-55. B o h m a n , James, 1986. "Formal Pragmatics a n d Social Criticism," Philosophy and Social
Crititism 11: 331-353.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992b. "Illokutionäre Bedeutung u n d normative Gültigkeit: Die
transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der uneingeschränkten kommunikativen Bohman, James, 1988. "Emancipation and Rhetoric: T h e Perlocutions a n d Illocu¬
Verständigung," Protosoziologie 2: 2-15. tions of the Social Critic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (3): 185-204.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992c. "Normatively G r o u n d i n g 'Critical Theory,'" in A. Honneth, B o h m a n , James, 1992. "Critique of Ideologies," in M. Dascal, D. Gerhardus, K. L o -
T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished renz, a n d G . Meggle, eds., Philosophy of Language: An International Handbook of Contem-
Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). porary Research ( B e r l i n / N e w York: de Gruyter).

Austin, J . L . , 1961. "Performative Utterances," in Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: B o h m a n , James, 1994. "World Disclosure a n d Radical Criticism," Thesis Eleven 37:
82-97.
Oxford University Press), pp. 233-252.

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Bar-Hillel, Y , 1973. " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language," Synthese Canovan, Margaret, 1983. " A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Haber-
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Bartels, Martin, 1982. "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n : eine Auseinandersetzung mit Chomsky, Noam, 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
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B a u r m a n n , Manfred, 1985. "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Understanding," Cobben, P., 1984. "Habermas' Theorie van het Kommunikatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor
in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Sodal Action. Filosofie 46: 216-268.

Beatty, Joseph, 1979. "Communicative Competence and the Skeptic," Philosophy and Comesana, Manuel, 1994. " L a Teoria de la Verdad en Habermas," Dianoia 40: 245¬
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Cometti, Jean-Pierre, 1992. "Raison, Argumentation et Légitimation: Habermas, Apel


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Cooke, Maeve, 1994. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cam- G e i m a n n , Kevin Paul, 1990. "Habermas's Early Lifeworld Appropriation: A Critical
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Corredor, Cristina, 1993. "Intentos de formulación de u n a teoría general de actos de Geuss, Raymond, 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University
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Cotesta, Vittoria, 1986. "Riferimento e Verita," AQUINAS 29: 465-502. Griffioen, Sander, 1991. ' T h e Metaphor of the Covenant in Habermas," Faith and
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Couture, Tony, 1993. "Habermas, Values, a n d the Rational, Internal Structure of Haarscher, Guy, 1986. "Perelman and Habermas," Law and Philosophy 5: 331-342.
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Habermas, Jürgen, 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston:
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Habermas, Jürgen, 1973. "Wahrheitstheorien," reprinted in Habermas, Vorstudien und
C u s h m a n , D. P., and P. K. Tompkins, 1980. " A T h e o r y of Rhetoric for Contemporary Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
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Czuma, Hans, 1981. "Rede oder Gewalt," Conceptus 15: 102-111. Society 3: 155-167.

Dallmayr, F r e d , 1987. "Life-World and Communicative Action," in B. Parekh, ed., Habermas, Jürgen, 1976b. "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der I c h -
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Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Signature Event Context," reprinted in Derrida. Margins of
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy
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Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Limited I n c abc . . . ." Glyph 2: 162-254.
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in L a c a n a n d Habermas," in P. Dews a n d S. Critchley, eds., Deconstructive Subjectivities
(Albany: S U N Y P r e s s ) , pp. 149-168. Habermas, Jürgen, 1983. "Interpretative Social Science a n d Hermeneuticism," in
N. H a a n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry
Dorschel, Andreas, 1988. "Is T h e r e Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?," (New York: Columbia University Press).
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Habermas, Jürgen, 1984. Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen
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Dummett, Michael, 1976. "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDow- Habermas, Jürgen, 1985a. "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Sub-
ell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ject, and Proposition in Habermas's Theory of Communication,'" Inquiry 28: 87¬
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Habermas, Jürgen, 1988. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and Kambartel, F., and H . J . Schneider, 1981. "Constructing a Pragmatic Foundation for
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Habermas, Jürgen, 1990. "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consaous-
ness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Keuth, Herbert, 1979. "Erkenntnis oder Entscheidung: die Konsenstheorien der
Mass: T h e M I T Press). Wahrheit u n d der Richtigkeit von Jürgen Habermas," Zeitschrift ßr allgemeine Wissen-
schaftstheorie 10: 375-393.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1992. Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Kissling, Christian, 1991. "Habermas et la theologie: Notes pour une discussion entre
la theologie et la Theorie de l'agir communicationnel," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie
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Kolb, David, 1992. "Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality," Philosophy
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T h e M I T Press).
Kompridis, Nikolas, 1994. " O n World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey,"
Hall, J . A., 1982. "Gellner and Habermas on Epistemology and Politics. Or, Need We Thesis Eleven 37: 29-45.
Feel Disenchanted?," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12: 384—408.
Kujundzic, Nebojsa, and William Buschert, 1993. "Staging the Life-World: Habermas
Healy, Paul, 1987. "Is Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Irish and the Recuperation of Austin's Speech Act Theory," fournal for the Theory of Social
Philosophical fournal 4: 145—152. Behaviour 23 (1): 105-116.

Heath, Joseph, 1995. "Threats, Promises and Communicative Action," European four- Lafont, Cristina, 1993. La Razon como Lenguaje (Madrid: V i s o r ) .
nal of Philosophy 3(3): 225-241.
Lafont, Cristina, 1994. "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Phi-
Hesse, Mary, 1995. "Habermas and the Force of Dialectical Argument," History of losophie 42(6): 1007-1023.
European Ideas 21(3): 367-378.
Lara, Maria Pia, 1995. "Albrecht Wellmer: Between Spheres of Validity," Philosophy and
H o h n , H a n s j o a c h i m , 1989. "Vernunft—Kommunikation—Diskurs: Z u Anspruch Social Criticism 21(2): 1-22.
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Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 36: 93-128. Leist, Anton, 1977. "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5/6.

H o n n e t h , Axel, 1979. "Communication and Reconciliation: Habermas's Critique of Leist, Anton, 1989. "Dieseits der 'Transzendentalpragmatik': gibt es sprachprag-
A d o r n o , " Telos 39(1): 45-61. matische Argumente für Moral?," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung AS: 301-317.

Husserl, E d m u n d , 1970. The Crisis of the European Sciences, trans. D. C a r r (Evanston, Levin, David Michael, 1994. "Making Sense: T h e Work of Eugene G e n d l i n , " Human
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Iking, Karl-Heinz, 1976. "Geltung als Konsens," Neue Hefte für Philosophie 10: 20-50. Machado, C . E . J . , 1988. ' T h e Concept of Rationality in Habermas: T h e 'Linguistic
T u r n ' of the Critical T h e o r y " (in Portuguese), Trans/Form/Acao, pp. 31-44.
Ingram, David, 1982. " T h e Possibility of a Communication Ethic Reconsidered:
Habermas, Gadamer, and Bourdieu on Discourse," Man and World 15: 149-161. McCarthy, Thomas, 1978. The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.:
T h e M I T Press).
Ingram, David, 1987. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (New Haven: Yale University
Press). McCarthy, Thomas, 1979. 'Translator's Introduction," i n j . Habermas, Communication
and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press).
Johnson, James, 1991. "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action," Political
Theory 19(2): 181-201. McCarthy, Thomas, 1980. "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory of Communi-
cative Action, " in Bernstein, ed. Habermas and Modernity.
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McCumber, J o h n , 1985. "Critical T h e o r y and Poetic Interaction," Praxis International Roderick, Rick, 1985. "Habermas on Rationality," Man and World 18: 203-218.
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Roderick, Rick, 1986. Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: St.
McGuire, R., 1977. "Speech Acts, Communicative Competence and the Paradox of Martin's Press).
Authority," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10: 30-45.
Rorty, Richard, 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
Merrill, Sarah A., 1990. "Linguistics as a Borderline Case," in Merrill, ed., Abeunt University Press).
Studio in Mores: A Festschrift for Helga Doblin on Philosophies of Education and Personal
Learning or Teaching in the Humanities and Moral Sciences (New York: L a n g ) . Rorty, Richard, 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: University of C a m -
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Mertens, T., 1986. "Habermas en Searle: Kritische Beschouwingen bij de Theorie van
het Communicatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 48: 66-93. Rorty, Richard, 1991a. Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cam-
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Misgeld, Dieter, 1977. "Discourse and Conversation: T h e T h e o r y of Communicative
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Gadamer," Cultural Hermeneutics 4: 321-344. schrift für Philosophie 42(6): 975-988.

Murphy, Peter, 1985. "Meaning, T r u t h , a n d Ethical-Value," Praxis International 5: Rosenberg, J . and C . Travis, eds., 1971. Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Engle-
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Nagl, Ludwig, 1984. " D i e Wahrheitsfrage zwischen sprachanalytischer Transforma- Saiedi, Nader, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r y of Practical Rationality,"
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T h o m p s o n , J o h n B., 1982. "Universal Pragmatics," in Thompson and Held, eds., Wellmer, Albrecht, 1998. Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of
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White, Stephen K., 1988. The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Index
Whitton, Brian J . , 1992. "Universal Pragmatics a n d the Formation of Western Civili-
zation: A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r v of H u m a n Moral Evolution," History and
Theory 31(3): 299-312.

Wood, Allen, 1985. "Habermas's Defence of Rationalism," New German Critique 25:
145ff.

Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1984. "Emancipation and Rationality: Foundational Problems in


the Theories of Marx and Habermas," Ratio 26: 143-166.

Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1985. Utopie—Rationalität—Politik (Freiburg: Karl Alber).

Acceptability conditions, 8-9, 11, 82¬ teleological (see Action, as purposive


83, 132-133, 139, 200, 225, 233, 269, activity)
297, 312, 339-340, 367. See also Adorno, T. W., 346, 410, 412, 414, 425¬
Speech acts, acceptability of; Truth 426, 429
conditions; Validity claims, accept- Aesthetic experience, 245-246, 412¬
ability of 415, 420
Accountability, 186, 267, 310 Aesthetic modernity, 410
Action, 114-118, 217, 313. See also Dis- Agreement. See Consensus. See also Ver-
course, vs. action ständigung, vs. Einverständnis
analytic theory of, 105-107 in a strict sense (Einverständnis), 17¬
as purposive activity, 105, 112-114, 18, 321-324, 328-329
121-123, 126, 163, 170, 203, 215, Alexander, J„ 27, 199, 201, 203, 207
217-219, 221, 224, 298, 301, 314 {see Alston, W. P., 67
also Communicative action; Strategic Analytic philosophy, 25, 51, 144, 344¬
action) 348, 405
communicative (see Communicative Apel, K . - 0 . , 21-22, 25, 43, 110, 197,
action) 207, 352, 365-366, 404, 429
coordination of (see Verständigung, as Argumentation, 4, 14-15, 164, 170¬
action-coordinating mechanism) 171, 240, 307, 311, 334, 362-371,
instrumental, 118, 226, 299, 377 406, 420-423. See also Communica-
linguistic vs. nonlinguistic, 59-60, 216¬ tive Action; Discourse
220 idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 14-15,
oriented toward reaching under- 367-368, 370
standing (see Verständigung) Art, 18, 171, 246, 389-390, 395-397,
oriented toward success (see Strategic 411-415, 420, 433n24. See also Aes-
action) thetic experience; Criticism; Expert
purposive-rational (zweckrational), 114, cultures; Validity, aesthetic; Validity
117-118, 234, 332 (see also Rational- claims, aesthetic
ity, purposive) autonomy of, 388, 391, 393, 396, 411,
social, 2, 21, 62-63, 93n2, 106, 113¬ 413-414, 420
119, 169, 205, 207, 213n47, 220, 233¬ and lifeworld, 396-397, 4 1 2 ^ 1 5
235, 326, 334 Austin, J . L . , 3, 6-7, 15, 56, 66-82,
sociological theory of, 105-106, 111¬ 101n86, 110-111, 122-123, 125,
112, 132, 227, 234 128-129, 155, 195-196, 217, 232,
strategic (see Strategic action) 282, 289-291, 294, 383-386,
symbolic, 63 408
448 449
Index Index

Bar-Hillel, Y., 27 weak vs. strong, 18, 326-329, 332, 334 Ethnocentrism, 372, 375, 381n63 340, 385. See also Speech-act offer;
Bataille, G . , 408, 413 (see also Verständigung, vs. Einverständ- Expert cultures, 171, 192, 240, 395¬ Speech acts, success of
Behaviorism, linguistic, 26-27, 278 nis) 398, 411, 413-414, 419-420, 423-425 Imperatives, 61, 67, 76, 132-141, 145,
Benjamin, W., 410, 412, 414, 425 Communicative competence, 2, 47-50, 160-161, 199-201, 226, 264-268,
Bennett, J . , 27, 106, 229, 278 53-54 Fallibilism, 12, 154, 236, 243-244, 312¬ 275n8, 286-287, 292, 295-296, 302¬
Berger, J . , 207 Communicative rationality. See Rational- 313, 337, 349, 356, 364-365, 368¬ 304, 319, 321-327, 338. See also L a n -
Bernstein, R., 404, 406-407 ity, communicative 371, 401n24, 404, 407, 412. See also guage, strategic use of; Power claims;
Binding and bonding power. See Comprehensibility, 22-24, 49-50, 79, Validity claims, criticizability of Speech acts, regulative; Strategic ac-
Speech acts, binding and bonding 87, 145, 291. See also Validity claims Fictionality. See Language, poetic use of tion, manifest
power of Consensus, 4, 13-14, 23, 142-145, 160, Freedom, 310-311, 316, 430 Information theory, 26-27
Bühler, K., 17, 107, 110-111, 196-197, 185-186, 188, 201, 203-204, 221, Frege, G . , 7-8, 51, 66, 109, 193-195, Insults, 226-227, 330, 338. See also Per-
228, 277-280, 284, 293-296, 298, 236, 294, 298-299, 325, 353, 364¬ 229, 278, 281-282, 286, 338 locutions; Strategic action, manifest;
389, 394 365. See also Agreement, in a strict Freud, S., 307, 335, 425-428, 431, Threats
Bürger, R, 414 sense (Einverständnis); Verständigung 433n26 Intentional sentences, 10, 138-139,
Contextual conditions of meaning. See 296, 318. See also Language, expres-
Carnap, R., 25, 33-34, 108 Meaning, contextual conditions of Gadamer, H . - G . , 387, 407, 417 sive use of; Promises; Semantics, i n -
Cartesian doubt, 243, 356, 358, 410 Contextualism, 196, 344, 351-360, 363, Gehlen, A., 307 tentionalist; Speech acts, expressive
Chomsky, N . , 35, 37-38, 40-41, 46-47, 371-372, 395 Grice, H . P., 27-28, 106, 147, 229, 259,
183 Conversation, 163-164, 170, 212n45 278-279, 284, 393 Jakobson, R., 196, 389-391
Commands. See Imperatives Criticism, art and literary, 396-399, Jay, M., 410-415
Communication 411-412, 414, 423 Hartman, G . , 390 Justice, 5, 12, 396, 411, 424. See also Dis-
general presuppositions of, 2, 21, 24, Culler, J . , 383-388 Hartmann, H . , 426 course ethics
44, 48, 80, 145, 207, 339 Culture, 186, 248, 250-253, 395-396, Hegel, G . W. F., 184, 191, 344-345, vs. happiness, 18, 428-431
indirect, 121, 285, 302, 333, 338 (see 411, 419. See also Lifeworld, three do- 348, 404, 424-426, 429 Justification, 5, 11-14, 197, 307, 325,
also Strategic action) mains of Heidegger, M., 253-254, 335, 337, 344, 351-352, 355-356, 365, 370, 372,
pathologies, 93n2, 168-169 346-348, 408 375-376, 406, 424. See also Discourse;
Communication community, 207, 338, Davidson, D., 8, 109, 194, 348, 379n35 Historicism, vs. transcendentalism, 404, Fallibilism; T r u t h , vs. justification; Va-
350-351, 353, 355-356, 360, 3 6 5 - 367 Declarations, 272-274, 292, 321-325, 407 lidity claims, criticizability of / vindi-
Communicative action, 3-5, 22-24, 57, 327, 338. See also Performatives Humboldt, W. von, 183-192, 297, cation of
62-63, 93n2, 105, 111, 118, 128-129, D e r r i d a . J . , 18, 383-388, 393-396, 398¬ 209nn2,4,6, 408
140-142, 145, 163-164, 167, 169, 399, 400n24, 408 Husserl, E . , 237, 239-240, 242-243, Kanngiesser, S., 61, 106
203-205, 215, 222, 224, 233, 236, Dewey, 343-344, 346-347, 409-410 259, 280, 359, 404 Kant, I . , 42-43, 45, 240, 311, 337, 349,
299, 326, 425. See also Language, com- Dialogue, 184-187 351, 411, 425-426, 428-429
municative use of; Verständigung Directions of fit, 158-161, 195, 263¬ Ideal speech situation, 13-14, 365, 367¬ Knowledge, 170-171, 340
functions of, 16, 111, 247 265, 273, 286-287, 291-292, 376 368 background, 16, 167, 171-173, 242¬
idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 15, Discourse, 4, 13-14, 86-87, 170, 236, Illocutionary acts, 7, 10, 57-58, 64-70, 245, 283, 386 (see also Lifeworld)
144, 166, 169, 190, 207, 240, 332, 309-311, 314, 363, 367-372, 393, 73-74, 82, 85, 122-123, 126, 163, cultural, 248-250, 253 (see also Life-
385-386, 393, 395 395-396, 412, 421, 423. See also 266, 289-290, 333, 340 world, three domains of)
and lifeworld, 6, 111, 237 (see also Life- Argumentation Illocutionary aims, 122-123, 125, 127, horizontal (Horizontwissen), 241-242
world; Knowledge, background) vs. action, 93n2, 206, 313, 364, 369¬ 201-204, 218, 258, 268-271, 299, (see also Lifeworld, as background)
obligations resulting from, 4, 82-87, 372 315-316 implicit, 33, 40, 46-47, 171-174, 237¬
124, 130-131, 137-138, 145, 198, Discourse ethics, 13, 188, 367, 370, Illocutionary force, 7-8, 15, 55-57, 66¬ 238, 240, 309
223, 233, 300 429. See also Justice 67, 72, 75-77, 81-83, 85, 88, 110, intuitive, 2, 39, 235, 242, 309 (see also
primacy of, 2-2, 15, 21, 102n92, 122, Dramaturgical action, 163-164, 170¬ 157, 159, 195-196, 232, 266, 272, Rule consciousness)
306n33 171, 205 292, 294, 296, 383-386, 390. See also practical vs. objective, 33, 35, 39, 238,
rationality of (see Rationality, commu- Dummett, M., 7-9, 11-12, 51, 109, 152¬ Speech acts, binding and bonding 312
nicative) 154, 194, 229, 231, 278, 287-288, power of prereflective, 2, 16, 33, 40, 119, 171,
vs. strategic action, 93n2, 119-129, 296, 352 and speaker's warranty, 4, 8, 83-88, 237
145, 167, 169, 203-206, 217, 220¬ Dürkheim, E . , 207 130, 136-138, 145, 198, 222, 233, topic-dependent contextual, 241¬
227, 248, 293, 298-304, 377 269, 299, 316 242
theory of, 1, 8, 55, 106-107, 110, 112, Epistemology, 239, 348-352 Illocutionary success, 83, 124-128, 130, unthematic, 237-238, 240-244, 246
164, 170, 174, 183, 200, 207-208, Ethical life (Sittluhkdt), 191, 243, 424, 132, 136, 201-204, 218, 223, 315, Kreckel, M., 157-159
240, 293, 407, 410 429-430
450 451
Index Index

Labov, W., 391 Language games, 7, 196-197, 203, 217, Mentalism, 259, 337, 348-355, 411. See Power claims, 111, 137-138, 200-201,
Language 254, 283, 288-289, 292, 329, 359, abo Meaning, intentionalist theory of 226, 264, 266-267, 303. See abo I m -
cognitive use of, 10, 75-78, 80-81, 86, 362, 370, 372-373, 386, 388, 414, 420 Metaphysics, 343, 346-348, 352, 374, peratives; Language, strategic use of;
89, 144, 289 (see abo Speech acts, L e a r n i n g process, 41, 170, 192, 204, 394 Strategic action, manifest
constative) 246, 252-253, 336, 353, 366, 374, Modernization, 420. See abo Rationaliza- Pragmatics
communicative use of, 10, 15, 142, 394, 405, 412-413, 418 tion empirical, 157-158, 163, 172, 197,
207, 315, 318-320, 338, 370 (see also Lifeworld, 111, 174, 187, 189, 208, 236¬ Morality, 190-191, 395-397, 424, 429¬ 351
Communicative action) 246, 250-251, 334, 350, 353, 363¬ 430. See abo Expert cultures; Validity formal vs. empirical, 2, 26, 28-29, 35¬
communicative use vs. poetic use of, 364, 368, 370-373, 407-408; 430. See claim, normative 41, 45, 52, 54-55, 164-168, 351
384-385, 388-398 also Communicative Action Morris, C . W., 26-27, 278 formal vs. formal semantics, 6-7, 9¬
dividing vs. unifying capacity of, 187¬ as background, 16, 127, 172, 174, 206, Mutual understanding. See Verständigung 10, 26-28, 51-52, 54, 151-154, 192¬
188 208-209, 227, 243, 245, 283, 335¬ 194, 196, 198-199
expressive use of, 80-81, 87, 89, 144 336, 350, 356, 358, 363, 370, 386 (see Neoconservatism, 406, 409, 431n7 formal vs. universal, 1-2, 9 2 n l
(see also Speech acts, expressive) also Knowledge, background) Neo-Darwinism, 374, 376, 428 intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist, 257¬
functions of, 49-50, 54, 72, 79, 81, 89¬ cultural impoverishment of the, 414 Neo-Kantianism, 345 260, 263, 268-269, 271
90, 92, 107, 110-111, 142-143, 165, invasion of, 424 Neopragmatism, 13, 343-344, 373 universal vs. transcendental hermeneu-
192, 196-199, 228, 231, 277-278, rationalization of the, 191, 430 tics, 41-46
282, 288, 293, 389 {see also Btihler, K.) reproduction of the, 16, 190-191, O h m a n n , R., 389-390 Pratt, M. L . , 390-393
holistic nature of, 58, 90, 233, 297 200, 246-247 (see also Culture) Organon model. See Bühler, K. Promises, 68, 83, 267-268, 324-325,
interactive use of (see Language, regu- as resource, 191, 209, 247, 336 327, 383-384. See abo Imperatives;
lative use of) as stabilizing factor, 16, 237, 240, 245, Paradigm shift, 110, 189, 337, 346, 352¬ Speech acts, regulative
knowledge of a, 2, 233, 245, 261-262 359 355, 417, 420 Psychoanalysis, 169, 426-428
297 three domains of, 208, 247-251 Peirce, C. S., 43, 243, 313, 337, 348¬ Putnam, H . , 13, 350, 365-366
noncommunicative use of, 10, 317¬ Locutionary acts, 66, 72-73, 75, 122¬ 349, 356, 365, 409-410
320, 333-334 (see also Rationality, 123, 289-290 Performative attitude, 65, 71, 89-91, Rationality, 219, 307-308, 325, 404,
epistemic / teleological) Logocentrism, 110, 195, 337, 408 132, 166, 205, 219, 224, 299-301, 407-409, 418, 420-423
parasitic use of, 15, 122, 201, 224, L u h m a n n , N . , 235 310, 312, 316, 319, 332, 369, 388, aesthetic-practical, 412
302, 384, 388 (see also Strategic ac- 406. See abo World-relations communicative, 4—5, 18, 120, 136,
tion) Marcuse, H . , 410, 425 Performatives, 7, 271-273. See abo Dec- 139-140, 168, 171, 188, 190, 192,
poetic use of, 15, 168, 383-384, 389¬ Marx, K., 206, 234, 254, 424-426, 431 larations 198-199, 207, 220, 222, 233, 240,
390, 392-393, 397-398 (see also McCarthy, T., 410, 412, 415-426, 431 Perlocutionary acts, 111, 122-127, 140, 294, 300, 309, 315-317, 319, 323,
Language, world-disclosing function Mead, G . H „ 187, 308, 409 167, 226-227. See abo Perlocutions; 326, 329, 333-334, 336, 407-408, 410
of) Meaning, 192-198, 227-233, 239. See Strategic action (see abo Postmetaphysical thinking)
pragmatic dimension of (see Sentence, also Semantics Perlocutionary effects, 123-129, 167, discursive, 188, 190, 307-311, 334
vs. utterance) contextual conditions of, 7, 11-12, 16, 201-202, 223, 301-302, 316, 329¬ epistemic, 309, 311-313, 334
problem-solving capacity of, 15, 192, 52, 61, 67-68, 172-173, 227-228, 332 purposive, 105, 114, 117, 203, 219¬
394, 396 385-387 Perlocutions, 326, 329-333, 340-341. 220, 234-235, 323, 327, 329
reflexivity of, 39, 64-65, 217, 284 intentionalist theory of, 106, 121, 257 See abo Insults; Language, strategic teleological, 113, 170, 203, 206, 309,
regulative use of, 75-78, 81, 86, 89, (see abo Semantics, intentionalis) use of; Strategic action, manifest; 313-314, 322, 334 (see abo Action, as
111, 144, 289 nominalist theory of, 106, 354 Threats purposive activity)
representational function of, 50-52, pragmatic theory of, 6-7, 9-10, 12, Personality structures, 247-250, 253 three core structures of, 18, 105, 308¬
58 16, 52, 66-67, 72, 131, 197-199, 227¬ Philosophy of consciousness, 279-281, 311, 314, 334, 336
strategic use of, 5, 17, 201, 224, 302, 233, 298, 338-341, 416 348, 405, 409 Rationalization, 105, 117, 171, 174,
377 (see also Strategic action) semantic theory of, 6, 9, 51-52, 131, Philosophy, role of, 347-348, 351-352, 335, 411, 420, 422
uncircumventability of, 335, 349-350, 193-195, 228 (see abo Pragmatics, for- 395-399, 400n24, 405-409, 411, 424. Realism, 351, 353, 360-362, 370, 372-373
355-59, 372 (see also Lifeworld, as mal vs. formal semantics; Semantics, See abo Paradigm shift Reconstruction, rational, 2, 28-41, 190,
background) truth-conditional) Piaget,J., 46, 53, 414, 426 207, 416
validity basis of, 3, 17, 21-25, 74, 88 use theory of, 6-7, 48, 51, 67, 109, Platonism, 186, 194, 337, 343-348, 359, Reconstructive sciences, 29, 46, 407
(see also Validity claims) 196, 229, 278, 282-284 373-374 Rorty, R., 13, 343-354, 357, 360, 366¬
world-disclosing function of, 15, 191¬ and validity, 66, 129-140, 193, 197, Pluralism, 403-407, 430 367, 370, 372-377, 381n63, 394-395,
192, 204, 246, 253-254, 335-337, 227-228, 253, 270-271, 282, 288, Popper, K., 295, 307, 361, 404 404-410, 426
390-396 (see also Language, poetic 300, 339 (see abo Language, validity Postmetaphysical thinking, 5, 312, 328, Rule consciousness, 2, 33-36, 45, 383.
use of) basis of) 346-347. See abo Rationality, commu- See abo Knowledge, intuitive
nicative Ryle, G . , 33
452 453
Index Index

Sanctions, 131, 134-138, 200-201, 225, 208, 221-224, 233, 299, 326, 332, Strawson, P. E . 27, 42, 125, 127, 285 discursive thematization of, 86-87 (see
264-265, 303. See also Imperatives; 385, 390, 392-393 (see also Illocution- Systems, 234-235, 254-255, 396-397, also Discourse)
Perlocutions; Power claims; Strategic ary force; Verständigung, as action- 411, 419 normative, 199-200, 208, 234, 303,
action, manifest; Threats coordinating mechanism) 381n55 (see also Morality; Validity,
Schiffer, S. R., 106, 229, 278, 285 classification of, 3, 7, 75, 77, 81, 109, Tarski, 194, 361 moral)
Schluchter, W., 114 140, 154-165, 180n85, 196, 267, 273, Taylor, C , 183, 185, 188, 190-191 to normative Tightness 3, 22, 76-79,
Schnadelbach, H . , 10, 307-308, 334, 291-292, 295 Threats, 226, 265-266, 275n8, 303-304, 81, 88-89, 91, 115, 136-137, 141,
407 consensual, 21, 24 330-331, 338. See also Imperatives; I n - 143, 147, 292, 327-328, 332 (see also
S e a r l e . J . R., 3, 6-7, 61-62, 81-84, 156¬ constative, 58, 73-77, 86-87, 137-138, sults; Language, strategic use of; Per- Imperatives; Speech acts, regulative)
161, 172-174, 194, 197, 242, 258¬ 144, 161-163, 267-268, 290, 292, locutions; Strategic action, manifest suspension of, 63, 168, 205, 225, 390¬
275, 291-295, 383-386 325, 328 (see also Language, cogni- T r u t h , 5, 11, 14-15, 75, 193-194, 349, 391, 393 (see also Language, poetic
Semantics. See also Meaning tive use of; Validity claims, to truth) 354-363, 375, 379n35, 404. See also use of)
formal, 6, 10, 51, 54, 192, 194-195, double structure of (see Speech acts, il- Semantics, truth-conditional; Validity to truth, 3, 22, 74-81, 88-90, 137,
197, 229, 278, 280-282 (see also Prag- locutionary and propositional com- claims, to truth 141, 143, 146-147, 150, 153-154,
matics, formal vs. formal semantics) ponet of) and argumentation, 5, 14—15, 362, 368 231-232, 326-328, 332-333, 359 (see
intentionalist, 54, 106-107, 112, 121, expressive, 80, 87, 137-138, 144, 147, vs. justification, 355, 357-360, 363¬ also Speech acts, constative)
229, 278-280, 284 (see also Pragmat- 151, 156, 161-163, 292-293, 295 (see 375, 406 to truthfulness, 3, 22, 80-81, 88-89,
ics, intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist) also Language, expressive use of; Va- pragmatic theory of, 13—15, 345, 357¬ 91, 137, 293, 326-328, 332 (see also
reference, 52, 108, 281 lidity claims, to truthfulness) 358, 360, 364-365, 367-372 Speech acts, expressive)
truth-conditional, 8, 109-110, 152, illocutionary and propositional com- as regulative idea, 13-14, 365-366, types of, 3, 23, 81, 92, 165, 230, 270¬
154, 193-194, 228-232, 282, 286¬ ponent of, 57-58, 63-74, 110, 122, 271, 295, 317 (see also Speech acts,
374-375
287, 295, 338 144, 232, 290, 294 classification of)
and sensorial certainty, 356
Sentence vs. utterance, 2, 6-7, 26, 48¬ indirect, 166, 265 (see also Communica- T r u t h conditions, 6, 8-11, 14, 152-154, universal, 3, 8, 15, 22, 34, 75, 77, 81,
53, 66-69, 193. See also Pragmatics, tion, indirect) 172, 193-197, 231, 263, 268, 281¬ 86, 89-90, 144, 146, 154, 430
formal vs. formal semantics institutionally bound, 60-62, 76, 82, 282, 286-287, 356-357, 361, 368. See universalist, 397, 400n24, 404, 407 (see
Skepticism, 344, 354-356, 359-360 85, 88, 128-129, 131, 162 also Acceptability conditions; Seman- also Discourse ethics)
Social action. See Action, social institutionally unbound, 60-62, 76, tics, truth-conditional vindication of, 5, 9, 11-13, 22, 24-25,
Social integration, 221, 236, 247, 250¬ 83, 85, 88 Tugendhat, E . , 148-150, 152, 201, 352, 73, 136, 152-154, 195, 198, 222, 240,
254. See also Communicative action propositionally differentiated, 58-64, 357 266, 297, 300, 312, 316, 340, 363¬
Socialization, 157, 174, 187, 189, 209, 146 364, 368-369, 372, 416 (see also Argu-
247-248, 250-253, 427, 429. See also regulative, 3, 86-87, 137, 144, 162¬ Validity mentation; Fallibilism)
Communicative action, functions of 163, 295-296, 325, 327-328 (see also aesthetic, 121, 396, 412, 415 (see also Verständigung, 2, 11, 15, 1 9 n l , 21-24,
Social order, 4-5, 16, 105, 227, 233¬ Language, regulative use of; Validity Art; Validity claims, aesthetic) 27-28, 44-45, 48, 50, 88-89, 93n2,
239, 251. See also Society claims, to normative lightness) dimensions of, 6, 22, 141-143, 159, 119-121, 127, 142-143, 183-184,
Society, 89-92, 174, 186, 235, 245-254. self-referential structure of, 123-124, 197-198, 208, 228-232, 291, 293, 186, 199, 227, 247, 298, 339, 387,
See also Lifeworld, three domains of; 217, 219, 237, 272-273, 284-285 295, 396-397, 408 (see also World-con- 406. See also Communicative action;
Social order; World-concepts standard form of, 56-64, 68, 122, 131, cepts) Consensus
Speech, validity basis of. See Language, 166-167, 217, 259, 271, 294, 300¬ moral, 12-13, 15 (see also Discourse as action-coordinating mechanism,
validity basis of 301, 383 ethics; Justice; Morality; Validity 105-107, 111, 121, 129-132, 139,
Speech-act offer, 70, 82, 110, 120, 130¬ success of, 49, 56, 74, 81-82, 87, 120 claims, normative) 163, 167, 187-188, 199, 206, 221,
132, 136, 198, 233. See also C o m m u n i - (see also Illocutionary success) Validity claims, 3, 8, 22-24, 49, 52-54, 223, 233, 247, 249, 298-300, 326¬
cative action; Illocutionary success; Speech-act theory, 7-8, 28, 46-47, 55¬ 68, 73, 81, 85-86, 88-89, 92, 110¬ 327, 385, 387
Speech acts, acceptability of 56, 109, 194, 229, 289-293, 295 111, 135-136, 138, 140-154, 186, vs. Einverständnis ("weak" vs. "strong"
Speech acts, 74-75, 79, 84, 86, 128, Strategic action, 4, 24, 63, 118, 123, 188, 192, 197, 232, 240, 293-294, mode of), 17-18, 320-325, 328, 333¬
139, 141, 269, 293, 296-297, 340, 126-129, 169, 202-205, 224-226, 416. See also Communicative action; 334, 340 (see also Communicative ac-
385, 390 249, 326, 330, 332-334. See also Ac- Language, validity basis of; Meaning, tion, weak vs. strong)
acceptability of, 11, 74, 82, 84, 87-88, tion, instrumental; Communicative and validity as "telos" of human language, 120,
132, 139, 141, 197-198, 220, 232¬ action, vs. strategic action; Impera- aesthetic, 412, 415 (see also Validity, 188, 203, 218, 227, 300, 316
233, 297-298, 316, 338, 340 (see also tives; Language, strategic use of; Per- aesthetic)
Acceptability conditions; Meaning, locutionary acts criticizability of, 11-12, 120, 143, 154, Weber, M., 105, 112-118, 171, 213n47,
contextual conditions of; Speech derivative status of, 3, 15, 21, 332 206, 231, 236, 296, 394-395 (see also 307, 326, 335, 404, 411, 416, 418-421
acts, success of) latent, 140, 169, 201-203, 223-224, Fallibilism; Validity claims, vindica- Weiss, J . , 207-208
binding and bonding power of, 15, 301-302, 304 tion of) Wellmer, A., 365, 368-369, 414
76, 84-85, 110, 128, 136, 163, 205, manifest, 201, 225-226, 302-304
454
Index

Whitebook,J., 410, 425-431


Williams, M., 358, 373
Wittgenstein, L . , 6, 8, 51, 109, 149, 151,
173-174, 196, 229, 278, 282-284,
288-289, 292, 316, 338, 344, 346¬
348, 356, 404-405, 408
World-concepts, 89-92, 111, 295-296,
350. See also Validity, dimensions of
World-disclosure. See Language, world-
disclosing function of
World-relations, 49-50, 68, 89-92, 110,
143-144, 158-159, 161-162, 165-166,
186, 245-246, 295-296, 301, 353¬
354, 376, 390, 394, 419, 421. See also
Performative attitude
Worldviews, rationalization of, 115, 411
Wunderlich, D., 27, 34-35

Z i m m e r m a n n , R., 192-193, 199, 201

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