1998 On - The - Pragmatics - of - Communication PDF
1998 On - The - Pragmatics - of - Communication PDF
1998 On - The - Pragmatics - of - Communication PDF
T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , M a s s a c h u s e t t s
Contents
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced i n any form or by any 1 What I s U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics? (1976) 21
electronic or mechanical means, (including photocopying, recording, or information
storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n 105
(1981)
T h i s book was set i n Baskeryille by Wellington Graphics and was printed a n d bound
in the United States of America
3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meaning a n d Action (1986) 183
9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d Communicative
U s e s of Language (1985) 383
vi
Contents
403
10 Q u e s t i o n s a n d C o u n t e r q u e s t i o n s ( 1 9 8 5 )
Editor's Acknowledgments
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y a n d F u r t h e r Reading 435
Index 447
I w o u l d like to t h a n k T h o m a s M c C a r t h y f o r i n i t i a t i n g this u n d e r t a k -
i n g , f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h e r o l e o f series e d i t o r i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n n e r ,
a n d for considerable h e l p over a n d above his e d i t o r i a l duties w i t h
r e g a r d t o t r a n s l a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . M y t h a n k s a r e also d u e t o J ü r g e n
Habermas for encouraging the project, for replying p r o m p t l y to m y
m a n y queries, a n d f o r his u n f a i l i n g cordiality. R o n a l d B ö h m e h e l p e d
with the proofreading, with financial assistance f r o m t h e D e p a r t -
m e n t o f G e r m a n , U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e D u b l i n , a n d h e also c o m p i l e d
the index. H e r e , too, I a m very grateful. Thanks, finally, to M a r t i n
Sauter, n o t j u s t f o r h i s p a i n s t a k i n g h e l p i n c h e c k i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s b u t
f o r h i s l o v e a n d s u p p o r t o v e r t h e m a n y years i t t o o k t o p u t t h i s b o o k
together.
T h e t r a n s l a t i o n s o f m a n y o f t h e c h a p t e r s have b e e n b a s e d on
e a r l i e r p u b l i s h e d t r a n s l a t i o n s , as f o l l o w s :
A translation o f chapter 1 by T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Communication and the Evolution of Society, © 1 9 7 9
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 2 b y T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n
J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Theory of Communicative Action, v o l . 1 , © 1 9 8 4
b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n .
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 3 b y J e r e m y G a i n e s a n d D o r i s L . J o n e s was
first p u b l i s h e d i n Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's
T h e T h e o r y o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , e d i t e d by A x e l H o n n e t h a n d
H a n s J o a s , © 1 9 9 1 b y P o l i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .
viii
Editor's Acknowledgments
H a b e r m a s ' s o r i g i n a l t e r m f o r h i s l i n g u i s t i c r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m was
" u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . " T h e a d j e c t i v e " u n i v e r s a l " was m e a n t t o i n d i -
cate t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r o j e c t a n d o t h e r p r a g -
m a t i c analyses o f l a n g u a g e . W h e r e a s e a r l i e r p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o
l a n g u a g e h a d t e n d e d t o analyze p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t s o f l a n g u a g e use,
H a b e r m a s set o u t t o r e c o n s t r u c t u n i v e r s a l f e a t u r e s o f u s i n g l a n -
guage. T h i s explains the title o f h i s p r o g r a m m a t i c essay, " W h a t
3
2
Introduction
Introduction
view, is t h a t i t r e m i n d s us t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is r e l a t e d t o f o r m a l v a l i d i t y . F r o m h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n is p r i -
conception o f s o c i a l o r d e r as r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e
a i m o f reaching agreement w i t h r e g a r d to the validity o f the disputed
action. v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h a t n o f o r c e e x c e p t t h a t o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is
I n s h o w i n g t h a t everyday l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n r a i s i n g e x e r t e d , t h a t n o c o m p e t e n t parties have b e e n e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e
a n d r e c o g n i z i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , H a b e r m a s p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e o f so- discussion, that no r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t has k n o w i n g l y b e e n sup-
c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p r e s s e d , t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s are u s i n g t h e s a m e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s
h a v e t w o s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h e y a r e , first, c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a - i n t h e s a m e way, a n d so o n . T h e s e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s r e f e r b o t h
tionships o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d responsibility: participants i n c o m m u - t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t o its o u t c o m e . F o r H a b e r m a s ,
n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n undertake t o b e h a v e i n c e r t a i n ways, a n d t h e the various idealizing suppositions unavoidably g u i d i n g a r g u m e n -
success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e cooperation o f b o t h p a r t i e s t a t i o n a r e w h a t give m e a n i n g t o t h e i d e a s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e as
involved. Second, the relationships of m u t u a l recognition charac- ideas t h a t t r a n s c e n d a l l l o c a l c o n t e x t s o f validity. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t
t e r i s t i c f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n h a v e a n i n h e r e n t rational d i m e n - t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y processes o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n
sion: the communicative actor undertakes a n o b l i g a t i o n to provide have a c o n n e c t i o n i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h possible v i n d i c a t i o n i n dis-
r e a s o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s h e raises w i t h h i s u t t e r a n c e s , course, they have a n i n h e r e n t c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t power. This
w h i l e his c o u n t e r p a r t i n a c t i o n may e i t h e r accept the proffered power is t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l b u i l t i n t o e v e r y d a y processes of
r e a s o n s o r c h a l l e n g e t h e m o n t h e basis o f b e t t e r reasons. I n t h i s communication.
sense, e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n v o l v e s a r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c -
H a b e r m a s ' s p i c t u r e o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h u s has
t i c e o f " a r g u m e n t a t i o n . " F u r t h e r m o r e , these e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s of
i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r critical social theory. F o r one t h i n g , i n
g i v i n g reasons f o r a n d against c o n t r o v e r s i a l validity claims—some-
p r e s e n t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f c o o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o m -
t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o b y H a b e r m a s as n a i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action—
m i t m e n t a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t o p p o s e s m o d e l s o f social o r d e r t h a t
p o i n t t o w a r d the possibility o f other, m o r e d e m a n d i n g f o r m s of
t a k e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects as f u n d a m e n -
a r g u m e n t a t i o n , w h i c h h e calls " d i s c o u r s e . " E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e
tal, for example, models g r o u n d e d i n decision o r game theory. For
a c t i o n n o r m a l l y operates o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e reasons sup-
another, i n the context-transcendent p o t e n t i a l o f the validity claims
p o r t i n g t h e validity claims raised are g o o d ones. W h e n this back-
r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes, i t l o c a t e s a basis f o r a
g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is s h a k e n — a s will happen more frequently i n
" p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y a n d , ac-
posttraditional societies—communicative action cannot continue
cordingly, a standard f o r critique. As that conception refers t o a
r o u t i n e l y . P a r t i c i p a n t s t h e n have t h r e e o p t i o n s : they can switch t o
p o t e n t i a l already b u i l t i n t o everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i t situ-
strategic a c t i o n ; they can b r e a k o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether; o r
ates r e a s o n i n e v e r y d a y l i f e : t h e ideas o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e t o w a r d
they can r e c o m m e n c e t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity at a d i f f e r e n t ,
w h i c h i t p o i n t s are g r o u n d e d i n i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that are p a r t
m o r e reflective level—namely, argumentative speech. I n the proc-
o f e v e r y d a y h u m a n activity. M o r e o v e r , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is
esses o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n k n o w n as d i s c o u r s e s , c e r t a i n i d e a l i z i n g s u p -
n o t reducible to the standards o f validity p r e v a i l i n g i n any local
positions already operative i n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are
c o n t e x t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity. R a t h e r , t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i -
f o r m a l i z e d . T h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a r e u n a v o i d a b l e i n t h e sense t h a t
tions o n w h i c h i t rests p r o v i d e s t a n d a r d s f o r c r i t i c i z i n g l o c a l p r a c t i c e s
t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e v e r y m e a n i n g o f w h a t i t is t o t a k e p a r t i n a r g u -
o f justification, b o t h w i t h regard to the outcomes o f the agreements
m e n t a t i o n ; t h e y are i d e a l i z i n g i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y a r e t y p i c a l l y
reached a n d w i t h r e g a r d to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n themselves.
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a n d w i l l n o t as a r u l e b e s a t i s f i e d m o r e t h a n a p p r o x i -
T h u s t h e i d e a o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a
mately. T h u s , H a b e r m a s claims, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n nec-
postmetaphysical alternative to traditional conceptions of t r u t h a n d
essarily s u p p o s e , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e y share t h e common
j u s t i c e t h a t nonetheless avoids value-relativism.
7
6
Introduction
Introduction
f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . t h e o r y as a f r u i t f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i n s u f f i c i e n t as i t stands, a n d
back to the propositional content o f utterances, thus indirectly re- a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s . I n a sense, t h e n , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e -
d u c i n g m e a n i n g t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e o b j e c - o r y o f m e a n i n g c a n b e r e g a r d e d as t h e p r o p o s e d h a p p y m a r r i a g e o f
tivist a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t m e a n i n g is t o b e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s A u s t i n a n d Searle w i t h F r e g e a n d D u m m e t t .
Introduction Introduction
t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t i o n s act w h e n w e k n o w w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . W e k n o w w h a t m a k e s a
time, he does challenge the claims o f formal-semantic theories to a i r l i n e steward to stop s m o k i n g . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d this request,
sions. M o r e o v e r , i f f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g c a n a c c o u n t necessary. T h e s e r e a s o n s m i g h t i n c l u d e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t s m o k i n g
a c t as a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o m o r a l v a l i d i t y as i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d t o t h e i d e a o f d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d
c o u l d a d d u c e i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e , h e has t o k n o w h o w t h e s p e a k e r o f t h i s is c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y a m e n d e d the
son for describing Habermas's theory of meaning (and, indeed, R o r t y reduces t r u t h to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , thus losing sight o f
c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n t h i s s e c o n d sense, v a l i d i t y is n o t o n l y o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y t h a t is p a r t o f t h e i d e a o f t r u t h , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g
p r a g m a t i c . T h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g a t t a c h e d t o w o r d s , is t o w o r k o u t a t h e o r y o f t r u t h t h a t is i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c
v e r y c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t sees i t s e l f as a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us a t a n y g i v e n t i m e . W h a t w o u l d s u c h
p r a g m a t i c i n t h i s s t r o n g e r sense m u s t t h e r e f o r e o f f e r a p r a g m a t i c a t h e o r y l o o k l i k e ? I n t h e 1980s, H a b e r m a s d e f e n d e d a v i e w n o t
r o u g h c h r o n o l o g y i n o r d e r t o show d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revisions; t h e
H a b e r m a s draws a t t e n t i o n to various k i n d s o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l -
r e a d e r is e n c o u r a g e d t o l o o k o u t f o r t h e m .
edge: f o r instance, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker's p e r s o n a l h i s t o r y o r
I n c h a p t e r 1 w e a r e i n t r o d u c e d t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a r e s e a r c h
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e ( c u l t u r a l l y specific) contexts i n w h i c h a given
program aimed a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis of
t o p i c is n o r m a l l y discussed. These kinds o f knowledge, although
speech. T h e procedure of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is elucidated
u s u a l l y o n l y i m p l i c i t i n acts o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , are r e l a t i v e l y close t o
t h r o u g h reference b o t h to empirical-analytic approaches a n d to
the f o r e g r o u n d a n d can be r e n d e r e d explicit w i t h o u t difficulty. T h u s
K a n t i a n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis. T h i s is f o l l o w e d b y a s k e t c h o f a
they can be contrasted w i t h the deep-seated, prereflective, taken-for-
t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h d i v e r g e s f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's
g r a n t e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t , as a h o r i z o n o f
t h e o r i e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects, a n d i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e
shared, u n p r o b l e m a t i c convictions, c a n n o t be s u m m o n e d to con-
characterized i n terms o f claims to validity.
sciousness a t w i l l o r i n its e n t i r e t y . T h i s b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of
the lifeworld forms the indispensable context for the communicative C h a p t e r s 2, 3, 4, a n d 6, t h o u g h s i t u a t i n g f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s i n
T h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is t o i d e n t i f y a n d r e c o n s t r u c t u n i -
v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). 1
T h e V a l i d i t y Basis o f S p e e c h
c. T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e r e is a c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a n y v a l i d i t y tal t h e o r y o f r e f l e c t i o n o r t h a t o f a n e m p i r i c a l l y substantive r e c o n -
view that the pragmatic d i m e n s i o n o f language from which one A l s o o f n o t e a r e t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a deontic logic ( H a r e , H . v o n W r i g h t ,
abstracts is b e y o n d f o r m a l ( o r l i n g u i s t i c ) analysis. A n a b s t r a c t i v e N . Rescher) 1 1
and corresponding a t t e m p t s at a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f
f a l l a c y arises i n t h a t t h e successful, o r a t least p r o m i s i n g , r e c o n s t r u c - s p e e c h acts s u c h as assertions a n d q u e s t i o n s ( A p o s t e l ) ; 1 2
approaches
t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c r u l e systems is seen as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s t r i c t i n g to a logic o f nondeductive a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( T o u l m i n , Botha) b e l o n g
f o r m a l analysis t o t h i s o b j e c t d o m a i n . T h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e t w o h e r e as w e l l . 1 3
F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p r e -
a n a l y t i c levels, language a n d speech, s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e i n s u c h a way suppositions (Kiefer, Petöfi), conversational postulates (Grice, L a k -
14
t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e is l e f t t o e x c l u s i v e l y e m - off), 1 5
s p e e c h acts (Ross, M c C a w l e y , W u n d e r l i c h ) , 1 6
and dialogues
p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s — t h a t is, t o e m p i r i c a l sciences s u c h as p s y c h o l i n g u i s - a n d texts ( F i l l m o r e , P o s n e r ) 1 7
lead to a consideration of the prag-
tics a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s . m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e f r o m a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p o i n t o f view.
tences), the elementary units o f speech (utterances) can be analyzed propositions, o f referential terms a n d predicates (Strawson) 1 9
is sig-
tional a c t i o n ( W i n c h , Taylor, v o n W r i g h t ) . 2 1
T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n -
o f f u n d a m e n t a l concepts they integrate the m o d e l o f linguistic be-
ing introduced b y W i t t g e n s t e i n has u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c aspects
haviorism (the symbolically m e d i a t e d behavioral reaction o f the
(Alston), 2 2
as d o e s t h e a t t e m p t b y G r i c e t o t r a c e t h e m e a n i n g of
stimulated individual organism) with the model of information
s e n t e n c e s b a c k t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers ( B e n n e t t , Schif-
transmission (encoding a n d decoding signals b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d
fer). 2 3
As the most p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for a universal
r e c e i v e r f o r a g i v e n c h a n n e l a n d a n a t least p a r t i a l l y c o m m o n store
28 29
u n d e r s t a n d s m e a n i n g u n d e r g o e s h e r e x p e r i e n c e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y as
o f mutuality i n the understanding o f identical meanings or i n the
a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e
r e c o g n i t i o n o f intersubjective validity claims.
r e l a t i o n established t h r o u g h symbols w i t h o t h e r individuals, even i f
I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts is l a r g e l y f r e e o f she is i n f a c t a l o n e w i t h a b o o k , a d o c u m e n t , o r a w o r k o f a r t . I s h a l l
t h e s e a n d s i m i l a r weaknesses. n o t h e r e analyze t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d
u n d e r s t a n d i n g any further; I w o u l d like to direct attention to j u s t
Some Remarks o n the Procedure o f Rational Reconstruction o n e aspect o f this: t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n level b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i b l e reality
a n d the understandable m e a n i n g o f a symbolic f o r m a t i o n . Sensory
I have b e e n e m p l o y i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " f o r m a l analysis" i n o p p o s i - e x p e r i e n c e is r e l a t e d t o s e g m e n t s o f r e a l i t y w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n , c o m -
t i o n t o e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e s ( i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense) w i t h - m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y m e d i a t e l y , as i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e d i a g r a m
o u t p r o v i d i n g a d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s is, a t least, m i s l e a d i n g . I below:
31
30
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1
F u r t h e r m o r e , I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o levels o f e x p l i c a t i o n of f o r m a t i o n — p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h its s u r f a c e , as i t w e r e — i n o r d e r t o
m e a n i n g . I f the m e a n i n g o f a w r i t t e n sentence, action, gesture, w o r k d i s c o v e r t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h i s s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n was
o f a r t , t o o l , t h e o r y , c o m m o d i t y , t r a n s m i t t e d d o c u m e n t , a n d so o n is p r o d u c e d ( i n o u r example, the rules according to w h i c h the lexicon
u n c l e a r , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g is d i r e c t e d first t o t h e s e m a n t i c o f a l a n g u a g e is c o n s t r u c t e d ) . T h e o b j e c t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o
c o n t e n t o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n . I n t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d its c o n - l o n g e r t h e content o f a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h a t specific a u t h o r s
t e n t , w e t a k e u p t h e same p o s i t i o n as t h e " a u t h o r " a d o p t e d w h e n h e m e a n t b y i t i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s b u t r a t h e r t h e i n t u i t i v e rule conscious-
w r o t e the sentence, p e r f o r m e d the gesture, used the t o o l , a p p l i e d ness t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has o f h i s o w n language.
t h e t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h . O f t e n , t o o , w e m u s t g o b e y o n d w h a t was F o l l o w i n g a suggestion m a d e by R y l e , 2 9
we can d i s t i n g u i s h between
m e a n t a n d i n t e n d e d by the a u t h o r a n d take i n t o consideration a know-how, t h e a b i l i t y o f a c o m p e t e n t s u b j e c t w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h o w t o
c o n t e x t o f w h i c h h e was n o t c o n s c i o u s . 2 8
T y p i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the un- p r o d u c e o r a c c o m p l i s h s o m e t h i n g , a n d know-that, t h e e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
derstanding of content p u r s u e s c o n n e c t i o n s t h a t l i n k t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c - e d g e o f h o w i t is t h a t h e is a b l e t o d o so. I n o u r case, w h a t t h e a u t h o r
tures o f t h e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e surface structures m e a n s b y a n u t t e r a n c e a n d w h a t a n i n t e r p r e t e r u n d e r s t a n d s o f its
o f other, familiar f o r m a t i o n s . T h u s , linguistic expressions can be c o n t e n t are a first-level k n o w - t h a t . T o t h e e x t e n t that his utterance
e x p l i c a t e d t h r o u g h paraphrase i n t h e same language or through is c o r r e c t l y f o r m e d a n d t h u s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , the author produced
t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o e x p r e s s i o n s o f a n o t h e r l a n g u a g e ; i n b o t h cases, c o m - i t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n r u l e s o r o n t h e basis o f c e r t a i n s t r u c -
p e t e n t speakers d r a w o n i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t t u r e s . H e k n o w s h o w t o use t h e system o f r u l e s o f h i s l a n g u a g e a n d
o b t a i n w i t h i n the l e x i c o n o f one language o r between t h e léxica o f u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i r c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n ; h e has a p r e t h e o r e t i -
two languages. cal k n o w l e d g e o f t h i s r u l e system, w h i c h is a t least s u f f i c i e n t t o
I f she c a n n o t a t t a i n h e r e n d i n t h i s way, t h e i n t e r p r e t e r m a y find enable h i m to produce the utterance i n question. This implicit r u l e
i t n e c e s s a r y t o a l t e r h e r a t t i t u d e . She t h e n e x c h a n g e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a k n o w - h o w . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r , i n t u r n , w h o n o t o n l y
understanding content (directed t o w a r d surface structures)—in shares b u t w a n t s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o m -
w h i c h she, as i t w e r e , l o o k s t h r o u g h s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d p e t e n t speaker, m u s t t r a n s f o r m t h i s k n o w - h o w i n t o e x p l i c i t k n o w l -
a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d — f o r a n a t t i t u d e i n w h i c h she e d g e , t h a t is, i n t o a s e c o n d - l e v e l k n o w - t h a t . T h i s is t h e task of
focuses o n t h e g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . r e c o n s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n i n t h e
T h e i n t e r p r e t e r t h e n attempts to explicate the m e a n i n g o f a sym- sense o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s u n d e r l y i n g
bolic f o r m a t i o n w i t h the help o f the rules according to w h i c h the the p r o d u c t i o n o f symbolic f o r m a t i o n s . Since t h e r u l e consciousness
a u t h o r m u s t have p r o d u c e d i t . I n n o r m a l p a r a p h r a s e a n d t r a n s l a - t o b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d is a c a t e g o r i a l k n o w l e d g e , the reconstruction
tion, the i n t e r p r e t e r draws o n semantic m e a n i n g relations (for i n - d e p e n d s first o f a l l o n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f c o n c e p t u a l e x p l i c a t i o n .
stance b e t w e e n the different words o f a language) i n an ad hoc
Carnap p u t f o r w a r d four requirements that the explication o f a
m a n n e r , so t o speak, i n t h a t she s i m p l y a p p l i e s a k n o w l e d g e shared
c o n c e p t m u s t f u l f i l l i n o r d e r to be adequate:
w i t h c o m p e t e n t speakers o f t h a t l a n g u a g e . I n t h i s sense, t h e r o l e o f
interpreter can ( u n d e r suitable conditions) be attributed to the i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d b e similar t o t h e e x p l i c a n d u m , t h a t is, f r o m
a u t h o r h i m s e l f . T h e a t t i t u d e c h a n g e s , h o w e v e r , as s o o n as t h e i n t e r - n o w o n the explicans s h o u l d be able to be used i n place o f the
p r e t e r t r i e s n o t o n l y t o apply t h i s i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f s p e a k e r s b u t e x p l i c a n d u m i n a l l r e l e v a n t cases.
t o reconstruct i t . She t h e n t u r n s away f r o m t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e o f i i . R u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o v i d e d t h a t f i x t h e use o f t h e e x p l i c a n s (in
t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n ; she n o l o n g e r l o o k s t h r o u g h i t intentione c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s ) i n a n exact m a n n e r .
recta t o t h e w o r l d . She a t t e m p t s i n s t e a d t o p e e r i n t o t h e symbolic
i i i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d p r o v e t o b e fruitful w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f o r m u l a t i o n o f general statements.
34 35
d o m a i n s o f p r e t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, t h a t is, n o t t o j u s t a n y i m p l i c i t
o p i n i o n , b u t to a proven intuitive preknowledge. T h e r u l e conscious-
R e c o n s t r u c t i v e versus E m p i r i c i s t L i n g u i s t i c s
ness o f c o m p e t e n t speakers f u n c t i o n s as a c o u r t o f e v a l u a t i o n , f o r
i n s t a n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences. W h e r e a s t h e
I h o p e I have sufficiently c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n t e n t is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n y u t t e r a n c e w h a t e v e r ,
of sciences t h a t t r a n s f o r m a p r a c t i c a l l y m a s t e r e d pretheoretical
reconstructive u n d e r s t a n d i n g refers o n l y to symbolic objects charac-
k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - h o w ) o f c o m p e t e n t subjects i n t o a n o b j e c t i v e a n d
t e r i z e d as " w e l l f o r m e d " b y c o m p e t e n t subjects t h e m s e l v e s . T h u s , f o r
e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - t h a t ) , so t h a t i t is c l e a r i n w h a t sense I a m
e x a m p l e , syntactic t h e o r y , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c , t h e t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e ,
using the expression " f o r m a l analysis." B e f o r e m e n t i o n i n g some
a n d ethics start w i t h syntactically w e l l f o r m e d sentences, c o r r e c t l y
methodological difficulties w i t h reconstructive linguistics, I w o u l d
fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, a n d m o r a l l y u n -
like t o contrast, i n b r o a d strokes, two versions o f linguistics, o n e
objectionable resolutions o f n o r m conflicts, i n order to reconstruct
e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a n d o n e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e . ( W u n d e r l i c h speaks o f a n
t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h these f o r m a t i o n s c a n b e p r o d u c e d . To
empirical-descriptive and an empirical-explicative linguistics. ) I will 3 4
t h e e x t e n t t h a t , as i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s , u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s
compare b o t h approaches u n d e r f o u r headings.
( t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences, t h e consistency of propositions,
t h e t r u t h o f h y p o t h e s e s , t h e Tightness o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n ) u n d e r l i e
Data
i n t u i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n s , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s relate t o p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis is s u p p o s e d t o b e secured
e d g e o f a g e n e r a l sort, t o universal capabilities, a n d n o t m e r e l y t o
t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n a l o n e , t h e d a t a o f l i n g u i s t i c s consist o f m e a s -
36 37
cation ( t h a t is, t h e c o n s t r u c t l a n g u a g e o f l i n g u i s t i c s , w h i c h is a
standardized version o f o r d i n a r y language) belongs i n p r i n c i p l e to Methodological Difficulties
t h e same l e v e l as t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e t o b e e x p l i c a t e d . ( N e i t h e r i n T o be sure, serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l difficulties have arisen i n c o n -
t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o r i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e case o f t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n c a n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C h o m s k i a n p r o g r a m f o r a g e n e r a l science o f l a n -
t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n b e c o n c e i v e d as g u a g e as t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . I
that of metalanguage to object language. ) 3 6 w o u l d l i k e t o consider, f r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective, two o f
39
38
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1
the problem complexes t h a t have developed. O n e concerns the o f the grammaticality o f linguistic expressions. T h e object o f recon-
status a n d r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e t e n t speak- s t r u c t i o n is t h e p r o c e s s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h o s e sentences h e l d b y
ers; t h e o t h e r , t h e a f o r m e n t i o n e d relation between linguistic a n d c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s t o b e l o n g t o t h e set o f g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s .
mental grammar. By c o n t r a s t , t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speak-
T h e r e h a v e b e e n t w o p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t c h o o s i n g speak- ers e v a l u a t e t h e s e n t e n c e s p u t b e f o r e t h e m a r e n o t t h e o b j e c t o f
e r s ' i n t u i t i o n s as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t h e o r y f o r m a - reconstruction b u t part of the data gathering.
tion. 39
F i r s t , t h e q u e s t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d w h e t h e r a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e ii. B e c a u s e o f t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , speak-
linguistics can ever a r r i v e a t a t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ; i n g a b o u t w h a t has b e e n s p o k e n , direct or indirect mention of
w h e t h e r o n t h e c h o s e n d a t a basis i t is n o t l i m i t e d t o d e v e l o p i n g , a t speech c o m p o n e n t s , b e l o n g s t o t h e n o r m a l l i n g u i s t i c process of
b e s t , a t h e o r y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t c o m p e t e n t speak- reaching understanding. T h e expression "metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s "
ers have o f t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e . S i n c e t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c use o f o n e ' s i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e a b o u t s e n t e n c e s o f t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e suggests
o w n o r d i n a r y language, to w h i c h a science t h a t appeals t o speakers' a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l t h a t d o e s n o t e x i s t . I t is o n e o f t h e m o s t i n t e r -
j u d g m e n t s m u s t have r e c o u r s e , is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e d i r e c t e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s t h a t t h e y c a n b e u s e d as t h e i r
use o f l a n g u a g e ( a n d is p r o b a b l y s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t l a w s ) , a g r a m - own languages o f explication. ( I shall c o m e back to this p o i n t
e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e c o m p e t i n g r e s e a r c h p a r a d i g m s m a k e possible.
I t h i n k t h i s o b j e c t i o n is b a s e d o n a c o n f u s i o n o f t h e t w o r e s e a r c h T h e s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f i n t u i -
paradigms elucidated above, the empirical-analytic a n d the recon- tively f o u n d e d s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s , f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists i m p r e s s i v e
structive. I wish to make three c o m m e n t s i n this regard: empirical evidence. 4 1
Nonetheless, i t seems t o m e h e r e t h a t o n c e
i. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t e s t o a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e - again a n e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f speakers' j u d g m e n t s stimulates
t e n t s p e a k e r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n false e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d suggests t h e w r o n g r e m e d i e s . T h e e x p r e s s i o n
o f sentences i n a n a t u r a l language a n d , o n the other, i n the appraisal " i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e " s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g t h a t a
40 41
between theory formation and a more precise rendering of the A s B e v e r suggests, e v e n t h i s thesis c a n b e w e a k e n e d to allow for
object d o m a i n . 4 2
restrictions placed o n the acquisition a n d application o f grammati-
T h e s e c o n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n is m o r e d i f f i c u l t . I t is o n e cal rule-knowledge by n o n l i n g u i s t i c p e r c e p t u a l mechanisms or n o n -
t h a t has b e e n t r e a t e d as a n e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n i n t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s - l i n g u i s t i c e p i s t e m i c systems i n g e n e r a l , w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e
tics o f t h e p a s t d e c a d e , a n d as s u c h has i n s p i r e d a g r e a t a m o u n t o f categorial framework o f a competence theory.
r e s e a r c h : i t asks w h e t h e r t h e r e is a d i r e c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n ii. I t is n o t c l e a r t o m e t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c c r i t i q u e
t h e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y o f g r a m m a r a n d t h e m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t is, so o f t h e a d m i t t e d l y essentialist i m p l i c a t i o n s o f C h o m s k y ' s c o m p e t e n c e
t o speak, " i n t h e m i n d " o f t h e s p e a k e r . 43
According to the correlation t h e o r y can be traced back to a confusion o f research paradigms. T h i s
hypothesis, linguistic reconstructions are not simply l u c i d and c o u l d be adequately discussed o n l y i f t h e r e w e r e clarity a b o u t t h e
economical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c d a t a ; i n s t e a d , t h e r e is a w a y i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r i e s c a n b e t e s t e d a n d , as t h e case m a y
psychological complexity of the actual p r o d u c t i o n process that be, falsified. I have the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t psycholinguistic investiga-
corresponds, supposedly, to the transformational complexity that tions p r o c e e d e m p i r i c a l l y a n d a n a l y t i c a l l y , a n d n e g l e c t a limine t h e
c a n be r e a d o f f t h e s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f linguistic expressions. I distinction between competence a n d performance. 4 6
a. S o m e t h i n g l i k e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f processes o f s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t r a n s p o s e d t o processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
u t t e r a n c e o f a n o t h e r s p e a k e r as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a c o m m u n i c a t i o n b. M o r e o v e r , a d o p t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " m i g h t c o n -
process, t h e h e a r e r (like t h e o b s e r v e r w h o perceives a s e g m e n t o f c e a l t h e b r e a k w i t h a p r i o r i s m t h a t has b e e n m a d e i n t h e m e a n t i m e .
r e a l i t y ) has a n e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h i s c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e , con- K a n t h a d t o s h a r p l y separate e m p i r i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis.
crete utterances w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d to e m p i r i c a l objects, a n d u t t e r - I f w e n o w u n d e r s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h e sense o f a
ances i n g e n e r a l t o o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l ( i n t h e sense o f o b j e c t s o f reconstruction o f general a n d unavoidable presuppositions o f expe-
p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ) . J u s t as w e c a n analyze o u r a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f riences t h a t c a n lay c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e n t h e r e c e r t a i n l y r e m a i n s
o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a n y c o h e r e n t a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c analysis.
experience whatsoever—we w o u l d also b e able to analyze o u r a Against this, the distinction between d r a w i n g o n a p r i o r i knowledge
p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f u t t e r a n c e s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e basic c o n c e p t s and drawing o n a posteriori knowledge becomes b l u r r e d . O n the
o f s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g {Verständigung), t h e o n e h a n d , t h e r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is f o r t h e m
c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t e n a b l e s us t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n c o r r e c t a n a p r i o r i knowledge; o n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this
46 47
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n r a i s e d a b o v e , o n e m i g h t see a
i . t o c h o o s e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n s u c h a way t h a t e i t h e r t h e
further difficulty with my proposal for conceptualizing universal
t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f the p r o p o s i t i o n stated o r the existential presup-
p r a g m a t i c s i n t h e f a c t t h a t f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s d o e s n o t fit w e l l i n t o
positions o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m e n t i o n e d are supposedly
the distinction between a l i n g u i s t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h sen-
f u l f i l l e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n s h a r e t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s p e a k e r ) ;
t e n c e s a n d a p r a g m a t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h u t t e r a n c e s . T h e r e is
i i . T o e x p r e s s h i s i n t e n t i o n s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s - a b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f different approaches to semantic theory. Lin-
s i o n r e p r e s e n t s w h a t is i n t e n d e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n t r u s t t h e guistically oriented theories of meaning * 6
t r y t o g r a s p systematically t h e
speaker); a n d s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f trans-
i i i . T o p e r f o r m t h e s p e e c h a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t i t c o n f o r m s to formational grammar, e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s o f sen-
r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s o r t o a c c e p t e d self-images (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n tences e i t h e r start w i t h semantic d e e p structures o r rely o n semantic
be i n a c c o r d w i t h the speaker i n shared value o r i e n t a t i o n s ) . p r o j e c t i o n s i n t o s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h leads as a r u l e
t o a c o m b i n a t o r y system, c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g e l e m e n t a r y sentences,
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t these decisions d o not depend o n particular
o f g e n e r a l s e m a n t i c m a r k e r s . Lexical semantics p r o c e e d s i n a s i m i l a r
epistemic presuppositions and changing contexts b u t cause sen-
m a n n e r ; i t clarifies t h e m e a n i n g structures o f a given l e x i c o n by way
t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l t o assume t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s of
o f a f o r m a l analysis o f m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s . T h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e s e
representation, expression, and the production of interpersonal
l i n g u i s t i c a p p r o a c h e s lies i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a c c o m m o d a t e t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e m is p r e c i s e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a -
p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s o n l y i n a n a d h o c way.
tive c o m p e t e n c e f o r w h i c h I a m p r o p o s i n g a universal-pragmatic H o w e v e r , t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e w o r k o f
investigation. W i t t g e n s t e i n has p r o v i d e d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e m e a n -
T h e p a r t o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is f u r t h e s t d e v e l o p e d is t h a t i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c expressions can be i d e n t i f i e d o n l y w i t h reference to
related to the representational f u n c t i o n o f utterances, for example situations o f possible e m p l o y m e n t .
to the use of elementary p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences. This classic
52 53
S y n t a c t i c t h e o r y investigates l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e e x a m i n e s i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n s o f a r as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n first-per-
f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n s o f the smallest m e a n i n g f u l units. Semantic t h e - s o n s e n t e n c e s . F i n a l l y , t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts e x a m i n e s i l l o c u t i o n -
o r y examines the m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f linguistic expressions. Evi- ary force f r o m the viewpoint of the establishment o f legitimate
dendy, only phonetic and syntactic theory are self-sufficient i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. These semiotic d i s t i n c t i o n s are s u m m a r i z e d
linguistic theories; semantic t h e o r y , by contrast, c a n n o t be con- i n the f o l l o w i n g table:
d u c t e d solely i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n o f l a n g u a g e , t h a t is,
T h e o r e t i c a l level Object domain
i n d i s r e g a r d o f p r a g m a t i c aspects.
Linguistics Sentences
Particular versus Universal Aspects of Speech Acts Grammar Sentences o f an i n d i v i d u a l
T h e task o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s consists, t o b e g i n w i t h , i n d e s c r i b -
language
i n g s p e e c h acts t y p i c a l o f a c e r t a i n m i l i e u , w h i c h c a n i n t u r n be
Grammatical theory Rules f o r generating
analyzed f r o m sociological, ethnological, a n d psychological points o f
sentences i n any language
view. G e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is c o n c e r n e d
w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e a b i l i t y o f a whatever
employing language—Austin mentions, a m o n g others, w r i t i n g po- tive actions satisfy or violate normative social expectations or
t h a t , i n b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h e s e n t e n c e u s e d is e m b e d d e d i n a c o n t e x t ,
m o r e precisely, i n s p e c i f i c i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I n a c e r t a i n way,
"I . . . you that...
e v e r y e x p l i c i d y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e b o t h establishes a n d r e p r e -
[verb] [sentence]
sents a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t least t w o s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e
e.g., " I ( h e r e b y ) p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l c o m e t o m o r r o w . "
o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n . T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e is t r i v i a l so l o n g as u n d e r
t h e r e l a t i o n a l aspect we m e r e l y c o n t r a s t t h e u t t e r a n c e c h a r a c t e r of "You are . . . ... ."
s p e e c h w i t h its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . I f n o t h i n g m o r e w e r e m e a n t b y t h e [verb] [p. part.] [sentence]
i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act, t h e c o n c e p t " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " c o u l d e.g., " Y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d t o s t o p s m o k i n g . "
s e r v e a t best t o e l u c i d a t e t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s h a v e t h e
" I ••. ... you that ...
c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n s , t h a t is, a r e s p e e c h actions. T h e p o i n t o f t h e
[auxiliary verb] [verb] [sentence]
c o n c e p t c a n n o t l i e t h e r e i n . I find i t r a t h e r i n t h e p e c u l i a r l y g e n e r a -
e.g., " I c a n assure y o u t h a t i t w a s n ' t I . "
tive p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts.
I t is t o t h i s g e n e r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t I t r a c e t h e f a c t t h a t a s p e e c h a c t I shall h o l d to the f o l l o w i n g t e r m i n o l o g i c a l rules. A n explicit
c a n s u c c e e d ( o r f a i l ) . W e c a n say t h a t a s p e e c h a c t succeeds i f a s p e e c h a c t satisfies t h e standard form i n its s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e i f i t is
r e l a t i o n between the speaker a n d hearer comes to pass—the r e l a t i o n m a d e u p o f a n illocutionary a n d a propositional c o m p o n e n t . T h e i l l o -
i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r — a n d i f t h e h e a r e r c a n understand and accept c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t consists i n a n illocutionary a c t c a r r i e d o u t w i t h
t h e c o n t e n t u t t e r e d b y t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e sense i n d i c a t e d (e.g., as a t h e a i d o f a performative sentence. T h i s s e n t e n c e is f o r m e d i n t h e
58 59
ized sign language, for instance, the standardized language o f the contrast, c o m m a n d s o r advice o r questions d o n o t represent i n s t i t u -
d e a f a n d m u t e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t also m e n t i o n p o i n t i n g tions b u t types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n fit v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s .
g e s t u r e s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a n e q u i v a l e n t f o r t h e use o f r e f e r e n t i a l T o be sure, t h e c r i t e r i o n o f b e i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d does n o t
terms, thereby s u p p l e m e n t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l speech. O n the o t h e r always p e r m i t a n u n a m b i g u o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . C o m m a n d s can exist
h a n d , t h e r e a r e also s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e n o t p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r - wherever relations o f a u t h o r i t y are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ; a p p o i n t m e n t s
e n t i a t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h acts s u c h as presuppose special, bureaucratically d e v e l o p e d organizations; and
" H e l l o ! " as a g r e e t i n g f o r m u l a , o r " C h e c k ! " a n d " C h e c k m a t e ! " as m a r r i a g e s r e q u i r e a s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n ( w h i c h is, h o w e v e r , t o b e f o u n d
p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r m o v e s i n a g a m e o f chess a n d t h e i r u n i v e r s a l l y ) . B u t this does n o t devalue t h e usefulness o f the analytic
c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is v i e w p o i n t . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y h a v e
l a c k i n g places t h e s e v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s o n a l e v e l w i t h n o r m a l n o n - a n y r e g u l a t i v e m e a n i n g a t a l l , r e f e r t o g e n e r a l aspects o f action
v e r b a l a c t i o n s ; w h i l e t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n s d o refer t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l n o r m s ; they are n o t , however, d e f i n e d by p a r t i c u l a r institutions.
c o n t e n t o f a p r e s u p p o s e d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e y d o n o t represent i t . We can n o w define t h e d e s i r e d a n a l y t i c u n i t s as propositionally
A s a first step i n d e l i m i t i n g t h e p r a g m a t i c u n i t s o f analysis, w e c a n differentiated a n d institutionally unbound speech acts. T o b e s u r e , o n l y
specify—out o f t h e set o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions t h a t rest o n the t h o s e w i t h a n e x p l i c i t l y linguistic f o r m a r e s u i t a b l e f o r analysis. F r e -
consensual f o u n d a t i o n o f reciprocally raised a n d recognized validity q u e n t l y , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts are e m b e d d e d
c l a i m s — t h e subset o f propositionally differentiated speech acts. B u t e v e n makes standard linguistic f o r m s superfluous; for example, w h e n the
t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n is n o t y e t selective e n o u g h ; f o r a m o n g t h e s e u t t e r - p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is d e t e r m i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e c o n t e x t of
a n c e s w e find s u c h s p e e c h acts as " b e t t i n g , " " c h r i s t e n i n g , " " a p p o i n t - u t t e r a n c e ; o r w h e n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is m e r e l y i n d i c a t e d ,
i n g , " a n d so o n . D e s p i t e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e n t t h a t is, e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h i n f l e c t i o n , p u n c t u a t i o n , w o r d p o s i t i o n , o r
(betting o n / f o r . . . , christening as/with . . . , appointing to . . . ) , p a r t i c l e s s u c h as " i s n ' t i t ? , " " r i g h t ? , " " i n d e e d , " " c l e a r l y , " "surely," a n d
they are b o u n d to a single i n s t i t u t i o n (or to a narrowly circum- similar expressions.
s c r i b e d set o f i n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; t h e y c a n t h e r e f o r e b e seen as t h e e q u i v a - F i n a l l y , w e s h a l l e x c l u d e t h o s e e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d
l e n t o f actions that fulfill presupposed n o r m s , either n o n v e r b a l l y o r f o r m t h a t a p p e a r i n c o n t e x t s t h a t p r o d u c e shifts o f m e a n i n g . T h i s is
i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d way. T h a t t h e s e s p e e c h acts a r e the case w h e n the pragmatic meaning of a context-dependent
institutionally bound c a n b e seen i n ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) t h e f a c t t h a t speech act diverges f r o m the m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences used i n i t
the permissible p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents are n a r r o w l y l i m i t e d by t h e ( a n d f r o m t h e i n d i c a t e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have t o
normative meaning of betting, christening, appointing, marrying, b e f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e t y p e o f s p e e c h act i n q u e s t i o n ) . Searle's " p r i n c i p l e
a n d so o n . O n e bets f o r stakes, c h r i s t e n s w i t h n a m e s , a p p o i n t s t o o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y " takes t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i n t o a c c o u n t : a s s u m i n g t h a t
o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , m a r r i e s a p a r t n e r , a n d so o n . W i t h i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y t h e s p e a k e r expresses h i s i n t e n t i o n precisely, e x p l i c i d y , a n d l i t e r a l l y ,
b o u n d s p e e c h acts, s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n always b e s p e c i f i e d . W i t h i t is p o s s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act c a r r i e d o u t o r c a p a b l e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, o n l y g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i - o f b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t to be specified unequivocally by a complex
tions can be specified—conditions that typically m u s t be m e t for a sentence.
c o r r e s p o n d i n g act t o s u c c e e d . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts e x -
K a n n g i e s s e r has g i v e n t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m : " F o r e v e r y
press a s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e s a m e u n m e d i a t e d w a y t h a t p r o p o -
m e a n i n g x, i t is t h e case t h a t , i f t h e r e is a s p e a k e r S i n a l a n g u a g e
sitionally nondifferentiated and nonverbal actions express a
c o m m u n i t y P w h o m e a n s (meint) x, t h e n i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e b e
p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m . T o e x p l a i n w h a t acts o f b e t t i n g o r c h r i s t e n i n g
a n e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y P w h i c h is a n e x a c t e x p r e s -
m e a n , I must refer to the institutions o f betting or christening. By
s i o n o f x." 72
For o u r purposes, we can weaken this postulate to
63
62
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1
Analytic units
64 65
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?
c o m m u n i c a t e o n t w o levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h e y c o m b i n e commu- T h i s o p t i o n is s o m e t i m e s t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a d e s c r i p t i v i s t f a l l a c y t o
nication of a content with "metacommunication"—communication w h i c h e v e n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r i e s f a l l p r e y . W e c a n analyze t h e s t r u c -
a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e c o m m u n i c a t e d c o n t e n t is u s e d . The tures o f speech, j u s t like every o t h e r object, o n l y i n a n objectivating
expression " m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n " m i g h t be m i s l e a d i n g h e r e because a t t i t u d e . I n d o i n g so, t h e r e l e v a n t a c c o m p a n y i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -
it c o u l d be associated w i t h metalanguage a n d suggest a n i d e a of p o n e n t c a n n o t , as w e saw a b o v e , b e c o m e uno acto t h e o b j e c t . T h i s
l a n g u a g e levels s u c h t h a t , a t e v e r y h i g h e r l e v e l , m e t a l i n g u i s t i c state- circumstance misleads m a n y language theorists i n t o the view that
ments about the object language o f t h e n e x t lower level can be c o m m u n i c a t i o n processes t a k e p l a c e a t a s i n g l e l e v e l , n a m e l y t h a t o f
66 67
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
t r a n s m i t t i n g c o n t e n t (i.e., i n f o r m a t i o n ) . F r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , the as f u n c t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s ) , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o t h e
r e l a t i o n a l a s p e c t loses its i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-à-vis t h e c o n t e n t aspect; p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts is n o t p l a u s i b l e . O b v i o u s l y ,
the communicative r o l e o f a n u t t e r a n c e loses its c o n s t i t u t i v e sig- t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s also h a v e a m e a n i n g i n a l i n g u i s t i c
n i f i c a n c e a n d is c o u n t e d as p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t . The sense. I n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t l y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e , t h e p e r -
pragmatic operator of the statement, w h i c h i n formalized presenta- formative verb employed has a l e x i c a l m e a n i n g , a n d t h e perfor-
tions (e.g., d e o n t i c l o g i c s ) r e p r e s e n t s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t m a t i v e s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h its h e l p has a m e a n i n g i n a m a n n e r
o f a n u t t e r a n c e , is t h e n n o l o n g e r i n t e r p r e t e d as a s p e c i f i c m o d e o f similar t o t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t o n i t .
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s b u t falsely as " W h a t A u s t i n calls t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e is t h a t
p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d . I d o n o t w i s h t o analyze this a s p e c t o f its m e a n i n g w h i c h is e i t h e r c o n v e y e d b y its e x p l i c i d y p e r -
fallacy here; I merely p o i n t to o n e o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s : t h a t t h e f o r m a t i v e p r e f i x , i f i t has o n e , o r m i g h t h a v e b e e n so c o n v e y e d b y
c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h is n e g l e c t e d t h e use o f s u c h a n expression." 7 7
i n theoretical approaches.
T h i s p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t n e g l e c t s , h o w e v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t f o r c e is
A s o p p o s e d t o t h i s , I c o n s i d e r t h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t o s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i n a s p e c i f i c sense, b e l o n g s o n l y t o u t t e r a n c e s a n d
be the r a t i o n a l reconstruction o f the double structure o f speech. n o t t o s e n t e n c e s . T h u s , o n e m i g h t first h i t u p o n t h e i d e a o f r e s e r v i n g
T a k i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ( i n "force" for the meaning content that accrues to the sentence
t h e n e x t t w o sections) I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o r e n d e r t h i s task m o r e t h r o u g h its b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h a t is, e m b e d d e d i n s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h .
precise i n r e l a t i o n to the p r o b l e m s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity. We can qertainly distinguish the p h e n o m e n o n of meaning that
comes about t h r o u g h the e m p l o y m e n t o f a sentence i n an utterance
Universal-Pragmatic Categories o f M e a n i n g f r o m the phenomenon o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g . W e c a n speak i n a
p r a g m a t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e , as we d o in a
A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts set o f f a l i n g u i s t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e . T h u s A l s t o n has t a k e n
b r o a d discussion t h a t has also b r o u g h t s o m e c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o the t h e fact t h a t t h e same speech act can be p e r f o r m e d w i t h v e r y d i f f e r -
theory o f meaning. Austin reserved t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r the e n t s e n t e n c e s as a r e a s o n f o r g r a n t i n g p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g a c e r t a i n
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , w h i l e he used t h e p r i o r i t y o v e r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c o n s i s t e n t use
c o n c e p t force o n l y f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o f u t t e r i n g s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , h e suggests t h a t s e n t e n c e ( a n d w o r d ) meanings
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s leads t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t e l l a t i o n s : a r e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h t h e y a r e
"principally" used. 7 8
T h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l is t h a t i t d o e s
M e a n i n g : sense a n d r e f e r e n c e , l o c u t i o n a r y act
n o t a d e q u a t e l y t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f sen-
o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s b y r e l a t i n g i t i n e v e r y case U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t w o ( d i f f e r e n t ) i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts is t i e d t o
t o t h e possibilities f o r u s i n g these expressions i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . B u t o t h e r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r ( c o n c o r d a n t ) pro-
t h i s m a k e s sense o n l y f o r s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s as c a n a p p e a r exclusively p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e c o m e s p e r c e p t i b l e as s o o n as
i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f speech. By contrast, the m e a n i n g o f one r e t u r n s to the conditions that m u s t be f u l f i l l e d by situations i n
p e r f o r m a t i v e expressions s h o u l d be clarified by r e f e r r i n g to the w h i c h s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n o t k n o w E n g l i s h m i g h t l e a r n (i.e., o r i g i -
p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( a n d t h e m e a n i n g nally understand) the meanings. A hearer can understand the mean-
o f o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions by r e f e r r i n g to the possibilities i n g o f the sentence w i t h the propositional content "the being yellow
f o r u s i n g t h e m t o express i n t e n t i o n s d i r e c d y ) . T h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p l i - o f f a t h e r ' s c a r " o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o c o r r e c d y use t h e
cation o f the m e a n i n g o f "to p r o m i s e " should o r i e n t itself a r o u n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence:
t h e possibilities f o r using the sentence
(5) " F a t h e r ' s n e w car is y e l l o w "
(1) " I hereby promise you that ..."
i n order, f o r e x a m p l e , t o express a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e , i n this
a n d n o t a r o u n d the possibilities f o r using the sentence case h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . T h e a b i l i t y t o
make this or a similar observation must be presupposed, for a p r o p e r
(2) " H e promises her t h a t . . . "
use o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n ( 5 ) d e m a n d s a t least t h e f o l l o w -
Correspondingly, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f "to hate" should i n g o f t h e speaker:
refer to the sentence
70 71
n e w c a r " is a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n , i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , f o r a h e a r e r t o t i o n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n e x p e r i e n c e m a d e p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h
select t h e ( a n d o n l y t h e ) o b j e c t t o w h i c h t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a p p l i e s . communication.
T h e difference between originally illocutionary a n d originally pro-
c. T h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n : t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " y e l l o w " c a n b e a t t r i b -
p o s i t i o n a l m e a n i n g s ( " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " i n A u s t i n ' s sense) c a n
u t e d t o t h e o b j e c t t h a t is d e s i g n a t e d .
be traced back to differences i n possible l e a r n i n g situations. We
Correspondingly, understanding the meaning of the prepositional l e a r n t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n l y i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e
sentence c o n t a i n e d i n (5) d e m a n d s o f t h e hearer t h a t h e a t t i t u d e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s p e e c h acts. B y c o n t r a s t , w e l e a r n t h e
m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n t h e n o n p e r f o r -
a', s h a r e t h e speaker-presupposition,
mative—objectivating—attitude o f observers w h o correctly repre-
b'. fulfill the speaker-presupposition, t h a t is, a c t u a l l y i d e n t i f y t h e sent their experiences i n propositional sentences. 79
We acquire
object designated, a n d originally illoctionary meanings i n connection with communicative
c'. u n d e r t a k e f o r his p a r t t h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n . e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t w e have i n e n t e r i n g t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
establishing an interpersonal relation. We learn originally proposi-
I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r so f a r as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f
tional meanings t h r o u g h r e p o r t i n g experiences w i t h objects a n d
u t t e r a n c e s ( 3 ) a n d (4) a r e c o n c e r n e d . A h e a r e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e
events i n t h e w o r l d .
m e a n i n g o f n o t i f y i n g o r a s k i n g o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this d i f f e r e n c e , meanings learned in a perfor-
t a k e p a r t i n successful s p e e c h acts o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :
m a t i v e a t t i t u d e c a n , o f c o u r s e , also o c c u r i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o s i -
(6) " I ( h e r e b y ) n o t i f y y o u t h a t . . ." tional content:
T h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, has l e a r n e d t o a s s u m e b o t h t h e r o l e o f the (9) " I ' m r e p o r t i n g t o y o u t h a t she asked m e yesterday w h e t h e r . . ."
( a c t i n g ) s p e a k e r as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e ( c o o p e r a t i n g ) hearer. The
T h i s fact may e x p l a i n why the i n d i c a t e d difference between the two
performance o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t c a n n o t serve t o r e p o r t a n o b -
c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g is o f t e n n o t n o t i c e d . I n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o -
s e r v a t i o n as t h e use o f a p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c a n ; n o r m u s t t h e
sitional c o n t e n t , however, we can d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m e a n i n g s o f expres-
a b i l i t y t o have p e r c e p t i o n s e s s e n t i a l l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d h e r e . R a t h e r ,
sions t h a t m a y be used i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e f r o m t h e w o r d
conversely, t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a s p e e c h a c t is a c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y
meanings t h a t — l i k e the n o m i n a l a n d predicative expressions i n
o f a n experience, n a m e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience that the
( 5 ) — a r e p e r m i t t e d only as m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t s i n sentences w i t h
h e a r e r has w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a t t e m p t e d
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n utterances like (8) a n d ( 9 ) , " n o t i f y " a n d
speech act and enters into an interpersonal relation with the
"ask" b e a r a s h a d e o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p o w e r t h a t t h e y have
speaker, a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n o n e w h o n o t i f i e s o r i n f o r m s a n d o n e w h o
o n l y i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y roles—as i n (6) a n d ( 7 ) .
r e c e i v e s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n — o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , takes u p
We can retain Austin's distinction between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g "
the relation between a person w h o questions a n d a person who
i n t h e sense o f t h e s e t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . " F o r c e " t h e n stands
answers.
72 73
a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( r e p o r t i n g o f facts o r states o f a f f a i r s ) , o n t h e
F r o m this the f o l l o w i n g correlations resulted:
o t h e r . ( I s h a l l h e r e leave t o o n e side t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f expression, t h a t is, t o t h e d i s c l o - L o c u t i o n a r y acts: constatives, t r u e / u n t r u e
s u r e o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse), a l t h o u g h reflections simi-
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: p e r f o r m a t i v e s , happy/unhappy
l a r t o t h o s e c a r r i e d o u t f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a p p l y t o i n t e n t i o n a l
s e n t e n c e s as w e l l . ) B u t t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c o u l d n o t
be m a i n t a i n e d w h e n i t became a p p a r e n t that a l l speech acts—the
I w o u l d like t o h o l d o n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g results:
constatives included—contain a locutionary component (in the
a. I t is n o t advisable t o r e s e r v e t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r t h e p r e p o - f o r m o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content) a n d an i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f a speech act a n d t o characterize t h e m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t ( i n the f o r m o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence) , 8 3
What Austin
o f an illocutionary c o m p o n e n t only by a pragmatic operator (which h a d i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d as t h e l o c u t i o n a r y act was n o w r e p l a c e d b y
d e s i g n a t e s a specific i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ) . (a) t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y e x p l i c i t s p e e c h
c o n t e x t s ( a ) ; b u t t h e y c a n b e v a l i d (gültig) o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t A f t e r h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e p r e s e n t o n l y o n e
( b ) . I s h a l l c o m e b a c k t o b o t h o f t h e s e classes o f c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t o f several types o f s p e e c h acts, A u s t i n gave u p t h e aforementioned
b e f u l f i l l e d i n o r d e r f o r s p e e c h acts t o s u c c e e d . A t t h i s p o i n t I a m c o n t r a s t i n f a v o r o f a set o f u n o r d e r e d f a m i l i e s o f s p e e c h acts. I a m
interested only i n the fact that the comparison between constative o f t h e o p i n i o n , however, t h a t w h a t h e i n t e n d e d w i t h the contrast
a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts t h r o w s l i g h t o n t h e v a l i d i t y basis t h a t " c o n s t a t i v e " versus " p e r f o r m a t i v e " c a n b e a d e q u a t e l y reconstructed.
m a n i f e s t l y u n d e r l i e s all s p e e c h a c t i o n s .
W e h a v e seen t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n l a n g u a g e c a n t a k e p l a c e o n l y
T o be sure, this does i n i t i a l l y clarify t h e special p o s i t i o n o f consta- when the participants, i n communicating with one another about
t i v e s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s d o n o t d i f f e r f r o m o t h e r types o f s p e e c h s o m e t h i n g , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e n t e r t w o levels o f communication—the
acts i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a t i v e / p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , n o r do level o f intersubjectivity o n w h i c h they take u p i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-
they d i f f e r by v i r t u e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , f o r these v a r y tions a n d t h e level o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents. However, i n speaking,
i n a t y p i c a l way f o r a l l s p e e c h a c t i o n s ; b u t t h e y d o differ f r o m we can m a k e e i t h e r t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
( a l m o s t ) a l l o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts i n t h a t t h e y p r i m a f a c i e i m p l y content more c e n t r a l l y t h e m a t i c ; i n so d o i n g , w e m a k e a more
a n u n m i s t a k a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a c l a i m t o t r u t h . I t is u n d e n i a b l e t h a t i n t e r a c t i v e o r a m o r e c o g n i t i v e use o f o u r l a n g u a g e . I n t h e interactive
o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts also i m p l y some or other v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; b u t use of language, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e r e l a t i o n s i n t o w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d
i n d e t e r m i n i n g exacdy w h a t validity c l a i m they imply, we seldom hearer enter—as a warning, promise, r e q u e s t — w h i l e we merely
e n c o u n t e r such a clearly d e f i n e d a n d universally recognized validity m e n t i o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s . I n t h e cognitive
c l a i m as " t r u t h " ( i n t h e sense o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ) . I t is easy t o see use of language, b y c o n t r a s t , w e t h e m a t i z e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e
76 77
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
as a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t is h a p p e n i n g i n t h e w o r l d ( o r J u s t as o n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e
t h a t c o u l d b e t h e case), w h i l e w e e x p r e s s t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n use o f l a n g u a g e , so f o r t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e o n l y t h o s e
o n l y i n d i r e c d y . T h i s i n c i d e n t a l character can be seen, f o r example, s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t h a t
i n the fact that i n E n g l i s h the e x p l i c i t f o r m o f assertion ("I am speaker a n d hearer can adopt to the n o r m a t i v e contexts o f t h e i r
a s s e r t i n g ( t o y o u ) t h a t . . . " ) , a l t h o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , is r a r e a c t i o n . I c a l l t h e s e regulative s p e e c h a c t s . 88
W i t h the illocutionary
in comparison to the short f o r m that disregards the i n t e r p e r s o n a l f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m — l i g h t n e s s o r a p -
relation. propriateness (Richtigkeit, Angemessenheit)—is b u i l t j u s t as u n i v e r s a l l y
A s t h e c o n t e n t is t h e m a t i z e d i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o n l y i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h as t h e t r u t h c l a i m . B u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m
s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s c a n assume t h e e x p l i c i t o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e x p l i c i t i y i n v o k e d o n l y i n r e g u l a t i v e
f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a r e p e r m i t t e d . W i t h these c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( i n c o m m a n d s a n d a d m o n i t i o n s , i n p r o h i b i t i o n s a n d
s p e e c h acts, w e raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted. I n r e f u s a l s , i n p r o m i s e s a n d a g r e e m e n t s , n o t i f i c a t i o n s , excuses, r e c o m -
t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , i n w h i c h t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n m e n d a t i o n s , a d m i s s i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e t r u t h r e f e r e n c e o f t h e
is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed, w e r e f e r i n v a r i o u s ways t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e m e n t i o n e d propositional content remains, by contrast, merely i m -
n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e s p e e c h act. p l i c i t ; i t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o its e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . Conversely,
F o r t h i s l a t t e r use, t h e ( a u t h o r i z e d ) c o m m a n d has a p a r a d i g m a t i c i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m , t h e
s i g n i f i c a n c e s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e a s s e r t i o n f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e use of n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t , a l t h o u g h these too (e.g.,
language. T r u t h is m e r e l y t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s — n o t t h e only— reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, a n d
validity c l a i m reflected i n the f o r m a l structures o f speech. T h e i l l o - so f o r t h ) m u s t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a t i o n s —
c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s a l e g i t i m a t e ( o r t h a t is, t h e y m u s t b e covered by a recognized normative back-
illegitimate) interpersonal relation between t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , is d e - g r o u n d — i f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations i n t e n d e d w i t h t h e m are to
r i v e d f r o m t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e (bindende Kraft) o f r e c o g - c o m e t o pass.
nized n o r m s o f action (or o f evaluation); to the extent that a speech I t seems t o m e t h a t w h a t A u s t i n h a d i n m i n d w i t h his (later
a c t is a n a c t i o n , i t actualizes a n a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a - a b a n d o n e d ) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o c o n s t a t i v e versus p e r -
tions. T h e validity o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f institutions, roles, f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s is c a p t u r e d i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o g -
s o c i o c u l t u r a l l y h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — t h a t is, o f conventions—is n i t i v e a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e uses o f l a n g u a g e . I n t h e cognitive use of
always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e d . T h i s b y n o m e a n s h o l d s t r u e o n l y f o r language, w i t h t h e h e l p o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b e t t i n g , g r e e t i n g , c h r i s t e n - p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; i n t h e interactive use of lan-
i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , e a c h o f w h i c h satisfies a specific n o r m guage, w i t h t h e h e l p o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e k i n d
o f a c t i o n ( o r a n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d class o f n o r m s ) . I n p r o m i s e s , o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n established. T h e difference i n thematiza-
too, i n recommendations, prohibitions, prescriptions, a n d the like, tion r e s u l t s f r o m stressing o n e o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n i v e r s a l l y i n h e r -
w h i c h are n o t r e g u l a t e d f r o m t h e outset by i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e speaker e n t i n s p e e c h , t h a t is, f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use of
i m p l i e s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t m u s t , i f t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t o s u c c e e d , l a n g u a g e w e raise t r u t h c l a i m s f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e
b e c o v e r e d b y e x i s t i n g n o r m s , a n d t h a t m e a n s b y ( a t least) d e facto use o f l a n g u a g e w e lay c l a i m t o ( o r c o n t e s t ) t h e v a l i d i t y o f a n o r m a -
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the claim that these norms rightfully exist. T h i s i n t e r n a l tive b a c k g r o u n d f o r i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A u s t i n h i m s e l f d i d n o t
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d i n s p e e c h acts d r a w this c o n s e q u e n c e because, o n t h e o n e h a n d , h e t o o k o n l y o n e
a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e universal validity claim i n t o consideration, namely, propositional
i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , j u s t as is t h e t r u t h c l a i m i n t h e c o g n i t i v e t r u t h interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h ;
use o f language. b u t he w a n t e d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , to m a k e this single validity c l a i m
78 79
fact." 9 0
I t seems t o m e that A u s t i n confuses the validity c l a i m o f
I n compressing the universal validity claim o f t r u t h together w i t h
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , w h i c h c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e first i n s t a n c e i n
a h o s t o f p a r t i c u l a r e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a i n t o a s i n g l e class, A u s t i n
t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s t a t e m e n t s a n d facts, w i t h t h e
b l u r r e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between the clear-cut universal validity claims
v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, w h i c h c a n n o t i n a n y w a y b e
o f propositional t r u t h and normative lightness (and truthfulness).
interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h .
B u t t h i s p r o v e s t o b e u n n e c e s s a r y i f i n a g i v e n s p e e c h act we d i s t i n -
T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w a r n i n g s o r p i e c e s o f a d v i c e rest o n p r e d i c t i o n s ,
guish a m o n g
t h e y a r e p a r t o f a c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . W h e t h e r t h o s e i n v o l v e d
w e r e r i g h t t o u t t e r c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s o r pieces o f a d v i c e i n a g i v e n a. t h e i m p l i c i t l y p r e s u p p o s e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s ,
s i t u a t i o n d e p e n d s i n t h i s case o n t h e t r u t h o f t h e corresponding b. t h e specific m e a n i n g o f the i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n to be estab-
p r e d i c t i o n s . A s p a r t o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , w a r n i n g s a n d lished, a n d
p i e c e s o f a d v i c e c a n also have a n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g . T h e n t h e r i g h t
c. t h e i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m .
t o issue c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s a n d a d v i c e d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e p r e -
s u p p o s e d n o r m s t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r a r e v a l i d ( t h a t is, a r e i n t e r s u b - W h e r e a s a. a n d b . fix t h e d i s t i n c t classes ( d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t
j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) o r n o t ( a n d , a t a n e x t stage, o u g h t o r o u g h t n o t l a n g u a g e s ) o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts, c. d e t e r m i n e s t h e u n i v e r s a l
t o b e v a l i d , t h a t is, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) . modes o f communication, t h a t is, m o d e s i n h e r e n t i n s p e e c h i n
M o s t types o f s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e general.
m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use. W h e t h e r a n e s t i m a t e is g o o d o r b a d c l e a r l y B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o a. a n d b . , I w o u l d l i k e a t least t o r e m a r k t h a t
d e p e n d s o n t h e t r u t h o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g statement; estimates usu- the Austinian starting p o i n t o f the distinction between performative
a l l y a p p e a r i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . L i k e w i s e , w h e t h e r t h e a n d constative utterances provides a n overly n a r r o w view; the validity
verdict o f a court, the r e p r i m a n d o f a person, or the c o m m a n d o f a s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e t w o m o d e s o f c o m m u n i -
superior to a subordinate w i t h r e g a r d to certain behavior are "justly" cation that I developed f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n . Naturally, there can be
pronounced, "deservedly" delivered, o r " r i g h t f u l l y " given d e p e n d s no mode of communication i n which the comprehensibility of an
j u s t as c l e a r l y o n w h e t h e r a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m has b e e n c o r r e c d y u t t e r a n c e is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed; f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act m u s t f u l f i l l
a p p l i e d t o a g i v e n case ( o r w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t n o r m has b e e n a p p l i e d t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f comprehensibility i n t h e s a m e way. I f i n s o m e
80 81
c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e r e is a b r e a k d o w n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , t h e r e q u i r e - s p e a k e r m u s t , i n a t r i v i a l sense, t r u t h f u l l y e x p r e s s h i s t h o u g h t s , o p i n -
m e n t o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y c a n b e m a d e t h e m a d c o n l y t h r o u g h pass- i o n s , a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ; h o w e v e r , i n a s s e r t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n ,
i n g over to a h e r m e n e u t i c discourse, a n d t h e n i n c o n n e c t i o n with w h a t m a t t e r s is n o t t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n s b u t t h e t r u t h
t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c system. T h e truthfulness w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e
expresses h e r i n t e n d o n s c a n , h o w e v e r , b e e m p h a s i z e d a t t h e l e v e l o f s p e a k e r expresses t h e i n t e n t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g , r e p r i m a n d i n g , r e f u s -
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e s a m e way as t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ; b u t i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n
a n d the lightness (or appropriateness) of an interpersonal relation. w i t h a h e a r e r , t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n is o n l y a necessary
Truthfulness guarantees the transparency o f a subjectivity r e p r e - c o n d i t i o n , w h e r e a s w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t t h e a c t i o n fit a r e c o g -
s e n t i n g i t s e l f i n l a n g u a g e . I t is e s p e c i a l l y e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e expressive nized normative context.
use of language. T h e p a r a d i g m s a r e f i r s t - p e r s o n s e n t e n c e s i n w h i c h T h u s w e have t h e f o l l o w i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s :
t h e s p e a k e r ' s wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , etc. ( w h i c h a r e e x p r e s s e d
i n c i d e n t a l l y i n e v e r y s p e e c h act) a r e t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h , d i s c l o s i n g Type o f
a c t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t r u t h f u l n e s s , t o o , is a u n i v e r s a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f d o e s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e consist? A t t h i s stage, w e
r e l y o n h i m . A n u t t e r a n c e c a n c o u n t as a p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , r e q u e s t , h e r s e l f i n a s p e c i f i c w a y a n d takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n
q u e s t i o n , o r avowal i f a n d o n l y i f t h e speaker makes a n offer t h a t he c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a c t i o n ; I c a n e s t a b l i s h a t b e s t w h e t h e r t h e r e are
is r e a d y t o m a k e g o o d i n s o f a r as i t is a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r . The sufficient indicators for the conjecture that the offer w o u l d w i t h -
s p e a k e r m u s t c o m m i t h i m s e l f , t h a t is, i n d i c a t e t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u - stand testing.
ations he w i l l draw c e r t a i n consequences f o r a c t i o n . T h e type of T h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is
o b l i g a t i o n d e t e r m i n e s t h e content o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t , f r o m w h i c h w i l l i n g t o e n t e r w i t h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act s i g n i f i e s
t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d . 9 6
This condi- a g u a r a n t e e t h a t , i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f h e r u t t e r a n c e , she w i l l f u l f i l l
t i o n , i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle as t h e " s i n c e r i t y r u l e , " m u s t always b e c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , r e g a r d a q u e s t i o n as s e t d e d w h e n
fulfilled i n t h e case o f a c t i o n oriented toward reaching under- a s a t i s f a c t o r y a n s w e r is g i v e n ; d r o p a n a s s e r t i o n w h e n i t p r o v e s t o be
standing. T h u s , i n w h a t follows I shall, i n speaking o f t h e speaker's false; f o l l o w h e r o w n a d v i c e w h e n she f i n d s h e r s e l f i n t h e s a m e
c o m m i t m e n t , p r e s u p p o s e b o t h t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t has a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n as t h e h e a r e r ; p l a c e e m p h a s i s o n a r e q u e s t w h e n i t is n o t
c o n t e n t a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s i n c e r e l y is w i l l i n g t o t a k e o n his c o m p l i e d w i t h ; act i n accordance w i t h an i n t e n t i o n disclosed by a n
c o m m i t m e n t . So f a r as I c a n see, p r e v i o u s analyses o f s p e e c h acts a v o w a l , a n d so o n . Thus, the illocutionary force of an acceptabk speech act
h a v e b e e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , as t h e y h a v e n o t c l a r i f i e d t h e c o m m i t m e n t consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical
o f t h e speaker o n w h i c h t h e acceptability o f his utterance specifically obligations of the speaker. B u t i f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e has m o r e t h a n a
depends. m e r e l y suggestive i n f l u e n c e , w h a t c a n m o t i v a t e t h e h e a r e r t o base
T h e discernible a n d sincere readiness o f t h e speaker t o e n t e r i n t o his action o n the premise t h a t t h e speaker seriously i n t e n d s t h e
a specific k i n d o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p c o m m i t m e n t she indicates? W h e n i t is a q u e s t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
has, c o m p a r e d with the general contextual conditions, a peculiar b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h e c a n p e r h a p s r e l y o n t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
status. T h e r e s t r i c t e d c o n t e x t s t h a t s p e c i f i c types o f s p e e c h acts p r e - f o r c e o f a n e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m o f a c t i o n . I n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y
s u p p o s e m u s t (a) exist a n d ( b ) b e s u p p o s e d t o e x i s t b y t h o s e i n - u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n n o t be t r a c e d
volved. Thus, the following two statements must hold: (a) a b a c k directly t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . I
s t a t e m e n t to t h e effect t h a t c e r t a i n contexts o b t a i n , i n d e e d those w o u l d t h u s l i k e t o p r o p o s e t h e thesis t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h
r e q u i r e d b y t h e type o f s p e e c h a c t i n q u e s t i o n ; a n d ( b ) a s t a t e m e n t w h i c h t h e speaker, i n c a r r y i n g o u t h e r s p e e c h act, i n f l u e n c e s the
to t h e effect t h a t speaker a n d h e a r e r suppose these contexts to hearer can be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y if, over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l speech
o b t a i n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o analyze t h e specific acts, w e t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e "yes" o r " n o " responses o f t h e
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t i n t h e same way, t h a t h e a r e r t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d a t least i m p l i c i d y b y t h e speaker.
is, so t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o s t a t e m e n t s w o u l d h o l d : (a) a s t a t e m e n t W i t h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r raise v a l i d i t y
t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e is a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e claims a n d d e m a n d that they be recognized. B u t this r e c o g n i t i o n
speaker; a n d (b) a statement t o t h e effect that t h e h e a r e r supposes n e e d n o t f o l l o w i r r a t i o n a l l y , s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have a c o g n i t i v e
this c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to o b t a i n . O n e could character a n d can be tested. I w o u l d l i k e , t h e r e f o r e , to d e f e n d the
c h o o s e t h i s strategy o f analysis; b u t I r e g a r d i t as u n s u i t a b l e . I t w o u l d f o l l o w i n g thesis: In the final analysis, the speaker can illocutionarily
suggest t h a t w e speak o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t influence the hearer, and vice versa, because speech-act-typical obligations are
o f a s p e a k e r i n t h e s a m e sense as w e s p e a k o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of connected with cognitively testable validity claims—that is, because t h e
restricted contexts. I can ascertain i n an appropriate manner r e c i p r o c a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p has a r a t i o n a l basis.
t h r o u g h observation or questioning whether certain contexts ob- T h e speaker w h o c o m m i t s herself n o r m a l l y connects the specific
t a i n ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n o n l y test w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r c o m m i t s sense i n w h i c h she w o u l d l i k e t o t a k e u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n -
86 87
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
nication. w h i c h w e e n t e r w i t h r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, r e f e r s d i r e c t l y t o t h e
c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act p e r f o r m e d fits a n e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k -
I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r p r o f f e r s a s p e e c h -
g r o u n d ; whereas w i t h the e n t r a n c e i n t o practical discourse, the topic
a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation to provide grounds (Begründungsverpflichtung).
o f discussion is t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o r m itself f r o m w h i c h the
C o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e o f f e r t o r e c u r i f n e c e s s a r y t o t h e
s p e a k e r ' s l i g h t n e s s c l a i m is m e r e l y d e r i v e d .
experiential source f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r d r a w s t h e certainty t h a t h i s
O u r r e f l e c t i o n s have l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n a l results:
s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . I f t h i s i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g d o e s n o t d i s p e l a n a d
hoc d o u b t , the persistently p r o b l e m a t i c t r u t h c l a i m can b e c o m e the a. A s p e e c h a c t succeeds, t h a t is, i t b r i n g s a b o u t t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l
s u b j e c t o f a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , r e l a t i o n t h a t 5 i n t e n d s w i t h i t , i f i t is:
the speaker proffers a speech-act-immanent obligation to provide
• comprehensible a n d acceptable, a n d
justification (Rechtfertigungsverpflichtung). O f course, regulative speech
acts c o n t a i n o n l y t h e o f f e r o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r t o i n d i c a t e , i f • accepted by the hearer.
necessary, t h e normative context t h a t gives h i m t h e conviction t h a t h i s b. T h e acceptability o f a speech act d e p e n d s o n (among other
u t t e r a n c e is r i g h t . A g a i n , i f t h i s i m m e d i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n d o e s n o t things) the f u l f i l l m e n t o f two pragmatic presuppositions:
88 89
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
c. t h e v a l i d i t y claims u n d e r w h i c h t h e r e l a t i o n s t o reality are estab- 2. [Added to 1979 English translation:] I shall focus on a n idealized case of commu-
lished, and nicative action, namely, "consensual interaction," i n which participants share a tradi-
tion and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they
d. t h e g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n s t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l sentences assume i n t h e i r start from the same definition of the situation a n d do not disagree about the claims
to validity that they reciprocally raise. T h e following schema locates the extreme case
r e l a t i o n s to reality.
of consensual interaction in a system of different types of social action. Underlying
/\
nature attitude
Acknowledgment b. Action Oriented toward Reaching Understanding versus Consensual Action. I n consen-
sual action, agreement about implicitly raised validity claims can be presupposed as a
background consensus by reason of common definitions of the situations; such
I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k E. T u g e n d h a t a n d G. G r e w e n d o r f f o r their agreement is supposed to be arrived at in action oriented toward reaching under-
standing. I n the latter case strategic elements may be employed under the proviso
helpful c r i t i c i s m s o f a f i r s t d r a f t o f t h i s essay. T h e y w i l l h a v e their
that they are meant to lead to a direct mutual understanding.
d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h i s r e v i s e d v e r s i o n as w e l l . J. H .
c. Action versus Discourse. I n communicative action, it is naively supposed that i m -
plicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way
Notes of question and answer). I n discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for
statements a n d norms are hypothetically bracketed a n d thematically examined. As
in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude.
1. [Added to 1979 English translation:] Hitherto the term "pragmatics" has referred
to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction d. Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication. Whereas in sys-
of universal features of using language (or o f employing sentences in utterances). T o tematically distorted communication at least one o f the participants deceives himself
mark this contrast, I introduced a distinction between "empirical" a n d "universal" about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparendy being maintained,
pragmatics. I a m no longer happy with this terminology; the term "formal pragmat- the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic
i c s " — a s an extension of "formal semantics"—would serve better. "Formalpragmatik" is attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner.
the term preferred by F. Schütze, Sprache Soziologisch Gesehen, 2 vols. (Munich, 1975);
cf. the summary, pp. 911-1024. 3. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d transzendentale Sprachpragmatik—zur Frage
ethischer N o r m e n , " in K . - 0 . Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt,
1976), pp. 10-173.
94 95
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?
4. I n the framework of Southwest G e r m a n Neo-Kantianism, E m i l Lask has earlier strative inference" in R. P. Botha, The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses (The Hague,
reconstructed the concept of "transsubjective validity"—in connection with the
meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of statements, and the beauty of works
of t — a s worthiness to be recognized. Lask's philosophy of validity combines motifs
a r 14. F. Kiefer, " O n Presuppositions," in F. Kiefer and N . Ruwet, eds., Generative Gram-
from Lotze, Bolzano, Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. "Valid value (geltender Wert) is mar in Europe (Dordrecht, 1973), pp. 218-242; K. H . Ebert, "Präsuppositionen im
worthiness to be recognized, recognition-value, that which deserves devotion, that to Sprechakt," in A. ten-Cate and P. Jordens, eds., Papers from the Seventh Linguistic
which devotion is due, thus that which demands or requires devotion. To be valid is Colloquium at Nijmegen (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 45-60; F. Petöfi, Präsuppositionen in
value, demand, norm. . . . All such terms as 'worthiness,' 'deserve,' 'be due,' 'de- Linguistik und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1974).
m a n d ' are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior corresponding to
validity: worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way—this demands a certain 15. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax
behavior." E . Lask, " Z u m System der Logik," Ges. Schriften, vol. 3 (Tubingen, 1924), and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974); and D . G o r d o n and G . Lakoff, "Conversational
p. 92. Postulates" MS (1973).
5. [Editor's note:] Cf. note 1 above. 16. J . R. Ross, " O n Declarative Sentences," i n j . Rosenbaum, ed., Readings in English
Transformational Grammar (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 222-277; J . D. MacCawley,
6. Y Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this i n his critique " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic ' T h e Role of Semantics in a Grammar," in E . B a c h and T. Harms, eds., Universals in
Philosophy of Language," Synthese26 (1973): 1-12. His critique is based on a paper Linguistic Theory (New York, 1968), pp. 125-170; D . Wunderlich, "Sprechakte," i n
I characterized as provisional. "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der U . Maas and D . Wunderlich, Pragmatik und sprachliches Handeln (Frankfurt, 1972),
kommunikativen Kompetenz," in J . Habermas and N . L u h m a n n , Theorie der Gesell¬ pp. 69-188, and " Z u r Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wunderlich,
schaft oder Sozialtechnobgie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101-141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, mis- ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 11-58.
understood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail. I
only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly programmatic) 17. C . J . Fillmore, "Pragmatics and the Description of Discourse," in P. Cole, ed.,
approach clear even to readers who are aggressively inclined and hermeneutically Radical Pragmatics (New York, 1981); G . Posner, Textgrammatik (Frankfurt, 1973).
not especially open.
18. J . Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (New York, 1968); J . J . Katz, Semantic
7. E . g . , K - O . Apel, Transformation derPhilosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 406ff, Theory (New York, 1972).
and "Programmatische Bemerkungen zur Idee einer transzendentalen Sprachprag¬
matik," in Annates Universitatis Tukuensis Sarja, Series B, O s a Tom, 126 ( T u k u , 1973), 19. P. F. Strawson, Logico-LinguisticPapers ( L o n d o n , 1971).
pp. 11-35.
20. A. C . Danto, Analytic Philosophy of Action (Cambridge, 1973); S. Hampshire,
8. Charles Morris, "Foundations of the T h e o r y of Signs," i n Encylopedia of Unified Thought and Action ( L o n d o n , 1960); D. S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour
Science, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago, 1938), and Signs, Language, Behavior (New York, 1955). ( L o n d o n , 1965); Care and Landesman, eds., Readings in the Theory of Action ( L o n d o n ,
1968).
9. Cf. my remarks on Morris in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen
and G . A . Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 63ff. 21. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London, 1958);
C. Taylor, " E x p l a i n i n g Action," Inquiry 13 (1973): 54-89; H . von Wright, Explanation
10. Y Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," in Aspects of Language (Jerusalem, 1970), and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1971), and " O n the Logic and Epistemology of the
pp. 69-88, and "Semantics and Communication," in H . Heidrich, Semantics and Com- Causal Relation," in P. Suppes, ed., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, vol. 4
munication (Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 1-36. Taking Bar-Hillel as his point of departure, (Stanford, 1973), pp. 239-312.
A . Kasher has proposed a formal representation embedding linguistic expressions in
extralinguistic contexts. " A Step Forward to a T h e o r y of Linguistic Performance," in 22. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964).
Y Bar-Hillel, ed., Pragmatics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht, 1971), pp. 84-93; cf.
also R. C . Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," i n D. Davidson and G . H a r m a n , Semantics of Natural 23. J . Bennett, ' T h e Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations of Language 10
Language (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 380-387. (1973): 141-168; S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).
11. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952); G . H . von Wright, Norm and 24. Cf. the bibliography by E . von Savigny, in J . L . Austin, Zur Theorie aer Sprechakte
Action ( L o n d o n , 1963); N. Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht, 1968). (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 203ff.
12. L . Apostel, " A Proposal on the Analysis of Questions," in Logique et Analyse 12 25. G . Grewendorf, "Sprache ohne Kontext," in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Prag-
(1969): 376-381; W. K u h l m a n n , Reflexion zzvischen Theorie und Kritik (Frankfurt, 1975). matik, pp. 144-182.
13. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1974); W. C . Salmon, The Founda- 26. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388, and "Utterer's
tion of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1967); cf. the summary chapter on "nondemon- Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," reprinted in Grice, Studies in the
96 97
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?
Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 117ff.; D. K. Lewis, Convention (Cam- 41. Ibid., pp. 14ff.
bridge, 1969).
42. I n responding to the doubts that Botha raises against the "clear case principle"
27. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, pp. 89ff. (Justification, p. 224), I would like to reproduce an argument that J . J . Katz and T. G .
Bever have brought against similar doubts in a paper critical of empiricism, " T h e Fall
28. H . - G . Gadamer emphasizes this in Truth and Method (New York, 1975). and Rise of E m p i r i c i s m , " in T. G. Bever, J . J . Katz, and D. T. Langendoen, eds., An
Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability (New York, 1976):
29. G . Ryle, The Concept of Mind ( L o n d o n , 1949); cf. the interpretation of E . von
Savigny in Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 91ff. Such a theory . . . seeks to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of
phonological properties in terms of a theory of the phonological component, to
30. R. Carnap and W. Stegmüller, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wien, 1959), explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of syntactic properties in terms
p. 15. of a theory of the syntactic component, and to explicate intuitions about the
interconnectedness of semantic properties in terms of a theory of the semantic
31. D . Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), p. 209. component. T h e theory of grammar seeks finally to explicate intuitions of relat-
edness among properties of different kinds in terms of the systematic connections
32. For an analysis of what explication in the sense of rational reconstruction means, expressed in the model of a grammar that welds its components in a single
cf. H . Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt, 1977), the chapter on " E x p l i - integrated theory of the sound-meaning correlation in a language.
kativer Diskurs," pp. 277-336.
These remarks are, of course, by way of describing the theoretical ideal. But as the
33. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). theory of grammar makes progress toward this ideal, it not only sets limits on the
construction of grammars and provides a richer interpretation for grammatical struc-
34. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 210-218. tures but it also defines a wider and wider class of grammatical properties and
relations. I n so doing, it marks out the realm of the grammatical more clearly,
35. Botha, Justification, pp. 75ff., speaks i n this connection of external versus internal distinctly, and securely than could have been done on the basis of the original
linguistic evidence. intuitions. As Fodor has insightfully observed, such a theory literally defines its own
subject matter in the course of its progress:
36. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, p. 216. I f I understand him correctly, H . Schnelle gives
an empirical interpretation to the model-theoretic version of linguistics in Sprachphi- T h e r e is then an important sense in which a science has to discover what it is
losphie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 82-114. about; it does so by discovering that the laws and concepts it produced in order
to explain one set of phenomena can be fruitfully applied to phenomena of other
37. Botha, Justification, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only report correct sorts as well. It is thus only in retrospect that we can say of all the phenomena
linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false linguistic intuitions; but the con- embraced by a single theoretical framework that they are what we meant, for
struct of pretheoretical knowledge does nor permit this possibility. I think it makes example, by the presystematic term "physical event," "chemical interaction," or
sense to assume that linguistic intuitions can be "false" only if they come from "behavior." To the extent that such terms, or their employments, are neologistic,
incompetent speakers. Another problem is the interplay of grammatical and non- the neologism is occasioned by the insights that successful theories provide into
grammatical (for example, perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse the deep similarities that underlie superficially heterogeneous events. (J. A. Fodor,
judgments about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating Psychological Explanation [New York, 1968], pp. 10-11.)
expressions of grammatical rule consciousness or, as the case may be, of isolating
genuinely linguistic intuitions. Cf. T. G . Bever, ' T h e Ascent of the Specious," in 43. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, Psycholinguistik (Frankfurt, 1973), and
D. C o h e n , ed., Explaining Linguistic Phenonema (New York, 1974), pp. 173-200. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie (Frankfurt,
1974); H . Leuninger, "Linguistik u n d Psychologie," in R. Bartsch and T. Vennemann,
38. I n this connection, U . Oevermann points out interesting parallels with Piaget's eds., Linguistik und Nachbarwissenschaften (Kronberg, 1973), pp. 225-241.
concept of reflecting abstraction (cf. J . Piaget, The Principles of Genetic Epistemohgy
(New York, 1972)): perhaps the procedure of rational reconstruction is merely a 44. E . H . Lenneberg, Biologische Grundlagen der Sprache (Frankfurt, 1972), and " E i n
stylized and, as it were, controlled form of the reflecting abstraction the child carries Wort unter u n s , " in Leuninger, Miller, and Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie,
out when, for example, she "reads off" her instrumental actions the schema that pp. 53-72.
underlies them.
45. L . Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D . Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization
39. W. J . M. Levelt, Formal Grammars in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics, vols. 1-3 Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969), and " F r o m Is to Ought," in T. Mischel, ed.,
(Amsterdam, 1974). Cognitive Development and Epistemohgy (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236.
40. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5-7. 46. O n this point, cf. U . Oevermann, "Kompetenz u n d Performanz" (Max-Planck¬
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).
98 99
Chapter 1 W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?
47. I . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York, 1961), p. 138. in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 614-628, "Austin on
Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts," Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 405-424, re-
48. B. Stroud, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Journal of Philosophy 9 (1968): 241-254; printed in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, pp. 262-275, Speech Acts (Cambridge,
J . Hintikka, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 6 (1972): 174-281; and M. S. G r a m , 1969), and "Linguistik u n d Sprachphilosophie," in Bartsch and Vennemann, Linguis-
"Categories and Transcendental Arguments," Man and World 6 (1973): 252-269, and tik und Nachbarwissenschaften, pp. 111-126.
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 5 (1971): 15-26. O t h e r sources include: W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1964), and "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964): 138-146; L . J .
49. R. Bittner, T r a n s z e n d e n t a l , " i n Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 5 (Mu- C o h e n , " D o Illocutionary Forces Exist?," Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964): 118-137,
nich, 1974), pp. 1524-1539. reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 580-598, and "Speech Acts," Current
Trends in Linguistics 12 (1970); R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical
50. F o r example, the reception of Kant by the Erlangen school assumes a transcen- Review 79 (1970): 3-24, and "Austin's Distinction between Locutionary and Illocu-
dental status for the basic concepts of protophysics only in a limited sense; cf. the tionary Acts," in R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences ( L o n d o n , 1972); D. Holdcroft, "Per-
discussion volume edited by G . Böhme, Protophysik (Frankfurt, 1975). formatives and Statements," Mind 83 (1974): 1-18; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and
Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 439-460, reprinted in
51. Piaget's Kantianism is typical of this approach. Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 599-613; S. T h a u , T h e Distinction between
Rhetic and Illocutionary Acts," Analysis 32 ( 1 9 7 1 / 7 2 ) : 177-183; C. Travis, "A Genera-
52. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel's introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of C . S. Peirce's Schriften tive T h e o r y of Speech Acts," in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 629-644; G . J .
(Frankfurt, 1967 and 1970). Warnock, " H a r e on Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 80-84;
Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 309-352.
53. Cf. my "Postscript," in Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston,
1971); cf. also R. Bubner, Transzendentale Hermeneutik," in R. Simon-Schäfer and 60. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3ff.
C. W. Zimmerli, eds., Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften (Hamburg, 1975),
pp. 57-70. 61. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle's principle of
expressibility.
54. F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur (Frankfurt, 1968).
62. P. F. Strawson, Individuals ( L o n d o n , 1959); M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Lan-
55. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitsfheorien," in Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen, guage ( L o n d o n , 1973); E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A.
1973), pp. 211-265, reprinted i n Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des G o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982).
kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
63. O n the analysis of intentionality and the expression of intentions, cf. W. Sellars,
56. W. Seilars, "Presupposing," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 197-215; P. F. Strawson, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of M i n d , " in Metaphysics ( L o n d o n , 1968); W. Sellars
" A Reply to Mr. Seilars," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 216-231. and R. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental," i n Minnesota Studies, vol. 1 (Min-
neapolis, 1963), pp. 507-539; W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London, 1968);
57. U . Oevermann, T h e o r i e der individuellen Bildungsprozesse" (Max-Planck¬ E . Tugendhat, "Phänomenologie u n d Sprachanalyse," in Festschrift für Gadamer, vol. 2
Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974). (Tübingen, 1970), pp. 3 - 2 4 ; J . Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief(Ithaca, 1962); C . Taylor,
"Explaining Action," Inquiry 13 (1970): 54-89. O n the analysis of expressive speech
58. O n this point, cf. the controversy between Q u i n e and Chomsky: N . Chomsky, acts, cf. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chs. 7-9.
"Quine's Empirical Assumptions," and W. V. O. Q u i n e , "Replies," both in D. Davidson
and J . Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 53-68 and 292-352; 64. Cf. D . Steinberg and L . Jakobovits, eds., Semantics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 157¬
W. V. O . Quine, "Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory," in 484; H . E . Boekle, Semantik (Munich, 1972).
Davidson and H a r m a n , eds., Semantics of Natural Language. H . Schnelle, Sprachphiloso-
phie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973) is also typical of methodological behaviorism i n 65. T h e work of P. W. Alston is a good example.
linguistics.
66. F. von Kutschera, Sprachphilosophie (Munich, 1971), pp. 117-161; Schnelle, Sprach-
59. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962); cf. the bibliography on philosophie und Linguistik, pp. 190-240; Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 238-273.
the theory of speech acts compiled by E . von Savigny for the G e r m a n edition of this
work (see note 24 above), pp. 204-209; J . L . Austin, "Performative Utterances," i n 67. P. WatzlawickJ. H . Beavin, and D. D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication
his Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970), pp. 233-252, and "Performative-Constative," (New York, 1967).
in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22-33.
Additional Austin bibliography can be found in von Savigny, Die Philosophie der nor- 68. A communication theory that is supposed to reconstruct conditions of action
malen Sprache, pp. 162-166. oriented toward reaching understanding does not necessarily require as its basic unit
See also J . R. Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America of analysis pairs of complementary speech acts—that is, reciprocally performed and
(Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239, reprinted i n j . Rosenberg and C . Travis, eds., Readings accepted speech acts; but it does require, at least, a speaker's utterance that can not
101
100
W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
Chapter 1
only be comprehended but can also be accepted by at least one other subject capable 78. W. P. Alston, "Meaning and U s e , " in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, p. 412:
" I can find no cases in which sameness of meaning does not hang on sameness of
of speech and action.
illocutionary act."
69. D . Wunderlich, "Zur Konventionalitât von Sprechhandlungen," in Wunderlich,
ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, p. 16; cf. also the linguistic characterization of the stan- 79. F o r ontogenetic studies, a combination of a Piagetian theory of meaning for the
dard form given there (which I do not deal with h e r e ) , and Wunderlich's analysis of cognitive schemata developed in connection with manipulated objects (cf. H . G .
advising in Grundlagen, pp. 349ff. Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969)) and a Meadian theory of
meaning for the concepts developed in connection with interactions (cf. Arbeits¬
70. Exceptions are avowals that, when rendered explicit, can also take on a negative gruppe Bielefelder Soziologen, eds., Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirk¬
form, for example, " I do not want (hereby) to conceal from you that. . . ." lichkeit, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1973)) seems promising to me.
71. Deviating from a widespread practice, I do not think it advisable to distinguish 80. B. Richards argues against this in "Searle o n Meaning and Speech Acts," Founda-
propositions (Aussagen) from assertions (Behauptungen) in such a way that, although tions of Language 7 (1971): 536: "Austin argued that sentences such as R a (I promise
a proposition is embedded i n a specific speech situation through being asserted, it that I shall pay within one year) never assert anything that is either true or false, i.e.,
does not receive its assertoric force therefrom. I am of the opinion, rather, that the never assert propositions. H e r e we agree; but this in no way upsets the claim that R a
assertoric force of a proposition cannot be reconstructed except through reference nevertheless expresses a proposition . . . viz. the proposition that R a . " Richards does
to the validity claim that anyone i n the role of a competent speaker raises for it in not equate the prepositional content of the speech act, R a , with the prepositional
content of the dependent sentence: " I shall pay within one year," but with the content
asserting it. Whether this claim can, if necessary, be discursively vindicated, that is,
of the objectified speech act, Ra, which must, however, then be embedded in a
whether the proposition is 'Valid" (true), depends on whether it satisfies certain truth
further speech act, Rv; for example, " I tell you, I promised him that I shall pay within
conditions. We can, to be sure, view propositions monologically, that is, as symbolic
one year." I regard the confusion of performative sentences with the assertoric
formations with an abstract truth value without reference to a speaker; but then we
reporting of their content as a category mistake (which, incidentally, diminishes the
are abstracting precisely from the speech situation i n which a prepositional content,
value of Richards's argument against Searle's principle of expressibility, in particular
owing to the fact that it is asserted as a proposition, receives a relation to reality, that
against his proposal to analyze the meaning of speech acts in standard form in terms
is, fulfills the precondition of being true or false. T h i s abstraction naturally suggests
of the meaning of the sentences used in the speech acts).
itself (and often remains hidden even from the logician) because the truth claim
raised by the speaker is universaUst—that is, precisely of such a nature that, although
it is raised i n a particular situation, it could be defended at any time against anyone's 81. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic subtheories,
doubts. that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory of elementary sentences
(and that of intentional expressions) can make its specific contribution to the theory
of meaning. I n Austin's choice of the terms " m e a n i n g " and "force," the descriptivist
72. S. Kanngiesser, "Aspekte zur Semantik u n d Pragmatik," Linguistische Berichte 24
prejudice continues to resonate; it is a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of
(1973): 1-28, here p. 5.
date since Wittgenstein at the latest, if not since Humboldt, according to which the
theory of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can claim
73. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 337ff.
a monopoly on the theory of meaning. ( O f course, this prejudice also keeps refer-
ence semantics alive.)
74. Cf. the schema in note 2 above.
75. I . Dornbach, "Primatenkommunikation" MS., (1975). O n the relatively early 82. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 132.
differentiation of different types of speech acts in the linguistic development of the
child, see the pioneering dissertation of M. Miller, "Die Logik der frûhen Spra¬ 83. Ibid., pp. 147-148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64ff.
chentwicklung" (University of Frankfurt, 1975).
84. Austin, "Performative Utterances," p. 248.
76. I n a letter to me, G. Grewendorf cites the following counterexample: signing a
contract, petition, and so forth, while simultaneously objectifying the corresponding 85. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144.
illocutionary act. But only the following alternative seems possible: either the con-
tract signing is carried out, in such a way that it has legal force, with the help of a 86. Ibid., pp. 145ff. Cf. also Austin, "Performative-Constative," p. 31:
performative utterance—in which case there is no objectification—or the nonverbal
contract signing is accompanied by a statement: " S signs contract x"—in which case T o begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance is not
it is a question of two independent illocutionary acts carried out parallel to one unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in all sincerity,
that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all criticism. It may always
another (in such a way that there is, normally, a division of roles: the statesman signs,
be criticized in a different dimension. L e t us suppose that I say to you " I advise
the reporter reports the signing).
you to do it;" and let us allow that all the circumstances are appropriate, the
conditions for success are fulfilled. I n saying that, I actually do advise you to do
77. C o h e n , "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?," p. 587.
102 103
Chapter 1 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?
i t — i t is not that I state, truely or falsely, thatl advise you. It is, then, a performative 95. D. Holdcroft ignores this distinction, "Performatives and Statements," Mind 83
utterance. T h e r e does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good (1974): 1-18, and thus comes to the false conclusion that only the speech acts that
or bad? Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your we call institutionally bound are subject to conventional regulations in the sense of
interest; but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? O r the sentence: " A sentence type is a performative if and only if its literal and serious
again—though perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out, utterance can consütute the performance of an act which is done in accordance with
in your interest? T h e r e is confrontation of my utterance with the situation i n , and a convention, which convention is not merely a grammatical or semantical one."
the situation in respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but
was I right? 96. I n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (see Grundlagen, p. 350), his conditions
B 4-6 make up the content of the obligations.
87. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144-145.
97. H . Delius, " Z u m Wahrheitscharakter egologischer Aussagen," in Brockman and
88. Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen," pp. l l f f . Hofer, eds., Die Wirklichkeit des Unverständlichen ( T h e Hague, 1974), pp. 38-77.
92. [Added i n 1983:] I n casually mentioning this restriction, I was unaware of the
problems connected with i t What I took at the time to be trivial is in fact in need of
careful justification: the thesis that the use of language oriented toward reaching
understanding represents the original mode of language use. Cf. chapter 2 i n the
present volume, pp. 122ff.
94. O n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.) the general con-
textual conditions would be as follows:
(A) S makes it understood in a conventional manner that (that is, S should give the
advice only if these conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they
obtain):
d. H is in a position to do a.
I f w e f o l l o w W e b e r ' s s t u d i e s i n t h e s o c i o l o g y o f r e l i g i o n , i t is a n
e m p i r i c a l — a n d thus to begin w i t h an o p e n — q u e s t i o n why all three
rationality complexes differentiated o u t after the disintegradon o f
t r a d i t i o n a l w o r l d v i e w s have n o t f o u n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l embodiment
t o a n e q u a l e x t e n t i n t h e o r d e r s o f l i f e o f m o d e r n societies, a n d w h y
they d o n o t d e t e r m i n e the c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life
e a c h t o t h e same d e g r e e . T h r o u g h h i s basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a s s u m p -
tions, h o w e v e r , W e b e r p r e j u d i c e d t h i s q u e s t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t
processes o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n c o u l d c o m e i n t o v i e w o n l y f r o m
the standpoint o f purposive rationality. I w o u l d like, therefore, to
discuss t h e c o n c e p t u a l b o t d e n e c k s i n h i s t h e o r y o f a c t i o n a n d t o use
t h i s c r i t i q u e as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y z i n g f u r t h e r t h e c o n c e p t
of communicative action.
u n d e r t h i s title ( t h e r e s u l t s o f w h i c h I h a v e d r a w n u p o n e l s e w h e r e ) 2
b y n o m e a n s r e p r e s e n t a u n i f i e d a p p r o a c h . W h a t t h e y d o have i n
c o m m o n is t h e m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis a n d a r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w
f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m . A n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y is f r u i t f u l for
c l a r i f y i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y . H o w e v e r , i t is l i m i t e d
to the atomistic m o d e l o f action by a n isolated actor a n d neglects
the mechanisms for coordinating action t h r o u g h which interper-
sonal relations c o m e about. I t conceptualizes action o n the o n t o l o g i -
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f e x a c t l y o n e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s
106 107
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n
a n d n e g l e c t s t h o s e a c t o r - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s t h a t are essential t o s o c i a l I n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e i d e a t h a t
i n t e r a c t i o n . As actions are r e d u c e d t o purposive i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a symbolic expression X c a n be traced
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n s stands i n t h e b a c k t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f s p e a k e r S t o give h e a r e r H
f o r e g r o u n d . F i n a l l y , a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y u n d e r s t a n d s its task t o b e t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y m e a n s o f a s i g n . I n t h i s way, a d e r i v a t i v e
a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s ; i t is n o t c o n c e r n e d m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o w h i c h s p e a k e r s c a n have r e -
w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l usefulness o f basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c assumptions c o u r s e i f t h e d i r e c t r o a d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is
a n d t h u s is scarcely c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n i n t h e social o b s t r u c t e d , is s t y l i z e d i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e o f r e a c h i n g under-
sciences. I t g e n e r a t e s a set o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t are too s t a n d i n g . T h e a t t e m p t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s t o base t h e m e a n -
unspecific f o r the purposes o f social theory. i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n X o n w h a t S m e a n s (mdnt) b y X, o r
O n the field o f a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y , e m p i r i c i s m is r e p e a t i n g i n d i r e c t l y gives t o u n d e r s t a n d b y X, m i s c a r r i e s . F o r a h e a r e r to
batdes l o n g since f o u g h t . O n c e again t h e r e are debates c o n c e r n i n g u n d e r s t a n d w h a t S m e a n s b y X — t h a t is, t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) of
t h e r e l a t i o n o f m i n d a n d b o d y ( i d e a l i s m versus m a t e r i a l i s m ) , c o n - X — a n d f o r h i m t o b e a w a r e o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is p u r s u i n g i n
c e r n i n g r e a s o n s a n d causes ( f r e e w i l l versus d e t e r m i n i s m ) , c o n c e r n - u s i n g X — t h a t is, t h e p u r p o s e t h a t S w a n t s t o a c c o m p l i s h w i t h h e r
ing behavior and action (objectivistic versus nonobjectivistic a c t i o n — a r e t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . S w i l l o n l y t h e n have c a r r i e d o u t
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a c t i o n ) , c o n c e r n i n g t h e l o g i c a l status o f e x p l a n a t i o n s successfully her intention of inducing i n H a meaning-intention
o f a c t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g causality, i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d so o n . T o p u t t h e (Bedeutungsintention) i f H r e c o g n i z e s S"s i n t e n t i o n t o communicate
m a t t e r i n a p o i n t e d way: a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y t r e a t s t h e v e n e r a b l e w i t h h i m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s what S m e a n t (gemeint hat) i n c a r r y i n g o u t
p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r e - K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness i n a n e w h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n . H, i f h e k n o w s o n l y t h e communica-
p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h o u t p u s h i n g t h r o u g h t o t h e basic q u e s t i o n s of a tive i n t e n t i o n o f S, w i l l n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t Smeans (mdnt), t h a t is,
sociological t h e o r y o f action. that concerning which she w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h i m . 9
t o s t u d i e s b y G r i c e , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d b y L e w i s , a n d l a t e r was
5 6
H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e use o f signs: t h e c o g n i t i v e
w o r k e d o u t by S c h i f f e r 7
and Bennett. This nominalistic theory of
8
f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f
m e a n i n g is n o t s u i t a b l e f o r c l a r i f y i n g t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g mechanism m a k i n g k n o w n s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f t h e speaker, a n d
o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n b e c a u s e i t analyzes t h e a c t o f t h e a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f d i r e c t i n g r e q u e s t s t o addressees. F r o m
reaching understanding according to a m o d e l o f action o r i e n t e d t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e l i n g u i s t i c s i g n f u n c t i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as s y m -
t o w a r d consequences. b o l , s y m p t o m , a n d s i g n a l . " I t is a symbol i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g c o r r e l a t e d
108 109
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
L i n k i n g u p w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i s t t h e o r y o f signs i n t r o d u c e d b y l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s .
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
r o l e as t h e c o m p o n e n t t h a t specifies which v a l i d i t y c l a i m a s p e a k e r is
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f these i n t e r m e d i a t e r e f l e c t i o n s , I c a n a t
r a i s i n g w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , how she is r a i s i n g i t , a n d f o r what.
best h o p e t o m a k e this p r o g r a m plausible. S t a r t i n g f r o m two versions
W i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f a n utterance, a speaker can m o t i - o f W e b e r ' s a c t i o n t h e o r y , I w o u l d l i k e first t o m a k e c l e a r t h e c e n t r a l
vate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n h e r s p e e c h a c t a n d i m p o r t a n c e o f the p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. F o l l o w i n g this,
t h e r e b y t o e n t e r i n t o a rationally motivated binding and bonding rela- I shall t r y to make Austin's distinction between illocutionary a n d
tionship (Bindung). This conception presupposes that acting and p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r u i t f u l f o r d e m a r c a t i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
s p e a k i n g subjects c a n r e l a t e t o m o r e t h a n o n l y o n e w o r l d , a n d t h a t r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. O n
113
112
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . S i n c e W e b e r starts f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d m o d e l o f ac-
t i o n , h e is u n a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f " s o c i a l a c t i o n " b y w a y
T w o Versions of Weber's T h e o r y o f Action o f a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g . I n s t e a d , h e has to
e x p a n d t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y w i t h t w o f u r t h e r specifica-
W e b e r i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e s " m e a n i n g " (Sinn) as a basic c o n c e p t o f t i o n s so t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n a r e satisfied: (a) a n
a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d , w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h i s c a t e g o r y , d i s t i n g u i s h e s ac- o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r a c t i n g subjects, a n d ( b ) a
t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r : "We s h a l l speak o f ' a c t i o n ' i n s o f a r r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n o t h e r o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f several
as t h e a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l a t t a c h e s a s u b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t o h i s b e h a v - i n t e r a c t i n g subjects. T o be s u r e , W e b e r v a c i l l a t e s as t o w h e t h e r h e
i o r — b e i t overt o r covert, omission o r acquiescence." 20
Weber does s h o u l d r e g a r d c o n d i t i o n (a) as s u f f i c i e n t f o r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n o r
n o t rely here o n a theory of m e a n i n g b u t o n an intentional theory s h o u l d also r e q u i r e ( b ) . I n s e c t i o n 1 o f Economy and Society h e says
o f consciousness. H e does n o t elucidate " m e a n i n g " i n connection m e r e l y : " A c t i o n is ' s o c i a l ' i n s o f a r as its s u b j e c t i v e meaning takes
w i t h the m o d e l o f linguistic m e a n i n g s a n d does n o t relate i t to the a c c o u n t o f t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r s a n d is t h e r e b y o r i e n t e d i n its
linguistic m e d i u m o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t to the course." 2 3
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n s e c t i o n 3 W e b e r stresses t h a t t h e
beliefs a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f a n a c t i n g subject, w h o is p r e s e n t e d in a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t o b e reciprocally r e l a t e d t o
i s o l a t i o n t o b e g i n w i t h . A t t h i s first s w i t c h p o i n t , W e b e r p a r t s c o m - o n e a n o t h e r : " T h e t e r m 'social r e l a t i o n s h i p ' w i l l be used t o d e n o t e
p a n y w i t h a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . W h a t c o u n t s as f u n d a - t h e b e h a v i o r o f a p l u r a l i t y o f a c t o r s i n s o f a r as, i n its m e a n i n g f u l
mental is n o t the interpersonal relation between a t least two c o n t e n t , t h e a c t i o n o f e a c h takes a c c o u n t o f t h a t o f t h e o t h e r s a n d
speaking a n d a c t i n g subjects—a r e l a t i o n t h a t refers back to l i n g u i s t i c is o r i e n t e d i n t h e s e t e r m s . " 2 4
Weber distinguishes between p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l , v a l u e - r a t i o n a l , af- Types of action in Subjective meaning covers these elements:
f e c t u a l , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h i s t y p o l o g y is b a s e d o n c a t e g o r i e s descending order
of rationality Means Ends Values Consequences
o f a c t i o n goals t o w a r d w h i c h a n actor can o r i e n t herself i n her
purposive activity: u t i l i t a r i a n , value-related, a n d affectual goals. T h e n Purposive-rational + + + +
" t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n " f o l l o w s as a r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y t h a t is, t o begin Value-rational + + + -
w i t h , n o t f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n e d . T h i s t y p o l o g y is o b v i o u s l y g u i d e d b y
Affectual + + - -
Traditional + - - -
a n i n t e r e s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e d e g r e e s t o w h i c h a c t i o n is r a t i o n -
a l i z a b l e . H e r e , W e b e r d o e s n o t s t a r t f r o m t h e social r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e
r e g a r d s as r a t i o n a l i z a b l e o n l y t h e m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n o f ideologi-
r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ; i n a f f e c t u a l a c t i o n , t h i s is t r u e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s
cally conceived, m o n o l o g i c a l action. I f one adopts this perspective,
a n d t h e values; i n a c t i o n t h a t is m e r e l y h a b i t u a l i z e d , o f t h e e n d s as
t h e o n l y aspects o f a c t i o n o p e n t o o b j e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l are t h e effective-
well (table 2.1).
ness o f a causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a n e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e truth
O f course, Weber can a c c o m m o d a t e "value-rational" action i n this
o f the e m p i r i c a l statements t h a t u n d e r l y the m a x i m or the p l a n o f
c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y by attaching to i t a restrictive m e a n i n g . T h i s type
a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f a b o u t a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l o r -
can i n c l u d e o n l y action o r i e n t a t i o n s o f a n ethics o f c o n v i c t i o n and
g a n i z a t i o n o f m e a n s . T h u s W e b e r c h o o s e s p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l (zweck-
n o t o f a n ethics o f responsibility. Moreover, i t does n o t take i n t o
rationat) a c t i o n as t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r h i s t y p o l o g y :
a c c o u n t t h e p r i n c i p l e d c h a r a c t e r o n t h e basis o f w h i c h t h e P r o t e s -
Social action, like all action, may be o r i e n t e d i n f o u r ways. I t may be: (1) t a n t e t h i c , f o r e x a m p l e , q u a l i f i e s as a f r a m e w o r k f o r a m e t h o d i c a l
instrumentally rational [zweckrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by expectations as c o n d u c t o f life. T h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l structures o f consciousness t h a t
to the behavior o f objects i n the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o f other h u m a n beings; W e b e r finds i n e t h i c a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d w o r l d v i e w s c a n n o t , o n a n a l y t i c
these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the a t t a i n m e n t
grounds a l o n e , b e i n c l u d e d i n a n a c t i o n t y p o l o g y t h a t rests o n a
o f the actor's own rationally pursued a n d calculated ends; (2) value-rational
(wertrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by a conscious belief i n the value f o r its c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f nonsocial a c t i o n s ; f o r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is r e l a t e d
o w n sake o f some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other f o r m o f behavior, t o t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n o f interpersonal c o n f l i c t s o f a c t i o n .
i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its prospects o f success; (3) affectual (especially emotional),
that is, d e t e r m i n e d by the actor's specific affects a n d feeling states; (4) T h e Unofficial Version
traditional, that is, d e t e r m i n e d by i n g r a i n e d h a b i t u a t i o n . 25
Schluchter, 2 6
this typology can be r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance w i t h o f s o c i a l a c t i o n , h e e n c o u n t e r s a d d i t i o n a l aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y
W e b e r , t h e r a n g e o f w h a t t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h e e r f a c t i c i t y o f a n e c o n o m i c o r d e r f r o m t h e social v a l i d i t y o f a l e g a l
Table 2.2
actions secured, to begin w i t h , merely t h r o u g h a c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f
An alternative typology of action
interests can be superimposed n o r m a t i v e l y by the a d d i t i o n o f "valid-
ity-based a g r e e m e n t , " t h a t is, b y " d e f e r e n c e t o c o n v e n t i o n o r l e g a l Degree of rationality of action
norms." 2 7
W e b e r elucidates this i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the development Coordination Low High
o f t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " c u s t o m " (Sitte) t o "convention":
Through interest positions De facto customary Strategic action.
" I t is b y way o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s t h a t m e r e l y f a c t u a l r e g u l a r i t i e s o f action (Sitte) ( Interessenhandeln)
a c t i o n , i.e., usages, are f r e q u e n d y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o b i n d i n g n o r m s , Through normative agreement Conventional action Postconventional action
g u a r a n t e e d p r i m a r i l y by psychological coercion." 2 8 based on agreement based on agreement
( Gemeinschaftshandeln) ( Gesellschaftshandeln)
I n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n complementarity of interests exists n o t o n l y i n
t h e f o r m o f c u s t o m — t h a t is, o f d u l l , i n s e n s i b l e h a b i t u a t i o n — b u t also
at t h e level o f r a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e behavior, f o r e x a m p l e i n m o d e r n meinschaftshandeln) n o t t h r o u g h the purposive-rational action orien-
c o m m e r c e , i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s have f o r m e d a clear consciousness tations o f the participants, b u t t h r o u g h the higher, postconventional
o f t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y as w e l l as o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t stage o f m o r a l - p r a t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . B e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t d o t h i s , a
p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n normative consen- specific c o n c e p t o f v a l u e - r a t i o n a l i t y c a n n o t g a i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e for
sus d o e s n o t o n l y take t h e f o r m o f t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d , c o n v e n t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t i t w o u l d have t o b e a c c o r d e d i f t h e e t h i c a l r a t i o n -
a c t i o n ; t h u s , t h e m o d e r n l e g a l system is d e p e n d e n t o n a n e n l i g h t - a l i z a t i o n t h a t W e b e r e x a m i n e d a t t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s is t o
e n e d belief i n legitimacy, w h i c h r a t i o n a l n a t u r a l l a w — w i t h the idea b e g r a s p e d i n t e r m s o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r systems o f social a c t i o n .
o f a basic c o n t r a c t a m o n g f r e e a n d e q u a l s — t r a c e s b a c k t o p r o c e - W e b e r was n o t a b l e t o m a k e his u n o f f i c i a l typology o f action
d u r e s o f r a t i o n a l w i l l - f o r m a t i o n . I f o n e p u r s u e s these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , f r u i t f u l f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . T h e official ver-
t h e n i t m a k e s sense t o c o n s t r u e types o f social a c t i o n (a) according s i o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is so n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d t h a t w i t h i n its
to the k i n d of coordination involved, and (b) according to the f r a m e w o r k social a c t i o n c a n b e assessed o n l y u n d e r t h e aspect o f
d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (see t a b l e 2 . 2 ) . purposive rationality. F r o m this conceptual perspective, the r a t i o n -
T h e r e a r e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t i n g s u c h a t y p o l o g y i n Economy a l i z a t i o n o f a c t i o n systems has t o b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t
and Society, 29
t h e r e is r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g e v i d e n c e f o r i t i n t h e essay a n d d i f f u s i o n o f types o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s p e c i f i c t o subsys-
"Some Categories o f Interpretive S o c i o l o g y . " 1 shall n o t pursue this
3 0
t e m s . I f processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a r e t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d in
h e r e , h o w e v e r , because W e b e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y c a r r y t h r o u g h , a t t h e their entire breadth, o t h e r a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s are r e q u i r e d .
level o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s themselves, the interesting distinc- I w o u l d like therefore to take u p o n c e again the concept o f c o m -
tion between social r e l a t i o n s m e d i a t e d by interest positions and municative action e x p o u n d e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n 3 1
a n d , by d r a w i n g
those m e d i a t e d by n o r m a t i v e agreement. ( I shall r e m e d y this b e l o w upon speech-act theory, to a n c h o r i n its c o n c e p t u a l foundations
i n t h e s e c t i o n b e g i n n i n g o n p a g e 119.) M o r e s e r i o u s is t h e f a c t t h a t t h o s e r a t i o n a l i z a b l e aspects o f a c t i o n n e g l e c t e d i n W e b e r ' s o f f i c i a l
w h i l e W e b e r does distinguish between t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d a n d r a t i o n a l a c t i o n t h e o r y . I n t h i s way, I h o p e t o c a p t u r e i n a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c t e r m s
a g r e e m e n t , h e e x p l a i n s t h i s r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t i n a d e q u a t e l y , as w e t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t W e b e r d i d e m p l o y i n his
have seen above, u s i n g t h e m o d e l o f a r r a n g e m e n t s a m o n g subjects c u l t u r a l analyses. I s h a l l b e s t a r t i n g f r o m a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n
o f p r i v a t e law. A t a n y r a t e , h e d o e s n o t t r a c e i t b a c k t o t h e m o r a l - that relies o n t h e u n o f f i c i a l version o f Weber's a c t i o n t h e o r y insofar
practical foundations of discursive will-formation. Otherwise it as social a c t i o n s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o t w o a c t i o n o r i e n t a -
would have b e c o m e clear at this p o i n t that action in society tions, corresponding to the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f action t h r o u g h interest
(Gesellschaftshandeln) is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c t i o n i n c o m m u n i t y (Ge- positions and t h r o u g h normative agreement (see t a b l e 2.3).
118
119
Chapter 2
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Table 2.3
Types of action t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n is a n essential c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e
accomplishments required for communicative action.
Action orientation
Oriented toward Oriented toward reaching Orientation toward Success versus Orientation toward Reaching
Action situation success understanding
Understanding
Nonsocial Instrumental action —
Social Strategic action Communicative action I n i d e n t i f y i n g s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as types, I
a m assuming that concrete actions can be classified f r o m these
p o i n t s o f view. I use t h e t e r m s " s t r a t e g i c " a n d " c o m m u n i c a t i v e " n o t
T h e m o d e l o f purposive-rational a c t i o n takes as its p o i n t o f d e p a r -
m e r e l y t o d e s i g n a t e t w o a n a l y t i c aspects u n d e r w h i c h o n e a n d t h e
t u r e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e a c t o r is p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a t t a i n i n g a n
same a c t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d — o n t h e o n e h a n d , as a r e c i p r o c a l
e n d ( w h i c h has b e e n r e n d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e i n t e r m s o f p u r -
i n f l u e n c i n g o f o n e a n o t h e r by agents a c t i n g i n a purposive-rational
p o s e s ) , t h a t h e selects m e a n s t h a t s e e m t o h i m a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e
m a n n e r a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
given situation, and that he calculates other forseeable conse-
s t a n d i n g a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a l i f e w o r l d . Rather, social actions c a n
q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n as s e c o n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f success. Success is
be distinguished according to w h e t h e r the participants adopt either
d e f i n e d as t h e o c c u r r e n c e i n t h e w o r l d o f a d e s i r e d state, w h i c h c a n ,
a success-oriented a t t i t u d e or one o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , be causally e f f e c t e d b y g o a l - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n o r
s t a n d i n g . A n d , u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s , these attitudes s h o u l d be
o m i s s i o n . T h e effects o f a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r c o m p r i s e t h e results o f
i d e n t i f i a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f the partici-
a c t i o n ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e set p u r p o s e has b e e n a c h i e v e d ) , the
p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s . T o b e g i n w i t h , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f
consequences o f action ( w h i c h t h e actor foresaw a n d i n t e n d e d , o r
t h e t w o a t t i t u d e s is r e q u i r e d .
m a d e a l l o w a n c e f o r ) , a n d t h e side-effects ( w h i c h t h e a c t o r d i d n o t
W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c t i o n t h e o r y , c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f t h e
f o r e s e e ) . W e c a l l a n a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success instrumentalwhen
t w o a t t i t u d e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l task. I t is n o t
we c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r the aspect o f f o l l o w i n g t e c h n i c a l r u l e s o f a c t i o n
m y a i m to characterize behavioral dispositions empirically, b u t to
a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a c o m p l e x
g r a s p g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
o f circumstances a n d events. W e call an action o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
f r o m w h i c h conditions f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n can be derived that may be
success strategic w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r t h e aspect o f f o l l o w i n g
characterized formally. To e x p l a i n w h a t I m e a n by "an attitude o r i -
r u l e s o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f its
e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " I have t o analyze t h e c o n -
i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f a r a t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t i n action. I n s t r u -
cept o f "reaching understanding" (Verständigung). T h i s is n o t a
m e n t a l actions can be c o n n e c t e d w i t h social i n t e r a c t i o n s ; strategic
q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s a n o b s e r v e r uses w h e n d e s c r i b i n g p r o c -
a c t i o n s a r e themselves s o c i a l a c t i o n s . B y c o n t r a s t , I s h a l l s p e a k o f
esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t o f t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l -
communicative action, whenever the plans o f action o f the actors
edge of competent speakers, who can themselves distinguish
involved are c o o r d i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h egocentric calculations of
intuitively situations i n w h i c h they are e x e r t i n g a n i n f l u e n c e upon
success b u t t h r o u g h acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o m m u n i c a -
others f r o m those i n w h i c h they are c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
tive a c t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e i r o w n
with t h e m , a n d w h o f u r t h e r k n o w w h e n t h e i r a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g
i n d i v i d u a l successes; t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l goals o n c o n d i t i o n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g f a i l . I f w e w e r e a b l e t o specify e x p l i c i t l y t h e s t a n d a r d s
t h a t t h e y c a n h a r m o n i z e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f c o m -
o n w h i c h t h e speakers i m p l i c i t l y base t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s , we w o u l d b e
m o n situation definitions. To this extent the negotiation o f d e f i n i -
i n a position to explain the concept o f reaching understanding.
120 121
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
c a r r y i n g o u t a s p e e c h act she b r i n g s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d .
T h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts has
T h u s , t h e t h r e e acts t h a t A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s c a n b e characterized
g i v e n rise t o a n e x t e n d e d c o n t r o v e r s y . 35
F r o m i t have e m e r g e d f o u r
w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g phrases: t o say something; t o act by s a y i n g s o m e -
criteria o f demarcation.
t h i n g ; t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g through a c t i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g .
a. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m a speaker pursues w i t h an utterance
A u s t i n makes his conceptual incisions i n such a way t h a t the
f o l l o w s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g — c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r s p e e c h a c t s — o f w h a t is
s p e e c h a c t (Mp), composed of an illocutionary and a prepositional
s a i d i t s e l f ; s p e e c h acts a r e , i n t h i s sense, s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g . W i t h t h e
3 6
component, is p r e s e n t e d as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t act t h a t t h e s p e a k e r
h e l p o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, a s p e a k e r lets i t b e k n o w n t h a t she w a n t s
always p e r f o r m s w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t , t h a t is, w i t h t h e a i m
w h a t she says t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a g r e e t i n g , c o m m a n d , w a r n i n g ,
t h a t a hearer may u n d e r s t a n d a n d accept his u t t e r a n c e . 3 3
T h e self-
e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . H e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t does n o t go
s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e s p e e c h a c t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense t h a t
beyond w a n t i n g the hearer to understand the manifest content of
the c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e speaker a n d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m
t h e s p e e c h act. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a speaker, l i k e
h e is p u r s u i n g f o l l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . I t
t h e e n d s p u r s u e d w i t h g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , does n o t f o l -
is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s . W e i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e a n -
124 125
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
o u t t h i s s p e e c h act. I n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , as i n ( 3 ) a n d
c. F r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , A u s t i n c o n c l u d e d t h a t i l l o c u -
( 4 ) b e l o w , k i n d s o f success a r e i n c l u d e d t h a t g o b e y o n d t h e m e a n i n g
t i o n a r y success s t a n d s i n a conventionally r e g u l a t e d o r internal c o n n e c -
o f w h a t is s a i d a n d t h u s b e y o n d w h a t a n addressee c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d
t i o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects r e m a i n
directly.
e x t e r n a l t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . T h e p o s s i b l e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
(1) 5 a s s e r t e d t o / / t h a t she gave n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . effects o f a s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d o n f o r t u i t o u s c o n t e x t s a n d , u n l i k e t h e
success o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a r e n o t fixed by c o n v e n t i o n s . 3 9
Of
S w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
course, o n e m i g h t use (4) as a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . O n l y i f t h e a d -
s e n t e d b y ( 1 ) i f H u n d e r s t a n d s h e r a s s e r t i o n a n d a c c e p t s i t as t r u e .
dressee takes t h e w a r n i n g s e r i o u s l y is u n e a s e a p l a u s i b l e r e a c t i o n ,
T h e same h o l d s f o r
a n d o n l y i f she d o e s n o t t a k e i t s e r i o u s l y is a f e e l i n g o f reassurance
(2) / / w a r n e d S n o t to give n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m . p l a u s i b l e . I n s o m e cases, t h e m e a n i n g c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e a c t i o n
p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e f o r m e d e x c l u d e c e r t a i n
H w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -
classes o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. N o n e t h e l e s s , these effects are c o n -
s e n t e d b y ( 2 ) i f S u n d e r s t a n d s h i s w a r n i n g a n d accepts i t as t r u e o r
n e c t e d w i t h s p e e c h acts n o t m e r e l y i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way. W h e n a
r i g h t — d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t i t has m o r e t h e
h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n a s s e r t i o n b y S as t r u e , a c o m m a n d as r i g h t , a n
sense o f a p r o g n o s i s o r o f a m o r a l a p p e a l . I n a n y case, a c c e p t i n g t h e
a d m i s s i o n as t r u t h f u l , h e t h e r e w i t h i m p l i c i d y d e c l a r e s h i m s e l f r e a d y
u t t e r a n c e described i n (2) provides g r o u n d s f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n
to b i n d his f u r t h e r action to c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l obligations. By
a c e r t a i n way o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a d d r e s s e e a n d f o r c o r r e s p o n d i n g
contrast, t h e f e e l i n g o f unease w h i c h a f r i e n d arouses i n S w i t h a
e x p e c t a t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e speaker. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e ex-
w a r n i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r takes s e r i o u s l y is a state t h a t m a y o r m a y n o t
p e c t e d s e q u e l o f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y c o m e s t o pass has n o e f f e c t o n t h e
ensue.
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e speaker. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , S d o e s n o t give
d. S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t e d S t r a w s o n t o r e p l a c e t h e
n o t i c e , t h i s is n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r i l y a c h i e v e d e f f e c t b u t t h e c o n s e -
criterion of conventionality with another criterion of demarcation. 4 0
s t a n d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t w h e n these a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic
t h r o u g h b e i n g expressed. E l o c u t i o n s are expressed openly; p e r l o c u -
interactions. W h a t we m e a n by r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d an
tions m a y n o t b e " a d m i t t e d " as s u c h . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n also b e s e e n
a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , has t o b e c l a r i f i e d
i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e
solely i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. A n a t t e m p t a t r e a c h i n g
d e s c r i b e d ( t o give a f r i g h t t o , t o cause u n e a s e , t o p l u n g e i n t o d o u b t ,
u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t a k e n w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s p e e c h act succeeds
to p u t someone i n a bad m o o d , to mislead, to offend, to infuriate,
w h e n a s p e a k e r achieves h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n A u s t i n ' s sense.
t o h u m i l i a t e , a n d so f o r t h ) c a n n o t a p p e a r a m o n g t h o s e predicates
F r o m t h i s i t also f o l l o w s t h a t w e c a n n o t e x p l a i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success
used t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h
i n t e r m s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p u r p o s i v e l y a c h i e v e d success o f a
c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d . P e r l o c u t i o n -
teleological a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims are d i f f e r e n t f r o m those p u -
a r y acts c o n s t i t u t e t h a t subclass o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s t h a t c a n be
poses t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d under the description o f s o m e t h i n g t o b e
c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e a g e n t
brought about i n the world.
d o e s n o t d e c l a r e o r a d m i t t o h e r a i m s as s u c h .
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects, l i k e t h e successful r e s u l t s o f teleological
W h e r e a s t h e sense o f t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n -
a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as states i n t h e w o r l d b r o u g h t
a r y acts is t o separate t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e m o d e o f
a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r l d . By contrast, i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s p e e c h acts as a n a l y t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t aspects, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
successes a r e a c h i e v e d at t h e level o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations on
t h e s e t w o types o f acts, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts,
which participants i n communication c o m e to an understanding
o n t h e o t h e r , is b y n o m e a n s a n a l y t i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y
w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h i s sense, t h e y
effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n l y i f t h e l a t t e r
a r e n o t i n n e r w o r l d l y , b u t e x t r a m u n d a n e . A t m o s t , successful i l l o c u -
a r e incorporated as means i n t o t e l e o l o g i c a l , s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n s .
tionary acts o c c u r w i t h i n t h e l i f e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n
P e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts are a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f s p e e c h
communication belong and that forms the background for their
acts i n t o c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y a r e p a r t o f t h e i n -
processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y c a n n o t b e i n t e n d e d u n -
t e n d e d sequel o f a c t i o n o r o f t h e results o f a teleological a c t i o n t h a t
d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f causally p r o d u c e d effects. T h i s m o d e l o f ac-
an actor undertakes w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f i n f l u e n c i n g a hearer i n a
tion oriented toward reaching understanding, which I develop
c e r t a i n w a y w i t h t h e h e l p o f successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. T o b e s u r e ,
b e l o w , is o b s c u r e d r a t h e r t h a n i l l u m i n a t e d b y A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n
s p e e c h acts c a n serve t h i s nonillocutionary aim of influencing hearers
between illocutions and perlocutions.
o n l y i f they are suited to achieving i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims. I f t h e h e a r e r
f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e s p e a k e r was s a y i n g , a ideologically F r o m the f o r e g o i n g i t appears that we can conceive perlocutions
a c t i n g , success-oriented speaker w o u l d n o t be able to b r i n g the as a s p e c i a l class o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n s a r e
h e a r e r , b y m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, t o b e h a v e i n t h e d e s i r e d employed as m e a n s i n t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n . A s S t r a w s o n
way. T o t h i s e x t e n t , w h a t w e i n i t i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d as " t h e use o f l a n - has shown, this employment is s u b j e c t to certain provisos. A
g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " is n o t a n o r i g i n a l i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g s p e a k e r has t o a c h i e v e h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m —
use o f l a n g u a g e b u t t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t h a t serve i l l o - t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d a n d e n t e r i n t o t h e o b l i g a -
c u t i o n a r y a i m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. tions c o n n e c t e d w i t h the acceptance o f the offer contained i n the
speech a c t — w i t h o u t b e t r a y i n g his p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m . T h i s proviso
A s s p e e c h acts b y n o m e a n s always f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r ,
lends to perlocutions the peculiarly asymmetrical character of
i t m u s t also b e p o s s i b l e t o c l a r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u -
c o n c e a l e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n s . T h e s e are i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least
n i c a t i o n w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e activity. T h e
one o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y , w h i l e h e deceives
t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t o r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success is n o t c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r
o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is not satisfying t h e
the successful a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of processes o f reaching under-
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
gives t h e c o m m a n d t o a t t a c k i n o r d e r t o g e t h i s t r o o p s t o r u s h i n t o
a trap, o r w h e n he proposes a bet o f $3,000 i n o r d e r to embarrass
M e a n i n g a n d Validity
s o m e o n e , o r w h e n h e tells a s t o r y late i n t h e e v e n i n g i n o r d e r to
d e l a y a guest's d e p a r t u r e , a n d so o n . I t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n
O n t h e basis o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d
c o m m u n i c a t i v e action u n i n t e n d e d consequences may o c c u r at any
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t w h i l e s p e e c h acts
time; b u t as s o o n as t h e r e is a d a n g e r t h a t t h e s e w i l l b e a t t r i b u t e d t o
c a n i n d e e d b e e m p l o y e d strategically, t h e y h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n -
t h e s p e a k e r as i n t e n d e d effects, t h e l a t t e r f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r
i n g o n l y f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
explanations a n d denials, a n d i f n e e d be, apologies, i n o r d e r to
strategic a c t i o n by t h e fact t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s unreservedly pursue
d i s p e l t h e false i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e s e side effects a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y
i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n o r d e r to arrive at an agreement that provides
effects. O t h e r w i s e , h e has t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l
t h e basis f o r a c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l l y p u r s u e d p l a n s
130 131
o f action. I n w h a t follows I w o u l d like to explicate the conditions d i r e c d y f r o m t h e social validity o f n o r m s (as i t is i n t h e case o f
t h a t have t o b e satisfied b y a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d agreement i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts) n o r o w e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y a v a i l -
t h a t is t o f u l f i l l t h i s f u n c t i o n o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . I n d o i n g so, I a b l e r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s (as i t is i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e
s h a l l t a k e as m y m o d e l e l e m e n t a r y p a i r s o f u t t e r a n c e s , e a c h o f w h i c h expressions o f will)? F r o m the perspective o f a hearer to w h o m a n
consists o f t h e s p e e c h a c t o f a s p e a k e r a n d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e u t t e r a n c e is a d d r e s s e d , w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels o f r e a c t i o n t o
o f a hearer. Consider the f o l l o w i n g examples: 4 2 a ( c o r r e c d y p e r c e i v e d ) s p e e c h act: t h e h e a r e r understands t h e u t t e r -
a n c e , t h a t is, h e grasps t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d ; w i t h h i s "yes" o r
(1) I (hereby) promise y o u that I shall come a r o u n d t o m o r r o w . " n o " t h e h e a r e r takes a position o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h
act, t h a t is, h e a c c e p t s o r rejects t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r ; a n d i n c o n s e -
(2) You are requested to stop s m o k i n g .
quence o f an achieved agreement, t h e h e a r e r d i r e c t s his a c t i o n
(3) I confess t o y o u t h a t I find y o u r a c t i o n s loathsome. a c c o r d i n g t o conventionally fixed obligations to act in a certain way. T h e
pragmatic l e v e l o f t h e a g r e e m e n t e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n c o n n e c t s
(4) I can predict (to you) that the vacation w i l l be spoiled by
t h e semantic l e v e l o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n i n g w i t h t h e empirical l e v e l
rain.
of further developing—in a manner dependent o n the context—the
W e c a n r e c o g n i z e i n e a c h case w h a t a n a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e w o u l d a c c o r d relevant to t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . H o w this connection
m e a n a n d w h a t k i n d o f i n t e r a c t i o n sequel i t w o u l d g r o u n d . comes a b o u t can be e x p l a i n e d by means o f the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ;
admittedly, for this purpose, the formal-semantic approach limited
(1') Yes, I s h a l l d e p e n d o n i t .
t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e n t e n c e s has t o b e expanded. 4 3
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r m a y a c c e p t i t . We u t t e r a n c e t h a t S is a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t h i m t o p e r f o r m a n a c t i o n a. 4 7
p o s i t i o n o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t
(5a) S t o l d H t h a t h e s h o u l d t a k e c a r e t o see t h a t "p" c o m e s t o
be satisfied one-sidedly, e i t h e r relative to the speaker o r to the
pass.
h e a r e r . T h e y a r e r a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e intersubjective recognition o f
a l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , w h i c h , i n a w a y t y p i c a l o f a g i v e n class o f s p e e c h (5b) S s i g n i f i e d t o / / t h a t h e s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
acts, g r o u n d s a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i e d content concerning
obligations relevant for the sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . (5c) T h e request (demand) u t t e r e d b y S is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n
t h e sense t h a t / / s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."
F r o m the standpoint o f a sociological t h e o r y o f action, m y p r i m a r y
interest m u s t be to m a k e clear t h e m e c h a n i s m relevant to the coor- H e r e "p" d e s i g n a t e s a state i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t , r e l a t i v e t o t h e
d i n a t i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s p e e c h acts. T o t h i s e n d I s h a l l c o n c e n - time o f t h e u t t e r a n c e , lies i n t h e f u t u r e a n d t h a t , o t h e r conditions
trate o n t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r is m o t i v a t e d t o r e m a i n i n g constant, can come i n t o existence t h r o u g h an i n t e r v e n -
a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n a s p e e c h act, a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e l i n g u i s - t i o n o r o m i s s i o n b y t h e a d d r e s s e e — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e state o f n o t
tic expressions e m p l o y e d are g r a m m a t i c a l l y w e l l f o r m e d a n d t h a t t h e s m o k i n g that H brings about by p u t t i n g o u t his l i t cigarette.
g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s typical f o r a given type o f speech act A h e a r e r accepts t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) by r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o
are satisfied. 44
A hearer understands the meaning o f an utterance
it with:
w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n to grammatical conditions o f well-formedness and
general contextual conditions, 4 5
h e k n o w s t h o s e essential conditions (5') Yes, I s h a l l d o w h a t is r e q u e s t e d o f m e .
u n d e r w h i c h he c o u l d be m o t i v a t e d by a speaker t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e
I f we restrict ourselves t o c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability i n the n a r r o w e r
response. 4 6
T h e s e acceptability conditions in the narrower sense r e l a t e t o
sense, t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h H a c c e p t s ( 5 ) f a l l i n t o t w o c o m -
t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e t h a t S i n t h e s t a n d a r d case
ponents.
expresses w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r e d i c a t e .
a. T h e h e a r e r s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g of
B u t l e t us l o o k first a t a g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t i m p e r a t i v e sen- i m p e r a t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t h e c o u l d p a r a p h r a s e t h i s m e a n i n g
t e n c e , f o r m u l a t e d as a n i m p e r a t i v e u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t u a l w i t h sentences l i k e (5a), ( 5 b ) , o r (5c) a n d c o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e p r o -
conditions: p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t o s t o p s m o k i n g " as a n i m p e r a t i v e d i r e c t e d t o
h i m . I n fact, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) i f he k n o w s
(5) I (hereby) request y o u to stop s m o k i n g .
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h "p" w o u l d o c c u r a n d i f h e k n o w s w h a t
I m p e r a t i v e s are o f t e n u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y h e h i m s e l f w o u l d have t o d o o r n o t t o d o i n t h e g i v e n circumstances
acts, as a t t e m p t s b y a n a c t o r S t o g e t i f t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . i n o r d e r t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s be satisfied. As o n e m u s t k n o w t h e
O n t h i s view, S p e r f o r m s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e o n l y w h e n she t r u t h conditions of a proposition i n order to understand i t , one
connects with her utterance the i n t e n t i o n that H infer f r o m the
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Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Validity C l a i m s I n t h e f i r s t case, w h a t is c o n t e s t e d is t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e p r o f e s s o r
is r i g h t i n t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; i n t h e s e c o n d , t h a t t h e
Having distinguished communicative actions f r o m all o t h e r social p r o f e s s o r m e a n s w h a t she says b e c a u s e she w a n t s t o a c h i e v e a c e r t a i n
actions t h r o u g h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect, i t p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect; i n t h e t h i r d , p r o p o s i t i o n s are contested whose
m a k e s sense t o o r d e r t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts a c c o r d - t r u t h t h e p r o f e s s o r has t o p r e s u p p o s e i n t h e g i v e n circumstances.
i n g t o types o f s p e e c h acts. A n d t o g u i d e o u r classifying o f s p e e c h W h a t we have s h o w n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h this e x a m p l e holds t r u e
acts w e m a y use t h e o p t i o n s o p e n t o a h e a r e r o f t a k i n g a r a t i o n a l l y f o r all s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o n -
m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker. I n texts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , s p e e c h acts c a n always b e rejected
o u r previous examples, we have assumed t h a t the speaker raises u n d e r each o f t h r e e aspects: t h e a s p e c t o f t h e l i g h t n e s s t h a t t h e
precisely one validity c l a i m w i t h h e r utterance. W i t h the p r o m i s e (1), speaker claims f o r h e r action i n r e l a t i o n to a n o r m a t i v e context (or,
she c o n n e c t s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n ; w i t h t h e d i r e c - i n d i r e c t l y , f o r these n o r m s themselves); t h e aspect o f t h e t r u t h f u l -
tive ( 2 ) , a validity c l a i m f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e ; w i t h t h e avowal ( 3 ) , a ness t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i -
validity claim for the expression o f a feeling; a n d w i t h the p r e d i c t i o n ences t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d f i n a l l y , t h e aspect o f
(4), a validity claim for a statement. Correspondingly, w i t h a "no" t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker, w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , c l a i m s f o r a s t a t e m e n t
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
s i o n as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
and let M c d e s i g n a t e t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , M e the expres- the claims to truthfulness, propositional t r u t h , a n d normative Tight-
sive, a n d M r t h e r e g u l a t i v e . W e c a n t h e n , o n t h e basis o f t h e a f o r e - ness, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d . T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f these c l a i m s brings
m e n t i o n e d basic a t t i t u d e s , d i s t i n g u i s h i n t u i t i v e l y t h e senses i n w h i c h about an agreement between S a n d H that grounds obligations that
t h e speaker wants the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r speech act t o are relevant f o r t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m these
b e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t y p e M p, c "p" s i g n i f i e s a the w a r r a n t y assumed by the speaker to r e d e e m t h e validity c l a i m he
state o f a f f a i r s t h a t exists i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; i n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e raises, as w e l l as t h e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r t a k e s
o f t h e t y p e M p, e "p" s i g n i f i e s a s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is m a n i - w i t h the negation o f a validity claim.
f e s t e d a n d a s c r i b e d t o t h e internal world o f t h e speaker; a n d i n a v a l i d
u t t e r a n c e o f t h e type M p, "p" s i g n i f i e s a n a c t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d R e s e r v a t i o n s have b e e n e x p r e s s e d m a i n l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e a s s u m p -
r
as l e g i t i m a t e i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d . t i o n s (a) t h a t w i t h every s p e e c h a c t o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g exactly three v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are r a i s e d ; ( b ) t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y
146 147
acts, t o o , have a r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h .
b. R e s e r v a t i o n s have also b e e n e x p r e s s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o s -
Moreover, this holds n o t only for propositionally differentiated sibility o f sharply d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between claims to t r u t h a n d claims
s p e e c h acts; i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h a c t s — f o r e x a m p l e , a t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . Is i t n o t t h e case t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o t r u t h f u l l y u t t e r s
" h e l l o " u t t e r e d as a g r e e t i n g — a r e u n d e r s t o o d as s a t i s f y i n g n o r m s t h e o p i n i o n "p" m u s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p"? I t
f r o m w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e speech act c a n be a p p e a r s t o b e i m p o s s i b l e " t o e x p e c t o f S t h a t h e is s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h
s u p p l e m e n t e d — f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e case o f a g r e e t i n g , t h e w e l l - b e i n g i n a n y o t h e r sense t h a n t h a t S w a n t s t o s p e a k t h e t r u t h — a n d t h i s
o f t h e addressee o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s social status. T h e e x i s - m e a n s n o t h i n g else t h a n t o b e t r u t h f u l . " 5 9
This objection is n o t
tential presuppositions o f a greeting include, a m o n g other things, r e l e v a n t t o t h e class o f expressive s p e e c h acts i n its e n t i r e t y b u t o n l y
t h e presence o f a person f o r w h o m t h i n g s can go w e l l o r badly, his to those utterances i n whose p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t a c o g n i t i o n
m e m b e r s h i p i n a social g r o u p , a n d so f o r t h . verb i n the first person present ( s u c h as I t h i n k , k n o w , believe,
149
148
Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2
like
as w i t h a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t :
(10+) I t is r a i n i n g n o w , b u t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t i t is r a i n i n g n o w . 6 0
(13) H e is i n p a i n .
t i o n s , t h a t a t m o s t t h e y derive t h e t r u t h c l a i m a s c r i b e d t o t h e m f r o m
c. W i t h t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n t h e t h i r d
t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g assertoric s e n t e n c e s i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n ; f o r o n l y
g r o u p o f o b j e c t i o n s , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c
t h e l a t t e r c a n represent t h e state o f a f f a i r s t o w h o s e e x i s t e n c e t h e t r u t h
approach t o t h e analysis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e s e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ,
c l a i m refers. T h u s T u g e n d h a t falls i n t o t h e d i l e m m a o f h a v i n g to
f o l l o w i n g t h e m o d e l o f l e g a l c l a i m s , have t o d o w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e -
characterize i n a c o n t r a d i c t o r y way w h a t a speaker means w i t h expe-
tween persons a n d are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n .
riential s e n t e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o b e a m a t t e r
T h e y are raised f o r t h e validity o f symbolic expressions, i n the stan-
o f k n o w l e d g e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f
d a r d case f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t have
t h a t is d e p e n d e n t on an illocutionary component. I t thus makes
t h e status o f a c o g n i t i o n , f o r c o g n i t i o n s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y i n
sense t o r e g a r d a v a l i d i t y c l a i m as a c o m p l e x a n d d e r i v a t i v e p h e -
a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e c o n t e s t e d as u n t r u e . B u t
nomenon that can be traced back to t h e u n d e r l y i n g phenomenon
t h i s d i l e m m a arises o n l y i f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s — w h i c h
o f t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sentences. B u t
is analagous t o t r u t h — i s identified with t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h e d i -
t h e n s h o u l d we n o t l o o k f o r these c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e semantic level
l e m m a dissolves as s o o n as o n e shifts f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c to the
o f a n a l y z i n g assertoric, e x p e r i e n t i a l , i m p e r a t i v e , a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen-
p r a g m a t i c l e v e l a n d c o m p a r e s s p e e c h acts r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s .
tences, r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f t h e e m p l o y m e n t of
Consider
s u c h s e n t e n c e s i n c o n s t a t i v e , expressive, a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts?
Is n o t p r e c i s e l y a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h h o p e s t o e x p l a i n t h e
(15) I have t o confess ( t o y o u ) t h a t I ' v e b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.
i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect t h r o u g h a w a r r a n t y o f f e r e d
(16) I c a n r e p o r t ( t o y o u ) t h a t h e ' s b e e n i n p a i n f o r days. b y t h e s p e a k e r f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t she says, a n d t h r o u g h a
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Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
semantics. D
I t is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s e n t e n c e t h a t w e are c a p a b l e of
D u m m e t t starts f r o m t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t
r e c o g n i z i n g grounds t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e claim t h a t its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s
a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e has t o satisfy t o b e t r u e a n d t h e knowledge
a r e s a t i s f i e d could be redeemed. T h u s , t h i s t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g
t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o asserts t h e s e n t e n c e as t r u e has o f t h e s e t r u t h
o f a s e n t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f its
c o n d i t i o n s — c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a t t h e same t i m e d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n -
v a l i d i t y , b u t d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g g r o u n d s t h a t are objectively
i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e . K n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s consists i n know-
available to a speaker f o r r e d e e m i n g a t r u t h c l a i m .
ing how one ascertains w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e satisfied i n a g i v e n case.
N o w a speaker m i g h t still p r o d u c e such g r o u n d s a c c o r d i n g to a
T h e o r t h o d o x version o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, w h i c h tries t o
p r o c e d u r e t h a t can be a p p l i e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y ; t h e n even an explana-
e x p l a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f k n o w -
tion o f t r u t h conditions i n terms o f g r o u n d i n g a t r u t h claim w o u l d
i n g its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , is b a s e d o n t h e u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t
n o t m a k e i t necessary t o m o v e f r o m t h e semantic level o f sentences
f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r e v e r y assertoric s e n t e n c e , p r o c e -
to t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f u s i n g sentences communicatively. D u m m e t t
d u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t its t r u t h
stresses, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is b y n o m e a n s a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e
c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n rests t a c i d y o n a n e m p i r i c i s t
the r e q u i r e d verifications i n a deductively c o m p e l l i n g m a n n e r on
t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t ascribes a f u n d a m e n t a l status t o t h e s i m p l e
t h e basis o f r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e . T h e set o f g r o u n d s available i n a n y
p r e d i c a t i v e sentences o f a n o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e . B u t n o t e v e n t h e
g i v e n i n s t a n c e is c i r c u m s c r i b e d b y i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f a u n i v e r s e o f
a r g u m e n t a t i o n game t h a t T u g e n d h a t postulates f o r v e r i f y i n g such
linguistic structures that can be surveyed only argumentatively. D u m -
s e e m i n g l y e l e m e n t a r y s e n t e n c e s consists i n a d e c i s i o n procedure
m e t t p u r s u e s t h i s i d e a so f a r t h a t i n t h e e n d h e gives u p e n t i r e l y t h e
t h a t c o u l d b e a p p l i e d l i k e a n a l g o r i t h m , t h a t is, i n s u c h a w a y t h a t
basic i d e a o f v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m .
f u r t h e r d e m a n d s for g r o u n d i n g are e x c l u d e d in principle. 6 6
I t is
e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n t h e case o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , u n i v e r s a l e x i s t e n t i a l
A verificationist t h e o r y comes as close as any plausible t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g
sentences, a n d sentences w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x — i n g e n e r a l , any can do to e x p l a i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f the grounds o n
s e n t e n c e s r e f e r r i n g t o p l a c e s a n d t i m e s t h a t are a c t u a l l y inaccessi- w h i c h i t may be asserted; i t must o f course distinguish a speaker's actual
b l e — t h a t effective d e c i s i o n p r o c e d u r e s a r e l a c k i n g . ' T h e difficulty grounds, w h i c h may n o t be conclusive, or may be i n d i r e c t , from the k i n d
154 155
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
r e s i g n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e r e is o v e r l a p n o t o n l y w i t h v e r d i c t i v e s
( s u c h as n a m i n g a n d a w a r d i n g ) b u t also w i t h b e h a b i t i v e s ( s u c h as
O n the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f S p e e c h A c t s
p r o t e s t i n g ) . T h e s e b e h a b i t i v e s i n t u r n f o r m a class t h a t is p r e t t y
h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n c o m p o s i t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o verbs f o r standardized
I f o u r thesis h o l d s t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d e x p r e s s i o n s o f f e e l i n g ( s u c h as c o m p l a i n t s a n d c o m m i s e r a t i o n s ) , i t
r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be contested u n d e r precisely t h r e e u n i - contains expressions f o r institutionally b o u n d utterances ( c o n g r a t u -
v e r s a l aspects, w e m i g h t c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a system o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s l a t i o n s , curses, toasts, e x p r e s s i o n s o f w e l c o m e ) as w e l l as e x p r e s s i o n s
also u n d e r l i e s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f types o f s p e e c h acts. I f so, t h e f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n s ( a p o l o g i e s , t h a n k s , a l l sorts o f m a k i n g g o o d ) . F i n a l l y ,
u n i v e r s a l i t y thesis w o u l d also h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a t t e m p t s t o class- t h e class o f e x p o s i t i v e s d o e s n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n constatives,
ify s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view. T h u s f a r I h a v e t a c i d y
156 157
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
a b d i c a t i n g , d e c l a r i n g war, a n d g i v i n g n o t i c e ; b u t t h e i r n o r m a t i v e
Indicators that relate to general dimensions o f the speech situ-
m e a n i n g is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f c o m m a n d s a n d d i r e c t i v e s . T h e last class
a t i o n a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r a p r a g m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts.
c o m p r i s e s expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e s e a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e i r a i m —
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e temporal dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r
namely, that w i t h t h e m , t h e speaker sincerely brings to expression
p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e o r i e n t e d m o r e t o w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t h e past, o r t h e
h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s . B u t S e a r l e is u n c e r t a i n i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n
p r e s e n t , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t e m p o r a l l y n e u t r a l . W i t h
o f t h i s c r i t e r i o n ; t h u s , t h e e x e m p l a r y cases o f avowals, disclosures,
r e g a r d t o t h e social dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o b l i -
a n d r e v e l a t i o n s are m i s s i n g . A p o l o g i e s a n d e x p r e s s i o n s o f j o y a n d
g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f o r t h e speaker,
s y m p a t h y a r e m e n t i o n e d . E v i d e n d y , Searle has a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e
t h e h e a r e r , o r f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . A n d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e dimension of
l e d astray b y A u s t i n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f b e h a b i t i v e s a n d has t a c k e d
objectivity (die sachliche Dimension) t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e
o n t o t h i s class i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts l i k e c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s
t h e m a t i c e m p h a s i s lies m o r e o n t h e o b j e c t s , t h e a c t i o n s , o r t h e a c t o r s
a n d g r e e t i n g s as w e l l .
t h e m s e l v e s . K r e c k e l uses these i n d i c a t o r s t o p r o p o s e a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
158 159
Searle m a k e s t h e m o v e t o w a r d a theoretically motivated typology of Does the speaker commit himself Does the speaker try to make
to future action? the hearer do something?
speech acts b y g i v i n g a n o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n -
Future
ary intentions a n d the p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes that a speaker pursues Examples: promising, refusing, Examples: advising, challenging,
o r a d o p t s w h e n she p e r f o r m s assertive ( c o n s t a t i v e ) , d i r e c t i v e , c o m - giving in ordering
missive, declarative, a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts. I n d o i n g so, he Source: M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared Knowledge in Natural Discourse (London,
d r a w s u p o n t h e f a m i l i a r m o d e l t h a t d e f i n e s t h e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y 1981), p. 188.
o f e x i s t i n g states o f affairs, sets u p t h e s p e a k e r / a c t o r as a n a u t h o r i t y
outside o f this w o r l d , a n d allows f o r precisely two linguistically m e -
w h e r e b y C stands f o r c o g n i t i o n s o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes of
diated relations between actor a n d w o r l d : the cognitive relation o f
t h i n k i n g , b e i n g o f t h e o p i n i o n , b e l i e v i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d I stands
a s c e r t a i n i n g facts, a n d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r e l a t i o n o f r e a l i z i n g a g o a l
for intentions or the propositional attitudes o f wanting, wishing,
o f a c t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n t i o n s may t h e n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n
i n t e n d i n g , a n d t h e l i k e . T h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t S raises a
t e r m s o f t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts a r e s u p p o s e d t o
truth claim for vis-à-vis H; t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r t h e
b e b r o u g h t i n t o a c c o r d . T h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g d o w n w a r d s (-1) says t h a t
a g r e e m e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e facts (-1); t h e i m p e r a -
t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e s u p p o s e d t o f i t t h e facts; t h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g u p -
tive f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t 5 raises a p o w e r c l a i m vis-à-vis / / f o r s e e i n g t o
w a r d s (T) says t h a t t h e facts a r e t o b e f i t t e d t o t h e s e n t e n c e s . T h u s ,
it that " / / b r i n g s about t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r h a v i n g
t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e imperative
t h e facts b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e (Î).
f o r c e o f d i r e c t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r as f o l l o w s :
I n d e s c r i b i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces by means o f the r e l a t i o n between
l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d , Searle has r e c o u r s e t o c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e
Constative h ^C(p)
v a l i d i t y o f a s s e r t o r i c a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . H e finds h i s t h e o r e t i -
Directive! tl(H b r i n g s a b o u t p) c a l s t a n d p o i n t f o r classifying s p e e c h acts i n t h e dimension of validity.
161
160
S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Chapter 2
linguistically mediated relations between a solitary actor a n d the one o f fit. I n p r o d u c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts, a s p e a k e r d o e s n o t at a l l r e f e r
o b j e c t i v e w o r l d has n o p l a c e f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; r a t h e r h e acts i n a c c o r d a n c e
t a l r o l e o f s e r v i n g as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a n d t h e
communicative n e g o t i a t i o n o f topics gains i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d be-
c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . I s h a l l speak o f " c o n v e r s a -
tion" whenever t h e w e i g h t is s h i f t e d i n t h i s way f r o m purposive
V
ja'
a c t i v i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; a r g u m e n t a t i o n is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m - O
3
CO
p o r t a n t special case o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . A s i n t e r e s t i n t h e t o p i c s n e g o -
tiated is p r e d o m i n a n t h e r e , w e c o u l d p e r h a p s say t h a t constative S
S
'u
s p e e c h acts have c o n s t i t u t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r conversations.
a
T h u s o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts c a n serve t o i n t r o d u c e t h r e e '•B •3 •5
a a
1
bJO
p r a c t i c e s . F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g c o n t r i b u -
bo 3
S
'D it
C fa
•s 53 c a
t i o n s t o t h e analysis o f stories a n d t e x t s , 7 9
f r o m sociology c o n t r i b u - .a fcr-3 V
sive basic a t t i t u d e s , w e a d m i t a n o v e r a r c h i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e strategic elements within a use of language oriented toward reaching under-
t o take a c c o u n t o f the fact t h a t w i t h every speech act p a r t i c i p a n t s i n standing can nonetheless be distinguished from strategic actions
c o m m u n i c a t i o n relate simultaneously to s o m e t h i n g i n the objective, t h r o u g h the fact that the entire sequence o f a segment o f speech
s o c i a l , a n d subjective w o r l d s . 8 5
168 169
stands—on the part o f all participants—under the presuppositions explanation of phenomena that are i d e n t i f i e d initially o n l y o n t h e
o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . basis o f a n i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a t u r e d b y c l i n i c a l e x p e r i e n c e .
b. A n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t d i d n o t e n s u r e f o r i t s e l f a f o r m a l - S u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n p a t h o l o g i e s c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f as t h e r e s u l t
p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e w o u l d n o t have a t its d i s p o s a l the of a confusion between actions o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching under-
c o n c e p t u a l i n s t r u m e n t s n e e d e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h e r a t i o n a l bases o f s t a n d i n g a n d a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. I n s i t u a t i o n s o f l a t e n t
linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e c o n f u s i n g c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e every- s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i e s b e h a v e s w i t h a n o r i e n t a -
d a y scenes o b s e r v e d . I t is o n l y i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s tion t o w a r d success, b u t leaves o t h e r s t o b e l i e v e t h a t a l l t h e p r e s u p -
t h a t we can secure f o r ourselves a n idea o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a r e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is t h e case o f
t h a t c a n g u i d e e m p i r i c a l analysis i n t o c h a l l e n g i n g problems—such m a n i p u l a t i o n that we m e n t i o n e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h perlocutionary
as t h e l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t levels o f society, t h e acts. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e k i n d o f u n c o n s c i o u s d e a l i n g w i t h c o n f l i c t s t h a t
manifestations o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n pathologies, or the development psychoanalysis explains i n terms o f defense mechanisms leads t o
of a decentered understanding of the world. disturbances o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n b o t h the intrapsychic a n d inter-
t i o n a l l y confusing modalities o f existence. For the clarification o f the can be seen below.
mechanisms o f d e c e p t i o n t h a t a s p e a k e r has t o m a s t e r i n o r d e r t o
Social actions
do this, f o r m a l pragmatics can c o n t r i b u t e m o r e t h a n even the most
precise e m p i r i c a l description o f the p h e n o m e n a to be explained.
W i t h t r a i n i n g i n t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, t h e g r o w i n g c h i l d
gains t h e ability to demarcate by h i m s e l f the subjectivity o f his o w n Communicative action Strategic a c t i o n
experiences f r o m the objectivity o f o b j e c t i f i e d reality, f r o m t h e n o r -
m a t i v i t y o f society, a n d f r o m t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e m e d i u m o f
language. I n l e a r n i n g to deal hypothedcally w i t h the corresponding
L a t e n t strategic M a n i f e s t strategic
validity claims, he practices d r a w i n g t h e categorial d i s t i n c t i o n s be-
action action
tween essence a n d a p p e a r a n c e , e x i s t e n c e a n d i l l u s i o n , "is" a n d
" o u g h t , " sign a n d m e a n i n g . W i t h these m o d a l i t i e s o f b e i n g , he h i m -
s e l f gets a g r i p o n t h e d e c e p t i v e p h e n o m e n a that initially spring
f r o m t h e i n v o l u n t a r y c o n f u s i o n b e t w e e n his o w n subjectivity, o n t h e Unconscious Conscious
one h a n d , a n d the domains o f the objective, the n o r m a t i v e , a n d the deception deception
intersubjective, o n the other. H e n o w knows h o w one can master the (systematically (manipulation)
confusions, produce de-differentiations intentionally, and employ distorted
t h e m i n fiction, w i t , i r o n y , a n d t h e l i k e . 8 7
communication)
r e j e c t e d as d e c e p t i o n s o r s e l f - d e c e p t i o n s . S e l f - d e c e p t i o n s c a n b e d i s -
172 173
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
p e r t s is i n j e c t e d , l o o k s l i k e , a n d h o w e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a d v e prac- b u t h e d o e s d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f a n e x p r e s -
tices a c t u a l l y c h a n g e w i t h t h i s i n f l u x . T h e c o n c e p t o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d s i o n is r e l a t i v e t o a b a c k g r o u n d o f v a r i a b l e i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e t h a t
t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g has t h e a d d i t i o n a l — a n d q u i t e d i f f e r - p a r t i c i p a n t s n o r m a l l y r e g a r d as t r i v i a l a n d o b v i o u s .
ent—advantage o f t h r o w i n g l i g h t o n this b a c k g r o u n d o f i m p l i c i t T h e sense o f t h i s r e l a t i v i t y thesis is n o t t o r e d u c e t h e m e a n i n g o f
k n o w l e d g e t h a t e n t e r s a tergo i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e processes o f i n t e r p r e - a speech act to w h a t a speaker means by i t i n a c o n t i n g e n t context.
t a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n takes p l a c e w i t h i n a l i f e w o r l d t h a t Searle is n o t m a i n t a i n i n g a s i m p l e r e l a t i v i s m o f t h e m e a n i n g of
r e m a i n s a t t h e backs o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t is p r e s e n t linguistic expressions; f o r t h e i r m e a n i n g i n n o w a y c h a n g e s as w e
to t h e m o n l y i n the prereflective f o r m o f taken-for-granted back- pass f r o m o n e c o n t i n g e n t c o n t e x t t o t h e n e x t . R a t h e r , w e discover
g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d n a i v e l y m a s t e r e d skills. the relativity o f the literal m e a n i n g o f a n expression only t h r o u g h a
I f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f t h e last d e c a d e i n socio-, e t h n o - , a n d psy- s o r t o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n t h a t is n o t s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y u n d e r our
c h o l i n g u i s t i c s c o n v e r g e i n a n y o n e r e s p e c t , i t is o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n — c o n t r o l . I t e m e r g e s as a r e s u l t o f p r o b l e m s t h a t o c c u r o b j e c t i v e l y a n d
demonstrated i n various ways—that the collective background have a n u n s e t t l i n g effect o n o u r n a t u r a l w o r l d v i e w . T h i s f u n d a m e n -
k n o w l e d g e a n d c o n t e x t u a l k n o w l e d g e o f speakers a n d h e a r e r s d e t e r - tal b a c k g r o u n d knowledge, w h i c h m u s t tacidy supplement our
mines the interpretation o f their explicit utterances to an e x t r a o r d i - knowledge of the acceptability conditions of linguistically stan-
n a r i l y h i g h d e g r e e . Searle has t a k e n u p t h i s d o c t r i n e o f e m p i r i c a l dardized utterances i f hearers are to be able to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i r
p r a g m a t i c s . H e c r i t i c i z e s t h e l o n g - d o m i n a n t v i e w t h a t s e n t e n c e s ac- l i t e r a l m e a n i n g s , has r e m a r k a b l e f e a t u r e s : I t is a n implicit k n o w l e d g e
q u i r e literal meaning solely b y v i r t u e o f t h e r u l e s f o r u s i n g t h e e x p r e s - t h a t c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n a finite n u m b e r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s ; i t is
sions c o n t a i n e d i n t h e m . 8 9
So far, I t o o h a v e c o n s t r u e d t h e m e a n i n g a holistically structured k n o w l e d g e , t h e basic e l e m e n t s o f w h i c h d e f i n e
o f s p e e c h acts as l i t e r a l m e a n i n g i n t h i s sense. C e r t a i n l y , l i t e r a l o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d i t is a k n o w l e d g e t h a t does not stand at our disposal,
m e a n i n g c o u l d n o t be c o n c e i v e d a t a l l i n d e p e n d e n d y o f c o n t e x t u a l to the extent that we cannot make i t conscious a n d place i t i n d o u b t
c o n d i t i o n s ; f o r e a c h t y p e o f s p e e c h a c t t h e r e are general c o n t e x t u a l as w e p l e a s e . W h e n p h i l o s o p h e r s n e v e r t h e l e s s seek t o d o so, t h e n
c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e m e t i f t h e s p e a k e r is t o b e a b l e t o a c h i e v e that k n o w l e d g e appears i n the shape o f c o m m o n s e n s e certainties i n
i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. B u t these g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s are i n w h i c h M o o r e , for instance, took an i n t e r e s t , 9 0
a n d to w h i c h W i t t g e n -
t u r n s u p p o s e d t o be d e r i v a b l e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f t h e l i n - s t e i n r e f e r s i n h i s r e f l e c t i o n s On Certainty.
g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s e m p l o y e d i n t h e s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts. A s a m a t t e r
W i t t g e n s t e i n calls these c e r t a i n t i e s e l e m e n t s o f a w o r l d v i e w t h a t
o f f a c t , i f f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t o lose its o b j e c t , k n o w l e d g e of
a r e " a n c h o r e d i n a l l m y questions and answers, so a n c h o r e d t h a t I
t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a s p e e c h a c t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d
cannot touch [them}." 9 1
O n l y t h o s e b e l i e f s t h a t d o n o t fit s u c h
c a n n o t d e p e n d completely o n c o n t i n g e n t b a c k g r o u n d knowledge.
convictions—convictions t h a t are as b e y o n d q u e s t i o n as t h e y a r e
H o w e v e r , Searle has s h o w n — o n t h e basis o f s i m p l e a s s e r t i o n s s u c h f u n d a m e n t a l — a p p e a r t o be a b s u r d . " N o t t h a t I c o u l d d e s c r i b e the
as ' T h e c a t is o n t h e m a t " a n d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as " G i v e m e a system o f these c o n v i c t i o n s . Yet m y c o n v i c t i o n s d o f o r m a system, a n
h a m b u r g e r " — t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s edifice." 9 2
W i t t g e n s t e i n characterizes the dogmatism of everyday
o f t h e assertoric a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s e m p l o y e d t h e r e i n c a n n o t b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d skills i n a w a y s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h
be specified i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e c o n t e x t . O n c e we b e g i n to vary Schütz describes t h e m o d e o f taken-for-grantedness i n w h i c h t h e
relatively deep-seated a n d trivial b a c k g r o u n d assumptions, we n o t i c e l i f e w o r l d is p r e s e n t as a p r e r e f l e x i v e b a c k g r o u n d : ' T h e c h i l d l e a r n s
that the seemingly context-invariant validity conditions change their t o b e l i e v e a h o s t o f t h i n g s . I . e . , i t l e a r n s t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o these
m e a n i n g a n d are t h u s b y n o m e a n s a b s o l u t e . Searle d o e s n o t g o so b e l i e f s . B i t b y b i t t h e r e f o r m s a system o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d , a n d i n
f a r as t o d e n y t o s e n t e n c e s a n d u t t e r a n c e s a n y l i t e r a l m e a n i n g a t a l l ; t h a t system s o m e t h i n g s s t a n d u n s h a k a b l y fast a n d s o m e o r more
174 175
a r e less l i a b l e t o s h i f t . W h a t s t a n d s fast d o e s so, n o t b e c a u s e i t is T. Farrell, "Language Action. A Paradigm for Communication," Quarterly Journal of
Communication 62 (1976): 333-334.
i n t r i n s i c a l l y o b v i o u s o r c o n v i n c i n g ; i t is r a t h e r h e l d fast b y w h a t l i e s
around it." 9 3
4. J . H e a l , " C o m m o n Knowledge," Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1978): 116ff.; G. Meggle,
Literal meanings, t h e n , are relative to a deep-seated, implicit ed., Grundbegriffe der Kommunikation (Berlin, 1981).
knowledge, about which w e normally know n o t h i n g b e c a u s e i t is 5. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388. See also "Utterer's
simply u n p r o b l e m a t i c a n d does n o t reach i n t o the d o m a i n o f c o m - Meaning, Sentence-Meaning and Word-Meaning," a n d "Utterer's Meaning a n d I n -
tentions," both reprinted in H . P. Grice, Studies in the Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass.,
m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d . " I f t h e t r u e is w h a t
is g r o u n d e d , t h e n t h e g r o u n d is n o t t r u e , n o r y e t f a l s e . " 9 4
20. M. Weber, Economy and Society, G. Roth and C . Wittich, eds., 2 vols. (Berkeley, 41. Cf. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 in the present volume:
1978), p. 4. Hereafter cited as ES.
With institutionally bound speech acts, specific institutions can always be spe-
21. M. Weber, "Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology," Sociological Quarterly 22 cified. With institutionally unbound speech acts, only general contextual condi-
(1981): 151-180. tions . . . typically must be met for a corresponding act to succeed. . . . To explain
what acts of betting or christening mean, I must refer to the institutions of betting
22. H . Girndt, Das soziale Handeln als Grundkategorie der erfahrungswissenschaftlichen or christening. By contrast, commands or advice or questions do not represent
Soziologie (Tübingen, 1967). institutions but types of speech acts that can fit very different institutions. T o be
sure, the criterion of being institutionally bound does not always permit an
23. ES, p. 4. unambiguous classification. Commands can exist wherever relations of authority
are institutionalized; appointments presuppose special, bureaucratically devel-
oped organizations; and marriages require a single institution (which is, however,
24. ES, p. 26.
to be found universally). But this does not devalue the usefulness of the analytic
viewpoint. Institutionally unbound speech acts, insofar as they have any regulative
25. ES, pp. 24-25.
meaning at all, refer to general aspects of action norms; they are not, however,
defined by particular institutions (pp. 6 0 - 6 1 ) .
26. W. Schluchter, Die Entwicklung des okzidentalen Rationalismus (Tübingen, 1979),
p. 192.
42. Cf. D. Wunderlich, " Z u r Konventionalitat von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wun¬
27. £5, p. 327. derlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 16-17; Here, Wunderlich
also provides a linguistic characterization of speech acts in standard form.
28. £5, p. 326.
43. Even the use theory of meaning stemming from the later work of Wittgenstein—
29. ES, pp. 26-36; pp. 319-333. see W. P. Alston, The Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964); Ernst
Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. Gorner (Cambridge,
30. See note 21. 1982)—remains fixated on the solitary employment of sentences. Like Frege's theory
of meaning, it takes its orientation from the noncommunicative use of assertoric
31. [Editor's note:] Habermas's introduction to his Theory of Communicative Action, sentences in foro interno; it abstracts from the interpersonal relations between speak-
vol. 1. ers and hearers who reach understanding with one another about something i n the
world with the aid of communicative acts. Tugendhat justifies this self-limitation of
32. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962). semantics with the argument that the communicative use of language is constitutive
only for special linguistic expressions, in particular for the performative verbs and
33. I shall leave aside the development that speech-act theory underwent i n the for the speech acts formed with them; in the areas essential to semantics, however,
hands of Austin himself [see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," chapter 1 i n the language can be employed in a monological train of thought. T h e r e is in fact an
present volume] and take as my point of departure the interpretation that Searle has intuitively easily accessible distinction between thinking in propositions i n abstraction
given to this theory. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969); D . Wunderlich, from speaker-hearer relations and making interpersonal relations present in the
Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976). imagination. I n imagining stories in which the " I " — a s imagining subject—accords
itself a place in a context of interaction, the roles of participants in communication
34. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 101. in the first, second, and third person—however internalized—remain constitutive for
the sense of what is thought or represented. But solitary thinking in propositions is
35. B. Schieben-Lange, Linguistische Pragmatik (Stuttgart, 1975), pp. 86ff. also discursive i n more than a figurative sense. T h i s becomes evident as soon as the
validity, and thereby the assertoric force, of a proposition becomes problematic and
36. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior ( L o n d o n , 1965), pp. 287ff. the solitary thinker has to move from inferring to devising a n d weighing up hypothe-
ses. H e then finds it necessary to assume the argumentative roles of proponent and
37. M. Meyer, Formale und handlungstheoretische Sprachbetrachtungen (Stuttgart, 1976). opponent as a communicative relation in his thought—as the daydreamer takes up
the narrative structure of speaker-hearer relations when she recalls scenes from
38. M. Schwab, Redehandeln (Königstein, 1980), pp. 28ff. everyday life.
39. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 118. 44. If, for example, a promise were to take the form
40. P. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1+) I promise you that I was in H a m b u r g yesterday.
(1964): 439ff.
178 179
Chapter 2 S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
one of the conditions of grammatical well-formedness would be violated. By contrast, 58. F o r other objections of this kind, see J . T h o m p s o n , "Universal Pragmatics," in
if S uttered the correct sentence (1) in a situation in which it was presupposed that
J . T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., Habermas: Critical Debates ( L o n d o n , 1982), pp. 116-
H could count on a visit from 5 in any case, one of the contextual conditions typically
presupposed for promises would be violated.
59. Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," p. 102; K. G r a h a m , "Belief and the Limits
45. Contributions to speech-act theory from philosophy and linguistics are chiefly of Irrationality," Inquiry 17 (1974): 315ff.
concerned with analyzing these conditions. D. Wunderlich analyzes speech acts of
the type "advising," from the theoretical perspective developed by Searle, in Grund-
60. Searle refers to this argument in Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983), p. 9.
lagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), pp. 349ff.
61. E . Tugendhat, Self Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge,
46. R. Bartsch, too, speaks in this sense of "acceptability conditions" in contrast to Mass., 1986), lectures 5 and 6.
conditions of correctness or validity, in "Die Rolle von pragmatischen Korrekt-
heitsbedingungen bei der Interpretation von Äußerungen," in G . Grewendorf, ed., 62. L . Wittgenstein, Zettel, G . E . M. Anscombe and G . H . von Wright, eds. (Berkeley,
Sprechakttheorie und Semantik (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 217ff. 1970), § § 4 0 4 , 5 4 9 .
47. Surprisingly, Searle also comes close to this view of intentionalist semantics in 63. Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, p. 114.
Speech Acts, p. 66. Cf. Schiffer, Meaning.
64. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G . E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
48. Schwab, Redehandeln, p. 65. 1958), p. 222. Cf. S. Hampshire, Feeling and Expression ( L o n d o n , 1961); B. Aune, " O n
the Complexity of Avowals," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America (London, 1965),
49. I n the case of commands or directives, principally for the addressee; in the case pp. 35ff.; D. Gustafson, " T h e Natural Expression of Intention," Philosophical Forum 2
of promises or announcements, principally for the speaker; in the case of agreements (1971): 299ff., and, "Expressions of Intentions," Mind 83 (1974): 321ff.; N. R. Nor-
or contracts, symmetrically for both parties; in the case of advice (with a normative rick, "Expressive Illocutionary Acts," Journal of Pragmatics 2 (1978): 277ff.
content) or warnings, for both sides, but asymmetrically.
65. M. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans and J . McDowell, eds.,
50. O n these speech-act immanent obligations, see "What Is Universal Pragmatics?," Truth and Meaning (Oxford, 1976), pp. 67ff.
chapter 1 in the present volume, pp. 85ff.
66. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy.
51. See J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), pp. 31ff. 67. Dummett, "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," p. 81.
52. Because Schwab distinguishes neither between simple and normatively autho- 68. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
rized imperatives—that is, between imperative and c o m m a n d — n o r between
monologically and communicatively employed intentional sentences—that is, be- 69. Ibid., p. 126.
tween intentions and declarations of intention—he draws a mistaken parallel be-
tween imperatives and declarations of intention and distinguishes both from 70. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chaps. 8 and 9.
constative speech acts by virtue of the separation, and hierarchical ordering, of two
types of success: success in the sense of validity and success in the sense of satisfaction. 71. A convincing example of this is P. F. Strawson's analysis of the resentment called
Redehandeln, pp. 72-73, 74ff., 95ff. forth by moral violations, in Freedom and Resentment ( L o n d o n , 1974).
53. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1967): 254ff; cf. D. Folles- 72. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 150ff.
dal, "Comments o n Stenius's 'Mood and Language G a m e , ' " Synthese 17 (1967): 275ff.
73. O n e should not, however, make the requirements as strong as T. Ballmer does
54. A . Leist, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5 / 6 (1977): in "Probleme der Klassifikation von Sprechakten," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie
93. und Semantik, pp. 247ff.
55. Ibid., pp. 97-98. 74. J . Searle, " A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts," in Expression and Meaning pp. Iff.
56. Ibid., p. 109. 75. D. Wunderlich, "Skizze zu einer integrierten Theorie der grammatischen u n d
pragmatischen Bedeutung," in Studien zur Sprechakttheorie (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 51ff.,
57. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax "Was ist das für ein Sprechakt?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie und Semantik,
and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974), pp. 41ff.; A. P. Martinich, "Conversational pp. 275ff., "Aspekte einer Theorie der Sprechhandlungen," in H . Lenk, ed., Hand-
Maxims and Some Philosophical Problems," Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1980): 215ff. lungstheorien, vol. 3 (Munich, 1980), pp. 381ff.; B. G . Campbell, "Toward a Workable
180 181
Chapter 2 Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Taxonomy of Illocutionary Forces and Its Implication to Works of Imaginative Lit- reaching understanding can succeed only if each speaker undertakes a regulated—
erature," Language and Style 8 (1975): 3ff.; M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared that is, rationally controlled—transition from one attitude (be it objectivating, norm-
Knowledge in Natural Discourse ( L o n d o n , 1981). conformative, or expressive) to the others. S u c h transformations rely on intermodal
invariances of validity. T h i s area of the logic of speech acts has scarcely been studied.
76. O n e measure of the flexibility of a society is the share of the totality of available Why, for example, may we infer from the validity of an expressive speech act M p, e
illocutionary possibilities for linking up action that is made up by institutionally the validity of a corresponding speech act of the form Mcp? I f Peter truthfully
more-or-less bound, idiomatically fixed, ritualized speech acts. T h u s Wunderlich confesses to loving Frances, we feel entitled to accept as true the assertion that Peter
distinguishes speech acts according to whether they depend more o n action norms loves Frances. A n d if, conversely, the assertion that Peter loves Frances is true, we feel
or on action situations (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 86ff.). For this Campbell uses the entitled to accept as truthful Peter's confession that he loves Frances. This transition
dimensions "institutional vs. vernacular" and "positional vs. interactional" (Campbell, could be justified according to the rules of propositional logic only if we could
"Workable Taxonomy"). In this regard, the dimension "initiative vs. reactive" is also assimilate expressive to constative speech acts or (first person) experiential sentences
relevant (Wunderlich, "Skizze," pp. 59ff.). to assertoric sentences. Since we cannot, we have to look for formal-pragmatic rules
for the connections between such speech acts, which appear with the same proposi-
77. O n the speech acts that serve to organize speech, see E . Schegloff, G . Jefferson, tional content in different modes. Table 2.7 is meant merely to illustrate which
and H . Sacks, " A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of T u r n T a k i n g for transitions we intuitively regard as permissable (+) and which not ( - ) . These phe-
Conversation," Language 50 (1974): 696ff., which draws on the work of Harvey Sacks; nomena cannot be explained satisfactorily by the familiar modal logics. However, on
see also Wunderlich, Studien zur Sprechakttheorie, pp. 330ff. the constructivist approach to a pragmatic logic, see C . F. Gethmann, ed., Theorie des
wissenschaftlichen Argumentierens (Frankfurt, 1980), part 3, pp. 165-240; C. E Geth-
mann, Protologik (Frankfurt, 1979).
78. T h e thesis that S, with an illocutionary act, informs the hearer of the execution
of this act, or tells h i m that the act is being executed, could be applied most easily
to this class of speech acts. For a critique of this thesis (which has been advanced by 86. T h i s is the methodological meaning of Searle's "principle of expressibility"; cf.
L e m m o n , Hedenius, Wiggins, D . Lewis, Schiffer, Warnock, Cresswell, and others), Speech Acts, pp. 87-88. Compare T. Binkley, ' T h e Principle of Expressibility," Philoso-
see G . Grewendorf, "Haben explizit performative Äußerungen einen Wahrheit- phy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1979): 307ff.
swert?," in Grewendorf, ed., Sprechakttheorie, pp. 175ff. It is, of course, wrong to
assimilate operatives, which express the bringing about of constructive accomplish- 87. J . Habermas, "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der Ich-Abgren-
ments, to constative speech acts. With the former, the speaker connects a claim not zungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation, Interaktion,
to propositional truth but to constructive well-formedness or intelligibility. Identität (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 332ff., "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics,"
Theory and Society 3 (1976): 155-167. See also the empirical study by M. Auwärter and
79. W. Kummer, Grundlagen der Texttheorie (Hamburg, 1975); M. A. K. Halliday, System E . Kirsch, "Die konversationeile Generierung von Situationsdefinitionen im Spiel 4-
and Function in Language: Selected Papers (Oxford, 1976); K. Bach and R. M. H a n i s c h , bis 6-jähriger Kinder," i n W. Schulte, ed., Soziologie in der Gesellschaft (Bremen, 1981),
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, Mass., 1979). pp. 584ff.
80. 'M. Coulthard, An Introduction into Discourse Analysis ( L o n d o n , 1977); L . C h u r c h i l l , 88. J . M. Ruskin, " A n Evaluative Review of Family Interaction Research," Family Process
Questioning Strategies in Sodolinguistics (Rowley, Mass., 1978); J . Schenken, ed., Studies 11 (1972): 365ff. J . H . Weakland, ' T h e Double B i n d Theory: A Reflexive Hindsight,"
in the Organization of Conversational Interaction (New York, 1978); S. Jacobs, "Recent Family Process 13 (1974): 269ff.; S. S. Kety, " F r o m Rationalization to Reason," American
Advances in Discourse Analysis," Quarterly Journal of Speech 66 (1980): 450ff. Journal of Psychiatry 131 (1974): 957ff.; D . Reiss, ' T h e Family and Schizophrenia,"
American Journal of Psychiatry 133 (1976): 181ff.
81. D. Hymes, ed., Language in Culture and Society (New York, 1964) and "Models of
the Interactions of Language and Social L i f e , " in J . J . Gumperz and D. Hymes, eds.,
Directions in Sodolinguistics (New York, 1972), pp. 35ff.
Table 2.7
Intermodal transfer of validity between speech acts with the same propositional content
82. R. Rommetveit, On Message-Structure (New York, 1974).
To
83. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d tranzendentale Sprachpragmatik," in Apel,
ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, pp. lOff.; Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmat- Constative Expressive Regulative
ics?" speech speech acts speech acts
From acts (truth) (truthfulness) (lightness)
84. See the critical appraisal of the formal-pragmatic approaches of Allwood, Grice,
and myself i n Kreckel, Communicative Acts, pp. 14ff. Constative speech acts (truth) X + -
85. Classification into constative, regulative, and expressive speech acts means that
Expressive speech acts (truthfulness) + X
-X
in each case we attribute one dominant basic attitude to the speaker. I n allowing for
a performative attitude, we take account of the fact that complex processes of
Regulative speech acts (lightness)
- +
182
Chapter 2
3
89. J . Searle, "Literal meaning," in Expression and Meaning, pp. 117ff. See also R. D.
Van Valin, "Meaning and Interpretation," Journal of Pragmatics 4 (1980): 213ff. Communicative Rationality and the Theories of
90. G . E . Moore, "Proof of an External World," Proceedings of the British Academy Meaning and Action (1986)
( L o n d o n , 1939).
O n the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
n e i t h e r Saussure n o r C h o m s k y c o n c e i v e s o f d i a l o g u e (Gespräch ) as 3
w i t h o u t c o n f r o n t i n g h e r as s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y e x t e r n a l — a s is t h e
O f c o u r s e , H u m b o l d t is n o t a n e m p i r i c i s t w h o r o b b e d t h e p r o c e s s
case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h t h e c o n t i n g e n t i n f l u e n c e o f n a t u r e . The
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the rails o n w h i c h i t r u n s a n d a l l o w e d
s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e m a i n t a i n s a n d r e n e w s i t s e l f solely t h r o u g h t h e
the identity o f linguistic meanings to emanate f r o m the i n t e n t i o n s —
linguistic c o m m u n i t y ' s practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e l a n -
arbitrarily iterated a n d reciprocally superseding one another—of
g u a g e system m a k e s s p e e c h acts p o s s i b l e t h a t , i n t u r n , r e p r o d u c e t h e
i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l speakers. F o r h i m , t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a c o m -
l a n g u a g e a n d , i n so d o i n g , m a k e i n n o v a t i v e c h a n g e s i n i t , h o w e v e r
m o n p e r s p e c t i v e d o e s n o t dissolve, f o r e x a m p l e , i n t o a series of
i m p e r c e p t i b l e these m a y b e . 4
E v e r y t h i n g else d e p e n d s on which
isolated I-perspectives t h a t are r e f l e c t e d m e r e l y i n o n e another;
m o d e l H u m b o l d t adopts w h e n conceiving o f the m e d i a t i n g u n i t y o f
r a t h e r i t arises e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y (gleichursprunglich) with the inter-
t h e s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e a n d s p e e c h p r a c t i c e s . Is l a n g u a g e as a
subjective validity o f linguistic expressions t h a t are identical i n m e a n -
w h o l e a self-referential subject t h a t h o l d s t o g e t h e r t h e l i v i n g process
i n g . B u t H u m b o l d t is n o less adverse t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g l a n g u a g e as
o f l a n g u a g e b y m e a n s o f i t s s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s , o r is t h i s
a t o t a l i t y t h a t w o u l d have t o p r e j u d g e t h e i n i t i a t i v e s a n d "yes" o r " n o "
synthesis a c c o m p l i s h e d solely i n t h e f o r m s t a k e n b y t h e f r a c t u r e d
p o s i t i o n s o f a u t o n o m o u s a n d u n i q u e subjects t h r o u g h a p r e d e t e r -
intersubjectivity o f dialogue (Gespräch)? Humboldt did not com-
m i n e d — f a t e f u l , as i t w e r e — p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H u m b o l d t w a n t s t o
pletely r e l i n q u i s h the m o d e l o f t h e self-referentiality o f t h e active,
d o j u s t i c e t o b o t h aspects: first, to the at once unavoidable a n d
k n o w i n g s u b j e c t . H i s n o t i o n o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r g a n i s m c l e a r l y s t i l l
counterfactual supposition that, i n a given instance, all participants
b e a r s t h e R o m a n t i c t r a i t s o f l a n g u a g e as a n expressive w h o l e t h a t
use t h e same e x p r e s s i o n s i n a s e m a n t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l way, f o r w i t h o u t
e x t e r n a l i z e s its essential p o w e r s a n d assures i t s e l f o f its c r e a t i v e s u b -
this i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n they w o u l d n o t even be able to enter i n t o
j e c t i v i t y b y c o n t e m p l a t i n g these o b j e c t i v a t i o n s . H u m b o l d t ' s c o n c e p -
a d i a l o g u e ; a n d s e c o n d , t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers
tion o f language appears s i m p l y t o be a v a r i a t i o n o n Hegel's c o n c e p t
invariably deviate f r o m the standard m e a n i n g s o f the expressions
o f t h e c o n c r e t e u n i v e r s a l : l a n g u a g e as s u c h r e l a t e s t o t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y
u s e d a n d t h a t t h i s d i f f e r e n c e casts i t s s h a d o w o v e r e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
o f n a t i o n a l l a n g u a g e s , a n d these i n t u r n r e l a t e t o c o n c r e t e s p e e c h
achieved agreement.
acts as t h e m o m e n t s o f t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h e p a r t i c u l a r , a n d t h e i n d i v i d -
u a l i n t h e processual web o f relations o f an i n d i v i d u a l totality. I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t T a y l o r d o e s n o t p a y s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n t o
this d i f f e r e n c e . Certainly, " I " a n d "We" perspectives are supposed to
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , H u m b o l d t is not a b l e t o a r t i c u l a t e i n t h e s e c o m p l e m e n t one another; b u t i n Taylor's w o r k the latter ends u p
basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e i n s i g h t t h a t t a k i n g p r e c e d e n c e o v e r t h e f o r m e r . T a y l o r speaks o f t e m p o r a r y
was o f p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e t o h i m , b o t h as t h e l i b e r a l p h i l o s o - b r e a c h e s i n a p r o c e s s u a l l y s e c u r e d c o n s e n s u s , so t h a t t h e b r e a k s t h a t
p h e r o f a bourgeois individualism a n d i n his philosophy o f language. h a v e o c c u r r e d w o u l d have t o b e s e a l e d o v e r b y processes o f r e a c h i n g
F o r h e is c o n v i n c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . W e c a n d e t e c t signs o f t h e R o m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n of
l a n g u a g e i n t h i s view, f o r w h i c h t h e s y n t h e s i z i n g a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d
t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l i t y o f a l a n g u a g e is o n l y s u c h by c o m p a r i s o n , b u t t h a t its
t r u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y r e s i d e s o n l y i n t h e g i v e n s p e a k e r at a g i v e n t i m e . O n l y i n t h e u n i f y i n g p r o d u c t i v e activities o f a self-referentially o p e r a t i n g
186 187
c o n t a i n e d i n r a t i o n a l s p e e c h . H e r e , T a y l o r is t o o q u i c k t o i n t r o d u c e h i s t o r i e s arise a n d a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . T h e "I" is
p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics i n t o t h e debate. I n m y o p i n i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e r e b y f o r m e d e q u i p r i m o r d i a l l y as a s u b j e c t i n g e n e r a l , as a t y p i c a l
r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y its m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l c o m p o n e n t . Every- m e m b e r o f s o c i a l c o l l e c t i v e s , a n d as a u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l . T h e u n i v e r -
v a l i d i t y ; c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness c o n s t i t u t e o n l y o n e among w e r e , a n d n o l o n g e r as i n t e r l o c k i n g m o m e n t s w i t h i n a t o t a l i t y . T h i s
g u a g e . I n so d o i n g , h e s u c c u m b s t o a n e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! p e r s p e c t i v i s m h a v e b e e n l e d , t h r o u g h o v e r g e n e r a l i z i n g t h e s p e c i a l case o f a c t i o n
t h a t H u m b o l d t h i m s e l f avoids. o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n t o c a r r y i n g t h e social
H u m b o l d t c o n c e i v e s o f t h e d i f f e r e n t l i n g u i s t i c w o r l d v i e w s as con- aspect o f t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d validity i n t o t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ,
verging rays t h a t i l l u m i n a t e o n e a n d t h e s a m e w o r l d as " t h e s u m o f a n d falsely m a k i n g i t i n t o t h e c e n t r a l a s p e c t o f l a n g u a g e i t s e l f . 2 5
p r a c t i c e s t h a t i t f o r its p a r t m a k e s p o s s i b l e . Because a l l o t h e r f u n c -
T h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e is F r e g e ' s t h e o r y , w h i c h e m e r g e s o u t o f a
t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e ( t h a t is, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e
d o u b l e c r i t i q u e o f psychologism a n d reference semantics. M e a n i n g s
t a k i n g u p o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d t h e expressive self-pres-
a r e t o b e a n a l y z e d o n t h e basis o f t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e i r
entation o f speakers) are i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h criticizable
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as s o m e t h i n g o b j e c t i v e a n d p u b l i c l y accessible.
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — a n d also t h e c u l -
I t is n o l o n g e r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f a n o b j e c t b y a n a m e t h a t is t h e
tures o f experts that emerge o u t o f t h e m — c a n develop an i n d e -
m o d e l f o r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g s , b u t r a t h e r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n sen-
p e n d e n t l o g i c (Eigensinn) that transcends all local boundaries. T h u s ,
t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e s e n t e n c e f o r m s t h e
the m o d e s o f action constituted by a linguistic worldview operate i n
m o s t e l e m e n t a r y u n i t c o n s t i t u t i n g m e a n i n g . T h e decisive step t h e n
the l i g h t o f a communicative rationality that imposes o n the partici-
is t o l i n k m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f t r u t h (Wahrheitsgel¬
p a n t s a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d i n t h i s way t r i g g e r s
tung). T a k i n g a s i m p l e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e , F r e g e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis
l e a r n i n g processes w i t h p o s s i b l e r e a c t i v e effects o n t h e antecedent
f u n d a m e n t a l f o r t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics: o n e understands the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . T a y l o r is w r o n g t o a l l o w t h i s p r o b l e m -
m e a n i n g o f a sentence i f one knows the conditions u n d e r w h i c h the
solving capacity o f language t o d i s a p p e a r b e h i n d its c a p a c i t y for
s e n t e n c e is t r u e . I n t h i s r e g a r d , F r e g e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e assertoric
w o r l d disclosure. 2 3
and, i n d i r e c d y , t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric sentences o r p r o p o s i - abstraction, let alone the semantic one. For the verificationist proce-
tions. A t h i r d a b s t r a c t i o n is d u e t o t h e o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , d u r e t h a t h e proposes i n o r d e r to establish t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s can be
w h i c h Davidson w i l l later e x p l a i n w i t h t h e h e l p o f Tarski's t h e o r y o f c a r r i e d o u t m o n o l o g i c a l l y a n d is g e a r e d solely t o t h e t r u t h c o n d i -
t r u t h , s t r i p p i n g i t o f the Platonist c o n n o t a t i o n s prevalent i n Frege's tions o f assertoric sentences. V e r i f i c a t i o n c a n n o t yet be e q u a t e d w i t h
w o r k . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h are c o n s t r u e d p u r e l y semantically, the intersubjective p u t t i n g i n t o effect o f a discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f
e x p l a i n w h a t makes a sentence t r u e , a n d d o n o t , f o r instance, e x t e n d different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .
epistemically to a knowledge o f t r u t h conditions attributable to a T h e post-Wittgensteinian m o d a l theories that nonetheless l i n k u p
s p e a k e r o r a h e a r e r . As a r e s u l t o f these a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e s p h e r e of w i t h F r e g e ' s ideas, s u c h as t h o s e p u t f o r w a r d b y S t e n i u s , K e n n y ,
a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s is i n i t i a l l y p r e t t y r e s t r i c t e d . 2 8
The T u g e n d h a t , a n d o t h e r s , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x t h e
f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is d r i v e n f o r w a r d b y c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n : t h e i n t e n t i o n h e r e is t o m a k e accessible t h e
a t t e m p t s t o r e l a x these abstractions a n d ultimately to overcome " f o r c e s " — n o w u n d e r s t o o d as i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s — t o a p u r e l y se-
t h e m . L e t m e r e m i n d y o u ( i n reverse o r d e r ) o f D u m m e t t ' s v e r i f i c a - m a n t i c analysis. T h e s i m p l e o n t o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f A u s t i n ' s t w o " d i r e c -
t i o n i s t t h e o r y , w h i c h gives u p t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o a n o b j e c t i v e c o n c e p - tions o f fit" u n d e r l i e s t h i s a p p r o a c h ; t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s
tion o f t r u t h , o f t h e m o d a l theories f r o m Stenius to Searle, w h i c h t h e a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a n d t h e i m -
e x p a n d Frege's a p p r o a c h t o i n c l u d e t h e analysis o f nonassertoric p e r a t i v e f o r c e r e p r e s e n t s t h e a d j u s t m e n t o f states o f a f f a i r s t o fit
forces, a n d o f A u s t i n ' s speech-act theory, w h i c h d r o p s t h e semantic s e n t e n c e s . T h i s m o d e l has t h e a d v a n t a g e o f i n t r o d u c i n g e a c h o f t h e
abstraction once a n d f o r all. Finally, I u n d e r s t a n d f o r m a l pragmatics f u n d a m e n t a l modes w i t h reference to "conditions o f satisfaction."
as a t h e o r y t h a t succeeds i n o v e r c o m i n g e v e n t h e b a r r i e r s o f t h e H o w e v e r , a l t h o u g h these c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o w d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t e r m s
empiricist ontology within w h i c h all three o f the aforementioned o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d success c o n d i t i o n s , respectively, t h e y n o n e -
developments o f f o r m a l semantics still move. theless c o n t i n u e t o b e b a s e d o n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of
D u m m e t t links t r u t h conditions to the knowledge that speakers l a n g u a g e as a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e w o r l d , a n d t h u s r e m a i n r e s t r i c t e d t o
a n d h e a r e r s have o f t h e m . T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d r e m a i n i n e f f e c - t h e f u n d a m e n t a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . O n
tive f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i f t h e y w e r e n o t this c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces d o n o t have to be conceived o f
k n o w n as s u c h c o n d i t i o n s . N o w , t h i s t u r n away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e as m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s , t h a t is, p r a g m a t i c a l l y , w i t h t h e r e s u l t
c o n d i t i o n s that make a sentence t r u e i n favor o f the epistemic con- that the semantic a b s t r a c t i o n r e m a i n s u n t o u c h e d . T h i s also, of
d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker a n d h e a r e r are able t o i d e n t i f y a n d course, explains the l i m i t e d e x p l a n a t o r y p o t e n t i a l o f this approach.
r e c o g n i z e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is s u p p o s e d n o t o n l y t o e x p l a i n t h e u n - F o r t h e w h o l e b r e a d t h o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s c a n i n n o way be
d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentences. I t is i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o e x t e n d derived f r o m the assertoric-imperative double m o d e . Even the most
the s p h e r e o f a p p l i c a t i o n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s t o i n c l u d e types o f elaborately w o r k e d o u t t a x o n o m y 2 9
does n o t succeed i n e m b r a c i n g
s e n t e n c e s t h a t h a d h i t h e r t o e l u d e d analysis. I f , n a m e l y , t h e r e a s o n s e v e n t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m o d e s o r classes o f s p e e c h act: n o r m a t i v e
t h a t t h e speaker can p r o v i d e f o r t h e possible t r u t h o f a sentence are obligations, orders, a n d declarations a l l evade—as d o expressive
c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r its m e a n i n g , a n d i f i n t h i s w a y t h e m e a n i n g o f a u t t e r a n c e s — a n a t t e m p t at classification t h a t operates using exactly
s e n t e n c e is l i n k e d b y w a y o f p o t e n t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s t o its v a l i d i t y , i n t w o r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n so
t h e sense o f t r u t h , t h e n c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s , m o d a l i z e d state- d o i n g , r e m a i n s b o u n d to the l o g o c e n t r i s m o f Frege's semantics. 30
m e n t s , s t a t e m e n t s w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x , a n d so f o r t h a r e a l l o p e n e d I n t h e e n d i t is A u s t i n w h o , f o l l o w i n g t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , takes
u p to an investigation based o n t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. With t h e decisive step t o w a r d a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts a n d o v e r c o m e s t h e
t h i s m o v e , D u m m e t t has n o t y e t d o n e a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o g n i t i v i s t semantic abstraction. H e resolutely replaces t r u t h semantics w i t h a
197
196
Chapter 3 Communicadve Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
c o n s t i t u t e o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l l y . T h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m is
e n d y u n d e r t a k e n s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t o conditions
204 205
Chapter 3 C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
n o t one o f ends a n d means. For this reason, the "aims" that a n actor r e s p e c t t o s t r u c t u r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis o f
p u r s u e s in l a n g u a g e a n d c a n r e a l i z e o n l y i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h a n - successful s p e e c h acts is r e q u i r e d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e , i n c o m m u n i c a -
o t h e r a c t o r c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as t h o u g h t h e y r e s e m b l e d condi- tive a c t i o n , t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d
t i o n s t h a t w e c a n b r i n g a b o u t b y i n t e r v e n i n g causally i n t h e w o r l d . r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is s u p e r i m p o s e d o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t e l e -
F o r t h e actor, t h e a i m s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d r e s p e c t i v e l y t o w a r d success o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i o n a n d subjects t h e a c t o r s t o p r e c i s e l y s u c h
a n d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s i t u a t e d o n d i f f e r e n t levels: c o n s t r a i n t s as c o m p e l t h e m to adopt a performative attitude—an
e i t h e r i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d or, b e y o n d a l l e n t i t i e s , i n t h e l i n g u i s t i - a t t i t u d e t h a t is m o r e l a d e n w i t h p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is t h e o b j e c t i -
c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d l i f e w o r l d . I d o n o t m e a n t o i m p l y t h a t s p e a k i n g is a v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f t h e s t r a t e g i c actor. I n t e r a c t i o n m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t a c t i o n t h a t bears its p u r p o s e w i t h i n i t s e l f a n d t h a t m u s t acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x h i b i t s b o t h a r i c h e r a n d a m o r e
be d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m actions a i m e d at purposes e x t e r n a l to t h e m . restrictive s t r u c t u r e t h a n does strategic a c t i o n .
N o n e t h e l e s s , w e m u s t i n b o t h cases d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e o n t o l o g i - A s g a m e t h e o r y has s h o w n , s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n has h a d t h e e f f e c t o f
c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s as w e l l as b e t w e e n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s a n d a t t i t u d e s g e n e r a t i n g m o d e l s . I f o n e is n o t l e d astray b y a s e m a n t i c i s t t h e o r y o f
o f t h e a c t o r s ; w e m u s t i n e a c h case c o n c e i v e o f t h e a i m s a n d t h e m e a n i n g , t h a t is, i f o n e d o e s n o t s p l i t o f f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g
r e a l i z a t i o n o f these p u r p o s e s i n a d i f f e r e n t way. a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t (Bindungswirkung) f r o m t h e s p e e c h act, r e l e g a t -
F o r t h e speaker a n d h e a r e r i n v o l v e d , i n r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n g t h i s e f f e c t t o c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , o n e w i l l
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h one another, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims o f u n d e r - h a v e n o d i f f i c u l t y i n r e c o g n i z i n g t w o l i m i t cases o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e
s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a n d a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) l i e beyond t h e a c t i o n i n t h e t w o o t h e r m o d e l s o f a c t i o n k n o w n t o us f r o m s o c i o l o g i -
w o r l d i n w h i c h a purposively acting individual intervenes i n o r d e r to c a l t h e o r y . J u s t as t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d expressive m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e
achieve his goal. I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims can, f r o m the perspective o f t h e use c o r r e s p o n d t o o n e f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e respectively, so t o o a r e
participants, be achieved o n l y w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f world-disclos- n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n t a i l o r e d t o fit o n e
i n g l a n g u a g e itself, a n d i n s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e specific a s p e c t o f v a l i d i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y : i n t h e f i r s t case, t h e l e g i t i m a c y
r e c o g n i t i o n o f disputable validity claims depends o n the autono- o f t h e p e r m i s s i b l e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d , i n t h e s e c o n d case,
m o u s a g r e e m e n t o f a s u b j e c t w h o is h e l d t o b e a c c o u n t a b l e . Illocu- the authenticity o f self-presentation. T h e above-mentioned models
t i o n a r y success c a n t h u s b e a c h i e v e d o n l y c o o p e r a t i v e l y a n d is n e v e r , r e p r e s e n t l i m i t cases ( a n d n o t , as I h a d i n c o r r e c t l y asserted, " p u r e
as i t w e r e , a t t h e d i s p o s a l o f a n i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t i n i n t e r a c t i o n . types") 4 4
o f action o r i e n t e d toward reaching understanding, to the
S t r a t e g i c a c t i o n is also s u b j e c t t o c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n - e x t e n t t h a t i n these cases t h e d y n a m i c s o f r e c i p r o c a l l y t a k i n g a
gency o f actors e q u i p p e d w i t h f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e . Yet these p u r - p o s i t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , w h i c h is essential
posive actors, w h o c o n d i t i o n o n e a n o t h e r w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r o w n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , is s u s p e n d e d : i n t h e o n e case, b y m e a n s o f
r e s p e c t i v e successes, are accessible f o r o n e a n o t h e r o n l y as e n t i t i e s a presupposed value consensus a n d , i n t h e other, by a n e m p i r i c i s t
in the world. T h e y have t o a t t r i b u t e successes a n d f a i l u r e s s o l e l y t o r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as i m p r e s s i o n m a n a g e m e n t , of self-presentation
t h e m s e l v e s , n a m e l y , as t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e i r o w n causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n oriented toward reaching understanding. 4 5
r e q u i r e d e m a n d i n g feats o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . H o w - c l a i m s . A p e l uses t h e v i v i d i m a g e o f t h e i n t e r l o c k i n g o f t h e i d e a l a n d
ever, b e c a u s e t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d the real communication c o m m u n i t y ; b u t this sounds almost too
reaching understanding imposes certain attitudes a n d perspectives Kantian. The d o c t r i n e o f t h e " t w o r e a l m s " has b e e n completely
o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actor t h a t are i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e x e r t i n g a o v e r c o m e . T h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e oriented toward
causal i n f l u e n c e o v e r a n o p p o n e n t , w h i c h is o r i e n t e d directly^ t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g demands idealizing suppositions on the
o n e ' s o w n success, I d o n o t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e t w o c o n t r o v e r s i a l p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors; however, these suppositions f u n c -
types o f a c t i o n solely f r o m a n a n a l y t i c a l p o i n t o f view. T h e sociologi- tion as s o c i a l facts a n d a r e , as is l a n g u a g e i t s e l f , c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e
c a l o b s e r v e r , t o o , is i n p r i n c i p l e i n a p o s i t i o n t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n f o r m i n w h i c h s o c i o c u l t u r a l l i f e r e p r o d u c e s itself.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s t h a t , Alexander maintains that, i n the concept o f communicative ac-
f r o m t h e perspective o f t h e actor, p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e a l t e r n a t i v e . 4 7
tion, I conflate "ideological" questions w i t h m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d e m -
T h i s i d e a l - t y p i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , t h a t is, o n e w h i c h is m a d e o n the p i r i c a l ones. I a m supposed t o have tacidy smuggled in "value
basis o f c r i t e r i a u n a m b i v a l e n t f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e p r a g m a t - postulates" by way o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d
ics o f l a n g u a g e , a n d w h i c h is b y n o m e a n s m e r e l y a n a l y t i c , d o e s n o t action oriented toward reaching understanding, instead o f declaring
i n any way r o b t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f social cooperation—what them openly. The identification of linguistic understanding
M a r x t e r m e d " l a b o r " — o f its r e l e v a n c e : s o m e t h i n g t h a t is i m p o r t a n t (Sprachverstehen) w i t h a communicatively achieved agreement sup-
i n s o c i a l r e a l i t y m u s t n o t also b e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t u a l l y . More- p o s e d l y serves t h i s p u r p o s e . E v e n i f w e leave t h i s m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
over, t h e d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n c a n v a r y ; seen aside, h o w e v e r , w h a t A l e x a n d e r o v e r l o o k s is t h e p o i n t o f t h e e n t i r e
empirically, i t rarely meets the demands o f game t h e o r y a n d decision p r o j e c t . I w o u l d n e v e r have t a c k l e d a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c reconstruc-
theory. tion o f the r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l o f speech i f I h a d n o t h a r b o r e d the
e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t I w o u l d i n this way be able to o b t a i n a c o n c e p t o f
I t s h o u l d n o w also b e c l e a r t h a t a p p r o a c h i n g a n analysis o f a c t i o n
communicative rationality f r o m the normative content o f the univer-
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m the vantage p o i n t o f
sal a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e noncircumventable p r a c t i c e
speech-act t h e o r y by n o m e a n s i m p l i e s a n assimilation o f this a c t i o n
o f e v e r y d a y processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is n o t a m a t t e r
to the m o d e l of discourses—which serve t o r e l i e v e a c t i o n . 4 8
Action
o f this o r that preference, o f " o u r " or " t h e i r " n o t i o n s o f rational life;
o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y is n o t (as D u x b e l i e v e s ) a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e
r a t h e r , w h a t is a t issue h e r e is t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a v o i c e o f r e a s o n ,
t r e a t m e n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have become
a voice t h a t we have n o c h o i c e b u t t o a l l o w to speak i n everyday
p r o b l e m a t i c . N e v e r t h e l e s s , I w a n t t o h o l d o n t o t h e thesis t h a t , w i t h
c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s — w h e t h e r w e w a n t t o o r n o t . P e r h a p s I have
the action-coordinating role o f factually raised a n d recognized valid-
d e v i o u s l y o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h d e f i n i t i o n s w h a t I c l a i m t o have f o u n d
ity claims, a m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y enters i n t o everyday c o m -
t h r o u g h r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s — t h i s , a t a n y r a t e , is t h e c l a i m o n w h i c h
m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . C r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are J a n u s - f a c e d : as
criticism s h o u l d focus.
c l a i m s t h e y t r a n s c e n d , a t least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i -
pants, all merely local agreements a n d r e l y o n a subversive, ever- Those w h o reproach me for neglecting materialist components
flexible reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l , disputable reasons; o n the other suspect m e o f a n o t h e r type o f i d e a l i z a t i o n . T h i s o b j e c t i o n occurs i n
h a n d , t h e y m u s t b e r a i s e d here and now w i t h i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s , w i t h several v e r s i o n s . J o h a n n e s B e r g e r suspects t h a t l u r k i n g b e h i n d m y
coverage p r o v i d e d by a n u n q u e s t i o n e d cultural background, and c o n c e p t u a l s t r a t e g y is t h e i n t e n t i o n t o d i v i d e u p , as D u r k h e i m d i d ,
accepted (or rejected) with regard to nonreversible action se- all social actions i n t o m o r a l a n d i m m o r a l actions f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
q u e n c e s — t h e social r e a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d consists o f s u c h a c t i o n view o f a l t r u i s m a n d egoism. Johannes Weiss also m a i n t a i n s t h a t
s e q u e n c e s , w h i c h are i n t e r m e s h e d b y way o f c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n owes its i n t e g r a t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s i n t h e first
208 209
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d A c t i o n
i t s e l f i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects; t h e y m a i n t a i n t h a t , 2. Cf. Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Über den Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," in
i n fact, t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g e f f e c t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts c a n Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie. Werke, vol. 3 (Darmstadt, 1963), p. 81: " A lively, engaged
conversation i n which the speakers truly exchange ideas, feelings, and perceptions is
arise o n l y " i f c e r t a i n s o c i a l a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n s as w e l l as in itself the central point of language, as it were, the essence of which can only be
p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s a r e p r e s u p p o s e d ; " a n d " i t is t o w a r d t h e s e conceived as both echo and re-echo, as address and response, which, in its origins as
in its transformations, never belongs to one but always to all, and which lies in the
empirical conditions for the development and b i n d i n g character o f
lonely depths of each person's spirit yet comes to the fore only in sociality."
rationality that the explanations o f f e r e d by a n e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y of
society m u s t be d i r e c t e d . " 5 0
T h i s is p r e c i s e l y m y c o n t e n t i o n . H o w e v e r , 3. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Gespräch" implies not only dialogue or discussion but
also conversation. I have translated it here as "dialogue" because Habermas himself
the pragmatic concept o f language permits another, nonempiricist focuses o n these more structured forms of speech rather than on conversations.
d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e same t h i n g . I have n e v e r l e f t a n y r o o m f o r d o u b t Nonetheless, it may be useful to bear in m i n d that Gespräch has a broader interpre-
tation than I have given it here.
that the concept of action oriented toward reaching understanding
developed i n "Intermediate Reflections: Social A c t i o n , Purposive 4. W. von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus u n d
Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n " 5 1
m u s t be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o m p l e - ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts," Werke, vol. 3,
p. 438: "Language has an objective effect and is independent precisely in so far as it
m e n t a r y c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as e l a b o r a t e d i n "Intermediate is subjectively effected and dependent. . . . Its dead part, as it were, must always be
R e f l e c t i o n s : System a n d L i f e w o r l d . " 5 2
I t w o u l d be c o m p l e t e l y i m p o s - generated anew in thought, become alive in speech or understanding (Verständnis)
and therefore completely merge with the subject. . . . I n this manner it o n each
sible to explain how e v e r y d a y processes o f c o n s e n s u s formation occasion experiences the full influence of the individual upon it; yet this influence
r e p e a t e d l y s u c c e e d i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e h u r d l e p o s e d b y t h e risk o f is already i n itself bounded by what it (language as a system) effects and has effected."
tion; this p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g resides i n t h e self-evident features o f a n A n unalterable dualism resides in the original essence of language, a n d the
possibility of speech is determined by someone speaking and someone replying.
T h o u g h t itself is already substantially accompanied by a proclivity for social exist-
210 211
ence, a n d human beings long for . . . a You that accords with the I ; concepts can follow from valid insight. . . . Aristotie insists that the eudaimonia of a successful
appear to them [human beings] to become determinate and certain only by being life is not the object of intersubjectively mediated knowledge but is rather the final
reflected back by an alien capacity for thought. . . . T h e objectivity appears even horizon of meaningful practices that is given directly with the h u m a n disposition to
more perfected, however, if this division does not occur solely within the subject, act." I have attempted to show why this position, which Bubner has since developed
but rather when the person imagining can truly perceive the thought outside him, fully in Geschichtsprozesse und Handlungsnormen (Frankfurt, 1984), is inconsistent if one
which is possible only if perceived in another being imagining a n d thinking like attempts to follow it through: see my essay i n H . Schnädelbach, ed., Rationalität
himself. T h e r e is, however, n o mediator other than language between one capac- (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 218ff.
ity for thought a n d another.
21. Cf. J . Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam-
7. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, pp. 80f. bridge, Mass., 1987), pp. 341ff.
8. [Editor's note:] T h e word "unvertretbar" expresses a particular interpretation of 22. C . Taylor, 'Theories of Meaning," i n his Human Agency and Language (Philosophical
the idea of irreplaceability—the idea that only I can speak on behalf of myself, in Papers, vol. 1) (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 215ff.
other words, the idea of unrepresentability; for a brief discussion of this, see M. Cooke,
"Selfhood a n d Solidarity," Constellations 1 (1995): 3. 23. I have put forward this argument with respect to Heidegger, Derrida, and Cas-
toriadis in Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, pp. 153ff., 179ff. (see chapter 9 below),
9. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 208. and 318f., respectively.
10. Von Humboldt, "Über den Dualis," pp. 113ff., a n d "Über die Verschiedenheit des 24. Rolf Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie-Rationalität-Politik (Freiburg, 1985).
menschlichen Sprachbaus," pp. 191ff., in particular, pp. 200ff.
25. Cf. also M . Bartels, "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n . Eine Auseinandersetzung mit
11. [Editor's note:] T h e word "Verständnis" has connotations beyond mere compre- Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 36 (1982):
hension, suggesting that two or more people see the world (or some aspect of it) in 226-233.
the same way.
26. Cf. E . Tugendhat, " J . Habermas on Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß a n d
12. Von Humboldt, "Über die Verschiedenheit," p. 60. R. Tuomela, eds., Social Action (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 179ff.
13. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 150. 27. H e r e I draw on some of James Bohman's reflections; cf. the second chapter in
his doctoral dissertation Language and Social Criticism (Boston University, 1985),
14. Ibid., p. 160. pp. 139ff.
15. Von Humboldt, "Über d e n Nationalcharakter der Sprachen," Werke, vol. 3, 28. Davidson himself lists the categories of sentences that cannot initially be analyzed
pp. 64ff. by means of the theory. Cf. T r u t h and Meaning," in Synthese (1967): 310.
16. Von Humboldt, Werke, vol. 3, p. 20: " [ T ] h e sum of all that is knowable, as the 29. Cf. J o h n Searle's 'Taxonomy of IUocutionary Acts" in his Expression and Meaning
field to be processed by the h u m a n spirit, lies i n the middle . . . between all lan- (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 1-29; cf. also J . Searle and D. Vanderveken, Foundations of
guages." Illocutionary Logic (Cambridge, 1985).
17. Ibid., p. 419. 30. Cf. my critique of Searle in chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 156ff.
18. Ibid., pp. 147-148: " I f there is one idea visible throughout history that has gained 31. [Editor's note:] J . Alexander, "Habermas a n d Critical Theory: Beyond the Marx-
ever increasing validity . . . then it is the endeavor to overcome all barriers that ian Dilemma?," in Honneth a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, pp. 49ff.
prejudices a n d one-sided views of all sorts inimically erect between humans, a n d to
treat all humanity, without consideration of religion, nation, a n d colour, as one great, 32. Z i m m e r m a n n , Utopie, p. 373: "Habermas hereby expands his conceptualization
almost fraternal tribe." of the illocutionary sense of speech acts in such a way that it already includes an
understanding of their social function."
19. Cf. J . Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t
a n d S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 105f., 175f. 33. See Tugendhat's example in "Habermas on Communicative Action," p. 184.
20. Cf. a similar argument by Rüdigier Bubner in "Rationaliät als Lebensform. Z u 34. Z i m m e r m a n n speaks of the "social deployment" of the same illocutionary forces
J . Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns," in Handlung, Sprache und Vernunft in different contexts. Here, the illocutionary meaning of a normative prescription is
(Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 295ff. O n p. 312: " I t is precisely this, however, which practical "superimposed" on the illocutionary meaning of the request.
philosophy has always regarded as a major problem, namely how consistent behavior
212 213
Chapter 3 Communicative Rationality a n d the Theories o f M e a n i n g a n d Action
35. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 131ff. 47. T h i s does not exclude combinations such as those considered by Max Weber
under the heading "Social Action": in the case of economic action regulated by civil
36. T h a t this second set of conditions belongs to the very meaning of the request law, for example, the conflicting action orientations are situated at a level different
that has been uttered can be seen from what it would mean to turn down the request. from the normative consensus regarding the framework of legal conditions involved.
With his " n o , " the foreigner can negate the existential presuppositions on which the It equally does not exclude hybrid forms such as a politician's rhetorical behavior,
propositional component rests ("I have no money o n me") or the sincerity of the which cannot be analyzed point by point in terms of the model of latently strategic
speaker ("You must be j o k i n g " ) , that is, the implicit claims to truth or truthfulness. action. Overall, indeed, the hierarchization of levels of action must be taken into
But only with a " n o " that challenges the normative context ("People should no account whenever both types of action are entwined. Communicative action is always
longer be begging in this day and age") does the hearer dispute the validity of the embedded in the teleological action contexts of the individuals respectively partici-
explicitly raised claim. pating in it. Admittedly, the situation of someone guilelessly pursuing a random
action goal, or one not declared explicitly due to specific circumstances, must be
37. J . Habermas, "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and distinguished from the situation of someone cunningly pursuing a deliberately con-
Proposition in Habermas's T h e o r y of C o m m u n i c a t i o n , ' " Inquiry, 28 (1985): 87-122. cealed (because it could not be declared openly) action goal that, as the likely side
effect of a communicatively achieved consensus, he strives for with a strate- gic inten-
38. [Editor's note:] See also chapters 4 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 223ff. and tion. Conversely, the strategic deployment of communicative means can be subordi-
301ff., respectively. nated to the goal of consensus formation if, for example, the situation permits no
more than a "giving the other person to understand something" (Zu- Verstehen-Geben)
39. Formal semantics is able to stylize this limit case as the normal case all the more in an indirect way. I assume that the corresponding attitudes of the actors similarly
easily because imperatives, in the course of ontogenesis, are learned initially as simple can form a hierarchy; attitudes oriented respectively toward success and reaching
understanding are incompatible only with reference to one and the same level of
imperatives reinforced by sanctions, and only later as imperatives that have normative
action.
"backing."
40. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 126ff. 48. [Editor's note:] F o r a discussion of the various "relief mechanisms" that compen-
sate for the ever-increasing complexity of communicative action in developed socie-
41. See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 125ff. and p. 164. ties, see J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1987), esp. pp. 179ff.
42. Misunderstandings may have been caused by the fact that, in earlier publications,
I introduced action types first in terms of criteria for the action orientations ascribed 49. J . Weiss, "Verständigungsorientierung u n d Kritik," Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie
to the actor, and not from the sociological standpoint of the combination of actor und Sozialpsychologie 1 (1983): 108ff.
attitudes (orientation toward success vs. orientation toward reaching understanding)
with types of coordination of different plans of action (influence vs. consensus). T h e 50. Ibid., p. 113.
fundamental teleological structure of all action, including all social interactions, was
thus lost from view. 51. [Editor's note:] See chapter 2 in the present volume, pp. 105ff.
43. F o r example, M. Baurmann, "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Under- 52. [Editor's note:] I n Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 113ff.
standing," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Soda! Action, pp. 187ff. Cf. also J . Berger,
' T h e Linguistification of the Sacred and the Delinguistification of the Economy," in 53. Weiss, 'Verständigungsorientierung," p. 113.
H o n n e t h a n d j o a s , Communicative Action, p. 172. " O n e can reach an understanding
successfully and achieve success in an understanding manner (verständnisvoll). T h e
two figures of action cannot be disentangled as easily as Habermas imagines."
e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as e l e m e n t a r y types o f a c t i o n , a c t i o n o f a t least o n e o t h e r a c t o r ( o r o f h i s r e f r a i n i n g f r o m a c t i o n ) .
T h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is s h o w n sympto- p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s e r v i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o i n s t i l l f e a r
matically i n the " i f - t h e n " s t r u c t u r e o f the threat, w h i c h replaces the a n d t e r r o r i n t h e addressee.
validity claims presupposed i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action with power The concept of communicative action provisionally introduced
c l a i m s ; f r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h e c h a n g e d c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f s p e e c h a n d h e r e is b a s e d o n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g
a c t i o n . I n manifestly strategic action, t h e s p e e c h acts ( w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i t has t o b e d e v e l o p e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e o r i e s o f
a r y f o r c e s have b e e n w e a k e n e d ) r e l i n q u i s h t h e r o l e o f c o o r d i n a t i n g m e a n i n g . I cannot a t t e m p t to do this i n detail here. Nonetheless,
a c t i o n , passing i t o n t o f o r m s o f e x e r t i n g i n f l u e n c e t h a t are e x t e r n a l I w i s h a t least t o i n t r o d u c e a n d e x p l i c a t e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n of
t o l a n g u a g e . S t r i p p e d i n t h i s w a y o f its p o t e n c y , l a n g u a g e n o w f u l f i l l s the f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , w h i c h refers to the i n t e r -
o n l y t h o s e i n f o r m a t i o n f u n c t i o n s r e m a i n i n g o n c e l i n g u i s t i c feats n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y . T h i s , as y e t , says n o t h -
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g have b e e n r o b b e d o f t h e i r consensus- i n g about the fruitfulness o f such a theoretical approach for the
f o r m i n g f u n c t i o n , and once the validity o f utterances—now sus- s o c i a l sciences. T h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n m u s t p r o v e
p e n d e d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n — c a n be d e d u c e d only indirectly. Speech its w o r t h w i t h i n t h e s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is s u p -
a c t ( 2 ) is a r e q u e s t o n l y o n t h e s u r f a c e ; i t is i n f a c t a t h r e a t : p o s e d t o e x p l a i n h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e
analysis o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of communicative action may be
(2a) S: I f y o u d o n o t give Y m o n e y , I w i l l t e l l t h e p o l i c e t h a t . . .
h e l p f u l . I t opens u p the d i m e n s i o n o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the life-
T h r e a t s a r e e x a m p l e s o f s p e e c h acts t h a t p l a y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e w o r l d , w h i c h e n m e s h e s a n d stabilizes i n t e r a c t i o n s t o f o r m h i g h e r -
i n contexts o f strategic a c t i o n , h a v e f o r f e i t e d t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y level aggregates.
force, a n d derive their i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g f r o m other contexts o f
e m p l o y m e n t i n w h i c h t h e s a m e s e n t e n c e s are n o r m a l l y u t t e r e d w i t h T h e P r a g m a t i c T u r n i n the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
a n o r i e n t a t i o n toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Acts o f this k i n d —
acts t h a t have b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t as p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — a r e not T h e concept o f communicative action develops the i n t u i t i o n that the
i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a t a l l , f o r t h e y a r e n o t a i m e d a t t h e r a t i o n a l l y t e l o s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is i n h e r e n t i n l a n g u a g e . Reaching
m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n o f a n a d d r e s s e e . T h i s c a n b e seen f r o m t h e way u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n o r m a t i v e l y l a d e n c o n c e p t t h a t goes b e y o n d t h e
i n w h i c h t h r e a t s are r e p u d i a t e d : m e r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a g r a m m a t i c a l expression. A speaker reaches
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another w i t h regard to some matter. Such an
(2a') H: N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
agreement (Einverständnis) c a n b e a c h i e v e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s o n l y i f
The " n o " refers to e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the t h r e a t t h e y a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e s i n v o l v e d as c o r r e c t (sachgemäß). A g r e e -
a l o n e c o u l d a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect. T h e hearer m e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g is m e a s u r e d i n t e r m s o f t h e i n t e r s u b ¬
contests t h e reasons t h a t w e r e s u p p o s e d t o m o t i v a t e h e r to act i n t h e j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y (Gültigkeit) o f a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t c a n
m a n n e r p r e d i c t e d b y S. U n l i k e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, t h r e a t s d o n o t r e l y i n p r i n c i p l e be criticized. O f course, u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f
o n g e n e r a l , addressee-independent reasons t h a t c o u l d c o n v i n c e any- a linguistic expression a n d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g about something
one. Their "then-component" p o i n t s r a t h e r to p a r t i c u l a r reasons w i t h t h e h e l p o f a n utterance h e l d to be v a l i d are two d i f f e r e n t
t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e s p e c i f i c addressees i n p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s things; an equally sharp distinction must be m a d e between an utter-
w i t h a n e m p i r i c a l m o t i v e t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. a n c e t h a t is h e l d t o b e v a l i d a n d o n e t h a t is v a l i d . Nonetheless,
L i k e s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , i n s u l t s , t o o , o f t e n have a n ambiguous q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s -
character. T h e y may have n o r m a t i v e b a c k i n g , a n d express, f o r i n - tions o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g theory—namely,
stance, m o r a l c o n d e m n a t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e y m a y also b e c o m e i n d e - w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n — c a n -
228 229
W i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r raises t h e n o r m a t i v e c l a i m t h a t h e is e n t e r i n g a h e a r e r is i n a p o s i t i o n t o recognize w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n
O n c e p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h has b e e n s u p p l e m e n t e d b y n o r m a t i v e I have t r e a t e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n as t w o v a r i a n t s o f
Tightness a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s , i t is p o s s i b l e , i n a f i n a l s t e p , t o linguistically mediated interaction. I t holds only for communicative
generalize D u m m e t t ' s explanation. We u n d e r s t a n d a speech act action t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d
w h e n we k n o w t h e k i n d s o f reasons t h a t a speaker c o u l d p r o v i d e i n l a n g u a g e i m p e l t h e a c t o r s — i n t h e sense o f a w e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
o r d e r t o c o n v i n c e a h e a r e r t h a t h e is e n t i d e d i n t h e g i v e n c i r c u m - necessity—to step o u t o f t h e e g o c e n t r i c i t y o f a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l
stances t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s u t t e r a n c e — i n s h o r t , w h e n w e k n o w o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e i r o w n respective success a n d t o s u r r e n d e r
what makes it acceptable. A speaker, w i t h a v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a p p e a l s t o a themselves to the public criteria of communicative rationality.
reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l reasons t h a t he c o u l d p r o d u c e i n s u p p o r t o f T h e t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f l a n g u a g e t h u s suggest a basis f o r
234 235
answering, f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f action theory, the classical this e x t e n t , media-steered interactions n o l o n g e r e m b o d y an i n s t r u -
q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . m e n t a l reason located i n the purposive rationality o f decision m a k -
T h e a t o m i s t i c c o n c e p t o f strategic a c t i o n d o e s n o t i t s e l f p r o v i d e us ers, b u t r a t h e r a f u n c t i o n a l i s t r e a s o n i n h e r e n t i n self-regulating
w i t h a n y e q u i v a l e n t answer. I f i t n o n e t h e l e s s is t o serve as t h e basic systems. T h i s a p p r o a c h , however, w h i c h is e l a b o r a t e d i n e c o n o m i c s
c o n c e p t i n a s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n , t h e n i t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h e o r y , covers o n l y s p e c i f i c d o m a i n s o f a c t i o n ; i t
h o w c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t e m e r g e solely f r o m t h e r e c i p r o c a l d o e s n o t m e e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f a n e x p l a n a t o r y t h e o r y t h a t w o u l d be
e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e u p o n o n e a n o t h e r o f s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d actors s u f f i c i e n t l y g e n e r a l i n scope t o e x p l a i n s o c i a l a c t i o n as a w h o l e i n
can establish themselves as stable o r d e r s . E v e r since H o b b e s , t h e t e r m s o f strategic a c t i o n . Since behavior-steering communication
a t t e m p t has r e p e a t e d l y b e e n m a d e t o e x p l a i n h o w n o r m s w i t h t r a n s - m e d i a s u c h as m o n e y m e r e l y b r a n c h o f f as s p e c i a l c o d e s f r o m a m o r e
subjectively b i n d i n g n o r m a t i v e validity claims can develop o u t o f the r i c h l y s t r u c t u r e d everyday language, m e d i a t h e o r y p o i n t s t o w a r d t h e
interest positions a n d i n d i v i d u a l p r o f i t calculations o f actors who broader framework o f a theory o f language (cf. m y The Theory of
m a k e d e c i s i o n s i n a p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l way a n d w h o e n c o u n t e r e a c h Communicative Action, v o l . 2, p p . 2 5 6 f f ) .
o t h e r o n l y haphazardly. Today, this " H o b b e s i a n p r o b l e m " (Parsons) T h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t r e m a i n s is t o d i s p e n s e w i t h a n y a t t e m p t
is b e i n g t a c k l e d u s i n g g a m e t h e o r y . H o w e v e r , t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t I t o d e v e l o p a c o n c e p t o f social o r d e r i n g e n e r a l f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
have b e e n able t o f o l l o w t h e d e b a t e s ( f r o m A m a r t y a S e n t o J o n view o f a c t i o n theory. T h e transsubjective structures o f language
E l s t e r ) , 1 have n o t g a i n e d t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w e n t w i n e d w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s are r e p l a c e d i n t h e w o r k o f Parsons
social o r d e r can e m e r g e f r o m t h e d o u b l e c o n t i n g e n c y o f actors w h o a n d L u h m a n n b y boundary-maintaining and autopoetic systems i n t r o -
m a k e decisions i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f one a n o t h e r can be answered m o r e d u c e d at a m o r e g e n e r a l level t h a n are actors a n d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y
convincingly today t h a n by H o b b e s i n his t i m e . mediated interactions. Actions a n d interactions can t h e n for their
M o r e p r o m i s i n g t h a n the a t t e m p t to renew w i t h m o d e r n means p a r t b e u n d e r s t o o d as p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d social systems t h a t f o r m
t h e classical c o n c e p t o f a n i n s t r u m e n t a l o r d e r is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f environments for a n d reciprocally observe one another. I n c u t t i n g
a m e d i u m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h behavior-steering infor- l o o s e f r o m a c t i o n t h e o r y , however, systems t h e o r y m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e
m a t i o n f l o w s are c o n d u c t e d . I n s o f a r as t h i s c o n c e p t is d e f i n e d ac- f o r its o b j e c t i v i s t i c a p p r o a c h . Systems f u n c t i o n a l i s m cuts i t s e l f o f f
cording to the m o d e l o f a m a r k e t exchange steered by money, f r o m t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d its m e m b e r s . H e r -
s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c a n be r e t a i n e d as t h e m e n e u t i c access t o t h i s r e s e r v o i r o f k n o w l e d g e p r o c e e d s b y way o f
conception o f action suitable f o r a steering m e d i u m . For example, ( a t least v i r t u a l ) p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices.
i n f o r m a t i o n conveyed via the m o n e y code c o n d i t i o n s — o n account O f c o u r s e , i n t h e f a c e o f c o m p l e x societies, t h e s o c i a l sciences m u s t
o f a built-in structure o f preferences—decisions r e g a r d i n g actions be prepared to extract even c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e insights f r o m their
w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o m o r e d e m a n d i n g a n d h i g h e r - r i s k feats o f c o m - o b j e c t d o m a i n . Yet society, w o v e n f r o m w e b s o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -
m u n i c a t i o n t h a t are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e a c t o r as- a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s , s i m p l y is n o t e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f a n e x t e r -
s u m e s a s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a t t i t u d e — i n t h e e x t r e m e case, a p u r p o s i v e n a l n a t u r e accessible o n l y t o o b s e r v a t i o n . The meaning t h a t is
r a t i o n a l o n e . H o w e v e r , f o r t h e actor, t h e s w i t c h t o media-steered inter- sedimented i n society's s y m b o l i c contexts a n d self-interpretations
actions results i n a n o b j e c t i v e i n v e r s i o n o f s e t t i n g goals a n d c h o o s i n g discloses i t s e l f o n l y t o a h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o a c h . W h o e v e r does n o t
means. T h e m e d i u m itself n o w transmits the system-maintenance w a n t t o b l o c k o f f t h i s p a t h f o r h i m s e l f , b u t wishes r a t h e r t o o p e n u p
i m p e r a t i v e s o f t h e system i n q u e s t i o n ( h e r e t h e m a r k e t s y s t e m ) . T h i s t h e s o c i o c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t o f l i f e from within, has t o t a k e as h i s p o i n t
i n v e r s i o n o f m e a n s a n d e n d s is e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e actor, as M a r x o f d e p a r t u r e a c o n c e p t i o n o f society t h a t c a n be c o n n e c t e d u p w i t h
o b s e r v e d , as t h e r e i f y i n g c h a r a c t e r o f o b j e c t i f i e d social processes. T o the perspectives o n a c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t i v e efforts o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s
236 237
Chapter 4 i Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically M e d i a t e d Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
t h e m a t i c k n o w l e d g e , Mp has t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h i s is e m b e d d e d . W h a t is a t issue h e r e is
topic, n e e d only shift marginally. I f I exceed the usual l e n g t h o f a t h e y s t a r t e d t o use c e r t a i n t o o l s f o r s u r v i v a l ; y e t t h e l a w o f levers was
l e c t u r e by even t e n m i n u t e s o r digress t o a n i m p e n d i n g h o l i d a y t r i p d i s c o v e r e d as a l a w a n d g i v e n t h e f o r m o f e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o n l y i n
w h e n dealing w i t h the topic o f l i f e w o r l d i n an academic context, t h e c o u r s e o f m e t h o d i c a l q u e s t i o n i n g b y m o d e r n science o f our
t h e n a t t e n t i o n will focus o n the violated pragmatic presuppositions pretheoretical knowledge.
t h a t w e h a d u n t i l t h e n t a c i t l y s h a r e d . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e (a) situ- H o w e v e r , t h e m e t h o d o f free v a r i a t i o n o f u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i -
ation-related horizontal knowledge a n d (b) topic-dependent contex- t i o n s s o o n m e e t s its l i m i t s . T h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e l i f e w o r l d is j u s t
tual knowledge are t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m (c) the background as l i t t l e a t o u r d i s p o s a l as we are i n a p o s i t i o n t o s u b j e c t a b s o l u t e l y
knowledge of the lifeworld. T h e l a t t e r is s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s e v e r y t h i n g t o a b s t r a c t d o u b t . R a t h e r , C h a r l e s S. P e i r c e , w i t h his
o f thematization. I t c a n n o t i n t e n t i o n a l l y be b r o u g h t to conscious- p r a g m a t i c d o u b t a b o u t t h i s C a r t e s i a n d o u b t , has r e m i n d e d us t h a t
ness i n t h e same way as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e f i r s t t w o , a n d i t f o r m s a p r o b l e m s t h a t severely u n s e t t l e l i f e w o r l d c e r t a i n t i e s c o m e t o m e e t us
deep stratum of unthematized knowledge i n w h i c h the situation- w i t h the objective power o f historical contingencies. Husserl h i m s e l f
related horizontal knowledge and topic-dependent contextual h a d a l r e a d y l i n k e d h i s analysis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h t h e crisis m o t i f .
k n o w l e d g e — w h i c h are b o t h still relatively i n t h e foreground—have I t is a crisis a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m o d e r n science t h a t
their roots. shakes H u s s e r l o u t o f a state o f o b j e c t i v i s t i c o b l i v i o n o f b o t h w o r l d
c. T h i s deep-seated background knowledge has a g r e a t e r s t a b i l i t y since a n d self. T h e p r o b l e m a t i z i n g p r e s s u r e b r o u g h t t o b e a r by s u c h crisis
i t is t o a l a r g e e x t e n t i m m u n e t o t h e p r e s s u r e o f p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n situations, w h e t h e r o f a w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l o r a life-historical type, ob-
e x e r t e d b y c o n t i n g e n c y - g e n e r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s . T h i s c a n b e seen b y jectively transforms the conditions for thematization, and only thus
t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s l a y e r o f e l l i p t i c a l a n d always already-presupposed creates a n i l l u m i n a t i n g d i s t a n c e f r o m w h a t is m o s t f a m i l i a r a n d m o s t
k n o w l e d g e c a n b e e x t r i c a t e d f r o m t h e inaccessible m o d e o f p r o v i d - t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d . A n e x a m p l e o f t h i s is t h e t h r u s t t o w a r d m o r a l
i n g a n u n q u e s t i o n e d b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e m a t i z e d o n l y b y methodical u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t sets i n w i t h t h e p r o p h e t i c w o r l d r e l i g i o n s , d i s r u p t -
effort a n d , even t h e n , o n l y p i e c e b y p i e c e . H u s s e r l p r o p o s e d t h a t a i n g naive f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the substantive e t h i c a l life (Sittlichkeit)—
p r o c e d u r e o f eidetic v a r i a t i o n be used f o r this purpose, namely, t h e c o m m a n d i n g reverence f r o m those w i t h i n i t — o f t h e clan o r t r i b a l
unrestrained i m a g i n i n g o f modifications o f the w o r l d or the project- a s s o c i a t i o n , a t h r u s t , i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t has s p a r k e d o f f so m a n y r e -
i n g o f c o n t r a s t i n g w o r l d s , w h i c h sheds l i g h t o n o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of g r e s s i o n s t h a t i t h a d t o be r e n e w e d a t i n t e r v a l s r i g h t u p u n t i l t h i s
n o r m a l i t y — a s u n c o n s c i o u s as t h e y a r e u n s h a k a b l e a n d u n a v a i l a b l e — c e n t u r y — u n t i l the d e a t h camps o p e n e d t h e i r doors.
a n d w h i c h may b r i n g to l i g h t h o w t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f o u r everyday Like all unthematic knowledge, the b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld
p r a c t i c e s d e p e n d o n a Weltanschauung. J o h n Searle's e x a m p l e s also is i m p l i c i t l y a n d p r e r e f l e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t . I t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , first, b y
r e c a l l H u s s e r l ' s m e t h o d . W i t h t h e h e l p o f these e x a m p l e s , Searle its m o d e o f immediate certainty. T h i s l e n d s a p a r a d o x i c a l c h a r a c t e r t o
d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f s p e e c h acts r e m a i n s i n d e t e r m i - this k n o w l e d g e f r o m w i t h i n w h i c h — w i t h o u t any distance—we live
n a t e u n t i l t h e i r s e m a n t i c a l l y fixed v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s h a v e b e e n s u p - o u r lives, u n d e r g o e x p e r i e n c e s , speak, a n d act. T h e i n s i s t e n t y e t a t
p l e m e n t e d by i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n , i m p l i c i t b a c k g r o u n d assumptions t h e same t i m e i m p e r c e p t i b l e p r e s e n c e o f t h i s b a c k g r o u n d appears
t h a t r e m a i n u n t h e m a t i c a n d are p r e s u m e d t o be c o m p l e t e l y u n p r o b - as a n i n t e n s i f i e d , a l t h o u g h n o n e t h e l e s s deficient, f o r m of knowl-
l e m a t i c . T h u s , Searle t r a n s p o s e s " t h e cat is o n t h e m a t " i n t o o u t e r e d g e . S u c h b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e lacks a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e
space i n o r d e r t o m a k e us a w a r e b y m e a n s o f t h i s m o d i f i c a t i o n t h a t , possibility o f b e c o m i n g problematic f o r i t comes i n t o contact w i t h
n o r m a l l y , w h e n we i m a g i n e a b o d y u p o n some surface, we i m a g i n e criticizable validity claims, thereby b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o fallible
i t o n l y as a f f e c t e d b y t h e f o r c e o f g r a v i t y . S i m i l a r l y , H o m o sapiens k n o w l e d g e , o n l y a t t h e m o m e n t i n w h i c h i t is e x p r e s s e d i n l a n g u a g e .
m u s t h a v e h a d a n i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f h o w levers w o r k ever since Absolute certainties r e m a i n unshakable u n t i l they suddenly disinte-
244 245
g r a t e ; for, i n l a c k i n g f a l l i b i l i t y , t h e y d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e k n o w l e d g e i n t h i n g s o n w h i c h w e r e l y a n d t h e t h i n g s w i t h w h i c h w e are f a m i l i a r ,
t h e s t r i c t sense at a l l . t h e t h i n g s t h a t m o v e us, a n d t h e t h i n g s t h a t w e c a n d o — a l l o f w h i c h
T h i s deep-seated b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is d i s t i n g u i s h e d , sec- are i n t e r m e s h e d i n this b a c k g r o u n d knowledge—are prereflective
o n d l y , b y its totalizing power. T h e l i f e w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e s a t o t a l i t y w i t h a p r é f i g u r a t i o n s o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t m u s t first b e t h e m a t i z e d i n s p e e c h
center a n d indeterminate, porous borders that recede rather t h a n acts b e f o r e i t c a n b r a n c h o u t a n d t a k e o n t h e m e a n i n g o f proposi-
p e r m i t themselves to be transcended. T h e two o t h e r f o r m s o f u n t h e - tional knowledge, of an interpersonal relationship produced
matic knowledge m e n t i o n e d — w h i c h are, relatively speaking, i n the t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y means, o r o f the speaker's i n t e n t i o n .
foreground—derive their w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g f u n c t i o n , i n the d i m e n - T h e three attributes o f immediacy, totalizing power, a n d holistic
sion o f perception as w e l l as i n t h a t o f m e a n i n g , f r o m t h e b a c k - constitution belonging to this unthematically presupposed k n o w l -
g r o u n d i n w h i c h t h e y are r o o t e d . T h e c o m m o n s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n edge may perhaps explain the lifeworld's paradoxical f u n c t i o n as
c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c e n t e r — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , m y b o d y , as a n a n t h r o - " g r o u n d " (Boden): h o w i t keeps c o n t i n g e n c y i n c h e c k t h r o u g h p r o x -
pologizing p h e n o m e n o l o g y has claimed—in which social spaces i m i t y t o e x p e r i e n c e . U s i n g sureties t h a t w e o b t a i n o n l y f r o m e x p e r i -
(staggered concentrically according to d e p t h a n d w i d t h ) a n d histori- e n c e , t h e l i f e w o r l d erects a w a l l a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e s t h a t t h e m s e l v e s
cal times (arranged three-dimensionally) converge p r i o r to any ob- o r i g i n a t e f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . I f k n o w l e d g e o f t h e w o r l d is d e f i n e d on
jectivation through measuring operations. The spaces a n d times t h e basis t h a t i t is a c q u i r e d a p o s t e r i o r i , w h e r e a s l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l -
e x p e r i e n c e d are t h e c o o r d i n a t e s o f our respective shared world; these edge, relatively speaking, represents a n a p r i o r i knowledge, t h e n the
c o o r d i n a t e s are always c o n c r e t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d o r e m b o d i e d , f o r i n - p a r a d o x may be e x p l a i n e d by the fact that, i n the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
s t a n c e , as v i l l a g e c o m m u n i t y , r e g i o n , state, n a t i o n , w o r l d society, a n d l i f e w o r l d , k n o w l e d g e o f the w o r l d a n d k n o w l e d g e o f language are
so f o r t h , o r as t h e succession o f g e n e r a t i o n s , e p o c h s , w o r l d h i s t o r i c a l integrated.
ages, l i f e - h i s t o r i e s i n d i v i d u a t e d i n t h e eyes o f G o d , a n d so f o r t h . I , The p r o b l e m a t i z i n g f o r c e o f c r i t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e s separates t h e
i n m y b o d y , a n d I , as m y b o d y , f i n d m y s e l f always a l r e a d y o c c u p y i n g b a c k g r o u n d o f the lifeworld f r o m the f o r e g r o u n d . Such experiences
a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d w o r l d , w h e r e b y these c o l l e c t i v e l y inhab- are t h e m s e l v e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a r i o u s ways i n w h i c h
i t e d lifeworlds telescope i n t o each other, overlap, a n d e n t w i n e l i k e w h a t is e n c o u n t e r e d i n t h e w o r l d — t h i n g s a n d events, p e r s o n s , a n d
text and context. stories i n w h i c h p e o p l e are i n v o l v e d — i s d e a l t w i t h p r a c t i c a l l y . T h e
A t h i r d f e a t u r e , c o n n e c t e d w i t h i m m e d i a c y a n d t o t a l i z a t i o n , is t h e world of things (Zeugtvelt) a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f e x p l a n a t i o n are
holism o f t h i s k i n d o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e t h a t , d e s p i t e t h e l a t t e r ' s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r h a n d l i n g o f t h i n g s a n d events; t h e solidary
a p p a r e n t t r a n s p a r e n c y , r e n d e r s i t i m p e n e t r a b l e ; t h e l i f e w o r l d m a y be world a n d h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g a r e c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h o u r
d e s c r i b e d as a " t h i c k e t . " C o m p o n e n t s are f u s e d t o g e t h e r h e r e t h a t interactive dealings w i t h persons to w h o m we r e l a t e — t h e former
can be split u p i n t o d i f f e r e n t categories o f k n o w l e d g e o n l y u n d e r the within the framework of communities o f cooperation, the latter
pressure o f p r o b l e m a t i z i n g experiences. I n d e e d , the formal-prag- w i t h i n the framework o f linguistic communities. Ontogenedcally, the
m a t i c analyst casts h i s gaze b a c k i n t o t h e l i f e w o r l d f r o m t h e v a n t a g e e m p i r i c a l w o r l d i n w h i c h we d e a l w i t h e x t e r n a l n a t u r e i n a t e c h n i -
p o i n t of a thematic k n o w l e d g e already differentiated into facts, c a l - p r a c t i c a l way separates o n l y g r a d u a l l y f r o m t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h w e
n o r m s , a n d subjective e x p e r i e n c e s . O n l y t h e r i c o c h e t i n g o f t h i s d i f - d e a l w i t h o t h e r s w i t h i n society i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l way. F i n a l l y , e x p e -
f e r e n t i a t i n g gaze leads h i m t o c o n c l u d e t h a t , i n t h e background riences w i t h o u r i n n e r nature, w i t h o u r body, needs, a n d feelings
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g are a l l o y e d are o f a n i n d i r e c t k i n d ; t h e y are reflected a g a i n s t o u r e x p e r i e n c e s o f
w i t h a relying-on-something, with a being-moved-by-something, with the external w o r l d . W h e n experiences of inner nature then gain
a knowing-how-to-do-something. T h e t h i n g s we simply assume, the independence as aesthetic experiences, the ensuing works of
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246
Chapter 4 Actions, S p e e c h Acts, Linguistically Mediated Interactions, a n d Lifeworld
b e s u r e , these g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b e c o m e v i s i b l e o n l y us t o p o s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e ac-
o f "background," "foreground," a n d "situationally relevant segment logically c a r r i e d o u t this shift i n perspective, we can m a k e a s i m i l a r
o f t h e l i f e w o r l d " is m e a n i n g f u l o n l y so l o n g as w e a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c - o b s e r v a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d t o r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t is
said o r w i t h r e g a r d to the socialization o f p a r t i c i p a t i n g persons;
tive o f a s p e a k e r w h o w i s h e s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e
t h e s e r o l e s , t o o , are f u l f i l l e d b y s p e e c h acts i n a l l t h e i r f u n c t i o n s .
a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d a n d , i n t h i s , c a n base t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y
F r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e y serve t o
o f h e r speech-act o f f e r o n a mass o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d , u n t h e -
transmit a n d f u r t h e r develop cultural knowledge; f r o m the p o i n t
matic knowledge. T h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e c o m e s i n t o v i e w only
o f view o f socialization, they serve to f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n p e r s o n a l
w h e n w e , as i t w e r e , s t a n d b e h i n d t h e b a c k o f t h e a c t o r a n d v i e w
identities.
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as a n e l e m e n t o f a c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s i n w h i c h
t h e a c t o r n o l o n g e r a p p e a r s as t h e i n i t i a t o r b u t r a t h e r as t h e p r o d u c t O n e can n o w imagine the c o m p o n e n t s o f the l i f e w o r l d — c u l t u r a l
o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h she is s i t u a t e d , o f s o l i d a r y g r o u p s t o paradigms, legitimate orders, a n d personality structures—as con-
w h i c h she b e l o n g s , o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g processes t o w h i c h d e n s e d f o r m s of, a n d s e d i m e n t s d e p o s i t e d by, t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o c -
she is s u b j e c t e d . O n l y a f t e r t h i s i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v a t i n g step d o e s t h e esses that operate by way of communicative action: reaching
network of communicative actions constitute the m e d i u m t h r o u g h understanding, action coordination, a n d socialization. W h a t e n t e r s i n t o
w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d r e p r o d u c e s itself. c o m m u n i c a t i v e action f r o m the resources o f the b a c k g r o u n d o f the
l i f e w o r l d , f l o w s t h r o u g h t h e s l u i c e gates o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n , a n d p e r -
S o c i e t y as S y m b o l i c a l l y S t r u c t u r e d L i f e w o r l d mits the mastery o f situations, constitutes the stock o f knowledge
preserved w i t h i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices. T h i s stock o f knowledge
E v e r y s p e e c h act w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r r e a c h e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g / w i t h solidifies, a l o n g paths o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n t o i n t e r p r e t i v e paradigms
a n o t h e r p e r s o n / w i t h r e g a r d t o s o m e t h i n g situates t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x - t h a t are h a n d e d d o w n ; the k n o w l e d g e becomes compressed, i n t h e
p r e s s i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e speaker, i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e h e a r e r , a n d i n n e t w o r k o f i n t e r a c t i o n s o f social g r o u p s , i n t o values a n d n o r m s ; a n d
r e l a t i o n to the w o r l d . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f c o n s t r u c t i n g i n t e r - i t c o n d e n s e s , b y way o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n processes, i n t o a t t i t u d e s , c o m -
a c t i o n s , w e have b e e n c o n c e r n e d a b o v e a l l w i t h t h e s e c o n d o f these petencies, modes o f perception, a n d identities. T h e c o m p o n e n t s o f
three aspects—the interpersonal relationship. W i t h t h e i r speech t h e l i f e w o r l d result f r o m a n d are m a i n t a i n e d t h r o u g h the c o n t i n u -
acts, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a c c o m p l i s h feats o f c o o r d i n a t i o n b y ation o f valid knowledge, the stabilization o f g r o u p solidarities, a n d
establishing such relationships. However, they d o n o t achieve this t h e f o r m a t i o n o f accountable actors. T h e w e b o f everyday commu-
248 249
b o d i e d — i n a literal sense—in the substratum o f h u m a n organisms. T h e concept o f lifeworld thus explicated does n o t only provide an
W h a t is t h u s e m b o d i e d a r e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t s t h a t c a n also b e l i q u i - a n s w e r t o t h e classical q u e s t i o n o f h o w s o c i a l o r d e r is p o s s i b l e . W i t h
dated a n d p u t into circulation i n the currency o f n o r m a l language. the idea o f the i n t e r m e s h i n g o f the l i f e w o r l d c o m p o n e n t s , this con-
A l l m e a n i n g comes together i n t h e m a r k e t p l a c e o f everyday c o m m u - c e p t also answers t h e o t h e r q u e s t i o n o f classical social t h e o r y : t h a t
nicative practices. Nonetheless, t h e various c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e life- o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d society. T h e lifeworld
w o r l d c o n s t i t u t e d i s t i n c t q u a n t i t i e s ; t h i s c a n b e seen o n t o l o g i c a l l y does not constitute an environment against whose contingent
f r o m t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l aspects o f t h e i r e m b o d i m e n t s . i n f l u e n c e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l has t o assert h e r s e l f . I n d i v i d u a l a n d society
C u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a r e d i f f u s e d across t h e b o u n d a r i e s o f c o l l e c t i v i - d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e systems e x i s t i n g i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e n v i r o n m e n t s
ties a n d l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d i n t h e i r l i f e s p a n a r e n o t t i e d t o t h a t w o u l d r e l a t e t o o n e a n o t h e r e x t e r n a l l y as o b s e r v e r s . E q u a l l y ,
t h e i d e n t i t y o f societies, l e t a l o n e p e r s o n s . T h e w o r l d r e l i g i o n s a r e h o w e v e r , t h e l i f e w o r l d is n o t s o m e k i n d o f receptacle i n w h i c h i n d i -
t h e best e x a m p l e o f t h i s . S o c i e t i e s , f o r t h e i r p a r t , o c c u p y a l a r g e r v i d u a l s m i g h t be c o n t a i n e d l i k e p a r t s o f a w h o l e . T h e l a t t e r figure o f
s o c i a l space a n d l o n g e r h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s t h a n a p e r s o n a n d h e r t h o u g h t , w h i c h c o m e s f r o m t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , is j u s t as
l i f e - h i s t o r y , b u t have less d i f f u s e a n d m o r e n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d d e f i c i e n t as t h a t o f systems t h e o r y .
b o u n d a r i e s t h a n traditions. Finally, personality structures, w h i c h ad- F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e s u b j e c t , society has
h e r e to t h e i r organic substrata, are d e f i n e d most sharply f r o m a b e e n c o n c e i v e d o f as a w h o l e c o m p o s e d o f p a r t s , w h e t h e r as t h e state
s p a t i o t e m p o r a l p o i n t o f view. F o r i n d i v i d u a l s , c u l t u r e a n d society m a d e u p o f p o l i t i c a l c i t i z e n s o r as t h e a s s o c i a t i o n o f f r e e p r o d u c e r s .
a p p e a r first o f a l l i n t h e shape o f a n o v e r a r c h i n g g e n e r a t i o n a l i n t e r - T h e c o n c e p t o f l i f e w o r l d also b r e a k s w i t h t h i s figure o f t h o u g h t . F o r
relationship. c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s o c i a l i z e d subjects w o u l d n o t b e subjects w i t h o u t
N o n e t h e l e s s , these c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d s h o u l d n o t be t h e n e t w o r k o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s a n d o f t h e t r a d i t i o n s o f society
c o n c e i v e d o f as systems c o n s t i t u t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t s f o r o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d c u l t u r e . O f c o u r s e , c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects e x p e r i e n c e
they r e m a i n e n t w i n e d w i t h one a n o t h e r via the c o m m o n m e d i u m o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e l i f e w o r l d s as a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d t o t a l i t y i n
e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e . So l o n g as n o s p e c i a l c o d e s s u c h as m o n e y o r t h e b a c k g r o u n d . B u t this totality, w h i c h w o u l d have to disintegrate
administrative power b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d split o f f f r o m this for them a t t h e m o m e n t o f t h e m a t i z a t i o n a n d h y p o s t a t i z a t i o n , is c o n -
m e d i u m — c o d e s b y w a y o f w h i c h , i n t u r n , f u n c t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c sys- s t i t u t e d b y t h e m o t i v e s a n d c o m p e t e n c i e s o f s o c i a l i z e d i n d i v i d u a l s as
t e m s o f a c t i o n b e c o m e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e society m u c h as b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d g r o u p s o l i d a r i t i e s . T h e l i f e w o r l d
component o f the lifeworld—everyday language ( w h i c h is always is s t r u c t u r e d b y c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r s n o m o r e
m u l t i f u n c t i o n a l ) sets a l i m i t t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . a n d n o less t h a n i t is by i d e n t i t i e s t h a t arise o u t o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n
E v e n systems o f a c t i o n t h a t a r e s p e c i a l i z e d t o a h i g h d e g r e e i n processes. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e l i f e w o r l d d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a n o r -
c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n (school) o r social i n t e g r a t i o n (law) o r sociali- g a n i z a t i o n t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s b e l o n g as m e m b e r s , n o r a n associa-
z a t i o n ( f a m i l y ) d o n o t o p e r a t e o n t h e basis o f s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n s . V i a t i o n i n w h i c h individuals j o i n together, n o r a collective comprised o f
t h e c o m m o n c o d e o f e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e t h e y also c o n c u r r e n t l y f u l f i l l i n d i v i d u a l participants. Rather, t h e everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-
t h e o t h e r respective f u n c t i o n s alongside t h e i r o w n p a r t i c u l a r ones, tices i n w h i c h t h e l i f e w o r l d is c e n t e r e d a r e n o u r i s h e d b y m e a n s o f
thus m a i n t a i n i n g a relation to the totality o f the lifeworld. The a n interplay o f c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n , social i n t e g r a t i o n , a n d s o c i a l i -
l i f e w o r l d , as a s y m b o l i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d c o n t e x t o f m e a n i n g t h a t ex- z a t i o n t h a t is i n t u r n r o o t e d i n these p r a c t i c e s .
t e n d s t h r o u g h these v a r i o u s f u n c t i o n s a n d f o r m s o f e m b o d i m e n t ,
O r g a n i s m s fall u n d e r the d e s c r i p t i o n o f persons o n l y if, a n d to the
c o m p r i s e s t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s entwined with one another in an equipri-
e x t e n t t h a t , t h e y a r e s o c i a l i z e d , t h a t is, i n v e s t e d w i t h a n d s t r u c t u r e d
mordial way.
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b y social a n d c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s o f m e a n i n g . P e r s o n s are s y m b o l i c
structures, whereas the symbolically s t r u c t u r e d n a t u r e - l i k e substra-
t u m , a l t h o u g h e x p e r i e n c e d as o n e ' s o w n b o d y , n o n e t h e l e s s , as n a -
t u r e , r e m a i n s j u s t as e x t e r n a l t o i n d i v i d u a l s as d o e s t h e m a t e r i a l
n a t u r a l basis o f t h e l i f e w o r l d as a w h o l e . W h e r e a s i n t e r n a l and
external nature constitute external boundaries—delimitations with
respect to an e n v i r o n m e n t — f o r socialized individuals a n d t h e i r life-
w o r l d s , these persons r e m a i n i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d — v i a g r a m m a t i c a l re-
l a t i o n s h i p s — w i t h t h e i r c u l t u r e a n d t h e i r society.
The content of culturally handed-down t r a d i t i o n s is always a
k n o w l e d g e a c q u i r e d by persons; w i t h o u t the h e r m e n e u t i c a p p r o p r i a -
tion and further development of cultural knowledge t h r o u g h per-
sons, n o t r a d i t i o n s c a n d e v e l o p o r b e m a i n t a i n e d . T o t h i s e x t e n t ,
persons accomplish s o m e t h i n g f o r c u l t u r e b y way o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e - Figure 4.1
tive achievements. However, c u l t u r e f o r its p a r t also r e p r e s e n t s a Entwining of personality structures with culture a n d society
T h e s p e a k e r has t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f g e t t i n g a n addressee t o r e c o g -
2 n i z e h i s i n t e n t i o n i w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s i g n x. A c c o r d i n g t o Searle's
revision, however, the i n t e n t i o n ] has the structure of a repre-
Searle h a d s h o w n i n 1969 t h a t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f a s p e e c h act sentation (Vorstellung) "p," w h i c h is t r u e i f "jb" exists. T h u s , the
c a n n o t b e d e s c r i b e d as a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . A s p e e c h act c a n n o t
3
speaker can i m p o s e o n the sign x the c o n d i t i o n s f o r the existence o f
a d e q u a t e l y be a n a l y z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y a state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d a f o r t i o r i ; h e c a n m e a s u r e t h e success
b e c a u s e t h e m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f w h a t t h e s p e a k e r wishes t o give a n o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h e t h e r t h e ad-
a d d r e s s e e t o u n d e r s t a n d is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e s u b j e c t i v e content dressee, w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i m p o s e d o n x, r e c o g -
o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o l l o w i n g A u s t i n , Searle h a d d e s c r i b e d the nizes t h e state o f affairs r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e speaker.
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s p e e c h a c t as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y g o a l t h a t results F r o m m y p o i n t o f view, by c o n t r a s t , a s p e e c h act, w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r
p r i m a r i l y f r o m w h a t is said i t s e l f a n d n o t f r o m t h e s p e a k e r ' s i n t e n - uses i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n addressee a b o u t s o m e -
t i o n . T h e g o a l i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r consists i n t h e addressee t h i n g , expresses s i m u l t a n e o u s l y (a) t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n , (b) a
recognizing that the conditions for the validity o f a correctly exe- state o f a f f a i r s , a n d (c) a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . A c c o r d i n g t o
260 261
e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s o f v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are d e t e r m i n e d by a i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a c t u a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n s . C l e a r l y , t h e ex-
nition of corresponding validity claims (section 4). This will be m a k e p r e s e n t a state o f affairs t o o u r s e l v e s in mente w i t h o u t u s i n g a n y
followed by a b r i e f exposition of an alternative approach (sec- language—whether for purposes o f representation or communica-
are a b l e t o d o t h i s n o t o n l y w h e n w e d o n o t use a n y l a n g u a g e b u t 4
e v e n w h e n w e have n o command o f a n y l a n g u a g e . However, the
conclusion drawn i n the excerpted passage d o e s n o t p r o v i d e a n y E v e n i f , c o n t r a r y t o t h e f o r e g o i n g r e f l e c t i o n s , i t p r o v e d possible to
a r g u m e n t i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s thesis. F o r h e r e , Searle a l r e a d y p r e s u p - defend thesis ( 1 ) , t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t e x p l a n a t o r y p r o g r a m w o u l d
poses t h a t S p r o d u c e s ( o r c h o o s e s ) h i s d r a w i n g ( o r s o m e o t h e r x) r e q u i r e t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f thesis ( 2 ) . B e c a u s e t h e success o f a s p e e c h
w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t i t s h o u l d p e r m i t r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c e r t a i n state act u l t i m a t e l y is s u p p o s e d t o b e m e a s u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n d i -
o f a f f a i r s , A. A n d , i n d e e d , t h e d r a w i n g o f a b r o k e n c r a n k s h a f t c a n t i o n s f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s
be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way b y a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y p r o f i c i e n t observer. o f s p e e c h acts m u s t be a n a l y z a b l e as j u s t so m a n y ways o f r e f e r r i n g
D r a w i n g s , h o w e v e r , d o n o t i n t r i n s i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s . As to the satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s f o r — o r i g i n a l l y m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d —
Searle h i m s e l f observes, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e d e p i c t e d object states o f a f f a i r s : " D i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y
a n d t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f is o f a d i f f e r e n t k i n d . T h e d r a w i n g r e p r o d u c e s h a v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , c a n b e r e g a r d e d as d i f f e r e n t m o d e s i n
a broken c r a n k s h a f t ; its usefulness depends on whether i t is w h i c h u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t reality. . . . I f w e see t h e basic f o r m o f t h e
s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r t o t h e o b j e c t b e i n g d e p i c t e d . S i m i l a r i t y is, h o w - i l l o c u t i o n a r y act as F(p) . . . t h e n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y p o i n t s w i l l d e t e r -
ever, m e r e l y a necessary a n d n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e i n t e r - mine t h e d i f f e r e n t ways i n w h i c h p's a r e r e l a t e d t o t h e w o r l d "
pretation in question—namely, that the depicted crankshaft (p. 219).
expresses t h e f a c t t h a t t h e c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . O n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t utterances owe t h e i r m e a n i n g s to t h e
C o n s i d e r e d o n its o w n t e r m s , t h e r e l a t i o n o f s i m i l a r i t y b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s , o n e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e u t t e r e d sen-
the representation a n d the original fulfills, perhaps, the role o f a tence i f one knows the conditions that make i t true. This holds to
d e i c t i c g e s t u r e o r a d e s i g n a t i o n . I t p o i n t s t o a c e r t a i n object, s e r v i n g b e g i n w i t h f o r assertoric sentences t h a t a r e u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h
to h i g h l i g h t this p a r t i c u l a r object a m i d s t t h e m u l t i t u d e o f all possible acts. H o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f m o s t s p e e c h acts, w h a t is at issue is n o t
objects, a n d thereby to i d e n t i f y i t . However, the d r a w i n g does n o t o f the existence o f states o f a f f a i r s . I f , n o n e t h e l e s s , the relation o f
its o w n a c c o r d r e p r e s e n t a state of affairs. I t is n o t e q u i v a l e n t t o a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is s u p p o s e d t o be c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r t h e m e a n i n g of
s t a t e m e n t , w h i c h c o u l d b e t r u e o r false. T h e c a r t o g r a p h i c r e p r e - n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y types m u s t b e
s e n t a t i o n o f a m o u n t a i n r a n g e m a y b e m o r e o r less a c c u r a t e ; b u t d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e a t t i t u d e s a d o p t e d i n e a c h case b y
o n l y t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t w e base o n o u r r e a d i n g o f t h e m a p — t h e s p e a k e r t o t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s , as w e l l as o n t h e basis
t h a t w e i n f e r f r o m i t , so t o s p e a k — a r e t r u e o r false, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t o f t h e sense in which his u t t e r a n c e s r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g : " T h e basic
t h e m o u n t a i n r a n g e s are s e p a r a t e d b y w i d e valleys o r t h a t t h e h i g h e s t i d e a h e r e is t h e o l d o n e , t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t is s o m e h o w
p e a k lies 3,000 m e t e r s a b o v e sea l e v e l . I n t h e same way, w e c a n infer g i v e n b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a c o m m a n d is g i v e n by
f r o m the drawing o f a b r o k e n crankshaft the proposition that the its o b e d i e n c e c o n d i t i o n s ; t h e m e a n i n g o f a p r o m i s e is g i v e n b y its
r e p r e s e n t e d c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . H o w e v e r , o n l y a n i n t e r p r e t e r w h o f u l f i l l m e n t c o n d i t i o n s , a.s.o." ( p . 2 2 0 ) .
k n o w s in advance w h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s m e a n s T h u s , t h e m o d e o f a s p e e c h act c h a n g e s w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
i n g e n e r a l is a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b r o k e n a t t i t u d e o f t h e speaker a n d w i t h the type o f satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s
c r a n k s h a f t as a d e s i g n a t i o n w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t t h a t t h e f o r t h e state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l component.
c r a n k s h a f t is b r o k e n . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r c o u l d n o t e v e n see t h a t t h e H o w e v e r , t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l l o w s o n l y t w o specifica-
d r a w i n g , b y i m i t a t i n g a c e r t a i n o b j e c t , r e p r e s e n t s a state o f a f f a i r s i f t i o n s i n t h e sense o f A u s t i n ' s " d i r e c t i o n s o f fit": t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e
he d i d n o t already have c o m m a n d o f a language a n d k n o w , o n the satisfied w h e n t h e w o r d s (Worte) fit t h e asserted states o f a f f a i r s ( o r
basis o f h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s , h o w states o f a f f a i r s are r e p r e s e n t e d t h e w o r l d ) (-1), a n d success c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d w h e n t h e d e s i r e d
linguistically. 5
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t h e w o r l d ) are m a d e t o fit t h e w o r d s (T). Searle
264 265
t h r e a t s ; b u t t h e n i n e a c h case w e m e a n s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t b y is n o c l a i m t o v a l i d i t y associated w i t h t h e m b u t r a t h e r a p o w e r c l a i m ;
" i n t e n t i o n a l c a u s a t i o n . " I t is t r u e t h a t i n b o t h cases s p e e c h acts they are o r i e n t e d n o t t o w a r d t h e possibility o f c o m m o n agreement
c o n s t i t u t e f o r t h e h e a r e r at least p a r t i a l l y a r e a s o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a b u t t o w a r d t h e causal effect o f t h e speaker's influence on the
c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s , b u t t h e types o f reasons t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a r e hearer. 8
d i s t i n c t i n a n i n t e r e s t i n g way. T h e r e a s o n s v i n d i c a t i n g t h e v a l i d i t y
c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h a n o r d e r a r e r e a s o n s f o r e v e r y b o d y , o r a t least f o r 5
all the parties w h o recognize the a u t h o r i z i n g n o r m s or institutions.
B y c o n t r a s t , reasons f o r s u b m i t t i n g t o a p o w e r c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h B e f o r e d r a w i n g s o m e c o n c l u s i o n s , l e t us r e t u r n t o t h e issue o f clas-
n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e s o r t h r e a t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o t h i s set o f g e n e r a l s i f i c a t i o n . T h e analysis t h a t I have p r o p o s e d f o r n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -
reasons; t h e y are specific i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y c o u n t as r e a s o n s o n l y r i z e d d i r e c t i v e s also a p p l i e s t o c o m m i s s i v e s .
f o r t h e m o r e o r less r a t i o n a l c h o i c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n with
(3) I p r o m i s e y o u I w i l l h a n d over the r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y
particular preferences i n a particular situation. T h i s difference be-
t o Y.
c o m e s o b v i o u s w h e n t h e h e a r e r r e j e c t s t h e r e s p e c t i v e speech-acts. I n
t h e case o f a n o r d e r , a h e a r e r w h o r e j e c t s t h e speech-act o f f e r d i s - A n a d d r e s s e e c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e u t t e r a n c e as a p r o m i s e o n l y w h e n
p u t e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is a u t h o r i z e d t o e x p e c t t h e b e h a v i o r com- she knows the conditions under which an accountable
m a n d e d o f her: (zurechnungsfähig) a c t o r c a n b i n d h i s o w n w i l l — t h a t is, t a k e o n a n
obligation to do s o m e t h i n g . H e r e , t o o , t h e n e g a t i v e r e s p o n s e is
(1') N o , you cannot order me to do anything.
a i m e d a t these a u t o n o m y c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h , as i n ( 1 ) , s u p p l e m e n t
I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e h e a r e r c h a l l e n g e s o n l y c e r t a i n e x i s t e n t i a l t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f success f o r "p." F o r i n s t a n c e :
presuppositions p e r t a i n i n g to t h e reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions o n
(3') N o , y o u are far too u n r e l i a b l e f o r m e to take such a promise
w h i c h t h e speaker d r a w s :
seriously.
(2') N o , y o u have n o t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a d i r e c t i v e o r c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h act, t h e
Whereas g e n e r a l reasons can facilitate a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t be- h e a r e r m u s t k n o w n o t o n l y t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state
t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , specific r e a s o n s , i n t h e sense i l l u s t r a t e d o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d i n i t , b u t also t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t
b y t h e l a t t e r case, m e d i a t e a n i n f l u e n c e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r e x e r t s o n c a n b e r e g a r d e d as l e g i t i m a t e o r as b i n d i n g . T h i s v i e w is d u e t o a
the attitude o f the hearer. f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f a basic i n s i g h t o f t r u t h - c o n d i -
T o t h i s o b j e c t i o n Searle c o u l d r e s p o n d b y d r a w i n g a t t e n t i o n t o h i s t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . T h i s is a l l t h e m o r e r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t i t m a y b e
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n successful a n d successful b u t d e f e c t i v e speech c o n f i r m e d t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as w e l l .
acts. E v e r y t h i n g t h e n h i n g e s o n w h a t k i n d o f d e f i c i e n c y w e m e a n . I f I n t h i s r e s p e c t , h o w e v e r , a n a s y m m e t r y is i n i t i a l l y s t r i k i n g : t h e
w e d e s c r i b e t h e l a c k o f a u t h o r i z i n g c o n d i t i o n s as a f a i l u r e i n p r e p a r a - v a l i d i t y o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r s t o d e p e n d only on the
t o r y c o n d i t i o n s , as Searle has s u g g e s t e d , w e w o u l d miss t h e p o i n t . s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e "p"
I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o w e t h e i r m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u s e d i n i t ; b y c o n t r a s t , however, as o u r analysis so f a r has s h o w n , t h e
t h e y c a r r y , since these c l a i m s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — a r e c a p a b l e of s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g success c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e state o f
b e i n g intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d to the e x t e n t that they are based a f f a i r s " t h a t p" e x p r e s s e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is i n f a c t
o n r e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t as r e a s o n s f o r a l l p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d . N a k e d n o t sufficient for the validity o f orders o r promises. T h i s asymmetry
imperatives a n d threats are d e p r i v e d o f this i l l o c u t i o n a r y force; there d i s a p p e a r s as s o o n as o n e realizes t h a t , e v e n i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e
268 269
s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r m u s t i n t e n d s o m e t h i n g m o r e a n d s o m e - M y m a i n p o i n t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h e i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e
t h i n g d i f f e r e n t t h a n w h a t is e x p e c t e d f r o m h i m o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . I t c o n d e m n s t h e h e a r e r t o a p e c u l i a r passivity.
r e a d i n g , namely, to get the hearer to recognize that he holds to I t d e p r i v e s h e r o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t a k i n g t h e speaker's utterance
b e t r u e ( i n t e n t i o n ^ a n d t h a t h e wishes t o l e t h e r k n o w t h i s ( i n t e n - seriously—that is, o f a c c e p t i n g i t as v a l i d o r o f r e j e c t i n g i t as i n v a l i d .
t i o n s ) . T h e speaker w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e t o t h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y t h e W i t h o u t t h e possibility o f t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n w i t h a "yes" o r "no,"
i n t e n t i o n i t h a t he has ( t h a t h e b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"), b u t h e also w a n t s however, the process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n r e m a i n s i n c o m p l e t e .
to communicate t o h e r t h e f a c t "/>" (so t h a t t h e addressee herself W i t h a s p e e c h act, t h e speaker n o t o n l y p r o v i d e s t h e h e a r e r w i t h
b e l i e v e s " t h a t p"). T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m d o e s n o t c o n s i s t s i m p l y i n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o b e c o m e aware o f h i s o w n i n t e n t i o n ; h e f u r t h e r
t h e addressee b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n (Meinung); c l a i m s t o h a v e r e a s o n s t h a t c a n m o v e t h e h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a n asser-
r a t h e r , she h e r s e l f is s u p p o s e d t o a r r i v e a t t h e same v i e w as t h a t o f t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , o r — a s I
w h i c h t h e speaker is c o n v i n c e d . I n s h o r t , t h e addressee is s u p p o s e d w o u l d l i k e t o a d d a t t h i s p o i n t — a n a v o w a l as s i n c e r e . T h e speaker
t o a c c e p t t h e speaker's a s s e r t i o n as v a l i d . T h i s is w h a t t h e c o m m u n i - c a n n o t achieve his i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f c o n v e y i n g a fact, g i v i n g a n
c a t i o n o f facts is a l l a b o u t . T h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n a c c o r d i n g order, m a k i n g a request or a promise, or revealing a subjective
t o w h i c h t h e speaker i n t e n d s t o p r o d u c e i n t h e h e a r e r t h e b e l i e f t h a t experience (Erlebnis) i f h e does n o t a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e k n o w n
t h e s p e a k e r is c o m m i t t e d t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c e r t a i n state o f a f f a i r s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h h i s u t t e r a n c e c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d ;
c o m e s close t o a d i s t o r t i o n . I n o r d e r t o achieve h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d , i n d e e d , h e m u s t d o so i n s u c h a w a y t h a t , i n c l a i m i n g t h a t these
a i m , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r i m p o s e truth conditions c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d , h e i m p l i c i d y also o f f e r s t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s
f o r a m e n t a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s o n a s i g n x a n d t h a t h e i n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c l a i m , i f necessary. T h e h e a r e r m u s t b e a b l e t o
m a k e s t h e addressee a w a r e o f these b y u t t e r i n g x ( t h e assertoric h a v e r e a s o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g a n a s s e r t i o n as t r u e , a n o r d e r as l e g i t i -
s e n t e n c e ) , w h i c h is i m p r e g n a t e d , as i t w e r e , w i t h t h e t r u t h c o n d i - m a t e , a p r o m i s e as b i n d i n g , a n a v o w a l as a u t h e n t i c o r s i n c e r e (or,
t i o n s . R a t h e r , t h e s p e a k e r m u s t c o n f r o n t t h e addressee w i t h h i s claim alternatively, f o r q u e s t i o n i n g such claims). T h e hearer does not
t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m a k e t h e asserted s e n t e n c e t r u e a r e i n d e e d u n d e r s t a n d t h e s p e e c h act i f she d o e s n o t k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r
satisfied. t a k i n g s u c h a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f
t h a t m a k e t h e assertoric s e n t e n c e e m p l o y e d t r u e . A g a i n s t t h i s , t h e a b o u t "jb"; o r t h a t h e w a n t s t o r e v e a l t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a
v a l i d i t y c l a i m s l i n k e d t o o r d e r s a n d p r o m i s e s r e f e r directly t o t h e b e l i e f , a f e e l i n g , a d e s i r e , a n i n t e n t i o n , a n d so f o r t h .
normative conditions that entitle one party to expect that the other
p a r t y w i l l b r i n g a b o u t t h e r e p r e s e n t e d state o f a f f a i r s . T h e c l a i m t o 6
p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h refers t o t h e existence o f a state o f a f f a i r s , i n
o t h e r w o r d s to t h e f a c t "p." By contrast, the c l a i m to n o r m a t i v e Understanding t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is c e r t a i n l y n o t
validity refers to the legitimacy o f t h e expectation that one o r o t h e r t h e s a m e as reaching understanding a b o u t s o m e t h i n g w i t h t h e h e l p o f
o f t h e p a r t i e s c o n c e r n e d s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t a r e p r e s e n t e d state o f an u t t e r a n c e h e l d to be valid. A n equally clear d i s t i n c t i o n m u s t be
a f f a i r s " t h a t p." m a d e b e t w e e n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e a n d o n e t h a t is m e r e l y h e l d t o b e
270 271
v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , q u e s t i o n s o f m e a n i n g c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d c o m - t h e s t a t e m e n t a b o u t t h e f u t u r e . A n y i l l o c u t i o n a r y act a t a l l c a n be
p l e t e l y f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y . T h e basic q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
9 c h a l l e n g e d f r o m t h e p o i n t s o f v i e w o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, t r u t h f u l -
u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n n o t be iso- ness (Wahrhaftigkeif), a n d t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , a n i m p e r a t i v e s u c h as
lated f r o m the question o f the context i n w h i c h this expression can (1) can be n e g a t e d n o t only w i t h respect to t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n o f the
be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . O n e s i m p l y w o u l d n o t k n o w w h a t i t is t o s p e a k e r b u t also w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e speaker's i n t e n -
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a linguistic expression i f one d i d n o t t i o n expressed i n i t , o r w i t h respect to t h e t r u t h o f t h e existential
k n o w h o w o n e could m a k e use o f i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g presuppositions o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i t expresses. 11
language, the dimensions o f m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y are internally sible speaks f o r t h e sharpness a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f Searle's analyses.
c u t i o n a r y types m a y b e i d e n t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s sis t h a t is b a s e d o n t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t m o d e l . T h e c o n c e p t o f a v a l i d i t y
c l a i m w o u l d lose its p o i n t i f i t w e r e b r o u g h t b a c k i n s i d e t h a t m o d e l .
associated w i t h t h e m . 1 0
I n o r d e r to identify the validity claims t h e m -
T r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a n d satisfaction c o n d i t i o n s are semantic concepts
selves, t h e f o l l o w i n g h e u r i s t i c q u e s t i o n m a y b e u s e f u l : I n w h a t sense
f o r w h i c h m e n t a l i s t c o r r e l a t e s m a y also b e s p e c i f i e d . H o w e v e r , p r i -
c a n t h e s p e e c h act as a w h o l e b e n e g a t e d ? W e a r r i v e a t p r e c i s e l y
vate access t o v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s — w h e t h e r p r e l i n g u i s t i c o r s i m p l y
three validity claims i f we consider f r o m w h i c h p o i n t s o f view a n
m o n o l o g i c a l — c a n b e d e f e n d e d o n l y a t t h e p r i c e o f w h a t I r e g a r d as
i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a m b i g u o u s s e n t e n c e s u c h as
an untenable correspondence t h e o r y o f t r u t h . I propose, therefore,
(4) I w i l l h a n d o v e r t h e r e q u i r e d s u m o f m o n e y t o Y. that validity c o n d i t i o n s s h o u l d be considered n o t i n isolation f r o m ,
b u t i n p r a g m a t i c c o n n e c t i o n w i t h , validity claims a n d p o t e n t i a l rea-
can be negated.
sons f o r t h e v i n d i c a t i o n o f s u c h c l a i m s .
(4') N o , y o u are f a r t o o u n r e l i a b l e i n s u c h m a t t e r s . C r i t i c i z a b l e validity claims, w h i c h have a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o -
e s c o r t i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is a r t i c u l a t e d i n a n u n t h e m a t i c a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f d e c l a r a t i o n s . T h i s p r o p o s a l faces t w o m a j o r
1. Cf. chapter 6 in this volume, pp. 286ff., especially notes 18 and 19, p. 305.
T h r e e A p p r o a c h e s to a T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g s h o u l d a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o
u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w e l l - f o r m e d symbolic expression. I n
1934, K a r l Bùhler p r o p o s e d a s c h e m a o f language f u n c t i o n s that
placed the linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n s t o t h e speaker, t o t h e
w o r l d , a n d to the hearer (figure 6.1). This schema o f how linguistic
1
signs a r e u s e d p r o v e s u s e f u l i f o n e releases i t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e
s p e c i f i c p s y c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h i t arose, e x t e n d s t h e s e m i -
otic approach, a n d gives a c h a r i t a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o t h e t h r e e
f u n c t i o n s m e n t i o n e d . T h e d i a g r a m t h e n yields the general thesis
that language represents a m e d i u m — B ù h l e r spoke o f the o r g a n o n
m o d e l o f l a n g u a g e — t h a t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y serves t h r e e d i f f e r e n t , a l -
t h o u g h i n t e r n a l l y related, functions. Expressions that are employed
c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y s e r v e t o express t h e i n t e n t i o n s ( o r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e -
riences (Erlebnisse)) o f a speaker, t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s (or
s o m e t h i n g the speaker encounters i n t h e w o r l d ) , a n d to establish
r e l a t i o n s w i t h a n addressee. T h e t h r e e aspects o f a speaker r e a c h i n g
understanding/with another person/about something are reflected
h e r e . I n l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h r e e c o n v e r g i n g rays o f m e a n i n g a r e
f o c u s e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i o n c o n n e c t s
u p w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t , as w e l l as w i t h t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h
i t s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e exists a t h r e e f o l d r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d w h a t is intended (gemeint)
278 279
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
c o n c a t e n a t i o n s o f signs p r o d u c e d b y h i m as a v e h i c l e f o r i n f o r m i n g
OBJECTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS
v > his addressee a b o u t his beliefs o r i n t e n t i o n s . I n this c o n c e p d o n , the
11 I I I i ' I I I
p r e m i s e s o f t h e m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s are s t i l l p r e s u p -
• I 11 ; I 1111
i 111 ' I ' i| j Representation p o s e d as u n p r o b l e m a t i c . The representing subject (das vorstellende Sub¬
jekt) stands o v e r a n d against a w o r l d o f t h i n g s a n d events, a n d asserts
at t h e s a m e t i m e h i s s o v e r e i g n t y i n t h e w o r l d as a p u r p o s i v e l y acting
subject. F r o m t h e same p e r s p e c t i v e , h e e n c o u n t e r s o t h e r subjects
w h o , i n t u r n , assert themselves. A s s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e o f a c t i o n , t h e y
i n f l u e n c e e a c h o t h e r i n t h e way i n w h i c h t h e y g e n e r a l l y intervene
causally i n i n n e r w o r l d l y processes. T h a t t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e m e d i -
a t e d b y l a n g u a g e a p p e a r s as s o m e t h i n g s e c o n d a r y i n c o m p a r i s o n t o
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a n d p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l subjects.
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) connect u p w i t h the substratum of
Figure 6.1
Bùhler's schema of language functions l i n g u i s t i c signs i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way, so as t o b e c a p a b l e o f e m e r g i n g
f r o m the inwardness o f a particular i n d i v i d u a l subjectivity a n d t a k i n g
o n e x t e r n a l f o r m . I n t u r n , t h e signs, as i n s t r u m e n t s f o r i n f l u e n c i n g
b y i t , w h a t is said i n i t , a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h i t is used i n t h e s p e e c h
a n a l i e n s u b j e c t i v i t y , are a c c o r d e d a p l a c e w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of
act. N o r m a l l y , l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g is n o t e x h a u s t e d by any o n e of
teleological action.
these t h r e e r e l a t i o n s . 2
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
I n o r d e r to explicate such distinctions between modes i n terms o f or are inaccessible to observation. Michael D u m m e t t correctly
t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s , S t e n i u s a n d K e n n y m a k e use o f a n i d e a p o i n t s o u t t h a t s i m p l e r u l e s o f v e r i f i c a t i o n f o r these a n d s i m i l a r
t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d states o f a f f a i r s . 2 0
T h e y begin w i t h statements r e n d e r t h e F r e g e a n thesis m o r e p r e c i s e t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t o n e u n d e r -
r e p r e s e n t e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d i m p e r a t i v e s r e q u i r e t h a t states tion. Relying o n the pragmatic distinction between "truth" and
a r e successfully c a r r i e d o u t . I n b o t h cases, w h a t is at issue a r e t h e knowledge o f the t r u t h conditions (or knowledge o f the verification
is e n t i t l e d t o raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e s e n t e n c e . 2 3
t h a t h a v e d e v e l o p e d , as i t w e r e , as p a r t o f t h e n a t u r a l h i s t o r y o f a
diversity o f i n t e r l o c k i n g ( a n d i n p r i n c i p l e , equally legitimate) l a n -
J u s t as D u m m e t t i m p l i c i t l y m a k e s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e g a m e o f a r g u -
guage games.
m e n t a t i o n i n w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r qua p r o p o n e n t is a b l e t o c o n v i n c e
a h e a r e r qua o p p o n e n t o f t h e e n t i t l e m e n t f o r h i s t r u t h c l a i m , so b. F o l l o w i n g o n f r o m t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n i n v e s t i g a t e d
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r o l e s i n h i s analysis o f t h e c o n c e p t o f f o l l o w i n g a g u a g e is b o u n d u p w i t h i n t e r a c t i v e p r a c t i c e s i n a f o r m o f l i f e . I n
rule. 2 4
F o l l o w i n g a r u l e m e a n s f o l l o w i n g t h e same r u l e i n e a c h case; a d d i t i o n , however, a n d u n l i k e W i t t g e n s t e i n , A u s t i n does n o t w a n t t o
o f a c r i t i c B w h o is a b l e t o a s c e r t a i n d e v i a t i o n s f r o m t h e r u l e . I d e n - s p e e c h acts t h a t c o m b i n e s t h e i n s i g h t s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s
F o r t h e i d e n t i t y o f a r u l e i n t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f its r e a l i z a t i o n s d o e s d u a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n t h a t i n a g e n e r a l w a y o p p o s e s i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts
t h e r e b y seeks t o a v o i d m i s t a k e s , a n d o n e f o r B, w h o is a b l e c r i t i c a l l y a r y acts as s u c h a r e n o t s u p p o s e d t o h a v e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ,
o f t h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n c a n h a v e a n a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d b e t r u e o r false b u t i n s t e a d p e r f o r m s a s o c i a l
least o n e o t h e r s u b j e c t , o f f o l l o w i n g a r u l e t h a t is v a l i d for both of them. w h i c h t h e speaker can p e r f o r m w i t h this expression. O f course, such
A m o n a d i c a l l y i s o l a t e d s u b j e c t c a n n o m o r e use a n e x p r e s s i o n i n a a n act c a n b e i n f e l i c i t o u s , i f , f o r e x a m p l e , i t is c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e
he thereby surrenders any r e l a t i o n to validity that transcends the Locutionary Act—Assertoric Sentence—Meaning—True/False
c o n t e x t o f a given language g a m e . U t t e r a n c e s are v a l i d o r i n v a l i d
o n l y a c c o r d i n g to the standards o f the language game to w h i c h they Illocutionary Act—Performative Sentence—Force—Felicitous/
b e l o n g . T h u s , almost i m p e r c e p t i b l y , even t h e r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h of Infelicitous
f a c t - a s c e r t a i n i n g s p e e c h is lost. F o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e r e p r e s e n t a -
290 291
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
T h i s d u a l i s m c o u l d n o t be m a i n t a i n e d . 2 5
A u s t i n saw f r o m t h e b e g i n - w h e t h e r i t is " i n o r d e r . " 2 6
T o be s u r e , A u s t i n d o e s n o t f i l l t h e d i m e n -
n i n g , o f c o u r s e , t h a t m o s t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d o n o t a p p e a r inde- s i o n o f " r i g h t n e s s " — t o w h i c h t h e v a l i d i t y , i n t h e sense o f t r u t h , o f
pendently but incorporate clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o w g e n e r a l i z e d — w i t h a s p e c i f i c n u m b e r o f
g e n e r a l , t h e s p e a k e r c a r r i e s o u t a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act b y s a y i n g some- w e l l - d e f i n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; r a t h e r , h i s " l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas o f
thing. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t establishes o n l y t h e m o d e o f a t r u t h a n d f a l s i t y " is s u p p o s e d t o o p e n u p a w h o l e s p e c t r u m o f aspects
s e n t e n c e t h a t is u s e d as a p r o m i s e , a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , a n a v o w a l , o f validity, r a n g i n g f r o m p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h via goodness a n d a p p r o -
a n d so f o r t h . T h e n o t a t i o n Mp i n d i c a t e s t h a t w e e x e c u t e t w o acts i n priateness to n o r m a t i v e rightness. O u t o f a wealth o f evaluative
o n e , acts t h a t c a n be s e p a r a t e d o n l y a n a l y t i c a l l y . B u t t h e n i t is n o v i e w p o i n t s , t h e l i n g u i s t i c analyst is s u p p o s e d i n e a c h case t o b e a b l e
l o n g e r clear w h y the contrast between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g , " f a m i l - t o i d e n t i f y t h e r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i o n o f assessment a n d t o c a p t u r e i t
iar f r o m t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semandcs, o u g h t to be r e t a i n e d i n a the- d e s c r i p t i v e l y . B y c o n t r a s t , Searle w a n t s t o a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t
o r y o f s p e e c h acts. P e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s o b v i o u s l y have j u s t as necessarily r e s u l t f r o m t h i s k i n d o f s u b s u m p t i o n o f v a l i d i t y , i n t h e
c l e a r a m e a n i n g as assertoric s e n t e n c e s . A n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts sense o f t r u t h , a n d n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y u n d e r a d i v e r s i t y o f "values."
e x h i b i t t h e same i l l o c u t i o n a r y - p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e as a l l I n t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts, h e a d m i t s o n l y t h e
o t h e r s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s , d e s c r i p d o n s , or narratives can, c o m - o n e clear-cut universal validity c l a i m that h a d already been p r i v i l e g e d
p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i r t r u t h v a l u e , be i n f e l i c i t o u s i n a way b y t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , Searle takes a step
s i m i l a r t o o t h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: o n e c a n m a k e s u c h a mess o f b a c k w a r d f r o m A u s t i n a n d the later W i t t g e n s t e i n to Frege.
t e l l i n g a t a l e t h a t " i t is n o l o n g e r a g o o d s t o r y , " o r discuss a d e l i c a t e
W e a r e n o n e t h e l e s s i n d e b t e d t o Searle f o r t h e v e r s i o n o f s p e e c h -
m a t t e r so b l u n t l y t h a t t h o s e p r e s e n t " w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e a n y f u r t h e r
act t h e o r y t h a t has b e e n m o s t p r e c i s e l y e x p l i c a t e d u p t o n o w . 2 7
He
discussion o f i t . "
takes A u s t i n ' s c o n d i t i o n s o f f e l i c i t y a n d r e n d e r s t h e m m o r e p r e c i s e
I f , h o w e v e r , all s p e e c h acts c a n b e a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r m Mp, t h e n as " p r e p a r a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s ; " these r e f e r t o s t a n d a r d i z e d contexts
l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose t h e s p e c i a l status t h a t was i n i t i a l l y c l a i m e d f o r t h a t m u s t o b t a i n i f c e r t a i n k i n d s o f s p e e c h acts a r e t o be performed
t h e m . T h e y a r e , so t o speak, a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m - m e a n i n g f u l l y a n d w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f success. H e t h e n a d d s c o m -
p o n e n t o f a n y a n d e v e r y s p e e c h act, a n d h a n d o v e r t h e i r monopoly p r e h e n s i b i l i t y a n d sincerity c o n d i t i o n s ; these r e f e r o n t h e o n e h a n d
o n t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h t o a p a r t i c u l a r class o f s p e e c h acts, t h e c o n s t a - to the availability o f a c o m m o n linguistic m e d i u m a n d the suitability
t i v e . T h i s t h e n gives rise t o t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o n l y o f the speech situation, a n d o n the o t h e r h a n d to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
constative s p e e c h acts c a n b e v a l i d o r i n v a l i d ( t r u e o r false) or i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker. H e f u r t h e r specifies c o n d i t i o n s f o r the
w h e t h e r o t h e r s p e e c h acts, t o o , m i g h t e x h i b i t a n e q u i v a l e n t d i m e n - s e m a n t i c f o r m t h a t t h e clauses w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m u s t obey,
s i o n f o r t h a t o f t r u t h . I f t h e l a t t e r w e r e t h e case, w e w o u l d h a v e t o and finally faces t h e task o f s p e c i f y i n g t h e "essential conditions"
work out a conception o f language t h a t a t t r i b u t e s n o essential i m - a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces o r m o d e s o f using
p o r t a n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t w h a t is said i n a l a n g u a g e always t r a n s c e n d s l a n g u a g e c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d . T h e five basic m o d e s d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y
the boundaries o f that language a n d refers to s o m e t h i n g i n the Searle ( c o n s t a t i v e , d i r e c t i v e , c o m m i s s i v e , expressive, a n d d e c l a r a t i v e
w o r l d . B u t b o t h A u s t i n a n d Searle give a n a f f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r t o t h i s s p e e c h acts) a r e o p e n t o m o r e p r e c i s e s u r f a c e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s u s i n g
question, albeit significantly d i f f e r e n t ones. p r a g m a t i c c r i t e r i a ( s u c h as t h e d i r e c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t o f t h e s p e a k e r
A u s t i n c o r r e c t s his p o s i t i o n t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e n o w u n d e r s t a n d s a n d hearer, the degree o f intensity i n b r i n g i n g o u t the i l l o c u t i o n a r y
the two dimensions o f evaluation, w h i c h he had initially correlated, p o i n t , o r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l ties o f t h e s p e e c h a c t ) .
respectively, w i t h l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( t r u t h vs. suc- However, the differentiation of t h e basic m o d e s themselves—
cess) , as aspects t h a t are m e r e l y a n a l y t i c a l l y s e p a r a b l e . Every s p e e c h m o r e o v e r , i n a v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n g e a r e d solely t o w a r d p r o p o s i t i o n a l
act can be evaluated a c c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r i t is " r i g h t " as w e l l as t r u t h ( w h i c h p e r m i t s v a r i a t i o n o n l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit
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Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d ) — i s t h e p r o b l e m o n w h i c h Searle n o r s i g n i n s u c h cases i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e t h e i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e
labors i n vain. I n b o t h directions ( f r o m " w o r d to w o r l d " a n d f r o m p e r s p e c t i v e o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s . I n expressive s p e e c h acts,
"world to w o r d " ) , the relation o f language to the objective w o r l d a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) comes i n t o play—a claim,
p r o v i d e s a basis t h a t is t o o n a r r o w f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e five p r o - m o r e o v e r , t h a t Searle has a l r e a d y e m p l o y e d i n a n u n s p e c i f i c way f o r
p o s e d classes o f s p e e c h acts. I n d e e d , f o r W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s i n c e r i t y c o n d i t i o n t h a t all c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h acts are s u p -
the r i c h variety o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces c o u l d n o t be b r o u g h t to o r d e r p o s e d t o satisfy. A s i m i l a r o b j e c t i o n c a n b e m a d e t o h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f
f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics h a d already b e e n the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f declarative speech acts. 29
s m a l l e s t i n d e p e n d e n t u n i t o f e x p l i c i t l y l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h - t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t o t h e addressee. A n d e a c h o f t h e t h r e e
i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c o m p o s e d o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y s p e e c h a c t Mp, t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g discussed i n t h e f o r e g o i n g c l a i m e d t h a t i t c o u l d
w i t h w h i c h S raises a t least o n e criticizable validity claim for her explain the comprehensibility of linguistic expressions through
u t t e r a n c e , a n d o f t h e "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r s o m e o n e o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s — w h e t h e r t h r o u g h t h e f u n c t i o n o f ex-
H u n d e r s t a n d s a n d accepts t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r f r o m S. R e a c h i n g p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n s , o r o f r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s , o r o f a c t u a l -
u n d e r s t a n d i n g aims at consensus f o r m a t i o n . T h e a t t e m p t by S to i z i n g a n d e s t a b l i s h i n g i n t e r a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s . W h a t w e are l o o k i n g
reach understanding w i t h H about something i n the w o r l d termi- f o r is a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t takes a c c o u n t o f t h e k e r n e l o f t r u t h
nates i n t h e a g r e e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t b e t w e e n t h e m ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t i n a l l t h r e e o f t h e s e t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . H o w e v e r , f r o m Searle's
is t h e n s e a l e d by t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e s p e e c h act. F o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i t has o n c e a g a i n b e c o m e a p p a r e n t t h a t
t h i s r e a s o n , u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen) a s p e e c h act a l r e a d y p o i n t s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s c o n c e i v e s t h e i n t e r n a l
t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p o s s i b l e a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) a b o u t w h a t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d m e a n i n g is too specialized.
is said. C e r t a i n l y , w h e t h e r o r n o t a n u t t e r a n c e f u l f i l l s its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l
O f course, the pragmatic r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f valid- f u n c t i o n is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ; however, t h e f u l f i l l -
i t y also r e q u i r e s a c o m p l e t e r é é v a l u a t i o n o f w h a t was o r i g i n a l l y m e n t o f t h e expressive a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e f u n c t i o n s is also m e a s u r e d
m e a n t b y t h e " i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e " o f a s p e e c h act. A s we saw, A u s t i n a g a i n s t c o n d i t i o n s t h a t are analogous to truth. I t h e r e f o r e w a n t t o
h a d c o n c e i v e d o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e as t h e l i t e r a l l y i r r a t i o n a l i n t r o d u c e s u b j e c t i v e t r u t h f u l n e s s a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness as t r u t h -
c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s the rational content was a n a l o g o u s c o n c e p t s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts. T h e r e l a t i o n s o f
m o n o p o l i z e d by t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e ( o r its n o m i - t h e s p e e c h act t o speakers' i n t e n t i o n s a n d t o addressees c a n also b e
nalized form). Meaning and u n d e r s t a n d i n g were concentrated conceived i n t e r m s o f the m o d e l o f a r e l a t i o n to the objective w o r l d .
solely o n t h i s r a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t . By c o n t r a s t , t h e c o n s i s t e n t e x e c u - T h a t is, t h e r e exists s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a r e l a t i o n t o t h e subjective w o r l d
t i o n o f t h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n m a k e s v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t o t h e stewards o f ( o f t h e s p e a k e r ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) t o w h i c h
a r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f as t h e s t r u c t u r a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n o f h e has p r i v i l e g e d access, a n d a r e l a t i o n t o t h e s o c i a l w o r l d ( o f t h e
v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r e f e r r i n g t o these c o n d i t i o n s , a n d speaker, t h e h e a r e r , a n d o t h e r m e m b e r s ) , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f i n t e r p e r -
reasons f o r the v i n d i c a t i o n o f these validity claims. T h e individual sonal relations h e l d to be legitimate. These world-concepts formed
s p e e c h act is b o u n d t o t h i s s t r u c t u r e p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h its m o d a l through analogy m u s t n o t , o f c o u r s e , b e m i s u n d e r s t o o d as p a r t i a l
component. T h a t is, t h e m o d e is d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f r e g i o n s ( i n P o p p e r ' s sense) o f t h e o n e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . 3 0
T h e subjec-
c l a i m raised by the speaker w i t h h e r m i s l e a d i n g l y n a m e d " i l l o c u t i o n - tive e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t S e x t e r n a l i z e s i n e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o -
a r y " act, i n t h e s t a n d a r d case t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a p e r f o r - t y p i c a l l y i n avowals a n d r e v e l a t i o n s ) s h o u l d n o m o r e b e understood
m a t i v e clause ( a n d also a c c o r d i n g t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h i s v a l i d i t y as a p a r t i c u l a r class o f entities ( o r i n n e r e p i s o d e s ) t h a n s h o u l d t h e
c l a i m is r e f e r r e d t o ) . T h e l o c u s o f r a t i o n a l i t y is t h e r e b y t r a n s f e r r e d norms l e g i t i m a t i n g an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p established be-
f r o m the p r o p o s i t i o n a l to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t , a n d at the t w e e n 5 a n d H b y m e a n s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( p r o t o t y p i c a l l y
same t i m e the validity c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r r e m a i n fixated o n the t h r o u g h commands a n d promises). F r o m the perspective of the
p r o p o s i t i o n . R o o m is t h u s m a d e f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f v a l i d i t y participants, the first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences e m p l o y e d in
c l a i m s t h a t a r e not d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s — t h a t is, a r e n o t expressive s p e e c h acts c a n b e u t t e r e d truthfully o r untruthfully, ac-
geared t o w a r d the r e l a t i o n o f language to the objective w o r l d . c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t h e says. B u t t h e y c a n n o t
b e t r u e o r false unless e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s are t o b e a s s i m i l a t e d
Bühler's schema o f language functions h a d already placed the
t o a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s . I n t h e s a m e way, t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s
linguistic expression i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker, t o
297
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Chapter 6
validity claim, then D u m m e t t ' s proposal for explicating the m e a n i n g separated sharply f r o m one a n o t h e r becomes plausible w h e n one
298 299
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g
. The binding and bonding effect o f a comprehensible a n d ac- sion, these sentences r e q u i r e p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs; f o r the subject
c e p t e d s p e e c h act is c a r r i e d o v e r t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e expression, t h e y r e q u i r e t h e first p e r s o n i n t h e p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e ;
sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n arising o u t o f the semantic content of the for the position o f the direct object, they require the second person.
s p e e c h a c t — w h e t h e r a s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r t h e h e a r e r o r t h e speaker, This grammatical f o r m o f the performadve sentence m i r r o r s the
o r s y m m e t r i c a l l y f o r b o t h sides. a t t i t u d e o f a s p e a k e r w h o takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n w i t h a
hearer i n order to reach understanding w i t h her about something,
T h u s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t s e l f f r o m s t r a t e g i c ac-
w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r is r e f l e x i v e l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t
t i o n t h r o u g h t h e f a c t t h a t successful a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n c a n n o t be
t h e h e a r e r m a y d i s p u t e t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d . S u c h a performative
traced back to the purposive r a t i o n a l i t y o f action o r i e n t a t i o n s b u t to
attitude o f a n a c t o r o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n be
t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f a c h i e v i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is,
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n c e p t u a l l y f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e o f a suc-
to a r a t i o n a l i t y that manifests itself i n the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c o m m u -
cess-oriented actor o n t h e basis o f t h e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s t h a t e a c h
n i c a t i v e l y r e a c h e d a g r e e m e n t . T h e way i n w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c processes
p e r m i t s : w i t h o u r s p e e c h acts, w e simultaneously r e l a t e , w i t h v a r y i n g
o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f u n c t i o n as a m e c h a n i s m f o r coordinat-
t h e m a t i z a t i o n s , to s o m e t h i n g i n t h e objective, t h e subjective, a n d t h e
i n g a c t i o n is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n i n t e r a c t i o n a g r e e a b o u t the
social w o r l d s , w h e r e a s i n a c t i n g p u r p o s i v e l y w e i n t e r v e n e solely i n
v a l i d i t y c l a i m e d f o r t h e i r s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is, t h e y r e c o g n i z e c r i t i -
the objective w o r l d .
c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . W h a t gives r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t -
i n g f o r c e t o speech-act o f f e r s is, i n t u r n , t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n If, however, the a t t i t u d e t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d that
between the meaning o f an utterance o n the one h a n d , and o n the o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success are n o t m e r e l y t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o n e
o t h e r its v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s , t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d , a n o t h e r a n a l y t i c a l l y , b u t r a t h e r c o r r e s p o n d t o t w o d i f f e r e n t types o f
T h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c o m e a b o u t o n l y i f t h e s p e a k e r d o e s n o t
I n t h e i r s t a n d a r d f o r m , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts are c a r r i e d o u t u s i n g
declare his aims to the hearer w i t h i n the f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m m o n
p e r f o r m a t i v e sentences. F o r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e e x p r e s -
d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , a speaker w h o wants
303
302
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a Critique of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g
t o p e r s u a d e h i s a u d i e n c e o f s o m e t h i n g p r o c e e d s i n t h i s way, p e r h a p s addressee o f a c o m m a n d o r a r e q u e s t m u s t as a r u l e b e f a m i l i a r w i t h
b e c a u s e i n t h e g i v e n s i t u a t i o n h e lacks c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s . Such the n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t that authorizes a speaker to make her de-
n o n p u b l i c p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y p a r a s i t i c a l l y , m a n d , a n d that thereby legitimates h e r expectation that the ad-
n a m e l y , o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e s p e a k e r f e i g n s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f unre- dressee has r e a s o n s t o c a r r y o u t t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d . Knowledge
servedly p u r s u i n g h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d leaves t h e h e a r e r i n t h e o f success c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l
d a r k as t o h i s a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of action ori- c o m p o n e n t "p" o f t h e i m p e r a t i v e Ip, is n o t s u f f i c i e n t i n o r d e r to
ented toward reaching understanding. 3 3
T h e l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c use o f u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s s p e e c h act, t h a t is, its
l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c because i t f u n c t i o n s o n l y w h e n a t least o n e p a r t y s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r as a n i m p e r a t i v e . K n o w l e d g e o f t h e success c o n d i -
assumes t h a t l a n g u a g e is b e i n g u s e d w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t i o n s (a) m u s t b e a u g m e n t e d b y k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s (b)
reaching understanding. Whoever acts s t r a t e g i c a l l y i n this way u n d e r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r has r e a s o n s t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h
must violate the sincerity condition of communicative action t h e c o n t e n t (a) as v a l i d , t h a t is, n o r m a t i v e l y j u s t i f i e d — f o r e x a m p l e ,
inconspicuously. t h a t c h i l d r e n i n t h e streets o f L i m a m a y b e g f r o m v i s i t i n g f o r e i g n -
sensitive t e a c h e r i n s t i l l s s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e i n h e r p u p i l b y m e a n s of o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is c o n t i n g e n t a n d is n o l o n g e r convention-
ously. 34
I n cases s u c h as t h e s e , i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has r o b b e r w h o at p i s t o l p o i n t d e m a n d s o f t h e t h r e a t e n e d b a n k teller
Chapter 6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e of the T h e o r y of M e a n i n g
p r e s u p p o s e d i n the case o f communicative action. Imperatives or 12. K . - 0 . Apel, "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Hermeneutic Understanding," in
Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London, 1980),
t h r e a t s t h a t are d e p l o y e d p u r e l y strategically and robbed of their
pp. Iff.
n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are n o t i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — t h a t is, acts w i t h
13. L . Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E . M. Anscombe ( L o n d o n ,
a built-in orientation toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a t all. They
1958), §§23ff.
r e m a i n p a r a s i t i c i n s o f a r as t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y m u s t b e derived
f r o m the e m p l o y m e n t c o n d i t i o n s for normatively secured i l l o c u t i o n - 14. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962).
20. E . Stenius, "Mood and Language G a m e , " Synthese 17 (1964), pp. 254ff.; A. Kenny,
Notes Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford, 1975); cf. also Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical
Philosophy, pp. 398ff.
1. K, Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), p. 28. 21. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Bos-
ton, 1984), pp. 298ff.
2. K . - 0 . Apel, Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico
(Bonn, 1963). 22. Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, pp. 207ff.
7
30. Cf. the discussion of Popper's doctrine of three worlds in Theory of Communicative
Action, vol. 1, pp. 76ff.
Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of
31. J . Habermas, "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in G . Seebaß Communicative Rationality (1996)
and R. Tuomela, eds., Soaal Action (Dordrecht, 1985).
Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action, pp. 179ff. (referred to i n chapter 3 of the
present volume pp. 199f). Schnadelbach h i m s e l f u n d e r s t a n d s r a t i o n a l i t y as a d i s p o s i t i o n f o r
reason on t h e p a r t o f subjects c a p a b l e o f k n o w l e d g e , speech, a n d
a c t i o n t h a t c a n b e c a p t u r e d d e s c r i p t i v e l y . W h a t h e sets u p
2
against
d i s c u r s i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t s i m p l y a ( g e n e r i c a l l y a s c r i b e d ) rational-
308 309
T h r e e Roots of Rationality F r e e d o m is d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i f f e r e n t s e l f - r e l a t i o n s
o f t h e k n o w i n g a n d a c t i n g s u b j e c t . R e f l e x i v e f r e e d o m i n t h e sense
I n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a p r o v i s i o n a l o v e r v i e w , I w i l l discuss t h e c o m p l e - o f c o g n i t i v e o p e n n e s s ( Unbefangenheit) requires liberation f r o m the
m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n discursive s t r u c t u r e a n d r e f l e c t i o n (or egocentric perspective o f a p a r t i c i p a n t deeply involved i n action
s e l f - r e f e r e n c e as a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p e r s o n s ) , p r o c e e d - c o n t e x t s ; t h i s is t h e f r e e d o m w e t r a d i t i o n a l l y associate w i t h t h e t h e o -
ing t h e n t o deal w i t h the r a t i o n a l core structures o f knowledge, retical stance. F r e e d o m o f c h o i c e {Willkurfreiheit) consists i n t h e
p u r p o s i v e activity, a n d communication. c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l l y c h o o s i n g t o a c t i n o n e way o r a n o t h e r , o r f o r
m a k i n g a n e w start i n t h e c h a i n o f events. W i t h K a n t , we refer to t h e
f o r h i s o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W e also c a l l t h i s k i n d o f e p i s t e m i c s e l f - r e l a t i o n a n d i n t h e v a r i o u s p r a c t i c a l s e l f - r e l a t i o n s I , as
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
t h i r d p e r s o n — i s d e e m e d f a l l i b l e ( t h i s , t o o , is p a r t o f t h e g r a m m a r
o f the w o r d " k n o w i n g " nowadays), even t h o u g h i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e Teleological Rationality
stance, t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t , w e c a n n o t a v o i d
unconditionally r e g a r d i n g t h e asserted k n o w l e d g e as t r u e . D e s p i t e t h i s A l l a c t i o n is i n t e n t i o n a l ; a n a c t i o n m a y b e u n d e r s t o o d as c a r r y i n g
"Platonic" n a t u r e o f knowledge, the rationality o f a j u d g m e n t does o u t t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a f r e e l y c h o o s i n g a n d d e c i d i n g actor. A c t i o n has
n o t i m p l y its t r u t h b u t m e r e l y its j u s t i f i e d a c c e p t a b i l i t y i n a g i v e n a t e l e o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e , f o r every a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n aims at the r e a l i -
context. z a t i o n o f a set g o a l . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a n a c t i o n is
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s w o u l d n o t be p r o p o r t i o n a t e n o t t o w h e t h e r t h e state a c t u a l l y o c c u r r i n g i n t h e
p o s s i b l e i f w e c o u l d n o t represent o u r k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is, i f w e c o u l d w o r l d as a r e s u l t o f t h e a c t i o n c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e i n t e n d e d state a n d
n o t e x p r e s s i t i n sentences, a n d i f we c o u l d n o t c o r r e c t i t a n d e x p a n d satisfies the corresponding conditions o f success, b u t r a t h e r to
i t ; a n d t h i s m e a n s : i f w e w e r e n o t a b l e also t o learn f r o m o u r p r a c t i c a l w h e t h e r t h e a c t o r has achieved t h i s r e s u l t o n t h e basis o f t h e d e l i b e r -
d e a l i n g s w i t h a r e a l i t y t h a t resists us. T o t h i s e x t e n t , e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n - a t e l y s e l e c t e d a n d i m p l e m e n t e d m e a n s (or, i n a c c u r a t e l y perceived
a l i t y is entwined w i t h a c t i o n a n d t h e use o f l a n g u a g e . 6
I speak o f a n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , c o u l d n o r m a l l y have d o n e s o ) . A successful a c t o r has
epistemic core s t r u c t u r e because t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e is d e - a c t e d r a t i o n a l l y o n l y i f h e ( i ) k n o w s w h y h e was successful ( o r w h y
p e n d e n t o n its e m b o d i m e n t i n s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n : i t is n o t a self- h e c o u l d have r e a l i z e d t h e set g o a l i n n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) and if
314 315
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality
( i i ) t h i s k n o w l e d g e m o t i v a t e s t h e a c t o r ( a t least i n p a r t ) i n s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e use o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l
way t h a t h e c a r r i e s o u t h i s a c t i o n f o r r e a s o n s t h a t c a n a t t h e same s e n t e n c e s , so t o o is i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n essentially d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
time e x p l a i n its p o s s i b l e success. use o f i n t e n t i o n a l sentences.
I n t h e s i m p l e s t case, t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that can simultaneously
justify a n d motivate a r a t i o n a l action take the f o r m o f a practical Communicative Rationality
inference. Given certain preferences, A intends i n situation S to
b r i n g a b o u t t h e state p; i n g i v e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s A r e g a r d s t h e i m p l e - T h e r e is a p e c u l i a r r a t i o n a l i t y , i n h e r e n t n o t i n l a n g u a g e as s u c h b u t
m e n t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n s M as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n e c e s s a r y — o r e v e n i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s , t h a t c a n b e r e -
sufficient—condition i n order to b r i n g about p with a certain prob- d u c e d n e i t h e r to the epistemic rationality o f knowledge (as classical
ability; for this reason A carries o u t the action that deploys the t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics supposes) n o r t o the p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l -
selected means. 8
W e have seen t h a t k n o w l e d g e i n t h e s t r i c t sense i t y o f a c t i o n (as i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s a s s u m e s ) . T h i s communicative
requires a reflexive " h a v i n g " o f knowledge that refers to possible rationality is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e u n i f y i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h o r i e n t e d t o -
justifications; correspondingly, purposive-rational action requires a w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h secures f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g
reflexive " h a v i n g " — s u i t a b l e f o r possible j u s t i f i c a t i o n s — o f the deci- speakers a n intersubjectively shared l i f e w o r l d , t h e r e b y securing at
sive a c t i o n - i n t e n t i o n , t h a t is, a c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e success o f the t h e same t i m e t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e c a n r e f e r t o o n e
a c t i o n . O n c e a g a i n , t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f m u t u a l r e f e r e n c e b e - a n d t h e same o b j e c t i v e w o r l d .
tween the rationality o f the action a n d the f o r u m o f a discourse i n
T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s serves n o t o n l y
w h i c h a n a c t o r ' s decisive r e a s o n s f o r m a k i n g h i s decision—deter-
t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r b u t also t o r e p r e s e n t
m i n e d ex ante—could b e t e s t e d . T h e t h e o r y o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e deals
states o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o p r e s u p p o s e t h e i r e x i s t e n c e ) a n d t o e s t a b l i s h
w i t h t h o s e aspects o f t h e d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o b l e m s o f a c t i n g s u b -
i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h a s e c o n d p e r s o n . H e r e , t h e t h r e e aspects
j e c t s , w h o are g u i d e d i n a n e g o c e n t r i c way b y t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e per-
o f (a) a n a c t o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( b ) w i t h s o m e o n e (c) about
s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s o f success, t h a t c a n b e u s e d t o
s o m e t h i n g a r e r e f l e c t e d . W h a t t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h an
construct models.
e x p r e s s i o n is c o n n e c t e d b o t h w i t h w h a t is l i t e r a l l y said i n i t a n d w i t h
T h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t o o , is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e t w o t h e a c t i o n as w h i c h i t s h o u l d b e understood. Thus, a threefold
o t h e r core structures o f knowledge a n d speech. F o r t h e p r a c t i c a l r e l a t i o n exists b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n and
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a r a t i o n a l p l a n o f a c t i o n is c a r r i e d (a) w h a t is intended (gemeint) b y i t , ( b ) w h a t is said i n i t , a n d (c) the
o u t are d e p e n d e n t on the i n p u t of reliable i n f o r m a t i o n (about way in which it is used i n t h e s p e e c h act. W i t h h i s s p e e c h act, t h e
e x p e c t e d events i n t h e w o r l d , o r a b o u t t h e b e h a v i o r a n d t h e i n t e n - speaker pursues his a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a hearer
tions o f other actors)—even if, i n g e n e r a l , the actors a c t i n g i n a a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m , as w e w i l l r e f e r t o i t , is
p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l way h a v e t o b e satisfied w i t h h i g h l y i n c o m p l e t e t w o - t i e r e d : t h e s p e e c h act is first o f a l l s u p p o s e d t o b e understood
i n f o r m a t i o n . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such i n f o r m a t i o n can be processed b y t h e h e a r e r a n d t h e n — s o f a r as p o s s i b l e — a c c e p t e d . T h e r a t i o n a l -
i n t e l l i g e n t l y — t h a t is, r e f e r r e d t o d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g m a x i m s a n d goals i t y o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g
t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t have b e e n s e l e c t e d i n l i g h t o f p e r s o n a l prefer- t h e n d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts are s u f f i c i e n t l y c o m p r e -
e n c e s — o n l y i n t h e m e d i u m o f l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s is o b - hensible a n d acceptable f o r the speaker to achieve i l l o c u t i o n a r y
vious in the case of the theoretical treatment of complex success w i t h t h e m ( o r f o r h i m t o b e a b l e t o d o so i n n o r m a l c i r c u m -
decision-making problems. But elementary action-intentions and stances) . O n c e a g a i n , w e d o n o t c a l l o n l y v a l i d s p e e c h acts r a t i o n a l
s i m p l e p r a c t i c a l i n f e r e n c e s , t o o , are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d . J u s t as b u t rather all comprehensible s p e e c h acts f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c a n
316 317
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
i
328 329
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality
t i z e d . E v e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s , w i t h w h i c h e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t o as m u c h as i t is i n t h e case o f n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ; s t a t e m e n t s o f
t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s are r a i s e d , c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o f a c t a n d " o u g h t " s e n t e n c e s have t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g m a d e i n t e l -
t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e as " o u t o f p l a c e , " "brazen," l i g i b l e f o r a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r t h e s a m e reasons. H o w e v e r , a c o g n i t i v e
" e m b a r r a s s i n g , " a n d so o n — i n s h o r t , as n o r m a t i v e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e . a g r e e m e n t a b o u t facts r e q u i r e s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n
I n s u c h cases, t h e y v i o l a t e t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l o n l y t o t a k e these a g r e e d - u p o n facts i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e s u b -
r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a social w o r l d to w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u - sequent course o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t t o a n o r m a t i v e agree-
nication belong. m e n t , a c o g n i t i v e a g r e e m e n t d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e way i n w h i c h t h e
F r o m n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s s u c h as t h e s e , r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts a c t o r s select a n d p u r s u e t h e i r a c t i o n goals; i t d o e s n o t a f f e c t w h e t h e r
derive the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker may r e g a r d h i m s e l f t h e y a r e g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e i r p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s o r w h e t h e r
as a u t h o r i z e d f o r d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , imperatives, advice, re- t h e y a r e also g u i d e d b y b i n d i n g n o r m s ( a n d values h e l d i n e s t e e m
quests, p r o m i s e s , c o n t r a c t s , n e g o t i a t i o n s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , and so by a l l m e m b e r s ) . Whereas i n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n o n l y c o n -
f o r t h . T o t h i s e x t e n t l i g h t n e s s c l a i m s , w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts stative s p e e c h acts a n d n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s i o n s of
o f t h i s s o r t are c o n n e c t e d , r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n a social w o r l d i n a w i l l c o m e i n t o play, s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d e m a n d s a use o f
m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h c l a i m s c o n n e c t e d l a n g u a g e t h a t also r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s o c i a l w o r l d . I n c i d e n t a l l y ,
w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h i s also h o l d s f o r t h o s e expressive s p e e c h acts t h a t — u n l i k e d e c l a r a -
( e v e n i f n o r m s are " c o n t r o v e r s i a l " i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n facts a n d tions o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives—do n o t refer to (future) actions,
a r e b y n o m e a n s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a c t i n g subjects i n t h e s a m e way f o r e x a m p l e , expressions o f feeling.
as t h e e n t i t i e s t o w h i c h w e r e f e r w h e n w e state facts a b o u t t h e m ) . A t
any rate, u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , claims to
P e r l o c u t i o n s , t h e Use o f Language O r i e n t e d t o w a r d Consequences,
t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f u t t e r a n c e s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — m a y be
a n d Strategic A c t i o n
d i s c u r s i v e l y v i n d i c a t e d , w h i c h m e a n s o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s t h a t are
t h e same reasons f o r a l l m e m b e r s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n q u e s t i o n . T h e
C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e m b o d i e d i n l a n g u a g e g a m e s i n w h i c h
a i m i n s u c h cases is a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t ; u n l i k e a m u t u a l u n d e r -
the participants take a position o n criticizable validity claims. I n the
s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f r e s o l u t i o n s
" w e a k " f o r m s o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i -
a n d decisions, such a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t extends n o t o n l y to the
cative a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e p u r -
a c t o r - r e l a t i v e p r e m i s e s o f t h e p u r s u i t o f a c t i o n goals s e l e c t e d o n t h e
posive rationality of actors in an attitude oriented toward
basis o f a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e , b u t also t o t h e actor-independent
success—although still i n such a way that t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims
m o d e o f s e l e c t i n g l e g i t i m a t e goals. I n s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,
dominate t h e " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " effects t h a t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s
t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s p r e s u m e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e y are g u i d e d b y facts a n d
m a y b e s t r i v e n f o r as w e l l . " P e r l o c u t i o n a r y " is, o f c o u r s e , t h e n a m e
say w h a t t h e y h o l d t o b e t r u e a n d w h a t t h e y m e a n , b u t also t h a t t h e y
w e give t o t h e effects o f s p e e c h acts t h a t , i f n e e d b e , c a n also b e
pursue their action plans only w i t h i n the boundaries o f n o r m s a n d
b r o u g h t a b o u t causally b y n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I
values d e e m e d to be v a l i d .
a m i n t e r e s t e d i n ( i ) t h o s e s p e e c h acts a n d ( i i ) t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n
U n d e r l y i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense is t h e p r e s u p - w h i c h the relationship o f dependency n o r m a l l y existing between
p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t is t h e same f o r a l l ; i n s t r o n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d effects is r e v e r s e d . I n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s over a n d above this c o u n t o n s u c h cases, c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e t r e a t s , l e a v i n g gaps t h a t c o n -
a s o c i a l w o r l d t h a t is s h a r e d b y t h e m i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . C e r t a i n l y , stitute a k i n d o f contrast o r foil f o r the peculiar b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g
a g r e e m e n t is r e c k o n e d w i t h i n t h e case o f assertoric s t a t e m e n t s j u s t p o w e r o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts.
331
330
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
i . I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h r e e classes o f p e r l o c u - i n g as a d e t e r r e n t o v e r s h a d o w s its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g as a n a n -
d o n a r y effects. P e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s i r e s u l t g r a m m a t i c a l l y f r o m t h e n o u n c e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , a t h r e a t s u c h as
c o n t e n t o f a successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — a s w h e n a v a l i d c o m m a n d
(4) I f y o u d o n ' t give Peter t h e m o n e y I ' l l i n f o r m y o u r s u p e r i o r
is e x e c u t e d , a p r o m i s e is k e p t , a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n is r e a l i z e d , o r
that . . .
w h e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y fit w i t h t h e s u b s e q u e n t
course o f the i n t e r a c t i o n . H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims r u l e the per- may be challenged not only as a literally meant "naked" an-
l o c u t i o n a r y o n e s . B y c o n t r a s t , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effectS2 a r e g r a m m a t i - n o u n c e m e n t f r o m the two points o f view o f the lack o f truthfulness
c a l l y n o n r e g u l a t e d , t h a t is, c o n t i n g e n t , c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a s p e e c h act o f the declaration o f intention a n d the lack o f t r u t h o f the existential
t h a t , h o w e v e r , o c c u r o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success—as p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ; i t c a n also be c h a l l e n g e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e x -
w h e n a p i e c e o f news, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , d e l i g h t s o r startles t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i n t e n d e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2. (4) m a y be
t h e receiver, o r w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e e n c o u n t e r s r e s i s t a n c e , a c o n f e s - n e g a t e d n o t o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s expressly r a i s e d
s i o n a w a k e n s d o u b t , a n d so f o r t h . F i n a l l y , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s 3 can w i t h t h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, as i n
be achieved o n l y i n a m a n n e r t h a t is inconspicuous as f a r as t h e
(4') You d o n ' t really m e a n w h a t y o u are saying.
addressee is c o n c e r n e d ; t h e success o f t h i s k i n d o f strategic a c t i o n — a
k i n d t h a t r e m a i n s l a t e n t f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y — i s also d e p e n d e n t on (4") Y o u d o n ' t h a v e a n y t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .
t h e m a n i f e s t success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act.
I n a d d i t i o n , the context presupposed b y t h e speaker, w i t h i n w h i c h
T h e so-called perlocutions c o n s t i t u t e a s p e c i a l case t h a t is i n t e r e s t -
(4) first b e c o m e s a t h r e a t f o r a specific a d d r e s s e e , c a n also b e con-
i n g f o r a n a l y t i c p u r p o s e s . T h e s e , t o o , r e q u i r e successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y
tested:
acts as t h e i r v e h i c l e ; h o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , e v e n t h e
apparent d o m i n a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m — s t i l l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e (4"') Y o u c a n ' t t h r e a t e n m e w i t h t h a t — h e has a l r e a d y k n o w n i t
last class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t I mentioned—disappears. 1 2
for a long time.
T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f a s s e r t i n g
I n s u c h a case t h e s p e e c h act is n o t s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g contested; r a t h e r
(3) You are behaving like a swine. i t is s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d w h y t h e i n t e n d e d e f f e c t w i l l n o t o c c u r a n d w h y
t h e p e r l o c u t i o n r e m a i n s ineffective. O n l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t c a n
takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e openly p u r s u e d p e r l o c u -
b e valid o r invalid m a y b e contested.
t i o n a r y a i m o f o f f e n d i n g t h e h e a r e r , f o r t h e n t h e a s s e r t i o n c o u n t s as
(However, p e r l o c u t i o n s o f this k i n d can be r e - e m b e d d e d in a
s l a n d e r , o r as a r e p r o a c h , o r as a n i n s u l t . I n a s i m i l a r way, a n y
n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t i n a s e c o n d a r y way b e c a u s e , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n -
i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h a t s o e v e r c a n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t e x t , c o u n t as
d e m n a t i o n o f m i s d e m e a n o r s i n a m o r a l o r a l e g a l sense a p p e a l s t o
a n expression o f m o c k e r y o r d e r i s i o n because t h e literally expressed
a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s a n d t o t h i s e x t e n t , d e s p i t e its
i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g is b l o t t e d o u t a n d r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e set
p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a -
p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f s h o w i n g u p t h e addressee ( o r b y t h e a l r e a d y
s o n , s u c h normatively embedded r e p r o a c h e s — u n l i k e a c t i o n s t h a t do
o c c u r r i n g effect o f t h i s ) .
n o t r e a l l y a i m t o say a n y t h i n g b u t , i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g , a i m t o o f f e n d
T h r e a t s represent a special sort o f p e r l o c u t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y
s o m e o n e — c a n b e r e j e c t e d o n t h e basis o f reasons. S o m e t h i n g s i m i -
a c t o f a n n o u n c i n g a c o n d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n a c q u i r e s t h e sense
l a r t o w h a t h o l d s f o r m o r a l r e p r o a c h e s , c o n d e m n a t i o n s , a n d so o n
o f a threat t h r o u g h the explicit reference to the i n t e n d e d perlocu-
also h o l d s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l e g a l t h r e a t s o f p u n i s h m e n t ; d u e t o t h e
t i o n a r y effects o f d e t e r r i n g t h e addressee. I t s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -
332 333
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s of t h e C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a l l o w s us t o see e v e r y - l i n g u i s t i c t u r n p e r m i t s us t o r e l i e v e t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g a n d a r t i c u -
t h i n g t h a t we e n c o u n t e r i n t h e w o r l d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f l a t i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e o f t h e b u r d e n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge.
Chapter 7 S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y
i
340 I 341
w e a k sense) i f t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f a n a n n o u n c e m e n t
7. H . I . Brown, Rationality (London, 1988); cf. also the early work of H . Schnädel-
or an imperative (or threat) can be p r o v e n w i t h the h e l p o f actor- bach, " U b e r den Realismus," Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 111 (1972):
relative reasons for t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g resolve. H e r e , 88ff.
those reasons "relative to a given a c t o r " are v a l i d that, f r o m t h e p o i n t 8. G . H . von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1991), pp. 83-132.
o f v i e w o f t h e addressee, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as g o o d - r e a s o n s - f o r - t h e -
9. See chapter 5 in the present volume, pp. 270ff.
given-actor.
T h e s e r e v i s i o n s take a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h acts a r e i l l o - 10. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam-
bridge, 1982), pp. 391ff.
c u t i o n a r y acts e v e n w h e n they are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h claims to
t r u t h a n d truthfulness, a n d w h e n t h e s e c l a i m s t o t h e seriousness 11. Cassirer assigned the "meaning function" to the epistemic use of language, which
in science is specified as the mathematical representation of regularities or as
(and viability) of intentions and decisions can be j u s t i f i e d only
i
342
Chapter 7
8
Fregean "thoughts;" see E . Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, trans.
R. Manheim (New Haven, 1957), pp. 279ff. Richard Rorros Pragmatic Turn (1996)
12. F. Hundschnur, "Streitspezifische Sprechakte," Protosouologie 4 (1993): 140ff.
14. See chapters 2 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 116ff. and pp. 278-306, respec-
tively.
o f h i s P l a t o n i c sickness. T o b e s u r e , t h e m e m o r y o f t h e e x o t i c s i g h t o f a d e f l a t i o n a r y strategy as r e g a r d s t h e p r o b l e m o f t r u t h o r t h r o u g h
a n d the overpowering smell o f the w i l d orchids i n the mountains of a n i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f . O n t h e o n e h a n d ,
h i s c h i l d h o o d i n t h e n o r t h w e s t o f N e w Jersey c a n n o t b e e x t i n g u i s h e d I w i l l t a k e issue w i t h t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t r e l i e s o n a s e m a n -
completely. tic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , e m p h a s i z i n g i n s t e a d t h e advantages of a
I t is r o u g h l y t h u s i n t e r m s o f h i s o w n l i f e - h i s t o r y t h a t R o r t y t o d a y pragmatic viewpoint. O n the o t h e r h a n d , again f r o m a pragmatic
e x p l a i n s t o us t h e m o t i v e s f o r h i s v i e w o f t h e d u a l d o m i n a n c e of perspective, I w i l l criticize a k i n d o f epistemization o f the idea of
D e w e y a n d H e i d e g g e r d e v e l o p e d i n Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. t r u t h t h a t I m y s e l f o n c e p r o p o s e d . I n d o i n g so I w i l l d e v e l o p a n
Strangely e n o u g h , this self-presentation contains n o reference to the a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e l i q u i d a d o n o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m s t o t r u t h . I t is
p a r a m o u n t role played by W i t t g e n s t e i n , the t h i r d party i n the alli- t h i s l i q u i d a t i o n t h a t has u l t i m a t e l y c o m p e l l e d R o r t y t o e f f e c t a p r o b -
ance. Rorty's r e p o r t o n t h e experiences o f his o w n philosophical lematic n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i f i e d r e a s o n — o r , at any rate, o n e
d e v e l o p m e n t b r e a k s o f f w i t h h i s r e a d i n g o f H e g e l as h i s s t u d e n t days that leads to f u r t h e r p r o b l e m s .
i n Yale d r a w t o a close a n d h i s w o r k as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r is
o n l y a b o u t to begin. H i s t r a i n i n g i n analytic p h i l o s o p h y w i t h his real A Platonicalfy M o t i v a t e d Anti-Platonist
t e a c h e r , W i l f r i d Sellars, h i s basic c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h o f p h y s i c a l -
i s m , h i s successful c a r e e r as a y o u n g a n a l y t i c philosopher—these R i c h a r d R o r t y is o n e o f t h e m o s t o u t s t a n d i n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ,
steps i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t a r e n o t m e n t i o n e d at a l l . H o w e v e r , i t is c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u i n g i n a n i n f o r m e d a n d a s t u t e way. B u t h i s p r o g r a m
solely h i s a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d t h e t r a d i t i o n o f analytic p h i l o s o p h y — f o r a p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is t o d o away w i t h a l l p h i l o s o p h y seems t o
t h e o n l y t r a d i t i o n i n w h o s e l a n g u a g e R o r t y has l e a r n e d t o a r g u e a n d spring m o r e f r o m the melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician,
using w h i c h he continues to e x p o u n d his e x c i t i n g teachings bril- d r i v e n o n b y n o m i n a l i s t spurs, t h a n f r o m t h e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m o f a n
l i a n t l y — t h a t c a n e x p l a i n w h y h e a t t r i b u t e s a c u l t u r a l l y c r i t i c a l sig- e n l i g h t e n e d a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r w h o wishes t o c o m p l e t e t h e l i n -
n i f i c a n c e t o h i s a n t i - P l a t o n i c t u r n , a s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o g u i s t i c t u r n i n a p r a g m a t i s t way. I n 1 9 6 7 , w h e n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y
e x t e n d far b e y o n d his o w n person a n d his private switch o f p h i l o - ( i n b o t h its v e r s i o n s ) h a d a c h i e v e d w i d e s p r e a d r e c o g n i t i o n c o m p a -
sophical allegiance. r a b l e to t h a t e n j o y e d by N e o - K a n t i a n i s m i n the p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e
I w i l l deal briefly w i t h this m o t i v a t i o n f o r a k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g F i r s t W o r l d War, R o r t y e d i t e d a r e a d e r w i t h t h e d e m a n d i n g l y l a c o n i c
t h a t w a n t s t o b i d f a r e w e l l t o i t s e l f as s u c h b e f o r e c o n f i n i n g m y s e l f t o t i t l e , The Linguistic Turn. T h i s r e a d e r , as w e c a n see i n r e t r o s p e c t ,
d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e n e o p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n itself. m a r k s a b r e a k i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t . T h e texts c o l l e c t e d
F r o m the pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n Rorty ob- i n t h e r e a d e r are m e a n t t o serve a d o u b l e p u r p o s e . I n s u m m i n g u p
tains a nonrealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f knowledge. I n order to test a t r i u m p h a n t progression, t h e y are i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o
w h e t h e r h e r a d i c a l i z e s t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n t h e r i g h t way, I w i l l t h e n s i g n a l its e n d . A t a n y r a t e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s l a u d a t o r y g e s t u r e , t h e
compare the contextualist approach with the epistemological doubt m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l distance f r o m w h i c h the e d i t o r c o m m e n t s o n the
o f t h e m o d e r n s k e p t i c . I n d o i n g so I w i l l r e c a l l a p r o b l e m t h a t was t e x t s b e t r a y s t h e H e g e l i a n message t h a t e v e r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t
always c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o h e r e n c e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h : t h e p r o b l e m t h a t a c h i e v e s m a t u r i t y is c o n d e m n e d t o d e c l i n e . A t t h a t t i m e R o r t y
o f h o w t r u t h is to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . I n gave t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n a l t o a d i s c o u r s e t h a t has s i n c e g i v e n i t s e l f t h e
r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ways. n a m e " p o s t a n a l y t i c . " I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e r e a d e r , h e speculates
W h e r e a s R o r t y assimilates t r u t h t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e of o n t h e " f u t u r e " o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y — a f u t u r e t h a t relegates i t t o
everyday realist i n t u i t i o n s , o t h e r s a t t e m p t to take a c c o u n t o f these t h e past tense. I n t h e face o f a s t i l l i n t a c t o r t h o d o x y , R o r t y p o i n t s t o
i n t u i t i o n s even w i t h i n the linguistic p a r a d i g m , w h e t h e r w i t h the h e l p three approaches that concur i n their contradiction of the general
346 347
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
H e i d e g g e r , R o r t y t h e n a t t r i b u t e s a d r a m a t i c w e i g h t i n e s s t o t h i s proton
m e l a n c h o l y i n the s t r a i n e d i r o n y p r o p a g a t e d today by Rorty: "Rorty's
pseudos o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s H e i d e g g e r i a n t h e -
p o s t - p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l is i r o n i c b e c a u s e h e realizes t h a t t r u t h
sis, t h e p r o f a n e d e s t i n i e s o f t h e West a r e s u p p o s e d t o have b e e n
is n o t a l l h e w o u l d l i k e i t t o b e . I r o n y d e p e n d s essentially o n a k i n d
f u l f i l l e d o n l y w i t h i n t h e scope o f a n e p o c h a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g ;
o f nostalgie de la vérité." E v e n t h e r o m a n t i c d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r b e t w e e n
4
m o r e o v e r , o n e g o v e r n e d by m e t a p h y s i c s . O f c o u r s e , u n l i k e H e i d e g -
i r o n y a n d seriousness, H e i d e g g e r a n d Dewey, c a n n o t ease t h e p a i n .
ger, R o r t y c a n n o l o n g e r stylize p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g p o s t a n a -
B e c a u s e m e t a p h y s i c s has c o m m a n d o n l y o v e r t h e l a n g u a g e o f k n o w l -
l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y as a sacral " C o m m e m o r a t i o n o f B e i n g " (Andenken
e d g e , t h e a e s t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f its c l a i m t o t r u t h a m o u n t s t o a n anaes-
des Seins). Rorty understands the deconstruction o f the history o f
t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n as m e r e c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e .
m e t a p h y s i c s as a d e f l a t i o n a r y d i a g n o s i s i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s sense. A n t i -
T h e r e a l i t y o f t h e ideas w i t h w h i c h P l a t o n i c t h e o r y p r o m i s e d t o b r i n g
P l a t o n i s m d r a w s its e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o n l y f r o m t h e
us i n t o c o n t a c t is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y a p p e a l o f aes-
severity o f t h e sickness t h a t i t is s u p p o s e d t o c u r e . T h e u n m a s k i n g
thetic experience. W h a t once aspired to be " t r u e " i n an e m p h a t i c
o f P l a t o n i s m is a i m e d , b e y o n d s c h o l a s t i c i s m , a t a c u l t u r e t h a t is
sense c a n n o t b e p r e s e r v e d i n t h e m o d e o f t h e " e d i f y i n g . " I n f o r f e i t -
a l i e n a t e d f r o m i t s e l f p l a t o n i s t i c a l l y . I f , finally, t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g
i n g t h e b i n d i n g p o w e r o f its j u d g m e n t s , m e t a p h y s i c s also loses its
is n o t t o e x h a u s t i t s e l f i n n e g a t i o n , R o r t y has t o o p e n a p e r s p e c t i v e
substance. 5
1. t h a t w e k n o w o u r o w n m e n t a l states b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g else;
t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s t h o u g h t s . R o r t y w o u l d n o t be t h e s c r u p u l o u s
a n d sensitive, suggestive, a n d s t i m u l a t i n g p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t h e is w e r e 2. t h a t k n o w i n g takes place e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g
h e t o i n s i s t solely o n t h e r h e t o r i c a l r o l e o f t h e r e e d u c a t o r . The objects; a n d
d i a g n o s i s o f a false s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o o , r e m a i n s a m a t t e r f o r 3. t h a t t h e t r u t h o f j u d g m e n t s rests o n e v i d e n c e t h a t v o u c h e s f o r
t h e o r y . R o r t y has t o p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s i f h e is t o c o n v i n c e his their certainty.
colleagues that the "Platonic" d i s t i n c t i o n between " c o n v i n c i n g " a n d
Analysis o f t h e linguistic f o r m o f o u r experiences a n d t h o u g h t s
" p e r s u a d i n g " m a k e s n o sense. H e has t o p r o v e t h a t e v e n a n a l y t i c
discovers i n these assumptions three c o r r e s p o n d i n g m y t h s — t h e
p h i l o s o p h y r e m a i n s captivated by t h e spell o f the metaphysics against
m y t h o f t h e g i v e n , t h e m y t h o f t h o u g h t as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t h e
w h i c h i t is b a t t l i n g .
m y t h o f t r u t h as c e r t a i n t y . I t is s h o w n t h a t we c a n n o t c i r c u m v e n t t h e
l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as t h e m e d i u m f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o m -
T h e Pragmatic T u r n
m u n i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e are n o u n i n t e r p r e t e d experiences
(Erfahrungen) t h a t a r e accessible o n l y p r i v a t e l y a n d e l u d e p u b l i c
R o r t y ' s i m p o r t a n t b o o k Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979)
assessment a n d c o r r e c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , k n o w l e d g e o f o b j e c t s is n o t a n
p u r s u e s a n u m b e r o f a i m s . B y c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u s i o n t h e
adequate m o d e l for the knowledge o f propositionally structured
d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness, he wants to c o m -
states o f a f f a i r s . F i n a l l y , t r u t h is a p r o p e r t y o f c r i t i c i z a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s
p l e t e a n o t yet c o m p l e t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n such a way t h a t t h e
t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t ; i t c a n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s —
Platonist self-misunderstanding deeply r o o t e d i n o u r culture be-
it cannot be authenticated o n the basis of the genesis of
c o m e s o b v i o u s . M y d o u b t s r e l a t e t o t h e s e c o n d step. D o e s t h e p r a g -
representations.
m a t i c t u r n , w h i c h R o r t y r i g h t l y d e m a n d s i n t h e face o f s e m a n t i -
Rorty, o f course, connects this critique o f m e n t a l i s m w i t h the m o r e
cally f i x a t e d a p p r o a c h e s , r e q u i r e a n anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
far-reaching a i m o f radicalizing t h e linguistic t u r n . H e wants to show
knowledge?
"what philosophy o f language comes to w h e n p u r i f i e d o f attempts to
a. T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e sub-
i m i t a t e e i t h e r K a n t o r H u m e . " So l o n g as t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n
7
j e c t has, f r o m P e i r c e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d H e i d e g g e r , b e e n s u b j e c t e d
is p r o j e c t e d m e r e l y o n t o t h e s e n t e n c e - f a c t relation, the resulting
to a relendess critique. R o r t y draws o n c o n t e m p o r a r y a r g u m e n t s
s e m a n t i c answers r e m a i n t i e d t o t h e m e n t a l i s t m o d e o f q u e s t i o n i n g .
( a m o n g o t h e r s t h o s e o f Sellars, Q u i n e , a n d D a v i d s o n ) i n o r d e r t o
So l o n g as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung) o f states o f a f f a i r s — l i k e
e x p o s e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m e n t a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y w i t h a v i e w
t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung) o f o b j e c t s — i s c o n c e i v e d as a t w o -
8
t o a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e i d e a s o f "self-consciousness" a n d "sub-
p l a c e r e l a t i o n , t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n leaves t h e " m i r r o r o f n a t u r e " — a s
j e c t i v i t y " i m p l y t h a t t h e k n o w i n g s u b j e c t c a n disclose f o r i t s e l f a
metaphor for knowledge of the world—intact.
p r i v i l e g e d s p h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y accessible a n d a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n
R o r t y w a n t s t o m a k e f u l l use o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l scope t h a t has b e e n
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) w h e n i t d o e s n o t f o c u s d i r e c t l y o n o b j e c t s b u t
o p e n e d u p by t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . W i t h Peirce he replaces
r a t h e r r e f l e x i v e l y o n i t s o w n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen) o f ob-
350 351
Chapter 8 R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
i t s e l f as a f o u n d a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e t h a t c h e c k e d a n d j u s t i f i e d t h e
f o u n d a d o n s o f all o t h e r disciplines. R o r t y n o w holds t h e view that T h i s discontinuity m e a n s t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s are n o t s e t t l e d
t h i s same f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g takes possession o f t h e through finding t h e r i g h t answers; r a t h e r , t h e y f a l l i n t o disuse o n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e w h e n i t stops s h o r t o f a c o n t e x t u a l i s t u n d e r - t h e y h a v e lost t h e i r m a r k e t v a l u e . T h i s also h o l d s f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f
standing of knowledge a n d justification. Universalist approaches the objectivity o f knowledge.
within the philosophy of language—such as R o r t y d i s c e r n s i n D u m - On t h e m e n t a l i s t view, o b j e c t i v i t y is e n s u r e d when the repre-
m e t t a n d others—come u n d e r suspicion here. s e n t i n g s u b j e c t r e f e r s t o h i s o b j e c t s i n t h e r i g h t way. H e c h e c k s t h e
subjectivity o f his representations against the objective w o r l d : "'sub-
C o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d S k e p t i c i s m as P r o b l e m s S p e c i f i c to P a r t i c u l a r j e c t i v e ' c o n t r a s t s w i t h ' c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o w h a t is o u t t h e r e , ' a n d t h u s
Paradigms m e a n s s o m e t h i n g l i k e ' a p r o d u c t o n l y o f w h a t is i n h e r e . ' " 1 7
O n the
l i n g u i s t i c view, t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f b e l i e f s is n o l o n g e r c h e c k e d d i r e c t l y
W h e n R o r t y r e g a r d s c o n t e x t u a l i s m as t h e necessary c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h r o u g h confrontation with the w o r l d b u t rather t h r o u g h public
a f u l l y e x e c u t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h e is r i g h t i n o n e r e s p e c t : c o n t e x t u - agreement achieved i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y : "a ' s u b j e c -
a l i s m d e s i g n a t e s a p r o b l e m t h a t c a n o c c u r o n l y w h e n we r e c k o n on t i v e ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n is o n e w h i c h has b e e n , o r w o u l d b e , o r s h o u l d b e ,
a r e a s o n e m b o d i e d i n l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . B u t h e is w r o n g t o see set aside b y r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s a n t s . " 18
W i t h this, the intersubjectivity o f
c o n t e x t u a l i s m at t h e s a m e time as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . T h i s r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g replaces t h e objectivity o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e
v i e w has its r o o t s , i f I a m c o r r e c t , i n a p r o b l e m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e - w o r l d relation becomes d e p e n d e n t o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be-
philosophical paradigms. tween speakers a n d hearers. T h e v e r t i c a l w o r l d - r e l a t i o n o f repre-
L i k e , for example, A p e l a n d T u g e n d h a t , Rorty regards the history s e n t a t i o n s of s o m e t h i n g , o r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about s o m e t h i n g , is b e n t
of philosophy as a succession o f t h r e e p a r a d i g m s . H e speaks o f b a c k , as i t w e r e , i n t o t h e h o r i z o n t a l l i n e o f t h e c o o p e r a t i o n of
metaphysics, epistemology, a n d the philosophy of language. 1 4
Of participants i n communication. The intersubjectivity of the life-
course, the philosophy o f language has d e t a c h e d i t s e l f o n l y h a l f - w o r l d , w h i c h subjects i n h a b i t i n c o m m o n , displaces t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
h e a r t e d l y f r o m m e n t a l i s m . R o r t y believes t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n can a w o r l d t h a t a solitary subject confronts: "For pragmatists, the desire
b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y t o its c o n c l u s i o n o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f f o r o b j e c t i v i t y is n o t t h e desire t o escape t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o n e ' s
a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n t h a t takes its leave o f p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . 1 5
I t is c o m m u n i t y , b u t s i m p l y t h e d e s i r e f o r as m u c h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a g r e e -
n o t j u s t t h e p r o b l e m s b u t t h e way o f p o s i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t c h a n g e s m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " 1 9
R o r t y w a n t s t o say: t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t t r a n s f o r m s
w i t h the leap f r o m one p a r a d i g m to the next: p e r s p e c t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s as s u c h a r e
passé.
T h i s p i c t u r e o f a n c i e n t a n d m e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y as c o n c e r n e d w i t h things,
t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h t h r o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s w i t h T h e contextualist understanding o f the linguistic t u r n f r o m which
ideas, a n d t h e e n l i g h t e n e d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e n e w i t h words h a s t h i s a n t i - r e a l i s m e m e r g e s goes b a c k t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e rise a n d
c o n s i d e r a b l e plausibility. B u t this s e q u e n c e s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t o f as fall o f paradigms that excludes c o n t i n u i t y o f theme between para-
o f f e r i n g t h r e e c o n t r a s t i n g views a b o u t w h a t is p r i m a r y , o r w h a t is f o u n d a - d i g m s as w e l l as l e a r n i n g processes t h a t e x t e n d across p a r a d i g m s . I n
tional. I t is n o t that A r i s t o d e t h o u g h t t h a t o n e c o u l d best e x p l a i n i d e a s a n d
f a c t , t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h we u n d e r t a k e a c o m p a r i s o n of paradigms
w o r d s i n t e r m s o f t h i n g s , w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s a n d R u s s e l l r e a r r a n g e d the
reflect o u r hermeneutic starting p o i n t — a n d , thus, our own para-
o r d e r o f e x p l a n a t i o n . It w o u l d b e m o r e c o r r e c t to say that A r i s t o t l e d i d n o t
h a v e — d i d n o t feel the n e e d o f — a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h a t D e s c a r t e s d i g m . T h a t R o r t y selects f o r h i s c o m p a r i s o n the frame of reference
a n d L o c k e d i d not have a theory of m e a n i n g . Aristotle's r e m a r k s about o f o b j e c t i v i t y , s u b j e c t i v i t y , a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e basic
354 355
Chapter 8 Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n
c o n c e p t u a l perspective f r o m w h i c h we n o w describe the linguistic tained the ontological paradigm: the idea that the t r u t h o f j u d g -
t u r n o f mentalism. O n the other h a n d , the picture o f a contingent ments is g u a r a n t e e d by a correspondence with r e a l i t y t h a t is
succession o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e p a r a d i g m s d o e s n o t i n a n y w a y fit g r o u n d e d i n r e a l i t y itself. T h i s " r e s i d u a l " i n t u i t i o n , as i t w e r e , w h i c h
w i t h this description. Rather, f r o m the perspective o f t h a t f r a m e of h a d l o s t n o n e o f its suggestive p o w e r w i t h t h e s w i t c h o f p a r a d i g m ,
r e f e r e n c e , a s u b s e q u e n t p a r a d i g m a p p e a r s as a n a n s w e r t o a p r o b l e m j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h t h e n e w s k e p t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r — a n d i f so,
b e q u e a t h e d t o us b y t h e d é v a l u a t i o n o f a p r e c e d i n g p a r a d i g m . C o n - how—the agreement between representation a n d represented ob-
t r a r y t o w h a t R o r t y supposes, p a r a d i g m s d o n o t f o r m a n a r b i t r a r y j e c t is t o b e g r o u n d e d o n t h e basis o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f o u r subjective
sequence b u t a dialectical relationship. e x p e r i e n c e s . I t is t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t first p r o v o k e s t h e epistemological
N o m i n a l i s m r o b b e d t h i n g s o f t h e i r i n n e r n a t u r e o r essence a n d quarrel between Idealism and E m p i r i c i s m . 2 0
However, i n light o f this
d e c l a r e d g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s t o b e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f a finite m i n d . S i n c e g e n e a l o g y i t b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t — a n d t h i s is m y m a i n p o i n t here—
then, comprehending t h a t w h i c h is (das Seiende) i n t h o u g h t has t h a t c o n t e x t u a l i s m is b u i l t i n t o t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c
lacked a foundation i n the conceptual constitution o f beings them- p a r a d i g m j u s t as s k e p t i c i s m is b u i l t i n t o m e n t a l i s m . A n d o n c e a g a i n ,
selves. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f m i n d w i t h n a t u r e c o u l d n o l o n g e r b e t h e i n t u i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t r u t h t h a t c a r r y o v e r o r s t i c k w i t h us f r o m
c o n c e i v e d as a n o n t o l o g i c a l relation, the rules of logic n o longer the preceding paradigms lead to an intensification of these
r e f l e c t e d t h e laws o f r e a l i t y . Pace R o r t y , m e n t a l i s m r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s problems.
challenge by reversing the o r d e r o f explanation. I f the knowing
J u s t as t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t u n i v e r s a l s at t h e e n d o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s
subject can n o l o n g e r derive the standards f o r k n o w l e d g e f r o m a
c o n t r i b u t e d to the devaluation o f objective reason, the critique of
d i s q u a l i f i e d n a t u r e , i t has t o s u p p l y t h e s e s t a n d a r d s f r o m a r e f l e x i v e l y
i n t r o s p e c t i o n a n d p s y c h o l o g i s m at t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n -
d i s c l o s e d s u b j e c t i v i t y itself. R e a s o n , o n c e e m b o d i e d o b j e c t i v e l y i n t h e
t u r y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e shaking u p o f subjective reason. W i t h the
o r d e r o f n a t u r e , retreats to subjective spirit. W i t h this, the b e i n g - i n -
d i s p l a c e m e n t o f reason f r o m the consciousness o f t h e k n o w i n g sub-
i t s e l f (das Ansich) o f t h e w o r l d is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f
j e c t t o l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a c t i n g subjects
a w o r l d t h a t is g i v e n f o r us, t h e s u b j e c t s — a w o r l d o f represented
c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one another, the o r d e r o f explanation changes
o b j e c t s o r phenomena. Whereas u p to t h e n , the constitution of the
o n c e m o r e . E p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y passes o v e r f r o m t h e k n o w i n g s u b -
w o r l d o f being-in-itself h a d enabled a correspondence o f thought
ject, w h i c h supplies f r o m w i t h i n herself the standards for the objec-
with reality—true judgments—the truth of judgments is n o w sup-
tivity o f experience, to the j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices o f a linguistic
p o s e d to be measured against the certainty o f evident subjective
c o m m u n i t y . U p to t h e n the intersubjective v a l i d i t y o f beliefs h a d
e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse). R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h o u g h t leads t o o b j e c t i v e
resulted f r o m the subsequent convergence o f thoughts or repre-
k n o w l e d g e i n s o f a r as i t c o m p r e h e n d s t h e p h e n o m e n a l world.
sentations. I n t e r p e r s o n a l agreement h a d b e e n e x p l a i n e d by the o n -
T h e c o n c e p t o f subjectivity i n t r o d u c e d a dualism between i n n e r tological a n c h o r i n g o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s o r by the shared psychological
a n d outer that seemed to c o n f r o n t the h u m a n m i n d w i t h the pre- o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e n d o w m e n t s o f k n o w i n g subjects. F o l l o w i n g t h e
c a r i o u s task o f b r i d g i n g a c h a s m . W i t h t h i s , t h e way was c l e a r e d f o r linguistic t u r n , however, all explanations take the p r i m a c y o f a c o m -
s k e p t i c i s m i n its m o d e r n f o r m . T h e p r i v a t e c h a r a c t e r o f m y p a r t i c u - mon l a n g u a g e as t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t . D e s c r i p t i o n o f states and
l a r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s , o n w h i c h m y a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y is b a s e d , events i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , l i k e t h e s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of experi-
simultaneously p r o v i d e s r e a s o n t o d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as i t ences t o w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t has p r i v i l e g e d access, is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e
a p p e a r s t o us is n o t i n f a c t a n i l l u s i o n . T h i s s k e p t i c i s m is a n c h o r e d i n t e r p r e t i n g use o f a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e t e r m
i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n c e p t s o f t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m . A t t h e same " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e " n o l o n g e r r e f e r s t o t h e r e s u l t o f a n observed c o n v e r -
t i m e i t c o n j u r e s u p m e m o r i e s o f t h e c o m f o r t i n g i n t u i t i o n t h a t sus- gence o f the thoughts or representations o f various persons, b u t to
356 357
performative need for behavioral certainty rules out a reservation i n P a r a d o x i c a l , t o o , is t h e i d e a o f a final consensus o r definitive l a n -
p r i n c i p l e w i t h r e g a r d t o t r u t h , e v e n t h o u g h we k n o w , as s o o n as t h e guage that w o u l d b r i n g to a standstill all f u r t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n or
naive p e r f o r m a n c e o f a c t i o n s is i n t e r r u p t e d , t h a t t r u t h c l a i m s c a n a l l f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t w h a t is meant as a
b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y d i s c u r s i v e l y — t h a t is, o n l y w i t h i n t h e relevant s i t u a t i o n o f i d e a l m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t a n d s r e v e a l e d as a s i t u -
c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T r u t h may be assimilated n e i t h e r to behav- a t i o n b e y o n d t h e necessity f o r ( a n d t h e p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d w i t h )
i o r a l certainty n o r to j u s t i f i e d assertibility. Evidently, o n l y s t r o n g l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " 4 5
T h i s o b j e c t i o n is
conceptions of knowledge a n d t r u t h — o p e n to the accusation of d i r e c t e d n o t j u s t a g a i n s t a n i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t h y p o s t a t i z e s f i n a l states
Platonism—can do justice to the unity o f the illocutionary m e a n i n g as attainable states i n t h e w o r l d . E v e n i f t h e i d e a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s a r e
o f assertions, w h i c h t a k e o n d i f f e r e n t r o l e s i n t h e r e a l m s o f a c t i o n u n d e r s t o o d as a i m s t h a t are n o t a t t a i n a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , o r a t t a i n a b l e
a n d d i s c o u r s e respectively. W h e r e a s i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s "truths" only approximately, i t remains "paradoxical t h a t we would be
p r o p u p behavioral certainties, i n discourses they p r o v i d e t h e refer- o b l i g e d t o strive f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a n i d e a l w h o s e r e a l i z a t i o n
ence p o i n t f o r t r u t h claims that are i n p r i n c i p l e fallible. w o u l d be the e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . " 4 6
As a regulative idea, the
366 367
t i o n a l character o f t r u t h claims by means o f requirements that cut O f course, i t can be objected to this that an idealization o f the
o f f a l l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f a m i l i a r t o us, o r j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s does n o t i n a n y way have t o t a k e t h e " t h i c k "
else t h e y r e t a i n t h e c o n n e c t i o n t o p r a c t i c e s f a m i l i a r t o us b y p a y i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o n e ' s o w n c u l t u r e as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; r a t h e r ,
the price that r a t i o n a l acceptability does n o t exclude the possibility it can start w i t h the f o r m a l a n d processual characteristics o f justifica-
o f e r r o r e v e n u n d e r these i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, d o e s n o t s i m u l a t e t o r y p r a c t i c e s i n g e n e r a l t h a t , a f t e r a l l , a r e t o b e f o u n d i n all c u l -
a p r o p e r t y " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t " : " I t w o u l d be a p p a r e n t e i t h e r t h a t t u r e s — e v e n i f n o t b y a n y m e a n s always i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m . T h e
t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o r t h a t t h e y a r e so fact that the practice o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n compels the participants
i d e a l as t o m a k e n o use o f t h e i n t e n d e d c o n n e c t i o n with human themselves to make pragmatic assumptions w i t h a counterfactual
abilities." 4 7
c o n t e n t fits i n w e l l w i t h t h i s . W h o e v e r e n t e r s i n t o d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e
that the standards f o r the r a t i o n a l acceptability o f propositions, al- o f the better a r g u m e n t . However, w i t h this they assume—normally
t h o u g h t h e y c h a n g e h i s t o r i c a l l y , d o n o t always d o so a r b i t r a r i l y . A t i n a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l w a y — a s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t satisfies i m p r o b a b l e
t o d e f e n d h e r views n o t o n l y h e r e a n d n o w b u t e v e n i n f r o n t o f i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t b u t i n a l l p o s s i b l e c o n t e x t s , t h a t is, a t a n y t i m e
nity." 4 8
O n R o r t y ' s view, e v e r y i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t goes b e y o n d t h i s w i l l H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is also t r u e for this reason. A
founder on the p r o b l e m t h a t i n i d e a l i z i n g we m u s t always take t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" says t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" are
s o m e t h i n g f a m i l i a r as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; u s u a l l y i t is " u s , " t h a t satisfied. W e have n o o t h e r way o f a s c e r t a i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s
368 369
I t is n o t so d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a - o f a c t o r s w h o a r e i n v o l v e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d m o r e naively.
W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s as a h i s t o r y o f d e c l i n e . H o w e v e r , w h a t H e i d e g - i n g size a n d e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g d i v e r s i t y — t h a t is, c o n d i t i o n s t h a t h a m -
g e r o r D e r r i d a , f o r e x a m p l e , have t o say i n t h e i r o w n f a i r l y m e t a - p e r t h e p o s s i b l e success o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n c e r t a i n , n o t c o m p l e t e l y
p h y s i c a l ways about the critique of metaphysics is, o n Rorty's a r b i t r a r y , ways.
e s t i m a t i o n , m o r e p a r t o f t h e " e d i f y i n g " l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o R o r t y c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h i s i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e success o f a r g u m e n -
b e r e s e r v e d f o r p r i v a t e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e self a n d c a n n o t , a t a n y r a t e , t a t i o n t h a t is u n n e c e s s a r y f r o m a f u n c t i o n a l p o i n t o f view. W i t h t h e
serve t h e p u b l i c c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t e d l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s . 5 9
o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d "more a n d m o r e , " "larger a n d larger," a n d " i n -
O f course, m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the m o t i v a t i o n f o r this enterprise creasingly diverse" audiences, R o r t y b r i n g s a weak idealization i n t o
is t h e q u e s t i o n o f its v i a b i l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o c o n c l u d e w i t h j u s t t w o p l a y t h a t , o n h i s p r e m i s e , is f a r f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t . A s s o o n as t h e
questions i n this regard: concept of truth is e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o r o f a context-dependent
epistemic validity-for-us, the n o r m a t i v e reference p o i n t necessary t o
a. Is t h e e n v i s a g e d r e v i s i o n o f o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g compatible
e x p l a i n w h y a p r o p o n e n t s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o seek a g r e e m e n t f o r "p"
w i t h t h e f a c t o f a n a b i l i t y t o l e a r n t h a t is n o t a l r e a d y c o n s t r i c t e d a
beyond the boundaries of her own group is m i s s i n g . T h e i n f o r m a d o n t h a t
priori? t h e a g r e e m e n t o f a n i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e a u d i e n c e gives us i n c r e a s i n g l y
b . W h a t is t o h a p p e n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r e a s o n , a n d h o w less r e a s o n to fear that we w i l l be r e f u t e d presupposes the v e r y
c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e is t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i s t s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n of i n t e r e s t t h a t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d : t h e d e s i r e f o r "as m u c h i n t e r s u b -
r a t i o n a l beings? j e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " I f s o m e t h i n g is " t r u e " i f a n d o n l y i f i t
is r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d "by u s " b e c a u s e i t is g o o d " f o r u s , " t h e r e is
a. T h e p r o g r a m o f a r a t i o n a l r e v i s i o n o f d e e p l y r o o t e d P l a t o n i c
n o rational motive for e x p a n d i n g the circle o f members. N o reason
p r e j u d i c e s presumes we are capable o f a l e a r n i n g process t h a t n o t
exists f o r t h e d e c e n t e r i n g e x p a n s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y
o n l y can take place w i t h i n a given vocabulary a n d a c c o r d i n g to the
e s p e c i a l l y since R o r t y d e f i n e s " m y o w n e t h n o s " as t h e g r o u p i n f r o n t
s t a n d a r d s p r e v a i l i n g i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t b u t t h a t seizes h o l d o f t h e
o f w h i c h I f e e l o b l i g e d t o give a n a c c o u n t o f myself. T h e r e is, h o w -
v o c a b u l a r y a n d standards themselves. T h i s reason alone requires
ever, n o n o r m a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a n y f u r t h e r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d
R o r t y to p r o v i d e a suitable equivalent f o r an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h
the a g r e e m e n t o f "strangers," m e r e l y an e x p l a n a t o r y p o i n t e r t o w a r d
t h a t aims b e y o n d the p r e v a i l i n g c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f , however,
t h e a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s o f a " l i b e r a l W e s t e r n c u l t u r e " i n w h i c h "we
the d i s t i n c t i o n between " t r u e " a n d ' j u s t i f i e d " shrinks to the fact that
i n t e l l e c t u a l s " a d o p t a m o r e o r less u n d o g m a t i c a t t i t u d e . B u t even w e
t h e p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d t o d e f e n d "p" e v e n i n f r o n t o f a different
a r e a s s u r e d b y R o r t y t h a t , "we m u s t , i n p r a c t i c e , p r i v i l e g e o u r o w n
a u d i e n c e , t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r s u c h a n a n t i c i p a t i o n [ o f t r u t h ] is
g r o u p , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e c a n be n o n o n c i r c u l a r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for
missing. R o r t y counters this o b j e c t i o n by conceding a cautious ide-
d o i n g so." 61
alization o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s . H e allows t h a t w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y
was c a l l e d t h e " p u r s u i t o f t r u t h " m i g h t j u s t as w e l l be d e s c r i b e d as b. I n l o s i n g t h e r e g u l a t i v e i d e a o f t r u t h , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a -
the "pursuit o f intersubjective, u n f o r c e d agreement a m o n g larger t i o n loses t h a t p o i n t o f o r i e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s o f w h i c h s t a n d a r d s o f
a n d larger g r o u p s o f i n t e r l o c u t o r s " : "We h o p e to j u s t i f y o u r b e l i e f to j u s t i f i c a t i o n are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " c u s t o m a r y " n o r m s . T h e sociolo-
as m a n y a n d as l a r g e a u d i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e . " 6 0
R o r t y , i t is t r u e , d o e s g i z i n g o f the practice o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n means a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f rea-
n o t w a n t t h i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d a n "ever- s o n . A s a r u l e , social n o r m s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e
r e t r e a t i n g g o a l , " t h a t is, as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . E v e n t h e l a r g e r a u d i - p o i n t o f v i e w o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r b u t also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e
ence a n d the o v e r a r c h i n g c o n t e x t are supposed to be n o m o r e t h a n o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n l i g h t o f t h e s t a n d a r d s t h e y h o l d t o be t r u e . W i t h o u t
a different audience a n d a different context. Nonetheless, Rorty a reference t o t r u t h o r reason, however, t h e standards themselves
adds to this description the qualifications m e n t i o n e d : ever-expand- w o u l d n o l o n g e r have any p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n a n d w o u l d
376 377
o f t h e o r g a n i s m w i t h its e n v i r o n m e n t . " 6 2
W h a t a p p e a r s t o us as t h e
normative dimension of the linguistically constituted h u m a n m i n d Notes
m e r e l y gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n s are
functional f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a species t h a t , t h r o u g h a c t i n g , m u s t 1. R. Rorty, 'Trotsky a n d the Wild O r c h i d s , " Common Knowledge 3 (1992): 140-153.
" c o p e " w i t h reality. T h i s n e o - D a r w i n i s t self-description d e m a n d s an 2. R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago,
i r o n i c p r i c e . F o r Rorty, i n r e p l a c i n g t h e " c o r r e c t d e s c r i p d o n o f facts" 1970), p. 33.
w i t h "successful a d a p t a t i o n t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , " m e r e l y e x c h a n g e s
3. T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans, by E . B. Ashton ( L o n d o n , 1973), p. 408
one k i n d o f objectivism for another: the objectivism o f "represented" (amended translation).
reality f o r the objectivism o f i n s t r u m e n t a l l y "mastered" reality. A l -
4. M. Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Princeton, N.J., 1996), p. 365 (n. 51). Cf. also
t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y , w i t h t h i s , t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit f o r i n t e r a c t i o n R. Rorty, "Is Derrida a Quasi-Transcendental Philosopher?," Contemporary Literature
between h u m a n b e i n g s a n d w o r l d is c h a n g e d , w h a t r e m a i n s the (1995): 173-200.
12. Ibid., p. 179: " [ T h e contexualist view] threatens the n e o K a n t i a n image of phi- 29. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 266.
losophy's relation to science and to culture. T h e urge to say that assertions and
actions must not only cohere with other assertions and actions but 'correspond' to 30. Ibid., p. 249.
something apart from what people are saying and doing has some claim to be called
the philosophical urge." 31. F. Kambartel, "Universalität richtig verstanden," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie
44 (1996): 249.
13. Ibid., p. 171.
32. It is no accident that I introduced the formal-pragmatic concept of the gram-
14. Cf. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie," in E . Martens and H . Schnädelbach, eds., matical supposition of an objective world in the context of the theory of action. Cf.
Grundkurs Philosophie (Hamburg, 1985), pp. 37-76. J . Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston,
1984), pp. 75-101; vol. 2 (Boston, 1987), pp. 119ff.
15. [Editor's note:] Habermas remarks that the subtitle to the G e r m a n translation
of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is A Critique of Philosophy (Eine Kritik der Philoso- 33. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 238: "All that is involved in the idea of an
phie) . objective world as 'what is there anyway' is that an objective proposition's being true
is one thing and our believing it to be true, or being justified in believing it to be
16. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 263. true, something else again."
17. Ibid., p. 339. 34. R. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly
45 (1995): 281-300 (here, p. 300).
18. Ibid.
35. D. Davidson pursues a third strategy that could be called "theoreticist" or, as he
19. R. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge, 1991), himself proposes, "methodological;" cf. D. Davidson, " T h e Folly of Trying to Define
p. 23. T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263-278. Davidson uses the semantic concep-
tion of truth, understood in a nondeflationary way, as the undefined basic concept
20. Only the empiricists were prepared to call "objective" the experience (Erfahrung) for an empirical theory of language. Both the concept of truth, which is used as a
that "corresponds to what is there outside" (Rorty). T h e transcendental idealists, by theoretical term in his theory of language, and the theory itself, which is supposed
contrast, reduce even the objectivity of experience to necessary subjective conditions to explain the comprehension of linguistic expressions, can prove their truth (sich
of possible experience. bewähren) at one and the same time. For this reason, Davidson's implicit "theory of
truth" can be discussed only in connection with his theory as a whole. I n general, I
21. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans, by D. Paul and G . E . M. Anscombe (Oxford, see the following difficulty: on the one hand, Davidson disputes that the concept of
1969), §115, p. 125. truth has a content capable of being explicated, to this extent allying himself with
the deflationist polemic against attempts to explain the meaning of truth; on the
22. H . Schnädelbach, " T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Zur Rehabilitierung other hand, he has to secure for the truth-predicate, over and above its disquota-
des animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 104—115. tional function, a certain content as far as the theory of rationality is concerned in
order to explain the veridical nature of beliefs. To this extent he joins forces with
23. With respect to a critique of Rorty's approach, I will confine myself in the Putnam and Dummett, who insist that Tarski's Convention T says nothing about the
following to the problem of truth. However, I would like to indicate, at least, that we actual meaning of truth. Standing between these two positions, Davidson, instead of
would not be able to explain the possibility of learning processes without reference merely using the concept, sees himself compelled to write learned treatises on a
to the capacity for recognizing the same entities under different descriptions. concept he declares to be "indefinable"—treatises in which he does, at least, in a
metacritical way, isolate the realist intuitions bound up with truth. Cf. D. Davidson,
24. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cam- " T h e Structure and Content of T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279-328.
bridge, 1982), pp. 50ff. Davidson holds onto the idea that we can know something of an objective world
"which is not of our own making." This view separates him from Rorty who attempts
25. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 178. in vain to pull Davidson over to his own side of an abolitionist understanding of truth.
Cf. D. Davidson, " A Coherence Theory of T r u t h and Knowledge," in A. Malachowski,
26. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 232: "We need only ask whether or not the ed., Reading Rorty (Oxford, 1990), pp. 120-139; cf. also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson,
'direct' grasping of facts on which such comparison depends is supposed to be a and T r u t h . " For a comparison of Davidson's and my own approaches to the theory
cognitive state with propositional content. I f it isn't, it can have no impact on of language, see B. Fultner, Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action (Ph.D. dis-
verification. But if it is, all we have been given is another kind of belief." sertation, Northwestern University, 1995).
27. Ibid, p. 267. 36. K. R. Popper, ' T r u t h , Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge," in
Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963), pp. 215-250.
28. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and T r u t h , " in E . Lepore, ed., Truth and Inter-
pretation (Oxford, 1986), p. 343.
380 381
37. E . Tugendhat, "Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit," Philosophische 53. Wellmer, "Wahrheit," p. 163; cf. the corresponding reflections on "superasserti-
Rundschau 8 (1960): 131-159, reprinted in his Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt, bility" in C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).
1992), pp. 179-213.
54. Cf. Lafont "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," p. 1021: "Only the presupposition
38. I refer here to positions held bv P. Horwich and A. Fine; cf. M. Williams, " D o We of a single objective world . . . permits [us] to make the unconditional validity of
(Epistemologists) Need a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 223-242. truth compatible with a fallible understanding of knowledge."
39. I introduced this distinction in the Christian Gauss Lectures on founding sociol- 55. I cannot in the present context deal with moral and other normative validity
ogy in the theory of language (1971); cf. J . Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur claims that have a built-in orientation toward discursive vindication. They lack the
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 1-126, esp. pp. 104ff. property of "transcending justification" that accrues to truth claims through the
supposition of a single objective world built into the communicative use of language.
40. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 22-42. Normative validity claims are raised for interpersonal relationships within a social
world that is not independent of "our making" in the same way as is the objective
41. H . Putnam, "Introduction," in Realism and Reason (Cambridge, 1983). world. T h e discursive treatment of normative claims is, however, "analogous to truth"
insofar as the participants in practical discourse are guided by the goal of a com-
42. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur manded, permitted, or forbidden "single right answer." T h e social world is intrinsi-
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. cally historical, that is, ontologically constituted in a different way than the objective
world. F o r this reason, in the case of the social world, the idealization of the justi-
43. K . - 0 . Apel, "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbegründung," ficatory conditions cannot include an "anticipation of future corroboration
in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 116¬ (Bewährung)," in the sense of an anticipated refutation of future objections (Win-
211. gert) , but only in the critical sense of a proviso concerning approximation, that is, a
proviso concerning the justification community's actually achieved state of decenter-
44. C . Lafont, "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie ing. T h e discursive vindication of a truth claim says that the truth conditions, inter-
42 (1994): 1007-1023; Williams, Unnatural Doubts, pp. 233ff. preted as assertibility conditions, are satisfied. I n the case of a normative validity
claim, the discursively achieved agreement grounds the corresponding norm's wor-
45. A. Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," in The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley thiness to be recognized; to this extent the agreement itself contributes to the
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 175 (amended translation). satisfaction of the norm's conditions of validity. Whereas rational acceptability merely
indicates the truth of a proposition, it provides a constructive contribution to the
46. A. Wellmer, "Wahrheit, Kontingenz, Moderne," in Endspiele (Frankfurt, 1993), validity of norms.
p. 162. English translation as Endgames: Essays and lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature
of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1998). 56. Rorty, " I s T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 300.
47. Davidson, " T h e Structure a n d Content of T r u t h , " p. 307. 57. R. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," Ms. (1995), p. 5.
48. R. Rorty, "Sind Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeitschrift für 58. T. McCarthy, "Philosophy and Social Practice: Richard Rorty's 'New Pragma-
Philosophie & (1994): 982f. tism,'" in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 11-34.
49. Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," pp. 451f. 59. R. Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy," Revue Interna-
tionale de Philosophie 49 (1995), 437-460; cf. my reply in ibid., pp. 553-556.
50. J . Habermas, "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Justification and Application, trans.
C. C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 30ff, pp. 58f. 60. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 298.
51. L . Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt, 1993), p. 277. 61. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I, p. 29.
52. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n term "sich bewähren" and its cognates have generally 62. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," pp. 1 If.
been rendered here as "prove to be true" (in the sense of "turn out to be t r u e " ) , so
as to preserve in translation its connection with "wahr" true. Sich bewähren is proving 63. T h e same objectivism and the same kind of insensitivity could be shown through
to be true in the sense of standing the test, withstanding critical scrutiny. However, reference to Rorty's egocentric or ethnocentric description of processes of interpre-
because it is the term that Albrecht Wellmer used to render "corroboration" in his tation, for example, of hard cases of intercultural understanding (Verständigung).
influential discussion of Popper, where the reference is clearly to Wellmer's idea of Unlike Gadamer, Rorty does not have recourse to the symmetrical conditions for an
"anticipating future Bewährung" "corroboration" is used. See A. Wellmer, Critical adoption of perspectives learned by speakers and hearers in learning the system of
Theory of Society, trans. J . C u m m i n g (New York, 1974). personal pronouns and making possible a reciprocal convergence of interpretive
382
Chapter 8
9
horizons that, initially, are far apart. Instead, he takes as his starting point an asym-
metrical relationship between " u s " and "them," so that we have to judge their utter- O n the Distinction between Poetic and
ances according to our standards and assimilate their standards to ours; cf.
J . Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., Communicative Uses of Language (1985)
1992), pp. 135ff. This assimilatory model of understanding (Verstehen) partially coin-
cides with Davidson's model of interpretation. However, what for Davidson is the
result of a methodological decision to view the interpretation of linguistic expressions
as the application of the hypotheses of an empirically turned theory of truth, results
for Rorty from the decision (of strategic significance for his theory) in favor of a
naturalist descriptive vocabulary.
1
F r o m this c o m p l e x discussion [between Jacques D e r r i d a a n d J o h n
S e a r l e ] , J o n a t h a n C u l l e r selects as t h e c e n t r a l issue t h e q u e s t i o n o f
1
w h e t h e r J o h n A u s t i n succeeds i n m a k i n g w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e a t o t a l l y
harmless, provisional, and purely methodological move. Austin
w a n t s t o a n a l y z e t h e r u l e s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r e d by c o m p e t e n t speak-
ers, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t y p i c a l s p e e c h acts c a n b e executed
successfully. H e b e g i n s t h i s analysis by f o c u s i n g o n s e n t e n c e s f r o m
normal e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d s e r i o u s l y a n d u s e d as simply
and literally as p o s s i b l e . T h u s , t h e u n i t o f analysis, t h e standard
s p e e c h act, is t h e r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t i o n s . T h e t h e o r e t i c i a n of
s p e e c h acts d i r e c t s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a s a m p l e o f n o r m a l linguistic
utterances f r o m w h i c h all complex, derivative, parasidc, a n d deviant
cases h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n is a c o n c e p -
tion of "customary" or n o r m a l linguistic practice—a concept of "or-
d i n a r y l a n g u a g e " w h o s e h a r m l e s s n e s s a n d c o n s i s t e n c y D e r r i d a calls
i n t o q u e s t i o n . A u s t i n ' s i n t e n t i o n is c l e a r : h e w a n t s t o analyze t h e
u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s of, f o r e x a m p l e , " p r o m i s e s " w i t h r e s p e c t t o cases
i n w h i c h the u t t e r a n c e o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences actually functions
as a p r o m i s e . N o w , t h e r e are c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h s u c h s e n t e n c e s lose
t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a p r o m i s e . S p o k e n b y a n a c t o r o n t h e stage,
as p a r t o f a p o e m , o r e v e n w i t h i n a m o n o l o g u e , a p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n
tells us, b e c o m e s " p e c u l i a r l y n u l l a n d v o i d . " T h e same h o l d s f o r a
384 385
p r o m i s e t h a t o c c u r s i n a q u o t a t i o n , o r f o r o n e t h a t is m e r e l y m e n - is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e q u o t e d p r o m i s e t h r o u g h t h e f o r m o f i n d i r e c t
t i o n e d . I n such contexts, t h e r e is n o serious o r binding use, and s p e e c h : i t is t h e r e b y t a k e n o u t o f t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t " f u n c t i o n s , "
s o m e t i m e s n o t e v e n a literal use, o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g performative t h a t is, i n w h i c h i t c o o r d i n a t e s t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s
s e n t e n c e , b u t r a t h e r a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c use. As Searle repeats i n i n t e r a c t i o n a n d gives rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n .
insistently, fictional o r s i m u l a t e d o r i n d i r e c t m o d e s o f use are " p a r a - O n l y t h e s p e e c h a c t a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e is effective
s i t i c " i n t h e sense t h a t l o g i c a l l y t h e y p r e s u p p o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a as action; t h e p r o m i s e m e n t i o n e d i n q u o t a t i o n , o r r e p o r t e d , d e p e n d s
s e r i o u s , l i t e r a l , a n d b i n d i n g use o f t h e s e n t e n c e s g r a m m a t i c a l l y a p - g r a m m a t i c a l l y u p o n t h i s . S u c h a s e t t i n g d e p r i v i n g i t o f its i l l o c u t i o n -
p r o p r i a t e f o r p r o m i s e s . C u l l e r e x t r a c t s essentially t h r e e objections ary force constitutes the bridge between quotation and fictional
f r o m D e r r i d a ' s texts; these a r e a i m e d a t s h o w i n g t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . E v e n a c t i o n o n t h e stage rests o n a basis o f e v e r y d a y
s u c h a use o f l a n g u a g e a n d a r e m e a n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e u s u a l actions ( o n t h e p a r t o f t h e actors, d i r e c t o r , stageworkers, a n d t h e a t e r
d i s t i n c t i o n s between serious a n d s i m u l a t e d , l i t e r a l a n d m e t a p h o r i c a l , employees); i n the context o f this f r a m e w o r k , promises can f u n c t i o n
everyday a n d fictional, a n d c u s t o m a r y a n d parasitic m o d e s o f speech in a different way t h a n t h e y d o " o n stage," g i v i n g rise t o o b l i g a t i o n s
collapse. relevant f o r the sequel o f a c t i o n . D e r r i d a makes no attempt to
i n g l i n k between quotability a n d iterability, o n the one h a n d , a n d within communicative action. I n the illocutionary binding and
fictionality, o n t h e o t h e r . T h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e is o n l y a p p a r - b o n d i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s , A u s t i n d i s c o v e r e d
p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p e t i t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a r u l e , t h a t is, c o n v e n - T h e c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n -
role-playing. " 2
however, change their meanings depending o n shifting contexts;
I n this a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a obviously already presupposes w h a t he moreover, c o n t e x t s are so c o n s t i t u t e d as t o be o p e n t o e v e r - w i d e r -
wants to prove: that every c o n v e n t i o n t h a t p e r m i t s t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f r e a c h i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n . I t is o n e o f t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f o u r language
e x e m p l a r y a c t i o n s i n t r i n s i c a l l y possesses n o t m e r e l y a s y m b o l i c b u t t h a t w e c a n release u t t e r a n c e s f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t s a n d t r a n s -
also a fictional c h a r a c t e r . B u t i t w o u l d first have t o b e s h o w n that p l a n t t h e m i n t o d i f f e r e n t o n e s — D e r r i d a speaks o f " g r a f t i n g . " I n t h i s
conventions r e l a t i n g t o p l a y u l t i m a t e l y are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m m a n n e r , we c a n , i n r e l a t i o n t o a s p e e c h a c t s u c h as a " m a r r i a g e v o w , "
n o r m s o f a c t i o n . A u s t i n uses t h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e as a n e x a m - t h i n k o f ever-new a n d m o r e i m p r o b a b l e contexts; t h e specification
p l e o f a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c f o r m because t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s does n o t r u n u p against any n a t u r a l
386 387
Chapter 9 O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e
Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e
a s s u m p t i o n only to the e x t e n t t h a t (against Culler's reconstruction reduce the sphere o f poetic f u n c t i o n to poetry or to confine poetry
e v e r y d a y ) use o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s a s p e c t is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o n e f o r a s u b s i d i a r y , accessory c o n s t i t u e n t . T h i s f u n c t i o n , b y p r o m o t i n g t h e
universal insurmountable textual context within which all genre a n d objects. H e n c e , w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h poetic f u n c t i o n , linguistics
t i o n , f a n t a s y f r o m p e r c e p t i o n , t h e t r a i n i n g m a n e u v e r f r o m t h e act o f
M a r y L . Pratt refers to O h m a n n ' s s t u d i e s 1 5
i n order to r e f u t e — a d - warfare, a n d the i m a g i n e d scenario f r o m t h e r e p o r t o n an actual
m i t t e d l y by means o f speech-act t h e o r y — t h e thesis o f t h e i n d e - c a t a s t r o p h e . B u t i n n o n e o f these cases d o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose
392 393
v i e w p o i n t , l a n g u a g e as s u c h c o n v e r g e s w i t h l i t e r a t u r e o r i n d e e d w i t h t e r m i n e s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y , science
" w r i t i n g . " T h i s aestheticizing of language, which is purchased with the a n d m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s a n d p o l i t i c s , a r e at t h e m e r c y o f a p r o c e s s
twofold denial of the independent logics of normal and poetic speech, also of language-creating p r o t u b e r a n c e s i n just the same way as a r t a n d
e x p l a i n s D e r r i d a ' s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o w a r d t h e t e n s i o n - f i l l e d p o l a r i t y be- philosophy. L i k e K u h n i a n history o f science, the f l u x o f i n t e r p r e t a -
t w e e n t h e p o e t i c , w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d its p r o - tions flows r h y t h m i c a l l y between the r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g a n d n o r m a l i z a -
saic, i n n e r w o r l d l y f u n c t i o n s ; t h e s e f u n c t i o n s a r e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t tion of language. Rorty observes this b a c k - a n d - f o r t h movement
by a m o d i f i e d version o f B u h l e r ' s schema o f language f u n c t i o n s . 2 2
between two situations i n all d o m a i n s o f c u l t u r a l life:
L i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes s u c h as t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l -
O n e is t h e sort o f s i t u a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d w h e n p e o p l e pretty m u c h a g r e e o n
edge, the transmission o f culture, the f o r m a t i o n of personal identity,
w h a t is w a n t e d , a n d a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h o w best to get it. I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n
socialization, and social i n t e g r a t i o n involve mastering problems
t h e r e is n o n e e d to say a n y t h i n g t e r r i b l y u n f a m i l i a r , for a r g u m e n t is typically
p o s e d i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e y owe t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f l e a r n i n g p r o c - a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f a s s e r t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t t h e utility o f v o c a b u l a r i e s .
esses, w h i c h D e r r i d a c a n n o t a c k n o w l e d g e , t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c s T h e c o n t r a s t i n g s i t u a t i o n is o n e i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g is u p for grabs at
o f these p r o b l e m s a n d t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m t a i l o r e d t o deal w i t h o n c e — i n w h i c h t h e motives a n d t h e t e r m s o f d i s c u s s i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l
t h e m . F o r D e r r i d a , l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes i n t h e w o r l d are subject of argument. . . . I n s u c h p e r i o d s p e o p l e b e g i n to toss a r o u n d o l d
w o r d s i n n e w s e n s e s , to t h r o w i n t h e o c c a s i o n a l n e o l o g i s m , a n d t h u s to
e m b e d d e d i n a world-constituting context that prejudices everything;
h a m m e r o u t a n e w i d i o m w h i c h i n i t i a l l y attracts a t t e n t i o n to itself a n d o n l y
t h e y a r e f a t a l i s t i c a l l y at t h e m e r c y o f t h e h a p p e n i n g s o f t e x t c r e a t i o n
later gets p u t to w o r k . 2 3
a d m i n i s t e r capacities for world-disclosure. Because D e r r i d a o v e r g e n e r a l - tic way. T h i s innovative potential then finds expression in the
izes t h i s o n e l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n — t h e p o e t i c — h e n o l o n g e r n o t i c e s c h a n g e d c o m p o s i t i o n o f a n evaluative v o c a b u l a r y — i n t h e r e n o v a t i o n
the complex relation between the n o r m a l language of everyday of value-orientations a n d n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s — w h i c h alters the
Chapter 9 O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e
13. Ibid., p. 17. answers to have. Today, however, it is evident that the scope of universalist ques-
tions—for instance, the question of the necessary conditions for the rationality of
14. G . Hartman, Saving the Text (Baltimore, 1981), p. xxi. utterances, or of the general pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and
argumentation—does indeed have to be reflected in the grammatical form of uni-
15. Cf. also R. O h m a n n , "Speech, Literature and the Space Between," New Literary versal propositions; it does not, however, have to be reflected in any unconditional
History 5 (1974): 34ff. validity or "ultimate foundations" claimed for such universalist propositions or for
their theoretical framework. T h e fallibilist consciousness of the sciences has long
16. W. Labov, Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia, 1972). since caught up with philosophy as well.
With this kind of fallibilism, we, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, do not
17. M. L . Pratt, A Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, 1977), p. 92. I in any way dispense with truth claims. Such claims cannot be raised in the perfor-
am grateful to Jonathan Culler for drawing my attention to this interesting book. mative attitude of the first person in any other way than as claims that—qua c l a i m s —
transcend space and time. But we are also aware that there is no zero-context for
18. Ibid., p. 148. truth claims. T r u t h claims are raised here and now and have a built-in orientation
toward criticism. H e n c e we reckon with the trivial possibility that they will be revised
19. Ibid. at some future date or in some other context. Just as it always has, philosophy
understands itself as the guardian of rationality in the sense of a claim of reason
20. Ibid., p. 147. endogenous to our form of life. I n its work, however, philosophy prefers a combina-
tion of strong propositions with weak status claims; this is so little totalitarian that
there is no call for a totalizing critique of reason against it. O n this point cf. J . Haber-
21. Ibid.
mas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and Communi-
cative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).
22. Cf. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston, 1984), pp. 273ff.
23. R. Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," in his Philosophical Papers II: Essays
on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 85-107, here p. 88, and Consequences
of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982), esp. the introduction and chapters 6, 7, and 9.
24. At any rate, our reflections have brought us to the point from where we can see
why Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida get into this aporia at all. T h e y continue to
defend themselves as though, like the first generation of Hegelian disciples, they were
still living in the shadow of the "last" philosopher. They are still battling against the
"strong" conceptions of theory, truth, and system that have in fact belonged to the
past for over a century and a half. T h e y still think they have to arouse philosophy
from what Derrida calls "the dream of its heart." They believe they have to tear
philosophy away from the delusion of expounding a theory that has the last word.
Such a comprehensive, closed, and definitive system of propositions would have to
be formulated in a language that is self-explicating, that neither needs nor permits
further commentary, and that thereby brings to a standstill the effective history
(Wirkungsgeschichte) in which interpretation is heaped upon interpretation endlessly.
Rorty speaks of the demand for a language "which can receive no gloss, requires no
interpretation, cannot be distanced, cannot be sneered at by later generations. It is
the hope for a vocabulary which is intrinsically and self-evidently final, not only the
most comprehensive and fruitful vocabulary we have come up with so far" (Rorty,
Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 93f.).
I f reason were bound, under penalty of demise, to hold on to these classical goals
of metaphysics, pursued from Parmenides to Hegel; if reason as such (even after
Hegel) stood before the alternative of either insisting on the strong conceptions of
theory, truth, and system as they were customary in the great tradition or of renounc-
ing itself, then an adequate critique of reason would have to be so very radical that it
could scarcely avoid the paradox of self-referentiality. Nietzsche saw the matter in this
way. A n d , unfortunately, Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, too, still seem to confuse
the universalist posing of questions that continues to be part of philosophy with the
long since abandoned claims to universalist status that philosophy once alleged its
10
Questions and Counterquestions (1985)
s t r a i g h t j a c k e t o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , R i c h a r d R o r t y has u n d e r t a k e n
d i s c o u r s e is p a r t o f s p e c i f i c a l l y m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s h a t t e r i n g o f
the most ambitious project: he wants to destroy the t r a d i t i o n o f the
n a i v e c o n s e n s u s is t h e i m p e t u s f o r w h a t H e g e l calls " t h e e x p e r i e n c e
p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — f r o m its C a r t e s i a n b e g i n n i n g s — w i t h
o f r e f l e c t i o n . " W e c a n n o t n o w s i m p l y w i s h t h i s e x p e r i e n c e away; we
t h e a i m o f s h o w i n g t h e pointlessness o f t h e e n t i r e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
c a n o n l y n e g a t e i t . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f o u r c u l t u r e , i n v e s t e d as i t is
foundations and limits of knowledge. H e concludes that philoso-
with r e f l e c t i o n , t h e t h r u s t o f t h i s e x p e r i e n c e has t o be worked
p h e r s , t o be r i d o f t h e p r o b l e m , n e e d o n l y r e c o g n i z e t h e h y b r i d
t h r o u g h n o t o n l y p o l i t i c a l l y b u t also p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T o d a y w e can
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e s a n d give t h e field o v e r t o t h e p r a c t i -
s u r v e y t h e s p e c t r u m o f answers g i v e n b y p h i l o s o p h e r s : r o u g h l y speak-
tioners o f science, politics, a n d daily life. L i k e the later W i t t g e n s t e i n ,
i n g , i t e x t e n d s a l l t h e way f r o m h i s t o r i c i s m t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m .
R o r t y sees p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f as t h e sickness w h o s e s y m p t o m s i t p r e -
O n t h e o n e h a n d , D i l t h e y , W e b e r , Jaspers, a n d K o l a k o w s k i t a k e a n
v i o u s l y a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d t o c u r e . B u t R o r t y is s t i l l e n o u g h of
a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e g r o w i n g p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s "
a p h i l o s o p h e r t o give a r e a s o n f o r h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t w e a v o i d
(Glaubensmachte), existential m o d e s o f b e i n g , myths, value attitudes,
t h e Holzweg of philosophical justification; one shouldn't scratch
a n d metaphysical o r r e l i g i o u s worldviews. A p h i l o s o p h y t h a t treats
w h e r e i t d o e s n ' t i t c h . I t is j u s t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " i t d o e s n ' t i t c h "
f o r m s o f t r u t h i n t h e p l u r a l is s u p p o s e d t o leave t o t h e sciences t h e
t h a t I find p r o b l e m a t i c .
j o b o f p r o v i d i n g an adequate reservoir o f consensual knowledge. O n
t h e o t h e r h a n d , p h i l o s o p h e r s s u c h as H u s s e r l , t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n , F o r m s o f l i f e a r e t o t a l i t i e s t h a t always e m e r g e i n t h e p l u r a l . T h e i r
C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions
hold t h e view that a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s capacity to create problems M a r c u s e . I n The Theory of Communicative Action, m y d i s c u s s i o n o f M a x
t h r o u g h i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n c i t i n g d o u b t is q u i t e l i m i t e d . I share Peirce's Weber's t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e a n d his diagnosis o f t h e times r e q u i r e d
d o u b t a b o u t any type o f Cartesian d o u b t . P r o b l e m s e m e r g e i n situ- understanding the autonomous art that emerged i n m o d e r n Europe
a t i o n s o v e r w h i c h we a r e n o t i n c o n t r o l ; t h e y a r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t ( t o g e t h e r w i t h a r t c r i t i c i s m i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d since t h e e i g h t e e n t h
o b j e c t i v e l y h a p p e n s t o us. T h e s l o g a n t h a t l e f t i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e t h e c e n t u r y ) as t h e p r o d u c t o f a d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d as t h e r e s u l t o f a
cause o f t h e m i s e r y t h e y analyze has b e e n b a n d i e d a b o u t f o r t o o l o n g process o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . W e b e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of
a m o n g r i g h d s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n G e r m a n y t o b e c r e d i b l e . I t is n o m o r e w o r l d v i e w s as a p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o s i t i o n and differentiation. On
c r e d i b l e i n t h e a t t r a c t i v e p a c k a g i n g o f a t h e o r y o f t h e n e w class. t h e o n e h a n d , t h e basic s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t h e w o r l d
T o m e , t h e n o t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l " v a l u e e l i t e s " is a b s o l u t e l y w o r t h - orders o f "salvation h i s t o r y " a n d c o s m o l o g y were c o n s t r u c t e d have
less. L i k e R o r t y , I have f o r a l o n g t i m e i d e n t i f i e d m y s e l f w i t h t h e d i s s o l v e d ; w i t h t h i s d i s s o l u t i o n , o n t i c , m o r a l , a n d expressive aspects
r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e n t a l i t y t h a t is p r e s e n t i n t h e best A m e r i c a n are n o l o n g e r fused i n t o o n e a n d t h e same c o n c e p t . W i t h o u t t h e
traditions a n d articulated i n A m e r i c a n pragmatism. This mentality possibility o f recourse t o G o d a n d t h e c o s m i c o r d e r as a n o r i g i n ,
takes s e r i o u s l y w h a t a p p e a r s t o s o - c a l l e d r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s as so m u c h t h e o l o g i c a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l f o r m s o f g r o u n d i n g lose t h e i r c r e d i b i l -
r e f o r m i s t naïveté. Dewey's " a t t e m p t t o c o n c r e t i z e c o n c e r n s w i t h t h e ity. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o f a n e f o r m s o f " k n o w l e d g e " that are
d a i l y p r o b l e m s o f o n e ' s c o m m u n i t y " expresses b o t h a p r a c t i c e a n d relatively i n d e p e n d e n t o f o n e a n o t h e r have arisen alongside a sub-
a n a t t i t u d e . I t is a m a x i m o f a c t i o n a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n f a c t s u p e r f l u - jectivized " f a i t h . " Philosophy, forced i n t o the position o f mediator,
ous t o p h i l o s o p h i z e . becomes dependent o n these. A s d o c u m e n t e d i n the division o f
Rorty puts i n question the entire u n d e r t a k i n g o f the theory of K a n t ' s t h r e e Critiques, questions o f t r u t h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m
r e s e r v a t i o n s o f M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e b o o k O r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i d e a l i s t aesthetics s t r i c t l y
c o n c e r n p a r t i c u l a r steps i n its e x e c u t i o n . T h e s e a u t h o r s d i r e c t t h e i r d i s t i n g u i s h e d aesthetic pleasure f r o m o t h e r " e m p i r i c a l " f o r m s of
attention to complications i n m y a t t e m p t to w o r k o u t the concept of s a t i s f a c t i o n ; t h a t is, i t s e p a r a t e d t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , o n
c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . Jay p o i n t s o u t a n u n d e r - i l l u m i n a t e d as- the one h a n d , f r o m the useful a n d the desirable, o n the other. A r t
p e c t ; M c C a r t h y t o u c h e s u p o n a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y ; W h i t e b o o k deals e m e r g e s w i t h its o w n p r o p e r c l a i m , as d o s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , l a w
w i t h a p r o b l e m t h a t e m e r g e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e t h e o r y . W i t h i n a n d m o r a l i t y . M a x W e b e r speaks o f t h e i n t e r n a l o r i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c
the f r a m e w o r k o f a b r i e f reply, I can r e s p o n d o n l y by a l l u d i n g to h o w (Eigensinn) o f e a c h o f these t h r e e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s p h e r e s , w h i c h a r e
I have d e a l t w i t h s o m e o f these p r o b l e m s i n t h e past a n d h o w I w o u l d also s e p a r a t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n t h e f o r m o f f u n c -
l i k e t o w o r k o n o t h e r s i n t h e f u t u r e . A n a d d e d d i f f i c u l t y h e r e is t h a t t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i e d systems o f a c t i o n . S i n c e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f A r -
o n l y M c C a r t h y directs his r e m a r k s to m y m o r e recent works. n o l d H a u s e r i n t o t h e social h i s t o r y o f m o d e r n a r t , t h i s institutional
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t has f r e q u e n t l y b e e n a n a l y z e d . 8
3 T h e r e is n o n e e d here to go i n t o t h e e x t e r n a l aspects o f t h e
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the forms o f p r o d u c t i o n o f art, the purposes to
W i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f h e r m e n e u t i c sensitivity, M a r t i n Jay has c o l l e c t e d w h i c h i t was p u t , o r t h e m o d e s o f its r e c e p t i o n i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m
a n d i n t e r p r e t e d m y scattered r e m a r k s o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f aesthetic sacrally b o u n d a r t , t h r o u g h t h e a r t o f t h e c o u r t a n d p a t r o n , t o
m o d e r n i t y . I n e v e r y case these r e m a r k s h a d a s e c o n d a r y character b o u r g e o i s c o m m e r c i a l i z e d a r t . W h a t is i n d i s p u t e a r e t h e i n t e r n a l
9
e x t e n t t o w h i c h o n e c a n speak o f a n a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l rationality, o r
m o r a l , is m i r r o r e d i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e e a r l y R o m a n t i c period
e v e n o f a learning process, i n t h i s s p h e r e .
(especially i n F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's w o r k ) , i n the aestheticism of
T h e r e is a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a c e r t a i n type
B a u d e l a i r e a n d t h e S y m b o l i s t s , i n t h e p r o g r a m o f I'art pour I'art, i n
o f " k n o w i n g " is o b j e c t i f i e d i n a r t w o r k s , a l b e i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n
the surrealistic celebration o f i l l u m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h s h o c k effects,
i n t h e o r e d c a l discourse or i n legal o r m o r a l representations. These
w i t h its a m b i v a l e n c e o f a t t r a c t i o n a n d r e p u l s i o n , o f b r o k e n c o n t i n u -
objectivations o f spirit, too, are f a l l i b l e a n d hence criticizable. A r t
ity, o f t h e s h u d d e r o f p r o f a n i z a t i o n , o f a g i t a t e d d i s g u s t — i n s h o r t , i n
c r i t i c i s m arose a t t h e same t i m e as t h e a u t o n o m o u s w o r k o f a r t ; a n d ,
the r e f l e c t i o n o f those m o m e n t s i n w h i c h the bewildered subject
since t h e n , i t has b e c o m e a n e s t a b l i s h e d i n s i g h t t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t
"transgresses h i s b o u n d a r i e s , " as B a t a i l l e p u t s i t . W h a t is r e f l e c t e d i n
calls f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n , a n d e v e n " l i n g u i s t i f i c a t i o n "
these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d declarations is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the
(Versprachlichung) o f its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . A r t c r i t i c i s m has d e v e l o p e d
f o r m o f aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i n d u c e d by avant-garde a r t itself, i n t h e
f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t specifically d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t f r o m the
d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e c e n t e r i n g a n d u n b o u n d i n g o f subjectivity. A t the
argumentative forms of theoretical and moral-practical discourse. 1 0
C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions
I f a e s t h e d c e x p e r i e n c e is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e x t o f i n d i v i d -
N e i t h e r t r u t h n o r t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) m a y be a t t r i b u t e d u n m e t a -
u a l l i f e - h i s t o r i e s , i f i t is u t i l i z e d t o i l l u m i n a t e a s i t u a t i o n a n d t o t h r o w p h o r i c a l l y to w o r k s o f a r t , i f o n e u n d e r s t a n d s " t r u t h " a n d " t r u t h f u l n e s s " i n
l i g h t o n i n d i v i d u a l l i f e - p r o b l e m s — i f i t a t a l l c o m m u n i c a t e s its i m - the sense of a pragmatically differentiated, everyday c o n c e p t of truth. We
pulses t o a c o l l e c t i v e f o r m o f l i f e — t h e n a r t e n t e r s i n t o a language c a n e x p l a i n t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — a n d e v e n n o r m a t i v e
g a m e t h a t is n o l o n g e r t h a t o f a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m b u t b e l o n g s r a t h e r t i g h t n e s s — a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i n t e r l a c e d i n w o r k s o f a r t o n l y by a p p e a l i n g
to t h e fact t h a t the w o r k o f art, as a s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n w i t h a n aesthetic
t o e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . I t t h e n n o l o n g e r affects o n l y
validity c l a i m , is at the s a m e t i m e o b j e c t o f a n experience, i n w h i c h t h e t h r e e
o u r evaluative language o r m e r e l y renews the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f needs
d i m e n s i o n s o f validity a r e unmetaphorically i n t e r m e s h e d . 1 5
d e g r e e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have t o e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n 5
between " t h e i r " s o r t o f e x p l a n a t i o n a n d t h e k i n d we a c c e p t as c o r -
r e c t . W e m u s t be a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e successful a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l I first w a n t t o isolate t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e t h a t
l e a r n i n g processes t h a t s e p a r a t e " u s " f r o m " t h e m ; " b o t h m o d e s o f I a p p r o p r i a t e d i n t o m y o w n view ( a ) . I n so d o i n g , w e t h e n e n c o u n t e r
e x p l a n a t i o n have t o b e l o c a t e d w i t h i n t h e same u n i v e r s e o f dis- M c C a r t h y ' s c o n c e r n f o r t h e costs o f a p r o c e s s o f disenchantment
c o u r s e . So l o n g as t h i s is n o t a c h i e v e d , t h e f e e l i n g r e m a i n s t h a t o n e t h a t n o w leaves o p e n o n l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y o f
d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I t is t h i s p e r p l e x i t y t h a t finds its reason cutting across different forms of argumentation (b).
appropriate expression i n the suspension of one's interpretive McCarthy finally treats t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e synthesis o f t h e d i f f e r e n -
efforts. t i a t e d m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n u n d e r t h r e e q u i t e d i s t i n c t aspects. H e lists
B u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e sciences t h a t m u s t estab- three problems t h a t c a n n o t b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e same a n a l y t i c
lish h e r m e n e u t i c access t o t h e i r o b j e c t d o m a i n also h a v e t o re- perspective ( t h a t is, t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e v a r i o u s basic a t t i t u d e s
nounce the objectivity of knowledge. I have criticized this t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e social, a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s ) (c).
hermeneutist position i n various ways. 16
I n principle, I do not see a. T o b e g i n w i t h , l e t m e t u r n t o w h a t I h a v e a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m
any difficulty i n achieving some theoretical knowledge even i n those W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e . I n W e b e r ' s view, t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a d i f f e r -
domains o f r e a l i t y w i t h w h i c h w e have c o n t a c t p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h e n t i a t i o n o f " v a l u e s p h e r e s " e a c h w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t logic—
n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e o r expressive a t t i t u d e s . M y r e s e r v a t i o n s c o n c e r n w h i c h was i n s p i r e d b y t h e n e o - K a n t i a n s E m i l L a s k a n d H e i n r i c h
o n l y those theoretical positions that i g n o r e the h e r m e n e u t i c d i m e n - R i c k e r t — c a n plausibly be d e f e n d e d i n r e g a r d to m o d e r n E u r o p e o n
sion of access t o the object d o m a i n entirely. 1 7
I f the sentence t w o levels: first, o n t h e level o f ideas t h a t c a n b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n
M c C a r t h y c r i t i c i z e s is t o b e r e a d as r e p o r t i n g m y o w n view, " t h a t traditions (scientific theories, m o r a l a n d legal beliefs, as w e l l as
n o t h i n g c a n be l e a r n e d i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t inner a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t i o n s ) ; b u t also, s e c o n d , o n t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l a c t i o n
n a t u r e qua s u b j e c t i v i t y , " 18
t h e n i t may be u n d e r s t o o d only i n the systems, i n w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d i n g " d i s c o u r s e s " a n d a c t i v i t i e s a r e g i v e n
sense o f a r e j e c t i o n o f purely o b j e c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h e s t o p s y c h o l o g y . professionally and institutionally organized f o r m . T h e differentia-
M c C a r t h y is f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n of whether the t i o n o f value spheres corresponds to a d e c e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s t h a t have b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n m o d e r n t i m e s t h e w o r l d , w h i c h is a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p r o f e s -
a n d h a v e a c h i e v e d a c e r t a i n a u t o n o m y d o n o t , as i t w e r e , also c o m - sionalized t r e a t m e n t o f cultural traditions separated i n t o questions
m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d h a v e t h e i r r o o t s i n o n e a n d t h e same o f t r u t h , j u s t i c e , a n d taste. T h i s m o d e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d
r e a s o n . I n m y view, t h i s t o p i c c a n b e t r e a t e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f the makes possible a hypothetical a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n a a n d e x p e r i -
problem of interpretive understanding. For this purpose, the ences, w h i c h a r e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f l i f e w o r l d c o n t e x t s
schema reproduced b y M c C a r t h y is n o t r e a l l y a f r u i t f u l p o i n t of a n d a n a l y z e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l l y v a r i e d c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is e q u a l l y
d e p a r t u r e . I t s p u r p o s e was o n l y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n t e n t o f Max t r u e f o r t h e states o f a n o b j e c t i f i e d n a t u r e , f o r n o r m s a n d m o d e s o f
W e b e r ' s f a m o u s Zwischenbetrachtung} 9
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n response to a c t i n g , a n d f o r t h e reflective experiences o f a n " u n b o u n d " subjectiv-
earlier objections, I m a d e the mistake o f r e f e r r i n g to this schema i n i t y (set f r e e f r o m t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e ) . The
a systematic w a y . 20
A n d M c C a r t h y does the same here. M y previous w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e by c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology
carelessness t h u s m a k e s i t necessary i n w h a t f o l l o w s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between s t r u c t u r a l l y d e f i n e d levels o f l e a r n i n g , o n t h e o n e hand,
more carefully between my interpretation of Weber and my own a n d the l e a r n i n g o f contents, o n the other, certainly may n o t be
views. a p p l i e d i n t h e same way t o s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t ,
my f o r m u l a t i o n s were not careful enough.
420 421
C h a p t e r 10 Questions and Counterquestions
C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions
Norm- X
A t this p o i n t the motivation b e h i n d McCarthy's criticism becomes
conformative Law |^ Morality
clear: a n interest i n the q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e m o m e n t s o f reason can
retain their u n i t y w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d o f h o w this u n i t y can be
T Aesthetic-practical a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m y
3 X ' rationality schematic presentation o f Weber's diagnosis of the times leads
Expressive M c C a r t h y to conflate three quite distinct questions u n d e r a single
Eroticism j Art v i e w p o i n t . A s has j u s t b e e n s h o w n , f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s p l a y a
1 r o l e i n t h e analysis o f these i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n the cognitive,
1
m o r a l , a n d expressive m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n . B u t t h e o t h e r t w o q u e s -
Figure 10.1 t i o n s r e a l l y have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m : first, t h e q u e s t i o n
Rationalization complexes o f h o w the k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c e d i n e x p e r t cultures can be m e d i a t e d
w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s ( w h i c h I have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n a b o v e
i n r e l a t i o n to the constellation " a r t a n d l i f e " ) ; a n d second, the ques-
t i o n o f w h e t h e r we can provide an e q u i v a l e n t f o r the m e a n i n g of
traditional worldviews—for their meaning-bestowing function.
c. W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d science, p r o b l e m s
o f m e d i a t i o n a r i s e — s u c h as t h e r e l a t i o n o f a r t a n d l i f e , o r o f t h e o r y
a n d practice. Since Hegel, a c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r o b l e m has e m e r g e d
424 425
C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions
C h a p t e r 10 Questions a n d Counterquestions
to f i t h a r m o n i o u s l y i n t o linguistic structures, a n d even be utterly structures o f rationality, b o t h i n the development of the individual
a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e m . B u t such a categorial f r a m e w o r k does d e c i d e i n a n d i n social e v o l u t i o n . I s h a l l l i m i t m y s e l f h e r e t o t h e m o r a l a n d
favor o f t h e perspective o f a l i f e w o r l d intersubjectively shared by l e g a l d i m e n s i o n , since b o t h W h i t e b o o k a n d M c C a r t h y , e a c h i n h i s
p a r t i c i p a n t s . O n e d o e s give u p b i o l o g i c a l o r p h y s i c a l i s t t h i r d - p e r s o n o w n way, r e n e w t h e c r i t i q u e o f e t h i c a l f o r m a l i s m ( a n d b o t h w i t h
descriptions o f the organic substratum. This change i n perspective r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e passage i n m y essay o n B e n j a m i n ) .
d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n n e r n a t u r e as a n e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c First o f a l l , I have t o p o i n t o u t t h a t I have revised m y earlier
referent. interpretation 3 2
o f t h e p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l stage o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t . 3 3
intellectual affinities that, notwithstanding the politically contrasting positions, stem conviction and the more pronounced consideration of hedonistic motives bring the
from the authority of Nietzsche (see my essay "Modernity versus Postmodernity," New perspectives of the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play
German Critique 22 (1981): 3-22). within universalistic ethics, perspectives that lie within the cognitive and expressive
validity domains; in this way, materialistic ideas can also be given their due, without
8. Cf. P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis, 1983). Cf. also his "Institution endangering the autonomy of the moral perspective. Finally, post-avant-garde art is
Kunst," in Vermittlung, Rezeption, Funktion (Frankfurt, 1979), and Kritik der idealistischen characterized by the simultaneous presence of realistic and 'committed' (engagiert)
Ästhetik (Frankfurt, 1983). tendencies along with the authentic continuation of classical modernity, out of which
the independent logic of the aesthetic sphere was distilled. With realistic and 'com-
9. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, mitted' art, cognitive and moral-practical moments enter once again into art, at the
1984), pp. 157ff. level of the wealth of form set free by the avant-garde" (Theory of Communicative Action,
vol. 2, pp. 396ff.).
10. Ibid., pp. 40ff., and the references given there.
25. Cf. Habermas, "Über Moralität und Sittlichkeit: Was macht eine Lebensform
11. Bürger, Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, pp. 104ff. rational?," in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 31ff.
12. Cf. also P. Bürger, "Das Altern der Moderne," i n j . Habermas and L . von Friede- 26. T h i s was, in any case, my intention in the F r e u d chapter of my Knowledge and
berg, eds., Adorno Konferenz 1983 (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 177ff. Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston, 1971). I do not find any basis in F r e u d for
the strict separation between a clinically justified theory of neurosis and a metapsy-
13. Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," pp. 12ff. chological superstructure that Adolf Grünbaum proposes in "Freud's Theory: T h e
Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
14. See A. Wellmer, ' T r u t h , Semblance, Reconciliation," in The Persistence of Moder- Philosophical Association 57, no. 6 (1983). T h i s separation completely obscures the
nity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D . Midgely (Cambridge, specific roots of Freudian theory in the experiences of the analytic dialogue. Such
Mass., 1991). an operation may be useful for the argumentative purpose of assimilating Freudian
theory to the standard model of unified science, only to reject it then for failing to
15. Ibid., p. 165. measure up to its standards. At the same time, it expresses the decision not to
consider the hermeneutic character of this science.
16. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 120ff. and 130ff.; and " I n -
terpretative Social Science and Hermeneuticism," in N. H a n n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, 27. Cf. J . Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in On the Logic of the
and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 251-270. Social Sciences, and "Überlegungen zur Kommunikationspathologie," in Vorstudien und
Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984).
17. J . Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A.
Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988). 28. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Moral Con-
sciousness and Communicative Action.
18. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 237.
29. R. Döbert, J . Habermas, and G. Nunner-Winkler, Entwicklung des Ichs (Köln,
19. Ibid., p. 238. 1977), pp. 9ff.
20. J . Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in J . B. T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., 30. K. H o r n expresses similar reservations in "Geheime kulturalistische Tendenzen
Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 248ff. der modernen psychoanalytischen Orthodoxie," in Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft
(Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 93ff.'
21. O n this "rather risky model," cf. my Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1,
pp. 239ff. 31. With respect to the empirical questions, I would like to point out that my
reflections on the change in symptoms typical of our times and on the significance
22. Ibid. of the adolescent crisis are quite similar to those of Whitebook. Cf. Theory of Commu-
nicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 386ff.
23. Cf. my excursus on argumentation theory, ibid., pp. 18-42.
32. Cf. J . Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and
24. " I n each of these spheres, the process of differentiation is accompanied by a the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1979), pp. 78ff.
countermovement that always re-incorporates the other two, initially excluded validity
aspects under the primacy of the dominant one. I n this way, nonobjectivist approaches 33. Cf. Habermas, " A Reply to My Critics." See also the essays in Habermas, Moral
to the human sciences also bring into play the perspectives of moral and aesthetic Consciousness and Communicative Action.
critique, while not endangering the primacy of the question of truth; only in this way
is a critical theory of society possible. T h e discussion of an ethics of responsibility or 34. Cf. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity."
Selected Bibliography and Further Reading
This bibliography is meant to lead readers further into the literature related to
Habermas's program of formal pragmatics. I have included mainly secondary discus-
sions of Habermas's writings rather than the sources that he cites (these are docu-
mented in the notes to the various chapters). T h e exception is where Habermas
mentions a particular writer repeatedly or deals in detail with her or his work. F o r
Habermas's work itself, I have included only those primary texts evidently relevant
to formal pragmatics or deemed by h i m to be correlative. English translations have
been cited where available.
Aladjem, Terry K., 1995. " O f Truth and Disagreement: Habermas, Foucault and
Democratic Discourse," History of European Ideas 2 0 ( 4 - 6 ) : 909-914.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1967. Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dor-
drecht: Reidel).
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981a. " C . S. Peirce a n d the Post-Tarskian Problem of an Adequate Bernstein, Richard, 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and
Practice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
Explication of the Meaning of T r u t h , " Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18:
3-17.
Bernstein, Richard, ed., 1985. Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
Press).
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981b. "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to Things," in
H . Parret and J . Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter).
Berten, André, 1989. "L'éthique et la Politique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 87:
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987a. "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Wahrheit und normative 74-96.
Gültigkeit," Archivio di Filosofa 55 (1987): 51ff.
Bogen, David E . , 1989. "Reappraisal of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action in
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987b. "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbe- Light of Detailed Investigations of Social Praxis," journal for the Theory of Sodal Behav-
iour 19: 47-77.
gründung," in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp), pp. 116-211.
Bohman, James, 1985. Language and Social Crititism, P h . D . Dissertation, Boston U n i -
versity.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992a. "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?," in
E . Lepore a n d R. Van Gulick, eds., fohn Searle and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell),
pp. 31-55. B o h m a n , James, 1986. "Formal Pragmatics a n d Social Criticism," Philosophy and Social
Crititism 11: 331-353.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992b. "Illokutionäre Bedeutung u n d normative Gültigkeit: Die
transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der uneingeschränkten kommunikativen Bohman, James, 1988. "Emancipation and Rhetoric: T h e Perlocutions a n d Illocu¬
Verständigung," Protosoziologie 2: 2-15. tions of the Social Critic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (3): 185-204.
Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992c. "Normatively G r o u n d i n g 'Critical Theory,'" in A. Honneth, B o h m a n , James, 1992. "Critique of Ideologies," in M. Dascal, D. Gerhardus, K. L o -
T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished renz, a n d G . Meggle, eds., Philosophy of Language: An International Handbook of Contem-
Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). porary Research ( B e r l i n / N e w York: de Gruyter).
Austin, J . L . , 1961. "Performative Utterances," in Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: B o h m a n , James, 1994. "World Disclosure a n d Radical Criticism," Thesis Eleven 37:
82-97.
Oxford University Press), pp. 233-252.
Austin, J . L . , 1962. How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Bohman, James, a n d Terence Kelly, 1996. "Intelligibility, Rationality, and Compari-
son," Philosophy and Sodal Crititism 22(1): 81-100.
Austin, J . L . , 1963. "Performauve-Constative," in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and
Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 22-33. Bühler, Karl, 1934. Sprachtheorie (Jena: Fischer).
Bar-Hillel, Y , 1973. " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language," Synthese Canovan, Margaret, 1983. " A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Haber-
mas and Arendt," Political Theory 11: 105-116.
26: 1-12.
Bartels, Martin, 1982. "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n : eine Auseinandersetzung mit Chomsky, Noam, 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T
Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36: 226-233. Press).
B a u r m a n n , Manfred, 1985. "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Understanding," Cobben, P., 1984. "Habermas' Theorie van het Kommunikatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor
in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Sodal Action. Filosofie 46: 216-268.
Beatty, Joseph, 1979. "Communicative Competence and the Skeptic," Philosophy and Comesana, Manuel, 1994. " L a Teoria de la Verdad en Habermas," Dianoia 40: 245¬
Sodal Crititism 6: 267-288. 261.
Cooke, Maeve, 1993. "Habermas and Consensus, " European Journal of Philosophy 1(3):
Bernstein, Jay, 1992. "De-Divination a n d the Vindication of Everyday-Life: Reply to
Rorty," Tijdschrift voor Filosofe 54(4): 668-692. 247-267.
438 439
Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading Selected Bibliography a n d Further Reading
Cooke, Maeve, 1994. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cam- G e i m a n n , Kevin Paul, 1990. "Habermas's Early Lifeworld Appropriation: A Critical
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Assessment," Man and World 23(1): 63-83.
Corredor, Cristina, 1993. "Intentos de formulación de u n a teoría general de actos de Geuss, Raymond, 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University
habla (J Searle y J Habermas)," Revista de Filosofía 6: 119-130. Press).
Cotesta, Vittoria, 1986. "Riferimento e Verita," AQUINAS 29: 465-502. Griffioen, Sander, 1991. ' T h e Metaphor of the Covenant in Habermas," Faith and
Philosophy 8 ( 4 ) : 524-540.
Courtois, Stephane, 1994. " L e faillibilisme de Jürgen Habermas et ses difficultés: u n
faillibilisme conséquent est-il possible?," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 33(2): Grondin, J e a n , 1989. "Habermas und das Problem der Individualität," Philosophische
253-282. Rundschau 36: 187-205.
Couture, Tony, 1993. "Habermas, Values, a n d the Rational, Internal Structure of Haarscher, Guy, 1986. "Perelman and Habermas," Law and Philosophy 5: 331-342.
Communication, "Journal of Value Inquiry 2 7 ( 3 - 4 ) : 403-416.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston:
Culler, Jonathan, 1985. "Communicative Competence and Normative F o r c e , " New Beacon Press).
German Critique 35: 133ff.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1973. "Wahrheitstheorien," reprinted in Habermas, Vorstudien und
C u s h m a n , D. P., and P. K. Tompkins, 1980. " A T h e o r y of Rhetoric for Contemporary Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
Society," Philosophy and Rhetoric 13: 43-67.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1976a. "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," Theory and
Czuma, Hans, 1981. "Rede oder Gewalt," Conceptus 15: 102-111. Society 3: 155-167.
Dallmayr, F r e d , 1987. "Life-World and Communicative Action," in B. Parekh, ed., Habermas, Jürgen, 1976b. "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der I c h -
Political Discourse (New Delhi: Sage), pp. 152-178. Abgrenzungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, and M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation,
Interaktion, Identität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Signature Event Context," reprinted in Derrida. Margins of
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy
(Boston: Beacon Press).
Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Limited I n c abc . . . ." Glyph 2: 162-254.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1982. "A Reply to my Critics," i n j . B. Thompson and D. Held,
Dews, Peter, 1996. " T h e T r u t h of the Subject: Language, Validity and Transcendence eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press), pp. 219-283.
in L a c a n a n d Habermas," in P. Dews a n d S. Critchley, eds., Deconstructive Subjectivities
(Albany: S U N Y P r e s s ) , pp. 149-168. Habermas, Jürgen, 1983. "Interpretative Social Science a n d Hermeneuticism," in
N. H a a n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry
Dorschel, Andreas, 1988. "Is T h e r e Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?," (New York: Columbia University Press).
Communication and Cognition 21: 5-16.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1984. Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen
Dorschel, Andreas, 1990. "Handlungstypen u n d Kriterien: Z u Habermas' Theorie des Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp).
kommunikativen Handelns" Zätschrift für Philosophische Forschung 44(2) : 220-252.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1984/1987. The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans.
Dummett, Michael, 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper & Row). T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press).
Dummett, Michael, 1976. "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDow- Habermas, Jürgen, 1985a. "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Sub-
ell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ject, and Proposition in Habermas's Theory of Communication,'" Inquiry 28: 87¬
122.
Ferrara, Alessandro, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y of T r u t h , "
Philosophy and Social Criticism 13: 39-67. Habermas, Jürgen, 1985b. "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in
Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action.
Fultner, Barbara, 1995. Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action, Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, Northwestern University. Habermas, Jürgen, 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence
(Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Fultner, Barbara, 1996. ' T h e Redemption of T r u t h : Idealization, Acceptability and
Fallibilism in Habermas' Theory of Meaning," International Journal of Philosophical
Studies 4 ( 2 ) : 233-251.
440 441
Habermas, Jürgen, 1988. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and Kambartel, F., and H . J . Schneider, 1981. "Constructing a Pragmatic Foundation for
G . A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Semantics," in G. Fl0istad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, vol. 1 (The
Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 155-178.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1990. "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consaous-
ness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Keuth, Herbert, 1979. "Erkenntnis oder Entscheidung: die Konsenstheorien der
Mass: T h e M I T Press). Wahrheit u n d der Richtigkeit von Jürgen Habermas," Zeitschrift ßr allgemeine Wissen-
schaftstheorie 10: 375-393.
Habermas, Jürgen, 1992. Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Kissling, Christian, 1991. "Habermas et la theologie: Notes pour une discussion entre
la theologie et la Theorie de l'agir communicationnel," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie
Habermas, Jürgen, 1993. "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Habermas, Justification und Theologie, pp. 235-244.
and Application, trans. C . C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).
Kolb, David, 1992. "Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality," Philosophy
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Kompridis, Nikolas, 1994. " O n World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey,"
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Kujundzic, Nebojsa, and William Buschert, 1993. "Staging the Life-World: Habermas
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Lara, Maria Pia, 1995. "Albrecht Wellmer: Between Spheres of Validity," Philosophy and
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145ff.
Bar-Hillel, Y., 27 weak vs. strong, 18, 326-329, 332, 334 Ethnocentrism, 372, 375, 381n63 340, 385. See also Speech-act offer;
Bataille, G . , 408, 413 (see also Verständigung, vs. Einverständ- Expert cultures, 171, 192, 240, 395¬ Speech acts, success of
Behaviorism, linguistic, 26-27, 278 nis) 398, 411, 413-414, 419-420, 423-425 Imperatives, 61, 67, 76, 132-141, 145,
Benjamin, W., 410, 412, 414, 425 Communicative competence, 2, 47-50, 160-161, 199-201, 226, 264-268,
Bennett, J . , 27, 106, 229, 278 53-54 Fallibilism, 12, 154, 236, 243-244, 312¬ 275n8, 286-287, 292, 295-296, 302¬
Berger, J . , 207 Communicative rationality. See Rational- 313, 337, 349, 356, 364-365, 368¬ 304, 319, 321-327, 338. See also L a n -
Bernstein, R., 404, 406-407 ity, communicative 371, 401n24, 404, 407, 412. See also guage, strategic use of; Power claims;
Binding and bonding power. See Comprehensibility, 22-24, 49-50, 79, Validity claims, criticizability of Speech acts, regulative; Strategic ac-
Speech acts, binding and bonding 87, 145, 291. See also Validity claims Fictionality. See Language, poetic use of tion, manifest
power of Consensus, 4, 13-14, 23, 142-145, 160, Freedom, 310-311, 316, 430 Information theory, 26-27
Bühler, K., 17, 107, 110-111, 196-197, 185-186, 188, 201, 203-204, 221, Frege, G . , 7-8, 51, 66, 109, 193-195, Insults, 226-227, 330, 338. See also Per-
228, 277-280, 284, 293-296, 298, 236, 294, 298-299, 325, 353, 364¬ 229, 278, 281-282, 286, 338 locutions; Strategic action, manifest;
389, 394 365. See also Agreement, in a strict Freud, S., 307, 335, 425-428, 431, Threats
Bürger, R, 414 sense (Einverständnis); Verständigung 433n26 Intentional sentences, 10, 138-139,
Contextual conditions of meaning. See 296, 318. See also Language, expres-
Carnap, R., 25, 33-34, 108 Meaning, contextual conditions of Gadamer, H . - G . , 387, 407, 417 sive use of; Promises; Semantics, i n -
Cartesian doubt, 243, 356, 358, 410 Contextualism, 196, 344, 351-360, 363, Gehlen, A., 307 tentionalist; Speech acts, expressive
Chomsky, N . , 35, 37-38, 40-41, 46-47, 371-372, 395 Grice, H . P., 27-28, 106, 147, 229, 259,
183 Conversation, 163-164, 170, 212n45 278-279, 284, 393 Jakobson, R., 196, 389-391
Commands. See Imperatives Criticism, art and literary, 396-399, Jay, M., 410-415
Communication 411-412, 414, 423 Hartman, G . , 390 Justice, 5, 12, 396, 411, 424. See also Dis-
general presuppositions of, 2, 21, 24, Culler, J . , 383-388 Hartmann, H . , 426 course ethics
44, 48, 80, 145, 207, 339 Culture, 186, 248, 250-253, 395-396, Hegel, G . W. F., 184, 191, 344-345, vs. happiness, 18, 428-431
indirect, 121, 285, 302, 333, 338 (see 411, 419. See also Lifeworld, three do- 348, 404, 424-426, 429 Justification, 5, 11-14, 197, 307, 325,
also Strategic action) mains of Heidegger, M., 253-254, 335, 337, 344, 351-352, 355-356, 365, 370, 372,
pathologies, 93n2, 168-169 346-348, 408 375-376, 406, 424. See also Discourse;
Communication community, 207, 338, Davidson, D., 8, 109, 194, 348, 379n35 Historicism, vs. transcendentalism, 404, Fallibilism; T r u t h , vs. justification; Va-
350-351, 353, 355-356, 360, 3 6 5 - 367 Declarations, 272-274, 292, 321-325, 407 lidity claims, criticizability of / vindi-
Communicative action, 3-5, 22-24, 57, 327, 338. See also Performatives Humboldt, W. von, 183-192, 297, cation of
62-63, 93n2, 105, 111, 118, 128-129, D e r r i d a . J . , 18, 383-388, 393-396, 398¬ 209nn2,4,6, 408
140-142, 145, 163-164, 167, 169, 399, 400n24, 408 Husserl, E . , 237, 239-240, 242-243, Kanngiesser, S., 61, 106
203-205, 215, 222, 224, 233, 236, Dewey, 343-344, 346-347, 409-410 259, 280, 359, 404 Kant, I . , 42-43, 45, 240, 311, 337, 349,
299, 326, 425. See also Language, com- Dialogue, 184-187 351, 411, 425-426, 428-429
municative use of; Verständigung Directions of fit, 158-161, 195, 263¬ Ideal speech situation, 13-14, 365, 367¬ Knowledge, 170-171, 340
functions of, 16, 111, 247 265, 273, 286-287, 291-292, 376 368 background, 16, 167, 171-173, 242¬
idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 15, Discourse, 4, 13-14, 86-87, 170, 236, Illocutionary acts, 7, 10, 57-58, 64-70, 245, 283, 386 (see also Lifeworld)
144, 166, 169, 190, 207, 240, 332, 309-311, 314, 363, 367-372, 393, 73-74, 82, 85, 122-123, 126, 163, cultural, 248-250, 253 (see also Life-
385-386, 393, 395 395-396, 412, 421, 423. See also 266, 289-290, 333, 340 world, three domains of)
and lifeworld, 6, 111, 237 (see also Life- Argumentation Illocutionary aims, 122-123, 125, 127, horizontal (Horizontwissen), 241-242
world; Knowledge, background) vs. action, 93n2, 206, 313, 364, 369¬ 201-204, 218, 258, 268-271, 299, (see also Lifeworld, as background)
obligations resulting from, 4, 82-87, 372 315-316 implicit, 33, 40, 46-47, 171-174, 237¬
124, 130-131, 137-138, 145, 198, Discourse ethics, 13, 188, 367, 370, Illocutionary force, 7-8, 15, 55-57, 66¬ 238, 240, 309
223, 233, 300 429. See also Justice 67, 72, 75-77, 81-83, 85, 88, 110, intuitive, 2, 39, 235, 242, 309 (see also
primacy of, 2-2, 15, 21, 102n92, 122, Dramaturgical action, 163-164, 170¬ 157, 159, 195-196, 232, 266, 272, Rule consciousness)
306n33 171, 205 292, 294, 296, 383-386, 390. See also practical vs. objective, 33, 35, 39, 238,
rationality of (see Rationality, commu- Dummett, M., 7-9, 11-12, 51, 109, 152¬ Speech acts, binding and bonding 312
nicative) 154, 194, 229, 231, 278, 287-288, power of prereflective, 2, 16, 33, 40, 119, 171,
vs. strategic action, 93n2, 119-129, 296, 352 and speaker's warranty, 4, 8, 83-88, 237
145, 167, 169, 203-206, 217, 220¬ Dürkheim, E . , 207 130, 136-138, 145, 198, 222, 233, topic-dependent contextual, 241¬
227, 248, 293, 298-304, 377 269, 299, 316 242
theory of, 1, 8, 55, 106-107, 110, 112, Epistemology, 239, 348-352 Illocutionary success, 83, 124-128, 130, unthematic, 237-238, 240-244, 246
164, 170, 174, 183, 200, 207-208, Ethical life (Sittluhkdt), 191, 243, 424, 132, 136, 201-204, 218, 223, 315, Kreckel, M., 157-159
240, 293, 407, 410 429-430
450 451
Index Index
Labov, W., 391 Language games, 7, 196-197, 203, 217, Mentalism, 259, 337, 348-355, 411. See Power claims, 111, 137-138, 200-201,
Language 254, 283, 288-289, 292, 329, 359, abo Meaning, intentionalist theory of 226, 264, 266-267, 303. See abo I m -
cognitive use of, 10, 75-78, 80-81, 86, 362, 370, 372-373, 386, 388, 414, 420 Metaphysics, 343, 346-348, 352, 374, peratives; Language, strategic use of;
89, 144, 289 (see abo Speech acts, L e a r n i n g process, 41, 170, 192, 204, 394 Strategic action, manifest
constative) 246, 252-253, 336, 353, 366, 374, Modernization, 420. See abo Rationaliza- Pragmatics
communicative use of, 10, 15, 142, 394, 405, 412-413, 418 tion empirical, 157-158, 163, 172, 197,
207, 315, 318-320, 338, 370 (see also Lifeworld, 111, 174, 187, 189, 208, 236¬ Morality, 190-191, 395-397, 424, 429¬ 351
Communicative action) 246, 250-251, 334, 350, 353, 363¬ 430. See abo Expert cultures; Validity formal vs. empirical, 2, 26, 28-29, 35¬
communicative use vs. poetic use of, 364, 368, 370-373, 407-408; 430. See claim, normative 41, 45, 52, 54-55, 164-168, 351
384-385, 388-398 also Communicative Action Morris, C . W., 26-27, 278 formal vs. formal semantics, 6-7, 9¬
dividing vs. unifying capacity of, 187¬ as background, 16, 127, 172, 174, 206, Mutual understanding. See Verständigung 10, 26-28, 51-52, 54, 151-154, 192¬
188 208-209, 227, 243, 245, 283, 335¬ 194, 196, 198-199
expressive use of, 80-81, 87, 89, 144 336, 350, 356, 358, 363, 370, 386 (see Neoconservatism, 406, 409, 431n7 formal vs. universal, 1-2, 9 2 n l
(see also Speech acts, expressive) also Knowledge, background) Neo-Darwinism, 374, 376, 428 intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist, 257¬
functions of, 49-50, 54, 72, 79, 81, 89¬ cultural impoverishment of the, 414 Neo-Kantianism, 345 260, 263, 268-269, 271
90, 92, 107, 110-111, 142-143, 165, invasion of, 424 Neopragmatism, 13, 343-344, 373 universal vs. transcendental hermeneu-
192, 196-199, 228, 231, 277-278, rationalization of the, 191, 430 tics, 41-46
282, 288, 293, 389 {see also Btihler, K.) reproduction of the, 16, 190-191, O h m a n n , R., 389-390 Pratt, M. L . , 390-393
holistic nature of, 58, 90, 233, 297 200, 246-247 (see also Culture) Organon model. See Bühler, K. Promises, 68, 83, 267-268, 324-325,
interactive use of (see Language, regu- as resource, 191, 209, 247, 336 327, 383-384. See abo Imperatives;
lative use of) as stabilizing factor, 16, 237, 240, 245, Paradigm shift, 110, 189, 337, 346, 352¬ Speech acts, regulative
knowledge of a, 2, 233, 245, 261-262 359 355, 417, 420 Psychoanalysis, 169, 426-428
297 three domains of, 208, 247-251 Peirce, C. S., 43, 243, 313, 337, 348¬ Putnam, H . , 13, 350, 365-366
noncommunicative use of, 10, 317¬ Locutionary acts, 66, 72-73, 75, 122¬ 349, 356, 365, 409-410
320, 333-334 (see also Rationality, 123, 289-290 Performative attitude, 65, 71, 89-91, Rationality, 219, 307-308, 325, 404,
epistemic / teleological) Logocentrism, 110, 195, 337, 408 132, 166, 205, 219, 224, 299-301, 407-409, 418, 420-423
parasitic use of, 15, 122, 201, 224, L u h m a n n , N . , 235 310, 312, 316, 319, 332, 369, 388, aesthetic-practical, 412
302, 384, 388 (see also Strategic ac- 406. See abo World-relations communicative, 4—5, 18, 120, 136,
tion) Marcuse, H . , 410, 425 Performatives, 7, 271-273. See abo Dec- 139-140, 168, 171, 188, 190, 192,
poetic use of, 15, 168, 383-384, 389¬ Marx, K., 206, 234, 254, 424-426, 431 larations 198-199, 207, 220, 222, 233, 240,
390, 392-393, 397-398 (see also McCarthy, T., 410, 412, 415-426, 431 Perlocutionary acts, 111, 122-127, 140, 294, 300, 309, 315-317, 319, 323,
Language, world-disclosing function Mead, G . H „ 187, 308, 409 167, 226-227. See abo Perlocutions; 326, 329, 333-334, 336, 407-408, 410
of) Meaning, 192-198, 227-233, 239. See Strategic action (see abo Postmetaphysical thinking)
pragmatic dimension of (see Sentence, also Semantics Perlocutionary effects, 123-129, 167, discursive, 188, 190, 307-311, 334
vs. utterance) contextual conditions of, 7, 11-12, 16, 201-202, 223, 301-302, 316, 329¬ epistemic, 309, 311-313, 334
problem-solving capacity of, 15, 192, 52, 61, 67-68, 172-173, 227-228, 332 purposive, 105, 114, 117, 203, 219¬
394, 396 385-387 Perlocutions, 326, 329-333, 340-341. 220, 234-235, 323, 327, 329
reflexivity of, 39, 64-65, 217, 284 intentionalist theory of, 106, 121, 257 See abo Insults; Language, strategic teleological, 113, 170, 203, 206, 309,
regulative use of, 75-78, 81, 86, 89, (see abo Semantics, intentionalis) use of; Strategic action, manifest; 313-314, 322, 334 (see abo Action, as
111, 144, 289 nominalist theory of, 106, 354 Threats purposive activity)
representational function of, 50-52, pragmatic theory of, 6-7, 9-10, 12, Personality structures, 247-250, 253 three core structures of, 18, 105, 308¬
58 16, 52, 66-67, 72, 131, 197-199, 227¬ Philosophy of consciousness, 279-281, 311, 314, 334, 336
strategic use of, 5, 17, 201, 224, 302, 233, 298, 338-341, 416 348, 405, 409 Rationalization, 105, 117, 171, 174,
377 (see also Strategic action) semantic theory of, 6, 9, 51-52, 131, Philosophy, role of, 347-348, 351-352, 335, 411, 420, 422
uncircumventability of, 335, 349-350, 193-195, 228 (see abo Pragmatics, for- 395-399, 400n24, 405-409, 411, 424. Realism, 351, 353, 360-362, 370, 372-373
355-59, 372 (see also Lifeworld, as mal vs. formal semantics; Semantics, See abo Paradigm shift Reconstruction, rational, 2, 28-41, 190,
background) truth-conditional) Piaget,J., 46, 53, 414, 426 207, 416
validity basis of, 3, 17, 21-25, 74, 88 use theory of, 6-7, 48, 51, 67, 109, Platonism, 186, 194, 337, 343-348, 359, Reconstructive sciences, 29, 46, 407
(see also Validity claims) 196, 229, 278, 282-284 373-374 Rorty, R., 13, 343-354, 357, 360, 366¬
world-disclosing function of, 15, 191¬ and validity, 66, 129-140, 193, 197, Pluralism, 403-407, 430 367, 370, 372-377, 381n63, 394-395,
192, 204, 246, 253-254, 335-337, 227-228, 253, 270-271, 282, 288, Popper, K., 295, 307, 361, 404 404-410, 426
390-396 (see also Language, poetic 300, 339 (see abo Language, validity Postmetaphysical thinking, 5, 312, 328, Rule consciousness, 2, 33-36, 45, 383.
use of) basis of) 346-347. See abo Rationality, commu- See abo Knowledge, intuitive
nicative Ryle, G . , 33
452 453
Index Index
Sanctions, 131, 134-138, 200-201, 225, 208, 221-224, 233, 299, 326, 332, Strawson, P. E . 27, 42, 125, 127, 285 discursive thematization of, 86-87 (see
264-265, 303. See also Imperatives; 385, 390, 392-393 (see also Illocution- Systems, 234-235, 254-255, 396-397, also Discourse)
Perlocutions; Power claims; Strategic ary force; Verständigung, as action- 411, 419 normative, 199-200, 208, 234, 303,
action, manifest; Threats coordinating mechanism) 381n55 (see also Morality; Validity,
Schiffer, S. R., 106, 229, 278, 285 classification of, 3, 7, 75, 77, 81, 109, Tarski, 194, 361 moral)
Schluchter, W., 114 140, 154-165, 180n85, 196, 267, 273, Taylor, C , 183, 185, 188, 190-191 to normative Tightness 3, 22, 76-79,
Schnadelbach, H . , 10, 307-308, 334, 291-292, 295 Threats, 226, 265-266, 275n8, 303-304, 81, 88-89, 91, 115, 136-137, 141,
407 consensual, 21, 24 330-331, 338. See also Imperatives; I n - 143, 147, 292, 327-328, 332 (see also
S e a r l e . J . R., 3, 6-7, 61-62, 81-84, 156¬ constative, 58, 73-77, 86-87, 137-138, sults; Language, strategic use of; Per- Imperatives; Speech acts, regulative)
161, 172-174, 194, 197, 242, 258¬ 144, 161-163, 267-268, 290, 292, locutions; Strategic action, manifest suspension of, 63, 168, 205, 225, 390¬
275, 291-295, 383-386 325, 328 (see also Language, cogni- T r u t h , 5, 11, 14-15, 75, 193-194, 349, 391, 393 (see also Language, poetic
Semantics. See also Meaning tive use of; Validity claims, to truth) 354-363, 375, 379n35, 404. See also use of)
formal, 6, 10, 51, 54, 192, 194-195, double structure of (see Speech acts, il- Semantics, truth-conditional; Validity to truth, 3, 22, 74-81, 88-90, 137,
197, 229, 278, 280-282 (see also Prag- locutionary and propositional com- claims, to truth 141, 143, 146-147, 150, 153-154,
matics, formal vs. formal semantics) ponet of) and argumentation, 5, 14—15, 362, 368 231-232, 326-328, 332-333, 359 (see
intentionalist, 54, 106-107, 112, 121, expressive, 80, 87, 137-138, 144, 147, vs. justification, 355, 357-360, 363¬ also Speech acts, constative)
229, 278-280, 284 (see also Pragmat- 151, 156, 161-163, 292-293, 295 (see 375, 406 to truthfulness, 3, 22, 80-81, 88-89,
ics, intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist) also Language, expressive use of; Va- pragmatic theory of, 13—15, 345, 357¬ 91, 137, 293, 326-328, 332 (see also
reference, 52, 108, 281 lidity claims, to truthfulness) 358, 360, 364-365, 367-372 Speech acts, expressive)
truth-conditional, 8, 109-110, 152, illocutionary and propositional com- as regulative idea, 13-14, 365-366, types of, 3, 23, 81, 92, 165, 230, 270¬
154, 193-194, 228-232, 282, 286¬ ponent of, 57-58, 63-74, 110, 122, 271, 295, 317 (see also Speech acts,
374-375
287, 295, 338 144, 232, 290, 294 classification of)
and sensorial certainty, 356
Sentence vs. utterance, 2, 6-7, 26, 48¬ indirect, 166, 265 (see also Communica- T r u t h conditions, 6, 8-11, 14, 152-154, universal, 3, 8, 15, 22, 34, 75, 77, 81,
53, 66-69, 193. See also Pragmatics, tion, indirect) 172, 193-197, 231, 263, 268, 281¬ 86, 89-90, 144, 146, 154, 430
formal vs. formal semantics institutionally bound, 60-62, 76, 82, 282, 286-287, 356-357, 361, 368. See universalist, 397, 400n24, 404, 407 (see
Skepticism, 344, 354-356, 359-360 85, 88, 128-129, 131, 162 also Acceptability conditions; Seman- also Discourse ethics)
Social action. See Action, social institutionally unbound, 60-62, 76, tics, truth-conditional vindication of, 5, 9, 11-13, 22, 24-25,
Social integration, 221, 236, 247, 250¬ 83, 85, 88 Tugendhat, E . , 148-150, 152, 201, 352, 73, 136, 152-154, 195, 198, 222, 240,
254. See also Communicative action propositionally differentiated, 58-64, 357 266, 297, 300, 312, 316, 340, 363¬
Socialization, 157, 174, 187, 189, 209, 146 364, 368-369, 372, 416 (see also Argu-
247-248, 250-253, 427, 429. See also regulative, 3, 86-87, 137, 144, 162¬ Validity mentation; Fallibilism)
Communicative action, functions of 163, 295-296, 325, 327-328 (see also aesthetic, 121, 396, 412, 415 (see also Verständigung, 2, 11, 15, 1 9 n l , 21-24,
Social order, 4-5, 16, 105, 227, 233¬ Language, regulative use of; Validity Art; Validity claims, aesthetic) 27-28, 44-45, 48, 50, 88-89, 93n2,
239, 251. See also Society claims, to normative lightness) dimensions of, 6, 22, 141-143, 159, 119-121, 127, 142-143, 183-184,
Society, 89-92, 174, 186, 235, 245-254. self-referential structure of, 123-124, 197-198, 208, 228-232, 291, 293, 186, 199, 227, 247, 298, 339, 387,
See also Lifeworld, three domains of; 217, 219, 237, 272-273, 284-285 295, 396-397, 408 (see also World-con- 406. See also Communicative action;
Social order; World-concepts standard form of, 56-64, 68, 122, 131, cepts) Consensus
Speech, validity basis of. See Language, 166-167, 217, 259, 271, 294, 300¬ moral, 12-13, 15 (see also Discourse as action-coordinating mechanism,
validity basis of 301, 383 ethics; Justice; Morality; Validity 105-107, 111, 121, 129-132, 139,
Speech-act offer, 70, 82, 110, 120, 130¬ success of, 49, 56, 74, 81-82, 87, 120 claims, normative) 163, 167, 187-188, 199, 206, 221,
132, 136, 198, 233. See also C o m m u n i - (see also Illocutionary success) Validity claims, 3, 8, 22-24, 49, 52-54, 223, 233, 247, 249, 298-300, 326¬
cative action; Illocutionary success; Speech-act theory, 7-8, 28, 46-47, 55¬ 68, 73, 81, 85-86, 88-89, 92, 110¬ 327, 385, 387
Speech acts, acceptability of 56, 109, 194, 229, 289-293, 295 111, 135-136, 138, 140-154, 186, vs. Einverständnis ("weak" vs. "strong"
Speech acts, 74-75, 79, 84, 86, 128, Strategic action, 4, 24, 63, 118, 123, 188, 192, 197, 232, 240, 293-294, mode of), 17-18, 320-325, 328, 333¬
139, 141, 269, 293, 296-297, 340, 126-129, 169, 202-205, 224-226, 416. See also Communicative action; 334, 340 (see also Communicative ac-
385, 390 249, 326, 330, 332-334. See also Ac- Language, validity basis of; Meaning, tion, weak vs. strong)
acceptability of, 11, 74, 82, 84, 87-88, tion, instrumental; Communicative and validity as "telos" of human language, 120,
132, 139, 141, 197-198, 220, 232¬ action, vs. strategic action; Impera- aesthetic, 412, 415 (see also Validity, 188, 203, 218, 227, 300, 316
233, 297-298, 316, 338, 340 (see also tives; Language, strategic use of; Per- aesthetic)
Acceptability conditions; Meaning, locutionary acts criticizability of, 11-12, 120, 143, 154, Weber, M., 105, 112-118, 171, 213n47,
contextual conditions of; Speech derivative status of, 3, 15, 21, 332 206, 231, 236, 296, 394-395 (see also 307, 326, 335, 404, 411, 416, 418-421
acts, success of) latent, 140, 169, 201-203, 223-224, Fallibilism; Validity claims, vindica- Weiss, J . , 207-208
binding and bonding power of, 15, 301-302, 304 tion of) Wellmer, A., 365, 368-369, 414
76, 84-85, 110, 128, 136, 163, 205, manifest, 201, 225-226, 302-304
454
Index