CHAPTER-3

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU AND THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT

Before an attempt is made to analyze Nehru's contribution to democracy

in India, it is necessary to make a few preliminary observations, which are partly
related to some substantive questions and partly to empiricist-positivist
methodology. The first question in this regard is that without taking into account
the imprint of history, particularly the history of liberation movement, whether
Nehru's contribution to democracy can be properly understood? At the same
time, it is necessary to see the opportunities provided and the limitations
imposed on Nehru by the objective situation in which he was placed. The second
question is that is it possible to understand the contribution of Nehru to the
theory and practice of democracy in India without examining his economic and
social philosophy? Further, is it possible to understand the essence of his
contribution without ascertaining the extent of reconcilability and
irreconcilability between his views on democracy on the one hand and his views
on related economic and social questions on the other? The third preliminary
observation is that how much reliance must one place on Nehru's ideas and
beliefs as contained in his writings and speeches and how much on his attempts
to translate them into practice? All these diverse yet inter related questions
cannot be understood only by empiricist-positivist epistemological-
methodological mix but rather by some sort of a amalgam of realism and
hermeneutics which probably be a more appropriate for understanding such a
venture. This is because realism not only rejects the crude empiricist
epistemology, it also tries to look for the working of 'real mechanics' i.e.
causally responsible for what we observe or experience. In the same way
hermeneutics tries to discern the meaningfulness and the pattern that pervades
the physical and the social world. To answer these questions his life can be
divided into the following phases:

43
 Early Life of Jawaharlal Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru was bom on 14 November 1889 in Allahabad. His

father Motilal Nehru was an outstanding lawyer, steeped in the Western lifestyle.
He was the first among the Kashmiri Brahamans who visited Europe several
times yet refused to perform any prayashchit or purification ceremony on his
return. Jawaharlal received most of his education at home until he was fifteen.'
But it will be folly to assume that he was totally imaware of political happenings
in the country. In fact, he was only thirteen when he was delighted by the news
of Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war and "mused on Indian freedom
and Asian freedom and dreamt of brave deeds... [to] fight for India and help in
freeing her."^ The idea of this nationalistic spirit developed when he listened to
the grown up talk about the character and insulting manners of the British people
as well as Eurasians towards Indians.

Motilal's ambitions to send his son to a public school in England brought

Jawaharlal at Harrow in 1905. From Harrow, he moved to Trinity College,
Cambridge in October 1907. He was twenty when he took his second class
honours degree at Cambridge. For pursuing higher education, he moved to
London and joined the Inner Temple to qualify for the bar. At this time, he was
particularly impressed by the Fabian and took pains to understand modern
economic theories. He also became familiar with socialism and took interest in
the socialist movement in Russia. Earlier, he was very much influenced by the
extremist movement going on in India and was greatly touched by its leaders
who had visited Cambridge and London especially by the oratory of Lala Lajpat
Rai.' Finally, Jawaharlal returned to India in August 1912, imbibing most of the

^ Ruskiii Bond. A Man of Destiny - A Biography of Jawaharlal Nehru, Orient Paperbacks, Bombay.
1993. p. 12.
" M. Chalapathi Rao. Builders of Modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru, Publication Division, New Delhi,
1990. p.6.
' Nehru. An Autobiography. OUP. New Delhi, 1980, p.22.

44
 prejudices of Harrow and Cambridge, arrogantly in favour of England and the
English as much as possible for an Indian."*

When he returned India, he saw it somewhat different from the one which
he had left behind. India was politically very dull. The extremists had been sat
upon and the moderates had been effectively "rallied" to the Minto-Morley
Scheme of Councils. There was some interest in Indians overseas, especially in
the condition of Indians in South Africa. The Congress, which represented
moderate group, meeting annually, passing some feeble resolutions and
attracting little attention.^ These developments made some impact on
.lawaharlal's mind. Though brought up in the British tradition, he hated the racial
superiority displayed by the British in India. Their over lordship created a sense
of resentment in him. His father joining the moderate politics brought him into
it. To Jawaharlal politics meant "aggressive nationalist activity against foreign
rule"'', yet. he joined the Congress and took part in its occasional meetings.
Gradually, he indulged himself in arm-chair discussions on current affairs and
became a delegate to the Congress Session at Bankipore during Christmas in
1912, which he found was "an English-knowing upper class affairs."

Evolution of His Political Thinking

The First World War broke out in August 1914. India had no interest in
the War but was brought into it without her consent. The Indian people helped
the British but they also wanted home rule. Slowly, political life grew again,
lllak came out of prison and he and Mrs. Besant started Home-Rule Leagues, to
demand freedom from British rule. Stirring speeches were made throughout the
country. The annual sessions of the Congress became a little more exciting and

;• Ratiq Zakaria (ed). A Study of Nehru, Rupa, New Delhi, 1989, p.24.
^ Nehru. An Autobiography, p.27.
' Ibid. p,30.
' Ibid. p,27.

45
 the Muslim League** began to march with the Congress. The atmosphere became
electric and young men felt exhilarated and expected big things in the near
future.''' Jawaharlal joined the U.P. Congress Committee. It was, in fact, in 1915
that he made his first public speech in Allahabad at a protest meeting against a
new law where he spoke briefly in English.

Though interested in politics, Jawaharlal finally plunged into it only when

he became the member of Kisan Sabha, which was formulated by Madan Mohan
Malaviya in 1915. Jawaharlal left the bar practice and took more and more
interest in Gandhi's struggle for satyagraha. He joined the Kisan Sabha with the
object of ameliorating the plight of the peasantry in the U.P. In 1918, he became
the Vice-President of the Kisan Sabha and toured Awadh exhorting peasants to
fight for their rights and for the betterment of their lot. The confidential note that
appeared of Jawaharlal Nehru in the History Sheets of Important Leaders
prepared by the Department of Intelligence in those days says: "His most
dangerous form of activity was directed through Kisan Sabhas...well educated
and a capable organizer, wielding considerable influence."' But Rostislav
Ulyanovsky believes Jawaharlal "became actively involved in political life" only
in "early 1920's." Although involved in the bourgeois liberalism, he also
"showed interest" in the Fabian version of the socialist movement. " A s a result
of his contact with the peasants, not only his outlook on life but also his whole
mode of living changed. He discarded wearing suits and started putting on
Achkan. He gave up moving in cars and went walking to villages, sometimes
even barefooted. He gave up European food and ate with the farmers whatever

** Muslim League was formed in 1906 by Aga Khan and backed by Lord Minto, the Viceroy, to counter-
poise the growing strength of Indian National Congress. It was to safeguard the interests of the Muslims in
general and the upper class Muslim in particular. The Muslim League demanded the reservation of seats
not only on their basis of population but on the basis of their political importance and their services in the
defense of the Empire. It "was the first major step in the direction of the separatist movement among
Indian Muslims." [Asghar Ali Engineer, Indian Muslim: A Study of the Minority Problem in India. Ajanta,
Delhi. 1985. p.6].]
Nehru. An Autobiography, p.31.32.
'" Home (Poll.) 253.1924, NAI. Also mHome (Poll.)K.W, 68, 1924.
" Rostislav Ulyanovsky. Three Leaders, M.K. Gandhi, J.L.Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Progress Publishers,
Moscow, 1990, p.74.

46
they cooked and gave him. He spent several nights in their mud-huts and did not
mind sharing his hfe with them. This was too sudden and too much of a
transformation in Jawaharlal for the liking of his fcither who was still too
attached to the Western style of living.

The end of the World War found India in a state of suppressed

excitement. Industrialization had spread and the capitalist class had grown in
wealth and power. These handfuls at the top had prospered and were greedy for
more power and opportunity to invest their savings and add to their wealth.
Among the middle classes there was everywhere an expectation of great
constitutional changes which would bring a large measure of self-rule and thus
better their lot by opening out many fresh avenues of growth to them. But when
the War was over, the Indians were filled with disillusionment, despondency,
anger, shock and hatred by what they received as reward - the infamous Black
Act. This Act enabled the Government to arrest and imprison any Indian only on
the basis of fear of seditious activity without trial.

Gandhi started the Satyagraha Sabha, whose members were pledged to

disobey the Rowlatt Act and even ready to court gaol openly and deliberately. In
spite of the initial opposition of his father, Jawaharlal plunged heart and soul into
the non-cooperation movement launched by Gandhi and took full part in
organizing India-wide hartals on April 6, 1919. The Bolshevik Revolution had
already shaken him and he admired Leninist announcement renouncing all
Czarist claims to the territories of other nations. The subsequent events changed
the whole situation, which blazed Jawaharlal with new vigour and enthusiasm
and opened the course of future action. The mob violence in Amritsar and
Ahmedabad, especially the massacre oi Jallianwala Bagh and terrible indignity

' General Dyer fired 1600 rounds of ammunition into an unarmed crowd in an enclosed place without
means of exit, killing (according to the official figures) 379 and leaving 1200 wounded without
means of attention, the object being, according to his subsequent statement, to create "a moral elTect
from a military point of view not only on those who were present, but more especially throughout
the Punjab" - i.e. to terrorize the population. (R.P. Dutt, India Today, Manisha Granthalya, Calcutlal,
1989. p.338.)

47
of martial law in the Punjab, horrified Jawaharlal beyond imagination. He was
deputed to assist the Congress Inquiry team of Gandhi, Motilal and C.R. Das.
I'here was also an official inquiry conducted by Lord Hunter. It has been already
mentioned that Jawaharlal did not believe in the moderate politics and wanted
the Congress to carry on an aggressive direct action policy. Therefore, the
constitutional politics which involved leading deputations, writing memorials',
discussing constitutional and legal devices at one level and fighting elections and
making speeches in the Legislatures at another level, did not suit to his genius.
There was another dimension to constitutional politics and this was the perpetual
search for an understanding with the Muslims; separate electorates vis-a-vis joint
electorate, acceptable formulas - a recurring expression of that period, universal
suffrage, reservation, quotas, safeguards and so on "Jawaharlal Nehru was never
enamoured of constitutional politics" argues Madhu Limaye, "such as the
Moderate leaders of the Indian National Congress."''' It was only the Rowlatt
agitation and the Punjab Tragedy which shook the foundations of his being and
he was drawn to Gandhi. It was Gandhi who gave Jawaharlal the action
programme which he craved. Gandhi's politics changed his outlook completely.
His aversion to constitutionalism increased.'"* During the summer of 1920
Jawaharlal favoured boycott of elections; for him there was no question of going
inside the Councils either for "obstruction or cooperation". He was totally
opposed to entering the Councils and taking the "oath of allegiance".'^ He
declared in a letter to 'The Leader' that he was "an ardent believer in non-
cooperation with all it implies" and he was "firmly convinced that non-
cooperation and no other cause will bring us victory."'^

' Madhu Limaye. Conleinporaiy Indian Politics, Radiant Publishers, New Del hi, 1987, p.1-2.
" Ibid. p.3.
'' Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. I, Delhi, 1972, p.i66.
"' Ibid. p.\67.

48
Jawaharlal Nehru and Non Cooperation Movement

In the autumn of September 1920, a special session of Congress met at

Calcutta to consider what step should be taken and in particular, to decide about
the new plan of non-violent non-cooperation. Lala Lajpat Rai was the President
at this session. He disliked the new-fangled proposal of and opposed it. Not only
Lala Lajpat Rai but the entire Old Guard of the Congress opposed Gandhi's
resolution. However, with the help of Motilal Nehru, C.R. Das and the mihtant
Muslim leaders, the Ali Brothers, at the head of the then powerful Khilafat
agitation (in form the protest against the injustices of the Treaty of Sevres to
Turkey, the leading Muslim power, but in practice it was astute or wise effort of
Gandhi as a strange device for bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity for agitation
against the British), Gandhi launched his Non-Cooperation Movement.

The resolution proclaimed the policy of progressive non-violent non-

cooperation until the said wrongs were righted and swaraj was established. The
poHcy envisaged successive stages, beginning with the renunciation of titles
bestowed by the government and the triple boycott (boycott of the legislatures,
law courts and educational institutions), together with "reviving hand-spinning
in every house and hand weaving" and leading up at some future date to final
stage of non-payment of taxes. Jawaharlal says, "This Special Session at
Calcutta began the Gandhi era in Congress politics...The whole look of Congress
changed; to fill the picture. European clothes vanished and soon only khadi was
to be seen; a new class of delegate, chiefly drawn from the lower middle classes
became the type of Congressman; the language used became increasingly
Hindustani, or sometimes the language of province where the session was
held...and a new life and enthusiasm became evident in Congress gatherings."'^
.lawaharlal expressed his stand as: "Evil flourishes only because we tolerate and
assist it; the most despotic and tyrannical government can only carry on because
the people it governs themselves submit to it. England holds India in bondage

49
 because Indians cooperate with the EngUshmen and thereby strengthen British
rule. Withdraw that cooperation and the fabric of foreign rule collapses." The
appeal for a boycott of the elections to the new legislatures was remarkably
successful. Sir Valentine Chirol happened to be in Allahabad on the election day
and was amazed at the efficiency of the boycott. At one rural polling-station
about 15 miles from Allahabad city, he found that not a single voter had
appeared.''' However, the boycott of elections had great local differences. In
Bombay only 8% of the voters went to the polls, but at Lucknow 60% and at
Madras about 50%, 32% in Punjab and 33% in the U-P.^*^

Because of this successfijl boycott, the conflict between Old Guard and
the new force of Gandhi was reduced. The creed of the Congress was changed
from the previous proclamation of the aim of colonial self-government within
the empire to the new aim of the attainment of swaraj by peaceful and legitimate
means. The organization of the Congress became a modem party, with its units
reaching down to the villages and localities and with a Standing Executive
91

(Working Committee of 15). Not only this, Gandhi had declared as a firm
prophecy that swaraj would be achieved within twelve months, i.e. by 31
December 1921. But he failed. The advance of the movement in 1921 was
demonstrated, not only in the enthusiastic development of the non-cooperation
movement, but in the accompanying rising forms of mass-struggle in all parts of
the country as in the Assam-Bengal railway strike, the Midnapore No-Tax
campaign, the Moplah rebellion in Malabar in the South, and the militant Akali
Movement against the Government defended rich Mahants in the Punjab.
Towards the closing months of 1921, the struggle leapt to new heights. Khilafat
and Non-Cooperation movements became combinedly a mass movement under
the leadership of Gandhi. People fi-eely discussed what had happened in the
'' Nehru. An Autobiography, p.65-66.
"^ Quoted by Rafiq Zakaria, op.cil., p.28.
' 'biehru. An Aulobiography, p.67.
-" D.M.G. Koch. Quoted by A.C. Neimeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, I9I9-I924, Martinus
Nijhoff. Hague. 1972. p.'l II. 227, fn.81.

50
 Punjab and the Khilafat. But the word 'khilafaf bore a strange meaning in most
of the rural areas. People thought it came from 'khilaf, an Urdu word meaning
'against' or 'opposed to' and so they took it to mean: opposed to government.^^
They discussed, of course, especially their own particular economic grievances.
Innumerable meetings and conferences added greatly to their political education.

The full force of the government repression was turned against the
national volunteers, even the method of combating non-cooperation was
adopted. Government proclaimed the volunteers 'illegal' and arrested them.
Thousands of students and factory workers replenished the ranks of volunteers.
By the end of December 1921, all the best-known Congress leaders except
Gandhi were imprisoned. 20,000 political prisoners filled the jails. "In January
1922, it is estimated that about 30,000 persons were sentenced to imprisonment
with the non-cooperation movement." In the midst of this ferment of national
enthusiasm, suddenly early in February 1922, the whole scene shifted. Gandhi
had stopped the aggressive aspects of struggle when at the village of Chauri
Chaura, a mob of villagers had retaliated on some policemen by setting fire to
the police station and burning half a dozen policemen in it. This suspension of
mass-movement resulted in resentment not only among the masses but also
among the political leaders and intellectuals. Jawaharlal Nehru who was in
prison at that time reacted as: "We were angry when we learnt of this stoppage
of our struggle at a time when we seemed to be consolidating our position and
advancing on all fronts."^'' He further writes that the manner of the decision
'"brought about certain demoralization. It is possible that this sudden bottling up
of a great movement contributed to a tragic development in the country. The
drift to sporadic and futile violence in the political struggle was stopped, but the
suppressed violence had to find a way out, and in the following years this

-' R.P. Dutt. India Today. p.341.

•' Nehru. An Autobiography, p.69.
-' Ibid. p.80.
'"'/A/rf. p.81.

51
 perhaps aggravated the communal trouble."^^ Subhas Chandra Bose writes: "To
sound the order of retreat just when public enthusiasm was reaching the boiling
point was nothing short of a national calamity. The principal lieutenants of the
Mahatma, Deshbandhu Das, Pt. Motilal Nehru and Lala Lajpat Rai, who were all
in prison, shared the popular resentment." In the words of R.P. Dutt, "The
entire movement which had been organized on the basis of complete
discouragement of any spontaneous mass-activity and mechanical subordination
to the will of one man, was inevitably thrown into helpless confusion and
77
demoralization."

The impact of this mass-movement on government can be realised when

the Viceroy telegraphed to London on February 9, 1922, "The lower classes in
the town have been seriously affected by the non-cooperation movement.... In
certain areas the peasantry have been affected, particularly in parts of the Assam
Valley, United Provinces, Bihar and Orissa and Bengal. As regards the Punjab,
the Akali agitation...has penetrated to the rural Sikhs. A large proportion of the
Mohammedan population throughout the country are embittered and
sullen...grave possibilities... . The Government of India is prepared for disorder
of a more formidable nature than has in the past occurred, and do not seek to
minimise in any way the fact that great anxiety is caused by the situation." This
was the government's picture of the situation three days before the whole
campaign was cancelled by the Bardoli decision on February 12. The impression
of the government on the crisis of 1922 and their view that only Gandhi's calling
off of the movement saved them was subsequently expressed by Lord Lloyd,
then Governor of Bombay, in an interview: "He gave us a scare! His programme
filled our jails. You can't go arresting people forever, you know - not when
there are 319,000,000 of them. And if they had taken his next step and refused to

-' Ihid, p.86.

""' Subhas Chajidra Bose. The Indian Struggle, p. 90.
- ' R . P . Dutt. o/j.n7, p.349.
"'' Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, February 9, 1922, ''Telegraphic Correspondence
regarding the situation in India" , Cmd. 1586, 1922.

52
 pay taxes! God knows where we should have been! Lord Lloyd observes:
"Gandhi's was the most colossal experiment in world history; and it came within
an inch of succeeding. But he couldn't control men's passions. They became
violent and he called off his programme. You know the rest. We jailed him."^*^

After months of strain and anxiety the government breathed again and for
the first time had the opportunity of taking the initiative with confidence. On
March 10, 1922, Gandhi was arrested and sentenced to six years imprisonment.
However, within less than two years he was released early in 1924 on the ground
of serious illness. The period of non-cooperation movement according to
.lawaharlal was a strange mixture of nationalism and politics and religion and
mysticism and fanaticism. It was Hindu-Musalman ki jai everywhere. It was
remarkable how Gandhi seemed to cast a spell on all classes and groups of
people and drew them into one motley crowd struggling in one direction. He
became, indeed (to use a phrase which has been applied to another leader), "a
symbolic expression of the confused desires of the people." But in reality, the
actual picture of bringing religion into politics produced negative impact. That is
why, Jawaharlal criticized Gandhi with such insight as: "Gandhiji, indeed, was
continually laying a stress on the religious and spiritual side of the Movement.
His religion was not dogmatic, but it did mean a definitely religious outlook on
life and the whole movement was strongly influenced by this and took on a
revivalist character so far as the masses were concerned."^' In spite of his
criticism on Gandhi, he also put forward the real cause and justification of the
decision after Chauri-Chaura incident taken by Gandhi as: "at that time our
movement, in spite of its apparent power and the wide spread enthusiasm was
going to pieces. All organization and discipline was disappearing, almost all our
good men were in prison and the masses had so far received little training to
carry on by themselves. Any unknown man who wanted to do so could take

'" Lord Lloyd in an interview vvitii Drew Pearson, Quoted in C.F. Andrews, New Republic. April 3.
1939.
'" Nehru. An Autobiography, p.75.

53
 charge of a Congress Committee and, as a matter of fact, large numbers of
undesirable men, including agents provocateurs, came to the front and even
controlled some local Congress and Khilafat Organizations. There was no way
of checking them."'^^

Jawaharlal Towards Socialism

Since his college days, Jawaharlal had socialistic bent of mind. But after
coming to India, his ideas went through an upheaval. He was deeply moved by
poverty-stricken, suffering, naked and hungry masses, resigned to their
miserable fate and sat upon and exploited by all who came in contact with them
the government, landlords, money-lenders, petty officials, police, lawyers,
priests etc. So, after joining the Kisan Sabha, he got a clear-cut programme of
the reform of rural India to which the nationalists had paid hardly any attention.
Agrarian troubles which were frequently taking place in various parts of India,
symptoms of deep-seated unrest and the kisan agitations in certain parts of
Awadh in 1920 and 1921 were all entirely unconnected with politics or
politicians. From an all-India point of view, however, it was a local affair and
very little attention was paid to it. Even the newspapers of the United Provinces
largely ignored it. In 1920, Jawaharlal was totally ignorant of labour conditions
in factories or fields. He knew that there was terrible poverty and misery and
"felt that the first aim of a politically free India must be to tackle this problem of
poverty." The agrarian upheavals and violence led to conflicts with the
government. In the words of Jawaharlal, "... this conflict was bound to come, for
the Government could not tolerate this growing power of a united peasantry. The
kisans took to travelling in railway trains in large numbers without tickets,
especially when they had to attend their periodical big mass meetings, which
sometimes consisted of sixty or seventy thousand persons. It was difficult to

" Ibid. p.72.

'- Ibid. p.85.
" Ibid. p.63.
''' Ibid. p.49.

54
 move them and, unheard of thing, they openly defied the railway authorities,
teUing them that the old days were gone."^^ This resulted in the arrest of few
kisan leaders. But still, they did not fear and demonstrated against the
government.

Whatever the result may be on the peasants, it had shaken the very
foundation of the British Empire because the earlier liberals who challenged the
British were very small in number but now the case was different - with the
involvement of the masses, the peasants and the workers it took the all India
character. All this was possible because of the commitment, which Jawaharlal
had made to the peasants and workers. In his D.D. Kosambi Memorial Lectures,
(1989), Bipin Chandra boasts, "As a national liberator he was second only to
Gandhi]i. But above all, it was Nehru who imparted a socialist vision to the
Indian national movement. He turned the face of the movement towards
socialism, helped it to acquire a cleaner and sharper socio-economic content and
gave the INC a socialist orientation. He helped bring together or rather relate the
struggle for national liberation with the struggle for economic or class
emancipation. There is no doubt that he played a leading role in the rooting of
socialist ideas in the Indian soil and in making socialism the accepted creed of
Indian youth."^"^ Jawaharlal's involvement with the agrarian movement or kisan
movement developed in him, the quality of mass-leadership (later on charismatic
leadership and statesmanship), which he professed in his Autobiography as: "I
experienced the thrill of mass-feeling, the power of influencing the mass. I began
to understand a little the psychology of the crowd, the difference between the
city-masses and the peasantry..."'^^

In this way, Jawaharlal gave the new direction to the INC by inviting the
peasants into the Congress fold. This view is corroborated by R. Ulyanovsky

^^M.Ap.59. ^ .,:^-' ^'^ ^'t:^

'" Bipin Ciiandra. Jawaharlal Nehru in Historical Perspective, D.D. Kosdrfbi Memorial Lecl
Dept. oF History. University of Bombay Publication, 1989, p.56. • ^__^ h
'^ }.L.'Hehru. An Autobiography, p. n. \ "^ f)

55 V >v
\
 who believes, he "embarked on a search for new forms and methods of national
liberation struggle."^^ The socialist tendencies made him "the leader of the INC
left wing, which was rapidly gaining momentum", and "continued through the
mid-1930's." At this time, Gandhi "held a commanding position in the INC and
he himself on many occasions supported the right wing, conservative elements
of the INC in their attempt to retain their influence and to put an end to the
attacks and demands of the revolutionary youth. Here Nehru played a dual role.
On the one hand he was the leader of the left wing and on the other, he was a
man who enjoyed the trust and love of Gandhi with whom he maintained a
special personal relationship...Gandhi regarded Nehru not only as the chief
spokesman of the left wing forces but also as the avowed leader of the Congress,
capable of keeping it within the bounds of radicalism... However, Nehru failed to
commit the Congress to his ideas; he totally submitted to Gandhi's pressure, had
implicit faith in the latter's infallible sense and allowed the right wing forces to
offset the effect of revolutionary-sounding declarations...Nehru realized that in
view of the intransigence of the right wing forces the continuance of his stand
might undermine national unity and opted for a compromise."

Jawaharlal Nehru and Controversy of Council-Entry Programme

At the end of January 1923, Jawaharlal and many other prominent leaders
were released from prison. The INC was torn by contradictions between the so-
called pro-changers (Swarajists) and no-changers. The former, led by Motilal
Nehru, C.R. Das and M.A. Jinnah, believed that the defeat of the non-
cooperation movement had not given the national forces any other choice but a
return to parliamentary activity, i.e. work in Central Legislative Assembly and in
Provincial Legislative Councils. While the latter, led by C. Rajagopalachari,
Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad "won at Gaya session by 1740 votes
against 890. A new split began. Das and Motilal formed the Swaraj Party with

"" R. Ulyanovsk)', op. cit.. p.74,

''' R. Ulyanovsky. Orest Martyshin. Jawaharlal Nehru and his Political Views, Preface, Progress

56
 Das as President. There was to be a frustrating struggle between the two sections
for popularity and control of the party machine; both owing allegiance to Gandhi
with different degrees of fidelity and both attempting compromises on that
basis.-"**'

The Swaraj party contested in the election for the second Assembly in
1923 polls. As compared to the barely 25% turn out of voters in 1920, polling in
1923 rose sharply to 41.9%. The Swaraj party backed by Congress achieved
remarkable success. By winning 45 seats - later increased to 48 - and,
determined to wreck the constitution from within, the Swaraj party became the
biggest party in the Central Legislature."" The prominent raoderate leaders like
Surendranath Banerjee, Paranjpe, Sheshigir Iyer, Nilratan Sarkar and S.R. Das
were defeated by unknown Swarajist candidates."*^ The Independents headed by
M.A. Jinnah 25 to 30 in number formed a coalition with Swarajists under the
name of the Nationalist Party with Pt. Motilal Nehru as the leader. The purpose
of the coalition was to achieve the goal of making the Council unworkable.'*^
The policy of obstruction agreed upon by the Swarajists and the Independents
worked well during 1924.^*"* However, by the beginning of the year 1925 the
Independents adopted a policy of reasonable opposition"*^ and the policy of
obstruction came to a standstill. Das was inclined to some compromise with the
British Government only if latter could take an initiative."*^ In May 1925, at
Faridpur, Das openly spelt out conditions of cooperation with the British
Government."*^ But Jawaharlal found no interest in it, nor was he enamoured of
fighting the British in the Coimcil-Chambers as his father was. He kept aloof

Publishers. Moscow. 1989. p. 9-10.

''" iM. Chalapathi Rao, op.cU.. p.49.
"*' Rajula Jain. Vallabhhhai Patel and I he Indian National Congress, Gyan Sagar Publications, Delhi,
1997. p.5.
^" Indian Quarter Resister, 1923, Vol.II, p.7. Also in H.N. Dasgupta, Deshbandhu Chitranjan Das,
Delhi, 1966, p.95.
^' IQR. 1924, Vol.1, p.72. Also in S.C. Kashyap, op. cit, p.ll2.
•'"'lOR. 1924. Vol.1, pp.130-144.
^' W.H. Sayid. h-fohammad AH Jinnah-A Political Study, p.159.
'""Letter from C.R. Das to Motilal Nehru, 26 January 1925 vide D.K. Chatterjee, C.R. Das and Indian
National Movement Appendix B, p.221.

57
 from these controversies as he was fed up with the Pro-change and No-change
pontics."^

At this time, Jawaharlal found himself in a quandary. On the one hand, he

himself was not in favour of entering the Councils, on the other he could not
start a crusade against his father as the No-changers led by Rajaji. Limaye
believes that the "Nehru family ties were so deep as to make this absolutely
inconceivable."'^^ Jawaharlal took a middle position and supported a compromise
between the Swarajists and the No-Changers. Even so he said that he differed
from C.R. Das (and also his father) and felt that fight in the Councils will not
gain anything that was "substantial or of importance." He pinned his faith in
direct action."^*^

The AICC met on 25 May 1923. Purushottam Das Tandon with the
support of Jawaharlal moved a resolution that there should be no propaganda
against elections. The No-Changers strongly opposed the resolution, which was
against the Gaya decision and resigned from the Working Committee. This
paved the way in favour of the Pro-Changers. A new Working Committee was
formed with members supporting compromise.^' However, Abul Kalam Azad,
the President, considered that the differences about Council entry were not of
principle but only of details. The Council entry was only a new tactic while
adhering to the fundamental creed. "Ultimately the No-Changers preferred not
to take responsibility on themselves for a split in the Congress and so accepted
Azad and Mohammad All's request for a compromise."

Jawaharlal as Chairman of the Municipal Council of Allahabad

- " D . K . Chatteijee./Wfif, p.164.

^^ Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 100.
"" Madhu Limaye, op. cit. p. 3.
'" Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 1 Delhi, 1972, p.362.
'' M.R. .layakar. Story of My Life. Vol.2, p.l 12-113. Also in N.D. Parikh, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.
Vol.1 p.l81.
'-Ihid. p.\53.
' ' Rajula .lain. op. cit. p. 5.

58
 At the same time, Jawaharlal was also depressed and frustrated with the
development of the tide of communal hatred. But, however, he had some solace
to get the training in municipal affairs. In 1923, he was elected Chairman of the
Allahabad Municipality where he worked with vigour and enthusiasm. But soon
he found himself "hedged in, obstructed and prevented from doing anything
really worthwhile"^'' because the whole steel-frame of municipal administration,
as erected by government, prevented radical growth or innovation. The financial
policy was such that the municipality was always dependent on the government.
Most radical schemes of taxation or social development were not permissible
under the existing municipal laws. The Municipal Council of Allahabad where
his inability to do wholesale changes due to limitations made him upset.^''

As Chairman of the Municipality, he got the hard course of training,

efficiency and strength and developed hatred towards the authoritarian
government, which had over-looked the "positive functions"^^ such as education,
sanitation, health, shelter etc. Thus, before becoming the Prime Minister of
India, he came across different responsibilities, which the government has to
perform. His adherence to democracy was reflected at this time when he
vehemently criticized the structure of Municipal Corporation. He criticized the
restricted franchise and favoured for its extension."

"The Municipal experience was not pleasant", writes Rafiq Zakaria, "but
it proved instructive and gave Nehru a peep into the working of administration;
CO

it was there that the foundation of his future role as an administrator was laid."'
Fed up of the incompetency, Jawaharlal resigned from the Chairmanship at the
end of second year of his service.

Trip to Europe and Struggle for Democratic Socialism

'"' Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 142.

' ' M. Brecher./( Political Biography, p. 11-12. Also in S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru - A Biography.
Vol.1, p. 16-17.
'" Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 143.
"//)/V/. p,144-145.

59
 Jawaharlal's revolutionary sympathies found expressions when he
participated in the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held in Brussels in 1927
and in the League against Imperialism, which was set up at that Congress. It was
to be a common front against imperialism and it was a gathering of the Left
Wing and oppressed nations for the purpose of joint deliberation and joint action
against the colonial powers - England, France, Italy etc. There were
representatives from the national organizations and the Left Wing Labour
Organizations of different countries, who had played a leading part in it. At the
Brussels Congress, Jawaharlal was elected to the Executive Committee of the
League. He defined the objectives of the INC and talked for the first time of the
•'liberation of the poor and oppressed from all exploitation", over and above the
necessity of "freedom from foreign rule."^ "The Brussels Congress", writes
Jawaharlal, "as well as the subsequent Committee meetings of the League,
which were held in various places from time to time, helped me to understand
some of the problems of colonial and dependent countries. They gave me also an
insight into the inner conflicts of the Western Labour World.... As between the
Labour worlds of the Second International and the Third International, my
sympathies were with the latter... So I turned inevitably with good will towards
Communism, for, whatever its faults, it was at least not hypocritical and not
imperialistic."^

In November 1927, he along with his family visited Moscow and

participated as official guests in the tenth armiversary celebrations of the
Bolshevik Revolution. They stayed there just for three or four days, but this
short visit had a great impact on Jawaharlal. He developed a sympathetic attitude
towards the Soviet Union and was keen to understand the role of the
Communists and was interested to develop Indo-Soviet friendship. His
gravitation towards the world of socialism could be found in several articles,

^' Rafiq Zakaria, op.cit.. p.3 1.

"' Statement to the Press at Brussels, 9 February 1927: Selected Works ofJawaharlal Nehru, Vol.2.
pp.270-272.

60
 which he seriahzed in 'The Hindu'' and 'Young India' and other newspapers
between April and July 1928. Subsequently, these articles came out in the form
of a booklet entitled "Soviet Russia" published in Bombay. Later on, this small
book played an outstanding role in the propagation of the ideas of socialism and
the October Revolution in India.

Jawaharlal returned from Brussels with a short break journey in Moscow

to India in December 1927. After returning from Europe, his whole outlook and
approach was changed. Now for him the concept of nationalism seemed "a
narrow and insufficient creed. Political freedom, independence, were no doubt
essential, but they were steps only in the right direction; without social freedom
and a socialistic structure of society and the State, neither the country nor the
individual develop much."^' However, he wanted to inter-relate the national
democratic movement of India with the democratic movements in different parts
of the world. For that purpose, he formulated a number of propositions of crucial
significance to the freedom struggle based on socialist ideology. He perceived
the Hberation movement "as part of the subject societies of Asia and Africa."
So, he wanted "to train and prepare (the) country for these world events - to
keep in readiness for them...seemed to be the immediate task. The preparation
was largely an ideological one. First of all, there should be no doubt about the
objective of political independence. This should be clearly understood as the
only possible political goal; something radically different from the vague and
confusing talk of Dominion Status." With these objectives, Jawaharlal attended
an annual session of the INC (December 1927) presided over by Dr.
M.A.Ansari, and presented a bunch of resolutions to the Working Committee
- resolution on independence, war danger, association v^^ith the League against
Imperialism, etc. - and nearly all of these were accepted and made into official

"" Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 163.

" //)/t/.p.l66.
62
B.N.Pande (ed.), A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol.2, New
Delhi. 1985. p.30.
'' Uiihru. An Autobiography, p. 166.

61
 Working Committee resolution. The Independence resolution was supported
even by Mrs. Annie Besant.^'* Gandhi was in Madras and he attended the open
Congress session, but he did not take any part in the shaping of policy. He did
not attend the meetings of the Working Committee of which he was a member.
Later on Gandhi condemned it as "hastily conceived and thoughtlessly passed."^^
.lawaharlal says, "I do not know how far the resolutions I put before the
Congress met with his approval. I am inclined to think that he disliked them, not
so much because of what they said, but because of their general trend and
outlook."'^^'^

Gandhi was worried about Jawaharlal's budding radicalism. In his view,

it would turn him away from non-violence. That is why Gandhi warned
.lawaharlal against his fascination with socialist ideas, against encouraging
mischief-makers and hooligans. Gandhi tried to prove that the time had not come
yet when society could exist without the rich and educated representative of the
middle classes, and the Congress could be turned into a movement of workers
and peasants.^ Gandhi's apprehensions early in 1928 were not groundless. In all
his speeches at that time, lawaharlal pointed out that the aim of the national
liberation movement must be full of independence and socialism. The fact that
lawaharlal laid so much emphasis on the socio-economic background of the
movement, especially on the problem of workers and peasants, was very new for
the Indian nationalism. The futility of engaging the peasantry and workers in the
national movement had already been proved by their continuous involvement in
violent activities during the Non-Cooperation movement, which pained Gandhi.
He also did not want to shed the blood of the ignorant peasants and workers
aimlessly; as he felt, they were still not prepared and trained for his non-violent
programmes. lawaharlal emphasized that socialism was the social philosophy of

"'//;/£/. p. 167.
"' Selected Works ofJ.LNehni, Vol.3, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1972, p.ll.
"' Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 167.
"'' Vithalbhai, K..lhaveri & D.G.Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi, Vol.8.
1947-1948. Bombay. 1954. p.349-351.

62
 the future world. He continuously praised the USSR as "the greatest opponent of
imperialism."''^ And nationalism had all along been a driving force for freedom
and independence. It gave certain degree of unity, vigour and vitality to many
peoples all over the world.

"With this advance", writes R.P. Dutt, "the new ideology of Working
Class, or Socialism, began to develop for the first time as a political factor in
India, and the influence of its ideas began to penetrate the youth and the left
sections of Indian Nationalism, bringing new life and energy and wider
horizons...The growth of Workers and Peasants' Party, which came to the front
during 1926 and 1927 preceded the great advance of trade unionism and the
strike movement in 1928. The colossal strike movement of 1928 with a total of
31,647,000 working days lost, or more than during the previous five years put
together."^" According to B. L. Grover & S. Grover, "During 1928 the country
witnessed unprecedented industrial unrest. The total number of strikes was 203
involving no less than 506,851 people."^'

At the Madras Congress, the left ward tendencies especially among the
youths were at peak. Jawaharlal and Subhas Chandra Bose were the principal
leaders of the youth and of the developing social tendencies in the Congress.
They were appointed as the General Secretaries of the Congress. There was also
the Independence for India League (consisting entirely of principal Congress
Workers), functioning as a socialist group of the Congress. "Indeed, one of the
objects", writes Jawaharlal, "of the Independence League was social freedom.
We had hoped to build up a strong League organization all over India and utilize
it for propaganda in favour of independence and socialism." For this purpose,
he travelled a great deal and addressed many important gatherings. He presided

"^ M.Brecher, Nehru ~ A Political Biography, OUP, London, 1959, p. 126.

"" Williai'd Range, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View: A Theory of International Relations, University of
Georgia Press. Alliens, 1961. p.44.
7(1
R.P. Dutt. OjD.d/.,p.357.
71
B.L. Grover & S. Grover. A New Look At the Modern Indian History, S. Chand & Co., New Delhi
p.460.

63
 over Provincial Conferences in 1928 - in the Punjab, Malabar, Delhi and the
United Provinces as well as over Youth Leagues and Students' Conferences in
Bengal and Bombay. From time to time, he also visited rural areas and
occasionally addressed industrial workers. For the first time, he attended and
participated in the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC)^^ held at Jharia for
the first two days. His regular and continuous attachment with the peasantry and
lately with the workers had gained for him a measure of popularity with the
masses. Not only this he was elected as a President in the armual Trade Union
Congress elections in his absence, though he was himself not in favour of this
and "would have withdrawn in favour of the worker candidate."^''

However, The Labour movement was becoming "class-conscious,

militant and dangerous, both in ideology and in organization."^^ The political
situation was also developing fast and though the two were separate and
unconnected, they were partly parallel, and "the Government could not
contemplate the future"''^ with any satisfaction.

Simon Commission and All Parties Conference

In 1927, Lord Irwin, the Viceroy of India annotmced the appointment of a

Statutory Royal Commission headed by Sir John Simon, a member of the British
Liberal Party. According to the Act of 1919, this Commission was to be
appointed in 1929 after the gap of 10 years. But this Commission was appointed
two years early because the ruling Conservative Party of Lord Birkenhead was
afraid of being ousted by the Labour Party in the General Election to be held in
1929. The Conservative Party, therefore, did not like to leave the appointment of
the Commission to a successor Government. This Commission was composed of

''' Nehru, An Autobiography, p. 183-184.

' ' The AITUC was founded on 31 October 1920 and Lala Lajpat Rai became its elected President "By
1927. the number of trade unions affiliated to the AITUC increased to 57 with a total membership of
1.50,555."" (B.L. Grover & S. Grover, op.cit.)
''' Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 187.
"ibid. p. 188.
'' Ibid.

64
 White M.P's of British Parliament, completely ignoring the inclusion of Indians.
The exclusion of Indian members - nearly all groups and sections of people - in
this Commission led to the country-wide agitation and was completely boycotted
by the Indian Nationalists/'' In the words of Jawaharlal, "the moderate groups
cooperated with the Congress in this boycott, and it was renewably successful.
Wherever the Commission went, it was greeted by hostile crowds and the cry of
TO

Simon GoBack"..."'"Theanti-S imon Commission demonstrations were held

all over India. In Lahore, it was headed by Lala Lajpat Rai, and as he stood by
the roadside in front of the thousands of demonstrators, he was assaulted and
beaten on his chest with a baton by a young police-officer. A few weeks later
with the affect of physical injury Lala Lajpat Rai died. His death was considered
not as a personal humiliation but as a national humiliation. The assault on Lala
Lajpat Rai, and his subsequent death, increased the vigour of the anti Simon
Commission demonstrations, in the places, where it subsequently visited. It was
due in Lucknow, and the local Congress Committee made extensive preparations
for its reception. Huge processions, meetings, and demonstration were organized
in many days in advance, both as propaganda and as rehearsals for the actual
show. Even the working-class demonstrated against the Simon Commission.^'
.lawaharlal went to Lucknow and was present at some of these. These
preliminary demonstrations evidently nettled the authorities. As a result, they
began to obstruct and issue orders against taking out of processions in certain
areas. It was in this connection that Jawaharlal had a new experience and his
body felt the baton and lathi-hlows of the police.

In view of disturbances all over the country, the Government made an

announcement to the effect that committee elected by Central as well as
Provincial Legislature would also be associated with the Commission. But this

" Montague - Chelmsford Report, Para 261; Simon Commission Report, p. xvi. (The decision to
boycott the Simon Commission was taken by an All Party Meeting held at Allahabad under the
Presidentship of Malaviya on 11 December, 1927.)
^'^ 'Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 171.
'" R. P. Dutt, op.cit.. p.357.

65
assurance did not evoke any enthusiasm among the organized parties in the
country. The appointment of the Commission was resented in the Legislative
Assembly.^° Various resolutions were moved by the Indian members of the
Assembly of which Lala Lajpat Rai's resolution was discussed and adopted on
16 February, 1928. The resolution read: "The Assembly recommends to the
Governor-General-in-Council to inform His Majesty's Government that the
present constitution and scheme of the Statutory Commission are wholly
unacceptable to this House and that this House will therefore have nothing to do
with the Commission at any stage and in any form." Before the Simon
Commission could begin its work, Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India
in the Conservative Government in England had said in the House of Lords on
24 November 1927 that "since no Constitution framed by the British could be
acceptable to the Indians, let them put forward their own suggestions" which
would meet the general acceptance.

Taking it up as challenge, on May 17, 1927, at the Bombay Session of the

Congress, Motilal Nehru had moved a resolution calling upon the Congress
Working Committee "to frame a Swaraj Constitution" "for India in consultation
with the elected members of the Central and Provincial Legislatures and the
Other leaders of political parties." It was this resolution on the Swaraj
Constitution which was later amplified by Jawaharlal Nehru and reiterated and
adopted by an overwhelming majority with amendments at its Madras Session
on December 28, 1927. In compliance with the directives contained in the
resolution, the Congress Working Committee organized an All-Parties
Conference at Bombay on May 19, 1928. This conference appointed a
Committee, under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru, "to determine the

It was the Third Assembly (1927 - 1930), the elections of which were held in 1926.
Legislative Assembly Debate. 1928, Vol.1, p.382.
House of Lords Debates, 24 November 1927, Irwin Papers, The Earl of Birkenhead
.lune 1929.
A.M.Zaidi (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Indian National Congress, Vol.9, p.263.

66
principles of the Constitution of India." The report of the Committee
(submitted on August 10, 1928) which was later to become famous as the Nehru
Report was the first attempt by Indians to frame a Constitution for their country
and has been described by Coupland as "not only an answer to the challenge that
Indian Nationalism was unconstructive" but "the frankest attempt yet made by
Indians to face squarely the difficulties of communalism."^^

At the Calcutta Session of the Congress held in December 1928, under

the Presidentship of Motilal Nehru, considerable heat was generated between the
Old Guard and the youthful group led by Jawaharlal, Subhash Bose and Srinivas
Iyengar. The main issue of conflict was Dominion Status versus Complete
Independence. Jawaharlal and his associates favoured immediate declaration of
Complete Independence as the Congress goal while the Old Guard headed by Sir
Tej Behadur Sapur, Motilal Nehru, Mr. Shoaib Qureshi, Sardar Mangal Singh,
Shri M.S. Pradhan etc. stood for the Dominion Status within the British Empire.

Jawaharlal as Congress President

At the Calcutta session in 1928, Gandhi returned to the active leadership

of the Congress. Gandhi was still keeping away from politics, except for the part
he played at the Calcutta Congress. He was, however, in full touch with
developments and was often consulted by the Congress leaders. His main
activity for some years had been Khadi propaganda, and with this object he had
undertaken extensive tours all over India. He took each province by turn and
visited every district and almost every town of any consequence, as well as
remote rural areas. Everywhere he attracted enormous crowds, and it required a
great deal of previous staff-work to carry through his programme. In this
manner he has repeatedly toured India and got to know every bit of the vast
country from the north to the far south, from the eastern mountains to the
western sea.

S.C.Bose. The Indian Struggle, part II, Calcutta, 1948, p.210.

67
 He came to the United Provinces in 1929 on his khadi tour, and spent
many weeks in these provinces during the hottest part of the year. During this
year of 1929, an election was to be held for the Presidentship of the Lahore
Session of the Congress. The Provincial Congress Committee busied themselves
with the election of the President for the Lahore session of the Congress. This
election used to be a lengthy process and used to go on from August to October.
In 1929, there was almost unanimity in favour of Gandhi to have him as
President for a second time. It was generally felt, however, that as a struggle was
impending, and he was bound to be the de facto leader of it, he might as well be
the de jure head of the Congress for the occasion. Besides, there was really no
other person outstanding enough and obvious enough for the presidentship.

So Gandhi was recommended for the Presidentship by the Provincial

Committees. But he refused and his refusal, though emphatic seemed to leave
some room for argument, and it was hoped that he would reconsider it. A
meeting of the All-India Congress Committee was held in Lucknow to decide
finally, and almost to the last hour all thought that he would agree. But he did
not agree and at the last moment he recommended Jawaharlal's name forward.
The AICC was somewhat taken aback by his final refusal and a little irritated at
being placed in a difficult and invidious position. For want of any other person,
and in a spirit of resignation they finally elected Jawaharlal. It is reported- that
Motilal pleaded Gandhi for his son to succeed him as the president of INC in
1929.**^ Jawaharlal embarrassment is proved from his writing that "I have seldom
felt quite so annoyed and humiliated as I did at that election. It was not that I was
not sensible of the honour, for it was a great honour, and I would have rejoiced if
1 had been elected in the ordinary way."

But to Gandhi, Jawaharlal's deflection began to cause concern. He was

conscious of the latter's growing hold on the people, especially the younger

^' ^ R. Coupland. The Constitutional Problem of India, Madras, 1944, part I, p. 87.
'" Brig. [Retd.] B.N.Sharma. India Betrayed: The Role of Nehru, p.14-15.

68
 generation. Gandhi said: "He is undoubtedly an extremist thinking far ahead of
his surroundings. But he is humble and practical enough not to force the pace to
the breaking point."^^ He was also anxious to "allow Jawaharlal to play his
natural role; nevertheless, the Mahatma wanted him to be tempered and,
therefore, suggested his name for the next Congress presidentship in suppression
on

of his own and Patel's nomination. Gandhi adhered: "Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru
has everything to recommend him. He has for years discharged with singular
ability and devotion the office of secretary of the Congress. By his bravery,
determination, application, integrity and grit, he has captivated the imagination
of the youth of the land. He has come in touch with laboiir and the peasantry. His
close acquaintance with European politics is a great asset in enabling him to
assess ours."'''^ Furthermore, the one year deadline given to the British for
declaring India a dominion was also to end by then, and there could be no better
person to herald the call of Purna Swaraj or "Complete Independence."
Gandhi justified his choice by asserting that: "no one can surpass him
(Jawaharlal) in his love for his country; he is brave and passionate, and at this
moment these qualities are very essential. But, although passionate and resolute
in struggle, still he possesses the reason of a statesman. An adherent of
discipline, he has proved in deeds his capability to submit to decisions with
which he is not in agreement. He is modest and practical enough not to run to
extremes. In his hands the nation is perfectly secure."

Just prior to the Lahore Congress a final attempt was made to find some
basis of agreement between Congress and the Government. An interview with
Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, was arranged. Jawaharlal, Gandhi, Motilal Nehru,
Jinnah, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and Sardar Patel were representing the Congress
view point. "The interview came to nothing", writes Jawaharlal, "there was no

Nehru. An Autobiography, p. 194.

*" Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 41, p.499.
Railq Zakaria. op.cit.. p.36-37.
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 41, p.240.

69
 common ground and the two main parties - the Government and Congress -
were far apart from each other. So now nothing remained but for the Congress to
go ahead. The year of grace given at Calcutta was ending; independence was to
be declared once for all the objective of the Congress, and the necessary steps
taken to carry on the struggle to attain it."

Throughout 1929 Trade Unions in India were agitated over a new issue -
the appointment of a Royal Commission on Labour in India, known as the
Whitley Commission. The Left Wing was in favour of a boycott of the
Commission, the Right Wing in favour of cooperation, and the personal factor
came in, as some of the Right Wing leaders were offered membership of the
Commission. In this matter, as in many others, Jawaharlal's sympathies were
with the Left, especially as this was also the policy of the National Congress.^
After becoming the President of the National Congress a new era started which
should be called as Nehru Era. In the words of Rafiq Zakaria, "the historic
session ushered in a new era - an era which gave out a declaration of an all-out
war against the British. A new zeal was generated among the people by Nehru
and the whole country was charged. The struggle could no longer, be delayed;
the Congress authorized it under the leadership of Gandhi. There was no doubt
much excitement, but the final programme of civil disobedience was yet to be
chalked out. Though thrilled at the awakening, as Nehru admitted, he was
anxious to canalise it properly. As the first step in this direcfion, the Congress
Legislators at the Centre and in the Provinces were called on to resign; more
than 178 of them immediately responded. As a symbolic expression the 26''^ day
of January was christened as "Independence Day"."^"*

Delivering his Presidential Address, Jawaharlal expressed his broad

vision on the Indian liberation movement thus: "We have now an open

'" Quoted by R.P.Dutt. op.cil., p.360-61.

'" Nehru, An Autobiography. p. 197.
"V/7/Vy. p.l98.
""* Rafiq Zakaria, op.cil.. p.37-38.

70
 conspiracy to free this country from foreign rule and you Comrades, and all our
countrymen and countrywomen are invited to join it."^^ He realised the
importance of those giants who laboured and suffered and spent out their lives
and nursed the tender plant of India's freedom struggle. He said: " ...they stood
up and proclaimed a people's right to freedom and declaration to the world that
India, even in her degradation, had the spark of life in her, because she refused to
submit to tyranny and serfdom. Brick-by-brick has our national movement been
built up, and often on the prostrate bodies of her martyred son has India
advanced. The giants of old m.ay not be with us, but the courage of old is with us
still...""^

India's freedom struggle went through different transitional phases which

•lawaharlal understood as: "Having attained some measure of religious liberty,
Europe sought after political liberty, and political and legal equality. Having
attained these also, she finds that they mean very little without economic liberty
and equality. And so today politics have ceased to have much meaning and the
most vital question is that of social and economic equality. "India also will have
to find a solution to this problem and until she does so her political and social
structure cannot have stability. That solution need not necessarily follow the
example of any other country. It must, if it has to endure, be based on the genius
of her people and be an outcome of her thought and culture. And when it is
found, the unhappy differences between various communities which trouble us
today and keep back our freedom will automatically disappear."^^ The British
Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom
but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses. Jawaharlal declared: "We
stand therefore today, for the fullest freedom of India. This Congress has not
acknowledged and will not acknowledge the right of the British Parliament to
dictate to us in any way. To it we make no appeal. But we do appeal to the

'" Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.4, New Delhi, p. 198.

'"' A.M.Zaidi, The Four Generations, p.103-104.
'"/Wrf. p.l06.

71
 Parliament and the conscience of the world to them we shall declare, I hope, that
no

hidia submits no longer to any foreign domination." Jawaharlal also made it

known that in his view liberation did not mean only throwing off the foreign
yoke: " I must frankly confess that I am a socialist and a republican and am no
believer in kings and princes, or in the order which produces the modern kings
of industry, who have greater power over the lives and fortunes of men.. ."'^'^ Not
only this, he also speU out the methods of freedom struggle as: "Any great
movement for liberation today must necessarily be a mass movement, and mass
movements must essentially be peaceful, except in times of organized
revolt...And if the principal movement is a peaceful one, contemporaneous
attempts at sporadic violence can only distract attention and weaken it.""'"
Civil Disobedience Movement

The Lahore Session of the Congress in 1929 had authorized the Working
Committee to launch a programme of Civil Disobedience including non-
payment of taxes. The Congress had also called upon all the members of the
Legislatures to resign their seats.'°' The resolution sponsored by Gandhi made it
clear that the Indian National Congress did not expect any positive results from
the British Government. The acknowledged expert on mass struggle was already
•'desperately in search of an effective formula." He had already given the
1 ri'i

ultimatum in the form of "11 points" which had been ignored, so there was

'"//w/. p.m.
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, op.cit., p. 192.
'"" Ibid. p. \95.
"" Bipin Chandra. India's Struggle for Independence, Penguin, New Delhi, 1989, p.270.
'"- Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi, Vol.42, p.389.
'"' I. Total Prohibition. 2. Reduction of the ratio to Is. 4d. 3.Reduction of the land revenue to at least 50
percent and making it subject to legislative control 4. Abolition of the Salt tax. 5. Reduction of the Military
expenditure to at least 50 percent to begin with. 6. Reduction of the salaries of the higher grade service to
one half or less so as to suit the reduced revenue. 7. Protective tariff on foreign cloth. 8. The passage of the
Coastal Tariff Reservation Bill. 9. Discharge of all political prisoners save those condemned for murder or
the attempt to murder or trial by ordinary judicial tribunals, withdrawal of political persecutions,
abrogation of section 124 -A. the Regulation of 1818 and the like, and permission to all the Indian exiles
to return. 10. Abolition of C.I.D. or its popular control.
i I. Issue of licenses to use fire arms for self defence subject to popular control. (Sankar Ghose, Indian
National Congress: Its History and Heritage, AICC, N. Delhi,1975, p. 261-62.)

72
now only one way out i.e. Civil Disobedience. Gandhi on March 12,1930, with a
small band of followers "left the Sabarmati Ashram on foot with about 79 male
and female members and covered the distance of 241 miles in 24 days"'"'' to
Dandi in Western India to make sah on the sea-shore of the Arabian sea in
defiance of the salt law regulations. For his part, Jawaharlal was most jubilant
and gave vent to his feeling in these words. "Today the pilgrimage marches
onwards on his long trek...The fire of a great resolve is in him and surpassing
love of his miserable countrymen. And love of truth that scorches and love of
freedom that inspires. And none that pass him can escape the spell, and men of
common clay feel the spark of life."'°^ The AICC met at Ahmedabad, after
Gandhi started on his march and gave large powers to the President, Jawaharlal
to act on behalf of the Committee in case it could not meet, to nominate
members of the Working Committee in place of those arrested, and to nominate
a successor to himself with the same powers. "^^ However as President of the
Congress Jawaharlal busied himself with the details of the new movement and
"issued like a Commander-in-Chief directions to soldiers of freedom in different
parts of the land."'"^

Within a fortnight, however, Jawaharlal was arrested in Allahabad and

sentenced to 6 months imprisonment under the Salt Act. According to official
figures "there were 29 cases of firing resulting in 103 killed and 420 injured, and
I OR

60,000 people were imprisoned in less than a year." However, early in March
1931 when the movement was at its peak Gandhi concluded an agreement with
the Viceroy of India, which came to be known as Gandhi-Irwin Pact. This Pact
resulted in the suspension of non-cooperation and negotiated constitutional
issues. Jawaharlal Nehru was not happy with this Pact and "admitted that the
Gandhi-Irwin Pact threatened the ultimate objective of the Congress: India's

R.C.MaJumdar. An Advanced History of India, Macmillan India Ltd., Madras, 1978, p.974.
'"^ Quoted by Ratlq Zakaria. op.cit., p.39.
'"" M. Chalapathi Rau, op.cit., p.63.
'"' Rafiq Zakaria. op.cit., p.39.
'"*' R.C.MaJumdar. An Advanced Histoiy of India, p.974.

73
independence.""''^ Gandhi also agreed upon to attend the Second Round Table
Conference. For Jawaharlal neither the Pact nor the London Conference (Second
Round Table Conference) gave any comfort. He did not expect anything out of
them. He even expressed a sneaking admiration for the terrorists. As he told at
the Karachi Session of the Congress, 'The corpse of Bhagat Singh shall stand
between us and England.' He was all for a fight but he found that neither Gandhi
nor the country was ready for it. At the session, therefore, he busied himself with
drafting a resolution on "economic policy and fundamental rights" in order to
end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real economic
freedom of the starving millions.""^ Earlier, he had met M. N. Roy and under
his influence and guidance prepared "a minimum programme" for the Congress,
which "guaranteed such freedoms as those of expression, religion, thought and
assembly; equality before the law irrespective of sex, creed or caste; protection
to regional languages and cultures; for the industrial workers, living wages,
limited hours of work, old-age insurance; safeguards against unemployment;
abolition of untouchability; universal adult franchise; free primary education;
prohibition; state control and management of key industries, services and public
undertaking; and the establishment of a secular state. The resolution, despite
some opposition from the right wing, was passed and most of it has since then
found an honoured place in the new constitution."'" For Jawaharlal, it was a
personal triumph; it laid the foundation of the welfare state that he was to try and
build in free India.

As it is already mentioned that during 1930 many Swarajists did not even
attend the Assembly as a response to the boycott resolution passed by the
Congress. The result was the success of the Government in seeing several
measures through without much resistance or opposition. The Congress was also
not more hopeful about the utility of the Councils and did not take part in the

Orest Martyshin, op.cit, p.27.

Sankar Ghose, Indian National Congress; Its History and Heritage, p.263.
''' Sankar Ghose (ed.). Congress Presidential Speeches, Calcutta, 1972, p.250,252, 254.

74
Fourth Assembly Elections of 1930. As a result, there was poor polling and the
percentage of voting was only 26.1 percent as compared to 48.7 percent of the
previous election. With the absence of an organized party like the Congress and
Swarjists from the Assembly, the power of resistance of Assembly had
comparatively come down. Of 160 divisions held on the floor of the Assembly
between 1931-1934, the Government won on 127 occasions. The Indians
outside, therefore, felt that their interests had been betrayed by the Assembly.
A series of Round Table Conferences had followed in the wake of the Civil
Disobedience Movement started by Gandhi and the severe repression resorted to
by the British rulers. The first Conference began on 12 November 1930 in which
Congress did not attend. Without the Congress, the Conference was an empty
pageant, a "marriage without the bridegroom." However, the British Prime
Minister Ramsay MacDonald speaking about the policy of the British
Government regarding India as: "The view of His Majesty's Government is that
responsibility for the Government of India should be placed upon Legislatures,
Central and Provincial with such provisions as may be necessary to guarantee,
during a period of transition, the observance of certain obligations and to meet
other special circumstances and also with such guarantees as are required by
minorities to protect their political liberty and rights.""'*

It has been argued that the Congress decision of keeping away from the
first session helped the minorities and other sections to entrench themselves in
guarded position. While it would have been possible to come to some
understanding with them in the first session, the task had become far more
difficult by the time the second session began in which Gandhi participated. At
the conclusion of the second Round Table Conference, the Secretary of State
announced that according to the proposed Constitution:

' Legislative Assembly Debate, 1932, p.2321, 2401, 3025; 1931 p. 1491-1492.
Rajendra Prasad, At the Feet of the Mahatma, Hind Kitabs, Bombay, p. 215.
Indian Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930- 19 January 1931, Proceedings, p.485.

75
 1. A beginning for establishment of a federal setup would be made if
more than half of the Princely States were prepared to join the
Federation.

2. The Indian Muslims would get 33 V2 percent of seats from British

India in the Central Legislature.

3. Sindh and Orissa would be made two new provinces.

White Paper and Demand for Constituent Assembly

The British Government published a White Paper"^ in March 1933

giving a complete outline of the Constitution. The idea of a federation was
mooted here for the first time."^ Thereafter, Jawaharlal expounded the idea of
the Constituent Assembly with a view to finding a way out of the Constitutional
impasse."^ In embracing the Constituent Assembly solution, Jawaharlal was
influenced, some claim, by M.N. Roy's ideas. This is at best doubtful. It is more
likely that he was influenced by the example of the American Constitutional
Convention and the Tennis Court Constituent Assembly after the Great French
Revolution. While moving the Objective Resolution on 13 December 1946,
Jawaharlal himself referred to the framing of the American Constitution which
had "stood the test of so many years, more than a century and a half and also
1 IO

the French Constituent Assembly.

In an early statement of his views, Jawaharlal wrote during his

incarceration in Naini prison in 1930: "it is desirable for us now to lay stress on a
properly elected Constituent Assembly meeting in India and drawing up our
future Constitution...It is also a solid answer to all Round Table Conferences and
the like... The permanent Constitution will be determined (only)... by this

''' li'hite Paper on the Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform, cmd. 4268. Also in Evidence oj the
Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, Vol.2,1932-33, p.l383.
"" S. C.Kashyap. op.cil.. p. 126.
" M.Limaye. op. cit. p.4.
' " Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2"** Series, Vol.1, p.246.

76
Assembly itself."'^ About this time, the difference between Gandhi and
Jawaharlal was at peak but "still he lacked the courage to break away from the
Mahatma."'^'' He was puzzled by Gandhi's methods especially the manner in
which he terminated all forms of civil disobedient in 1934 on the slim ground
that "some valued comrade of his had not performed his prison task fully." He
could not restrain himself and called the decision "monstrous proposition and an
immoral one."''' Jawaharlal writes: "A vast distance seemed to separate him
from me. With a stab of pain I felt that the chords of allegiance that had bound
me to him for many years had snapped."'^^ He wrote in his jail diary in April
1934: "Our objectives are different, our spiritual outlook is different and our
methods are likely to be different."

But such was their affection for each other that neither was prepared for a
break. This can be cited from Motilal's letter to Ansari which illustrates:
"Travelling in a packed third class compartment from Agra to Ahmedabad the
poor boy (Jawaharlal) had not had a wink of sleep during the previous night but
left immediately as desired by Gandhiji."'^"^ Jawaharlal was "young and
therefore he could be erratic. Gandhi was older and more understanding. He
could not react in the same manner as Nehru did."'^^ As Jawaharlal told Patel,
"No amount of political difference will ever separate him from me." To Gandhi,
Jawaharlal was "the rightful helmsman of the Congress."'^^ However, in June
1934. the Congress Working Committee passed a resolution, on the White Paper
Scheme which was strongly opposed. In the Presidential address, Rajendra
Prasad voiced the resentment of the Congress in his elaborate criticism. He
impressed upon everyone not to expect anything from the pronoune^nj^t^f the
government, saying: "it has dragged on in some form or other its interminab)^/ ,

'''/Wc/. Vol.lV. p. 444&450.

'° Rafiq Zakaria. op.cit.. p.44.
''' Ihid. p.45-46.
" Nehru. An Aulobiogvaphy., p.506.
'"' Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.VI, p.271.
'^;' MA.Ansari Papers: Motilal Nehru to Dr Ansari, 20 March 1930, (Microfilm), NMlvT
"' Ratlq Zakaria. op. cit.. p.46.

77
investigations for 6 or 7 long years. It is yet to be seen if this long labour is
going to produce anything acceptable even to be most moderate opinion in the
country." The White Paper did not "in anyway fiilfil the requirements of the
Congress." It was the negation of the demands voiced by the Congress and held
no promise of "even a gradual progress towards any of them." In the words of
Abul Kalam Azad, "The Government of India Act 1935 provided for complete
provincial autonomy but there was a fly in the ointment. Special powers were
reserved to the Governors to declare a state of emergency...and assume all
powers to himself (themselves). Democracy in the provinces could therefore
function only so long as the Governors permitted it." The real cause of the
resentment of the Congress was made clear when Jawaharlal writes: "It retained
in British hands complete control over finance, military and foreign affairs. It
made the Viceroy even more powerful than he had been." In spite of all these
opposition the White Paper Scheme got the Royal assent on 4 August 1935 and
became the Government of India Act, 1935. Some of the major provisions of this
Act were as follows. The federal legislature was to consist of His Majesty,
represented by the Governor-General and two Chambers to be known
respectively as the Council of State (Upper Chamber) and the House of
Assembly (Lower Chamber). The Council of State was to consist of 156
representatives of British India and not more than 104 representatives of the
Indian States while the Assembly was to consist of 250 representatives of British
India and not more than 125 representatives of the Indian States. The Council of
State was to be a permanent body, not subject to dissolution, but l/3rd of its
members, were to retire every third year. Every Federal Assembly, unless sooner
dissolved by the Governor-General in his 'discretion', was to continue for 5
years. The Act provided for a system of direct election for the Upper Chamber
and of indirect election for the Lower Chamber. Each House was to elect its

';'• Ibid.
'"^ Sankar Ghose. Congress Presidential Speeches (ed.), Calcutta, 1972, p.276-77.
'J^ Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, Madras, 1988, p. 14.
Nehru, Discovery of India, p.366.

78
Chairman and Deputy Chairman and would have power to regulate, subject to
the provisions of the Act, its own procedure and business. The Governor-
General was empowered to summon and prorogue the Legislature, and to
dissolve the Lower House in his discretion.

The Act conferred on the Governor-General special legislative powers. In

order to meet the circumstances which required 'immediate action' he could
promulgate Ordinances during the recess of the Legislature. Even when the
Legislature was in session, he could promulgate ordinances for the purpose of
'enabling him satisfactorily to discharge his functions' which fell within the
scope of his 'discretion' or 'individual judgment'. "The Federal part of the 1935
Act, however, never came into operation", writes S.C. Kashyap, "as Princely
States could not be persuaded to accede to the Federation. As a result, the
Constitution of the Central Government in India remained the same as it was
under the Act of 1919 with such modification as were necessitated by the
introduction of autonomy in the Provinces. Thus, no Council of Minister
responsible to the Legislature, was appointed at the Centre and the powers and
functions of the Central Legislature, as provided in the 1919 Act, remained
unchanged until the Indian Independence Act, 1947."

The cause of the resentment on this Act was later on pointed out by
Clement Atlee that the Central Legislature was being "over-loaded with
conservative interests, Landlords, Commerce and the like", which was an ample
proof "that India is to be ruled by the wealthy and the privileged."''^' Thus, the
Bill was "deliberately framed so as to exclude as far as possible the Congress
Party from effective power."'-^^ Moreover, Linlithgow, the Chairman of the Joint
Parliamentary Committee on the Act of 1935 and the Viceroy of India from
1936, stated later, the intention of dividing the Congress internally and prevent
the resurgence of another powerful mass-movement in the years to come. The

''" S.C.Kashyap, op.cit., p. 130.

Ill
A.C.Banerjee (ed.), Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol.2, Calcutta, 1946, p.355-363.

79
Act had been framed "because we thought that was the best way...of
maintaining British influence in India. It was no part of our pohcy, I take it, to
expedite in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to
hurry the handing over of the controls to Indian hands at any pace faster than
that which we as best calculated, on a long view, to hold India to the Empire."

In his Presidential Address, Jawaharlal Nehni described this Act as a

"retrograde measure", "a new charter of slavery" to strengthen the bonds of
imperialist domination and declared that "to this Act, our attitude can only be
one of uncompromising hostility and a constant endeavour to end it." That the
Act "in no way represents the will of the nation", "was designed to facilitate and
perpetuate the domination and exploitation of the people of India." And stressed
that it would accept only a constitution adopted by "a Constituent Assembly in
the name of the Indian people."'^"* Office acceptance would take away from the
Congress the revolutionary character of the movement and it would fall into "a
pit from which it would be difficult for us to come out."

After the suspension of the Civil Disobedience Movement in May

1934,'^'' the elections to the Fifth Assembly were held in November 1934. In
October 1934, at its Bombay session the INC decided to take part in the
elections to the Central Legislative Assembly. Now it was felt essential to enter
the Assembly with a view to achieving country's demands.

Provincial Election and Working of Congress Ministries

' A.B.Keith, Constilulional History of India, Vol.3, p.317.

" R.,1 .Moore. The Problem of Freedom With Unity: London's India Policy 1917-1947, in D.A.Low
(ed.). Congress and tine Raj. p.379.
Congress Encyclopaedia, Vol.11, p.98-117.
' " Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.7, p.185-187.
"In the same month and year, a Parliamentary Board was set up by the AICC meeting at Patna, under
Gandhi's guidance to tight the election under the aegis of the Congress.
'"S.C.Kashyap. 0/7.C//. p.l30.

80
 After imposing the Act of 1935, the British decided to immediately put
1 TO

into the practice the provision of Provincial Autonomy. To achieve this

objective the elections of Provincial Legislatures were announced in early 1937.
This was the new political reality before the nationalist, especially to Jawaharlal
Nehru because to him "office acceptance would mean in practice, 'a surrender'
before imperialism. The Congress would forget the main issues of freedom,
economic and social justice, and removal of poverty. It would be co-opted and
de-radicalized." In criticizing the Act of 1935, Jawaharlal firmly declared
"The Congress, as representing the will of the Indian people for national
treedom and a democratic state declares that no constitution which curtails the
sovereignty of the people of India and does not recognize their right to shape and
control fully their political and economic fliture can be accepted. In the opinion
of the Congress such a Constitution must be based on the independence of India
as a nation and it can only be framed by a Constituent Assembly elected on adult
franchise..."''"' On the other hand Gandhi had given more emphasis on
constructive work in the villages, especially the revival of village crafts. To
Gandhi, constructive work would lead to the consolidation of people's power,
and open the way to the mobilization of millions in the next phase of mass
struggle.'"" Both these leaders Jawaharlal and Gandhi were against the Council-
entry proposal but the course of history changed their minds in favour of office-
acceptance. In the words of Bipin Chandra, "Those who favoured office
acceptance said that they were equally committed to combating the 1935 Act...
But, they said, the objective political situation made it necessary to go through a
constitutional phase, for the option of a mass movement was not available at the
time. The Congress should, therefore, combine mass politics with work in the

' '^ The real intention of tiiis provision came out wiien Linlithgow wrote in 1936, "our best hope of
a\'oiding a direct clash is in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to destroy the effectiveness of
Congress as an All India instrument of revolution." (John Glendevon, the Viceroy at Bay - Lord
Linlithgnw in India, 1936-43. London, 1971, p.52.)
''' Bipin Chandra, op.cit.. p.320.
"" Quoted by S.C.Kashyap, p. 16.
'"*' Collected Works Mahalma Gandhi, Vol.55, p.429.

81
Legislatures and ministries in order to alter an unfavourable political
situation."'"*--

However, Rajendra Prasad wrote a letter to Jawaharlal in December 1935:

"So far as I can judge, no one wants to accept offices for their own sake. No one
wants to work the constitution as the government would like it to be worked.
The questions for us are altogether different. What are we to do with this
constitution? Are we to ignore it altogether and go our way? Is it possible to do
so? Are we to capture it and use it as we would like to use it and to the extent it
lends itself to be used in that way... It is not a question to be answered a priori
on the basis of pre-conceived notion of a so-called pro-changer or no-changer,
cooperator or obstructionist." He further assured Jawaharlal that, "I do not
believe that anyone has gone back to pre-non-cooperation mentality. I do not
think that we have gone back tol923-28. We are in 1928-29 mentality and I have
no doubt that better days will soon come." " So far as the view of Gandhi was
concerned, he as early as in May 18 and 19, 1934 moved a resolution in the
AICC meeting at Patna, under the Presidentship of Madan Mohan Malaviya
regarding Council-entry. "The resolution stated that, as there was a vast body of
members in the Congress, who believed in the necessity of entry into the
Legislatures as a step in the country's progress towards its goal, a Parliamentary
Board, was to conduct the elections to the Legislatures on behalf of the
r^ 55144
Congress.

At the same time, Gandhi assured Jawaharlal and the leftists that only
Civil Disobedience had been discontinued, the war continued. The new policy,
he said, "is founded upon one central idea - that of consolidating the power of
the people with a view to peaceful action."'''^ Moreover, he told Jawaharlal in

' " Bipin Chandra, op.cit., p.320.

' .lawaharlal Nehru -.4 Bunch of Old Letters, Asia Publishing, Bombay, 1960, p.160,159.
Mushirul Hasan (ed), Muslims And The Congress; Select Correspondence of Dr. M.A.Ansari 1912 -
I9i5, Manohar. New Delhi. 1979, p.l54 f.n.2.
' ' Collected Works ofMahalma Gandhi, Vol.61, p.239.

82
August 1934, "1 fancy that I have the knack for knowing the need of the time."'"*^
However, Gandhi, later on clarified the meaning of office-acceptance in Harijan
on 7 August 1937 as: "These offices have to be held lightly, not tightly. They are
or should be crowns of thorns, never of renown. Offices have been taken in order
to see if they enable us to quicken the pace at which we are moving towards our
goal."''*'' As a result of the persistent pressure, the Congress under the
Presidentship of Jawaharlal Nehru decided at Lucknow in early 1936 and at
Faizpur in late 1936 to fight the elections and postpone the decision on office-
acceptance. Jawaharlal suggested that the elections under the 1935 Act should
themselves be used to create mass support for the Constituent Assembly idea.
The resolution was as follows: "Congress members of the Legislatures should
take the earliest opportunity to put forward in the new Assemblies the demand
for a Constituent Assembly, elected by adult suffrage, and this demand should be
supported by a mass-agitation outside to enforce the right of the Indian people to
self-determination. "'''^

However, Jawaharlal was over-ruled by the old guard majority in the

matter of accepting office. Writing on July 20, 1937 he asserted that while the
majority opinion was undoubtedly in favour of acceptance of office, it was "even
more strongly and unanimously in favour of the basic Congress policy of
fighting the new constitution and ending it." He added, "Acceptance of office
may be a phase in our freedom struggle, but to end the Constitution and have a
Constituent Assembly is our main objective today as it was yesterday.
Acceptance of office does not mean by an iota acceptance of the slave
Constitution. It means a fight against the coming of the Federation by all means
in our power, inside and outside the Legislature."'''^ The acceptance of office did
invite criticism. In the words of Brig. Sharma, Jawaharlal accepted office

146
'//m/. Vol.58. p.3l8.
147
^//j/t/, Vol.66, p. 16.
148
N.N.Mitra (ed.), The Indian Annual Register, Calcutta, 1936,Vol.11, p.205. Also in B.Pattabhi
Silaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol.11, Madras, p.35.
149
.Jawaharlal Nehru. Unity of India, Collected Writings, 1937-40, London, 1948, p.61.

83
because he was hungry of power. "The image of a disciplined soldier who shall
fall in line with the objectives of the organization in spite of sharp personal
difference even on fundamental issues, was being carefully cultivated and
remained Nehru's trademark. Side by side, he tested the waters for his ideas and
acquiesced, v^^hen outmaneuvered, to remain in power, waiting for the time when
he would have no rivals."'''*' Critics on the left endorsed Jawaharlal's views and
called for an unequivocal rejection of office in advance, "but the lure of power
and prestige was too great for the majority." Jawaharlal was sadly disappointed
and thiice decided to resign. He, however, stayed on in the wider interests of
Congress unity.'" The Congress contested the election of 1937, even as its
election-manifesto rejected totally the provisions of the 1935 Act. Jawaharlal as
Congress President took active part to propagate "the ideas of independence,
socialism, and advocated the formation of a national front. At his insistence a
special provision on agrarian reforms was included in the election manifesto of
the INC." ' "It promised the restoration of civil liberties, the release of political
prisoners, the removal of disabilities on grounds of sex and untouchability, the
radical transformation of the agrarian system, substantial reduction in rent and
revenue, scaling down of the rural debts, provision of cheap credit, the right to
form trade unions and the right to strike."'^^ The Congress election campaign
received massive response and once again aroused the political consciousness
and energy of the people as both the communities tried "to avoid a conflict as
much as possible and to accommodate each other... [but] a number of Muslims
who were more or less Congressmen were doubtful if they would stand on
behalf of the Congress or the League."'^'* Jawaharlal's country-wide election
tour was to acquire legendary proportions. "He travelled nearly 80,000
kilometers in less than five months and addressed more than ten million people,

''" Brig. (Retd.) B.N.Shamia, op.ch., p.l 13.

"' Michael Brecher. Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford, 1959, p.219-220. Also in Dorothy Norman
(ed.), Nehru: The First Sixty Years, Vol. I, London, 1965, p.424.
'"•' Orest Martyshin. op.cit., p.34.
Bipin Chandra, op. cit, p.322.
154
Jawaharlal Nehru Papers: Jawaharlal to Rajendra Prasad, 21 July 1937, NMML.

84
familiarizing them with the basic poUtical issues of the time." ^ Referring to the
election campaign, Jawaharlal said, "We went...to that forgotten creature, the
Indian peasant and remembered that his poverty was the basic problem of India:
we identified ourselves with him in his suffering and talked to him of how to get
rid of it through political and social freedom...We read out to him our Election
Manifesto and explained its significance. He and his kind gathered in vast
numbers to hear us and listening to the Congress message.. ."'^^ But in reality his
audience did not understand his plea of socialism and non-acceptance of office.
Even his biographer S.Gopal admits that the people were more interested to see
him than to hear him. "His audience came merely to see for themselves the God
like figure of whom they had heard so much." The Congress won a decisive
victory in the first elections to the Provincial Legislature in February 1937. It
secured absolute majority in seven provinces out of eleven. Following the
election results the Congress Working Committee met at Wardha on February
27-28, 1937 with the objective of complete independence and the demand for a
constituent assembly.

The cheerful atmosphere of the times is explained by Jawaharlal as

"....the psychological change was enormous and an electric current seemed to
run through the countryside. This change was noticeable more in the rural areas
than in the cities, though in the industrial centres, the workers also reacted in the
same way. There was a sense of immense relief as of the lifting of a weight
which had been oppressing the people; there was a release of long suppressed
mass energy which was evident everywhere... At the headquarters of the
provincial government, in the very citadels of the old bureaucracy, many a
symbolic scene was witnessed...Now, suddenly, hordes of people, from the city
and the village, entered this sacred precincts and roamed about almost at will.
They were interested in everything; they went into the Assembly Chamber,

' " Bipin Chandra, op.cil., p.322.

'''' Quoted by S.C.Kashyap. JaM'aharlal Nehru: The Constitution and the Parliament, National, Delhi,
1981. p.20.

85
 where the sessions used to be held; they even peeped into the Ministers' rooms.
It was difficult to stop them for they no longer felt as outsiders; they had a sense
of honourship in all this, although it was all very complicated for them and
difficult to understand. The policeman and orderlies with shining daggers were
paralyzed; the old standards had fallen; European dress symbol of position and
authority, no longer counted. It was difficult to distinguish between members of
the Legislatures and the peasants and townsmen who came in such large
numbers." " This view is also endorsed by many Congressmen and Leftists.
Gandhi wrote on 21 August 1937, "Indeed, the triumph of the Congress will be
measured by the success it achieves in rendering the police and military
practically idle...The best and the only effective way to wreck the existing
Constitution is for the Congress to prove conclusively that it can rule without the
aid of the military and with the least possible assistance of the police... "'^"^

Till 1937, Jinnah was a staunch nationalist. In his Presidential address of

the Bombay Session of the Muslim League in 1936, he condemned the Act of
1935, asking " is there any moral justification left for perpetuating differences,
when the supreme need of the country is in its struggle for freedom in unity? A
united India will be a force to be reckoned with, not the helpless victims of
callous and irresponsible Government."'^° While moving a resolution in the
same session, he appealed to the Muslims to stand shoulder to shoulder with
other communities and fight against imperialism. He said that the Muslims owed
it not only to their own community, but to their country at a large to march along
the road to freedom and if they succeed, the Congress would be forced to accept
them."'' K.K.Aziz also pointed out in favour of this view by saying that Jinnah's
policy from the fime of his return to India in 1934 till 1937, clearly showed his
anxiety to reach the settlement with the Congress to form a coalition

' S.Gopal, Jmvaharlal Nehru-A Political Biography, p.216.

'** Nehru. Discovery of India, p.369-370.
''" Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi, Vol. 66, p.63.
'"" Indian Annual Register. 1936, Vol.1, p.294.
'''' A.M.Zaidi (ed.). Foundation of Pakistan, 1936 Session of the Muslim League, n.l6, p.262.

86
 governments with it and to work the provincial part of the 1935 Constitution.'*'^
But a dramatic change tool: place after the Provincial Election in 1937. Jinnah
wanted the Congress to recognize the distinctive nature of the MusHm
Community and accommodate the demands of the Muslim League in the future
policies of Indian politics. He declared, "tinity and honourable settlement
between Hindus and Muslims and other minorities is the only pivot upon which
national self-government for India of 380 million can be constructed and
1 A"*

maintained." " However, there were some major differences in the election
manifestos of the two parties. The most important difference was that the League
was not ready to support the agricultural reform policies of the Congress which
went against the landlords. This was the last time the League aspired for self-
government for a united India. Soon, after the 1937 elections, the relationship
between the two political parties, the Congress and the League, was marred and
reached a point of no returns. The statement made by Jawaharlal that there were
only two parties in the country, namely the Government and the Congress"''',
was bitterly criticized by Jinnah who reminded the Congress that there "is a third
party in this country and that is the Muslims" who are "not going to be dictated
by anybody.""'^ He asserted that not only the Congress but also the Muslim
League made efforts for the liberation of the country, but now "by falsely
representing that the Congress alone has got the monopoly to champion and fight
for the freedom of India and no other party has the right to exist, if they do not
cent per cent agree with the Congress. When the question of protection of
minority is raised by anybody who dares raise it, he is dubbed as a
communalist..." '^'

'"- K.K.Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan, Vol.Ill, Vanguard Book Ltd., Lahore, 1987, p.625.
"'"' Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy, cited in "'Parliamentary Government ofIndia", Thacker Spink, CalcuUa,
1943, p.366-67.
"^ .lawaharlal Nehru, Eighteen Months in India, 1936-37, Kitabistan, Allahabad, 1938, p. 127.
'"' Tlie Indian Annual Register, 1936, Vol.1, p.301.
"-'" A.I.e.C Papers: File No. G -32/1938, Press Statement of Mr. Jinnah regarding Muslim League
Policy. 19 April, 1938.

87
 Jinnah sent a private verbal message to Gandhi and urged upon to talce the
lead in forging "Hindu-Muslim unity" but Gandhi replied back "I wish I could
do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever;
only 1 see no daylight...""''' However, the success of the Congress in forming
Governments in seven Provinces out of the eleven Provinces where elections
were held"'^ added more fuel to the already smoldering fire of disappointment

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman. Pathway to Pakistan, Pakistan Longman, Lahore, 1961, p.167.

1^8 Result of Provincial Elections, 1937

PROVINCES TOTAL OPEN CONGRESS MUSLIM MUSLIM OTHERS

SEATS GENERAL SEATS LEAGUE INDEPENDENT

SEATS

Madras 215 116 159 11 - 45 1

Bombay 175 99 88 20 10 57

Bengal 250 48 50 40 43 117^

United Provinces 228 120 134 27 30 37'

Punjab 175 34 18 1 - 156^

Bihar 152 71 98 - 15 39

Central Provinces 112 64 71 - 14 27

Assam 108 40 35 9 14 50

N.W.F.P. 50 9 19 - 2 29

Orissa 60 38 36 - - 24

Sind 60 18 7 - - 53

88
 of the League. Durga Das in one of his interview stated that in the pre-election
days, the Congress leaders encouraged Jinnah with an idea, "in case as a result of
elections there was difficulty in forming a Government, the Congress could form
a coalition Government with the Muslim League", and also felt that in U.P. in
particular by backing the Muslim League it should defeat the toady Muslims."'^^
The Congress further inflamed the hostility of the Muslim League, by refusing to
form coalition Governments in U.P. In the same year Choudhry Khaliquzzaman
was elected as leader of the Muslim League in U. P. in a meeting of the
Provincial Parliamentary Board. With the intention of forming the coalition
ministry, Abul Kalam Azad, asked by the Congress to supervise and talk with
the U. P. League leader, Khaliquzzaman.'^° But he demanded that his party
would stand for 1/3 of the total number of seats, i.e. 2 seats out of 6 and 3 seats
out of 9.'^' The Congress would accept two ministers from the Muslim League
only on certain conditions such as:

a) The Muslim League in the U.P. Legislature shall cease to function as a

separate group.

b) The Muslim League Party in U.P. Assembly shall become part of the
Congress Party and would be subject to the control and discipline of the
Congress.

c) The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in U.P. would be dissolved, and no

candidate would thereafter be set up by the said Board at any bye-election.

Total 1,585 657 715 108 128 634

1. Including Justice Pai1\', 17.

2. Including Proja Party, 38.
3. Including National Agriculturist Party, 16.
4. Mostly Unionist Party.
(Source Cmd. 5589, Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937. Also in R.P.Dutt, India Today, op. cit., p.-522.)
' " Oral Transcripts of Durga Das, 26 February, 1969, p.62-63, NMML.
™ Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, Penguin, New Delhi, 1987, p.l45.
171
Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 160.

89
 d) If the Congress decided to resign from the Ministry or Legislature, the
members of the League Party would be bound by its decision.'''^

"There in no doubt that the decision of the Congress leaders was extremely
unwise and it was bound to have disastrous consequences."'^^ However, the
number of seats demanded by the League in the U. P. Cabinet was not conceded
by the Congress. League wanted Khaliquzzaman and Nawab Ismail Khan, both
Leaguers on the Cabinet and no Congress Muslim while Jawaharlal was adamant
to give only one seat to League and one to the Congress Muslim. Despite Azad's
persuasion to accept the League demand, Jawaharlal refused to accept.''"'

Jinnah bitterly criticized the Congress Governments in the seven

provinces. He asserted, "by their words, deeds, and programme they showed
more and more that the Musalmans could not expect any justice or fair-play at
their hands."''''^ According to Frank Moraes: "[If] the Congress handled the
League more tactfully after the (1937) elections, Pakistan might never have
come into being."'^^ Penderel Moon describes Congress's failure to cooperate
with the League in 1937 as "the prime cause of the creation of Pakistan"''^'' In the
words of Coupland, "The Congress system is not only highly unitarian: it is
also... totalitarian. In many ways, of course, this Indian form of one party
dictatorship is very different from the form it has taken in Europe, but the
I -JQ

principle is the same." Consequently, the Working Committee of the Muslim

League passed, a resolution, resolving, "the Muslim India is irrevocably opposed
to any 'Federal Objective' which must necessarily result in a majority
community rule under the guise of democracy and a parliamentary system of

"" Ibid p.\6\.

"' R.C.Majumdar (ed.), Struggle for Freedom, op.cit., p.l90.
' " Abul Kalam Azad. Jndia Wins Freedom, Orient Longman, Madras, 1988, p.l71.
" ' Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents,
National Publishing House, Karachi, 1970, n.l6, p.267-270.
'"' Quoted in Alien Hayes Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, Minerva, Calcutta, 1980, p.57.
' " Penderel Moon. Divide and Quit, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962, p.l5.
178
** R.Coupland. The Constitutional Problem of India, Madras, 1944, Part 1.1, p. 100.

90
 government."'^'^ Jinnah also expressed his doubts regarding the suitability of
introducing British parliamentary democratic system to Indian Government as:
"Having regard to the 35 millions of voters, the bulk of whom are totally
ignorant, illiterate and superstitious of the worst type, thoroughly antagonistic to
each other culturally and socially". He observed, "the working of this
constitution has clearly brought out that it is impossible to work a democratic
1 OA

parliamentary government in India."

From the above account of the events, it is believed that it was

Jawaharlal's greatest mistake. "This may appear to be so in the light of after
events, but in the context of the man, the time, and the circumstances, Jawaharlal
acted correctly....The Muslim League leadership consisted mostly of landed
gentry, moderates in the confidence of the British, and middle class professional
men, whereas the Congress was overtly anti-British, and drew its support from
the peasantry and lower social levels...Furthermore ... while the Muslim
League... was right wing, conservative and moderate, the Congress was left
wing, socialist and revolutionary. "Nehru...judged that the Congress Programme
would be thwarted by the moderate and conservative Muslim League minister
specially in the United Provinces where the Muslim leaders were mostly feudal.
He, therefore, rejected Jinnah's offer and insisted that the Congress provincial
governments should include only those Muslim ministers who would abide by
the Congress socialist programme...Nehru's socio-economic motives were of
course misunderstood, and Jinnah immediately misrepresented his action as
proof that the "Hindu" Congress was determined to dominate the Muslims
I^1
and submerge the "Muslim identity"."

However, the period of the Congress Ministries witnessed the emergence

of serious weaknesses in the Congress. The practice of bogus membership made

"" N.N.Mitra (ed,). The Indian Annual Register, Vol.1, Calcutta, 1975, p.351.
"^" .lamil-ul-Din Ahmed (ed.), Speeches and Writings ofJinnah, 2 December 1939, Bombay, Vol.l, Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, Lahoi-e, 1957, n.54, p.l38.
'^' M.R.A. Baig. The Muslim Dilemma,in India, Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1974, p. 65-67.

91
 its appearance and began to grow. There was a scramble for jobs and position of
personal advantage. Indiscipline among Congressmen was on the increase
everywhere. Opportunists, self-seekers and careerists, drawn by the lure of
associating with a party in power, began to enter the ranks of the Congress at
various levels. Many Congressmen began to give way to casteism in their search
tor power. This might be one of the major reason that Gandhi began to
question the efficacy of continuing the policy of office acceptance.'^'^ He began
to feel that "We seem to be weakening from within." He lashed out in the
columns of Harijan with full of despondency and said, "I would go to the length
of giving the whole Congress organization a decent burial, rather than put up
v/ith the corruption that is rampant."'^"* He wrote in December 1938 that if the
Congress Ministries "find that they cannot run the state without the use of the
police and the military, it is the clearest possible sign, in terms of non-violence,
that the Congress should give up office and again wander in the wilderness in
search of the Holy Grail."'^^ Not only Gandhi, Jawaharlal was too worried about
the growing misuse of office and creeping corruption in Congress ranks. He
wrote to Gandhi on 28 April 1938, "I feel strongly that the Congress ministries
are working inefficiently and not doing much that they could do. They are
adapting themselves for too much to the old order... what is far worse in that we
are losing the high position that we have buih up, with so much labour, in the
hearts of the people. We are sinking to the level of ordinary politicians who have
no principles to do stand by and whose work is governed by a day to day
opportunism ... But their minds are fiill of party conflicts and the desire to crush
this individual or that group."

The Communist critique, R.P.Dutt, later on summed up the working of

Congress Ministries as "the experience of the two years of Congress Ministries

'*'- Bipin Chandra, India's Struggle for Independence, p.338-339.

'*" Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi, Vol.66, p.300-302.
'^•* D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma. Life of Mohan Das Karam Chand Gandhi, Vol. 5, 1969, p.94.
' " Collected Works ofMahatma Gandhi, Vol.68, p. 195.
' ^'^ Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 8, p.3 88.

92
 demonstrated with growing acuteness the dangers imphcit in entanglement in
imperialist administration under a leadership already inclined to compromise.
The dominant moderate leadership in effective control of the Congress
machinery and of the Ministries was in practice developing to increasing co-
operation with imperialism, was acting more and more openly in the interests of
the upper-class landlords and industrialists and was showing an increasingly
marked hostility to all militant expression and forms of mass struggle."'**^ The
all-pervading problem confronting and shackling the Congress Ministries, with
the War Crisis and the rupture with the Central Government, led them to resign
in October 1939. The A.I.C.C. resolution protested against the Viceroy having
dragged India into the war without the people's consent and said that peace and
freedom depended on the extension of democracy and the application of the
principle of self-determination to all colonial countries.'^^ In order to associate
Indian public opinion with the prosecution of the war, the Viceroy Lord
Linlithgow proposed "the establishment of a consultative group, representative
of all major political parties in British India and of the Indian Princes, over
which the Governor-General would himself preside." Therefore, on October
22,1939, the Congress Working Committee met at Wardha, accordingly adopted
a resolution rejecting the Viceroy's proposals and reiterating the view that the
British Government was using the differences among several parties in India as a
screen for hiding its true intentions of denying the fulfillment of legitimate
aspirations of the Indian people for freedom and democracy. The resolution,
inter alia called upon the Congress Ministries to tender their resignations ' and
all the Congress Ministries resigned between 27 October and 15 November
1939.

' " R.P. Dutt. India Today. p.530.

'^' Jawahaiial Nehru Papers: AlCC Resolution of Wardha, 1939, File no. G - 49/1939, NMML. Also
in V.P.Menon, The Transfer of Power, Orient Longman, 1957, p.64-66.
IS' ' R.Coupiand, Britain and India, 1600-1941, Madras, 1941, p.217.
190 B. Pattablii Sitaramayya. The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol.11, Madras, 1935, p. 141

93
 The proposal of resignation was welcomed by Gandhi, who wrote to C.
Rajagopalchari on 23 October 1939: "I am quite clear in my mind that what has
happened is best for the cause. It is a bitter pill I know. But it was needed. It will
drive away all the parasites from the body. We have been obliged to do wrong
things which we shall be able to avoid."'^' Meanwhile, Jawaharlal was very
much disappointed by the trend in Congress' activities, therefore, he plunged
into the work of the National Planning Committee launched by Subhas Chandra
Bose as a President of INC in 1938, for drawing up a comprehensive plan of
industrialization and of national development. This caused the widening of gulf
between the two wings of the Congress Party because Gandhi was opposed to
industrialization and paid greater attention "to the development of village and
cottage industries, thus absorbing the vast number of the unemployed and
partially employed." Jawaharlal became the Chairman of this Committee,
which was consisted of fifteen members, plus representatives of provincial
governments and many others. Some of the objectives were as under:

a) "Increase in agricultural production; b) increase in industrial production;

c) diminution of unemployment; d) increase in per-capita income; e)
liquidation of illiteracy; f) increase in public utility services; g) provision
of medical aid on the basis of a unit for 1,000 population; h) increase in
the average expectation of life."

August Offer and Cripps Proposals

As the Viceroy announced that India was to be a passive pawn of British

policy and automatically dragged into the War did not like by Gandhi because of
his adherence principle of Non-Violence. While Jawaharlal who regarded the
struggle against fascism as the international duty of all democrats, "was anxious
about the fate of the democracies. His natural sympathies were with them

"' Collected Works ofMahafma Gandhi, Vol. 70, p.291.

'"" Nehru. Discovery of India, p.397.
"' Ibid, p.398.

94
 (British) and he wanted to help them as far as possible. He was therefore
inclined to consider the proposal favourably."^^'' Jawaharlal's reaction was later
endorsed by the Congress Working Committee in a resolution which stated: "the
Working Committee, therefore, invites the British Government to declare in an
unequivocal terms what their War aims are, in regard to democracy and
imperialism and the new order that is envisaged in particular, how these aims are
going to apply to India and to be given effect to the present (conditions). Do they
include the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation
whose policy will be guided in accordance with the wishes of her people."'^^
The negative reply of the Viceroy worsened the situation. The Congress passed
a resolution in 1940 under the Presidentship of Abul Kalam Azad that "the
recent pronouncements made on behalf of the British Government in regard to
India demonstrate that Great Britain is carrying on the War fundamentally for
the imperialist ends... Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Congress
cannot in anyway, directly or indirectly, be party to the War."'^^ This session
also reiterated the firm conviction that the people of India alone could properly
shape their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly elected on the
basis of aduh franchise.

The demand for the Constituent Assembly was for the first time
authoritatively conceded by the British Government, though in an indirect way
and with important reservations, in what is known as the "August Offer" of
1940. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow "made an offer to include representative
Indians in his Executive Council, but rejected the Congress demand for an
immediate transfer of power as impracticable." In a speech at Manchester on
November 20, 1941, the Secretary of State for India said, "Congress has
demanded that the future Constitution should be settled by a Constituent

''"* M.A.K.Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.5I-52.

''" Quoted in R.P.Dutt, India Today, p.553.
''"' Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. India Wins Freedom - The Complete Version, Orient Longman,
Madras, 1988, p.30.
197
J.N.Papers: File No. G - 26, ( pt.4) 1942.

95
 Assembly elected by universal adult franchise over the whole of India. This is an
impossible demand."'"^^ However, the demand for a settlement of the
Constitution through a Constituent Assembly of duly elected representatives had
been misrepresented as coercion and the issue of minorities made into an
insuperable barrier to India's progress.^"" The result was that the "August Offer"
remained infructuous since not only the Congress but also other major political
parties were unwilling to accept it. On March 11, 1942 under pressure from
President Roosevelt of the United States and Marshal Chiang Kai Shek of China,
the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill announced in the House of
Commons the dispatch of Sir Stafford Cripps for negotiation with Indian
leaders.^^^ The Cripps Proposals^^^ marked an advance over the "August Offer"
in that the making of the new Constitution was now to rest "solely" and not
partially in Indian hands, and a clear undertaking to accept the Constitution
framed by the proposed constitution-making body was given by the British
Government. However, both the National Congress and the Muslim League
rejected them - although the grounds were different. The proposals were
unacceptable to the Congress, because first, they did not make any provision for
consulting the people of the Indian States regarding their future or for giving
them a voice in choosing representatives to the constitution-making body.
Secondly, the acceptance of the "novel principle" of the right of non-accession
for a province would have meant a "severe blow to the conception of Indian
Unity."^^'' The Muslim League did not agree to the proposals because it was
against the setting up of a single constitution-making body, which in effect,
relegated its demands for Pakistan "only to the realm of remote possibility." '

'"^ F^afiq Zakaria, A Study of Nehru, p.54.

''''' Nehru, The Unity of India, footnote, p. 372.
-''\l.N.Papers: File no. G-32/1940,NMML.
""' Viceroy's Address to the Central Legislature on November 20, 1940, Legislative Assembly Debate,
1940, Vol.V.p.841-848.
""' B.S. Rao, V.K.N.Menon. Subhas C.Kashyap and others (ed.). The Framing of India's Constitulion
Select Documents, Vol.1. II PA, New Delhi, p.126-127.
""' For more details see Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.54-55.
-"•' Indian Annual Register. Vol.1, 1942, p.224-225.
-''' Ibid. p.25\-253.

96
 Jawaharlal strongly opposed the provisions of the Cripps Proposals, on the
behalf of the Congress and said: "The whole conception on which these
proposals are based would lead to the break-up of India with British armed
forces guarding the Princes' States and British power interfering with the
freedom of the new Indian Union and encouraging disruptive tendencies."^'"' He
further proclaimed that "The more one thought of these proposals, the more
fantastic they grew...There was to be neither political nor economic unity, and
Britain might v/ell continue to exercise dominating control both politically and
economically, through the many petty states it controlled." ' The position may
be briefly summed up as: "The Cripps Offer stressed that after the War, Indian
independence would be recognized. During the War, the only change was that
the Executive Council would be entirely Indian and consist of leaders of the
political parties. Regarding the communal problem Cripps said that after the
War, the Provinces would have the option to decide whether to join the Union or

At this time, Gandhi had a staunch disciple, named Miss Slade, also
known as Mira Ben, the daughter of a British Admiral. Gandhi sent her to
apprise the Viceroy of the purport of the Working Committee's resolution but
Viceroy refused to interview her. "He made it clear that the Government would
not tolerate any rebellion during the War, whether it was violent or non-violent.
Nor was the Government prepared to meet or discuss with any representative of
an organization which spoke in such terms."^^^ "The refusal of the Viceroy even
to receive Mira Ben made Gandhi realize that the Government would not easily
yield. The confidence he had in this regard was shaken but he still clung to the
belief that the Government would not take any drastic action. He thought that he

-"" Dorothy Norman. Nehru. The First Sixty Years, Asia, Bombay, 1965, Vol.1, p.92-93.
-"' Nehru. Discovery of India. Calcutta, 1946, p.554.
'"^ Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, p.59.
""' Ibid. p.84.

97
 would have enough time after the AICC to prepare a programme of the work and
gradually build up the tempo of the movement."^'"

When the Working Committee passed the resolution at Wardha on 14

July 1942, Gandhi said: "there is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or
negotiation. There is not question of one more chance. After all it is an open
rebellion."^" Once more, he said, "I shall take every precaution I can to handle
the movement gently, but I would not hesitate to go to the extremist limits if I
find that no impression is produced on the British Government or the Allied
Powers. "^'^

Quit India Resolution

The AICC met at Bombay on 7 August 1942. It sanctioned the non-

violent mass struggle under the leadership of Gandhi, but provided also for the
contingency of his arrest. "A time may come when it may not be possible to
issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress
Committee can function. When this happens, every man and woman who is
participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the
four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires
freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard
road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the
independence and deliverance of India."

At the meeting of the AICC in Bombay in 1942, the "Quit India"

resolution was passed. Gandhi gave a dramatic slogan to it and declared: "every
one of you from this moment onwards consider yourself a free man or woman
and act as if you are free...I am not going to be satisfied with anything short of
complete freedom. We shall do or die. We shall either free India or die in the

-'" Ibid. p. 85.

"'' Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the
disturbances in India, 1942-43. Parliamentary Report, Accounts and Papers, 1942- 43, Vol.IX.
-'^ lliid.

98
 attempt."^''^ Though Jawaharlal supported the call of Gandhi but he was not
happy with Gandhi's unbending attitude. He believed that Gandhi's attitude
might jeopardize the chance of an Allied victory which was fighting for the
cause of democracy. Until the last, Jawaharlal tried for a settlement but British
did not respond. "On the contrary, within a few hours of the passing of the "Quit
India" resolution, which had left the door open for negotiation, the authorities
swooped on Gandhi, Nehru and other Congress leaders and whisked them away
in a special train. Gandhi was taken to the Aga Khan's palace in Poona; the rest,
including Nehru, to the Ahmadanagar Fort, where they remained detained until
June 15, 1945" ' and "the Congress was declared an illegal organization."^""

The movement which landed Congress leaders in the prison gave enough
room and time to Jinnah and to the British to pursue their own political ends,
with perfect understanding and mutual support. Jinnah described it as the most
dangerous mass movement. The League instructed the Mohammedans to abstain
trom any participation in the movement. Jinnah tasted his first big success
within the Muslim masses, when a sizable section of them from different parts
believed that the movement was trying to establish Hindu Raj and stayed
away from it. The League leader had a free field to canvass many supporters for
his own movement of Pakistan. As a result the membership of the League
multiplied in the Central Province to 56,541 in 1943, in Bengal to 550,800 in
1944 and in Sind to 30,000 in 1944.^'^

The Viceroy of India was very happy with this situation, in which, the
position in India was very easy to handle. He wrote to the Secretary of State for
India with confidence, "None of these people know what to do, the Muslim

"'"' P.Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, Madras, 1935, p.342-46.
"''' Parliamentary Report. Accounts and Papers, 1942-43, Vol IX.
"'' Rafiq Zakaria, A Study of Nehru, p.57.
-"'R.P.DuiL India Today. p.5\\.
'"20 August 1942 Resolution of Muslim League Working Committee, 'Resolution of All India Muslim
League from April 1942 to May 1943', Published by Liaqat All Khan, New Delhi, p.l 5.
-" Home (poll.) D (1) F 3/34/1942, p.7-26, NAI.
-'' Gowher Rizvi, Linlithgow and India-A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India

99
 League has no wish to do anything; the Congress are completely at loss, Jinnah
has everything to gain; the longer Gandhi remains shut up and unable to take any
active part in politics, the worse it in for the Congress and more their stock goes
down." The real intention of the policy of Divide and Rule was revealed by a
Russian writer as "Allying themselves with the Muslim League, the British at
the same time posed as mediators in the conflict between the Hindus and
Muslims and as the sole defenders of the rights of the minority. In actual fact the
British were hard at work trying to weaken the positions of the Indian National
Congress and dismember the country. The plan for India's independence,
sponsored by the so-called Cabinet mission, was so confusing and artificial to be
used as a basis for running the affairs of the country. The plan deliberately
highlighted and exacerbated the conflict between the League and the Congress,
between groups of provinces and individual provinces."'^^'

However, the Second World War came to an end v/ith the surrender of
Japan on 15 August 1945. Shortly before this, a general election was held in
Britain. It resulted in the landslide victory of the Labour Party and the
777

installation of Labour Government in Britain on 26 July 1945. Churchill was

replaced by Clement Attlee as the Prime-Minister, Lord Pethick Lawrence as
Secretary of State for India and Lord Wavell who had succeeded Lord
Linlithgow as Viceroy in 1943. The thrust of the Labour Government's policy
was disengagement, so achieved that the most valued aspects of old imperial
77^

relationship would be preserved.

Lord Wavell Plan

On 23 March 1945, Lord Wavell arrived in London to have a prolonged
discussion to summon a conference of leaders of all the parties and for this
1936-43. Royal Historical Society, London, 1978, n.31, p.l24.
"" Mansergh and Lumby (ed.), Transfer of Power, Linlithgow to Amery, 19 July 1943, n.64, p.l 5,
--' Orest Martyshin. Jawaharlal Nehru and His Political Views, p.39.
"- N. Mansergh. (ed.). Transfer of Power, Vol.Vl, Nos.146,115,138.
--•' R.J.Moore. Escape from Empire, Oxford, 1983, p.339.

100
 purpose to release unconditionally all the members of the Congress Working
Committee. On 4 June, 1945 he returned from London to Delhi and on 14 June
he. broadcast his designed proposals "to ease the present political situation and
to advance India towards her goal of full self-government."^^'' "It was his
intention, he announced, to hold a political conference in Simla on 25 June, to
which would be invited twenty-one leaders...The purpose of the Conference
would be taken to counsel with the Viceroy with a view to the formation of a
new Executive Council which would be more representative of organized
political opinion. It was intended that the new Council would represent the main
communities and would include 'equal proportions of Caste Hindus and
Muslims'." ' On 25 June, 1945, the conference assembled in the Viceregal
Lodge, Simla and attended by twenty one invitees like Jawaharlal, Azad and
others. The Conference, however, came to a deadlock over the comjjosition of
the Executive Councils. Jinnah would not agree to the appointment of Muslims
who did not belong to the League. This attitude was widely criticized throughout
the country, even by a section of the Muslims who did not belong to the
League.^^^However, the Conference failed due to the obduracy of Jinnah.^^^
Wavell was initially nervous at the massive Labour victory that the Government
might try to hand over "India to their Congress friends as soon as possible", but
soon realized that the difference in the attitude of the two parties was little more
than marginal. With a war weary army and a ravaged economy, Britain was
in no position to hold on to the empire.

A decisive shift in British policy came under mass pressure in 1945-46. What the
officials feared was another Congress revolt, made much more dangerous

"'^ B.Shiva Rao. V.K.N.Menon. Subhash C.Kashyap and Others (ed.), The Framing of India's
Constitution - Select Documents, p.136-142.
-'^ V.P.Menon, Transfer of Power in India, Orient Longman, 1957, p.182-183.
""ibid.p.l91.
--' According to V. P. Menon, Husain Imam, the leader of the Muslim League Party in the Council of
State and Liaqat Ali ichan did not endorse the views of Jinnah (Ibid, p.214)
''^ Rao. Menon, Kashyap and others (ed.) op. cit., p. 143-144.
"'' Sumit Sarkar. Modern India, Mc. Millan India Ltd., 1983, p.417.
-'" Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961, p.l2.

101
 because of the wide spread agrarian revolt, labour trouble, army disaffection and
the presence of Indian National Army (INA) men with some military
expertise.^'' The public trial of INA prisoners in the Red Fort in November,
1945 resulted in country-wide protests. On the other hand these trials provided
the political parties with excellent material for propaganda against the
Government which they used to the fullest extent for their own benefit.^'^^
Meanwhile came the mutiny in the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay as a pace-
setter of the imminent change. Jawaharlal hailed it as the breaking down of the
"iron wall" between the army and the people.'^'^'^ Because of the above wide-
spread disturbances, the British Government felt bound to take some fresh
action. Therefore, a Parliamentary Delegation was sent to India in December,
1945 stressing the urgency of reaching solution.^^'' They would meet leading
political Indian personalities, to learn their views at first hand, as also to convey
in person, the general desire of the people of England that India should speedily
attain her full and rightful position as an independent partner State in the British
Commonwealth^^"' and to set up a machinery for constitution-making in India.^^^
"Nehru in his talks with the Delegation conceded that the British Government
might have to declare for Pakistan, but that there would have to be a plebiscite in
border districts to confirm it."

The Cabinet Mission Plan and Communal Impasse

However, the successful outcome of discussions and the positive attitude

of the Indian leaders led Attlee to announce "that the tide of nationalism was
running very fast in India and that it was time for clear and definite action. The
Cabinet Mission was going to India in a posifive mood. The temperature of 1946

-" N.Mansergh (ed), Transfer of Power, Vol.VI, Nos.203,256.

"'- Leonard Mosley. The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961, p. 186-87.
"'•' N.Manserg (ed.), Transfer of Power, No. 499.
-" //?/(/.. NOS..400.426.525.
"^' V.P.Menon. Transfer of Power in India, p.223-224.
""' Secretary of State for India. Lord Pethick Lawrence's statement in the House of Lords on February
19. 1946. Parliamentary Debate. House of Lords, 1945-1946, Vol.139, cc.667-670.
"" V.P.Menon. op. cit.. p.lll.

102
 was not the temperature of 1920, 1930 or even 1942. His colleagues were going
to India with the intention of using their utmost endeavours to help her to attain
freedom as speedily and as fully as possible. What form of Government was to
replace the present regime for India [was] to decide." In conclusion, he said,
"We are mindful of the rights of the minorities and the minorities should be able
to live free from fear. On the other hand, we can not allow a minority to place
their veto on the advance of the majority."^^^

In the meantime, the Viceroy announced that "We must first hold
elections (to the Central and Provincial Legislatures), so that the will of the
Indian electorate may be known." He explained that it was "not possible to
undertake any major alteration of the franchise system"'^^^ as that would "delay
the matters for at least two years."'^'^° The elections to the Central and Provincial
Legislatures were fought not over independence but on the issue of a united or
divided India. The Congress won all the general seats in Central Assembly
(57seats with 91.3% of the votes) while the reserved seats for the Muslims were
won by League candidates (30 with 86.6% of the Muslim vote). In the Provinces
the League improved its 1937 position. The League which in 1937 had won only
108 seats out of 492 reserved for Muslims, now captured 428^^*', although in two
of the Provinces, Assam and the N.W.F.P., which were claimed by Jinnah for the
Pakistan to be, the Congress gained absolute majorities.

In regard to the formation of the proposed constitution-making

machinery, the Cabinet Mission realized that the most satisfactory method would
be "to utilize the recent elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as electing

- " Ibid, p.234-235.

"''•* Jawaharlal and the Congress had throughout stood for a Constituent Assembly elected on the basis of
universal adult franchise. However, the existing franchise, as laid down in the Government of India Act,
1935. Schedule VI, was mainly based on property qualifications. The total voting strength of the British-
Indian Provinces was about 30 million against a population of 256 million, according to the census of
1931. Thus. 11.5 percent of the population was enfranchised (R.Coupland, The Constitutional Problem of
India, op.cit.. Vol.1, p. 134 and Vol. II, p. 107).
-'" Indian Annual Register, op.cit., 1945, Vol.11, p.148-149.
-"//)(^. 1946. Vol.1, p. 230-231.

103
 949

bodies."' The task of Cabinet Mission was to work out a formula for the
transfer of power to the representatives of different sections of Indians. The
Mission represented its proposals in two installments.'^''^ The Mission regarded
the arguments of the League in favour of Partition as self-defeating and so
decisively rejected the demand for partition. The alternative suggestion was a
weak centre controlling only foreign affairs, defense and communications with
the provinces grouped into three sections: Section (A) for the Hindu majority
provinces, comprising of Madras, Bombay, the United Provinces, Bihar, the
Central Provinces and Orissa, Section (B) and (C) for the Muslim majority
provinces, comprising of Punjab, the N.W.F.P., Sind and Assam, Bengal
respectively. ^'^'^ The League in its resolution of 6 June 1946, regarded grouping
to compulsory, with Section (B) and (C) developing into solid entities leading
ultimately to the establishment of a complete sovereign Pakistan.^"*^
On the controversial provision of compulsory groupings, the Congress
leaders quickly realized that Jinnah had won a disproportionately large share in
the proposed distribution of power and a centre so weak that an effective
government of a united India would be frustrated?"*^ The Congress Working
Committee in its resolution on June 25, 1946 accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan
in so far as it involved joining the Constituent Assembly with a view to framing
the Constitution of a free, united and democratic India. Jinnah and the Muslim
League, on the other hand, wanted the Viceroy to postpone the elections to the
Constituent Assembly. They were the least anxious for transfer of power either
to interim Government or to a Constituent Assembly. Jawaharlal felt concerned
and wrote "...we would urge upon the League to enter on the constructive phase
of resolving our difficulties through a Constituent Assembly with full heart and

"•*" Rao,Menon,Kashyap and others (ed.) op.cit.,p.208-218. Statement by the Cabinet Mission, May 16,
1946, para 42.
-•'• A.C.Banerjee. Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol. IV, Calcutta, 1973, p.210-214.
"•*'' Rao. Minon. Kashyap and others (ed.), op.cit., Para 19.
"^' Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol.IV, p.225-227.
"^" Brain Lapping, End of Empire, Granada, 1985, p.66.
"'" Indian Constitutional Documents, Vol. IV, p.227-228.

104
 with no mental reservations. The Muslims are as much entitled to shape the
Constitution as the majority community. There are certain vague features in the
(Cabinet Mission) Scheme, but nothing is so vague as the vacancy of power left
at the Centre, now filled by a team of caretakers, except that we have an
assurance that efforts will still be made to constitute an interim Government."

When Jawaharlal became the Congress President in 1946 he declared at a

press conference on 10 July that the only commitment made by this party was to
participate in Constituent Assembly elections. About the grouping scheme he
declared that it would probably never come to fruition because N.W.F.P and
Assam would have objections to joining Sections (B) and (C) respectfully.^"*'^ On
the other hand Muslim League believing that the Plan provided for "compulsory
grouping". By a resolution adopted on July 27-29, 1946, the Muslim League
decided to withdraw its earlier acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan and
calling upon the Muslims to observe 16 August as "Direct Action Day" to
achieve Pakistan.^^" Furthermore, Jawaharlal announced, "when the Congress
got into the Constituent Assembly what we do there we are entirely and
absolutely free to determine." "... nothing can be accepted which goes against
Indian freedom or democracy or disrupts India. Nor can a minority be allowed to
dominate or override the majority. After all, the majority has also some
rights.

On this account Jawaharlal was bitterly criticized by many prominent

scholars and politicians. Maulana Azad refers to Jawaharlal's statement as "one
'ICO

of those unfortunate events which changed the course of history" and his
political biographer regards it as a "tactical error" and "the most fiery and

-••^ National Herald, .lulv 2.1946.

""*'' S.Gopal (ed.). Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol 15, op.cit., Nehru's press interview, 10
•Inly. 1946.
-'" Rao. Menon. Kashyap and others (ed.), op.cit., P. 282-286.
V.P.Menon, Transfer ofPoM'er, op.cit, n.51, p.280.
~^' .iavvaharlal Nehru, Unity of India, op. cit., p.364-372.
' ' ' Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Calcutta, 1959, p.l54.

105
 provocative statements in forty years of public life."'^^'* As observed by
A.C.Banerjee, "as one of the three parties involved in the agreement the
Congress was not entitled unilaterally to modify its terms."^^^ The lack of
discretion on the part of Jawaharlal, opened the door for Jinnah, who was
waiting to grasp any opportunity, to blame the Congress as a party, hungry for
power, ignoring the very existence of the other parties. Lumby thinks that
.Tawaharlal's statements constituted a deliberate misinterpretation of facts and
goes on to say, "the overriding motive for his posture of defiance was surely the
belief that now at last the day of power was at hand. The imminent departure of
the British was assured and the Muslim League could be pushed aside or
swamped by the national will for freedom in unity... (this) under-estimate of the
strength of Muslim feeling led it (the Congress) to suppose that its supremacy
was unassailable and so to make the tragic error of over-playing its hand."^^^
Penderel Moon writes that it was as if a curse had been laid on Jawaharlal and
some of his colleagues, causing them, "to act in such a way as to bring about
exactly the opposite result to that which they intended. They passionately desired
to preserve the unity of India; they consistently acted so as to make its partition
certain."^^^ Leonard Mosley says, "In the circumstances, Nehru's remarks were a
direct act of sabotage."^"^ One may agree with Tara Chand when he observes
that the Rajaji Formula, the Gandhi and Jinnah Talks, the resolution of All India
Congress Committee all had conceded the right of self- determination of the
Muslim majority areas in the Western and Eastern regions. Therefore, the total
-ICQ

opposition of the Congress to the grouping of provinces was illogical. " Not
only this, Abul Kalam Azad went to the extent that "If unfortunately any
inseparable difficulties crop up in direct conflict with our fundamental problems.

''* Michael Brecher, Nehni. A political Biography, London, 1959, p.316-3I7.

" A.C.Banerjee, Two Nations. Concept Publishing House, Delhi, 1981, p.242.
'" E.W.R. Lumby, The Transfer of Power in India, London, 1954, p. 109-110.
' ' Penderel Moon, Divide and Quit, London, 1962, p. 14.
'* Leonard Mosley, The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961, p.28.
' ' Tara Chand. History of Freedom Movement in India, Vol.lV, Publication Division, Government, of
India. 1972. p.479.

106
we shall not hesitate to kill the Constituent Assembly. However, it is wrong to
Oft)

believe that Pakistan was the upshot of Jawaharlal's intemperate statements.

Moreover, the Cabinet Mission left India for Britain and leaving India on the
brink of a civil war unparalleled in the history of the world.'^^^
However, in their "efforts to be all things to all men, they had engaged in
irreversible ambiguities, putting themselves in moral as well as verbal
quagmire." " The Viceroy's efforts to set up a short term Interim Government at
the Centre with both the Congress and the League participating failed because
the League wanted the proportion of five Congress Hindus, five League
Muslims, one Sikh and one Scheduled Caste, and the Congress rejected as a step
back from even the Simla Conference. The Viceroy, however, began to realize
the need for getting the Congress into the Interim Government, even if the
League stayed out and wrote to the Secretary of State on 31 July 1946: "If
Congress will take the responsibility, they will realize that firm control of unruly
elements is necessary and they may put down the Communists and try to curb
their own Left Wing. Also I should hope to keep them so busy with
administration that they would have much less time for politics."'^^'^ The
Director of the Intelligence Bureau also noted on 9 August, 1946 that the
"Labour situation is becoming increasingly dangerous...until a responsible
Indian Government is introduced at the Centre, there is little that can be
done."^^^

^^° The Indian Annual Register, 1946, Vol. 11, p.l44.

^*' S.Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, A Biography. Vol.1, Oxford, 1976, p.328.
Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi's Emissary, Bombay, 1967. He gives a revealing account of the back door secret
negotiations between the Cabinet Mission and the Congress leaders. There were no such intimate contacts between the
Muslim League and the Cabinet Mission, or for that matter, between the League and the British Government. The
intimacy of the Congress-British Government relations worked against Muslim interests at every critical stage. The
British had an eye on the future advantages to be reaped from friendship with the larger and more powerful community
and were willing to go very far indeed to meet its desires.
^*^ Ian Stephens, Pakistan, London, 1963, p.98-99.Also in M.A.H.Isphani, Quid-e-Azam JinnahAs 1
Know Him, Karachi, 1966, p. 183-184.
^*'' N.Mansergh, Transfer of Power, op.cit., Vol.Viii, no.96.
^" Home (poll.) File No.(l) 12/7/47, N.A.I.

107