G.R. No.

148338 June 6, 2002 property is not covered by any public land application or whom he recognized as the owner of the lot. Telia stated that
patent;8 (f) Tax Declaration No. 7414, Series of 1998, covering the when he was still young, the property was already planted
ANGEL DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, parcel of land;9 and (g) Official Receipt No. 1038951S, dated with kakawati trees along its boundaries. According to him, when
vs. September 9, 1997, showing petitioner's payment of the realty he came of age, he already knew that petitioner owned the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. taxes on the said lot up to 1997.10 property and that anybody who needed to get bamboo, gather
firewood, or do kaingin farming could do so only upon petitioner's
On the same day he filed his application, petitioner also submitted permission. Furthermore, Telia stated that he and his parents
MENDOZA, J.: stayed in the property during the Japanese occupation and settled
to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M. Resus, the
original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891. 11 On October 15, there until the 1950s with leave from petitioner. Telia said he
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the 1997, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land Registration stayed on the land for about three years more engaging in kaingin
Court of Appeals, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's application for farming. He further claimed that, although he did not personally
Court, Branch XV, Naic, Cavite and denying the application of registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the original tracing cloth plan, know Madiano Villanueva, Lucas Arcival, and Danilo Sisayan,
petitioner Angel del Rosario for registration of title over a large and the other documents submitted by petitioner in support of his who allegedly were the owners of the adjoining lots, it was public
tract of land in Maragondon, Cavite. application.12 knowledge that they were indeed such.15

On October 13, 1997, petitioner filed an application 3 for During the initial hearing on February 24, 1998, no oppositor On August 25, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision granting
registration of a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1891, Cad- appeared except for the provincial prosecutor of Maragondon, the application of petitioner. The dispositive portion thereof reads
457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-0011601, consisting of Cavite, who appeared on behalf of the Solicitor General in as follows:
772,329 square meters in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, representation of the Republic of the Philippines through the
Cavite. In his application, petitioner stated that he is a Filipino, Bureau of Lands. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order of WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court
married to Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, general default against the whole world, with the exception of the confirming its previous Order of General Default hereby
Ternate, Cavite; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had Bureau of Lands, after which petitioner submitted documentary decrees and adjudge[s] that certain parcel of land as
been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, the case herein above identified, described, and bounded,
possession and occupation of the land in question, which was was referred to a trial commissioner for the reception of further consisting of 772,329 square meters, described as Lot
alienable and disposable land, under a bona fide claim of evidence.13 No. 1891, Cad-457-D, Maragondon Cadastre, Ap-04-
ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that such land was 0011601 situated in Barangay Pinagsanhan,
being occupied and cultivated by him and his family. Petitioner Maragondon, Cavite and its technical description,
further alleged that there was no mortgage or encumbrance on Aside from himself, petitioner presented Raymundo Telia before
the trial commissioner to prove his claim of ownership and title pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 496, as
the land; that the same was not bound by any public or private amended by P.D. No. 1529, in the name of the applicant,
road or by any river or creek; and that there was no person having over the parcel of land applied for registration. Both of them were
subjected to cross-examination by the provincial prosecutor. Angel del Rosario, Filipino, married to Agustina
any interest therein, legal or equitable, or having possession Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite.
thereof other than himself. Petitioner indicated the
owners/claimants/occupants of the adjoining properties [(a) the In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
Municipal Engineer (northern boundary), Ternate, Cavite; (b) Juan application and identified the annexed documents. He claimed he Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding
Angeles (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1890), Brgy. Sapang, and his family planted in the subject lot mango and bamboo trees decree of registration be issued by the Administrator of
Ternate, Cavite; (c) Madiano Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; and raised animals on it. Petitioner testified that he inherited the the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
for Lots 1286 & 1291), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (d) land from his grandfather, who caused the survey of the said lot to
Agripino Villanueva (or his heirs/successors; for Lot 1290), Brgy. be made in his name as the original claimant. He said that he SO ORDERED.16
Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; (e) Lucas Arcival (or his possessed the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral
heirs/successors; for Lot 1482), Maragondon, Cavite; (f) Danilo survey was made thereon, but also claimed that the first survey Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, putting in issue the
Sisayan (for Lot 1287), Brgy. Bucal, Maragondon, Cavite; and (g) on the land was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his failure of petitioner to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) predecessors-in-interest started cultivating the property in 1940, plan for Lot No. 1891 and to establish that he and his
for the Republic of the Philippines (Lot 1692), Plaza Cervantes, planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He claimed that he predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
Binondo, Manila], and annexed to his application the following and his family alone were the ones who gathered the fruits and notorious possession of the land applied for registration for the
documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for forest products of the land and that no one had ever disturbed his period required by law.17
with technical descriptions, Survey Plan, Ap-04-0011601;4 (b) possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of the
Technical Description of Lot No. 1891;5 (c) Certification in lieu of same.14
Geodetic Engineer's certification issued for registration purposes, On January 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its
attesting to the genuineness of the survey plan; 6 (d) Certification, decision18 reversing the decision of the trial court on the ground
To corroborate petitioner's testimony, Raymundo Telia, then 59 that petitioner indeed failed to submit in evidence the original
dated August 14, 1997, that the subject land is alienable and years old, testified that he personally knew the real property
disposable;7 (e) Certification, dated October 7, 1997, that the tracing cloth plan of the land applied for registration. Petitioner
subject of the application since he went there with petitioner,
moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied for lack of respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to
merit.19 The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a petitioner's application and marked in evidence, suffice to comply
statutory requirement of mandatory character. with the requirement of the law. Although in one case 26 it was
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that ruled that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with
Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that the lot's technical description, was sufficient to identify the land
he submitted the original tracing cloth plan, together with applied for registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical
1. THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S APPLICATION FOR description were certified as to their correctness by the Director of
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION WAS UNJUSTIFIED. other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the
application. The application and supporting documents Lands. In this case, what was marked in evidence, the advance
were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission survey plan and the technical description, lacked the necessary
2. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE (now the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration certification from the Bureau of Lands.
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN REOPENED Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the
TO ADMIT THE ORIGINAL TRACING CLOTH PLAN IN Director of Lands. Respondent argues the fact that the Second. Petitioner prays that the trial court proceedings be
EVIDENCE, TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE SAME Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of reopened in order for him to be able to present in evidence either
PROCEEDINGS ALREADY HAD IN THIS Initial Hearing would indicate that respondent had the original tracing cloth plan27 or the "sepia copy" (Diazo
APPLICATION.20 submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his Polyester Film) in lieu thereof28 pursuant to the NALDTRA (LRC)
application. Circular No. 66 dated May 2, 1985.29 Petitioner contends that the
The petition is without merit. original tracing cloth plan or the "sepia copy" thereof may be
This argument had already been disposed of in Director considered as newly discovered evidence which, when admitted
First. Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because of Lands vs. Reyes [68 SCRA 177, 189 (1975)], wherein in evidence, may alter the result of the case.
of his failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of this Court held ---
Lot No. 1891 was unjustified. He claims that he should not be The argument is without merit. For evidence to be admitted under
faulted for such failure since he turned over the same to the trial Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the Rule 53, §1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the same must
court on the day he filed his application, but it was submitted to non-submission of the original tracing cloth plan comply with the following requisites: (a) the evidence was
the LRA by the branch clerk of court and could not be produced by claiming that the same must be with the discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
during the trial. Land Registration Commission which checked discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence;
or verified the survey plan and the technical and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly description thereof. It is not the function of the impeaching, and is of such weight, that, if admitted, will probably
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of LRC to check the original survey plan as it had change the judgment.30 In the present case, the original tracing
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. 21 The no authority to approve original survey plans. If, cloth plan could not be considered as newly discovered evidence
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan since it was already available upon the filing of the application for
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof was forwarded there, the applicant may easily registration. Although it could not be produced during the trial
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall retrieve the same therefrom and submit the because it was still in the custody of the LRA at that time, it was
the possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent same in evidence. This was not done. petitioner's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in producing
registration of any adjoining land.22 The failure to comply with this the same that accounts for its non-presentation in
requirement is fatal to petitioner's application for registration. evidence.31 With regard to the "sepia copy" of the cloth plan, it is
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to apparent that the prayer to allow its presentation is a mere
object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when the afterthought because it was never offered in evidence during the
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the trial and petitioner had already turned over his original tracing
tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter objection to said evidence. cloth plan to the branch clerk of court for submission to the
submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. LRA.32 Petitioner should have submitted in evidence the "sepia
Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of copy" duly approved by the Bureau of Lands in lieu of the original
LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. 23 The Court of Court provides: tracing cloth plan while the case was still on trial, and not now as
Appeals appropriately quoted from our decision in Director of he belatedly offers it on appeal.
Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court,24 in which it was similarly
claimed that applicant failed to present the tracing cloth plan of These rules shall not apply to land registration,
the land applied for because it had been forwarded to the Land cadastral and election cases, naturalization and Third. Petitioner failed to establish that he and his predecessors-
Registration Authority. Rejecting the contention, this Court, insolvency proceedings, and other cases not in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the nature and
through Justice Nocon, held: herein provided for, except by analogy or in a length of possession leading to a registrable title over the land.
suppletory character and whenever practicable Petitioner claims that he and his family cultivated the subject land,
and convenient.25 without the help of tenants, in order to plant bamboo and mango
It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the trees thereon. His witness also testified that the land was for a
land applied for was not submitted in evidence by time planted with coconut trees and palay. However, from the
testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that petitioner Maragondon, Cavite per Lc Map No. 2720; cert. on
is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon, Cavite, has November 12, 1971.
actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite from
childhood until the present. Moreover, it appears that the land was 2. the remaining portion of the area is within the
only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much Alienable or Disposable (sic), Block-1, Project No. 15-A,
tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango trees, if of Maragondon, Cavite per LC Map No. 3091; cert. on
any, existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from June 21, 1983.36
these trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the
tax declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements
found on the land were only bamboo trees.33 Thus, one portion of the land was certified on November 12, 1971,
while the remaining portion was certified on June 21, 1983. As
petitioner's application was filed only on October 13, 1997, almost
Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on 26 years from the time one portion was certified as alienable and
the land some coconut trees, but these were no longer there at disposable and 14 years from the time the remaining portion was
the time of his testimony. He also testified that the land was certified, the property was still unclassified at the time petitioner
planted with palay, but not by petitioner or his predecessors or his and his predecessors-in-interest allegedly began their possession
family but by kaingeros, including himself, who only asked of the same. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
permission from petitioner to use the land. Assuming that Appeals:37
petitioner had planted the bamboo and mango trees thereon, this
fact would hardly suffice to prove possession as it would
constitute "a mere casual cultivation" of that large tract of land. A A person cannot enter into forest land and, by the simple
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
does not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him, towards the eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a Government must first declare the forest land to be
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land, alienable and disposable agricultural land before the
however long the period thereof may have extended, never year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the title.
state, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation
of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of Hence, in view of the lack of sufficient evidence of the 30-year
years.34 open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an
owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, §48 (b), as amended,
Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No. 1891
himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, cannot be granted.38
his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. It is
noteworthy that the land subject of the application was declared WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
for taxation purposes only on September 8, 1997 and the taxes application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for original registration
due thereon covered only a period of 10 years beginning 1988 of Lot No. 1891, Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-
and was paid only on September 9, 1997, or a little more than a 0011601, is AFFIRMED.
month prior to the filing of the application. There is no other tax
declaration or receipt for tax payments by petitioner's SO ORDERED.
predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts
are not conclusive evidence of ownership but are merely indicia of
a claim of ownership.35

It is also noteworthy that the certification submitted by petitioner

shows that the land became alienable and disposable only on
certain dates

. . . the area shaded in orange color is within the

Alienable or Disposable (sic), Project No. 15 of
G.R. No. 108558 June 21, 2001 "b) Plaintiff Andrea Tabuso claims to be the "On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the court
owner as successor in interest (granddaughter) dismissed the complaint and declared the defendant the
ANDREA TABUSO and RENATO BISMORTE, petitioners, of one Andrea Elaba, daughter of Maria Montes lawful owners of the land in question." 5
vs. and Borja Elaba, Maria Montes appears to be a
COURT OF APPEALS and the HEIRS OF ESTEBAN ABAD sister of Ignacio Montes, in whose name the tax The trial court 6 concluded that there was abundant proof of
represented by Nemesio Abad and Ana Abad declaration for the property in question was private respondents' ownership of the lot in question as against
Paghubasan, respondents. issued for the year 1912 (Exh. A). the scanty evidence offered by petitioners. And even if the latter
had built a house thereon, such action was only tolerated by
PANGANIBAN, J.: "c) The property in question has been in the private respondents, who had originally allowed one Marcelo
possession of the defendants (heirs of Esteban Tabuso (father of Petitioner Andrea Tabuso), to construct a house
Abad), although the house standing thereon on the same lot. Besides, Petitioner Tabuso is not a compulsory
It is settled that great weight, and even finality, is accorded to the appears to have been constructed by Marcelo heir of Ignacio Montes, from whom she claims to have inherited
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of Tabuso, father of plaintiff Andrea Tabuso. the lot, subject of this litigation. In addition, the tax declaration in
the trial courts. Only when it is clearly shown that such findings his name has long been revised.
are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned.
"On the other hand, evidence for the defendants tends to
establish the following: The trial court likewise gave credit to the testimony of Atty. Jose
Statement of the Case Gonzales, private respondents' counsel who had been presented
"a) The land in question originally owned by by petitioners as their own witness. He testified that the land in
Before us is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Maria Montes was donated to Isabel Elaba question, which was adjacent to the land he himself possessed,
Court, assailing the July 29, 1992 Decision 1 of the Court through an ancient document executed on had been in the possession of Esteban Abad's heirs, herein
of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 26047 and its September 24, 1923 (Exh. F). Isabel in turn sold private respondents. The trial court also took note of the various
January 14, 1993 Resolution 3 denying reconsideration. the land to Esteban Abad on May 5, 1948 (Exh. tax declarations covering the property, indicating that it was
The CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial 4). owned by private respondents.
Court, which had found abundant proof of appellees'
ownership of the land, as opposed to the scanty Ruling of the Court of Appeals
evidence offered by appellants. The dispositive portion of "b) The original tax declaration in the name of
the assailed Decision reads as follows: Ignacio Montes (Exh. A) was superseded by
Tax Declaration Nos. 6422 and 1450 both in the The Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the trial court. It ruled
name of Isabel Elaba (Exh. 6-D; 6-E)[;] as follows:
"WHEREFORE, [there being] no reversible error in the Declaration No. 1450 for the year 1948 was
decision appealed from[,] the same is hereby affirmed in superseded by Tax Declaration No. 6959 for
toto. Costs against appellants." 4 "The only issue presented to [u]s for resolution is the
1960 (Exh. 6-C) in the name of Esteban Abad; question of ownership. After a careful review of the
and the latter was superseded in 1969 by Tax records, [w]e agree with the trial court that the
The Facts Declaration No. 1661 (Exh. 6-B) in the name of preponderance of evidence supports the claim of
Esteban Abad. In 1974 a new tax declaration ownership of defendants-appellees.
The undisputed facts of the case are summarized by the Court of No. 19 (Exh. 6-A) was issued in the name of
Appeals as follows: Esteban Abad with Nemesio Abad and his co-
heirs as administrators. The last tax declaration "As regards the first assigned error, [the] trial court
No. 22 (Exh. 6) for 1982 was in the name of cannot be faulted for giving weight to the testimony of
"This case involves declaration of ownership filed before Esteban Abad. The land taxes due thereon for Atty. Jose Gonzales. He testified that the land in
the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Leyte, [in] Biliran, the years 1947 to 1982 were paid by Isabel question had been in he possession of appellees; that he
Leyte, of an unregistered parcel of land at Antipolo, Elaba[,] Esteban Abad and Nemesio Abad personally [knew] this as he own[ed] the land adjacent to
Naval, Leyte with an area of 3,267 square meters. (Exhs. 7 to 7-W). the land in question at the northern point; that he
inherited said land from his late father; and that he
"The plaintiffs' evidence consists of the following: frequently visit[ed] his land and passe[d] by the land in
"c) The land in question is tenanted by one question. Thus, he testified of his own personal
Valentin Poblete in accordance with a lease knowledge regarding the fact of possession. Moreover,
"a) A tax declaration No. 3705 (Exh. A) in the contract executed by defendant Nemesio Atty. Gonzales, although a counsel for appellees, was
name of Ignacio Montes for the year 1912. [Abad], one of the heirs and co-owners of the presented by appellants ad their own witness; hence,
However, the land taxes thereon for the years land. they are bound by his testimony.
1944 to 1947 were paid only in 1981 (Exh. F
and series).
 "As to the validity of the document of donation executed The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding Both the trial and the appellate courts were likewise correct in
by appellants' predecessor in interest, Maria Montes in private respondents as owners of the land giving weight to the testimony of Atty. Jose Gonzales. He testified
1923, or more than sixty (60) years ago, it is too late in notwithstanding the undisputed fact that they (private that being, the owner of the adjacent land, he had personal
the day to raise the question of the validity of said respondents) admitted the facts set forth by appellants[,] knowledge of the simple fact that the land in question was owned
document. Appellants are barred by laches to raise the now petitioners in their appellants brief[,] as the former by private respondents, who were in actual, open and continuous
same. Moreover, the issue is being raised for the first (private respondents[)] did not file their appellees brief[.] possession thereof. Significantly, while he was private
time on appeal, which is not allowed. respondents' counsel, he was presented by petitioners
"IV themselves. Having done so, they are bound by his testimony,
"It also appears that since 1923 to the present, or for even if it is hostile.
more than 60 years, appellees have been able to The Order of the respondent Court of Appeals to deliver
establish by the tax declarations in their name and that of the entire 11,927 sq. meters to private respondent is The only substantial argument of petitioners supporting their claim
their predecessors in interest that they have been in illegal and unsupported by evidence. of ownership is their construction of a small house (barong-
open, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession barong) on the property, as acknowledged in private respondents'
of the land in question. letter, which reads:
"V
"x x x xxx xxx "Notice to Vacate
The Court of Appeals gravely erred in concluding that
private respondents are the owners of the land merely on
"Finally, the area of the land appears to be immaterial. the basis of their tax declarations without evidence of Naval, Leyte
Whether it is only 3,267 square meters as contained in actual physical possession." 9 September 24, 1981
the tax declaration, or 11,927 square meters, as found
by the court-appointed commissioner, the important thing
to consider is that appellants have not substantiated their In sum, the main issue that needs to be resolved in the case at To: Mr. & Mrs. Renato Bismorte
claim by a preponderance of evidence adverse to the bar is the ownership of the land in question. The other issues Barangay Calumpang
claim of ownership and possession of appellees." 7 presented by petitioners are merely ancillary and will be Naval, Leyte
discussed in conjunction with this main issue.
Issues Greetings:
The Court's Ruling</P>
In their Memorandum,8 petitioners raise the following issues: You are advised to vacate the area/lot where your
The Petition is devoid of merit.10 'Barong-Barong House' [was] temporarily constructed for
we, the lawful owners, shall have to use it. You are given
"I
Main Issue: three (3) months grace period upon receipt thereof within
Ownership of the Property which to transfer or completely vacate the area/lot.
The findings and conclusion of the Honorable Court of
Appeals that private respondents are in possession and [Should there be f]ailure to comply [with] this notice or
owners of the land in dispute are contradicted by the After a careful examination of the issues involved, the evidence
adduced, and the arguments or issues raised by both parties, this advise [,] an ejectment proceeding shall be instituted or
evidence on record.
Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented leans filed against you before the proper court. Hence,
heavily in favor of herein private respondents. compliance is hereby desired.
"II
"It is settled that great weight, and even finality, is given to the
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave abuse factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it the trial courts. Only where it is shown that such findings are (Signed) Mr. NEMESIO E. ABAD
upheld the validity of the Deed of Donation dated whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned." 11 Co-Owner
September 23, 1923 which is [a] spurious document as it
was executed by Maria Montes who was already dead
as early as 1919. We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that for a (Signed) ANA A. PAGHUBASAN
period of more than 60 years, private respondents have been able Co-Owner
to establish that they are the owners of the lot; and that for said
"III period, they have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted
possession of the same. (Signed) NESTORA DELA CUALA" 12
Obviously, the claim of private respondents that they are the September 23, 1923; whereas the death certificate issued by the
owners of the land is supported by the above letter, in which they Holy Rosary Cathedral Parish of Naval, Leyte, shows that Maria
were asking petitioners to vacate the property. Moreover, Montes was buried on February 21, 1919.
considering its size, which is 11,927 square meters as found by
the court-appointed commissioner, the fact that petitioners' house However, the Court of Appeals was correct in stating that
is only a barong-barong or make-shift shanty lends support to petitioners were barred by laches from questioning the validity of
private respondents' claim that the former's presence on the the Deed. "Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for
property was merely tolerated. an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done
It must be stressed "that possession and ownership are distinct earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one reasonable time, warranting [the] presumption that the party
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not entitled to it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." 16 It is
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. too late for private respondents to raise this issue now,
Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the considering that the Deed of Donation was executed more than
right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. xxx. On the other 60 years ago. Moreover, they are precluded from raising this
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the argument, because it is being raised for the first time on appeal. 17
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be In addition, private respondents have not proven that the Maria
had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner Montes mentioned in the Death Certificate is the same Maria
and possession of a holder. Possessors in the concept of owners Montes who executed the Deed of Donation. The two have been
may be the owners themselves or those who claim to be so. On shown to have different sets of parents, thus raising serious
the other hand, those who possess as mere holders acknowledge doubts on the identity of the person mentioned in the Death
in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, Certificate. Lastly, the Death Certificate was not marked in
whether his belief be right or wrong." 13 evidence, nor was it subjected to cross-examination. It is thus
inadmissible in evidence.
In this case, the evidence shows that the occupation of the
property by petitioners is not in the concept of owners, because Size of Lot Immaterial To Private Respondents' Claim of
their stay is merely tolerated. This finding is bolstered by the fact Ownership
that Petitioner Andrea Tabuso is the daughter of Marcelo Tabuso,
who was merely allowed by the previous owner, Esteban Abad, to
construct a small house on the lot. As held in Caniza v. Court of Lastly, petitioners argue that private respondents own only 3,267
Appeals, 14 "an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his square meters of the questioned lot. This is the area that appears
house, rent-free[,] does not create a permanent and indefeasible on their Tax Declarations. On the other hand, the entire lot that
right of possession in the latter's favor." 15 was adjudicated measures 11,927 square meters. Petitioners'
contention deserves scant consideration, because they have not
substantiated, by any means whatsoever, their claim to any part
Lastly, the claim of petitioners that private respondents are not in of the disputed land. Hence, they are not entitled to ownership
actual possession of the land is unsubstantiated. Besides, it is not thereof. Besides, what defines a piece of land is not the numerical
necessary that the latter actually stay on the property in order to data indicated as its area, but the boundaries or "metes and
prove ownership of the same. As found by both the trial and the bounds" specified in its description as enclosing the land and
appellate courts, since the acquisition of the subject property by indicating its limits. 18
private respondents, they had religiously paid the taxes due
thereon. Further, one of the co-owners executed a lease contract
over it in favor of a tenant. These acts are clearly consistent with WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
ownership. assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Deed of Donation Not Proven to Be Invalid
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners point out that the Deed of Donation executed by Maria
Montes to Isabel Elaba, who in turn sold the lot to private
respondents, is spurious since the Deed was executed on
G.R. No. 155012 April 14, 2004 of the property in the concept of owners and in a public Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the registration of
and peaceful manner. said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration
vs. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the once the decision becomes final and executory.
CARMENCITA M. ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the following
CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in- Upon appeal10 by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M. interest possess sufficient title to the property or have been in decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
LAZARO, respondents. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
DECISION the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts, erred in (a) giving weight to the self-serving testimonies of
presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their
sufficient evidence of a bona fide right to registration of the land predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an
known as The Public Land Act,6 as amended by Presidential owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents'
To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Decree No. 1073; (c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the tax declaration is sufficient proof that they and their parents have
Constitution, the State promotes an equitable distribution of basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the been in possession of the property for at least thirty years, despite
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to deserving respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain the fact that the said tax declaration was only for the year 1994
citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.7 and the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were
must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997.
deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an imperfect At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., Finally, the OSG states that even granting for the sake of
title over such lands so that the public domain may not be raided and Carmencita M. Alconaba testified to establish their claim over argument that the respondents have been in possession of the
by unscrupulous land speculators.1 the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and his co-respondents property since 1940, their adverse possession should be
acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property was
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
Procedure seeking to set aside the decision 2 of the Court of possession of the said land since 1949 and had been religiously
Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323, which paying the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and his The petition is meritorious.
affirmed the decision3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of siblings immediately took possession of said property in the
Cabuyao, Laguna,4 of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. concept of an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice
06 ordering the registration in favor of the respondents of parcels thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed an While the rule is well settled that the findings of fact of appellate
of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna, designated Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and courts are conclusive upon us,11 there are recognized exceptions
as Lot 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. subdivided it into five lots.8 thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are not
supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
constitute a serious abuse of discretion.12 This exception is
The pertinent facts are as follows: For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had present in this case.
been in the possession of their parents since 1940 and that after
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the the death of their parents she and her siblings immediately took
possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The land is Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application5 for registration 1942,13 reads as follows:
of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, improvements have been introduced by their family on the lot. On
Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application, they stated, cross examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property Section 48. The following described citizens of the
among other things, that they are the sole heirs of were at hand.9 Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in respondents have sufficiently established their family's actual, apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
possession of the said property since 1949, more or less. continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
After the death of their mother and father on 19 February property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that Registration Act, to wit:
property among themselves and subdivided it into five such possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise,
lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and it found that the land in question is alienable and disposable and …
2111-E. Since then they have been in actual possession is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it confirmed the
title of the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of
 (b) Those who by themselves or through their possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim Mauricio. The two were aged 6217 and 60,18respectively, when
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945. they testified in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in 1935
continuous, exclusive, and notorious and 1937, respectively. If the asserted possession lasted for a
possession and occupation of agricultural lands There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the period of fifty-seven years at the time they testified, the same
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that
acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years But it is not clear as to when it was classified as alienable and Carmencita was just 5 years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old.
immediately preceding the filing of the disposable by proper authorities. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp, before coming to
application for confirmation of title except when the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall land and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their
be conclusively presumed to have performed all We do not find merit in OSG's claim that the subject property was testimonies could not be relied upon to prove the adverse
the conditions essential to a Government grant classified as within the alienable and disposable zone only on 28 possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents.
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under September 1981, and hence, possession by respondents'
the provisions of this chapter. predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be considered. In
support of this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and
the survey plan marked as Exhibit "Q," which reads: occupation by their predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 14 by testified to by Carmencita19) or since 1949 (as testified to by
substituting the phrase "for at least thirty years" with "since June Mauricio20 and declared in respondents' application for
12, 1945"; thus: This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence
per Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 certified on required in cases of this nature. Proof of specific acts of
September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or military ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. They
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section reservation.
48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply of law than factual evidence of possession.21 Even granting that
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certified on the possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940,
domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive September 28, 1981" could not have meant that Lot 2111 became still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had
and notorious possession and occupation by the alienable and disposable only on 28 September 1981. That date been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, 004 was certified. acquisition of ownership.
since June 12, 1945.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P. D. that since Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the
No. 1529,15 otherwise known as the Property Registration forms part was approved on 31 December 1925 by the then law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
Decree, provides: Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and broader than occupation because it includes constructive
alienable as early as of that date. There is nothing to support their possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
claim that 31 December 1925 is the date of the approval of such seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may project or the date of the classification of the subject property as possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional disposable and alienable public land. It is settled that a person exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, who seeks registration of title to a piece of land must prove his the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
whether personally or through their duly authorized claim by clear and convincing evidence.16 The respondents have a mere fiction.22 Actual possession of a land consists in the
representatives: failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot 2111 was manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
classified as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural party would naturally exercise over his own property.23
(1) Those who by themselves or through their lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they Melendez cultivated, had control over, or used the whole or even
and occupation of alienable and disposable and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, a greater portion of the tract of land for agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject purposes.24 Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, property under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time there is no evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by
or earlier. (Emphasis supplied). immemorial or since 12 June 1945.1awphil.net the tenant. Moreover, there is no competent proof that the
Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the finding of fifty- purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are
the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and seven years of possession by the respondents and their not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of Carmencita and least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious property.25 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the
desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao, Laguna, of 1
with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are
government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The land registration case
acquisition of ownership.26 MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of Costs de oficio.
the subject land upon the death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz
Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and 19 February 1967, SO ORDERED.
respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes
thereon. If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced
any improvement on the land?27 We even find unsubstantiated the
claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the land. They did
not present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant
could have cultivated such a vast tract of land with an area of 2.6
hectares.

The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for
taxation purposes by the respondents only for the year 1994.
They paid the taxes thereon only for the years 1990, 1991, 1992,
1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust the
assertion of the respondents that they immediately took
possession of the property in the concept of an owner after the
death of their parents. While belated declaration of a property for
taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of
possession,28 tax declarations or realty tax payments of property
are, nevertheless, good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession.29

Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on

the subject property. Carmencita even admitted that plans of
selling the property were at hand. Thus, it would be rational to
conclude that this move for registration is just but a camouflage by
smart land speculators who saw in the land applied for expected
profits from its existence.

In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an

imperfect title over the land subject of the application at the time
MTC LRC Case No. 06 was filed with the trial court. They failed to
prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classified as part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June
1945 or earlier; (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or
earlier.
G.R. No. 168222 April 18, 2006 Santiago executed an "Affidavit (quit-claim)"9ratifying the transfer due thereon.21Joaquin explained that after the death of his father
of his rights over Lot No. 379 to Teodulo. Between 1960 and in 1971, he no longer visited the land and it was only when the
SPS. TEODULO RUMARATE, (deceased) and ROSITA 1970, three conflagrations razed the land reducing the number of complaint was filed against them when he learned that petitioners
RUMARATE; deceased TEODULO RUMARATE is represented coconut trees growing therein to only 400, but by the time Teodulo are in actual possession of the property.22 He added that his
herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely, ANASTACIA testified in 1992, the remaining portions of the land was almost siblings had planned to convert Lot No. 379 into a grazing land for
RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA RUMARATE, entirely cultivated and planted with coconuts, coffee, jackfruits, cattle but decided to put it off for fear of the rampant operations
ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO RUMARATE, FIDEL mangoes and vegetables.10 From 1929, Teodulo and later, his then of the New People’s Army between the years 1965-
RUMARATE, MERLINDA RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, wife and 11 children possessed the land as owners and declared 1970.23 1avvphil.net
CLEMENCIA RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA the same for taxation, the earliest being in 1961.11
RUMARATE, Petitioners, On March 31, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
vs. In 1970, Teodulo discovered that spouses Cipriano Hernandez petitioners. It held that since the latter possessed the land in the
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, SALVADOR and Julia Zoleta, respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were able concept of an owner since 1929, they became the owners thereof
HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, LEONORA to obtain a title over Lot No. 379. He did not immediately file a by acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years, pursuant to
HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA HERNANDEZ-MERCURIO, case against respondents because he was advised to just remain the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, when Santiago sold the lot to
RODRIGOHERNANDEZ, BERNARDO HERNANDEZ, on the land and pay the corresponding taxes thereon.12 respondents’ parents in 1964, the former no longer had the right
LOURDES HERNANDEZ-CABIDA, MARIO SALVATIERRA, over the property and therefore transmitted no title to said
ADELAIDA FONTILA-CIPRIANO, and THE REGISTER OF Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that on November 11, respondents. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision,
DEEDS OF QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents. 1964, Santiago sold the questioned lot to their parents, the reads:
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta, for
DECISION P9,000.00.13 Respondents alleged that on April 21, 1925, the CFI WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing considerations
of Tayabas rendered a Decision written in Spanish, declaring Lot judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: No. 379 as a public land and recognizing Santiago as claimant the defendants, to wit:
thereof in Cadastral Proceeding No. 12. However, no title was
issued to Santiago because he failed to file an Answer. Spouses 1. Declaring that the parcel of land (Lot No. 379 of the
Assailed in this petition for review is the May 26, 2005 Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta filed a motion to re-open
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57053, Cadastral Survey of Guinayangan, Cadastral Case No.
Cadastral Proceeding No. 12, alleging that though no title was 12, LRC Cadastral Record No. 557), situated in Brgy.
which reversed and set aside the March 31, 1997 Decision2 of the issued in the name of Santiago, the same decision is,
Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case Katimo, Tagkawayan, Quezon had been fraudulently,
nevertheless, proof that Santiago was in possession of Lot No. deceitfully and mistakenly registered in the names of the
No. C-964, declaring petitioners as owners of Lot No. 379 with an 379 since 1925 or for more than 30 years. Having succeeded in
area of 187,765 square meters and located in Barrio spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta;
the rights of Santiago, the spouses prayed that Cadastral
Catimo,3 Municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Quezon. Proceeding No. 12 be re-opened and that the corresponding title
over Lot No. 379 be issued in their name. On September 13, 2. Declaring that herein defendants [heirs] of spouses
The facts show that on September 1, 1992, petitioner spouses 1965, the CFI of Tayabas rendered a decision adjudicating Lot Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta have no better
Teodulo Rumarate (Teodulo) and Rosita Rumarate filed an action No. 379 in favor of the spouses, in whose name Original rights than their parents/predecessors-in-interest, they
for reconveyance of real property and/or quieting of title with Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1184414 was issued on the same having stepped only on (sic) their shoes;
damages against respondent heirs of the late spouses Cipriano date.15 Cipriano Hernandez planted coconut trees on the land
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.4 Teodulo averred that Lot No. 379 through the help of a certain Fredo16 who was instituted as 3. Declaring that the plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and
was previously possessed and cultivated by his godfather, caretaker. In 1970, Fredo informed Cipriano Hernandez that he substitute plaintiffs-[heirs] of the deceased Teodulo
Santiago Guerrero (Santiago), a bachelor, who used to live with will no longer stay on the land because there are people Rumarate are the true, real and legal owners/or the
the Rumarate family in San Pablo City. Between 1923 and 1924, instructing him to discontinue tilling the same.17 owners in fee simple absolute of the above described
Santiago and the Rumarate family transferred residence to avail parcel of land;
of the land distribution in Catimo, Guinayangan, Quezon. From After the death of the spouses,18 respondents executed a deed of
1925 to 1928, Santiago occupied Lot No. 379 cultivating five partition over the subject lot and were issued TCT No. T- 237330 4. Ordering the defendants to convey the above-
hectares thereof. Before moving to Kagakag, Lopez, Quezon in on June 28, 1988 in lieu of OCT No. O-11844.19 described parcel of land to plaintiff Rosita Victor
1929, Santiago orally bequeathed his rights over Lot No. 379 to Rumarate and to the substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the
Teodulo and entrusted to him a copy of a Decision of the Court of deceased Teodulo Rumarate;
First Instance (CFI) of Tayabas dated April 21, 1925 recognizing Respondent Joaquin Hernandez (Joaquin) testified that in 1964,
his (Santiago) rights over Lot No. 379.5 Since Teodulo was only he accompanied his father in inspecting the lot which was then
14 years old then, his father helped him cultivate the land.6 Their planted with coconut trees.20 Thereafter, he visited the land twice, 5. Ordering the Register of Deeds for Quezon Province
family thereafter cleared the land, built a house 7 and planted once in 1966 and the other in 1970. From 1966 up to the time he in Lucena City to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No.
coconut trees, corn, palay and vegetables thereon.8 In 1960, testified, his family declared the lot for taxation and paid the taxes T-237330 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of
 title in favor of plaintiff Rosita Victor Rumarate and the over the property, or to respondents who have a certificate of title (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
substitute plaintiffs (heirs) of the deceased plaintiff but are not in possession of the controverted lot? interest have been, in continuous, exclusive, and notorious
Teodulo Rumarate, in accordance with law and settled possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
jurisprudence; and In an action for quieting of title, the court is tasked to determine domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for
the respective rights of the parties so that the complainant and at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the those claiming under him may be forever free from any danger of application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
suit.1avvphil.net hostile claim.26 Under Article 47627 of the Civil Code, the remedy or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
may be availed of only when, by reason of any instrument, record, performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and
claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
SO ORDERED.24 chapter.
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, a cloud is
thereby cast on the complainant’s title to real property or any
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 26, interest therein. Article 477 of the same Code states that the When the conditions specified therein are complied with, the
2005, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court. It ruled plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
that Teodulo did not acquire title over Lot No. 379, either by property which is the subject matter of the suit. right to a government grant, without necessity of a certificate of
donation or acquisitive prescription; that Teodulo’s bare allegation title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the public
that Santiago orally bequeathed to him the litigated lot is domain. The confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little
insufficient to prove such transfer of ownership; and that even For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
assuming that the property was truly donated by Santiago to the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
Teodulo in 1929, or in the 1960 Affidavit, said conveyance is void an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
for not complying with the formalities of a valid donation which recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
require the donation and the acceptance thereof by the donee to claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
be embodied in a public instrument. Both requirements, however, confirm such conversion already effected by operation of law from
are absent in this case because in 1929, the alleged donation was or legal efficacy.28
the moment the required period of possession became
not reduced to writing while the purported 1960 donation was complete. 31
never accepted in a public document by Teodulo. The appellate In Evangelista v. Santiago,29 it was held that title to real property
court thus surmised that since it was not established that Santiago refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of
donated Lot No. 379 to Teodulo, it follows that the latter also the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means In the instant case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to
failed to prove that he possessed the land adversely, exclusively he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert a right to exclusive the testimony of Teodulo and his witnesses that his (Teodulo’s)
and in the concept of an owner, a vital requisite before one may possession and enjoyment of the property. possession of the land since 1929 was open, continuous,
acquire title by acquisitive prescription. In conclusion, the Court of adverse, exclusive, and in the concept of an owner. It is a settled
Appeals ruled that even assuming further that Teodulo had a right rule in civil cases as well as in criminal cases that in the matter of
In the instant case, we find that Teodulo’s open, continuous, credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial courts are given
over the property, his cause of action is now barred by laches exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379, in
because he filed an action only in 1992 notwithstanding great weight and highest degree of respect by the appellate court
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years vested him and considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the
knowledge as early as 1970 of the issuance of title in the name of his heirs title over the said lot. The law applicable at the time
spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta. The decretal question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
Teodulo completed his 30-year possession (from 1929 to 1959) of their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 32
portion of the decision states: Lot No. 379, in the concept of an owner was Sec. 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, as amended
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, effective June 22, 1957 30 which A careful examination of the evidence on record shows that
GRANTED. The assailed March 31, 1997 decision of the Regional provides: Teodulo possessed and occupied Lot No. 379 in the concept of
Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. C- an owner. Since 1929, Teodulo cultivated the controverted land,
964 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. built his home, and raised his 11 children thereon. In 1957, he
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, filed a homestead application over Lot No. 379 but failed to
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such pursue the same.33 After his demise, all his 11 children, the
SO ORDERED.25 lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been youngest being 28 years old,34 continued to till the land. From
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance 1929 to 1960, Santiago never challenged Teodulo’s possession of
Hence, the instant appeal. (now Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is Lot No. 379 nor demanded or received the produce of said land.
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a For 31 years Santiago never exercised any act of ownership over
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act (now Lot No. 379. And, in 1960, he confirmed that he is no longer
The issue to be resolved is to whom should Lot No. 379 be Property Registration Decree), to wit:
awarded? To petitioners who possessed and cultivated the lot interested in asserting any right over the land by executing in
since 1929 up to the present, but do not have a certificate of title favor of Teodulo a quitclaim.
xxxx
Indeed, all these prove that Teodulo possessed and cultivated the cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of Lands v. and Julia Zoleta and herein respondents did not acquire any right
land as owner thereof since 1929. While the oral donation in 1929 Intermediate Appellate Court:36 over the questioned lot and the title issued in their names are
as well as the 1960 quitclaim ceding Lot No. 379 to Teodulo are void, because of the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher
void for non-compliance with the formalities of donation, they It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and than the source.37
nevertheless explain Teodulo and his family’s long years of occupation." Since these words are separated by the
occupation and cultivation of said lot and the nature of their conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one Furthermore, spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta
possession thereof. synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than cannot be considered as purchasers in good faith because they
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, had knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
In Bautista v. Poblete,35 the Court sustained the registration of a therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry.38 The Court notes
parcel of land in the name of the successors-in-interest of the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken that Santiago was not residing in Lot No. 379 at the time of the
donee notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation inasmuch as together with the words open, continuous, sale. He was already 81 years old, too old to cultivate and
said donee possessed the property in the concept of an owner. exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight maintain an 18-hectare land. These circumstances should have
Thus – the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid prompted the spouses to further inquire who was actually tilling
section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As the land. Had they done so, they would have found that Teodulo
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, and his family are the ones possessing and cultivating the land as
because it involves an immovable property and the donation was in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands: owners thereof.
not made in a public document as required by Article 633 of the
old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code "x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by In the same vein, respondents could not be considered as third
(concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also persons or purchasers in good faith and for value or those who
donation may not serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be buy the property and pay a full and fair price for the
on the strength thereof the donee has taken possession of the observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive same39 because they merely inherited Lot No. 379 from spouses
property adversely and in the concept of owner. possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications, and Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta.
this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications
It follows therefore that Teodulo’s open, continuous, exclusive, is ‘one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy Then too, even if Santiago acquired title over Lot No. 379 by
and notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 for 30 with reference to the portion actually in possession of the virtue of the April 21, 1925 Decision of the CFI of Tayabas, and
years, or from 1929 to 1959 in the concept of an owner, earned claimant.’ While, therefore, ‘possession in the eyes of the law not on account of his alleged 30-year possession thereof, we will
him title over the lot in accordance with Sec. 48 (b) of the Public does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square still arrive at the same conclusion. This is so because the
Land Act. Considering that Lot No. 379 became the private meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession’, declaration of this Court that petitioners are the rightful owners of
property of Teodulo in 1959, Santiago had no more right to sell possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as the controverted lot is based on Teodulo’s own possession and
the same to spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta in amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not occupation of said lot under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
1964. Consequently, the latter and herein respondents did not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or ownership, regardless of the manner by which Santiago acquired
acquire ownership over Lot No. 379 and the titles issued in their symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of ownership over same lot.
name are void. dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not
a mere fiction x x x." On the issue of prescription, the settled rule is that an action for
Interestingly, respondents adopted the theory that Santiago quieting of title is imprescriptible, as in the instant case, where the
acquired title over Lot No. 379 not from the April 21, 1925 person seeking relief is in possession of the disputed property. A
Decision of the CFI of Tayabas which merely recognized his rights Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted: person in actual possession of a piece of land under claim of
over said lot, but from his more than 30 years of possession since ownership may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
1925 up to 1964 when he sold same lot to their (respondents) "x x x The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, and that his
predecessors-in-interest, the spouses Cipriano Hernandez and purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was done by undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the
Julia Zoleta. On the basis of said claim, said spouses filed an him, does not constitute acts of possession." aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
action for, and successfully obtained, confirmation of imperfect the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
title over Lot No. 379, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land In the instant case, Santiago’s short-lived possession and title.40Considering that petitioners herein continuously possessed
Act. cultivation of Lot No. 379 could not vest him title. While he tilled Lot No. 379 since 1929 up to the present, their right to institute a
the land in 1925, he ceased to possess and cultivate the same suit to clear the cloud over their title cannot be barred by the
However, the records do not support the argument of respondents since 1928. He abandoned the property and allowed Teodulo to statute of limitations.
that Santiago’s alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 exercise all acts of ownership. His brief possession of Lot No. 379
is in the nature contemplated by the Public Land Act which could not thus vest him title. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium Neither could petitioners’ action be barred by laches because they
requires more than constructive possession and casual transferre quam ipse habet. No one can transfer a greater right to continuously enjoyed the possession of the land and harvested
another than he himself has. Hence, spouses Cipriano Hernandez the fruits thereof up to the present to the exclusion of and without
any interference from respondents. They cannot therefore be said they (respondents) instituted in the lot. From 1970 up to the filing Nevertheless, the imperfect title of petitioners over Lot No. 379 is
to have slept on their rights as they in fact exercised the same by of petitioners’ complaint in 1992, or after 22 years, respondents enough to defeat the certificate of title issued to respondents. 50
continuously possessing Lot No. 379. never bothered to assert any right over Lot No. 379. Respondent
Joaquin Hernandez testified that he and his siblings had a plan to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the May 26, 2005
On the contrary, we find that it is respondents who are actually convert the land into a grazing land for cattle but decided to put it Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR. CV No. 57053,
guilty of laches. Though not specifically pleaded, the Court can off for fear of the rampant operations of the New People’s Army is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 31, 1997 Decision of
properly address the issue of laches based on petitioners’ between the years 1965-1970. However, even after said years, the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Civil
allegation in the complaint that "[n]either spouses Cipriano respondents took no step to implement their plan. Worse, among Case No. C-964, awarding Lot No. 379 in favor petitioners and
Hernandez and Julia Zoleta x x x nor [herein respondents] had the siblings of spouses Cipriano Hernandez and Julia Zoleta who ordering the cancellation of respondents’ Transfer Certificate of
taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to said parcel of land are all living in the Philippines,46 only Joaquin Hernandez visited Title No. T- 237330, is REINSTATED with
from the date of their registration of title in November, 1965 up to the land and only thrice, i.e., once in each years of 1964, 1966 the MODIFICATION deleting the trial court’s order directing the
the present."41Such averment is sufficient to impute abandonment and 1970. Thereafter, not one of them paid visit to Lot No. 379, up Register of Deed of Lucena City to issue a certificate of title in the
of right on the part of respondents. At any rate, laches need not to the time Joaquin Hernandez testified in 1996,47 despite the fact name of petitioners.
be specifically pleaded. On its own initiative, a court may consider that two of them are living only in Calauag, Quezon; one in
it in determining the rights of the parties.42 Agdangan, Quezon;48 and two in Lucena City.49 Neither did they
send a notice or correspondence to petitioners invoking their right SO ORDERED.
over the property. From all indications, the late spouses Cipriano
The failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do Hernandez and Julia Zoleta as well respondents, have neglected
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been Lot No. 379. Were it not for this action instituted by petitioners in
done earlier constitutes laches. It is negligence or omission to 1992, their conflicting claims over the property could not have
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption been settled. It goes without saying that to lose a property that
that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or has been in the family from 1929 up to the present, or for 77 years
declined to assert it. While it is by express provision of law that no will certainly cause irreparable pecuniary and moral injury to
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner petitioners, especially so if the same ancestral land will be lost
shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession, it is under most unfair circumstances in favor of respondents who
likewise an enshrined rule that even a registered owner may be appear to have no real interest in cultivating the same.
barred from recovering possession of property by virtue of
laches.43
Finally, payment of taxes alone will not save the day for
respondents. Only a positive and categorical assertion of their
In applying the doctrine of laches, we have ruled that where a supposed rights against petitioners would rule out the application
party allows the following number of years to lapse from the of laches. It means taking the offensive by instituting legal means
emergence of his cause of action without enforcing his claim, to wrest possession of the property which, however, is absent in
laches sets in: 36 years; 12 years; 50 years; 34 years; 37 years; this case. Respondents’ payment of taxes alone, without
32 years; 20 years; 47 years; 11 years; 25 years; 40 years; 19 possession could hardly be construed as an exercise of
years; 27 years; 7 years; 44 years; 4 years; and 67 years. 44 ownership. What stands out is their overwhelming passivity by
allowing petitioners to exercise acts of ownership and to enjoy the
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct of a party on the basis of fruits of the litigated lot for 22 years without any interference.
which the other party seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting one’s
rights, despite having had knowledge or notice of the other party’s In sum, the Court finds that Lot No. 379 should be adjudicated in
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a favor of petitioners.
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of a party that the
person against whom laches is imputed would assert the right;
and (4) injury or prejudice to the party asserting laches in the One last point. Notwithstanding this Court’s declaration that Lot
event the suit is allowed to prosper.45 No. 379 should be awarded in favor of petitioners, their title over
the same is imperfect and is still subject to the filing of the proper
application for confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the
All these elements are present in this case. Petitioners’ Public Land Act, where the State and other oppositors may be
continuous possession and occupation of Lot No. 379 should given the chance to be heard. It was therefore premature for the
have prompted the respondents to file an action against trial court to direct the Register of Deeds of Lucena City to issue a
petitioners, but they chose not to. Respondents cannot deny certificate of title in the name of petitioners.
knowledge of said possession by petitioners as they even
asserted in their Answer that in 1970, Teodulo ousted the tenant
G.R. No. 160421 October 4, 2004 (1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan9 and Technical (5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the
Description10 of Lot 806, both certified by Land land involved is not covered by any land patent or by
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of land application pending issuance of patent.14
by their Attorney-in-fact, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners, (DENR); (6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR
vs. that the subject lot falls within Alienable and Disposable
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (2) Tax Declarations11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955, lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, per BFD
1968, 1974, 1980, 1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name of LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925.15
DECISION Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name of Rosita Guevarra
and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip and (7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR
Ester Recto). that Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael,
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998 Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not
This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the January from the Municipal Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;12 a portion of nor identical to any previously approved
16, 2003 decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. isolated survey.16
65407 which reversed the September 7, 1998 decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land (4) Report13 from the Community Environment and
Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed is the appellate Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment There being no opposition to the petition from any private
court’s October 17, 2003 resolution3 denying petitioners’ motion and Natural Resources (DENR) stating, among others, individual, an Order of General Default was issued by the
for reconsideration. that – trial court.17

On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester (a) the entire area is within the alienable and On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision
C. Recto, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, disposable zone as classified under Project granting the petition for registration. The dispositive portion
Batangas, Branch 6, an application for registration of title over a No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582 and released and thereof, reads:
23,209 square meter lot,4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. certified as such on December 31,
Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San 1925; (Emphasis, supplied) WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the
Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, under Order of General Default, this Court hereby adjudicates
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known as the (b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre on
Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the alternative within the forest zone; plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
that their petition for registration be granted pursuant to Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.5 (c) the lot is not within a previously issued of and in the names of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester
patent, decree or title. C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of 1322 Palm
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.
from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres (d) there is no public land application filed for
for the amount of P6,943,534.40.6 The two, in turn, inherited the the same land by the applicant or any other Once this Decision shall have become final let the
lot from their deceased parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. person; corresponding decree of registration be issued.
Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945, her
father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became aware of SO ORDERED.18
her father’s possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner (e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No.
in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the 021-02166-A in the name of the predecessor-in-
subject lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated interest and that there is no difference in area; The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to
by Rosita,7 who testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of the Court of Appeals contending that petitioners failed to – (1)
age, she first came to know that her father was the owner of Lot (f) the lot is agricultural in nature; and offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2)
806. The sisters added that during the lifetime of Vicente, he prove possession of the lot for the period required by law; and (3)
planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After overthrow the presumption that subject property forms part of the
(g) the lot does not encroach upon an public domain.19
his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through hired established watershed, riverbed and river bank
farmers.8 protection.
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences – of the trial court on the sole ground of failure to offer in evidence
the original tracing cloth plan of the land.20
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of four years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where
of their compliance with all the substantive and procedural ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the the subject lot is located. As his testimony goes, he and
requirements for registration, save for the submission of the land subject of the application is alienable and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he usually
tracing cloth plan, the case be remanded to the trial court for the disposable land of the public domain.24 passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was
presentation of the said tracing cloth plan. The Solicitor General, only a child at the required inception of possession does
on the other hand, interposed no objection to petitioners’ motion In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest not render him incompetent to testify on the matter. It is
for reconsideration.21 of petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior to them well-established that any child regardless of age, can be
their father, had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ concept of owners. Maria, having been born on October 22, 1917, can make known his perception to others and that he is
motion for reconsideration.22 Hence, the instant petition praying and Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age when they capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is
for the remand of the case before the trial court. became aware of their family’s possession of Lot 806 in 1930 and examined. The requirements of a child’s competence as
1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly capable and a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of
competent to perceive their father’s possession of Lot 806 in the recollection; and (c) capacity of communication. There is
In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the no showing that as a child, claimant did not possess the
interest of justice, he will not to oppose the petition.23 concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies
to be worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a
below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue, having witness’ knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states: personally heard the witnesses testify and observed their obtained in adulthood. He may have first acquired
deportment and manner of testifying, her findings deserve the knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at the age
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may highest respect.25 of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the
file in the proper Court of First Instance [now the years, up until he testified in court in 1990. There is
Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title reason to reject petitioner’s claim that Divinaflor is
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for incompetent to testify regarding Listana’s possession
to land, whether personally or through their duly the year 1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note that said
authorized representatives: since it appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in
1948 Tax Declaration cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No. Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had occasion to see Listana
26472),26 thus substantiating petitioners’ possession of Lot 806 possessing the land.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their through their predecessor-in-interest even prior to said date. At
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, any rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that the
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated
and occupation of alienable and disposable necessarily mean that possession by the previous owners thereof declaration of the property for tax purposes does not necessarily
lands of the public domain under a bona did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony lead to the conclusion that the predecessors were not in
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or supporting possession for the required period is credible, the court possession of the land as required by law since 1945. Petitioner
earlier. will grant the petition for registration. Pertinent portion of the capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration presented
decision, reads – took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is
dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in
as amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor the concept of owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated
provides: who testified on the possession of Marcial Listana for the declaration of the same for tax purposes negates the fact of
period required by law. The issue of credibility is possession, especially in the instant case where there are no
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended position to pass judgment on the issue having personally
in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to heard the witnesses testify and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a better So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain public domain having been released and certified as such
which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and position to observe the witnesses, the trial court’s
appreciation of the witness’ testimony, truthfulness, on December 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona honesty, and candor, deserves the highest respect.
entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within an alienable
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor within a
1945. xxx xxx xxx forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbed, and riverbank protection. 28 Petitioners were
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of … [A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original registration
land, the applicant must show that – (a) he, by himself or capable of perceiving at the time of the occurrence of the of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, fact and (b) he can make his perception known. True, in possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable land
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration Having met all the requirements for registration of title including
earlier. purposes was the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of the presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the land sought
Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide to be registered, there is no more need to remand the case before
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the sufficient identification. This rule was bolstered only recently in the the trial court for the presentation of the tracing cloth plan.
trial court granting the petition for registration on the ground of case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
petitioners’ failure to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan: WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17,
plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the submission of the tracing cloth is a 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407
mandatory requirement for registration.29 However, it was held We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the are reversed and set aside. the September 7, 1998 decision of
that while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for appellate court in ruling that Exhibit "O," the true certified the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in Land
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from the copy of the white paper plan, was sufficient for the Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the issuance of a decree of
Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence could also purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan
provide sufficient identification.30 In Republic v. Court of was found by the appellate court to reflect the land as Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.
Appeals,31 the Court ruled that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan surveyed by a geodetic engineer. It bore the approval of
together with the lot’s technical description duly certified as to the Land Registration Commission, and was re-verified No pronouncement as to costs.
their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now the Land and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974
Management Bureau of the DENR)32 are sufficient to identify the pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing
land applied for registration, thus – from the Land Registration Commission the authority to SO ORDERED.
approve original survey plans. It contained the following
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality
Director of Lands v. Reyes, where it was held that "the (Amadeo) and province (Cavite) where the subject land
original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which is located, its area of 379 square meters, the land as
must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the
identification of the land sought to be registered. As what Technical Descriptions signed by a geodetic surveyor
was submitted in the case at bar to identify the subject and attested by the Land Registration Commission. In
property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court necessary for a proper and definite identification of the
should have rejected the same as insufficient. land sought to be registered, thereby serving the
purpose for which the original tracing cloth plan is
required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was was recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth
correct when it observed that in that case the applicant in effect should not detract from the probative value thereof. x x x.
"had not submitted anything at all to identify the subject property"
because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the
Director of Lands. By contrast — In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue
print copy of the plan (Exhibit "R")33 and the technical description
(Exhibit "S")34 thereof both approved by Land Management
In the present case, there was considerable compliance Services, DENR. Also, per report of the Land Management
with the requirement of the law as the subject property Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
was sufficiently identified with the presentation of Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of
blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor
Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, identical to any previously approved isolated survey. 35 Petitioners
1981). It should be noted in this connection that the also submitted before the Court of Appeals a certified true
Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of copy36of the original tracing cloth plan as well as a
the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical certification37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the
description that go with it. Hence, we cannot ignore fact that the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester
the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has film is on file with their office. Under the circumstances, therefore,
provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial
the subject property. (Emphasis supplied) court solely on the ground that petitioners failed to present the
original tracing cloth plan.
Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where we held that
G.R. No. 146341 August 7, 2003 on the South by the Provincial Road 41.00; on the East by In dismissing petitioners’ appeal, the CA declared that
Perfecto Ozoa 11.00; on the West by Emeliana 16.40. Containing respondents had never lost their right to the land in question, as
AQUILA LARENA joined by her husband, CANDIDO an area of Five Hundred Thirty Four (534) square meters more or they were the heirs to whom the property had descended upon
MERCADERA, Petitioners, less.’ the death of the original claimant and possessor. It also found no
vs. legal justification for the application of prescription and laches.
FRUCTUOSA MAPILI, JOSE MAPILI and ROSELA ‘Hipolito Mapili died and was buried on July 14, 1934. He was
VENELES, Respondents. survived by his only son, Magno Mapili and daughters Julia, Hence this Petition.11
Azucena, Anatolia and Abundia. These daughters have since died
DECISION without issue. Magno Mapili died in 1944 survived by his widow, The Issues
Rosela Veneles, and children Fructuosa, Jose, Generosa and
Pantaleona.
PANGANIBAN, J.: "1 - Did Felomina Larena, the predecessor of petitioner Aquila
Larena, buy the property in question from its original owner
‘Under date of October 28, 1949, Filomena6 Larena executed an Hipolito Mapili?
In denying this appeal, the Court reiterates the well-known rule Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property involving the property
that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of covered by Tax Declaration No. 1419, alleging that she bought
the trial court, are entitled to respect and even finality. Petitioners the property from Hipolito Mapili. After the death of Filomena, "2 - Is the lot in question now owned by Petitioner Aquila Larena
have not convinced this Court that their case constitutes one of Aquila Larena, her niece[,] took possession of the property[,] by virtue of the joint operation of the principles of acquisitive
the exceptions to this doctrine. claiming that she bought the same from her said aunt. prescription and laches?"12

The Case ‘Plaintiffs Fructuosa Mapili, Jose Mapili and Rosela Veneles are There is really only one issue: Did Filomena (or Felomina) Larena
suing Aquila Larena, the successor in interest of Filomena acquire the subject property by means of sale, prescription and/or
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Larena[,] impleading Candido Mercadera, Aquila’s husband, [as] laches?
Court, challenging the July 21, 2000 Decision2 and the November co-defendant. Defendants Generosa Mapili-Bahandi and
8, 2000 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR No. Pantaleona Mapili, sisters of [p]laintiffs[,] were impleaded as co- The Court’s Ruling
44927. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as defendants for being unwilling co-plaintiffs. Defendant Rural Bank
follows: of Valencia, Inc.7 was also sued as the banking institution from The Petition is unmeritorious. The short answer to the above
[which] defendant Aquila Larena obtained a loan using OCT No. question is "No."
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal, FV-30714 of the property in question as collateral.
devoid of merit in fact and in law is hereby ordered DISMISSED, Sole Issue:
and the judgment of the Trial Court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with ‘Plaintiffs’ [C]omplaint alleged that Filomena Larena falsely stated
costs against [petitioners]."4 in her Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property (Exh. ‘B’) that Hipolito
Mapili sold the property to her on October 28, 1949[,] which The Alleged Acquisition of Property
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners’ Motion for Hipolito Mapili could not have done because he was already dead
Reconsideration. at that time (Exhibit ‘C’). At the outset, we must emphasize that only questions of law may
be raised in a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the
‘Defendants’ Answer contends that Filomena Larena lawfully Rules of Court. Well-entrenched, indeed, is the doctrine that
The Facts questions of fact are not proper subjects in this mode of
acquired the said property from Hipolito Mapili in a private
document of sale which got lost during the last World War. By appeal.13 The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial
The appellate court, quoting the Decision5 of the Regional Trial reason of the sale, Magno Mapili and his family had to move out court are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City (Branch 30), summarized the of the land [allowing]8 Filomena Larena to take possession thereof appeal, except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the
facts of the case as follows: as owner. Filomena Larena then sold the property to defendant conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
Aquila Larena on February 17, 1968. Defendant Aquila Larena (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
"‘The record shows that Hipolito Mapili during his lifetime owned a [attributed the statement in Filomena’s affidavit] 9 that she there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
parcel of unregistered land situated at Balabag, Valencia, Negros purchased the land from Hipolito Mapili on October 28, 1949 to a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
Oriental which was declared for taxation purposes in his name mistake committed by the one who assisted her in executing said (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual
under Tax Declaration No. 1419 described as follows: transferor’s affidavit.’"10 (Citations omitted) findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
‘A parcel of unregistered land situated at Balabag, Valencia, Ruling of the Court of Appeals CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
Negros Oriental. Bounded on the North by Apolonia Mapili 37.00; that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and Neither does the existence of tax declarations change our mind. It Gratia argumenti that the Tax Declarations indicate the date of
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, but a "proof that the actual or constructive possession, petitioners still cannot benefit
parties.14 Since none of these exceptions is present in this case, holder has a claim of title over the property." 30 Tax Declaration No. therefrom. Tax Declaration No. 9839, on the one hand, was
the CA’s findings of fact remain final and conclusive and may not 1419 for the year 1949 was registered in the name of the original registered in 1950 in Filomena’s name, not Aquila’s. For lack of a
be reviewed on appeal. owner, Hipolito Mapili.31 A year later, Tax Declaration No. 9839 just title,49 the ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten
was registered in the name of Petitioner Aquila’s aunt. 32 The RTC years50 cannot be applied. Moreover, only twenty-seven years had
Indeed, as found by both lower courts, the property had noted in its Decision33 that beginning 1968, the property had lapsed at the time the Complaint was filed -- a period that was
descended by succession from Hipolito Mapili to his only son, already been registered in the name of Petitioner Aquila, as can short of three years for extraordinary acquisitive prescription 51 to
Magno -- the former’s daughters having died without issue -- and be seen from Tax Declaration Nos. 18899,34 402735and 03-640-C. apply. Tax Declaration No. 18899, on the other hand, was
on to the latter’s own widow and children. These heirs took registered in Aquila’s name in 1968. At the time the Complaint
possession of the property up to the outbreak of the Second Normally, one will not pay taxes on a property not in one’s actual was filed, the elapsed period was still short of one year for
World War when they evacuated to the hinterlands, where they or constructive possession.36 Hence, being good indicia of ordinary acquisitive prescription52 to apply. The same can be said
remained until the war was over. possession in the concept of owner, the Tax Declarations in the of Tax Declaration No. 4027, filed for the year 1974, which fell
name of Petitioner Aquila may strengthen her bona fide claim of short of seven years.
It was in the 1970s when Petitioner Aquila Larena took acquisition of ownership.37 Petitioners, however, have not been
possession of the property, alleging that she had purchased it able to present the evidence needed to tack 38 the date of Laches is likewise unavailing. Defined, it is the "failure or neglect,
from her aunt, who in turn claimed to have bought it from Hipolito. possession on the property in question. for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
Aquila’s allegations were never substantiated,15and the Affidavit of which could or should have been done earlier through the
Transfer on which she had hinged her claim was even declared Supposedly, there were testimonies favorable to petitioners. They exercise of due diligence."53 It is an "omission to assert a right
by the RTC to be spurious.16Hipolito was already dead17 when the allegedly indicate that after the war, the Mapilis returned to a within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
alleged transfer was made to her aunt. Not having acquired the different house that was built, not on the property in question, but entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it." 54
property, the latter had nothing to sell. on another.39 They also showed that when the Larenas took
possession of the property, there was no opposition. 40 The RTC Assuming that petitioners took possession of the property in the
Even the unwilling co-plaintiffs’ testimonies before the RTC are did not consider these testimonies, however, but held that the early 1970s, the filing by respondents of the Complaint in 1977
hearsay. Their probative value is not based on personal preponderance of evidence was with respondents.41 1âwphi1 completely negates the assertion that the latter were negligent in
knowledge,18 but on the knowledge of some other person who asserting their claim.
was never presented on the witness stand. 19Thus, they must be Contrary to the findings of the CA,42 petitioners raise prescription
excluded, because the party against whom they were presented and laches as special defenses. They contend: "[A]ssuming WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
was deprived of the opportunity for cross-examination.20 arguendo that [respondents] have a cause of action regarding the Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
land in question, the same has been long barred by estoppel,
The hearsay rule bars the admission of evidence that has not laches and prescription[.]"43 They further argue that even if the SO ORDERED.
been given under oath or solemn affirmation and, more important, rules44 provide that defenses not pleaded in the Answer are
has not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing deemed waived, the court shall dismiss the claim if the pleadings
counsel. Cross-examination is required to test the perception, the or the pieces of evidence on record show that the action is barred
veracity and the articulateness of the out-of-court declarant, upon by prescription.45
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement
depends.21 Unfortunately for petitioners, prescription cannot be taken in their
favor because, as we mentioned earlier, there is no evidence on
Of no moment in the instant case is the issuance of a Torrens record that tacks on the property Petitioner Aquila’s date of
certificate pertaining to the disputed property.22 It "does not create possession. "Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring
or vest title,"23 but is merely an "evidence of an indefeasible and ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose order to ripen into ownership, possession must be en concepto de
name appears therein."24 Land registration under the Torrens dueño, public, peaceful and uninterrupted." 46 Coupled with the
system was never intended to be a means of acquiring court a quo’s finding that the claims of purchase were
ownership.25 Moreover, the Original Certificate of Title was never unsubstantiated, petitioners’ acts of a possessory character --
formally offered by petitioners. In its Order dated October 1, acts that might have been merely tolerated by the owner -- did not
1993,26 the RTC considered their prolonged failure to offer it in constitute possession.47 No matter how long tolerated possession
evidence27 as a waiver of their right to offer exhibits.28 In so ruling, is continued, it does not start the running of the prescriptive
the court a quo followed the rule that evidence not formally offered period.48
should not be considered.29
G.R. No. 109111 June 28, 2000 possession of the property to any person, and even assuming that Given at San Mateo, Rizal this 26th day of November,
MWSS possessed the land, it did not acquire ownership by 1990.
CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO, MONTSERRAT M. SANTIAGO, prescription.
NILDA M. IBOLEON, BELINDA MANAHAN AND JOSEFINA M. (t/s) CIPRIANO D. ROMA
CAPINPIN, petitioners, On October 24, 1988, petitioner Montserrat M. Santiago as heir of Judge 7
vs. Vicente Manahan, likewise filed an opposition. She claimed
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND METROPOLITAN ownership of a portion of the land included in the application and On January 21, 1991, respondent MWSS appealed to the Court of
WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM, respondents. presented Original Certificate of Title No. 1153 of the Register of Appeals.8
Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
PARDO, J.: Resolving the appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled differently.
On October 24, 1988, petitioner Carmelino M. Santiago also filed Reasoning: First, the property covered by the original and transfer
On appeal1 before the Court is the decision2 of the Court of an opposition, alleging ownership of a portion of the land. He certificates of title presented by petitioners merely adjoins and are
Appeals declaring respondent Metropolitan Waterworks and presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-39258 of the Registry adjacent to the property claimed by MWSS.9 Such is shown by the
Sewerage System ("MWSS") the owner of eleven (11) parcels of of Deeds of the Province of Rizal. technical descriptions in the certificates of title presented. The
land situated in San Mateo, Rizal, and allowing registration of title parcels of land covered by the certificates of title do not overlap or
to the land in its name. The Court of Appeals reversed the "partial After due hearings, on November 26, 1990, the trial court decided encroach on the property claimed by MWSS. In fact, the strips of
decision"3 of the Regional Trial Court, San Mateo, Rizal. the case in favor of petitioners. It reasoned: First, the tax land where the pipes were laid were deliberately excluded in the
declarations presented by MWSS did not prove ownership and survey plans of petitioners' property. The survey served as basis
The issue raised is factual, which we do not review. 4 However, merely constituted prima facie evidence of possession. Second, for issuance of petitioners' certificates of title. Second, the
since the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at different the transfer certificates of title presented by petitioners proved aqueducts were installed and buried long before World War II,
factual conclusions, we depart from the general rule. ownership and cannot be attacked collaterally. Third, the pipelines under untitled land, giving rise to the presumption that such land
installed by respondent MWSS were buried and hidden under the was "public land". Third, petitioners did not present compelling
ground, hence, MWSS' possession was not "open". Further, proof that the land under which the pipelines were buried were
On July 22, 1980, the MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, respondent admittedly discontinued use of the pipelines after owned by their predecessors-in-interest. There was no proof that
San Mateo, Rizal an application for registration of title under the 1968, hence, possession was not "continuous". Last, respondents' use of the land by MWSS was merely tolerated by petitioners'
torrens system of eleven (11) parcels of land, situated in San use and possession of the land was merely tolerated by predecessors. The testimonies presented by petitioners on the
Mateo, Rizal.5 petitioners and could not ripen into ownership. Thus, the decretal matter are hearsay. Last, MWSS acquired ownership by
portion of the trial court's partial decision reads: prescription. True, the pipes were "hidden" under the land.
Long before World War II, MWSS buried a 42-inch diameter steel However, it is a matter of public knowledge and judicial notice that
aqueduct pipeline under the subject parcels of land. The pipeline WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby the pipes existed and were buried there before World War II. The
drew water from the Wawa Dam in Montalban, Rizal to the Balara renders judgment in favor of the oppositors Montserrat existence of the pipelines was indicated above the ground by
Filters in Quezon City. Fifteen (15) kilometers long, it ran through Santiago, Carmelino Santiago, Nilda Manahan Iboleon, "pilapils" constructed by the adjoining landowners themselves,
the municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo and Marikina. 6 Belinda Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin and since they planted rice alongside the strips of land. Further, the
against the petitioner, as follows: fact that use of the pipes was discontinued was not relevant since
On August 21, 1987, MWSS filed with the Regional Trial Court, the pipes had remained buried under the land up to the
San Mateo, Rizal a second amended petition alleging ownership present.1âwphi1.nêt
1) Ordering the dismissal of the petition insofar as the
of the subject parcels of land. It alleged that by itself and through opposition of the said oppositors are concerned;
its predecessors-in-interest, the National Waterworks and On July 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
Sewerage System ("NAWASA") and the Metropolitan Water the dispositive portion of which reads:
District ("MWD"), it has been in "'open, continuous, exclusive and 2) Declaring the aforesaid oppositors the owners of the
notorious possession and occupation of the said parcels of land," strips of land applied for and are located inside the
oppositors' properties described in OCT 1153; TCT No. WHEREFORE, the partial decision appealed from herein
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. is REVERSED and in lieu thereof, another partial
N-39258 and TCT Nos. 178148 and 178149; and
decision is entered herein declaring applicant MWSS
On January 27, 1988, petitioners Nilda Manahan Iboleon, Belinda owner of the parcels of land applied for by them in this
Manahan and Josefina Manahan Capinpin, as heirs of Modesto 3) Sentencing the petitioner to pay the oppositors the case and granting and allowing their registration in its
Manahan, filed an opposition to the application. They alleged sum of P10,000.00 as and attorney's fee and name.
ownership of a portion of the land subject of the application. They
presented transfer certificates of title, related papers and 4) To pay the costs. Costs against oppositor-appellees.
documents to support their claim. They stated that neither they
nor their predecessors-in-interest ever ceded ownership or SO ORDERED.
 SO ORDERED. 10 (3) TCT No. 178148 — ". . . Lot 4, Psu-133565, LRC # prescription. 20 If the owner proves that the possession is
N-4438 . . . is bounded on the SE by property of the clandestine, it will not affect his possession. 21
On February 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals acting on a motion Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot 5, Psu-133565, LRC
for reconsideration filed by petitioners, clarified its decision as # N-4438 . . . is bounded on the NE by property of the Petitioners also cannot claim that MWSS abandoned its
follows: Metropolitan Water District." possession. There is no showing that by discontinuing the use of
the pipes, MWSS voluntarily renounced its claim over the land.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby clarified herein that the titled (4) TCT No. 178149 — "Lot 6, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Petitioners did not prove that the spes recuperendi was gone and
property of appellee Carmelino Santiago adjoining a Case No. 4438 . . . is bounded on the E by the properties the animus revertendi was given up.
portion of the strips of land applied for registration by of Maria Valero and Metropolitan Water District; . . . Lot
appellant MWSS in this case is excluded from the new 7, Plan Psu-133565, LRC Case No. N-4438 . . . is WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
partial decision rendered by this Court in favor of bounded on the NW by property of the Metropolitan Court of Appeals, 22 we AFFIRM the same in toto. No costs.
appellant in LRC Case No. 18-SM in lieu of that of the Water District, Lot 23, Psu-73270."
lower court appealed from in this case. SO ORDERED.
A torrens certificate of title covers only the land described therein
As to the other matters raised in appellees' motion for together with improvements existing thereon, if any, nothing
reconsideration, we find the same without merit and said more. 15 The titles presented by petitioners covering as they do
motion is denied with respect thereto. land adjacent to that claimed in MWSS' application for
registration, do not support their claim, but even defeat it.
SO ORDERED. 11
Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals that if petitioners'
12
predecessors-in-interest being members of the bar and learned in
Hence, this appeal. the law merely allowed and tolerated MWD or NAWASA's use of
the land, they would have reduced the agreement into writing for
Petitioners raise three issues 13 essentially revolving around the use in the registration of their property which at that time was still
question of whether the factual findings of the Court of Appeals unregistered. 16
are correct.
We hold that if petitioners' predecessors were truly the owners of
The appeal is not meritorious. The findings of the Court of the subject parcels of land, they would have taken steps to have
Appeals are supported by substantial evidence and are binding on the land properly titled long ago. The land was possessed by
this Court. 14 MWSS long before World War II. That was over sixty (60) years
ago! Petitioners "slept on the rights" they claim to possess. Relief
Documents proving ownership such as transfer and original is denied to a claimant whose right has become "stale" by reason
certificates of title are the legs on which petitioners' case stands. of negligence or inattention for a long period of time. 17
Premised on the relevance of these documents, the trial court
ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the proverbial legs of MWSS presented tax declarations to buttress its ownership of the
evidence are broken. While the titles presented by petitioners land. True, tax declarations do not prove ownership. However, tax
show ownership, such ownership is not of the land claimed, but declarations can be strong evidence of ownership when
over the adjoining parcels of land. The technical descriptions in accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for
the titles presented by petitioners betray them as adjacent and prescription. 18 Since MWSS possessed the land in the concept of
adjoining owners of the land claimed by MWSS for owner for more than thirty (30) years preceding the application,
registration.1avvphil The titles presented are: MWSS acquired ownership by prescription. By placing the
pipelines under the land, there was material occupation of the
(1) OCT No. ON-1153 — the property is bounded on "the land by MWSS, subjecting the land to its will and
NW., from point 10-1, by the property of Metropolitan control. 19 Petitioners cannot argue that MWSS' possession was
Water District, Lot 21, Psu-73270." not "open". The existence of the pipes was indicated above the
ground by "pilapils".

(2) TCT No. 39258 — a portion of Lot C, Psd 68750 is

adjacent or adjoining the MWSS property on the Even assuming arguendo that the pipes were "hidden" from sight,
southeast side from corner 28 to 29. petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the existence of the pipes.
The possession must be public in order to be the basis for
G.R. No. 123417 June 10, 1999 issues, together with their respective position papers. After JAIME R.
respondents' failure to file their position papers within the REMONTE
JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, prescribed period, the trial court considered the case submitted
vs. for decision. Ju
JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and dg
DANIEL CORRAL, respondents. On March 29, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court rendered e6
decision5 in favor of petitioners. It held that petitioners had been in
actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the land in Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Ligao, Albay.
question for forty-five (45) years. The decretal portion of the They questioned the trial court's jurisdiction contending that the
decision reads: case was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian Reform
PARDO, J.:
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). They alleged that petitioners
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing engaged in forum shopping and that the trial court erred in
What is before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of granting the reliefs prayed for.
decision1 of the Court of Appeals and the resolution, 2denying the plaintiffs and against the defendants in both
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion cases as follows:
for reconsideration. In its decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision
the petition for review filed before it, ruling that the cases below reversing that of the Municipal Trial Court and dismissing the
fall within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. 1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and above cases,7 ruling that these cases for damages are tenancy-
disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs related problems which fall under the original and exclusive
in the lands in question situated at San Rafael, jurisdiction of the DARAB. The court also declared that the filing of
The antecedent facts are as follows: Guinobatan; Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, while a case involving the same
issue was pending before the DARAB, amounted to forum
On January 10 and 21, 1994, 3 petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and 2) Condemning the defendants in Civil Cases shopping.
Purificacion Padilla filed two (2) cases 4 for damages with No. 481 to jointly and severally pay the plaintiffs
preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, the total amount of P8,130.00 representing the On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a petition for review8 with
Albay, against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano value of the coconuts, pilinuts and anahaw the Court of Appeals, contesting the decision of the Regional Trial
Baranda, Jr. and Daniel Corral, which were consolidated pursuant leaves and for the destroyed plants; Court. On May 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals9 rendered decision
to Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the complaints, affirming the lower's court ruling that the cases fall within the
petitioners alleged that respondents through the instigation of original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. However, it ruled
Atty. Baranda, gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts 3) Ordering the defendants in Civil Cases No.
481 jointly and severally to reimburse the that petitioners did not engage in forum shopping.
from their respective land, delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano
Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In plaintiffs the amount of P202.00 as legal
Civil Case No. 481, petitioners claimed damages amounting to expenses incurred filing this suit; On June 6, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for
P8,930.00, plus costs of suit; in Civil Case No. 482, petitioners reconsideration. 10 On June 13, 1995, they filed a supplemental
claimed P9,950.00, as damages. The court considered the cases 4) Condemning the defendants in Civil Case motion for reconsideration, 11 stressing that there was no tenancy
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and ordered No. 482 jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs relationship between the parties, as certified by the Municipal
respondents to file their answer. the total amount of P9,950.00 representing the Agrarian Reform Office (MARO). 12
value of the coconuts and anahaw leaves;
In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the On December 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the
owners of the land in question. They alleged that the torrens titles 5) Ordering the said defendants in Civil Case motions. 13
of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the registered owner. No. 482 to jointly and severally reimburse the
Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who plaintiffs the sum of P202.00 as legal expenses Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
inherited the lots upon the former's death. Respondent Jaime in filing this suit.
Occidental contended that he was a bona fide tenant of Josefina Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime
Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no Guinobatan, Albay, March 29, 1994. Occidental or Josefina Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO
annotation on the titles establishing petitioners' right over the land. certification. They argue that the civil actions for damages are not
They denied harvesting the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial
as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr. (si
gn court, not the DARAB.
ed
Thereafter, the Municipal Trial Court ordered the parties to submit ) We resolve to grant the petition.
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy- DARAB. It had, in fact, been determined in DARAB Case No.
as which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the related that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It 2413 that respondent Jaime Occidental — a defendant in one of
complaint and the character of the relief sought. 14 "Jurisdiction relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina the MTC cases — is the tenant of Josefina Opiniana-Baraclan
over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and (1st par., p. 7 of ponencia). There is at all no showing that this
in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to Jaime Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner determination by DARAB has been set aside by some higher
recover upon a claim asserted therein — a matter resolved only Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even authorities. The claim of petitioner Morta that he is the owner of
after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina the land is of no moment, for whether it is Josefina or Morta who
court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership is the owner does not affect Occidental's right as tenancy.
defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its Tenancy attaches to the land.
rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
upon the defendant." 15 The complaint filed by petitioners before ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The As I see it, the cases filed by petitioners Morta and Padilla were a
the Municipal Trial Court is an action for damages for illegal issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding clever way to defeat the agrarian law. While the cases were
gathering of anahaw leaves, pilinuts and coconuts, and the before the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof. ostensibly for damages, they were, at bottom, a fight on issues
destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations. The incident to or arising from an agrarian relationship. The first relief
respondents did not question the municipal trial court's jurisdiction At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the granted by the MTC, to wit:
in their answer. The issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first land, the case can not be considered as tenancy-related for it still
time on appeal. fails to comply with the other requirements. 1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and
Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, in the lands in question situated at San Rafael,
tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental can not claim that Guinobatan;
agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential to there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites,
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related mirrors the true nature of the controversy.
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that cognizable by the DARAB.
there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the instant petition since no
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35300 and that of the Regional challenged decision.
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. 16 In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that
the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Municipal Trial Court,
the following: Guinobatan, Albay, in Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, for
damages.
a) adjudication of all matters
involving implementation of SO ORDERED.
agrarian reform;
Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
b) resolution of agrarian
conflicts and land-tenure Davide, Jr., C.J., pls. see dissenting opinion.
related problems; and
Melo, J., I join Chief Justice Davide in his dissent.
c) approval and disapproval
of the conversion, Separate Opinions
restructuring or readjustment
of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting opinion;
industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses. I beg to dissent. I agree with both the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals that the cases before the Municipal Trial Court
involved an agrarian dispute exclusively cognizable by the
G.R. No. 123951 January 10, 2000 Lapayag, on the East by seashore, on the south by land Nelson Ranola for that 285-square meter parcel of land which he
of Gregorio Navales, and on the West by the national bought from the Rural Bank of Talisay.2 Later, a survey notification
ROMEO RANOLA AND NELSON RANOLA, petitioners, road, with an assessed value of P440.00, which is card dated 28 April 1983 was issued to petitioner Nelson Ranola
vs. presently in the possession of private respondents. by another member of the survey team.3 However, the sketch of
COURT OF APPEALS, FERMIN B. ALFORQUE, MARCELINA the property found at the back thereof included the property being
A. LALUNA, MARIA B. ALFORQUE, ALBERTO ALFORQUE, In 1967 respondents as heirs of Cesario Alforque mortgaged the claimed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque. At his instance, a sketch
BERNARDO ALFORQUE, JR., MARCELO ALFORQUE, two (2) parcels of land above-described to the Rural Bank of plan of the land, denominated as Lot No. 1102, was prepared
NICOLAS ALFORQUE, MARINA ALFORQUE and CESARIO Talisay to secure a loan, and upon their failure to pay the loan the patterned after the sketch found at the back of the card and
ALFORQUE,* respondents. bank foreclosed the mortgaged property. On 29 December 1979 describing his property as containing 531 square meters. 4
the Rural Bank of Talisay sold the foreclosed property to
BELLOSILLO, J.: defendant Nelson Ranola for P5,000.00. Consequently, on 4 September 1984 an action for quieting of title
and damages was filed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque led by
Nelson Ranola however could not take possession of the 285- Fermin Alforque against Romeo Ranola5 praying that they be
ROMEO RANOLA and NELSON RANOLA, petitioners, seek a declared the true and legal owners of Lot No. 2015 situated in
review and to reverse and/or nullify the 10 October 1995 Decision square meter cocoland, the first parcel of land herein above-
described in par (a), in view of the claim of Fermin B. Alforque, Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, containing an area of approximately 495
of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 029785, and
Regional Trial Court, Br. 23, Cebu City, declaring respondents as one of the heirs of Cesario Alforque, that the wooden house
situated on the land as well as part of the rear portion was not bounded on the north by the property of Catalino Repolido, on the
the true owners of the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration east by the property of Cesario Alforque, on the south by the
No. 029785 with an area of 495 square meters, more or less, as among the property sold by the Rural Bank of Talisay to Nelson
Ranola.1âwphi1.nêt property of Pio Navales, and on the west by the property of Rufo
well as its Resolution of 8 February 1996 denying a Navales. The Heirs of Cesario Alforque further claimed that the lot
reconsideration. was among several parcels inherited by them from Cesario
In December 1982 Nelson Ranola filed a complaint for ejectment Alforque, separate and distinct from the 285-square meter
Respondents Fermin B Alforque, Marcelina A. Luluna, Maria B. against Angeles Alforque, occupant of the house and said to be a property purchased by petitioner Nelson Ranola from the Rural
Alforque, Alberto Alforque, Bernardo Alforque Jr., Marcelo sister-in-law of the Alforques, with the Municipal Trial Court of Bank of Talisay but which petitioners had been trying to usurp
Alforque, Nicolas Alforque, Marina Alforque and Cesario Alforque Naga, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. R-164. In his amended through threats and intimidation. The Heirs likewise claimed that
are the descendants and heirs of one Cesario Alforque, a resident complaint dated 22 December 1982 Nelson Ranola alleged that their predecessor-in-interest was in continuous possession of Lot
of Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, who owned several parcels of land he was the absolute and registered owner of a 285-square meter No. 2015 in the concept of owner since 1946 and had declared it
in his barrio. In December 1960 his children herein named lot in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu covered by Tax Declaration No. in his name under Tax Declaration No. 00578,6 and that they
executed a document known as "Affidavit (Declaration of Heirs)" 17354.1Subsequently, Nelson Ranola and Angeles Alforque continued such possession from the death of Cesario Alforque
where they agreed for sentimental reasons and convenience to entered into a compromise agreement now embodied in the 28 and had it declared in their names under Tax Declarations Nos.
hold pro indiviso as their community property the following two (2) February 1984 decision of the lower court declaring that the latter 016107 in 1967,7 008605 in 19748 and 029785 in 1980.9
parcels of land belonging to their father, the deceased Cesario should vacate the premises and that the residential house found
Alforque, located in Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, and described as on the land should be given to her.
On 13 March 1985 Nelson Ranola filed his answer with
— counterclaim stating that the property he bought from the Rural
Thereupon the house was transferred to a site not far from its Bank of Talisay and covered by Tax Declaration No. 17354 had a
(a) A parcel of cocoland declared in the name of the former location, on a lot claimed by the heirs of Cesario Alforque total area of 531 square meters which included the portion being
deceased Cesario Alforque covered by Tax Declaration as among their inherited properties and which was separate and claimed by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque and identified as Lot No.
No. 10829, covering an area of 285 square meters, with distinct from the lot bought by Nelson Ranola from the rural bank. 1102, Cadastral Survey No. 747-FD, Case No. 7, and that his
seven (7) fruit-bearing coconut tress as permanent The latter thereafter filed a motion to declare Angeles Alforque ownership over the property had already been fully established in
improvement and a two (2) storey house with G.I. roofing and six (6) of the heirs of Cesario Alforque in contempt of court. the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. R-164, hence
and lumber walling and flooring, bounded on the North The trial court however denied the motion but declared that there barred by res judicata. Nelson Ranola likewise contended that the
by land of Gregorio Repolido, on the East by land of should be no contempt until the ownership or identity of the Heirs of Cesario Alforque perjured themselves when they claimed
Gregorio Repolido, on the south by national road, and on specific site on which the constructions were built was ownership over Lot No. 2015 of Cadastral Survey No. 747-D since
the West by land of Eulogio Alforo and in the possession conclusively determined. the property actually belonged to one Porferio Sasan, situated in
of private respondents, with an assessed value of Inayagan, Naga, Cebu, with an area of 4,780 square meters, with
P120.00 at least as of December 1960; and (b) A parcel During the pendency of the ejectment case, the lands in Naga, different boundaries.
of cocoland declared in the name of the deceased Cebu, were cadastrally surveyed. The heirs of Cesario Alforque
Cesario Alforque, covered by Tax Declaration No. received a survey notification card dated 16 December 1982 On 16 November 1989 private respondents herein filed a second
11023, with an area of 4,090 square meters with twenty showing at the back thereof a sketch of the property being amended complaint alleging that Lot No. 2015 of Cadastral
(20) fruit-bearing coconut trees as permanent claimed, denominated as Lot No. 2015, marked "Heirs of Cesario Survey No. 747-D had been mysteriously erased from the tracing
improvement, bounded on the North by land of Florencio Alforque," and declaring as one of the adjoining property owners cloth plan, merged with the lot of Nelson Ranola and then
designated as Lot 1102 in his name. Fortunately, the error was land bought by Nelson Ranola from the Rural Bank of Talisay is With the series of tax declarations and the deed of absolute sale,
discovered and recorded at the Bureau of Lands as "Nelson clearly shown by the series of Tax Declarations covering the lot, combined with the judicial admission of petitioner Nelson Ranola
Ranola v. Hrs. of Cesario Alforque," as evidenced by Bureau of from year 1950 and by subsequent revisions thereof in 1967, in this regard, it becomes certain that the area of Lot No. 1102 is
Lands Form No. 70 C V-4, Exh. "00-2." 1974 and 1980. Cesario Alforque had been in continuous confined only to 285 square meters. That the cadastral survey
possession in the concept of owner of the property since 1950 notification card of Lot No. 1102 issued to Nelson Ranola
On 18 June 1991 the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and declared it in his name in the same year under Tax allegedly reflected an actual area of 531 square meters is of no
finding that there were noticeable erasures of the line separating Declaration No. 00578. Upon his death, his heirs took possession moment as the deed of sale reveals that the subject of the sale is
the property of Nelson Ranola from the property of the Heirs of of the property and declared the land in their names under Tax limited only to 285 square meters, no more no less. It was that
Cesario Alforque on the original tracing cloth plan, which resulted Declarations Nos. 016107, 008605 and 029785. All these tax expanse which was sold; it was the same expanse that was
in the considerable increase of the area of Nelson Ranola's declarations consistently show that a parcel of land situated in bought.
property from 285 square meters to 531 square meters. Hence, Tuyan, Naga, Cebu, with an area of 495 square meters, bounded
the trial court declared respondents as the true owners of the on the north by Catalina Repolido, on the south by Pio Navales, Furthermore, an examination by the trial court of the sketch plan
disputed property; directed the Bureau of Lands to revise the on the east by Cesario Alforque or his heirs, and on the west by of Lot No. 1102 revealed an alteration in its preparation. There
survey of Lot No. 1102 by segregating therefrom, from points 5 to Rufo Navales or his heirs, was formerly owned by Cesario was a noticeable erasure of the line separating the property of
9, the portion belonging to the latter, and to assign a new lot Alforque and later by his heirs. While it is true that tax receipts petitioner Nelson Ranola from the property claimed by the Heirs of
number to the portion adjudicated to respondents. The claim of and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of Cesario Alforque, particularly referring to the line connecting
Nelson Ranola over the disputed land was declared invalid and ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the points 5 and 9, as was discerned from an analysis of the original
petitioners were ordered to pay jointly and severally to property.14 Coupled with the Alforques' actual possession of the tracing cloth plan, thereby resulting in the increase in the area of
respondents P20,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as property since 1946, the tax declarations become strong evidence Nelson Ranola's property and his encroachment on the 495-
attorney's fees, and to pay costs. of ownership.15 square meter property of respondents. The findings of the lower
court being conclusive unless arbitrarily arrived at, we see no
On 10 October 1995 respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the On the other hand, it remains indisputable that one of the reason to disturb them in the case before us.
Decision of the trial court,11 and on 8 February 1996 the motion to properties mortgaged by the Alforques in favor of the Rural link of
reconsider the Decision was denied. Talisay was the lot containing an area of 285 square meters and it Petitioners assail the authenticity and due execution of the survey
was the same parcel of land which that bank ultimately foreclosed notification card presented by the Heirs of Cesario Alforque as an
and sold at public auction to petitioner Nelson Ranola. The 29 inaccurate basis to subdivide Lot No. 1102 into two (2) lots. But
Petitioners now pray this Court to determine who has a better December 1979 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the bank to
right over the disputed property. Petitioners insist that the we are not persuaded. Surveyor Enrique G. Fuentes was not
Nelson Ranola also shows that the property subject of the sale presented during the trial to substantiate his claim; hence, his
appellate court erred in relying on the survey notification card contained an area of 285 square meters only. This lot was
presented by respondents as basis for its adjudication as the certification is of little weight. However we are convinced by the
originally declared in the name of Cesario Alforque under Tax declaration of Survey Chief Pilar Cabahug that the survey card
same is fake and does not exist in the records of the Bureau of Declaration No. 10829 in 1958.16 It was later cancelled by Tax
Lands. Petitioners invite our attention to the certification of 11 was not issued by the Bureau of Lands. The trial court therefore
Declaration No. 12271 in 1961,17 then by Tax Declaration No. should not have relied on the survey card in ordering the
February 1990 issued by Surveyor Enrique G. Fuentes, allegedly 016086 in 196718 and by Tax Declaration No. 008598 in 1974,19 all
a signatory on the card, that the same was null and void, 12 and the segregation of the portion marked Exhibit "T-1" in favor of
declared in the names of respondents Bernardo, Marcelina, Maria respondents, and assigning the portion marked Exhibit "T-2" to
admission of Pilar Cabahug, Chief of the Survey Section, Bureau and Fermin Alforque. When the property was transferred to the
of Lands, that the card was not issued by the Bureau of Lands. 13 petitioner Nelson Ranola. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the sketch
Rural Bank of Talisay in 1975 it was covered by Tax Declaration plan indicated the area of Lot No. 1102 to be 531 square meters,
No. 013732,20 and was thereafter transferred anew to petitioner instead of only 285 square meters, we shall order its revision.
Petitioners furthermore assert that Lot No. 2015, per existing Nelson Ranola under Tax Declaration No. 17354.21 In all these tax
cadastral survey of Naga, Cebu, on file with the Bureau of Lands, declarations, the property was invariably described as containing
actually belongs to Porfirio Sasan with an area of 4,780 square an area of 285 square meters, situated in Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Concerning the other argument of petitioners that per records of
meters and situated in Inayagan, Naga, Cebu, two (2) kilometers Cebu, and bounded on the north and east by property of Gregorio the Bureau of Lands Lot No. 2015 refers to a different property
away from Lot. No. 1102, contrary to the representations made by Repolido, on the south by the highway, and on the west by which is claimed by another, this circumstance should not be
respondents. Hence, it should be concluded that the survey Eulogio Alforo. taken against respondents since they merely relied on the sketch
notification card held by respondents showing them as owners of plan of the disputed property designating it as such.
Lot No. 2015, with an area of 495 square meters, is fake and Moreover, Nelson Ranola acknowledged the expanse of the
cannot be the basis of the division of the genuine survey of Lot property which he bought from the Rural Bank of Talisay as only However, the trial court erred in awarding P20,000.00 as moral
No. 1102 into two (2) lots. 285 square meters in the ejectment case which he filed against damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees without making a
Angeles Alforque. Such judicial admission is conclusive upon him; finding thereon. Whenever granted, the court must explicitly state
In sustaining the claim of respondents over subject property, the he is precluded from denying it. in the body of its decision, and not only in the dispositive portion
appellate court did not commit any reversible error. That the lot thereof, the legal reason for the award.22 The power of the courts
claimed by respondents is separate and distinct from the parcel of to grant damages and attorney's fees demands factual, legal and
equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
conjecture.23

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 10 October 1995
affirming the Decision of the trial court, as well as its Resolution of
8 February 1996 denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED
subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
and attorney's fees is DELETED.

Private respondents FERMIN B. ALFORQUE, MARCELINA A.

LALUNA, MARIA B. ALFORQUE, ALBERTO ALFORQUE,
BERNARDO ALFORQUE JR., MARCELO ALFORQUE,
NICOLAS ALFORQUE, MARINA ALFORQUE and CESARIO
ALFORQUE, are declared the owners pro-indiviso of the 495-
square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Tuyan, Naga, Cebu.

The Bureau of Lands is ordered to revise the survey of Lot No.

1102 as shown in the sketch plan to conform to its area of 285
square meters and thereafter to submit the revised sketch plan to
the trial court of origin. The Bureau of Lands is directed to assign
a new lot number to the portion adjudicated to respondents to be
reflected in the revised sketch plan.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioners Romeo and Nelson Ranola are directed henceforth to

cease and desist from further disturbing the ownership and
possession of respondents over the property in litigation.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124605 June 18, 1999 respondent Santiago Fontanilla, evidenced by a notarized deed of the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (herein
absolute sale, signed by Rosa. The instrument was not registered. respondents) spouses Santiago Fontanilla and Rafaela Rasing,
ENRIQUITO SERNA and AMPARO RASCA, petitioners, decreeing:
vs. In 1955, respondents constructed their house of strong materials
COURT OF APPEALS, SANTIAGO FONTANILLA, and on the lot in question, which was completed in 1957. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
RAFAELA RASING, respondents.
On December 16, 1957, Rosa's heirs, Estanislao Pajaro and his (a) Declaring the plaintiffs as the absolute and
two (2) children, Fructoso and Paciencia, executed another deed legal owners of the land in question particularly
of absolute sale over the same land in favor of respondent described and bounded and stated in paragraph
PARDO, J.: Santiago Fontanilla. two (2) of the complaint;

The petition for review on certiorari before us seeks to review the In 1978, respondents went to the United States to visit their (b) Ordering the defendants to Transfer and
decision of the Court of Appeals,1 which affirmed that of the daughter Mila Fontanilla Borillo. They stayed there until 1981. Recover [sic] Original Certificate of Title No.
Regional Trial Court, Alaminos, Pangasinan,2 declaring 139 to the plaintiffs;
respondents as the absolute and lawful owners of the land On December 20, 1978, talking advantage of respondents'
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 139 of the Registry of absence from the country, petitioners Enriquito and Amparo (c) Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the
Deeds of Pangasinan. Serna applied to the land registration court of Pangasinan for amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
registration4 of the said parcel of land in their name.
The antecedent facts are as follows: (d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs
In 1979, the land registration court approved the application, and the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary
Dionisio Fontanilla had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, pursuant to Decree N-176768, the Register of Deeds of damages;
Jose and Lorenza, all surnamed Fontanilla. Rosa married Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to
Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and petitioners. On January 10, 1980, the title was transcribed in the (e) And to pay the costs, without
Paciencia. Lorenza married Alberto Rasca and they had a registration book of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. pronouncement as to moral damages.
daughter, petitioner Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna).
Jose had a son, respondent Santiago Fontanilla (married to On May 27, 1981, respondents filed with the Court of First Done at Alaminos, Pangasinan, this 5th day of
Rafaela Rasing). Hence, the parties involved are first cousins. Instance, Branch XIII, Alaminos, Pangasinan, an action for August, 1992
reconveyance with damages, and sought the annulment of O.C.T.
Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a No. 139.5
parcel of land, containing an area of twelve thousand five hundred
eight square meters (12,508 sq. m.), located in Barangay Lucap, In the trial court, petitioners admitted that Dionisio Fontanilla
Alaminos, Pangasinan. 3 originally owned the land in dispute. However, they claimed that in
1978 they bought the property for three thousand pesos
In 1921, the property was declared in his name for taxation (P3,000.00) from Lorenza Fontanilla-Rasca. Lorenza, in turn,
purposes. In the same year, Turner Land Surveying Company traced her title from her husband, Alberto Rasca.
surveyed the land for Dionisio Fontanilla, with the agreement that
the cost of survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Petitioner Amparo said that when Dionisio failed to pay the survey
Bureau of Lands. On March 2, 1923, the Bureau of Lands costs in 1921, Turner Land Surveying Company took the property
approved the survey plan. in question as payment for services. Her father, Alberto Rasca,
redeemed the property from Turner evidenced by a deed of sale,
In 1938, for failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent which, however, Amparo could not produce in court. When her
foreclosure, Dionisio Fontanilla sold the land to his daughter, father died, Santiago Fontanilla borrowed from her mother the
Rosa Fontanilla. In 1939, Rosa began paying the real estate deed covering the transfer of the property, which Santiago did not
property tax thereon. return. She said that the property was first declared in Alberto's
name for taxation purposes in 1951. Later, the property was
ceded to her.
On August 21, 1955, for a consideration of one thousand seven
hundred pesos (P1,700.00), Rosa sold the land to her nephew,
After due trial and consideration of the evidence presented before
the trial court and in the land registration case, on June 5, 1992,
 Such reliance does not violate tsubstantive and procedural due becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or
process."11 u review.
g
a of the Court of Appeals are
As a general rule, findings of fact However, the right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or
binding and conclusive upon us, nand we will not normally disturb interest therein by adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by
such factual findings. This is because in an appeal by certiorari to actual fraud is recognized by law21 as a valid and legal basis for
this Court, only questions of law J may be raised.12 And "for a reopening and revising a decree of registration.
question to be one of law it must u involve no examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented
d by the litigants or any The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud,
of them."13 "To reiterate the distinction
g between the two types of which includes an intentional omission of a fact required by law.
questions: there is a question ofe law in a given case when the For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or
doubt or difference arises as to 6what the law is pertaining to a collateral, and the facts upon which it is based have not been
certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 14 to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently
From the decision of the trial court, both parties appealed to the deprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration
Court of Appeals. Respondents questioned the Petitioners claim ownership of the land based on the deed of sale case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration. 22
court a quo's failure to grant their claim for moral damages. On executed by Turner Land Surveying Co. in favor of Alberto Rasca,
the other hand, petitioners claimed that the trial court committed which, however, they failed to present in court. The truth or falsity "An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
serious error in the appreciation of facts and application of law of this claim is a question of fact, which, as aforesaid, is not (10) years. This means that petitioners should have enforced the
and jurisprudence. reviewable in this appeal. trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the
alleged fraudulent registration of the property."23 Discovery of the
On August 22, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision On the other hand, respondents proved that they were enjoying fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of
affirming that of the trial court. open, continuous and adverse possession of the property for the certificate of title "because registration of real property is
more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their considered a "constructive notice to all persons" and it shall be
In a resolution dated February 26, 1996,7 the Court of Appeals predecessors in interest, Dionisio Fontanilla and Rosa Pajaro. As counted "from the time of such registering, filing or entering."24
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. early as 1921, Dionisio Fontanilla was in adverse possession and
paying taxes over the land. Rosa in turn, paid taxes for the first In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in
time in 1939,15 while respondents began paying taxes in securing title to the land sometime after its registration, however,
Hence, this petition for review. 1967.16 They had their residential house built in 1955, which was an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property.
completed in 1957. In 1980, Santiago executed a tenancy Extrinsic fraud attended the application for the land registration. It
Petitioners submit these issues for resolution: (1) whether or not agreement17with Sixto Fontanilla. Until 1984, Santiago paid the was filed when respondents were out of the country and they had
the appealed decision is supported by evidence; (2) whether or taxes together with his tenant Sixto.1âwphi1.nêt no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their
not the decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.8 name.
Though mere tax declaration does not prove ownership of the
The first issue is factual, which we cannot review on property of the declarant,18 tax declarations and receipts can be Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as
appeal.9 However, petitioners make an issue of the fact that the strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by it was filed within ten (10) years from the issuance of the torrens
judge who penned the decision was not the one who presided possession for a period sufficient for prescription.19 title over the property.25
over the proceedings.
Going to the second issue that the appellate court's decision is not WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for
"We have ruled in People vs. Rayray,10 that the fact that the judge supported by law and jurisprudence, we find this to be vague and lack of merit. We AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court
who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, without merit as well. of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39922.
signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling
reason to jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per At the time material hereto, registration of untitled land was
se render his decision void. While it is true that the trial judge who No costs.1âwphi1.nêt
pursuant to Act No. 496, as amended. Later, Presidential Decree
conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain 1529, the Property Registration Decree, amended and codified
the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not laws relative to registration of property. "Adjudication of land in a SO ORDERED.
necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and
trial cannot render a valid and just decision. For a judge who was incontrovertible until the expiration of one (1) year after the entry
not present during the trial can rely on the transcript of of the final decree."20 After the lapse of said period, the decree
stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
G. R. No. 156888 November 20, 2006 xxxx family were asked8 to vacate and return possession of the subject
housing unit.
PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her
vs. capacity as heir and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondent. Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, Order[9] against respondent SBMA from ousting petitioner
for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land of Hermogenes Santiago and his family from the premises of the subject housing
DECISION Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x. unit within seventy two (72) hours from receipt. Further, it was
likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any other acts
xxxx that would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: premises they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.

The Case By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R.

Santiago is presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the
consisting of 2.5 hectares, more particularly the improvements issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.
the 3 December 20021 and 7 January 20032Orders of the On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch filed a Motion to Dismiss10 the abovementioned complaint on the
74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002 entitled Victoria M. Rodriguez, Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two
aforesaid parcels of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, argument, inter alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of
Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic Bay action.
Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the defendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over
application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and them. More particularly, defendant is using these two parcels of
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. land for its (sic) own commercial and other purposes. On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In
denying and dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover of Preliminary Injunction and complaint respectively, the RTC
The Facts stated that since the alleged right of complainant Rodriguez
possession of the property from the defendant so that she could
comply with her contractual commitments to her co-plaintiffs. stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo de
This case stemmed from a Complaint3 for Recovery of Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in
Possession of Property, filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando esse. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No.
G. Mateo and herein petitioner Pedro R. Santiago against xxxx 892,12 which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to
respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on 12 apply for registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496,
March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch [D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,13 within six months
74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a the parcels of land described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately, from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 August 1976. After such
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago was informed by purported agents or time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as evidence
Order. employees of the defendant that he should vacate the premises of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
he and his family are occupying since defendant would be Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of the
In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to RTC read:
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that: do this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner,
Victoria Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they
plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo.4 claim is still a valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator
of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order, fact that said title was never registered under Act 496, the land
dated February, 1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends Registration Act (later PD 1529), plaintiffs still claim that they have
of the Settlement of the Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y that sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner a cause of action.
Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court at Iriga Pedro R. Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent
City x x x. SBMA, availed herself of the housing privilege accorded to the The court is not convinced.
latter’s employees; that due to said privilege, she was allowed to
lease a housing unit6 inside the Subic Bay Freeport Zone; that the
xxxx lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated if the lessees are The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based
no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002, on the ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract concluded; that since evidenced by a Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law
owner of parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic) said contract was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be particularly the enabling clauses of PD 892, said type of title can
certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de an employee of respondent SBMA; and that as a consequence no longer be utilized as evidence of ownership. Verily, Spanish
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol x x x. thereof, as mandated by the SBMA Housing Policy, she and her
titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of As the appeal of respondent Santiago involves only questions of scheme of things, so to speak, his right to recover possession is
land ownership. (Citation omitted.) law, the Court took cognizance of the instant petition.16 anchored on the alleged ownership of Victoria M. Rodriguez,
which right to the claimed parcel of land is not in esse. As such,
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a Petitioner Santiago maintains that "x x x P.D. No. 892 merely petitioner Santiago is equally bound by the final and executory
cause of action simply because the court can take judicial notice disallowed the use of Spanish titles as evidence of land ownership order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of
of the applicability of PD 892 and of the pertinent decisions of the in any registration proceedings under the Torrens system. In other action.
Supreme Court to the case at bench.14 words, Spanish titles can still be used as evidence of land
ownership in any other proceedings except registration under the Nevertheless, even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous
Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was Torrens system. Since the instant case is not one for registration error, we would be hard pressed to find fault in the assailed orders
denied in the second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003. under the Torrens system, but x x x who should be entitled to the of the RTC. The present petition is substantially infirm as this
possession thereof, then the presentation as evidence of land Court had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
ownership of the Spanish title in question is permissible." As to Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that the Spanish
The Issues the non-presentation of the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos, title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
petitioner Santiago had this to say: Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to
Hence, petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort to this Court by way establish ownership over real property.
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a
Court, as amended, raising the following issues:15 defendant moving to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
action is regarded as having admitted all the allegations thereof, Santiago anchor their right to recover possession of the subject
I. at least hypothetically". (sic) The Complaint specifically alleged real property on claim of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez
that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-great-great being the sole heir of the named grantee, Hermogenes
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in Promulgated on 29 April 2005, in the aforementioned Evangelista
LANDS; his lifetime Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of Case, we categorically stated that:
land registered in his name under that certificate of title
denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The
II. Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore, successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14
deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name covering the
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE admissions, then there would be no more need, at least at this Subject Property. In the absence of an allegation in petitioners’
COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN VIEW OF THE FACT stage of the case, for the plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest complied with
THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR other words, the inadmissibility of the title, as argued by the P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do so.
CLAIMS ON THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no more need to Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the
THE SPANISH TITLE; and present this title in view of the admissions." successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their ownership of the
III. Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Subject Property in registration proceedings.
Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent SBMA,
however, stresses that "Spanish titles can no longer be Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A
countenance as indubitable evidence of land ownership by sheer or vest title, but only confirm and record title already created and
MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN ANSWER,
force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D. 892 in vested. (Citation omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in
WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED
expressly providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession
HYPOTHETICALLY PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF registration proceedings under the Torrens system, are precluded
of the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be utilized as from accepting, confirming and recording a Spanish title. Reason
OWNERSHIP.
proof or evidence of ownership x x x." therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are prevented from
accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some
In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for
A priori, before the Court goes into the resolution of the other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on
resolution by the Court the question of whether or not the RTC
fundamental issue raised by the instant petition, a critical matter or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or
committed reversible error in denying the application for the
must be dealt with – the fact that the assailed orders of dismissal registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as well as dismissing
of the complaint and denial of the motion for reconsideration, circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the existence of
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
respectively, of the RTC had already become final and executory land titles, recognized and affirmed by the courts, but would never
against Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the be recorded under the Torrens system of registration. This would
The Court’s Ruling case. It must be remembered that petitioner Santiago is merely definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause confusion and
the alleged lessee of part of the claimed parcel of land. In the
instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
eliminate. registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
registration proceeding, the applicant should present to the court Philippines.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession of the real
proof of ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the property. However, if such land registration proceeding was filed With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in
fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads: and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could no longer tandem with the Court’s pronouncements in numerous cases,
present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of i.e., Director of Forestry v. Muñoz;20 Antonio v.
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in Barroga; Republic v. Court of Appeals.;22National Power
21
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been his actual possession.
brought under the operation of the Torrens system, being subject Corporation v. Court of Appeals;23 Carabot v. Court of
to prescription, are now ineffective to prove ownership unless Appeals;24 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;25 Widows
accompanied by proof of actual possession; . . . Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of and Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;26 Director of
the Subject Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona;27 and Intestate Estate of Don
court on 29 April 1996 does not exclude them from the application Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,28 it is quite
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of of P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in taking heed
the Subject Property, then they could still present the Spanish title evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions
as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation land registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so
omitted.) or to quiet title. far as the use of Spanish titles to evidence ownership are
concerned. For it is the better practice that when a court has laid
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
possession only becomes necessary because, as the same from claiming ownership of the real property on some other basis, will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where
whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are subject to such as those provided in either the Land Registration Decree the facts are substantially the same.291âwphi1
prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his (Citation omitted.) or the Public Land Act.42 Petitioners though
ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their Complaint The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation aside from possession of the Subject Property from time principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision
omitted.) Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases
applicant for registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for
system must also submit proof that he is in actual possession of the Subject Property. securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require
the real property, so as to discount the possibility that someone identity of or privity of parties.30 This is unmistakable from the
else has acquired a better title to the same property by virtue of wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said that such
prescription. Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property,
the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and,
of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a particular dismissal of the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for actuations not only of those called upon to decide thereby but also
provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the abstract may easily this Court to address the issue of prescription of the action. 19 of those in duty bound to enforce obedience
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended thereto."31 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
with which it is associated. An apparently general provision may Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be predictability which is expected from this Court would be
have a limited application if read together with other provisions of denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the immeasurably affected and the public’s confidence in the stability
the statute. (Citation omitted.) legal rights and relations of herein parties substantially the same of the solemn pronouncements diminished.32
as those passed upon in the aforementioned 2005 Evangelista
Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the issues, and the
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that a It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
and harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute. ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to 892 which took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of
(Citation omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential any attempt to relitigate the same issue. registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and
decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them all holders of Spanish titles or grants should cause their lands
of any probative value as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set covered thereby to be registered under the Land Registration Act
a deadline for the filing of applications for registration The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to (Act No. 496) within six months from the date of effectivity of the
of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system (i.e., six months precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is said Decree or until 16 August 1976.33 If not, non-compliance
from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the Spanish well entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, to wit: therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.
titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling 200338 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City,
that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002, are hereby
evidence of land ownership.34 And, without legal or equitable title AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.
to the subject property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo
and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago lacked the personality to claim SO ORDERED.
entitlement to possession of the same. Title to real property refers
to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the
right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he
can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.35

Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of

cause of action.

Anent the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion

to Dismiss, respondent SBMA already admitted all the allegations
of the complaint such that the question of whether or not the
subject Spanish Title was inadmissible or not had become
immaterial.

We do not agree.

Basic is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on

lack of cause of action, the question posed to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegation of facts made in
the complaint to constitute a cause of action. It is beside the point
whether or not the allegations in the complaint are true, for with
said motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming arguendo that the
facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the
court to render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint.

Consequently, by anchoring their right to recover possession of

property on the subject Spanish title that has been divested of any
legal force and effect in establishing ownership over the subject
real property, the complaint filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez,
Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago was
correctly dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action.

In fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the

Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The issue has been
settled and this Court’s final decision in the said cases must be
respected.36 This Court’s hands are now tied by the finality of the
abovementioned decisions. The Court has no alternative but to
deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED. The assailed 3 December 200237 and 7 January
G.R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999 No costs. RO-6316 (18422) in the name of the original registered
owners.
JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner, The Facts
vs. Defendant Jessie Pisueña filed a petition for the
HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR The present case is rooted in an action for recovery of (1) surrender of withheld owner's duplicate certificate of title
Represented by Salvador Upod and Dolores possession and ownership of a parcel of land, as well as (2) a under Special Case No. 4610 against Salvador
Bautista, respondents. sum of money and damages. Before the RTC of Roxas City on Upod, et. al. for [Quieting] of Title and Damages with Writ
May 15, 1989, this case was originally filed against herein of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before this court
PANGANIBAN, J.: petitioner, Jessie Pisueña, by herein respondents, the heirs of then presided by Hon. Odon C. Yrad, Jr. who dismissed
Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar represented by Salvador Upod said complaint on August 27, 1984.
Real property acquired during marriage is presumed to be and Dolores Bautista.4
conjugal. Such prima facie presumption, however, can be Plaintiffs' evidence further show[s] that Salvador Upod
overturned by a cadastral courts' specific finding, which has long The CA adopted the trial court's summation of the facts as and Dolores Bautista filed a complaint for ejectment with
become final, that the lot in question was paraphernal in follows:5 damages against defendant Jessie, Pisueña and
character. The title to the entire property shall pass by operation Norberto Tugna before, the Municipal Court of Ivisan as
of law to the buyer once the seller acquires title over it by Civil Case No. 94.
The lot in dispute, known as Lot 1201, Cadastral 228 of
hereditary succession, even if at the time of the execution of the the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located at Barangay
deed of sale, the seller owned only a portion of the property. Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of Capiz, is a xxx xxx xxx
registered land in the name of Petra Unating married to
The Case Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of Title No. Plaintiffs [respondents herein] contend that during the
18422, containing an area of 83,536 square meters, lifetime of the registered owners, Petra Unating and
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set more or less. Petra Unating died on October 1, 1948 Aquilino Villar, they enjoyed the absolute ownership and
aside the February 26, 1997 Decision of the Court of while Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953. The possession of Lot No. 1201. However, sometime in 1950
Appeals1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39955,2 as well as its February spouses had two [legitimate] children, namely Felix Villar (after the death of Petra Unating on October 1, 1948)
12, 1998 Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed and Catalina Villar. Felix Villar died on October 24, 1962, Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement
Decision affirmed in toto the ruling3 of the Regional Trial Court while Catalina Villar died on February 21, for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra involving the
(RTC) of Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-5462, which disposed as 1967.1âwphi1.nêt swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of
follows: around four (4) hectares. It was agreed that the area of
For the purpose of this case, Felix Villar is represented around three (3) hectares shall further be developed into
by Dolores Villar Bautista, the eldest of his four children a fishpond while about one (1) hectare shall be
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of
renders judgment: while Catalina Villar is represented by Salvador Villar
Upod, the eldest of her three (3) children, all as plaintiffs Agustin Navarra. Whatever excess there was in the
[herein respondents]. capital so invested shall be used to make the fishpond
1. Declaring the "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" by Felix productive. Parties agreed that the net income after
Villar and Catalina Villar in favor of Agustin Navarra, deducting expenses shall be divided equally between
defendant's predecessor-in-interest, as valid with respect Defendant [herein petitioner], Jessie Pisueña, is the son- Aquilino Villar and his co-heirs on one hand and Agustin
to the one-half share of the whole Lot. No. 1201, in-law of Agustin Navarra who was once a [m]unicipal Navarra on the other. The upland portion of the land was
Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz, located [m]ayor of the Municipality of Ivisan. Agustin Navarra not included in the transaction, hence it remained in the
at Barangay Cabugao, Municipality of Ivisan, Province of died on October 30, 1958. possession of the plaintiffs. While alive, Agustin Navarra,
Capiz, which is registered in the name of Petra Unating who managed the partnership, religiously gave Aquilino
married to Aquilino Villar under Original Certificate of The land in question was a subject of court litigations Villar and his co-heirs their share. This arrangement
Title No. RO-6316 (18422) while the other half belongs between Dolores Bautista and Salvador Upod on one continued until Aquilino Villar died on January 14, 1953.
to the plaintiffs as Heirs of Aquilino Villar; hand, and defendant Jessie Pisueña on the other. Thus, Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership
when Salvador Upod filed a petition for reconstitution of was delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix Villar and
2. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merits; its title in Reconstitution Case No. 1408 before Branch I, Catalina Villar.
then Court of First Instance of Capiz, defendant Jessie
Pisueña filed his opposition. Nevertheless, the title was Since Agustin Navarra died in 1958, Felix and Catalina
3. Dismissing parties' claim for damages and attorney's reconstituted in the name of the registered owners
fees. Villar repossessed the land in question. They maintained
pursuant to the resolution of the court dated August 6, their possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar
1980 and it now has a reconstituted title under OCT No. died. Thereafter, the children of Felix and Catalina Villar
 continued the possession of their predecessor-in-interest considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still reconstitution of the certificate as it stood at the
until the defendant disturbed their possession sometime alive. It likewise held that the respondents, as heirs of Aquilino time of its loss or destruction and should not be
in 1974. However, in 1975, they regained physical Villar, were entitled to his one-half share in the disputed lot. stretched to include later changes which alter or
possession of the disputed area. From 1975, there were affect the title of the registered owner. The
intermittent disturbances and intrusions of their physical Before the Court of Appeals, Dolores Bautista, and Salvador original registered owner of Lot 1201 being
possession of the land in dispute by the defendant Upod assailed the trial court's ruling upholding the validity of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. [That
particularly the fishpond portion consisting of about four the Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Jessie Pisueña, on the other t]he title should be reconstituted in the same
(4) hectares more or less which resulted [in] the filing of hand, questioned the court's conclusion that the subject lot was names and findings of said court as to the
cases against one and the other as earlier stated. conjugal. He claimed that it was paraphernal, and that the Deed of ownership of the land as paraphernal property
Sale transferred the whole lot to Agustin Navarra, his of Petra Unating is an obiter. It therefore did not
Sometime in 1982, the defendant in the company of predecessor-in-interest. decide whether Lot 1201 is a paraphernal or a
several men including policemen, wrested physical conjugal property of the registered owners.
possession from the plaintiffs which possession of the Ruling of the Court of Appeals
defendant continued up to the present. Hence, this We further agree with the lower court when it held that
complaint for its recovery particularly the fishpond "in the absence [o]f any evidence o[f] any system [o]f
portion. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling in toto, holding property relation between Petra Unating and Aquilino
that the disputed lot belonged to the conjugal partnership of Petra Villar, it is presumed that it is one of conjugal
Unating and Aquilino Villar, viz.: partnership." Besides, it appears that Lot 1201 was
On the other hand, defendant counters that the whole
land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar acquired during the marriage of the Spouses Petra
to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. The contract in Anent the first issue, defendant argues that Lot. 1201 Unating and Aquilino Villar, since the Original Certificate
Spanish captioned "ESCRITURA DE VENTA was a paraphernal property of Petra Unating. In support of Title indicates that Lot 1201 was registered in the
ABSOLUTA" to evidence such sale was duly notarized of his argument, he mentions the decision of the Court of name of Petra Unating, married to Aquilino Villar. Thus,
by Jose Villagracia, Notary Public, and was entered in First Instance of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408, the property is presumed conjugal.
his Notarial Register as Document No. 517; Page 7; where in the dispositive portion thereof, said court
Book IV; Series of 1949. ordered the reconstitution of the Original and Owner's In resolving the question of presumption of conjugality,
copy of the Original Certificate of Title covering Lot 1201 the Supreme Court had occasion to rule that:
"in the name of Petra Unating, 40 years old, married to
On December 31, 1968, which [was] more than ten (10) Aquilino Villar, Filipino and residents of Ivisan, Capiz,
years after the death of Agustin Navarra on October 30, having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita The presumption is a strong one. As stated
1958, his heirs executed a Deed of Extra Judicial Argamaso." He further argues that the mention of the in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil.
Partition and Deed of Sale of the land in question in favor name Aquilino Villar in the certificate of title is merely 629, 639), "it is sufficient to prove that the
of the Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. descriptive of the civil status of Petra Unating and the property was acquired during the marriage in
The document was notarized by Jose P. Brotarly, Notary same could not convert the property into a conjugal one. order that the same may be deemed conjugal
Public, and docketed in his notarial register as Document property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 Phil
No. 409; Page 83; Book No. VI; Series of 1968. From the 494, 504), we stated, "proof of acquisition of the
time of the sale up to the present, the fishpond portion We are not persuaded. The lower court rejected the property in dispute during the marriage suffices
was in the possession of the spouses Jessie Pisueña statement of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in to render the statutory presumption operative."
and Rosalie Navarra. However, the upland portion is in Reconstitution Case No. 1408 that Lot 1201 was (Mendoza vs. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154; emphasis
the possession of Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. We agree supplied).
by mere tolerance of the defendant. The latter denies with the lower court when it found the phrase "having
any partnership agreement o[n] the fishpond portion by inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso"
as a mere obiter, a finding of fact which we find no Additionally, defendant Pisueña, who brought up the
Agustin Navarra, their predecessor-in-interest, and the question of Lot 1201 being the paraphernal property of
plaintiffs. justifiable reason to set aside. It must be considered that
the authority of the Court of First Instance of Capiz to Petra Unating failed to adduce convincing and concrete
declare Lot 1201 as having been inherited by Petra evidence that would rebut the presumption of conjugality
xxx xxx xxx Unating from her mother is doubtful. We quote the of the subject lot. Moreover, it is settled that registration
pertinent ruling of the lower court, thus: alone of the property in the name of one of the spouses
On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot does not destroy the conjugal nature of the property.
was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino (Mendoza vs. Reyes, supra and Bucoy vs. Paulino, 23
Reconstitution of a certificate of title [denotes] SCRA 248).
Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin restoration of the instrument which is supposed
Navarra could be considered valid. The court, however, ruled that to have been lost or destroyed in its original
its validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating, form and condition. It is limited to the
The Court of Appeals also rejected Salvador Upod's attack on surrender of the owner's duplicate provided for under II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the Escritura de Venta Absoluta, reasoning that the Deed of Sale Section 107 of P.D. 1529 or Section 112 of Act 496 is Lot 1201 belongs to the conjugal [partnership] of Petra
was duly notarized and that no evidence was presented to rebut unavailing as there [exist] serious conflicting claims of Unating and Aquilino Villar.
its due execution, validity and admissibility as evidence. ownership; and 3) the ordinary civil action for quieting of
Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the respondents were title to Lot 1201 is not the proper remedy, since it is only The Court's Ruling
aware of the nature and the content of the assailed Deed, and the registered owner of the property affected who can
that they did not object to its translation given in the trial court. sue as plaintiff. Clearly, the dismissal of said petition did
not have any effect on the present case. The Petition is meritorious.
Likewise, the CA debunked Upod's contention that Pisueña's
cause of action had prescribed. It ruled: xxx xxx xxx First Issue:

On the fourth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod contends However, we agree with the plaintiffs' statement that the Paraphernal or Conjugal?
that defendant Pisueña could no longer enforce his right law applicable is the Old Civil Code, considering that
since Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that an Petra Unating died in 1948 before the effectivity in 1950 Both the CA and the RTC held that the disputed lot was conjugal
action based upon a written contract must be brought of the New Civil Code. Suffice it to say that we agree and dismissed, as obiter, the phrase "having inherited said lot
within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. with the lower court when it ruled citing Prades from her [Petra Unating's] mother, Margarita Argamaso" found in
vs. Tecson (49 Phil 479) and Rodriguez v. Borromeo (43 the dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of First
The contention is not meritorious. It is obvious that the Phil 479) that "when a spouse dies and the conjugal Insurance (CFI) of Capiz in Reconstitution Case No. 1408. They
above-mentioned article does not apply in the case at assets are not liquidated, a co-ownership over said explained that the CFI had no authority to include the phrase,
bench since defendant Pisueñas [was] not the one who assets may be formed among the surviving spouse and because the only objective of reconstitution was to "restore the
filed the complaint. Furthermore, defendant is in the heirs of the decedent." Absent any showing that certificate covering the property as it stood at the time of its loss
possession of the fishpond portion of the property in there are debts and charges against the conjugal assets, or destruction, and should not be stretched to include later
dispute. Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the we therefore declare Aquilino Villar, the surviving spouse changes which alter of affect the title of the registered owner." 7
aforementioned article is applicable, the claim of of Petra Unating, as the owner of the undivided one-half
defendant Pisueña has not yet prescribed. Defendant of their conjugal property, while their children, Felix and We do not agree. It must be emphasized that the dispositive
Pisueña obtained his right over Lot 1201 by virtue of the Catalina Villar, are the owners of the other undivided portion of the 1930 Decision, which was rendered by the same
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Sale dated half, pursuant to Article 1426 of the Old Civil Code. . . . CFI of Capiz acting as a cadastral court, already contained the
December 31, 1968. In 1974, within the ten year questioned phrase. Therefore, it cannot be said that the CFI in
prescriptive period, he filed his Answer to the complaint In all, the CA agreed with the trial court that the disputed lot 1980 exceeded its authority when it ordered the reconstitution, in
for ejectment filed by plaintiffs[,] (Exh. "G") raising therein should be divided equally between the heirs of Petra Unating on Petra Unating's name, of the original certificate of title covering
his ownership over Lot 1201. Also, he filed his the one hand, and Jessie Pisueña on the other. the disputed lot or in stating therein that she had inherited it from
Opposition (Exh. "U") to the petition for reconstitution her mother. After all, such disposition was copied from the same
filed by plaintiff Salvador Upod. To our minds, this action Asserting full ownership over the disputed property and claiming court's 1930 Decision, as evidenced by an authentic copy of it on
and [the] leadings filed by defendant Pisueña interrupted that the CA erred in ruling that Felix and Catalina could have sold file with the Bureau of Lands in Capiz.
the prescriptive period. only their one-half share in the property, Petitioner Pisueña filed
this Petition for Review.6 Cadastral proceedings are proceedings in rem; like ordinary
Anent the fifth issue, plaintiff Salvador Upod posits that registration proceedings, they are governed by the usual rules of
the trial court failed to consider the decision of this court Issues practice, procedure and evidence.8 A cadastral decree and a
dated January 31, 1985 in AC-UDK Sp. No. 2273 which certificate of title are issued only after the applicants prove that
passed upon the defendant-appellant's rights over the they are entitled to the claimed lots, all parties are heard, and
subject property. Petitioner ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following specific evidence is considered.
errors:
A perusal of this Court's decision in said case (Exh. "P") Thus, the finding of the cadastral court that Petra Unating
shows that, contrary to plaintiffs['] allegation, this Court I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the inherited the lot in question from her mother cannot be dismissed
thru Mr. Justice Purisima did not pass upon the rights of ruling of the lower court that the phrase "having inherited as an obiter, which is "an observation by the court not necessary
defendant Pisueña over Lot 1201. We take note that said lot from her mother Margarita Argamaso" [i]s a mere to the decision rendered."9 The conclusion of the cadastral court
while the "petition for Review" of the defendant was obiter. was found in the dispositive portion of its Decision, and it was
dismissed by this Court, the dismissal was anchored on material to the nature of Petra Unating's ownership of the lot.
the ground that 1) Petition for Review was not the Furthermore, it was based on the evidence presented by the
appropriate remedy; 2) the summary proceedings for the parties and considered by the said court. In any event, it must be
pointed out that the Decision became final a long time ago, and a the nature of Exhibit "1". As proof thereof, they even The aforequoted article was applied in Llacer v. Muñoz,18 Estoque
final judgment in a cadastral proceeding, or any other in questioned the defendant on the subject document. v. Pajimula,19 Bucton v. Gabar20 and Quijada v.Court of
21
rem proceeding for that matter, is binding and conclusive upon the Importantly, when required by the court to comment on Appeal. In each of these cases, the Court upheld the validity of
whole world.10 Therefore, the lot in dispute can properly be the English translation of Exhibit "1" (p. 316, records) the sale by one who previously did not have, but who
considered as a paraphernal property of Petra Unating.11 plaintiffs did not bother to comment giving rise to the subsequently acquired, title to the property sold.
presumption that the translation submitted was correct
Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are (p. 340, records). Hence, the court a quo did not err in Thus, although Felix and Catalina Villar were not yet the owners
presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima faciepresumption admitting the Escritura de Venta Absoluta.13 of the remaining one third of the disputed lot when they sold to
cannot prevail over the cadastral court's specific finding, reached Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, they became its owners
in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra Furthermore, the respondents were not able to impugn the due upon their father's death on January 14, 1953. Pursuant to Article
Unating from her mother. Noteworthy is the fact that the parties do execution and validity of the notarized Deed. 1434, the title to the lot passed to Agustin Navarra. 22 It must be
not assail the validity of the cadastral court's Decision. The 1980 noted that at the time Felix and Catalina executed the Deed of
reconstitution of the title to the lot in the name of "Petra Unating, Neither are we persuaded by Upod's argument that the Sale covering the disputed lot, they intended to sell the entire lot,
40 years old, married to Aquilino Villar, Filipino and resident of petitioner's right has prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil not just their interest therein, as can be gleaned from a pertinent
Ivisan, Capiz, having inherited said lot from her mother Margarita Code.14 It is undisputed that he was already in possession of the portion of the Deed, the English translation of which reads:
Argamaso . . ." was notice to the world, including her heirs and fishpond when the present case was filed.
successors-in-interest, that it belonged to Petra as her xxx xxx xxx
paraphernal property. Thus, the words "married to" were merely
descriptive of Petra Unating's status at the time the lot was Petitioner and His Wife Are Owners of the Disputed Lot
awarded and registered in her name.12 DESCRIPTION
As already shown, the disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra
Second Issue: Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her A piece of mangrove and coconut grove land (Lot. No.
demise in 1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her 1201 of Cadastre of Ivisan), and its improvements,
children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino situated in the Municipality of Ivisan, Capiz; that is
Efficacy of the Escritura de Venta Absoluta Villar.15 The two children were entitled to the two-thirds of their bounded N to Dapdap Creek; E. to Lot No. 1196,
mother's estate,16 while the husband was entitled to the remaining Sunsunan Creek; and S to Lots Nos. 1239 and 1151;
Petitioner Jessie Pisueña traces his claim over the disputed lot to one-third.17 and W to Dapdap Creek YB B.M. No. 21; and containing
his father-in-law, Agustin Navarra, who in turn acquired it on an area of Eighty Three Thousand Five Hundred Thirty
February 4, 1949 from Felix and Catalina Villar, Petra Unating's By virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina Six square meters (83,536 sq. mts.) more or less;
children. His claim is evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, declared under Tax No. 609 and valued/appraised at
written in Spanish, captioned Escritura de Venta Absoluta. Private their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, P490.00.
Respondent Salvador Upod, on the other hand, asserts that both they could not have disposed of their father's share in the same
the trial and the appellate courts erred in admitting the Deed, property at the time, as they were not yet its owners. At the most, xxx xxx xxx
citing Section 33, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which provides: being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their
father's share. And finally, we make known, that from/on this date we
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be hand over the said property, its possession/holding and
admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one- absolute dominion of the aforesaid piece of land to the
translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption third share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina's inchoate buyer, namely Mr. Agustin Navarra, his heirs and
of the proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them assignees, free from liens and liabilities/obligations, and
to have such translation prepared before trial. the title to their father's share and, consequently, to the entire lot. of such title we promise and assure to defend now and
Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article always against all possible just claims/demands and
We do not agree. Instead, we uphold the Court of Appeals' 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the claimants or those that may present them.
disquisition, which we quote: time of Aquilino's death in 1953. This provision reads:
xxx xxx x x x23
The assertion is without merit. The aforementioned rule When a person who is not the owner of the thing sells or
is not always taken literally so long as there was no alienates or delivers it, and later, the seller or grantor Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of
prejudice caused to the opposing party (People v. acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of the whole of Lot No. 1201 became vested in Jessie Pisueña and
Salison, G.R. No. 115690, February 20, 1996). The law to the buyer or grantee. his wife.
records show that there was no prejudice caused to the
plaintiffs who appear to be familiar with the contents or
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife,
Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot. No.
1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadastral of Ivisan, Capiz. The
Register of Deeds of Capiz is AUTHORIZED to cancel the
Original Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and to
issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Spouses
Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25660 February 23, 1990 GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA, No. 76, L.R.C. Record No. N-4251. On July 26,1951,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo filed an amended
LEOPOLDO ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, application for registration. After hearing, the land was registered
VENCILAO, MAURO RENOBLAS, TELESFORO BALONDIA, F TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS NAGANAS, PASTOR under Original Certificate of Title No. 400 (pp. 84-85, Record on
ELIX ABANDULA, FAUSTOGABAISEN, ISIDORO ELIVERA, R ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, Appeal; p. 7, Rollo).
AYMUNDO BONGATO, MARTIN ROLLON, EUSTAQUIO vs.
MEDANA, DOROTEO ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAURA, HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First On October 9, 1962, a complaint for reconveyance of real
MACARIO GEPALAGO, GREGORIO ITAOC, ALEJANDRO Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, The Provincial Sheriff, Province properties with damages and preliminary injunction, Civil Case
RENOBLAS, SIMEON BARBARONA, GREGORIO RENOBLAS, of Bohol, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. al., respondents. No. 1533, (pp. 2-19, Record •n Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) was filed by
FRANCISCO ASOY, TEOFILA GUJELING, FABIAN VILLAME, plaintiffs-appellants before the Court of First Instance of Bohol. It
VICENTE OMUSORA, PEDRO BALORIA, GREGORIO ITAOC, Lord Marapao and Lorenzo A. Lopena for petitioners. was alleged that they are the lawful owners of their respective
TERESITA ITAOC, FAUSTINO ITAOC, FORTUNATO ITAOC, parcels of land including the improvements thereon either by
FLORENTINA GEMENTIZA, RESTITUTA OMUSORA, ZOILA Roque R. Luspo for respondents. purchase or inheritance and have been in possession publicly,
OMUSORA, FELISA OMUSORA, ROBERTO HAGANAS, continuously, peacefully and adversely under the concept of
FELISA HAGANAS, FERMIN HAGANAS, VICTORIANO owners for more than thirty (30) years tacked with the possession
HAGANAS, JULIA SEVILLA, ROMAN MATELA, MARCELA of their predecessors-in-interest. However, those parcels of land
MATELA, DELFIN MATELA, PELAGIO MATELA, ROBERTA were included in the parcels of land applied for registration by the
MATELA, PROCOPIO CABANAS and SERAFINA MEDIALDEA, J.: heirs of Juan Reyes, either by mistake or fraud and with the
CABANAS, plaintiff-appellants, intention of depriving them of their rights of ownership and
vs. On February 7, 1974, We resolved to allow the consolidation of possession without their knowledge, not until the last part of 1960
TEODORO VANO, JOSE REYES, ROSARIO REYES, SALUD when the defendants-appellees, through their agents, attempted
these three cases, considering that they involve the same parties
OGILVE BELTRAN, AMALIA R. OGILVE, FLORA VDA. DE and parcels of land: (1) G.R. No. L-25660---this is an appeal from to enter those parcels of land claiming that they now belong to the
COROMINAS, JESUSA REYES, LOURDES COROMINAS the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol (now Regional heirs of Juan Reyes. To the complaint, the defendants-appellees
MUNOZ, JUAN COROMINAS, LOURDES C. SAMSON Trial Court)1 dated May 12,1964 dismissing the cases of some of moved to dismiss on two grounds (pp. 19-22, Record on Appeal;
CEBALLOS, SOLEDAD C. SAMSON RAMA, DOLORES V. p. 7, Rollo), namely: (1) for lack of cause of action and (2) the
the plaintiffs-appellants and its order dated August 25, 1965
GARCES FALCON, JAIME GARCES, JOAQUIN REYES, and cause of action is barred by prior judgment.
denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to declare
PEDRO RE R. LUSPO, defendants- appellees.
the defendants- appellees in default; (2) G.R. No. L32065---this is
a petition for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of On July 20, 1963, the court a quo issued an order denying
G.R. No. L-32065 February 23,1990 Bohol dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of its prior order defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss (pp. 29-30, Record on
dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt; (3) G.R. Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). However, acting on the motion to set aside
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO No. L-33677--- this is a petition for certiorari with mandamus and such order (pp. 31-32, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), on May 12,
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, prohibition of the order of the Court of First Instance of Bohol 1964, the same court issued another order reversing itself partially
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO dated June 2, 1971 directing the demolition of the houses of the (p. 56, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo), the dispositive portion of
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO petitioners. which reads:
GABAISIN, ALBINO RENOBLAS, EUSTAQUIO MENDANIA,
SIMEON BARBARONA, TELESFORO BALONDA, FELIX On February 15, 1988, We resolved to require the parties to WHEREFORE, the cases herein of the plaintiffs
ABANDOLA, SATURNINA GEPILAGO, TEOFILA GOHILING, manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting Alejandro Renoblas, Fausto Cabaisan, Fabian
TOMAS REAMBONANSA, MARCOS HAGANAS, PASTOR these cases, or supervening events have transpired which render Villame, Gregorio Ita-oc, Faustino Ita-oc,
ASNA and MAURO RENOBLAS, petitioners, these cases moot and academic or otherwise substantially affect Fortunato Ita-oc, Roberto Haganas, Felisa
vs. the same. On March 25, 1988, the petitioners filed an ex Haganas, Fermin Haganas, Victorians
HONORABLE PAULINO S. MARQUEZ, Judge, Court of First parte manifestation that they are still very much interested in the Haganas, Julia Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Roberto
Instance of Bohol, Branch 1, and MARIANO OGILVE, et. just prosecution of these cases. Matela, Procopio Cabañas and Vicente
al., respondents. Amosora are hereby dismissed on the ground
The antecedent facts are as follows: of res adjudicata with these plaintiffs paying
G.R. No. L-33677 February 23, 1990 proportionately eighteenth forty one (18/41) of
the costs, but the petition to dismiss the case of
G.R. No. 25660 the rest of the plaintiffs is hereby denied.
LEOPOLDO VENCILAO, SOFRONIO ROLLON, AURELIO
ELIVERA, FRANCISCO PAGAORA, MARTIN ROLLON, On April 1, 1950, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an
GRACIANO MAHINAY, GERARDO ELIVERA, GREGORIO SO ORDERED.
application for registration of the parcels of land allegedly
ITAOC, ISIDRO ELIVERA, DEMOCRITO ELIVERA, FAUSTO inherited by them from Juan Reyes, in Land Registration Case
On May 28,1964, the plaintiffs-appellants whose cases were The appeal is not impressed with merit. fully and fairly adjudicated. Interest republicae ut sit finis
dismissed filed a motion for reconsideration (pp. 57- 58, Record litium (Carandang vs. Venturanza, G.R. No. L41940, Nov.
on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo). On July 24, 1964, the plaintiffs-appellants The plaintiffs-appellants claim that no evidence was presented by 21,1984,133 SCRA 344). To ignore the principle of res
whose cases were not dismissed filed a motion to declare the the defendants-appellees that they (plaintiffs-appellants) were judicata would be to open the door to endless litigations by
defendants-appellees in default for failure to file their answer with notified of the date of the trial on the merits of the application for continuous determination of issues without end (Catholic Vicar
the time prescribed by law (pp. 68-75, Record on Appeal; p. 7, registration nor were they given copies of the decision of the trial Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
Rollo). On the other hand, defendants-appellees filed their court. Likewise, they contend that res judicata is not applicable in G.R. Nos. 80294- 95, Sept. 21, 1988, 165 SCRA 515).
opposition to the motion for reconsideration praying that the an action for reconveyance.
complaint as regards the rest of the plaintiffs-appellants be Thus, when a person is a party to a registration proceeding or
likewise dismissed (pp. 75-80, Record on Appeal; p. 7 Rollo). when notified he does not want to participate and only after the
The allegations that no evidence was presented by the
defendants-appellees that plaintiffs-appellants were notified of the property has been adjudicated to another and the corresponding
On August 25, 1965, the court a quo issued an order in date of the trial on the merits of the application for registration nor title has been issued files an action for reconveyance, to give due
connection therewith (pp. 82-98, Record on Appeal; p. 7, Rollo) were they given copies of the decision of the trial court are new course to the action is to nullify registration proceedings and
denying all motions. issues. It is a well-settled rule that, except questions on defeat the purpose of the law.
jurisdiction, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
The case is now before Us with the following as assignments of been raised in the court below and it is within the issues made by In dismissing the cases of some of the petitioners, the court a
errors (p. 3, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants; p. 9, Rollo), to wit: the parties in their pleadings (Cordero vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 36789, quo meticulously discussed the presence of all the elements
July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532). The other contention that res of res judicata (pp. 36-38; pp. 42-54, Record on Appeal; p. 7;
I judicata is not applicable in an action for reconveyance is not Rollo):
plausible. The principle of res judicata applies to all cases and
proceedings, including land registration and cadastral There is no question that in that Registration
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING proceedings (Republic vs. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35376, September
THE CASES OF THE PLAINTIFFS- Proceedings, LRC Record No. N-4251, Land
11, 1980, 99 SCRA 65; Paz vs. Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Penaloza Registration Case No. N-76, the Court of First
APPELLANTS WHOSE NAMES ARE vs. Tuazon, 22 Phil. 303).
ALREADY MENTIONED ABOVE ON THE Instance of the province of Bohol had
ALLEGED GROUND THAT THEIR CASES jurisdiction of the subject matter, that said court
ARE BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT OF It is a settled rule that a final judgment or order on the merits, had rendered a judgment on the merit that was
RES ADJUDICATA. rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of terminated in the Court of Appeals since
the parties, is conclusive in a subsequent case between the same December, 1958, and that decision is now final
parties and their successors in interest litigating upon the same with a decree of registration over the parcels of
II thing and issue, regardless of how erroneous it may be. In order, land described in the application issued to the
therefore, that there may be res judicata, the following requisites applicants.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE must be present: (a) The former judgment must be final; (b) it
MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the The subject matter (the parcels of land) now
WHOSE CASES ARE NOT DISMISSED TO subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the claimed by the plaintiffs in this case at bar are
DECLARE THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second the same, or at least part of the parcels already
IN DEFAULT FOR HAVING FAILED TO FILE actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of adjudicated registration in that registration case
THEIR ANSWER WITHIN THE TIME action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Ramos vs. Pablo, to the persons, some of them are made
PRESCRIBED BY LAW. G.R. No. 53692, Nov. 26,1986, 146 SCRA 24). defendants in this case before us. The cause of
action between the two cases are the same,
On August 12, 1966, a resolution was issued by this Court The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of res judicata is that ownership of these parcels of land, though the
dismissing the appeal as regards the second issue because the parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more forms of action are different, one is an ordinary
order appealed from was merely interlocutory, hence, not than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and Land Registration and the other is
appealable (pp. 35-38, Rollo). determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it reconveyance.
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and
On August 17, 1988, petitioners Alex Abandula, Mauro Renoblas, those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao vs. Court of 'It is settled that
Simeon Barbarona, Fabian Villame, Macario Gepalago, Eustaquio Appeals, G.R. No. 61752, Sept. 28,1984,132 SCRA 302). The notwithstanding the difference
Medana, Julia Sevilla, Gregorio Itaoc, Francisco Asoy and Martin doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom in the form of two actions, the
Rollon filed a motion to withdraw their appeal on the ground that and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it doctrine of res adjudicata will
they are now the absolute owners and possessors of their is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to apply where it appears that
respective parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 1533. litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once the parties in effect were
 litigating for the same thing. A Phil. 487-1 Romero vs. Franco, 54 Phil. 744; Catalino Orellena, Manuel Mondano, Angel
party can not, by varying the Valdez, et a]. vs. Penida No. L- 3467, July 30, Mondano, Victoriano Bolalo, Eugenio del
form of action, escape the 1951). Rosario, Verinici Bayson, Filomeno Ruiz,
effects of res Apolonio Horboda, the Heirs of Gregorio
adjudicata (Aguirre vs. xxx xxx xxx Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Adriano
Atienza, L-10665, Aug. 30, Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Asilom,
1958; Geronimo vs. Nava No. Gregorio Baguinang, Nicolas Omosura, Simon
L-1 21 1 1, Jan. 31, 1959; Returning our attention to the case at bar, and Lagrimas and Martin Quinalayo, Calape, Bohol;
Labarro vs. Labateria et al., with in mind the principles of res the heirs of Catalino Polvos, Fausto Baguisin,
28 O.G. 4479). adjudicata above-quoted, we noticed that many Cipriano Samoya, Silveria Pohado, Enojario,
of the plaintiffs were not oppositors in the Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas and Leoncio
former registration case, but many are children Barbarona, Antequera Bohol.
'Well settled is the rule that a of the former oppositors. In such a case we
party can not by varying the have to determine the case of every plaintiff, if
form of action, or adopting a the former decision in the land registration case And after the application had been filed and
different method of presenting is conclusive and binding upon him. published in accordance with law the following
his case, escape the persons represented by Atty. Conrado D.
operation of the principle that Marapao filed opposition to that registration
one and the same cause of xxx xxx xxx proceeding: Felipe Cubido, Simon Lagrimas,
action shall not be twice Simeon Villame, Felix Lacorte, Victor Omosura,
litigated between the same The defendants had proven that the adjoining Germana Gahil, Anastacio Orillosa, Enerio
parties or their privies. owners and claimants of the parcels of land Omosura, Valeriano Tuloy, Cipriano Sanoya,
(Francisco vs. Blas, et al., No. object of registration proceeding had been Pablo Dumadag, Andres Reimbuncia, Roman
L-5078; Cayco, et al., vs. notified when the land was surveyed. These Reimbuncia, Celedonio Cabanas, Moises
Cruz, et al., No. L-1 2663, persons notified according to the surveyor's Cabanas, Calixto Gohiting, Gervasio Sevilla,
Aug. 21, 1959). certificate, Exhibit "B" were as follows: Cipriano Pedro Omosura, Daniel Itaoc, Luis Omosura,
Samoya, Fausto Baguisin, Silveria Pahado, Bartolome Omusura, Nicasio Omosura, Calixto
'Accordingly, a final judgment Enojario Laroda, Alejandro Renoblas, Heirs of Sevilla, Teodora Omosura, Jose Sabari, Silverio
in an ordinary civil action, Gregorio Lofranco, Julian Villame, Pedro Itaoc, Lacorte, Silverio Tuloy, Gertrudes Sevilla,
determining the ownership of Adriano Toloy, Bartolome Omosura, Marcelina Teodora Sevilla, Magno Orillosa, Gervacia
certain lands is res Asilon, Gregorio Baguinang, et al., Nicolas Sevilla, Marcos Hagonas, Eleuterio Pandas,
adjudicata in a registration Omosura, Simon Lagrimas, et al., Martin Pablo Omosura, Fabian Villame, Teodoro
proceeding where the parties Quinalayo, Gorgonio Baquinang, Demetrio Omosura, Magdalina Asilom, Mauricio Matela,
and property are the same as Asolan, Catalino Orellena, Heirs of Catalina Marciano Ordada, Eusebio Omosura, and
in the former case (Paz vs. Palves, Manuel Mondano, Angel Mondano, Gregorio Repelle, (Exhibit "E"), Atty. Juna V.
Inandan 75 Phil. 608; Victoriano Balolo, Eugenio del Rosario, Verinici Balmaseda in representation of the Bureau of
Penaloza vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. Bayson, Felomino Ruiz, Apolonio Horbeda, and Lands, and Asst. Fiscal Norberto M. Gallardo in
303).' Mun. of Calape. representation of the Municipality of Calape.

xxx xxx xxx The following persons were notified by the Chief Plaintiffs Mauro Renoblas and Gregorio
of the Land Registration Office of the initial Renoblas are children of plaintiff Alejandro
hearing (Exhibit "J") of the registration Renoblas. Plaintiff Telesforo Balanda is son-in-
But are there identities of parties in this case proceedings enjoining them to appear on June law of Alejandro, being the husband of Juliana
before us and the former registration 16,1952, at 8:30 a.m., before the Court of First Renoblas, daughter of Alejandro. Plaintiff
proceedings? Identity of parties means that the Instance of Bohol to show cause why the prayer Alejandro Renoblas was not one of the
parties in the second case must be the same of said application should not be granted: the oppositors in the registration proceedings, but
parties in the first case, or at least, must be Solicitor General, the Director of Lands, the he was notified of the initial healing of that
successors in interest by title subsequent to the Director of Public Works and the Director of registration case and by the surveyor that
commencement of the former action or Forestry, Manila; the Provincial Governor, the surveyed the land object of registration (Exhibit
proceeding, or when the parties in the Provincial Fiscal and the District Engineer, J-Movant). Therefore, the decision of the land
subsequent case are heirs (Chua Tan vs. Del Tagbilaran, Bohol; the Municipal Mayor, registration proceeding is binding upon him and
Rosario, 57 Phil. 411; Martinez vs. Franco, 51 Gorgonio Baguinang, Demetrio Azocan,
his case is dismissed on the ground of res the registration case is conclusive and binding G.R. No. L-32065
adjudicata with costs. to their predecessors-in-interest. Hence, their
case here is dismissed with costs. Upon the death of administratrix Bernardina Vda. de Luspo,
xxx xxx xxx Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3561 was issued in the name of
Plaintiff Julia Sevilla is the wife of Marcelo Pedro R. Luspo and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562 was
Plaintiff Fausto Cabaisan was notifed by the Matela, who was the oppositor in the issued in the name of several persons (p. 36, Rollo).
surveyor and that notice of the initial hearing. registration proceedings. Plaintiffs Roman
And though he was not an oppositor, the former Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin Matela, and A writ of possession dated November 6, 1959, a first alias writ of
land registration proceeding is binding on him. Roberta Matela are their children. She has no possession dated January 6, 1961, and a second alias writ of
Therefore, this case is dismissed in so far as son by the name of Pelagic. Julia testified that possession dated July 2, 1966 were issued by the trial court
Fausto Cabaisan is concerned with costs. the land now claimed by her children came from against the petitioners. A sample of the guerilla-like, hide and
her father Pio Sevilla. The land that was seek tactics employed by the petitioners was proved by the official
claimed by Mauricio Matela as oppositor was in report of the deputy sheriff dated January 21 1960. Another
xxx xxx xxx his name under Tax Declaration No. 5099. This evidence of petitioners' refusal to sign and to vacate was a
is the same land now claimed by plaintiffs Julia certification dated July 22, 1966 and the Sheriffs return dated
Plaintiffs Gregorio Ita-oc, Teresita Ita-oc, Sevilla, Ramon Matela, Marcela Matela, Delfin October 25, 1966.
Faustino Ita-oc and Fortunate Ita-oc are Matela, and Roberta Matela (Exhibit 0-4).
children of Daniel Ita-oc, one of the oppositors These plaintiffs are successors-in-interest of
in the registration proceedings. They claim Mauricio Matela, who is bound by the decision On March 29, 1967, a petition for contempt was filed by Mariano
parcel No. 10 described in paragraph 2 of the in that land proceeding wherein he was the Ogilve, who is one of the registered owners of the parcel of land
complaint. Gregorio Ita-oc testified that his land oppositor. Therefore, the case of these plaintiffs covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3562, against the
was inherited by said plaintiffs' mother from her are dismissed with costs. petitioners for refusing to vacate the land occupied by them and
father, Pio Sevilla. The evidence on record for refusing to sign the Sheriffs return.
(Exhibits J-3, J- 4, J-5). However (sic), shows Plaintiff Procopia Cabanas was the wife of
that the land is declared in the name of Daniel Andres Reambonancia, oppositor in the land On May 6, 1969, the court a quo issued a resolution, the
Ita-oc, a former oppositor in the registration registration proceedings. She claims parcel No. dispositive portion of which reads (p. 47, Rollo):
case. Hence, these plaintiffs are successors-in- 20 described in paragraph 2 of the complaint
interest of Daniel Ita-oc, and, therefore, are bearing Tax Declaration No. R-8121. It appears FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
bound by the decision in that registration case. that this land is declared in the name of Andres CONSIDERATION, make it of record that
Their case, therefore, is dismissed, with costs. Reambonancia (Exhibit N-3) who, as oppositor Procopia Reambonansa voluntarily left the land
in the land registration case, is bound by the and dropped out from the case; the charge of
"Plaintiffs Roberto Haganas, Felisa Haganas, decision of that case. Therefore, the case of contempt against Alejandro Renoblas (who
Fermin Haganas and Victoriano Haganas are plaintiff Procopia Cabanas as successor-in- died) is dismissed and each of the remaining 22
children of Marcos Haganas, a former oppositor interest to Andres Reambonancia, is hereby respondents are hereby found guilty of
in the registration case. Marcos testified that his dismissed, with costs. contempt under Sec. 3-b of Rule 71 and are
claim before was only two hectares, while the hereby sentenced each to pay a fine of One
claim of his children is seven hectares, which Plaintiff Vicente Amosora is the son of Enerio Hundred Pesos, authorizing the Constabulary
come from his wife, not from him. These Amosora and Florencia Gahil both oppositors in Detachment at or near Candungao Calape
plaintiffs claim two parcels, one under Tax the former registration case. The land claimed Bohol to collect the same and to transmit the
Declaration No. R-4452, and Tax Declaration by plaintiff Vicente Amosora is described as money to the Clerk of this Court, with subsidiary
No. R-8456. It appears that Tax Declaration No. parcel No. 24 of paragraph 2 of the complaint imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
R-4452 (Exhibit M) is in the name of Marcos under Tax Declaration No. R-6107, under the of one day for every P2.50 or fraction of a day,
Haganas and the land described under Tax name of his father Enerio Amosora. Since the said Constabulary Detachment to effect the
Declaration No. R-8456 was bought by the Enerio Amosora was an oppositor in the former commitment if any of them is unable to pay the
spouses Marcos Haganas and Tomasa Sevilla land registration of which this land was a part, fine. The fingerprints of each of these 22
from Gertrudis Sevilla in 1956 (Exhibit M-3), the decision of that land registration case is respondents shall also be taken by the
who was an oppositor in the registration conclusive and binding not only to Enerio constabulary and filed with the record of this
proceeding. Therefore, plaintiffs Roberto Amosora, but also to his successor-in-interest, case.
Haganas, Felisa Haganas, Fermin Haganas, plaintiff Vicente Amosora, whose case
and Victoriano Haganas are successors-in- therefore, is dismissed with costs. It is so ordered.
interest to properties in which the decision in
On June 4, 1969, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which On March 22,1971, Mariano Ogilve filed a Motion for a Writ of
of the aforestated resolution whereas Ogilve filed an opposition the administration of justice rests (Romasanta et. al. vs. Platon, Demolition which was granted by the trial court on April 5, 1971
thereto. 34 O.G. No. 76; Abulocion et. al. vs. CFI of Iloilo, et. al., 100 Phil. (pp. 42-43, Rollo) against those who were adjudged guilty of
554 [1956]). A writ of possession may be issued not only against contempt. On April 29, 1971, the petitioners filed an urgent motion
On February 14, 1970, the motion for reconsideration was denied. the person who has been defeated in a registration case but also for reconsideration of said order. On June 2, 1971, the trial court
On March 18, 1970, another motion for reconsideration was filed against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or issued another order, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 48,
by petitioners on the ground of pendency of the action for any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to Rollo):
reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1533 and their appeal in G.R. No. the issuance of the final decree (Demorar vs. Ibañez, et al., 97
L-25660. On May 14, 1970, the court a quo ordered the proper Phil 72 [1955]). WHEREFORE, in the absence of writ of
officers to actually execute the resolution dated May 6, 1969. preliminary injunction Deputy Provincial Sheriff
The petitioners' contention that they have been in possession of Pedro Aparece must not only take P.C. soldiers
Hence, the present petition. the said land for more than thirty (30) years which began long with him but also carpenters to effect the
before the filing of the application for registration and continued in demolition, the carpenters being at the expense
possession after the hearing of the registration case, worked of the Luspo.
Petitioners raise the following issues: against them. It was a virtual admission of their lack of defense.
Thus, the writs of possession were properly issued against them. IT IS SO ORDERED.
I
However, We do not subscribe to the ruling of the court a quo that Hence, the present petition.
THAT THE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN ISSUING A petitioners are guilty of contempt. Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 19,
WRIT OF POSSESSION WITHOUT ANY COMPLAINT FILED IN Rules of Court, if the judgment be for the delivery of the
COURT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER, NOR FOR possession of real property, the writ of execution must require the The issue here is whether or not the respondent judge acted
RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION AGAINST THE HEREIN possession of the property, describing it, to the party entitled discretion and thus excluded the herein petitioners from the use
PETITIONERS. thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the and enjoyment of their right to which they are entitled when he
losing party from the premises and deliver the possession thereof (respondent judge) issued the order of demolition on April 5, 1971
to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or and again on June 2, 1971 (p. 107, Rollo).
II
ejectment the losing party enters or attempts to enter into or upon
the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership On July 14, 1971, this Court issued a temporary restraining order
THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession of the (p. 51, Rollo).
ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION AGAINST THE person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may
PETITIONERS HEREIN, WHO WERE NOT PARTIES TO THE the loser be charged with and punished for contempt (Quizon vs.
REGISTRATION PROCEEDING AND WHO WERE NOT The petition is not impressed with merit.
Philippine National Bank, et. al., 85 Phil. 459). According to this
DEFEATED OPPOSITORS OF THE SAID APPLICATION FOR section, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to
REGISTRATION. carry out the mandates of the judgment in question, and in fact, it The petitioners allege that the respondent-judge cannot issue a
was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the trial judge writ of demolition pending the resolution of G.R. No. L-32065.
The petition is impressed with merit. who rendered that judgment, to place the respondents in
possession of the land. The petitioners in this case had nothing to We rule that the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 was not a bar to the
do with that delivery of possession, and consequently, their issuance of the writ of demolition. It is significant to note that the
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor
refusal to effectuate the writ of possession, is entirely officious subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. L-32065 is the order
defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their
and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less dated May 14, 1970 directing the execution of the prior order
names do not appear in the amended application for registration;
prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to dated May 6, 1969 finding petitioners guilty of contempt and not
that they have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than
comply with his duty. It was solely due to the latter's fault, and not the writs of possession themselves. Thus, the respondent Judge
thirty (30) years which began long before the filing of the
to the disobedience of the petitioners' that the judgment was not correctly issued the writs of demolition. In Meralco vs. Mencias,
application for registration; and that after the hearing of the
duly executed. For that purpose, the sheriff could even have 107 Phil 1071, We held:
registration case, they continued in possession of the said land.
availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort
thereto (see United States v. Ramayrat 22 Phil. 183).
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the [I]f the writ of possession issued in a land
applicant and ordering its registration in his name necessarily registration proceeding implies the delivery of
G.R. No. L-33677 possession of the land to the successful litigant
carried with it the delivery of possession which is an inherent
element of the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of therein (Demorar vs. Ibanez, 97 Phil. 72; Pasay
possession is, therefore, sanctioned by existing laws in this Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil.
391; Manlapas vs. Llorente 48 Phil. 298), a writ
 of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially
considering that the latter writ is but a
complement of the former which, without said
writ of demolition, would be ineffective.

xxx xxx xxx

[The issuance of the writ of demolition] is

reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner
who is being deprived of the possession of the
lots in question, by reason of the continued
refusal of respondent ...... to remove his house
thereon and restore possession of the promises
to petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) In G.R. No. L-25660, the appeal is DENIED and the orders of

the Court of First Instance dated May 12, 1964 and August 25,
1965 are AFFIRMED; the motion to withdraw the appeal of some
of the plaintiffs-appellants is GRANTED;

2) In G.R. No. L-32065, the petition is GRANTED and the

resolution of the Court of First Instance dated May 14, 1970 is
SET ASIDE; and

3) In G.R. No. L-33677, the petition is DISMISSED and the order

of the Court of First Instance dated June 2, 1971 is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120066 September 9, 1999 Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for attorney was attached. He opposed the
title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that registration of the northeastern portion of the
OCTABELA ALBA Vda. De RAZ, Spouses MANUEL and the land applied for was purchased by him and land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square
SUSANA BRAULIO, RODOLFO, LOURDES and BEATRIZ all his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz. meters. He alleged that his principal is the
surnamed ALBA, petitioners, The documents attached to the application are: owner by right of succession and is in the
vs. technical description, surveyor's certificate, possession of said portion with all its
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE LACHICA, respondents. certification by the chief deputy assessor of improvements for more than 80 years together
Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277. with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously,
peacefully and openly under claim of
The initial hearing was scheduled for October ownership. He prayed that his principal be
31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the declared the true and absolute owner of the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Official Gazette was issued on September 23, disputed portion of 43.83 square
1958. The certification of posting of the notice of meters.1âwphi1.nêt
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.
the Court of Appeals dated August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in The land applied for is residential, situated in allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor
Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K. 15104, the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of to segregate the non-controversial portion of the
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast land applied for and to notify the oppositors and
by the property of the Municipality of Banga their counsels.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as (Sketch, Exh. "F").
follows: On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order
The initial hearing was held on October 31, of general default and to admit the attached
1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu- 1958. An order of general default was issued opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
161277 and the improvements thereon situated but those who presented their opposition, Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit the
in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de
Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an area of and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated
4,845 square meters is brought under the Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and
operation of the property registration decree Municipality of Banga represented by the set aside the order of default.
(PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to
and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose file their written opposition. In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba,
Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela
Philippines; Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-
their opposition on October 31, 1958. They owners of a portion of the land applied for with
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the opposed the registration of the southeastern an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the
national road mentioned in the application be portion of the 240 square meters of the land north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor,
segregated for future road widening program applied for alleging that they are the owners in Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the
upon payment of just compensation to be fee simple and possessors of said portion and south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the
annotated at the back of the title; all the improvements thereon for not less than public market of Banga. They claimed to have
70 years together with their predecessor-in- inherited the above-mentioned portion from
interest deriving their title by purchase from the their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who
3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in
spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio, Octabela original owners. They prayed for the Court to
declare them the true and absolute owners of 1918. Hence, they have been in possession
Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba continuously, openly and peacefully under claim
and Beatriz Alba are hereby DISMISSED. the disputed portion of the same in their names.
of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for
not less 70 years. They prayed that the
SO ORDERED. 1 On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be
filed her opposition. registered as their pro-indiviso property.
The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court
and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows: Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda.
1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of de Raz opposed the registration of the
Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of
southeastern portion of the land applied for with The Commissioner's report and sketch was In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for
an area of 331.44 square meters. She claimed submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would
to have been in peaceful, continuous and open filed his opposition to the Commissioner's report file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and
possession together with her deceased on December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of Jose Rago himself declared his conformity
husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal
of the above-mentioned portion for not less than to submit an amended report and amended motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor
70 years, by purchase from its owners. She sketch. Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf;
likewise opposed the registration of the western hence, his opposition must be disregarded.
portion of the land applied for, with an area of The Commissioner's corrected report and
676 square meters, having purchased the same sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975 As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans
from its original owners on (sic) her which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly
predecessor-in-interest has been open, there being no objection from the parties. executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba
peaceful and continuous under claim of Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon
ownership for a period of not less than 70 Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept.
years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44 On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order
whereby the testimony of oppositor Octabela 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed
square meters be registered in her name and cannot be found in the records. Even so, the
that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for
her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing Braulios have not presented evidence to show
and the other portion of 676 square meters be that by the time this application was filed, they
registered solely in her name. on March 15, 1977.
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the possession of the land claimed, in concept of
Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire
reply to the motion to lift order of default stating stricken off record because the latter was title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code
that there is no reason to do so under the Rules bedridden and can not possibly appear for of the Philippines). As such, the opposition of
of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo cross-examination. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be
Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as dismissed. 2
the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
de Raz are without merit in law and in fact. substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence
exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his presented by the applicant and the oppositor Raz, the court a
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The quorendered judgment in favor of the applicant as stated at the
of general default was granted and the Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and of their witness on March 1, 1989. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by
Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted. In this application for title to land filed by herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have
applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant filed by the following: taxes for the disputed portions of the subject property from 1941
offered for admission exhibits "A" to "I" and the to 1958 while the respondent/applicant continuously paid taxes
testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose 1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property from
Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica Rebeco; 1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the
(July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court Municipal Treasurer's Office of Banga. 3 In rendering judgment in
admitted the same. favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court stressed that while it
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio; is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order 3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription
appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de when accompanied by proof of actual possession.
Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed Raz; and
by the three sets of oppositors and submit an
amended approved plan together with the Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of
technical description for each portion. 4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz. Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that —

1. The Civil law provisions on the basic In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of
prescription are inapplicable. rules Appeals reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
governing
2. The applicable law is the On the basis of the testimonial and
Section 48 [a] of the Public introduction documentary evidence presented by the
Land Law or Act 141, as of applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming
amended. secondary that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee
evidence. simple of the property subject of the application
3. Private respondent has not for registration entitling him to register the same
acquired ownership in fee 3.5. The in his name under the operation of PD 1529.
simple, much less has he met applicant/re
the conditions for judicial spondent's It is of no moment that the applicant failed to
confirmation of imperfect title Tax produce the originals of those other
under Section 48 [a] of Act Declaration deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was
141, as amended, except No. 14181 able to present sufficient substantial secondary
perhaps for a 620 square is a evidence, in accordance with the requirements
meter portion of the land "doctored" of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
applied for because: tax Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised
declaration. Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in point.
3.1. There
is 3.6. Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817,
absolutely Applicant/re explained that when the original writing is not
no proof of spondent's available for one reason or another which is the
the alleged tax best or primary evidence, to prove its contents
sales made declaration is the testimony of some one who has read or
by Raz and s have no known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
Alba. probative 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before
value. secondary evidence is introduced, that the due
3.2. There execution, delivery and reason for non-
is 3.7. production of the original writing must first be
absolutely Applicant/re produced. Raylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247,
no reliable spondent ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of
proof of the has not the original document beyond all possibility of
alleged satisfied mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is
theft of the the sufficient and this may be shown by
deeds of required a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly
sale. quantum of made, for it in places where it is likely to be
evidence in found. After proving the due execution and
land delivery of the document, together with the fact
3.3. The registration that the same has been lost or destroyed, its
identity of cases. contents may be proved, among others, by the
the land recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing,
has not 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4
been 3.8.
Petitioners- Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that
established where the lost documents are more than thirty
. oppositors
have (30) years old and would thus prove themselves
proven their if produced, secondary evidence of their
3.4. The right over contents is admissible without proof of their
Court of the subject execution.
Appeals property.
misapplied
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the thence, S. Indeed, to borrow the apt words of
property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed 33 deg. 46' the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of
(Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino E., 87.66 ownership of, and the adverse, continuous
Martirez. While he failed to present the other m. to point possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly
deeds of sale covering the other portions of the "2" ". . . militate against any judicial cognizance of a
property, he has sufficiently established that matter that could have been withheld in its ken,"
they were notarized documents and were taken thence, S. hence, whatever right oppositors may have had
by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He 56 deg. 42' over the property or any portion thereof was
reported the loss to the authorities and even W., 63.81 thereby also lost through extinctive prescription
filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts m. to point in favor of the applicant who had been in actual,
and made a diligent search of those documents "3" open, adverse and continuous possession of
from the notary public but in vain. He presented the land applied for in the concept of owner for
the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer's Office of over 10 years when the application for
Banga, who testified having seen those deeds thence, N. registration was filed in court. 4
as they were presented to him by the applicant 37 deg. 22'
and which were used as basis for the W., 59.26
m. to point It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial
preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration court and the Court of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on
No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax "4"
the parties and upon this Court, 5 which will not be reviewed 6 or
Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by
in Court, proving that the land was declared for thence, N. evidence 7 or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate
tax purposes in the name of the applicant and 33 deg. 42' otherwise. 8
his wife. The applicant has been paying the E., 73.08
realty tax covering the property since 1945 and m. to the
beyond 1958, when the application for point of More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which
registration was filed in court, per certification of are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this
the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1). Court in the following instances:
beginning, . . . All points
referred to are indicated on
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial the plan and are marked on 1.] When the factual findings
court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. of the Court of Appeals and
owner in fee simple of the land described in his Conc. Mons. Bearings true the trial court are
application for its original registration in his date of the survey, January contradictory; 9
name. The land contains an area of 4,845 25, 1957, and that of the
square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, approval, October 3, 1957. 2.] When the conclusion is a
Aklan, and finding grounded entirely on
The applicant has been in public, open, speculation, surmises and
Bounded on the NE., along continuous and adverse possession of the conjectures; 10
line 1-2, by property of property since 1940-41 up to the present to the
Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the 3.] When the inference made
along line 2-3, by National property by acquisitive prescription, in by the Court of Appeals from
road; on the SW., along line accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, its findings of fact is
3-4, by property of the Mpl. otherwise known as the "Code of Civil manifestly mistaken,
Government of Banga (Public Procedure", having been in actual and adverse absurd 11 or impossible;
Market); and on the NW., possession under claim of ownership for over
along line 4-1, by property of ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his 4.] Where there is a grave
the Municipal Government of occupancy might have commenced or abuse of discretion in the
Banga (Public Market). continued under a claim of title exclusive of any appreciation of
Beginning at a point marked 1 other right and adverse to all other claimants, facts; 12
on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by
E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio,
1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan; 32 SCRA 516). 5.] When the appellate court
in making its findings went
 beyond the issues of the As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte
case, and such findings are Appeals is not a function that this Court normally pesos (P20.00) . . .
contrary to the submission of undertakes 6 unless the appellate court's findings are palpably
both appellant and appellee; unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of
itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. 17 A thorough review 840 square meters as well as its dimensions of 40
6.] When the judgment of the of the record convinces this Court that the general rule with regard meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this
Court of Appeals is premised to the conclusiveness of the trial court's and appellate tribunal's parcel was further reduced to 620 square meters is
on a misapprehension of factual findings should not be applied because there are material explained by the fact that the Municipal Government of
facts; 13 circumstances which, when properly considered, would have Banga appropriated 220 square meters thereof for the
altered the result of the case. Banga Public Market Road.
7.] When the Court of
Appeals manifestly First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases
overlooked certain relevant reveals that with the exception of 620 square meters, there has of the other two parcels from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square
facts not disputed by the been no satisfactory showing of how private respondent/applicant meters and from Eufrocino Alba measuring 3,725 square meters
parties which, if property acquired the remainder of the subject land. owing to the questionable circumstances surrounding their
considered, would justify a acquisition.
different conclusion; 14 As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as
well as the arguments proffered by private respondent, he The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by
8.] When the findings of fact acquired the land in question from three (3) sources, namely: a.] A Dionisia Regado under Tax Declaration No. 802. 19 The records
are themselves conflicting; Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters
Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b] 300 square of the land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish
meters allegedly purchased from private respondent's father-in- document denominated as a deed of sale dated April 29,
9.] When the findings of fact law Eulalio Raz, and c.] 3,725 square meters private respondent
are conclusions without 1914; 20 [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced by a
allegedly bought in 1940 from Eugrocino Alba. document entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated September
citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; and 6, 1918, 21 and [3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated September 6, 1918
meters, was not questioned by petitioners as its technical written in Spanish. 22
10.] When the findings of fact description delineated in the Escritura De Venta Absoluta dated
of the Court of Appeals are August 13, 1941, 18 to wit:
premised on the absence of Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from
evidence but such findings Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933. 23 Raz retained 480 square
are contradicted by the Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba conveyed a 240
evidence on record. 15 regado, actuado en el casco central del square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on November 5,
municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna 1956. 24 Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the heirs of Eufrocino
mejora, de una extension superficial de Alba sold a 676 square meter portion of the parcel purchased by
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz. 25 The deed of
respondent/applicant is entitled to the confirmation of his mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of
ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845 square meter parcel of land otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos Aklan pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 1969 26 and is covered
he applied for. por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the name of Eulalio Raz, her
con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con husband. 27
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated la carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por
confirmed private respondent/applicant's title to the land on the Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land
basis of the findings that: 1.] the private respondent/applicant terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al which are borne out by the documentary evidence on record,
purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de private respondent/applicant did not produce the alleged deeds of
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio
respondent/applicant has paid the realty taxes on the land from terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on
1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the private todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was
respondent/applicant has been in actual, open and continuous limite visible de linderia mas que dichos sustained by both the trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance
possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una on secondary evidence vis-a-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in
1945, and 5.] the private respondent/applicant has acquired the sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of
land by prescription. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de
the overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed property was purchased by the spouses Jose Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero
against it because — Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino Alba is cocal
M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced secano. Palay is unhusked rice, 32 thus, the term palayero refers
. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on to land devoted to the planting rice; cocal, on the other hand,
proven by means of witnesses, but must November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros means coconut tree plantation 33 while secano denotes unwatered
necessarily be evidenced by a written Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado land or a dry sand bank; 34 c.] the land applied for has an area of
instrument, duly subscribed by the party Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by
charged, or by his agent, or by secondary Serie 1940). Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land
evidence of their contents. No other evidence, applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on
therefore, can be received except the On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically the SE by Apolinia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo
documentary evidence referred to, in so far as per Psu 161277 as — National Road; and on the NW by the Banga Public market
regards such contracts, and these are valueless whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is
as evidence unless they are drawn up in writing bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E
A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu- by the Banga-Libaco Carreta Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido
in the manner aforesaid. 28 161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Alba and on the W by the Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be
Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., stressed in this regard that a person who claims that he has better
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; right to real property must prove not only his ownership of the
on a document evidencing his title thereto, must on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof. 35
prove not only the genuineness of his title but the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
the identity of the land therein referred to. The Government of Banga (Public Market); and on
document in such a case is either a basis of his the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on
claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this Municipal Government of Banga (Public Tax Declaration No. 14181 considering that there is no
case, he only claims a portion of what is Market). Beginning at a point marked "1" on satisfactory explanation of how the area of land covered by Tax
included in his title, he must clearly prove that plan, being N. 45 deg. 02' E., 423.38 m. from Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest
the property sought to be registered is included B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan; 620 square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square
in that title. 29 meters.
thence S. 33 deg. 46' E.
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical 87.66 m. to point "2" As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was
descriptions of the land applied for by private preceded by 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578 in the name of
respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly purchased from private respondent/applicant and his spouse which shows that the
thence S. 56 deg. 42" W., land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620
Eufrocino Alba. 63.81 m. to point "3" square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953
Tax Declaration No. 13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the thence N. 37 deg. 22' W., respondent's wife. The land declared for taxation purposes therein
remainder of the subject land measuring 3,725 square meters 59.26 m. to point "4" also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No.
from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring that this parcel is 134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the
listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit "I" which is denominated as an name of private respondent's wife, Adela Raz. The land declared
"Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses thence N. 33 deg. 42' E.,
73.08 m. to the point of therein for taxation purposes likewise measures 620 square
Adela Raz De Lachica (Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica." Item meters.
No. 5 30 of the said inventory described the parcel of land
mentioned therein as follows: beginning, containing an area of FOUR
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters in 1947
FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points to 4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account of an
5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, affidavit dated November 17, 1956 wherein private
amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el referred to are indicated on the plan and are
respondent/applicant requested 36 the Municipal Assessor of
Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc.
Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25, Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square
el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el meters on the bare claim that "the area has been decreased" to
Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al 1957, and that of the approval, October 3,
1957. 31 only 620 square meters. The timing of the revision and its
Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; proximity to the date of filing of the application can not but
al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con engender serious doubts on the application more so considering
Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension It will be readily noted vis-a-vis the foregoing that: a.] the land that prior thereto realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to
aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y applied for is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the 1956 covered an area measuring 620 square meters and private
(35) centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to claim
possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely of First Instance of the province where the land considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian
larger area of 4,845 square meters. is located for confirmation of their claim and Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of the Land Registration Act, to wit: Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable
ownership. 37 Tax declarations for a certain number of years, lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-
although constituting proof of claim of title to land, 38 is not (a) Those who prior to the transfer of disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private
incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported sovereignty from Spain to the United States appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral
by other effective proof. 39 It was, thus, held in one case 40 that have applied for the purchase, composition or lands. 53 For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands
where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31) years were paid only a other form of grant of lands of the public domain of the public domain classified as "disposable" or "alienable" are
few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment does under the laws and royal decrees then in force further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential,
not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona and have instituted and prosecuted the commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.]
fide claim of ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in proceedings in connection therewith, but have Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.]
another case, 41 the claim that the applicant had been with or without default upon their part, or for any Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
incontinuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed land other cause, not received title therefor, if such purposes. 54
was not given credence because it was negated by the fact that applicants or grantees and their heirs have
he declared the land for taxation purposes in October 1959 when occupied and cultivated said lands continuously From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be
he filed his application for registration although he could have since the filing of their applications. 49 defined as those alienable portions of the public domain which are
done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A belated neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus the term includes
declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no (b) Those who by themselves or through their residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that
real claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the predecessors in interest have been in open, these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands. 55
declaration 42 and where there are serious discrepancies in the continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied. 43 If and occupation of agricultural lands of the
at all, the foregoing facts only serves to underscore private On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended,
public domain under a bona fide claim of permits the registration of private lands claimed to be owned by
respondent/applicant's crafty attempt to cloak with judicial color ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining parcels of land the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
preceding the filing of the application for
and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners. confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be 1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles
Fourth, the lower court's reliance on prescription is not well-taken conclusively presumed to have performed all from the government during the Spanish
given the peculiar facts prevailing in this case. the conditions essential to a Government grant Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
the provisions of this chapter. 50 b.] Concession especial or special grant;
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the c] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment
proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. 44 Basic (c) Members of the national cultural minorities and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory
is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or who by themselves or through their information title, which could become a Titulo
policy shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated predecessors-in-interest have been in open, gratuito or a gratuitous title; 56
so. 45 Along the same vein, a court's jurisdiction depends on the continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
law existing at the time an action is filed 46 and a law continues to and occupation of lands of the public domain
be in force with regard to all rights which accrued prior to the suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or 2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by
amendment thereof. 47 not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation of
least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for
granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51 in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code;
In this case, the controlling statute when the private and
respondent/applicant filed his application for registration on April
28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that
RA Nos. 1942 and 6236, 48 which states that: in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals 3.] Lands which have been acquired in any
relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act 496 52 in relation to other manner provided by law.
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the the Civil Code's provision's on prescription on the assumption that
Philippines, occupying lands of the public the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an appellate court's postulate. The application for registration of respondent hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of
interest therein, but whose titles have not been private respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title land referred to by Act No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not
be pleaded to bolster private respondent/applicant's claim could not transmit any thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the
because — right. 62 Public Market Road. 66

. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private It can not be said that private respondent's possession was con The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole
persons without any grant, express or implied justo titulo y buena fe. On the contrary, private area was one Dionisia Regado who executed three (3) deeds of
from the government; it is indispensable that respondent/applicant's act of appropriating for himself the entire sale covering certain portions of the disputed lands, namely: 1.]
there be a showing of title from the state . . . . 57 area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering 1,850 square
have been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted meters executed in favor of the Municipality of Banga; 67 2.] the
xxx xxx xxx acts of deprivation tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915 covering 1,320 square meters
ruled that the — executed in favor of Eulalio Raz; 68 and, 3.] the Deed of Sale
dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an area of
Indeed, the possession of public agricultural 2,938 square meters in favor of Eufrocino Alba. 69
land, however, long the period may have . . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the
extended, never confers title thereto upon the application that no other persons had any claim
possessor. 58 The reason, to reiterate our ruling, or interest in the said land, constitute specific Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of
is because the statute of limitations with regard allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by the land by purchase Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as
to public agricultural land does not operate competent proof. Failure and intentional confirmed in paragraph 2 of the Escritura De Venta
against the State, unless the occupant can omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of Absoluta executed by him on August 13, 1941. 70 After selling 840
prove possession and occupation of the same actual physical possession by another person square meters to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480
under claim of ownership for the required constitutes an allegation of actual square meters to Susana Braulio 71 leaving a balance of 240
number of years to constitute a grant from the fraud. 63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit square meters which remained undiposed.
State. 59 or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 64 On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba,
Fifth, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that prescription can be children of the deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter
applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and the appellate Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private portion of the 2,938 square meter lot purchased by their father
court, it must be pointed out that — respondent/applicant to benefit from his own wrong would run from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor Octabela alba Vda.
counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio — no man can De Raz. 72 This Deeds was duly registered with the Registry of
be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. 65 Deeds of Aklan in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17,
. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides 1969. 73 The land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332 in the
that "(o)wnership and other real rights over name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's husband. 74
immovable property are acquired by ordinary It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive
prescription through possession of ten years," prescription can not similarly vest ownership over the property
this provision of law must be read in conjunction upon private respondent/applicant because Article 1137 of the Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz's ownership of
with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that — the remaining 240 square meter portion which she and her
states that ". . . (o)rdinary acquisitive husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia Regado 75 and the 676
prescription of things requires possession in Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of
good faith and with just title for the time fixed by immovables also prescribe through Eufrocino Alba 76 is fully substantiated by documentary
law." Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for proof. 77 Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba's ownership
not acquired by mere possession thereof under thirty years, without need of good faith. of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters 78 and another
claim of ownership for a period of ten years portion measuring 2,262 square meters 79 is likewise backed by
unless such possession was acquired con justo documentary evidence. Susana Braulio's ownership of a 240
Needless to state, private respondent/applicant's possession of square meter portion 80 which she acquired from Octabela Alba
titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good thirteen (13) years falls way below the thirty-year requirement
faith). 60 The good faith of the possessor Vda. De Raz on November 11, 1956 81 is also documented, her
mandated by Article 1137. predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same from Dionisia
consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner Regado on September 6, 1918. 82
thereof, and could transmit his ownership. 61 For Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the
purposes of prescription, there is just title when secondary proof of private respondent, adduced overwhelming The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof
the adverse claimant came into possession of evidence to prove their ownership of the portions they claim in the of private respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership
the property through one of the recognized subject land. The evidence on record clearly points to the fact that over the entire 4,845 square meter area. He has not adduced
modes of acquisition of ownership or other real private respondent/applicant's right, if at all, is confined to only evidence to show how and when he was able to acquire, with the
rights but the grantor was not the owner or 620 square meters or what has been left of the 840 square meters exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square
he purchased from Faustino Martirez after 220 square meters meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the
market road, the bigger area of 3, 755 square meters from
anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia Regado.

His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No.

14181 which he was able to procure from the Municipal Assessor
of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving affidavit which
proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of
the area of the land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters
instead of 620 square meters — which was the area reflected in
earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax Declaration No. 13578;
1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528.

Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of

adjudicating to petitioners the contested portions of the subject
land, in view of their failure to present the technical descriptions of
these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence showing
that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful
and continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner,
considering that the testimony of Octabela Alba vda. De Raz was
stricken off the record.

WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18,
1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC Record No. K-
15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent

Jose N. Lachica's house is situated, clearly delineating its metes
and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the parcel of
land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area
of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in the
name of private respondent;

2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned
in the application be segregated for future road widening
programs upon the payment of just compensation to be annotated
at the back of the title.

3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is

concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin
for the reception of further evidence for the petitioners to establish
the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in
their names of the areas they respectively claim.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152016 April 13, 2010 On December 30, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision, whose The petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was
dispositive portion reads: nothing in the RTC decision that ordered the demolition of existing
NARCISO TUMIBAY,* RUPERTO TUMIBAY, ELENA TUMIBAY, improvements.
EDUARDO TUMIBAY, CORAZON TUMIBAY, MANUELA WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby
SEVERINO VDA. DE PERIDA and GREGORIA DELA rendered, as follows: THE RTC RULING
CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs. 1. Declaring the "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" dated The RTC issued an Order (dated September 6, 1999) denying the
SPS. YOLANDA T. SORO and HONORIO SORO, SPS. JULITA February 2 & 13, 1967 and all sales executed respondents’ motion. In sustaining the petitioners’ views, the RTC
T. STA. ANA and FELICISIMO STA. ANA,Respondents. subsequent thereto as null and void ab initio; noted that a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive
portion of the decision sought to be executed; it cannot go beyond
DECISION 2. Ordering the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title the terms of the judgment.7
No. T-11574, issued in the name of Narciso Tumibay
BRION, J.: and all subsequent titles issued thereafter, such as TCT When the RTC denied8 their motion for reconsideration,9 the
Nos. T-23150, 27151 and 42467 of the Register of respondents elevated their case to the CA via a petition for
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by Deeds of Cabanatuan City, in the name of the other certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They insisted that
petitioners Narciso Tumibay (Narciso), Ruperto Tumibay, Elena defendants; the removal or demolition of the improvements was the logical
Tumibay, Eduardo Tumibay, Corazon Tumibay, Manuela consequence of the RTC decision.
Severino Vda. De Perida and Gregoria Dela Cruz (petitioners), to 3. Declaring the plaintiff Yolanda T. Soro and defendant
reverse and set aside the decision2 dated August 24, 2001 and Julita T. Sta. Ana, as the sole heirs of Estela Perida and THE CA RULING
resolution3 dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth owners of the land covered originally by Original
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56489. Certificate of Title No. 1738; The CA decided the petition on August 24, 2001. The appellate
The assailed CA decision nullified, for having been issued with court, applying Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the Rules of
grave abuse of discretion, the order dated September 6, 1999 of 4. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the said property Court, noted that since the RTC ordered the petitioners to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City in to the said Yolanda T. Soro and Julita T. Sta. Ana, and in reconvey to the respondents the subject property that contains
Civil Case No. 8269. The assailed CA Resolution denied the default thereof, the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is improvements the petitioners introduced, the demolition of the
petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. hereby authorized to execute the necessary deed of improvements can be done only after a special order of the RTC,
conveyance in favor of said Yolanda T. Soro and Julita issued upon the respondents’ motion, after due hearing, and after
FACTUAL BACKGROUND T. Sta. Ana; and the petitioners failed to remove the improvements within the time
fixed by the RTC. Thus, the CA declared void the September 6,
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly 5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay 1999 RTC Order and directed the RTC to fix the time within which
summarized below. the plaintiff ₱5,000.00 as actual and moral damages, and the petitioners should remove the improvements from the subject
attorney’s fee of ₱5,000.00 and cost of suit. property.
The petitioners, including the respondent Julita T. Sta. Ana
(Julita), were the defendants in Civil Case No. 8269, an action for SO ORDERED. After the CA’s denial10 of their motion for reconsideration,11 the
annulment and recovery of ownership with damages, filed on petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari under
January 17, 1984 by the respondent Yolanda T. Soro (Yolanda) Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC decision was affirmed, successively, by the CA and by
and her husband, respondent Honorio Soro. The subject of the this Court. After finality, the RTC – on Yolanda’s motion – issued
case was a 1,083 square meter parcel of land in Cabanatuan City a writ of execution. In obedience to the writ, the Register of Deeds THE PETITION
(subject property) originally titled in the name of Francisca Sacdal, of Cabanatuan City issued TCT No.T-986494 and TCT No. T-
the grandmother of Yolanda and Julita, under Original Certificate 986505 in the names of Yolanda and Perlita. The petitioners argue that the writ of execution should conform to
of Title (OCT) No. 1738 of the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed and
City. Thru a "Bilihang Tuluyan ng Lupa" dated February 2 and 13, the demolition of the existing improvements was not expressly
1967, OCT No.1738 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of On March 3, 1999, Yolanda and Perlita, with their respective
spouses, filed with the RTC a motion to be restored to the ordained in the decision. They submit that to effect the demolition,
Title (TCT) No. T-11574 was issued in Narciso’s name. Narciso the respondents must file an ejectment case. They cite Nazareno
subsequently sold the subject property to the other petitioners in possession of the subject property and to demolish the
improvements thereon, in accordance with paragraphs (c) and (d) v. Court of Appeals,12which held that "being declared owner of the
this case, thereby causing the issuance of TCT Nos. T-23150, subject lot does not also mean that [the winning party] is
27151 and 42467 in their names. of Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.6
automatically entitled to possession of all improvements thereon."

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

The respondents submit that the petitioners’ argument runs SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of (c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall
counter to the express provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery
Rules of Court that a judgment is conclusive on all matters that having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming
the parties could have raised; to further require them to file an be as follows: rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three
ejectment suit to oust the petitioners would amount to (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment
encouraging multiplicity of suits. xxxx obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons
therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace
THE ISSUE officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their necessary to retake possession, and place the judgment obligee
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or
The core issue is whether the CA erred when it declared void the in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same
September 6, 1999 RTC Order denying the respondents’ motion have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily manner as a judgment for money.
to be restored to possession of the subject property and to included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.) 18
demolish the improvements thereon.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. -
Petitioners misread Nazareno v. Court of Appeals When the property subject of execution contains improvements
OUR RULING constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
We find that the petitioners misread the ruling in Nazareno v. officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements,
We find no merit in the petition. Court of Appeals19 when they understood the ruling to mean that except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of
in all cases, a declaration of ownership does not include a the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has
A judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the declaration of the right to possession. What Nazareno actually failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
decision holds is that adjudication of ownership would include the delivery court. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to
possess the land independently of his rejected claim of In Buñag v. Court of Appeals,21 we explained that a judgment for
We are not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument that, since the ownership. This ruling, as understood in its correct sense, fully
RTC decision to reconvey to respondents the subject property did the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to
applies to the present case, as there is no allegation, much less place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the
not expressly order the removal of improvements thereon, the any proof, that the petitioners have any right to possess the
RTC cannot, by order, reach these improvements and accordingly defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the
improvements on the land independently of their claim of prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him.
act to enforce its decision. ownership of the subject property. Thus, the respondents have full No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision;
right to possession of the subject property. nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such
As a general rule, the writ of execution should conform to the event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to
dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is We remind the petitioners that we do not allow the piecemeal remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to
void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or interpretation of our Decision as a means to advance one’s case. do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the
award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed
must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context; the read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special
promulgated,13 and may not vary the terms of the judgment it decision must be considered in its entirety.20 Read in this manner, order by the court for the removal of the improvements. 22
seeks to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment the respondents’ right to possession of the subject property fully
sought to be executed.14 follows. In light of the foregoing, we find that the CA committed no
reversible error in declaring void the September 6, 1999 RTC
Nonetheless, we have held that a judgment is not confined to Rule 39, Section 10 sets the procedure for execution of Order.
what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to judgment for specific acts
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.15 Thus, in
Treble costs against petitioners
Perez v. Evite,16 where the ownership of a parcel of land was
decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land In addition, Rule 39, Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), of the
was considered included in the decision where the defeated Rules of Court provides the procedure for execution of judgments We lament that the petitioners, by instituting the present petition,
party's claim to possession was based solely on his claim of for specific acts, as follows: has effectively delayed the full execution of the final and
ownership. executory RTC judgment. In doing so, they deprived the winning
SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.- respondents of the fruits of the judgment, and made a mockery of
In Baluyut v. Guiao,17 we stressed that this rule fully conforms with the RTC judgment that has stood scrutiny all the way to our level.
Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court that xxxx We have always frowned upon any scheme to prolong litigations
provides: and we view the present dispute as an unwarranted effort to avoid
the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at. We
cannot countenance, and in fact, condemn this kind of abuse of
judicial process. Thus, we deem it fit to impose treble costs
against the petitioners.

We note that the petitioners filed a Manifestation dated August 28,

200823 informing us that Julita sold her pro indiviso share in the
subject property to one Corazon T. Logramente thru a "Bilihang
Lubusan ng Lupa" dated July 17, 2003, and the latter caused the
annotation of her adverse claim in the TCT Nos. T-98649 and T-
98650. However, this supervening event has no bearing to the
present case where the only issue involved is the propriety of the
September 6, 1999 RTC Order that denied the respondents’
motion to be restored in possession. Besides, whatever right
Corazon T. Logramente, a third party to the present dispute, may
have on the subject property is adequately protected by the
inscription of her adverse claim in the land titles. Any right she
may have can only be raised or brought by her as the affected
party, or the real party-in-interest, in a proper forum.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby DENY the

petition and AFFIRM the decision dated August 24, 2001 and
resolution dated January 29, 2002 of the Former Special Tenth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56489
insofar as it declared void the Order dated September 6, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City in Civil
Case No. 8269. The Court is directed to conduct a hearing with
dispatch, in accordance with Section 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with due notice to the parties involved.

Treble costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-55854 February 23, 1990 Conrado R. Fabular, one of the counsels of the
Greetings: Republic of the Philippines was furnished a
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the copy of said decision on June 17, 1980. The
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST Please enter the appearance of the Solicitor Solicitor General was also furnished copy of
DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, General as counsel for the Government in the said decision which the latter claims to have
vs. above-entitled case, and cause all notices of received on July 8, 1980.
HON. OTILIO G. ABAYA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of hearings, orders, resolutions, decisions and
Agusan del Sur, RENATO N. AQUINO, LENY G. AQUINO, other processes to be served upon him at the The counsels for Republic of the Philippines are
NELDA LEE, RODOLFO N. AQUINO, LORNA AQUINO, Office of the Solicitor General, Department of First Assistant Fiscal Conrado R. Fabular,
ROSALINDA N. AQUINO, LUCINA G. AQUINO, RAUL N. Justice, Manila. District Land Officer Jose Roasol and the
AQUINO, RAFAEL C. AQUINO, REFUGIO N. AQUINO, Solicitor General.
Spouses JOAQUIN C. AQUINO and LUCENA G. AQUINO, The Provincial Fiscal of Prosperidad, Agusan
REBECCA A. BANTUG, ROSITA A. RAMOS and ROWENA N. del Sur has been authorized to appear in this It is a rule that when a party is represented by
AQUINO, respondents. case and therefore should also be furnished several counsels, notice to one of them is
notices of hearings, orders, resolutions, sufficient and such notice binds such party. In
Nazareno, Azada, Sabado & Dizon Law Offices and Tranquilino decisions and processes. However, as the this case, Fiscal Fabular was notified of the
O. Calo, Jr. for respondents Solicitor General retains supervision and control decision on June 17, 1980 and during the thirty
of the representation in this case and has to (30) day period allowed him to appeal which
approve withdrawal of the case, non-appeal, or expired on July 17, 1980, he failed to do so.
other actions which appear to compromise the The contention of the Solicitor General that he
interest of the Government, only notices of received notice of said judgment on July 8,
GANCAYCO, J.: orders, resolutions, and decisions served on 1980 and that he filed his notice of appeal on
him will bind the party represented. July 25, 1980, does not resurrect the right of
For purposes of an appeal from a decision of the trial court in a Republic of the Philippines to appeal said
land registration case, should the period of appeal be reckoned Adverse parties are likewise requested to judgment which was already lost when Fiscal
from the time of notice to the fiscal or notice to the Solicitor furnish both the Solicitor General and the Fiscal Fabular or any of Republic's counsels failed to
General? This is the issue posed in this case. with copies of their pleadings and motions. do so within thirty (30) days from June 17,
(Emphasis supplied) 1 1980, the date of receipt of said decision by
In 1977 and 1978, private respondents filed with the Court of First Fiscal Fabular which expired on July 17, 1980.
Instance of Agusan del Sur separate applications for registration After the latter date the Republic of the
After a joint trial of all the cases the trial court rendered a decision Philippines foreclosed its right to appeal. 2
of several parcels of land located in Bahbah, now Prosperidad, dated June 6, 1980 adjudicating the land applied for in the
Agusan del Sur with a total area of 7,880,418 square meters more proposal indicated therein to the applicants, private respondents
or less. The applications were docketed as LRC Nos. N-160 to N- herein. A copy of the decision was received by the Solicitor Hence, this petition wherein petitioners allege that the aforesaid
170. On subsequent dates, some of these applications were General on July 8, 1980. order of said respondent judge should be set aside because it
amended. was issued in excess of jurisdiction, in grave abuse of discretion,
and in violation of applicable jurisprudence.
On July 29, 1980, oppositors, the Director of Land and the
The Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development Director of Forest Development, through the Solicitor General,
through the Solicitor General filed separate oppositions to the filed separate notices of appeal from the decision to the Court of Pending consideration of this petition, on March 23, 1981, this
applications for registration. Along with said oppositions the Appeals. On the same date said oppositors filed separate motions Court issued a restraining order as prayed for in the petition to
Solicitor General also filed separate notices of appearance for extension of time within which to file the records on appeal. On restrain said respondent judge, any officers or agents
addressed to the Clerk of Court and copies furnished the September 3, 1980, or within the extended period first requested, representing any person or persons acting upon his orders, place
applicants. The notices of appearance read as follows: the same oppositors filed separate motions for further extension or stead from taking any further proceedings in LRC Nos. N- 60
of time to file record on appeal. and N-170.
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
On September 19, 1980 the trial court issued an order denying The petition is impressed with merit. By express provision of law,
CFI Agusan del Sur the government's appeal as follows: the Solicitor General is the counsel of the government in all land
The Clerk of Court registration cases and related proceedings. 3 He formally entered
his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and the
The Court rendered a joint judgment in all these Director of Forest Development. In his notice of appearance, he
cases on June 6, 1980. First Assistant Fiscal made it clear that he is the counsel for the government of the
aforesaid land registration cases and only notices, orders, represent the Government in all land
resolutions and decisions served on him will bind the government. registration and related proceedings. 5
He also made it clear that while the provincial fiscal acknowledged
that he was authorized to appear in this case and should The notices of appeal in the eleven (11) registration cases appear
therefore, be served with notices, orders, resolutions, decisions to have been filed within the original reglementary period while the
and processes, the Solicitor General retained the supervision and corresponding records on appeal were filed within the period of
control over him such that it is he alone who can approve the the extension requested to file record on appeal. Thus, as the
withdrawal of the decision, non-appearance and other actions to Solicitor General related, he received a copy of the decision on
protect the interest of the government. July 8, 1980. He filed the notices of appeal on July 29, 1980. On
the same date, he filed a motion requesting for thirty (30) days
In Republic vs. Polo 4 where the issue is Identical to the issue extension of time to file record on appeal from August 8, 1980, or
presented in this case, this Court held as follows: up to September 7, 1980 within which to file the record on appeal.
On September 5, 1980, or within the first extension requested, the
We hold that the thirty-day period should be Solicitor General filed another motion dated September 3, 1980
counted from the date when the Solicitor for further extension of time to file record on appeal for thirty (30)
General received a copy of the decision days from September 7, 1980 within which to submit the said
because the service of the decision upon the record on appeal. Before the expiration of the second extension or
city fiscal did not operate as a service upon the on September 26, and 29, 1980, the corresponding records on
Solicitor General. appeal were filed with the court in said cases.

It should be clarified that, although the Solicitor The reglementary period cannot be counted from receipt of the
General requested the city fiscal to represent copy of the decision by the Asst. Fiscal Conrado R. Fabular in
him in the trial court, he nevertheless, made his June 7, 1980 since, as above-stated, Fiscal Fabular was not the
own separate appearance as counsel for the counsel of record but only a surrogate of the Solicitor General in
State. In that "notice of appearance," he the proceedings.
expressly requested that he should be served in
Manila with "all notices of hearings, orders, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of
resolutions, decisions and other processes" and the respondent judge dated September 19, 1980 is hereby
that such service is distinct from the service of REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondent judge or his
notices and other papers on the city fiscal. successor is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of
petitioners. The restraining order issued on March 23, 1981 is
The Solicitor General also indicated in his hereby lifted. The Court makes no pronouncement as to costs.
"notice of appearance" that he retains
supervision and control of the representation in SO ORDERED.
this case and has to approve withdrawal of the
case, non-appeal, or other actions which
appear to compromise the interest of the
Government and that "only notices of orders,
resolutions and decisions served on him will
bind" the Government.

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, it is obvious that, strictly speaking,

the city fiscal did not directly represent the
Government. He was merely a surrogate of the
Solicitor General whose office, as the law office
of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, is the entity that is empowered to
G.R. No. 151068 May 21, 2004 The Provincial Prosecutor recommended no bail in this case, The provincial prosecutor opposed the motion, contending that
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6002. the filing of a petition for review of the investigating prosecutor’s
BENITO C. SALAZAR, petitioner, resolution in the Office of the Secretary of Justice was not a
vs. Barely three hours after filing the Information, the Provincial justification for the suspension of the enforcement of the warrant
HON. TOMAS R. ROMAQUIN, in his capacity as Presiding Prosecutor filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of of arrest issued by the court. The petitioner, the Provincial
Judge of Br. 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Warrant of Arrest in the said case alleging, inter alia, that: Prosecutor averred, cannot rely on the ruling in Roberts, Jr. vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by AKLAN Court of Appeals8 because the facts therein are different from
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR HON. LOURDES QUIMPO- those in the case before the court. Moreover, the Provincial
There is an urgent need for the issuance of Warrant of Prosecutor averred, the petitioner had not yet been arrested;
MAYOR, HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, and JODEL B. Arrest against the accused as the lives of some people
RENTILLO,respondents. hence, the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person.
are in danger considering that the motive is political and The prosecution asserted that the petitioner’s filing of a motion for
with the election day on May 14, 2001, there is an urgent the lifting of the warrant of arrest against him did not constitute a
RESOLUTION need to protect the public from anymore bloodshed and voluntary appearance before the court.
as wrongly or intentionally design by the accused, if the
CALLEJO, SR., J.: motive is infidelity, to protect the life of her wife, Noli
Marie Salazar, who is residing on the same address in The petitioner filed on May 29, 2001 a supplement to his motion,
Dumaguit, New Washington, Aklan.3 alleging that since Executive Judge Martelino-Cortes was the aunt
This is a petition for review of the Resolution 1 of the Court of of the wife of the deceased, it was illegal for her to have acted on
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67252 denying due course and the provincial prosecutor’s motion for the issuance of a warrant of
dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Benito Cortez On May 12, 2001, Executive Judge Sheila Martelino-Cortes arrest against him, and to thereafter grant the motion and issue
Salazar, on the ground that he served a copy of his petition on the issued an Order granting the motion.4 On the same day, the trial the said warrant. Hence, according to the petitioner, the Executive
respondent People of the Philippines, through the Provincial court issued a warrant for the petitioner’s arrest.5 However, the Judge was disqualified to act on the motion, viz:
Prosecutor, and not through the Office of the Solicitor General; petitioner was nowhere to be found, and as such, the police
and, the resolution of the appellate court denying the petitioner’s officers failed to serve the warrant on him. The case was later
raffled to Branch 2 of the court, presided by Judge Tomas R. 4. Finally, the Honorable Executive Judge is related
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution. within the fifth degree of consanguinity to Vivien Y.
Romaquin.
Bontogon-Rodriguez, wife of the deceased, Raymundo
The Antecedents Rodriguez. Vivien is the daughter of her first cousin
On May 15, 2001, the petitioner received a copy of the Joint Angela Yap-Bontogon, and therefore, a niece of the
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor finding probable cause Honorable Executive Judge. In view of this relationship,
On May 12, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor of Aklan filed an for murder against him which formed the basis for the filing of the
Information in the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, charging the Honorable Executive Judge is disqualified to sit in
Information. any case or in any proceedings involving the death of
the petitioner with murder. The accusatory portion reads:
Raymundo Rodriguez. She should have refused to act
On May 16, 2001, the petitioner filed in the RTC an Urgent Motion on Prosecutor Mayor’s motion for issuance of the
That on or about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of April 26, to Suspend Proceedings and to Lift Warrant of Arrest. The warrants of arrest.9
2001, in Barangay Dumaguit, Municipality of New petitioner alleged, inter alia, that he had filed a petition for review
Washington, Province of Aklan, Republic of the of the Joint Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor finding
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable The provincial prosecutor disagreed with the petitioner and
probable cause for murder against him in the Office of the averred in his reply to the supplement to the petition that the
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, Secretary of Justice. The petitioner cited Rule 112, Section 4 of
with treachery and use of superior strength, with intent to petitioner failed to prove the relationship of the Executive Judge to
the Rules of Court and the ruling of this Court in Roberts, Jr. vs. the wife of the deceased. He asserted that the matter of the
kill and without any justifiable cause, did then and there Court of Appeals,6 to support his plea for the suspension of the
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and inhibition of the judge should have been addressed to her, and
proceedings. To justify his motion for the lifting of the warrant of that even with her disqualification, the warrant of arrest and the
shoot one RAYMUNDO RODRIGUEZ, hitting the latter arrest issued against him, the petitioner alleged, thus:
on the different parts of his body which caused his order she issued were valid.
instantaneous death. Xeroxed copy of the Post-Mortem
Examination is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made ... He further submits that this motion is in consonance with his On August 10, 2001, Judge Tomas R. Romaquin, who presided
an integral part of this information. constitutional presumption of innocence and will not prejudice over Branch 2 of the court, issued an Order granting the
anyone. Accused is a person of good moral standing, a member petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings. However, the
of the bar and an officer of the court, a noted businessman, and petitioner’s motion to lift warrant of arrest was denied. The
By reason of the unlawful acts of the accused, the family had served the Philippine government until April 2001, as
of the victim suffered P100,000.00 actual damages. petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the order, but
President of the Food Terminal, Inc. He is innocent of the charges the court denied the same. The trial court declared that the issues
in this case and has no intention whatsoever to avoid the raised by the petitioner had become moot and academic since the
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 jurisdiction of the Honorable Court and the proceedings in this Secretary of Justice had denied his petition for review and
case.7
affirmed the joint resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding SERVICE OF THE "PETITION FOR CERTIORARI" HAD may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon
probable cause against him. BEEN MADE UPON THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of
WHO HAD REPRESENTED THE PEOPLE OF THE the case to the Regional Trial Court.
The petitioner forthwith filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of PHILIPPINES IN THE PROCEEDINGS WHICH GAVE
Appeals on November 5, 2001, assailing the orders of the RTC. RISE TO THE PETITION.10 The pleadings of the accused and copies of the orders or
However, the petitioner failed to submit proof of service of copies resolutions of the trial court are served on the People of the
of his petition on the respondent RTC, the People of the The petitioner avers that the exclusive authority of the Solicitor Philippines through the Provincial Prosecutor. However, in
Philippines and Jodel Rentillo. General to represent the People of the Philippines in the Court of appeals before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
Appeals and in the Supreme Court under Section 35(1), Chapter either (a) by writ of error; (b) via petition for review; (c) on
On November 12, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code, automatic appeal; or, (d) in special civil actions where the People
denying due course and dismissing the petition, on the ground comes into being only when the appellate court has already of the Philippines is a party, the general rule is that the Office of
that the petitioner failed to show proof of service of the petition on acquired jurisdiction over the case which, in turn, takes place only the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of
the respondents, as mandated by Rule 46, Section 3 in relation to upon the service on the State of the order or resolution of the the Philippines. This is provided for in Section 35 (1) Chapter 12,
Rules 65 and 13 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended. appellate court indicating its initial action on the petition, or by the Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, viz:
respondent’s voluntary submission to such jurisdiction as provided
for in Rule 46, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and
On November 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals received a reads:
Manifestation and Submission which the petitioner filed through the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings;
registered mail on November 5, 2001 alleging that, on the latter represent the Government and its officers in the
date, copies of the petition were served on the respondents SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over the person of respondent, how Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other
through registered mail, as evidenced by the affidavit of service acquired.— The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
executed by Danilo B. Elardo, the messenger in the law office of person of the respondent by the service on him of its proceedings in which the Government or any officer
the petitioner’s counsel. The petitioner also filed a motion for order or resolution indicating its initial action on the thereof in his official capacity is a party.
reconsideration of the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such
ground that he had substantially complied with the requirements jurisdiction. A copy of the petition in such action must be served on the People
of the Rules of Court, as amended. of the Philippines as mandated by Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules
Before then, the petitioner submits, service of a copy of his of Court, through the Office of the Solicitor General. 11 The service
On December 13, 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution petition on the respondent People of the Philippines may be of a copy of the petition on the People of the Philippines, through
denying the said motion, on the ground that the petitioner failed to effected through the Provincial Prosecutor who appeared as its the Provincial Prosecutor would be inefficacious. The petitioner’s
serve a copy of his petition on the Solicitor General, the counsel counsel in the trial court, conformably to Rule 13, Section 2 of the failure to have a copy of his petition served on the respondent,
of the respondent People of the Philippines. Rules of Court, as amended. through the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in the last
The Court’s Ruling paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Unless and
The Issues until copies of the petition are duly served on the respondent, the
appellate court has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition.
In his petition at bar, the petitioner contends that: The contention of the petitioner is devoid of merit.
The purpose of the service of a copy of the petition on the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED The authority of the Provincial Prosecutor to appear for and respondent in an original action in the appellate court prior to the
FROM THE USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL represent the respondent People of the Philippines is confined acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent is to
PROCEEDINGS, AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF only to the proceedings before the trial court. This is based on apprise the latter of the filing of the petition and the averments
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure contained therein and, thus, enable the respondent to file any
SECTION 1 OF RULE 6, AND SECTION 4 OF RULE 46, which provides, viz: appropriate pleading thereon even before the appellate court can
OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS WELL AS SECTION act on the said petition, or to file his comment thereon if so
35(1), CHAPTER 12, TITLE III OF BOOK IV OF THE SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All ordered by the appellate court. But if a copy of the petition is
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, AND APPLICABLE criminal actions commenced by a complaint or served on the Provincial Prosecutor who is not authorized to
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, WHEN IT information shall be prosecuted under the direction and represent the People of the Philippines in the appellate court, any
IGNORED THE IMPORTANT AND SUBSTANTIVE control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial pleading filed by the said Prosecutor for and in behalf of the
LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER, AND Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the People of the Philippines is unauthorized, and may be expunged
REFUSED TO SET ASIDE ITS DISMISSAL OF THE prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not from the records.
"PETITION FOR CERTIORARI" PETITIONER FILED available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public
EVEN AFTER IT FOUND THAT A COPY OF THAT officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated
On the petitioner’s plea that we brush aside his procedural lapse
and order the appellate court to take cognizance of and act on his
petition for certiorari, we are not persuaded. As gleaned from his
petitions in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, the petitioner
contends that the assailed order of Executive Judge Martelino-
Cortes dated May 12, 2001 and the warrant of arrest issued by
her are null and void, considering that she was the aunt of Vivien
Bontogon-Rodriguez, the wife of the deceased Raymundo
Rodriguez, as Angela (Urgino) Yap-Bontogon, Vivien Rodriguez’
mother, is her first cousin. Thus, the Executive Judge was
disqualified to take cognizance of Criminal Case No. 6002 and to
grant the motion of the provincial prosecutor. However, we have
reviewed the pleadings of the parties in the Court of Appeals and
in this Court, and find that the petitioner failed to adduce
preponderant evidence in the trial court to prove the said
relationship of the Executive Judge to the deceased and the
latter’s wife, let alone append in his petition in the Court of
Appeals and in this Court, documents to prove such relationship.
The barefaced fact that the provincial prosecutor or the private
prosecutor did not specifically and categorically deny the
petitioner’s allegations in his supplement to his motion for
reconsideration, that the Executive Judge and the deceased and
his wife are related, did not relieve the petitioner of his burden to
prove the same with the requisite quantum of evidence. Such
allegation should have been proven during the hearing of the
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and to lift the warrant
of arrest, and of his supplement to the said motion for
reconsideration.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED due

course for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77770 December 15, 1988 On 6 October 1981, the trial court issued an order 3 expressly subject of another registration (Manalo vs.
stating that the decision of 5 August 1981 had become final and Lukban, et al., 48 Phil. 973).
ATTY. JOSE S. GOMEZ, DELFINA GOMEZ ESTRADA, directed the Chief of the General Land Registration Office to issue
ENRIQUITA GOMEZ OXCIANO, BENITA GOMEZ GARLITOS, the corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, We
REYNALDO GOMEZ ESPEJO, ARMANDO GOMEZ, ERLINDA in the decision of 5 August 1981. resolve to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
GOMEZ GUICO, EUGENIA GOMEZ CALICDAN, AZUCENA
GOMEZ ORENCIA, TEODORO S. GOMEZ, JR., and ALEJO S. On 11 July 1984, respondent Silverio G. Perez, Chief of the SO ORDERED.
GOMEZ (now deceased) represented by his wife, LETICIA Y. Division of Original Registration, Land Registration Commission
GOMEZ, and children, namely, MARGIE GOMEZ GOB, (now known as the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
JACINTO Y. GOMEZ, ALEJO Y. GOMEZ, JR., and MARY ANN Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo stating that Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Y. GOMEZ, petitioners, Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already covered by appellate court in its Resolution dated 10 March 1987. 8Hence, this
vs. homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and registered under recourse.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO G. ADUCAYEN the Land Registration Act. He recommended that the decision of 5
Judge Regional Trial Court, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) August 1981, and the order of 6 October 1981 be set aside. Several issues are raised by petitioners in this petition. The more
Branch LVI, HON. CHIEF, LAND REGISTRATION Petitioners opposed the report, pointing out that no opposition important issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not
COMMISSION, Quezon City, Metro Manila, and SILVERIO G. was raised by the Bureau of Lands during the registration respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision of 25
PEREZ, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land proceedings and that the decision of 5 August 1981 should be March 1985 which set aside the lower court's earlier decision of 5
Registration Commission, Quezon City, Metro implemented because it had long become final and executory. August 1981 and the order of 6 October 1981; (b) whether or not
Manila, respondents. the respondents Acting Land Registration Commissioner and
After hearing, the lower court rendered a second decision on 25 Engr. Silverio Perez, Chief, Division of Original Registration, Land
March 1985 setting aside the decision dated 5 August 1981 and Registration Commission, have no alternative but to issue the
the order dated 6 October 1981 for the issuance of decrees of registration pursuant to the decision of 5 August 1981
decrees.4 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion and the order for issuance of decrees, dated 6 October 1981, their
PADILLA, J.: duty to do so being purely ministerial; (c) whether or not "the law
was denied by respondent judge on 6 August 1985 for lack of
merit. 5 of the case" is the decision in Government of the Philippine
The present case originated with the filing by petitioners on 30 Islands v. Abran, supra, which held that the lands adjudicated to
August 1968 in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Consolacion Gomez were not public lands, and therefore they
Court) of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, of an application for Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with this could not have been acquired by holders of homestead titles as
registration of several lots situated in Bayambang, Pangasinan. Court which in turn referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 6 against petitioners herein.

The lots applied for were Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 0, 11 On 17 September 1986, the appellate court rendered It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had
and 12 of Plan Psu-54792 Amd.-2. The lots were among those judgment, 7 dismissing the petition and stating, among others, become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that
involved in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands vs. thus— said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened,
Abran,1 wherein this Court declared Consolacion M. Gomez reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section
owner of certain lots in Sitio Poponto Bayambang, Pangasinan. In resumé, prior to the issuance of the decree of 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which
Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Y. Gomez (father of registration, the respondent Judge has still the provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the
Consolacion) who, together with Consolacion's son, Luis Lopez, power and control over the decision he court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
inherited from her parcels of land when Consolacion Gomez died rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
intestate. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro Y. in a registration or cadastral case takes place certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be
Gomez, they became the absolute owners of the subject lots by only after the expiration of the one-year period read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
virtue of a Quitclaim executed in their favor by Luis Lopez. The after entry of the final decree of registration judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the
lots (formerly portions of Lots 15,16, 34 and 41 covered by Plan (Afalla vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil. 622; Valmonte vs. decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being
Ipd-92) were subdivided into twelve lots—Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Nable, 85 Phil. 256; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil. the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The subdivision plan was duly approved 113). When the respondent Judge amended his his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981
by the Bureau of Lands on 30 November 1963. Petitioners agreed decision after the report of the respondent and the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without
to allocate the lots among themselves. officials of the Land Registration office had jurisdiction.
shown that homestead patents had already
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the been issued on some of the lots, respondents Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions,
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On 5 cannot be faulted because land already granted the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
August 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the by homestead patent can no longer be the proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
subject lots in petitioners' favor. 2 incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the
entry of the final decree of registration.9 This Court, in several assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not
decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been proceedings ." 13 "the law of the case", for the lots in question were not private
entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and lands of Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of The foregoing observations resolve the first two (2) issues raised issued over them in 1928-1929. There is sufficient proof to show
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in by petitioners. that Lots 15, 16, 34 and 41 of Ipd-92 were already titled lands way
the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and back in 1928 and 1929 as shown by Annexes "A", "B", "C", and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.10 "D" of respondents' Memorandum. 16
Petitioners next contend that "the law of the case" is found
in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran, et al., supra,
Petitioners contend that the report of respondent Silverio Perez where it was decided by this Court that the lands of Consolacion Lastly, petitioners claim that if the decision of 5 August 1981 of
should have been submitted to the court a quobefore its decision M. Gomez, from whom petitioners derive their ownership over the the lower court is sustained, the homestead title holders may still
became final. But were we to sustain this argument, we would be lots in question, were not public lands. A reading of the pertinent vindicate their rights by filing a separate civil action for
pressuring respondent land registration officials to submit a report and dispositive portions of the aforesaid decision will show, cancellation of titles and for reconveyance in a court of ordinary
or study even if haphazardly prepared just to beat the however, that the lots earlier covered by homestead patents were civil jurisdiction. Conversely, the same recourse may be resorted
reglementary deadline for the finality of the court decision. As said not included among the lands adjudicated to Consolacion M. to by petitioners. "(T)he true owner may bring an action to have
by this Court in De los Reyes vs. de Villa: 11 Gomez. The decision states: the ownership or title to land judicially settled, and if the
allegations of the plaintiff that he is the true owner of the parcel of
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees land granted as free patent and described in the Torrens title and
With respect to the portions of land covered by that the defendant and his predecessor-in-interest were never in
of registration must be stated in convenient homestead certificates of title, we are of opinion
form for transcription upon the certificate of title possession of the parcel of land and knew that the plaintiff and his
that such certificates are sufficient to prevent predecessor-in-interest have been in possession thereof be
and must contain an accurate technical the title to such portion from going to appellants
description of the land. This requires technical established, then the court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction,
aforesaid, for they carry with them without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon
men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only preponderating evidence that the respective
portions of a parcel of land included in an the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to
homesteaders held adverse possession of such reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to
application are ordered registered and that the portions, dating back to 1919 or
limits of such portions can only be roughly be the true owner thereof." 17
1920, accordingly to the evidence, and the said
indicated in the decision of the court. In such appellants failed to object to that possession in
cases amendments of the plans and sometimes time. (Emphasis supplied) WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of
additional surveys become necessary before the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners-
the final decree can be entered. That can hardly appellants.
be done by the court itself; the law very wisely Wherefore modifying the judgment appealed
charges the Chief Surveyor of the General Land from, it is hereby ordered that the lots
respectively claimed by Agustin V. SO ORDERED.
Registration Office with such duties
(Administrative Code, section 177). Gomez, Consolacion M. Gomez, and Julian
Macaraeg, be registered in their name, with the
exclusion of the portions covered by the
Thus, the duty of respondent land registration officials to render homestead certificates ... . (Emphasis
reports is not limited to the period before the court's decision supplied.) 14
becomes final, but may extend even after its finality but not
beyond the lapse of one (1) year from the entry of the decree.
The report of respondent land registration officials states that the
holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in question in
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in Government of the
officials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in Philippine Islands vs. Abran was promulgated on 31 December
the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the 1931. Hence, the subject lots are specifically excluded from those
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and adjudicated by the aforesaid decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.
with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in
the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation
to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under
refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible and
of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the incontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the
act of the court. 12 They are specifically called upon to "extend subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in
cadastral proceeding. 15
G.R. No. 160657 June 30, 2004 2003, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that outright dismissal and, of course, the inevitable ignominy which
considering the CSC’s manifested intention to file its own petition, such dismissal entails.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, the OSG had no recourse but to withdraw its 21 November
vs. 2003 Motion for Extension and allow the CSC to actively pursue Instead, the CSC, using its own lawyers, filed the wrong mode of
NIMFA P. ASENSI, respondent. its own case.10 We required the CSC to comment on the OSG’s review. The CSC’s assertion as to the capacity of its Office of
Manifestation and Motion.11 In their Comment filed on 27 April Legal Affairs to appear before this Court is of dubious legal basis.
2004, the CSC asserted that Under Section 16 (3), Chapter 3, A similar issue was raised, albeit pertaining to the legal officers of
RESOLUTION Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, its the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in the Court’s R E S O L U T I O
Office for Legal Affairs was authorized to represent the CSC N in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and
TINGA, J.: "before any Court or tribunal".12 Cigarette Factory.19 The BIR therein asserted that on the basis of
Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, its legal officers were
Respondent Nimfa Asensi was ordered dismissed by petitioner In the meantime, respondent filed her Comment on the Petition for allowed to institute civil and criminal actions and proceedings in
Civil Service Commission ("CSC") from her position as Revenue Certiorari.13 She prayed for the immediate dismissal of the behalf of the government. The Court disagreed, saying that it is
District Officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Lucena City. petition, as the proper remedy for the CSC was not the special the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear
Her dismissal came after an investigation revealed that she had civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, but a petition for review for the government in appellate proceedings,20 it being the
falsified entries in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) relative to her under Rule 45. Moreover, since the period for filing a petition for principal law officer and legal defender of the government.21 The
educational background.1 Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition review had already elapsed, according to the respondent, the Court also cited with approval, the exception enunciated in Orbos
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the CSC CSC had deliberately resorted to the special civil action. v. Civil Service Commission22 which is that the government office
Resolution ordering her dismissal. may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or
We agree with the respondent. So, we dismiss the petition. There representative only if it is adversely affected by the contrary
On 9 July 2003, the Court of Appeals’ Fourth Division is little need to elaborate on the reasons, which are after all, position taken by the OSG. Herein, there is no indication that the
promulgated a D E C I S I O N2 holding that the dismissal of elementary in procedural law. The special civil action for certiorari OSG has adopted a position contrary to that of the CSC; hence,
respondent was not warranted, and setting aside the assailed lies only to correct acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of appearance by the CSC on its own behalf would not be
resolution of the CSC.3 Acting upon the CSC’s motion for jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.14 The grave abuse warranted.
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied it in a R E S O L U T of discretion imputed to the Court of Appeals was its finding that
I O N dated 29 October 2003. respondent was not guilty of the charges against her, a charge Yet, even if the CSC Office of Legal Affairs were allowed to
that if true, would only constitute an error in law. Certiorari will represent the CSC in this petition, still the dismissal of the case
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") received a copy of the issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure would still be warranted in view of the erroneous mode by which
29 October 2003 Resolution on 7 November 2003. Having until 22 or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As the assailed Court of Appeals D E C I S I O N was elevated.
November 2003 to file a petition for review on certiorari before this long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors Moreover, the OSG, which had been given until 22 December
Court, on 21 November 2003, the OSG filed a motion for committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing 2003 to file the petition for review, did not file any such petition,
extension until 22 December 2003 to file the petition for more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by timely interposing instead the Manifestation and
review.4 This Court granted the OSG’s motion in appeal and not by special civil action for certiorari. 15 Neither is Motion.23 This Manifestation, of course, did not stay the period for
a Resolution dated 9 December 2003.5 certiorari warranted if there is another plain, speedy and adequate filing the petition for review. Thus, such period has already
remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 The remedy to the elapsed for good. On account of the lapse of the period, there is
adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is a petition no need for us to pass upon the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion.
Apparently, the CSC remained in the dark as to the legal moves for review under Rule 45.17
made by its counsel, the OSG. On 25 November 2003, the CSC,
filed a Manifestation To File Its Own Petition for We are hardly sympathetic to the CSC’s predicament. Not only
Review.6 This Manifestation was signed by three lawyers from the The OSG, counsel of record for the CSC, well understood the did it supply the noose by which it was hung, it also tied the knot.
Office of Legal Affairs of the CSC.7 proper procedure for appeal, and undertook the initiatory step for Had the CSC been in consultation with its counsel of record, the
a petition for review by filing a Motion for Extension of Time to file petition could have been taken without incident. Instead, without
such petition.18 It is unclear if the CSC had known about the seeking the heed of sager minds, it went off by its lonesome into
On 27 November 2003, the CSC, through its Office of Legal OSG’s Motion, though the answer to that question does not really high noon, ill-equipped. There is nothing left to do but pronounce
Affairs, filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65, matter to the disposition of this case. The Court granted the the demise of the case.
assailing the 9 July 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals, which OSG’s Motion, allowing the OSG to file its Petition until 22
it received on 30 July 2003.8 In a Resolution dated 13 January December 2003. The OSG, being the designated legal
2004, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, directed The Petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
representative of the Government and its instrumentalities, has a
the respondent to file her comment thereon.9 long history of association with this Court and acquired in the
process an awesome wealth of experience in appellate practice. SO ORDERED.
The OSG was surprised by the twin legal moves taken by the Had the CSC relied on its counsel’s expertise, it would have been
CSC without their consent and participation. On 22 December spared of the needless burden of salvaging its petition from
G.R. No. 123780 December 17, 1999 Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, this Court The said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the
reconsidered its Resolution of January 20, 1997, after finding the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07475, but on August 1,
In Re: Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and existence of a real and existing conflict of interest between the 1989, the Court of Appeals1 affirmed in its entirety the said
Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting respondents, whose claim to the title of subject property is decision in Civil Case 24873. After the motion for reconsideration
Decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court anchored on the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90380, and the of Eduardo V. Santos' (one of the defendants) was denied in the
petitioner and intervenors, whose claim is based on the decision Order dated October 5, 1989, he elevated the case to this Court
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 27602 and this Court's on a petition for review, under G.R. No. 90380, entitled "Eduardo
Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group, Resolution in G.R. No. 110900. Thus, in the interest of justice, this V. Santos, petitioner versus The Hon. Court of Appeals and
Philippine Army, under the incumbency of COLONEL PEDRO Court resolved to give due course to the motion for Ambrocio Aguilar, Respondents."
R. CABUAY, JR., petitioner, reconsideration of the petitioner and intervenors and ordered the
vs. parties to submit their respective Memoranda within thirty (30)
DR. POTENCIANO MALVAR, PRIMEX CORPORATION, On September 13, 1990, this Court affirmed the decision of the
days from notice. Court of Appeals, which decision became final and executory per
MARCELINO LOPEZ, as representative of the Heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez, respondents, HEIRS OF ELINO ADIA, entry of judgment dated November 29, 1990. In the said Decision,
represented by JULIANA ADIA, intervernors. G.R. No. 90380 the Court2 resolved the conflicting claims between the petitioner,
Eduardo V. Santos, and the private respondent, Ambrocio Aguilar,
Records on hand disclose that, on April 15, 1981 in Civil Case No. thus:
24873, entitled "Ambrosio Aguilar vs. Heirs of Fernando
Gorospe, et al.", the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Rizal, Branch Petitioner's arguments hinge on whether or not
PURISIMA, J.: 161, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Ambrosio Aguilar, the parcel of land in dispute was brought within
disposing as follows: the operation of the Land Registration Act. We
Originally filed on February 27, 1996 by Colonel Pedro R. rule that to never did. Accordingly, finding the
Cabuay, Jr., Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in assigned errors to be without merit, the petition
of the Philippine Army, was the petition at bar "seeking for favor of plaintiff and against defendants: must fail.
clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two (2) Final
and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of the Honorable In reaffirming the declaration of nullity of OCT
Supreme Court" in G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. No. 110900. 1. Declaring the plaintiff as
the true and rightful owner of No. 537 we rely on the Director of Lands
the land in question; vs. Basilio Abache, et al. where it was ruled that
On January 20, 1997, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition land is not affected by operations under the
for lack of any justiciable issue raised. torrens system unless there has been an
2. Declaring null and void ab application to register it, and registration has
initio Original Certificate of been made pursuant to such application. In that
Confident in the righteousness and merits of their cause, the Title No. 637 and all
petitioners and intervenors sent in a motion for reconsideration case, while the lot in question was awarded in a
subsequent transfer cadastral proceeding to movant therein, it was
inviting this Court's attention to the injustice that may result from certificates of title emanating
the two (2) conflicting decisions, especially due to the impending registered and a certificate of title was issued in
therefrom; the names of persons who never established
enforcement of a writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City) in Civil Case No. 463- their right over the same, i.e., they neither
A, implementing the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. The 3. Dismissing the intervention claimed the lot nor appeared at the trial. We
said writ was directed against the buildings and structures of the of the Director of Lands; and affirmed the lower court's declaration of nullity
Intelligence and Security Group (ISG) of the Philippine Army, the of the certificate of title and the order for the
Group Commander of which initiated the present recourse. The 4. Ordering defendants to pay issuance of a new certificate of title in the name
ISG derived the right to occupy a portion of a subject parcel of to plaintiff, jointly and of movant.
land and to erect thereon extensive military structures, from the severally: (a) P20,000.00 as
Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, the Intervenors, moral damages; (b) In the case at bar, not only do the records
whose right to subject property was duly recognized in G.R. No. P10,000.00 as and for indicate that Gorospe, petitioner's predecessor-
110900. attorney's fees, and (c) the in-interest, had not filed any application for the
costs of suit. parcel of land in question; also, no evidence
On the other hand, the respondents insist on the validity of was submitted that the registration in Gorospe's
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196256, registered in the names The counterclaims are hereby dismissed. name was made pursuant to a satisfactory
of respondents' predecessors-in-interest (Lopezes), placing showing of his compliance with the application
reliance on the pronouncements of this Court in G.R. No. 90380. requirements for homestead under the Public
Land Act, i.e., that he introduced improvements 7) Plans H-147383, Psu- situations where the original registration was
thereon and cultivated the same, etc. 146727 and F-1543 which all valid and Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act
show that Hermogenes Lopez was squarely applicable.
Compare Gorospe's record with the mountain of is one of the boundary
evidence in favor of private respondent. To owners. G.R. No. 110900
support his predecessor-in-interest's claim of
ownership, private respondent presented the In addition to the foregoing public documents, It appears that during the pendency of the case aforementioned,
following documents: also presented were persons connected with or on September 10, 1985, to be exact, the Heirs of Elino Adia
the Bureau of Lands whose testimonies proved (herein intervenors) lodged a protest against Plan H-138612 of
1) The original tracing cloth of that Hermogenes Lopez filed a homestead Hermogenes Lopez involving the same property in dispute, before
Plan H-138612 [Exhibits "A- application bearing No. H-138612 covering the the Lands Management Bureau (LMB), which land protest was
3"] which was surveyed for land in question and that the same was duly decided by the LMB in favor of the protestants, Heirs of Elino
Hermogenes Lopez; processed by the Bureau of Lands after he had Adia. In its Decision of December 10, 1990, the LMB summarized
complied with all the requirements of the law. the antecedents facts and circumstances leading to the institution
Said patent was duly approved and a of the present case as follows:
2) The microfilm of Plan H- corresponding homestead patent was issued in
138612 also bearing the his favor.
corresponding Accession No. The Heirs of Elino Adia filed a protest against
103378 [Exhibit "D-1"]; Plan H-138162 of Hermogenes Lopez covering
What irretrievably turns the tide against the a piece of land (equivalent to Lot 7546, Cad. 29,
petitioner is the finding that there exist in the Extension, Antipolo Cadastre), situated at
3) The Whiteprint of Plan H- records of the Register of Deeds of Pasig two
138612 also bearing the Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Rizal.
original certificates of title bearing No. 537
same Accession No. 103378 based on a free patent and covering two
[Exhibit "D"1]; different lots situated in two different On the September 10 and October 28, 1985
municipalities of Rizal, and registered in the hearing in the case, only protestants appeared.
4) The inventory Book names of two different persons. The first was Upon request of counsel, an ex-
prepared in the year 1951 by for a parcel of land in Pililla, Rizal, registered in parte investigation was conducted with
the Bureau of Lands [Exhibit the name of a certain Simeon Alejar on protestants submitting testimonial and
"XX"] containing a list of December 23, 1993, the validity and regularity documentary evidence. After protestants rested
salvaged plans [among] of which has never been questioned. The their case, one Francisco R. Cruz filed an
which [was] . . . Plan H- second is the questionable document registered intervention alleging that he has been deprived
138612 as surveyed by on August 31, 1944 in the name of Fernando of his chance to be heard and present his
Hermogenes Lopez; Gorospe. The petition is silent on this aspect; evidence.
petitioner does not even attempt to refute this.
5) The Index Card of the On the contrary, while petitioner avers that OCT In the interest of justice, another investigation
Bureau of Lands [Exhibit "XX- No. 537 proceeds from a homestead was conducted on April 10 and September 29,
2"] showing the Plan H- application, the spurious title on its face 1989. This time, Francisco Cruz was required to
138612 is one of the indicates that it was based on a free patent. present the original or certified copy of the
salvaged plans and the same Quitclaim or Transfer of Rights dated May 18,
is in the name of It is thus only proper, based on the foregoing, 1981, allegedly executed by Hermogenes
Hermogenes Lopez; that We reaffirm the declaration that OCT No. Lopez in his favor. To obviate lengthy
537 is null and void ab initio and the land investigation, the parties agreed to submit their
covered thereby has never having been brought respective memorandum in support of their
6) The consolidated Plan AP- claims.
6450 [Exhibit "X"] prepared by under the operation of the torrens system. This
the Bureau of Lands which being the case, Sec. 38 of the Land
shows that Hermogenes Registration Act cannot be invoked in this Apart from testimonial and documentary
Lopez is the owner of the instance. Parenthetically, it may be stated that evidence presented during the hearing of
parcel of land covered by Our rulings in Baranda v. Baranda and Albienda October 28, 1985, the Heirs of Elino Adia
Plan H-138612; v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner to submitted their memorandum contending that
support his contention do not apply to the facts from 1929 up to July 1943, Elino Adia occupied
of the case at bar because both involve and cultivated continuously, adversely, publicly
and peacefully the disputed land; that he and interposed their protest against the Plan H- applications, which are all administrative and
introduced considerable improvements thereon; 138612 of Hermogenes Lopez. It averred that executive in nature.
that after Elino's death, possession of the land respondent Hermogenes Lopez is not entitled to
was taken over by Emiliano and Juliana Adia; a homestead patent because neither he nor his Their motion of reconsideration having been denied by the LMB
that the land was declared for taxation purposes legal heirs resided or occupied that land in on January 29, 1992, the Lopezes brought a petition
and the taxes thereon paid; and that they question. for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed
therefore prayed for the approval of the final as CA-G.R. SP No. 27602; which petition was, however,
proof on the homestead application of the Heirs As things are, there are four (4) parties claiming dismissed in the Decision, dated February 26, 1993, of the Court
of Elino Adia. In support thereof, they submitted to be entitled to acquire the land in question. of Appeals, with the following findings of facts, disquisition and
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "C-1", "H-1", "N", "O" and The issue, therefore, here is who among them conclusion, to wit:
"Q". deserves to be given the preference rights to
apply for the controverted land. In the investigation, the Heirs of Elino Adia
Upon the other hand, applicants-respondents presented six (6) witnesses, namely, Bartolome
Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez averred that After examining and evaluating the respective position and Sierra, Maria Sierra, Francisco Tandoc,
ownership of the land contested by protestant evidence of the parties, the LMB found for and decided in favor of Fortunato Suarez, Juliana Adia and Emiliano
had been the subject of exhaustive judicial the Adias, in its Order dated December 10, 1990, the decretal Adia. Their testimony substantially consist of
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of portion of which ratiocinated and ruled: the following:
Rizal; that ownership of the land in question by
deceased Hermogenes Lopez had already
been duly established and hence, protestants WHEREFORE, Plan H-138612 appearing in the Bartolome Sierra declared that he was among
claim has no legal and factual bases, as it had records of this Office in the name of the heirs of the first settlers in Barrio Macatubang in 1922
been finally settled judicially; and that the Hermogenes Lopez is hereby as it is, corrected followed by Elino Adia; his house was more or
assignment of rights in favor of Francisco Cruz and amended, in that it shall thereafter be less 200 meters away from Adia's house; he is
is only a simulation, because at the time of the considered to be recorded in the name of Elino a son of Luciana Sierra whose land adjoins the
alleged sale Hermogenes Lopez was no longer Adia, now his heirs represented by Emiliano land of Elino Adia, which was (Sierras) (sic)
the owner of the disputed land having been and Juliana Adia. The claims of Hermogenes surveyed under Plan F-46231; Adia's (sic)
previously conveyed to Ambrocio Aguilar in Lopez and all those claiming under him, planted palay and fruit trees on his land and
1959. Respondent prayed that the protest be Francisco R. Cruz and the Overlooking used portions thereof for carabao fattening;
denied and the intervention, dismissed. Storeowners and Planters Association, Inc., are some of the trees planted by Adia are still
hereby dismissed and this case dropped from existing; Juliana and Emiliano are the children
the records. The homestead application of Elino of spouses Elino Adia and Lucia San Gabriel;
Intervenor Francisco Cruz, for his part, asserted Adia, covering plan H-138612 shall be and no other person claimed Adia" land and he
that on May 18, 1991, the land in question and reconstituted or in lieu thereof, a new does not know Hermogenes Lopez.
all its improvements were transferred to him in application may be filed by the Heirs of Elino
"Quitclaim and assignment of Rights"; that he Adia, which shall thereafter be given due
tried to locate the records of the homestead Mariano Suarez declared that he was born in
course. Within a period of sixty (60) days from barangay dela Paz and was the Barangay
application of Hermogenes Lopez but to no the receipt of this order, the O.S. & P.A. shall
avail; that after a fruitless search for the said Captain thereof in 1972 and 1981; he knows
vacate and remove whatever improvements Emiliano and Juliana whose father (Elino) died
application, he finally requested on November they have in the premises.
27, 1982 for inclusion of Hermogenes Lopez, during the Japanese occupation; after Elino's
now Francisco Cruz in the list of survey death, Emiliano and Juliana continued with the
claimants in the Antipolo Cadastre; that as What is decisively clear and of utmost significance to note, is that occupation and cultivation of the land; he does
successor-in-interest of the deceased in its said decision, the LMB found that subject land was still a not know Hermogenes Lopez; and different
Hermogenes Lopez, he has a valid and better public land, at the time; concluding and ruling thus: kinds of trees, such as mango, duhat and
claim to the land in controversy; that all the bamboo, some of which are still visible, were
unpleasant incidents attendant to the case The land in dispute is definitely a PUBLIC planted by them but most of the trees were
hindered him in constructing his house on the LAND and as such, the authority to administer used for firewood by the people.
land; and, that he prayed for the award to him of and dispose of it is entrusted to Department of
the land in question. Environment and Natural Resources. The Juliana Adia said that her parents Elino Adia
authority to administer public land carries with it and Lucia Adia are now both dead; they
On July 7, 1989, the Overlooking Storeowners such powers as GRANTING, APPROVING, occupied the land in question, cleared the same
and Planters Association, Inc. also intervened REJECTING and REINSTATING public land and planted fruit trees thereon; her father Elino
Adia applied for homestead and the survey of null and void ab-initio. The land was also in (sic) defendants
the land was approved in 1939; after the death the subject of a protest filed with the Bureau of (Aguilar)
of her parents, her uncle Ambrocio Narvasa Lands which was dismissed. Further, the land dated July
helped in the cultivation of the land; and her was involved in Tanodbayan Case No. 830220 31, 1959
possession up to the present has been entitled "Juliana Adia versus Rodolfo Paelmo", null and
peaceful, unmolested by anybody, including which was resolved in favor of Paelmo, the void.
Fermin Lopez and Hermogenes Lopez. This Regional Land Director in region IV of the
testimony was corroborated by Francisco defunct Bureau of Lands, as follows: 2. Ordering
Tandoc, Fortunata Suarez and Emiliano Adia. the
In support of their claim, protestants submitted The document presented by defendants
Exhibits "A" to "Q" inclusive; Among these is a respondent Rodolfo Paelmo to vacate
certified Tracing Cloth of Plan-H-138612 consisting of the approved the land in
SURVEYED FOR ELINO ADIA with accession plan in the name of question or
No. 103378 issued by Engineer Felipe R. Hermogenes Lopez, described
Valenzuela, Chief Technical Services Section, predecessor-in-interest of in the
Bureau of Lands dated July 31, 1981, Ambrocio Aguilar, plaintiff in claim.
containing an area of 19.48888 (sic) hectares Civil Case No. 24873,
situated at de la Paz, Antipolo, Rizal, with the strongly belies complainants
certification stating, to wit: 3.
father in the amended survey Declaring
plan. the plaintiff
This is to certify that this the true
tracing cloth plan is true copy All the foregoing considered, and
of Homestead Application No. there exists no probable absolute
138612 which was approved cause to justify further owners of
on February 7, 1939, as inquiring into the charge. said parcel
verified from the microfilm on of land.
file in this office. This certified
plan is issued upon request of WHEREFORE, let this
Engr. Ricardo O. Vasquez complaint be as the same Pending appeal of the aforementioned decision,
who paid the verification fee hereby DISMISSED. a writ of demolition was issued against the
of P5.00 under O.R. No. squatters on the land. The Heirs of Elino Adia in
9915364 dated July 31, 1981. The ownership of the land in question appears behalf of all squatters filed a petition
(Exhibit A) also to have been clearly established in Civil for certiorari with the appellate court to nullify
Case No. 463-3 filed by Hermogenes Lopez the judgment and the order of demolition and a
and the title and possession over the said restraining order was issued. The Heirs of
Plan H-138612 was subject of Civil Case No. Hermogenes Lopez filed their comment and on
5957 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal parcel of land were ordered reconveyed to the
heirs of Hermogenes Lopez in the February 3, July 15, 1985 the petition for certiorari was
entitled, "Hermogenes Lopez versus Fernando denied and the restraining order was dissolved.
Gorospe" wherein former Director of Lands 1985 decision whose dispositove portions
reads: For said reason, the Heirs of Hermogenes
Nicanor Jorge testified in court. The Heirs of Lopez pray for the dismissal of the protest and
Hermogenes Lopez maintain that the ownership the intervention.
of the land in question had already been settled In view of the foregoing
in judicial proceedings before the Court of First consideration Judgment is
Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 24873 hereby rendered: It will be noted that except for the instant
entitled "Ambrosio Aguilar versus Beatriz de investigation, the case has never been formally
Zuzuarregui, et al., for declaration of investigated by this Office in order to determine
1. the issue of who has the right to the land in
inexistence and/or nullity of Free Patent, Declaring
Original Certificate of Title and Transfer dispute. The protest filed by the Heirs of Elino
the Deed of Adia with the Region IV was never formally
Certificate of Title. Here, Ambrosio Aguilar, Absolute
plaintiff, was declared as the true and rightful investigated The case ended in a Tanodbayan
Sale Exhibit case filed against Director Paelmo, who in his
owner of the land in question and OCT No. 573 "C" in favor
it the name of Fernando Gorospe was declared answer to the complaint of Adia solely relied on
of
the decision of the court in Civil Case No. the eastern boundary of the Please be informed that the
24873, portion of which is quoted hereunder. document Exhibit "8". only records that we have of
the Plan H-13812 (sic) in the
The document presented by A — On the basis of this plan name of Hermogenes Lopez
the respondent Rodolfo it shows that Elino Adia is a containing an area of 19.4888
Paelmo consisting of the homesteader whose hectares situated in Dela Paz,
approved plan in the name of homestead is Homestead Antipolo as surveyed on
Hermogenes Lopez, Application No. 13812 (sic). . November 10, 1938 by
predecessor-in-interest of .. surveyor Benito Guevarra
Ambrocio Aguilar, plaintiff in under the supervision of
Civil Case No. 24873, Public Lands Surveyor
Q — Exhibit "39" what would Conrado Santillan.
strongly belies complainants you say? Would you say that
ascertion that respondent Hermogenes Lopez is the
Rodolfo Paelmo used the person for whom this survey The then Chief of Technical
approved plan of Plan H-13812 (sic) was Services of the National
complainant's father in the made? Capital Region Engr. Felipe
amended survey. R. Venezuela issued a
certified copy of H-13812 (sic)
A — It appears that when this allegedly as verified in the
It is worth mentioning also that Plan H-13812 plan Exhibit "39" was certified
(sic) was also involved in Civil Case No. 5957, microfilm. We had however
to, the name appearing on changed the survey, claimant
entitled "Hermogenes Lopez versus Fernando the original plan was not
Gorospe" wherein Director of Lands Nicanor from Hermogenes Lopez as
HERMOGENES LOPEZ that appearing in our record of
Jorge testified to the effect that the applicant in is why there appeared here
the application covering Plan H-138612 was survey plan to Elino Adia.. . . .
AS PREPARED FOR.
Elino Adia for whom it was surveyed. Portions
of his direct testimony are quoted as follows: As records are now three responsible Bureau of
Q — Now, you would like to Lands Officials certified and testified in court in
convey to the effect that per connection with Plan H-13812 (sic). Nicanor
DIRECT EXAMINATION: document Exhibit "39", Jorge, in Civil Case No. 5957, declared that
Hermogenes Lopez was NOT Elino Adia is a Homesteader and his
Q — Mr. Jorge, I see that this THE PERSON for whom it homestead is numbered as Homestead
particular area involved is was originally survey. Application No. 13812 (sic). On the other hand,
bounded on the East by Elino the Chief, Technical Services Section, Surveys
Adia with a reading A — That is true. Division, Region IV, certified that the tracing
underneath which may be cloth plan marked as Exhibit "A" was a Plan H-
quoted as Homestead 13812 (sic) surveyed for Elino Adia with
Application No. 13812 (sic). Q — You said that is true,
what do you mean? Accession No. 103378. This was contradicted
Will you please tell us, Mr. by Engr. Privadi Dalire, Chief, Bureau who
Director what that mean? certified that Plan H-13812 (sic) is in the name
A — I mean that when this of Hermogenes Lopez and that Engr. Felipe
A — It shows that Elino Adia was certified by our Chief Venezuela changed the survey claimant from
is a homesteader and his Records Division that plan Hermogenes Lopez as appearing in our records
homestead is numbered as appearing here was not of survey plan to Elino Adia.
Homestead Application No. surveyed in the name of
13812 (sic). Hermogenes Lopez.
From all the foregoing, it is obvious that crucial
and vital point to be established is the real and
Q — As far as your office is On July 24, 1990, the Chief of Surveys Division true owner of Plan H-13812 (sic). Portions of
concerned, who is the issued a memorandum involving Plan H-13816 the testimony of Director Nicanor Jorge is
homestead applicant per (sic) addressed to the Chief, Legal Division quoted hereunder:
Homestead Application No. which read:
13812 (sic) as appearing in
Q — Now, advance Planters Association, Inc. opted to submit their
there any opinion respective memorandum or position paper in
seems to why they support of their respective claims.
be an have such
incompatibil incompatibil On July 22, 1993, the Lopezes filed with this Court a petition for
ity between ity in the review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 110900. The Court
Exhibit "D" preparation resolved to "DENY" the petition for failure to comply with legal
and "39" of this plan. requirements. In the pertinent Resolution, dated August 11, 1993,
with the Unless, this Court further stated:
original there has
plan been
pertaining some mane Besides, even if the petitioners complied with
to Psu- uvering, the aforesaid requirement, the petition would
106705, well could still be denied as no reversible error was
which was not tell committed by the appellate court. (emphasis
surveyed what had supplied)
for Pablo happened.
and Luz Petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 110900 was
Ventura Clearly, the authenticity of the survey records of denied with finality on November 3, 1993. On December 6, 1993,
claim who this Office is at issue as to the real owner of the denial became final and executory.
appears to Plan H-13812 (sic) that is, whether it is Elino
be in the Adia or Hermogenes Lopez. The Heirs of Elino On November 25, 1994 and in accordance with the LMB decision
western Adia submitted Exhibit "B", copy of Psu-106705 dated 10 December 1990 (as affirmed by this Court) which,
boundary of in the name of Pablo and Luz Ventura involving among others, directed that "the homestead application of Elino
the area parcels of land in Barrio dela Paz, Antipolo, Adia, covering plan H-138612 shall be reconstituted or
involved Rizal, surveyed on October 26, 1938 and in lieu thereof a new application may be filed by the Heirs of Elino
under approved on May 10, 1939 showing that Elino Adia," the heirs of Elino Adia filed eight (8) new applications
Exhibit "39" Adia is the boundary owner at the eastern covering the 19.4888 hectares earlier declared as public land.
and "D". In portion of the land covered thereby, Exhibit "G"
this is a copy of TCT No. 44541 of Robert Philipps
document it On December 14, 1994, eight (8) land patents in the name of
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on "Heirs of Elino Adia", represented by Juliana Adia, were issued by
shows that May 26, 1956 and originally registered on
Elino Adia the DENR's OIC-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
August 2, 1939 as OCT No. 1254 in the name Officer of Rizal (under the authority of the President) and on
Homestead of Pablo Ventura showing that Elino Adia is the
Application January 26, 1995, Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819 to P-
boundary owner at the eastern portion thereof 826 were issued in the name of the Heirs of Elino Adia,
No. 13812 as of August 2, 1939. Exhibit "E" is a copy of
(sic). So represented by Juliana Adia.
TCT No. 8362 of the La Colina Development
there are Corporation issued by the Register of Deeds of
three Rizal and originally registered on August 2, Other incidents/cases
seemingly 1939 as OCT No. 1254 in the name of Pablo
incompatibl Ventura showing that the property covered During the pendency of both cases, several incidents/cases were
e sheets. thereby is bounded on the eastern portion by H- initiated by the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, tending to further
Will you 13812 (sic) of Elino Adia as of August 2, 1939. muddle the situation.
please tell
us, if you
know how Of all the parties thereto, only the heirs of Elino While Civil Case No. 24873 (Aguilar vs. Gorospe, et al. for
can this Adia was able to submit substantial and annulment of OCT No. 536 — which was later elevated as G.R.
happened? material testimonial and documentary evidence No. 90380) was pending before the Court of Appeals, the
in substantiation of their claims. Instead of Lopezes brought an action for cancellation executed by
availing of a formal proceedings, the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez in favor of Ambrosio Aguilar. The case was
A — Well, I Hermogenes Lopez and Intervenors Francisco docketed as Civil Case No. 463-A before Branch 71 of the Rizal
could not Cruz and the Overlooking Storeowners and Regional Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City). 3 On
February 5, 1985, the said Regional Trial Court came out with a the nullification of TCT No. N-104422 issued in the name of the Their set-back notwithstanding, the Lopezes once again
decision declaring the deed of absolute sale in litigation null and Lopezes. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Antipolo,
void, and disposing thus: Rizal6 (now Antipolo City) a Motion to Order Cancellation
On December 23, 1985, the Court of Appeals rendered its of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 72439 (in the name of
In view of the foregoing considerations decision in CA G.R. SP No. 06096,5 disposing as follows: Eduardo Santos) and Issuance of New Certificate of
Judgment is hereby rendered: Title, in lieu thereof. On January 28, 1991, the said
Regional Trial Court issued an order granting subject
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: motion and, on February 8, 1991 the Register of Deeds
1. Declaring the Deed of in Marikina issued TCT No. 196256 in the name of the
Absolute Sale Exhibit "C" in 1. Declaring that portion of Lopezes.
favor of defendants dated the decision of 5 February
July 31, 1959 null and 1985 adjudging defendants
void ab-initio; On June 18, 1991, the Lopezes filed another petition purportedly
Lopezes as the true and under Section 108, PD 1529, with Branch 71 of the Regional Trial
absolute owners of the land in Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City). This time, they
2. Ordering defendants to question as null and void; (Lopezes) prayed for, among others, for the cancellation of OCT
vacate the land in question or No. 5377 "and all Transfer Certificates of Title originating
described in the complaint 2. Declaring the order of 19 therefrom" and that TCT No. 196256, which was previously issued
(par. 4 thereof) and April 1985 to be null and void; to them, be "indicated as an Original Certificate of Title with a
immediately restore the corresponding number assigned therefor."
possession thereof to the
plaintiffs; 3. Ordering the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, Marikina On June 24, 1991, Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch, to cancel TCT No. N- Antipolo, Rizal, (now Antipolo City) granted the said petition and
3. Declaring the plaintiffs the 10442 issued in the names of ordered the Register of Deeds in Marikina, Rizal to cancel OCT
true and Absolute owners of defendants Lopezes and No. 537 and to indicate TCT No. 196256 as OCT and to further:
the said parcel of land; and restoring TCT No. 72439 in
the name of plaintiff and the . . . indicate that it was, as herein quoted:
4. To pay the attorney's fees notice of lis pendens thereon; "issued by virtue of the Decision of the Supreme
to plaintiffs in the sum of Court in G.R. No. 90380 on September 13,
P5,000.00 and the costs of 4. Ordering defendants 1990 (in relation to the Decision in Civil Case
this action. Lopezes to surrender to the No. 463-A as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Register of Deeds of Rizal, in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242 and the Supreme
Aguilar's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court Marikina Branch, within five Court in G.R. No. 81092) which declared that
on March 14, 1985 and the decision of the Regional Trial Court (5) days from entry of Hermogenes Lopez, now his heirs, as the true
was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals on August 18, judgment, TCT No. N-10442 and rightful owner by virtue of Homestead
1987 in CA G.R. No. 06242. 4 for cancellation. Should they Patent Application No. 138612 and the
fail to do so, the Register of corresponding homestead patent issued in his
In view of the aforecited judgment of Branch 71 of the Regional Deeds, Marikina Branch, may favor in June, 1939, after complying with the
Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City), the Lopezes proceed to cancel the original requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
presented an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion" before the same court, and owner's duplicate of the amended, otherwise known as the Public Land
praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 72439 (in the name of title without further notice; Act.
Eduardo V. Santos) and for the issuance of a new certificate of
title in their favor. The said motion was granted by the same 5. Denying plaintiff's prayer to On July 31, 1991, the same Register of Deeds inscribed the said
Regional Trial Court on April 19, 1985 and TCT No. N-104422 be placed in possession of Order on TCT No. 196256 and on October 10, 1991, it cancelled
was then issued in favor of the Lopezes. the property in question; and, TCT No. 196256 and in its place, issued thirteen (13) transfer
certificates of title, TCT No. 207990 — 208000, 208002 and
On May 8, 1995, Eduardo V. Santos filed with the Court of 6. Dismissing the complaint 208358, all in the names of Marcelino Lopez, Felisa Lopez, Zoilo
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06096, a petition for as against defendants Lopez and Leonardo Lopez.
nullification of the portion of the aforesaid decision of the Regional spouses Aguilar.
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 463-A adjudging the Lopezes as "true On September 10, 1992, the Lopezes and Primex Corporation,
and absolute" owners of the land in question. Santos also sought which firm had bought a portion of the property in dispute,8 filed
anew with Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo, Rizal In resolving the petition under consideration, this Court is thus, land not only because no certificate of title has
(now Antipolo City) a "Petition for Entry/Amendment of Certificate called upon to resolve the respective claims of the parties, over yet been issued to petitioners but also because
of Title", praying that the same Register of Deeds be ordered, subject parcel of land, in light of the decision and disposition of they have presented no positive and convincing
among others, to "transcribe Homestead Patent No. 54072 and this Court in G.R. Nos. 90380 and 110900. evidence of private ownership over the same
issue the corresponding Original Certificate of Title in the name of except the claim that they are the heirs of
Hermogenes Lopez, assigning to it the certification number, It is beyond cavil that subject property was a disposable and Hermogenes Lopez.
volume, page and such other numbers as he may deem alienable public land at the time the principal parties asserted their
appropriate, and to consider the same registered as of August 31, respective claim thereover. In the initial determination of who has Now, while it is true that Hermogenes Lopez
1944, the date when Free Patent No. 54072 covering the same a better and superior right to acquire the said public land, had filed an application for a Homestead Patent
property was originally registered." Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land over the subject land, and his application was
Act, governs. Thereunder, the Director of Lands, subject to the determined as superior to the claims of other
The said petition was granted by the same Regional Trial Court in authority of the Secretary of Natural Resources (now Secretary of persons by the court, such determination in the
its Order dated October 8, 1992. Environment and Natural Resources) is vested with direct control cases that finally reached the Supreme Court
of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of did not bind the government, particularly the
Then on January 4, 1994, even after the Resolution in G.R. No. concession or disposition and management of lands of the public Lands Management Bureau. (sic) The cases
110900 (upholding the LMB decision in favor of the Adias) had domain, and his decision as to questions of fact is conclusive, cited by petitioners as having declared the
become final and executory, the Lopezes interposed an appeal when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural subject land as private property because the
from the same LMB decision to the Secretary of Environment and Resources (now Secretary of Environment and Natural homestead patent thereon was confirmed by
Natural Resources but their appeal was dismissed on January 5, Resources) (Section 4, C.A. 141; De los Santos vs. Rodriguez, 22 the Supreme Court did not LMB for two
1995. Their (Lopezes) motion for reconsideration was denied in SCRA 451). It is decisively not proper for the courts to interfere reasons: (1) it was not, and was not impleaded
the Order, dated December 4, 1995, but at the same time, the with the administration of public lands by the Director of Lands as, a party to said cases, and (2) the cases
parties were advised "to pursue their respective claims before the (now the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). were in personam in nature, in which while the
courts and under pertinent laws." subject thereof was a right over a piece of land,
In De Buyser vs. Director of Lands, 121 SCRA 13 (1983), this the controversy was in essence between
Court held: different persons asserting conflicting claims.
On February 21, 1995, Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in
Antipolo, Rizal (now Antipolo City) issued a writ of execution
against the structures/properties of the ISG, Philippine Army, Since the land is admittedly property of public The subject property being part of the public
represented by the group commander, the herein petitioner, dominions, its disposition falls under the domain is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
standing on a portion of the land in question. In the meantime, or exclusive supervision and control of the Bureau Lands Management Bureau. (sic) It is not only
on April 20, 1995, Marcelino Lopez sold a portion of the land of Lands. mandated by the Public Land Act but the
under controversy to the herein co-respondent, Dr. Potenciano Supreme Court itself has declared it to be so in
Malvar. Cerdon vs. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 198,
And in Francisco vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural 200, to wit:
Resources, 121 SCRA 380, it was reiterated that the law has
On October 6, 1995, the Lopezes presented a motion for the vested in the Director of Lands primarily, and ultimately in the
issuance of an alias writ of execution to demolish the structures Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of The function of administering
belonging to the Philippine Army. The said incident prompted the Environment and Natural Resources) the administration and and disposing of lands of the
Group Commander of the ISG to file a Comment with the same disposition of public lands. Consequently, the decision of finding public domain in the manner
Regional Trial Court, drawing the attention of the Presiding Judge by the Director of Lands, as approved by the now Secretary of authorized by law, is not
of the said court to the ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 110900. Environment and Natural Resources, upon a question of fact is entrusted to the courts but to
Despite such step taken by the Group Commander of ISG, conclusive and not subject to review by the courts in the absence executive officials. Originally,
however, an aliaswrit of execution issued on December 11, 1995, of any showing that such decision or finding is tainted with fraud it was the Director of the
just the same. or mistake. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals and this Bureau of Lands primarily,
Court, in G.R. No. 110900, had passed upon the nature of subject and ultimately, the Secretary
parcel of land and upheld the disposition by the Lands of Agriculture and Natural
It was the persistent threat of demolition of their communications Resources, who had this
facilities which prompted the Group Commander of the Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of the Adias; ratiocinating
and finding as follows: function. Section 4 of the
Intelligence and Security Group, Philippine Army, purchaser of a Public Land Act
portion of 1,650 square meters, more or less, of subject tract of (Commonwealth Act No. 141)
land, from the heirs of Elino Adia, to bring the present petition To begin with, there is the presumption juris declared that subject to the
which, as heretofore mentioned, the Court resolved to consider tantum that all the lands form part of the public control of the Secretary of
and treat as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. domain. The land subject of H-138612 is public Agriculture and Commerce,
 the Director of Lands shall carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Law, has control between the same parties in the same case continues to be the
have direct executive control over the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of law of the case so long as the facts on which such decision was
of the survey, classification, concession or disposition and management of the public lands, predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the Court
lease, sale or any other form and his finding and decision as to questions of fact, when [Mangoma vs. CA, 241 SCRA 21]. In short, the doctrine applies
of concession or disposition approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources only when a case is before a Court a second time after a ruling by
and management of the lands (now Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources), is an appellate court (Kilosbayan, Inc., vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).
of the public domain, and his conclusive.
decisions as to questions of In the two cases (G.R. No. 90380 and G.R. No. 110900) under
fact shall be conclusive when In view of the foregoing ratiocination, disquisition and findings, this consideration, the subject matter is the same but there a no
approved by the Secretary of Court is of the irresistible conclusion, and so holds, that the ruling identity of parties and causes of action. As found by the Court of
Agriculture and in G.R. No. 110900 prevails over the disposition in G.R. No. Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP 27602, the Adias and the Lands
Commerce. Thus, initially 90380. It bears stressing that under Public Land Act, the Management Bureau were not parties in what eventually became
within the exclusive disposition of public lands is exclusively vested in the Lands G.R. No. 90380. What is more, the said case merely involved the
jurisdiction of the Director of Management Bureau (LMB) subject only to the control of the issue of possession, on which the claim of the Lopezes was
Lands were such questions Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Since anchored or based on their alleged homestead application over
as the adjudication of the what has been litigated upon is a disposable public land, under subject public land. On the other hand, the case of the Lands
conflicting claims of rival the power of administration and disposition of the Bureau of Management Bureau (LMB) which became G.R. 110900, squarely
claimants to public land, or Lands (now the Lands Management Bureau), subject only to the put in issue the validity of the alleged homestead patent of the
cases involving disposition control of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Lopezes, on the ground that its issuance was tainted with fraud. It
and alienation of public Natural Resources; it is not proper to deprive the Lands is thus succinctly clear that the ruling in G.R. No. 90380 cannot be
lands. (184 SCRA, pp. 200- Management Bureau which "absorbed the functions and powers the "law of the case" as to bar G.R. No. 110900.
201) of the Bureau of Lands, abolished by Executive Order No. 131,
except those line functions and powers thereof which are The Orders issued on June 24, 1991 and October 8, 1992,
As above adverted to, in its decision of January 5, 1995, the transmitted to the regional field offices", of its direct executive respectively, by Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), control over the disposition and management of the public Rizal (now Antipolo City) are void for lack of any legal basis.
found that the actual occupants of the land under controversy domain, any more that it can divest the State of its title and confer
were the spouses Elino and Lucia Adia, who possessed the same it to another (Espinosa vs. Makalintal, 79 Phil 134).
from 1929 to 1943. Thereafter, their heirs took over and continued All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective,
possession thereof. Such a factual finding arrived at by the DENR the Court upholds the disposition of subject public land, now
In Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. DAT, G.R. No. L-29534, February covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820, P-821,
is conclusive upon the courts. Conformably, in G.R. No. 110900 28, 1977, this Court, citing Pinero vs. Director of Lands [57 SCRA
(Marcelino Lopez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al.) this Court P-822, P-823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, in favor of the Heirs of
386], ruled: Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, by the Lands
affirmed the ruling of the Lands Management Bureau in favor of
the Adias. Management Bureau and approved by the Department of
. . . even a torrens title is not a bar to the power Environment and Natural Resources and the President.
of the Director of Lands to investigate an
In Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Dans, 4 SCRA 1035 allegation of fraud that could have led to the
(1962), the Court held: WHEREFORE,
issuance of a free patent. As stated by him: "It
is to the public interest that one who succeeds
It should be remembered that the disposition of in fraudulently acquiring a title to a public land 1. The validity of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-819, P-820,
public lands is lodged exclusively in the Director should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and P-821, P-822, P-823, P-824, P-825 and P-826, registered in the
of Lands subject only to the control of the the State should, therefore, have an ever name of Heirs of Elino Adia, represented by Juliana Adia, is
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. existing authority, thru its duly authorized UPHELD;
. . . Consequent to the power and discretion officers, to inquire into the circumstances
granted the Director of Lands as set forth surrounding the issuance of any such title . . .. 2. All certificates of title issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez
above, the courts have no power to review, and succesors-in-interest, and all titles originating from any of the
reverse or modify his decisions, as approved by Although G.R. No. 90380 (Eduardo Santos vs. CA, et al.) was certificates of title so issued to the Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural decided ahead of G.R. No 110900, the Court holds that the latter including Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 207990, 207991,
Resources . . . case was not barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." 207992, 207993, 207994, 207995, 207996, 207997, 207998,
207999, 208000, 208001, 208002, 208358, over subject tract of
So also, in Vda. De Calibo vs. Ballesteros, 15 SCRA 37, it was land, as well as TCT No. 216876 issued to Primex Corporation,
The doctrine of "law of the case" means that whatever is once and any other title derived therefrom are declared null and void.
ruled that the Director of Lands, who is the officer charged with irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
3. The Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez and all persons claiming any
right under them, including but not limited to Primex Corporation,
and Dr. Potenciano Malvar, as well as all members of the
Overlooking Storeowners and Planters' Association, Inc., their
assignees and successors-in-interest, are ordered to remove all
their improvements on the areas covered by the Original
Certificates of Titles Nos. P-819 to P-826 aforementioned and to
surrender possession thereof to their Heirs of Elino Adia,
represented by Juliana Adia; and

5. The writ of demolition, issued by Branch 71 of the Regional

Trial Court, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 463-A, is SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43445 January 20, 1988 special proceedings, such as a land registration complement of the former which, without said writ of demolition,
case. This is so because a party in a civil action would be ineffective."
EUFEMIA VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BARROGA and SATURNINA must immediately enforce a judgment that is
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE PACADA, oppositors-appellants, secured as against the adverse party, and his The appeal at bar entails nothing more than the application of
vs. failure to act to enforce the same within a these established jurisprudential precepts to the undisputed facts.
ANGEL ALBANO, ARSENIO ALBANO, ENCARNACION reasonable time as provided in the Rules
ALBANO, ROSALIA ALBANO, assisted by her husband, makes the decision unenforceable against the
losing party. In special proceedings the purpose In Cadastral Proceeding No. 44 (LRC Rec. No. 1203) of the then
JUANITO ALBANO, ROSITA ALBANO, assisted by her Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, a decision was rendered
husband, ALFREDO RAMIREZ, MIGUEL ALBANO, CHARITO is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a on July 31, 1941 adjudicating a parcel of land known as Lot No.
ALBANO, and PEDRO ALBANO, petitioners-appellees. 9821 in favor of Delfina Aquino. 7One of the oppositors was
RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, in his capacity as Judge of Sala I, person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been Ruperta Pascual, who was declared in default. 8 However, for
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, respondent. reasons not disclosed by the record, but as to which no sinister or
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no
further proceedings to enforce said ownership is prejudicial character is imputed by the appellants, the decree of
necessary, except when the adverse or losing registration did not issue except until after the lapse of fourteen
party had been in possession of the land and (14) years or so, or on October 14, 1955; and it was only after
NARVASA, J.: the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. twenty-four (24) years had passed, or on November 17, 1979, that
an original certificate of title (No. C-2185) was issued in Delfina
Aquino's name. 9
On November 24, 1925 judgment was promulgated by this Court Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land
in Manlapas, et al. v. Llorente, etc., et al., 1 ruling that: (1) a party Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
in whose favor a decree of registration is issued by a cadastral regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil On August 11, 1970, after the decree of registration had been
court in accordance with the Torrens Act (Act No. 496), or his action, except the proceedings to place the handed down but before title issued in Delfina Aquino's favor, the
successor-in-interest, has "a perfect right not only to the title of the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of children and heirs of Ruperta Pascual — appellants Eufemia
land, but also to its possession;" (2) he has the right, too, under possession. The decision in a land registration Barroga and Saturnina Padaca-brought suit in the same Court of
Section 17 of the same Act, to a writ of possession as against any case, unless the adverse or losing party is in First Instance against the children and heirs of Delfina Aquino —
"party to the registration proceeding and who is directly and possession, becomes final without any further appellees Angel Albano, et al. 10 Said appellants alleged that they,
personally affected and reached by the decree" (or who had been action, upon the expiration of the period for and their mother, Ruperta Pascual, had been in possession of Lot
served with process therein but had not appeared nor perfecting an appeal. ... 9821 since 1941 and were the real owners thereof; and they
answered); 2 and (3) his right to obtain a writ of possession is not prayed that Delfina Aquino's title be voided and cancelled, that the
subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding defendants be commanded to reconvey the land to them, and that
... There is nothing in the law that limits the a new title be made out in their names. 11
execution of judgments, 3since the decree "is to exist forever." period within which the court may order or issue
These doctrines have since been reiterated and reaffirmed. a decree. The reason is ... that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not It appears, parenthetically, that Delfina Aquino's title encroached
"The fundamental rule," the Court said some forty-three years need to be asserted or enforced against the upon a 4-square-meter portion of an adjoining lot, No. 9822,
later, 4 "is that a writ of possession can be issued not only against adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a belonging to a Cesar Castro. So, Castro filed, with leave of court,
the original oppositors in a land registration case and their decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge a complaint in intervention on February 22, 1987 for the recovery
representatives and successors-in-interest, but also against any and of the Land Registration Commission; thereof.
person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
before and up to the issuance of the final decree." It also pointed decree for the reason that no motion therefor After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered dismissing the
out that neither laches nor the statute of limitations applies to a has been filed can not prejudice the owner, or Barroga's and Padaca's complaint, and declaring intervenor
decision in a land registration case, citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, et the person in whom the land is ordered to be Castro owner of the 4-square-meter portion overlapped by Delfina
al. 5 to the following effect: registered. Aquino's title. 12

We fail to understand the arguments of the The Court restated those same principles in Lucero v. Loot 6 some The correctness of this judgment cannot be gainsaid in light of the
appellant. ... except insofar as it supports his months later and took occasion to stress that in Marcelo v. recorded facts. The familiar doctrine of res adjudicata operated to
theory that after a decision in a land registration Mencias, decided in 1960, the Court had gone "so far as to hold blot out any hope of success of Barroga's and Padaca's suit for
case has become final, it may not be enforced that if the writ of possession issued in a land registration recovery of title Lot No. 9821. Their action was clearly barred by
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except proceeding implies the delivery of possession of the land to the the prior judgment in the cadastral proceeding affirming Delfina
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment. successful litigant therein, ... a writ of demolition must, likewise, Aquino's ownership over the property, and in which proceeding
... (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules issue, especially considering that the latter writ is but a the former's predecessor-in-interest, Ruperta Pascual, had taken
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to part as oppositor but had been declared in default. The judgment
of the cadastral court was one "against a specific thing" and July 31, 1941, marked Exh. A for the Barroga and Padaca, as successors-in-interest of Ruperta
therefore "conclusive upon the title to the thing." 13 It was a petitioners-claimants; Pascual, who was a party in the registration proceedings which
judgment in rem, binding generally upon the whole world, resulted in the declaration of Delfina Q. Aquino as the owner of
inclusive of persons not parties thereto, 14 and particularly upon 2. That movants-oppositors Eufemia Villanueva the land subject thereof; and the appellees are entitled to said writ
those who had actually taken part in the proceeding (like the de Barroga and Saturnina Vda. de Pacada are of possession, despite the lapse of many, many years, their right
appellants' predecessor, Ruperta Pascual, who had intervened the children-heirs and successors of Ruperta thereto being imprescriptible at least as against the persons who
therein as an oppositor) as well as "their successors in interest by Pascual, who was an oppositor in Lot No. 9821, were parties to the cadastral case or their successors-in-
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special Cad. Case No. 44, LRC Rec. No. 1203, and interest. 20 The appellants, it must be said, have succeeded in
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title who was defaulted in said cadastral case, and prolonging the controversy long enough. They should no longer
and in the same capacity. 15 decided on July 31, 1941 as follows: be allowed to continue doing so.

The judgment became final and executory, the appeal taken Lote No. 9821 — Por WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by appellants Eufemia
therefrom to the Court of appeals by Barroga and Padaca having incomparecencia injustificada Villanueva Vda. de Barroga and Saturnina Villanueva Vda. de
been dismissed because of their failure to file brief, and this Court de la opositora Ruperta Padaca is DISMISSED, and the Orders of the Court a quo dated
having thereafter refused to set aside that dismissal Pascual, se desestima su August 8, 1975, September 22, 1975 and March 17, 1976 are
on certiorari. Thereafter, at the instance of defendants Angel contestacion. Se adjudica AFFIRMED, as being in accord with the facts and the law. This
Albano, et al., the Court of First Instance ordered execution of the este lote No. 9821, con las decision is immediately executory, and no motion for extension of
judgment on December 6, 1973. Plaintiffs Barroga and Padaca - mejoras en el existentes, en time to file a motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
moved to quash the writ of execution, on December 22, 1973. nombre de Delfina Q. Aquino,
They argued that there was nothing to execute since the verdict filipina, major de edad, viuda
was simply one of dismiss of the complaint; they moreover y residents del municipio de
invoked Section 11, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court. 16 But here the Lauag de la provincia de
matter apparently ended. No further development anent this case Ilocos Norte.
appears in the record.
3. That the heirs of Ruperta Pascual, namely,
What the record does show is that on August 8, 1975, the Eufemia Villanueva de Barroga and Saturnina
Cadastral Court promulgated an Order in Case No. 44, LRC Rec. Vda. de Padaca , are in possession of the lot in
No. 1203, granting the motion of Angel Albano, et al. for a writ of question since 1941 up to the present time. 18
possession as regards Lot No. 9821; and pursuant thereto, a writ
of possession dated August 28, 1975 was issued. Again Barroga
and Padaca sought to frustrate acquisition of possession by Angel The motion was thereafter denied by the Court a quo, by Order
Albano, et al. They filed a "Motion to Nullify Order to Lift Writ of dated September 22, 1975. The Court stated that the writ of
Execution Issued and to Revoke Writ of Possession Issued" under possession could properly issue despite the not inconsiderable
date of September 23, 1975. 17 Their argument was that as period of time that had elapsed from the date of the registration
possessors of the lot in question, they could not be ejected decree, since the right to the same does not prescribe pursuant to
therefrom by a mere motion for writ of possession. the rulings in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuvar and Lucero
v. Loot, 19 It also declared that the segregation of the 4-square
meter portion from Lot 9821 and its restoration as integral part of
The motion was heard on October 24, 1975, at which time the Lot 9822, had no effect whatever on the Albanos' right to the writ
parties and their counsel stipulated upon the following facts, to of possession, which was the appropriate process for the
wit: enforcement of the judgment in the cadastral case. Barroga and
Padaca moved for reconsideration. When this proved unavailing,
1. That the claimants-petitioners Angel Albano, they appealed to this Court.
Arsenio Albano, Encarnacion Albano, Rosalia
Albano, Rosita Albano, Miguel Albano, Jr., The inevitable verdict should by now be apparent. Conformably
Charito Albano, Federico Albano, Jr. and with the established axioms set out in the opening paragraphs of
Pedrito Albano are the children-heirs and this opinion, the appellees, Angel Albano, et al. must be declared
successors of Delfina Aquino, who is the to be entitled to a writ of possession over Lot No. 9821 in
registered owner of Lot No. 9821 covered by enforcement of the decree of registration and vindication of the
O.C.T. No. 0-2185, which decree was issued on title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Delfina Q.
Aquino; the writ may correctly be enforced against the appellants,
G.R. No. L-55152 August 19, 1986 [c] a parcel of land situated in the Municipality of an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to
Cauayan, Province of Isabela, having an area his statement or to suppress or prevent the truth
FLORDELIZA L. VALISNO and HONORIO D. of Six Thousand Two Hundred Fifty (6,250) or to state what is false. [Deering v. Wisona
VALISNO, petitioners, square meters or fifty (50) meters at the east Harvester Workers, 155 U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 238]
vs. side by one hundred twenty-five (125) meters at
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court the North and South; bounded on the north by Therefore, as the land occupied by the
of First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, and VICENCIO Matias del Rosario, on the south by Alberto appellant has not been successfully Identified
CAYABA, respondents. Tungangui, on the east by Agapita Blanco and with that described in the complaint, the instant
on the west by Cauayan Diversion Road and action should have been dismissed outright, in
Matias del Rosario. [Annex "B", Petition, pp. 41- view of the provision of Article 434 of the New
Francisco A. Lava, Jr. for petitioners. 42, Rollo.] Civil Code which reads.
Diosdado B. Ramirez for private respondent. Thereafter, petitioners declared the above-described parcels of Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property
land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive must be Identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
possession thereof in the concept of owners by installing as the strength of his title and not on the weakness
caretaker one Fermin Lozano, who had his house built thereon. of the defendant's claim' as well as the doctrine
FERNAN, J.: enunciated in a long line of decision [sic]
On August 12, 1968, private respondent Vicencio Q. Cayaba, starting from Lim vs. Director of Lands, 64 Phil.
Challenged in this petition for certiorari with prayer for a temporary claiming to be the owner of the land in question by virtue of a 343.
restraining order are two [2] orders issued by respondent judge in deed of sale executed in his and one Bienvenido G. Noriega's
Land Registration Case No. Branch 11-N-204 of the then Court of favor on June 30, 1967 by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano, Secondly, it is undisputed that the appellant is
First Instance of Isabela, Second Branch, entitled, "Application for ousted Fermin Lozano from possession of the land. He the present occupant of the land since he
Registration of Title, Vicencio Q. Cayaba, Applicant, vs. Flordeliza subsequently erected a six-door apartment on said land. purchased the same from Tomasita F. Verano
Valisno and Honorio D. Valisno, Oppositors," the order dated July on June 30, 1967, having constructed a six-
2, 1980, dismissing the opposition filed by petitioners on the On January 22, 1970, petitioners instituted before the then Court door apartment in the premises which he lets to
ground of res judicata, and the order dated September 19, 1980, of First Instance of Isabela a complaint against private respondent both transients and residents of the locality.
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. for recovery of possession of said parcels of land. The case, Being the actual possessor of the property, he,
docketed as Civil Case No. Branch II-895, was in due time therefore, possesses it with a just title and he
The antecedents are as follows: resolved in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. need not show or prove why he is possessing
On appeal, however, by private respondent to the then Court of the same. [Arts. 433 and 541 of the New Civil
Appeals, the appeal being docketed as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, the Code].
On August 21, 1964, petitioners-spouses Flordeliza and Honorio appellate court in a decision promulgated on January 19, 1978,
Valisno purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita V. Blanco, reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the
namely, Guillermo, Guillermo, Jr., Manuel and Rosario, all Finally, between the evidence of the appellees
complaint of petitioners on a finding that: and that of the appellant, We unhesitatingly
surnamed Blanco, two parcels of land, particularly described as
follows: choose the latter in the matter of Identifying the
Firstly, the 'land in question described in the property in question because it is a vicinity plan
complaint and sketched in Exhibit C ... by Dr. [Exhibit "8"] showing the position of the land in
[a] a tract of land situated at Sitio Sisim Guillermo Blanco,' is completely different from relation not only to the properties adjoining the
Barangay Cabaruan, Municipality of Cauayan, the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of same but also with known boundaries and
Province of Isabela, having an area of Five the appelles appellant, their respective area and landmarks in the area. On the other hand, the
Thousand (5,000) square meters or fifty (50) boundaries being completely dissimilar. appellees' evidence, particularly the description
meters facing the Provincial Road by one in Tax Declaration No. 17009, is unreliable,
hundred (100) meters long; bounded on the since the area and boundaries of the property
North by Pedro del Rosario, on the South by Clearly, we fail to see anything in the evidence
of the appellees showing that their property are mere estimations, reached thru pure guess-
Alberto Tungangui, on the East by the work. [Smith Bell & Co. vs. Director of Lands,
Provincial Road; and on the West, by Terreno encroaches, much less covers that of the
property presently occupied by the appellant, 50 Phil. 8791]. Expressing the same sentiment,
del Estado, now Matias del Rosario; one noted authority states:
except the self-serving sketch prepared by the
appellees' own witness, Dr. Blanco. We refuse
and, to give any weight to this piece of evidence The proposition that in Identifying a particular
because it was prepared by someone who' has piece of land its boundaries and not the area
 are the main factors to be considered holds true ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT A MOTION TO as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had
only when the boundaries given are sufficiently DISMISS OPPOSITION IS PROPER IN A previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To
certain and the Identity of the land proved by LAND REGISTRATION CASE, AND have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course
the boundaries clearly indicates that an THAT RES JUDICATA MAYBE RAISED IN would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same
erroneous statement concerning the area can SAID MOTION TO DISMISS. consideration applies to the case at bar.
be disregarded.' [Bilog, Effective Judicial
Implementation of Land and Forestry Laws, RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an
Fourth Advanced Course for Municipal Courts DEPRIVING PETITIONERS HEREIN OF answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the
(1971), cit. Paterno v. Salud, L-15620, THEIR DAY IN COURT, SPECIALLY IN THE counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the
September 30, 19631. (Annex "C-l," Petition, FACE OF STRONG INDICATIONS, ALREADY original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who
pp. 5355, Rollo.] IN THE RECORD, THAT RESPONDENT becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer
CAYABA IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO SECURE the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to
A petition for review on certiorari of said decision filed by TITLE TO WHAT REALLY IN THE LAND OF dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba
petitioners before this Court was denied due course. THE PETITIONERS. opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely,
if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that
Subsequently, on September 25, 1979, private respondent filed RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY, petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of
before the Court of First Instance of Isabela an application for WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it
registration in his name of the title of the lands in question, basing IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING being unauthorize.
his entitlement thereto on the aforementioned deed of sale as well HIS ORDERS OF JULY 2,1980 [ANNEX "E"]
as the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, AND SEPTEMBER 19, 1980 [ANNEX "H"]. (pp. The case of Abellera vs. Farol 74 Phil. 284, heavily relied upon by
[Annex "A", Petition, pp. 32-40, Rollo). 18-19, Rollo) petitioners needs re-evaluation. In said case, Mr. Justice Bocobo,
speaking for the Court, ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res
On April 26, 1980, petitioners filed an opposition to the On April 1, 1981, this Court gave due course to the petition and judicata is available to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged
application. [Annex "B", Petition, p. 41, Rollo] Private respondent, required the parties to file their briefs. Petitioners did so on August rights of another claimant, nevertheless, prior judgment can not
however, moved for the dismissal of said opposition on the 26, 1981. Private respondent, on the other hand, failed to file his be set up in a motion to dismiss. " Concurring in said opinion were
ground that the same is barred by a prior judgment, i.e., the brief within the given period which expired on October 9, 1981. then Chief Justice Yulo and Associate Justices Moran and
appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Despite the Thus, the case was consider submitted for decision without the Ozaeta. Mr. Justice Paras dissented, saying "in my opinion, Rule
opposition of petitioners to said motion to dismiss, the lower court brief of private respondent. 132 in connection with Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, instead of
issued the first of the assailed orders dismissing the petitioner's prohibiting expressly authorizes the lower court in land registration
opposition on the ground of res judicata. [Annex "E", Petition, p. or cadastral proceedings to entertain a motion for dismissal on the
On July 8, 1985, this Court received a copy of the motion to ground of res judicata or prescription. Of course, the dismissal of
83, Rollo] When their motion for reconsideration was denied, amend application filed by Bienvenido G. Noriega, Sr., thru
petitioners filed the instant petition, raising as grounds therefor the petitioner's claim will not necessarily or automatically mean
counsel, in LRC Case No. Br. II-N-204, praying that he be adjudication of title to the individual respondents but it will
following: included as co-applicant to the land sought to be registered. certainly facilitate the consideration of their claims which cease to
be contested. Prompt disposal of cases or such claims is the main
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN In the course of our study of pertinent jurisprudence, We observe purpose of said rules. Let there be no retrogression in the
DISMISSING PETITIONERS' OPPOSITION TO that the situation obtaining in the case at bar, i.e., a motion to application of sound rules and doctrines." [Ibid, pp. 286-287) In
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR dismiss the opposition having been filed and more importantly, support of his opinion, Justice Paras cited the cases of Menor v.
REGISTRATION OF TITLE, WHICH IS granted, is indeed unique and peculiar. But while this may be so, Quintana, 56 Phil. 657, Versoza v. Nicolas, 29 Phil. 425
HIGHLY IRREGULAR IN LAND it is not highly irregular as petitioners would characterize it. and Santiago v. Santos, 54 Phil. 619, wherein the Court invariably
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS. ruled that a "final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining
Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a the ownership of certain land is res judicata in a registration case
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 when the parties and the property are the same as in the former
DISREGARDING THE PRECEDENT case. " [Menor v. Quintana, supra.]
of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules
OF ABELLERA VS. FAROL THAT RES contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory
JUDICATA CANNOT BE SET UP IN A LAND character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the
REGISTRATION CASE. expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment
in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED GRAVELY IN application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a
HOLDING THAT THE REQUISITES FOR RES dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first
JUDICATA EXIST IN THE CASE AT BAR, shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The It does not matter that the first case was decided by a court of
decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the general jurisdiction, while the second case is being heard by one
merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject of a limited jurisdiction, such as a registration court. It is enough
matter and the parties. There is, between the registration case that the court which decided the first case on the merits had
under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of validly acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. parties. That both courts should have equal jurisdiction is not a
The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, requisite of res judicata.
Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does
not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One If, as the Abellera case, supra, held that res judicata can be set up
right of a co-owner is to defend in court the interests of the co- by a claimant to defeat the alleged right of another claimant, what
ownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. useful purpose would be served by allowing a party to present
II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba evidence of ownership over the land sought to be registered when
defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing the final result would necessarily be in favor of the claimant who
so in behalf of the co-ownership. This is evident from the fact that had set up the defense of res judicata? And supposing the land
one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the registration court finds that the party against whom the principle
deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his of res judicata operates does have a better right or title to the
and Bienvenido Noriega's favor. land, what happens to the principle of res judicata? Can a court
sitting as a land registration court in effect, annul a final judgment
With respect to the subject matter, there can be no question that of another court of general jurisdiction?
the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very same
parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and To our mind, therefore, the better policy, both for practicality and
Noriega's names. convenience, is to grant the dismissal of either the application for
registration or the opposition thereto, once it has been indubitably
While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of shown, as in the case at bar, that one or the other is barred by a
possession, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise prior judgment. The ruling in the Abellera case, should therefore
the issue of ownership. In effect, it is in the nature of an accion be, as it is, hereby abandoned.
reinvidicatoria. The second case is for registration of title.
Consequently, between the two cases there is identity of causes Petitioners complain that by dismissing their opposition,
of action because in accion reinvidicatoria, possession is sought respondent court had denied them their day in court. It is well to
on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration remind petitioners that they had their day in court in Civil Case
cases. Registration of title in one's name is based on ownership. No. Branch II-895 as well as CA-G.R. No. 60142-R, where their
In both cases, the plaintiff and the applicant seek to exclude other claim over the land in question was fully aired and ventilated.
persons from ownership of the land in question. The only
difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directed
against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the The conflicting claims of petitioners and respondent Cayaba [in
exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the behalf of the co-ownership] with respect to the land under
cause of action remains the same. In fact, this Court held in Dais consideration had been put to rest in CA-G.R. No. 60142-R. Said
v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, [51 Phil. 896] that the answers decision having attained finality, the same remains the law of the
in a cadastral proceedings partake of an action to recover title, as case between the parties.
real rights are involved therein. It is only the form of action which
is different. "But the employment of two different forms of action, Finding no error to have been committed by respondent judge in
does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle that dismissing petitioners' opposition, such dismissal must be
one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated." affirmed.
[Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 590 and the cases cited
therein, Gonzales v. Gonzales, 26 SCRA 76; Aguilar v. Tuason WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. Cost
Co., 22 SCRA 690; Albano v. Coloma, 21 SCRA 411; Sumarariz against petitioners.
v. Development Bank of the Phil., 21 SCRA 1378; Abes, et al. v.
Rodil, et al., 17 SCRA 824; Cayco, et al. v. Cruz et al., 106 Phil.
68; Ma. Garcia de Lim Toco v. Go Pay, 81 Phil. 258; San Diego v. SO ORDERED.
Cardona, et al., 70 Phil. 281].
G.R. No. L-26348 March 30, 1988 Gabriel. Survey Plan Psu- 9742 was prepared and approved by always remained in the possession of the late Eligio Naval
the Director of Lands, with an area of 2,729,712 square meters. because as above stated, it was included in Lot 363, which was
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, ANDREA GABRIEL, ISABEL GABRIEL, This plan was subsequently amended because it was found that subdivided into Lot 363-A and Lot 363-B. The latter, acquired by
ESTER GABRIEL, BENJAMIM GABRIEL, SALUD GABRIEL, certain portions of the land covered by Plan I-1054 in the name of Naval with TCT No. 787 in his name, embraces the portion in
VICTORIA GABRIEL, RIZALINA GABRIEL AND ANDRES Quimson and later transferred to Naval were included. The question (Rollo, pp, 22-23).
GABRIEL, JR., petitioners, undivided portions were excluded by order of the Court and so
vs. Plan Psu- 9742 was amended (Plan Psu-9742-Amd) with an area There appears to be no controversy that aforesaid lot had always
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PETRITA PASCUAL and of 2,436,280 or a reduction of 293,432 square meters. The been in the possession of Naval in the concept of owner, as
RUDYARDO SANTIAGO, respondents. Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 issued in the name of petitioners' claim that the same was merely loaned to Naval, was
Potenciano Gabriel on November 1, 1918 contained the reduced not properly supported by evidence, as found both by the trial
area. court and the Court of Appeals.

A cadastral survey was also made of the Municipality of Hermosa, After trial, the court rendered its decision on August 29, 1958
PARAS, J.: Bataan and the land of Potenciano Gabriel, covered by Plan Psu- dismissing the complaint on the ground that the right of the
9742 Amd. became Lot No. 557 with a reduced area of 2,096,433 plaintiffs to the land in question, if any, was lost by prescription,
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse: (a) the square meters, or a further reduction by 339,847 square meters. and that the plaintiff are also guilty of laches in failing to prosecute
Decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May No new certificate of title was issued for Cadastral Lot No. 557 their claim within a reasonable time.
31, 1966 in CA-G.R. No. 25418-R affirming the Decision 2 of the showing the reduced area so that Original Certificate of Title No.
then Court of First Instance of Bataan in Civil Case No. 2283 1264 subsisted with an area of 2,436,280 square meters under
which dismissed the complaint for recovery of land clue to, laches Plan Psu-9742 Amd. Accordingly the partition of the estate of Specifically, the dispositive portion of said judgment reads:
and prescription and required complainants herein petitioners) to Potenciano Gabriel by his heirs on August 28, 1947 was based on
surrender their certificates of title, and b) the Resolution 3 of the plan Psu-9742 Amd. under Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
Court of Appeals dated July 7, 1966 denying petitioners' Motion with an area of 2,436,280 square meters, instead of Lot No. 557 CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders
for Reconsideration. with a smaller area of 2,096,433 square meters. judgment:

As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court.. the factual Petitioners who are the heirs of the late Potenciano Gabriel and (1) Dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs;
background of this case is as follows: alleged joint co-owners of 1,196 square meters of a fishpond
situated in Hermoso, Bataan by virtue of an agreement of partition (2) Ordering the plaintiffs to surrender the
On April 12, 1909, a survey was made for Santiago Quimson of a of the estate of Don Potenciano, flied a complaint, Civil Case No. owners' copies of the certificates of title issued
parcel of land located in Barrio Totopiac, Orani, Bataan, 2283 at the Court of First Instance of Bataan against Petrita pursuant to the subdivision of Plan Psu-9742-
containing an area of 687,360 square meters, more or less, the Pascual and Rudyardo Santiago, joint administratrix and Amd. to the Register of Deeds for safekeeping
survey plan being designated as 1-1 054. This parcel of land was administrator of the estate of Eligio Naval, a son-in-law of Don until the plaintiffs could submit a new
registered on September 18, 1909, and Original Certificate of Title Potenciano. subdivision plan based on the technical
No, 46 of the Registry of Deeds of Bataan was issued in favor of description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso
Quimson. Subsequently, a cadastral survey was made from They claim that said land was usurped by the late Eligio Naval Cadastre; and
February, 1919 to March, 1920 which resulted in the increase of who was also an adjoining owner; that said land was only loaned
the area of the land by 17,053 square meters and the designation to the latter for dike and water control purposes of the latter's (3) Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
of the land as Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre with an area of fishpond and that after the death of Don Potenciano on February
704,413 square meters. After hearing, the Cadastral Court 17, 1943, private respondents continued to possess, occupy and
confirmed the title of Quimson and Transfer Certificate of Title No. use said property and notwithstanding repeated demands refused SO ORDERED.
723 was issued in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 46. The to vacate and to return the possession thereof, to the petitioners.
lot was subdivided into Lot No. 363-A with an area of 209,250 Balanga, Bataan, August 29, 1958.
square meters for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 760 was Hence, it was prayed that the defendants, private respondents
issued, and Lot No. 363-B with an area of 495,163 square meters herein, be ordered to vacate the premises described in the (Record on Appeal, pp. 127 -1 28; Rollo, p. 11
for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 759 was issued. Lot No. complaint and to pay damages (Rollo, pp. 18-20; Record on 3)
363-B was subsequently acquired by Eligio Naval and Transfer Appeal, p. 96). The records show that the portion of 1,196 square
Certificate of Title No. 787 was issued in his name on July 6,1926. meters sought to be recovered by petitioners is included in Lot
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court in its
No. 363-B of the Orani Cadastre and in amended plan Psu-9742,
Decision promulgated on May 31, 1966, the dispositive portion of
In December, 1916, a parcel of land located in Barrio mentioned above, which shall hereafter be referred to as Psu-
which states:
Bagumbayan, Hermoso, Bataan was surveyed for Potenciano 9742 Amd. After the cadastral survey of Orani, said portion
 WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment 2. THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE LOWER COURT, AN express purpose of cadastral proceedings and must therefore, be
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed ACTION PUBLICIANA OR TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF A considered as within the jurisdiction of the courts in such
with costs against the appellants. (Rollo, pp. 18- CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND WITHHELD FROM PLAINTIFFS' proceedings. Furthermore, it was stressed that in such
31). POSSESSION, IS IT NOT A GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT proceedings no final decree or registration was reopened or set
OF FIRST INSTANCE TO HAVE THE TECHNICAL aside (Timbol v. Diaz, 44 Phil. 589-590 [1932]).
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on July 7, DESCRIPTION OF THE REGISTERED PROPERTY
1966. CORRECTED SO AS TO CONFORM TO CADASTRAL LOT In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that the lower court
AND, THEREFORE, A COMPOUNDED GRAVE ERROR FOR did not order the reopening of the decree of registration for the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS TO SUSTAIN SUCH land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1264 in the name
Hence, this petition. CORRECTION? of Potenciano Gabriel. Neither did the lower court decree a new
registration in favor of the estate of Eligio Naval because said
In the resolution of December 19, 1966, the petition for review on 3. IS IT NOT THAT PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POSSESSION OF estate has a title that embraces actually the portion in dispute,
certiorari was given due course (Rollo, p. 166). In the notice of A REGISTERED OWNER UNDER THE PROVISION OF THE although it is also included in the Original Certificate of Title No.
January 5, 1967 (Rollo, p. 169) petitioners were required to file LAND REGISTRATION ACT ARE IMPRESCRIPTIBLE UNDER 1264 of Potenciano Gabriel. What the lower court did was merely
brief Meanwhile, private respondent Petrita Pascual in a THE PROVISION OF SECTION 46 OF ACT NO. 496 AS to correct the error in the technical description appearing in Plan
manifestation and motion dated January 10, 1967 (Rollo, p. 170) AMENDED? (Rollo pp. 8-9). Psu-9742 Amd. so as to make it conform to the areas and
informed this Court that the property in litigation was transferred technical description of Lot No. 557 of the Hermoso Cadastre and
by absolute sale to the spouses Morencio Lucio and Conchita Lot No. 363 of Orani Cadastre which lots embody the correct
Gandan and she prayed that said spouses be substituted in this The main issue in this case is whether or not courts have the
authority to order the necessary correction of an erroneous technical description thereof. Thus, the respondent appellate court
action in her capacity of Petrita Pascual in her capacity as co- stressed that this is not a reopening of the decree of registration
administratrix. technical description and make it conform to the correct area.
for the land covered by the certificate of title of Potenciano Gabriel
because that title stands and its existence remains unaffected.
In the resolution of January 23, 1967 (Rollo, p. 1 72), petitioners Petitioners contend that in ordering that OCT No. 1264 be made The action therefore of the trial court is well within its jurisdiction
were required to comment on aforesaid motion for substitution of to conform with the land covered by Cadastral Lot No. 557 which (Reno, pp. 40-41).
parties. Said comment was filed by the petitioners on February 8, contains an area very much less than that covered by said title,
1967 (Rollo, p. 176) opposing said motion as improper and the trial court and later the Court of Appeals deprived them of their
property as registered owners. Such act, petitioners insist, would The fact that the portion of land in question is not a part of the
praying instead that said parties be joined as additional property of the late Potenciano Gabriel, is established not only by
respondents. Thus in the resolution of March 7, 1967 (Rollo, p. amount to a reopening of a decree of title after the lapse of the
one-year statutory period, or the granting of an entirely new the Hermoso and Orani Cadastre but by the behavior of
184), this court authorized the inclusion of new parties, Florencio Potenciano Gabriel himself, who is the original owner. He did not
Lucio and Constancio Lucio. Petitioners submitted their Brief decree to a land already registered under act 496, now P.D. 1529.
Furthermore, such procedure is tantamount to a collateral attack take the necessary action to recover said lot during his lifetime but
(Rollo, p. 177) on February 9, 1967 while respondents Petrita after the discovery of its occupation in March, 1933, by the late
Pascual, Florencio Lucio and Constancio Lucio submitted their on the title.
Eligio Naval, he allowed instead the continued use and
Brief on May 2,1967 (Reno, p. 195). For failure to file petitioner's occupation of the same. In fact, there is no dispute that Eligio
Reply Brief, the court considered the case submitted for decision This contention is untenable. Naval and his successors-in-interest have always been in
without the Reply Brief on November 8, 1968 (Rollo, p. 211). possession of said property since that date. As previously stated,
It has long been settled that in cadastral cases the jurisdiction of petitioners' claim that such occupation was by virtue of a loan or
The grounds relied upon for the petition are as follows: the court over lands already registered is limited to the necessary accommodation, was not supported by evidence. As held by this
correction of technical errors in the description of the lands, court, title and possession of registered owners, cannot be
1. PLAN PSU-9742-AMD. COVERED BY ORIGINAL provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of defeated by oral evidence which can easily be fabricated and
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1264 WITH AN AREA OF the registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to contradicted Sinoan v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 407 [1985]).
2,436,280 SQUARE METERS, WHICH AREA WAS REDUCED deprive a registered owner of his title. (Pamintuan v. San Agustin,
BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF ORANI AND FURTHER 43 Phil. 561 [1922]). As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both parties
REDUCED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA OR A were in occupation of their respective properties within the correct
LOSS OF 336,901 SQUARE METERS TO CONFORM WITH In a later case, such power of the court was further clarified and areas and boundaries sought to be adjusted in this case. More
LOT 557 OF THE CADASTRAL SURVEY OF HERMOSA amplified to the effect that the above proposition does not exclude than that, it was also found that there is no impairment of
IMPAIRS GRAVELY THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE from the jurisdiction of the court the power to determine the substantial right or the deprivation of the title of a registered
REGISTERED OWNER AND IS IN CONFLICT WITH AND priority of over-lapping or over- lying registered titles. There is owner, sought to be guarded against. The heirs of Potenciano
CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND nothing in this proposition which militates against allowing the Gabriel are not deprived of the land covered by Original
DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT, NOTABLY THE court in a cadastral case to determine which one of several Certificate of Title No. 1264, nor are they unjustly deprived of the
DECISIONS IN THE CASES ENTITLED P.I. VS. ARIAS, conflicting registered titles shall prevail. This power is necessary portion in question because on the basis of the correct technical
CABALLERO, 34 PHIL. 541. for a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the description, that portion is not a part of their property but a part of
the property of the late Eligio Naval under TCT No. 797. Hence, SO ORDERED.
this Court has held that the Land Registration Act and the
Cadastral Act do not give anybody who resorts to the provisions
thereof a better title than what he really and lawfully has. More
specifically the decision reads:

... The Land Registration Act as well as the

Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title
in good faith and does not permit its provisions
to be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the
expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48
Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil.
838). The above- stated Acts do not give
anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof,
a better title than he really and lawfully has. If
he happened to obtain it by mistake or to
secure, to the prejudice of Ms neighbor, more
land than he really owns, with or without bad
faith on his part, the certificate of title, which
may have been issued to him under the
circumstances, may and should be cancelled or
corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31
Phil. 590). This is permitted by section 112 of
Act. No. 496, which is applicable to the
Cadastral Act because it is so provided
expressly by the provisions of Section 11 of the
latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as
stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos,
Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil 361), errors in the
plans of lands sought to be registered in the
registry and reproduced in the certificate of title
issued later, do not annul the decree of
registration on the ground that it is not the plan
but the land itself which is registered in the
registry. ... (Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. pp.
449450 [1938]).

Finally as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioners for

failing to prosecute their claims for twenty (20) years have lost by
laches their right to recover their property. In a similar case, this
Court ruled that failure of the deceased or his predecessors-in-
interest to take steps to assert any rights over the disputed land
for 20 years from date of registration of title is fatal to their cause
of action ground of laches (Layno v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
718 [1984]).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of

merit, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-66242 August 31, 1984 said land until he himself died sometime in 1976; and that allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30)
subsequent thereto, possession of the property in issue passed to days, a record of appeal being required.
HEIRS OF CORNELIO LABRADA represented by NATIVIDAD Meliton's direct heirs, who until the present are still in possession
L. DIOCTON, petitioner, thereof, (Decision, p.1 ). None of the heirs of Isabel Iboa is in These rules were issued pursuant to the provisions of Batas
vs. possession of any portion of the questioned lot." 1 Petitioners had Pambansa Blg. 129, particularly section 39 thereof which provides
THE HONORABLE SINFORIANO A. MONSANTO, in his moved in 1973 for the case to be heard by the now defunct Court for a 15-day period within which to take an appeal and expressly
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch of First Instance of Samar. The conflicting parties presented both abolished the need of a record on appeal, as follows:
XXVII, Catbalogan, Samar, and the HEIRS OF ISABEL YBOA, their oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective
represented by Tito V. Tizon, respondents. claims over the lot. On July 11, 1983, the respondent regional trial
court rendered its decision in favor of respondents-claimants. SEC. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal
Within 2 days from receipt of the adverse decision, petitioners from final orders, resolutions, awards,
Mateo Leanda for petitioner. filed their appeal on August 6, 1983 by filing a notice of appeal judgments or decisions of any court in all cases
with a prayer that the records be elevated to the Intermediate shall be fifteen days counted from the notice of
Tito V. Tizon for private respondent. Appellate Court, pursuant to the new Interim Rules of Court. Over the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
a month later, on September 14, 1983, respondents-claimants decision appealed from.
filed their motion for the issuance of a decree contending that
petitioners had failed to perfect their appeal because they failed to No record on appeal shall be required to take
file a record on appeal. Respondent court granted respondents' an appeal. In lieu therefor, the entire original
TEEHANKEE, Acting C.J.: motion for the issuance of a decree on the theory that an appeal record shall be transmitted with all the pages
taken in a cadastral case involves "multiple appeals," for which prominently numbered consecutively, together
The procedural issue at bar is whether an appeal by a conflicting the filing of the record on appeal was required. The decree for the with an index of the contents thereof.
claimant to a specific lot of cadastral survey proceedings from the registration was accordingly ordered by respondent court.
adverse decision of the regional trial court in favor of another Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having failed, they have The appeal sought to be taken in the petition at bar concerning
conflicting claimant may be taken by filing a simple notice of now filed the petition at bar for the setting aside of respondent conflicting claims of the parties to a specific lot clearly falls under
appeal within the reglementary 15-day period, as provided in the court's questioned orders denying due course to their appeal and this general rule. Therefore, petitioners' appeal must be given due
Interim Rules and Guidelines relative to the implementation of the ordering the issuance of a decree of registration on the lot in course and the issuance of a decree of registration and the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129), question in favor of respondents. corresponding certificate of title were prematurely and baselessly
adopted by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983. Or does ordered by respondent court and must be set aside. All that
such appeal fall within the exception provided by the same interim The pertinent provisions of Appellate Procedure on appeals are respondent trial court had to do was to transmit the original record
rules for special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court contained in sections 18 and 19 of the Interim Rules and consisting of the pleadings of the parties and its decision and
and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, in which Guidelines, as follows: orders, which petitioners have in effect so elevated with their
case an appeal must still be filed by the filing of a record on petition at bar as per Annexes "A" to "I" of their petition, 2 together
appeal within a period of 30 days provided for the purpose. The with the transcripts and exhibits. 3
Court rules that appeals in cadastral proceedings may be taken 18. Elimination of record on appeal and appeal
by a simple notice of appeal. bond. — The filing of a record on appeal shall
be dispensed with, except in the cases referred It must not be lost sight of that the basic objective of this
to in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 19 hereof. innovative Rule which dispenses with the filing of a record on
The lot involved is Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan Cadastral appeal and the filing of an appeal bond was and is to simplify
Survey. It is contested by the claimants, petitioners-heirs of appellate court procedure by doing away with the tedious and
Cornelio Labrada, on one hand, and by respondents-heirs of No appeal bond shall be required for an appeal.
expensive requirement of reproducing practically the entire
Isabel Yboa on the other. Said predecessors-in-interest had filed original record of the case in the record on appeal in the trial
their respective answers in the cadastral proceedings in June, 19. Period of Appeal. — court. This old requirement of a record on appeal by itself laid the
1932. appellate procedure open to a number of dilatory and vexing
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases questions of clerical errors and claims of omitted pleadings and
Petitioners thus state their claim to the lot, as follows: "Cornelio and in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) orders which in tum required the filing of an amended record on
Labrada who had previously deforested the area which is now the hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days appeal. Such record on appeal under the Rules still had to be
disputed Lot No. 1910, had already been in continuous from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or printed, mimeographed or typed in 12 copies resulting many times
possession of said lot for more than forty-three (43) years when award appealed from. in typographical errors 4 and adding needless expense and
he filed his answer in 1932, or at least from 1894; and that he additional burden on litigants. Thus, have the legislators and the
continued his possession until 1943 when he died. His son, (b) In appeals in special proceedings in Court sought to simplify the rules to assist the parties in obtaining
Meliton, succeeded in possessing the land. Immediately after his accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of every court
demise, Meliton Labrada was succeeded in the possession of and other cases wherein multiple appeals are case, as well as decongesting judicial dockets.
The exceptions must be strictly construed. The Court provided for
specific exceptions with respect to "appeals in special
proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,"
wherein multiple appeals at different stages of the case are
allowed such as when the order or judgment on appeal refers to:
(a) the allowance or disallowance of a will, (b) determination of the
lawful heirs of a deceased person or their distributive shares in
the estate; (c) the allowance or disallowance, in whole or in part,
of any claim against the estate or any claim presented on behalf
of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) the settlement of the
accounts of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) a
final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing in proceedings relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person or the administration of a trustee or guardian;
and (f) the final order or judgment rendered in the case. In these
cases, therefore, since the original record has to remain with the
probate court in connection with the other various pending
matters, a party appealing from a specific order is required to file
the corresponding record on appeal.

This is not the case in cadastral proceedings. Cadastral

proceedings involve contest over specific lots which may be
claimed by parties who have timely filed their respective answers,
failing which the land is declared to belong to the State. In all such
cases of contested lots, records may readily be kept of each lot or
lots so contested by the same parties and the State, and given a
separate sub-number corresponding to each contested lot. Upon
the trial court's rendering of its judgment as to such specific lot(s),
then the original records pertaining to such lot(s) may be readily
elevated, leaving with the lower court the records or pleadings
referring to disputed lots not covered by said court's adjudication.
In this particular cadastral proceeding, as stated by respondent
court itself in its questioned order, there remain only "around 8
contested ones [lots] which have not yet been adjudicated not
counting the 180 lots which were 'archived' by a predecessor of
the presiding judge." 5 This readily shows the lack of any difficulty
to keep separate records for specific lots claimed by conflicting
parties, and elevating only the particular record for the specific lot,
subject of judgment and appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. Dispensing with briefs or

memoranda, judgment is hereby rendered (a) setting aside the
questioned orders which denied due course to petitioners' appeal
and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration; (b) annulling
any certificate of title which may have been issued to respondents
pursuant thereto; and (c) ordering respondent court to give due
course to petitioners' appeal from its decision of July 11, 1983 and
to transmit to the Intermediate Appellate Court the records of the
case pertaining to the disputed Lot No. 1910 of the Catbalogan
Cadastral survey, together with the oral and documentary
evidence as hereinabove indicated. No costs.
G.R. No. L-23973 April 29, 1969 were taken within the reglementary period, would not serve any 1928 in Director of Lands v. Court of First Instance of Tarlac. 5 The
benefit." 2 language used by Justice Laurel in Corders v. Court of First
CIPRIANO VERASTIGUE, ET AL., petitioners, Instance of Laguna, 6 a 1939 decision, would, if carefully
vs. Petitioners thus disputed the right of respondents to the analyzed, likewise yield an affirmative answer to the question of
COURT OF APPEALS, CARMEN VERDAGUER, EMILIO aforementioned lot, but without success. They ought to have whether or not a cadastral court may issue a writ of possession.
VILLASIN, ET AL., respondents. taken the proper steps to appeal; they failed to do so within the
reglementary period. They would then rely on the special civil In a recent decision, less than three years ago, where the party
De Mesa and De Mesa for petitioners. action for mandamus and certiorari as a substitute measure, adversely affected did not even bother to assail the legality of an
Manuel L. Villamayor for respondents. having lost the right to appeal. The Court of Appeals saw through order of a writ of possession coming from a cadastral court, we
their scheme and dismissed their petition. pointed out, in an opinion through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, how
broad and extensive is the scope of such an authority. Thus:
FERNANDO, J.: "Neither do respondents dispute the propriety and validity of the
More specifically, insofar as the issue of the writ of possession is
concerned, the version in the brief of petitioners t follows: "After order of the cadastral court, granting the writ of possession in
A point of jurisdiction as to the power of a court of first instance the appeal was dismissed the private respondents moved for the favor of petitioners as well as its enforcement. Under these
sitting as a cadastral court to issue a writ of possession was issuance of a Writ of Possession to place them in possession of circumstances, we hold that the Order, dated March 20, 1962, of
raised and an issue of due process invoked in this petition for the the land in controversy. The said Motion was heard on 27 March, the cadastral court, granting petitioners' motion to compel
review of a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing a special 1961 and was, with, undue haste, granted on the same day but a respondents to remove their respective houses from the disputed
civil action for mandamus and certiorari. As will hereafter be made copy thereof was received by the undersigned only on 28 March lot, is valid and enforceable against respondents. In the case
apparent, neither is sufficiently persuasive to call for a reversal. 1961, or the following day after it had heard and granted. After of Marcelo v. Mencias, etc., et al., L-15609, April 29, 1960, 58
We affirm. their Motion to reconsider the Order of 27 March 1961, granting O.G. 3349, this Court had already upheld the jurisdiction or
the issuance of a Writ of Possession, was denied in the Order of authority of the court of first instance, sitting as a land registration
The principal question raised in the Court of Appeals according to 27 September 1961, the Trial Court issued such writ. (Actually the court, to order, as a consequence of the writ of possession issued
the decision sought to be reviewed "is whether as claimed by the herein petitioners, however, still remain in possession of the land.) by it, the demolition of improvements introduced by the
petitioners, 'the respondent Court has acted without or in excess Thus, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was successor-in-interest of a defeated oppositor in the land
of its jurisdiction in trying the oft-stated cadastral case for dismissed by the principal respondent." 3 registration case." 7 The confidence with which therefore
re-opening and review, on account of its special and limited petitioners asserted such lack of jurisdiction in a cadastral court to
jurisdiction, because of the pendency of Civil Case No. 211-G issue a writ of possession is clearly unjustified.
It is in the light of the above facts thus presented that they would
before it, between the same parties and over the same land, raise the aforementioned jurisdictional and due process
where the issue of ownership and possession is involved.'" 1 questions. Their contention, as set forth in their lone assignment 2. The due process question is just as easily disposed of.
of error is that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring null and Petitioners in their brief would argue thus: "The herein petitioners
The question was disposed of in the Court of Appeals decision void the aforesaid orders with particular emphasis on the writ of had no chance to object to the private respondents' Motion for
thus: "Upon careful consideration, we arrived at the conclusion possession thereafter issued. In their effort to lend substance to Writ of Possession because, as hereinbefore discussed, they
that said question should be answered in the negative. Inasmuch the above allegation, petitioners stressed the alleged lack of received a copy thereof only on 28 March 1961, or on the
as it was the respondent Court, sitting as Cadastral Court, that jurisdiction of the court of first instance acting as a cadastral court following day that it was heard and granted by the Court on 27
handed down the decision sought to be reviewed in the Petition to issue a writ of possession and the alleged denial of procedural March 1961." 8
for Review abovementioned, it is unquestionable that said Court due process.
did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction when it In an earlier page of their brief, they did admit, that they had a
entertained said petition for review based upon the ground that As already indicated, their plea is futile and unavailing, running motion to reconsider such order of March 27, 1961 which was
said Court did not have legal authority to award and adjudicate counter as it does to controlling decisions of this Court. The court denied in an order of September 27 of the same year. Only then,
privately owned lands already covered by Torrens Title. We are of first instance sitting as a cadastral court was empowered to as admitted by them likewise, did the lower court issue such a writ
satisfied, under the facts hereinabove mentioned, that the issue a writ of possession. Nor was there a failure to accord of possession. Where then is the denial of due process?
respondent Court was right in reconsidering and setting aside its petitioners procedural due process.lawphi1.nêt
said decision and declaring null and void the decrees as well as Our ruling in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
the certificates of title issued in accordance therewith, it appearing Cadiao 9 would dispel any doubt that the answer to the above due
that although given a chance to do so, the herein petitioners had 1. In Abellera v. De Guzman, 4 we left no doubt about the power of
the cadastral court to issue a writ of possession. Thus: "After process question must be in the negative. Thus: "While it is true
not presented evidence to show, or had not succeeded in then that the order of November 2, 1967 was issued ex parte, it is
showing, that Certificate of Title No. 75 issued in favor of Andres hearing, the cadastral court may declare the plaintiff the owner of
the lots and entitled to their possession and may issue a writ equally true that whatever objections could have been raised by
Villasin of Parafina on September 15, 1914 did not include Lot No. petitioner were in fact set forth in its petition to set aside and to
5387. In view hereof, it would appear that the appeal sought to be directing the sheriff to put him in possession thereof, but it cannot
award damages to the plaintiff." As a matter of fact, the Abellera reconsider and were inquired into in a hearing held on January
taken by the herein petitioners from the aforementioned orders of 24, 1968. As far back as 1935, it has already been a settled
the Cadastral Court, even granting that the steps towards that end doctrine has its roots in our opinion rendered 22 years earlier in
doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not
lie where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of hearing
was thereafter cured by the alleged aggrieved party having had
the opportunity to be heard on a motion for reconsideration. 'What
the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.'
There is then no occasion to impute deprivation of property
without due process where the adverse party was heard on a
motion for reconsideration constituting as it does 'sufficient
opportunity' for him to inform the Tribunal concerned of his side of
the controversy. As was stated in a recent decision, what 'due
process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it
requires is fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form
being paramount', the conclusion being that the hearing on a
motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due
process."

3. The third point raised by petitioners to the effect that a writ of

possession cannot affect parties who enter the land after the
issuance of a decree of registration is equally devoid of merit. This
is a factual matter, the determination of which was properly within
the cognizance of the Court of Appeals. It should there have been
raised. Apparently, petitioners did not do so. The invocation of this
particular issue at this stage cannot be characterized as other
than a last-ditch attempt of petitioners to impute an aspect of
vulnerability to the decision now on appeal, when in reality there is
none.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of August 28,

1964, dismissing the petition for mandamus and certiorari, is
affirmed. With costs against petitioners.