Theses in Arabic English Translation .. Neologisim
Theses in Arabic English Translation .. Neologisim
Theses in Arabic English Translation .. Neologisim
TRANSLATION
A THESIS IN TRANSLATION
Presented to the faculty of the American University of Sharjah
College of Arts and Science
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF ARTS
by
SINAN GAILAN HAMEED
B.A. 2002
Sharjah, UAE
April 2009
© 2009
Date of Signature
___________________________________ ______________________
Dr. Basil Hatim
Professor
Thesis Advisor & Committee Chair
___________________________________ ______________________
Dr. Said Faiq
Professor
Graduate Committee
___________________________________ ______________________
Dr. Sattar Izwaini
Assistant Professor
Graduate Committee
___________________________________ ______________________
Dr. Ibrahim El-Sadiq
CAS Graduate Program Director
___________________________________ ______________________
Dr. William Heidcamp
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
___________________________________ ______________________
Kevin Mitchell
Director, Graduate and Undergraduate Programs
COPING WITH NEOLOGISMS IN ENGLISH/ARABIC
TRANSLATION
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the strategies Arab translators use when dealing with English
new terms (neologisms) that do not readily have apparent equivalents in Arabic. The
techniques or strategies, which will be identified in the process of this investigation, may
be considered as basic parameters or elements to bear in mind when designing training
programs and delivering the actual training of future Arab translators.
Neologisms are vital to the development of any language since they are important
mechanisms for generating new lexemes that cater for terminological evolution.
Neologisms ensure that languages develop in a lively and effective ways in order to cope
with the needs of different language communities. This is all part of linguistic creativity
manifested by the morphology of a language.
In the present study, two research tools are employed to increase the validity of
the conclusions reached and thus enhance the credibility of the findings. The first tool of
investigation is the survey study where a set of English neologisms in their contextual
occurrences along with a set of term creation strategies determined a priori is presented to
a group of professional translators. The subjects (translators) are asked to read the
neologisms and to select the strategy that they would most probably choose if they were
to translate them into Arabic. To enhance the sample representativity and data credibility
a second tool of investigation is included. Journal articles from well known magazines
are examined along with their translations. They are selected to cover different areas of
interest such as political, economic, scientific, technical, and social areas.
The findings are carefully analyzed and the results regarding which strategies are
thought to be most appropriate have yielded valuable insights into how, in their
translations into Arabic, professional translators actually handle neologisms to best effect.
It is concluded that, contrary to common belief, some of the strategies employed to render
English neologisms, like Derivation and Metaphor, are used more often than strategies
like Arabicization and Omission.
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………………. ii
Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………… 1
1.1 Importance of the Research Area ……………………………………... 1
1.2 Significance of the Present Research ………………………………….. 2
1.3 Thesis Map ……………………………………………………………. 3
5. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………… 58
VITA………………………………………………………………………….......... 137
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Great appreciation goes to the dearest person in my life, my mother Dr. Shamila
Shakir Al-Obaidi, for her endless support and unconditional love and for her continuous
sacrifice to provide me with the best in life.
Grateful appreciation for his support and valuable help goes to Dr. Nabil
Sulaiman, head of Family and Community Medicine and Behavioral Sciences
Department at the University of Sharjah.
INTRODUCTION
Neologisms are words or phrases that have been recently coined often to apply to
new or pre-existing concepts. They can also be older terminologies which have been
reformulated to be more contemporary. Neologisms are especially useful in identifying
inventions, new phenomena, or older ideas that have taken on new cultural contexts. The
term ‘neologism’ was itself a neologism it was coined around 1800. Neologisms form a
highly relevant linguistic category for a number of reasons – they are the elements that
make a language dynamic, they indicate language change, they form a serious challenge
in translation situations, and they show the morphological productivity of a language.
From a literary point of view, André Lefevre sees neologisms as “new words
[that] are variations on existing words or combinations of parts of existing words”
(Lefevre 1992: 41). Lefevre’s definition is slightly problematic as it is concerned with the
diachronic and derivational sides of the phenomenon. Perhaps it is the literary view of the
phenomenon that affected the definition.
Arabic research to date has not tackled the phenomenon of neology extensively or
elaborately. Most Arabic translation research in general, and the research into
terminology in particular, deal with the surface of the phenomenon as being one of the
many processes of term creation. Although recognized as a process, neology, in Arabic
translation studies, is not identified as a field of research yet. This can be demonstrated
simply by the distinct lack of research works on neology in Arabic language. Moreover,
modern Arab translators tend to be monotypic when dealing with foreign neologisms
(especially English). The method mostly used for transferring neologisms into Arabic
seems to be transliteration as in the word nano in nanophysics and eco in financial-
ecosystem, which are translated as ﻧﺎﻧﻮيand إﻳﻜﻮﻟﻮﺟﻲrespectively. Consequently, the lack
of rigorous investigation has marginalized the phenomenon in the process of designing
curricula and training translation/ interpreting trainees.
The survey took the form of a questionnaire that is designed with clear
instructions for those being surveyed. In order to identify the neologisms to be included
in the questionnaire, Cabré’s multidimensional approach was adopted. This has helped in
searching relevant websites for neologisms and in verifying them.
As for translation strategies, a set of term creation procedures used by old Arab
translators are redeployed. These procedures were devised by those professional
translators ages ago.
The second tool of investigation is the examination of English journal articles and
their translations to identify neologisms and their translation strategies. The texts are
taken from different well-known magazines covering different areas such as scientific,
technical, political, economic and social areas. Here, the researcher found both Cabré’s
multidimensional approach and Newmark’s taxonomy of neologisms of great assistance
to identify and verify neologisms. Newmark’s taxonomy also helped in identifying the
procedures employed to render neologisms.
The findings are scientifically analyzed using Microsoft Excel computer software
to calculate the sums and percentages and to draw necessary charts in order to identify
the strategies used in actual translation situations. The strategies extracted are organized
on the basis of the frequency of use and percentage received by each strategy. A list of
strategies of translating English neologisms to Arabic was then drawn up based on the
results of the survey study and the examination of the texts.
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the thesis and
argues that neology is an important linguistic category which is marginalized in Arabic
translation studies, where it is considered just another procedure of term creation. The
Chapter also discusses the issue of translating English neologisms into Arabic and the
distinct lack of research works and systematic investigations in a field that requires
special attention and specific translational skills.
Chapter Two introduces the most prominent and influential translation models
through a historical transition of translation from a practice to a field of study. The
Chapter focuses on relevant notions such as equivalence and translation strategy starting
with the well-known theories of Catford’s translation shifts, Nida’s dynamic equivalence
and Newmark’s communicative approach. Translation strategies is another important
issue that was handled innovatively by Vinay and Darbelnet in 1958. Their approach
influenced many scholars and translation schools such as the Prague Circle. Other issues
discussed include translation function with Reiss’s text type approach and Nord’s text
analysis. The important notions of discourse, register and genre are presented in details
through discussing key approaches in this area such as House’s model of translation
quality assessment, Baker’s pragmatic analysis and Hatim and Mason’s semiotic
approach.
Chapter Four is the core of the present thesis as it deals with the investigation
done and the results obtained. The chapter opens with a short illustration of the
methodology adopted and the work plan made. The chapter then demonstrates the two
tools used in the research, explains them separately, illustrates and discusses the results of
each tool alone with charts showing the probabilities for better understanding of the work
done. The chapter concludes with an illustration and discussion of the results obtained.
In Chapter Five, conclusions based on the present research work are drawn
demonstrating the value of the findings and further discussing the results obtained along
with implications of such findings in both educational and professional domains. The
chapter also incorporates some suggestions and recommendations for implementation of
the findings and for further research.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The proper study and theory of translation emerged only after the second half of
the twentieth century. Before that, the study of translation consisted only of personal
remarks mostly on translation as a product. Some European theorists go as far as
suggesting that translation theory actually existed in ancient European empires, mainly
the Roman Empire. In particular, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 to 43 BC) and Horace (65
to 8 BC) are considered to have started translation as a discipline (Malmkjær 2005: 1).
This is supported by the fact that Cicero’s writings as well as Horace’s were among the
first writings about translation that are still in existence and had a significant impact on
the development of translation as a study and activity.
2.1.1.1 Equivalence
Adhering closely to the linguistic form of the source text. It covers formal
relationships which exist when ‘a TL category can be found which
occupies the “same” place in the “economy” of the TL as the given SL
category occupies in the SL.
Beside the scientific and analytic nature of his approach to translation, Catford
made an undeniable contribution to translation studies, which is the notion of
untranslatability that incorporated features beyond the linguistic realm, features that are
considered contextual and communicative such as function, context, culture, situation and
relevance. Such features will form critical issues in future translation studies. Malmkjær
(2005) explains Catford’s notion of untranslatability in terms of distinction he makes
between two types of untranslatability: (1) linguistic untranslatability and (2) cultural
untranslatability. However, he still prefers to limit untranslatability to the linguistic level
justifying that by arguing that it is always easier to describe a language than a culture
(Malmkjær 2005: 27-28).
According to Hatim (2001), there are two assumptions which marked this type of
response research, and Nida’s is not an exception. The first is the universality not
practicality in making statements and assumptions about translation and translatability, a
principle formulated by Nida as follows: “anything which can be said in one language
can be said in another, unless the form is an essential element of the message” (Hatim
2001: 18). The second assumption relates to the communicative approach invested in the
translation process where the receptor’s response, and not the ST linguistics, is the focal
point (Hatim 2001: 18).
On this basis, Nida established his concepts of ‘dynamic equivalence’ and ‘formal
equivalence’. The latter indicates, Nida argues, that the translator’s main concern is the
original message’s form and content. The translator should focus on producing a text in
the receptor’s language that “should match as closely as possible the different elements in
the source language.” (Nida 1964: 159). Dynamic equivalence, on the other hand, is
based on what Nida calls ‘the principle of equivalent effect’. It simply means that the
translator should reproduce an effect on TT reader (receptor) ‘equivalent’ (or similar) to
the effect of that which the original message has on the ST reader (receptor) (Nida 1964:
159).
Nida further explains that the TL message should suit the TT receptor’s linguistic
needs and cultural expectations and that the translator should aim at ‘naturalness of
expression’, which is very important in Nida’s opinion (Nida 1964: 166). Munday (2001)
argues that dynamic equivalence is not an absolute concept, and Nida is aware of that,
due to the problems between “traditional notions of content and form” (Munday 2001:
42) and the difficulty of resolving them. But in order to achieve equivalent effect, Nida
sees that priority should be given to equivalence of meaning over equivalence of style
(Munday 2001: 42).
Nida’s influence on translation research and theory is undeniable. His views and
concepts drew the first border lines of translation studies as a discipline and managed to
bring translation research into the scientific era. His work has been influential on many
subsequent distinguished figures in translation studies like Peter Newmark, Werner
Koller and others.
Mona Baker, in her book In Other Words (1992), tackles the notion of
equivalence in a more detailed and systematic fashion. Starting with the word level,
Baker arranges types of equivalence according to the levels of word, grammar, text and
pragmatics, justifying her approach by recognizing that many factors can affect
equivalence such as linguistic and cultural factors.
2. Calque: This is “a special kind of borrowing” (Vinay and Darbelnet 1995: 32),
which occurs at phrase level, e.g. the English term “science-fiction” used in
French as it is, the English phrases like money-laundering, rush hour and
skyscraper are imposed on Arabic as ﻏﺴﻴﻞ أﻣﻮال, ﺳﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺬروةand ﻧﺎﻃﺤﺔ ﺳﺤﺎب
respectively. Another example is the ball is in their court now = اﻟﻜﺮة ﻓﻲ ﻣﻠﻌﺒﻬﻢ اﻷن.
if, given two utterances, one in English and the other in Spanish, there
exist between them a precise correspondence of ‘structure’ and of
‘signification’, and the equivalence is achieved moneme by moneme,
literal translation results and can be applied without risk.
Vinay and Darbelnet (1995: 34) advocate the use of literal translation
describing it as a good technique. However, the literal strategy is deemed
unacceptable if:
(a) Gives a different meaning;
4. Transposition is the change of one grammatical part of the ST for another part in
the translated TT without changing the sense, e.g. he went bankrupt = أﻓﻠﺲ, Arabs
pioneered medicine = آﺎن اﻟﻌﺮب رواد اﻟﻄﺐ. This may not be a rule, as Fawcett
(1997) suggests, which is one of Vinay and Darbelnet's weakness points as they
make their list sound like a list of imperative rules (Fawcett 1997: 37).
Nevertheless, Vinay and Darbelnet's view is that transposition might be the most
common grammatical shifting process undertaken by translators, supporting their
view with a list of ten categories where transposition might occur (Vinay and
Darbelnet 1995: 94-98).
6. Équivalence: Vinay and Darbelnet use this term to refer to the translation of
idioms and proverbs. In particular, they define it as a procedure undertaken “when
two languages refer to the same situation in totally different ways” (Fawcett 1997:
38), e.g. he killed his neighbor in cold blood = ﻗﺘﻞ ﺟﺎرﻩ ﻋﻤﺪا, how nice to remember
your palmy days = ﻣﺎ أﺟﻤﻞ أن ﺗﺘﺬآﺮ أﻳﺎم اﻟﻌﺰ. Therefore, it relies on language
knowledge, which means that the translator either knows or does not know the
equivalent phrase. Hence, Munday argues, Vinay and Darbelnet’s equivalence is
used in a “restricted sense” and must not be confused with the more general
concept (discussed above) (Munday 2001: 58).
7. Adaptation is the last and the most controversial technique proposed by the two
authors. It occurs when the cultural reference must be changed, as the situation of
the SL does not exist in the TL (ibid), e.g. before you could say Jack Robinson =
ﻗﺒﻞ أن ﻳﻨﺒﺲ ﺑﺒﻨﺖ ﺷﻔﻪ.
According to Qvale, Levý does not seem to be interested in discussing the content
of the translation, which he assumes it to be “a fixed quantity” that cannot be affected by
any variation of form. Therefore, he prefers to employ a functional approach to render
meaning, style and form (Qvale 2003: 27). Nevertheless, Levý is criticized for narrowing
his model to word level.
Reiss also identifies other text types, which she calls ‘mixed forms’ e.g. sales
promotion (subsumed under operative type) with poetic elements. She argues that there is
a “correlation” between text types, translation technique and text function (Hatim 2001:
77). Therefore, Reiss identifies each text type with a certain translation technique (or
method), (Munday 2001: 75):
Through these details, it is possible to say that Reiss deems it crucial to determine
the text type of the ST in order to identify the translation technique.
Vermeer’s Skopos theory emerges from his work on the function of translated
texts and from his overall view of translation as a process. He sees translation as a cross-
cultural act and defines it as “information offered in a language z of culture Z which
imitates information offered in language a of culture A so as to fulfill the desired
function.” (cited in Snell-Hornby 1995: 46).
Through theme-rheme analysis, she finds that different languages have different
thematic structures and, thus, require different treatments such as changing nominal
sentences into verbal. However, Baker (1992) argues that Halliday’s thematic analysis
may not always be applicable to translation since it is designed for English language.
Here, Baker suggests, translators should acquaint themselves with “alternative traditions”
such as the Prague School functional sentence perspective (FSP) saying “a functional
sentence perspective approach may prove more helpful in explaining the interactional
organization of languages other than English” (Baker 1992: 160).
Through their study of key passages of a French ST and English TT, for example,
Hatim and Mason (1997) could establish that altering the “transitivity structure” in the
English TT result in shifting the “ideational function” of the text (Hatim and Mason
1997: 7-10). They further demonstrate how such shifts may be due to the translator’s own
understanding of the text.
In their discussion of shifts in language functions between STs and TTs, the two
authors tackle the issue of shifts in modality in translation. This is illustrated by a study
of how a group of trainee interpreters had problems distinguishing between French
conditional allegation and rumor in a European Parliament debate. The majority of the
sample altered the modality (probability) in the French ST into factual statement shifting
the function of discourse and the entire intended message of the English TT (Hatim and
Mason 1997: 73-76).
The two authors also discuss the influence on his/her translation of the translator’s
own views and beliefs that is the translator’s ideology and discourse. They further
highlight the semiotic function of dialects and idiolects and their importance in
translation (Hatim and Mason 1997: 103). In their text-analysis approach, Hatim and
Mason (1997) state that a text has “stable” elements that can be rendered fairly easily
through literal translation and “dynamic” elements which put the translator in a more
challenging situation. With the latter, literal translation is assumed to be always
applicable (Hatim and Mason 1997: 30-31).
Al-Khūry (1988) and Baker (1998) also explain that there were two
methodologies in translation. Those methodologies came to be known as ‘schools’ of
translation. Both methodologies were associated with the names of their creators. The
first one known as the method (school) of Yuhanna Ibn Al-Batriq and Ibn Nā‛ima Al-
Himsi, and the second method was known as the method (school) of Hunayn Ibn IsHāq
and Al-Jawhari. Those two methodologies (schools), with different sets of principles,
views and strategies, were the foundation of the theoretical and pedagogical systems for
teaching translation (Al-Khūry 1988: 51, 52) (Baker: 1998: 312, 313).
Moreover, and due to the importance of translation for Arabs at that time,
intellectuals in general and translators in particular began to think and reflect upon the
concept, methods, principles and strategies of translation. Al-Khūry (1988) and Al-
Didawi (2005) present two different examples written by the same person, who was one
of the greatest Arab intellectuals of his time, namely Al-JāHidh. The first, stated in Al-
Khūry (1988), is Kitāb Al-Haywān in which Al-JāHidh laid out the characteristics of a
translator and the translation of literary works, the translation of poetry in general and
Arabic poetry in particular. The second book is Al-Bayān wal-Tabyīn in which he
included a definition of a concept, which many Arab intellectuals agreed that it is of
translation, and the features of correct textuality (Al-Didawi 2005: 356).
Nevertheless, as Baker (1998) states, Arab translation studies at that time took the
form of critiques of existing translated texts, on which later studies of issues of
translation were built (Baker 1998: 113). In other words, Arab translation studies at that
time started from application to theory, i.e. they highlighted the problems of translation in
already translated texts and put solutions to them, then built some theoretical frameworks
for better translation processes.
It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that Arabs felt the need to
cope with the international major advancements. At that time translation, again, seemed
to be the answer to their needs. Translation confronted Arabs with the same problematic
issues for which modern Arab intellectuals sought answers. But in spite the fact that
many research works, papers and books about translation are written and published in the
Arab world, only a small number deal with the issues, problems and methodology of
‘translation studies’.
Most Arabic translation works are either individual impressions based on personal
experiences or translations of European and Western publications about the translation
theory. With the latter type, Arab translators include their comments and texts taken from
Arabic literature as examples of the cultural and linguistic problems that may be
encountered in translation. In either type, the product (the translation study work) lacks
scientific, analytical and objective methodology. The translation process in the Arab
world, as mentioned above, suffers from the lack of attention and organization.
Translation process and ‘translation studies’ in the Arab world are based on individual
decisions.
However, many Arab authors advocate the idea and the process of translating the
main Western source books of the discipline into Arabic. In their argument, Arab
intellectuals and translators believe that during the last thirty years, translation as a
discipline had major developments and achieved huge breakthroughs in the fields of
translation theories and translation critique. Some authors even further argue that
translating, or at least summarizing, the major Western reference books of translation into
Arabic is the best way to found a translation discipline. Then an Arab translation
discipline, whose principles are derived from Arabic translation problems, can emerge
(Al-Didawi 2005: 359).
The above is a general review of previous Western and Arab research work in the
field of translation studies. The aim of this demonstration is to establish relevance
between past translation models and the area of translation strategy, which is the scope of
the present research. From the above translation literature review, it can be said that
translation strategy (or technique) is a key concept to the study of translation activity. The
next chapter will attempt to link translation strategy to the core issue of this thesis, which
is the translation of neologisms.
CHAPTER THREE
NEOLOGY
Two main goals in the linguistic observation of neologisms can be identified: one
is updating existing lexicons and dictionaries with words that have recently come into the
language. The other is the analysis and description of the neologisms themselves in terms
of distribution over word-classes, statistics on derivational methods, statistics on loan
word origination, etc. The latter type of research is of special importance as it depends on
the detection of all the neologisms occurring in a given corpus.
The lack of a standard definition of what a neologism is has made the detection of
neologisms a far from trivial task. Nevertheless, many linguists, lexicographers and
terminologists have attempted to define the phenomenon from different perspectives. One
of the best attempts to define neologisms is made by Alain Rey (1975/1995), who
concludes that there are no objective criteria for being a neologism. In his book Essays on
Terminology (1975/1995), Rey states that, for a long time, the concept of neology is
considered a psychopathic formation of words. This view of neology can be seen in
psychological research works which identify neology as a result of mental disorders such
as Jargon Aphasia. Bose & Buchanan, in their paper titled A Cognitive and
Psycholinguistic Investigation of Neologisms (2006), associate the phenomenon of
neologism with aphasia and study it as part of the disorder. Rey (1975/1995) further lists
many definitions that contribute to this view, including definitions of the phenomenon by
well-known dictionaries such as Merriam Webster’s dictionary, which to this day defines
neologism as “a meaningless word coined by a psychotic”1
1
(cf. Merriam Webster online dictionary: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/neologism)
Rey (1975/1995), admits that the definition of neologism as a linguistic
phenomenon is difficult, though he provides what he describes as a “problematic
definition” in which he sees a neologism as “a lexical unit perceived as recent by
language users” (Rey 1975/1995: 64). Accepting the problems of this definition, Rey
poses three questions:
Given the vagueness of the term, Rey argues against the use of the word
neologism in dictionaries, stating that ‘neologism’ is only a “pseudo-concept” (Rey 1988:
cited in Cabré 1999: 205). He further illustrates that the notion of neologism bears no
abstract meaning of “new”, but a neologism is a word that is new in a given language at a
given moment in time. Thus, a word can be counted as a neologism with respect to time
only (Rey 1975/1995: 75). Furthermore, he discusses the types of neologisms one can
distinguish (formal, semantic and pragmatic), and what it means for a word to be ‘new’.
Concerning the latter issue, Rey concludes that no solid, objective criteria for newness
can be given, and that hence the label neologism is only an indication of a subjective
sentiment.
Although concise and clear at first glance, Newmark’s definition raises many
questions concerning the criteria to identify a neologism. Is the lexicon that should be the
decisive criterion? If so, which one to choose? If not, should it be experts or the public to
decide what a neologism is? Who are those experts, or people? What authority they
should have? Although, Newmark’s definition does not cater for such possibilities, it is
only fair to say that the classification of the types of neologisms proposed is truly
beneficial.
Another contribution to the effort of defining the phenomenon comes from Maria
Teresa Cabré (1999). She formulates four “parameters” or criteria for the identification of
a neologism: a psychological criterion, a lexicographic criterion, a diachronic criterion,
and a criterion based on a word exhibiting systematic signs of formal or semantic
instability (Cabré 1999: 205). As Cabré herself points out, none of these criteria alone can
give a fully satisfactory identity to the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the combination of all
criteria can, in fact, yield a multidimensional definition of neologisms.
Cabré formulates a set of four criteria to identify a neologism, three of which are
of particular importance. These are the psychological criterion, lexicographic criterion,
and the diachronic criterion. The next three sections are dedicated to the explanation of
each of them along with their advantages and disadvantages.
3.1.1 Psychological Definition
A neologism is, by definition, a new word. The term ‘neologism’ is commonly
found in dictionaries, where it is intended to be an established yet new word in the
language as defined, for instance, by Plag as a newly created linguistic expression which
is considered known by at least part of the linguistic community (Plag 2006: 541).
Cabré’s psychological definition is based on Rey’s views and conclusion that the
identification of a neologism is subject to individual criteria of what a neologism may be.
Thus, to Cabré, a neologism is a word that is perceived as new by the language
community (Cabré 1999: 205).
The word being new should imply that the word is currently part of the language,
but was not so previously. However, language does not progress through well-defined
stages, where the words in the new lexicon can be compared to the words in the old
lexicon. Firstly, ‘new’ is a relative notion – some words may be older than others, but
there is no definite period for being new. Secondly, there is no well-defined, stable
lexicon of a language against which newness can be tested - a language cannot be stably
defined within “its limits in the chronological, spatial, and social dimensions” (Rey
1975/1995: 75).
Novelty can be a reason for a word not to appear in the dictionary, but other
reasons may include the fact that the word is too infrequent, too predictable, too
specialized, too old, obsolete, taboo, or simply accidentally overlooked by the
lexicographers. All these reasons do not indicate that a word is a neologism simply for
not being in the dictionary. A dictionary is not an objective repository of all words. It is
subject to various intervening factors such as editorial decisions, market demand, and
specialty, to name a few. Hence, appearing in the dictionary is not enough to be a
neologism as dictionaries are almost incomplete repositories of words (Coleman 2006:
591-594). However, the reason why the dictionary (or the lexicographic criterion) is very
frequently used as a decisive criterion can be attributed to the fact that neologism
research is often initiated and/or funded by dictionary publishers to identify changes in
vocabulary (ibid).
The problem of the diachronic definition is that it does not, by itself, define which
words are part of the language, and hence which words are new. As shown in the
previous section, the dictionary is not a sufficient source for establishing which words are
part of the language. Dictionaries attempt to be faithful abstractions of a language, but
can never be complete repositories. Only the language itself can be a full representation
of itself. Consequently, dictionaries are not the suitable tools to define a concept like
neology and neologism.
Other scholars follow the same categorization method of Newmark, but with
different labels. Among these are Laurie Bauer (1995, 1996, 1997), Silvia Pavel (1993),
and Ingo Plag (2006). Some of these creation methods are derivation, composition,
compounding, blending, acronymy and abbreviation, and borrowing. It should be noted
here that Newmark’s and Pavel’s lists of creation methods are more into the technical
side of neologism, while Bauer’s and Plag’s are general language word-formation
methods.
In any case, and whatever means of creation is used, certain factors should be
considered for a neologism to be accepted in a language as Pavel (1993) points out. She
further explains that the most frequent criteria to accept and approve a new word are
correctness, which refers to the conformity of the newly formed word to the rules and
syntax of the language in which it is created (Pavel 1993: 23, 24), and acceptability, i.e.
the approval of the language users of the new word (ibid). Here Pavel admits that
acceptability does not presuppose correctness as she states:
Neologisms, like any other phenomenon, have a certain lifetime with specific
stages. Bauer (1996) states three stages which resemble a lexeme’s life. The first stage is
nonce formations and refers to “a new complex word coined by a speaker/writer on the
spur of the moment to cover some immediate need” (Bauer 1996: 45). The new creations
are characterized with extreme instability and are limited to a small group of users only.
Synonymy is a high probability at this stage since the lexeme is not yet fully standardized
(or institutionalized). Another characteristic of this stage is that many lexemes may live
for a relatively short time as Bauer (1996) points out that “there are large numbers of
nonce formations which are used on very few occasions (perhaps no more than once)”
(ibid). This happens when the need for the nonce formation, i.e. the lexeme, is extremely
rare and ceases to be very quickly.
However, according to Bauer, when the users (speakers/writers) are aware that
they are using a lexeme they already heard, the lexeme is no more a nonce formation.
Here the lexeme enters a new stage, which Bauer names institutionalization. At this stage
the lexeme goes through two phases, the first can be labeled as the diffusion phase in
which it has reached a significant audience, but not yet gained widespread acceptance.
What characterizes lexemes in this phase is that meanings of a lexeme are narrowed
down as possible and any ambiguity is ignored for the sake of clarity and preciseness
(Bauer 1996: 48). The second phase is when lexemes gain recognizable and probably
lasting acceptance. Bauer (1996) explains that a lexeme at this phase becomes more
“transparent” and specific in meaning shedding off any accompanying ambiguities from
the previous phase. Here the lexeme becomes more stable and ‘institutionalized’.
The third, and final, stage of a lexeme’s life is when it gives up its novelty and
passes into formal linguistic acceptance, or become culturally dated in its use. In Bauer’s
terms, this stage is referred to as lexicalization and it is at this stage a lexeme can be
“traced at every level of linguistic analysis” (Bauer 1996: 49). Here, lexemes become part
of the language and cease to be new creations (or neologisms), and gain transparency,
limitation and clarity of meaning.
From the point of view of linguistic purism, any lexical neology that is not based
on a scientific study of the developmental tendencies of a given language is considered a
sort of linguistic deviation. Baker & Jones, in their book Encyclopedia of Bilingualism
and Bilingual Education (1998), recognize the concept as the manifestation of a desire on
the part of a speech community (or some section of it) to preserve a language from, or rid
it of, putative foreign elements or other elements held to be undesirable (Baker & Jones
1998: 217, 218).
All ‘puristic’ and other language standardization activities are part of the process
of language planning which is the responsibility of language planning organizations like
language councils and academies, linguists as well as translators.
In the old Arab Islamic state (7th – 13th century), Arab linguists attributed
linguistic innovation to language deviation and dialectal use. Al-Zubaidi (1886/ 1994)
explains that Arabs had a very puristic view of any linguistic innovation. They believed
that any new expression is of foreign origin and is, thus, condemned. In the introduction
to his book Taj Al-‘Arūss, Al-Zubaidi identifies linguistic neology as “a new expression
that is created by ‘non-original Arabs’ whose language cannot be substantiated” (Al-
Zubaidi 1886/1994: 61) (my translation)2.
This illustrates that, in the past, Arabs established a connection between linguistic
concepts and sociological factors, e.g. Arabs vs. non-Arabs, which consequently led to
the exclusion of any lexical innovation from the domain of classical, ‘correct’ language.
(Khassara 1994: 128).
However, modern Arab linguists have an entirely different view towards neology
and neologisms. Many Arab language scholars and terminologists recognize the vital role
of neology in the development of Arabic language. Khassara (1994) points out that
lexical innovation is considered the first means of Arabic language development (ibid).
(61 :1994/1886 "وأﻣﺎ اﻟﻤﻮﻟﺪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻣﺎ أﺣﺪﺛﻪ اﻟﻤﻮﻟﺪون اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻻ ﻳﺤﺘﺞ ﺑﺄﻟﻔﺎﻇﻬﻢ" )اﻟﺰﺑﻴﺪي2
of a particular text" (ibid). Wilss’s view seems to be based on the variety of definitions
available as other theorists discussed this concept in relation to many other notions such
as equivalence, adequacy, function and translation unit. But it is the nature of the concept
to be relative to other translation concepts as it comes to serve certain translation needs
that seems to be the predominant view.
1. Technical procedures:
a. analysis of the source and target languages;
b. a thorough study of the source language text before making
attempts translate it;
c. Making judgments of the semantic and syntactic
approximations.
• Adaptation which is the freest form of translation, and is used mainly for plays
(comedies) and poetry; the themes, characters, plots are usually preserved, the SL
culture is converted to the TL culture and the text is rewritten.
• Free translation which produces the TL text without the style, form, or content of
the original.
• Idiomatic translation which reproduces the 'message' of the original but tends to
distort nuances of meaning by preferring colloquialisms and idioms where these
do not exist in the original.
Vinay and Darbelnet also dealt with the concept of strategies or "techniques" as
they called them (cf. Ch-2). However, their approach is widely criticized due to the
narrow linguistic view it has about translation (Fawcett 1997: 50, 51).
Venuti (1998) indicates that translation strategies "involve the basic tasks of
choosing the foreign text to be translated and developing a method to translate it" (Venuti
1998: 240). He employs the concepts of domesticating and foreignizing to refer to
translation strategies.
Rey (1975/1995) has his own view in terms of procedures to create neologisms.
Morphology, abbreviation, acronymy, borrowing and creation of fixed expressions seem
to be the tools to deal with neologisms in translation (Rey 1975/1995: 80). Sager (1997)
lists several methods to form neologisms (Sager 1997: 38-40):
• New creations, which are very rare in most languages, for example: gas, byte and
blog.
• Interlingual borrowing, for example from ancient Greek and Latin to many
European languages.
• Scientific vocabulary, which in the case of English scientific vocabulary is mostly
from Greek and Latin, for example: reservoir.
• Derivation ,for example: television.
• Secondary term formation, which replaces the borrowed word by a formation
more suitable to the pattern of the language. For example: FAX (English) (from
facsimile transmission) and telecopieur (French).
• Loan translation, whereby a term from one language is translated element by
element into the receiving language. For example: online (Engish) into en linea
(Spanish).
• Double loan translation, as a result of loan translation from several language
sources for the same concept. For example: in Spanish there is a synonym
linguistica informatica (from French) and linguistica computacional (from
English).
5. Recognized TL translation
B. New forms
6. Functional term
1. New coinages
7. Descriptive term
2. Derived words (including blends)
8. Literal translation
3. Abbreviations
9. Translation procedure combination
4. Collocations (couplets etc.)
9. Pseudo-neologisms
10. Internationalisms
Furthermore, Newmark formulates a set of “contextual factors” that can help the
translator to adopt a certain strategy (or procedure) highlighting the importance of
“language planning, policy and politics” of the TL in the process of translating
neologisms (Newmark 1988/2000: 149). As a result, it is possible to say that Newmark
created a comprehensive framework of ‘neo-specific’ translation strategies in translation
studies.
Term creation is in the main part of translation, which is an old craft in Arabic
heritage. As pointed out in Chapter Two, translation can be traced back to the Arab
Islamic Empire especially during the Abbasid rule. In fact, it can be said that most Arabic
knowledge, at that time, owed its richness to translation, which is why it had such a
prestigious status.
According to Al-Shihabi (1995), in the past, Arabic had four procedures of term
creation. However, he believes that, today, these procedures are still valid. Those
procedures are (Al-Shihabi 1995: 28):
1. Modifying the original linguistic meaning of the Arabic word incorporating the
new (intended) meaning;
2. Deriving new expressions from original Arabic roots or from arabicized roots to
designate new meanings;
3. Translating foreign words along with their meanings;
4. Arabicizing foreign words and deem them correct.
(my translation)6
Although these procedures are for term ‘creation’, Al-Shihabi does not mention
the notion of neologism, at any time. Perhaps, old Arab terminologists and translators did
not know the concept of neology. Al-Didawi (2000: 69-75), (2005: 111-114) includes the
same list of term creation procedures in his account of Arab translation and terminology
heritage.
Following in the same path, Al-Khūry (1988), also formulates a list of procedures
to create new terms. Although very close to Al-Shihabi’s, Al-Khūry includes blending in
his list instead of translating (cf. procedure 3 of Al-Shihabi). Al-Khūry’s procedures
.(102 :1994 وﻣﺘﻔﻖ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺑﻴﻦ ﻃﺎﺋﻔﺔ ﻣﺨﺼﻮﺻﺔ" )ﺧﺴﺎرﻩ، "اﻟﻤﺼﻄﻠﺢ هﻮ ﻟﻔﻆ ﻣﻨﻘﻮل ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ اﻟﻠﻐﻮي إﻟﻰ ﺁﺧﺮ3
.(28 :1988 "اﻹﺻﻄﻼح ﻋﺒﺎرة ﻋﻦ إﺗﻔﺎق ﻗﻮم ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺴﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﺸﺊ ﺑﺈﺳﻢ ﻣﺎ ﻳﻨﻘﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ اﻷول" )اﻟﺠﺮﺟﺎﻧﻲ4
.(102 :1994 "اﻟﻠﻔﻈﻴﺔ وﻧﻘﻞ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ و اﻹﺗﻔﺎق" )ﺧﺴﺎرﻩ5
. ﺗﺤﻮﻳﺮ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ اﻟﻠﻐﻮي اﻷﺻﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﻜﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ وﺗﻀﻤﻴﻨﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﻰ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ-1 6
. اﺷﺘﻘﺎق اﻟﻔﺎظ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻣﻦ أﺻﻮل ﻋﺮﺑﻴﺔ أو ﻣﻌﺮﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﺪﻻﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻧﻲ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة-2
. ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ آﻠﻤﺎت أﻋﺠﻤﻴﺔ ﺑﻤﻌﺎﻧﻴﻬﺎ-3
(28 :1995 )اﻟﺸﻬﺎﺑﻲ. ﺗﻌﺮﻳﺐ آﻠﻤﺎت أﻋﺠﻤﻴﺔ وﻋﺪّهﺎ ﺻﺤﻴﺤﺔ-4
include derivation (in Arabic), metaphor, blending and arabicization (my translation) (Al-
Khūry 1988: 161)7.
Khassara (1994) proposes a different and more detailed list of term creation
procedures. His list has three main procedures (or labels) which includes several different
sub-procedures. The main procedures are translation, lexical creation and borrowing (my
translation) (Khassara 1994: 102)8. Although, the first and third procedures are familiar
ones, the second can be of particular interest. Khassara actually incorporated the concept
of neology in his procedures for the definition of /tawli:d/ i.e. lexical creation which,
according to Khassara, is somehow similar to the definition of neologism in the Western
tradition. Khassara defines the concept of /tawli:d/ as getting a word from a previously
existing one (Khassara 1994: 127). This shows that Arabs are no strangers to the concept
of neology and neologism. Furthermore, Khassara strictly emphasizes the importance of
/tawli:d/ in the development of Arabic throughout history describing it as the pillar of
language development (ibid). Al-Sayadi (1984) goes even further in his recognition of the
process stating that /tawli:d/ is “the creation of a new word that does not exist either in
the old or modern language” (Al-Sayadi 1984: 61) (my translation)9. Although this
definition seems an orthodox linguistic one, Khassara (1994) emphasizes that the root of
the newly created word should be in the Arabic language. Khassara continues to propose
two methods of creating ‘neologisms’, the first is derivation, which is of three types: the
small, the big and the biggest. The second is metaphor.
Many Arabic language academies (in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia) and
the Bureau for Coordination of Arabicization in Morocco, have agreed a set of strategies
for creating new terms. This agreement was one of the recommendations of a convention
held in 1981, which emphasized traditional term creation processes. The procedures
endorsed include, first, the use of old words (from Arabic language heritage) and, second,
the creation of new terms using derivation, metaphor, blending and arabicization (cf. Al-
Khūry 1988: 159).
In the present thesis, it was decided to adopt the same set of procedures of term
creation stated in Al-Khūry (1988) for two reasons. First, it is the most comprehensive set
of term creation procedures that is applicable to term creation and neologisms as well.
Second, it has been either replicated or partially quoted in other books and research
works for various reasons. Therefore, it seems proper now to present a short account of
each of the procedures.
1. Derivation is to “pull out (coin) a word from another word provided that the two
words have a proportional harmony in pronunciation and meaning” (ibid) (my
translation). derivation is of three types:
a. The small derivation occurs when the newly derived word and the root from
which it is derived are identical in the number and order of letters.
b. The big derivation occurs when the newly derived word and the root from
which it is derived are proportionally identical in the pronunciation and
meaning but not the order of letters. It is also referred to as ‘reversion’.
c. The biggest derivation occurs when the newly derived word and the root
from which it is derived are proportionally identical in the pronunciation and
meaning but differ in some letters. It is also referred to as ‘alteration’.
4.1 Methodology
This chapter tackles the methodology used in the investigation of translation
strategies of neologisms, and presents and discusses the findings of the research. This
will be informed by the literature dealing with the strategies and/or procedures for
translating problematic concepts and phenomena like neologisms which, as explained in
the previous chapter, is substantial (cf. 3.4.2 Creating and Translating Neologisms).
The translation of neologisms is not a direct process of rendering words form one
language to another. There are certain procedures devoted to this linguistic phenomenon
due to its sensitivity and importance. Different strategies to translate neologisms are
available. However, the actual use of these strategies varies from one language
community to another due to lexicographic traditions and cultural differences. Hence
identifying the strategies of translating neologisms adopted in a language community is
important to establish, with the training of future translators in mind, the basis on which
new words are presented in the language community.
The aim of this research is not a mere illustration of translation strategies. Rather,
it aims at putting these strategies to test and find out which are in actual use today.
Therefore, the core of the research is based on two different tools. The first is a survey
study to determine the actual strategies used in translation, the second is the examination
of English texts translated into Arabic for various types of neologisms and translation
strategies.
In the process of formulating the questionnaire, the present research took into
consideration the time and place pressure factors under which professional translators
work. Thus, to encourage the subjects (translators) to answer it without consuming much
of their time, the questionnaire form was designed to be simple and easy to use with clear
instructions on how to answer. The questionnaire consists of ten neologisms which are
selected on the basis of two criteria: recency and form of word. To satisfy the first
criterion, which is the recency of the lexeme, several soft and hard copies of specialized
dictionaries were consulted to determine the date of each lexeme. The neologisms
themselves are from two online sources, the first is a website named Word Spy10
dedicated to collecting neologisms through individual participations. The second is Rice
University Neologism Database11. Each of the websites was investigated to determine
their reliability. As for the second criterion, many forms are chosen to reflect real-life
translation situations. The forms are single word forms, collocations, blends and
abbreviations. This range of word formation is the most prevalent pattern in creating
neologisms. The neologisms chosen are from different fields of knowledge, as the aim is
to cover the phenomenon of neology in general not in a certain branch. The list of
neologisms consists of: walkshed, mullet strategy, digital native, videophilia, groceraunt,
exoplanet, peaknik, defictionalization, daughter track, scuppie.
As for the strategies suggested in the questionnaire, it was decided to adopt the
list devised by old Arab translators in the translation of terms. This list is recognized by
many (if not all) modern Arab translators and translation scholars as an official set of
‘rules’ to deal with new terms and concepts in translation into Arabic. The list of
strategies as illustrated in the previous chapter (cf. 3.4.2 Creating and Translating
Neologisms) consists of four strategies (procedures as labeled by Al-Khūry: 1988, and
Khassara: 1994) as Derivation, Metaphor, Blending, and Arabicization.12 We considered
giving the subjects a fifth strategy quoted from Newmark’s list of strategies (cf. 3.4.2
Creating and Translating Neologisms), which is Recognized TL Translation to give the
subjects more options from modern translation studies and to find out whether modern
Arab translators are aware of and actually use such ‘international’ strategies. Although
optional, another field labeled Other Strategy along with a certain space for comments
and suggested translation are also provided. All this is presented in a simple direct format
to induce the subjects to answer the whole questionnaire.
The survey is in two parts. The first part is a pilot study where the questionnaire
was given to seven translators who are also students of the Masters of Arts in English-
Arabic-English Translation and Interpreting program (MATI) at the American University
of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates to identify any weaknesses in the questionnaire
form. The feedback was of crucial importance. The first comment was on the length of
the questionnaire which varied from “medium” to “long”. However, the length of the
questionnaire and the number of neologisms were carefully studied to be representative,
doable and calculable. The other comment was on the fifth strategy Recognized TL
Translation; most feedback suggested that it is not a feasible strategy in English-Arabic
translation of neologisms and some suggested Omission13 instead, which is especially
10
www.wordspy.com
11
www.esa4.rice.edu
12
اﻹﺷﺘﻘﺎق واﻟﻤﺠﺎز واﻟﻨﺤﺖ واﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﺐ
13
اﻟﺤﺬف
used with abbreviations that cannot be translated or transliterated. Thus, we decided to
discard the strategy Recognized TL Translation and replace it with Omission, leaving the
rest of the questionnaire format as it is. Consequently, the final list of strategies given to
professional translators in the second part of the survey consists of Derivation, Metaphor,
Blending, Arabicization and Omission.
In the second part of the survey, the present researcher did an online search for
translation agencies in the UAE which have good reputation and resources. The search
resulted in identifying eleven agencies in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman. Sixty
hard copies of the final questionnaire were made and distributed by hand to the agencies
in Dubai, Sharjah and Ajman while the agency in Abu Dhabi received a soft copy of the
questionnaire. A time limit of fifteen days was given to the agencies due to some logistic
problems like delivering the questionnaire copies to subjects as some of their translators
are actually freelancers living outside the UAE which required sending them additional
soft copies. In addition, twenty professional translators who were part of Mohammed Bin
Rashid Foundation translation project were contacted by e-mail sending them soft copies
of the questionnaire.
The second tool of investigation included texts which are taken from different
respectable well-known journals. The types (or fields) of the magazines were categorized
into (1) scientific/technical (2) political/economic and (3) social/general. For each type
one representative title (i.e. journal) was selected. For the scientific/technical type the
American science and technology magazine Scientific American and the Arabic
‘translated’ version of the same texts in Al-Oloom14 magazine were used. The Economist
and its translated texts in Al-Majalla15 were chosen to represent the political/economic
type. Finally, the English and Arabic versions of Newsweek were selected for type three,
which is the social/general type. Although, the abovementioned categorization is merely
theoretical devised by the researcher himself to help in organizing the research and the
findings, it must be noted here that three different issues included for each of these types
do ensure comprehensiveness and reliability of the findings.
The responses are scientifically analyzed in order to identify the strategies used in
actual translation situations. The strategies extracted are organized on the basis of
ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم14
اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺔ15
percentage each strategy received. A list of strategies of translating English neologisms to
Arabic is drawn up based on the results of the survey study and the examination of the
texts.
The following sections demonstrate how each tool is used in this research, along
with the findings and discussion.
The study consisted of a questionnaire in two parts, first a pilot study part where
the translators gave their comments on the strategies and overall format of the
questionnaire, then a short survey undertaken with multiple-choice questions where the
translators tick their preferences of the different strategies. The final survey has the
following five strategies:
1. Derivation
2. Metaphor
3. Blending
4. Arabicization
5. Omission
4.2.1.2 Results
Five of the targeted translation agencies started forwarding notifications of replies
from their associates within ten days and by the end of the period given, fifty-four
completed copies were collected either by hand or via e-mail.
Computer software used for analyzing the responses was Microsoft Excel. It is
selected for its user-friendly features and flexibility in operation. The aim of using this
software is to calculate the sum and percentage of responses and draw necessary charts of
the findings.
Table: (Results of Translators’ Survey)
For further illustration, the results are shown down in the form of a graph showing
the percentage of each strategy as actually used by translators:
Figure 1: Translators’ Survey
It is clear that strategies 3. Blending and 5. Omission are the least popular
strategies. The strategies that the translators prefer are 1. Derivation and 2. Metaphor. To
further understand the findings and get a stronger basis for future research, it is better to
highlight each strategy and discuss the results.
1. Derivation
Strategy 1, Derivation: The results show that this is the most popular translation
procedure; the following figure shows the actual use of this strategy in each of the
contextualized short texts given in the survey. The figure illustrates that Derivation is
widely used when the neologism has an identifiable, direct and single meaning as in the
translation defictionalization, exoplanet, and grocernaut, which scored 47, 45, and 43
respectively. Clarity and singularity of meaning seem to be the criteria of using
Derivation as a translation strategy; this is supported by the low scores of using
derivation with mullet strategy, videophilia, and scuppie, where the numbers are 7, 2, and
1 respectively.
Figure 2: Translators’ Actual Use of Derivation
2. Metaphor
When it comes to strategy 2, Metaphor, there is a slight difference in preference.
As shown in the following figure, this strategy is used with a certain type of lexical items,
which consist of more than one lexeme and have indirect (metaphorical) meanings. The
figure illustrates that Arab translators tend to use this strategy with items like daughter
track, mullet strategy, and walkshed, which received 37, 30, and 18 respectively of the
responses. Other neologisms received a noticeably few to none responses.
Figure 3: Translators’ Actual Use of Metaphor
3. Blending
For strategy 3, Blending, the answers show a considerable low tendency to use
this strategy. The numbers hardly go above six. For some reason, it seems that Arab
translators do not rely on this strategy when dealing with new lexemes. Perhaps the
differences in the phonological, morphological, and syntactic systems are the main cause.
Figure 4: Translators’ Actual Use of Derivation
4. Arabicization
Strategy 4, Arabicization - here one can again see a rather clear tendency to use
this strategy with a certain type of lexical items, Abbreviations and blends. The high
number of responses for both videophilia and scuppie (45, 34 respectively) compared to
the low responses for other lexemes, and also in comparison to the responses of strategy 1
and 2 above, show that Arab translators tend to use this strategy as the last option when
all other strategies fail or when the neologism is hard to interpret. A tendency that goes in
line with what old Arab translators and terminologists used to do (cf. 3.4.2 Creating and
Translating Neologisms).
Figure 5: Translators’ Actual Use of Arabicization
5. Omission
Finally strategy 5, Omission. This strategy is quite controversial among Arab
translators according to the comments from the pilot study. It is interesting to note that it
was suggested by professional translators themselves. However, the comments of the
subjects in the second part of the survey study suggest other procedures after using this
strategy, they can be called as ‘post-omission strategies’. Those include Transference of
Meaning and Translation of the Sentence.
Figure 6: Translators’ Actual Use of Omission
As mentioned above in section 4.1, the present researcher included another option
in the questionnaire, which is labeled as Other Strategy. The following figure shows the
responses of this option:
Figure 7: Translators’ Actual Use of Other Strategies
The figure shows that particular types of neologisms attracted most of the
responses; those are abbreviations and lexemes with metaphorical meanings. The reason
behind this is the failure of other strategies to deal with them. Scuppie (a Socially
Conscious Upwardly Mobile Person), for example, as a neologism refers to a concept that
has no equivalent in the Arabic language so it is not possible to translate it, and it is not
easy to arabicize for spelling difficulties. Thus, translators suggest to either translate the
phrase from which the abbreviation is coined, or paraphrase it. The same procedure
applies to peaknik, which is a lexeme with metaphorical meaning. The suggested
strategies for this neologism are explanation of meaning, paraphrase, and translation of
sentence which includes the neologism.
4.2.1.3 Discussion
Naturally, a survey like this does not only aim at revealing the actual behaviour of
translators - that has to be studied in real-life translating situations - but also shows the
attitudes and tendencies of individual translators, related to norms within society in which
they work. Attitudes and norms are important factors for the shaping of translation
strategies.
There are some interesting findings in the results of the translators’ survey. One is
the tendency towards using Arabicization as a term creation procedure. Contrary to the
Arabic lexicographic tradition manifested by Bahumaid (1992: 133-139) who states that
arabicization in the form of loan translation, direct loan or transliteration is the most usual
way of introducing foreign, normally English or French terms in Standard Arabic, the
results of the present research show that arabicization as a translation strategy is only
used in restricted situations when other strategies fail to give the desired translation. Even
when using this strategy, translators seem to be hesitant to use it more than once and
emphasize the need for additional clarifications. This is clear in some of the translators’
comments on the use of arabicization with neologisms such as videophilia “arabicize with
explanation of meaning” and “”ﻣ ﻊ ﺗﻮﺿ ﻴﺢ اﻟﻤﻌﻨ ﻰ, and scuppie “use once with explanation”
and “translation of sentence then use borrowing”.
Another aspect that would be interesting to explore is the high preference of both
Derivation and Metaphor as translation strategies of English neologisms into Arabic.
This reflects the strong background knowledge of Arab translators of the Arabic lexical
and grammatical systems as well as Arabic literature. Derivation as a lexical procedure of
term creation requires an extensive knowledge of Arabic lexicology. Metaphor, as well,
requires the translator to have a considerable knowledge of Arabic literature, metaphors
used in the past and present, novels and even folk stories to achieve accuracy when using
this strategy. Being the first and second strategies, as indicated by the results shown
above, it can be said that Arab translators are in strong touch with their language heritage.
These findings draw our attention to another role that Arab translators play
besides being translators which is worthy of further investigation, namely the role of
terminologists. Although translators usually do not prefer to "invent" words in the
translation situation itself, many of them have been active in producing glossaries and
dictionaries both for their own use and for the communities involved. It would not be
farfetched to use the great interest and the linguistic creativity of translators in
lexicographic work, e.g. in the creation and dissemination of new terminology.
The type of literature selected for this research tool is journal articles. The reason
behind the selection of this particular type of written literature is to ensure recency,
availability of translated versions and vitality of style. The first and most accredited
criterion of identifying neologisms is recency. This is why journal articles are preferred to
other types of written literature.
The areas of investigation are divided into three. The first area of investigation is
the scientific/ technical area and for this type, the American scientific and technical
magazine titled Scientific American is chosen. The Arabic translated version of this
magazine titled Al-Oloom magazine is the version in which translation strategies are
specified. The second area of investigation is the political/ economic area has The
Economist and the translated version of its articles in Al-Majalla as the chosen sample.
The third and last area of investigation is the social/ general area and Newsweek (English
and Arabic) is chosen.
The following sections illustrate and discuss the findings of this research tool
using figures that show the actual results.
4.2.2.2 Methodology
The methodology used in this part of the research is simple and direct. After
identifying the subject matter areas of investigation and selecting the issues of each
publication, the source text articles in the English versions are examined carefully for
identifying lexemes that are possible neologism candidates. The second step was to verify
the list of candidates against a number of soft and hard copies of reliable dictionaries. The
dictionaries used for verification are:
After drawing up the final list of English neologisms, the Arabic translated
versions (TT) of the English articles (ST) are examined to identify the translation
strategies used in transferring the SL neologisms. The following section illustrates the
findings in a written as well as graphical manner along with a discussion of the results.
4.2.2.3 Results
The process of identifying translation strategies of neologisms in journal articles
took a considerable time and effort as accuracy and precision are priorities in this thesis.
The findings are best explained through the following figure:
Figure 8: Translation strategies of neologisms
The numbers shown in the (percentage) field illustrate the percentage of use of a
particular strategy in translating the neologisms in the included specimen. The chart
above shows some interesting tendencies. The first interesting finding is the
overwhelming use of strategies other than those devised and used traditionally by Arab
translators to deal with neologisms. The main strategy employed is the transference of
meaning of the neologism which eventually led to the deletion of the new word in the TT
which is Arabic in this case. The reasons of this heavy reliance on such strategies are
dealt with in the next section. Another interesting finding is the zero-use of blending as a
recognized Arabic strategy of translating neologisms. Although we could not find any
trace of blends in the TT’s of ST’s neologisms, it should be noted that Al-Oloom
magazine is interested in introducing new Arabic blends but of words that are not
neologisms anymore. Thus, the strategies are arranged according to priority of use as
follows:
1. Other strategy.
2. Metaphor.
3. Derivation.
4. Omission.
5. Arabicization.
4.2.2.4 Discussion
As mentioned above, the findings of the second tool of research, i.e. the
examination of journal articles, are quite interesting and unexpected. The most interesting
finding is the heavy use of transference of meaning. Not less interesting is the negative
result regarding blending.
From the point of view of the working situation of the translator at any
moment of his work (that is from the pragmatic point of view), translating
is a DECISION PROCESS: a series of a certain number of consecutive
situations— moves, as in a game— situations imposing on the translator
the necessity of choosing among a certain (and very often exactly
definable) number of alternatives.
Thus, the results obtained from this research tool can be interpreted according to
the assumptions made above, that is, there are pre-decision-making elements as well as
post decision-making elements that formulate the decisions of selecting a certain
translation strategy.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
5.1 Conclusion
Language, like any organism, continuously changes in response to the changes in
time, social realities, political, cultural, and economic variables. In the present
technological fast-pace world, neologisms are created in various fields; hence, translators
must be sensitive to neologisms and must continually work on understanding them as
well as know the ways to introduce them in their cultures in an easy and readable way.
English language can be considered as one of the fastest-changing languages with
hundreds of new words created, and similar numbers fading away, each year. English
language can be said to be the ‘exporting’ language of new terms and concepts. Many
cultures and consequently languages including Arabic are mere ‘importers’ of new
lexemes and concepts, which puts further burden on translators. Arabic for hundreds of
years had been a flexible language capable of embracing any new concept and word. The
history of Arabic is full of evidence of intercultural interactions that brought to Arabic
many foreign words. All that led to the development of the Arab Islamic State in the
ninth century including translation which was recognized as a respectable profession and
central to all advancements made at that time.
As a profession, translation grew more sophisticated with rules and schools. Many
experienced translators of that time shared their experience and passed their knowledge to
the younger generations. Together, they devised solutions for each problem, an answer to
each issue. We owe much of our present knowledge of translation to them.
The aim of the present thesis was to examine those translation operations used by
modern professional Arab translators to deal with English neologisms. One of the things
that make neologisms attractive is that they are often exotic descriptions of other cultures
even though they do not exist in ours. This is not surprising at all, as it is a well-known
fact, that in this rapidly changing world, there is an increased need for knowledge, and
reading. This increases the demand for literature that is informing, (and also for good
translations which are informative and readable).
In order to achieve the aim of the present thesis, two different research tools are
adopted. The first tool is survey study to have responses from real-life translation
situations. The results demonstrate that Arab professional translators do use a certain set
of translation strategies that was used in Arab Islamic era. To increase validity of the
findings, a second research tool is included. This time a defined set of English, well
known journals and their Arabic versions (or their translated articles) is selected for
examination, extraction of neologisms and identification of the strategies employed by
Arab translators. The investigation produced slightly different results. The analysis of the
findings illustrated a tendency to use some alternative strategies and avoid creating TL
neologisms. This tendency can be attributed to a number of factors affecting the process
of translation such as ideology, skopos of the client, and readership.
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دَار ﺻﺎدِر
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اﻟﻮﺣﺪة اﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﺔ.
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اﻟﺘﺮﺟﻤﺔ .دﻣﺸﻖ :وزارة اﻟﺜﻘﺎﻓﺔ
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أهﻨﺎك ﺣﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ رؤوس. ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺳﻼﻣﻪ وإﺑﺮاهﻴﻢ ﺧﻤﻴﺲ و ﻋﺪﻧﺎن اﻟﺤﻤﻮي: ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ.( إﺑﺮﻳﻞ/ ﻣﺎرس،2008) . دي،ّﺑﻴﻠﻮ
.15-10 ،4/3 ،(24) . ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.ﺣﺮﺑﻴﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة
65 ،2/1 ،(24) . ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم. ﻻﺟﺌﻮن ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺧﻲ.( ﻓﺒﺮاﻳﺮ/ ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ،2008) . ﺟﻴﻔﺮي دي،ﺳﺎآﺲ
ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺘﻐﻠﺐ اﻷﺳﻮاق ﻋﻠﻰ. أﺣﻤﺪ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻮن و ﻋﺪﻧﺎن اﻟﺤﻤﻮي: ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ.( إﺑﺮﻳﻞ/ ﻣﺎرس،2008) . ﻏﺎري،ﺳﺘﻜﺲ
.74-66 ،4/3 ،(24) . ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.إﺳﺘﻄﻼﻋﺎت اﻟﺮأي
7-4 ،1 ،(25) . ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم. ﻣﺴﺄﻟﺔ ﺗﻐﺬﻳﺔ. ﻋﺎدل اﻟﺤﺮﻓﻮس وﻋﺪﻧﺎن اﻟﺤﻤﻮي: ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ.( ﻣﺎﻳﻮ،2008) .ـــــــــــــــــ
ﻏﺮوس ،داﻧﻴﻴﻞ ،2008) .دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ .(23اﻟـــﺮاﺣـــــﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠـــــﻨــــﻮب .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ
اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ ،2008 ،25ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=704438&pageId=127
ﻓﺎﻳﻜﻨﺒﺎوم ،أ .و هﻴﺮﻣﺎن ،أ .و هﻮﻧﻜﺴﺮﻣﺎﻳﺮ ،ﺗﻲ .و ﻧﻴﻮﻣﺎن ،إي .و ﺳﺘﻴﻔﻨﺰ ،أس ،2008) .ﻣﺎرس /إﺑﺮﻳﻞ( .ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ:
ﺳﻌﻴﺪ اﻷﺳﻌﺪ و ﻣﺤﻤﺪ دﺑﺲ .اﻟﻮب اﻟﺪﻻﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﻴﻖ .ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.65-58 ،4/3 ،(24) .
ﻓﺎﻳﻨﻤﺎن ،هﺎورد ،2008) .أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .(14ﺣﻈﺎ ﺳﻌﻴﺪا ﻟﻠﺮﺋﻴﺲ اﻟﻤﻘﺒﻞ .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل
ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ ،2008 ،15ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=679537&pageId=127
ﻓﺮوهﺎر ،رﻧﺎ ،2008) .أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .(14ﺑﺪاﻳــﺔ ﻋﺼـﺮ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ ﻣـــﻦ اﻟـــــﺮأﺳﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ.
.Newsweek.Alwatan.comﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ ،2008 ،15ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?pageId=127&mgdid=679540
ﻓﻮآﻮﻳﺎﻣﺎ ،ﻓﺮاﻧﺴﻴﺲ ،2008) .ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ .(23اﻧﻬﻴﺎر اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل
ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ ،2008 ،25ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=679534&pageId=127
ﻓﻴﺰﺷﻴﺘﻲ ،ﻣﺎرك ،2008) .ﻣﺎﻳﻮ( .ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ :ﻏﺪﻳﺮ زﻳﺰﻓﻮن و ﻧﺰار اﻟﺤﺮﻳﺲ و اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ .هﻞ ﻃﻌﺎﻣﻚ ﻣﻠﻮث .ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.
)59-56 ،5 ،(24
ﻓﻴﻠﻴﺒﺲ ،ﻣﺎﺛﻴﻮ ،2008) .أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .(14اﻟﻮﺣﺶ اﻟﺬي اﻟﺘﻬﻢ وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل
ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ ،2008 ،15ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=679544&pageId=127
آﺎرﻳﻔﺎ ،ﺑﻲ .و ﻣﺎرﻓﻴﻴﺮ ،أم ،2008) .ﻣﺎرس /إﺑﺮﻳﻞ( .ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ :ﻧﺰار ﻣﻴﺮ ﻋﻠﻲ و ﻏﺪﻳﺮ زﻳﺰﻓﻮن و اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ .اﻟﺤﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ
اﻟﺒﻴﺌﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ اﻟﺒﺸﺮ .ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.29-22 ،4/3 ،(24) .
آﻮﻟﻨﺰ ،ﻏﺮاهﺎم ﺑﻲ ،2008) .ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ /ﻓﺒﺮاﻳﺮ( .ﻋﻮدة إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ .ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.79 ،2/1 ،(24) .
آﻮي ،ﺗﺸﺎرﻟﺰ آﻴﻮ ،2008) .ﻳﻨﺎﻳﺮ /ﻓﺒﺮاﻳﺮ( .ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ :ﺣﺎﺗﻢ اﻟﻨﺠﺪي وﻣﺤﻤﺪ دﺑﺲ .ﻣﺨﺘﺒﺮ آﺒﻴﺮ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺷﻴﺒﺔ ﺻﻐﻴﺮة .ﻣﺠﻠﺔ
اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.64-60 ،2/1 ،(24) .
ﻣﻴﺸﺎم ،ﺟﻮن ،2008) .أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .(14ﻣﺸﻜـﻠــﺔ ﺑـﺎﻟــﻴﻦ .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ
،2008 ،15ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=679536&pageId=127
ﻧﻮردﻻﻧﺪ ،رود ،2008) .أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .(14اﻟﻬﺠﻮم إﻟﻰ اﻟﻴﻤﻴﻦ .Newsweek.Alwatan.com .ﺗﻢ اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ
أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ ،2008 ،15ﻣﻦ
http://newsweek.alwatan.com.kw/Default.aspx?MgDid=679547&pageId=127
هﺎﻳﺪن ،ﺗﻲ أﺗﺶ ،2008) .ﻣﺎرس/إﺑﺮﻳﻞ( .ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺔ :ﻏﻴﺎث ﺳﻤﻴﻨﺔ و أﺣﻤﺪ ﺣﺠﺎزي و اﻟﺘﺤﺮﻳﺮ .ﺗﻌﺮّف اﻟﻤﻐﺬﻳﺎت اﻟﺪواﺋﻴﺔ.
ﻣﺠﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم.21-16 ،4/3 ،(24) .
Appendix
A. SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE
I am conducting a questionnaire for my MA research project on the translation of
English neologisms into Arabic. The purpose of this research project is to explore and
better understand the difficulties in handling neologisms, and the resources and strategies
translators use to render them.
Guidelines:
1. Please read each paragraph carefully.
2. Please tick only one box which represents your actual choice of translation
strategy.
3. Please provide a short comment (under Comment) if you choose the box (Other
strategy).
4. Please provide answers on all questions on pages 2 to 11.
1. Neologism: Walkshed
[...] Those under-a-mile journeys fall into the zone that new urbanists call
'walkshed': the area a person can reasonably cover on foot. People whose
walksheds teem with shops and restaurants have more reason to walk than those
whose don't.
- Dashka Slater, "Walk the walk," The New York Times, April 20, 2008
Strategies: (please tick only one box)
Derivation ()اﻹﺷﺘﻘﺎق
Metaphor ()اﻟﻤﺠﺎز
Blending ()اﻟﻨﺤﺖ
Arabicization ()اﻟﺘﻌﺮﻳﺐ
Omission ()اﻟﺤﺬف
Other strategy
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PHOTOS
The Bailout Felt 'Round the World
A look at how an American made crisis has shaken economies the world over.
Lower Credit-Card Limits Hit Holiday Shopping
Photos: What About Us?
It was a week for dramatic words and even more dramatic gestures. as the U.S.
congress debated, then vetoed, and then revised and ultimately passed a $700
billion plan to bail out the country's failing banks, world stock markets rose and
fell in what can really only be described as rollercoaster fashion. The Dow
recorded its biggest loss in two decades before making up much of the ground,
falling and rising again in triple digits each day of the week as Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson's plan wound its way through Congress. Among lenders, paranoia
reigned—record-high interbank lending rates underscored the fact that after
weeks of financial fall-out, nobody knew who was the next falling angel with a
basket of exploding assets. Individual investors were gripped by siege mentality.
The usual queues of limousines formed in front of London's posh Savoy Place
were outnumbered by queues of customers inside, piling into a gold exchange
looking to turn stacks of cash into bullion, many paying premiums of up to $100
an ounce above spot prices to walk away with coin and bars in hand. Demand for
Krugerrands threatened to outstrip supply. "At least it's a safe bet," said one
buyer. "I mean, what are these banks doing with our money?"
It's the question on everyone's lips. And increasingly, it's not just bank solvency
that's being questioned, but the entire Anglo-Saxon capitalist system. Three
decades of conventional economic wisdom said the markets were supposed to
know best, but as U.S. politicians bowed to public outrage at the idea of average
Joes spending nearly a trillion dollars of their hard-earned cash to bail out
profligate masters of the universe who seemed to have in the end created nothing
of real value (in fact, quite the opposite), it was clear that the idea that "what's
good for Wall Street is also good for Main Street" is over.
Now, as the clout of Reagan–Thatcher ideology diminishes before our eyes,
there's a palatable sense that a line has been drawn—we are leaving the golden era
of free markets, easy credit, high-risk deals, and big paydays, and entering a new
“capitulation bottom” paradigm of tight money, tough regulation, less speculation
and more government meddling in markets. Politicians everywhere, eager to
reassert themselves, are calling for new regulation and "reform" of the financial
system. Meanwhile, authoritarian capitalist states like China, along with social
democratic nations like Germany and France, greeted the crisis with an attitude
somewhere in between relief and "I told you so." Both have been fearful of the
Anglo model, albeit for different reasons. The demise of Wall Street now meant
that their own models might not only survive, but flourish.
In France, President Sarkozy is planning a world forum to "rethink capitalism,"
declaring "the legitimacy of public powers to intervene in the functioning of the
financial system is no longer in question." Germany's Angela Merkel remarked
last week, "A few years ago, it was fashionable to say that governments would be
ever weaker in a globalized world. I never shared that view." She added that it
was the Americans and British who rejected her calls for more financial
regulation at the G8 meeting. Her finance minister, Peer Steinbrück, went a step
further, saying the crisis would lead to "the end of America as a financial
superpower."
It's a sentiment that will no doubt draw cheers in Russia, where Putin is busy
blaming the "American contagion" for his market troubles, and in Latin America,
where leaders from Hugo Chávez to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner to Evo
Morales are declaring neoliberalism DOA. "The U.S. economic model is
terminally ill," crowed Ecuador's Rafael Correa last week.
Certainly, there is no lack of schadenfreude surrounding the fall of Wall Street.
But beyond that is a sense, even from many eminent players within the financial
community, that things had indeed gone too far. "At a fundamental level, the
model of globalization and deregulation has blown up, and that's what's caused
the current crisis," says investor and philanthropist George Soros, one of the first
to sound a warning about the dangers of complex securitization of nearly
everything, from mortgages to credit-card bills. "We're now at the end of that
ideology." The future, says Soros, will be "less freewheeling, less aggressively
speculative, less leveraged, and tighter on credit. We're in the midst of a massive
de-leveraging."
Indeed, the past twenty years of deregulation and financial liberalization set the
stage for an era in which bank leverage ratios reached such nose-bleed heights as
33 to 1 for Morgan and 28 to 1 for Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch as these and
other global financial giants wielded growing numbers of complex securities like
mortgage-backed derivatives to boost their profits to record highs. Now, as such
banks are more tightly regulated, their leverage will decrease, and with it, so will
their profits. That's bad news not just for banks, but for the economy as a whole—
over the past few years, financial firms have represented around a quarter of all
corporate profits in the United States. Their shrinkage will take a significant
chunk out of the country's national income.
Yet the riches were borne out of a system that had become so complex and
opaque that many of the people doing the deals in the end had no idea about the
value of the assets they were holding. "What ultimately needs to come out of this
crisis is more judicious management of capital, more transparent financial
instruments and institutions, and as a result, a system that is better aligned with
the real economy that it was designed to serve in the first place," says Stephen
Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. "Finance has simply moved too far
from its moorings in the real economy."
It didn't happen overnight. From the late 1970s onward, a slew of legal and
technological changes unshackled the growth and earning potential of financial
institutions—pension funds were allowed to start investing their portfolios in the
stock markets, brokers were able to start offering mutual funds to individuals,
different types of banks were allowed to merge and enter new areas of business,
automatic teller machines and trading software created a 24/7 electronic finance
network. From the 1970s to 2005, the percentage of Americans owning stock rose
from 16 percent to more than 50 percent. As former Clinton labor secretary
Robert Reich notes in his book "Supercapitalism," there was a profound change in
the economic psychology of Americans. "Savers turned into investors, and
investors turned active."
Driving it all were the investment bankers, who, in the post-Volcker era of low
inflation, were looking for new ways to make double-digit returns. Financial
innovation burgeoned, helped along by market-friendly politicians, mostly
notably Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. There were bubbles and blips
along the way—remember the S&L crisis of the 1980s? But they were quickly
forgotten as growing prosperity continued to ensure that a "market knows best"
philosophy reigned. Throughout the 1990s, the deregulation continued, one of the
high points being the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that separated commercial
and investment banking.
Banks took advantage of the subsequent economies of scale (and, say some,
conflicts of interest) to grow even bigger, doing more and more highly profitable
megamergers and underwriting ever-ballooning IPOs. The repeal of the act
allowed retail banks like Citigroup and others to get into the hot new credit-
derivative markets (which included products like mortgage-backed securities and
CDOs, which represent the spliced and diced debt of many entities, and are at the
heart of the current crisis). Investment bankers themselves became cigar-smoking,
suspender-wearing Croesian archetypes immortalized in numerous books and
films of the period. The rise of stock options throughout the decade further
increased their wealth (along with that of the corporate executives they serviced)
while at the same time making it more difficult to quantify the exact numbers.
Most everyone now believes the two trends together created a toxic mix. "By
allowing even commercial banks into this riskier territory, and encouraging stock
options as pay, you had an increasingly short-sighted focus on immediate profits,"
says Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz. "It created a culture of gambling."
Of course, the economy had turned by 2001, making things a bit tougher at the
roulette table, but thanks to lower and lower interest rates (the Federal Reserve,
under Alan Greenspan, cut rates to 1 percent in 2003) easy money continued to
flow. The decline in rates also had the effect of exploding the market for credit
derivatives, those spliced and diced securities that are at the heart of the current
crisis, as bankers looked for ways to boost returns in a low-interest environment.
Between 2000 and its peak last summer, the market for credit default swaps, the
main type of credit derivative, went from $100 billion to $62 trillion. While sages
like Warren Buffett (who memorably called derivatives "financial weapons of
mass destruction") and institutions like the Bank for International Settlements
expressed concern, others like Greenspan insisted that they played an important
role in spreading risk.
And there was plenty being spread, particularly after 2004, when another legal
shift further increased the stakes of the game. The SEC, in order to gain more
regulatory jurisdiction over the parent holding companies of investment banks
(which it regulated), bartered away the traditional 12 to 1 cap on leverage in a
Faustian bargain, allowing banks to take bets as big as they liked. On one level,
the move made sense, since the holding companies were typically the entities
taking the hazy credit-derivative bets that were making people increasingly
nervous. Yet the result was a situation in which SEC regulators no longer had
clear-cut capital guidelines to review when judging the solvency of banks;
instead, they had to pour over incredibly complex models comparing the value of
one group of assets with another at different points in time (it was perhaps
apropos that these models were known as "Monte Carlo simulations"). It's not too
difficult to imagine SEC staffers being paid five figures having a hard time
keeping up with such high finance. "There are a lot of things that the SEC is good
at, but that wasn't one of them," says Professor John Coffee, a securities-law
expert at Columbia University. "The market for complex securities was growing
too fast for them to keep up." (Coffee believes that regulation of such complex
models is ultimately better left to the bankers at the Federal Reserve, which will
be in charge of regulating banks such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
going forward.)
House prices, which had shot up between 2001 and 2005, plummeted, exposing
poor credit standards (it didn't help that the credit agencies were paid by the
companies they were supposed to rank). The bubble burst. The dominoes fell.
And now Americans are left wringing their hands about the cost of a bailout
package that would seem to reward the greed that created the mess to begin with.
"Much of the anger over the past week has not been about the fact that the
government has produced this massive safety net, but that the people who will
receive it are the Wall Streeters who've made out like bandits in the past few
years," notes Robert Reich. Meanwhile, average Joes are scared (a point worked
to effect by both presidential candidates in the U.S.), and basic dreams like
homeownership seem to be slipping away for many. Experts like Coffee predict
that with the demise of securitized mortgages, the overall mortgage market in the
U.S. will contract to one tenth its current size. The sort of Depression-era scenario
of a one-lender town painted in movies like "It's a Wonderful Life" no longer
seems so far away.
While it's unclear yet how much help average Americans will get from the
government's bailout package once details are finalized, what is clear is that the
extremely free-wheeling capitalism of the past two decades is changing—if not
into an entirely new ideology, then into a more moderate version of itself. For
starters, old-school investment banks as we knew them are finished. Policed by
the Fed, their ability to leverage themselves into big deals will shrink massively.
"I think it's going to be back to basics," says Morgan Stanley's Roach. "More
advice giving and less highly leveraged trading. Deals will be driven by the
strategic needs of the clients—not the intermediaries—and we'll see deals
themselves that are more strategic rather than financial."
Bankers' pay may even be capped (in the U.S., Reich and many others are calling
for pay pegged to five-year rolling performance targets to help curb undue short-
term risk-taking, in Europe there are plans to legislate delays in the vetting of
options). Meanwhile, the complex derivative markets that made the bankers so
rich are also liable to be constrained. In the U.S., there are calls for a
clearinghouse that would make trades more transparent. In Europe, plans to
regulate derivatives are already moving forward: last week, the EC drafted a
proposal that would ban or limit CDOs and other banking magic tricks that turned
risky debt into triple A securities.
German Finance Minister Steinbrück has even launched an official campaign to
"civilize" financial markets. "Unrestrained capitalism like the kind we're
experiencing right now with all its greed will in the end devour itself," he
proclaimed, referencing Marx in a speech in an interview with a German weekly.
Steinbrück is gunning for higher cash reserves for banks, prohibitions on short
selling, bonus caps, and no more off-balance-sheet vehicles, among other things.
"It must be clear that returns of 25 percent can't be attained without unreasonable
risk or intentionally damaging other market participants," Steinbrück told the
Bundestag last week.
Of course, it's worth remembering that some of the most highly leveraged deals in
recent memory were done by state-regulated German banks rather than Wall
Street giants. More government oversight itself is no guarantee that all will turn
out well—regulations must be well crafted, well enforced, and to some extent,
flexible. George Soros, for example, a strong critic of Wall Street excesses,
advocates not lowering leverage ratios to a set rate, but giving the Fed the
flexibility to raise and lower the rates as market conditions dictate.
It's also worth asking whether political proclamations can actually stop people
from trying to make 25 percent returns. Can capitalism itself ever really be
hobbled? Or will its more buccaneering side always re-emerge after periods of
repression? Hedge funds, wounded by recent losses, may be heading for the hills
(they've parked some $100 billion in money market funds in recent weeks). But
there are currently no major proposals to regulate them, and at some point, their
thrusting managers will be back, ready to take on the risk that investment bankers
will no longer hold. Likewise, sovereign wealth funds and new emerging markets
powers are flush with cash—Asian central banks alone have reserves of more than
$4 trillion dollars, enough to fund several Paulson plans. This growing wealth was
a major driver of financial innovation over the past several years. Now, all that
money will inspire a new kind of creativity focused on circumventing any new
regulations. Investors and the people who service them will seek ever more
creative ways to dodge the rules.
A good chunk of the new money will undoubtedly end up in Western markets.
And while that will certainly increase the power and political clout of emerging
powers, and further catalyze the shift to a more multipolar world, it won't mean
the wholesale demise of the free-market system. While China has used the crisis
on Wall Street as an opportunity to tout its own authoritarian capitalism, the
"Chinese model" resulted in market losses of 66 percent this year, and massive
wealth destruction among ordinary people—hardly a comparative success.
Europeans, despite their schadenfreude, don't really have anything better to offer
than Anglo-style capitalism, either. Their own regimes simply tend to follow the
Anglo-American lead, albeit with resentment, a few years later, and with a lot of
brakes put on by the state.
That said, the world as it enters this new economic era may in fact end up looking
more like Europe. "We will muddle through and complain a lot, with no major
growth surges, but no disasters, either," says Bob McKee, chief economist at
London-based Independent Strategy. We will once again be savers rather than
investors. A culture of thrift will reign, as credit continues to be tight in the short
term. And then, at some point, the money will flow again. New bubbles will be
formed. Where they will be—in energy, or green technology, or space—is
anyone's guess. But regardless of bailouts and new laws, they will come again.
And when they do, everyone will have forgotten that the world almost came to an
end in 2008.
With Stefan Theil in Berlin, William Underhill and Sophie Grove in London, Mac
Margolis in Rio and Tracy Mcnicoll in Paris
© 2008
Biden’s Unified Theory of Biden
At a Wilmington coffee shop, the veep nominee falls off the tight-
lipped wagon.
Joe Biden was so disciplined during the vice presidential debate, so brief (under five
minutes!) in his speech bidding farewell to his son Beau and other members of his
Delaware National Guard unit heading to Iraq, that his inner self sought some release,
some way of saying, "Hey, the old Joe's still alive." "The very thing people like best
about me at home is that I don't have to pick every word and parse everything," he says
the day after the debate, at a Wilmington, Dela., coffee shop. "And if I say something
politically incorrect, they know my motive is good."
His tone is wistful as he explains how the new 24/7 coverage is draining all spontaneity
from politics: "It's a shame. It requires you to withhold." So he doesn't, and proceeds to
spill on subjects ranging from the demands he made before agreeing to go on the ticket,
to his feelings about Barack Obama and John McCain, to a confession and Bidenesque
rationalization of his own weaknesses. No gaffes, but the level of detail won't thrill the
Obamaniacal control freaks in Chicago.
He was happy with the St. Louis debate, of course, and trying to be gracious: "I liked her
[Sarah Palin]. When our families met, it was congenial, with none of the tension that's
sometimes in the air." But he doesn't think the event was terribly relevant. "The real issue
is John and Barack."
About that catch in his throat: in the moment, he "could picture Beau in the bed" after the
1972 car accident that killed Biden's first wife, Neilia, and their baby girl and critically
injured his young sons. Now Beau, the 39-year-old attorney general of Delaware, was off
to war, a judge advocate general traveling to obscure regions of Iraq, where the road isn't
exactly the safest place to be. The memory of being a single parent mixed with worries
about Beau to create "a lot of bundled emotions. It surprised me. I was hoping nobody
noticed." Only 70 million or so did.
Biden compares running for vice president to being a "cicada," in which the only time
you surface publicly (if you're not Sarah Palin) is when chosen, at the debate and if you
win. His description of his reluctance to accept Obama's offer to go on the ticket is
unconfirmable because the Democratic presidential candidate isn't talking. But it goes
like this:
When Obama phoned in June to tell him he wanted to vet him, Biden said OK, but that he
might well decline. He consulted with longtime advisers Ted Kaufman and Ron Klain
and went back and forth on whether the vice presidency was really the best place for him
to have influence with an Obama administration. It helped that all spring Obama had
called him every other week or so to get his thinking on varied matters (like how to
question Gen. David Petraeus when he testified). They both knew that the role of the
veep under Obama would not be like Dick Cheney's, but the terms remained to be
worked out.
At a secret meeting in mid-August at the Graves 601 Hotel in St. Paul, Minn., that lasted
two to three hours, Obama told him it wouldn't work unless Biden viewed the vice
presidency as "the capstone" of his career, not a step down. "Not the tombstone?" Biden
joked.
"Will this job be too small for you?" Obama asked, with a deft appreciation of the art of
flattery.
"I said no, as long as I would really be a confidant. I told him, 'The good news is, I'm 65
and you're not going to have to worry about my positioning myself to be president. The
bad news is, I want to be part of the deal'."
Biden, who had stayed neutral in the Democratic primaries after dropping out in January,
told Obama that he was "ready to be second fiddle" and sought no specific portfolio—but
only if he got a guaranteed hourlong, one-on-one session with the president every week
(like Al Gore's lunches with Bill Clinton, and George H.W. Bush's with Ronald Reagan)
and a presence at all important meetings. Obama said yes, that he wanted him for his
judgment and for his help in enacting a big legislative agenda. And so the job was
defined: "My role will be to say, 'Boss, here's the way I'd go about it'."
Biden says Obama reminds him of Bill Clinton in his "confidence, cognitive ability,
judgment" and intellectual security—that he can listen and absorb advice without having
to prove he's the smartest person in the room, a critical leadership skill. He says he
experienced an "epiphany" during a recent conference call on the bailout bill with Bob
Rubin, Paul Volcker, Warren Buffett, Paul O'Neill, Joseph Stiglitz, Larry Summers and
Laura Tyson. "He [Obama] comes on the call and says, 'Well, folks, sorry I'm late. I've
got four questions.' He was in total frigging command! Here's a 47-year-old guy in one of
the most complicated economic dilemmas anyone has had to face since 1929 to '33. And
it was like, 'Bang! Bang! Bang!' I called him afterward and said, 'You sold me, sucker!' "
Would the relationship prosper over time? The history in Democratic White Houses is
mixed. JFK grew weary of the needy narcissism of LBJ, who felt patronized by the
Camelot crowd. Clinton and Gore fell hard for each other, then fell out over the
Lewinsky scandal. Biden expresses no doubts about this one. He says he and his wife,
Jill, have bonded with the Obamas. "I know that he knows I would never, ever undercut
him." The words are emphatic and carefully enunciated: "I have never undercut anyone in
my life. And I'm comfortable enough in my own skin that I don't need to be recognized."
Biden's friends say that he is, indeed, more mature, philosophical and oblivious to
criticism that once would have wounded him. Even if he still occasionally inhabits the
stereotype of a Senate blowhard, his effusive decency and hard work have always made
him exceptionally popular with his colleagues on both sides of the aisle (while still in
command of his faculties, the late Sen. Strom Thurmond instructed his wife that Biden
should give the eulogy at his funeral). "The reason I got so much done in the Senate was
that I could say, 'This ought to be your idea'," Biden says. In other words, he wants some
credit for not being a credit hog.
Biden readily acknowledges he has had a problem zipping his lip. As a former chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (he now chairs Foreign Relations), he took hits for his
talky and sometimes peevish handling of the confirmation process. His own mom called
in 2005 after his tough questioning of chief justice nominee John Roberts to say, "Joey,
he's such a nice young man." This is not a story most senators would tell about
themselves.
When he puts himself on the couch, Biden finds that he has what he describes as a
Reaganesque habit of occasionally telling stories that are true in a larger sense but "might
not be totally accurate" (the 1987 plagiarism from British politician Neil Kinnock fit into
this category). Throughout his life, he says, he gets in trouble when he gets angry, even if
it's for the right reasons. He finally concluded that what sets him off (whether it was
punching another kid in the old neighborhood who pushed his sister or losing control in a
hearing room) is the same thing that has animated his public passions (civil rights at the
beginning of his career, the Violence Against Women Act, confronting genocide in
Bosnia). It's Joe Biden's unified theory of himself: "Everything about my faith and family
has centered on this notion of abuse of power. Where I end up crossing the line is related
to people being taken advantage of."
The righteous anger connects Biden to John McCain. He says the two men often confided
in each other. "Some, including in my own family, think I'm being too protective of an
old friend," Biden says. He doesn't think McCain has sold out his principles because he
was never a maverick to begin with: "When you cut through the marginal stuff, he's a
very serious economic conservative and always has been. And his disagreements with
Bush on foreign policy have all been about tactics, not strategy." McCain's politics, he
says, are "visceral," "personal" and "moral." Certain issues "prick his conscience and
emotions on an ad hoc basis" that Biden describes as "incoherent."
Biden is far from cocky about the outcome of the election. He says he has plenty of work
to do even around his birthplace of Scranton, Pa., to make Democrats and independents
more comfortable voting for Obama. But he's comfortable going down the stretch, with
his campaign, his new "boss" and with himself.
© 2008
The Fall of America, Inc.
Along with some of Wall Street's most storied firms, a certain
vision of capitalism has collapsed. How we restore faith in our
brand.
By Francis Fukuyama | NEWSWEEK
Published Nov 22, 2008
The implosion of America's most storied investment banks. The vanishing of more than a
trillion dollars in stock-market wealth in a day. A $700 billion tab for U.S. taxpayers. The
scale of the Wall Street crackup could scarcely be more gargantuan. Yet even as
Americans ask why they're having to pay such mind-bending sums to prevent the
economy from imploding, few are discussing a more intangible, yet potentially much
greater cost to the United States—the damage that the financial meltdown is doing to
America's "brand."
Ideas are one of our most important exports, and two fundamentally American ideas have
dominated global thinking since the early 1980s, when Ronald Reagan was elected
president. The first was a certain vision of capitalism—one that argued low taxes, light
regulation and a pared-back government would be the engine for economic growth.
Reaganism reversed a century-long trend toward ever-larger government. Deregulation
became the order of the day not just in the United States but around the world.
The second big idea was America as a promoter of liberal democracy around the world,
which was seen as the best path to a more prosperous and open international order.
America's power and influence rested not just on our tanks and dollars, but on the fact
that most people found the American form of self-government attractive and wanted to
reshape their societies along the same lines—what political scientist Joseph Nye has
labeled our "soft power."
It's hard to fathom just how badly these signature features of the American brand have
been discredited. Between 2002 and 2007, while the world was enjoying an
unprecedented period of growth, it was easy to ignore those European socialists and Latin
American populists who denounced the U.S. economic model as "cowboy capitalism."
But now the engine of that growth, the American economy, has gone off the rails and
threatens to drag the rest of the world down with it. Worse, the culprit is the American
model itself: under the mantra of less government, Washington failed to adequately
regulate the financial sector and allowed it to do tremendous harm to the rest of the
society.
Democracy was tarnished even earlier. Once Saddam was proved not to have WMD, the
Bush administration sought to justify the Iraq War by linking it to a broader "freedom
agenda"; suddenly the promotion of democracy was a chief weapon in the war against
terrorism. To many people around the world, America's rhetoric about democracy sounds
a lot like an excuse for furthering U.S. hegemony.
The choice we face now goes well beyond the bailout, or the presidential campaign. The
American brand is being sorely tested at a time when other models—whether China's or
Russia's—are looking more and more attractive. Restoring our good name and reviving
the appeal of our brand is in many ways as great a challenge as stabilizing the financial
sector. Barack Obama and John McCain would each bring different strengths to the task.
But for either it will be an uphill, years-long struggle. And we cannot even begin until we
clearly understand what went wrong—which aspects of the American model are sound,
which were poorly implemented, and which need to be discarded altogether.
Many commentators have noted that the Wall Street meltdown marks the end of the
Reagan era. In this they are doubtless right, even if McCain manages to get elected
president in November. Big ideas are born in the context of a particular historical era.
Few survive when the context changes dramatically, which is why politics tends to shift
from left to right and back again in generation-long cycles.
Reaganism (or, in its British form, Thatcherism) was right for its time. Since Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, governments all over the world had only grown
bigger and bigger. By the 1970s large welfare states and economies choked by red tape
were proving highly dysfunctional. Back then, telephones were expensive and hard to
get, air travel was a luxury of the rich, and most people put their savings in bank accounts
paying low, regulated rates of interest. Programs like Aid to Families With Dependent
Children created disincentives for poor families to work and stay married, and families
broke down. The Reagan-Thatcher revolution made it easier to hire and fire workers,
causing a huge amount of pain as traditional industries shrank or shut down. But it also
laid the groundwork for nearly three decades of growth and the emergence of new sectors
like information technology and biotech.
Internationally, the Reagan revolution translated into the "Washington Consensus," under
which Washington—and institutions under its influence, like the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank—pushed developing countries to open up their economies.
While the Washington Consensus is routinely trashed by populists like Venezuela's Hugo
Chávez, it successfully eased the pain of the Latin American debt crisis of the early
1980s, when hyperinflation plagued countries such as Argentina and Brazil. Similar
market-friendly policies are what turned China and India into the economic powerhouses
they are today.
And if anyone needed more proof, they could look at the world's most extreme examples
of big government—the centrally planned economies of the former Soviet Union and
other communist states. By the 1970s they were falling behind their capitalist rivals in
virtually all respects. Their implosion after the fall of the Berlin Wall confirmed that such
welfare states on steroids were an historical dead end.
Like all transformative movements, the Reagan revolution lost its way because for many
followers it became an unimpeachable ideology, not a pragmatic response to the excesses
of the welfare state. Two concepts were sacrosanct: first, that tax cuts would be self-
financing, and second, that financial markets could be self-regulating.
Prior to the 1980s, conservatives were fiscally conservative— that is, they were unwilling
to spend more than they took in in taxes. But Reaganomics introduced the idea that
virtually any tax cut would so stimulate growth that the government would end up taking
in more revenue in the end (the so-called Laffer curve). In fact, the traditional view was
correct: if you cut taxes without cutting spending, you end up with a damaging deficit.
Thus the Reagan tax cuts of the 1980s produced a big deficit; the Clinton tax increases of
the 1990s produced a surplus; and the Bush tax cuts of the early 21st century produced an
even larger deficit. The fact that the American economy grew just as fast in the Clinton
years as in the Reagan ones somehow didn't shake the conservative faith in tax cuts as the
surefire key to growth.
More important, globalization masked the flaws in this reasoning for several decades.
Foreigners seemed endlessly willing to hold American dollars, which allowed the U.S.
government to run deficits while still enjoying high growth, something that no
developing country could get away with. That's why Vice President Dick Cheney
reportedly told President Bush early on that the lesson of the 1980s was that "deficits
don't matter."
The problem is that Wall Street is very different from, say, Silicon Valley, where a light
regulatory hand is genuinely beneficial. Financial institutions are based on trust, which
can only flourish if governments ensure they are transparent and constrained in the risks
they can take with other people's money. The sector is also different because the collapse
of a financial institution harms not just its shareholders and employees, but a host of
innocent bystanders as well (what economists soberly call "negative externalities").
Signs that the Reagan revolution had drifted dangerously have been clear over the past
decade. An early warning was the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Countries like
Thailand and South Korea, following American advice and pressure, liberalized their
capital markets in the early 1990s. A lot of hot money started flowing into their
economies, creating a speculative bubble, and then rushed out again at the first sign of
trouble. Sound familiar? Meanwhile, countries like China and Malaysia that didn't follow
American advice and kept their financial markets closed or strictly regulated found
themselves much less vulnerable.
A second warning sign lay in America's accumulating structural deficits. China and a
number of other countries began buying U.S. dollars after 1997 as part of a deliberate
strategy to undervalue their currencies, keep their factories humming and protect
themselves from financial shocks. This suited a post-9/11 America just fine; it meant that
we could cut taxes, finance a consumption binge, pay for two expensive wars and run a
fiscal deficit at the same time. The staggering and mounting trade deficits this
produced—$700 billion a year by 2007—were clearly unsustainable; sooner or later the
foreigners would decide that America wasn't such a great place to bank their money. The
falling U.S. dollar indicates that we have arrived at that point. Clearly, and contrary to
Cheney, deficits do matter.
Even at home, the downside of deregulation were clear well before the Wall Street
collapse. In California, electricity prices spiraled out of control in 2000-2001 as a result
of deregulation in the state energy market, which unscrupulous companies like Enron
gamed to their advantage. Enron itself, along with a host of other firms, collapsed in 2004
because accounting standards had not been enforced adequately. Inequality in the United
States rose throughout the past decade, because the gains from economic growth went
disproportionately to wealthier and better-educated Americans, while the incomes of
working-class people stagnated. And finally, the bungled occupation of Iraq and the
response to Hurricane Katrina exposed the top-to-bottom weakness of the public sector, a
result of decades of underfunding and the low prestige accorded civil servants from the
Reagan years on.
All this suggests that the Reagan era should have ended some time ago. It didn't partly
because the Democratic Party failed to come up with convincing candidates and
arguments, but also because of a particular aspect of America that makes our country
very different from Europe. There, less-educated, working-class citizens vote reliably for
socialist, communist and other left-learning parties, based on their economic interests. In
the United States, they can swing either left or right. They were part of Roosevelt's grand
Democratic coalition during the New Deal, a coalition that held through Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society in the 1960s. But they started voting Republican during the
Nixon and Reagan years, swung to Clinton in the 1990s, and returned to the Republican
fold under George W. Bush. When they vote Republican, it's because cultural issues like
religion, patriotism, family values and gun ownership trump economic ones.
This group of voters will decide November's election, not least because of their
concentration in a handful of swing states like Ohio and Pennsylvania. Will they tilt
toward the more distant, Harvard-educated Obama, who more accurately reflects their
economic interests? Or will they stick with people they can better identify with, like
McCain and Sarah Palin? It took an economic crisis of massive proportions from 1929 to
1931 to bring a Democratic administration to power. Polls indicate we may have arrived
again at that point in October 2008.
The other critical component of the American brand is democracy, and the willingness of
the United States to support other democracies around the world. This idealistic streak in
U.S. foreign policy has been constant over the past century, from Woodrow Wilson's
League of Nations through Roosevelt's Four Freedoms to Reagan's call for Mikhail
Gorbachev to "tear down this wall."
Promoting democracy—through diplomacy, aid to civil society groups, free media and
the like—has never been controversial. The problem now is that by using democracy to
justify the Iraq War, the Bush administration suggested to many that "democracy" was a
code word for military intervention and regime change. (The chaos that ensued in Iraq
didn't exactly help democracy's image either.) The Middle East in particular is a
minefield for any U.S. administration, since America supports nondemocratic allies like
the Saudis, and refuses to work with groups like Hamas and Hizbullah that came to
power through elections. We don't have much credibility when we champion a "freedom
agenda."
The American model has also been seriously tarnished by the Bush administration's use
of torture. After 9/11 Americans proved distressingly ready to give up constitutional
protections for the sake of security. Guantánamo Bay and the hooded prisoner at Abu
Ghraib have since replaced the Statue of Liberty as symbols of America in the eyes of
many non-Americans.
No matter who wins the presidency a month from now, the shift into a new cycle of
American and world politics will have begun. The Democrats are likely to increase their
majorities in the House and Senate. A huge amount of populist anger is brewing as the
Wall Street meltdown spreads to Main Street. Already there is a growing consensus on
the need to re-regulate many parts of the economy.
Globally the United States will not enjoy the hegemonic position it has occupied until
now, something underscored by Russia's Aug. 7 invasion of Georgia. America's ability to
shape the global economy through trade pacts and the IMF and World Bank will be
diminished, as will our financial resources. And in many parts of the world, American
ideas, advice and even aid will be less welcome than they are now.
Still, another comeback rests on our ability to make some fundamental changes. First, we
must break out of the Reagan-era straitjacket concerning taxes and regulation. Tax cuts
feel good but do not necessarily stimulate growth or pay for themselves; given our long-
term fiscal situation Americans are going to have to be told honestly that they will have
to pay their own way in the future. Deregulation, or the failure of regulators to keep up
with fast-moving markets, can become unbelievably costly, as we have seen. The entire
American public sector—underfunded, deprofessionalized and demoralized—needs to be
rebuilt and be given a new sense of pride. There are certain jobs that only the government
can fulfill.
And while fewer non-Americans are likely to listen to our advice, many would still
benefit from emulating certain aspects of the Reagan model. Not, certainly, financial-
market deregulation. But in continental Europe, workers are still treated to long
vacations, short working weeks, job guarantees and a host of other benefits that weaken
their productivity and will not be financially sustainable.
The unedifying response to the Wall Street crisis shows that the biggest change we need
to make is in our politics. The Reagan revolution broke the 50-year dominance of liberals
and Democrats in American politics and opened up room for different approaches to the
problems of the time. But as the years have passed, what were once fresh ideas have
hardened into hoary dogmas. The quality of political debate has been coarsened by
partisans who question not just the ideas but the motives of their opponents. All this
makes it harder to adjust to the new and difficult reality we face. So the ultimate test for
the American model will be its capacity to reinvent itself once again. Good branding is
not, to quote a presidential candidate, a matter of putting lipstick on a pig. It's about
having the right product to sell in the first place. American democracy has its work cut
out for it.
Fukuyama is professor of International Political Economy at the Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies. © 2008
أﺷﺎر اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻘﻴﻦ إﻟﻰ أن اﻧﻬﻴﺎر وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ ﺷﻜﻞ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ﺣﻘﺒﺔ رﻳﻐﺎن .وهﻢ ﻣﺤﻘﻮن ﻓﻲ ذﻟﻚ ﺑﻼ ﺷﻚ ،ﺣﺘﻰ
وإن ﺗﻢ اﻧﺘﺨﺎب ﻣﺎآﻴﻦ رﺋﻴﺴﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ .اﻷﻓﻜﺎر اﻟﻌﻈﻴﻤﺔ وﻟﻴﺪة إﻃﺎر ﺣﻘﺒﺔ ﺗﺎرﻳﺨﻴﺔ ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ .وﻗﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ هﺬﻩ اﻷﻓﻜﺎر
ﻳﻤﻜﻨﻬﺎ اﻻﺳﺘﻤﺮار ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻐﻴﺮ اﻹﻃﺎر إﻟﻰ ﺣﺪ آﺒﻴﺮ ،وهﺬا هﻮ ﺳﺒﺐ اﻧﺘﻘﺎل اﻟﻨﺰﻋﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻴﺴﺎر إﻟﻰ اﻟﻴﻤﻴﻦ
واﻟﻌﻜﺲ ﺑﺎﻟﻌﻜﺲ ﻓﻲ دورات ﺗﺪوم ﺟﻴﻼ.
ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ رﻳﻐﺎن( أو ﺑﺸﻜﻠﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﺮﻳﻄﺎﻧﻲ ،ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﺗﺎﺗﺸﺮ( آﺎﻧﺖ ﺻﺎﻟﺤﺔ ﻓﻲ زﻣﻨﻬﺎ .ﻣﻨﺬ اﻟﺨﻄﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة اﻟﺘﻲ
اﻗﺘﺮﺣﻬﺎ ﻓﺮاﻧﻜﻠﻴﻦ روزﻓﻠﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺛﻼﺛﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،ﺗﻮﺳﻌﺖ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺎت ﻓﻲ آﻞ أﻧﺤﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ أآﺜﺮ ﻓﺄآﺜﺮ .وﺑﺤﻠﻮل
ﺳﺒﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،ﺗﺒﻴﻦ أن اﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺪم ﺧﺪﻣﺎت اﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ واﺳﻌﺔ ﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻴﻬﺎ واﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ ذات اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدات
اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﻮﺿﻬﺎ اﻟﺒﻴﺮوﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻓﻌﺎﻟﺔ أﺑﺪا .ﺣﻴﻨﺬاك آﺎن اﻟﺤﺼﻮل ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﻄﻮط هﺎﺗﻒ أﻣﺮا ﻣﻜﻠﻔﺎ وﺻﻌﺒﺎ،
واﻟﺴﻔﺮ ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺎﺋﺮات ﻣﻦ وﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﺮف اﻟﻤﺤﺼﻮرة ﺑﺎﻷﻏﻨﻴﺎء ،وآﺎن ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﻨﺎس ﻳﻀﻌﻮن ﻣﺪﺧﺮاﺗﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺴﺎﺑﺎت
ﻣﺼﺮﻓﻴﺔ ذات ﻓﻮاﺋﺪ ﻣﺘﺪﻧﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﺪدهﺎ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ .وآﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ ﻣﺜﻞ" ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻼت ذات اﻷوﻻد" ﺗﺸﺠﻊ
اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻼت اﻟﻔﻘﻴﺮة ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﺪم اﻟﻌﻤﻞ وﻋﺪم اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺰواج ،وﺗﻔﻜﻜﺖ اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻼت .ﺛﻮرة رﻳﻐﺎن ﺗﺎﺗﺸﺮ ﺳﻬﻠﺖ
اﺳﺘﺨﺪام وﺻﺮف اﻟﻌﻤﺎل ،ﻣﺴﺒﺒﺔ أﻟﻤﺎ آﺒﻴﺮا ﻣﻊ ﺗﻘﻠﺺ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ أو إﻗﻔﺎﻟﻬﺎ .ﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﻣﻬﺪت اﻟﺴﺒﻴﻞ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻟﻤﺎ
ﻳﻘﺎرب ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻋﻘﻮد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻤﻮ وﻟﺒﺮوز ﻗﻄﺎﻋﺎت ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻣﺜﻞ ﻗﻄﺎع ﺗﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت واﻟﺘﻜﻨﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ اﻟﺤﻴﻮﻳﺔ.
ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺼﻌﻴﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ،ﺗﺮﺟﻤﺖ ﺛﻮرة رﻳﻐﺎن إﻟﻰ "إﺟﻤﺎع واﺷﻨﻄﻦ "اﻟﺬي ﺣﺜﺖ واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺑﻤﻮﺟﺒﻪ ــ وآﺬﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت
اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﻊ ﺗﺤﺖ ﺳﻴﻄﺮﺗﻬﺎ ،ﻣﺜﻞ ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻟﻨﻘﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ واﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ــ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﻨﺎﻣﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ اﻗﺘﺼﺎداﺗﻬﺎ .ﻓﻲ
ﺣﻴﻦ ﻳﺘﻢ اﻧﺘﻘﺎد إﺟﻤﺎع واﺷﻨﻄﻦ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻤﺮار ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻮﻳﻴﻦ أﻣﺜﺎل هﻮﻏﻮ ﺗﺸﺎﻓﻴﺰ رﺋﻴﺲ ﻓﻨﺰوﻳﻼ ،ﻓﻘﺪ ﻧﺠﺢ ﻓﻲ
ﺗﺨﻔﻴﻒ اﻷﻟﻢ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﺞ ﻋﻦ أزﻣﺔ اﻟﻘﺮوض ﻓﻲ أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ اﻟﻼﺗﻴﻨﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ أواﺋﻞ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ آﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﻠﺪان
ﻣﺜﻞ اﻷرﺟﻨﺘﻴﻦ واﻟﺒﺮازﻳﻞ ﺗﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﺗﻀﺨﻤﺎ ﻣﻔﺮﻃﺎ .واﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﻤﺎﺛﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﻳﺪة ﻟﻸﺳﻮاق اﻟﺤﺮة هﻲ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺣﻮﻟﺖ اﻟﺼﻴﻦ
واﻟﻬﻨﺪ إﻟﻰ ﻗﻮﺗﻴﻦ اﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺘﻴﻦ آﺒﻴﺮﺗﻴﻦ اﻟﻴﻮم.
وإذا آﺎن أﺣﺪ ﺑﺤﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺰﻳﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪﻻﺋﻞ ،ﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺳﻮى اﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻨﻤﺎذج اﻷآﺜﺮ ﺗﻄﺮﻓﺎ ﻟﻠﺤﻜﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮة،
اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدات اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺨﻄﻴﻂ ﻣﺮآﺰي ﻓﻲ ﺑﻠﺪان اﻻﺗﺤﺎد اﻟﺴﻮﻓﻴﻴﺘﻲ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻖ وﻏﻴﺮهﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺸﻴﻮﻋﻴﺔ .ﺑﺤﻠﻮل
ﺳﺒﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،آﺎﻧﺖ ﻣﺘﺨﻠﻔﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻏﺮﻳﻤﺎﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﺮأﺳﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ آﻞ اﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ ﺗﻘﺮﻳﺒﺎ .اﻧﻬﻴﺎرهﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺳﻘﻮط ﺟﺪار
ﺑﺮﻟﻴﻦ أآﺪ أن ﻣﺜﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻔﺮط ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ ﻟﺴﻜﺎﻧﻬﺎ أﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ.
ﻋﻠﻰ ﻏﺮار آﻞ اﻟﺤﺮآﺎت اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮﻳﺔ ،ﻓﺈن ﺛﻮرة رﻳﻐﺎن ﺿﻠﺖ ﻃﺮﻳﻘﻬﺎ ﻷﻧﻬﺎ أﺻﺒﺤﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﺴﺒﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺆﻳﺪﻳﻬﺎ
إﻳﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﺘﺸﻜﻴﻚ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ،وﻟﻢ ﺗﻌﺪ ردة ﻓﻌﻞ ﺑﺮاﻏﻤﺎﺗﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻓﺮاﻃﺎت دوﻟﺔ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ .آﺎن هﻨﺎك
ﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﺎن ﻣﻘﺪﺳﺎن :أوﻻ ،إن اﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﺗﻤﻮل ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ،وﺛﺎﻧﻴﺎ ،إن اﻷﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ
ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ.
ﻗﺒﻞ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،آﺎن اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻮن ﻣﺤﺎﻓﻈﻴﻦ ﺿﺮﻳﺒﻴﺎ ،أي إﻧﻬﻢ آﺎﻧﻮا ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪﻳﻦ ﻹﻧﻔﺎق أآﺜﺮ ﻣﻤﺎ ﺗﺪر
اﻟﻀﺮاﺋﺐ .ﻟﻜﻦ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ رﻳﻐﺎن اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ أﻃﻠﻘﺖ اﻟﻔﻜﺮة اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻠﺔ إن أي ﺗﺨﻔﻴﺾ ﺿﺮﻳﺒﻲ ﺳﻴﺤﻔﺰ اﻟﻨﻤﻮ ﻟﺪرﺟﺔ أن
اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ ﺳﺘﺠﻨﻲ أﻣﻮاﻻ أآﺜﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ )وهﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﻤﻨﺤﻨﻰ ﻻﻓﺮ( .ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ ،اﻟﻨﻈﺮة اﻟﺘﻘﻠﻴﺪﻳﺔ آﺎﻧﺖ هﻲ
اﻟﺼﺎﺋﺒﺔ :إذا ﺧﻔﻀﺖ اﻟﻀﺮاﺋﺐ ﻣﻦ دون ﺗﺨﻔﻴﺾ اﻹﻧﻔﺎق ،ﻓﺴﻴﺆدي ذﻟﻚ إﻟﻰ ﻋﺠﺰ ﻣﺆذ .ﻟﺬﻟﻚ أدت اﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت
اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن ﻓﻲ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ إﻟﻰ ﻋﺠﺰ آﺒﻴﺮ وأدت زﻳﺎدة اﻟﻀﺮاﺋﺐ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن
اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ آﻠﻨﺘﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻓﺎﺋﺾ :آﻤﺎ أن ﺗﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت ﺑﻮش اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ أواﺋﻞ اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟـ 21أدت إﻟﻰ ﻋﺠﺰ أآﺒﺮ.
ﻏﻴﺮ أن ﻧﻤﻮ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪي آﻠﻨﺘﻮن ورﻳﻐﺎن ﻟﻢ ﻳﺰﻋﺰع ﺛﻘﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻓﻈﻴﻦ ﺑﺄن
اﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ هﻲ ﻣﻔﺘﺎح اﻟﻨﻤﻮ.
واﻷهﻢ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ أن اﻟﻌﻮﻟﻤﺔ أﺧﻔﺖ ﻋﻴﻮب هﺬا اﻟﺘﻔﻜﻴﺮ ﻃﻮال ﻋﻘﻮد .ﺑﺪا أن اﻷﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪون ﻻﻗﺘﻨﺎء اﻟﺪوﻻرات
اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ ،ﻣﻤﺎ أﺗﺎح ﻟﻠﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ أن ﺗﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﺠﺰا ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺎ وﺗﺴﺘﻤﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺑﻤﻌﺪل ﻧﻤﻮ ﻋﺎل،
وهﻮ أﻣﺮ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﻷي ﺑﻠﺪ ﻧﺎم ﻣﺠﺎراﺗﻪ .ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﺴﺒﺐ ،ﻳﺰﻋﻢ أن ﻧﺎﺋﺐ اﻟﺮﺋﻴﺲ دﻳﻚ ﺗﺸﻴﻨﻲ ﻗﺎل ﻟﻠﺮﺋﻴﺲ ﺑﻮش ﻓﻲ
ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻣﺒﻜﺮة إن اﻟﺪرس اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﻰ ﻣﻦ ﺛﻤﺎﻧﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ هﻮ أن "اﻟﻌﺠﺰ ﻻ ﻳﻬﻢ".
اﻟﻤﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻤﻘﺪس اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن ــ وهﻮ إزاﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ــ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺪﻋﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻒ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﻮﻗﻊ
ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺆﻣﻨﻴﻦ اﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻴﻴﻦ ﺑﻪ وﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ ،وﺑﺤﻠﻮل ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ اﻋﺘﺒﺮﻩ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﻮن أﻳﻀﺎ
أﻣﺮا ﻣﻘﺪﺳﺎ .ﺟﺎدﻟﻮا ﺑﺄن اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻘﺪﻳﻤﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻏﻼس ﺳﺘﻴﻐﻞ اﻟﺬي ﻳﻌﻮد إﻟﻰ ﺣﻘﺒﺔ اﻟﺮآﻮد )واﻟﺬي
ﻓﺼﻞ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﻳﺔ واﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎرﻳﺔ( آﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﻘﻮض اﻹﺑﺪاع وﺗﻨﺎﻓﺴﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ .آﺎﻧﻮا
ﻣﺤﻘﻴﻦ ،ﻓﺈزاﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد هﻲ اﻟﺘﻲ أدت إﻟﻰ اﺑﺘﻜﺎر ﻣﺸﺘﻘﺎت ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻣﺜﻞ اﻷﺳﻬﻢ اﻟﻤﺪﻋﻮﻣﺔ ﺑﻘﺮوض ،اﻟﺘﻲ هﻲ
اﻟﻤﺴﺒﺐ اﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻸزﻣﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ .ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮرﻳﻴﻦ ﻟﻢ ﻳﺴﺘﻮﻋﺒﻮا هﺬا اﻷﻣﺮ ﺑﻌﺪ ،وهﺬا ﺟﻠﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺒﺪﻳﻞ اﻟﺬي
اﻗﺘﺮﺣﻮﻩ ﻟﺨﻄﺔ اﻹﻧﻘﺎذ ،اﻟﺬي ﺗﻀﻤﻦ ﺗﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت ﺿﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ إﺿﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻟﺼﻨﺎدﻳﻖ اﻟﺘﺤﻮط.
اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ هﻲ أن وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﺎ ﻋﻦ وادي اﻟﺴﻠﻴﻜﻮن ﻣﺜﻼ ،ﺣﻴﺚ ﻗﻠﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻣﻔﻴﺪة ﺣﻘﺎ .إن
اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺗﺮﺗﻜﺰ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺜﻘﺔ ،اﻟﺘﻲ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ أن ﺗﺘﻨﺎﻣﻰ إﻻ إذا ﺣﺮﺻﺖ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﺗﻜﻮن ﺷﻔﺎﻓﺔ،
وﻋﻠﻰ أن ﻳﻜﻮن اﺗﺨﺎذهﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺎﻃﺮ ﻣﺤﺪودا ﻷﻧﻬﺎ ﺗﺴﺘﻌﻴﻦ ﺑﺄﻣﻮال اﻵﺧﺮﻳﻦ .اﻟﻘﻄﺎع ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻒ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻷن اﻧﻬﻴﺎر ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺔ
ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻀﺮ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﻴﻦ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ وﻣﻮﻇﻔﻴﻬﺎ ،ﺑﻞ ﺑﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺑﺮﻳﺎء اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻻ ﻋﻼﻗﺔ ﻟﻬﻢ ﺑﻬﺎ أﻳﻀﺎ )وهﻮ ﻣﺎ
ﻳﺴﻤﻴﻪ ﻋﻠﻤﺎء اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﺑﺄﺳﻒ "اﻟﺘﺄﺛﻴﺮات اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﻴﺔ"(.
اﻟﺪﻻﺋﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ أن ﺛﻮرة رﻳﻐﺎن اﻧﺤﺮﻓﺖ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺧﻄﻴﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺴﺎرهﺎ ﺑﺪت ﺟﻠﻴﺔ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻌﻘﺪ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ .أﺣﺪ اﻟﻤﺆﺷﺮات
اﻟﺘﺤﺬﻳﺮﻳﺔ آﺎن اﻷزﻣﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ اﻵﺳﻴﻮﻳﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﻲ 1997و .1998ﻓﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان ﻣﺜﻞ ﺗﺎﻳﻠﻨﺪ وآﻮرﻳﺎ اﻟﺠﻨﻮﺑﻴﺔ اﻣﺘﺜﻠﺖ
ﻟﻠﻨﺼﺎﺋﺢ واﻟﻀﻐﻮط اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ،وﺣﺮرت أﺳﻮاﻗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ أواﺋﻞ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ .وﺑﺪأ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻷﻣﻮال
ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺪﻓﻖ ﺑﺴﺮﻋﺔ إﻟﻰ اﻗﺘﺼﺎداﺗﻬﺎ ،ﻣﻤﺎ أدى إﻟﻰ ﻓﻘﺎﻋﺔ ﺳﺒﺒﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﻀﺎرﺑﺔ ،ﻟﺘﻌﻮد هﺬﻩ اﻷﻣﻮال وﺗﺴﺤﺐ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ أول
ﻣﺆﺷﺮ إﻟﻰ ﺣﺪوث ﻣﺸﻜﻠﺔ .هﻞ ﻳﺒﺪو ذﻟﻚ ﻣﺄﻟﻮﻓﺎ؟ ﻓﻲ ﻏﻀﻮن ذﻟﻚ ،آﺎﻧﺖ ﺑﻠﺪان ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺼﻴﻦ وﻣﺎﻟﻴﺰﻳﺎ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻟﻢ ﺗﻤﺘﺜﻞ
ﻟﻠﻨﺼﻴﺤﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ وأﺑﻘﺖ أﺳﻮاﻗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻣﻐﻠﻘﺔ أو ﺧﺎﺿﻌﺔ ﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﺻﺎرم ﺗﺠﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ أﻗﻞ ﻋﺮﺿﺔ ﺑﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻟﻠﻀﺮر.
اﻹﺷﺎرة اﻟﺘﺤﺬﻳﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ ﺗﻤﺜﻠﺖ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻔﺎﻗﻢ اﻟﻌﺠﺰ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ .ﻟﻘﺪ ﺑﺪأت اﻟﺼﻴﻦ وﻋﺪد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻠﺪان اﻷﺧﺮى ﺑﺸﺮاء
اﻟﺪوﻻرات اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻋﺎم 1997آﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ اﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ ﻣﺘﻌﻤﺪة ﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﺾ ﻗﻴﻤﺔ ﻋﻤﻼﺗﻬﺎ وإﺑﻘﺎء ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﻬﺎ ﺷﻐﺎﻟﺔ
وﺣﻤﺎﻳﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻻﺿﻄﺮاﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ .هﺬا آﺎن ﻣﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎ ﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﺑﻌﻴﺪ هﺠﻤﺎت 11ﺳﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ« وﻋﻨﻰ أن ﺑﺈﻣﻜﺎﻧﻨﺎ
ﺗﺨﻔﻴﺾ اﻟﻀﺮاﺋﺐ وﺗﻤﻮﻳﻞ إﻓﺮاﻃﻨﺎ اﻻﺳﺘﻬﻼآﻲ ودﻓﻊ آﻠﻔﺔ ﺣﺮﺑﻴﻦ ﻏﺎﻟﻴﺘﻲ اﻟﺜﻤﻦ ﻣﻦ دون ﺣﻞ ﻣﺸﻜﻠﺔ اﻟﻌﺠﺰ ﻓﻲ
اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ .اﻟﻌﺠﺰ اﻟﺘﺠﺎري اﻟﻬﺎﺋﻞ واﻟﻤﺘﺰاﻳﺪ اﻟﻤﺘﺄﺗﻲ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ ــ 700ﻣﻠﻴﺎر دوﻻر ﺳﻨﻮﻳﺎ ﺑﺤﻠﻮل ﻋﺎم 2007ــ
آﺎن ﻳﻔﻮق ﻗﺪرﺗﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﺑﺸﻜﻞ واﺿﺢ« ﻋﺎﺟﻼ أم ﺁﺟﻼ آﺎن اﻷﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺳﻴﻘﺮرون أن أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ذﻟﻚ اﻟﻤﻜﺎن
اﻟﻤﺜﺎﻟﻲ ﻹﻳﺪاع أﻣﻮاﻟﻬﻢ .واﻧﺨﻔﺎض ﺳﻌﺮ ﺻﺮف اﻟﺪوﻻر اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﻳﺸﻴﺮ إﻟﻰ أﻧﻨﺎ وﺻﻠﻨﺎ إﻟﻰ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻘﻄﺔ .ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺿﺢ
أن ﻟﻠﻌﺠﺰ أهﻤﻴﺔ ،ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻳﻨﺎﻗﺾ رأي ﺗﺸﻴﻨﻲ.
ﺣﺘﻰ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪاﺧﻞ ،آﺎﻧﺖ هﻨﺎك ﻣﺴﺎوئ واﺿﺤﺔ ﻹزاﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد ﻗﺒﻞ اﻧﻬﻴﺎر وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ ﺑﻮﻗﺖ ﻃﻮﻳﻞ .ﻓﻲ آﺎﻟﻴﻔﻮرﻧﻴﺎ،
ارﺗﻔﻌﺖ ﺗﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﻜﻬﺮﺑﺎء ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺧﺎرج ﻋﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة ﻋﺎﻣﻲ 2000و 2001ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﻟﺮﻓﻊ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد ﻓﻲ ﺳﻮق اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ
اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺔ ،وهﺬا ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻐﻠﺘﻪ ﺷﺮآﺎت ﻋﺪﻳﻤﺔ اﻷﺧﻼق ﻣﺜﻞ "إﻧﺮون" ﻟﺠﻨﻲ اﻷرﺑﺎح .إﻧﺮون ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ،ﻓﻀﻼ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ
ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﺮآﺎت اﻷﺧﺮى ،أﻓﻠﺴﺖ ﻋﺎم 2004ﻷﻧﻪ ﻟﻢ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ ﻣﻌﺎﻳﻴﺮ اﻟﻤﺤﺎﺳﺒﺔ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺟﻴﺪ .وازداد اﻟﺘﻔﺎوت
اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﺧﻼل اﻟﻌﻘﺪ اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،ﻷن اﻷرﺑﺎح اﻟﻤﺘﺄﺗﻴﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻤﻮ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي ذهﺒﺖ ﻟﻸﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ
اﻷآﺜﺮ ﺛﺮاء واﻷآﺜﺮ ﺗﻌﻠﻤﺎ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺘﻜﺎﻓﺊ ،ﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن ﻣﺪاﺧﻴﻞ اﻟﻄﺒﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺷﻬﺪت رآﻮدا .وأﺧﻴﺮا ،آﺸﻒ
اﺣﺘﻼل اﻟﻌﺮاق ﺑﺸﻜﻞ أﺧﺮق وردة اﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻋﺼﺎر آﺎﺗﺮﻳﻨﺎ اﻟﻀﻌﻒ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ،ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ ﻟﻌﻘﻮد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﻤﻮﻳﻞ
ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻜﺎﻓﻲ واﻟﻤﻜﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺪﻧﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻮﻇﻔﻴﻦ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﻴﻴﻦ ﺑﺪءا ﻣﻦ ﻋﻬﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن وﺻﻮﻻ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻔﺘﺮة اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ.
آﻞ هﺬا ﻳﺸﻴﺮ إﻟﻰ أن ﻋﻬﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن آﺎن ﻳﺠﺐ أن ﻳﻨﺘﻬﻲ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻵن .ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﺑﻘﻲ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺟﺰﺋﻴﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻲ
اﻟﺬي ﻓﺸﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ ﻣﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ ﻣﻘﻨﻌﻴﻦ وﺣﺠﺞ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﻴﺔ ،ﻟﻜﻦ أﻳﻀﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﻳﺠﻌﻞ ﺑﻠﺪﻧﺎ
ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺎ آﺜﻴﺮا ﻋﻦ أوروﺑﺎ .هﻨﺎك ،اﻟﻤﻮاﻃﻨﻮن اﻷﻗﻞ ﺗﻌﻠﻤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﻘﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻳﺼﻮﺗﻮن ﻷﺣﺰاب اﺷﺘﺮاآﻴﺔ وﺷﻴﻮﻋﻴﺔ
وﻏﻴﺮهﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﺰاب ذات اﻟﻤﻴﻮل اﻟﻴﺴﺎرﻳﺔ ،وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻤﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﻢ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ .ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ،ﻳﺼﻮﺗﻮن إﻣﺎ ﻟﻠﻴﺴﺎر
أو اﻟﻴﻤﻴﻦ .ﻓﻘﺪ ﺷﻜﻠﻮا ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﺎﻟﻒ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻲ اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮ اﻟﺬي أﻗﺎﻣﻪ روزﻓﻠﺖ ﺧﻼل ﺣﻘﺒﺔ اﻟﺨﻄﺔ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ
اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة ،وهﻮ ﺗﺤﺎﻟﻒ ﺑﻘﻲ ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺎ ﺧﻼل ﺣﻘﺒﺔ "اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ اﻟﻌﻈﻴﻢ" ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ ﺣﻜﻢ ﻟﻴﻨﺪن ﺟﻮﻧﺴﻮن ﻓﻲ ﺳﺘﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن
اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ .ﻟﻜﻨﻬﻢ ﺑﺪأوا ﻳﺼﻮﺗﻮن ﻟﻤﺼﻠﺤﺔ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮري ﺧﻼل ﺳﻨﻮات ﺣﻜﻢ ﻧﻴﻜﺴﻮن ورﻳﻐﺎن ،واﻧﺘﻘﻠﻮا ﻟﻠﺘﺼﻮﻳﺖ
ﻟﻜﻠﻨﺘﻮن ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ،وﻣﻦ ﺛﻢ ﻋﺎدوا ﻟﺘﺄﻳﻴﺪ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮري ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ ﺟﻮرج دﺑﻠﻴﻮ ﺑﻮش .إﻧﻬﻢ
ﻳﺼﻮﺗﻮن ﻟﻠﺤﺰب اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮري ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺗﺘﻐﻠﺐ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﺛﻘﺎﻓﻴﺔ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺪﻳﻦ واﻟﻮﻃﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﻘﻴﻢ اﻟﻌﺎﺋﻠﻴﺔ وﺣﻖ اﻗﺘﻨﺎء اﻷﺳﻠﺤﺔ
ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺨﺎوف اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ.
هﺬﻩ اﻟﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﺎﺧﺒﻴﻦ ﺳﺘﻘﺮر ﻧﺘﻴﺠﺔ اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ ،ﻻ ﺳﻴﻤﺎ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻣﺮآﺰة ﻓﻲ ﺣﻔﻨﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺤﻮرﻳﺔ
ﻣﺜﻞ أوهﺎﻳﻮ وﺑﻨﺴﻠﻔﺎﻧﻴﺎ .هﻞ ﺳﻴﻤﻴﻠﻮن إﻟﻰ أوﺑﺎﻣﺎ اﻟﺬي درس ﻓﻲ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ هﺎرﻓﺎرد وﻻ ﻳﺸﺎرآﻬﻢ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اهﺘﻤﺎﻣﺎﺗﻬﻢ
ﻟﻜﻨﻪ ﻳﻌﻜﺲ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ أدق ﻣﺼﺎﻟﺤﻬﻢ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ؟ أو هﻞ ﺳﻴﺆﻳﺪون أﺷﺨﺎﺻﺎ ﻳﺸﻌﺮون ﺑﺄﻧﻬﻢ أﻗﺮب إﻟﻴﻬﻢ ،ﻣﺜﻞ ﻣﺎآﻴﻦ
وﺳﺎرة ﺑﺎﻟﻴﻦ؟ ﺗﻄﻠﺐ اﻷﻣﺮ أزﻣﺔ اﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ ﺿﺨﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺎم 1929وﺣﺘﻰ ﻋﺎم 1931ﻹﻳﺼﺎل إدارة دﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ إﻟﻰ
اﻟﺤﻜﻢ .وﺗﺸﻴﺮ اﺳﺘﻄﻼﻋﺎت اﻟﺮأي إﻟﻰ أﻧﻨﺎ رﺑﻤﺎ وﺻﻠﻨﺎ إﻟﻰ ﻧﻘﻄﺔ ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ أآﺘﻮﺑﺮ .2008
اﻟﻤﻜﻮن اﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ اﻵﺧﺮ ﻟﻠﻨﻤﻮذج اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ هﻮ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ واﺳﺘﻌﺪاد اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﻟﺘﺄﻳﻴﺪ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ
اﻷﺧﺮى ﻓﻲ أﻧﺤﺎء اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ .هﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﺰﻋﺔ اﻟﻤﺜﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺨﺎرﺟﻴﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﺑﻘﻴﺖ ﺛﺎﺑﺘﺔ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ،
ﺑﺪءا ﻣﻦ ﻋﺼﺒﺔ اﻷﻣﻢ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ وودرو وﻳﻠﺴﻮن وﺻﻮﻻ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﺮﻳﺎت اﻷرﺑﻊ ﻓﻲ ﻋﻬﺪ روزﻓﻠﺖ واﻧﺘﻬﺎء ﺑﻤﻄﺎﻟﺒﺔ
رﻳﻐﺎن ﻣﻴﺨﺎﺋﻴﻞ ﻏﻮرﺑﺎﺗﺸﻴﻒ ﺑـ"هﺪم هﺬا اﻟﺤﺎﺋﻂ".
ﻧﺸﺮ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ــ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ وﺗﻘﺪﻳﻢ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪة ﻟﻠﻤﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺪﻧﻴﺔ وﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ اﻹﻋﻼم وﻣﺎ
ﺷﺎﺑﻪ ــ ﻟﻢ ﻳﻜﻦ ﻗﻂ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﺟﺪال .اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ اﻵن هﻲ أﻧﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﺳﺘﻐﻼل اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻟﺘﺒﺮﻳﺮ ﺣﺮب اﻟﻌﺮاق ،أوﺣﺖ
إدارة ﺑﻮش ﻟﻠﻜﺜﻴﺮﻳﻦ أن" اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ" هﻲ آﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﺴﺮ ﻟﻠﺘﺪﺧﻞ اﻟﻌﺴﻜﺮي وﺗﻐﻴﻴﺮ اﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ) .اﻟﻔﻮﺿﻰ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺒﻌﺖ
ﻏﺰو اﻟﻌﺮاق ﻟﻢ ﺗﺴﺎﻋﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺤﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺻﻮرة اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ أﻳﻀﺎ( .اﻟﺸﺮق اﻷوﺳﻂ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺧﺎص ﺑﻤﻨﺰﻟﺔ ﺣﻘﻞ
أﻟﻐﺎم ﻷي إدارة أﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ،ﻷن أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﺗﺪﻋﻢ ﺣﻠﻔﺎء ﻏﻴﺮ دﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﻴﻦ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺴﻌﻮدﻳﻴﻦ ،وﺗﺮﻓﺾ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت
ﻣﺜﻞ ﺣﻤﺎس وﺣﺰب اﷲ وﺻﻠﺖ إﻟﻰ اﻟﺤﻜﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت .ﻣﺼﺪاﻗﻴﺘﻨﺎ ﻣﺸﻜﻮك ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻧﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ
"أﺟﻨﺪة اﻟﺤﺮﻳﺔ".
ﻟﻘﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺗﻠﻄﻴﺦ اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺣﺪ آﺒﻴﺮ أﻳﻀﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل إدارة ﺑﻮش ﻟﻮﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘﻌﺬﻳﺐ .ﺑﻌﺪ هﺠﻤﺎت 11
ﺳﺒﺘﻤﺒﺮ ،ﺑﺮهﻦ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻮن ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻣﺨﻴﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ أﻧﻬﻢ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪون ﻟﻠﺘﺨﻠﻲ ﻋﻦ ﺣﻘﻮﻗﻬﻢ اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮرﻳﺔ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ أﻣﻨﻬﻢ .وﻗﺪ
ﺣﻞ ﺧﻠﻴﺞ ﻏﻮاﻧﺘﺎﻧﺎﻣﻮ واﻟﺴﺠﻨﺎء اﻟﺬﻳﻦ وﺿﻌﺖ ﻗﻠﻨﺴﻮات ﻋﻠﻰ رؤوﺳﻬﻢ ﻓﻲ أﺑﻮ ﻏﺮﻳﺐ ﻣﻜﺎن ﺗﻤﺜﺎل اﻟﺤﺮﻳﺔ آﺮﻣﻮز
ﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻧﻈﺮ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻏﻴﺮ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ.
أﻳﺎ آﺎن اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺰ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻴﺔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺷﻬﺮ ،ﻓﺴﻴﻜﻮن اﻻﻧﺘﻘﺎل إﻟﻰ دورة ﺟﺪﻳﺪة ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ واﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ
ﻗﺪ ﺑﺪأ .ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﺟﺢ أن اﻷآﺜﺮﻳﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺑﻬﺎ اﻟﺤﺰب اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﻠﺴﻲ اﻟﻨﻮاب واﻟﺸﻴﻮخ ﺳﺘﺰداد أﻋﺪادهﺎ.
اﻟﻐﻀﺐ اﻟﺸﻌﺒﻲ ﻋﺎرم ﻣﻊ اﻧﺘﺸﺎر ﺗﺪاﻋﻴﺎت اﻧﻬﻴﺎر وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺑﺪأت ﺗﻄﻮل ﺣﻴﺎة ﻋﺎﻣﺔ اﻟﺸﻌﺐ .وهﻨﺎك إﺟﻤﺎع
ﻣﺘﺰاﻳﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺿﺮورة إﻋﺎدة ﺗﻨﻈﻴﻢ أﻗﺴﺎم آﺜﻴﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد.
ﻋﺎﻟﻤﻴﺎ ،ﻟﻦ ﺗﺴﺘﻤﺘﻊ اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﺑﻤﻮﻗﻌﻬﺎ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﺪادي اﻟﺬي اﺣﺘﻠﺘﻪ ﺣﺘﻰ اﻵن ،وﻏﺰو روﺳﻴﺎ ﻟﺠﻮرﺟﻴﺎ ﻓﻲ 7
أﻏﺴﻄﺲ ﻳﻌﻜﺲ ذﻟﻚ .ﺳﻮف ﺗﺘﻀﺎءل ﻗﺪرة أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻣﺴﺎر اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻣﻌﺎهﺪات ﺗﺠﺎرﻳﺔ
وﻋﺒﺮ ﺻﻨﺪوق اﻟﻨﻘﺪ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ واﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ،وآﺬﻟﻚ ﺳﺘﺘﻀﺎءل ﻣﻮاردﻧﺎ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ .وﻓﻲ ﻣﻨﺎﻃﻖ آﺜﻴﺮة ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ،
ﺳﺘﺤﻈﻰ اﻷﻓﻜﺎر واﻟﻤﺸﻮرة اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ وﺣﺘﻰ اﻟﻤﺴﺎﻋﺪات اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻘﺒﺎل أﻗﻞ ﺣﻔﺎوة ﻣﻤﺎ هﻮ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﺣﺎﻟﻴﺎ.
ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ ﻇﺮوف آﻬﺬﻩ ،ﻣﻦ هﻮ اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺢ اﻟﺬي ﺳﻴﻜﻮن ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮﻗﻊ أﻓﻀﻞ ﻹﻋﺎدة ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﺻﻮرة أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ؟ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮاﺿﺢ أن
ﺑﺎراك أوﺑﺎﻣﺎ هﻮ اﻷﻗﻞ ارﺗﺒﺎﻃﺎ ﺑﺎﻷﺣﺪاث اﻷﺧﻴﺮة ،وﻳﺴﻌﻰ ﺑﺄﺳﻠﻮﺑﻪ ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﺤﺰﺑﻲ إﻟﻰ ﺗﺨﻄﻲ اﻟﺸﻘﺎﻗﺎت اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻴﺔ
اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ .ﻓﻲ ﺻﻤﻴﻤﻪ ،ﻳﺒﺪو واﻗﻌﻴﺎ وﻟﻴﺲ إﻳﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎ .ﻟﻜﻦ ﺳﻴﺘﻢ اﺧﺘﺒﺎر ﻗﺪراﺗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺸﻜﻴﻞ اﻻﺋﺘﻼﻓﺎت ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﻳﺤﻴﻦ
اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﻻﺗﺨﺎذ ﺧﻴﺎرات ﺻﻌﺒﺔ ،وﻋﻠﻴﻪ أن ﻳﻘﻨﻊ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻓﻘﻂ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮرﻳﻴﻦ ﺑﻞ اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﺘﻤﺮدﻳﻦ أﻳﻀﺎ .ﻣﺎآﻴﻦ ﻣﻦ
ﺟﻬﺘﻪ ﺗﻜﻠﻢ ﻣﺜﻞ ﺗﻴﺪي روزﻓﻠﺖ ﻓﻲ اﻷﺳﺎﺑﻴﻊ اﻷﺧﻴﺮة ﻣﺘﻬﺠﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ وﻣﻄﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﻘﺎﻟﺔ آﺮﻳﺲ آﻮآﺲ
رﺋﻴﺲ ﻟﺠﻨﺔ ﻣﺮاﻗﺒﺔ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺒﻮرﺻﺔ .ﻗﺪ ﻳﻜﻮن اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮري اﻟﻮﺣﻴﺪ اﻟﻘﺎدر ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻘﻞ ﺣﺰﺑﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻀﺾ إﻟﻰ ﺣﻘﺒﺔ ﻣﺎ
ﺑﻌﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن .ﻟﻜﻦ ﻳﺨﻴﻞ ﻟﻠﻤﺮء أﻧﻪ ﻟﻢ ﻳﻘﺮر ﺑﻌﺪ أي ﻧﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﺠﻤﻬﻮرﻳﻴﻦ هﻮ ﺣﻘﺎ ،أو ﻣﺎ هﻲ اﻟﻤﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺘﺤﺪد
أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪة.
ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﻌﺎدة ﻧﻔﻮذ أﻣﺮﻳﻜﺎ ،وهﺬا ﻣﺎ ﺳﻴﺤﺪث ﻓﻲ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﻳﺔ .ﺑﻤﺎ أن اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻢ ﺑﻜﺎﻣﻠﻪ ﺳﻴﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷرﺟﺢ اﻧﻬﻴﺎرا
اﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺎ ،ﻟﻴﺲ واﺿﺤﺎ إن آﺎن ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻟﺼﻴﻨﻲ أو اﻟﺮوﺳﻲ ﺳﻴﻜﻮن أﻓﻀﻞ ﺑﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ.
ﻟﻘﺪ اﺳﺘﻌﺎدت اﻟﻮﻻﻳﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة ﻋﺎﻓﻴﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻧﺘﻜﺎﺳﺎت ﺧﻄﻴﺮة ﺧﻼل ﺛﻼﺛﻴﻨﺎت وﺳﺒﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻗﺪرة
ﻧﻈﺎﻣﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺘﺄﻗﻠﻢ وﻣﺮوﻧﺔ ﺷﻌﺒﻨﺎ.
ﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ ،ﻓﺈن اﺣﺘﻤﺎل اﺳﺘﻌﺎدة ﻋﺎﻓﻴﺘﻨﺎ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻒ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺪرﺗﻨﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﻴﺎم ﺑﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮات أﺳﺎﺳﻴﺔ .أوﻻ ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺘﺨﻠﻰ ﻋﻦ
ﻣﺒﺎدئ ﻋﻬﺪ رﻳﻐﺎن اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮاﺋﺐ واﻟﻘﻮاﻧﻴﻦ اﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻤﻴﺔ .اﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﺗﺸﻌﺮﻧﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﺮور ﻟﻜﻨﻬﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺤﻔﺰ
اﻟﻨﻤﻮ ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺮورة أو ﺗﺴﺪد آﻠﻔﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ« ﻧﻈﺮا إﻟﻰ وﺿﻌﻨﺎ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻲ اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ اﻷﻣﺪ ،ﺳﻴﺘﻌﻴﻦ إﻋﻼم اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ﺑﺼﺮاﺣﺔ
أن ﻋﻠﻴﻬﻢ أن ﻳﺘﺤﻤﻠﻮا ﻧﻔﻘﺔ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﺒﻠﻬﻢ ﺑﺄﻧﻔﺴﻬﻢ .إزاﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد أو ﻋﺠﺰ اﻟﻤﻨﻈﻤﻴﻦ ﻋﻦ ﻣﺠﺎراة اﻷﺳﻮاق اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻌﺔ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﺮ
ﻳﻤﻜﻦ أن ﻳﻜﻮن ﻋﺎﻟﻲ اﻟﻜﻠﻔﺔ آﻤﺎ رأﻳﻨﺎ .إن اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﺑﻜﺎﻣﻠﻪ ــ اﻟﺬي ﻻ ﻳﺤﻈﻰ ﺑﺘﻤﻮﻳﻞ آﺎف وﻳﻔﺘﻘﺮ إﻟﻰ
اﻟﺨﺒﺮات اﻟﻤﻬﻨﻴﺔ واﻟﻤﺤﺒﻂ ــ ﺑﺤﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ أن ﺗﺘﻢ إﻋﺎدة ﺑﻨﺎﺋﻪ وإﻋﺎدة ﺗﻌﺰﻳﺰ آﺒﺮﻳﺎﺋﻪ .هﻨﺎك ﻣﻬﺎم ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺔ ﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ
إﺗﻤﺎﻣﻬﺎ إﻻ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ.
ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻧﺴﻌﻰ إﻟﻰ إﺣﺪاث هﺬﻩ اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮات ،ﻳﺒﺮز ﺧﻄﺮ اﻹﻓﺮاط ﻓﻲ ﺗﺼﺤﻴﺢ ﻣﺠﺮى اﻷﻣﻮر .إن اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﺑﺤﺎﺟﺔ
إﻟﻰ رﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﺻﺎرﻣﺔ ،ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻮاﺿﺢ إن آﺎﻧﺖ ﻗﻄﺎﻋﺎت أﺧﺮى ﻣﻦ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﺑﺤﺎﺟﺔ إﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ أﻳﻀﺎ .ﻻ ﺗﺰال
اﻟﺘﺠﺎرة اﻟﺤﺮة ﻣﺤﻔﺰا ﻗﻮﻳﺎ ﻟﻠﻨﻤﻮ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎدي وهﻲ أﻳﻀﺎ أداة ﺗﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪﺑﻠﻮﻣﺎﺳﻴﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ .ﻋﻠﻴﻨﺎ أن ﻧﻘﺪم
ﻣﻌﻮﻧﺔ أﻓﻀﻞ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﺎل اﻟﺬﻳﻦ ﻳﺘﺄﻗﻠﻤﻮن ﻣﻊ اﻟﻈﺮوف اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻐﻴﺮة ﺑﺪﻻ ﻣﻦ أن ﻧﺪاﻓﻊ ﻋﻦ وﻇﺎﺋﻔﻬﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻟﻴﺔ .إذا ﻟﻢ
ﺗﻜﻦ اﻟﺘﺨﻔﻴﻀﺎت اﻟﻀﺮﻳﺒﻴﺔ ﺳﺒﻴﻼ ﻟﻼزدهﺎر اﻟﻤﺆآﺪ ،ﻓﺎﻹﻧﻔﺎق اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ اﻟﻤﻔﺮط ﻟﻴﺲ اﻟﺴﺒﻴﻞ إﻟﻰ ذﻟﻚ أﻳﻀﺎ .وآﻠﻔﺔ
ﺧﻄﻂ اﻹﻧﻘﺎذ وﺿﻌﻒ اﻟﺪوﻻر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﺪى اﻟﻄﻮﻳﻞ ﻳﻌﻨﻴﺎن أن اﻟﺘﻀﺨﻢ ﺳﻴﺸﻜﻞ ﺗﻬﺪﻳﺪا آﺒﻴﺮا ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ .آﻤﺎ أن
اﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻏﻴﺮ ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻳﻔﺎﻗﻢ اﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ ﺑﻜﻞ ﺳﻬﻮﻟﺔ.
وﻓﻲ ﺣﻴﻦ أن ﻋﺪدا أﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻏﻴﺮ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﻴﻦ ﺳﻴﺼﻐﻮن إﻟﻰ ﻧﺼﺎﺋﺤﻨﺎ ،ﻓﺈن اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮﻳﻦ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ ﻗﺪ ﻳﺴﺘﻔﻴﺪون ﻣﻦ ﺗﻘﻠﻴﺪ
ﺑﻌﺾ ﺟﻮاﻧﺐ ﻧﻤﻮذج رﻳﻐﺎن .وإزاﻟﺔ اﻟﻘﻴﻮد اﻟﻤﻔﺮوﺿﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ ﻟﻴﺴﺖ ﻣﻦ ﺿﻤﻨﻬﺎ .ﻟﻜﻦ ﻓﻲ أوروﺑﺎ،
ﻻﻳﺰال اﻟﻌﻤﺎل ﻳﺤﻈﻮن ﺑﻌﻄﻞ ﻃﻮﻳﻠﺔ وﻳﻌﻤﻠﻮن ﻟﺴﺎﻋﺎت ﻗﻠﻴﻠﺔ وﻳﺤﻈﻮن ﺑﻀﻤﺎﻧﺎت ﻟﻠﺤﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ وﻇﺎﺋﻔﻬﻢ وﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ
أﺧﺮى ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﻊ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﻮض إﻧﺘﺎﺟﻴﺘﻬﻢ وﻻ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺤﻤﻞ ﻧﻔﻘﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﻟﻤﺪة ﻃﻮﻳﻠﺔ.
وﺗﻈﻬﺮ ردة اﻟﻔﻌﻞ اﻟﺒﻐﻴﻀﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أزﻣﺔ وول ﺳﺘﺮﻳﺖ أن اﻟﺘﻐﻴﻴﺮ اﻷآﺒﺮ اﻟﺬي ﻧﺤﺘﺎج إﻟﻴﻪ هﻮ ﻓﻲ ﺳﻴﺎﺳﺎﺗﻨﺎ .ﻟﻘﺪ وﺿﻌﺖ
ﺛﻮرة رﻳﻐﺎن ﺣﺪا ﻟـ 50ﻋﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة اﻟﻠﻴﺒﺮاﻟﻴﺔ واﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﺎت اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ وﻓﺘﺤﺖ اﻟﻤﺠﺎل
ﻟﻤﻘﺎرﺑﺎت ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻟﺤﻞ ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ زﻣﻨﻬﺎ .ﻟﻜﻦ ﻣﻊ ﺗﻮاﻟﻲ اﻟﺴﻨﻴﻦ ،ﺗﺤﻮﻟﺖ اﻷﻓﻜﺎر اﻟﺘﻲ آﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﺪﻳﺪة إﻟﻰ إﻳﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎت
ﻣﺘﺼﻠﺒﺔ .وﻧﻮﻋﻴﺔ اﻟﺠﺪال اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ ﻓﻘﺪت ﻣﺮوﻧﺘﻬﺎ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﻣﺤﺎزﺑﻴﻦ ﻻ ﻳﺸﻜﻜﻮن ﻓﻘﻂ ﻓﻲ أﻓﻜﺎر ﻣﻨﺎﻓﺴﻴﻬﻢ ﺑﻞ أﻳﻀﺎ ﻓﻲ
ﺣﻮاﻓﺰهﻢ .آﻞ هﺬا ﻳﺼﻌﺐ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺘﺄﻗﻠﻢ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ اﻟﺠﺪﻳﺪ واﻟﺼﻌﺐ اﻟﺬي ﻧﻮاﺟﻬﻪ .ﻟﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﺈن اﻻﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻷهﻢ أﻣﺎم
اﻟﻨﻤﻮذج اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻲ ﺳﻴﺘﻤﺜﻞ ﻓﻲ ﻗﺪرﺗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻋﺎدة ﺻﻴﺎﻏﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺪﻳﺪ .اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺤﺴﻨﺔ ،ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺪ ﺗﻌﺒﻴﺮ أﺣﺪ
اﻟﻤﺮﺷﺤﻴﻦ اﻟﺮﺋﺎﺳﻴﻴﻦ ﺗﺘﻌﺪى وﺿﻊ أﺣﻤﺮ ﺷﻔﺎﻩ ﻟﺨﻨﺰﻳﺮ ،ﺑﻞ هﻲ ﻣﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺈﻳﺠﺎد اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺞ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ اﻟﺬي ﺗﺤﺘﺎج إﻟﻴﻪ
اﻷﺳﻮاق .ﺳﻴﻜﻮن اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻖ ﺻﻌﺒﺎ أﻣﺎم اﻟﺪﻳﻤﻮﻗﺮاﻃﻴﺔ اﻷﻣﺮﻳﻜﻴﺔ.
ﻓﻮآﻮﻳﺎﻣﺎ هﻮ أﺳﺘﺎذ ﻓﻲ اﻻﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﺴﻴﺎﺳﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﻓﻲ آﻠﻴﺔ ﺟﻮﻧﺰ هﻮﺑﻜﻨﺰ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﺪوﻟﻴﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻘﺪﻣﺔ.
America’s bail-out plan
AP
AMERICAN congressmen are used to hyperbole, but they were left speechless by the
dire scenario Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, painted for them on the
night of September 18th. He “told us that our American economy’s arteries, our financial
system, is clogged, and if we don’t act, the patient will surely suffer a heart attack, maybe
next week, maybe in six months, but it will happen,” according to Charles Schumer, a
Democratic senator from New York. Mr Schumer’s interpretation: failure to act would
cause “a depression”.
Mr Bernanke and Hank Paulson, the treasury secretary, had met congressional leaders to
argue that ad hoc responses to the continuing financial crisis like that week’s bail-out of
American International Group (AIG), a huge insurer, were no longer sufficient. By the
weekend Mr Paulson had asked for authority to own up to $700 billion in mortgage-
related assets. By the time The Economist went to press, Congress and Mr Paulson
appeared to have agreed on the broad outlines of what is being called the Troubled Asset
Relief Programme, or TARP.
Both the crisis and the authorities’ response have been called the most sweeping since the
Depression. Yet the differences from that era are more notable than the similarities to it.
From the stockmarket crash of 1929 to the federally declared bank holiday that marked
its bottom, three and a half years elapsed, and unemployment reached 25%. This crisis
has been under way for a little over a year and unemployment is just over 6%, lower even
than in the wake of the last, mild recession. More than 4% of mortgages are now
seriously delinquent (see chart 1), but the figure topped 40% in 1934.
The scale of the American authorities’ response reflects both the violence with which this
crisis has spread, and the determination of the American authorities, most importantly Mr
Bernanke, to learn from the mistakes that made the Depression so deep and long.
In responding with such speed and vigour, they run several risks. One is that they overdo
it, paying far too much for assets, sending the deficit into the stratosphere and triggering a
run on the dollar. The risk of underdoing it may be even greater. Politicians, determined
not to be seen as doing favours for Wall Street, might blunt the programme’s effect in the
name of protecting the taxpayer. Then there’s the logistical nightmare of fixing a market
whose very complexity is central to the crisis.
Experience, at home and abroad, is a poor guide. In past episodes authorities have
typically not committed public money to their financial systems until bank failures and
insolvency have become widespread. The first wave of savings-and-loan failures came in
the early 1980s; the Resolution Trust Corporation was not created to dispose of their
assets until 1989. Japan’s banks began to fail in 1991, but a mechanism for taking over
large, insolvent banks was not set up until 1998. Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke are
attempting to prevent the crisis from reaching that stage. “The firms we’re dealing with
now are not necessarily failing, but they are contracting, they are deleveraging,” Mr
Bernanke told Congress. They are unable to raise capital and are refusing to lend, and
that, he said, is squeezing the economy.
One risk with such a pre-emptive bail-out is that to congressmen the benefits are
hypothetical whereas the fiscal and political costs, five weeks before an election, are all
too real. In polls voters waver between opposition and support depending on how the
question is asked.
In spite of these risks, the odds seem to be in favour of both political passage and success.
America has owned up to its mistakes with exceptional speed, and pulled out the stops to
correct them.
After the crisis first broke in August last year, the Fed pursued a two-pronged strategy.
The first element was to lower interest rates to cushion the economy. The second was to
use its balance sheet to help commercial and investment banks finance their holdings of
hard-to-value securities and avoid fire-sales of assets. Behind this approach lay the belief
of “endism”, that the economy and the financial system were basically solid. Yes, too
many houses had been built and prices were too high, but a return to more normal levels
would be manageable if stretched over a few years. And banks in aggregate had entered
the crisis in good shape, with much more capital this June than in 1990. The Fed saw
their problem essentially as illiquidity, not insolvency. The Bush administration broadly
shared this diagnosis—and an aversion to using public money to help overextended
borrowers.
The intensification of the crisis came not from the banks but the “shadow banking
system”: the finance companies, investment banks, off-balance-sheet vehicles,
government-sponsored enterprises and hedge funds that fuelled the credit boom, aided by
less regulation and more leverage than commercial banks. As home prices fell and loan
losses mounted, more of the shadow system became insolvent.
Insolvency cannot be cured with more loans, no matter how easy the terms. It requires
more capital, which in deep crises only the government can provide. Mr Bernanke’s
groundbreaking paper on the Depression, published in 1983, noted that recovery began in
1933 with large infusions of federal cash into institutions, through the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, and households, through the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation.
They were, he wrote, “the only major New Deal programme which successfully
promoted economic recovery.”
A month ago Mr Bernanke and his closest aides began to think something similar might
now be needed. The Fed and the Treasury had already drawn up contingency plans,
thinking it would be months before a need arose. Then the financial hurricane blew up
over the weekend of September 13th and 14th. That is when Mr Paulson, Mr Bernanke
and Tim Geithner, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, decided not to
commit any public money to a bail-out of Lehman Brothers. They reasoned, wrongly,
that the financial system was adequately prepared. The company’s failure, coupled with
the near-bankruptcy of AIG, threw the safety of all financial institutions into doubt,
causing their stocks to plunge and borrowing costs to soar.
Several money-market funds that held Lehman debt reported negative returns, sparking a
flight of cash to the safety of Treasury bills that briefly pushed their yields close to zero.
On September 18th companies could no longer issue commercial paper. Banks,
anticipating huge demands from companies seeking funds, began hoarding cash, sending
the federal funds rate as high as 6%. That week, no investment-grade bonds were issued,
for the first time (holidays aside) since 1981.
Conceivably, the Fed could have contained the damage by supplying lots of cash. But
that would have meant ever greater and more creative use of its balance sheet. By
September 17th it had grown to $1 trillion, up by 10% in a fortnight, with most of it tied
up in loans to banks, investment banks, foreign central banks, AIG and Bear Stearns (see
chart 2). It was becoming the lender of first resort, not last.
Such steps were also courting political risk. After the rescue of AIG, Nancy Pelosi,
speaker of the House of Representatives, demanded, “Why does one person have the
right to grant $85 billion in a bail-out [to AIG] without the scrutiny and transparency the
American people deserve?” Mr Bernanke later acknowledged that the Fed wanted to get
out of crisis management, for which it lacked authority and broad support. “We prefer to
get back to monetary policy, which is our function, our key mission,” he told Congress
this week.
The Fed chairman told Mr Paulson on September 17th that the time had come to call for a
big injection of public money. By the next day Mr Paulson was in agreement and the two
men, after getting Mr Bush’s approval, approached Capitol Hill.
Mr Paulson’s first proposal left Democrats cold: it would give the Treasury virtually
unchecked authority for two years to spend up to $700 billion on mortgage assets or
anything else necessary to stabilise the system. It looked like a power-grab. Democrats
countered with several conditions: troubled mortgages would be modified where possible
to keep homeowners in their homes; an oversight board would watch over the
programme; taxpayers would share any gains for participating companies via shares or
warrants; and executives’ compensation would be capped. By September 24th, Mr
Paulson seemed to be bending to all these conditions. For its part, the finance industry is
ready to yield to all of these conditions in order to get something done. “It was a
gargantuan abyss that we faced last week,” says Steve Bartlett, chairman of the Financial
Services Roundtable, which represents about 100 big financial firms.
Assuming it comes into existence, there are still numerous risks surrounding the TARP.
The first is that it does too much. At $700 billion, the amount allocated to it easily
exceeds the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) estimate of roughly $500
billion of residential mortgages seriously delinquent in June, out of a total of $10.6
trillion, though that figure will rise. The Treasury has sought broad authority to buy not
just mortgage securities but anything related to them, such as credit derivatives, and if
necessary equity in companies weakened by their bad loans.
When the loans to AIG and Bear Stearns assets are added in, the gross public backing so
far approaches 6% of GDP, well above the 3.7% of the savings-and-loan bail-out in the
late 1980s and early 1990s (see chart 3). That would still be much less than the average
cost of resolving banking crises around the world in the past three decades, which a study
by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, of the IMF, puts at 16%. One reason why bail-outs,
especially in emerging markets, have been so costly is inadequate safeguards against
abuse, says Gerard Caprio, an economist at Williams College. “There was a lot of
outright looting going on.”
The Congressional Budget Office had pegged next year’s federal budget deficit at more
than $400 billion, or 3% of GDP. Private estimates top $600 billion. Tack on $700 billion
and various other crisis-related outlays and the total could reach 10% of GDP, notes
JPMorgan Chase, a level last seen in the second world war. On September 22nd the euro
made its largest-ever advance against the dollar on worries that America might one day
inflate its way out of those debts. Such fears are compounded by the expansion of the
Fed’s balance sheet. Some even think that the burden of repairing a broken financial
system could place the dollar’s status as the world’s leading reserve currency in jeopardy.
The consequences will probably not be so far-reaching. The true cost to taxpayers is
unlikely to be anywhere near $700 billion, because many of the acquired mortgages will
be repaid. The expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet reflects a fear-induced demand for
cash, which drove the federal funds rate above the 2% target.
It is more likely that the programme will not go far enough. Conscious of the public’s
deep antipathy to anything that smacks of favours for Wall Street, politicians from both
parties have insisted that the protection of the taxpayer be paramount. Yet the point of
bail-outs is to socialise losses that are clogging the financial system. If taxpayers are
completely insulated from losses, the bail-out will probably be ineffective. “The ultimate
taxpayer protection will be the market stability provided,” Mr Paulson argues.
This is especially critical in deciding how the government will set the price for the assets
it purchases. An impaired mortgage security might yield 65 cents on the dollar if held to
maturity. But because the market is so illiquid and suspicion about mortgage values so
high, it might fetch just 35 cents in the market today. Recapitalising banks would mean
paying as close to 65 cents as possible. Those that valued them at less on their books
could mark them up, boosting their capital. On the other hand, minimising taxpayer
losses would dictate that the government seek to pay only 35 cents. But this would
provide little benefit to the selling banks, and those that carried them at higher values on
their books could see their capital further impaired.
To some, that would be fine. “If they choose to fail rather than sell their debt at its real
market value and record the loss on the books, they should be free to take that option,”
said Michael Enzi, a Republican senator from Wyoming. The failure of smaller regional
banks may be tolerable. The FDIC offers a proven system for coping with failed entities
(although it too may need a loan from the taxpayer) and other banks are keen to snap up
their deposits. But the final result of big-bank failures would be a deeper crisis and a
bigger cost in lost economic output.
Similarly, requiring participating banks to give the government warrants or cap their
executives’ salaries might make them less willing to take part. Veterans of the emerging-
markets crises of the 1990s say their effectiveness would have been crippled had their
ability instantly to deploy cash as they saw fit been compromised. “There is far more risk
that the authorities will have too little flexibility…than there is risk that they will have
too much authority,” says Lawrence Summers, a former treasury secretary.
A more serious criticism is that buying assets is an inefficient way to recapitalise the
banking system. Better, many argue, to inject cash directly into weakened banks. A dollar
of new equity could support $10 in assets, reducing the pressure to deleverage. Moreover,
since the price of banks’ shares are less arbitrary and more homogeneous than those of
illiquid mortgage securities, the process would be far more transparent, says Doug
Elmendorf of the Brookings Institution. But banks might not volunteer to sell equity to
the government before they reach death’s door; and the prospect of share dilution could
discourage private investors. In any event, the Treasury plan could be flexible enough to
permit such capital injections.
There have been several false dawns since the crisis began in August of last year. This
could be another. The TARP may address the root cause, namely house prices and
mortgage defaults, but the crisis has long since mutated. “The same underlying
phenomenon that we saw in housing we’re seeing in auto loans, in credit-card loans and
student loans,” says Eric Mindich, head of Eton Park Capital Management, a hedge fund.
The crisis could claim another institution before the TARP’s effect is felt.
The TARP could conceivably slow the resolution of the crisis by stopping property prices
and home ownership falling to sustainable levels. Some homeowners who are up-to-date
with payments but whose home is worth less than their mortgage may stop paying,
betting the federal government will be a more forgiving creditor. The Treasury is
considering using the TARP to write down mortgages to levels that squeezed
homeowners can afford. But in the meantime, buyers might be reluctant to step in while a
big inventory of government-owned property hangs over the market. That’s one reason
Japan’s many efforts to bail out its banks failed to revitalise its economy: the institutions
that took over the loans were hesitant to dispose of them for fear of pushing insolvent
borrowers into bankruptcy, says Takeo Hoshi of the University of California at San
Diego.
All the same, the TARP is likely to mark a turning-point. “It promises to break the
vicious circle of deleveraging in the mortgage market,” predicts Jan Hatzius, an
economist at Goldman Sachs. This does not mean the economy will soon rebound, but it
does suggest the worst scenarios will be averted. If the TARP helps banks and investors
establish reliable prices for mortgage securities, it could restart lending and help bring the
housing crisis to an end.
This will not come without a price. The unprecedented intrusion of the federal
government into the capital markets seems certain to be accompanied by a heavier
regulatory hand, something on which both Barack Obama and John McCain now agree.
Even without new rules, more of the system will be regulated because so much of it has
been absorbed by banks, which are closely overseen. Sheila Bair, chairman of the FDIC,
thinks this is a good thing. Banks were relative pillars of stability because of their insured
deposits and the regulation that accompanied it. Although some banks have failed, she
notes that other banks, not taxpayers, will pay the clean-up costs. Now that institutions
like money-market funds are caught by the federal safety net even though that was never
intended, they can expect to pay for it.
Yet predictions of a sea change towards more invasive government are premature. The
Depression witnessed a pervasive expansion of the federal government into numerous
walks of life, from trucking and railways to farming, out of a broadly shared belief that
capitalism had failed utterly. If Mr Paulson and Mr Bernanke have prevented a
Depression-like collapse in economic output with their actions these past two weeks, then
they may also have prevented a Depression-like backlash against the free market.
American finance
THE radical overhaul of the City of London in 1986 was dubbed the Big Bang. The
brutal reshaping of Wall Street might be better described as the Big Implosion. The
“bulge-bracket” brokerage model—the envy of moneymen everywhere before the
crunch—has collapsed in on itself. Even more humiliating for the Green Berets of the
markets, the new force in finance is the government.
The last remaining investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, sought safety
by becoming bank holding companies after last week’s run on the industry, which sent
Wall Street scrambling for loans from the central bank (see chart). After Lehman
Brothers collapsed, the markets could no longer stomach their mix of illiquid assets and
unstable wholesale liabilities. Both will now start gathering deposits, a more stable form
of funding. Signing up strong partners should also help. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
(MUFG), a giant Japanese bank, will buy up to 20% of Morgan (see article). Goldman
has gone one better, coaxing $5 billion from Warren Buffett (see article).
Mr Buffett, no idle flatterer, describes Goldman as “exceptional”. But some doubt that it
will be able to adapt and thrive. As a bank, it faces more supervision from the Federal
Reserve, tougher capital requirements and restrictions on investing. Universal banks,
such as Citigroup and Bank of America, long dismissed as stodgy, argue that their vast
balance sheets and wide range of businesses, from credit cards to capital markets, give
them an edge in trying times. The head of one bank suggests that the golden years of risk-
taking enjoyed by investment banks in 2003-06 were an “aberration”, fuelled by the
global liquidity glut.
Private-equity firms and hedge funds spy opportunity, too. Blackstone’s Stephen
Schwarzman is keen to take advantage of Wall Street’s disarray. Kohlberg Kravis
Roberts, a rival, has ambitions to create a financial “ecosystem”. The buy-out barons got
good news this week, when the Fed relaxed its rules on their ownership of banks. One of
them, Christopher Flowers, bought a small lender in Missouri, which he may use to
hoover up other troubled financial firms. Citadel, a hedge-fund group that is already an
options marketmaker, is reportedly mulling a move into the advisory business. Hedge
funds have stepped up their financing of mid-tier firms that cannot get loans from Wall
Street.
These investors are also going after the “talent” in investment banks. Morale there is not
high. One executive admits that becoming a bank “does little for our cachet”. Hedge
funds will be particularly keen to get their hands on cutting-edge risk-takers, particularly
the Goldman crowd who used to thrive on leverage.
Power may shift in two other directions: abroad and, to a lesser extent, to boutique
investment banks. MUFG will be joined by others. After a brief wrangle in the
bankruptcy courts, Britain’s Barclays has taken over Lehman’s American operations and
quickly put its logo on the fallen firm’s headquarters. “Global financial power is
becoming more diffuse,” says Andrew Schwedel of Bain & Company, a consultancy.
Merger boutiques, such as Lazard and Greenhill, will emphasise their stability to pick up
business. Their shares have done relatively well this year.
But all is not lost for the former investment banks. For one thing, they may not have to
cut leverage by as much as feared. Though their overall leverage ratios are high, their
risk-adjusted capital ratios under the Basel 2 rules are stronger than those of most
commercial banks. They acknowledge, however, that they may have to raise these even
higher for a while to assuage market concerns about hard-to-sell assets.
Brad Hintz of Sanford Bernstein, an asset manager and research firm, reckons regulatory
shackles will cut Goldman’s return on equity by four percentage points over the cycle.
The bank disputes this. Either way, even if it is forced to tone down its in-house
proprietary trading it can make up for this by, for instance, launching more hedge funds.
And it faces no immediate pressure to sell its large private-equity or commodities
holdings. It will continue to co-invest in projects alongside clients, a key Goldman
strategy.
Moreover, there are some advantages to becoming a bank. Goldman and Morgan should
be able to amass deposits cheaply and easily, because dozens of regional lenders are
expected to fail. Almost one-fifth have less capital than regulators consider a safe
minimum. However, the new banks will be under scrutiny to ensure they do not put those
deposits at great risk.
As sharp distressed-debt investors, they will also be looking to buy assets from the
government’s giant loan-buying entity when it gets going. This is likely to be more
helpful to them than to commercial banks, which have marked down their mortgage
assets less and will not benefit as much when clearing prices are set.
Given the acute stress that remains in money markets, however, the accent for the time
being is still on survival. Morgan Stanley’s debt with a maturity of four months was
trading to yield as much as 37.5%. Maybe it should consider using credit cards instead.
Financial firms fear further fallout from the recent, potentially catastrophic run on
money-market funds, after several of the supposedly ultra-safe vehicles saw their net
asset values slip below the sacrosanct $1 level at which investors break even. Only when
the government stepped in to guarantee that no more funds would “break the buck” did a
semblance of calm return. But “prime” money funds, which are big buyers of corporate
debt, are still pulling away from anything deemed risky. This is a big problem for banks,
since some $1.3 trillion of their short-term debt is held by such funds, and they may have
to turn to longer-term (and dearer) sources.
It seems implausible that the investment bank will make a comeback, given the speed
with which it has unravelled. Yet, 75 years after the legal separation of commercial and
investment banking, America has made a full return to the one-stop-shop model practised
by John Pierpont Morgan. Another black swan in 2083, and who knows?
Data mining
Know-alls
Sep 25th 2008
IF A Muslim chemistry graduate takes an ill-paid job at a farm-supplies store what does it
signify? Is he just earning extra cash, or getting close to a supply of potassium nitrate
(used in fertiliser, and explosives)? What if apparent strangers with Arabic names have
wired him money? What if he has taken air flights with one of those men, with separate
reservations and different seats, paid in cash? What if his credit-card records show
purchases of gadgets such as timing devices?
If the authorities can and do collect such bits of data, piecing them together offers the
tantalising prospect of foiling terrorist conspiracies. It also raises the spectre of
criminalising or constraining innocent people’s eccentric but legal behaviour.
In November 2002 news reports revealed the existence of a big, secret Pentagon
programme called Total Information Awareness. This aimed to identify suspicious
patterns of behaviour by “data mining” (also known as “pattern recognition”): computer-
driven searches of large quantities of electronic information. After a public outcry it was
dubbed, perhaps more palatably, Terrorism Information Awareness. But protests
continued, and in September 2003 Congress blocked its funding.
That, many people may have assumed, was that. But six of TIA’s seven components
survived as secret stand-alone projects with classified funding. A report in February by
America’s Department of Homeland Security named three programmes it operates to
sniff out suspicious patterns in the transport of goods. Similar projects have mushroomed
in, among other countries, Britain, China, France, Germany and Israel.
Civil-liberties defenders are trying hard to stop data-mining becoming a routine tool for
the FBI to spy on ordinary Americans. They say that the administration is racing in its
final months to formalise in law programmes that have run solely under authorisation
from the White House that bypasses Congress. One pending change would authorise
more intelligence sharing between federal and local officials. In a federal court filing
made public on September 20th, America’s attorney-general, Michael Mukasey, sought
legal immunity for telecoms firms which have provided details on international phone
calls. What happens in practice, and what the law permits, is a hot and unresolved issue.
Last month, after a briefing by the Department of Justice about a secret data-mining plan
for the FBI, a group of American lawmakers wrote to Mr Mukasey complaining that the
plan would allow the FBI to spy on Americans “without any basis for suspicion”. The
proposed project could be made public in coming weeks.
Fast company
FAST, a Norwegian company bought by Microsoft this year for $1.3 billion, collects data
from more than 300 sources (including the web) for national data-mining programmes in
a dozen countries in Asia, Europe and North America. In April British members of
Parliament learned that almost a year earlier the home secretary, Jacqui Smith, had
secretly authorised the transfer of licence-plate data recorded by roadside cameras to
foreign intelligence agencies. In June the Swedish Parliament voted into law a data-
mining programme strongly backed by the defence ministry. From January 1st it will
provide sweeping powers to monitor international electronic messages and telephone
traffic.
Companies, and especially credit-reporting firms, generally enjoy more latitude than
government bodies do in making personal information available to third parties. They
find intelligence agencies are eager clients. Chris Westphal, head of Visual Analytics, a
firm in Poolesville, Maryland that operates data-mining software for security and
intelligence agencies, says the data provided by such firms is “very significant”.
Narayanan Kulathuramaiyer, an expert in data mining at UNIMAS, a Malaysian
university, says companies are selling database access to intelligence and law-
enforcement agencies “at a level you would not even imagine”.
Spies are increasingly snooping on private internet use. Katharina von Knop, a data-
mining expert at the University of German Federal Armed Forces in Munich, says many
systems remotely analyse the content of web pages people visit. A man who has travelled
to, say, Peshawar, a stronghold of Islamist extremism in Pakistan, is considered more
dangerous if he also reads the blog of an extremist Muslim cleric. If the cleric lives in
Peshawar, the man’s suspicion score rises further. Data-mining software develops
profiles by taking into account all web pages visited by a computer user; if a suspect
visits a stamp-collecting website, the suspicion score is lowered.
Such profiling increasingly relies on “sentiment analysis”. Hsinchun Chen, head of the
Artificial Intelligence Lab at the University of Arizona says this technique, which he
performs for American and international intelligence agencies, is an emerging and
booming field. The goal is to identify changes in the behaviour and language of internet
users that could indicate that angry young men are becoming potential suicide-bombers.
For example, a person who exhibits curiosity by visiting many Islamist websites and
asking numerous questions in online forums might be flagged by sentiment-analysis
software if he shows signs of resentment and eventually turns to “radicalising” others by,
say, justifying violence and providing links to militant videos. Mr Chen says intelligence
agencies in the United States, Canada, China, Germany, Israel, Singapore and Taiwan are
customers for this technique.
Does it work?
Donald Tighe, vice-president for public affairs at In-Q-Tel, a non-profit investment outfit
that helps the CIA stay abreast of advances in computing, says that data mining is now so
powerful it has become “essential to our national security”. But campaigners for privacy
have many worries. One fear, prevalent in Britain after incidents in which officials lost
huge quantities of confidential personal information, is that the state may be even more
careless with data than private firms are. Another is that innocents are flagged for further
investigation or added to “watch-lists” that may impede air travel, banking and gaining
jobs in places where radioactive materials are used, such as hospitals. The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a lobby, says the list maintained by the Terrorist
Screening Centre at the FBI now has more than 900,000 names, with 20,000 more every
month. Being removed is tricky.
Data-mining may be bad for national security as well as for civil liberties. The software is
often modelled on the fraud-detection applications used by financial institutions. But
terrorism is much rarer. So spotting conditions that may precede attacks is harder. Mike
German, a former FBI agent who now advises the ACLU, says intelligence agencies too
readily believe in the “snake oil” of total information awareness, which drains effort from
more useful activities such as using informers and infiltrators.
Abdul Bakier, a former official in Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, says that
tips to foil data-mining systems are discussed at length on some extremist online forums.
Tricks such as calling phone-sex hotlines can help make a profile less suspicious. “The
new generation of al-Qaeda is practising all that,” he says.
Last year two pattern-detection programmes, ADVISE and TALON, run respectively by
America’s Department of Homeland Security and the Pentagon, were shut down
following privacy concerns and irregularities. Privacy advocates, however, say that other
programmes continue—and many are operated, with minimal oversight, by the National
Security Agency. The NSA insists that it does keep Congress informed. It also vigorously
defends data mining, saying that if today’s systems were in place before the terrorist
attacks of September 11th 2001, some of the hijackers would have been identified.
Mr Bush says that FISA helps protect citizens’ liberties “while maintaining the vital flow
of intelligence”. Several hours after the president signed the bill into law, the ACLU filed
a federal lawsuit, on the grounds that the executive branch’s expanded wiretapping
powers violated the constitution.
Sinan Gailan Hameed was born on June 11, 1978, in Baghdad, Iraq. He was
educated in local public schools and graduated from Tariq Bin Ziad High School in 1996.
He, then, accompanied his parents to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya where he graduated
from Misurata University in 2002. His degree was a Bachelor of Arts in English
Language and Literature.
Mr. Hameed had his first post in Libya as a cooperative teacher of English
grammar in 2001 at Um Al-Qura Secondary School for Girls. In 2003, he moved to the
United Arab Emirates and worked as an Executive Secretary and personal Assistant at
ITEICO Green Building Investments L.L.C. in Dubai. In 2006, Mr. Hameed began a
master’s program in Translation and Interpreting at the American University of Sharjah.
He was awarded the Master of Arts degree in Translation and Interpreting in 2009.