10 in Re - Ngo Burca v. Republic

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-24252. January 30, 1967.]

IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all quali cations


and none of the disquali cations for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her alien
registry with the Bureau of Immigration, ZITA NGO BURCA,
petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.

Solicitor General for oppositor and appellant.


Imperio & Tinio and Artemio Derecho for petitioner and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; ALIEN WOMAN WHO MARRIES A FILIPINO DOES NOT


AUTOMATICALLY BECOME FILIPINO CITIZEN. — By constitutional and legal precepts,
an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the mere act of marriage -
automatically become a Filipino citizen.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITE FOR ADMISSION TO CITIZENSHIP. — Jurisprudence has
since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory precepts with a uniform
pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a
citizen of the Philippines, unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized (Cua vs. Board, etc., 101 Phil. 521; Ly Giok Ha, et al., vs. Galang, et al., 101
Phil. 459; Lee Giok Ha, et al vs. Galang, etc. et al., G.R. No. L-21332, March 18, 1966; Lee
Suan Ay, et al. vs. Galang, etc., et al., 106 Phil., 706). Which means that, in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess
the quali cations under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the
disquali cations enumerated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Lo San
Tuang vs. Galang, G. R. No. L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Tong Siok Sy vs. Vivo, etc., et al., G.
R. No. L-21136. Dec. 27, 1963; Lao Chay, et al., vs. Galang, G. R. No. L- 19977, Oct. 30,
1964; Choy King Tee vs. Galang, G. R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965; Austria, et al. vs.
Conchu, G. R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965; Co. Im Ty vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, July
30, 1966).
3. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE. — Re ection will reveal why this must be so.
The quali cations prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disquali cations enumerated in its Section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and if all that
were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disquali ed under Section 4, the
result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute.
4. ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE OF CITIZENSHIP SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN BLINDLY TO
ALIEN WOMAN; SCOPE OF RULE. — The political privilege of citizenship should not be
handed out blindly to any alien woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino -
"irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identi cation with Filipino
ideals, customs and traditions" (Choy King Tee vs. Galang, supra; Brito, et al vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965). The rule heretofore
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adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a natural born Filipino (Austria, et
al vs. Conchu, supra), a naturalized Filipino (Ly Hiok Ha, et al. vs. Galang, et al., 101 Phil.
459; Lo San Tuang vs. Galang, supra; Lao Chay, et al. vs. Galang, supra) or a Filipino by
election.
5. ID.; CITIZENSHIP NOT PROPER FOR DECLARATORY PROCEEDINGS. —
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship (Channie
Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-15775, April 29,
1961; Palaran vs. Republic, G. R. No. L- 15047, January 30, 1962). Citizenship is not an
appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings (Obiles vs. Republic, 92 Phil.
864; Delumen, et al. vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 287; Tan vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-16108, Oct.
31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, G. R. No. L- 14653, Jan. 31, 1963; Board of
Commissioners vs. Domingo G. R. No. L- 21274, July 31, 1963). In one case, we held
that citizenship of an alien woman married to a Filipino must be determined in an
"appropriate proceeding" (Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, supra).
6. ID.; ID.; ALIEN WOMAN MUST FILE PETITION FOR CITIZENSHIP TO
ACQUIRE STATUS OF FILIPINO CITIZEN. — If an alien woman married to a Filipino does
not become ipso facto a citizen, then she must have to le a "petition for citizenship" in
order that she may acquire the status of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law in which the plain language is: "Any person
desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, shall le with the competent court" a petition
for the purpose. And this, because such alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to
acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8 of the same law points out, is the Court of First
Instance of the province where the petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition".
7. ID.; RESOLUTION OF CITIZENSHIP OF ALIEN WOMAN RESTS
EXCLUSIVELY WITH COMPETENT COURTS. — The determination of whether said alien
wife should be given the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to
competent courts. That this is so, is exempli ed by the fact that this Court has taken
jurisdiction in one such case originating from the Court of First Instance, where an alien
woman had directly sought naturalization in her favor (Co Im Ty vs. Republic, supra).
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other o ce agency,
board or o cial, to determine such a question, we are persuaded to say that resolution
thereof rests exclusively with the competent Courts.
8. ID.; RULES TO FOLLOW RE ALIEN WOMAN. — We accordingly rule that (1)
an alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must
apply therefor by ling a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
quali cations set forth in Section 2, and none of the disquali cations under Section 4,
both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) said petition must be led in the Court of
First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the
ling of the petition; and (3) any action by any other o ce, agency, board or o cial,
administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a competent court of justice
— certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.
9. NATURALIZATION; APPLICANT MUST ALLEGE ALL PLACES OF
RESIDENCE; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT. — Section 7 of the Naturalization Law
requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former
places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and
physically resided (Tan vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-22207, May 30, 1966). The reason for
exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that
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information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided
by people in his actual, physical surrounding" (Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Qua vs.
Republic, G. R. No. L-19834, Oct. 27, 1964). And the State is deprived of full opportunity
to make inquiries as to petitioner's tness to become a citizen, if all the places of
residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of
residence is fatal (Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Chang vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-20713,
April 29, 1966; Chan Kiat Huat vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-19579, Feb. 28, 1966; Republic
vs. Reyes, et al., G. R, No. L-20602, Dec. 24, 1965).
10. ID.; APPLICANT MUST SUBMIT AFFIDAVIT OF TWO CREDIBLE PERSONS;
REASONS FOR REQUIREMENT. — The necessity for the a davit of two witnesses
cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses are. The State
should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain
whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its
face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner".
These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the
character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail (Ong Kim Kong vs. Republic,
G. R. No. L-20505, Feb. 28, 1966, citing Ong vs. Republic, 55 Off. Gaz. No. 18, p. 3290).

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J : p

On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca — "as
possessing all quali cations and none of the disquali cations for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the
Bureau of Immigration." 1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca,
a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she
was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she
was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder of Native Born Certi cate
of Residence No. 46333. After making a number of other allegations and setting forth
certain denials, she manifests that "she has all the quali cations required under Section
2 and none of the disquali cations under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473"
aforesaid.
Notice of hearing was sent to the Solicitor General and duly published.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the petition on two main
grounds, viz: (1) that "there is no proceeding established by law, or the rules for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual"; and (2) that as an application for
Philippine citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention
the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law", such as,
among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits
of at least two supporting witnesses.
Trial was held on December 18, 1964. Sole witness was petitioner. With the
documentary evidence admitted, the case was submitted for decision.
The judgment appealed from, dated December 18, 1964, reads:
"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the opposition,
and declaring that ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner, has all the quali cations
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and none of the disquali cations to become a Filipino Citizen and that she
being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby declared a citizen of the
Philippines, after taking the necessary oath of allegiance, as soon as this
decision becomes final and executory."

The controlling facts are not controverted. Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in
Gigaquit, Surigao (now Surigao del Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was Ngo Tay
Suy, and her mother was Dee See alias Lee Co, now both deceased and citizens of
Nationalist Republic of China. She holds native born Certi cate of Residence 46333 and
Alien Certi cate of Registration A-148054. She married Florencio Burca, a native-born
Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
1. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino
citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage — automatically become a Filipino
citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public o ce in
the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and,


upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

And, on the speci c legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the
Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law —
legislated the following:
"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines."

Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the constitutional and statutory
precepts just quoted with a uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino
citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is proof
that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. 2 Which means that, in line with the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, the wife must possess the
quali cations under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the Revised Naturalization Law. 3
This Court, in Ly Giok Ha, et al., vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18, 1966,
explains the reasons for the rule in this wise:
"Re ection will reveal why this must be so. The quali cations
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disquali cations enumerated in its section 4, are not mutually exclusive; and
if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino be not disquali ed
under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred
upon persons in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4
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disqualifies only —
'(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude', so
that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not
previously convicted by a competent court, would not be thereby
disquali ed; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such a person to be
admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2 that an
applicant for citizenship 'must be of good moral character'.
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial
supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right to vote
exclusively by certain 'herrenvolk', and thus disbelieve in the principles
underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be disquali ed
under section 4, as long as she is not opposed to 'organized government',
nor a liated to groups 'upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all
organized government', nor 'defending or teaching the necessity or propriety
of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of their ideas'. Et sic de caeteris".

Indeed, the political privilege of citizenship should not be handed out blindly to
any alien woman on the sole basis of her marriage to a Filipino — "irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identi cation with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions". 4
The rule heretofore adverted to is to be observed whether the husband be a
natural born Filipino, 5 a naturalized Filipino, 6 or a Filipino by election.
2. We next go to the mechanics of implementation of the constitutional and
legal provisions, as applied to an alien woman married to a Filipino. We part from the
premise that such alien woman does not, by the fact of marriage, acquire Philippine
citizenship. The statute heretofore quoted (Sec. 15, Revised Naturalization Law), we
repeat, recites that she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized".
How then shall she be "deemed" a citizen of the Philippines? An examination of
the Revised Naturalization Law is quite revealing. For instance, minor children of
persons naturalized under the law who were born in the Philippines "shall be considered
citizens thereof". Similarly, a foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the
time of the naturalization of the parents, "shall automatically become a Filipino citizen".
7 No conditions are exacted; citizenship of said minor children is conferred by the law
itself, without further proceedings and as a matter of course. An alien wife of a Filipino
does not t into either of the categories just mentioned. Legal action has to be taken to
make her a citizen.
There is no law or rule which authorizes a declaration of Filipino citizenship. 8
Citizenship is not an appropriate subject for declaratory judgment proceedings. 9 And
in one case, we held that citizenship of an alien woman married to a Filipino must be
determined in an "appropriate proceeding". 1 0
Speculations arise as to the import of the term "appropriate proceeding". The
record of this case discloses that, in some quarters, opinion is advanced that the
determination of whether an alien woman married to a Filipino shall be deemed a
Filipino citizen, may be made by the Commissioner of Immigration. 1 1 Conceivably,
absence of clear legal direction on the matter could have given rise to divergence of
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views. We should aim at drying up sources of doubt. Parties interested should not be
enmeshed in jurisdictional entanglements. Public policy and sound practice, therefore,
suggest that a clear-cut ruling be made on this subject.
If an alien woman married to a Filipino does not become ipso facto a citizen, then
she must have to le a " petition for citizenship " in order that she may acquire the status
of a Filipino citizen. Authority for this view is Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law
in which the plain language is: "Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship,
shall le with the competent court" a petition for the purpose. And this, because such
alien woman is not a citizen, and she desires to acquire it. The proper forum, Section 8
of the same law points out, is the Court of First Instance of the province where the
petitioner has resided "at least one year immediately preceding the ling of the
petition".
It is quite plain that the determination of whether said alien wife should be given
the status of a citizen should fall within the area allocated to competent courts. That
this is so, is exempli ed by the fact that this Court has taken jurisdiction in one such
case originating from the court of rst instance, where an alien woman had directly
sought naturalization in her favor. 1 2
And, as nothing in the Revised Naturalization Law empowers any other o ce,
agency, board or o cial, to determine such question, we are persuaded to say that
resolution thereof rests exclusively with the competent courts.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to
be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by ling a petition for citizenship
reciting that she possesses all the quali cations set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disquali cations under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be led in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least
one year immediately preceding the ling of the petition; and (3) Any action by any
other o ce, agency, board or o cial, administrative or otherwise — other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of a
Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of
the law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be. Because a reading of the
petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove
afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. The
trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact,
declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines".
We go to the merits of the petition.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao; that
her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal
St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testi ed that she also resided in Junguera St.,
Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
"present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where
petitioner actually and physically resided. 1 3 Cebu, where she studied for one year,
perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition
of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and
objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding". 1 4 And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to
petitioner's tness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in
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the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. 1 5
Viewed from another direction, we nd one other aw in petitioner's petition.
Said petition is not supported by the a davit of at least two credible persons, "stating
that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of
good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all
the quali cations necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way
disquali ed under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the
names and post-o ce addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case". 1 6
The necessity for the a davit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is
important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the
opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good
standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could
serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should
indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short
of this, the petition must fail. 1 7
Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other
witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement.
Upon the view we take of this case, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the petition dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar
and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Special Proceeding 653-O, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc city), R. A. p.
5.
2. Cua vs. Board, etc., 101 Phil. 521, 523; Ly Giok Ha, et al., vs. Galang, et al., 101 Phil. 459,
463. See also the second case of Ly Giok Ha, et al., vs. Galang, et al., L-21332, March 18,
1966; Lee Suan Ay, et al., vs. Galang, etc., et al., L-11855, December 23, 1959.
3. Lo San Tuang vs. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; Tong Siok Sy vs. Vivo, etc., et al.,
L-21136, December 27, 1963; Lao Chay, et al., vs. Galang, L-19977, October 30, 1964;
Choy King Tee vs. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Austria, et al., vs. Conchu, L-20716,
June 22, 1965; Co Im Ty vs. Republic, L-17919, July 30, 1966. .
4. Choy King Tee vs. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965.
5. Austria, et al., vs. Conchu, supra.
6. Ly Giok Ha, et al., vs. Galang, et al., 101 Phil. 459, 460; Lo San Tuang vs. Galang, supra;
Lao Chay, et al., vs. Galang, supra.
7. Paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 15, Revised Naturalization Law.
8. Channie Tan vs. Republic, L-14159, April 18, 1960; Tan Yu Chin vs. Republic, L-15775,
April 29, 1961; Palaran vs. Republic, L-15047, January 30, 1962.
9. Obiles vs. Republic, 92 Phil. 864, 867; Delumen, et al., vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 287, 289; Tan
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vs. Republic, L-16108, October 31, 1961; Santiago vs. Commissioner, L-14653, January
31, 1963; Board of Commissioners vs. Domingo, L-21274, July 31, 1963.
10. Brito, et al., vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965.
11. Rollo, pp. 32-45.

12. Co Im Ty vs. Republic, supra.


13. Tan vs. Republic, L-22207, May 30, 1966.
14. Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Qua vs. Republic, L-19834, October 27, 1964.
15. Tan vs. Republic, supra, citing Chang vs. Republic, L-20713, April 29, 1966; Chan Kiat
Huat vs. Republic, L-19579, February 28, 1966; Republic vs. Reyes, et al., L-20602,
December 24, 1965.
16. Section 7, Revised Naturalization Law.
17. Ong Kim Kong vs. Republic, L-20505, February 28, 1966, citing Ong vs. Republic, 55
O.G. No. 18, pp. 3290, 3295.

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