Co Kim Cham V Tan Keh
Co Kim Cham V Tan Keh
Co Kim Cham V Tan Keh
SUPREME COURT government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the
Manila people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation
and control;
EN BANC
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect
and legally binding upon the people in areas of the
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner, Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other
First Instance of Manila, respondents.1
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner. areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh. control.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and
FERIA, J.: on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the
Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers
and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the
Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."
respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated
under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the
established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands. principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be
reduced to the following:(1) Whether the judicial acts and
proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation
were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or
issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the
reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and
forces; (2)Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by
judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and
established during the Japanese military occupation, and that,
processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of
furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in
of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has
defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law
invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and proceedings of the
granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and
said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not
memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government
been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were
the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and
no de facto governments.
continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the
Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the
of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the
"the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as
the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether
Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all
proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the
public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
faithfully their duties as before."
were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
A civil government or central administration organization under the Filipino forces.
name of "Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order
No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts
Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was
and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial
appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the
departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The
immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs
question to be determined is whether or not the governments
and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine
approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise
Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the
jurisdiction over judicial courts.
Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments.
If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of
administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or
justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth
government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of
instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission
the majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself
by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in
against the will of the latter, such as the government of England
the latter's Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic
under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell
principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in
as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained
exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of
by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in
said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and
the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing
paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was
statutes, orders, ordinances and customs. . . ."
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico,
Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was United States. And the third is that established as an independent
inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned against the parent state of such as the government of the Southern
during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the
administered and enforced. first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto
governments.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte,
General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme
the Philippines which declared: Court of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8
Wall., 1), said: "But there is another description of government,
called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might,
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the
perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount
Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the
force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is
maintained by active military power with the territories, and against ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the
the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and supervision of the American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's
(2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.)
private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to
such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of
acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
the United States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra,
Actual governments of this sort are established over districts
recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de
differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually
facto government. In that case, it was held that "the central
administered directly by military authority, but they may be
government established for the insurgent States differed from the
administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by
temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance
military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in
that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it
the case of Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war
was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think
of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found
that it must be classed among the governments of which these are
in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the
examples. . . .
troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614).
These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull
and regular governments at war with the country of which the In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme
territory so possessed was part." Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the
Confederate States, said: "The same general form of government,
the same general laws for the administration of justice and
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description
protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to
are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which
the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far
is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on
as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the
the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the
supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens
legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the
under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid
occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and
and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law.
insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
ed., 657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected,
belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the
insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time
possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the
suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States
changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, touching these and kindered subjects, where they were not hostile in
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the
occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under
those laws which enforce public order and regulate social and the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous
commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political other cases."
nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the
right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press,
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388,
and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered
400), held: "That what occured or was done in respect of such
as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation.
matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto
Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as
governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely
a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is
because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union
not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his
established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence
own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to
of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not
continue administering justice; and judges and other judicial officers
relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the
are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent
necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do
occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the
away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws,
supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the
and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as
Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice
organized within the enemy's territory although they may have
have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject,
indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful
and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the
government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were
President of the United States.
without blame 'except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and "That judicial
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called
work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were
belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority
its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the under the Constitution."
Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which
Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such
23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil
authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
government established by the military forces of occupation and
established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the
therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not
writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law
different from the government established by the British in Castine,
of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the
Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says,
laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military
"The government established over an enemy's territory during the
occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the
military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of
acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de
war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all
facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing
restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence
laws or make new ones."
whether such government be called a military or civil government.
Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far
an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world,
Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts." (Vol.
Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating to the occupation of the 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a
Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though the powers civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not
of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of existing administration under the general direction of a french
person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same
considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France, authorized the local
the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently
the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually without appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI,
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered 307.). The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in
by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars.
adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they
accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government ." (Hall,
organized as a sovereign state independent from any other International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the
government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the
government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has
forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty
Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence
the same — the Japanese military authority and government. As to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the
General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.)
portion of which has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a
so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the Philippines' was
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto
established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free
governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and
expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of
remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a
the United States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence
belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by
to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to,
General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null
or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its
and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments
military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into
established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it
an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of
would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate
peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a
them if they were invalid ab initio.
well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article
45 of the Hauge Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of
the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the 2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase
hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially "processes of any other government" as used in the above-quoted
provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 —
controlled although the de jure government is during the period of that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of
occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. the American Forces to annul and void thereby all judgments and
(Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes during the Japanese military occupation.
vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the
Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may
people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese
refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or
gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into
legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the
the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief
Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands
that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the
during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact
neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States
that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of
and other allied nations.
international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are
not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and
by the free will of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the
withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not,
occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
an independent government under the name with the support and MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government"
backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said
one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of
the parent state or the Unite States. And as such, it would have been the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other
a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate than judicial processes of court proceedings, for according to a well-
states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the by known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028,
the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. any other possible construction remains."
Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the
It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of
Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the
occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs.
suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied
United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-
territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation
named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on
demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of
December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional
nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military
government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in
forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been
insurrection against Spain, took possession of the Islands and
occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration
established a republic, governing the Islands until possession thereof
of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of
was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And the
the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the
said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of
exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of
the class of de facto governments described in I Moore's
occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur,
International Law Digest, S 20, . . . 'called also by publicists a
who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government
government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly
and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in
denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say,
chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the
that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces
principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the
in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the
United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the
same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of
Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague
an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power.
Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed
that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the
being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the
acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, international policy and practice of his own government, but also
which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of
virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in our Constitution, which provides that "The Philippines renounces war
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to Nation."
that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and
of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a
public hardship would result, and great public interests would be
very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader,
endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged
which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do.
would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified,
Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a
sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily
political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that
become immune for evidence against them may have already
they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the
disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all
various acts done during the same time by private persons under the
court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a
sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole
consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of
social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as
statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result
between the state and the individuals the evil would be scarcely
from a particular construction, or great public interests would be
less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made
endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction
under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the
is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such
general interest that the sentences passed upon criminals should be
construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to
required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C. L., pp. 1025, assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals
1027.) of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B.,
857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of
justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular
nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights,
sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied
by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of
by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or
liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or
proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the
setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation
right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety
during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these
during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social
precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare
life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be
them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts
expected that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to
the right and action of the nationals of the territory during the
courts whose judgements or decisions may afterwards be annulled,
military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that
and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or
a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time
offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if
empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether
judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
the President or commanding officer of the United States Army has
violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and
proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the
impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Ochoa, vs.
of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from
by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the general rules of international law and from fundamental principles
Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. known wherever the American flag flies."
Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided
"that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order
of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision."
issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United States
This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and
in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation
decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within
have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur
its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts
of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases
approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of
which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese
the same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of
occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March
military officers in command of the several states then lately in
10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be
rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said; "We have
presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the
looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867.
Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila
They give very large governmental powers to the military
on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the
commanders designated, within the States committed respectively
restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost
to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order
all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the
here in question. . . . The clearest language would be necessary to
Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First
satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts
Instance during the Japanese regime.
should be so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch of authority,
needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we
Law which say: "Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that
valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are
subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency
instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4
international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C.,
most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint
the matter can hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, indicated, we hold that the order was void."
International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And
from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the conclusion that
It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur
whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not,
of October 23, 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and
is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of
there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored
the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in
government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has
denies to the restored government the right of exercise its discretion
not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a
on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of
political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that
recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation,
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid
abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation of
regulations and processes other than judicial of the government the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that
the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the
government" and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not necessary
Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and
to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power
continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine
to annul and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts
Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the
during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is
Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in
whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the
actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were
President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the
reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the
proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared
Commonwealth Government was restored.
null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it
would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case
whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and
them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide, judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as
undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not
limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of Military Forces of usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but
liberation or subsequent conqueror. continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of
the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to
respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they
international law, as they result from the usages established
(the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to
between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the
remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals
requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from the law
substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened
of nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake,
practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the
occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical
Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in
point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the
discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the
right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of
obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the
government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point
same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to
of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of
declare . . . suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of
the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local
the nationals of the hostile party," forbids him to make any
laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor,
International Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been of their powers in the name of French people and government was at
adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the
occupation is essentially provisional, and the government use of the name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and
established by the occupant of transient character. Lorraine," but later offered to allow use of the name of the Emperor
or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed.
1944, p. 244.)
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations,
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3,
1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political
martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the some
"all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of
and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the time sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III,
being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met.,
present post and carry on faithfully their duties as before." When the 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws
Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum
the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt
Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final
and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed
justices of the peace of courts, with the same jurisdiction in condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or
conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of
the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign
on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines by legislative acts creates a change."
was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no
substantial change in organization and jurisdiction thereof.
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon
that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction,
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior it is evident that such laws, not being a political nature, are not
to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force "ex
Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A
Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is
to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such
conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of
and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which
the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had
continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in become the courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating
speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until
upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue
with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before
resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until
elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of upon them are repealed by the said government. As a consequence,
absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one
International Public Law, p. 615.) court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not
required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They
are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in
jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking
support in his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in
presided over by him "has no authority to take cognizance of, and
order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said
continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and
cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty
unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines . . .
in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the
shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of
possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court
the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases
was continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take
commenced and the left pending therein," is "that said courts were a
cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the
government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they
Spanish sovereignty until the said "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was
enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to
abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of Act No.
Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws — and the
136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance
courts had become the institutions — of Japan by adoption (U.S. vs.
of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking
Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws
cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of
and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the
sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them
Republic of the Philippines."
and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in
substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order
that the laws and institutions of the country occupied if continued by that the courts in the Island were continued.
the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by
adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of
territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military
Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the
occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer
provost courts created by the military government of occupation in
the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What
the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same
the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are continued in
section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending
use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from
in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of
him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws
the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having
and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and
jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the
institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the
criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was
courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being
abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided
continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of
that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the
Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague
municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the
Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the
latter.
population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile
power, "extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a
change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty That the present courts as the same courts which had been
is neither to innovate in the political life of the occupied districts, nor functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue
needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of
the courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive
territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our
name of the legitimate sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive
second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor need Order provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established
not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in under Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be abolished, as it is
1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by hereby abolished," and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore
ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to
to administer justice in the name of the "High German Powers the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so providing, the said
occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the ground that the exercise Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same
that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the The occupation applies only to be territory where such
Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in discussing authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.
the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending
therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945)
ARTICLE XLIII. The authority of the legitimate power having
been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming
actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the later
from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the
shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as
Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese
country. (32 Stat. II, 1821.)
occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had,
prior to and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been dully
appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the The above provisions of the Hague Convention have been adopted
Supreme Court for final decision. by the nations giving adherence to them, among which is United
States of America (32 Stat. II, 1821).
It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to
continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant
complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the may exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual
Commonwealth Government. possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be
exercised upon principles of international Law (New Orleans vs.
Steamship Co, [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99
Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of
U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law
First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment
Ed., 1260; II Oppenheim of International Law, section 167).
the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of
the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government,
pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said There can be no question that the Philippines was under Japanese
Government; and that the respondent judge of the court, having military occupation, from January, 1942, up to the time of the
refused to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office reconquest by the armed forces of the United States of the Island of
as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and Luzon, in February, 1945.
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into
consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein
It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded State
involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other
continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant
cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands.
unfavorably. The regular judicial Tribunals of the occupied territory
continue usual for the invader to take the whole administration into
In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of his own hands, partly because it is easier to preserve order through
mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of the agency of the native officials, and partly because it is easier to
First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and partly
continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of because the latter are more competent to administer the laws in
said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. force within the territory and the military occupant generally keeps
in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are
willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.
the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by
him.(Young vs. U.S., 39; 24 Law, ed., 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee,
97 U.S., 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. U.S., 229 U.S., 416; 33
Sup. Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; Taylor on International Law,
sections 576. 578; Wilson on International Law; pp. 331-37; Hall on
Separate Opinions
International Law, 6th Edition [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476;
Lawrence on International Law, 7th ed., pp. 412, 413; Davis,
DE JOYA, J., concurring: Elements of International Law, 3rd ed., pp. 330-332 335; Holland on
International Law pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake on International Law,
2d ed., pp. 121-23.)
The principal question involved in this case is the validity of the
proceedings held in civil case No. 3012, in the Court of First Instance
of the City of Manila, under the now defunct Philippine Republic, It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government
during Japanese occupation; and the effect on said proceedings of under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation,
the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur, dated October 23, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting the local
1944. The decision of this question requires the application of courts to function and administer such laws, as proclaimed in the
principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law City of Manila, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Imperial
in force in this country, before and during Japanese occupation. Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and
principles of International Law.
Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of
general law (Juntington vs. Attril, 146 U.S., 657; 13 Sup. Ct. 224; 36 If the military occupant is thus in duly bound to establish in the
Law. ed., 1123); and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, territory under military occupation governmental agencies for the
under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, it is preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of
a part of the fundamental law of the land (Article II, section 3). justice, in accordance with the laws in force within territory it must
necessarily follow that the judicial proceedings conducted before the
courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal
As International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be
and valid, even after said government establish by the military
ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever questions of
occupant has been displaced by the legitimate government of the
right depending upon it are presented for our determination, sitting
territory.
as an international as well as a domestic Tribunal (Kansas vs.
Colorado, 185 U.S., 146; 22 Sup. Ct. 552; 46 Law. Ed., 838).
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the
American Civil War, merely settling the rights of private parties
Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by
actually within their jurisdiction, not tending to defeat the legal
nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of the
rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws
existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of nations to
passed in aid of the rebellion had been declared valid and binding
abide by that rule; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the
(Cock vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs.
usages and customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages
Tennessee, 97 U. S., 509; 24 Law. ed., 118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.
and customs are, the universal practice is to turn to the writings of
S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20
publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of the different
id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99
countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U.S., 677; 20 Sup. Cit., 290;
U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in
44 Law. ed., 320).
November, 1861, for the purchase money of slaves was held valid
judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871(French vs. Tumlin,
But while usage is the older and original source of International Law, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).
great international treaties are a later source of increasing
importance, such as The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
Said judgments rendered by the courts of the states constituting the
Confederate States of America were considered legal and valid and
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War,
on land, expressly declares that: because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto
government. The Confederate States were a de facto government in
the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government
ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is
obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.
wrong-doers, for such acts of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the
Wall. [U.S.], 9; 19 Law. ed., 361). legal doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings conducted
before the courts of justice, established here during Japanese
military occupation, merely applying the municipal law of the
In the case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Court
territory, such as the provisions of our Civil Code, which have no
held — "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil
political or military significance, should be considered legal, valid
war the same general form of government, the same general law for
and binding.
the administration of justice and the protection of private rights,
which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained
during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the It is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur is familiar with
States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national said rules and principles, as International Law is an integral part of
authority, or the just and legal rights of the citizens, under the the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of
Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding." the Constitution of the United States. And it is also to be presumed
(William vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; that General MacArthur his acted, in accordance with said rules and
Sprott vs. United States, 20 id., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 id., 700.) principles of International Law, which have been sanctioned by the
Supreme Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial
proceedings conducted before our courts, during Japanese
The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese
occupation would lead to injustice and absurd results, and would be
occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition of de
highly detrimental to the public interests.
facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full This cannot be said to be an open question. The subject
respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the came under the consideration by this court in The
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations Grapeshot, where it was decided that when, during the late
and other acts of their duly constituted government whose civil war, portions of the insurgent territory were occupied
seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil. by the National forces, it was within the constitutional
authority of the President, as commander in chief, to
establish therein provisional courts for the hearing and
October 23, 1944.
determination of all causes arising under the laws of the
States or of the United States, and it was ruled that a court
instituted by President Lincoln for the State of Louisiana, "PROCESS" IN THE OCTOBER PROCLAMATION
with authority to hear, try, and determine civil causes, was
lawfully authorized to exercise such jurisdiction. Its
In the third section of the dispositive part of the October
establishment by the military authority was held to be no
Proclamation, it is declared that all laws, regulations and processes
violation of the constitutional provision that "the judicial
of any other government in the Philippines than that of the
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Commonwealth, are null and void.
Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may form
time to time ordain and establish." That clause of the
Constitution has no application to the abnormal condition of Does the word "processes" used in the proclamation include judicial
conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering, processes?
army. It refers only to courts of United States, which
military courts are not. As was said in the opinion of the
In its broadest sense, process is synonymous with proceedings or
court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase, in The Grapeshot,
procedures and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a judicial
"It became the duty of the National government, wherever
cause from it commencement to its conclusion.
the insurgent power was overthrown, and the territory
which had been dominated by it was occupied by the
National forces, to provide, as far as possible, so long as the PROCESS. In Practice. — The means of compelling a
war continued, for the security of the persons and property defendant to appear in court after suing out the original
and for the administration of justice. The duty of the writ, in civil, and after indictment, in criminal cases.
National government in this respect was no other than that
which devolves upon a regular belligerent, occupying during
The method taken by law to compel a compliance with the
war the territory of another belligerent. It was a military
original writ or command as of the court.
duty, to be performed by the President, as Commander in
Chief, and instructed as such with the direction of the
military force by which the occupation was held." A writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by
authority law; also the means of accomplishing an end,
including judicial proceedings; Gollobitch vs. Rainbow, 84
Thus it has been determined that the power to establish by
la., 567; 51 N. W., 48; the means or method pointed out by
military authority courts for the administration of civil as
a statute, or used to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants,
well as criminal justice in portions of the insurgent States
whether by writ or notice. Wilson vs. R. Co. (108 Mo., 588;
occupied by the National forces, is precisely the same as
18 S. W., 286; 32 Am. St. Rep., 624). (3 Bouvier's Law
that which exists when foreign territory has been conquered
Dictionary, p. 2731.)
and is occupied by the conquerors. What that power is has
several times been considered. In Leitensdorfer & Houghton
vs. Webb, may be found a notable illustration. Upon the A. Process generally. 1. Definition. — As a legal term
conquest of New Mexico, in 1846, the commanding officer process is a generic word of every comprehensive
of the conquering army, in virtue of the power of conquest signification and many meanings. It is broadest sense it is
and occupancy, and with the sanction and authority of the equivalent to, or synonymous with, "proceedings" or
President, ordained a provisional government for the "procedure," and embraces all the steps and proceedings in
country. The ordinance created courts, with both civil and a cause from its commencement to its conclusion.
criminal jurisdiction. It did not undertake to change the Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the means
municipal laws of the territory, but it established a judicial whereby a court compels a compliance with it demands.
system with a superior or appellate court, and with circuit "Process" and "writ" or "writs" are synonymous in the sense
courts, the jurisdiction of which declared to embrace, first, that every writ is a process, and in a narrow sense of the
all criminal causes that should not otherwise provided for term "process" is limited to judicial writs in an action, or at
by law; and secondly, original and exclusive cognizance of least to writs or writings issued from or out of court, under
all civil cases not cognizable before the prefects and the seal thereof, and returnable thereto; but it is not always
alcades. But though these courts and this judicial system necessary to construe the term so strictly as to limit it to a
were established by the military authority of the United writ issued by a court in the exercise of its ordinary
States, without any legislation of Congress, this court ruled jurisdiction; the term is sometimes defined as a writ or
that they were lawfully established. And there was no other formal writing issued by authority of law or by some
express order for their establishment emanating from the court, body, or official having authority to issue it; and it is
President or the Commander in Chief. The ordinance was frequently used to designate a means, by writ or otherwise ,
the act of the General Kearney the commanding officer of of acquiring jurisdiction of defendant or his property, or of
the army occupying the conquered territory. bringing defendant into, or compelling him to appear in,
court to answer.
In view of these decisions it is not to be questioned that the
Constitution did not prohibit the creation by the military As employed in the statutes the legal meaning of the word
authority of court for the trial of civil causes during the civil "process" varies according to the context, subject matter,
war in conquered portions of the insurgent States. The and spirit of the statute in which it occurs. In some
establishment of such courts is but the exercise of the jurisdictions codes or statutes variously define "process" as
ordinary rights of conquest. The plaintiffs in error, therefore, signifying or including: A writ or summons issued in the
had no constitutional immunity against subjection to the course of judicial proceedings; all writs, warrants,
judgements of such courts. They argue, however, that if this summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial
be conceded, still General Butler had no authority to officers; or any writ, declaration, summons, order, or
establish such a court; that the President alone, as a subpoena whereby any action, suit or proceeding shall be
Commander in Chief, had such authority. We do not concur commenced, or which shall be issued in or upon any action,
in this view. General Butler was in command of the suit or proceeding. (50 C. J., PP. 441, 442.)
conquering and the occupying army. He was commissioned
to carry on the war in Louisina. He was, therefore, invested
The definition of "process" given by Lord Coke
with all the powers of making war, so far as they were
comprehends any lawful warrant, authority, or proceeding
denied to him by the Commander in Chief, and among
by which a man may be arrested. He says: "Process of law
these powers, as we have seen, was of establishing courts
is two fold, namely, by the King's writ, or by proceeding and
in conquered territory. It must be presumed that he acted
warrant, either in deed or in law, without writ." (People vs.
under the orders of his superior officer, the President, and
Nevins [N. Y.] Hill, 154, 169, 170; State vs. Shaw, 50 A.,
that his acts, in the prosecution of the war, were the acts of
869; 73 Vt., 149.)
his commander in chief. (Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union
Bank, 89 U. S. [22 Wall.], 276-298.)
Baron Comyn says that process, in a large acceptance,
comprehends the whole proceedings after the original and
There is no question, therefore, that when General of the Army
before judgement; but generally it imports the writs which
Douglas MacArthur issued on October Proclamation, he did it in the
issue out of any court to bring the party to answer, or for
legitimate exercise of his powers. He did it as the official
doing execution, and all process out of the King's court
representative of the supreme authority of the United States of
ought to be in the name of the King. It is called "process"
America. Consequently, said proclamation is legal, valid, and
because it proceeds or goes upon former matter, either
binding.
original or judicial. Gilmer, vs. Bird 15 Fla., 410, 421. (34
Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940 edition, p.
Said proclamation has the full force of a law. In fact, of a paramount 147.)
law. Having been issued in the exercise of the American sovereignty,
in case of conflict, it can even supersede, not only the ordinary laws
In a broad sense the word "process" includes the means
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, but also our Constitution
whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant
itself while we remain under the American flag.
before it, or a compliance with it demands, and any every
writ, rule order, notice, or decree, including any process of
execution that may issue in or upon any action, suit, or acquiring jurisdiction and includes attachment,
legal proceedings, and it is not restricted to mesne process. garnishment, or execution, and also a writ. Blair vs.
In a narrow or restricted sense it is means those mandates Maxbass Security Bank of Maxbass, 176 N. W., 98, 199; 44
of the court intending to bring parties into court or to N. D. 12 (23 Words and Phrases, permanent edition 1940
require them to answer proceedings there pending. edition, p. 328.)
(Colquitt Nat. Bank vs. Poitivint, 83 S. E., 198, 199; 15 Ga.
App., 329. (34 Words and Phrases, permanent edition, 1940
There is no question that the word process, as used in the October
edition, p. 148.)
Proclamation, includes all judicial processes or proceedings.
It was necessary to free that ideology from any Japanese impurity. Since they entered the threshold of our capital, the Japanese had
announced that for every one of them killed they would kill ten
prominent Filipinos. They promised to respect our rights by
Undoubtedly, the author of the proclamation thought that the laws,
submitting us to the wholesale and indiscriminate slapping, tortures,
regulations, and processes of all the branches of the governments
and atrocious massacres. Driving nails in the cranium, extraction of
established under the Japanese regime, if allowed to continue and to
teeth and eyes, burnings of organs, hangings, diabolical zonings,
have effect, might be a means of keeping and spreading in our
looting of properties, establishments of redlight districts, machine
country the Japanese influence, with the same deadly effects as the
gunning of women and children, interment of alive persons, they are
mines planted by the retreating enemy.
just mere preludes of the promised paradised that they called
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".
The government offices and agencies which functioned during the
Japanese occupation represented a sovereignty and ideology
They promised religious liberty by compelling all protestant sects to
antagonistic to the sovereignty and ideology which MacArthur's
unite, against the religious scruples and convictions of their
forces sought to restore in our country.
members, in one group, and by profaning convents, seminaries,
churches, and other cult centers of the Catholics, utilizing them as
Under chapter I of the Japanese Constitution, it is declared that Japan military barracks, munitions dumps, artillery base, deposits of bombs
shall reigned and governed by a line Emperors unbroken for ages and gasoline, torture chambers and zone, and by compelling the
eternal (Article 1); that the Emperor is sacred and inviolable (Article government officials and employees to face and to bow in adoration
3); that he is the head of the Empire, combining in himself the rights before that caricature of divinity in the imperial palace of Tokyo.
of the sovereignty (Article 4); that he exercises the legislative power
(Article 5); that he gives sanction to laws, and orders to be
The Japanese offered themselves to be our cultural mentors by
promulgated and executed (Article 6);that he has the supreme
depriving us of the use of our schools and colleges, by destroying
command of the Army and Navy (Article 11); that he declares war,
our books and other means of culture, by falsifying the contents of
makes peace, and concludes treaties (Article 13).
school texts, by eliminating free press, the radio, all elemental
principles of civilized conduct, by establishing classes of rudimentary
There is no reason for allowing to remain any vestige of Japanese Japanese so as to reduce the Filipinos to the mental level of the rude
ideology, the ideology of a people which as confessed in a book we Japanese guards, and by disseminating all kinds of historical,
have at our desk, written by a Japanese, insists in doing many things political, and cultural falsehoods.
precisely in a way opposite to that followed by the rest of the world.
Invoking our geographical propinquity and race affinity, they had the
It is the ideology of a people which insists in adopting the policy of insolence of calling us their brothers, without the prejuce of placing
self-delusion; that believes that their Emperor is a direct descendant of us in the category of slaves, treating the most prominent Filipinos
in a much lower social and political category than that of the most An author said that the law of nations, the "jus gentiun", is not a
ignorant and brutal subject of the Emperor. fixed nor immutable science. On the country, it is developing
incessantly, it is perpetually changing in forms. In each turn it
advances or recedes, according to the vicissitudes of history, and
The civil liberties of the citizens were annulled. Witnesses and
following the monotonous rythm of the ebb and rise of the tide of the
litigants were slapped and tortured during investigations. In the
sea.
prosecuting attorney's offices, no one was safe. When the Japanese
arrested a person, the lawyer who dared to intercede was also
placed under arrest. Even courts were not free from their dispotic Le driot des gens, en effet, n'est point une science fixe est
members. There were judges who had to trample laws and shock immuable: bein au contraire, il se developpe sans cesse, il
their conscience in order not to disgust a Nipponese. change eternellement de formes; tour il avance et il recule,
selon less vicissitudes de histoire et suivan un rhythm
monotone qui est comme le flux et le reflux d'un mer. (M.
The most noble of all professions, so much so that the universities of
Revon, De l'existence du driot international sous la
the world could not conceive of higher honor that may be conferred
republique romain.)
than that of Doctor of Laws, became the most despised. It was
dangerous to practice the profession by which faith in the
effectiveness of law is maintained; citizens feel confident in the Another author has this to say:
protection of their liberties, honor, and dignity; the weak may face
the powerful; the lowest citizen is not afraid of the highest official;
International law, if it is or can be a science at all, or can be,
civil equality becomes reality; justice is admnistered with more
at most a regulative science, dealing with the conduct of
efficiency; and democracy becomes the best system of government
States, that is, human beings in a certain capacity; and its
and the best guaranty for the welfare and happiness of the individual
principles and prescriptions are not, like those of science
human being. In fact, the profession of law was annulled, and the
proper, final and unchanging. The substance of science
best lawyers for the unfortunate prisoners in Fort Santiago and other
proper is already made for man; the substance of
centers of torture were the military police, concubines, procurers,
international is actually made by man, — and different ages
and spies, the providers of war materials and shameful pleasures,
make differently." (Coleman Philippson, The International
and the accomplices in fraudulent transactions, which were the
Law and Custom of Ancient Greece of Rome, Vol. I, p. 50.)
specialty of many naval and military Japanese officers.
Now let us see if any principle of international law may effect the
INTERNATIONAL LAW
enforcement of the October Proclamation.
Certainly not because of the awe aroused by the looming figure of Our Constitution provides:
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the Allied Supreme
Commander, the military hero, the greatest American general, the
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
Liberator of the Philippines, the conqueror of Japan, the gallant
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
soldier under whose authority the Emperor of the Japan, who is
international law as part of the law of the Nation. (Sec. 3,
supposed to rule supreme for ages as a descendant of gods, is
Art. II.)
receiving orders with the humility of a prisoner of war.
We awaited in vain for any one to dare deny General MacArthur the
No authority could be cited, because the majority itself loses faith in
authority, under international law, to declare null and void and
the validity of such absolute and sweeping proposition, by
without effect, not only the laws and regulations of the governments
establishing an unexplained exception as regards the judicial acts
under the Japanese regime, but all the processes of said
and proceedings of a "political complexion."
governments, including judicial processes.
And it provided specifically that "the Supreme Court, Courts of the The suit, shown by the record, was originally instituted in
First Instance and courts of the justice of the peace established by the District Court of the United States for the District of
this Act (No. 136) are authorized to try and determine the actions so Louisiana, where a decree was rendered for the libellant.
transferred to them respectively from the provost courts, in the From the decree an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court,
same manner and with the same legal effect as though such actions where the case was pending, when in 1861, the
had originally been commenced in the courts created" by virtue of proceedings of the court were interrupted by the civil war.
said Act. Louisiana had become involved in the rebellion, and the
courts and officers of the United States were excluded from
its limits. In 1862, however, the National authority had been
MUNICIPAL COURTS UNDER ACT NO. 183
partially reestablished in the State, though still liable to the
overthrown by the vicissitudes of war. The troops of the
On July 30, 1901, the Philippine Commission enacted the Organic Act Union occupied New Orleans, and held military possession
of the City of Manila, No. 183. of the city and such other portions of the State as had
submitted to the General Government. The nature of this
occupation and possession was fully explained in the case
Two municipal courts for the city were created by section 40 of said
of The Vinice.
Act, one for the northern side of Pasig River and the other for the
southern side.
Whilst it continued, on the 20th of October, 1862, President
Lincoln, by proclamation, instituted a Provisional Court of
They were courts with criminal jurisdiction or identical cases under
the State of Louisiana, with authority, among other powers,
the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace then existing in Manila.
to hear, try, and determine all causes in admiralty.
Although both courts were of the same jurisdiction, in order that the
Subsequently, by consent of parties, this cause was
criminal cases belonging to the justice of the peace courts may be
transferred into the Provisional Court thus, constituted, and
transferred to the municipal courts just created, and the proceedings
was heard, and a decree was again rendered in favor of the
may be continued by the same, the Philippine Commission
libellants. Upon the restoration of civil authority in the
considered it necessary to pas the proper enabling act.
State, the Provincial Court, limited in duration, according to
the terms of the proclamation, by the event, ceased to
So on August 5, 1901, it enacted Act No. 186, section 2 of which exist.
provides that all criminal cases and proceedings pending in the
justices of the peace of Manila are transferred to the municipal
On the 28th of July, 1866, Congress enacted that all suits,
courts, which are conferred the jurisdiction to continue said cases
causes and proceedings in the Provisional Court, proper for
and proceedings.
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, should be transferred to
THE CABANTAG CASE that court, and heard, and determined therein; and that all
judgements, orders, and decrees of the Provisional Court in
causes transferred to the Circuit Court should at once
On August 1, 1901, Narciso Cabantag was convicted of murder by a
become the orders, judgements, and decrees of that court,
military commission. (Cabantag vs. Wolfe, 6 Phil., 273.) The decision
and might be enforced, pleaded, and proved accordingly.
was confirmed on December 10, 1901, and his execution by hanging
was set for January 12,1902. .
It is questioned upon these facts whether the establishment provoked the present controversy, being a judicial process of a
by the President of a Provisional Court was warranted by Japanese sponsored government, is absolutely correct, under the
the Constitution. legal doctrines established by the United States and the Philippine
Government, and consistently, invariably, and without exception,
followed by the same.
xxx xxx xxx
If we accept, for the sake of argument, the false hypothesis that the
We have no doubt that the Provisional Court of Louisiana
Commonwealth tribunals have jurisdiction to continue the judicial
was properly established by the President in the exercise of
processes left pending by the courts of the governments established
this constitutional authority during war; or that Congress
under the Japanese regime, the courts which disappeared and,
had power, upon the close of the war, and the dissolution of
automatically, ceased to function with the ouster of the enemy, the
the Provisional Court, to provide for the transfer of cases
position of the Judge Dizon, in declining to continue the case, is still
pending in that court, and of its judgement and decrees, to
unassailable, because, for all legal purposes, it is the same as if the
the proper courts of the United States. (U. S. Reports,
judicial processes in said case were not taken at all, as inevitable
Wallace, Vol. 9, The Grapeshot, 131-133.)
result of the sweeping and absolute annulment declared by the
General MacArthur in the October Proclamation.
JUDGEMENTS OF THE REBEL COURTS IN LOUISIANA WERE
VALIDATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
In said proclamation it is declared in unmistakable and definite terms
that "ALL PROCESSES" of the Japanese sponsored governments "ARE
During the civil war in 1861, the prevailing rebel forces established NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT", and they shall
their own government in Louisiana. remain so until the Commonwealth, through its legislative power,
decides otherwise in a proper validating act.
When the rebel forces were overpowered by the Union Forces and
the de facto government was replaced by the de jure government, to The fact that the Japanese invaders, under international law, were in
give effect to the judgments and other judicial acts of the rebel duty bound to establish courts of justice during the occupation,
government, from January 26, 1861, up to the date of the adoption although they made them completely powerless to safeguard the
of the State Constitution, a provision to said effect was inserted in constitutional rights of the citizens, and mere figureheads as regards
said document. the fundamental liberties of the helpless men, women and children
of our people, so much so that said courts could not offer even the
semblance of protection when the life, the liberty, the honor and
Section 149 of the Louisiana Constitution reads as follows:
dignity of our individual citizens were wantonly trampled by any
Japanese, military or civilian, does not change the situation. "ALL
All the rights, actions, prosecutions, claims, contracts, and PROCESSES" of said court are declared "NULL AND VOID AND
all laws in force at the time of the adoption of this WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT" in the October proclamation, and we do
Constitution, and not inconsistent therewith, shall continue not have any other alternative but to accept the law, as said
as if it had not been adopted; all judgments and judicial proclamation has the full force of a law.
sales, marriages, and executed contracts made in good
faith and in accordance with existing laws in this State
The fact that in the past, the legitimate governments, once restored
rendered, made, or entered into, between the 26th day of
in their own territory, condescended in many cases to recognize and
January, 1861, and the date when this constitution shall be
to give effect to judgments rendered by courts under the
adopted, are hereby declared to be valid, etc. (U. S. Report,
governments set up by an invading military occupant or by a rebel
Wallace, Vol. 22, Mechanics' etc. Bank vs. Union Bank, 281.)
army, does not elevate such condescension to the category of a
principle, when Wheaton declares that no international wrong is
EVEN AMONG SISTERS STATES OF THE UNITED STATES done if the acts of the invader are reversed.
JUDGEMENTS ARE NOT EXECUTORY
Many irrelevant authorities were cited to us as to the duties imposed
The member states of the United States of America belong to the by the international law on military occupants, but no authority has
same nation, to the country, and are under the same sovereignty. been cited to the effect that the representative of the restored
legitimate government is a bound to recognize and accept as valid
the acts and processes of said occupants. On the contrary, Wheaton
But judgements rendered in one state are not executory in other
says that if the occupant's acts are reversed "no international wrong
states.
would be committed."
2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive The proceeding in question, having been had before the liberation of
Commission "and later as the Republic of the Philippines", Manila, were unquestionably "processes" of the Japanese-sponsored
established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial government in the Philippines within the meaning of the aforesaid
Japanese Forces or by his order was not a de-facto government — proclamation of General of the Army MacArthur and, consequently,
the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto fall within the condemnation of the proclamation. Being processes of
court, and the judge who presided it was not a de facto judge; (b) a branch of a government which had been established in the hostility
the rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de to the Commonwealth Government, as well as the United States
facto Government in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied Government, they could not very well be considered by the parties
or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the to be valid and binding, at least after October 23, 1944, without said
governments thus established here by Japan; parties incurring in disobedience and contempt of the proclamation
which enjoins them to render full respect for the obedience to our
Constitution and the laws, regulations and other acts of our duly
3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our
constituted government. Nine days after the inauguration of the so-
Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese occupation;
called "Republic of the Philippines," President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt of the United States declared in one of his most
4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth memorable pronouncements about the activities of the enemy in the
Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of either or Philippines, as follows:
both of those Japanese-sponsored governments;
One of the fourtheenth of this month, a puppet government
5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate was set up in the Philippine Island with Jose P. Laurel,
against petitioner's contention. formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as
"president." Jorge Vargas, formerly as a member of the
Commonwealth Cabinet, and Benigno Aquino, also formerly
I
a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with
Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet
The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The
void under General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of second act was a hyphocritical appeal for American
October 23, 1944 (41 Off. Gaz., 147, 148). sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was
designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people.
In this proclamation, after reciting certain now historic facts, among
which was that the so-called government styled as the "Republic of I wish to make it clear that neither the former
the Philippines" was established on October 14, 1943 "under enemy collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the
duress, . . . based upon neither the free expression of the people's present "Philippine Republic " has the recognition or
will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States," the sympathy of the Government of the United States. . . .
great Commander-in-Chief proclaimed and declared:
Our symphaty goes out to those who remain loyal to the
xxx xxx xxx United States and the Commonwealth — that great majority
of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the
promises of the enemy.
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in October 23, 1943.
areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control; and
FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT
xxx xxx xxx President of the United
States
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full
respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the (Form U.S. Naval War College International Law Documents,
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations 1943, pp. 93, 94.).
and other acts of their duly constituted government whose
seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.
It is a fact of contemporary history that while President Manuel L.
Quezon of the Philippines was in Washington, D.C., with his exiled
The evident meaning and effect of the 3rd paragraph above quoted government, he also repeatedly condemned both the "Philippine
is, I think, that as the different areas of the Philippines were Executive Commission" and the "Philippine Republic," as they had
progressively liberated, the declaration of nullity therein contained been established by or under orders of the Commander in Chief of
shall attach to the laws, regulations and processes thus condemned the Imperial Japanese Forces. With these two heads of the
in so far as said areas were concerned. Mark that the proclamation Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
did not provide that such laws, regulations and processes shall be or Philippines condemning the "puppet regime" from its very inception,
are annulled, but that they are null and void. Annulment implies it is beyond my comprehension to see how the proceedings in
some degree of the effectiveness in the act annulled previous to the question could be considered valid and binding without adopting an
annulment, but a declaration of nullity denotes that the act is null attitude incompatible with theirs. As President Roosevelt said in his
and void ab initio — the nullity precedes the declaration. The above quoted message, "Our symphaty goes out to those remain
proclamation speaks in the present tense, not in the future. If so, the loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — that great
fact that the declaration of nullity as to the condemned laws, majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the
regulations, and processes in areas not yet free from enemy promises of the enemy.
occupation and control upon the date of the proclamation, would
attach thereto at a later date, is no argument for giving them validity
The most that I can concede is that while the Japanese Army of
or effectiveness in the interregnum. By the very terms of the
occupation was in control in the Islands and their paramount military
proclamation itself, that nullity had to date back from the inception
strength gave those of our people who were within their reach no
of such laws, regulations and processes; and to dispel any shadow of
other alternative, these had to obey their orders and decrees, but
doubt which may still remain, we need only consider the concluding
the only reason for such obedience would be that paramount military
paragraph of the proclamation wherein the Commander in Chief of
strength and not any intrinsic legal validity in the enemy's orders
the army liberation solemnly enjoined upon all loyal citizens of the
and decrees. And once that paramount military strength
Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the
disappeared, the reason for the obedience vanished, and obedience
Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and
should likewise cease.
other acts of their duly constituted government. This is all-inclusive
As was stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case continued to be subjected, they would have had to recognize as
of Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 719), "In the face of binding and obligatory the acts of the different departments of that
an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may often be a government. But fortunately for the Filipinos and for the entire
necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No concession is thus civilized world, Japan was defeated. And I now ask: Now that Japan
made to the rightfulness of the authority exercised." (Emphasis has been defeated, why should the Filipinos be still bound to respect
ours.) The court there refers to its own former decision in Thorington or recognize validity in the acts of the Japanese-sponsored
vs. Smith, and makes it clear that the doctrine in the Thorington government which has been so severely condemned by both the
case, so far as the effects of the acts of the provisional government heads of the United States and our Commonwealth Government
maintained by the British in Casetine, from September, 1814 to the throughout the duration of the war? If we were to draw a parallel
Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the consideration of Tampico as United between that government and that which was established by the
States territory, were concerned, was limited to the period during Confederate States during the American Civil War, we will find that
which the British, in the first case, retained possession of Castine, both met with ultimate failure. And, in my opinion, the conclusion to
and the United States, in the second, retained possession of be drawn should be the same in both cases.
Tampico. In referring to the Confederate Government during the Civil
War, as mentioned in the Thorington case, the court again says in
As held by the United States Supreme Court in Williams vs. Bruffy
effect that the actual supremacy of the Confederate Government
(supra), referring to the Confederate Government, its failure carried
over a portion of the territory of the Union was the only reason for
with it the dissipation of its pretentions and the breaking down in
holding that its inhabitants could not but obey its authority. But the
pieces of the whole fabric of its government. The Court said among
court was careful to limit this to the time when that actual
other things:
supremacy existed, when it said: . . . individual resistance to its
authority then would have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable."
(Emphasis ours.) The immense power exercised by the government of the
Confederate States for nearly four years, the territory over
which it extended, the vast resources it wielded, and the
Because of its pertinence, we beg leave to quote the following
millions who acknowledged its authority, present an
paragraph from that leading decision:
imposing spectacle well fitted to mislead the mind in
considering the legal character of that organization. It
There is nothing in the language used in Thorington vs. claimed to represent an independent nation and to posses
Smith (supra), which conflicts with these views. In that case, sovereign powers; as such to displace to jurisdiction and
the Confederate Government is characterized as one of authority of the United States from nearly half of their
paramount force, and classed among the governments of territory and, instead of their laws, to substitute and
which the one maintained by great Britain in Castine, from enforce those of its own enactment. Its pretentions being
September 1814, to the Treaty of Peace in 1815, and the resisted, they were submitted to the arbitrament of war. In
one maintained by the United States in Tampico, during our that contest the Confederacy failed; and in its failure its
War with Mexico, are examples. Whilst the British retained pretentions were dissipated, its armies scattered, and the
possession of Castine, the inhabitants were held to be whole fabric of its government broken in pieces. (24 Law,
subject to such laws as the British Government chose to ed., 719; emphasis ours.)
recognize and impose. Whilst the United States retained
possession of Tampico, it was held that it must regarded
By analogy, if the Japanese invasion and occupation of the
and respected as their territory. The Confederate
Philippines had been lawful — which, however, is not the case — and
Government, the court observed, differed from these
if Japan had succeeded in permanently maintaining the government
temporary governments in the circumstance that its
that she established in the Philippines, which would have been the
authority did not justifying acts of hostility to the United
case had victory been hers, there would be more reason for holding
States, "Made obedience to its authority in civil and local
the acts of that government valid, but because Japan has lost the
matters not only a necessity, but a duty." All that was
war and, therefore, failed in giving permanence to that government,
meant by this language was, that as the actual supremancy
the contrary conclusion should legitimately follow.
of the Confederate Government existed over certain
territory, individual resistance to its authority then would
have been futile and, therefore, unjustifiable. In the face of The validity of legislation exercised by either contestant "depends
an overwhelming force, obedience in such matters may not upon the existence of hostilities but upon the ultimate success of
often be a necessity and, in the interest of order, a duty. No the party which it is adopted" (emphasis ours). And, referring to the
concession is thus made to the rightfulness of the authority overthrow of the of the Confederacy, the Court, said, "when its
exercised. (Williams vs. Bruffy, 24 Law ed., 719; emphasis military forces were overthrown, it utterly perished, and with it all its
ours.) enactments" (emphasis ours)
The majority opinion, in considering valid the proceedings in The majority cite on page 9-10 of their opinion a passage from the
question, invokes the rule that when a belligerent army occupies a same case of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, which is a mere obiter
territory belonging to the enemy, the former through its Commander dictum. The majority opinion says that in this passage the Court was
in Chief, has the power to establish thereon what the decisions and "discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States." In the
treaties have variously denominated provisional or military first place, an examination of the decision will reveal that the
government, and the majority holds that the Japanese-sponsored controversy dealt with an act of the Confederate Government, not of
government in the Philippines was such a government. Without the Confederate States individually; and in the second place, the
prejudice to later discussing the effects which the renunciation of quoted passage refers to something which was not in issue in the
war as an instrument of national policy contained in our case, namely, the acts of the individual States composing the
Commonwealth Constitution, as well as in the Briand-Kellog Pact, Confederacy. But even this passage clearly places the case at bar
must have produced in this rule in so far as the Philippines is apart from the Court's pronouncement therein. The quoted passage
concerned, let us set forth some considerations apropos of this commences by stating that "The same general form of government
conclusion of the majority. If the power to establish here such a the same general laws for the administration of justice and the
provisional government is recognized in the Commander in Chief of protection of private rights, which has existed in the States prior to
the invasion army, why should we not recognize at least an equal the rebellion, remanded during (its) continuance and afterwards. "In
power in the Commander in Chief of the liberation army to overthrow the case at bar, the same general form of the Commonwealth
that government will all of its acts, at least of those of an executory Government did not continue under the Japanese, for the simple
nature upon the time of liberation? Considering the theory reason that one of the first acts of the invaders was to overthrow the
maintained by the majority, it would seem that they would recognize Commonwealth Constitution and, therefore, the constitutional
in the Japanese Commander in Chief the power to overthrow the government which existed thereunder, as an effect of the following
Commonwealth Government, and all of its acts and institutions if he acts and decrees of the Commander in Chief of the Imperial
had choosen to. Why should at least an equal power be denied the Japanese Forces:
Commander in Chief of the United States Army to overthrow the
substitute government thus erected by the enemy with all of its acts
1. Order No. 3, dated February 20, 1942 of the Commander in Chief
and institutions which are still not beyond retrieve? Hereafter we
of the Imperial Japanese Forces to the Chairman of the Philippine
shall have occasion to discuss the aspects of this question from the
Executive Commission directed that, in the exercise of legislative,
point of view of policy or the practical convenience of the
executive and judicial powers in the Philippines, the "activities" of
inhabitants. If the Japanese Commander in Chief represented
the "administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall
sovereignty of Japan, the American Commander in Chief represented
be based upon the existing status, order, ordinances and the
the sovereignty of the United States, as well as the Government of
Commonwealth Constitution (1 Official Journal of the Japanese
the Commonwealth. If Japan had won this war, her paramount
Military Administration, page 34). Under the frame of government
military supremacy would have continued to be exerted upon the
existing in this Commonwealth upon the date of the Japanese
Filipino people, and out of sheer physical compulsion this country
invasion, the Constitution was the very fountain-head of the validity
would have had to bow to the continuance of the puppet regime that
and effects of all the "status, orders, and ordinances" mentioned by
she had set up here for an indefinite time. In such a case, we admit
the Japanese Commander in Chief, and in overthrowing the
that, not because the acts of that government would then have
Constitution he, in effect, overthrew all of them.
intrinsically been legal and valid, but simply because of the
paramount military force to which our people would then have
2. Instruction No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration (Vol. 1, the power or right of a belligerent army of occupation to set up a
usages 36 et seq., Official Gazette, edited at the Office of the provisional government on occupied enemy territory, were evolved
Executive Commission) gave the "Detailed Instruction Based on prior to the first World War, but the horrors and devastations of that
Guiding Principle of the Administration," and among other things war convinced, at least the governments of the United States and
required "The entire personnel shall be required to pledge their France, that they should thereafter renounce war as an instrument
loyalty to the Imperial Japanese Forces. . . ." (This, of course, was of national policy, and they consequently subscribed the Briand-
repugnant to the frame of government existing here under the Kellog Pact. Those horrors and devastations were increased a
Commonwealth Constitution upon the date of invasion.) hundred fold, if not more, in this second World War, but even before
this war occurred, our own people, through our Constitutional
delegates, who framed the Commonwealth Constitution also adopted
3. Proclamation dated January 3, 19452 of the Japanese Commander
the same doctrine, and embodied an express renunciation of war as
in Chief provided in paragraph 3 that "The Authorities and the People
an instrument of national policy in the instrument that they drafted.
of the Commonwealth should sever their relations with the U.S.
It is true that in section 3, Article II, above-cited, our Constitution
o . . ." (This is, likewise, repugnant to the Commonwealth
adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as a
Constitution and the to the Government of that Commonwealth
part of the law of the Nation. But, of course, this adoption is
Constitution and to the Government of that Commonwealth which
exclusive of those principles of International Law which might
was expressly made subject to the supreme sovereignty of the
involve recognition of war as an instrument of national policy. It is
United States until complete independence is granted, not by the
plain that on the side of the Allies, the present war is purely
mere will of the United States, but by virtue of an agreement
defensive. When Japan started said war, treacherously and without
between that Government and ours, under the Tydings-McDuffie
previous declaration, and attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines
Act.)
on those two fateful days of December 7 and 8, 1941, she employed
war as an instrument of the national policy. Under the Briand-Kellog
The individual States of the Confederate and their governments Pact and our Commonwealth Constitution, the United States and the
existed prior to the Civil War and had received the sanction and Commonwealth Government could not possibly have recognized in
recognition of the Union Government, for which the Federal Supreme Japan any right, as against them, to employ that war as an
Court was speaking in the Williams-Bruffy case; while the Japanese- instrument of her national policy, and, consequently, they could not
sponsored governments of the "Philippine Executive Commission" have recognized in Japan power to set up in the Philippines the
and the Republic of the Philippines" neither existed here before the puppet government that she later set up, because such power would
war nor had received the recognition or sanction of either the United be a mere incident or consequence of the war itself. The authorities
States or the Commonwealth Government — nay, they had received agree that such a power, under the cited rules, is said to a right
the most vigorous condemnation of both. derived from war. (67 C.J., p. 421, sec. 171.) There can be no
question that the United States and the Commonwealth
Governments were free to refuse to be bound by those rules when
The Court further says in Williams vs. Bruffy (supra):
they made their respective renunciations above referred to. Indeed,
all the United Nations have exercised this free right in their Charter
No case has been cited in argument, and we think recently signed at San Francisco.
unsuccesfully attempting to establish a separate
revolutionary government have been sustained as a matter
As necessary consequence of this, those rules of International Law
of legal right. As justly observed by the late Chief Justice in
were no longer applicable to the Philippines and to the United States
the case of Shortridge vs. Macon, I Abb. U.S., 58, decided at
at the time of the Japanese invasion as a corollary, it follows that we
the circuit, and, in all material respects like the one at bar,
have no legal foundation on which to base the proposition that the
"Those who engage in rebellion must consider the
acts of that Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines were
consequences. If they succeed, rebellion becomes
valid and binding. Moreover, I am of opinion, that although at the
revolution, and the new government will justify is founders.
time of the Japanese invasion and up to the present, the United
If they fail, all their acts hostile to the rightful government
States retains over the Philippines, a certain measure of sovereignty,
are violations of law, and originate no rights which can be
it is only for certain specified purposes enumerated in the Tydings-
recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and
McDufie Act of the Commonwealth Constitution. (Ordinance
existence have been alike assailed. S.C., Chase, Dec., 136.
appended to the Constitution.) And our territory was at the time of
(Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; 24 Law. ed., 716, 718.)
the Japanese invasion not a territory of the United States, within the
(Emphasis ours.)
meaning of the laws of war governing war-like operations on enemy
territory. Our territory is significantly called "The National Territory"
I am of opinion that the principles thus enunciated for the case of an in Article I of our Constitution and this bears the stamps of express
unsuccessful rebellion should be applied with greater force to the approval of the United States Government. The Philippines has been
case of a belligerent who loss the war. And since the founding of the recognized and admitted as a member of the United Nations. We,
Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines was designed to therefore, had our own national and territorial identity previous to
supplant and did actually supplant the rightful government and since that invasion. Our nation was not at war with the Filipinos. And line
all its acts could not but a hostile to the latter (however blameless with this, the Japanese army, in time, released Filipino war prisoners
the officials who acted under enemy duress might be), and since captured in Bataan. Lt. Gen. Maeda, Chief of Staff, Imperial Japanese
Japan failed, all said acts, particularly those of the Japanese- Forces, in his speech of January 2, 1942, said:
sponsored court in said civil case No. 3012, "are violations of law,
and originate no rights which can be recognized by the courts of the
. . . we had not the slighest intensions to make your people
nation whose authority and existence have been alike assailed",
our enemy; rather we considered them as our friends who
quoting the language of the court in Shortridge vs. Macon, cited by
will join us has hand-in-hand in the establishment of an
Mr. Justice Field in Williams vs. Bruffy, supra (24 Law. ed., 718).
orderly Greater East Asia. . . ., (Official Gazette, edited at
the Office of the Executive Commission, Vol. I, p. 55.)
II
If the Philippines was a neutral territory when invaded by the
(a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Japanese, the following principles from Lawrence, International Law
Executive Commission" and later as the Republic of the (7th ed.), p. 603, are pertinent:
Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of
the Imperial Japanese Forces or by the his order was not a
The Duties of Belligerent States Towards Neutral States. — .
de facto government--the so-called Court of First Instance of
. . To refrain from carrying on hostilities within neutral
Manila was not a de facto court and the who presided it was
territory. — We have already seen that, though this
not a de facto judge;
obligation was recognized in theory during the infancy of
International law, it was often very imperfectly observed in
(b) The rules of International Law regarding the practice. But in modern times it has been strickly enforced,
establishment of a de facto government in territory and any State which knowingly ordered warlike operations
belonging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an to be carried on in neutral territory . . . would bring down
opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments upon itself the reprobation of civilized mankind. Hostilities
thus established here by Japan. may be carried on in the territory of either belligerent, on
the high seas, and in territory belonging to no one. Neutral
land and neutral territorial waters are sacred. No acts of
Under the doctrine of Williams vs. Bruffy, supra, and the pertinent
warfare may lawfully take place within them. . . . (Emphasis
cases therein cited, the short-lived provisional government thus
ours.)
established by the Japanese in the Philippines should be classified, at
best, as a government of paramount force. But this is not all. The
Constitution of this Commonwealth which has been expressly In all the cases and authorities supporting the power or right to set
approved by the United States Government, in Article II, section 3, up a provisional government, the belligerent had the right to invade
under the heading "Declaration of Principles", renounces war as an or occupy the territory in the first instance. Such was not the case
instrument of national policy. This renunciation of war as an with the Philippines. President Roosevelt, in his message to the
instruments of national policy follows an equal renunciation in the Filipino people, soon after the landing of American Forces in Leyte,
Briand-Kellog Pact. The rules of International Law , cited in support of on October 20, 1944, characterized Japan's invasion and occupation
of the Philippines as "the barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous presumed — to say the least — that the judge who presided over the
attack upon the Philippines," and he announced the American proceedings in question during the Japanese occupation, firstly,
people's "firm determination to punish the guilty." (41 Off. Gaz., accepted his appointment under duress; and secondly, acted by
149.) (Emphasis ours.) The illustrious leader of the United Nations virtue of that appointment under the same duress. In such
could not have in more unmistakable terms the utter illegality of that circumstances he could not have acted in the bona fide belief that
invasion and occupation. If the establishment of a provinsional the new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japanese
government in occupied territory by a belligerent is "a mere Military Commander in chief had been legally created--among them
application or extension of the force by which the invasion or the "Court of first Instance of Manila," — that the Chairman of the
occupation was effected" (67 C.J., p. 421, sec 171), the illegality of "Philippine Executive Commission" or the President of the "Republic
the invasion, would necessarily permeate the government, which of the Philippines", whoever appointed him, and conferred upon him
was its mere application or extention. a valid title to his office and a legitimate jurisdiction to act as such
judge. Good faith is essential for the existence of a de facto judge
(Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Phil., 866, 872). The very idea of enemy
The fact that shortly before December 8, 1941, the date of the
duress would necessarily imply that but for the duress exerted upon
"barbarous, unprovoked and treacherous attack," the meager and
him by the enemy he would have refused to accept the appointment
almost untrained forces of the Philippine Army had been inducted
and to act thereunder. And why? Because he must be presumed to
into the American Army, did not change the neutral status of the
know that the office to which he was thus appointed had been
Philippines. That military measure had been adopted for purely
created by the enemy in open defiance of the Commonwealth
defensive purposes. Nothing could be farther from the minds of the
Constitution and the laws and regulation promulgated by our
government and military leaders of the United States and the
Commonwealth Government, and that his acceptance of said office
Philippines in adopting it than to embark upon any aggressive or
and his acting therein, if willfully done, would have been no less than
warlike enterprise against any other nation. It is an old and honored
an open hostility to the very sovereignty of the United Sates and to
rule dating as far back as the 18th century that even solemn
the Commonwealth Government, and a renunciation of his
promises of assistance made before the war by a neutral to a nation
allegiance to both. There is no middle ground here. Either the judge
which later becomes a belligerent, would not change the status of
acted purely under duress, in which case his acts would be null and
the neutral even if such promises were carried out, so long as they
void; or maliciously in defiance of said governments, in which case
were made for purely defensive purposes. In the words of Vattel
his acts would be null and void for more serious reasons.
"when a sovereign furnishes the succor due in virtue of a former
defensive alliance, he does not associate himself in the war.
Therefore he may fulfill his engagements and yet preserve an exact The courts created here by the Japanese government had to look for
neutrality." (Lawrence, Principles of International Law [7th ed.], pp. the source of their supposed authority to the orders of the Japanese
585, 586.) Military Commander in chief and the so-called Constitution of the
"Republic of the Philippines," which had been adopted in a manner
which would shock the conscience of democratic peoples, and which
If the Filipinos had, from contemptible cowardice and fear, allowed
was designed to supplant the Constitution which had been duly
their shores to be invaded, and their territory occupied by the
adopted by the Filipino people in a Constitutional Convention of their
Japanese without resistance, such invasion occupation would
duly elected Constitutional Delegates. And it was decreed that the
undoubtedly have been considered in violation of International Law.
Commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces "shall exercise
Should the Filipinos be punished for having had the patriotism,
jurisdiction over judicial courts." (Vol. 1, p. 7, Official Journal of the
bravery, and heroism to fight in defense of the sacredness of their
Japanese Military Administration, cited on pp. 2, 3, of the order of the
land, the sanctity of their homes, and the honor and dignity of their
respondent judge complained of and marked Exhibit H of the petition
government by giving validity, in whatever limited measure, to the
for mandamus.) How can our present courts legitimately recognize
lawless acts of the ruthless enemy who thus overran their country,
any efficacy in the proceedings of such an exotic judicial system,
and robbed them of the tranquility and happiness of their daily lives?
wherein the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces
And yet, to my mind, to give any measure of validity or binding
possessed the highest judicial jurisdiction?
effect to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First
Instance of Manila, involved herein, would be to give that much
validity or effect to the acts of those same invaders. To equalize the III
consequences of a lawful and a wrongful invasion of occupation,
would be to equalize right and wrong, uphold the creed that might
The courts of those governments were entirely different
makes right, and adopt "the law of the jungle."
from our Commonwealth courts before and after the
Japanese occupation.
If said Japanese-sponsored government was not a de facto
government, it would seem clearly to follow that its "Court of First
Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines, dated
Instance of Manila" was not a de facto court. But it should
March 10, 1945, in its very first paragraph, states the prime concern
additionally be stated that for it be a de facto court, its judge had to
of the government "to re-establish the courts as fast as provinces
be a de facto judge, which he could not be, as presently
are liberated from the Japanese occupation." If the courts under the
demonstrated.
Japanese-sponsored government of the "Republic of the Philippines"
were the same Commonwealth courts that existed here under the
As said by President Osmeña, in replying to the speech of General of Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion, President Osmeña
the Army MacArthur when the latter turned over to him the full would not be speaking of re-establishing those courts in his aforesaid
powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth Government, on Executive Order. For soothe, how could those courts under the
February 27, 1945: "Republic of the Philippines" be the courts of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines when they were not functioning under the
Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laws enacted in
xxx xxx xxx
pursuance of said Constitution? The jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth courts was defined and conferred under the
The time has come when the world should know that when Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted
our forces surrendered in Bataan and Corregidor, resistance thereunder, that of the Japanese-sponsored courts was defined and
to the enemy was taken up by the people itself — conferred by the orders and decrees of the Japanese Commander in
resistance which was inarticulate and disorganized in its Chief, and, perhaps, the decrees of the "Philippine Executive
inception but which grew from the day to day and from Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislature under the
island until it broke out into an open warfare against the Republic, which was not composed of the elected representatives of
enemy. the people. The Justices and Judges of the Commonwealth courts had
to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth with
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, pursuant to the
The fight against the enemy was truly a people's war
Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
because it counted with the wholehearted support of the
under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was appointed by the
masses. From the humble peasant to the barrio school
Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, and the
teacher, from the volunteer guard to the women's auxilliary
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice and
service units, from the loyal local official to the barrio folk —
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance
each and every one of those contributed his share in the
and of all inferior courts were appointed by the Chairman of the
great crusade for liberation.
Executive Commission, at first, and later, by the President of the
Republic, of course, without confirmation by the Commission on
The guerrillas knew that without the support of the civilian Appointments under the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief
population, they could not survive. Whole town and villages Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the President
dared enemy reprisal to oppose the hated invader openly or and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, and the Judges of
give assistance to the underground movement. . . . (41 Off. First Instance and of all inferior courts in the Commonwealth judicial
Gaz., 88, 89.) system, had to swear to support and defend the Commonwealth
Constitution, while this was impossible under the Japanese-
sponsored government. In the Commonwealth judicial system, if a
Under these facts, taken together with the General of the Army
Justice or Judge should die or incapacitated to continue in the
MacArthur's accurate statement that the "Republic of the
discharge of his official duties, his successor was appointed by the
Philippines" had been established under enemy duress, it must be
Commonwealth President with confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and said successor had to swear to support and Republic of the Philippines. No amount of argument or legal
defend the Commonwealth Constitution; in the exotic judicial system fiction can obliterate this fact.
implanted here by the Japanese, if a Justice or Judge should die or
incapacitated, his successor would be appointed by the Japanese
Besides, I am of the opinion that the validity of the acts of the courts
Commander in Chief, if the dead or incapacitated incumbent should
in the "judicial system implanted by the Philippine Executive
be the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or otherwise, by the
Commission and the Republic "would not depend upon the laws that
Chairman of the "Executive Commission" or the President of the
they "administered and enforced", but upon the authority by virtue
"Republic", of course without confirmation by the Commission on
of which they acted. If the members of this Court were to decide the
Appointments of the Commonwealth Congress, and, of course,
instant case in strict accordance with the Constitution and the laws
without the successor swearing to support and defend the
of the Commonwealth but not by the authority that they possess in
Commonwealth Constitution.
their official capacity as the Supreme Court of the Philippines, but
merely as lawyers, their decision would surely be null and void. And
If, as we believe having conclusively shown, the Japanese-sponsored yet, I am firmly of opinion that whoever was the "judge" of the
courts were not the same Commonwealth courts, the conclusion is Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila who presided
unavoidable that any jurisdiction possessed by the former and any over the said court when the proceedings and processes in the
cases left pending therein, were not and could not be automatically dispute were had, in acting by virtue of the supposed authority
transfered to the Commonwealth courts which we re-established which he was supposed to have received from that government, did
under Executive Order No. 36. For the purpose, a special legislation so with no more legal power than if he had acted as a mere lawyer
was necessary. applying the same laws to the case. If duplication of work or effort,
or even if confussion, should be alleged to possibly arise from a
declaration of nullity or judicial proceedings had before those
Executive Order No. 37, in my humble opinion, does not, as held by
Japanese-sponsored courts, it should suffice to answer that the party
the majority, imply that the President recognized as valid the
so complaining in voluntarily resorting to such courts should be
proceedings in all cases appealed to the Court of Appeals. Section 2
prepared to assume the consequences of his voluntary act. On the
of that order simply provides that all cases which have been duly
other hand, his convenience should not be allowed to visit upon the
appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the
majority of the inhabitants of this country, the dire consequences of
Supreme Court for final decision. The adverb "duly" would indicate
a sweeping and wholesale validation of judicial proceedings in those
that the President foresaw the possibility of appeals not having been
courts. Let us set forth a few considerations apropos of this
duly taken. All cases appealed to the Court of Appeals before the war
assertion. It is a fact of general knowledge that during the Japanese
and the otherwise duly appealed, would come under the phrase
occupation of the Philippines, the overwhelming majority of our
"duly appealed" in this section of the Executive Order. But
people and other resident inhabitants were literally afraid to go any
considering the determined and firm attitude of the Commonwealth
place where there were Japanese sentries, soldiers or even civilians,
Government towards those Japanese-sponsored governments since
and that these sentries were posted at the entrance into cities and
the beginning, it would seem inconceivable that the President
towns and at government offices; that the feared Japanese "M. P.'s"
Osmeña, in section 2 of Executive Order No. 37, intended to include
or Kempeitai's" were a constant terror to them; and lastly, that the
therein appeals taken to the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals,
greater number who lived or had evacuated to places for from the
or from the Japanese-sponsored inferior courts. It should be
Japanese, were found precisely in the cities and towns where the
remembered that in the Executive Order immediately preceeding
courts were located; and as a consequence, the great majority of the
and issued on the same date, the President speaks of re-establishing
people were very strongly adverse to traveling any considerable
the courts as fast as provinces were liberated from the Japanese
distance from their homes and were, one might say, in constant
occupation.
hiding. Add to these circumstances, the fact of the practical absence
of transportation facilities and the no less important fact of the
IV economic structure having been so dislocated as to have
impoverished the many in exchange for the enrichment of the few —
and we shall have a fair picture of the practical difficulties which the
The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth
ordinary litigant would in those days have encountered in defending
Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of
his rights against anyone of the favored few who would bring him to
either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.
court. It should be easy to realize how hard it was for instances, to
procure the attendance of witnesses, principally because of the fact
In the last analysis, in deciding the question of validity or nullity of that most of them were in hiding or, at least, afraid to enter the
the proceedings involved herein, we are confronted with the cities and towns, and also because of then generally difficult and
necessity to decide whether the Court of first Instance of Manila and abnormal conditions prevailing. Under such conditions, cases or
this Supreme Court, as re-established under the Commonwealth denial of a party's day in court expected. Such denial might arise
Constitution, and the entire Commonwealth Government, are to be from many a cause. It might be party's fear to appear before the
bound by the acts of the said Japanese-sponsored court and court because in doing so, he would have had to get near the feared
government. To propound this question is, to my mind, to answer it Japanese. It might be because he did not recognize any legal
most decidedly in the negative, not only upon the ground of the legal authority in that court, or it might be his down-right repugnance of
principles but also for the reasons of national dignity and the hated enemy. And I dare say that among such people would be
international decency. To answer the question in the affirmative found more than seventeen million Filipinos. These are but a few of
would be nothing short for legalizing the Japanese invasion and countless cause. So that if some form of validation of such judicial
occupation of the Philippines. Indeed, it would be virtual submission proceedings were to be attempted, all necessary safeguards should
to the dictation of an invader our people's just hatred of whom gave be provided to avoid that in any particular case the validation should
rise to the epic Philippine resistance movement, which has won the violate any litigant's constitutional right to his day in court, within
admiration of the entire civilized world. the full meaning of the phrase, or any other constitutional or
statutory right of his. More people, I am afraid, would be prejudiced
than would be benefited by a wholesale validation of said
V
proceedings.
As to the public order — why! any public order which then existed
was not due to the courts or other departments of the puppet
government. It was maintained at the point of the bayonet by the
Japanese army, and in their own unique fashion.