PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Alcantara vs Alcantara G.R. No. 167746 August 28, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They went
through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. In her
Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license issued as
evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that Restituto has
a mistress with whom he has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The CA affirmed
the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a “fixer”
who arranged everything for them. He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of
the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE: Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was
also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn
the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the city
or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the marriage. An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume that
the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend that
he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate
himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to
his lifestyle (Alcantara vs Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007).

Sevilla v Cardenas G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

FACTS:
In a Complaint filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter’s father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and
they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date,
the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did
they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they “failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered,” for the reason that “the employee handling is already retired.“ With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties’ marriage contract was
not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it
“failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered.” Simply put, if the pertinent book
were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.

ISSUE: WoN there was a marriage license issued.

HELD:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document
does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records
of his office contain no such record or entry.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the
person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented
in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material
contents therein, had been exerted.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the
absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction
is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus
hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.”

De castro vs De Castro G.R. No. 160172 February 13, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their
first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went
back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through
with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge
Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.
Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live
together as husband and wife.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.

HELD:
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant
case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they
contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more
than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked
during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have
lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least
five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no "scandalous
cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent
executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license
renders their marriage void ab initio.

Republic vs. Dayot GR No. 175581 March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his
consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu
of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or
barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that
an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be
raised any time.

VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen
of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada,
USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
 In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that
Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
“no community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?

HELD:
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and
Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent
who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.

QUITA v COURT OF APPEALS GR. 124862 December 22, 1998

FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in
favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage
between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
ISSUE: 1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court? 2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is
the proper heir of the decedent?

HELD:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are
proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo
Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles
80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.
The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

BAYOT VS CA G.R. NO. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They had
a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California. In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce
proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the
marriage. The same court also issued Civil Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa
in March 4, 1997.
She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity, docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent
monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil
Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's
motion to dismiss, since the marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted
since Rebecca was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

HELD:
Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.
Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one, being
born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli granting American
citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of American passport.
She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic. Being an American
citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a country which allows divorce.
The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the ex-couple's property
relations. The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient. Thus the foreign decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in 1996. In determining whether
or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the
reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v - CRASUS L. IYOY

FACTS:
 Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent
Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant.” In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the
United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he
sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the
family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was
already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that her marriage to
her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of her present nationality shall
govern her status.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC – Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.

ISSUE: Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid and subsisting

HELD:
YES. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being
continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by –

(a) Gravity – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.

While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible
for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
NOTES: Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

“Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

“WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY

CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE
CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.”

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Ninal vs. Bayadog G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

FACTS:
Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s death. Pepito
and Norma got married without any marriage license because they lived together for 5 years and thus exempt from
marriage license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident.
The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights (succession only occurs after the death of
an ascendant) due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of marriage’ (a.k.a. declaration
of nullity of void marriages) between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a marriage license as a
legal basis.

ISSUES:
The lower court dismissed the petition because:
(1) The Family Code is silent whether the petition has a ’cause of action’. Can there be such a petition when the
heirs’ parent is deceased?
(2) Are the heirs a ‘proper party’?
(3) Determination whether the second marriage is void ab initio (from the beginning) is a must but is a different
matter. Void marriages cannot be attacked collaterally.
(4) Whether the petition for declaration for nullity of marriage has prescribed.
The lower court ruled:
(1) Petitioners should have filed an action to declare null and void their father’s marriage before the latter’s death.
(2) The prescription period and the proper party in an annulment proceeding were used as a basis to dismiss
petitioner’s case.
Petitioners disagree with the decision and petitions for a review.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that:

(1) The applicable law, for the determination of marriage, is the Civil Code and not the Family Code. (In
determining the validity of marriage, it is to be tested by the law in force at the time the marriage was contracted.)
(2) There is no second marriage. The absence of a marriage license renders marriage void ab initio. The exemption
for a marriage license, the cohabitation, was not the one described by the Civil Code. It is not the one described by
the Civil Code because the cohabitation, after the first marriage, was only twenty months whereas the law requires
five years. If the respondent took into consideration the other years and months before the second marriage, then the
cohabitation would include the period of the first marriage. This is in violation of the law.
(3) Separation in fact (not the legal separation) by the first marriage does not count cohabitation.
“This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity – that is unbroken.”
(4) The judge’s ruling (lower court), where void and voidable marriages are made identical is erroneous. Void and
voidable marriages are not identical.
“A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio
is considered as having never to have taken place.”
“A voidable can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while a void marriage can
never be ratified.”
“A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be
attacked collaterally.”
“Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only
during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be
left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.”
“The action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.”
“Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.“
“Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such
void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.”
(5) The Supreme Court requires a judicial decree of nullity of second marriage before determining succession
rights.
“Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage.”
“However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that
such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.”

Silverio v Republic of the Philippines GR 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically
male but feels, thinks and acts as a “female” and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He
underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From
then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of the Republic.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

HELD:
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority which was amended by RA 9048 – Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that
he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in
the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained
no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no
correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of
civil status shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended
by error is immutable
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. The
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.

REPUBLIC v CAGANDAHAN GR 166676 September 12, 2008

FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her
gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics.
Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in
court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate
is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the
same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local
civil registrar.

ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the
lower court.

HELD:
The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to
implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit.
However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the
order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In
which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his
birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts
present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality” which
is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings
who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose
sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as
a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the
instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the
person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that
the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows
this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.