JBC Public Panel Interview for the Position of

Associate Justice of Supreme Court

September 9, 2019 – A.M.

Questions of Hon. Franklin J. Demonteverde to Atty. Jose Midas Marquez

Q: Your record shows that, especially the SALN, that you have two children
but the name of the spouse is blank, how is it?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Why is it?

A: Because my marriage was annulled, Your Honor.

Q: Okay, so you’re now single?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Do you agree on this Court Ad, on the bill filed in Congress on divorce?

A: Your Honor, first I think if it’s going to conflict with any of existing laws,
then that that would have to be looked in to. Uhm, with regard, my personal
biases, I think that is something I will have to decide in accordance with
what I think. And my personal biases will come in to play. I think that is
the essence of a collegial body, because each justice, each judge, have their
own philosophies, their own biases, their own upbringings and advocacies.
So, that is where they have to discuss and throw in their views and then
decide afterwards taking everything into consideration.

Q: Thank you. For the past year that you have been with the Supreme Court,
what is your greatest contribution and what long term programs do you want
to initiate if appointed as an Associate Justice, Court Ad?

A: Your Honor, I think it would be court automation. I think the court and all
its offices, the Supreme Court and all its offices including all the lower
courts, third level courts, second level courts, and first level courts should
be fully automated Your Honor. So, if and when appointed, I will pursue in
and advocate full automation of our court system, Your Honor.

Q: Thank you. You’re taking this, Court Ad. (Same question, what do you
think is your biggest advantage among other applicants you already have
this experience in the judiciary?)

A: Your Honor, I’ve been with the Court for almost 28 years. I’ve been a law
clerk for I think around 19 years for different eminent jurists of I’ve learned
and seen their strengths and weaknesses. And of course, I’ve tried to avoid
the witnesses and emulated the strengths in the last almost 10 years. I’ve
been a Court Administrator, I’ve spoken for the Court as a head of the Public
Information Office for almost 5 years and then again, when the incumbent
Chief justice was appointed, I was again requested to head that Office for a
few months. I’ve dealt with the two branches of government; I’ve seen the
Court through different impeachment cases. I think my experience will be
able to help the 15-man Court in a, you know, addressing of various issues
that would confront the Supreme Court, Your Honor.
Q: Thank you. Differentiate between option money and earnest money and
when is payment considered on option or earnest.

A: My recollection is that an option money is something that you pay for ahead
before purchasing something and then later on you have that option whether
or not to purchase that thing. It binds the seller because of the option money
given prior to the purchase. The earnest money is just showing or just
indicating to the seller that you have an interest in purchasing that thing and
therefore, and to consider your offer of purchasing, your Honor.

Q: Court Ad, as it is the power to appoint judges and justices of the court is
lodged before the president, there are however some sectors or some
proponents who seek to remove from the president the authority to name
the members of the judiciary including those in the Sandiganbayan and
instead the same be transferred to the Members of the Supreme Court
themselves who are supposedly in a better position to choose the incoming
members of the judiciary. Your opinion on this?

A: I think, Your Honor, that the appointing power belonging to the president
is part of the check and balance between the judiciary and the executive
department. We have a JBC, and the mandate of the JBC is to screen the
appointment to the judiciary and I think, when the JBC gives a shortlist to
the president, that is a limitation already on the appointing authority of the
president. And therefore, the president, being able to choose members of
the court from the Supreme Court down to the first level court, I think, can
be retained. Because, anyway, the JBC is headed by the Chief Justice, Your
Honor.

Q: In your case Court Ad, is pass or fail system of checking the papers
practicable?

A: Your Honor, I have so much respect for Dean Villanueva, he was my

professor in college but I will have to give another, the opposing view, Your
honor. I think pass or fail is worth looking into. I think we have to think of
what is really the objective of national bar examinations, in the past years
many of our law students have been fixed with landing in the top ten, getting
a higher grade than the rest. I think that misses the point on because I think
the objective really of a national bar examination is to determine whether or
not an applicant or an examinee is already equipped with the necessary
knowledge to pass the bar or become a lawyer. And therefore, I think it has
to be thought very well whether if we continue with the essay type or purely
MCQ is another issue, Your Honor. But I think the present essay type, if
ever we’re going to institutionalize MCQs, I think the present essay type
should not be done away with. I think maybe a certain percentage should be
MCQs and a certain percentage should be essay, your Honor.

Q: Court Ad, you were shortlisted for this position four time already, what do
you think are the reason or reasons that you didn’t make it? Do you feel that
today is your best time?

A: Well Your Honor, it’s always my best time, but I think it’s really a
presidential prerogative your honor once I shortlisted, it’s up to the
president who he wants to appoint in there for that presidential prerogative
should be respected, Your Honor.

Q: Thank you. I have a few more questions here. Court Ad, what is the Doctrine
of Processual Presumption?
A: Your Honor, I’ll have to pass.

CORRECT ANSWER: Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.

Q: Court Ad, this is your brainchild, the tele-hearing, according to you, the said
tele-hearing would somehow address jail overcrowding, decongest court of
cases and result in speedy disposition of the same. Do you think this
innovation will bring difference as to the acceleration of court processes and
why?

A: Your Honor, before I answer, I just like to put it on the record that it was
actually first requested by the jail warden of Davao City that we do tele-
hearing or at that time, video conferencing which we eventually adopted. I
only recommended that we do it to the court, but it was actually the
brainchild of the jail warden of Davao City. Who is no longer, who actually
has retired already when the last time I went to visit Davao City jail. I was
looking for her, but she has retired already. Because the letter of Davao City
jail warden I think was sometimes still in 2017 and when I first
recommended it, we had a different composition of the court back then. But
anyway, Your Honor, to address your second concern, provided that the
constitutional rights of the accused will always be respected, it is my firm
belief that video conferencing can speed up court processes. It can also
lessen, if not totally remove the risk posed by high profile inmates being
transported from the court, from the jail to the court and vice-versa, because
you remove that risk that they can be rescued and that the wardens, BJMP
officials will be there, there will be danger to their safety and security. And
also of course, the risk attendant to or the risk that is attendant whenever a
high-risk inmate is in court the judge, the court personnel, the public
watching, that risk will also be eliminated. Now, in many instances, Your
Honor, the BJMP wardens are not able to bring the accused to court because
of some concerns, no transportation to bring them and so many others and
that sets back the hearing. The hearing will be postponed, it will again be
scheduled maybe two-three months later and that delays the proceeding.
Another major or point, Your Honor, is those who are serving final sentence
in state penitentiaries, there is an existing policy of the Supreme Court that
those serving final sentence cannot be brought out of court to attend if, let’s
say they have other cases. And therefore, videoconferencing will play a very
big role here. These inmates in the state penitentiaries will no longer have
to be transported out of the state penitentiaries and their hearings, trials can
proceed because if we’re going to be able to have videoconferencing
nationwide, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. to Atty. Jose Midas Marquez

Q: Yes, Court Ad, can you describe your leadership style as a Court
Administrator?

A: Your Honor, my leadership style is that I try to be very approachable and

accommodating to the judges, to my staff, but I know that there is a line that
should not be crossed and therefore if let’s say the request is not in
accordance with our policies, with our rules, with our laws, then that request
cannot be accommodated in the same manner if there are some indiscretion
or irregularities that are being committed, then those should not be allowed
to continue or to happen. But I’d like to be very accommodating and
 approachable so that I will be able to know what are the real concerns by
those in the field and what’s really happening in the field, Your honor.

Q: How do you move or steer people in the direction you wish?

Q: Well, Your Honor, there’s only one direction and that is what is right and
what is in accordance with our policies, rules, and processes, Your Honor.
So, in going that direction, there is no compromise, Your Honor.

Q: How do you gain their respect?

Q: Your Honor, that, if I may, Your Honor, that was one question when I was
asked when I was applying for Court Administrator. Because that was
almost ten years ago and I was considered to be very young to be appointed
as Court Administrator and that question was asked if how do I gain the
respect of the judges who are much older than I am and I simply said that I
will just show them that I work and that I will also give them the respect
that they should be accorded and I think because of what they see in me and
because of my style then I will be accorded the respect that is necessary for
my stature, Your Honor.

Q: Why do you want to leave the Office of the Court administrator, aren’t you
that comfortable? Have you been doing good in OCA?

Q: Your Honor, I’ve been the longest serving Court Administrator almost ten
years already, the one before me did not even go five years, Your honor. I
think it’s about time that there be change in a leadership in the Office of the
Court Administrator, Your Honor.

Q: To give others opportunity to go up also?

A: That is right, Your Honor.

Q: How insistent are your deputies to that position, if and when they are going
to be capitulated and be promoted?
A: Well, Your Honor, of course the Deputy Court Administrators will have an
advantage over the other applicants if that position will be vacant. And of
course, the appointment of a Court Administrator is left to the 15-man
Supreme Court, and I would like to think that each and every member of
the court would have their own preference, Your Honor.

Q: In your opinion, what are the issues plaguing the judiciary?

A: Your Honor, I would still go for the twin evils of congestion and delay,
Your Honor. While in the past few months we have seen great improvement
in the dockets of many of our courts meaning let’s say here in a Quezon
City or even in Makati, the past few years, the court dockets were around
800 to 1500 now we have courts in Makati, Quezon City and even in Manila
with only double figures, 80-90 cases but still in other far flung areas now
in the provinces, Bogo, in the outskirts of Cebu, also in Cavite, even in some
courts in Bulacan, we still have overburdened courts, Your Honor. And if
you have an overburdened court, that also equates in delay and a resolution
of cases because it is just physically impossible for a judge to address or
manage 1500-2000 cases. So, even if he prioritizes some of those cases, the
other cases will suffer delay, Your Honor. So, I would still think that the
two most troublesome areas in our court system would be over congestion
of some courts which results in delay, Your Honor. But if I may be able to
 relate to an earlier question, I think court automation will solve this problem
of congestion and delay to a certain extent and will enable the courts to be
more efficient, Your Honor.

Q: We had interviewed judges, justices, who complaint about the turtle pace or
slow pace resolution or disposition of administrative cases of judges and
justices the extent that those who retreated will never yet to receive their
retirement benefits, what’s your thought on this? Because they complained
that your assistant deputies do not stay in the office for so long, others have
a singing engagement, other activities there. What can you address to this?

A: Your Honor, the function and the responsibilities of the Court Administrator
together with a Deputy Court Administrators, an Assistant Court
Administrators, are actually very vast. It cannot be that they will be staying
in the office all the time from 8:00-5:00 p.m. They really have to go out, not
necessarily, Your Honor. In fact, that is why I actually was the one who
advocated the different Deputy Court Administrators will have to be
assigned in their respective group of islands, one for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. So that they can be more accessible by the judges and court
personnel in those areas. Also, Your Honor, I think the delay, I mean, in
resolving administrative cases concerning judges and court personnel is not
only within the Office of the Court Administrator, Your Honor, because we
have a number of cases actually, or a number of recommendations already
filed in court but has remained unacted upon. In fact, Your Honor, if I may
cite an example, we have a recommendation to the court for an imposition
of a sanction against an official which has been pending for maybe five-six
years already, and that official is under suspension. So, that means we
cannot move because, and that position cannot be considered vacant
because it’s still with the court, Your honor. Also, Your Honor, I think we
also have to automate our Office of the Court Administrator, so that we can
speed up our processes, Your Honor. These are just some of the things I
think that should be done to speed up the process in the Office of the Courts
Administrator, Your Honor.

Q: Administrative cases had been delayed. The resolution had been delayed
also in the court.

A: Your Honor, if I may add. I actually been monitoring some of these cases
especially those which have been filed in court already for like 2-3 years
and I’ve also actually requested no less than the Chief Justice and I think he
has already taken this up with those in charge of those cases, Your honor.

Q: Alright, in this stage there is, the vetting process is that at the Judicial
Nominating Committee, they have also this Judicial Monitoring Committee,
monitoring judges/justices together. How about in the Office of the Court
Administrator? How do you monitor the performance of judges as well as
justices? Is it possible or is it feasible to create the committee on monitoring
engaged in judges?

A: Your Honor, well as Court Administrator, I only actually monitor our first
and second level court judges unless the Supreme Court directs me or
instructs me to also look into our third level courts. While the law creating
the Office of the Court Administrator says that it has a supervision over all
lower courts meaning courts lower than the Supreme Court. I defer to the
presiding justices of the appellate courts, a third level court. So, I only
monitor and supervise first and second level courts. Now, they can be
monitored because all our courts are supposed to submit monthly reports
 and those monthly reports will indicate their clearance rate, disposition rate,
and that is where they can be monitored. Of course, if they do not submit
monthly reports, that will also show and therefore when the Court
Administrator is asked to recommend who the next executive judge or vice
executive judges will be, then we look at all these data. Now, of course, we
also take into consideration the reputation of the judges and the years of
service of our judges, Your Honor. And of course, the Court Administrator
sits as a consultant of the JBC, so when the Court Administrator is asked
about reputations of certain judges, who are vying for a promotion, then we
have also some data on those, Your Honor.

Q: What have you done professionally that is not an experience you would
want to repeat?

A: Professionally going through another set of interviews before the JBC, Your
Honor.

Q: You would not want to repeat this again?

A: Well, Your Honor, professionally, Your Honor, as Court Administrator, I

go to the lower courts. What I don’t want really to repeat would be going to
the families of our judges and condoning with them because we have a judge
who was killed or shot while in the service, that happened very recently,
Your Honor. When I had to travel to Dipolog and that was really very
unfortunate, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Justice Noel Tiham to Atty. Jose Midas Marquez

Q: Court Administrator Midas, you have been consultant of the JBC, you have
sat during the JBC deliberations, you have been interviewed before the JBC,
what suggestions can you make to make the screening process more
objective, more judicious, more impartial?

A: Well, what I noticed or observed in the JBC, not only in the present JBC but
even in the past JBCs, is that, let’s say when an applicant for a first level or
second level court is interviewed, then there is only one member who
interviews the applicant.

Q: We have discarded the practice already. So, with respect to applicants for
the first level and second level, we started a few weeks ago to conduct a
panel interview as well.

Q: Thank you, Your Honor. But well, again of course, I think that will have its
pros and cons, because if a panel will be required to interview first and
second level court applicants, then that will take too much time of the
members. Because as we know, there are so many applicants for vacant
courts. But anyway, Your Honor, what I notice is that when after the
interview, when it’s already voting or for the shortlist, there is not much
discussion on a particular individual with being nominated to be included
in the shortlist.

Q: We have already made innovations in than. So, the practice right now is
before the voting on the shortlist, we extensively discuss the individual
merits of the applicants.

A: Maybe, Your Honor, for the regular members that can be said but we have
three other members who are in the, sitting in their official capacities
 because of their respective positions and I don’t think they are able to
participate in the deliberations of the regular members.

Q: Should the names of people recommending applicants be given due way?

Are they important? Are they to be considered as assets or liabilities?

A: Well I think, Your Honor, you mean the one, the member, the JBC?

Q: When an applicant for a judgeship submits his application letter in the PDS,
it is normally stated their references. Is it important to find out whether the
persons recommending them are likewise credible? In other words,
recommendation by politicians for example, big business people who might
have ultimately cases in the court. Are those recommendations more of
liabilities than assets?

Q: I think, Your Honor, it will depend on the particular individual being named
as reference or that individual who is recommending. And of course, if I
were the applicant and I would put a certain name there, then I would have
chosen that recommender to be someone of stature, someone who is
respected, and someone who would be giving a good account of my
accomplishment in my capabilities. Again, that would depend on the
members of the JBC and perhaps later, if the JBC is not sure about a certain
applicant, then that’s the time maybe the JBC can call on these individuals
giving the recommendation, but I think it should also be considered by the
JBC.
Q: Court Administrator Midas, in your dealings with judges nationwide, what
impresses you most, skills or attitude?

A: Attitude, Your Honor. Attitude because I think judges should always be

constantly or consistently motivated to do their work to resolve their cases
within the period required or if not, even a shorter period. And the skills,
they can be learned through their continuing judicial education and in the
lectures that they are attending, Your Honor.

Q: Apart from the enumeration made by Atty. Gatdula, what human values do
you practice in your personal as well as professional life? Atty. Gatdula
mentioned loyalty, honesty and charity, love.

A: Your Honor, if I may just briefly, I’d like to say also loyalty, I think (in) my
almost 30 years of service in the Supreme Court says so much about it.
Instead of honesty or integrity, also I think because of my long years in the
court, I’ve been serving different chief justices, I think I will not be still here
if I have not practice integrity. And also, Your Honor, I’d like to add the
industry, Your Honor. I think my work ethic is something I have maintained
since day one as a court administrator or even when I was law clerk working
for the various justices, Your Honor.

Q: Court Administrator Midas, you have encountered lots of, where judges
with mental quirks. What steps have you taken or has the court taken to
address these concerns considering that the vetting of the psychological
profile of judges is done by the JBC at the time of screening and vetting,
but once appointed, how do you monitor the mental status of judges? And
if you come across a situation where a particular judge has psychological
mental problems that will affect the performance of the work of that judge,
can you remove or sanction the judge?
A: Your Honor, you’re correct that our judges only go through that process of
evaluation their mental condition whenever they apply first or apply for
promotions before the JBC, because on a regular basis, the court does not
subject them to regular monitoring of their mental conditions. It will only
come to for when let’s say a complaint is filed against them or a report is
sent to the Office of the Court Administrator when we can do something.
Looking into the mental health of an incumbent first level or second level
court judge is actually very sensitive that to my view, I will have to
recommend to the court that this particular magistrate be subjected to
psychological evaluation and examination. So, we can only do that if let’s
say there’s a complaint filed against a judge or reports come into my office
that would require or necessitate these kinds of monitoring and evaluation,
Your Honor.

Q: Court Administrator Midas, if appointed to the court, how would you be

able to influence the other members of the court considering that you have
worked for them for many years and in effect, you you work for them. You
were the subordinate of these justices of the Supreme Court. will you defer
to their judgement and wisdom considering that you’re a loyal person and
you have been trained for many years to follow orders?
A: Not necessarily, Your Honor. I will argue on the strength of my position in
a very respectful manner. If I see wisdom in their position that will make
me agree then I will agree in those certain issues. But definitely, Your
Honor, if I have a position that I’ve really studied and even perhaps based
on my experience, I think my position is the better position then I will
respectfully argue my position and try to convince the other members of the
court. If I fail like what Dean Villanueva said, then I will submit or turn in
my dissenting opinion, Your Honor.

Questions of Atty. Jose Mendoza – Representing the retired member of the Supreme Court
to Atty. Jose Midas Marquez

Q: Atty. Marquez, Court Ad, are you familiar with the Gios-Samar case?

A: No, Your Honor. I’m sorry.

Q: You’re not familiar with the Gios-Samar Case? On the filtration approach.
I thought it was a giveaway question.

GIOS-SAMAR, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON

GERARDO M. MALINAO, PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS AND CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The 1987 Constitution and the Rules of Court promulgated, pursuant to its
provisions, granted us original jurisdiction over certain cases. In some
instances, this jurisdiction is shared with Regional Trial Courts (RTCs)
and the Court of Appeals (CA). However, litigants do not have unfettered
discretion to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts dictates that, direct recourse to this Court is allowed
only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of
paramount or transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not
mere policy, rather, it is a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to
enable the Court to focus on the more fundamental and essential tasks
assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
On December 15, 2014, the Department of Transportation and
Communication[1] (DOTC) and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify
and Bid[2] (Invitation) on the airport development, operations, and
maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay, Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New
Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports (collectively,
Projects).[3] The total cost of the Projects is P116.23 Billion, broken down
as follows:[4]
Bacolod-Silay P20.26 Billion
Davao P40.57 Billion
Iloilo P30.4 Billion
Laguindingan P14.62 Billion
New Bohol
P4.57 Billion
(Panglao)
Puetio
P5.81 Billion
Princesa
P116.23
Billion[5]
The Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve services and
enhance the airside and landside facilities of the key regional airports
through concession agreements with the private sector. The Projects will
be awarded through competitive bidding, following the procurement rules
and procedure prescibed under Republic Act (RA) No. 6957,[6] as
amended by RA No. 7718[7] (BOT Law), and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The concession period would be for 30 years.[8]

On March 10, 2015, the DOTC and the CAAP issued the Instructions to
Prospective Bidders (ITPB),[9] which provided that prospective bidders are
to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and maintenance of
the airports, which are now bundled into two groups (collectively, the
Bundled Projects), namely:
Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo
Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol
(Panglao)[10]
The costs of Bundle 1 and Bundle 2 are P50.66 Billion and P59.66 Billion,
respectively. The Puerto Princesa Airport project was not included in the
bundling.[11]

The general procedure for the bidding of the Bundled Projects stated that
"[p]rospective [b]idders may bid for only Bundle 1 or Bundle 2, or bid for
both Bundle 1 and Bundle 2. x x x The [Pre-Qualification, Bids and
Awards Commitee (PBAC)] shall announce in a Bid Bulletin prior to the
Qualifications Submission Date[,] its policy on whether a [p]rospective
[b]idder may be awarded both bundles or whether a [p]rospective [b]idder
may only be awarded with one (1) bundle."[12]

The submission of the Pre-Qualification Queries was scheduled for April

3, 2015 and the submission of Qualification Documents on May 18,
2015.[13]

On March 27, 2015, petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its

Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao (petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and
invoking the transcendental importance of the issue, filed the present
petition for prohibition.[14] Petitioner alleges that it is a non-governmental
organization composed of subsistence farmers and fisherfolk from Samar,
who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda relying on government
assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and livelihood.[15] It
assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to
enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the
same.

Petitioner raises the following arguments:

First, the bundling of the Projects violated the "constitutional prohibitions

on the anti-dummy and the grant of opportunity to the general public to
invest in public utilities,"[16] citing Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.[17] According to petitioner, bundling would allow companies
with questionable or shaky financial background to have direct access to
the Projects "by simply joining a consortium which under the bundling
scheme adopted by the DOTC said [P]rojects taken altogether would
definitely be beyond the financial capability of any qualified, single
Filipino corporation."[18]

Second, bundling violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies

under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution because it would allow
one winning bidder to operate and maintain several airpm1s, thus
establishing a monopoly. Petitioner asserts that, given the staggering cost
of the Bundled Projects, the same can only be undertaken by a group, joint
venture outfits, and consortiums which are susceptible to combinations
and schemes to control the operation of the service for profit, enabling a
single consortium to control as many as six airports.[19]

Third, bundling will "surely perpetrate an undue restraint of

trade."[20] Mid-sized Filipino companies which may have previously
considered participating in one of the six (6) distinct Projects will no
longer have a realistic opportunity to participate in the bidding because the
separate projects became two (2) gargantuan projects. This effectively
placed the Projects beyond the reach of medium-sized Filipino
companies.[21]

Fourth, the PBAC of the DOTC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it bundled the projects without
legal authority.[22]

Fifth, bundling made a mockery of public bidding because it raised the

reasonable bar to a level higher than what it would have been, had the
projects been bidded out separately.[23]

In support of petitioner's prayer, for the issuance of a temporary

restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, it states that there
is extreme urgency to enjoin the bidding of the Bundled Projects so as not
to cause irreparable damage and injury to the coffers of the government.[24]

In its comment,[25] the DOTC counters that: (1) the petition is premature
because there has been no actual bidding yet, hence there is no Justiciable
controversy to speak of; (2) petitioner has no legal standing to file the suit
whether as a taxpayer or as a private individual; (3) petitioner's allegation
on the violation of anti-dummy and equal opportunity clauses of the
Constitution are speculative and conjectural; (4) Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution is not applicable to the bidding process assailed by
petitioner; (5) the bundling of the Projects does not violate the prohibitions
on monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade; and (6) the DOTC
and the CAAP did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.[26]

For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic
fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged
any special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from
the Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court, because it
raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown
trial.[27] The CAAP also maintains that petitioner has neither legal capacity
nor authority to file the suit and that the petition has no cause of action.[28]

In its reply,[29] petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of the
bidding to file the suit because doing so would render useless the very
purpose for filing the petition for prohibition.[30] As it is, five groups have
already been pre-qualified to bid in the Bundled Projects.[31] Petitioner
also submits that direct recourse to this Court is justified as the "matter of
prohibiting the bidding process of the x x x illegally bundled projects are
matters of public interest and transcendental importance."[32] It further
insists that it has legal standing to file the suit through Malinao, its duly
authorized representative.[33]

The main issue brought to us for resolution is whether the bundling of the
Projects is constitutional.

Petitioner argues that the bundling of the Projects is unconstitutional

because it will: (i) create a monopoly; (ii) allow the creation and operation
of a combination in restraint of trade; (iii) violate anti-dummy laws and
statutes giving citizens the opportunity to invest in public utilities; and (iv)
enable companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate in the
Projects.

While petitioner asserts that the foregoing arguments involve legal (as
opposed to factual) issues, our examination of the petition shows
otherwise. As will be demonstrated shortly, petitioner's arguments against
the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are inextricably
intertwined with underlying questions of fact, the determination of which
require the reception of evidence. This Court, however, is not a trier of
fact. We cannot resolve these factual issues at the first instance. For this
reason, we DISMISS the petition.

Petitioner claims that the bundling of the Projects violates the

constitutional provisions on monopolies and combinations in restraint of
trade under Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies while the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,[34] we clarified that the
Constitution does not prohibit the operation of monopolies per se.[35] With
particular respect to the operation of public utilities or services, this Court,
in Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro,[36] further clarified that "[b]y
their very nature, certain public services or public utilities such as those
which supply water, electricity, transportation, telephone, telegraph, etc.
must be given exclusive franchises if public interest is to be served. Such
exclusive franchises are not violative of the law against monopolies."

In short, we find that the grant of a concession agreement to an entity, as a

winning bidder, for the exclusive development, operation, and
maintenance of any or all of the Projects, does not by itself create a
monopoly violative of the provisions of the Constitution. Anglo-Fil
Trading Corporation teaches that exclusivity is inherent in the grant of a
concession to a private entity to deliver a public service, where
Government chooses not to undertake such service.[37] Otherwise stated,
while the grant may result in a monopoly, it is a type of monopoly not
violative of law. This is the essence of the policy decision of the
Government to enter into concessions with the private sector to build,
maintain and operate what would have otherwise been government-
operated services, such as airports. In any case, the law itself provides for
built-in protections to safeguard the public interest, foremost of which is to
require public bidding. Under the BOT Law, for example, a private-public
pat1nership (PPP) agreement may be undertaken through public bidding,
in cases of solicited proposals, or through "Swiss challenge" (also known
as comparative bidding), in cases of unsolicited proposals.

In any event, the Constitution provides that the State may, by law, prohibit
or regulate monopolies when the public interest so requires.[38] Petitioner
has failed to point to any provision in the law, which specifically prohibits
the bundling of bids, a detail supplied by the respondent DOTC as
implementing agency for the PPP program for airpm1s. Our examination
of the petition and the relevant statute, m fact, provides further support for
the dismissal of the present action.

Originally, monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade were

governed by, and penalized under, Article 186[39] of the Revised Penal
Code. This provision has since been repealed by RA No. 10667, or the
Philippine Competition Act, which defines and penalizes "all forms of
anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and anti-
competitive mergers and acquisitions."[40]

RA No. 10667 does not define what constitutes a "monopoly." Instead, it

prohibits one or more entities which has/have acquired or achieved a
"dominant position" in a "relevant market" from "abusing" its dominant
position. In other words, an entity is not prohibited from, or held liable for
prosecution and punishment for, simply securing a dominant position in
the relevant market in which it operates. It is only when that entity
engages in conduct in abuse of its dominant position that it will be
exposed to prosecution and possible punishment.

Under RA No. 10667, "dominant position" is defined as follows:

Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

xxxx

(g) Dominant position refers to a position of economic strength that an

entity or entities hold which makes it capable of controlling the relevant
market independently from any or a combination of the following:
competitors, customers, suppliers, or consumers[.]
"Relevant market," on the other hand, refers to the market in which a
particular good or service is sold and which is a combination of the
relevant product market and the relevant geographic market.[41] The
determination of a particular relevant market depends on the consideration
of factors which affect the substitutability among goods or services
constituting such market, and the geographic area delineating the
boundaries of the market.[42] An entity with a dominant position in a
relevant market is deemed to have abused its dominant position if it
engages in a conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen
competition.[43]

Here, petitioner has not alleged ultimate facts to support its claim that
bundling will create a monopoly, in violation of the Constitution. By
merely stating legal conclusions, petitioner did not present any sufficient
allegation upon which the Court could grant the relief petitioner prayed
for. In Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran,[44] we held that "[a] pleading should
state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted,
as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law.
General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair, and
reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a
contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public
policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions
of law."[45] The present action should thus be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state cause of action.[46]

Similarly, RA No. 10667 does not define what a "combination in restraint

of trade" is. What it does is penalize anti-competitive agreements.
Agreement refers to "any type of form or contract, arrangement,
understanding, collective recommendation, or concerted action, whether
formal or informal."[47] The following agreements are considered anti
competitive:
Sec. 14. Anti-Competitive Agreements. -

(a) The following agreements, between or among competitors, are per

se prohibited:

(1) Restricting competition as to price, or components thereof, or other

terms of trade;

(2) Fixing price at an auction or in any form of bidding including cover

bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and market allocation and other
analogous practices of bid manipulation;

(b) The following agreements, between or among competitors which have

the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or lessening
competition shall be prohibited:

(1) Setting, limiting, or controlling production, markets, technical

development, or investment;

(2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or

purchases, territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any
other means;

(c) Agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b) of this section
which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or
lessening competition shall also be prohibited: Provided, Those which
contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods and
services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, may not necessarily be
deemed a violation of this Act.

An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with

another entity or entities, have common economic interests, and are not
otherwise able to decide or act independently of each other, shall not be
considered competitors for purposes of this section.
The bundling of the Projects is an an arrangement made by the DOTC and
the CAAP in the conduct of public bidding. The question that arises is
whether the same constitutes an anti-competitive agreement prohibited by
RA No. 10667. However, to resolve this, we refer to the factors
enumerated in Section 26 of RA No. 10667 on the determination of anti-
competitive agreements or conduct:
Sec. 26. Determination of Anti-Competitive Agreement or Conduct. - In
determining whether anti-competitive agreement or conduct has been
committed, the Commission shall:

(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected by the anti-

competitive agreement or conduct, following the principles laid out in
Section 24 of this Chapter;

(b) Determine if there is actual or potential adverse impact on

competition in the relevant market caused by the alleged agreement
or conduct, and if such impact is substantial and outweighs the actual
or potential efficiency gains that result from the agreement or
conduct;

(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking perspective, recognizing future

developments, any overriding need to make the goods or services
available to consumers, the requirements of large investments in
infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the need of our economy
to respond to international competition, but also taking account of past
behavior of the parties involved and prevailing market conditions;

(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition is not prevented or

substantially restricted and the risk that competition efficiency,
productivity, innovation, or development of priority areas or industries in
the general interest of the country may be deterred by overzealous or
undue intervention; and

(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it is more likely than not
that the entity has engaged in anti-competitive agreement or conduct
including whether the entity's conduct was done with a reasonable
commercial purpose such as but not limited to phasing out of a product or
closure of a business, or as a reasonable commercial response to the
market entry or conduct of a competitor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similar to its assertion that bundling will create a monopoly prohibited by
law, we find that petitioner, again, utterly failed to sufficiently state a
cause of action, by failing to plead ultimate facts to support its conclusion
that bundling, as an arrangement, is in restraint of trade or results in unfair
competition under the provisions of RA No. 10667.

Even granting that the petition sufficiently pleads a cause of action for the
foregoing violations, there is a need to receive evidence to test the
premises of petitioner's conclusions.

To illustrate, applying the facts and claims relative to the violation of the
proscription against monopolies, what RA No. 10667, in fact, prohibits
and punishes is the situation where: (1) an entity, having been granted an
exclusive franchise to maintain and operate one or more airports, attains a
dominant position in that market; and (2) abuses such dominant position
by engaging in prohibited conduct, i.e., acts that substantially prevent,
restrict or lessen competition in market of airport development, operations
and maintenance. Thus, for petitioner to succeed in asserting that such a
prohibited situation legally obtains, it must first establish, by evidence, that
indeed: (1) the relevant market is that of airport development,
maintenance, and operation (under the facts-based criteria enumerated in
Section 24 of RA No. 10667); (2) the entity has achieved a dominant
position (under the facts-based criteria enumerated in Section 27 of RA
No. 10667) in that relevant market; and (3) the entity commits acts
constituting abuse of dominant position (under the facts based criteria
enumerated in Section 27 of RA No. 10667).

In addition, to support the legal conclusion that bundling is an anti-

competitive agreement, there must be evidence that: (1) the relevant
market is that of airport development, maintenance, and operation (under
the facts-based criterion enumerated in Section 24 of RA No. 10667); (2)
bundling causes, or will cause, actual or potential adverse impact on the
competition in that relevant market; (3) said impact is substantial and
outweighs the actual or potential efficiency gains that results from
bundling; and (4) the totality of evidence shows that the winning bidder,
more likely than not engaged, in anti-competitive conduct.

The Court, however, is still not a trier of facts. Petitioner should have
brought the challenge before a tribunal, specially equipped to resolve the
factual and legal issues presented.[48]

We now jointly discuss petitioner's remaining allegations, namely, that

bundling of the Projects: (i) violates the anti-dummy law and the
constitutional provision allegedly giving citizens the opportunity to invest
in public utilities; (ii) is in grave abuse of discretion; and (iii) enables
companies with shaky financial backgrounds to participate in the Projects.

Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-

Dummy Law, was enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic
activities to Filipino citizens or corporations.[49] Section 2 of said law
states:
Sec. 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock. - In all cases in which a
constitutional or legal provision requires that, in order that a corporation or
association may exercise or enjoy a right, franchise or privilege, not less
than a certain per centum of its capital must be owned by citizens of the
Philippines or of any other specific country, it shall be unlawful to falsely
simulate the existence of such minimum stock or capital as owned by such
citizens, for the purpose of evading said provision. The president or
managers and directors or trustees of corporations or associations
convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment
of not less than five nor more than fifteen years, and by a fine not less than
the value of the right, franchise or privilege, enjoyed or acquired in
violation of the provisions hereof but in no case less than five thousand
pesos.
For liability for violation of Section 2 to attach, it must first be established
that there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a
right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least a certain percentage of which is
owned by such citizens.[50] Moreover, it must be shown by evidence that a
corporation or association falsely simulated the existence of the minimum
required Filipino stock or capital ownership to enjoy or exercise the right,
franchise, privilege, or business.

In this case, petitioner failed to allege ultimate facts showing how the
bundling of the Projects violated the Anti-Dummy Law. It did not identify
what corporation or association falsely simulated the composition of its
stock ownership. Moreover, it did not allege that there is a law limiting,
reserving, or requiring that infrastructure or development projects must be
awarded only to corporations, a certain percentage of the capital of which
is exclusively owned by Filipinos. Executive Order (EO) No. 65,[51] even
exempts contracts for infrastructure/development projects covered by the
BOT Law from the 40% foreign ownership limitation.

For the same reasons above, petitioner's allegation that bundling violated
Section 11,[52] Article XII of the Constitution - which prescribes a 60%
Filipino ownership requirement for franchises, certificate, or for the
operation of public utilities - must be rejected.

Petitioner's argument that, bundling of the Projects gave shady companies

direct access to the Projects, also raises questions of fact. Foremost,
petitioner does not identify these "shady companies." Even assuming that
petitioner is referring to any or all of the five companies who have been
pre-qualified to bid in the projects,[53] its assertion that these companies
are not financially able to undertake the project raises a question of fact,
financial ability being a pre-qualification requirement. As already stated
earlier, such question is one which this Court is ill-equipped to resolve.[54]

Finally, the allegation that bundling is in grave abuse of discretion is a

conclusion of law. As shown, no facts were even alleged to show which
specific law was violated by the decision to bundle the Projects.

In short, these three above arguments of petitioner must be dismissed for

failure to. sufficiently plead a cause of action. Even assuming that
petitioner's causes of action were properly alleged, the resolution of said
issues would still require the determination of factual issues which this
Court simply cannot undertake.

In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus[55] (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this Court is proper only
to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance
provided by the Constitution under Section 18, Article VII,[56] cases the
resolution of which depends on the determination of questions of fact
cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of
facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and
evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of
the lower courts or regulatory agencies.[57] This is the raison d'etre behind
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering
mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more
fundamental tasks assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule
which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the transcendental
importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.
 II

For a better understanding of our ruling today, we review below, in light

of the Court's fundamental constitutional tasks, the constitutional and
statutory evolution of the Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction, and
its interplay with related doctrines, pronouncements, and even the Court's
own rules, as follows:

(a) The Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction;

(b) Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara[58] model;

(c) The transcendental importance doctrine;

(d) The Court is not a trier of facts;

(e) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts;

(f) The Court's expanded jurisdiction, social rights, and the Court's
constitutional rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution;

(g) Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts: The case of The

Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections;[59]

(h) Hierarchy of courts as a constitutional imperative; and

(i) Hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism.

A
The Court's original and concurrent jurisdiction

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary

writs predates the 1935 Constitution.

On June 11, 1901, the Second Philippine Commission, popularly known

as the Taft Commission, enacted Act No. 136, or An Act Providing For
the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands.[60] Act No. 136 vested
the judicial power of the Government of the Philippine Islands unto the
Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance (CFI), courts of justices of the
peace, together with such special jurisdiction of municipal courts, and
other special tribunals as may be authorized by law.[61] Under Act No.
136, the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec. 17. Its Original Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in
the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine controversies
thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Code of Civil Procedure[62] (1901 Rules) referred to in Section 17 of
Act No. 136, in turn, provided that the Supreme Court shall have
concurrent jurisdiction with the CFIs in certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus proceedings over any inferior tribunal, board, or officer
and in quo warranto and habeas corpus proceedings.[63] Likewise, the
1901 Rules stated that the Court shall have original jurisdiction
by certiorari and mandamus over the proceedings of CFIs wherever said
courts have acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or in case of
a mandamus proceeding, hen the CFIs and judges thereof unlawfully
neglect the performance of a duty imposed by law.[64]

Notably, Sections 496 and 497 of the 1901 Rules proscribed the Court not
only from reviewing the evidence taken in the court below but also from
retrying questions of fact, viz.:
Sec. 496. General Procedure in the Supreme Court. - The Supreme Court
may. in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, or modify
any final judgment, order, or decree of a Court of First Instance, regularly
entered in the Supreme Court by bill of exceptions, or appeal, and may
direct the proper judgment, order, or decree to be entered, or direct a new
trial, or further proceedings to be had, and if a new trial shall be granted,
the court shall pass upon and determine all the questions of law
involved in the case presented by such bill of exceptions and necessary
for the final determination of the action.

Sec. 497. Hearings Confined to Matters of Law, With Certain Exceptions.

- In hearings upon bills of exception, in civil actions and special
proceedings, the Supreme Court shall not review the evidence taken in
the court below, nor retry the questions of fact, except as in this
section hereafter provided; but shall determine only questions of law
raised by the bill of exceptions. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
On July 1, 1902, the Congress enacted the Philippine Bill[65] or the first
"Constitution" of the Philippines under the American occupation.[66] The
Philippine Bill retained original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
conferred under Act No. 136, with the caveat that the legislative
department might add to such jurisdiction.[67] Thus, in Weigall v.
Shuster,[68] one of the earliest cases of the Court, we held that the
Philippine Commission could increase, but not decrease, our original
jurisdiction under Act No. 136.

On December 31, 1916, Act No. 2657 or the Administrative Code was
enacted, which included the "Judiciary Law" under Title IV, Chapter 10. It
was revised on March 10, 1917 through the Revised Administrative
Code,[69] which increased the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
adding those cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls.[70]

On May 14, 1935, 33 years after the enactment of the Philippine Bill, the
Philippines ratified the 1935 Constitution. Like its predecessor, the 1935
Constitution adopted the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in existing laws, i.e., Act No. 136, the 1901 Rules, and the
Revised Administrative Code. Section 3, Article VIII of the 1935
Constitution states that, "[u]ntil the [Congress] shall provide otherwise the
Supreme Cow1shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may
be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. x x x"[71] The 1935
Constitution further stated that the Congress may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls.[72]

On December 31, 1935, Commonwealth Act No. 3,[73] amending the

Revised Administrative Code, created the Court of Appeals (CA) and
granted it "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and
process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."[74]

On June 17, 1948, the Congress enacted RA No. 296, otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948. Section 17 of RA No. 296
vested the Supreme Court with "original and exclusive jurisdiction in
petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
against the Court of Appeals." It also provided that the Supreme Court
shall exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction with CFIs :
xxxx

1. In petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus;

2. In actions between the Roman Catholic Church and the municipalities

or towns, or the Filipino Independent Church for controversy as to title to,
or ownership, administration or possession of hospitals, convents,
cemeteries or other properties used in connection therewith;

3. In actions brought by the Government of the Philippines against the

Roman Catholic Church or vice versa for the title to, or ownership of,
hospitals, asylums, charitable institutions, or any other kind of property;
and

4. In actions brought to prevent and restrain violations of law concerning

monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
RA No. 5440 amended RA No. 296 on September 9, 1968, deleting
numbers 3 and 4 mentioned above.[75]

Several years later, on January 17, 1973, the Philippines ratified the 1973
Constitution. Article X of the same is dedicated to the Judiciary. Section
5(1) of the said article provides for the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction, viz.:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
corpus.

xxxx
Where the 1935 Constitution only referred to the original jurisdiction
which the Supreme Court possessed at the time of its adoption, the 1973
Constitution expressly provided for the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs.

In 1981, this Court's original jurisdiction over extraordinary writs became

concurrent with the CA, pursuant to Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 (BP 129)
or The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. BP 129 repealed RA No.
296[76] and granted the CA with "[o]riginal jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction."[77] In addition, Section 21(2) of BP 129 bestowed the RTCs
(formerly the CFIs) with original (and consequently, concurrent with the
Supreme Court) jurisdiction over actions affecting ambassadors and other
public ministers and consuls.

Seven years after the enactment of BP 129, the Philippines ratified the
1987 Constitution; Article VII, Section 5(1) of which provides the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which is an exact reproduction of
Section 5(1), A1ticle X of the 1973 Constitution.
 B
Direct recourse to the Court under the Angara model

Direct invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction over the issuance of

extraordinary writs started in 1936 with Angara v. Electoral
Commission.[78] Angara is the first case directly filed before the Court after
the 1935 Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935. It is the
quintessential example of a valid direct recourse to this Court on
constitutional questions.

Angara was an original petition for prohibition seeking to restrain the

Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of an election
contest led against an elected (and confirmed) member of the National
Assembly. The main issue before the Court involved the question of
whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.[79]

We took cognizance of the petition, ruling foremost that the Court has
jurisdiction over the case by virtue of its "power of judicial review under
the Constitution:"
x x x [W]hen the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries,
it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. x x x[80]
In Angara, there was no dispute as to the facts. Petitioner was allowed to
file the petition for prohibition directly before us because what was
considered was the nature of the issue involved in the case: a legal
controversy between two agencies of the government that called for
the exercise of the power of judicial review by the final arbiter of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court.

Several years later, another original action for prohibition was filed
directly before the Court, this time seeking to enjoin certain members of
the rival political party from "continuing to usurp, intrude into and/or hold
or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in
the Senate Electoral Tribunal." In Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et
al.[81] we were confronted with the issue of whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias - a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate -
on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be
chosen "upon nomination x x x of the party having the second largest
number of votes. x x x x."[82] There, this Court proceeded to resolve the
constitutional issue raised without inquiring into the propriety of direct
recourse to us. Similar with Angara, the question before us, then, was
purely legal.

The Angara model of direct recourse would be followed and allowed by

the Court in Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[83] Francisco,
Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc.[84] Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the
Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP),[85] Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,[86] Belgica v.
Ochoa,[87] Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,[88] Araullo v. Aquino III,[89] Saguisag v.
Ochoa, Jr.,[90] Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines,[91] to name a few. To
stress, the common denominator of all these cases is that the threshold
questions presented before us are ones of law.

C
The transcendental importance doctrine

In 1949, the Court introduced a legal concept that will later underpin most
of the cases filed directly before us - the doctrine of transcendental
importance. Although this doctrine was originally used to relax the rules
on locus standi or legal standing, its application would later be loosely
extended as an independent justification for direct recourse to this Court.

We first used the term "transcendental importance" in Araneta v.

Dinglasan.[92] Araneta involved five consolidated petitions before the
Court assailing the validity of the President's orders issued pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 671, or "An Act Declaring a State of Total
Emergency as a Result of War Involving the Philippines and Authorizing
the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations to Meet such
Emergency."[93] Petitioners rested their case on the theory that
Commonwealth Act No. 671 had already ceased to have any force and
effect.[94] The main issues for resolution in Araneta were: (1) whether
Commonwealth Act No. 671 was still in force; and relatedly, (2) whether
the executive orders issued pursuant thereto were valid. Specifically, the
Court had to resolve the issue of whether Commonwealth Act No. 671
(and the President's Emergency Powers) continued to be effective after the
opening of the regular session of Congress.

In overruling the objection to the personality or sufficiency of the interest

of petitioners in bringing the actions as taxpayers,[95] this Court declared
that "[a]bove all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure."[96] Thus, and similar with Angara,
direct recourse to the Court in Araneta is justified because the issue to
be resolved there was one of law; there was no dispute as to any
underlying fact. Araneta has since then been followed by a myriad of
cases[97] where transcendental importance was cited as basis for setting
aside objections on legal standing.

It was in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[98] when, for the first time, it
appeared that the transcendental importance doctrine could, apart from its
original purpose to overcome objections to standing, stand as a
justification for disregarding the proscription against direct recourse to the
Court. Chavez is an original action for mandamus filed before the Court
against the Public Estates Authority (PEA). There, the petition sought,
among others, to compel the PEA to disclose all facts on the PEA's then
on-going renegotiations to reclaim portions of Manila Bay.[99] On the issue
of whether the non-observance of the hierarchy of courts merits the
dismissal of the petition, we ruled that:
x x x The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case,
however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to
the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any
factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition
for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise
primary jurisdiction over the instant case.[100] (Emphasis supplied; citation
omitted.)
D
The Court is not a trier of facts

In 1973, the dictum that the Supreme Court is not trier of facts first
appeared in jurisprudence through the concurring opinion of then Chief
Justice Querube Makalintal in Chemplex (Philippines) Inc. v.
Pamatian.[101] Chemplex involved a petition for certiorari against an order
recognizing the validity and legitimacy of the election of directors on the
board of a private corporation. In his concurrence to the majority decision
dismissing the petition, Chief Justice Querube Makalintal wrote:
Judge Pamatian issued the order now assailed herein after he heard
the parties and received relevant evidence bearing on the incident
before him, namely, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by the defendants. He issued the writ on the basis of the facts
as found by him, subject of course, as he himself admitted, considering the
interlocutory nature of the injunction, to further consideration of the case
on the merits after trial. I do not see that his factual findings are
arbitrary or unsupported by the evidence. If anything, they are
circumspect, reasoned out and arrived at after serious judicial
inquiry.

This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its function to make
its own findings of certain vital facts different from those of the trial
court, especially on the basis of the conflicting claims of the parties
and without the evidence being properly before it. For this Court to
make such factual conclusions is entirely unjustified - first, because if
material facts are controverted, as in this case, and they are issues being
litigated before the lower court, the petition for certiorari would not be in
aid of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court; and, secondly, because it
preempts the primary function of the lower court, namely, to try the
case on the merits, receive all the evidence to be presented by the
parties, and only then come to a definite decision, including either the
maintenance or the discharge of the preliminary injunction it has issued.

The thousands of pages of pleadings, memoranda, and annexes

already before this Court and the countless hours spent in discussing
the bare allegations of the parties - as to the factual aspects of which
the members are in sharp disagreement - merely to r solve whether or
not to give due course to the petition, demonstrate clearly why this
Court, in a case like this, should consider only one question, and no
other, namely, did the court below commit a grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the order complained of, and should answer that question
without searching the pleadings for supposed facts still in dispute and not
those set forth in the order itself, and in effect deciding the main case on
the merits although it is yet in its preliminary stages and has not entered
the period of trial.[102] (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The maxim that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts will later find its
way in the Court's majority opinion in Mafinco Trading Corporation v.
Ople.[103]

Mafinco involved a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to

annul a Decision of the Secretary of Labor, finding that the old National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had jurisdiction over the complaint
filed against Mafinco Trading Corporation for having dismissed two union
members. The crucial issue brought before the Court was whether an
employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and the private
respondents. Before resolving the issue on the basis of the parties'
contracts, the Court made the following pronouncements:
The parties in their pleadings and memoranda injected conflicting factual
allegations to support their diametrically opposite contentions. From the
factual angle, the case has become highly controversial.

In a certiorari and prohibition case, like the instant case, only legal
issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer
involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed facts. Sections 1,
2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require that in the verified
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition the petitioner
should allege "facts with certainty".

In this case, the facts have become uncertain. Controversial

evidentiary facts have been alleged. What is certain and indubitable is
that a notarized peddling contract was executed.

This Court is not a trier of facts. It would be difficult, if not

anomalous, to decide the jurisdictional issue on the basis of the parties
contradictory factual submissions. The record has become voluminous
because of their efforts to persuade this Court to accept their
discordant factual statements.

Pro hac vice the issue of whether Repomanta and Moralde were
employees of Mafinco or were independent contractors should be resolved
mainly in the light of their peddling contracts. A different approach would
lead this Court astray into the field of factual controversy where its legal
pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds.[104] (Emphasis supplied.)
The Rules of Court referred to above is the 1964 Rules of Court. Up to this
date, the requirement of alleging facts with certainty remains in Sections 1
to 3 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

Meanwhile, the Court, aware of its own limitations, decreed in Section 2,

Rule 3 of its Internal Rules[105] that it is "not a trier of facts," viz.:
Sec. 2. The Court Not a Trier of Facts. - The Court is not a trier of facts;
its role is to decide cases based on the findings of fact before it. Where the
Constitution, the law or the Court itself, in the exercise of its discretion,
decides to receive evidence, the reception of evidence may be delegated to
a member of the Court, to either the Clerk of Court or one of the Division
Clerks of Court, or to one of the appellate courts or its justices who shall
submit to the Court a report and recommendation on the basis of the
evidence presented.
E
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Starting in 1987, the Court, in two cases, addressed the penchant of

litigants to seek direct recourse to it from decisions originating even from
the municipal trial courts and city courts.

In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,[106] the Court's original jurisdiction over special

civil actions for mandamus was invoked to compel a Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) to issue summary judgment in a case for illegal detainer.
There, we declared in no uncertain terms that:
x x x As a matter of policy[,] such a direct recourse to this Court should
not be allowed. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must
so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist
therefor[.] Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative
to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where
the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ's procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard,
a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.[107] (Emphasis
supplied.)
This so-called "policy" was reaffirmed two years later in People v.
Cuaresma,[108] which involved a petition for certiorari challenging the
quashal by the City Fiscal of an Information for defamation on the ground
of prescription. In dismissing the petition, this Court reminded litigants to
refrain from directly filing petitions for extraordinary writs before the
Court, unless there were special and important reasons therefor. We then
introduced the concept of "hierarchy of courts," to wit:
x x x This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well
as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is
not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts
(formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable
in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and
by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue
the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also
serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to
enjoin strict adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a
growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their
applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometime even
their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately
by the highest tribunal of the land. x x x[109] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citation omitted.)
This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the proper venue
of appeals and/or the appropriate forum for the issuance of extraordinary
writs. Thus, although this Court, the CA, and the RTC have concurrent
original jurisdiction[110] over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are
directed, as a rule, to file their petitions before the lower-ranked court.
Failure to comply ts sufficient cause for the dismissal of the petition.[111]

This Court has interchangeably referred to the hierarchy of courts as a

"principle,"[112] a "rule,"[113] and a "doctrine."[114] For purposes for this
discussion, however, we shall refer to it as a doctrine.

F
The Court's expanded jurisdiction, social rights, and the Court's
constitutional rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution

With the 1987 Philippine Constitution came significant developments in

terms of the Court's judicial and rule-making powers.

First, judicial power is no longer confined to its traditional ambit of

settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable.[115] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution provides that judicial power also includes the duty
of the courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the government." In Araullo v. Aquino
III, former Associate (now Chief) Justice Bersamin eruditely explained:
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.

xxxx

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and

prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the
second paragraph of Section 1, supra.[116] (Italics supplied.)
It must be stressed, however, that this grant of expanded power of judicial
review did not result to the abandonment of the Angara model.[117] Direct
recourse to the Court, on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, was still
allowed only when the questions presented were legal.

Second, in addition to providing for "self-executory and ready for

use"[118] civil and political rights, the 1987 Constitution also contained
provisions pertaining to what has been termed as "social rights." Esteemed
constitutionalist and member of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, explained:
x x x But as will be seen, the 1987 Constitution advances beyond what
was in previous Constitutions in that it seeks not only economic social
justice but also political social justice.

x x x The guarantees of civil and political rights found principally in the

Bill of Rights are self-executory and ready for use. One can assert those
rights in a court of justice. Social rights are a different phenomenon.
Except to the extent that they prohibit the government from embarking in
activity contrary to the ideals of social justice, they generally are not rights
in the strict sense that the rights in the Bill of Rights are. x x x In legal
effectiveness, they are primarily in the nature of claims of demands which
people expect government to satisfy, or they are ideals which government
is expected to respect. x x x[119]
This, in turn, gave rise to a slew of litigation invoking these so-called
"social rights."[120] In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,[121] for example, this Court
famously recognized an enforceable right to a balanced and healthful
ecology under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

Third, the Supreme Court's rule-making power was enhanced under the
new Constitution, to wit:
xxxx

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.[122] (Italics in the original)
For the first time, the Court was granted with the following: (1) the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights; and (2) the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 1987 Constitution also took
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure.[123]

Pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power,[124] the Court

promulgated new sets of rules which effectively increased its original and
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA: (1) A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC or the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;[125] (2) A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC or
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data;[126] and (3) A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.[127]

Under these Rules, litigants are allowed to seek direct relief from this
Court, regardless of the presence of questions which are heavily factual in
nature. In the same vein, judgments in petitions for writ of amparo, writ
of habeas data, and writ of kalikasan rendered by lower-ranked courts can
be appealed to the Supreme Court on questions of fact, or law, or both, via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.[128]
In practice, however, petitions for writ of amparo, writ of habeas data,
and writ of kalikasan which were originally filed before this Court
invariably found their way to the CA for hearing and decision, with the
CA's decision to be later on brought before us on appeal. Thus,
in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,[129] the first
ever amparo petition, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the CA
for the conduct of hearing, reception of evidence, and decision.[130] We
also did the same in: (1) Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo;[131] (2) Saez v.
Macapagal-Arroyo;[132] and (3) International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines).[133] The consistent practice of the Court in these cases (that
is, referring such petitions to the CA for the reception of evidence) is a
tacit recognition by the Court itself that it is not equipped to be a trier of
facts.

Notably, our referral of the case to the CA for hearing, reception of

evidence, and decision is in consonance with Section 2, Rule 3 of our
Internal Rules which states that if the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, decides to receive evidence, it may delegate the same to one of
the appellate courts for report and recommendation.

G
Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Aside from the special civil actions over which it has original Jurisdiction,
the Court, through the years, has allowed litigants to seek direct relief
from it upon allegation of "serious and important reasons." The Diocese of
Bacolod v. Commission on Elections[134] (Diocese) summarized these
circumstances in this wise:
(1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time;

(2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;

(3) cases of first impression;

(4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Court;

(5) exigency in certain situations;

(6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;

(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from
the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression; [and]

(8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and
the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or
the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy."[135]
A careful examination of the jurisprudential bases[136] of the foregoing
exceptions would reveal a common denominator - the issues for resolution
of the Court are purely legal. Similarly, the Court in Diocese decided to
allow direct recourse in said case because, just like Angara, what was
involved was the resolution of a question of law, namely, whether the
limitation on the size of the tarpaulin in question violated the right to free
speech of the Bacolod Bishop.

We take this opportunity to clarify that the presence of one or more of the
so-called "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor
considered by the Court in deciding whether to permit the invocation, at
the first instance, of its original jurisdiction over the issuance of
extraordinary writs. Rather, it is the nature of the question raised by the
parties in those "exceptions" that enabled us to allow the direct action
before us.

As a case in point, we shall focus our discussion on transcendental

importance. Petitioner after all argues that its direct resort to us is proper
because the issue raised (that is, whether the bundling of the Projects
violates the constitutional proscription on monopoly and restraint of trade)
is one of transcendental importance or of paramount public interest.

An examination of the cases wherein this Court used "transcendental

importance" of the constitutional issue raised to excuse violation of the
principle of hierarchy of courts would show that resolution of factual
issues was not necessary for the resolution of the constitutional issue/s.
These cases include Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[137] Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[138] Jaworski v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[139] Province of
Batangas v. Romulo,[140] Aquino III v. Commission on
Elections,[141] Department of Foreign Affairs v. Falcon,[142] Capalla v.
Commission on Elections,[143] Kulayan v. Tan,[144] Puna v. Manila
Economic & Cultural Office,[145] Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista,[146] and Ifurung v.
Carpio-Morales.[147] In all these cases, there were no disputed facts and
the issues involved were ones of law.

In Agan, we stated that "[t]he facts necessary to resolve these legal

questions are well established and, hence, need not be determined by a
trial court,"[148] In Jaworski, the issue is whether Presidential Decree No.
1869 authorized the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation to
contract any part of its franchise by authorizing a concessionaire to
operate internet gambling.[149] In Romulo, we declared that the facts
necessary to resolve the legal question are not disputed.[150] In Aquino III,
the lone issue is whether RA No. 9716, which created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur, is
constitutional.[151] In Falcon, the threshold issue is whether an information
and communication technology project, which does not conform to our
traditional notion of the term "infrastructure," is covered by the
prohibition against the issuance of court injunctions under RA No.
8975.[152] Similarly, in Capalla, the issue is the validity and
constitutionality of the Commission on Elections' Resolutions for the
purchase of precint count optical scanner machines as well as the
extension agreement and the deed of sale covering the
same.[153] In Kulayan, the issue is whether Section 465 in relation to
Section 16 of the Local Government Code authorizes the respondent
governor to declare a state of national emergency and to exercise the
powers enumerated in his Proclamation No. 1-09.[154] In Funa, the issue is
whether the Commission on Audit is, under prevailing law, mandated to
audit the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural
Office.[155] In Ferrer, the issue is the constitutionality of the Quezon City
ordinances imposing socialized housing tax and garbage
fee.[156] In Ifurung, the issue is whether Section 8(3) of RA No. 6770 or
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 is constitutional.[157]
More recently, in Aala v. Uy,[158] the Court En Banc, dismissed an original
action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, which prayed for the
nullification of an ordinance for violation of the equal protection clause,
due process clause, and the rule on uniformity in taxation. We stated that,
not only did petitioners therein fail to set forth exceptionally compelling
reasons for their direct resort to the Court, they also raised factual issues
which the Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of the
case. We reiterated the time-honored rule that we are not a trier of facts:
"[T]he initial reception and appreciation of evidence are functions that
[the] Court cannot perform. These are functions best left to the trial
courts."[159]

To be clear, the transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with

the power to tackle factual questions and play the role of a trial court. The
only circumstance when we may take cognizance of a case in the first
instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the exercise of our
constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.[160] The case before us does not fall
under this exception.

H
Hierarchy of courts is a constitutional imperative

Strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should not be a

matter of mere policy. It is a constitutional imperative given (1) the
structure of our judicial system and (2) the requirements of due process.

First. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts recognizes the various levels of

courts in the country as they are established under the Constitution and by
law, their ranking and effect of their rulings in relation with one another,
and how these different levels of court interact with one another.[161] It
determines the venues of appeals and the appropriate forum for the
Issuance of extraordinary writs.[162]

Since the creation of the Court in 1901,[163] and save for certain
exceptions, it does not, as a rule, retry questions of facts.[164] Trial courts
such as the MTCs and the RTCs, on the other hand, routinely decide
questions of fact and law at the first instance, in accordance with the
jurisdiction granted to them by law.[165] While the CA and other
intermediate courts can rule on both questions of fact and law, the
Supreme Court, in stark contrast, generally decides only questions of law.
This is because the Court, whether in the exercise of its original or
appellate jurisdiction, is not equipped to receive and evaluate evidence in
the first instance. Our sole role is to apply the law based on the findings of
facts brought before us.[166] Notably, from the 1901 Rules[167] until the
present 1997 Revised Rules of Court,[168] the power to ascertain facts and
receive and evaluate evidence in relation thereto is lodged with the trial
courts.

In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Alonso),[169] this Court had occasion
to articulate the role of the CA in the judicial hierarchy, viz.:
The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA
stands between the RTC and the Court, and its establishment has
been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by
the Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the
Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and
intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily might
escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to better discharge its
constitutional duties and perform its most important work, which, in
the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, "is less concerned with the decision
of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of
particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national
policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of
governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental
rights."[170] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the Court, they
bypass the judicial structure and open themselves to the risk of presenting
incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers the resolution of
controversies before the Court. Without the necessary facts, the Court
cannot authoritatively determine the rights and obligations of the parties.
The case would then become another addition to the Court's already
congested dockets. Thus, as we explained in Alonso:
x x x Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has forthwith
enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it may
not seem burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the Court,
which has to devote time and effort in poring over the papers submitted
herein, only to discover in the end that a review should have first been
made by the CA. The time and effort could have been dedicated to other
cases of importance and impact on the lives and rights of others.[171]
Second. Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts also
proceeds from considerations of due process. While the term "due process
of law" evades exact and concrete definition, this Court, in one of its
earliest decisions, referred to it as a law which hears before it condemns
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It
means that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society.[172] Under the present Rules of Court, which governs our judicial
proceedings, warring factual allegations of parties are settled through
presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of ascertaining, in a
judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact:[173] As earlier
demonstrated, the Court cannot accept evidence in the first instance. By
directly filing a case before the Court, litigants necessarily deprive
themselves of the oportunity to completely pursue or defend their causes
of actions. Their right to due process is effectively undermined by their
own doing.

Objective justice also requires the ascertainment of all relevant facts

before the Court can rule on the issue brought before it. Our
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[174] is enlightening:
The resolution of controversies is, as everyone knows, the raison
d'etre of courts. This essential function is accomplished by first, the
ascertainment of all the material and relevant facts from the pleadings
and from the evidence adduced by the parties, and second, after that
determination of the facts has been completed, by the application of the
law thereto to the end that the controversy may be settled authoritatively,
definitely and finally.

It is for this reason that a substantial part of the adjective law in this
jurisdiction is occupied with assuring that all the facts are indeed
presented to the Court; for obviously, to the extent that adjudication
is made on the basis of incomplete facts, to that extent there is
faultiness in the approximation of objective justice. It is thus the
obligation of lawyers no less than of judges to see that this objective is
attained; that is to say, that there no suppression, obscuration,
misrepresentation or distortion of the facts; and that no party be unaware
of any fact material and relevant to the action, or surprised by any factual
detail suddenly brought to his attention during the trial.[175] (Emphasis
supplied.)
I

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts as a filtering mechanism

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate

demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;[176] (2) prevent further over-
crowding of the Court's docket;[177] and (3) prevent the inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which
often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court better equipped to
resolve factual questions.[178]

Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is an effective

mechanism to filter the cases which reach the Court. As of December 31,
2016, 6,526 new cases were filed to the Court. Together with the
reinstated/revived/reopened cases, the Court has a total of 14,491 cases in
its docket. Of the new cases, 300 are raffled to the Court En Banc and
6,226 to the three Divisions of the Court. The Court En Banc disposed of
105 cases by decision or signed resolution, while the Divisions of the
Court disposed of a total of 923 by decision or signed resolution.[179]

These, clearly, are staggering numbers. The Constitution provides that the
Court has original jurisdiction over five extraordinary writs and by our
rule-making power, we created four more writs which can be filed directly
before us. There is also the matter of appeals brought to us from the
decisions of lower courts. Considering the immense backlog facing the
court, this begs the question: What is really the Court's work? What sort of
cases deserves the Court's attention and time?

We restate the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara that the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. Hence, direct recourse to us
should be allowed only when the issue involved is one of law. However,
and as former Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza reminds, the Court
may still choose to avoid passing upon constitutional questions which are
confessedly within its jurisdiction if there is some other ground on which
its decision may be based.[180] The so-called "seven pillars of limitations of
judicial review"[181] or the "rules of avoidance" enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority[182] teaches that:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in
the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act."

2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in

advance of the necessity of deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case."

3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than
is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although

properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most
varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right
of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the
challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained. In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have
the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and

even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided."[183] (Citations omitted.)
Meanwhile, in Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc.,[184] the Court summarized the
foregoing "pillars" into six categories and adopted "parallel guidelines" in
the exercise of its power of judicial review, to wit:
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority from different decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following
categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by

the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the

operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court
in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
 2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity;

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the

case.[185] (Citations omitted.)
Thus, the exercise of our power of judicial review is subject to these four
requisites and the further requirement that we can only resolve pure
questions of law. These limitations, when properly and strictly observed,
should aid in the decongestion of the Court's workload.

To end, while reflective deliberation is necessary in the judicial process,

there is simply no ample time for it given this Court's massive
caseload.[185] In fact, we are not unaware of the proposals to radically
reform the judicial structure in an attempt to relieve the Court of its
backlog of cases.[186] Such proposals are, perhaps, borne out of the public's
frustration over the slow pace of decision-making. With respect, however,
no overhaul would be necessary if this Court commits to be more
judicious with the exercise of its original jurisdiction by strictly
implementing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Accordingly, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reiterate
that when a question before the Court involves determination of a
factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the
Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or
invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or
paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be
brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are
specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition

is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Q: What is the most cited reason for the delay in the resolution of
administrative cases?

A: You mean by the court, Your honor, or by the Office of the Court
Administrator?

Q: The whole process.

A: Well the most cited reason for the delay I think of these cases is because the
sheer volume of cases has been pending in a certain tribunal, Your Honor.

Q: In your level, what is the process in your level?

A: In our level, Your Honor, when a complaint is filed against a judge or a

court personnel, it goes to our legal office. And then, the legal office will
evaluate, will give a recommendation on whether or not to dismiss the case
or to let’s say if the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, then a
 comment may be required. So, we require the judge to comment, sometimes
it will take some time before the comment is received by the office and then
after the comment the comment is submitted, the legal office will again
evaluate the complaint against the comment. Then, we’ll give a
recommendation, that recommendation will go to the deputy court
administrator or assistant court administrator in charge of that area and then
it will go to the court administrator.

Q: From the filing up to your resolution, how many months?

A: Resolution meaning, Your Honor, the recommendation given to them?

Normally, Your Honor, that should take around four to five months,
sometimes it’s longer because sometimes the comment of the judge is
submitted right away and the judge will ask for extension of time to submit
a comment. But in some instances, also, Your Honor, we do not require the
judge anymore to comment if we think that the complaint on its face is
harassment, is judicial in nature, has no merit at all. Then we make the
recommendation right away to the court that the complaint be dismissed for
the reasons aforementioned, Your Honor.

Q: How about in the Supreme Court, what is your experience?

A: Your Honor, we have actually varying experiences with the court. It

depends actually to whom that the case is raffled, Your Honor. And we have
also varying experiences in many cases whenever we submit a
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint without requiring the
judge to comment, that recommendation is approved but, in some instances,
that recommendation is not accepted and the Supreme Court will still
require the judge to comment.

Q: In the past, an administrative case or complaint can be dismissed by the

Office of the Court Administrator if there is no probable cause, it’s not
recommended to the Supreme Court but on its own dismisses the case. Do
you want to return to that practice?

A: That was actually, Your Honor, going to be adopted by the late Chief Justice
Corona. And if let’s say the complaint to the view of the court administrator
should be dismissed, then the court administrator, the power to dismiss that
complaint being delegated to the court administrator however. And if let’s
say, it will only go up to the Supreme Court if let’s say there is a motion for
recommendation, a motion for reconsideration on the dismissal made by the
court administrator then that’s the time it will up to the court. However, that
procedure was not eventually adopted because of many other circumstances
intervened during that time and it was never brought again to the court, Your
Honor.

Q: What is your position on that regard?

A: I think that will speed up the process, Your Honor. I think, with all due
respect to the members of the court, I think the court administrator should
be given that prerogative to dismiss complaint against judges and personnel
where the complaints are viewed to be judicial in nature, pure harassment,
or without merit at all. And only will it go to the Supreme Court if let’s say
there are questions on that judgment of the court administrator, Your Honor.

Q: So, it’s still subject to review? So, it’s not yet final? Because you said it’s
subject to review.
A: Only if the aggrieved party, only if the complainant who filed the complaint
originally is not satisfied with the decision of the court administrator, then
we let it go to the Supreme Court, Your Honor.

Q: Anyway, if you’d be appointed, you can make that recommendation.

A: Yes, Your Honor. Actually, the only reason that I am not doing that or
making that recommendation is because the members of the court might say
that because it’s me who’s doing it. But, the one I mentioned earlier, with
regards during the time of Chief Justice Corona, that recommendation or
that idea actually came from him, Your Honor. And I said if that is the
wisdom of the court, then we will abide by it, Your Honor.

Q: You heard Atty. Gatdula on his view on divorce, do you agree with his
views?

A: I agree, Your Honor, with the views more of Dean Villanueva, Your Honor,
on the issue of divorce.

Q: Court Administrator Marquez, what is your position on that?

A: I think the information should set out all the elements that would constitute
the crime, not necessarily the details because that can be later on be
determined during trial.

Q: But you need not allege that in the information? How about the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges? Is that sufficient alleging treachery
only?

A: I think it should be given a little bit some circumstance on how treachery

was committed, Your Honor. The word treachery, I think would not suffice,
Your Honor.

Q: Atty. Marquez, is anybody been charged with non-filing of SALN before

your office?

A: I have not come across any complaints against non-filing or complaints of

non-filing of SALN against any of our judges or court personnel, Your
Honor.

Q: Were you aware of the prescriptive period?

A: I’m sorry, Your Honor.

Q: Court Administrator Marquez, within what period do you collect the

assurance fund or do you apply against the assurance fund?

A: I’m sorry, Your Honor. I was not able to look into that, Your Honor.

Q: And the period, from what time do you have it? The period.

A: Well I’d like to think, Your Honor, from the time that the subsequent
registration was made, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Franklin J. Demonteverde to Atty. Cesar L. Villanueva

Q: Thank you. Going to Atty. Villanueva, you were with the Villanueva-
Gabionza law office, from 1990-2011?

A: That’s correct, Your Honor.

Q: And likewise, from 2016-present? Can you explain the reason between
these two periods why you were not with the law office?

A: Yes, Your Honor. In 2011, Your Honor, I was appointed by then President
Aquino to be the chairman of a newly established government agency, it’s
the Governance Commission for GOCC, Your Honor. So, in those almost
six years, five and a half years, Your Honor, I was in public service. I
withdrew from the law firm from the time I accepted the appointment and I
rejoined the law firm after my term expired which was coterminous with
then President Aquino, Your Honor.

Q: What was your expertise in that law firm?

A: I’ve always been in commercial law practice, Your Honor, including

particularly on corporate law and corporate law litigation, Your Honor. But
I still, I do participate in other areas where our clients would request our
intervention or soccer, Your Honor. So, it’s pretty broad. It included no n-
commercial litigation and also labor issues, Your Honor.

Q: So, all of this would center more on consultations? Is that it, conferences?

A: NO, Your Honor, basically I involve myself, I’ve always involved myself
not only in special projects putting up together a deal or a merger but I also
continue to involve myself in corporate commercial litigation, Your Honor ,
especially before the regional trial court with special jurisdiction on
commercial matters, Your Honor.

Q: Your views on this, personal views Atty. Villanueva? (on divorce)

A: I believe in a divorce law should be enacted. I think it’s good for society. I
think that our stands on annulment is basically a de facto divorce law
anyway. Instead of doing this, and protecting more the, although marriage
is an inviolable social institution, it should be protected only when it
promotes the relationship within the spouses and the children. And when
the marriage is no longer there, when the love and affection and respect is
no longer there, I think the spouses should be granted the liberty to part
ways and then build new marriages. A divorce would actually allow the
protection of those who, of the rights of those who are no longer related to
one another. Rather than doing an action that is called annulment, that is
difficult to obtain anyway, Your Honor.

Q: Thank you. Now you were the first Chairman of the Governance
Commission for GOCCs from 2011-2016, is that correct?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Now what is your take on the public’s opinion that instead of piloting the
growth and development of GOCCs, the GCG became another bureaucratic
layer in the already confounded structure of checks and balances and that
GCG overlaps with the COA, the NEDA, the GPPB and the OGCC?
A: Your Honor, it does not, first of all it does not overlap if you look at the
charter of the Governance Commission for GOCCS because it is actually
not doing COA’s work. It is concentrated on what it calls good corporate
governance when it comes to the public corporate sector. Therefore, the
mission of the GCG is to put into the GOCC sector the same great practices,
good governance practices as they practice them in government. Therefore,
to allow GOCCs to contribute to national development, and that in fact Your
Honor the records would show that since the Governance Commission for
GOCCs was constituted, the record of declaration of dividends, because
they oversee on how they operate, has the dividend that they declared to
government has increased over the years and even after my term, in the three
year term, so far in the three years since the new commission have come in,
commissioners have come in, still it’s a breaking record every year. It has
become one of the main sources by which the government is able to fund
many of its social and developmental findings. There are criticisms Your
Honor about the fact that it is not as effective that it tends to overlap, and I
think that may be contributed to the fact that the new commissioners had,
well they had a, they had to get experience on how it is. It is technical work
Your Honor, it’s not just corporate governance, it goes into redoing,
revamping the organization and setting out the proper renumeration. So, you
attribute that to that fact that there was a growing up pain to understand how
it works Your Honor. But even then, they continued in each of those three
years to be able to supervise the GOCCS to be declaring dividends that are
record breaking, Your Honor. So, in that respect, perhaps Your Honor, the
GCG continues to be relevant Your Honor.

Q: You are in the private practice for 28 years and as per your PDS, you have
no judiciary experience, what do you think is your biggest advantage among
other applicants you already have this experience in the judiciary?

A: I think it would be bringing into decision-making up the courts basically

what they call the private sector experience, especially practitioners
experience in all matters that are before the courts. When it’s a commercial
law aspect, civil law aspect, and therefore as well as being able to bring with
it with my experience in government, I was not only the chairman of the
Governance Commission, I was for many years with the Philippine Judicial
Academy and I participated in the training of newly appointed judges, as
well as judges in updating them in matters that are in developments in
commercial law. So, it’s being able to bring into a perspective that may be
unique in the sense that I do have public sector experience, I do have private
sector experience but in academic experience to look at things to always
question the way things have been. I have always been an how to make
things better as well as the practice experience that allows the toss and
tumbles that you experience in commerce, in the market to be brought into
the discussions of the issues that are raised before the courts, Your Honor.

Q: Atty. Villanueva, this may be peanuts for you but we would like to know
the answer to the question, what is the Realty Installment Buyer Act or
commonly known as the Maceda Law and how is it applied?

A: The Maceda law is a special law governing in the law and sales that governs
the remedies appreciation that may be availed of by an unpaid seller when
it comes to a particular type of sale, Sale of Realty on its own installments.
It is the counterpart of the Recto Law, so to speak, which governs the
remedies available when it comes to sale of movables on installments and
basically, it seeks to protect the constitutional right of our people to abode
that they shall be protected when the basis of what the subject matter that
 they buy is basically residential real estate or a residential condominium
unit Your Honor. And it basically allows for somebody (who) has paid the
purchase price over several years. Like for example, more than two years,
then and he cannot pay anymore, the buyer, he basically is allowed the
ability to before it is rescinded to a grace period. A minimum of 60 days
within which to update his account without penalty in spite of a penalty
provision provided for and not being away available availing of that grace
period, then the seller can only be seen by a notarial decision and even then
if it’s more than two years, he would be allowed, the buyer would be
allowed to receive a cash render value so to speak Your Honor.

Q: Atty. Villanueva, this may be peanuts for you but we would like to know
the answer to the question, what is the Realty Installment Buyer Act or
commonly known as the Maceda Law and how is it applied?

A: The Maceda law is a special law governing in the law and sales that governs
the remedies appreciation that may be availed of by an unpaid seller when
it comes to a particular type of sale, Sale of Realty on its own installments.
It is the counterpart of the Recto Law, so to speak, which governs the
remedies available when it comes to sale of movables on installments and
basically, it seeks to protect the constitutional right of our people to abode
that they shall be protected when the basis of what the subject matter that
they buy is basically residential real estate or a residential condominium
unit Your Honor. And it basically allows for somebody (who) has paid the
purchase price over several years. Like for example, more that two years,
then and he cannot pay anymore, the buyer, he basically is allowed the
ability to before it is rescinded to a grace period. A minimum of 60 days
within which to update his account without penalty in spite of a penalty
provision provided for and not being away available availing of that grace
period, then the seller can only be seen by a notarial decision and even then
if it’s more than two years, he would be allowed, the buyer would be
allowed to receive a cash render value so to speak Your Honor.

Q: Thank you. Your opinion on this Atty. Villanueva? (The power to appoint
judges and justices was lodge before the president)

A: I agree with them just as might that perhaps it’s important to remove as
much politics the Supreme Court from so much politics. Granting the
Supreme Court the power to appoint the members of the judiciary would
actually put it smack into exercising what is essentially an executive power
and therefore it brings the Supreme Court again into the limelight of
lobbying and politics and things like that. In under the current set up, Your
Honor, it’s the Supreme Court has the power to discipline over judges which
are appointed, who are appointed, by the executive and for it to be the one
to appoint them, and to discipline them, just doesn’t smack well in the sense
that if it does not appoint well, then it will not show that it has not done its
job by removing so many of this. So I think that line, that check and balance
line, as Justice Midas said is so important in order to preserve the important
role of the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter of national issues, Your
Honor.

Q: What reforms would you want to inititate in the Philippine bar exams if
appointed as Supreme Court (Associate Justice), this pass or fail system of
checking paper practicable?
A: I do not believe in a pass or fail, this is because the legal profession is one
that requires the best and the brightest only to work for them to engage
because hold into our hands, aside from those who assume the judge
position, the life liberty and property of many of our people and to do
together, as to be able to visualize some of the visions for many of the great
issues that are at hand. So, it should be allowed only to those who can
demonstrate the highest, the best knowledge of the law. So to speak, what I
would introduce, Your Honor, is basically the same one that Justice BB
Mendoza in a monogram to institutionalize, so to speak, the MCQ in a way
that it’s not just one type of MCQ but it will gather, but the only thing that
was not adopted there Your Honor, that there has to be a panel of examiners.
It cannot be that you appoint examiners every year in order to provide the
MCQ because that’s a whole body of law that will be organized in each of
the eight subjects that will cover everything from mere ideas to being able
to resolve putting problems into a practical question and then for them to
choose and therefore and sometime MCQs have to be calibrated well and
that can only be done by professionals, examiners who are full time, who
look at it every year. That allows the Supreme Court therefore the ability to
offer because there is so many who are asking to take the bar almost nine
thousand that allows the giving of the bar exam twice a year Your Honor
because if the computation is computerized, then it’s easy to come up with
results and it can be held in various regions, Your Honor. MCQ to me has
been done by many studies probably is a good way of trying to do that and
it could be dovetailed with something like putting into the curriculum what
we call apprenticeship. So that other aspect gets to be served also, Your
Honor.

Q: In your case Atty. Villanueva, you have been shortlisted three times, in what
aspect do you think you lacked for not getting the appointment or an
appointment?

A: I think it’s the same, I have the same answers as Justice Marquez. Basically,
the president appoints those whom he considers the best in the shortlist,
Your Honor and we must respect that because that is how the constitutional
setup is. But we also respect the process because we keep coming back
applying, hoping that somehow the process would respect whatever merits
we bring and are applying in spite of not being chosen by the president. It’s
a sign of our respect that we believe in the process that set out by the
constitution through the JBC, Your Honor.

Q: Atty. Villanueva? (on Doctrine of Processual Presumption)

A: My understanding of that doctrine, Your Honor, is that whenever anything

has been passed, has been processed or vetted in a government or an agency,
then we presume that the normal course of complying with the procedures
mandated by law have been passed and it is the person who says that the
process, the proceedings have not been held in accordance with what the
law provides such as the burden of proof of proving otherwise.

Q: Now we have seen the appointment of many uniformed men to the different
branches of the government, can the Principle of Civilian Supremacy be
used as a defense to question these appointments, Atty. Villanueva?

A: Not at all, Your Honor. Precisely the appointing power is the civilian, the
number one civilian politician, the president, and therefore when he
appoints people who have retired from the military, that just shows the
supremacy of the civilian authority over the military, Your Honor.
Q: My last question, what do you understand of this phrase, “rights beget
responsibilities and progress begets change”?

A: We think the first part of the phrase comes from, maybe adopted from what
was said in Spiderman movie that he who was given much power has much
responsibility. In other words, the rights basically are things that are given
in their hands recognized by law to be something that is in the hands of
individuals who have the right to demand it by family, from others, from
the state, but in exercising those rights it is so important to realize that we’re
all part of a community and therefore we must be responsible for demanding
those rights in a manner that not only protects our interest but those of the
community at large. The second part of the phrase therefore has something
to do with being able to realize that we live in an age where changes are
ever coming. When it comes to values, not only the technology and
therefore, it is important for us to look at the rights that are there and see
whether those rights are not suppose, are undermining the ability of a
community to adopt new changes and therefore when those changes have
to be there then for the better good of the people or more, then we should
move as a community towards those that in, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Toribio E. Ilao, Jr. to Atty. Cesar L. Villanueva

Q: Atty. Villanueva, how are you again? With respect to careerism, not having
a judicial experience I’ll give you two minutes to convince us why you
should be chosen among the other applicants.

A: I’ll first address the question on whether it is right that those who are not in
the judiciary should also be in the shortlist and therefore taking away the
spot that’s supposed to be reserved for those who coming from the appellate
courts and my personal view, Your Honor, is that in order to encourage
career in the judiciary, the priority should be coming (appointments in the
Supreme Court), should be coming really from the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, and all the appellate courts that is the bulk and therefore we
try to create a judicial career path that starts from, let me start from the
lowest court up to the Court of Appeals with a dream of one day, being in
contention for appointment that is what I have to say. But I also agree with
my two gentlemen Reza says that it is important also that even as those
coming from the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan should be first had the
crack of being able to fill in, that once in a while we should, the Supreme
Court should be filled in from coming from outside because of the strength
that that person brings. Filling up the vacancies of two outstanding associate
justices who really came from the private sector without having to serve in
the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or in the judiciary before they were
appointed to the Supreme Court and both of them have done outstanding
job in being able to show how a private sector or non-judiciary career or
even an academic career can sometimes make whole, so to speak the mind
of the Supreme Court, Your Honor.

Q: Are we not going to heed to the ruling of the court, respect to those who
came from the outside who joined the judiciary but yet who have been
removed the judiciary?

A: That happens, Your Honor, not because of their non-judicial career but I
think that goes into, in each case when that happens, that goes into the
character of the person who is there, Your Honor. I don’t think it is always
necessarily tied up to the fact that they were appointed too young or that
 they came not from the judiciary and because there are really outstanding
people (who) have served out their term in the Supreme Court, were their
career as a judge began and ended illustriously in the Supreme Court, Your
Honor.

Q: I understand that you have been shortlisted three times, do you think that
this justiceship is yours?

A: No, Your Honor. It’s always being part of the Supreme Court for me has
always been a matter of faith, Your Honor. That somehow in His mysterious
ways our God determines who would be in the Supreme Court at a great
way. Many people prepare, many people go to the line, but so to speak, only
the once that are appointed are handed out by faith. But we keep trying,
Your Honor, because none of us really know whether it is us that faith would
tap on the shoulder, Your Honor.

Q: Alright, Dean Caesar Villanueva, what will you do differently if you knew
no one would judge you?

A: In my life, (if) no one will judge me? I probably spend more time with my
family, my grandchildren, and make up for all the lost time trying to build
a career. Because trying to build a career is one of the things that you begin
to feel well because of the honor and praise of the society will heap upon
you. Therefore, if society’s judgment were not important, on how successful
one’s career would be, I would spend those time with my family, being a
better husband, a better father, a better grandfather, and then spending
whatever time I have trying to help those in my community basically. That’s
it, trying to be invisible except to those who consider, who are most
important in my life, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Justice Noel Tiham to Atty. Cesar L. Villanueva

Q: Atty. Villanueva, you were making some discussions on the bar

examinations. Should grades in the bar examinations of applicants for
judgeship be given more premium? And Should applicants who took the bar
once be given more preference than somebody who took it twice?

A: Human nature as it is, Your Honor. The grades in the bar exam especially
for those who topped the bar exams do impress people whether in the JBC
or not. But in the end, Your Honor, it’s what they do with their license to
practice law that is more important to consider. And therefore, this answers
the question, “should those who took the bar exam only once against those
who took two or three times be given a premium?” the answer is no, Your
Honor. Human nature as it is, it is our role to rise up even beyond where we
are. In fact, it is those who have fallen and are able to rise the truth to be
better equipped to solve society’s problems and those who have always been
constantly championed. So, I think, aside from the fact that they do have a
good start by the time they are before the JBC, they would have had a career
since they took the bar exams and therefore how they did with the illustrious
grades that they have or how they were able to rise above having to take it
several times is the more important consideration because that would show
the person and show to us how much they appreciate society’s Ferber trying
to rise up above certain norms, Your Honor.

Q: Based on your experience and information, do lawyers who excelled

academically on the average, make better lawyers and better judges?
A: To the extent, the answer is not always the same, Your Honor. To the extent
that high grades or those who win Latin honors or achieved Latin honors,
those are manifestation as a certain discipline the way they look at life. In
other words, they achieve those because of the discipline that they have and
they carry that, that becomes second nature to that and they carry that
whether in practice or when they become judges and therefore to a great
extent many of them do. In fact, the two justices, retiring justices today
who’s position we are replacing indicate that they’re two brilliant scholars
of the law who have proven well in both their practice. But to every brilliant
person, academically, there are others who, because they concentrated more
on EQ and the relationship with people, of understanding how people react
in certain circumstances, they’re also effective. In fact, they become more
effective in the sense that they have a feel on how the average Filipino feels
and react, Your Honor.

Q: Dean Villanueva, the same question, human values which are dear to your
heart. And which human values would you consider paramount?

A: I think the unique human value of being able to feel and express love, Your
Honor. It’s a value that we share I think with God, he so loved the world
that he gave up his only son to save us all. It is that human ability to love
like no other animal on earth, that makes us closer to him. That love for the
knowledge that makes us stay out in night and read and find the truth. That
love for our family and our fellow beings that make us become martyrs and
choose death in order to protect them and the love for everything that makes
life wonderful that allows many of us to try to preserve the environment. I
think that’s the most important virtue that man possesses that makes him so
different in this universe I believe, Your Honor.

Q: Dean Villanueva, mental health in the judiciary, now let’s talk of the
Supreme Court, will it be an important factor during the deliberation of
cases the mental health status of members in the judiciary? Would it be a
factor in the deliberating process or even in the lower courts, will it have
any connection to the judicious disposition of cases, evaluation, making
decisions?

A: Yes, Your Honor, I believe it does. And I think it is important for the JBC
to consider mental health as one of the factors to qualify a judge because
somebody who is not in good mental health, then what is the rule of reason,
rule of law? How can it abide, Your honor? To somebody who’s crazy, Your
Honor, then reason has no meaning because they cannot understand
reasoning so I think it’s important. When the lives of men and women and
their future and their career and the property are in the hands of a decision
by the judge or by a court, and the fate of the nation hangs in the hands of a
decision, then how can a judge or a justice who does not know what is
reasonable and not reasonable? Can I distinguish what is true and fantastic?
We cannot expect justice to feel from that and the erosion of public regard
for dispensation of justice goes down eventually, Your Honor. So, I think it
so quite important.

Q: Dean Villanueva, as somebody from the academe if appointed to the court,

during deliberation in the court, what would you do to endeavor, to teach
the other members of the court to have a complete and thorough analysis of
the merits of the case? And connected to that, if you are unsuccessful in
encouraging them, to your side, which do you think is more challenging,
being in the majority or being alone or being in the minority?
A: In that occasion, Your Honor, I would not actually try to teach the members
of the tribunal, simply because they probably have more to teach me being
new. What I would do is to convince them of the merits of the points by
participating in a very respectful way in the deliberation. Showing to them
by the sheer worth and merit of the argument and why they would consider
this. And in the end, it’s up to them to accept them and my success in being
able to convince them is based on the merits of my arguments and in fact if
I am unable to convince them to the sheer merits of my arguments, then I
must look at my own position and consider their consideration. That’s what
a collegial body should do, but in the end, Your Honor, I am unable to
convince them, and I still believe in the position I stand for, then it becomes
my solemn duty then to write a very respectful dissenting opinion to try to
show the basis of why I think they should be it. And a dissenting opinion,
once it’s published, not only speaks to the public, it also speaks to the
justices themselves because having gone out there in public consumption,
they begin to… intelligent people as we are all, an argument even if we
don’t accept begins to turn in our mind. And when that same thing happens,
therefore that dissenting opinion becomes like a client call perhaps on that
day, they begin to believe that. But rather than teaching them, I believe
that’s my position, Your Honor.

Questions of Atty. Jose Mendoza to Atty. Cesar L. Villanueva

Q: Can you repeat your definition of Processual Presumption?

A: My understanding I said, Your Honor, was that it’s in any issues raised that
the rules and proceedings provided for by law have not been followed, as to
deny a person of procedural process, the presumption is that they were and
it’s up to the person who says that they have not been followed where the
burden of proof lies to prove that they were indeed not followed.

Q: Dean Villanueva, you have been a bar examiner?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: In what subject?

A: In Commercial Law, Your Honor.

Q: Are you familiar with the replevin or replevin bond?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How much is the replevin bond?

A: I’m not really aware of the amount, Your Honor.

Q: If the main case is dismissed without prejudice, what happens to the bond?

A: If the main case is dismissed without prejudice, the bond itself, Your
Honor? I think that bond gets forfeited, Your Honor. Because the replevin
is supposed to support an appeal preventing the execution of the, I’m sorry,
the bond gets refunded, Your Honor. Because a replevin bond is supposed
to prevent the execution of the judgment pending appeal. That’s my
understanding.
Q: The amount of the replevin bond is doubled the value. Is it forfeited
immediately of do you conduct a hearing?

A: I’m not sure, Your Honor.

CORRECT ANSWER: A replevin bond is intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss
that he may suffer by reason of its being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed
property pending trial of the action. The same may also be answerable for damages if any when
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant or the party against whom a writ of replevin was
issued and such judgment includes the return of the property to him. Thus, the requirement that
the bond be double the actual value of the properties litigated upon. Such is the case because the
bond will answer for the actual loss to the plaintiff, which corresponds to the value of the properties
sought to be recovered and for damages, if any.

Q: How are you in criminal law?

A: I have a working knowledge in criminal law, Your Honor.

Q: In People v. Valdez, the information did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances and it was ruled that the information was defective, on
the other hand, in People v. Batin, the allegation of an attending
circumstance such as treachery in the information is sufficient, what is your
personal view?

Atty. Villanueva: Your Honor, on what particular issue?

JBC: Do we need to describe the specifics or just the circumstance?

Atty. Villanueva: I think because the requirement of our constitution of due process especially in
criminal proceedings, it is important that the information completely sets out on its face the
elements that would constitute a crime charged in order to allow the accused to be able to plead
properly on whether he is guilty or not guilty to that. And if he pleads not guilty to properly prepare
his defense, Your Honor.

JBC: You mean if you are not satisfied with alleged, you mean to say for example the circumstance
of treachery was alleged, it is not sufficient for you?

Atty. Villanueva: It is not sufficient unless it shows in the information that the ultimate facts that
support that circumstance of treachery, Your Honor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,vs. DANILO VALDEZ

and SINIPLICIO ORODIO alias "Kamlon", appellants.

G.R. No. L-75390 March 25, 1988

FELICIANO, J.:

This case is before us on automatic review of the decision of the Regional

Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union,
convicting the accused-appellants Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio of
the crime of murder and sentencing each of them to death.

The accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio were charged in an

information which read as follows:

That on or about the 7th day of June, 1977, in the

Municipality of Santol, Province of La Union, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, armed with a fire arm, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with deliberate
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, shoot Eleno Maquiling inflicting upon him a
gunshot wound which caused the victim's instantaneous
death.

That the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was present

in the commission of the crime. Contrary to Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.

After arraignment and trial, the trial court rendered in due course, on 27
June 1986, a decision finding both of the accused guilty of murder. The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds

the accused Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias
'Kamlon' guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon
each of them the Capital penalty of death; to indemnify the
heirs of Eleno Maquiling the sum of P30,000.00; to
reimburse the expenses in the sum of P3,000.00 to said
heirs, and to pay the costs.

The bail bonds posted by the accused for their provisional

liberty are hereby cancelled and their immediate arrest
ordered.

The accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in the following
respects:

1) That the evidence of the prosecution does not establish

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt; and

2) That the evidence of the prosecution is based simply on

suspicion.

We will address these arguments together.

From the record, the facts of the case may be collated as follows:

The house of the Maquiling family stands on the slope of a mountain in

Barangay Ambagat, Santol, La Union. At about 8:00 o'clock in the
evening of 7 June 1977, the victim Eleno Maquiling, his sisters Leticia and
Thelma, his mother Esmenia, and his father Juanito were an in the yard of
their house. Esmenia and Juanito were under the awning of their house
facing north, engaged in stringing together tobacco leaves. The victim's
brother Dionisio was eating his dinner in the wall-less kitchen located on
the ground floor of the house. The victim Eleno was seated with his back
toward the north and plucking a guitar. The place and its surroundings
were lighted by a 300 candle power petromax lamp hanging under the
northern end of the awning of the house. 1

While the Maquilings were thus seated in their yard, a relative of the
family, one Carolina, arrived and asked Esmenia to accompany her to a
prayer meeting. Esmenia demurred and instead asked Eleno to accompany
Carolina. The victim was then just about two (2) meters away from his
parents and about to stand up when suddenly a very loud gun shot rang out
from the northern side of the yard and Eleno fell to the ground, crying out
to his father for help. Juanita rushed to his fallen son and carried him into
their house; Eleno, however, died immediately thereafter.

The victim's mother Esmenia was about to succour Eleno when she
instinctively looked toward the direction from whence the gunshot came
and saw the two (2) accused, Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio,
running down the hill away from the bamboo groves on the northern side
of the house. According to Esmenia, the accused Danilo was wearing a
blue shirt and dark pants and carrying a long firearm, while the other
accused Simplicio was running along side the former. Dionisio Maquiling,
brother of the victim, also testified that he too had seen Danilo with a gun
and Simplicio both running away in a westernly direction. Danilo stated
that he was then about seven (7) meters away from the accused-
appellants. 2 Danilo Valdez was a neighbor and a relative of the
Maquilings, while Simplicio Orodio was their old accquaintance residing
in Sitio Village, Barangay Corooy of the same town; thus, both were well-
known to Esmenia and Dionisio Maquiling.

On 8 June 1977, the Municipal Health Officer of Balaoan, Dr. Monico O.

Morales, conducted an autopsy which showed that the victim Eleno had
sustained eight (8) gunshot (pellet) wounds on his back:

1. Wound, gunshot, ½; inch longest dia., 1 cm. below base

of neck, medial, pellet plowed slightly upward and found
its exist at the lower 3rd of neck, left, measuring 3/4 inch
longest diameter. (Thru and thru).

2. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia medial, 1 inch

lateral to vertebral column, right, pellet plowed upward and
found its exit at the base of neck, left, measuring ¾ longest
diameter. (Thru and thru).

3. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia level of 4th

intercostal space, back, right, penetrating the chest cavity,
pellet was recovered at the upper lobe of right lung.

4. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 1 inch above armpit,

back, right, pellet plowed slightly upwards and to left.
Pellet was not recovered.
 5. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia 8th intercostal
space, back, right, 1 inch lateral to the vertebral column,
pellet penetrated check cavity hitting lower lobe of lungs,
right. Pellet was not recovered.

6. Wound, gunshot ½ inch longest dia medial, back, left,

level of 8th intercostal space, hitting the lower lobe, lung,
left. Pellet was not recovered.

7. Wound, gunshot. ½ inch longest dia chest, back medial,

left, (Level of 9th interspace), penetrating chest cavity
hitting lower lobe, lung, left. Pellet was not recovered.

8. Wound, gunshot, ½ inch longest dia postero-lateral,

back, I inch below lowest rib of chest, right. Pellet was
recovered at the abdominal wall, hypochondic region, front,
right. Two (2) pellets were given to Chief of Police,
Segundo Tuvera. 3

The morning after the shooting, on 8 June 1977, Sgt. Segundo Tuvera of
the Integrated National Police, Santol, La Union, went to the house of the
Maquilings to investigate the death of Eleno. 4 He saw a petromax lamp
hanging from the awning of the northern end of the house, as well as
footprints near the bamboo groves near the northern side of the house.
During his investigation, neither Esmenia nor Dionisio informed Sgt.
Tuvera of what they had seen.

On 10 June 1977, Juanito Maquiling, the victim's father, executed a sworn

statement before the police in the Santol Police Substation. Juanita
admitted in his statement that he had not seen the accused-appellants on
the night of the shooting. He did relate, however, that three (3) days prior
to the shooting of Eleno, Eleno had informed him that in case something
untoward happened to him (Eleno), the accused-appellants Danio Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio should be held responsible, since he (Eleno) had
quarrelled with them concerning their stealing and robbing. 5 Juanita
further, stated that the accused Danilo has had a personal grudge against
Eleno; Danilo had mortgaged to Eleno's brother a stolen spading fork, a
circumstance that Eleno discovered when the real owner of the spading
fork came to talk to him. Esmenia, Eleno's mother, gave no sworn
statement on that day. Ten (10) days later, on 20 June 1977, however, she
made a sworn statement to the Philippine Constabulary in San Fernando,
La Union. Shortly thereafter, on 23 June 1977, Dionisio Maquiling,
Eleno's brother, gave his own separate sworn statement also to the
Philippine Constabulary. Both Esmenia and Dionisio Identified Danilo
Orodio as Eleno's killers. 6

At the trial, Esmenia Maquiling was firm and categorical in Identifying the
appellants as the men she saw running from the bamboo groves
immediately after the shooting —

Q. When you heard that gunshot, what did

you do?

A. We immediately rushed to his side and

we found him on the ground, sir.
Q. From what direction did you hear the
gunshot?

A. North of our yard, sir.

Q. When you went to the succour of your

son, what else did you do?

A. When I went, to give succour to my son,

I turned and I saw these two, sir,

Q. Where did you see the two accused?

A. North of our yard, sir.

Q. How far were they from you when you

saw them?

A. Witness indicating a distance of more or

less five meters.

Q. When you saw the two accused, did you

see anything in their possession?

A. They have, sir, (Witness indicating a

length of about a foot), and it was Danilo
Valdez who was holding that object.

Q. Were you able to recognize that object

which Danilo Valdez was then holding?

A. It was a gun, sir.

Q. When you saw Danilo Valdez and

Simplicio Orodio north of your yard, what
were they doing?

A. I saw Danilo Valdez holding the gun

while Simplicio Orodio ran downhill and
then Danilo Valdez followed, sir.

Q. You Id that you saw Danilo Valdez and

Simplicio Orodio north of your yard. In
relation to the place where you heard the
gunshot, where were they?

A. Near the bamboo grove which is located

north of our house, sir?

Q. In relation to that bamboo grove where

you heard the gunshot, where were Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio at the time you
saw them?

A. They were east of the bamboo grove, sir.

Q. How far were they from that bamboo
grove?

A. Witness referring to a distance of about 6

to 6-½ meters away.

COURT:

Q. How far were you from the accused when

you recognized them?

A. Less than a meter away when I

recognized them, sir.

FISCAL:

Q. You Id that the distance between you and

the two accused at the time you saw them
was five meters more or less. Upon
questioning of the court, you Id that the
distance is less than a meter. Which is true?

A. Witness pointing to a distance of more or

less five meters.

Q. How were you able to recognize the two

accused at that distance of five meters from
you considering that it was nighttime?

A. There was a light from the petromax

lamp which was hanging [from] the awning
of our house, sir.

Q. That part of the house where this awning

is located, is there a wall surrounding the
awning?

A. None, sir.

Q. That petromax lamp which you said was

hanging under the awning of your house,
how high is the petromax light from the
ground level?

A. The height is 12 feet, sir.

Q. How big was the petromax light?

A. About two feet, sir. 7

Esmenia's testimony was corroborated by

the equally definite testimony of Dionisio
Maquiling, who declared that:

Q. Where were you at the time your brother

was shot to death?
 A. I was in our kitchen eating.

Q. Where was your brother then at the time

he was shot in relation to your house?

A. He was west of our kitchen.

Q. In what particular part of your house,

inside or outside?

A. Outside of our house.

Q. What time was your brother shot to

death?

A. More or less 8 o'clock in the evening.

Q. You said you were in the kitchen of your

house eating and you Pointed to Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias
"Kamlon" as the persons who shot your
brother. How were you able to see Simplicio
Orodio and Danilo Valdez shoot your
brother?

A. I saw them.

Q. Will you relate how were you able to see

Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio alias
Kamlon shoot your brother Eleno
Maquiling?

A. When I was eating facing westward I

heard a gunshot and when I looked through
the north I saw Danilo Valdez running being
followed by Simplicio Orodio.

Q. When you looked northward and you saw

Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
running, did you see anything in their
possession?

A. A gun. (Witness showing a length of

about half a meter).

Q. Who of the two, Danilo Valdez and

Simplicio Orodio was hiding the gun?

A. Danilo Valdez. 8

The trial court found the testimony of witnesses Esmenia and Dionisio as
positive, credible and reliable. We find no reason to disagree with the
finding of the trial court. It is commonplace that "the findings of the trial
court as to the credibility of the witnesses are to be given great weight and
a high degree of respect by the appellate court". 9 There is nothing in the
record to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any
improper motive to accuse falsely the accused-appellant — one a relative
and the other an old acquaintance — of so grave a crime as murder.

The circumstance that Esmenia waited for thirteen (13) days after her son's
assassination before reporting the Identities of the accused to the
authorities, was not unnatural in itself. She explained the delay by saying
that she was afraid to talk about the killing and that she had seen the
accused loitering frequently around the Maquilings' house, carrying a gun,
after the burial of her son.10 The trial court observed that Esmenia's fear —

was not imaginary because the night that she reported the
Identities of the accused their house was stoned by
unidentified persons. The delay was satisfactorily
explained. In People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260, it was
held that delay of witness for several months, because of
fear, in reporting the incident to the police does not affect
credibility. "Fear of likely retaliation by the several accused
who were still at large has been considered as a justified
reason for the witnesses' delay in coming forward with their
testimony' (People vs. Sampang, 16 SCRA 531; People vs.
Equal, 14 SCRA 89). 11

This explanation does not appear incredible in itself and certainly such a
delay of thirteen(13)days, under the circumstances of this case, does not
warrant a conclusion that her testimony as to the Identities of the killers of
her son was false. In People v. Martinez, 12 the Court held that the failure
of a witness to reveal immediately the Identities of the accused does not
militate against his credibility.

Both Esmenia Maquiling and Dionisio Maquiling did not testify that they
had actually seen either Danilo Valdez or Simplicio Orodio shooting at the
deceased victim. The principal evidence against the accused is, therefore,
circumstantial in character. The trial court recognized this and was careful
to analyze the chain of circumstantial evidence on the basis of which the
trial court concluded that the two (2) accused had killed Eleno Maquiling:

While the prosecution failed to present an eye witness to

the actual shooting by the accused of deceased Eleno, the
chain of circumstances, prior and subsequent to the killing,
leaves no room for doubt that accused are the guilty
persons. The rule is that before conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the
authors of the crime. (People vs. Pamintuan, 127 SCRA
820). In this case, this requisite has been fully met.

Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court

provides:

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, WHEN

SUFFICIENT. — Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

 (b) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances

is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Tested by the rule stated above, and considering that Eleno

was killed by a shot in the back and suffered eight (8) pellet
wounds from one gunshot only; that the accused were
immediately seen running down-hill away from the scene
after the gunshot report with accused Danilo v.
Valdez carrying a long firearm; that three (3) days before
the incident there was already bad blood between the
victim and accused Danilo Valdez as the victim confided to
his father Juanito Maquiling that if ever he would be shot
accused Danilo Valdez is the one to be blamed; 13 that
when the place where the clime was committed is an
isolated place and it is highly probable that some other
malefactors could have been present; and that footprints
were seen by the police investigators behind the bamboo
grove where the accused were seen to come from
immediately after the shooting that Esmenia Maquiling
even described the clothing of accused Danilo Valdez; that
the two accused are well known to the victim's family
thereby precluding the possibility of mistaken Identity; all
these proven facts afford sufficient or a reasonable
inference that the two accused were indeed the killers of the
victim. 14

In his brief, the Solicitor General took the position that accused-appellant
Simplicio Orodio should be acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence to
sustain this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice. The Solicitor
General said:

In the case at bar, the information charged Orodio as

having allegedly conspired with Valdez in killing Eleno.
The prosecution did not however adduce any evidence
establishing the aforesaid alleged conspiracy between
Valdez and Orodio to commit the crime charged. The only
fact that the prosecution was able to successfully prove was
the presence of Orodio at the crime scene when he was
seen running together with Valdez by Dionisio and
Esmenia after Eleno was gunned down and that he was
a barkada of Eleno. It is submitted that in the light of the
aforecited ruling in the Madera case, there exist no factual
and legal basis to sustain the conviction of Orodio either as
a principal or accomplice in this case. 15

We are unable to agree with the Solicitor General, whose view appears to
be too drastic a simplification of the evidence that was in fact before the
trial court. Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling
was killed by a shotgun blast at his back. He was in the company of a man
running with a shotgun, at approximately 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
immediately after the fatal shooting, just outside the Maquilings house
where he had no business being if he were not acting in concert with
Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant who carried the shotgun. He was a
close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the
deceased victim had Identified as probably responsible should any
untoward event befall the victim. Simplicio Orodio completely failed to
explain what he was doing with Danilo Valdez the night of the killing, on
the one hand. Upon the other, both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
pleaded the same alibi. Valdez and Orodio both testified that they were in
Cervantes, Ilocos Sur, when Eleno was shot to death. Their common alibi
remained uncorroborated for both failed to present either the mother of
accused Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to Cervantes
Ilocos Sur, to inform them that Eleno Maquiling had been shot to death, or
any other witness for that matter. The trial court found the accused
common defense of alibi as non-credible "as it was not impossible for the
accused to be present at the scene of the crime. 16

We hold that the prosecution's evidence was more than adequate to sustain
the finding of the trial court of a conspiracy between Danilo Valdez and
Simplicio Orodio. Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the
prosecution had failed to show who as between the two actually pulled the
trigger of the shotgun that killed Eleno Maquiling. 17 Both Danilo Valdez
and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-
conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of
participation in the act. 18

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery and evident
premeditation. The accused had purposely sought nocturnity and hid
themselves behind the bamboo groves located close by the victim's house
and had fired at Eleno Maquiling suddenly, without any warning, from
behind obviously to ensure the success of their deadly purpose without
any risk to themselves and without any possibility of retaliation. Three (3)
days before his assassination, Eleno was already apprehensive for his life
when he disclosed to his father, Juanito Maquiling, his quarrel with Danilo
Valdez and Simplicio Orodio over the latter's thievery and robbery.
Clearly, the accused had planned to kill Eleno some days before the fateful
night of 7 June 1977; the shotgun blast at the back of Eleno was not the
result of a spur of the moment decision.

Since both treachery and evident premeditation were present, and only one
(1) qualifying circumstance is necessary to constitute homicide into
murder, evident premeditation may be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance. 19 The circumstance of nighttime is, however, absorbed by
treachery. 20 A second aggravating circumstance — that the victim who
had given no provocation was slain in his dwelling — was also found by
the trial court. 21

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court finding

Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED. In view of the abolition of
capital punishment under the 1987 Constitution, and in view of the
presence of two (2) aggravating circumstances not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the applicable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 177223 : November 28, 2007]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CASTOR

BATIN, Accused-Appellant.
 DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

We are reviewing herein the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 6

February 2007, in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01396, affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, convicting father and son,
Castor and Neil Batin, of the crime of murder. The conviction was for the
killing of one Eugenio Refugio, who was shot in the afternoon of 21
October 1994, while he was leaning against a mango tree near his house
on St. Peter Street, San Paolo Subdivision, Nagkakaisang Nayon,
Novaliches, Quezon City.

The Information2 against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 11 April 1995, alleging as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO
REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a handgun,
hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.

Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty.

The prosecution, presented as its witnesses Eusebio Farrales, Vilma

Juadinez Rodriguez, Florante Baltazar, Josephine Refugio, PO3 Marifor
Segundo and Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, offered the following
version of the facts, as summarized by the trial court:

Eugenio's wife, Josephine Refugio, was with him when he was shot,
facing him as he leaned against the mango tree and, in fact, had her arms
resting on his shoulders. She recalled that before the shooting, she was at
home at No. 4-A St. Peter Street that afternoon when, looking out of the
window, she caught sight of Castor Batin washing his feet at a nearby
faucet. Castor was angrily muttering, and she distinctly heard him say,
among the other things he said: "Mga matatandang kunsintidor, dapat
manahimik na." Then, being through with washing himself, Castor moved
towards the street. Seeing this, she went down and also went to the street
because of a feeling of uneasiness ("Para po akong kinakabahan, kasi,
ganoon naman ang ginagawa nila lagi, eh, pag nalalasing"). Finding her
husband leaning against the mango tree on the side of St. Peter Street, she
went to him. She tried to talk Eugenio into going home with her because
Castor was again into one of his wild ways ("Nagwawala na naman, daldal
ng daldal"). As he was talking with Eugenio, she glanced to her left and
saw Neil Batin standing at the gate to their (Batins') compound, looking
towards her and her husband. A few moments later, Neil went to one of
the parked cars, opened its door, and took a gun from inside. She next
noticed Castor going towards Neil as the latter stood at the side of the car
and shouting: "Huwag!" Castor grabbed the gun from Neil. After the gun
was taken from him, Neil just proceeded towards the right rear of the car.
Castor followed Neil and handed the gun back to him.

When she shifted her glance from the Batins, Josephine heard Castor
ordering his son: "Sige, banatan mo na." Neil responded by drawing the
gun from his waistline, raising and aiming it at her and her husband, and
firing twice from his eye-level. Both Josephine and Eugenio fell to the
ground, the former, backwards, and the latter landing on top of her. As
they tried to get up, Eugenio uttered to her: "Nanay, may tama ako." She
then pulled her husband by the shoulder of his shirt so that she could take
him to their house as he was already slumped to the right. She later rushed
her husband to the Quezon City General Hospital, where he underwent
surgery, but later expired.

Other eyewitnesses from the neighborhood were presented and they

substantially corroborated her testimonial account.

One of them, Eusebio Farrales, a resident of No. 7 St. Paul Street, in

relation to which St. Peter Street was perpendicular, recalled being at the
barangay outpost near the corner of St. Peter Street and St. Paul Street
between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of the afternoon of October 21, 1994 - engaged
in the clearing of the debris of the recent typhoon - when he heard
someone cursing and challenging to a fight. Walking towards St. Peter
Street where the voice came, he saw that it was Castor. He also saw other
neighbors, namely, Eugenio, Josephine, and Eugenio's mother, Emilia
Refugio. According to Farrales, Castor was moving aimlessly for around
five minutes ("Walang direktion at pa-ikot ikot lang siya doon") while
cussing: "Putang ina ninyo, sino ang matapang lumabas."

Farrales stated that a white car and a white-and-yellow colored taxicab

were parked on the side portion of the street fronting the gate to the
compound of the Batins and near where Eugenio and Josephine stood.
Emilia, the mother of Eugenio, then came towards him, but he advised her
to seek assistance from the barangay tanod. After Emilia proceeded
towards St. Paul Street to do so, Neil came out through the gate, opened
the door of the white car, took out a gun from inside, and handed the gun
to Castor, but the latter returned the gun to Neil. Upon getting back the
gun, Neil reentered the yard through the gate.

Farrales asserted that in the meanwhile Eugenio remained leaning against

the mango tree with Josephine facing him and her arms resting on his
shoulders. They were in this position when Neil again came out through
the gate a few moments later and proceeded to the right side of the car,
still holding the handgun. From there, Neil fired twice at the Refugios.
The Refugios both fell to the left of the mango tree. Farrales saw both
Castor and Neil quickly enter the compound. At that point, Farrales
decided to run home in order to summon Alfredo Dizon, his tenant, who
was a police officer because he feared that the Batins might escape from
the scene by car.

Farrales and Dizon lost no time in going to the place of the Batins. After
Dizon talked with Castor at the gate of the latter's compound, the latter
entered the house of his nephew, Ricky Basilio, which was beside Castor's
own house. A few moments later, Castor came out of Basilio's house to let
Dizon in through the gate. It was about this time that the responding police
officers arrived at the scene. The victim had been rushed to the hospital
immediately.
Another neighbor, Vilma Juadines Rodriguez, resident of No. 7-A St.
Peter Street, declared that while she was at home taking care of her baby
at between 3:00 and 3:30 pm of October 21, 1994, she heard someone
challenging others to a fight; that looking out of her window ("dungaw"),
she saw that it was Boy Batin - Castor - and he was then walking about on
St. Peter Street; that just then, her child cried, and so she went to him; that
upon returning to the window to call her other child, she saw Castor hand
over a handgun to Neil, and the latter thereafter entered through their gate;
that she next saw Neil load bullets into the gun and then tucking it in his
right waistline; that after loading, Neil went out to the street, went between
the parked white car and yellow taxicab, aimed the gun at Eugenio and
Josephine who were at the mango tree, and then asked Castor: "Tay,
banatan ko na?"; that Castor replied: "Sige, anak, banatan mo na." that, at
that instant, Neil fired two shots; that as she went down to get her other
child upon hearing the gunshots, she heard Josephine say: "Tay, may tama
ka"; that she later reentered her house; and that she knew that Eugenio
died afterwards.

Although Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital right
after the shooting and was operated on, he expired the next day. His
remains were properly identified in writing by his brother, Tito Eugenio.3

The medico-legal officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Dr.

Florante Baltazar, conducted an autopsy on Eugenio's remains. In his
Medico-Legal Report No. M-1715-94,4 he indicated that Eugenio
sustained one gunshot wound, which was, however, fatal, because "it went
slightly upward, slightly anteriorward from the right to the left of the
body, fracturing the right to [the] left [of the] thoracic region, lacerating
the right lumbar region." Dr. Baltazar made the certification as to the
cause of death in the death certificate.5

Upon a written request6 from the Novaliches Police Station, Quezon City,
Police Inspector Solomon Segundo, Chief of the Firearms Identification
Branch of the Central Crime Laboratory, Northern Police District
Command, Quezon City, conducted the ballistics examination to ascertain
whether or not the bullet recovered from the victim was fired from the
specimen firearm submitted for examination. P/Insp. Segundo prepared
Ballistics Report No. B-042-94,7 wherein he certified that the bullet from
the recovery box8 and the bullet recovered from the victim's body9 were
fired from the same specimen firearm.10 This conclusion was arrived at
after a test fire and a comparison under the bullet comparison microscope.

The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Neil Batin, Castor's
common-law wife Maricon Pantoja, and one Restituto Paller. Neil Batin's
testimony is summarized by the trial court as follows:

Neil substantially claimed that it was his responsibility to conduct his

younger brothers to school and fetch them by car; that he also drove their
taxicab; that it was about 7:00 o'clock in morning of October 21, 1994,
while he was cleaning the family-owned taxicab, that he found a short gun
("de bola") underneath it beside the right rear wheel; that he picked the
gun and concealed it in the compartment of the taxicab; that he continued
with his chore of cleaning; that as soon as he finished cleaning the taxicab,
he drove the white Datsun car to Tondo to fetch his six-year old brother
Mark, the son of his father with Maricon Pantoja; that Mark was a pupil at
the Magat Salamat Elementary School in Tondo; that after picking up
Mark, they drove to the house of his uncle, Domingo Batin, in Marulas,
Valenzuela, to get his clothes from his cousin; that they arrived there at
11:00 am, and spent around two hours there; that from Marulas, they went
home, arriving at St. Peter Street at around 2:30 pm; that he parked the car
on the road in front of their fence; that he and Mark first entered the house
to deposit Mark's school things and later went outside to await the arrival
of Mark's mother; that his other brothers were outside; that Castor was
also outside talking with a man whose name he did not know but whom he
had seen thrice before as well as with Boy Iñigo in front of the latter's
house; that Iñigo's house was 15 meters from their gate; that Pantoja soon
arrived at around 2:45 pm; that he continued talking and playing with his
brothers; and that at that point he decided to take the gun from the
compartment of the taxicab - then parked around 2 - meters away from
where he and his brothers were - and tucked it in his waistline.

Having thus tucked the gun, Neil went to stand at the right rear side of the
Datsun car which was parked facing the mango tree ("halos magkatapat
lang po"). Maricon came out to the street at that point to ask him about the
time he had fetched Mark. It was while he was standing there with the
others that, according to Neil, he suddenly felt the impulse of drawing the
gun from his waistline ("Bigla kong naisipang bunutin ang baril"). He thus
drew the gun and turned around, but, as he did so, he accidentally pulled
the trigger, causing the gun to fire twice ("Tumalikod po ako, tapos
nakalabit ko, pumutok ng dalawang beses").

Neil admitted knowing the late Eugenio Refugio and his wife Josephine
because they were his neighbors with only a high wall separating their
houses; but denied seeing them that afternoon beside the mango tree.

At the sound of gunfire, Castor rushed towards Neil from where he was in
front of Iñigo's house, shouting twice to his son: "Huwag!" Pantoja, for her
part, forced Neil to enter the compound, where she brought him inside the
house of his aunt. Neil concealed the gun in the ceiling of the aunt's house.

Neil said that he and his father did not grapple inside the Datsun car for
possession of the gun; that his father did not wrest the gun from him; that
he did not enter the compound to put bullets in the gun; that his father did
not order him to shoot Eugenio; and that his father was not drunk and
challenging others to a fight. He insisted that he and the Refugios, with
whom he was acquainted since 1987, had no misunderstandings, for he
even had shared drinks with the late Eugenio before October 21, 1994.11

As regards the testimonies of the defense's two other witnesses, the trial
court could not make an intelligible narrative of the version of the facts
presented by them, considering the contradictions it found in their
testimonies. The trial court found glaring Maricon Pantoja's "self-
contradiction" as to where she and the accused were when Eugenio was
shot. During the trial, Maricon testified that she, Neil and Castor were
outside their house when Neil drew the gun and accidentally fired.
However, in her affidavit,12 she alleged that they went outside their house
upon hearing a gun explosion and saw "Eugenio Refugio alone holding his
stomach x x x we have no any knowledge whether he was hit by a
bullet."13

On 8 June 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision finding both accused
guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
CASTOR BATIN and NEIL BATIN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Art. 248, Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and they are hereby each sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua; and ordered to pay the heirs of EUGENIO
REFUGIO, through his wife, JOSEPHINE REFUGIO, as follows:

1] P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2] P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3] P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4] P307,920.00, as indemnity for lost of earning capacity; and

5] The costs of suit.14

Neil and Castor Batin filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. However,
on 13 November 2000, accused Neil Batin filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. The People interposed no objection to the Motion,
which was granted.

On 6 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision

affirming, with modification, the Decision of the trial court, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila in Criminal Case No. Q-95-
61003 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to civil liabilities.
With the exception of the award of moral damages which is reduced
to P100,000.00 and the indemnity for loss of earning capacity which is
increased to P723,840.00, the awards for death indemnity and actual
damages are retained.15

Castor Batin now comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS PRINCIPAL FOR
INDUCEMENT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT

GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TRACHERY.16

Castor Batin prays that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed
and set aside and a new one entered acquitting him of the crime charged.
In the alternative, he prays that he be held liable for the crime of homicide
only, arguing that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
sufficiently stated in the Information.

Whether there was conspiracy in the killing of Eugenio Refugio

It is evident from Castor's Supplemental Brief and all his other issuances
after the withdrawal of Neil's appeal that he had already discarded Neil's
theory of accidental shooting. Instead, his arguments are geared toward his
distancing himself from the act of Neil in shooting Eugenio Refugio.

We cannot, however, dispose of the discussion of Neil's theory of

accidental shooting. As Neil's testimony had been the only evidence
presented by the defense to rebut the prosecution's evidence concerning
the acts of Castor during the incident, we should carefully scrutinize Neil's
testimony to determine his credibility.

Neil claims that while his back was still turned against the Refugios, he
suddenly felt the impulse to draw the gun from his waistline. He drew the
gun, turned around with the gun in hand, and accidentally fired it twice
without aiming it at anyone.

As held by the trial court, this account is plainly far-fetched and

incredible. As observed by the trial court,

The revolver involved herein was a mechanical firearm which belonged to

the so-called double-action type of guns. This type has a firing mechanism
which permits two methods of firing - the first is by manually cocking or
retracting the hammer and then pressing the trigger to release the hammer;
the second is by applying continuous pressure on the trigger in order to
cock the hammer and then releasing the trigger. The drop of the hammer
by either method propels the firing pin forward so that its other end strikes
the primer cap to explode the propellant charge inside the shell which then
forces out the bullet through the gun barrel. From the nature of the firing
mechanism of Exhibit O, and there being no evidence showing that the
hammer was manually cocked before the gun fired, it was absolutely
physically impossible for the gun to fire accidentally.

In order to determine for himself how much pressure was necessary to

cock the hammer into firing position, the undersigned presiding judge
personally tested the trigger pull of Exhibit O. Even assuming that the
passage of time from the date of the shooting caused some change on the
efficiency of the firing mechanism, such change can only show up by way
of a weakening of the hammer spring. Nonetheless, it was not surprising
for the undersigned presiding judge to find heavy resistance at each trigger
pull, such that he exerted some force to cock the hammer. This actual
testing easily validated the conclusion that firing the gun accidentally and
unintentionally was impossible.17

Neil's claim that he accidentally fired the gun twice in quick succession is,
thus, even more incredible. Given the difficulty of pulling the trigger to
cock the hammer into firing position, it is inconceivable how the gun
could have been fired by Neil twice in quick succession except by a
deliberate and intentional pulling of the trigger.

Given the physical attributes and condition of the gun involved in the case
at bar, the testimony of Eusebio Farrales is likewise observed to be much
more credible than that of Neil. Whereas Neil claims that he accidentally
fired the gun twice using only one hand, Eusebio Farrales testified that
Neil fired at the Refugios while holding the gun with both hands and from
a standing position.
While the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of
law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence,18 Neil's
credibility has been severely tarnished by the foregoing portion of his
testimony. Thus, we should likewise take with a grain of salt the following
parts of his testimony which tend to refute the account of the prosecution
concerning the acts of Castor during the incident: (1) that Neil and Castor
did not grapple inside the Datsun car for possession of the gun; (2) that
Castor did not wrest the gun from him; (3) that Neil did not enter the
compound to put bullets in the gun; (4) that Castor did not order Neil to
shoot Eugenio; and (5) that Castor was not drunk and challenging others to
a fight.

As stated above, Castor has already discarded Neil's theory of accidental

shooting and, instead, focuses on distancing himself from the act of Neil in
shooting Eugenio Refugio. Castor's principal defense in this appeal is that
the conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (1) that
the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of
the crime; and (2) that such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission by the material executor.19

Castor claims that there is no conclusive proof that he participated in the

shooting, and that "(h)is alleged utterance of the words 'Sige, banatan mo
na' " cannot be considered as the moving cause of the shooting. According
to Castor, if he had wanted his son to shoot Eusebio Refugio, he would not
have shouted "Huwag" and struggled for possession of the gun.

We are not persuaded.

First of all, the theory presented by the prosecution in both the Information
and in their arguments before the courts is not Castor's being a principal
by inducement, but rather his being a co-conspirator. If conspiracy is
proven, the act of one is the act of all. As stated above, the widow,
Josephine Refugio, and the neighbors - - Eusebio Farrales and Vilma
Juadinez Rodriguez - - testified to the fact that Castor handed the gun to
Neil and urged the latter to fire at the Refugio spouses. The trial court,
whose assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect,
since it had the important opportunity to observe first-hand the expression
and demeanor of the witnesses at the trial,20 found these witnesses
credible, thus:

From its careful and thorough evaluation of the record, the Court finds that
Castor and Neil conspired in shooting Eugenio. This finding is inexorable
because the testimonies of the Prosecution witnesses - that Castor returned
the gun back to Neil; that he instigated Neil to shoot by shouting: "Sige,
banatan mo na"; and that Neil then fired his gun twice - were credible and
sufficed to prove Castor's indispensable cooperation in the killing of
Eugenio. Accordingly, Castor was as much liable criminally for the death
of Eugenio as Neil, the direct participant in the killing, was.

The reliability of witnesses Farrales and Rodriguez, for one, cannot be

doubted. Being the neighbors of both the Batins and the Refugios, their
claim of witnessing the events that culminated into the shooting of
Eugenio was unassailable. The accused, in fact, could not provide any
reason or motive for them to testify against the Batins unless it was upon
the truth.21
While Castor was indeed heard to have shouted "Huwag," this cannot be
considered as reliable evidence that he tried to dissuade Neil from firing
the gun. It was established by credible testimony that he handed back the
gun to Neil and urged him to shoot the Refugio spouses. Josephine
Refugio plainly stated on cross-examination that Castor shouted "Huwag"
while inside the car grappling for possession of the gun, and not when Neil
was aiming the gun at the spouses. Thus:

(Atty. Siobal Cross-examining)

Q The second time around that you saw him was when he moved towards
the right rear of the car?cra lawlibrary

A I did not remove my sight at Neil Batin as he moved towards this car,
sir.

Q Also, without moving your glance or gaze at Neil Batin, you saw him
proceed to the right rear portion of the car and open the right rear door of
said car, is it not?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir.

Q And without also removing your gaze or sight at Neil Batin, you saw
him open and get a gun inside the car?cra lawlibrary

A I saw Neil Batin opened the right rear door, as if he is putting all his
body inside the car, when Mang Boy took hold of Neil, they were
grappling for possession of the gun, and raised it above, and that was the
time when my husband saw the gun raised, and I also saw the gun.

Court

So they were both inside the car, their arms were both inside the car and
the gun was inside the car when you and your husband saw this particular
scene?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, your Honor.

Atty. Siobal

So you saw Castor Batin and Neil Batin grappling for the gun when they
were inside the car?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir, and then Castor Batin shouted "huwag."

Q And at that time they were grappling for the gun inside the car and
Castor Batin shouted "huwag," after that, you and your husband saw the
gun atop the roof of the car, is that what you want to convey to the
Court?cra lawlibrary

A The gun was still inside the car, only we saw it through the glass
window, sir.

Q And what happened after that?cra lawlibrary

A Neil Batin got out of the car, followed by Castor Batin and then Castor
gave the gun to Neil, and after receiving the gun, Neil placed the gun at
his waist, sir.

Q You said Neil Batin got out of the car ahead of Castor Batin, where did
Neil Batin go or proceed, to what direction?cra lawlibrary

A He proceeded to that place labeled as Exhibit G-7, sir.

Q And you said Castor Batin followed Neil Batin to the place where he
proceeded here at Exhibit G-7?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir.

Q Of course, when Neil Batin got out of the car ahead, his back, he must
have turned his back from you?cra lawlibrary

A He was sidewise in relation to me, sir.

Q How about Castor Batin, when he got out of the car, he must have
turned his back from you?cra lawlibrary

A Yes, sir.

Q And where was Castor Batin facing when you said he gave the gun to
Neil Batin?cra lawlibrary

A He was facing Neil, sir.22

As concluded by the trial court, the circumstances surrounding Castor's

utterance of "Huwag!" shows beyond doubt that Castor shouted the same,
not to stop Neil from firing the gun, but to force him to leave the use of the
gun to Castor. These circumstances only confirm the conspiracy between
the Batins in committing the crime: after the Batins grappled for the gun
and Castor shouted "Huwag," Castor finally decided to give the gun to
Neil - a crystal-clear expression of the agreement of the Batins concerning
the commission of a felony.

Conspiracy may also be deduced from the acts of the appellants before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which are indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments.23 Prosecution witnesses Josephine Refugio and Eusebio
Farrales positively indicated in their testimonies that prior to the shooting
of Eugenio Refugio, Castor was drunk, was openly challenging others to a
fight, and was uttering angry words. It was at this juncture that witnesses
saw Neil retrieve his gun from the parked car, after which Castor grabbed
the gun from his son, grappled with it, returned it to his son, and ordered
the latter to shoot the Refugios.

Secondly, even if we pursue the theory that the defense is trying to stir us
to, the results would be the same. Castor's argument is that "(h)is alleged
utterance of the words 'Sige, banatan mo na' cannot be considered as the
moving cause of the shooting and, therefore, he cannot be considered a
principal by inducement.

Inducement may be by acts of command, advice or through influence or

agreement for consideration. The words of advice or the influence must
have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. We
have held that words of command of a father may induce his son to
commit a crime. In People v. Tamayo,24 we held that the moral influence
of the words of the father may determine the course of conduct of a son in
cases in which the same words coming from a stranger would make no
impression.

There is no doubt in our minds that Castor's words were the determining
cause of the commission of the crime. As stated above, Vilma Juadines
Rodriguez testified that the eighteen-year-old Neil Batin asked his father
before shooting: "Tay, banatan ko na?" Neil Batin was clearly seeking the
consent of his father before proceeding with the act, and it was Castor's
words "Sige, banatan mo na"25 that sealed Eugenio Refugio's fate.

Whether treachery was specifically alleged in the Information

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.26

According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of

Eugenio because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly
saw that he was still leaning against the mango tree and being restrained
by Josephine who had her arms on his shoulders. Thereby, "the accused
insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act of Eugenio who,
in that position of helplessness and unpreparedness, obviously had no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate even if he wanted to. The
accused thus consciously used the firearm to assault from a distance, all
the more to enhance the chances of killing the victim without risk to
themselves."27

Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery
was sufficiently proven during the trial. All that Castor claims before us is
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged
in the Information. The Information filed against the Batins states that "the
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and
with evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there
shooting him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death."28 Castor claims that
this charge does not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused.
According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused "with
treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence" is a mere
conclusion of law by the one who drafted the said Information. Hence, it
did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 provides:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall

state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

Pertinently, we have held in Balitaan v. Court of First Instance of

Batangas29 that the main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set forth in an Information is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense. We added in said case that

[I]t is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished

from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information
sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of
evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the
offense, need not be averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on
the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be
defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of
treachery sufficient without any further explanation as to the
circumstances surrounding it. Here are some of the cases:

In People v. Lab-eo,30 Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the
following Information:

That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion,

Tadian, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a
sharp knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and
pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim
as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to wit:

Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax,

which caused the death of the victim thereafter.

That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,

abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of the
offense.

The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while
captioned as "Murder," only charged him with homicide as written. This
Court found nothing wrong with the Information, and ruled that the
Information sufficiently charged the accused with murder, not even
considering the absence of an explanation of the treachery stated therein,
thus:

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second
paragraph and not in the first paragraph of the Information, as commonly
done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should not be
faulted. That the Provincial Prosecutor decided to write the Information
differently did not impair its sufficiency. Nothing in the law prohibits the
prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As long as the
requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial
scrutiny.

xxx

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of

common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to
render judgment properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must
be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused's
constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully
prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. Significantly,
the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or
form adopted in the Information.31

This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with
murder qualified by treachery.

The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance

was similarly assailed in People v. Opuran,32 wherein the charge was as
follows:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,

Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate
intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use
of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby
inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which
wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of

treachery.

This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the
allegation of treachery sufficient, and later on finding the accused therein
guilty of murder qualified by treachery:

We do not find merit in appellant's contention that he cannot be convicted

of murder for the death of Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was not alleged
with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such
contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary
to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In
any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive
words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.33

Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar34 :

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of
Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident
premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accused's father-in-law,
hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio
Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior

strength, disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age,
habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of the
crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to]

Article 14, paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have
sufficiently alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary
facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters of
defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons
therefor could be proved during the trial.35

Whether the civil liabilities of the accused were correctly awarded by the
lower courts

The trial court ordered the accused, Neil and Castor Batin, to pay the heirs
of Eugenio Refugio in the following amounts:

1) P50,000.00, as death indemnity;

2) P61,500.00, as actual damages;

3) P500,000.00, as moral damages;

4) P307,920.00, as indemnity for loss of earning capacity; and

5) the costs of suit.36

Jurisprudence pegs the death indemnity in the above amount (P50,000.00)

pursuant to the current judicial policy on the matter. No proof thereof is
required. The P61,500.00 in actual damages consists of the expenses
incurred by the family of Eugenio Refugio, which Josephine Refugio
testified to and was summarized in Exhibit H:37 (1) P25,000.00 for
medicines, surgery and other expenses for the hospitalization and
emergency treatment;38 (2) P20,000.00 for funeral expenses, inclusive of
the costs of coffin, funeral services, and expenses during the wake;39 and
(3) P6,500.00 as for burial expenses.

The Court of Appeals also modified the trial court's computation of the
indemnity for loss of earning capacity. The trial court, finding the work of
Eugenio Refugio to be hazardous, reduced his life expectancy to 20 years.
 This modification is in accord with our ruling in Pleyto v.
Lomboy.40 Pleyto offers the following computation for the award for loss
of earning capacity:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 - Age at x (Gross Annual

Capacity time of death) Income - Reasonable

& Necessary Living

Expenses)

Eugenio Refugio, who was 31 years old at the time of his death, had a
daily income of P145.00. The Court of Appeals multiplied this amount by
26 working days to get Eugenio Refugio's monthly income of P3,770.00.
The Court of Appeals thus applied the Pleyto formula as follows:

Net Earning = 2/3 x (80 - 31) x [(P3770 x 12) - (P3770 x 12)]

Capacity

Net Earning = 2/3 x (49) x [(P45,240) - (P22,620)]

Capacity

Net Earning = 32 x [P22,620]

Capacity

Net Earning = P723,84041

Capacity

Lastly, the Court of Appeals found the award of P500,000.00 as moral

damages to be excessive, and instead fixed the amount at P100,000.00. In
accord with prevailing jurisprudence, however, we further reduce this
amount to P50,000.00.42

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with

modification the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder
is AFFIRMED with FURTHER MODIFICATION as to the amount of the
moral damages, which is hereby reduced to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Q: This was covered by a Supreme Court decision last August, People v. Hular.
Dean Villanueva, when you were a bar examiner, was the MCQ used?

A: No, Your Honor. I was a bar examiner in the last bar exam under the
chairmanship of Del Castillo, so it was an all essay problem solving type of
exam, Your Honor.

Q: But have you heard of MCQ? Do you know the four principle of MCQ?

A: I am aware of three of them, Your Honor, not four.

Q: What are those three?

A: The first one, Your Honor, it’s just a recall of basic principles. The MCQs
is a question is done in such a way as to be able to ask the examinees
 whether they can recall from the facts, the doctrine that laid out there. It’s a
familiarization with certain doctrines and principles and procedures, Your
Honor. The second one is the analytical aspect, Your Honor where the facts
differ basically shows layers of circumstances or layers of thinking that will
you invite the examinees to actually not only just to recall but to determine
what is the doctrine or principle involved that arises from the sets given in
the stem of the problem. And the third one, Your Honor, is the problem-
solving type of MCQ, but basically lays out either the facts, the important
decisions are facts of a decision record that will be used as the basis by
which a similar problem solving would be done but instead you’re given
four choices at most to determine which is the best answer, Your Honor.

Q: You were never, I’m not sure but you were once (a) government official?

Q: Yes, Your Honor, in the year 2011-2016, June I was the chairman of the
newly constituted public agency, the Governance Commission for
Government and Controlled Corporations, Your Honor.

Q: What is the general law on SALNs?

A: General Law on SALNS has constitutional basis, Your Honor. But it first
appeared as a implementation, my understanding is under Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and then into the Code of Ethics for government
officials and employees that all require basically the declaration, the filing
by members of, by officers and employees of the government of statement
of assets and liabilities, Your Honor.

Q: And when do you file them?

A: My understanding, Your Honor, is that from a moment of, within a certain

number of days from appointment, you must file a SALN and I think that’s
30 days, Your Honor. And then every year thereafter, the deadline is around
April, you must file them. And then the moment you leave government
service, within a certain number of days, you must file your last SALN in
order to verify what amounts are there at the time you left the government,
Your Honor.

Q: What is the prescriptive period for filing a case for violation of the SALN
law?

A: I’m not sure, Your Honor.

Q: What is the assurance fund?

A: The assurance fund, Your Honor, is that provided for I think the public
registration law that provides that because of the unassailability and
inprescribtibility of the torrent title once it is issued. There are those whose
titles will be lost because another person has been able to register their land
and that person has registered in good faith and therefore the sanctity of that
historian system has now to be respected. So, ultimately the one who
supposed to be the owner of that land has lost it because of proper
registration and the assurance fund is set up by the government to reimburse
and compensate the aggrieved party for what he has lost because of the
importance of trying to provide for the system of the torrent system, Your
Honor
Q: Dean Villanueva? (on what is the proper period to file an application for
assurance fund)

A: I would think that would be the proper period to look at it from the time it
is clear that a request for your registration has been denied because another
one has enough title has been issued in favor on another person, Your
Honor. That would be a reasonable time to determine when to file an
application, Your Honor.

JBC Public Panel Interview for the Position of

Associate Justice of Supreme Court
September 9, 2019 – P.M.

Questions of Judge Franklin Monteverde to Atty. Oscar V. Badelles

Q: Scanning over your health record Judge Badelles, while physically fit yet
your medical exams such as the blood chemistry and the blood count shows
that you have high results?

A: That is correct, Your Honor. That was the time when I changed my
medicines, Your Honor. Because I was having discomfort with my previous
medicines, there was some adjustment that’s why the chemistry spiked up,
Your Honor, that time.

Q: But despite that result, you are still fit physically and mentally to discharge
the duties of your office.

A: I take a walk 30 minutes every day, then on weekends if possible, I play

golf.

Q: Now if appointed to Supreme Court, what do you think will be the biggest
adjustment you will be facing, coming of course from the Court of Appeals?
That you have been there for six years and what challenges do you foresee
if appointed?

A: I believe the questions that are presented or the issues before the Supreme
Court are much different from those presented before the Court of Appeals
because the Court of Appeals is a trier of facts, Your Honor. And so, that
adjustment because the issues now before the Supreme Court are more
focused on the constitutionality or validity of certain acts or decisions, Your
Honor.

Q: You have been in the Cagayan de Oro for so many years already, seven
years? Now, what are the advantages and disadvantages of being assigned
there as Associate justice of the Courts of Appeals?

A: The reason I refused to be assigned here in Manila is convenience actually

because I am from Iligan and it is very convenient for me to go home every
weekend and well the cost of living in Cagayan de Oro is much lower than
cost of living here in Manila, Your Honor.

Q: What is your view on the divorce bill that has just been filed?

A: Well, as a, personally, Your Honor, I believe that marriage should as much

as possible be preserved by the government. However, to my mind, Your
Honor, that divorce bill merely confirms certain situations where the family
or the marriage has already broken down irreparably so that when that
 divorce is brought, a petition for divorce is brought before a court, what we
see is a broken family and no amount of I don’t know, counseling might
bring them back together in fact in some families they go to the extent of
killing, injuring and harming each other. So, to my mind, the divorce bill is
good as to certain families or certain marriages which have already broken
down beyond repair. But as a rule, as a general rule, we should strive to
preserve the family, Your Honor as the basic unit of our society.

Q: Now, how different is divorce from a petition to declare a marriage a

nullity?

A: I really have not read the bill, Your Honor, the proposed bill on divorce.
Assuming that it passes through, I would assume, I’m just speculating, Your
Honor.

Q: Your personal view?

A: There are similarities, Your Honor, I believe. But in divorce, the grounds
for divorce may be different from the declaration of nullity of marriage
where perhaps like as I said, there is a complete incompatibility between the
husband and the wife. They have been fighting and their family is broken,
their attempt on the life of one against the other, those may be the grounds
for divorce, but as to annulment, I understand that annulment would be on
more on the legal side, Your Honor. That for instance, the consent has been
vitiated, the authority of the person solemnizing is not present among
others, Your Honor.

Q: How about psychological incapacity as a ground for granting the petition to

declare a marriage a nullity?

A: Yes, Your Honor. That is one of the grounds in under the present law, Your
Honor. But as I said, the grounds that might be in the proposed divorce law
might be different, Your Honor.

Q: How about you Justice Badelles, are you in favor of the death penalty?

A: Yes, Your Honor. Because I believe that one of the functions of the death
penalty is retribution, Your Honor. It is the right of the state to demand
retribution from the person who has committed heinous crimes, Your
Honor. Moreover, not all convicts, Your Honor, are capable of reformation.

Q: Now tell us the Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy.

A: Constitutional supremacy, as I understand it, Your Honor, is the power of

the Supreme Court or the judiciary to determine and allocate the various
power between the branches of government in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution so that in the end the Supreme Court or the
judiciary is not dictating on the other branches of government but rather
simply stating for a fact how these powers of the government were allocated
among them, the three branches, Your Honor.

CORRECT ANSWER:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch
or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation,
it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Q: Justice Badelles, SOGIE Bill is now one of the favorite topics in social
media, how important is religious belief in discussing this LGBTQ+ issues
in general? Because we remember in the hearing, there were nuns attending
it. So, how important is religious belief in this issue?

A: In one case I remember, Your Honor, the Supreme Court has decided, I
think that’s Ang LADLAD v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582; April 8,
2010), that religious belief should not be a basis for classification, Your
Honor. In like manner like sexual preference of the SOGIE, this LGBTQ+,
Your Honor, to cannot serve as basis for their classification as far as I can
see or as I am concerned, Your Honor, they do not constitute a class. They
do not constitute a class because what they are exposing or promoting is the
sexual preference that is not their gender. It’s more of their sexual
preference the lesbians preferred women, the gays preferred men. It’s sexual
preference, it’s not gender.

G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair,

DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose

is that others may make different choices – choices we would not make for
ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or
offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate
about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our
Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about
the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral
convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same
time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if
not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with
an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the
First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed
Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA)
No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration
with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied
on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.
On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration
with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a

marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that
LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational
supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the

COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds,
stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the

Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community,
thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly

disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and

sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of
a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27,
Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise
also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust
one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated

October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated

in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of
the Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is
the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,

relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to
be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent
and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised

Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and

indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from
six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and
fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines

openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their

knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and
the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any

other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts
or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether
live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market
 for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or
religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees
and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,

engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating

immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it
"or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be

exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the
teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer
in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a
threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the
State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to
protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to

overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution,
stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list

system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation
and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative
organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But
that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is
not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons
or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are
also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the
attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time
comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations
and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine

jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and
bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it
has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of

LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies
are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female
protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or

Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular
religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as
moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They
are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore
its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that
some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into
society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of
the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of
prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang
Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its
Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever,
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x
or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the
issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing
the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of
January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioner’s application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.15

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary

restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC
to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed
a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its
Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang
Ladlad’s petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles
of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On
January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to

Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.19

The Parties’ Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified

the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as
well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also
opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which
should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate
classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG
maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the

ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and
RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani

stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated
in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its
members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few
isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all
provinces in the country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition

when it alleged its national existence" is a new one; previously, the
COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or
failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-
existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of
the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst,
a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious
violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory

perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist
in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang
Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:"

§ Abra Gay Association

§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan

§ Albay Gay Association

§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija

§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila

§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila

§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City

§ Circle of Friends

§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte

§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality

(GALANG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte

§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City

§ Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur

§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

§ LUMINA – Baguio City

§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila

§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila

§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City

§ ONE BACARDI

§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila

§ PUP LAKAN

§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR

§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila

§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan

§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal

§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) –

Metro Manila

§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal

§ The Link – Davao City

§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon

 § Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila

§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT
or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be
believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently

demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent
ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for
Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for
is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran
to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed

Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to
advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:26

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,

not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious
teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public
order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting
policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard
as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove
contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the
policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for
all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1

In other words, government action, including its proscription of

immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it
is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly,
moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling influence on
those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might
also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral
codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform
manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be
religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it
must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification
to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society,
however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict
but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that
government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same
time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.27

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for

Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of

homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long
been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:

Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group

consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people
especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector
which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without
a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct,
and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure –
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and
their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has
not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these
"generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral
act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should
have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have
committed or are committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender,

of a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does
not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and
action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized,
COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against
both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of
the law.31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the
state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality,
sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will
and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and
explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly
then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our
scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our

penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment,
condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement
without judicial proceedings.32 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere
allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation
of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to
further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications
give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally
reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which

provides "nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws,"
courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons."33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard
of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational
basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population

considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for
the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No
law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties
about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public
opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here –
that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no
legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system
on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State
intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating

LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned
does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals
and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not
prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or
differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this
effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner
itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as
all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the
circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through
normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held
convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated
upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is

distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the
public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or
espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the
public square. In this representative democracy, the state is prohibited
from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary
principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation
on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely
reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or
median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a
constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not only for a majority,
however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do:
to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise
stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even

overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public
morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and
equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the
extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have
reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on
Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the
Court’s analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts

have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian
rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint."43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and

beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party
may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a
state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are
consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that
political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such
ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority
of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to
find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.45 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.46

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that

homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their
supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes
using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude
from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for
gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to
highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this
Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor
expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this
Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues
that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any

assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review
and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to
participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be
said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members
of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right
to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner

contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has the clear and
immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its
members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement
in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x47

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and – as advanced by
the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a
limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing
its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find
that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental
rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown
dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world
order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems
so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to

protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize
the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR,

as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of

general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26
of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual
orientation."48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have
declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.49

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through

freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which

shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service

in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the

right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs
and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every

citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to
be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of
constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure
that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects.
Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent
of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand
for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice
of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as
minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as
education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No
person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because
of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the
legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons
from elective office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law
obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea
for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the
Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights
Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which
petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta

Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are
declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not
reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
 any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles
of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain

segment of society – wants or demands is automatically a human right.
This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or
subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies
many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international
law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of
diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are
couched in "rights" language, then they are no longer
controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles,

consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding
obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which
amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of
either State practice or opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented
by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s
role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to
apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public
opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient
enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of

the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16,
2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission
on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list
accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Q: How about transgenders wanting to use the women’s or the ladies’ room,
such as what happened weeks ago?

A: To my mind, Your Honor, or maybe a special facility can be built for them
but generally, they should follow the gender that they are born with. So, if
they are born male, they should go to the men’s room.

Q: Even though they are transgenders?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Why we should vote for you?

A: I submit that I can make a difference if ever I make it to the Supreme Court,
on the ground that I have shown in my track record as RTC judge and as a
Court of Appeals judge that I can deliver, make decisions. In fact, when I
left my RTC station, Your Honor, I had left only around 50 cases. I did not
go lower because my colleague advised me not to, otherwise, the Supreme
Court will assign me to another (station), give me additional assignments.
Now, in the Court of Appeals, Your Honor, I can say probably with pride,
Your Honor, that I have only 98 cases for completion. I have no case
submitted for decision, Your Honor. So, with that track record, Your Honor,
I believe that I can make a contribution, I can make a difference if ever I am
appointed to the Supreme Court.

Questions of Justice Mario Victor F. Leonen to Oscar V. Badelles

Q: In re: Tony Valenciano (A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC), the complaint of Tony

Valenciano was that there were catholic masses that was conducted every
lunch time in the regional trial court hall of justice in Quezon City, would
you vote for the majority there or join the dissent?

A: To be honest, Your Honor, I have not read the case.

Q: Oh, you have not read the case? Well this is the seminal case regarding
masses in halls of justice. It is a landmark case written again by very
eminent juries. Would you know who?

A: I don’t know.

Q: Huhula ka nalang sa aming tatlo ditto.

A: I believe the holding of masses could be justified, Your Honor.

Q: Yes. Who was the ponente?

A: I have no idea, Your Honor.

Q: You have no idea? Pogi. Very handsome justice, except me. (draws
laughter) Would you know the voting in that case?

A: As I said your honor, I have not read the decision.

Q: Would you agree with me that part of the role of an Associate Justice is to
do the extra reading with respect to these cases?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: It was 14-1, correct? Would you know who the dissenting opinion was? It
is easy, he is always in the dissenting position. Would you vote for the
majority or the minority?

A: I would guess that the majority voted to the holding od the masses. In my
opinion, Your Honor, the holding of masses is valid, Your Honor, and
justified. Considering that it’s part of our social religious practice, Your
Honor.
Q: Oh my God! In other words, you are for the injection of religion into the
secular world. There is Section 6 of Article 3 of the Constitution, would you
be able to recite the contents of the section 6? Section 6, Article 2 is already
the separation of state shall be inviolable

A: I think it’s about the puns, no puns should be…

Q: Article 3, Section 6. Article 3 is bill of rights, maybe you are referring to

Article 6 which is the legislature. But Article 3, Section 6 is no law shall be
passed respecting the establishment of a religion. And the free exercise of
one’s religion, correct? Isn’t this a violation?

A: No, Your Honor, because as a matter of tradition, in our country, Your

Honor.

Q: Precisely, that’s why there is this provision in order that the dominant
religion will no subsume those who atheist, agnostic, etc.

A: Because it has a laudable effect on the part of the people, Your Honor, that’s
why you will allow this.

Q: Petition for mandamus is filed against a Justice of the Court of Appeals who
refuses to recite the ecumenical prayer, would you grant or deny that
petition?

A: I assume that he is invoking his right, freedom of religion, Your Honor.

Q: Regardless, he refuses to recite ecumenical prayer, does he/she have to

justify why he will not recite the ecumenical prayer? Does he or she have
to reveal that he or she is agnostic, Buddhist, Taoist, Satanist, or atheist?
There are seven types of atheist by the way. Will you require the justice to
recite it? How would you go about interpreting that provision that we
mentioned? First of all, will you grant mandamus? A litigant in the Court
of Appeals attended a hearing of Writ of Amparo, the justice refused to pray,
refused to recite, he stands up any silent while the ecumenical prayer is
pronounced, would you grant mandamus?

A: No, Your Honor. Because this is personal, I cannot compel the justice to do
what is against his personal belief.

Q: Would you know of any justice of the Supreme Court that does not recite
the court’s prayer?

A: I do not know, Your Honor.

Q: Really? Again, choose among the non-handsome. So, because you did
mention about religion a while ago.

Q: I have a final question to all of you, three months after I was appointed as
Associate Justice, three months after I was asked to vote in a case entitled
Gonzales v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 196231; January 28, 2014), my
colleagues know that the vote then before I entered was 77 and I cast a vote
against the appointing authority, my appointing authority which is why
there is now a doctrine that the president cannot remove a deputy
Ombudsman, that was my vote three months after I was appointed. Now,
just a brief question to all of you, are you ready to vote against the President
Duterte when you think that the doctrine that they follow is wrong?
A: If ever, Your Honor, I’d be elevated to the Supreme Court, what should
prevail is that justice should be served. So, it’s not whether or not it is the
opinion or the decision of the president.

Q: So, what’s your brief answer, yes or no?

A: Yes, I can go against his decision, Your Honor, if it contravenes what I feel
is just unright on that issue, Your Honor.

Q: Oh, are you here to do what you feel is just or are you here to do the law?

A: To do the law, Your Honor. When I find that it is against the law, then it
should be struck down, Your Honor.

G.R. No. 196231 January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING
THROUGH AND REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-IN-
CHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR.
ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY. CARLITO D.
CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND ATTY.
FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG
LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Office of the President's (OP 's) motion for reconsideration
of our September 4, 2012 Decision1 which ruled on the petitions filed by
Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III and Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit. Their petitions challenged the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.2

In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary
jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The
Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of
public trust; and (ii) imposed on him the penalty of dismissal.
Sulit, who had not then been dismissed and who simply sought to restrain
the disciplinary proceedings against her, solely questioned the jurisdiction
of the OP to subject her to disciplinary proceedings. The Court affirmed
the continuation of the proceedings against her after upholding the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

The fallo of our assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the

President in OP Case No. 1 O-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment
of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. ll-
B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts
and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a
betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989.3

In view of the Court’s ruling, the OP filed the present motion for
reconsideration through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

We briefly narrate the facts that preceded the filing of the petitions and the
present motion for reconsideration.

I. ANTECEDENTS

A. Gonzales’ petition (G.R. No. 196231)

a. Factual antecedents

On May 26, 2008, Christian Kalaw filed separate charges with the
Philippine National Police Internal Affairs Service (PNP-IAS) and with
the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector Rolando Mendoza and four others (Mendoza, et al.) for robbery,
grave threat, robbery extortion and physical injury.4

On May 29, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence Guinto

filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct with the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) PNP-NCRPO against Mendoza, et al.
based on the same allegations made by Kalaw before the PNP-IAS.5

On July 2, 2008, Gonzales, Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other

Law Enforcement Officers (MOLEO), directed the NAPOLCOM to turn
over the records of Mendoza’s case to his office. The Office of the
Regional Director of the NAPOLCOM duly complied on July 24,
2008.6 Mendoza, et al. filed their position papers with Gonzales, in
compliance with his Order.7

Pending Gonzales’ action on Mendoza, et al.’s case (on August 26, 2008),
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila City dismissed Kalaw’s
complaint against Mendoza, et al. for his failure to substantiate his
allegations.8 Similarly, on October 17, 2008, the PNP-IAS recommended
the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative case against
Mendoza, et al. for Kalaw’s failure to prosecute.9
On February 16, 2009, after preparing a draft decision on Mendoza, et
al.’s case, Gonzales forwarded the entire records to the Office of then
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez for her review.10 In his draft decision,
Gonzales found Mendoza, et al. guilty of grave misconduct and imposed
on them the penalty of dismissal from the service.11

Mendoza, et al. received a copy of the Ombudsman’s decision that

approved Gonzales’ recommendation on October 30, 2009. Mendoza, et
al. filed a motion for reconsideration12 on November 5, 2009, followed by
a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration.13

On December 10, 2009, the MOLEO-Records Section forwarded

Mendoza, et al.’s case records to the Criminal Investigation, Prosecution
and Administrative Bureau-MOLEO. On December 14, 2009, the case
was assigned to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer (GIPO)
Dennis Garcia for review and recommendation.14

GIPO Garcia released a draft order15 to his immediate superior, Director

Eulogio S. Cecilio, for appropriate action on April 5, 2010. Dir. Cecilio
signed and forwarded the draft order to Gonzales’ office on April 27,
2010. Gonzales reviewed the draft and endorsed the order, together with
the case records, on May 6, 2010 for the final approval by the
Ombudsman.16

On August 23, 2010, pending final action by the Ombudsman on

Mendoza, et al.’s case, Mendoza hijacked a tourist bus and held the 21
foreign tourists and the four Filipino tour assistants on board as hostages.
While the government exerted earnest attempts to peacefully resolve the
hostage-taking, it ended tragically, resulting in the deaths of Mendoza and
several others on board the hijacked bus.

In the aftermath, President Benigno C. Aquino III directed the Department

of Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government to
conduct a joint thorough investigation of the incident. The two
departments issued Joint Department Order No. 01-2010, creating an
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC).

In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman
and Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence and grave
misconduct in handling the case against Mendoza."17 The IIRC stated that
the Ombudsman and Gonzales’ failure to promptly resolve Mendoza’s
motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite repeated
pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking."18 The
IIRC recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further
determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of
the proper administrative proceedings.19

Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before

the OP for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance
of Official Duty and for Misconduct in Office.20

b. The OP ruling

On March 31, 2011, the OP found Gonzales guilty as charged and

dismissed him from the service.21 According to the OP, "the inordinate
and unjustified delay in the resolution of [Mendoza’s] Motion for
Reconsideration [‘that spanned for nine (9) long months’] xxx amounted
to gross neglect of duty" and "constituted a flagrant disregard of the Office
of the Ombudsman’s own Rules of Procedure."22

c. The Petition

Gonzales posited in his petition that the OP has no administrative

disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman. Under Section 21 of
RA No. 6770, it is the Ombudsman who exercises administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction over the Deputy Ombudsman.

On the merits, Gonzales argued that his office received the draft order
from GIPO Garcia on April 27, 2010. On May 6, 2010, he completed his
review of the draft, approved it, and transmitted it to the Office of the
Ombudsman for final approval. Since the draft order on Mendoza’s
motion for reconsideration had to undergo different levels of preparation,
review and approval, the period it took to resolve the motion could not be
unjustified, since he himself acted on the draft order only within nine (9)
calendars days from his receipt of the order.23

B. Sulit’s petition (G.R. No. 196232)

In April 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General

Carlos F. Garcia and several others, before the Sandiganbayan, with
plunder and money laundering. On May 7, 2007, Garcia filed an Urgent
Petition for Bail which the prosecution opposed. The Sandiganbayan
denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail on January 7, 2010, in view of the
strength of the prosecution’s evidence against Garcia.

On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and
her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining agreement
(Agreement) with Garcia.24 Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea
of not guilty to the charge of plunder and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser
offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the
charge of money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of
facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would convey to the
government his ownership, rights and other interests over the real and
personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank deposits
alleged in the information.25

The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 201026 based on

the parties’ submitted Joint Motion for Approval.27

The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement drew public outrage and

prompted the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives to
conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that
Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust – grounds for removal under
Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.28 The Committee recommended to the
President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the filing of
appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the
appropriate government office.

Accordingly, the OP initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding

against Sulit.29 On March 24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation,
questioning the OP’s jurisdiction.30 The question of jurisdiction
notwithstanding, the OP set the case for preliminary investigation on April
15, 2011, prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.
II. COURT’S RULING

On motion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to

grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman. (As the full
explanation of the Court’s vote describes below, this conclusion does not
apply to Sulit as the grant of independence is solely with respect to the
Office of the Ombudsman which does not include the Office of the Special
Prosecutor under the Constitution. The prevailing ruling on this latter
point is embodied in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Marvic
Mario Victor Leonen).

A. Preliminary considerations:

a. Absence of motion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners

At the outset, the Court notes that Gonzales and Sulit did not file a motion
for reconsideration of the Court’s September 4, 2012 Decision; only the
OP, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of our ruling
reinstating Gonzales.

This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its
ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been
raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of
the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional
authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor
in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s
decision on the merits will be an empty one.

In other words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the
dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the
constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue –
remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration.

b. The justiciability of the constitutional

issue raised in the petitions

We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be

subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President
(concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political
– question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law,31 as where the court finds
that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers
conferred on a political branch of the government.32

In resolving the petitions, we do not inquire into the wisdom of the

Congress’ choice to grant concurrent disciplinary authority to the
President. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant violates
the Constitution, particularly whether Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman as expressed in Section 5, Art. XI of the Constitution.

To be sure, neither the Executive nor the Legislative can create the power
that Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 grants where the Constitution confers
none. When exercised authority is drawn from a vacuum, more so when
the authority runs counter to a core constitutional principle and
constitutional intents, the Court is duty-bound to intervene under the
powers and duties granted and imposed on it by Article VIII of the
Constitution.

B. The Deputy Ombudsman: Constitutional Issue

a. The Philippine Ombudsman

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several

Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing
grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the
government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize
their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic.33

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman
became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political
independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the
1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630,
creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was
tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any
administrative act of any administrative agency, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the
Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the
Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was
given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding
information, and control the prosecution of these cases.34

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman
was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution, its
independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives
are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II35 and the standard
of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read:

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees

must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the
Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against the
inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a
complaints and action bureau.36 This constitutional vision of a Philippine
Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to
directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the
bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize
the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The
Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. [emphasis
ours, italics supplied]

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court

has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad
powers granted it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions
are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent with the law
and the Constitution.38

The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all

acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their
tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to
insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of
officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by
making it an "independent" office. Section 5,

Article XI of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan,
one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed. [emphasis ours]

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman
is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is considered "a
notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies."39 It has
powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are commensurate with its
daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.40

b. "Independence" of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the Ombudsman’s

independence

Under the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressly

labeled as "independent."41 The extent of the independence enjoyed by
these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted with
two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or
the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any
allowable interference to these powers and functions, with the principle of
checks and balances.

Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and

by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do
not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the
Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general
terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these "independent"
bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
"independence" would result in the impairment of their core functions.
In Bengzon v. Drilon,42 involving the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, we
ruled against the interference that the President may bring and maintained
that the independence and the flexibility of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman are crucial
to our legal system.

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must

have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their
constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and
violative not only the express mandate of the Constitution but especially
as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.

The constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions’

need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973 Constitution, the
delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a
constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one created
by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
freedom from the tentacles of politics.43 In a similar manner, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit
highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure.44

Notably, the Constitution also created an "independent" Commission on

Human Rights, although it enjoys a lesser degree of independence since it
is not granted fiscal autonomy in the manner fiscal autonomy is granted to
the constitutional commissions. The lack of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly expressed
their desire to keep the Commission independent from the executive
branch and other political leaders:

MR. MONSOD. We see the merits of the arguments of Commissioner

Rodrigo. If we explain to him our concept, he can advise us on how to
reconcile his position with ours. The position of the committee is that we
need a body that would be able to work and cooperate with the executive
because the Commissioner is right. Many of the services needed by this
commission would need not only the cooperation of the executive branch
of the government but also of the judicial branch of government. This is
going to be a permanent constitutional commission over time. We also
want a commission to function even under the worst circumstance when
the executive may not be very cooperative. However, the question in our
mind is: Can it still function during that time? Hence, we are willing to
accept suggestions from Commissioner Rodrigo on how to reconcile this.
We realize the need for coordination and cooperation. We also would like
to build in some safeguards that it will not be rendered useless by an
uncooperative executive.

xxxx

MR. GARCIA. xxx Very often, when international commissions or

organizations on human rights go to a country, the most credible
organizations are independent human rights bodies. Very often these are
private organizations, many of which are prosecuted, such as those we
find in many countries in Latin America. In fact, what we are proposing is
an independent body on human rights, which would provide governments
with credibility precisely because it is independent of the present
administration. Whatever it says on the human rights situation will be
credible because it is not subject to pressure or control from the present
political leadership.

Secondly, we all know how political fortunes come and go. Those who are
in power yesterday are in opposition today and those who are in power
today may be in the opposition tomorrow. Therefore, if we have a
Commission on Human Rights that would investigate and make sure that
the rights of each one is protected, then we shall have a body that could
stand up to any power, to defend the rights of individuals against arrest,
unfair trial, and so on.45

These deliberative considerations abundantly show that the independent

constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers
to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned,
jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these
bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac,46 we emphasized that the Constitutional

Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as
"independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they
discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as
unconstitutional the President’s act of temporarily appointing the
respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the Comelec "however
well-meaning"47 it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga,48 the Court categorically stated that the

tenure of the commissioners of the independent Commission on Human
Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President:

Indeed, the Court finds it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an

office conceived and created by the Constitution to be independent – as
the Commission on Human Rights – and vested with the delicate and vital
functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing
responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures
therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the
tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the
pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to
the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on
Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional.

Again, in Atty. Macalintal v. Comelec,49 the Court considered even the

mere review of the rules of the Commission on Elections by Congress a
"trampling" of the constitutional mandate of independence of this body.
Obviously, the mere review of rules places considerably less pressure on a
constitutional body than the Executive’s power to discipline and remove
key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, yet the Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional.

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman

certainly cannot be inferior – but is similar in degree and kind – to the
independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the
Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and
proper functioning.50
c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
vesting disciplinary authority
in the President over the
Deputy Ombudsman violates
the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman and is thus
unconstitutional

Our discussions, particularly the Court’s expressed caution against

presidential interference with the constitutional commissions, on one hand,
and those expressed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, on the other,
in protecting the independence of the Constitutional Commissions, speak
for themselves as overwhelming reasons to invalidate Section 8(2) of RA
No. 6770 for violating the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

In more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to

discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and
officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s
disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by
express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them
tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate.
Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office
seeks to revitalize.

What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for
her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of
their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her
complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to
her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer
still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption
is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the independence

of the Ombudsman fully support this position. Commissioner Florenz
Regalado of the Constitutional Commission expressed his apprehension
that any form of presidential control over the Office of the Ombudsman
would diminish its independence.51 The following exchanges between
Commissioners Blas Ople and Christian Monsod further reveal the
constitutional intent to keep the Office of the Ombudsman independent
from the President:

MR. OPLE. xxx

May I direct a question to the Committee? xxx [W]ill the Committee

consider later an amendment xxx, by way of designating the office of the
Ombudsman as a constitutional arm for good government, efficiency of
the public service and the integrity of the President of the Philippines,
instead of creating another agency in a kind of administrative limbo which
would be accountable to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional
body?

MR. MONSOD. The Committee discussed that during our committee

deliberations and when we prepared the report, it was the opinion of the
Committee — and I believe it still is — that it may not contribute to the
effectiveness of this office of the Ombudsman precisely because many of
the culprits in inefficiency, injustice and impropriety are in the executive
department. Therefore, as we saw the wrong implementation of the
Tanodbayan which was under the tremendous influence of the President, it
was an ineffectual body and was reduced to the function of a special fiscal.
The whole purpose of our proposal is precisely to separate those functions
and to produce a vehicle that will give true meaning to the concept of
Ombudsman. Therefore, we regret that we cannot accept the proposition.52

The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical

principle: the Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of
the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would
result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is
given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very
persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the
impression that would be given to the public if the rule were otherwise. A
complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the
Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor, would be
discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the
complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would
be susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an
impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of
the Ombudsman as champion of the people against corruption and
bureaucracy.

d. The mutual-protection argument for

crafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6770

In crafting Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770, Congress apparently addressed

the concern that a lack of an external check against the Deputy
Ombudsman would result in mutual protection between the Ombudsman
and her Deputies.

While the preceding discussion already suffices to address this concern, it

should be added that this concern stands on shaky grounds since it ignores
the existing checks and balances already in place. On the one hand, the
Ombudsman’s Deputies cannot protect the Ombudsman because she is
subject to the impeachment power of Congress. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman’s attempt to cover up the misdeeds of her Deputies can be
questioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. The same attempt can
likewise subject her to impeachment.

The judicial recourse available is only consistent with the nature of the
Supreme Court as a non-political independent body mandated by the
Constitution to settle judicial and quasi-judicial disputes, whose judges
and employees are not subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman and whose neutrality would be less questionable. The
Members of the Court themselves may be subjected to the impeachment
power of Congress.
In these lights, the appeal, if any, of the mutual protection argument
becomes distinctly implausible. At the same time, the Court remains
consistent with its established rulings - that the independence granted to
the Constitutional Commissions bars any undue interference from either
the Executive or Congress – and is in full accord with constitutional intent.

e. Congress’ power determines the

manner and causes for the removal
of non-impeachable officers is not a
carte blanch authority

Under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,53 Congress is

empowered to determine the modes of removal from office of all public
officers and employees except the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman, who are all impeachable officials.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that "[a]ll other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment" in the second sentence of Section 2, Article
XI is to prevent Congress from extending the more stringent rule of
"removal only by impeachment" to favored public
officers.54 Understandably so, impeachment is the most difficult and
cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by its
nature, a sui generis politico-legal process55 that signals the need for a
judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate
the proceeding;56 the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation;57 the
limited grounds for impeachment;58 the defined instrumentality given the
power to try impeachment cases;59 and the number of votes required for a
finding of guilt.60 All these argue against the extension of this removal
mechanism beyond those mentioned in the Constitution.

On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and
problems an impeachment proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited
application only to the officials occupying the highest echelons of
responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of the negative
practical effects of impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an
expensive process in terms of the cost of prosecution alone; and, more
importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation.61 Thus, in a cost-benefit
analysis of adopting impeachment as a mechanism, limiting Congress’
power to otherwise legislate on the matter is far more advantageous to the
country.

It is in these lights that the second sentence in Section 2, Article XI of the

1987 Constitution should be read. Contrary to the implied view of the
minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for
Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the
manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this
must still be consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles,
namely: the right to procedural and substantive due process; the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of separation of
powers; and the principle of checks and balances.62

In short, the authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide

for the manner and cause of removal of all other public officers and
employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles
and precepts established by the Constitution.
In the same manner, the congressional determination of the identity of the
disciplinary authority is not a blanket authority for Congress to repose it
on whomsoever Congress chooses without running afoul of the
independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and without
disrupting the delicate check and balance mechanism under the
Constitution. Properly viewed from this perspective, the core
constitutional principle of independence is observed and any possible
absurdity resulting from a contrary interpretation is avoided. In other
words, while the Constitution itself vested Congress with the power to
determine the manner and cause of removal of all non-impeachable
officials, this power must be interpreted consistent with the core
constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Our observation in Macalintal v. Comelec63 is apt:

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is

circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that
constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC shall be
"independent."

While one may argue that the grounds for impeachment under Section
8(2) of RA No. 6770 is intended as a measure of protection for the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor – since these grounds are not
intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of
judgment - this argument seriously overlooks the erosion of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman that it creates. The mere
fact that a statutorily-created sword of Damocles hangs over the Deputy
Ombudsman’s head, by itself, opens up all the channels for external
pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics. The fear of
external reprisal from the very office he is to check for excesses and
abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office of
the Ombudsman.

That a judicial remedy is available (to set aside dismissals that do not
conform to the high standard required in determining whether a Deputy
Ombudsman committed an impeachable offense) and that the President’s
power of removal is limited to specified grounds are dismally inadequate
when balanced with the constitutional principle of independence. The
mere filing of an administrative case against the Deputy Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor before the OP can already result in their suspension
and can interrupt the performance of their functions, in violation of
Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. With only one term allowed
under Section 11, a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor, if
removable by the President, can be reduced to the very same ineffective
Office of the Ombudsman that the framers had foreseen and carefully tried
to avoid by making these offices independent constitutional bodies.

At any rate, even assuming that the OP has disciplinary authority over the
Deputy Ombudsman, its decision finding Gonzales guilty of Gross
Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public
trust is patently erroneous. The OP’s decision perfectly illustrates why the
requirement of impeachment-grounds in Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
cannot be considered, even at a minimum, a measure of protection of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

C. The Deputy Ombudsman: The Dismissal Issue

a. The Office of the President’s
finding of gross negligence
has no legal and factual leg to
stand on

The OP’s decision found Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and of
Grave Misconduct. The assailed Decision of the OP reads:

Upon consideration of the First Report, the evidence and allegations of

respondent Deputy Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence
gathered, this Office finds that the inordinate and unjustified delay in the
resolution of Captain Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration timely filed
on 5 November 2009 xxx amounted to gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency in the performance of official duty.64

b. No gross neglect of duty or inefficiency

Let us again briefly recall the facts.

1. November 5, 2009 - Mendoza filed a Motion for

Reconsideration of the decision of the
Ombudsman,65 which was followed by a Supplement to the
Motion for Reconsideration;66

2. December 14, 200967 - GIPO Garcia, who was assigned

to review these motions and make his recommendation for
the appropriate action, received the records of the case;

3. April 5, 2010 – GIPO Garcia released a draft order to be

reviewed by his immediate superior, Dir. Cecilio;68

4. April 27, 2010 – Dir. Cecilio signed and forwarded to

Gonzales this draft order;69

5. May 6, 2010 (or nine days after the records were

forwarded to Gonzales) – Gonzales endorsed the draft order
for the final approval of the Ombudsman.70

Clearly, when Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus on August 23, 2010, the
records of the case were already pending before Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even

the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a
breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.71

Gonzales cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency

since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. In finding
Gonzales guilty, the OP72 relied on Section 8, Rule III of Administrative
Order No. 7 (or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
series of 1990, as amended) in ruling that Gonzales should have acted on
Mendoza’s Motion for Reconsideration within five days:

Section 8. Motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation: Grounds –

Whenever allowable, a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may
only be entertained if filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the
decision or order by the party on the basis of any of the following grounds:

a) New evidence had been discovered which materially

affects the order, directive or decision;

b) Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities

have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the
movant.

Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be allowed,

and the Hearing Officer shall resolve the same within five (5) days from
the date of submission for resolution. [emphasis and underscore ours]

Even if we consider this provision to be mandatory, the period it requires

cannot apply to Gonzales since he is a Deputy Ombudsman whose
obligation is to review the case; he is not simply a Hearing Officer tasked
with the initial resolution of the motion. In Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 7 on the resolution of the case and submission of the proposed
decision, the period for resolving the case does not cover the period within
which it should be reviewed:

Section 6. Rendition of decision. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the
case is declared submitted for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit
a proposed decision containing his findings and recommendation for the
approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be reviewed by
the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy Ombudsmen concerned.
With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy Ombudsman
concerned shall be the approving authority. Upon approval, copies thereof
shall be served upon the parties and the head of the office or agency of
which the respondent is an official or employee for his information and
compliance with the appropriate directive contained therein. [italics and
emphases supplied]

Thus, the OP’s ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking
nine days, instead of five days, to review a case was totally baseless.

c. No actionable failure to supervise subordinates

The OP’s claims that Gonzales could have supervised his subordinates to
promptly act on Mendoza’s motion and apprised the Tanodbayan of the
urgency of resolving the same are similarly groundless.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a corner office in our bureaucracy. It

handles numerous cases that involve the potential loss of employment of
many other public employees. We cannot conclusively state, as the OP
appears to suggest, that Mendoza’s case should have been prioritized over
other similar cases.

The Court has already taken judicial notice of the steady stream of cases
reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.73 This consideration certainly
militates against the OSG’s observation that there was "a grossly
inordinate and inexcusable delay"74 on the part of Gonzales.

Equally important, the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition of

cases" before, among others, quasi-judicial bodies,75 like the Office of the
Ombudsman, is itself a relative concept.76 Thus, the delay, if any, must be
measured in this objective constitutional sense. Unfortunately, because of
the very statutory grounds relied upon by the OP in dismissing Gonzales,
the political and, perhaps, "practical" considerations got the better of what
is legal and constitutional.

The facts do not show that Gonzales’ subordinates had in any way been
grossly negligent in their work. While GIPO Garcia reviewed the case and
drafted the order for more than three months, it is noteworthy that he had
not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had to review the case for
the first time.77 Even the Ombudsman herself could not be faulted for
acting on a case within four months, given the amount of cases that her
office handles.

The point is that these are not inordinately long periods for the work
involved: examination of the records, research on the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and exercise of legal judgment and discretion. If this Court
rules that these periods per se constitute gross neglect of duty, the
Ombudsman’s constitutional mandate to prosecute all the erring officials
of this country would be subjected to an unreasonable and overwhelming
constraint. Similarly, if the Court rules that these periods per se constitute
gross neglect of duty, then we must be prepared to reconcile this with the
established concept of the right of speedy disposition of cases – something
the Court may be hard put to justify.

d. No undue interest

The OP also found Gonzales guilty of showing undue interest in

Mendoza’s case by having the case endorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman and by resolving it against Mendoza on the basis of the
unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim, Kalaw.

The fact that Gonzales had Mendoza’s case endorsed to his office lies
within his mandate, even if it were based merely on the request of the
alleged victim’s father. The Constitution empowers the Ombudsman and
her Deputies to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against any public official or employee of the government.78 This
provision is echoed by Section 13 of RA No. 6770,79 and by Section 3,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1990, as amended.80

Moreover, Gonzales and his subordinates did not resolve the complaint
only on the basis of the unverified affidavit of Kalaw. Based on the
prosecution officer’s recommendations, the finding of guilt on the part of
Mendoza, et al. was based on their admissions as well. Mendoza, et al.
admitted that they had arrested Kalaw based on two traffic violations and
allowed him to stay the whole night until the following morning in the
police precinct. The next morning, Kalaw was allowed to leave the
precinct despite his failure to show a valid license and based merely on his
promise to return with the proper documents.81 These admissions led
Gonzales and his staff to conclude that Mendoza, et al. irregularly acted in
apprehending Kalaw, since the proper procedure for the apprehension of
traffic violators would be to give them a ticket and to file a case, when
appropriate.82

Lastly, we cannot deduce undue interest simply because Gonzales’

decision differs from the decision of the PNP-IAS (which dismissed the
complaint against Mendoza). To be sure, we cannot tie the hands of any
judicial or quasi-judicial body by ruling that it should always concur with
the decisions of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies which may have
also taken cognizance of the case. To do so in the case of a Deputy
Ombudsman would be repugnant to the independence that our
Constitution has specifically granted to this office and would nullify the
very purpose for which it was created.

e. Penalty of dismissal totally

incommensurate with established facts

Given the lack of factual basis for the charges against Gonzales, the
penalty of removal imposed by the OP necessarily suffers grave infirmity.
Basic strictures of fair play dictate that we can only be held liable for our
own misdeeds; we can be made to account only for lapses in our
responsibilities. It is notable that of all the officers, it was Gonzales who
took the least time — nine days — followed by Cecilio, who took 21 days;
Garcia — the writer of the draft — took less than four months, and the
Ombudsman, less than four months until the kidnapping incident rendered
Mendoza’s motion moot.

In these lights, the decision of the OP is clearly and patently wrong. This
conclusion, however, does not preclude the Ombudsman from looking into
any other possible administrative liability of Gonzales under existing Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

D. The Special Prosecutor: The Constitutional Issue

The 1987 Constitution created a new, independent Office of the

Ombudsman. The existing Tanodbayan at the time83 became the Office of
the Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution. While the composition
of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution
does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the
foregoing discussions on the unconstitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 should equally apply to the

Special Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of

the Ombudsman as expounded in jurisprudence.

Under the 1973 Constitution,84 the legislature was mandated to create the
Office of the Ombudsman, known as the Tanodbayan, with investigative
and prosecutorial powers. Accordingly, on June 11, 1978, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted PD No. 1487.85

Under PD No. 1486,86 however, the "Chief Special Prosecutor" (CSP) was
given the "exclusive authority" to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute cases that are within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.87 PD
No. 1486 expressly gave the Secretary of Justice the power of control and
supervision over the Special Prosecutor.88 Consistent with this grant of
power, the law also authorized the Secretary of Justice to appoint or detail
to the Office of the CSP "any officer or employee of Department of Justice
or any Bureau or Office under the executive supervision thereof" to assist
the Office of the CSP.

In December 1978, PD No. 160789 practically gave back to the

Tanodbayan the powers taken away from it by the Office of the CSP. The
law "created in the Office of the Tanodbayan an Office of the Chief
Special Prosecutor" under the Tanodbayan’s control,90 with the exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Unlike the earlier decree, the law also
empowered the Tanodbayan to appoint Special Investigators and
subordinate personnel and/or to detail to the Office of the CSP any public
officer or employees who "shall be under the supervision and control of
the Chief Special Prosecutor."91 In 1979, PD No. 1630 further amended
the earlier decrees by transferring the powers previously vested in the
Special Prosecutor directly to the Tanodbayan himself.92

This was the state of the law at the time the 1987 Constitution was ratified.
Under the 1987 Constitution, an "independent Office of the Ombudsman"
is created.93 The existing Tanodbayan is made the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, "who shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now94 or hereafter may be provided by law."95

Other than the Ombudsman’s Deputies, the Ombudsman shall appoint all
other officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman.96 Section
13(8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman
may exercise "such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law." Pursuant to this constitutional command,
Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to provide for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman and the extent of its
disciplinary authority.

In terms of composition, Section 3 of RA No. 6770 defines the

composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, including in this Office not
only the offices of the several Deputy Ombudsmen but the Office of the
Special Prosecutor as well. In terms of appointment, the law gave the
President the authority to appoint the Ombudsman, his Deputies and the
Special Prosecutor, from a list of nominees prepared by the Judicial and
Bar Council. In case of vacancy in these positions, the law requires that
the vacancy be filled within three (3) months from occurrence.97

The law also imposes on the Special Prosecutor the same qualifications it
imposes on the Ombudsman himself/herself and his/her deputies.98 Their
terms of office,99 prohibitions and qualifications,100 rank and salary are
likewise the same.101 The requirement on disclosure102 is imposed on the
Ombudsman, the Deputies and the Special Prosecutor as well. In case of
vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy cannot
assume the role of Acting Ombudsman; the President may designate any
of the Deputies or the Special Prosecutor as Acting Ombudsman.103 The
power of the Ombudsman and his or her deputies to require other
government agencies to render assistance to the Office of the Ombudsman
is likewise enjoyed by the Special Prosecutor.104

Given this legislative history, the present overall legal structure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, both under the 1987 Constitution and RA No.
6770, militates against an interpretation that would insulate the Deputy
Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet expose the
Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the
Office of the Ombudsman was designed for.

Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a

necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by
making the Office of the Special Prosecutor an organic component of the
Office of the Ombudsman and by granting the Ombudsman control and
supervision over that office.105 This power of control and supervision
includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign
duties to the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem fit.1âwphi1 Thus, by
constitutional design, the Special Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary
subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in
the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution
of officials in the Executive Department.

Under Section 11(4) of RA No. 6770, the Special Prosecutor handles the
prosecution of criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and this prosecutorial authority includes high-ranking executive officials.
For emphasis, subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and
removal powers of the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the
Executive Department are subject to the prosecutorial authority of the
Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman itself at risk.

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made
part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it
performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a
differential treatment between the Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand,
and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is true for the
Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for
other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the
Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.

In Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman,106 the Court was confronted with an

argument that, at bottom, the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not a
subordinate agency of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, in fact,
separate and distinct from the latter. In debunking that argument, the Court
said:

Firstly, the petitioners misconstrue Commissioner Romulo's statement as

authority to advocate that the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution was to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the President. Xxx

In the second place, Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the

then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, "shall continue to function and exercise its powers as
now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." The
underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under
P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory legislation. It follows then that
Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's
powers under P.D. N0. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers
conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express
mandate of paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may "exercise such other powers or perform functions or
duties as may be provided by law," it is indubitable then that Congress has
the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of
the Ombudsman.107

Thus, under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the
Special Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least
insofar as an extraneous disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also
enjoy the same grant of independence under the Constitution.
 III. SUMMARY OF VOTING

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7,108 the Court
resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner
Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of
RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the
President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman.

However, by another vote of 8-7,109 the Court resolved to maintain the

validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The
Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not
entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section

8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on
the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but
is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an
administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative
liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil
Service laws, rules and regulations.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Q: You remember learn at hand shouted to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes do

justice, justice. And Oliver Wendel Holmes shout back and said that’s not
what I do. What I do is I do law, not do justice. You of course know the
difference.

Q: Now as a follow up, if you joined the court will you be hesitant to revisit
doctrines, hesitant to revisit decisions of the court only for purposes of
judicial stability Justice Badelles?

A: I believe, Your Honor, it depends on the circumstances of the case, Your

Honor. There may be instances when one…

Q: Because the mindset of a justice of a Court of Appeals is that when you

decide a case, you decide it in accordance with a decision of the Supreme
Court. But now, you are in the Supreme Court, are you bound by
jurisprudence enunciated by the Supreme Court or can you rethink or revisit
the rulings of the court just so there is judicial stability?

A: Well, following the Doctrine of Judicial Stability, Your Honor, as a justice,

assuming I am already a member of the court, my first instinct would be to
follow the doctrines already established by the court. However, as I said, it
depends on the circumstances. If it appears that this will lead to injustice,
Your Honor. I will not hesitate in…

Q: What would be your standard to say that it will lead to an injustice? What
would be your standard, will it be your moral convictions, your moral
judgments that will affect your decision on the case?
A: No, Your Honor. Depends as I said on the circumstances of the case, Your
Honor.

Q: How do you gauge yourself as a jurist? Are you a wavering jurist? Can you
easily change your mind one way or the other?

A: If the argument is valid, Your Honor, yes, I can be waived. I can be

persuaded, Your Honor. But as a rule, as I said, I am more of conservative
in the sense that I would stick to precedents. Unless it can be shown that
these precedents no longer serve the purpose of justice, it’s against public
interest for instance, Your Honor.

Q: Let’s talk about good conduct time allowance, Justice Badelles, have you
read the law?

A: Yes, I scanned that law, Your Honor.

Q: You scanned through it? How fast did you scan through it?

A: Just went over it, Your Honor.

Q: What is good conduct under the law?

A: I think it’s equated to good behavior, Your Honor, during the time that the…

Q: What is good behavior? Is it defined in the law?

A: Not really, Your Honor. I am not sure, Your Honor, if there was.

Q: So, can you venture a guess? What is the meaning of good conduct or good
behavior that will entitle a convicted felon or a detainee or a convicted PDL
from, what is a PDL by the way?

A: Person deprived of liberty.

Q: That will benefit a convicted PDL of the good conduct time allowance. So,
what is he supposed to do to benefit from it?

A: I recall, Your Honor, that among others, he can be credited good conduct if
he, for instance, participated in mentorship program.

Q: That’s the right answer to the wrong question. The question is, what is good
conduct? Is it something positive or something passive?

A: It’s more passive, Your Honor. That he has been complying or obedient to
the rules.

Q: So, if a prisoner is just loitering around for years, that is a good conduct?
Because does not define what is good conduct.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: It does not mean something positive to do something good but rather not to
do something bad, that is good conduct.
A: That I suppose, Your Honor. Because he has followed the rules and obeyed
all the orders of the custodians, Your Honor, then he is considered as a PDL
with good conduct, Your Honor.

Q: Is that law constitutional in your mind?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Why is it constitutional?

A: Oh, there is a, this is in consonance, Your Honor, with one of the theories
of ideology, Your Honor.

Q: Are all laws passed by Congress constitutional?

A: We say, Your Honor, that the rules of Congress are constitutional, Your
Honor.

Q: So, all of them are constitutional?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: So, there’s nothing, nothing else for the Supreme Court to do since all laws
passed by Congress are constitutional.

A: Unless it is expressly, directly challenged, Your Honor, that’s the only time.
But then the presumption is always that the laws are valid and constitutional.

Q: Presumption of Constitutionality? But you cannot make a categorical

statement that all laws passed by Congress are constitutional. Some laws
have been declared unconstitutional.

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Questions of Hon. Toribio E. Ilao to Atty. Oscar V. Badelles

Q: Any substantial or notable changes in your last interview? You still sporting
that whisper.

A: Since then, I am now the chairman of the 23rd division of the Court of
Appeals in Cagayan de Oro, Your Honor.

Q: Canon 1 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct that the judges, magistrates
shall not wholly be free from inappropriate connections with and influenced
by the executive and legislative branches of the government. But must also
appear to be free from a reasonable observer, how would you ensure
compliance with this requirement when the position calls for connections
with officials of other branches of the government? You received some
endorsements trial coming from the City of Iligan and other private
organizations?

A: Yes, Your Honor. I was endorsed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, Your

Honor. For that reason, I inhibited in cases involving them, Your Honor.
Also, I was endorsed by my colleagues from the Court of Appeals, Your
Honor.
Q: And what if those endorsements would have a case before you, if appointed
as Supreme Court, how would you handle it without burning bridges for
embarrassing those people whom might have helped you in attaining such
mandate of being Associate Justice of the Supreme Court?

A: As I said, Your Honor, on grounds of delicadeza, Your Honor, I would have

to inhibit because these are people who have helped me, for instance,
assuming for the sake of argument that they helped me in getting appointed.
Eventually, I have to inhibit myself in cases involving these people, Your
Honor, because that would be inappropriate on my part. At any rate, I can
always tell them and my usual response to these kinds of approach, Your
Honor, is you get a good lawyer for that purpose to help you in your case.

Q: And we have received documents which we requested for the list of your
cases wherein you inhibited for some reasons, for overall of 91. So, being a
member of many organizations, as well in the judiciary, with so many
friends, do you think this is a curse or a blessing?

A: Well, it’s neither, Your Honor. Having friends is good, Your Honor, but
being influenced by them or to tilt the justice in their favor would not be
appropriate, Your Honor. I would say that being involved in many
organizations has expanded my view or my experiences, Your Honor. I have
become a better person, as a member for instance of the JCJC Senate, it has
trained me to become what I am today. And I have learned a lot also as a
member of Freemasons, Your Honor. Rotary also, I was a member of rotary.
But since then, I have stopped being a member of rotary because I thought
it was too much of a burden already on my part, Your Honor. But on the
whole, Your Honor, I see no negative effect on me of being a member of
various organizations. In fact, it has helped me to be what I am today, Your
Honor.

Q: This basic question trusted to all the members of the Court of Appeals, how
come that the decisions of the Court of Appeals do not get 100% affirmance
from the Supreme Court? is there something that meets the eye?

A: Sometimes, Your Honor, it’s just the mere appreciation of the evidence,
Your Honor. For instance, for us, we might rely on the fact that findings of
the trial court are binding on us. But when it come to the Supreme Court,
they might have a different perspective such that they might reverse the
decision on ground of reasonable doubt. In other words, it’s in the
appreciation of the evidence, Your Honor. Like in one case, I recall Justice
Lloren affirmed a decision of the trial court, but she was reversed because
according to the Supreme Court, a distance of 10 meters is not enough for
the policeman to observe properly or to see properly the transaction subject
of the buy-bust. So, it’s matter of, to my mind, Your Honor, perspective
because in the Court of Appeals sometimes we just rely on the findings of
the trial court. that’s it, Your Honor.

Q: How does Supreme Court define requirement of Physical inventory and

photograph of the illegal drugs immediately after seizure and confiscation?

A: Under section 21, Your Honor, it is required that the arresting officers or
the PDEA should immediately conduct an inventory of the items seized at
the place where the arrest was made or the buy-bust was made. And for,
there should be a photograph taken likewise of the item seized and this must
be in the presence of the taking of the inventory. Must be made in the
 presence of the elected public official and a member of the National
Prosecution Service or media.

Q: Alright, correct. That’s all, thank you and good luck again.

Questions of Atty. Jose Mendoza to Atty. Oscar V. Badelles

Q: Do you agree with Justice Bruselas? (Do you agree that when you say that
an act has been committed with treachery, it is merely conclusion?

A: I believe, Your Honor, that the information itself should be framed in such
a way that some of the acts constituting treachery are mentioned in
describing how the crime was committed and for that reason, Your Honor,
I believe that the mere fact that treachery is mentioned as an aggravating
circumstance is not enough, Your Honor. Because I believe that the body
itself of the information can accommodate a description of how the crime
was committed and this includes the circumstances providing for treachery,
Your Honor.

Q: What is your view, do you agree with Justice Delos Santos? (on the
president ordering the re-arrest of released prisoners)

A: I believe, Your Honor, it is one of the duties of the president to see to it that
the laws of the land are faithfully executed, along this light, Your Honor, I
would like to believe that the provisions of the rules of court on warrantless
arrest may apply in the case of the escapees from the penitentiary, Your
Honor. You can make a case that these people may be considered as
escapees, Your Honor. Considering that the release from jail was facilitated
by the erroneous and mistaken computation of their GCTA.

Q: Who said erroneous?

A: That is the allegation, Your Honor.

Q: You have to prove such allegations before you can order the arrest. Why do
you consider them escapees?

A: Because as I said, Your Honor, erroneous and the mistaken computation of

their GCTA. Meaning that they were not entitle yet to be released.

Q: Was there a review of the computation?

A: In some cases, Your Honor, I believe there have been in the sensational
cases, Your Honor, I think. That is why, Your Honor, they might be
considered as escapees.

Q: Was there a review of the sensational cases? Was there a review of the
computation in the sensational cases?

A: Not yet, Your Honor.

Q: Not yet? But there is already an order of arrest.

A: Yes, Your Honor. So, in that light, Your Honor, they can be ordered arrest…

Q: Is there no violation of the due process clause? Do they not have the right
to be heard?
A: Not initially, Your Honor, but eventually, yes. However, I believe that their
arrest is on the basis of the order issued by the trial court, Your Honor.

Q: But the trial court already lost jurisdiction.

A: No, it’s not. The court has not lost jurisdiction it has residual jurisdiction to
see to it that its judgments are duly executed, Your Honor. Mitimus order
directing that this convict we put inside the jail penitentiary to serve a
sentence. It appears that he has not served his sentence completely.
Therefore, on the basis of the order of the court.

Q: If there is such a hearing, a hearing before the court assuming that is covered
by their residual jurisdiction?

A: Yes, Your Honor, but not necessarily a hearing. But the question here is
whether the president can order their arrest. Using as basis the mitimus order
issued by the courts directing that these…

Q: Was there a court order?

A: Yes, the mitimus order, Your Honor.

Q: Was there a court order which the president use as a basis?

A: Perhaps, none. He did not mention it. But we know that before these
prisoners were confined in jail, there was a mitimus order directing their
confinement in jail, Your Honor. And that confinement has not been
complied with completely. As I said, it is the duty of the president to see to
it that the laws are faithfully executed, Your Honor.

Q: You know very well that decisions of ombudsman in administrative cases

are reviewed by your office. Now these are the facts, representative Jose, a
former governor was found guilty of grave misconduct by the Office of the
Ombudsman. The case stem from an unauthorized contract that he entered
into when he was still serving as a governor, as such the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from the service the said dismissal order
carried with it the accessory penalties of perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, cancellation of eligibility, and forfeiture of retirement
benefits. Congressman Jose move for reconsideration of the said ruling but
the Office of the Ombudsman denied the same. On motion, the Office of
the Ombudsman ordered the speaker of the house of the representatives to
enforce the dismissal order against Congressman Jose, the speaker refused
arguing that under the 1987 Constitution there is nothing among its
provisions that authorizes the Ombudsman to discipline any member of
Congress. Now the question is, can the order of dismissal by the Office of
the Ombudsman be implemented against Congressman Jose for an offense
that he committed during his incumbency as a local official?

A: There are two issues here, Your Honor. That would appear to me as
relevant, one is the condonation doctrine. Having been reelected, by the
same constituents who elected him as governor before and now he is elected
as a congressman, then by the application of that doctrine, Your Honor, the
condonation doctrine, then he should be exonerated. Second Your Honor,
on the power of the ombudsman to direct the speaker to dismiss a member
of the House of Representatives, I believe it is very clear that only the House
of Representatives have the power to determine the qualification and who
may be become members of the House of Representatives and any intrusion
into this, Your Honor, would be not allowed, Your Honor.