Gonzales v. Comelec
Gonzales v. Comelec
Gonzales v. Comelec
Palomaria
Case Name Gonzales vs. COMELEC
Topic Freedom of Expression
Ponente Fernando, J.
RELEVANT FACTS
• Two new sections were included in the Revised Election Code, under Republic Act 4880, which was
approved and took effect on 17 June 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting
the period of election campaign or partisan political activity.
• On 22 July 1967, Arsenio Gonzales and Felicisimo R. Cabigao filed an action entitled "Declaratory Relief
with Preliminary Injunction," a proceeding that should have been started in the Court of First Instance, but
treated by the Supreme Court as one of prohibition in view of the seriousness and the urgency of the
constitutional issue raised.
• Gonzales and Cabigao alleged that the enforcement of said RA 4880 would prejudice their basic rights,
such as their freedom of speech, their freedom of assembly and their right to form associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law, guaranteed under the Philippine Constitution," and that therefore said act
is unconstitutional.
• Cabigao was, at the time of the filing of the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila
and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently
elected on 11 November 1967; while Gonzales is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of
Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner.
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute.
The Court is of the view that no unconstitutional infringement exists insofar as the formation of
organizations, associations, clubs, committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or
party is restricted and that the prohibition against giving, soliciting, or receiving contribution for
election purposes, either directly or indirectly, is equally free from constitutional infirmity. The
restriction on freedom of assembly as confined to holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting
votes or undertaking any campaign or propaganda or both for or against a candidate or party,
leaving untouched all other legitimate exercise of such poses a more difficult question.
Nevertheless, after a thorough consideration, it should not be annulled. The other acts, likewise
deemed included in "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" tax to the utmost the
judicial predisposition to view with sympathy legislative efforts to regulate election practices
deemed inimical, because of their collision with the preferred right of freedom of expression. The
scope of the curtailment to which freedom of expression may be subjected is not foreclosed by the
recognition of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, the debasement of
the electoral process.
The majority of the Court is of the belief that the ban on the solicitation or undertaking of any
campaign or propaganda, whether directly or indirectly, by an individual, the making of
speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interview for or against the election for
any party or candidate for public office, or the publication or distribution of campaign literature
or materials, suffers from the corrosion of invalidity. It lacks however one more affirmative vote
to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality. The necessary 2/3 vote, however, not being
obtained, there is no occasion for the power to annul statutes to come into play. Such being the
case, it is the judgment of the Court that RA 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
RULING
PeGGon DISMISSED