Benito V People
Benito V People
Benito V People
DECISION
LEONEN , J : p
Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of its
existence beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, there can be no conspiracy to commit a
crime that has already been consummated.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals' Decision, 2
affirming in toto the November 17, 2009 3 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80,
Quezon City. The trial court convicted Angelita Cruz Benito of estafa, nding that she
conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in misappropriating the pieces of jewelry the latter
received in trust from Dorie Cruz-Abadilla. 4
In the Information dated October 28, 1994, Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita
Cruz Benito 5 (Benito) were charged with estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That in or about the period comprised from June 8, 1994 up to August 3,
1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud DORIE CRUZ-ABADILLA in the
following manner, to wit:
Agbulos and Benito were arraigned on July 10, 1995, pleading not guilty to the
charge. Trial ensued. 7
The prosecution presented as witnesses complainant, Dorie Cruz-Abadilla
(Abadilla); her friend, Concepcion Quiñonez Pamintuan (Pamintuan); 8 and Estela Diloria
(Diloria), 9 a pawnshop appraiser of E. Ochoa Pawnshop.
Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn
tickets. She learned that the items pawned were among the pieces of jewelry she turned
over to Agbulos, speci cally, a men's diamond ring and a set of diamond ring and earrings.
She also learned from Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the "Linda Chua" who pawned
her jewelry was Benito. 19
The defense's version of the facts
For the defense, Agbulos and Benito testi ed. Benito denied that she was the "Linda
Chua" who pawned Abadilla's jewelry. According to her, on June 8, 1994, she was at the
house of Agbulos' mother, working as a cook and taking care of Agbulos' children. She
denied being with Agbulos when the latter transacted with Abadilla and that she only knew
of Abadilla when the latter looked for Agbulos. 20
Agbulos supported the testimony of her co-accused Benito, stating that the latter
"had no participation [in her transactions with Abadilla]." 21 Agbulos likewise denied that
Benito accompanied her to Abadilla's residence whenever she received jewelry from
Abadilla. 22
The Regional Trial Court's findings
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The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit estafa. According to the trial court,
Agbulos and Benito received the pieces of jewelry in trust for Abadilla. They undertook to
sell the jewelry for Abadilla or return them in the afternoon should they fail to sell them.
However, in violation of that trust, they failed to return the unsold jewelry. Worse, they had
the jewelry pawned under a different name. 23
Thus, in the Decision 24 dated November 17, 2009, the trial court sentenced Agbulos
and Benito to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
It also ordered Agbulos and Benito to pay Abadilla P2,070,300.00 by way of civil indemnity
plus 12% interest from the filing of the Information until full payment. 25
Disposition of the Court of Appeals
Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that she had nothing to do
with Agbulos' transaction with Abadilla. 26
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals sustained the nding that Benito was the "Linda
Chua" who pawned Abadilla's jewelry as testi ed to by the pawnshop appraiser, Diloria.
Thus, even assuming that Agbulos alone transacted with Abadilla, "it was the action of
[Benito] that paved the way [to the misappropriation or conversion of the jewelry, to the
prejudice of Abadilla]." 27 The Court of Appeals upheld the nding that Agbulos and Benito
conspired to commit estafa.
A rming in toto the trial court's Decision, the Court of Appeals denied Benito's
appeal in the Decision 28 dated June 30, 2011.
Benito led a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in the
Resolution 29 dated November 13, 2012.
Proceedings in this court
Benito led a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. On behalf of the
People of the Philippines, the O ce of the Solicitor General commented on Benito's
Petition, 30 after which, Benito replied to the Comment. 31
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari and Reply, Benito insists that the prosecution
failed to prove her alleged conspiracy with Agbulos to commit estafa. She maintains that
Agbulos alone transacted with Abadilla, denying that she received any of the pieces of
jewelry. That she allegedly accompanied Agbulos to Abadilla's residence does not prove
that she likewise received some of the pieces of jewelry. Thus, the element of estafa
consisting of the receipt in trust of personal property does not apply to her. 32
Moreover, Benito vehemently denies that she was the "Linda Chua" who pawned
Abadilla's jewelry. She points out that prosecution witness Diloria did not personally
transact with "Linda Chua." Diloria allegedly testi ed that her co-worker entertained "Linda
Chua" and appraised the jewelry being pawned. With "no extraordinary reason why [the
Linda Chua transaction] stuck to [Diloria's] mind," 33 Benito argues that Diloria was
incompetent to testify as to the identity of "Linda Chua." 34
Maintaining that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
Benito prays for her acquittal. TCaEIc
In the Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that Benito raises questions of
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fact that is not allowed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition, the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals agreed in their ndings of fact. Thus, the ndings that
Benito received jewelry from Abadilla and that she was the "Linda Chua" who pawned some
of the jewelry are entitled to great respect, if not finality, by this court. 35
Considering that the arguments of Benito are a mere rehash of those she raised in
her appeal before the Court of Appeals, the People of the Philippines prays that this court
deny Benito's Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The issue for this court's resolution is whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with
Rebecca Agbulos in committing estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
We grant this Petition.
I
The judgments of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals are
based on a misapprehension of facts
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in
a Petition for Review on Certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment, nal order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts, whenever authorized by law, may le with the Supreme Court a
veri ed petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek
the same provisional remedies by veri ed motion led in the same action or
proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts." 37 On the other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt
or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." 38
Benito raises questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari. Speci cally,
she prays that this court examine the truth of the following ndings: that she received
jewelry from Abadilla and that she posed as "Linda Chua" and pawned the jewelry she
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received from Abadilla.
Despite Benito raising questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari, we
nevertheless take cognizance of her Petition. The trial court and Court of Appeals
misapprehended the facts of this case.
II
The prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt Benito's conspiracy
with Agbulos to commit estafa
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it." Proof of conspiracy may be direct or circumstantial. 39 So long as the evidence
presented show a "common design or purpose" 40 to commit the crime, all of the accused
shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one or more of them did not participate
in all the details of the execution of the crime. 41 IEHSDA
For this reason, the fact of conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of
evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties," 42 that is, proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 43
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code punishes estafa through
misappropriation:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property
received. 44 (Citation omitted)
However, the identi cation of Benito as the "Linda Chua" who pawned the jewelry is
"open to serious doubt." 61 As testi ed to by Diloria, she saw Benito in E. Ochoa Pawnshop
only on two occasions: on June 6 and 17, 1994. 62 Moreover, there is evidence that Diloria
was not the pawnshop appraiser who entertained "Linda Chua" 63 but a co-worker named
Mary Ann:
Q[:] Who prepared the pawn ticket?
A[:] Anybody who is available.
xxx xxx xxx
Q[:] Anybody who is available?
Therefore, as Benito argues, "[t]here is . . . no special reason why the [Linda Chua
transaction] stuck to D[e]loria's mind, such that she was able to remember the face of a
complete stranger and positively identify her more than three (3) months after the alleged
transaction." 65 cIEHAC
Further, based on Diloria's testimony, "Linda Chua" rst went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop
on June 6, 1994. 66 This date was prior to the rst time Agbulos received pieces of jewelry
from Abadilla on June 9, 1994. There is thus some reasonable doubt as to whether the
jewelry "Linda Chua" pawned on June 6, 1994 belonged to Abadilla.
With respect to the second time "Linda Chua" went to the pawnshop on June 17,
1994, Benito cannot be held liable for it as well.
Generally, demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust is necessary before an
accused is convicted of estafa. However, if there is an agreed period for the accused to
return the thing received in trust and the accused fails to return it within the agreed period,
demand is unnecessary. Failure to return the thing within the agreed period consummates
the crime of estafa, i.e., the misappropriation of the thing received in trust. 67
In United States v. Sotelo , 68 Manuel Araneta (Araneta) delivered to Vicente Sotelo
(Sotelo) pieces of jewelry for the latter to sell for a price not less than P180.00 or to return
the jewelry within one hour from delivery if unsold. Sotelo failed to return the pieces of
jewelry within one hour from their delivery. Without demanding for the return of the jewelry,
Araneta led against Sotelo a complaint for estafa within the hour after Sotelo failed to
return the jewelry.
The court convicted Sotelo of estafa because "[he] did not return [the pieces of
jewelry] within the [agreed period] nor at any other time." 69
When Agbulos failed to return in the afternoon the jewelry she received on June 9,
14, and 16, 1994, she was already presumed to have misappropriated the jewelry. There
would be no more need to present any act to prove the misappropriation.
Consequently, the estafa had already been consummated when "Linda Chua"
allegedly pawned the jewelry on June 17, 1994. Benito, who was allegedly "Linda Chua,"
cannot be held criminally liable with Agbulos. "There can be no ex post facto conspiracy to
do that which has already been done and consummated." 70
In Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 71 Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc., through its president, Edwin Yu (Yu), entered into an agreement with
Specialty Oils, Inc. for the toll manufacturing of high-quality margarine. Yu, however, had
second thoughts in continuing the agreement with Specialty Oils, Inc. 72
Through the intervention of Harley Sy (Sy), Yu continued the agreement with
Specialty Oils, Inc. 73 However, the margarine delivered by Specialty Oils, Inc. discolored
and "turned white." 74 Yu also learned that Specialty Oils, Inc. claimed in an a davit led
before the Securities and Exchange Commission that it was already non-operational when
it entered into the agreement with Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. 75
Claiming that Specialty Oils, Inc. defrauded it, Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. filed a
complaint for estafa against the o cers of Specialty Oils, Inc. It impleaded Sy as
respondent for allegedly conspiring with the o cers of Specialty Oils, Inc. in defrauding
Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. In a certiorari proceeding against the Department of
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Justice's Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered the criminal Complaint against Sy
dismissed. 76
This court a rmed the Court of Appeals' decision, ruling that the crime of estafa
had already been consummated by the time Sy intervened between Preferred Home
Specialties, Inc. and Specialty Oils, Inc. According to this court, Sy intervened after
Specialty Oils, Inc. had delivered the substandard margarine. Therefore, Sy could not be
held criminally liable with the officers of Specialty Oils, Inc. 77
In People v. Furugganan , 78 Anacleto Furugganan (Furugganan), together with other
co-accused, was charged with murder for allegedly shooting to death several men and
wounding a Joseph Ferrer (Ferrer). According to Ferrer, he, together with other shermen,
was sleeping in a nipa hut when he heard gunshots. He was shot on the leg but pretended
to be dead. 79
After the shooting had stopped, Ferrer saw Furugganan and other men climbing up
the hut. One of the men hit Ferrer's head to con rm that he was dead. After the men had
left, Ferrer went home to have his wound treated and report the incident. 80
In his defense, Furugganan denied that he shot Ferrer's companions and alleged that
he was merely threatened by one of the shooters to go up the hut or he himself would be
shot. Furugganan emphasized that he was unarmed when he went up the hut. Ferrer would
eventually testify that Furugganan was indeed unarmed. 81 cSCTID
This court found Furugganan credible and acquitted him on the ground of
reasonable doubt. According to this court, Furugganan's act of going up the hut "cannot . . .
be said to have lent in any way even a whit of material or moral aid in the actual
commission of the [crime] charged as, by then, [the crime] had already been
consummated." 82
All told, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Benito
conspired with Agbulos in misappropriating the jewelry belonging to Abadilla. Benito,
therefore, cannot be convicted of estafa.
There is no proof of Benito's direct participation in the commission of the crime
charged. Neither is there proof beyond reasonable doubt of her conspiracy with Agbulos.
The presumption of innocence holds in favor of Benito. 83 She should be acquitted
on the ground that her guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE , the Petition for Review on Certiorari i s GRANTED . The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59259 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to Angelita Cruz Benito. Petitioner Angelita Cruz
Benito is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
4. Id. at 73. She was also referred to as "Doris Cruz-Abadilla" in the rollo.
5. Id. at 59. She was also referred to as "Angelita Cruz-Benito" and "Angelita C. Benito" in the
rollo.
6. Id. at 29-30.
7. Id. at 30.
8. Id. at 28 and 62. She was also referred to as "Connie Pamintuan" in the rollo.
9. Id. at 29-30. She was also referred to as "Estela Dilorio" and "Estelita Deloria" in the rollo.
24. Id. at 59-73. Criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-94-59259 was penned by
Presiding Judge Charito B. Gonzales.
36. Pagsibigan v. People, 606 Phil. 233, 241-242 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]. See
Medina v. Asistio, Jr., G.R. No. 75450, November 8, 1990, 191 SCRA 218, 223 [Per J.
Bidin, Third Division] where this court enumerated for the first time the instances when
the findings of fact by the trial courts and the Court of Appeals were passed upon and
reviewed in a Rule 45 Petition.
37. Sesbreno v. Honorable Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 671, 679 (1995) [Per J. Quiason, First
Division], citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992, 216
SCRA 224, 232 (1992) [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
38. Id.
39. Franco v. People, G.R. No. 171328, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 474, 485 [Per J. Del
Castillo, First Division].
40. Id.
41. REVISED PENAL CODE, art. 17 provides:
Art. 17. Principals. — The following are considered principals:
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
See People v. Balasa, 356 Phil. 362 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
42. Franco v. People, G.R. No. 171328, February 16, 2011, 643 SCRA 474, 484 [Per J. Del
Castillo, First Division].
43. RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 2 provides:
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
44. Pamintuan v. People, 635 Phil. 514, 522 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
47. Gomez v. IAC, 220 Phil. 295, 310 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division], citing People v.
Drilon, 208 Phil. 70, 76 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
48. Rollo, pp. 60-62.
See Gomez v. IAC, 220 Phil. 295, 307 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
52. See Gomez v. IAC, 220 Phil. 295, 307 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
53. Gomez v. IAC, 220 Phil. 295, 307 (1985) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., First Division].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
59. Id.
60. Rollo, p. 32.
61. People v. Abejero, G.R. No. 95455, March 23, 1993, 220 SCRA 336, 344 [Per J. Nocon,
Second Division].
62. Rollo, p. 63.
71. 514 Phil. 574 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
72. Id. at 581-582.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 584.