Ekrem Demirli (Istanbul University, Turkey)

THE INFLUENCE OF IBN SĪNĀ ON

SADR AL-DĪN QŪNAWĪ AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Sufism emerged in Islamic society, affecting many affairs, both spiritual and
physical, after undergoing through a number of different processes. Sufism was
sometimes a “reaction” that preferred poverty to social comfort, sometimes a
“turning inwards” that elevated the individual above futile discussions in intellec-
tual life and sometimes it manifested itself as a “joyful expression” that took as its
basis divine love and spiritual training as opposed to the strict religious sciences
and torpid styles. However, its character as a movement of “morals and piety” was
preserved in all these processes1. The dynamic and complicated interactive pro-
cess that existed between the Sufi tradition and the conditions of time and space
under which Sufism developed acted as a mirror that indicated the social, political,
cultural and intellectual transformations that Muslims underwent. Developing this
principal idea, we will focus in this article on the influence of Ibn Sīnā on Qūnawī
and his followers.
As it is known, the first theoretical trend of Sufism, which developed first as
an ascetic movement, emerged owing to such writers as Sarrāj, Qushayrī, and
Kalābādhī, who were motivated by the problems that appeared in the ascetic peri-
od. The question that they were trying to answer in this period — an era that con-
centrated on determining the relationship between the Sharī‘a and reality — was:
what is Sufism and what is its place among the sciences? After a long struggle, the
early Sufi historians were able to answer this question thus: “Sufism is one of the
religious sciences, like kalām, fiqh, and hadīth”; however, this did not solve the
problem. The real problem would fully appear in the conception of Sufism that
was to be formed under the leadership of Ibn ‘Arabī and which was systematized
by Qūnawī. This period, known as “the period of the formation of Sunni Sufism”,
differs from the first period by claiming that Sufism has a central and determin-
ing place among the sciences. If we want to summarize the wide-ranging histori-
cal analysis that was first attempted by Ibn ‘Arabī and Qūnawī, it is possible to
see the Sufism of the new period as the aim and product of all Islamic sciences2.

1
See e.g.: Abū Nasr Sarrāj al-Tūsī. Al-Luma‘ fī ’l-tasawwuf / Ed. A. Mahmūd. Qāhira:
Maktaba al-thaqāfa al-dīnīyya, 103/2002. P. 25.
2
İbnü’l-Arabî. Fütûhât-ı Mekkiyye / trans. into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul: Litera,
2006. Vol. I. P. 307.
 The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī and His Followers 473

This meaning must be directly related to the theoretical traditions that preceded
Sufism and, therefore, must contain the same problems. According to Qūnawī,
what we are talking about now is not Sufism, but ‘ilm ilāhī (divine knowledge,
i. e., metaphysics)3. In other words, Sufis called the sciences of the new era ‘ilm
ilāhī and thus arrived at a stage, completely different from that wherefrom the first
Sufi historians had started. Ibn ‘Arabī and Qūnawī, both of whom turned to fiqh
and kalām when they searched for proofs of “legitimacy” of Sufism, also wanted
to establish a superior and ultimate science which would be served by all the infe-
rior sciences. This science was called metaphysics by Ibn Sīnā4. When one exam-
ines the history of Sufism, he notices that the conception of Sufism that appears
in the new period is a new concept that is totally different from the conceptions
of Sufism that had appeared earlier. For this reason, the Sufism of the new period,
from the moment it first appeared, has constantly been a field of contention of dif-
ferent opinions.
The Sufism of this new era, suggests Ibn Khaldūn, should be considered as the
“product of an integrating period”5. According to Khaldūn, a comparison can be
drawn between the Sufism of the new era and the development of the kalām. If
we accept this approach, we can consider Qūnawī to be the Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī of
the new era, and Sufism, like kalām, to be a product of this integrating era. If we
keep in mind Ibn Khaldūn’s longing to return to the Sufism of the ascetic period,
the Sufism purified of philosophy and mysticism, it is very clear that these aspects
of the evaluation are justified. The most incorrect and inconsistent evaluation of
Qūnawī and his followers is given by Kātib Chelebī (Hājī Khalīfa)6. On the basis
of weak proofs he attributes Qūnawī and his followers to Suhravardī and qualifies
them as part of the Ishrāqī (Illuminationist) movement. It is possible to find more
examples of such incorrect evaluations of the concept of Sufism of Qūnawī and
his followers. In brief, the conception of Sufism which appeared in this period, if
we take into account the entire history of Sufism, is one of the most debated is-
sues. While Ibn Taymiyya, praising the asceticism of common Sufis, attacks the
followers of Ibn ‘Arabī and the new conception of Sufism, some mutakallimīn —
e.g. Taftāzānī — choose the entire discussion on existence as the object of their
criticism, thus giving it a more theoretical level. Such external criticism provoked
a number of discussions among the Sufis themselves. In this connection, Abd al-
Karīm Jīlī (I mean particularly his -critical remarks about certain technical as-
pects of the wahdat al-wujūd), Alā’ al-Dawlā Simnānī and, in particular, Imām
Rabbānī (Ahmad Sirhindī), in my opinion, are most worthy of attention. Thus, the

3
Sadreddin Konevî. Tasavvuf Metafiziği / trans. into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul: İz,
2002. p. 9.
4
İbn Sina. Metafizik / trans. into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli, Ömer Türker. Istanbul: Litera,
2004. vol. I. p. 13.
5
See: İbn Haldun, Mukaddime (MEB). vol. II. p. 605.
6
See: Katip Çelebi, Keşfü’z-zünûn. vol. I. p. 9, etc.
474 Islamic Mysticism * Ekrem Demirli

place of the new era Sufism in the history of science was always debated and, no
doubt, this debate will continue.
Modern research qualifies the Sufism of this period as “philosophical Sufism”,
thus trying to separate it from the ascetic Sufism of the earlier period. It is hoped
that investigations into the Sufism of this period, a time that had a determining in-
fluence on Seljuk-Ottoman intellectual life, will lead to the formation of a more
correct opinion.
The figure which can be of most help for correct understanding of the concep-
tion of Sufism in this era is Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī. The assessments of the place and
importance of Qūnawī play a determining role in understanding the Sufism of the
new era. As we know, the first serious academic research on Qūnawī in Turkey was
carried out by Dr. Nihat Keklik, who described him as the “13th century Ghazālī”7.
The basic reason why Nihat Keklik arrived at this conclusion must be that his
study was focussed on the letters Qūnawī exchanged with the Avicennian scholar,
Nasīr ad Dīn Tūsī. In the letters Qūnawī poses many questions to Tūsī about Ibn
Sīnā’s philosophy, expressing doubts about the possibility of an “intellectual sci-
ence”. The manner of Qūnawī’s criticism must have led Nihat Keklik to such an
evaluation. In my opinion, Keklik, whose study is in some aspects quite valuable,
used an incorrect analogy. Interpreting Qūnawī’s critical remarks on Ibn Sīnā from
a narrow perspective, Keklik was influenced by the common criticism of intellec-
tual reasoning, which was prevalent in Sufism from its very beginning. This did
not allow him to correctly understand Qūnawī’s thought as a whole. One of the
most important consequences of this is that Qūnawī’s use of the term ‘ilm ilāhī is
overlooked. A sound and insightful study on Qūnawī should be based upon his two
main books — the Miftāh al-ghayb and the Ī‘jāz al-bayān (the commentary on the
surah al-Fātiha). If we examine Qūnawī’s thought, taking these two works as our
basis, we arrive at a conclusion, which is exactly opposite to that of Nihat Keklik’s.
The second reason for this error is the exaggeration of the influence of Ghazālī on
the later Sufi tradition. This is a more common error than the first.
In this situation, if we use a similar comparison, the conclusion we can arrive
at is this: Qūnawī, particularly in metaphysics, is the “Ibn Sīnā of the 13th cen-
tury”. This comparison could be thought to slightly overstep its mark, or even to
be surprising when considering the specific situation of Sufism. However, if we
carefully study the critical remarks, which, we suspect, have misled Nihat Keklik,
we can see that they are directed towards a totally different aim than the criti-
cisms that are directed towards metaphysical thought as such. An important part
of the criticisms are directed towards the use of the art of debate (or disputation)
(jadal) in metaphysical discussions. Qūnawī, who is opposed to this, insistently
defends metaphysical science and metaphysicians against some of Ghazālī’s at-
tacks8. Without going into details, what we have to say is this: Qūnawī, sometimes

7
See: Nihat Keklik. Sadreddin Konevî’de Allah. Kainat ve İnsan. p. 6—7.
8
See: Ekrem Demirli. Sadreddin Konevî’de Bilgi ve Varlık. Istanbuk: İz 2005. p. 110ff.
 The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī and His Followers 475

accepting the earlier criticisms, sometimes dismissing them, came to the conclu-
sion that “despite all the objections, metaphysical knowledge is possible”.
It is clear that this conception presents a completely new trend in the history of
Sufism. At this period the main problem, as evidenced in the Sufi works, was the
determination of the relationship between Sufism and philosophy. While the ear-
ly Sufis tried to correlate Sufism with fiqh and kalām, in Qūnawī’s time the prob-
lem was the determination of the place of Sufism in relation to philosophy; that is,
the position of the Sufis vs. the metaphysicians. Starting with Ibn ‘Arabī, writers
like Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, Mu’ayyid al-Dīn Jandī, Sa‘īd al-Dīn Farghānī, Dāvud
Qaysarī and Mullā Fanārī examined this subject, trying to determine in what ways
Sufis differed from philosophers, to what extent they could benefit from the teach-
ings of the latter, and the relationship between the methods of Sufism and those
used by philosophy9. However, something more important can be seen in an idea
expressed by Qūnawī in his correspondence with Tūsī. When discussing the po-
sition of Sufism in relation to the kalām and philosophy, Qūnawī uses an expres-
sion that perhaps cannot be found in any other era of Sufism: According to him,
while Sufis disagree on almost every subject with kalām, the issues in which they
differ from the mystic philosophers — here with the phrase ‘mystic philosophers’
Qūnawī is primarily referring to Ibn Sīnā — are few. The difference of this state-
ment from the words of Kalābādhī, who said: “Sufi belief is in complete agree-
ment with the beliefs of the Sunnis”, is evident.
We would also like to draw attention to some terms used by Qūnawī that tes-
tify to Ibn Sīnā’s influence: such influence of Ibn Sina on Qūnawī and his fol-
lowers can be best seen in their use of the expression ‘ilm mā’ ba‘d al-tabī‘a. In
other words, we can have definite knowledge about that which comes after na-
ture — whatever it may be — just as we have it in other natural sciences. In my
opinion, the matter that has most influenced the Sufis is the clarity and certainty
of the contents of this synthesis. Sufis have to a large extent adopted the thoughts
that Ibn Sina expressed on this point. The criticisms that Sufis have made about
intellect and its power can only have meaning against this common background.
The criticism of the information that intellect provides about God is focused on
the discussion of God’s attributes. Here, Sufis usually criticize their opponents in
a general way, using the expression ahl-i nazar or “rationalists”, but sometimes
they refer to Ibn Sīnā by name. The most important point of their criticism con-
sists in the assertion that intellect can only provide negative information about
God. Claiming that there is a necessity to counterbalance tanzīh (incomparability
or the belief that God is free from any fault) and the negative, Sufis who accept
wahdat al-wujūd base their understanding of God on this principle. Bringing to
the fore comparison rather than negative information - because wahdat al-wujūd
is not negative — they defend the existence of the set of attributes that are solely
possessed by God. This subject is the heart of Ibn Sīnā’s criticism on Sufis. This

9
See: Ekrem Demirli. İbnü’l-Arabî ve Vahdet-i Vücûd Ekolü. Istanbul: Kabalcı 2008. p. 77ff.
476 Islamic Mysticism * Ekrem Demirli

matter is one in which the Sufis, contrary to what Qūnawī suggests, take a posi-
tion that is closer to that of the kalām theorists.
Qūnawī considers himself to be a metaphysician in the full sense of the word.
In this regard, the subject, problems and principles of metaphysics have been dis-
cussed by Qūnawī in a detailed way. In all these matters he reiterates the opin-
ions of Ibn Sīnā. Sometimes Qūnawī, who presents metaphysics with the different
designations given to it by Ibn Sīnā, labels it as ma‘rifat Allāh, ‘ilm rabbānī, ‘ilm
ilāhī, or ‘ilm al-haqā’iq, or sometimes as tahqīq (verification) or ‘ilm al-tahqīq;
those who possess these qualities are muhaqqiqīn, ahl Allāh, or awliyā’ kāmila,
etc10. There is a specific reason and justification for each of these designations:
First of all ma‘rifat Allāh and ‘ilm ilāhī can be considered as synonyms. Here the
designation is not according to the subject of the science, but rather according to
the matter and the aim. In other words, ‘ilm ilāhī, meaning knowing God and the
divine, is much clearer in the first expression. Calling this ‘ilm al-haqā’iq is in
keeping with Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysics of the knowledge of the first causes of the
natural and mathematical existence and the cause of causes and the origin of the
origins11.
The fact that the Sufis who came after Ibn ‘Arabī and Qūnawī perceived their
science as ‘ilm ilāhī or metaphysics, rather than as a system of concepts that ex-
plain Sufi spiritual life, opened the way to the creation of a conception that would
explain existence. For example, while the terms qabd and bast (‘contraction’ and
‘spreading out’) in the early (pre-Ibn ‘Arabī) period of Sufism referred to two
states experienced by Sufis, in the new era these terms alluded to two states that
were constantly experienced by the universe as a result of their being two attri-
butes of God. Sufis have explained the idea of continuous creation with the aid of
these two concepts, which they developed on the basis of the jawhar-‘arad theory
of the kalām; this latter replaced the connection through causation of the contin-
gent by the necessary that was included in the manifestation theory derived from
Ibn Sina. For this reason, the ethical contents of the concepts of the early Sufism
were replaced, due to the influence of the teachings of Muslim philosophers and
some mutakallimīn, with metaphysical ones.
Qūnawī deeply influenced subsequent Sufi and scientific conceptions. The
commentaries written in this tradition, primarily on the Fusūs al-Hikam and
Miftāh al-ghayb, contributed to his influence a lot, allocating him an important
place in philosophical discussions. The influence of Ibn Sīnā upon Ibn ‘Arabī and
Qūnawī can be clearly seen in the change of the contents of Sufi literature. To
show the change in the content of Sufi literature it is enough to compare the books
of this period, in particular, Fusūs al-Hikam and Miftāh al-ghayb, with any Sufi
work belonging to the previous period. For example, the umūr ‘ āmma (‘common

10
Sadreddin Konevî. Tasavvuf Metafiziği. p. 9ff; idem. Fatiha Suresi Tefsiri / tran. into
Turkish by Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul: İz, 2002. p. 55ff.
11
İbn Sina. op. cit. p. 11ff.
 The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī and His Followers 477

affairs’) are discussed at the beginning of the Fusūs al Hikam12. The main prob-
lems discussed in the Fusūs are the problems like why God created the universe,
the place of human being in the universe13, the relationship between the beings/
things in the universe and God. Miftāh al-ghayb starts with a discussion of sci-
entific classifications and subjects, as well as their matters and principles. In this
regard, starting with the theory of nafs, the most important issues in which the
Sufis were influenced by philosophers include the relationship between God and
the universe, causality and manifestation. On the other hand, the relationship of
the prior and the posterior, the cause and the effect, and, in connection with this,
the relationship of the macrocosm to the microcosm and the issue of oneness and
manyness were the most important problems of Sufism in this period. As it is well
known, all these issues occupy an important place in the post-Avicennian meta-
physical thought.
Probably the most important part of the Akbarian Sufi literature are the so-
called “wujūd treatises”. These treatises were written as common introductions to
Sufism and almost all of them begin with the expression “existence in so far as it
is considered [only] as existence” (wujūd bi mā’ huwa wujūd) — a phrase that we
are familiar with from the metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā14. However, Sufis, unlike Ibn
Sīnā, considered this to be an expression that indicates God. Thus, the phrase “ex-
istence in so far as it is considered [only] as existence is God” is frequently quoted
in Sufi texts as the first premise of the concept of wahdat-al wujūd. Another area
of literature, which is as important as this subject, is the “a‘yān thābita” treatises.
The issue of the a‘yān thābita was perhaps the most important issue of the new
age of Sufism. While the issue deals with the attributes of God on the one hand,
on the other it discusses the relationship between possible existence and God. The
Sufis sometimes express their views on these matters in a comparative manner.
For example, what the Sufis call a‘yān thābita, the philosophers refer to as “na-
ture”, while the mutakallimīn call it ma‘lūm ma‘dūm (‘the known non-existent’)15.
Moreover, the concepts of necessary existence and contingent existence have
an important place in the arguments of accidental relationship, causation and des-
tiny in Sufi texts; in all these discussions the Sufis refer to the views of the phi-
losophers. For example, in Jandī’s commentary on the Fusūs, after presenting a
variety of views concerning astronomy and cosmography, attention is focused
on the difference in opinions between Sufis and philosophers. In his treatise on
time Dāvud Qaysarī discusses in detail the views of Muslim philosophers, harshly
12
İbnü’l-Arabî. Fusûsu’l-Hikem / trans. into Turkish by Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul: Kabalcı
2006. p. 25
13
İbnü’l-Arabî. Fusûsu’l-Hikem. p. 23; İbnü’l-Arabî. Fütûhât-ı Mekkiyye. vol. I. p. 23.
14
For example, see: Dāvud al-Qaysarī. Muqaddima // Dāvud al-Qaysarī. Risā’il. Cairo: Dār
al-thaqāfa, 1997. p. 35; Abdülgani Nablusi, Gerçek Varlık, translated into Turkish by Ekrem
Demirli. Istanbul: İz, 2004. p. 23.
15
See: Sadreddin Konevî. Tasavvuf Metafiziği . p. 25; idem. Yazışmalar / trans. into Turkish
by Ekrem Demirli. Istanbul: İz 2002 . p. 110.
478 Islamic Mysticism * Ekrem Demirli

criticizing, in particular, the opinion of Abū Barakāt al-Baghdādī16. Mullā Fanārī

gives a lot of attention to the discussion of existence in his Misbāh al-uns and de-
fends the Sufi view of existence against the views of philosophers. Other com-
mentators of the Miftāh al-ghayb, like Qutb al-Dīn Iznīqī, Atpazarī, Uthmān Ilāhī
and Bursawī, quote the views of Ibn Sīnā, sometimes referring to him by name,
sometimes alluding to the Shifā’ or his other books. Because of this, Ibn Sīnā’s
views spread over a wider area and were learnt sometimes through Qūnawī’s
works and sometimes directly from the works of Ibn Sīnā himself. On the other
hand, if we also take into account some commentaries on books which were of
great importance in Sufism, in particular Rūmī’s Mathnawī, and some other texts
which had a great impact on the Akbarian tradition, we can better estimate the
influence of Avicennian metaphysics on the later Sufi tradition — the influence
which spread mostly through Qūnawī and his followers.
In order to correctly evaluate Qūnawī and his followers, it is necessary to con-
stantly have in mind two sources of his inspiration. The first of them is the tradi-
tional Sufism. Traditional Sufi practices and the methods, those things that make
a Sufi a Sufi, compel us to consider Ibn ‘Arabī and his followers as Sufis. The
second source is the metaphysical thought, whose main champion was Ibn Sīnā.
Sufis who relied on this method expressed their views on existence predominant-
ly in terms of Ibn Sīnā’s metaphysical perceptions. However, important contribu-
tions were also made by a number of Mutakallimīn.

Conclusion:
The Sufi conception, formulated by Ibn ‘Arabī and Sadr al-Dīn Qūnawī, aimed
to reconstruct Ibn Sīnā’s conception of metaphysics. The change of the aim and
methods used here did not change the general situation. Thus, if we leave aside
the Sufi conception, the new era — in particular as manifested in the texts of
Qūnawī, from the point of view of the language and concepts used — can be des-
ignated, in the true sense of the word, as the era of following in the footsteps of
Ibn Sīnā. However, when we consider the ideas about God’s existence, the rela-
tionship between the necessary and contingent, destiny, the issue of the nafs, and
existence, we can see that Sufi thought is based on Ibn Sīnā.

16
See: Dāvud al-Qaysarī. Nihāyat al-zamān fī dirāyat al-zamān // Risā’il.