Categories

By Aristotle

Written 350 B.C.E

Translated by E. M. Edghill

Section 1
Part 1

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a

common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each.
Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name
'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common
name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For
should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the
one case will be appropriate to that case only. 

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both
the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an
ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only
the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man
should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case
would be identical with that in the other. 

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some
other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his
name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man from the word
'courage'. 

Part 2 

Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are

such expressions as 'the man runs', 'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox',
'runs', 'wins'. 

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present

in a subject. Thus 'man' is predicable of the individual man, and is never
present in a subject. 
By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a
whole, but being incapable of existence apart from the said subject. 

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a
subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in
the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness
may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is
never predicable of anything. 

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject.
Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of
grammar. 

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor
predicable of a subject, such as the individual man or the individual horse.
But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the character of
a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to
prevent such being present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical
knowledge is present in a subject. 

Part 3 

When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the
predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of
the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be
predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and
'animal'. 

If genera are different and co-ordinate, their differentiae are themselves

different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus
'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of
'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same
differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being
'two-footed'. 

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent

their having the same differentiae: for the greater class is predicated of the
lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae also of
the subject. 

Part 4 
Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality,
relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my
meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the horse', of quantity,
such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes
as 'white', 'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of
relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the Lyceum', under that of place;
'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating
position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced',
'to be cauterized', affection. 

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the

combination of such terms that positive or negative statements arise. For
every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas
expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs',
'wins', cannot be either true or false. 

Part 5 

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is
that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for
instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things
are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are
included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the
individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus to which the
species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore-that is to say, the species 'man'
and the genus 'animal,-are termed secondary substances. 

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of
the predicate must be predicable of the subject. For instance, 'man' is
predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species man'
is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the
individual; and the definition of 'man' will also be predicated of the individual
man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both the name and
the definition of the species are predicable of the individual. 

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject,
it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is
predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition
is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name
being used. For instance, 'white' being present in a body is predicated of that
in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of
the colour white' is never predicable of the body. 
Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary
substance or present in a primary substance. This becomes evident by
reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of the
species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual
man of whom it could be predicated, it could not be predicated of the species
'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for
if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be
present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either
predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did
not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist. 

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus,

being more nearly related to primary substance. For if any one should render
an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive
account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by
stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an
individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal,
for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree,
while the latter is too general. Again, the man whogives an account of the
nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning
the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'. 

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of

the fact that they are the entities which underlie every. else, and that
everything else is either predicated of them or present in them. Now the same
relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists
also between the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as
subject is to predicate, since the genus is predicated of the species, whereas
the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second ground
for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus. 

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is

more truly substance than another. We should not give a more appropriate
account of the individual man by stating the species to which he belonged,
than we should of an individual horse by adopting the same method of
definition. In the same way, of primary substances, no one is more truly
substance than another; an individual man is not more truly substance than an
individual ox. 

It is, then, with good reason that of all that remains, when we exclude primary
substances, we concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary
substance', for these alone of all the predicates convey a knowledge of
primary substance. For it is by stating the species or the genus that we
appropriately define any individual man; and we shall make our definition
more exact by stating the former than by stating the latter. All other things
that we state, such as that he is white, that he runs, and so on, are irrelevant
to the definition. Thus it is just that these alone, apart from primary
substances, should be called substances. 

Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie

and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists
between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the
species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one
hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For
these are the subjects of all such. If we call an individual man 'skilled in
grammar', the predicate is applicable also to the species and to the genus to
which he belongs. This law holds good in allcases. 

It is a common characteristic of all sub. stance that it is never present in a

subject. For primary substance is neither present in a subject nor predicated
of a subject; while, with regard to secondary substances, it is clear from the
following arguments (apart from others) that they are not present in a
subject. For 'man' is predicated of the individual man, but is not present in any
subject: for manhood is not present in the individual man. In the same way,
'animal' is also predicated of the individual man, but is not present in him.
Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well
be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet
of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to
the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the
genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present
in a subject. 

Yet this is not peculiar to substance, for it is also the case that differentiae
cannot be present in subjects. The characteristics 'terrestrial' and 'two-footed'
are predicated of the species 'man', but not present in it. For they are not in
man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia may be predicated of that of
which the differentia itself is predicated. For instance, if the characteristic
'terrestrial' is predicated of the species 'man', the definition also of that
characteristic may be used to form the predicate of the species 'man': for 'man'
is terrestrial. 

The fact that the parts of substances appear to be present in the whole, as in

a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we should have to admit that
such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase 'being present in a
subject', we stated' that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'. 
It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all propositions of
which they form the predicate, they are predicated univocally. For all such
propositions have for their subject either the individual or the species. It is
true that, inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can
never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary substances, the
species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of
the individual. Similarly the differentiae are predicated of the species and of
the individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of the genus
are applicable to the primary substance, and that of the genus to the species.
For all that is predicated of the predicate will be predicated also of the
subject. Similarly, the definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the
species and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word 'univocal'
was applied to those things which had both name and definition in common. It
is, therefore, established that in every proposition, of which either substance
or a differentia forms the predicate, these are predicated univocally. 

All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the case of primary

substance this is indisputably true, for the thing is a unit. In the case of
secondary substances, when we speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our
form of speech gives the impression that we are here also indicating that
which is individual, but the impression is not strictly true; for a secondary
substance is not an individual, but a class with a certain qualification; for it is
not one and single as a primary substance is; the words 'man', 'animal', are
predicable of more than one subject. 

Yet species and genus do not merely indicate quality, like the term 'white';
'white' indicates quality and nothing further, but species and genus determine
the quality with reference to a substance: they signify substance qualitatively
differentiated. The determinate qualification covers a larger field in the case
of the genus that in that of the species: he who uses the word 'animal' is
herein using a word of wider extension than he who uses the word 'man'. 

Another mark of substance is that it has no contrary. What could be the

contrary of any primary substance, such as the individual man or animal? It has
none. Nor can the species or the genus have a contrary. Yet this characteristic
is not peculiar to substance, but is true of many other things, such as quantity.
There is nothing that forms the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits
long', or of 'ten', or of any such term. A man may contend that 'much' is the
contrary of 'little', or 'great' of 'small', but of definite quantitative terms no
contrary exists. 

Substance, again, does not appear to admit of variation of degree. I do not

mean by this that one substance cannot be more or less truly substance than
another, for it has already been stated' that this is the case; but that no single
substance admits of varying degrees within itself. For instance, one particular
substance, 'man', cannot be more or less man either than himself at some
other time or than some other man. One man cannot be more man than
another, as that which is white may be more or less white than some other
white object, or as that which is beautiful may be more or less beautiful than
some other beautiful object. The same quality, moreover, is said to subsist in a
thing in varying degrees at different times. A body, being white, is said to be
whiter at one time than it was before, or, being warm, is said to be warmer or
less warm than at some other time. But substance is not said to be more or
less that which it is: a man is not more truly a man at one time than he was
before, nor is anything, if it is substance, more or less what it is. Substance,
then, does not admit of variation of degree. 

The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining

numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.
From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to
bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour
cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this
law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the selfsame
substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary
qualities. The same individual person is at one time white, at another black,
at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad. This
capacity is found nowhere else, though it might be maintained that a
statement or opinion was an exception to the rule. The same statement, it is
agreed, can be both true and false. For if the statement 'he is sitting' is true,
yet, when the person in question has risen, the same statement will be false.
The same applies to opinions. For if any one thinks truly that a person is
sitting, yet, when that person has risen, this same opinion, if still held, will be
false. Yet althoughthis exception may be allowed, there is, nevertheless, a
difference in the manner in which the thing takes place. It is by themselves
changing that substances admit contrary qualities. It is thus that that which
was hot becomes cold, for it has entered into a different state. Similarly that
which was white becomes black, and that which was bad good, by a process of
change; and in the same way in all other cases it is by changing
that substances are capable of admitting contrary qualities. But
statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by
the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be
theirs. The statement 'he is sitting' remains unaltered, but it is at one time
true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has beensaid of
statements applies also to opinions. Thus, in respect of the manner in which
the thing takes place, it is the peculiar mark of substance that it should be
capable of admitting contrary qualities; for it is by itself changing that it does
so. 

If, then, a man should make this exception and contend that statements and
opinions are capable of admitting contrary qualities, his contention is
unsound. For statements and opinions are said to have this capacity, not
because they themselves undergo modification, but because this
modification occurs in the case of something else. The truth or falsity of a
statement depends on facts, and not on any power on the part of the
statement itself of admitting contrary qualities. In short, there is nothing
which can alter the nature of statements and opinions. As, then, no change
takes placein themselves, these cannot be said to be capable of admitting
contrary qualities. 

But it is by reason of the modification which takes place within the substance

itself that a substance is said to be capable of admitting contrary qualities; for
a substance admits within itself either disease or health, whiteness or
blackness. It is in this sense that it is said to be capable of admitting contrary
qualities. 

To sum up, it is a distinctive mark of substance, that, while

remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary
qualities, the modification taking place through a change in the
substance itself. 

Let these remarks suffice on the subject of substance. 

Part 6 

Quantity is either discrete or continuous. Moreover, some quantities are such

that each part of the whole has a relative position to the other parts: others
have within them no such relation of part to part. 

Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines,

surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place. 

In the case of the parts of a number, there is no common boundary at which

they join. For example: two fives make ten, but the two fives have no common
boundary, but are separate; the parts three and seven also do not join at any
boundary. Nor, to generalize, would it ever be possible in the case of number
that there should be a common boundary among the parts; they are always
separate. Number, therefore, is a discrete quantity. 

The same is true of speech. That speech is a quantity is evident: for it is

measured in long and short syllables. I mean here that speech which is vocal.
Moreover, it is a discrete quantity for its parts have no common boundary.
There is no common boundary at which the syllables join, but each is separate
and distinct from the rest. 

A line, on the other hand, is a continuous quantity, for it is possible to find a

common boundary at which its parts join. In the case of the line, this common
boundary is the point; in the case of the plane, it is the line: for the parts of
the plane have also a common boundary. Similarly you can find a common
boundary in the case of the parts of a solid, namely either a line or a plane. 

Space and time also belong to this class of quantities. Time, past, present, and
future, forms a continuous whole. Space, likewise, is a continuous quantity;
for the parts of a solid occupy a certain space, and these have a common
boundary; it follows that the parts of space also, which are occupied by the
parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid.
Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity, for its parts have
a common boundary. 

Quantities consist either of parts which bear a relative position each to each,

or of parts which do not. The parts of a line bear a relative position to each
other, for each lies somewhere, and it would be possible to distinguish each,
and to state the position of each on the plane and to explain to what sort of
part among the rest each was contiguous. Similarly the parts of a plane have
position, for it could similarly be stated what was the position of each and
what sort of parts were contiguous. The same is true with regard to the solid
and to space. But it would be impossible to show that the arts of a number had
a relative position each to each, or a particular position, or to state what parts
were contiguous. Nor could this be done in the case of time, for none of the
parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can
hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative
order, in virtue of one being prior to another. Similarly with number: in
counting, 'one' is prior to 'two', and 'two' to 'three', and thus the parts of
number may be said to possess a relative order, though it would be impossible
to discover any distinct position for each. This holds good also in the case of
speech. None of its parts has an abiding existence: when once a syllable is
pronounced, it is not possible to retain it, so that, naturally, as the parts do
not abide, they cannot have position. Thus, some quantities consist of
parts which have position, and some of those which have not. 

Strictly speaking, only the things which I have mentioned belong to the
category of quantity: everything else that is called quantitative is a quantity in
a secondary sense. It is because we have in mind some one of these quantities,
properly so called, that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak
of what is white as large, because the surface over which the white extends is
large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy, because the time covered
is long; these things cannot in their own right claim the quantitative epithet.
For instance, should any one explain how long an action was, his statement
would be made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a year,
or something of that sort. In the same way, he would explain the size of a
white object in terms of surface, for he would state the area which it covered.
Thus the things already mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic
nature quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right, but, if
at all, only in a secondary sense. 

Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities this is obvious;

thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of 'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits
long', or of a surface, or of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue
that 'much' was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these are not
quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small absolutely, they are so
called rather as the result of an act of comparison. For instance, a mountain is
called small, a grain large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than
others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference here to an
external standard, for if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely,
a mountain would never be called small or a grain large. Again, we say
that there are many people in a village, and few in Athens, although those
in the city are many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that
a house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the theatre far
outnumber those in the house. The terms 'two cubits long, "three cubits long,'
and so on indicate quantity, the terms 'great' and 'small' indicate relation, for
they have reference to an external standard. It is, therefore, plain that these
are to be classed as relative. 

Again, whether we define them as quantitative or not, they have no

contraries: for how can there be a contrary of an attribute which is not to be
apprehended in or by itself, but only by reference to something external?
Again, if 'great' and 'small' are contraries, it will come about that the same
subject can admit contrary qualities at one and the same time, and that things
will themselves be contrary to themselves. For it happens at times that the
same thing is both small and great. For the same thing may be small in
comparison with one thing, and great in comparison with another, so that the
same thing comes to be both small and great at one and the same time, and is
of such a nature as to admit contrary qualities at one and the same moment.
Yet it was agreed, when substance was being discussed, that nothing admits
contrary qualities at one and the same moment. For though substance is
capable of admitting contrary qualities, yet no one is at the same time both
sick and healthy, nothing is at the same time both white and black. Nor is
there anything which is qualified in contrary ways at one and the same time. 

Moreover, if these were contraries, they would themselves be contrary to

themselves. For if 'great' is the contrary of 'small', and the same thing is both
great and small at the same time, then 'small' or 'great' is the contrary of
itself. But this is impossible. The term 'great', therefore, is not the contrary of
the term 'small', nor 'much' of 'little'. And even though a man should call these
terms not relative but quantitative, they would not have contraries. 

It is in the case of space that quantity most plausibly appears to admit of a

contrary. For men define the term 'above' as the contrary of 'below', when it is
the region at the centre they mean by 'below'; and this is so, because nothing
is farther from the extremities of the universe than the region at the centre.
Indeed, it seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse to
a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries which, within
the same class, are separated by the greatest possible distance. 

Quantity does not, it appears, admit of variation of degree. One thing cannot

be two cubits long in a greater degree than another. Similarly with regard to
number: what is 'three' is not more truly three than what is 'five' is five; nor is
one set of three more truly three than another set. Again, one period of time
is not said to be more truly time than another. Nor is there any other kind of
quantity, of all that have been mentioned, with regard to which variation of
degree can be predicated. The category of quantity, therefore, does not admit
of variation of degree. 

The most distinctive mark of quantity is that equality and inequality are

predicated of it. Each of the aforesaid quantities is said to be equal or
unequal. For instance, one solid is said to be equal or unequal to
another; number, too, and time can have these terms applied to them, indeed
can all those kinds of quantity that have been mentioned. 

That which is not a quantity can by no means, it would seem, be termed equal
or unequal to anything else. One particular disposition or one particular
quality, such as whiteness, is by no means compared with another in terms of
equality and inequality but rather in terms of similarity. Thus it is the
distinctive mark of quantity that it can be called equal and unequal.