Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator

4/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 238
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 721

Cadalin vs. POEA's Administrator
*
G.R. No. 104776. December 5, 1994.
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO

B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-
COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty.
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION’S ADMIN-
ISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTER-NATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 104911-14. December 5, 1994.
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN &
ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
722
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. Nos. 105029-32. December 5, 1994.*
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and

BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001719285f0c87ddb33bc003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/67
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO

B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES,
IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN,
EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO
ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO,
MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO
ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE ARLITA,
HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO BALOBO,
FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX
BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO
S. BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C.
BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER,
DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO
BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO
CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO,
IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO,
REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO
CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO
DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE
GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA,
MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S.
DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA,
ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO
ESCOTOTO, JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU,
ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M.
ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA,
OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO
GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO
HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO,
ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U.
LIRIO, LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALENJANDRO
LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN,
LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE
MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS
MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY,
CRESENCIANO MIRANDA,
723
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 723

ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR,

RESURRECCION D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO,
FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO
ORDONEZ, ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P.
PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I.
PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME
POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ,
LUCIEN M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS
B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES,
SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO
RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS,
PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO,
AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO
SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN
MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL
SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE,
CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS
TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA,
BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES,
MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A.
URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA,
DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE
VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO
VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO
VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA,
ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO
ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES
ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE
ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO,
HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G.
ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO S.
ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA,
EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO
ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA, FLORENTINO R. AGNE,
QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTE
AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR.,
CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA,
MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO
V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L.
ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO
724

ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO

ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R.
AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA,
TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P. ANTILLON,
ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO, ANTONIO
APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO APOLINARIO,
BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR
AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN,
BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO
ARAULLO, ALEXANDER ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA,
JOSE AREVALO, JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO,
RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P.
ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION,
ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M.
ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA,
RICARDO P. AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME
AXALAN, ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L.
BACANI, ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN,
RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O.
BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN, CEFERINO
BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S. BAUTISTA,
LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA, ROSTICO
BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S.
BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA,
WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G.
BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMILIANO BENALES, JR., RAUL
BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO,
ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO
BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL,
ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO
BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO
BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO,
AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC,
JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C.
BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE,
PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA,
BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO,
ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR.,
HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO, BENEDICTO
CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI CABRERA,
725
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 725

PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L.

CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDEJON, OSCAR C.
CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA,
NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T. CAMACHO, ROBERTO
CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG, EDGARDO M. CANDA,
SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS D.
CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M.
CASTANEDA, BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L.
CASTILLO, JOSEPH B. CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO,
JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P.
CASTILLO, SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO,
PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE
CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO,
RODOLFO B. CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO,
VICTORIANO CELESTINO, BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C.
CHUA, VIVENCIO B. CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE,
AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO
CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C.
CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO, ABELARDO
CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ,
JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO
O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO
CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ,
DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, EMILIANO DELA CRUZ, JR.,
PANCHITO CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P.
CRUZ, TEODORO S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO
A. CUARESMA, FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON,
RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO
DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID,
ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID,
EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO
DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE
GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN,
NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA, GENEROSO
DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA CRUZ,
LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO
A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ,

GERARDO C. DIGA, CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO
DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA, BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO,
ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO, BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN
726

DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO

A. EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO,
UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO
ENCARNACION, EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS
EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL
ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS,
ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU, REYNALDO
ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE,
IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO
R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR,
CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA,
WILFREDO P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO
FERRER, MISAEL M. FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES,
BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C. FLORES,
BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO,
ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO,
RODOLFO GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C.
GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL GAMBOA,
BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES
GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA,
MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR.,
PONCIANO G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL
P. GARCIA, ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL,
RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO
GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO GONZALES,
RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO, MARTIN V.
GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO,
FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B.
GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H.
HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO
HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO HILAPO,
ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA, EDUARDO
HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN,

RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G.
ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO
HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO,
FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN,
BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS,
REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E.
JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO
M. JOCSON, PEDRO N.
727
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 727

JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA,

ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE, RICARDO SAN JOSE,
GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S. KOLIMLIM, SR.,
LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA, EDGARDO B.
LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J. LADINES, RUFINO
LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID,
GAUDENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO
LATOJA, WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA,
DANIEL R. LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S.
LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON,
MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S.
LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFEREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO
LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO
M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F.
LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA,
DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE,
ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR.,
LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN LUALHATI,
FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE
LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI
MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO
MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V.
MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG, BENJAMIN
MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL
MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q.
MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G.
MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT,
ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE,

ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON
M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO, MACARIO S.
MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V. MAGTIBAY,
GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO
MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI,
MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L.
MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI MANIGBAS,
ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL MANONSON, ERNESTO
F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO N. MAPA,
RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO
MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO MARASIGAN, LEONARDO
MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE,
728

SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO

MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO, AURELIO MATABERDE,
RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA, VIRGILIO
MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ,
RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE,
AVELINO MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO
MENDOZA, GREGORIO MERCADO, ERNANI DELA
MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO METRELLO,
RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN MIRANDA,
FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR
MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA,
RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M.
MORALES, FEDERICO M. MORENO, VICTORINO A.
MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ,
ILDEFONSO MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO
NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA,
FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO D. NAVARRO,
FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE
NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO, HERBERT G. NG,
FLORENCIO NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON, AVELINO
NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO
OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO,
REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO,
FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V.

ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ,
WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A, DAVID PAALAN, JESUS
N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN,
NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO
PAKINGAN, LEANDRO PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO,
JOSE PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN,
BIENVENIDO PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V.
PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION,
ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO
PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ,
ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO
E. PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO
G. PERINO, FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA,
SALVADOR PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN,
ARTURO POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA,
BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE,
729
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 729

DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O.

PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN,
ALFREDO L. QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W.
RACABO, RICARDO C. DE RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA,
ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A. RAMIREZ, LITO S.
RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ,
ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS,
WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO, REYNADO RAQUEDAN,
MANUEL F. RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO,
ERNESTO E. RECOLASO, ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR
REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA,
EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA,
REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S.
REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE
A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES, ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO
REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO, FERNANDO M. RICO,
EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B. ROBLES,
RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO
ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ,
BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE

ROMEO, ELIAS RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL
B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO
RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES,
ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO,
TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO,
CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN
PEDRO, ADRIANO V. SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA,
ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P.
SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO,
EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D.
SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA,
DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M.
SILANG, FAUSTINO D. SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS,
ANICETO G. SILVA, EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C.
SILVERTO, ARTHUR B. SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO,
JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS,
III, EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS,
EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G.
STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO,
MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN
TARUC, JR.,
730

LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO

TIPOSO, ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO,
FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE
TORRES, GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA,
FRANCISCO UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V.
UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA,
NILO VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO
VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA,
BIENVENIDO VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R.
VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO
VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ,
JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G.
VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX
VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO
VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R.

VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL,
FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS
VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE
YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, respondents.
Conflict of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not

be applied in the forum.—As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based
upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Sec.
685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131 [1979]).
Same; Prescription; A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws.—A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict
of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law. Thus in
Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied
the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription
was intended to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law
even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of
actions.
Same; Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; “Borrowing Statute,”
Explained; One form of “borrowing statutes” provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in
731
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 731
the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.—However,
the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a “borrowing
statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]).
A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel,
Conflicts 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of “borrowing
statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-
153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides: “If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of
action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
Same; Same; Same; Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not
been repealed or amended by the Civil Code.—Section 48 has not been
repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2270 of
said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as
to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws, 104 [7th
ed.]).
Same; Same; Labor Law; The courts of the forum will not enforce any
foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.—In the light of the
1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976. The courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy (Canadian
Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713
[1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
public policy on the protection to labor.
Labor Law; Overseas Contract Workers; Prescription; Article 291 of
the Labor Code applies to money claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those arising from application of foreign laws providing
for greater employee benefits.—Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
provides the prescriptive period for filing “actions to enforce any cause of
action under said law.” On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims
arising from employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases at bench
all arose from the employer-
732
employee relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a

specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement. The contention of
the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period under
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money
claims specifically recoverable under said Code, does not find support in the
plain language of the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in
G.R. No. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims “arising from the
employer’s violation of the employee’s right,” as provided by the Labor
Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; “Speedy
disposition of cases” is a relative term, a flexible concept consistent with
delays and depends upon the circumstances of each case.—It is true that the
constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice. However, as held in Caballero v.
Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), “speedy disposition of cases” is a
relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial”
accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, “speedy disposition of
cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the cases took seven years to be disposed
of in the administrative level there is no violation of the constitutional right
to speedy disposition of cases where the cases are not of the run-of-the-mill
variety, involve a total of 1,767 claimants hired on various dates, with
claims totalling more than US$65 million.—The cases at bench are not of
the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their final disposition in the
administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be said to
be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate
the constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767
claimants. Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first
being on April 3, 1985. The claimants were hired on various dates from
1975 to 1983. They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the
other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalled more than
US$65 million.
733
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 733
Same; Same; Actions; Class Suits; Where the claims are for benefits
granted under the Bahrain law, only the claimants who worked in Bahrain
shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit, excluding those who
worked elsewhere.—A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are
so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12). While all the claims are for
benefits granted under the Bahrain law, many of the claimants worked
outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and
Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment. NLRC and
the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as the first
requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based
on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only
those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class
suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A principle basic to the concept of “class
suit” is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and
protect the interests of the others, such that if it appears that each claimant
is only interested in collecting his own claims and has no concern in
protecting the interests of the others, the most that can be accorded to them
is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint.—It appears that each
claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims. A claimant has no
concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compro-mise settlements of their respective claims. A
principle basic to the concept of “class suit” is that plaintiffs brought on the
record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the others
(Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this
matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a
class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them
under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one
complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is extra-cautious in
allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the condition sine
qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties.—The Court is
extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the exceptions to the
condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable parties. In
an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision
is adverse to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their
self-appointed representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
734
Actions; Forum Shopping; Before Administrative Circular No. 04-94,

the Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) applied only to
petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.—The Anti-
Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a stop
to the practice of some parties of filing multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to
resolve the same issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed
with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled “Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitioners and
Complainants.” The first sentence of the circular expressly states that said
circular applies to and governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. While Administrative Circular No. 04-94
extended the application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts
and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1, 1994.
Jurisdiction; Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The NLRC and the POEA have
no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.—
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical
conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no
jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Complaints for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate
proceeding.—The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty.
Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and appropriate
proceeding.
Same; Attorney’s Liens; A statement of a claim for a charging lien
should be filed with the court or administrative agency which renders and
executes the money judgment.—A statement of a claim for a charging lien
shall be filed with the court or administrative agency which renders and
executes the money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The
lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to
the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The
statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have
been filed with the administrative agency that rendered and executed the
judgment.
Evidence; Conflict of Laws; Administrative Law; An official document
from a foreign government can be admitted in evidence in
735
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 735
proceedings before an administrative body even without observing the rule

provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence.—
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain
dated April 16, 1983. While said document was presented to the POEA
without observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign
government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings before an
administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the said
memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
Same; Offer to Compromise; In civil cases, an offer to settle a claim is
not an admission that anything is due and is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror.—The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by
BRII as contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27,
Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim
is not an admission that anything is due. Said Rule provides: “Offer of
compromise not admissible.—In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not
an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror.” This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of
the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is
great public interest in having the protagonists settle their differences
amicably before these ripen into litigation. Every effort must be taken to
encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The submission of offers and
counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to
bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do,
would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
Contracts; Overseas Contract Workers; Any ambiguity in the overseas-
employment contracts should be interpreted against the parties who drafted
them.—The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more
felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the
employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total computation

(thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation” therein agreed, another part of the same provision
categorically states “that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below
that of the host country regulation and custom.” Any ambiguity in the
overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted against AIBC and
BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-
Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Same; Conflict of Laws; Parties to a contract may select the law by
which it is to be governed, and instead of adopting the entire mass of the
foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a
736
foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of
terms.”—The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In such a
case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the
formalities to be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth (16
Am Jur 2d, 150-161). Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law,
the parties may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall
be deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not become
a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the
contract (Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris,
The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
Same; Same; The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship
to the parties or their transaction.—A basic policy of contract is to protect
the expectation of the parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts,
16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the
applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467
[1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the
parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes, Conflict of Law, 644-647
[1982]). There is no question that the contracts sought to be enforced by
claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
Administrative Law; Due Process; There is no denial of due process
even if the respondents had no opportunity to refute the evidence of the
claimants before the POEA where they had all the opportunity to rebut said
evidence and to present their counter-evidence before the NLRC.—NLRC
noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the
POEA Administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed
submitted for resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA
Administrator in resolving the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no
opportunity to refute said evidence of the claimants before the POEA
Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to
present their counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and
BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence
which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator. Under Article
221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to “use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without
737
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 737
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due

process.”
Same; Same; While technical rules of procedure and evidence do not
apply to the proceedings conducted by administrative agencies, there are
cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to
comply with the due process requirements of the Constitution.—A principle
well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of
procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by
administrative agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency Inc. v.
Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152
SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before
NLRC. Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of
procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal
rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in order to comply
with the due process requirements of the Constitution. These cardinal rules
are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635

(1940).
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law
Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.
QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled “Bienvenido M. Cadalin,

et al., v. Philippine Overseas Employment Admin-istration’s
Administrator, et al.,” was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA
Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-
86-05-460; 2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private
respondents as in default; (ii) declaring the said labor cases
as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown & Root International Inc.
(BRII) to pay the claims of the
738

1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty.

Florante M. de Castro guilty of forum-shopping; and (v)
dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution
dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled “Bienvenido M.

Cadalin, et al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.,” was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of

NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-
85-10-799 and L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the

three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the
Philippines instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied the “three-
hour daily average” formula in the computation of
petitioners’ overtime pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC,
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Resolution
dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled “Asia International

Builders Corporation, et al., v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.” was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of

NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-
85-10-779 and L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims
of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC
insofar as it denied the motions for reconsideration of AIBC
and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified

the decision of the POEA in the four labor cases: (1) awarded
monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor
Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence
on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial
evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the

Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the
739
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 739

Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second
Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division

granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the
consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32,
which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 986, 1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 369-377,
426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First
Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14
with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and

Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728
other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by
filing an “Amended Complaint” with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from
their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo
del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston,
Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and
deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest
of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund; interest on all the
unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe
benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund
of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of
AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of
the complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5,
740

1984 to file its answer.

On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and
BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten
days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their answers
within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The POEA
Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25,
1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their “Compliance and
Manifestation.” On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a “Motion to Strike
Out of the Records” the “Complaint” and the “Compliance and
Manifestation .” On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their
“Rejoinder and Comments,” averring, among other matters, the
failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-
trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC
and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had
defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial
conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the
“Motion to Strike Out of the Records” filed by AIBC but required
the claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out
in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to
comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an “Urgent
Manifestation,” praying that the POEA Administrator direct the
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which
the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day,
Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same money
claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of whom
were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case
No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their “Compliance” with
the Order dated October 2, 1984 and an “Urgent Manifestation,”
praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously
their position papers after which the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to file
its comment on the “Compliance” and “Urgent Manifestation” of
claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for
extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC
that its motion for extension of time was granted.
741
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 741

On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the motions

for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default for failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a “Comment”
praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to
amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from
receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC
seeking the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator.
Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and
praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an “Amended
Complaint and/or Position Paper” dated March 24, 1985, adding
new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night
work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay,
retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA
Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended
complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an “Urgent Motion For
Summary Judgment.” On the same day, the POEA issued an order
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the “Amended
Complaint,” otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their
right to present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis
of complainants’ evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a “Motion to Dismiss as
Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended
Complaint dated March 24, 1985.” Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his
directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the
NLRC, together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of
injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA
Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the period
for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
742

On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to

include additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged
wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a
complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII
with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those subject
of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month, Solomon
Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779)
against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro &
Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of
record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney given
the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice
of the claim to enforce attorney’s lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money
claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants
including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-
555.
On December 12, 1986, NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed
on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed in
the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely—G.R. No. 72132 on
September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on March
18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator
to resolve the issues raised in the motions and oppositions filed in
POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460 and to decide the
labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
78489), questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the
POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer
the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a
resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by
informing AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be
resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was
filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguellas
743
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 743

and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several

NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the
complaint to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request
for the early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The
second was filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista
and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of
labor and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and
BRII of violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA
Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an
answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the
resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC
dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc
denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to
the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period
of 15 days from said date within which to submit their respective
position papers. On June 24, 1987, claimants filed their “Urgent
Motion to Strike Out Answer,” alleging that the answer was filed out
of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their “Supplement to
Urgent Manifestational Motion” to comply with the POEA Order of
June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted
their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their “Ex-
Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records” the position paper of
AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On
September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental
Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its “Reply to
Complainant’s Memorandum.” On October 26, 1988, claimants
submitted their “Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-
Supplemental Motion,” together with 446 individual contracts of
employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and
BRII filed a “Consolidated Reply.”
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his
decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated
744

cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only

324 complainants.
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their “Appeal
Memorandum For Partial Appeal” from the decision of the POEA.
On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal in addition to the “Notice of Appeal” filed earlier on
February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their “Answer to Appeal,”
praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their “Supplement to
Complainants’ Appeal Memorandum,” together with their “newly
discovered evidence” consisting of payroll records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their
“Manifestation,” stating among other matters that there were only
728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their
“Counter-Manifestation,” alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their “Urgent Motion For
Execution” of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds
that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted the
supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve
the labor cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their “Manifestational
Motion,” praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their
monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their
answers within the reglementary period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution,
disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these

consolidated cases is modified to the extent and in accordance with the
following dispositions:
1. The claims of the 94 complainants identified and listed in Annex

“A” hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identified and listed in
Annex “B” hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of
the total amount in US dollars indicated opposite their respective
names;
745
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 745

3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complainants classified

and listed in Annex “C” hereof, who appear to have worked
elsewhere than in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex “B”, including those
for overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are
beyond the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority

under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby
directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon
parties, conduct hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible,
and thereafter submit a written report to this Commission (First Division) of
the proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identified and listed in Annex “D” attached and made
an integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by
the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these
complainants numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the
decision of POEA, subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified and listed in Annex “E” attached and made
an integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the
POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence”
(G.R. No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12-co-

claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-
44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27,
1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991
Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants
represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants
represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the
motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty.

Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty.
De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII
746

(G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and
AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise
agreements for our approval and jointly moved for the dismissal of
their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-parties to the
compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of
claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a
compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the
approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and approved
by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio

Abarquez and 47 co-claimants dated September 2, 1992
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner
Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-petitioners dated September
3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose M.
Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-
516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio
T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-

590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio
Bobongo and 6 co-claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio
A. Evangelista and 4 co-claimants dated March 10, 1993
(G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants
Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants dated March 17, 1993
(G.R.
747
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 747

No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,

Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant
Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-claimants dated May
4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio
Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner
Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-claimants dated June 14, 1993
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo
J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo
C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants dated September 7, 1993
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,

pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante
C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants dated September 8, 1993
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V.
Abella and 27 co-claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B.
Solano and six co-claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
“We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fifty volumes
now comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that
the complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-
appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on
various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all
748

deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several

countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab
Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the
Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard
overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference
to the records would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic
arrangement) with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines. These
overseas employment contracts invariably contained the following relevant
terms and conditions.
PART B—
(1) Employment Position Classification :___________________

(Code) :___________________
(2) Company Employment Status :___________________
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :__________________
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :___________________
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :___________________
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :___________________
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :___________________
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C (1) of this [sic]) :___________________
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as

set out in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and
Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as
maybe deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement,

the Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee’s
service with cause, under this agreement at any time. If the
Employer terminates the services of the Employee under this
Agreement because of the completion or termination, or suspension
of the work on which the Employee’s services were being utilized,
or because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of
such work, or by change
749
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 749

in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be

responsible for his return transportation to his country of origin.
Normally on the most expeditious air route, economy class
accommodation.
xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory

completion of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days
vacation leave with pay. This shall be computed at the basic wage
rate. Fractions of a year’s service will be computed on a pro-rata
basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the employee for every
year of service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the
employee failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same shall be
forfeited at the end of the year in which said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and
payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8
hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be
paid at the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable
only when the laws of the Host Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were
deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his
Amiri Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law
for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August
16, 1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant
to the claims of the complainants-appellants are as follows (italics supplied
only for emphasis):
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour equivalent to his
wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty-five per centum thereof for
hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of fifty per centum thereof for hours
worked during the night which shall be deemed to being from seven o’clock in the
evening until seven o’clock in the morning x x x.”
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full pay.
x x x an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on his weekly
day of rest if circumstances so require and in
750

respect of which an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be
paid to him x x x.”
Art. 81: x x x When conditions of work require the worker to work on any official
holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage.”
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year’s continuous service with his
employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period of not less than 21 days
for each year increased to a period not less than 28 days after five continuous years
of service.”
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in respect of the
proportion of his service in that year.”
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of indefinite duration may
be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other party thirty days’ prior
notice before such termination, in writing, in respect of monthly paid workers and
fifteen days’ notice in respect of other workers. The party terminating a contract
without giving the required notice shall pay to the other party compensation
equivalent to the amount of wages payable to the worker for the period of such
notice or the unexpired portion thereof.”
Art. 111: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his employment
calculated on the basis of fifteen days’ wages for each year of the first three years of
service and of one month’s wages for each year of service thereafter. Such worker
shall be entitled to payment of leaving indemnity upon a quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his service completed within a year.”
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been repatriated to the
Philippines at the time of the filing of these cases (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-
65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First:—Whether or not complainants are entitled to the benefits provided by

Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are
entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a
more favorable treatment of alien employees) bars
751
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 751

complainants from enjoying its benefits.

Second:—Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable
in these cases, whether or not complainants’ claim for the benefits provided
therein have prescribed.
Third:—Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth:—Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as
well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the
requirements of due process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due
process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these
cases were submitted for decision was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root
International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial
evidence;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula
presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by
substantial evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the
complainants-appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these
awards are valid.
Fifth:—Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC

and Brown & Root jointly and severally liable for the judgment awards
despite the alleged finding that the former was the employer of the
complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown &
Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed
construction contractor precludes a finding that Brown & Root is
liable for complainants claims.
Sixth:—Whether or not the POEA Administrator’s failure to hold

respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh:—Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing
the following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;

b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;

c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
752

f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;

g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R’s “A Summary of Employee Benefits”
(Annex “Q” of Amended Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;
m. Attorney’s fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to
recruit of AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof.
Eighth:—Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing

POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof
of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrain’s Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private
Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure. NLRC
agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23,
being more favorable and beneficial to the workers, should form part
of the overseas employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only
to the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the
POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked

elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and
not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
753
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 753

On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason
that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the
subject matter of the action, the claims arising from the Bahrain law,
is not of common or general interest to all the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the
cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure
of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence presented by
AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not supported by
substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the
decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the
hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA
Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the
claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual
employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect
employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the
POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its
local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was
correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the

claims for refund of the SSS premiums and refund of
withholding taxes and the claimants should file their claims
for said refund with the appropriate government agencies;
that claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the

(2) claims which are not based on the overseas employment
contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over
claims for moral and exemplary damages and nonetheless,
the basis for granting said damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of their contract may be allowed if filed within the
three-year prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely
repatriated prior to the expiration of their overseas contract
was
754

not established; and

(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for the suspension or cancellation of the AIBC’s
recruitment license and the cancellation of the accreditation
of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case
No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that
the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No.
(L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-
460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in POEA
Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass
upon the same claims twice.
G.R. No. 104776

Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on
the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their
right to a speedy disposition of their cases as guaranteed by
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to file their

answers in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the filing of
the original complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in
total disregard of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have
declared AIBC and BRII in default and should have
rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings
and evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) that NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding
that the labor cases filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be
considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten
years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have
dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by
Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
755
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 755

AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776,

argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the
disposition of the labor cases, considering the great
difficulty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500
claimants, the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the
addition of hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it
was impossible to prepare the answers within the ten-day
period provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the motion
to declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19, 1987, said
party had already filed its answer, and that considering the
staggering amount of the claims (more than
US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by
the parties, the ten-day rule to answer was not fair and
reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC’s finding that there
was no common or general interest in the subject matter of
the controversy—which was the applicability of the Amiri

Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied,
some being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired
portion of the contracts while others being for pure money
claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar
only to himself and depending upon the particular
circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the claims is that
prescribed by Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten
years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460 should be dismissed, this being a
private quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp.
292-305).
Attorney’s Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to
strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII
dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants who
entered into the compromise agreements subject of said
manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante
M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said
756

agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less than
the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected
additional attorney’s fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to
receive; and that the consent of the claimants to the compromise
agreements and quitclaims were procured by fraud (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated November 23,
1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint
Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a “Notice and
Claim to Enforce Attorney’s Lien,” alleging that the claimants who
entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the
assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement

with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del
Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of
court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this
Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered into the
compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when
in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges
against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the
voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14

The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for
certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period under the
Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the claimant’s
formula based on an average overtime pay of three hours a day
(Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII
itself during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their
money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated
757
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 757

April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-
22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in
G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of
the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on
the method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed
that they were not bound by what appeared therein, because such
memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain official and
there was no showing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister
of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was

discussed in the course of the negotiation for the amicable settlement
of the dispute and any offer made by a party therein could not be
used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32

In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the employment
contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime and leave
indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence admitted in
contravention of petitioners’ constitutional right to due process; and
(3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for the
683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed for lack of proof by
the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they allege that
assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable,
NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year prescription
provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32

All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although
they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the
prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten
years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three
758

years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the

Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that
the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years,
instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the
prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that Article

291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
“These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those
arising from the employer’s violation of the employee’s right as provided by
the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the
workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the workers’
contracts of employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to
these provisions which specifically provide for the increase of the workers’
rate. It was only after June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders
brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain for this same claim, when
respondent AIBC’s contracts have undergone amend-ments in Bahrain for
the new hires/renewals (Respondent’s Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this
instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
‘Article 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years from the time
the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;’
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents

shall prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims
were filed within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the
infirmity of being prescribed” (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the

prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
759
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 759

“The Labor Code provides that ‘all money claims arising from employer-
employee relations x x x shall be filed within three years from the time the
cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred’ (Art. 291,
Labor Code, as amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the
one applied here and which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation
of each individual complainant, considering the fact that the case is having
(sic) filed in this country. We do not agree with the POEA Administrator
that this three-year prescriptive period applies only to money claims
specifically recoverable under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives
no such indication. Likewise, We can not consider complainants’ cause/s of
action to have accrued from a violation of their employment contracts.
There was no violation; the claims arise from the benefits of the law of the
country where they worked” (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as

provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that
the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e.,
whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute of
limitation as “substantive” or “procedural.” NLRC cited the decision
in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the Panama Labor
Code in a case filed in the State of New York for claims arising from
said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under the
Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian
Law was procedural as it was not “specifically intended to be
substantive,” hence, the prescriptive period provided in the law of
the forum should apply. The Court observed:
“. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a

foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose
was to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country
concerned, of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains, we think
that as a yardstick for determining whether that was the purpose this test is
the most satisfactory one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity
of examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different
foreign legal systems . . .”
The Court further noted:
760

xxx xxx xxx

“Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian
period of limitation in question was specifically aimed against the particular
rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a
statute having broad objectives, viz: ‘The present Code regulates the
relations between capital and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice,
so that, without injuring any of the parties, there may be guaranteed for
labor the necessary conditions for a normal life and to capital an equitable
return to its investment.’ In pursuance of these objectives the Code gives
laborers various rights against their employers. Article 623 establishes the
period of limitation for all such rights, except certain ones which are
enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to the impact of
Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced here, as
distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is also applicable.
Were we confronted with the question of whether the limitation period of
Article 621 (which carves out particular rights to be governed by a shorter
limitation period) is to be regarded as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural’ under the
rule of ‘specifity’ we might have a different case; but here on the surface of
things we appear to be dealing with a ‘broad,’ and not a ‘specific,’ statute of
limitations” (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC,
refers only to claims “arising from the employer’s violation of the
employee’s right as provided by the Labor Code.” They assert that
their claims are based on the violation of their employment
contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided by
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R. Nos.
104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there
is in force in the Philippines a “borrowing law,” which is Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law
exists, it takes precedence over the common-law conflicts rule (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or
761
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 761

a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.

Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
“A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable

after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract” (G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the

forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based
upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 1 31 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of
Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the
American court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription of
actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum
has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of
treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). A “borrowing
statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of
limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law (Siegel,
Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of “borrowing
statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the
place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even
though the local statute has not run against it (Goodrich and Scoles,
Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil
Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the
action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
762

Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of

the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48
of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws,
104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in
this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum’s public policy (Canadian Northern Railway
Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To
enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the
public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987
Constitution emphasized that:
“The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national

development” (Sec. 10).
“The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare” (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987

Constitution provides:
“Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.”
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the

Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive period
governing the filing of the claims is three years, as provided by the
Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
763
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 763

“The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.”
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is

Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent
part provides:
“Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations

accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
x x x.”
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.

Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the
claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at
bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation
of overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining agreements
and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: “That is precisely why petitioners did not
make any reference as to the computation for overtime work under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead
insisted that work computation provided in the collective bargaining
agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for pay
differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between
the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art.
1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern.”
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as
amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
“Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise
such action shall be forever barred, x x x.”
The Court further explained:
“The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA
No. 444 as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials
764

for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on a collective
bargaining agreement or any other contract. In the instant case, the claim for
overtime compensation is not so much because of Commonwealth Act No.
444, as amended but because the claim is a demandable right of the
employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective bargaining
agreement.”
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive

period for filing “actions to enforce any cause of action under said
law.” On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing “money claims
arising from employer-employee relations.” The claims in the cases
at bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is
broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law or from the
collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of the
provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. Nos.
104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims “arising from the
employer’s violation of the employee’s right,” as provided by the
Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776

A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June 6,
1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30, 1989, a
clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the case; and (2)
that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared
AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their
cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
765
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 765

It is true that the constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of

cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasijudicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153
(1987), “speedy disposition of cases” is a relative term. Just like the
constitutional guarantee of “speedy trial” accorded to the accused in
all criminal proceedings, “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights
nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the right to a “speedy
disposition of cases” has been violated, thus:
“In the determination of whether or not the right to a ‘speedy trial’ has been
violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or
failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may
also be considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person
officially charged with the administration of justice has violated the speedy
disposition of cases.”
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991),

we held:
“It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justified motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.”
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served
with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking
that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their
answers within the ten-day period provided in
766

Section 1, Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the

POEA. At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII
to strike out of the records the amended complaint and the
“Compliance” of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them
to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such
that their final disposition in the administrative level after seven
years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of
1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several
amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983.
They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other
groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more than
US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
“1. Unexpired portion of contract;

2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic
pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security
System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of
Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root’s “A Summary of
Employees Benefits consisting of 43 pages (Annex “Q” of
Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney’s fees of at least ten percent of amounts;

14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license
to recruit of AIBC and issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not
excluding reportorial requirements thereof” (NLRC
Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
767
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 767

Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient definiteness

and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with
the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When claimants filed
their “Compliance and Manifestation,” AIBC moved to strike out
the complaint from the records for failure of claimants to submit a
proper bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the
motion to strike out the complaint, he ordered the claimants “to
correct the deficiencies” pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the
complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700
claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle
East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA
Administrator were interrupted several times by the various appeals,
first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases
were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA
Cases Nos. L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was
filed on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in
exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never
been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were consolidated
with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in
terminating the proceedings, thus:
“These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards
resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing
the truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical
reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these cases a
litigation of emotion. The intransigence of parties and counsel is

remarkable. As late as last month, this Commission made a last and final
attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties (this Commission issued a
special order directing respondent Brown & Root’s resident agent/s to
appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this failed” (Rollo, p.
58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in

the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which
complained:
768

“It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these
consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on the
one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two
lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante
De Castro, have yet to settle the right of representation, each one
persistently claiming to appear in behalf of most of the complainants. As a
result, there are two appeals by the complainants. Attempts by this
Commission to resolve counsels’ conflicting claims of their respective
authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by these
two counsels are reflected in their pleadings. In the charges and
countercharges of falsification of documents and signatures, and in the
disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large
extent, abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the
presentation of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable
settlement. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel,
unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the com-plainants, with the
proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more than US$100 million, the
aggregate of the claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that
their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to throw all caution to the
wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and evidence” (Rollo,
pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the

listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the two
lawyers. As noted by NLRC, “the problem created by this situation
is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the parties and
the public respondents would not know which claim of which
petitioner was dismissed and which was not.”
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be

consolidated in a “class suit” because “all the named complainants
have similar money claims and similar rights sought irrespective of
whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu
Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East” (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain
law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the
claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under
769
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 769

different terms and conditions of employment.

NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance
that inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present
(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State
of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in Bahrain
shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the
nature of the claims is the same (for employee’s benefits), there is no
common question of law or fact. While some claims are based on
the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked in
that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is
interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other
employees of defendants. The named claimants have a special or
particular interest in specific benefits completely different from the
benefits in which the other named claimants and those included as
members of a “class” are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil.
473 [1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in
collecting his own claims. A claimant has no concern in protecting
the interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that
hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have
entered into separate compromise settlements of their respective
claims. A principle basic to the concept of “class suit” is that
plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the
interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations,
101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in
Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial

proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them under the Rules
of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they
are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the
joinder of all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem
if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem
arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the others
who were impleaded by their self-appointed representatives, would
surely claim denial of due process.
770

C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De
Castro guilty of “forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,
falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities” and his
appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo,
pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is
intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with the
result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same issues.
Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled “Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of
Petitioners and Complainants.” The first sentence of the circular
expressly states that said circular applies to and governs the filing of
petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the
application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and
administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1,
1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for
unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA
have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical conduct of
lawyers.
Attorney’s Lien
The “Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney’s Lien” dated December
14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his
claim for attorney’s fees for legal services rendered in favor of the
claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810; 1525).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the
court or administrative agency which renders and executes the
money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer
shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients and to
the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The
statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo
should have been filed with the administrative
771
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 771

agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante
De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and
appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14

Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not
accepting their formula of “Three Hours Average Daily Overtime”
in computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII
itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the
settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel to
disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of
Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
“After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area
Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the
compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of vacation
leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e., minutes of the
meetings between the Representative of the employees and the management
of the Company, the complaint filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where

they have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract
executed between one of the employees and the company through its agent
in (sic) Philippines, Asia International Builders Corporation where it has
been provided for 48 hours of work per week and an annual leave of 12 days
and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35

months for the Philippino (sic) employees x x x.
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is
US$2.69 x x x.
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public
holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation
forthe difference of the wages of the overtime done for each
Philipino
772

(sic) employee x x x” (Rollo, p. 22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not
prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain
Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the Bahrain
Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3) that the
offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an amicable
settlement of the claims and therefore it was not admissible in
evidence to prove that anything is due to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without
observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign
government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989 Revised
Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in proceedings
before an administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of
the said memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity
and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27,
Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to settle a

claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
“Offer of compromise not admissible.—In civil cases, an offer of

compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in
evidence against the offeror.”
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of

the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy.
There is great public interest in having the protagonists settle their
differences amicably before these ripen into litigation. Every effort
must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The
submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a
step in the right direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as what
claimants would make this Court do, would defeat the salutary
purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32

A NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides
for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment
contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that
773
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 773

“where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract.” It quoted with
approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that “x x x in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the provisions
of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be
resolved in favor of labor” (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and
whimsically when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment
contracts, which became the law of the parties. They contend that
the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies
only to provisions of a Philippine law in relation to contracts
executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by
AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host
country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms and
conditions more favorable than those stipulated therein. It was

stipulated in said contracts that:
“The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not
engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with
anyone other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and
attention and his best energies, and abilities to the performance of such
duties as may be assigned to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times
be subject to the direction and control of the Employer; and that the benefits
provided to Employee hereunder are substituted for and in lieu of all other
benefits provided by any applicable law, provided of course, that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation or custom, it being understood that should applicable laws
establish that fringe benefits, or other such benefits additional to the
compensation herein agreed cannot be waived. Employee agrees that such
compensation will be adjusted downward so that the total compensation
hereunder, plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to the
compensation herein agreed” (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more

felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the compensation to
the employee may be “adjusted downward so that the total
computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable benefits shall be
equivalent to the compensation” therein agreed, another part of the
same provision categorically states “that total
774

remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host country
regulation and custom.”
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93
SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
“The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not

favor the party who caused the obscurity.”
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion

where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of
the employment contract and the employees merely “take it or leave

it.” The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party
against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of
necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen’s Insurance
Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-
employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In
such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the
relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to enter
into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be
deemed incorporated into their contract “as a set of terms.” By such
reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The
said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual
terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private International
Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 702-703,
[8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the
parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation
is protected by giving effect to the parties’ own choice of the
775
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 775

applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465,

467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some
relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes,
Conflict of Law, 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were rendered
in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117
SCRA 486 (1982), the “Employment Agreement,” between Norse
Management Co. and the late husband of the private respondent,
expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the

employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not
due to his own misconduct, “compensation shall be paid to
employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or
the Worker’s Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater.” Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the
vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at the
time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we applied
said foreign law in preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by
AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench. The
issue in that case was whether the amount of the death compensation
of a Filipino seaman should be determined under the shipboard
employment contract executed in the Philippines or the Hongkong
law. Holding that the shipboard employment contract was
controlling, the Court differentiated said case from Norse
Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express
stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign law would be
applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their
right to due process when said administrative agency granted
Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in Annex
B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution of the
POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding that the
POEA Administrator failed to consider the
776

evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of

the POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and
that some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII
(Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to
the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further
delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the
validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII
complain of as being irregular and a “reversible error.”
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence

submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have
been “unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not disclosed to
the adverse parties” (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were
submitted to the POEA Administrator by the claimants after the
cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were taken
cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the cases.
While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of
the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the
opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their counter-
evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII
themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence
which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is
enjoined to “use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.”
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis
of the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA
Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not
expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that
would only prolong the already protracted legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for the reception
of evidence, where the same can be readily determined from the
uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990];
Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission,
777
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 777

127 SCRA 463 [1984]).

C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for
683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated September
2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA Administrator
“for lack of proof” and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the
same Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC itself as
not “supported by evidence” (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, which empowers it “[to] conduct investigation for
the determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its
jurisdiction, x x x.”
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority
under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had
already been dismissed because such provision contemplates only
situations where there is still a question or controversy to be
resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the
technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the
proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986];
Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]).
This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of
procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are
cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in
order to comply with the due process requirements of the
Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
VIII
The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
778

SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan,

JJ., concur.
ANNEX A
LIST OF CLAIMANTS WHO SIGNED QUITCLAIMS
ANNEX A
Bienvenido Cadalin Ardon Ello
Antonio Acupan Josefino R. Enano
Benjamin Alejandre Rolando E. Espiritu
Wilfredo Aligada Patricio L. Garcia, Jr.
Robert Batica Felino M. Jocson
Enrico Belen Eduardo S. Kolimlim
Guillermo Cabeza Emmanuel C. Labella
Rodolfo Cagatan Ernesto S. Lising
Francisco De Guzman Edilberto G. Magat
Ignacio De Vera Victoriano L. Matilla
Ernesto De la Cruz Renato V. Morada
Reynaldo Dizon Ildefonso C. Munoz
Ricardo Ebrada Herbert G. Ng
Antonio Ejercito Reynado Oczon
Eduardo Espiritu Romeo Orial
Ernesto Espiritu Ricardo Paguio
Rodolfo Espiritu Emilio Pakingan
Oligario Francisco Ernesto S. Pangan
Antonio Jocson Albert L. Quinto
Alejandro Olorino Romulo M. Reyes
Efren Lirio Leonilo Tiposo
Noel Martinez Manuel P. Villanueva
Francis Mediodia Arnaldo J. Alonzo
Luciano Melendez Pastor M. Aquino
Reymundo Milay Ramon Castro
Jose Pancho Graciano Isla
Modesto Pin Pin Renato Matilla
Gaudencio Retana Ricardo B. Morada
Rodelio Rieta, Jr. Pacifico D. Navarro
Jose Robleza Eugenio A. Remonquillo
ANNEX A
Nemeriano San Mateo Felix Barcena
Juanito Santos Eliseo Fajardo
Paquito Solanto Sergio S. Santiago
Conrado Solis, Jr. Antonio R. Rodriguez
Menandrano Temprosa Luis Val B. Ronquillo
779
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 779

Maximiano Torres Teodorico C. Del Rosario

Francisco Trias Joselito C. Solante
Delfin Victoria Ricardo C. Dayrit
Gilbert Victoria Antonio P. Hilario
Domingo Villahermosa Edgardo O. Salonga
Rogelio Villanueva Dante C. Aceres
Jose M. Aban Reynaldo S. Acojido
Amorsolo S. Anading Esidro M. Aquino
Alfredo S. Balogo Rosendo M. Aquino
Ramon T. Barboza Rodolfo D. Arevalo
Felix M. Bobier Rexy De Leon Ascuncion
Jose H. Castillo Basilio Buenaventura
Emmanuel H. Castillo Alexander Bustamante
Remar R. Castrojerez Virgilio V. Butiong, Jr.
Romeo O. Cecilio Delfin Caballero
Bayani M. Dayrit Danilo M. Castro
Felizardo S. Delos Santos Francisco O. Corvera
Nestor N. Estava Edgardo N. Dayacap
Rolando M. Garcia Napoleon S. De Luna
Angel D. Guda Benjamin E. Doza
Henry L. Jacob Renato A. Eduarte
Dante A. Matreo Clyde C. Estuye

Renato S. Melo Buenaventura M. Francisco
Resurrecion D. Nazareno Rogelio D. Guanio
Jaime C. Pollos Arnel L. Jacob
Domingo Pondales Renato S. Lising
Eugenio Ramirez Wilfredo S. Lising
Lucien M. Respall Rogelio S. Lopena
Alvin C. Reyes Bernardito G. Loreja
Rizalina R. Reyes Ignacio E. Munoz
Quirino Ronquillo Romeo C. Quintos
Avelino M. Roque Willafredo Dayrit Raymundo
Pedro L. Salgatar Virgilio L. Rosario
Rodolfo T. Sultan Joselito Santiago
Benedicto E. Torres Ernesto G. Sta Maria
Sergio A. Ursolino Gavino U. Tuazon
Rogelio R. Valdez Elito S. Villanueva
Dionisio Bobongo Lamberto Q. Alcantara
Crisenciano Miranda Arturo P. Apilado
Ildefonso C. Molina Turiano V. Concepcion
Gorgonio C. Parala Domingo V. Dela Cruz
Virgilio Ricaza Eduardo R. Enguancho
Palconeri D. Banaag Melanio R. Esteron
Bayani S. Bracamante Santiago N. Galoso
780

Onofre De Rama Joveniano Hilado

Jose C. Melanes Eduardo Hipolito
Romeo I. Patag Romeo M. Javier
Valerio A. Evangelista Valentino S. Jocson
Gilbert E. Ebrada Jose B. Lacson

Juanito P. Villarino Armando M. Magsino
Aristeo M. Bicol Avelino O. Nuqui
Quiterio R. Agudo Delmar F. Pineda
Marianito J. Alcantara Federico T. Quiman
Jose Arevalo Alberto M. Redaza
Ramon A. Arevalo Renosa Ronquillo
Jesus Baya Rodolfo Ronquillo
Guillermo Buenconsejo Antonio T. Valderama
Teresito A. Constantino Ramon Valderama
Eduardo A. Diaz Benigno N. Melendez
Emigdio Abarquez Claudio A. Modesto
Herbert Ayo Solomon Reyes
Mario Bataclan Isaias Talactac
Ricardo Ordonez William G. Taruc
Bernardino Robillos Oscar C. Calderon
Francisco Villaflores Pacifico P. Campano
Angel Villarba Eulalio G. Arguelles
Honesto Jardiniano Ben G. Belir
Juan Y. Olindo Cornelio L. Castillo
Hernani T. Victoriano Valeriano B. Francisco
Ubed B. Ello, Sr. Jaime L. Relosa
Ernesto V. Macaraig Alex Q. Villahermosa
Espiritu A. Munoz, Sr. Vivencio V. Abello, Jr.
Rodrigo E. Ocampo Renato C. Corcuera
Rodolfo V. Ramirez Emiliano B. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Ceferino Batitis Esteban B. Jose, Jr.
Augusto R. Bondoc Ricardo B. Martinez
Jaime C. Catli Bienvenido Vergara
Gerardo B. Limuaco, Jr. Pedro G. Cagatan
Macario S. Magsino Francisco Apolinario
Domingo B. Solano Miguel Abestano
Ricardo De Rama Prudencio Araullo
Arturo V. Araullo
Petitions dismissed.
Notes.—Any ambiguity in a contract whose terms are susceptible

of different interpretations must be read against the party who
drafted it. (Nacu vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 237
781
VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 781

Verdejo vs. Court of Appeals
[1994])
The governing principle is that parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions
dealing with matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law
relating to labor and employment is clearly such an area and parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from
the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with
each other. (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation vs. Ople,
190 SCRA 90 [1990])
——o0o——
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4/19/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 238

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 721

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.

722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. Nos. 105029-32. December 5, 1994.*

ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and

BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 723

ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR,

724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 725

PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L.

A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ,

726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN, GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO

HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN,

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 727

JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA,

ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE,

728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO

FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V.

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 729

DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O.

BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE

730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO

VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R.

Conflict of Laws; As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not

VOL. 238, DECEMBER 5, 1994 731