COMFPOLRepoer DelaCruz
COMFPOLRepoer DelaCruz
COMFPOLRepoer DelaCruz
There are various contributors with different perspectives and views on how to evaluate Japan’s
diplomatic behavior or what future developments to expect.
1. Common theme: Japan’s minimalist strategy in dealing or “Coping “ with foreign policy
issues. Japan has pursued a low-risk strategy throughout the postwar years. Japan’s
foreign policy has been to cope effectively with situations created by other countries.
Blaker mentioned that the strategy term is called “Coping”. However, the strategy was
questioned about its effectiveness and success in coping foreign policy issues.
2. Second theme: The primary importance of the American connection in Japanese foreign
policy. Japan’s economic challenge may not fully appreciate the degree to which
Japanese decision makers and the public at large, view their nation’s foreign policy
through the prism of its relationship with the United States. This was strikingly illustrated
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. For Japan, the Gulf conflict demonstrated clearly how
much more difficult managing the U.S. relationship had become the complex post-Cold
War international environment.
3. Third theme: The challenge to Japanese foreign policy posed by the combination of
Japan’s rise to economic superpower status and the end of the Cold War. Some will
argue that Japan will be able to break out its traditional diplomatic mold and design a
new foreign policy despite these changes in world politics and the international
economy. Others argue that Japan is already moving toward a new, more active role in
international affairs. Yasutomo and Ueki, emphasize multilateral settings as having
significant potential for Japan to play a major role worldwide.
Although, there is much written about Japanese foreign policy processes, there is relatively little
about why Japan does what it does in its foreign relations; what are the intentions, principles,
motives, ideas, and concepts behind Japan’s pursuit of its national interests.
However, based on the case studies of the protracted United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference (1973-1980) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), Blaker mentioned that Japan’s
coping strategy has been unsuccessful. Although, the central goal of the “coping” strategy is
freedom from foreign criticisms, there were heavy criticisms on Japan in these two cases; on
how much Tokyo officials misread the international environment, the degree of American
decline and Japanese independence in new global circumstances, and the extent of foreign
expectations.
Japan - US Relations
John Campbell raises another perspective that challenged the idea of Blaker’s. According to
Campbell, much of the friction in U.S. - Japanese relations and much of the criticisms leveled
against Japan are part of a highly ritualized scenario of accusation, negotiation, threats and
resolution that constitute the U.S. - Japanese relations “game”.
The U.S. - Japanese relations at the government-to-government level has been remarkably
strong and stable. With deepened economic interdependence; there has been a high degree of
cooperation or parallelism in the two countries’ policies towards third countries wherein a pattern
of close bilateral cooperation and coordination on security issues has been firmly established.
Campbell contends this stability results from two governments’ commitment to handling the bulk
of their affairs through a set of games with fairly well-defined rules. These games emerged after
major crises that threatened the relationship.
- The crises in the political sphere emerged in the early 1950’s but since then Japan
deferred to the United States on virtually all diplomatic issues.
- In the military field, since the security treaty crisis of 1960, the US and Japan have
argued each year about how much Japan would undertake to raise its “burden-sharing”
effort.
- In trade, the crisis produced by the dispute over Japanese textile exports led to an
American-demand and Japanese-response ritual which in subsequent years invariably
has produced a “solution” with Japanese concessions insufficient to resolve fundamental
problems but sufficient to allow the game itself to continue.
In each area, political, military, and economic, the United States has been the side to initiate the
interaction, set the agenda by specifying the problem or issue and proposing a solution, and win
in the sense that Japan ends up ascending at least partially to American demands.
From Japan’s perspective, this is what diplomatic minimalism is all about: defining its goals by
the least concessions required to avoid provoking a crisis in its relations with the United States.
The third chapter, diplomatic style treats an institution rarely discussed where issues of postwar
Japanese foreign policy are concerned.
On the other hand, David Titus’ analysis offers an illuminating perspective on the century-long
struggle in Japan to define a collective Japanese identity that can resolve the tension between
the pull of universality and the tug of cultural uniqueness and a preoccupation with that makes
Japan different.
- Titus points out, despite their drastically reduced roles in Japanese policy compared to
what they had been from 1868 to 1945, the emperor and the members of the imperial
family have been more active in international affairs since the Allied Occupation ended in
1952, than at any other time in Japanese history.
- Since 1868, the imperial institution has facilitated Japan’s “internalization” by putting the
imprimatur of this most Japanese of Japanese institutions on the importation of the
world’s cultural and material resources. The emperor faces the world;l as a symbol of the
unity of his people, he reflects as the faces of the Japanese. Thus, the emperor is in a
unique position to connect the outside world to the Japanese people, and his activities
are managed by the government and the palace to maintain Japan as a unique
community within the world. However, the 1990 enthronement ceremony highlighted the
problems of Japan in reconciling its sense of communal self and a unique culture with a
more universal notion of civilization.
- Analysis by Nathaniel Thayer looks at the issue of political leadership in the conduct of
Japanese foreign policy. One of the most strongly entrenched images of Japanese
policy making is the image of a “leaderless” process.
Bureaucratic dominance, consensus building, the absence of charismatic
leaders, and a constitutional structure limiting the prime minister’s authority and
autonomy are widely regarded as producing a system marked by the absence of strong
political leaders.
- However, at critical moments in postwar Japanese foreign foreign policy, political leaders
have been the driving force behind major policy decisions.
Examples: Yoshida Shigeru’s push for a security treaty with the United States;
Hatoyama Ichiro’s initiative to normalize relations with the Soviet Union; Sato Eisaku’s
determination to realize the reversion of Okinawa; Tanaka Kakuei’s move to establish
formal diplomatic relations with mainland China; and Nakasone Yashurio’s efforts to
carve a new security policy.
An analysis by T.J. Pempel underscores the importance of relating changes in economic foreign
policy to changes in the structure of domestic political power. There is a relative shift of power
from the central bureaucracy to politicians and big businesses. Small business interests and
farmers are less significant than before, while the white-collar and blue-collar workforce wield
more influence more influence than in earlier years.
Lastly, Frances Rosenbluth examines Japan’s political handing of the issue of yen appreciation.
In particular, she discusses how the political leadership sought to balance demands from the
international community to strengthen the yen against demands from small and medium sized
businesses to protect them from the adverse consequences of yen appreciation.
Despite the LDPs heavy dependence on these companies for electoral support, the LDP did
very little to assist this sector. The LDP leadership only acted according to uts view of what was
necessary to serve the collective interests of LDP Diet members. Rosenbluth notes that LDP
leaders are moving away from electoral dependence on the country’s economically
noncompetitive sectors and toward resilience on groups having a stake in policies of freer trade.
● In her analysis, any discussion of Japanese foreign policy which neglects domestic
policies will fail to capture the dynamics of the policy process.
● Timothy Curran discusses the role of Japanese multinational corporations in U.S.
Japanese relations and addresses non-governmental actors in Japan’s external
relations. It is important because it focuses on the globalizing Japanese company,which
is the engine of Japan’s integration into the world economy.
- Japanese multinational firms in the United States are moving toward establishing
fully integrated businesses including product design, value engineering, and
other value-added aspects of the manufacturing process.
- The pattern of growth of Japanese multinational corporations will likely create
powerful a constituencies in the United States, that will work in favor of a strong
and stable U.S. - Japanese relationship.
- Growing ties between the Japanese U.S.- based multinationals and their local
American suppliers will open up the much-criticized keiretsu which is considered
the “ iron triangles” of bureaucrats, LDP politicians, and local businessmen that
often act as an effective nontariff barrier.
Japan and the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences (1973-1980)
Omnidirectional Diplomacy
● Japan’s “defenseless from every side” diplomatic approach was the solution to Japan’s
weak position in the world. It was essentially a policy of maintaining political neutrality in
foreign affairs while expanding economic relations wherever possible.
● Okita Saburo, renowned economist and later foreign minister, wrote that Japan must
avoid becoming a danger to any other country in the world and “being friends with
everyone” may be justified as Japan’s basic principle of Japan’s diplomacy in the present
and years to come.
● The collapse of socialist regimes in 1990 (at the end of the Cold War) seemed to
bolster Japan’s prospect for unshackling itself from its narrow diplomacy of the
past to become a major world actor. At this extraordinary juncture, it seemed
Japan might be able to win recognition as a leading global player, enhance its
prestige, gain greater independence, and separate politics from economics at last
by elevating economics above military strength without having to deal seriously
with defense/security limits upon its diplomacy.
● “Motivated Diplomacy’ was Japan’s formula to deal with the emerging post-Cold
War order. Based on the premise that cooperation now replaced missiles and
tanks as tools for achieving order and that the role of military might is diminishing,
Prime Minister Miyazawa declared it Japan’s “change and duty” to marshall its
economic and technological strength, along with its store of experience and its
conceptual ability” in facing the challenges of the new order.
● Given this pre-crisis mentality, Japanese leaders would not be prepared for the sort of
operational role the crisis in the Gulf would require from Japan. The 1991 Persian Gulf
crisis was to shatter any illusions of an early transition to a new post-Cold War
international order.
● Whatever the opportunity of the Japanese leadership might have had in the Persian Gulf
case to seize the moment, to assert Japan’s stated global interests and to demonstrate
its heavy stake in the Middle East stability and the depth of commitment to the US
alliance, these were all lost at the outset.
● Since Japan’s original interest in the Gulf crisis had been limited, the Japanese
leadership in Tokyo seemed to be open to advice and the Bush Administration was even
more prepared to provide it.
● From the outset, Tokyo seemed bereft of ideas, beyond “checkbook diplomacy” that
would satisfy American and other foreign critics. But Japan’s ‘coping’ strategy was
unsuccessful because Tokyo misread the international environment, the degree of
American decline and Japanese independence in new global circumstances and the
extent of foreign expectations of Japan.
● When the Gulf War erupted (Japan imported only 5.8% oil from Iraq and 5.9%
from Kuwait), Japan readily joined the US in imposing economic sanctions.
● However there had been intense lobbying among the US public, urging Japan to
take assertive action - recommendations for Japan to send minesweepers, use
Japan’s airlift capabilities, transport food and supplies for the US-led multinational
force, expanding cooperation on Japan’s sealane defense & raising the sums
paid to support American military forces in Japan.
● Bush also made phone calls personally appealing to Japanese officials - the
intensive arm twisting transformed Japan’s response into what was a test of
Japan’s commitment to the US-Japanese alliance.
● Japan grappled with the dilemma: non-participation was not even an option - it
had to contribute as an economic and not military superpower - Japan should
play its role in a ‘world division of labor’; Japan had to something but it was not
clear what it should be - there would be criticism if contribution would only be in
the form of economic sanctions but military contribution would also be ruled out.
● In the end, Japan’s package: 100 medical volunteers, 2 ships and 2 planes to
provide supplies to allied forces and equipment to guard the troops against heat;
if US was disappointed w/ the package, carrying out of the pledges was even
more disappointing - only 17 doctors volunteered and Japan’s follow through on
delivery of promised equipment became snarled in bureaucratic tangle.
● In both UNCLOS and Persian Gulf crisis, Japan had neither an ocean policy nor
a Middle East policy - it may have guarded its own interest but fail;ed to project
its interests in a wider multilateral or military/security context.
Discussion
● In the Law of the sea and Persian Gulf episodes, Japan- the perpetual outsider, the
latecomer who joins the international structures already in place-was offered two
chances to share in historic regime building processes at the global level.
● Japan seems to lack the will to execute its professed diplomatic goals. Japan will never
risk its economic interests or the lives of its citizens on behalf of some principle or cause,
another country or ally in need, or the international community.
● In the Persian Gulf crisis, Tokyo failed to grasp the Bush administration’s perception of
the crisis as a test to the American alliance structure’s ability to handle a major threat
and of allied willingness to respond positively. In both cases, Japan’s first response
reflected its preoccupation with its own narrow economic interests. Bureaucratic
insighting and miscalculation seriously impaired the process of adjusting Japan’s
responses.
● In the end, Japan did not jeopardize its own interests but acted methodically,
pragmatically and when necessary, opportunistically to secure and protect those
interests. Rejecting the military option and restricting both financing and manpower
support in the Gulf case illustrate vividly the paramount significance Japan attaches to
certain basic national interests. In the Persian Gulf example, Japan’s response has not
been based on Iraq’s act of aggression in annexing Kuwait, nor did Japan’s approach
reflect moral outrage over Saddam Hussein’s actions, no matter what the outcome,
Japan’s task would be to place priority on setting up a crisis management organization.
Some Costs of Japan’s Minimalist Diplomacy
● Unappreciated Efforts. Japan rarely associates its own success with that of the
conference, the alliance, or the organization. Japan’s commitment to carrying out its
goals is lukewarm, even to the point of jeopardizing the success of larger endeavors to
which its own success is linked.
● Communication Static. Without articulating foreign policy objectives clearly, it squanders
energy just to gauge what others want it to want or not want. In seeking to clarify and
confirm others’ policies, motives, and meanings, Japan unduly complicates its
diplomacy.
● Distrust and Resentment. J apan’s half hearted effort to execute an externally prescribed
agenda attracts the criticisms it wishes to avoid. Japanese officials often seek
recognition for their contribution toward some development assistance program,
multilateral agency, or issue (ex: whaling, refugees, trade with South Africa) even though
that ‘contribution’ comes from a reluctant Japan kicking and screaming every effort of the
way. But when the efforts are unacknowledged or unappreciated, Japan turns resentful.
In the case of the Persian Gulf, one is likely to hear: “We made great efforts to do
everything in the United States wanted, but we can never do enough to satisfy them”
● hat passes as Japan’s domestic debate on
Alice in Wonderland Domestic Debate. W
foreign policy reinforces these misconceptions in that key policy issues are radically
altered when discussed in Japan’s political arena. As in past controversies, the Gulf
crisis bore dispute along peripheral factional, opposition, bureaucratic, and ideological
battle lines (ex: whether the Soviet “threat” to Japan is “indirect” or “direct”, What “1% of
GNP” for defense really means, the third of the “Non Nuclear Principles”, distinguishing
“offensive” from “defensive” weaponry, defining “alliance” with the United States).
● Japan’s Future Left to Others. Japan lacks reciprocity in monitoring the monitors which
then lets control over its own future slip. There remains to be a gap between Japan’s
contributions and their influence in defense, foreign aid, and in multilateral organizations.
Japan has allowed the game, the rules, and the scoring to be handled by others. Japan
had neither an ocean policy nor a Middle East policy - Japan guarded its own interests
but was unable to express its interests in a multilateral or military/security context.