Rule 65

2013

The decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Since, the Office of the Ombudsman’s Decision
exonerating respondents from the administrative charges had resolved all issues raised by petitioner, it is
in a proper exercise of discretion when it found the evidence adduced by petitioner as wanting to support
the administrative charges brought against respondents.
The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave abuse of discretion" and
not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by
Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not
mere errors of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of jurisdiction
(i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction).

When a trial court dismissed a case involving a rural bank (foreclosure sale without publication), the same
must be treated as a dismissal with the character of finality. That being a final decision, the proper
recourse that petitioner should have availed of is the remedy under Rule 41, which is appeal, and not
Rule 65.

However, despite the rigid wording of Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC, which now disallows an extension of the 60-day reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari,
courts may nevertheless extend the same, subject to its sound discretion.

A party who, after complying with the requirements laid down by law, files a petition for continuing
mandamus may institute the same with the RTC having jurisdiction of the place in controversy.
Jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by
law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the
defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. A special civil action for continuing mandamus
shall be filed with the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred.

It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure. It
is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with

When a court grants a motion to release founded on legal bases supporting its , it therefore did not
gravely abuse its discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so
patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to
act at all in contemplation of law.

When the acts being prevented by a party have already been accomplished, a writ of prohibition is not
proper. A prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the
proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not
intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.

When the court liberally allows the petitioner-spouses to file their petition five days after the extended
period, there is no ground to believe that the court gravely abused its discretion when it subsequently
dismissed the petition. Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave
abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous
concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one’s purpose.

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When a party raises issues involving questions of facts, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is not proper. Such petition covers only questions of law. In this relation, questions
of fact are not reviewable and cannot be passed upon by the Court unless exceptions are found to exist.

Co-parties before the RTC and CA cannot be made adversary parties in a petition for review on certiorari.
There is no basis to treat the co-parties as such when it cannot be shown that there was a cross-claim
filed against said co-parties. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against her co-defendants before the RTC,
petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.

When the commission, having no knowledge of a prior dismissal, fixes the reckoning point of the period of
disallowance at an erroneous date, it does not tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Not every error
in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in remedial law. Indeed, by restricting the review of judgments
or resolutions of the COA only thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the Constitution
and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of discretion, simple
errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be reviewed—even by this Court.

The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent. Since respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after
petitioner has completed the presentation of its evidence in the trial court, we can say that the filing of the
motion to dismiss was a mere ploy on the part of respondent to delay the prompt resolution of the case
against her.

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be put into issue while in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, only questions of jurisdiction may be inquired into.

A petition was filed to assail a CA decision rendered under Rule 65 where it failed to pass upon the
intrinsic correctness of the NLRC decision. In reviewing the legal correctness of a CA decision rendered
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court examines the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it,
and not strictly on the basis of whether the NLRC decision under review is intrinsically correct
When a petition for the judicial declaration of presumptive death/absence was granted by the RTC, the
Republic filed an appeal of the RTC decision with the CA. No appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition
for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Secretary of Justice to charge Dalandag for multiple
murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be
used to direct the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised.
Consequently, the Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request
or a motion to include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act
in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.

Tigaz filed three pleadings assailing the Ombudsman’s decision finding probable cause to indict him for
violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 and the Sandiganbayan’s resolution denying his motion to quash the
information and suspending him pendent lite.

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In the determination of probable cause, absolute certainty of evidence is not required, for opinion and
reasonable belief are sufficient. Besides, any other defense contesting the finding of probable cause that
is highly factual in nature must be threshed out in a full-blown trial, and not in a special civil action for
certiorari before this Court.
A Rule 65 petition is an inappropriate remedy to question the refusal of the Sandiganbayan to quash an
information and, its imposition of suspension pendente lite. The remedy is not the filing of a special civil
action for certiorari, but the continuance of the case in due course.

NLC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA without filing a motion for reconsideration
before the RTC. Before a petition for certiorari can prosper, the petitioner must be able to show, among
others, that he does not have any other "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." This remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the questioned
order.

The CA dismissed Indoyon’s petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43 for being non-compliant with
the Rules of Court and various Supreme Court Circulars. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the proper remedy to question the CA’s judgment, final order or resolution is a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from; or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed in due time after
notice of the judgment.
Under Supreme Court Circular 2-90, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or to the CA by a wrong or an
inappropriate mode merits outright dismissal. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their
properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for certiorari,
to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their properties

2014

The rationale for the requirement of first filing a motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for
certiorari is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors
and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. In the instant case,
the NLRC had all the opportunity to review its ruling and correct itself. Hence, the CA erred in dismissing
the Rule 65 petition filed by Olores.

While a government office may prohibit altogether the filing of a motion for reconsideration with respect to
its decisions or orders, the fact remains that certiorari inherently requires the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, which is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself.
Unless it is filed, there could be no occasion to rectify. Worse, the remedy of certiorari would be
unavailing. Simply put, regardless of the proscription against the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
same may be filed on the assumption that rectification of the decision or order must be obtained, and
before a petition for certiorari may be instituted. So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of
Labor is subject to judicial review only through a special civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be
resorted to without the aggrieved party having exhausted administrative remedies through a motion for
reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be allowed to move for a reconsideration of the same so that
he can bring a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision, the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the
prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals
in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

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The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed
orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary
matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The remedy against an
interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided
that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to

A resort to the remedy of mandamus is improper if the standard modes of procedure and forms of remedy
are still available and capable of affording relief. So that when the COA still retained its primary
jurisdiction to adjudicate money claim, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445. Hence, the COA's refusal to act did not leave the petitioners
without any remedy at all. Since remedy is still available to petitioner, mandamus cannot be sustained.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari may only be filed when there
is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, the records amply show that
Bancommerce’s action fell within the recognized exceptions to the need to file a motion for
reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari. The Sheriff forcibly levied on Bancommerce’s Lipa
Branch cash on hand amounting to P1,520,000.00 and deposited the same with the Landbank. He also
seized the bank’s computers, printers, and monitors, causing the temporary cessation of its banking
operations in that branch and putting the bank in an unwarranted danger of a run. Clearly, Bancommerce
had valid justifications for skipping the technical requirement of a motion for reconsideration.

Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days from receipt
of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed out of time. The order of
dismissal is thus beyond appellate review

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VII of the 1987 Constitution]. Thus,
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Undoubtedly, applying the aforementioned precepts and pronouncements to the instant case, the writ of
prohibition issued by the Manila RTC in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the territorial limits of
its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.

A Petition for Certiorari cannot be resorted to when then the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the petitioners for any perceived error in its interpretation of the law and its
assessment of evidence would only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Hence,
such is correctible by appeal and not by certiorari

The appellate court acted within its sound discretion when it re-evaluated the NLRC’s factual findings and
substituted the latter’s own judgment. It is settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA, pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary,
to resolve factual issues.

The Comelec Special Division issued an order granting Felins prayer for Preliminary Injunction. With this,
Villarosa filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court. Certiorari will not generally
lie against an order, ruling,or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account
the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. Failure to abide
by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition

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Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition for review to be accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified
correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and the requisite number of plain copies thereof
and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition for review.

A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable
herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was
nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the motion for reconsideration in
election offense cases.

Respondent moved for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in a Resolution. Atty. Borromeo,
respondent’s counsel, was duly notified of the said resolution. The respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA 25 days after the period to file such petition has lapsed. He reasoned that his counsel has
been relieved of his duties long before and that he was not notified of such resolution. The Court ruled
that the CA did not acquire jurisdiction.Well-settled rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices
of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is
considered notice to his client.

Although the petition was filed within the 60-day period to institute a certiorari proceeding, the long delay
negates 680 Home’s claimed urgency of its cause and indicates that it resorted to the present petition for
certiorari as a substitute for its lost appeal

It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not
essential that the challenged proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which
that word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi-judicial.
In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was issued upon the [mayor’s] finding that Boracay West Cove’s
construction, expansion, and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is illegal. Such a finding of illegality
required the respondent mayor’s exercise of quasi-judicial functions, against which the special writ of
certiorari may lie.

In the instant case, the Court cannot but agree with petitioner Republic that this case falls within the
abovementioned exceptions. The questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the same as those
already raised and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a motion for reconsideration would be
useless and serve no practical purpose. (National Irrigation case-just compensation)

In this case, Court finds no abuse of discretion, grave or simple in nature, committed by the CA in
dismissing the petitioners’ certiorari petition for being the wrong mode of appeal.. The Court previously
held that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court shall govern the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders,
or resolutions of the DAR Secretary, and that an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the CA by the
wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.

In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings
and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The onus probandi falls on the
seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the
grant of relief. Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible
error in granting Hipe’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
the complaint for permanent disability benefits for Hipe’s failure to establish his claim through substantial
evidence.

Jurisdiction over the issue of the constitutionality of the OWWA Omnibus Policies is a question of law, as
issuance was done in the exercise of their quasi-legislative and administrative functions within the
confines of the granting law. Hence, contrary to the lower court’s contention, certiorari under Rule 65 is

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not the proper remedy in the instant case. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over the controversy and it was
erroneous for it to dismiss the complaint outright.

Bureau of Immigration ordered deportation of petitioner. The Secretary of Justice affirmed the order.
Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before the CA which was denied. From the denial of the BOI Board of
Commissioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aggrieved party has three options: (a) he may file an
appeal directly to the CA via Rule 43 provided that he shows that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion
doctrine attend; (b) absent any of the exceptions, he may exhaust the available administrative remedies
within the executive machinery, namely, an appeal to the Secretary of Justice and then to the OP, and
thereafter, appeal the OP’s decisions via Rule 43; or (c) he may directly resort to certiorari before the CA
strictly on jurisdictional grounds, provided that he explains why any of the aforementioned remedies
cannot be taken as “adequate and speedy.

RTC issued a writ of to which respondent sheriff has reported that it has been fully implemented. Two
years after, petitioner filed for another issuance of writ of execution which has been denied. Petitioner
filed an action for mandamus to compel the RTC to issue such. The Court dismissed the petition. A writ of
mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which is that
which an officer or tribunal in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his or its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The writ of execution
has already been implemented. The proper remedy is to cite the disobedient party in contempt

The Optical Media Board contends that the CA should have dismissed Rigor’s Petition for Certiorari for
being an improper remedy. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the OMB should
be taken to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is settled that certiorari
under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral which aimed to
dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law, and the COMELEC twice ordered
the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its regulation which imposed a size limit on campaign
materials, the petitioners may directly file a Rule 65 Petition with the Supreme Court without need for a
ruling from the COMELEC En Banc, as the petitioners are not candidates in the elections but is asserting
their right to free speech, and the COMELEC acts not in its quasi-judicial function but in its regulatory
function. The petitioners also did not violate the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the
same yields in order to protect this fundamental right. Even if it applies, the case falls under the
exceptions to the doctrine; namely: it involves a legal question and the application of the doctrine would
be unreasonable.
Finally, the case is about COMELEC’s breach of the petitioners’ fundamental right of expression of
matters relating to election. Such a violation is grave abuse of discretion; thus the constitutionality of
COMELEC’s orders are within the Supreme Court’s power to review under Rule 65.

As can be gleaned from both the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Rules of
Court, the respondent is required to be furnished a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits
and documents. Clearly, these pertain to affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits
of the co-respondent. As such, no grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for
the issuance of an order denying the request of the respondent to be furnished copies of counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. Also, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before
the filing of a petition for certiorari. Absent any compelling reason to justify non-compliance, a petition for
certiorari will not lie. Finally, a respondent’s claim that his rights were violated cannot be given credence
when he flouts the rules himself by resorting to simultaneous remedies by filing Petition for Certiorari
alleging violation of due process by the Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising the
very same issue remained pending with the Ombudsman.

Complaints against the petitioner were taken in a meeting of the Commission on Human Rights. A Show
Cause Order was issued against petitioner. Questioning its validity, petitioner filed petition for certiorari.
The Court dismissed it and ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion. Special civil action for

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certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess or its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Respondents, as Chairperson and Members of the CHR, did not engage in judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. They did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but
simply undertook to initiate the investigation.

2016

The dismissal of a petition for mandamus is warranted by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies when the issue raised by petitioner is not a purely legal question

The respondents filed a special civil action for prohibition before the CA without first filing a motion to stay
or quash the writ of execution before the RTC. Hence, the petition for prohibition obviously lacked the
requirement that no "other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should
have been dismissed. The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such parties
representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter founded on
the same facts; (iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other action.

2015

In the case before us, the CA clearly ignored certain compelling facts and misread the evidence on record
by relying on the LA’s erroneous appreciation of facts. The NLRC acted well within its jurisdiction in
finding that Lumahan had not been dismissed. Otherwise stated, by reversing the ruling that there was no
dismissal to speak of, the CA committed a reversible error in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC.

The general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment
introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Under exceptional cases, however, the 60-day period may be
extended subject to the court’s sound discretion.

The existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the
requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal.

Mere error of judgment on the part of the RTC, if any, is insufficient ground to reverse the CA's dismissal
of the petitioner's certiorari petition. As heretofore clarified, a special civil action for certiorari is for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction (where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion), and not errors of judgment; in the latter case, the
court may have been legally in error in its conclusion, but was still acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction.”

It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will prosper
only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must
be grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
passion or hostility. (revival of provisionally dismissed case)

The 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA should be counted from the receipt by
the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC Decision on November 19, 2009.

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As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence or
absence of probable cause. As the Court is not a trier of facts, it reposes immense respect to the factual
determination and appreciation made by the Ombudsman.
Such issue is not reviewable by this Court via certiorari.

The Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari is an improper remedy to assail the Resolutions in question issued by
the ERC in its quasi-legislative power

Mandamus is the relief sought "[w]hen any tribunal corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station," and "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law." Article XI(C), Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." One of
the laws that the Commission on Elections must implement is Republic ActNo. 8436, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9369, which requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing
a voter-verified paper audit trail. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of
Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards
to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections

A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not prosper unless the inferior court has been
given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This is because a
motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Contrary to the CA’s findings,
however, Spouses Espinosa already complied with this requirement. Their motion to stay execution is, in
fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12, 2007. Although not captioned as a
"motion for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution directly challenged the RTC’s
order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed the inclusion of the awards for moral and
exemplary damages. Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that execution pending appeal of
awards of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees is not allowed.
A petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the sheriff's actions. The special civil action of
certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. lt
is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process,
which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. The more appropriate
remedy would have been a petition for prohibition filed under Section 2 of Rule 65. Moreover, the matters
being raised by the petitioner are factual in nature and, hence, not proper for the Supreme Court to
resolve at the first instance.

The special civil action of prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The respondents filed a special civil
action for prohibition before the CA without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution
before the RTC. Hence, the petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that no "other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have been dismissed

Rule 66

2013

De Castro, a presidential appointee filed a petition for quo warranto under Rule 66 directly with the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. A direct
invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that
are clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. A disregard of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.

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The instant special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case. Given the final
and executory resolution of the COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and
proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque, it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of
the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement
of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title.

Rule 67

2011

Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court which dispenses with the filing
of an extraordinary motion to dismiss. The present rule requires the filing of an answer as responsive
pleading to the complaint. Thus, the defendant who has objections to the taking of his property is now
required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations in the complaint
for eminent domain.

2013

The Republic found that Spouses Genato’s land overlapped government property and moved to have it
declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject of conflicting claims. The RTC ruled that the
issue of the validity of the title would be properly ventilated in a separate proceeding and barred the
Republic from presenting further evidence. However, the authority to resolve ownership should be taken
in the proper context. The discussion in Republic was anchored on the question of who among the
respondents claiming ownership of the property must be indemnified by the Government. Thus, such
findings of ownership in an expropriation proceeding should not be construed as final and binding on the
parties. By filing an action for expropriation, the condemnor (petitioner), merely serves notice that it is
taking title to and possession of the property, and that the defendant is asserting title to or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
When the PAC was appointed as commissioners for the determination of just compensation, there was
no contravention to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Although the appointment of commissioners is
mandatory, the Rules do not impose any qualifications or restrictions on the appointment, other than that
the commissioners should not number more than three and that they should be competent and
disinterested parties.

While the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to Special Agrarian Court proceedings, it is clear that,
unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or
commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. And
since neither party objected to the appointment of commissioners, the proper fees to be paid to them
should likewise be governed by the Rules of Court.

Respondent had no right to claim prescription because a CLT had already been issued in favor of
petitioner. The farm is considered expropriated and placed under the coverage of the land reform law. As
such, respondent had neither the right to evict petitioner nor to claim prescription.

Only the Clerk of Court is authorized to collect filing fees for the conduct of extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate or chattel mortgage under the direction of the sheriff. The sheriff is devoid of any authority to bill
and collect payment for such fees.

In the present case, NAPOCOR admits that the expropriation of the land in question is no longer
necessary for public use. Had that admission been made in the trial court the case should have been
dismissed there. It now appearing positively, by resolution of [NAPOCOR], that the expropriation is not
necessary for public use, the action should be dismissed even without a motion... The moment it appears

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in whatever stage of the proceedings that the expro-priation is not for a public use the complaint should
be dismissed and all the parties thereto should be relieved from further annoyance or litigation.

2014

Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA was to
determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property
when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded to the RTC for the
purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case where an amendment of
the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of the trial of the original complaint
filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the damages which respondent allegedly
suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no evidence proving damages was received and
passed upon when the RTC issued its Order dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule
10, Rules of Civil Procedure on amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case.

When the National Power Corporation filed an expropriation case and the same was subsequently
dismissed due to failure to prosecute, it is as if no complaint for expropriation was filed. As a result the
NPC is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure
prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. Thus,
the RTC should have fixed the value of the property for the purposes of just compensation at the time
NPC took possession of the same in 1990, and not at the time of the filing of the complaint for
compensation and damages in 1994 or its fair market value in 1995

2015

The determination of just compensation is a judicial function; hence, courts cannot be unduly restricted in
their determination thereof. While the courts should be mindful of the different formulae created by the
DAR in arriving at just compensation, they are not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the situations before
them do not warrant it. Thus, the RTC is advised that while it should be mindful of the different formulae
created by the DAR in arriving at just compensation, it is not strictly bound to adhere thereto if the
situations before it do not warrant their application

DPWH wanted to expropriate portions of the properties of BPI. BPI claimed for the inclusion of the value
of its building in determining the just compensation although it was never taken by the government. The
general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is
the market value. The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken, he
is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. No
actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from impairment or
decrease in value

Rule 68

2013

Act No. 3135 has no requirement for the determination of the mortgaged properties’ appraisal value.
Nothing in the law likewise indicates that the mortgagee-creditor’s appraisal value shall be the basis for
the bid price. Neither is there any rule nor any guideline prescribing the minimum amount of bid, nor that
the bid should be at least equal to the properties’ current appraised value. Under the circumstances, no
necessity of determining the mortgaged properties’ current appraised value or any showing of the

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existence of any prejudicial question warrants the suspension of the foreclosure proceedings. It must be
noted that a prejudicial question is a prior issue whose resolution rests with another tribunal, but at the
same time is necessary in the resolution of another issue in the same case.

Respondent extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
Maglasang. Upon foreclosure, there is deficiency in obligation .Thus, respondent filed a suit to recover the
deficiency amount against the estate of Flaviano.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an
action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third
option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the
estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified ,the probate court of the outstanding amount of its
claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86,
respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.

When there is a pending civil case challenging the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure, such
pendency does not bar the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession after said foreclosure, sale
of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of the one-year period. As a ministerial function of the court,
the judge need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, as these are the
questions that should be properly decided by a court of competent jurisdiction in the pending case filed
before it.

Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made to the detriment of
another who relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not
make any representation.

An order for extrajudicial foreclosure given by an executive judge in the exercise of her administrative
function is not a civil action of the Regional Trial Courts that may be the proper subject of an action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession cannot be consolidated with an action for annulment of
mortgage where title to the property has already been consolidated in favor of the mortgagor following the
expiration of the one year redemption period except when title has not yet consolidated in favor of the
mortgagor and this presumed right of ownership is contested and made the basis of another action, in
which case, the actions must be consolidated.

After title has been consolidated in UCPB, the purchaser, it filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession, a pending action for annulment of mortgage. Regardless of the pendency of such suit, the
purchaser remains entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome
of the pending annulment case. Otherwise stated, the issuance of the writ of possession remains the
ministerial duty of the RTC until the issues raised in the annulment case are, once and for all, decided by
a court of competent jurisdiction.

Gerry Centeno, Spouses Centeno’s son, bought the property from his parents and remained in
possession. The Bank petitioned the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession after title to the
property was consolidated in its name. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of

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title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function, unless it
appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of the
mortgagor.

2014

The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public document by virtue of its being acknowledged
before notary public. As a notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it
with respect to its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear, convincing and
more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld. Petitioners undeniably failed to
adduce clear and convincing evidence against the genuineness and authenticity of the deed. Instead,
their actuations even demonstrated that their transaction with respondents had been regular and at arms-
length, thereby belying the intervention of fraud.

It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during
(with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure
sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that
the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure
unless a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. The issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, who had already consolidated their title over the extra-judicially
foreclosed property, is merely ministerial in nature.

The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on his title or right of possession. Corollary
thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the property
mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably
establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the Spouses Garcia failed to prove that
they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to present credible evidence to prove their
ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as title holders of the land and the
presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas Villasi, on the other hand, was able
to show documentary proof of ownership.

The spouses mortgaged their property to PNB as security for their loan. Since they were unable to pay, it
was foreclosed and PNB was the highest bidder. PNB filed for writ of possession which was held in
abeyance by Judge Venadas, Sr. The Court ruled that the judge committed grave abuse of discretion.
Once the one-year redemption period has lapsed from the foreclosure sale and once title is consolidated
under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part
of the court. The alleged invalidity of the sale of PNB to Atty. Garay is not a ground to defer the issuance
of the Writ of Possession.

Moreover, a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. As one brought for the
benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest, it is a judicial
proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an
opportunity to be heard. Since the judge to whom the application for writ of possession is filed need not
look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure, it has been ruled that the ministerial
duty of the trial court does not become discretionary upon the filing of a complaint questioning the
mortgage.

Petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the decision of the CA holding that an ex-parte petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession was not the proper remedy for the petitioner. The SC, though agreed
with the CA, held that petitioner is not without recourse. The remedy of a writ of possession made
available to a subsequent purchaser only after hearing and after determining that the subject property is
still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during the

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redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. Thus, petitioner being a
third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to
determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor. If the property is in the
possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ
of possession is no longer available to petitioner, but he can wrest possession over the property through
an ordinary action of ejectment.

2015

In the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale, the name “Guellerma Malabanan rep. by her AIF David M. Castro”
appeared as mortgagor while the amount of mortgaged indebtedness is P96,870.20 but the mortgagors
are Spouses Castro and the amount must be P100,000. The mistakes and omissions referred to in the
above-cited ruling which would invalidate notice pertain to those which: 1) are calculated to deter or
mislead bidders, 2) to depreciate the value of the property, or 3) to prevent it from bringing a fair price.
With jurisprudence as the measure, the errors pointed out by the spouses appear to be harmless.

Rule 70

Nonetheless, the declaration by the DENR-NCR that Lot 3976 is still part of the public domain does not
mean that neither of the parties is entitled to the possession of the subject properties. It must be stated
that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand,
violence or terror.

2013

When a petitioner wishes to file an action for unlawful detainer, there should first be a demand to pay or
to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso
facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate
the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to vacate,
which make unlawful withholding of possession.

When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
Prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case
brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

The CA admitted and gave weight to a testimony given in a different proceeding (action for specific
performance) pending before the Regional Trial Court in resolving the issue herein (unlawful detainer). In
the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or
any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by
name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the formercase or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction,
at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.

It is well-settled that the sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject
property, independent of any claim of ownership by the parties. The argument of Spouses Abacan that
they subsequently acquired ownership of the subject property cannot be considered as a supervening
event that will bar the execution of the questioned judgment, as unlawful detainer does not deal with the
issue of ownership.

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Dominga filed unlawful detainer case against Stop and Save. However, CA dismissed the case on the
ground that the latter filed annulment of the lease agreement and constitutes as litis pendencia. The court
ruled that unlawful detainer is not the same as annulment of contract. In the unlawful detainer suit, the
issue is who between the parties has a better right to physical possession over the property or
possession de facto and the principal relief prayed for is for Stop and Save to vacate the property for
failure to pay the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the issue is the validity of the lease
contract

Petitioner filed unlawful detainer against respondents who were the assigned caretakers. They declared
the subject lot under their name for tax purposes and applied for titling with the DENR when they learned
it was public land. Upon learning of their acts, petitioner demanded them to vacate but they refused. The
Court granted the petition, holding that petitioner has the better right of possession de facto over the
subject lot and that the spouses’ stay on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere
tolerance of the petitioner.

Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from the time the demand to vacate was served
upon it and not from the time it began occupying the disputed premises, Pro-Guard Security Services
Corporation (Pro- Guard) sought recourse to the Court. The Supreme Court held that the date of unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.

The subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court or the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second level court, the RTC’s decision is void
for lack of jurisdiction over the case. The proceedings before a court without jurisdiction, including its
decision, are null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought before the appellate court, as well as
the decisions or resolutions promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.

Failure to pay the rent must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of rent. It therefore
follows that the cause of action for unlawful detainer must necessarily arise before the termination of the
contract and not the other way around.

2014

As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the
subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession to restore them to their possession of the subject property. The legal limitation, despite the
finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which was
established in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of defendant’s
predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect to who
has title to the land in question.

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise,
if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper
remedy. In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by
respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby depriving
petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started.

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2015

In actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

An allegation of tenancy before the MTC does not automatically deprive the court of its jurisdiction. The
material averments in the complaint determine the jurisdiction of a court. A court does not lose jurisdiction
over an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of a party raising as a defense therein the alleged
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties. The court continues to have the authority to hear
and evaluate the evidence, precisely to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, and, if, after hearing,
tenancy is shown to exist, it shall dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that
the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the unlawful
deprivation of possession took place. As such, the complainant must allege and prove prior physical
possession (in the concept of possession de facto, or actual or material possession and not one flowing
out of ownership) of the propertyin litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. In this
regard, it has been settled that tax declarations and realty tax payments are not conclusive proofs of
possession. They are merely good indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the
presumption that no one in one’s right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in one’s
actual or constructive possession.

A boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the
defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible
entry.

2016

In an ejectment suit (accion interdictal), the sole issue is the right of physical or material possession over
the subject real property independent of any claim of ownership by the parties involved. Ownership over
the property is immaterial and is only passed upon provisionally for the limited purpose of determining
which party has the better right to possession. The suit is only filed against the possessor(s) of the
property at the commencement of action, and not against one who does not in fact occupy the land. To
determine who should be made a party-defendant, The court simply looks at who committed the acts
amounting to forcible entry and remains in possession of the subject property.
Ejectment suits are actions in personam wherein judgment only binds parties who had been properly
impleaded and were given an opportunity to be heard.

2017

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who unlawfully withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express
or implied. The possession of the defendant in an unlawful detainer case is originally legal but becomes
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The sole issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties.

When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the opposing
party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of

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tolerance established. Further, the party seeking possession must identify the source of his or her claim
as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it.

The RTC and the CA passed upon the parties respective claim of ownership, a procedure that is
sanctioned under Section 16, Rule 70. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.

The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case for unlawful detainer if the
demand to vacate is premised on the expiration of the lease, not on the non-payment of rentals or non-
compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease.

Rule 71

2014

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court’s mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the
Rules. The recourse provided for in the Rule 71 is clear enough: the person adjudged in indirect contempt
must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its
suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond, effectively making the
September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.

Contempt signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such conduct
which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice. Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this
Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By
acting in opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding its final determination of the legal issue
pending before him, respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration of justice and
consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as interpreted in the decisions of the Court.

Pursuant to a court’s order respondent issued Warrants of Levy against several delinquent properties of
the petitioner. These properties were advertised and sold at public auction. Digital Telecommunications
made a request to the respondent to lift the warrant invoking the final Decision in Civil Case No. 3514
decreeing petitioner’s exemption from the payment of real property tax is binding upon respondent. Since
the warrants remained unlifted, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Indirect Contempt.
The acts of respondent in issuing the Warrants of Levy and in effecting the public auction sale of
petitioner’s real properties, were neither intended to undermine the authority of the court nor resulted to
disobedience to the lawful orders of Branch IX. He merely performed a ministerial function which he is
bound to perform under Sections 176 and 177 of RA 7160.

When the petitioner filed other pending actions involving the same people, same reliefs prayed for and
essentially the same issue, there exists forum shopping because the elements of litis pendentia are
present (5 contempt cases). Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3)
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case.

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Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the
trial court, which is immediately executory. However, respondent’s act was not contumacious considering
that he had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children.

The pendency of a special civil action for certiorari instituted in relation to a pending case does not stay
the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
Rule 65, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules makes this clear: x x x The petition shall not interrupt the course of
the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the case

The Court cannot see why the petition questioning the dropping of De Guzman as co-defendant was
patently without merit. Davao City was of the firm and sincere belief that he had a hand in the
reconveyance of the subject property to the Heirs. The use of the word "may" in the last sentence of the
second paragraph or Section 8, Rule 65, indicates that the assessment of treble costs is not automatic or
mandatory. Although the court is afforded judicial discretion in imposing treble costs, there remains a
need to show that it is sound and with basis that is taking all the pertinent circumstances into due
consideration. In the case at bench, the imposition of treble costs was not explained at all. As the CA
never justified it, the imposition should be stricken off.

Elisa Angeles alleged that respondents committed contempt for defying the order of the trial court to
elevate the records of her case to the Court of Appeals. The court ruled that Contrary to Elisa Angeles
allegations, the records show that respondents were merely implementing the orders issued by the trial
court in Civil Case No. 69213 and that no stay order was issued against the enforcement of the subject
writ of execution. There is no sufficient showing of acts committed by respondents which may constitute
contempt, such as among others, refusing to obey [a] lawful order of the court or act of disrespect to the
dignity of the court which tends to hamper the orderly proceedings and lessen its efficiency.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to
avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of
this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
However, A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the
theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of
justice.

2015

A disbarred lawyer's name cannot be part of a firm's name. A lawyer who appears under a firm name that
contains a disbarred lawyer's name commits indirect contempt of court.

A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice may be punished for indirect contempt

2017

When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this case, it would be an abuse
of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer who uses the public fora as his
battleground cannot expect to be protected from public scrutiny.

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Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court and any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice are
acts considered as Indirect Contempt.

When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title,
the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property.

The supposed inaction of the SLU and its officials when the Olairez group visited the school to demand
their compliance with the decision was not borne out of a contumacious conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to hinder the implementation of a judgment. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness,
bad faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is clearly not the case here. On the contrary,
SLU was well within its rights to appeal the decision and not immediately heed the demand of the Olairez
group.

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