Flynn Motion To Dismiss

Case 1:17-cr-00232-EGS Document 198 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Crim. No. 17-232 (EGS)
MICHAEL T. FLYNN,
Defendant
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION

AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MICHAEL T. FLYNN
The United States of America hereby moves to dismiss with prejudice the criminal
information filed against Michael T. Flynn pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
48(a). The Government has determined, pursuant to the Principles of Federal Prosecution and
based on an extensive review and careful consideration of the circumstances, that continued
prosecution of this case would not serve the interests of justice.
Mr. Flynn entered a guilty plea—which he has since sought to withdraw—to a single
count of making false statements in a January 24, 2017 interview with investigators of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). See ECF Nos. 3-4. This crime, however, requires a
statement to be not simply false, but “materially” false with respect to a matter under
investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Materiality is an essential element of the offense.
Materiality, moreover, requires more than mere “relevance” or relatedness to the matter being
investigated; it requires “probative weight,” whereby the statement is “reasonably likely to
influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.” United States v.
Weinstock, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (emphasis added).
After a considered review of all the facts and circumstances of this case, including newly
discovered and disclosed information appended to the defendant’s supplemental pleadings, ECF
Nos. 181, 188-190,1 the Government has concluded that the interview of Mr. Flynn was
untethered to, and unjustified by, the FBI’s counterintelligence investigation into Mr. Flynn—a
no longer justifiably predicated investigation that the FBI had, in the Bureau’s own words,
prepared to close because it had yielded an “absence of any derogatory information.” Ex. 1 at 4,
FBI FD-1057 “Closing Communication” Jan. 4, 2017 (emphases added). The Government is not
persuaded that the January 24, 2017 interview was conducted with a legitimate investigative
basis and therefore does not believe Mr. Flynn’s statements were material even if untrue.
Moreover, we not believe that the Government can prove either the relevant false statements or
their materiality beyond a reasonable doubt.
“A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental
interests of society require the application of federal criminal law to a particular set of
circumstances. . . .” Justice Manual § 9-27.001. In the Government’s assessment—mindful of
the high burden to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
“government prosecutors have a duty to do justice,” United States v. Darui, 614 F. Supp. 2d 25,
37 (D.D.C. 2009)—continued prosecution of the charged crime does not serve a substantial
federal interest. The Government respectfully moves to dismiss the criminal information with
prejudice against Mr. Flynn.

1
This review not only included newly discovered and disclosed information, but also recently
declassified information as well.
2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The FBI opened a counterintelligence investigation into Mr. Flynn on August 16, 2016,
“as part of the larger Crossfire Hurricane umbrella” investigation into the presidential campaign
of Donald J. Trump and its possible coordination with Russian officials to interfere with the 2016
presidential election. Ex. 1 at 3; Ex. 2 at 1-2, FBI FD-1057, “Opening of the CROSSFIRE
RAZOR Investigation,” Aug. 16, 2016. Code-named “Crossfire Razor,” the investigation’s
stated “goal” was to determine whether Mr. Flynn “was directed and controlled by and/or
coordinated activities with the Russian Federation in a manner which is a threat to the national
security and/or possibly a violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 951 et
seq., or other related statutes.” Ex. 1 at 2; Ex. 2 at 2.
In addition to the predication for opening Crossfire Hurricane, which did not specifically
identify Mr. Flynn, the FBI predicated the counterintelligence investigation of him on “an
articulable factual basis” that consisted of three facts: Mr. Flynn’s service as a foreign policy
advisor to the Trump campaign, his publicly documented connection to state-affiliated Russian
entities, and the fact that he had traveled to Russia in December 2015. Ex. 1 at 3-4; Ex. 2 at 1-2.
After approximately four months of investigation, however, the FBI “determined that [Mr.
Flynn] was no longer a viable candidate as part of the larger Crossfire Hurricane umbrella case”
and prepared to close the investigation. Ex. 1 at 3. At some point prior to January 4, 2017, the
FBI drafted a “Closing Communication” to effect the termination of the case. See Ex. 1; Ex. 3 at
2, FBI FD-302, Interview of Mary McCord, July 17, 2017 (Date of Entry: Aug. 10, 2017). This
document noted the specific “goal” and predication for the investigation. Ex. 1 at 2. It laid out
the numerous searches of holdings and investigative steps that had at each step yielded “no
derogatory information” on Mr. Flynn. Ex. 1 at 2-3 (emphasis added); see also id. at 5 (noting
3

“the absence of any derogatory information or lead information”). It stated that the investigation
had failed to produce “any information on which to predicate further investigative efforts.” Id. at
3 (emphases added). And it noted that no interview of Mr. Flynn was required “as part of the
case closing procedure,” before concluding: “The FBI is closing this investigation.” The
document also stated: “If new information is identified or reported to the FBI regarding the
activities of CROSSFIRE RAZOR, the FBI will consider reopening the investigation if
warranted.” Id. at 4. The document had not been approved, however, as of January 4, 2017. See
Ex. 7 at 1-2, FBI Electronic Communications and Lync Messages (1/4/17; 1/23/17; 1/24/17;
2/10/17).
Before the intended case closing took effect, the FBI learned of communications between
Mr. Flynn and Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak that had taken place in late December 2016
and which touched on matters of foreign policy. See Ex. 3 at 2; Ex. 5 at 3-5, FBI
Counterintelligence Investigations: Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Statement of FBI
Director James Comey, Mar. 2, 2017; Ex. 6 at 3-5, FBI FD-302, Interview of Michael Flynn,
Jan. 24, 2017 (Date of Entry: Feb. 10, 2017). By this time, Mr. Flynn had already been named
by President-Elect Trump as his incoming National Security Advisor. See Ex. 3 at 3; Bryan
Bender, Trump Names Mike Flynn National Security Adviser, Politico (Nov. 17, 2016), available
at https://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/michael-flynn-national-security-adviser-231591.
The FBI had in their possession transcripts of the relevant calls. See Ex. 5 at 3; Ex. 13 at
3, FBI FD-302, Interview of Peter Strzok, July 19, 2017 (Date of Entry: Aug. 22, 2017).
Believing that the counterintelligence investigation of Mr. Flynn was to be closed, FBI
leadership (“the 7th Floor”) determined to continue its investigation of Mr. Flynn on the basis of
these calls, and considered opening a new criminal investigation based solely on a potential
4

violation of the Logan Act, 18 U.S.C. § 953. See Ex. 3 at 2-3; Ex. 7 at 1-2; Ex. 8 at 1-5, FBI E-
mails RE: Logan Act Jan. 4, 2017. Yet discussions with the Department of Justice resulted in the
general view that the Logan Act would be difficult to prosecute. Ex. 3 at 2-3; Ex. 4 at 1-2, FBI
FD-302, Interview of Sally Yates, Aug. 15, 2017 (Sept. 7, 2017); Ex. 5 at 9. The FBI never
opened an independent FBI criminal investigation.
On January 4, 2017, FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok learned that “RAZOR’s
closure” had not been timely executed, and the counterintelligence investigation into Mr. Flynn
was, unexpectedly, still formally open. Ex. 7 at 1-2. Mr. Strzok immediately relayed the
“serendipitously good” news to Lisa Page, the Special Counsel to FBI Deputy Director Andrew
McCabe, remarking that “our utter incompetence actually helps us.” Id. at 1. Ms. Page reacted
with surprise and relief. Id. Mr. Strzok, moreover, instructed agents to “keep it open for now” at
the behest of “the 7th Floor.” Id. Mr. Strzok indicated that there was a “[n]eed to decide what to
do with him.” Id. Other internal FBI messages from that afternoon reflect apparently related
conversations about a potential “interview.” See id. at 2 (“i heard pete say, ‘Andy and [redacted]
will interview.…”). As of January 4, 2017, then, the FBI kept open its counterintelligence
investigation into Mr. Flynn based solely on his calls with Kislyak—the only new information to
arise since the FBI’s determination to close the case. See Ex. 3 at 2; Ex. 5 at 5.
On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post reported the December 29 communications
between Mr. Flynn and the Russian ambassador. See David Ignatius, Why Did Obama Dawdle
on Russia’s Hacking, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 2017. The next day, January 13, Sean Spicer, the
spokesperson for the Trump transition, clarified that the communications had involved only
logistics, which seemed to contradict the nature of the calls. Ex. 4 at 2. On January 15, Vice
5

President-Elect Mike Pence stated in a news interview that Mr. Flynn had suggested that his
conversation with Kislyak did not relate to sanctions. Ex. 3 at 4; Ex. 4 at 2-3; Ex. 5 at 4-5.
Around this time, FBI Director James Comey advised DOJ leadership of its investigation
into Mr. Flynn, and senior officials at both the FBI and DOJ had concerns that the incumbent
White House officials’ descriptions of Mr. Flynn’s calls with Kislyak were not accurate. Ex. 3 at
4; Ex. 4 at 2-3; Ex. 5 at 4-5. FBI Director Comey took the position that the FBI would not notify
the incoming Trump administration of the Flynn-Kislyak communications. Ex. 3 at 4-5; Ex. 4 at
4. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates and other senior DOJ officials took the contrary view
and believed that the incoming administration should be notified. Ex. 3 at 4-5; Ex. 4 at 4.
Deputy Attorney General Yates and another senior DOJ official became “frustrated” when
Director Comey’s justifications for withholding the information from the Trump administration
repeatedly “morphed,” vacillating from the potential compromise of a “counterintelligence”
investigation to the protection of a purported “criminal” investigation. Ex. 3 at 5; compare Ex. 5
at 5 (“[W]e had an open counterintelligence investigation on Mr. Flynn”), with Ex. 4 at 4
(“Comey had said something to the effect of there being an ‘ongoing criminal investigation’”).
The Deputy Attorney General, Director of National Intelligence, and Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency all agreed that the FBI should notify the incoming Trump administration of
what had actually been said on the calls. Ex. 3 at 5. FBI Director Comey continued to refuse to
brief the White House in a subsequent conversation with CIA Director John Brennan. Id.; Ex. 5
at 5-6. On January 23, 2017, then Acting Attorney General Yates met with senior DOJ officials,
and they again discussed the need to press the FBI to notify the White House. Ex. 3 at 5; Ex. 4 at
4.
6

Matters came to a head on January 24, 2017. That morning, Yates contacted Director
Comey to demand that the FBI notify the White House of the communications. Ex. 3 at 5; Ex. 4
at 4. Director Comey did not initially return her call. Ex. 4 at 4. When Director Comey called
her back later that day, he advised her that the FBI agents were already on their way to the White
House to interview Mr. Flynn. Ex. 3 at 5; Ex. 4 at 4. Acting Attorney General Yates was
“flabbergasted” and “dumbfounded,” and other senior DOJ officials “hit the roof” upon hearing
of this development, given that “an interview of Flynn should have been coordinated with DOJ.”
Ex. 3 at 6; Ex. 4 at 5.
In fact, in the preceding days, senior officials at the FBI had been engaged in discussions
about how to approach Mr. Flynn and whom to notify. See Ex. 9, FBI E-mails, Jan. 21-24, 2017.
On January 21, 2017, Mr. Strzok proposed to Bill Priestap, the FBI’s counterintelligence chief,
that Mr. Flynn should be given a “defensive briefing” about an investigation under the Crossfire
Hurricane umbrella or alternatively an “interview under light ‘defensive briefing’ pretext.” See
Ex. 9 at 1. Mr. Strzok also noted that DOJ might “direct[] us” to inform “VPOTUS or anyone
else,” speculating that this could lead to the “WH specifically direct[ing] us not to” speak with
Mr. Flynn. Id. On January 22, 2017, a FBI attorney emailed Mr. Strzok and Ms. Page that “if
we usually tell the WH, then I think we should do what we normally do,” though the official also
noted that they could be “told not to [] debrief or interview Razor.” Id. at 2.
In advance of the interview, Director Comey determined that they would go interview
Mr. Flynn the following day without notifying either DOJ or the White House. Ex. 3 at 5-6; Ex.
4 at 4-5; Ex. 5 at 6. In a December 2018 interview with MSNBC and NBC News analyst Nicolle
Wallace, he stated this course of action was “something we, I probably wouldn’t have done or
gotten away with in a [] more organized administration.” See Interview by Nicolle Wallace with
7

James Comey, Dec. 10, 2018, 14:31-14:55; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xqGu66D6VU.
Messages between Mr. Strzok and Ms. Page on January 23, 2017, indicated that “Bill” had
conducted “several conversations with Andy [McCabe]” because “he wanted to know why we
had to go aggressively doing these things, openly.” Ex. 7 at 2.
On the morning of January 24, 2017, follow-up messages between Mr. Strzok and Ms.
Page indicated that “Bill … brought [it] up – again, this time in front of D[irector Comey]” and
that Deputy Director McCabe was “frustrated” and “cut him off.” Ex. 7 at 3.2 In any event, that
morning, Deputy Director McCabe called Mr. Flynn to arrange the interview. See Ex. 11,
Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Untitled Memorandum, January 24, 2017. He explained that
recent media statements about his contacts with Kislyak merited a “sit down” and expressed the
FBI’s desire to accomplish the interview “quickly, quietly and discretely as possible.” Id.
Deputy Director McCabe further advised that if Mr. Flynn wished to have anyone else at the
meeting, including the White House Counsel, the FBI would have to elevate the issue to DOJ.
Id. Mr. Flynn, himself a former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that he
readily expected that the FBI already knew the contents of his conversations with the
ambassador, stating: “you listen to everything they say.” Id. Mr. Flynn then agreed to meet with
the interviewing agents in his office less than two hours later. Id.
Mr. Flynn was “unguarded” in the interview and “clearly” viewed the agents as “allies.”
Ex. 13 at 3. When interviewing Mr. Flynn, Mr. Strzok and the other agent “didn’t show him the

2
Priestap’s notes dated January 24 state, “What’s our goal? Truth/Admission or to get him to
lie, so we can prosecute him or get him fired?” On the same paper, Priestap wrote, “If we’re
seen as playing games, WH will be furious. Protect our institution by not playing games.” Ex.
10, FBI Handwritten Note, Jan. 23/24, 2017. Another note stated, “We regularly show subjects
evidence, with the goal of getting them to admit their wrongdoing. I don’t see how getting
someone to admit their wrongdoing is going easy on him.” See id.
8

transcripts” of his calls. Ex. 5 at 7; see also Ex. 3 at 6; Ex. 4 at 5; Ex. 6. Nor did the agents give,
at any point, warnings that making false statements would be a crime. Ex. 3 at 6; Ex. 4 at 5; Ex.
9 at 5-6; see also Ex. 6. According to the FBI agents’ recollections, when asked if Mr. Flynn
recalled any conversation in which he encouraged Kislyak not to “escalate the situation” in its
response to American sanctions, Mr. Flynn responded uncertainly, stating, “Not really. I don’t
remember. It wasn’t, ‘Don’t do anything.’” Ex. 6 at 5. Mr. Flynn also stated that although it
was possible, he did not recall any conversation in which the ambassador stated that Russia
would moderate its response due to Mr. Flynn’s request. Id. He stated that he did not have a
long conversation with Mr. Kislyak to “don’t do something.” Id.
Meanwhile, when asked if he recalled asking countries to take certain actions on the
United Nations vote on Israeli settlements, Mr. Flynn explained that the conversations were
“along the lines of where do you stand and what’s your position” and that “he did not believe his
calls to the various countries would change anything.” Id. at 4. He also stated that his calls did
not involve any requests for how to vote, and answered “no” when asked if he discussed
delaying or defeating the vote. See id. at 4. The FD-302, moreover, indicates that Mr. Flynn
denied that Kislyak described any Russian request to his response. Id.; see Ex. 12, FBI
Handwritten Notes of Michael Flynn Interview (January 24, 2017).
After the interview, the FBI agents expressed uncertainty as to whether Mr. Flynn had
lied. See Ex. 4 at 5. FBI agents reported to their leadership that Mr. Flynn exhibited a “very sure
demeanor” and “did not give any indicators of deception.” Ex. 13 at 3. Both of the agents “had
the impression at the time that Flynn was not lying or did not think he was lying.” Id. When
Director Comey was asked, based on his evaluation of the case: “Do you believe that Mr. Flynn
9

lied?” Director Comey responded: “I don’t know. I think there is an argument to be made he
lied. It is a close one.” Ex. 5 at 9.
On November 30, 2017, the Special Counsel’s Office filed a criminal information against
Mr. Flynn charging him with a single count of making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2). ECF No. 1. Mr. Flynn pleaded guilty to that offense, see ECF Nos. 3-4, but
moved to withdraw that guilty plea on January 14, 2020, ECF Nos. 151, 154, 160. On January
29, 2020, Mr. Flynn also filed a “Motion to Dismiss Case for Egregious Government Misconduct
and in the Interest of Justice,” ECF No. 162, and supplemented that motion on April 24 and 30,
2020 based on additional disclosures, see ECF Nos. 181, 188-190. Both Mr. Flynn’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and motion to dismiss the case remain pending before the Court.3
LEGAL BACKGROUND
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) permits the Government, “with leave of court,”
to “dismiss an indictment, information or complaint.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). It is also “well
established that the Government may move to dismiss even after a complaint has turned into a
conviction because of a guilty plea.” United States v. Hector, 577 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir.
2009) (collecting cases); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 31 (finding an abuse of
discretion to refuse to grant post-conviction Rule 48(a) motion).
When the Government so moves, the role for courts addressing Rule 48(a) motions is
“narrow” and circumscribed. United States v. Fokker Servs., B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir.
2016). The “leave of court” provision serves “primarily to guard against the prospect that
dismissal is part of a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant” through repeated

3
On May 7, 2020, defense counsel confirmed with the prosecution team that upon the
Government filing this motion to dismiss, the defense would move to withdraw all pending
defense motions without prejudice.
10

prosecutions—a prospect not implicated by, as here, a motion to dismiss with prejudice. Id. at
742 (citing Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 29 n.15); see also In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th
Cir. 2003) (no such concerns where “[t]he government wants to dismiss the civil rights count
with prejudice, and that is what [the defendant] wants as well”).
The discretion accorded the DOJ under Rule 48(a) recognizes that “decisions to dismiss
pending charges … lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion” and “‘at the core of
the Executive’s duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws.’” Fokker Servs., 818 F.3d at 741
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive
Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a
case.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, the factors relevant to carrying forward with a
prosecution, including “the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall
enforcement plan,” are “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
For those reasons, a court should not deny the Government’s motion to dismiss “based on
a disagreement with the prosecution’s exercise of charging authority,” such as “a view that the
defendant should stand trial” or “that more serious charges should be brought.” Fokker Servs.,
818 F.3d at 742-43. Nor should a court second-guess the Government’s “conclusion that
additional prosecution or punishment would not serve the public interest.” Id. at 743; see also In
re United States, 345 F.3d at 453 (“We are unaware … of any appellate decision that actually
upholds a denial of a motion to dismiss a charge” on grounds that dismissal would not serve the
“public interest.”).
11

DISCUSSION
Based on an extensive review of this investigation, including newly discovered and
disclosed information attached to the defendant’s supplemental pleadings, see ECF Nos. 181,
188-190, the Government has concluded that continued prosecution of Mr. Flynn would not
serve the interests of justice.
Under the Principles of Federal Prosecution, the Government should not prosecute a
defendant “unless the attorney for the government believes that the admissible evidence is
sufficient to obtain and sustain a guilty verdict by an unbiased trier of fact.” Justice Manual 9-
27.220. “A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental
interests of society require the application of federal criminal law to a particular set of
circumstances. . . .” Justice Manual 9-27.001. The particular circumstances of this case militate
in favor of terminating the proceedings: Mr. Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements
that were not “material” to any investigation. Because the Government does not have a
substantial federal interest in penalizing a defendant for a crime that it is not satisfied occurred
and that it does not believe it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt, the Government now moves
to dismiss the criminal information under Rule 48(a).
Proof of a false statement to federal investigators under Section 1001(a)(2) requires more
than a lie. It also requires demonstrating that such a statement was “material” to the underlying
investigation. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kim, 808
F. Supp. 2d 44, 59 (D.D.C. 2011). Section 1001 prohibits “knowingly and willfully ... mak[ing]
any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” in a “matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive … branch of the Government of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. §
1001(a)(2) (emphasis added). As is well-established, materiality does not equate to mere
12

“relevance”; rather, “[t]o be ‘material’ means to have probative weight”—that is, to be
“reasonably likely to influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.”
Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 701 (emphasis added).
The materiality threshold thus ensures that misstatements to investigators are
criminalized only when linked to the particular “subject of [their] investigation.” Kim, 808 F.
Supp. 2d at 59; cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 774 (1988) (false date and birthplace
statements in immigration application were not “material” as they were not “relevant to his
qualifications [for citizenship]”). And it prevents law enforcement from fishing for falsehoods
merely to manufacture jurisdiction over any statement—true or false—uttered by a private
citizen or public official.
In the case of Mr. Flynn, the evidence shows his statements were not “material” to any
viable counterintelligence investigation—or any investigation for that matter—initiated by the
FBI. Indeed, the FBI itself had recognized that it lacked sufficient basis to sustain its initial
counterintelligence investigation by seeking to close that very investigation without even an
interview of Mr. Flynn. See Ex. 1 at 4. Having repeatedly found “no derogatory information”
on Mr. Flynn, id. at 2, the FBI’s draft “Closing Communication” made clear that the FBI had
found no basis to “predicate further investigative efforts” into whether Mr. Flynn was being
directed and controlled by a foreign power (Russia) in a manner that threatened U.S. national
security or violated FARA or its related statutes, id. at 3.
With its counterintelligence investigation no longer justifiably predicated, the
communications between Mr. Flynn and Mr. Kislyak—the FBI’s sole basis for resurrecting the
investigation on January 4, 2017—did not warrant either continuing that existing
counterintelligence investigation or opening a new criminal investigation. The calls were
13

entirely appropriate on their face. Mr. Flynn has never disputed that the calls were made.
Indeed, Mr. Flynn, as the former Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, would have readily
expected that the FBI had known of the calls—and told FBI Deputy Director McCabe as much.
See Ex. 11. Mr. Flynn, as the incumbent National Security Advisor and senior member of the
transition team, was reaching out to the Russian ambassador in that capacity. In the words of
one senior DOJ official: “It seemed logical . . . that there may be some communications between
an incoming administration and their foreign partners.” Ex. 3 at 3. Such calls are not uncommon
when incumbent public officials preparing for their oncoming duties seek to begin and build
relationships with soon-to-be counterparts.
Nor was anything said on the calls themselves to indicate an inappropriate relationship
between Mr. Flynn and a foreign power. Indeed, Mr. Flynn’s request that Russia avoid
“escalating” tensions in response to U.S. sanctions in an effort to mollify geopolitical tensions
was consistent with him advocating for, not against, the interests of the United States. At
bottom, the arms-length communications gave no indication that Mr. Flynn was being “directed
and controlled by … the Russian federation,” much less in a manner that “threat[ened] …
national security.” Ex. 1 at 2, Ex. 2 at 2. They provided no factual basis for positing that Mr.
Flynn had violated FARA. Nor did the calls remotely transform Mr. Flynn into a “viable
candidate as part of the larger … umbrella case” into Russian interference in the 2016
presidential election. Ex. 1 at 3.
In any event, there was no question at the FBI as to the content of the calls; the FBI had
in its possession word-for-word transcripts of the actual communications between Mr. Flynn and
Mr. Kislyak. See Ex. 5 at 3; Ex. 13. at 3. With no dispute as to what was in fact said, there was
no factual basis for the predication of a new counterintelligence investigation. Nor was there a
14

justification or need to interview Mr. Flynn as to his own personal recollections of what had been
said. Whatever gaps in his memory Mr. Flynn might or might not reveal upon an interview
regurgitating the content of those calls would not have implicated legitimate counterintelligence
interests or somehow exposed Mr. Flynn as beholden to Russia.
Notably, at this time FBI did not open a criminal investigation based on Mr. Flynn’s calls
with Mr. Kislyak predicated on the Logan Act. See Ex. 7 at 1-2.4 See Ex. 3 at 2-3; Ex. 4 at 1-2;
Ex. 5 at 9. The FBI never attempted to open a new investigation of Mr. Flynn on these grounds.
Mr. Flynn’s communications with the Russian ambassador implicated no crime. This is apparent
from the FBI’s rush to revive its old investigation rather than open and justify a new one, see Ex.
7 at 1-2, as well as its ongoing inability to espouse a consistent justification for its probe in
conversations with DOJ leadership, See Ex. 3 at 5. In fact, Deputy Attorney General Yates
thought that the FBI leadership “morphed” between describing the investigation into Mr. Flynn
as a “counterintelligence” or a “criminal” investigation. Id.
In short, Mr. Flynn’s calls with the Russian ambassador—the only new information to
arise since the FBI’s decision to close out his investigation—did not constitute an articulable
factual basis to open any counterintelligence investigation or criminal investigation. Mr. Strzok

4
Congress first enacted the Logan Act in 1799 to “guard by law against the interference of
individuals with the negotiation of our Executive with the Governments of foreign countries.”
Joseph Gales & William Seaton, Annals of the Congress of the United States, 2494 (1851)
(quoting 5th Congress, 3d Session); see also Waldron v. British Petro. Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89
n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The Department of Justice does not appear ever to have brought a
prosecution under the statute in the Department’s 150-year history, and the Government is aware
of only two indictments, in 1803 and 1852, neither of which resulted in a conviction. In the
absence of any history of enforcement or any public guidance concerning the scope of its
prohibition, the Department does not believe there was a legitimate basis to investigate and
prosecute the designated National Security Advisor of the President-Elect under the Logan Act
for communicating with a foreign ambassador and seeking to mollify geopolitical tensions in
advance of the inauguration of the next President.
15

and Ms. Page apparently celebrated the “serendipitous[]” and “amazing” fact of the FBI’s delay
in formally closing out the original counterintelligence investigation. Ex. 7 at 1. Having the
ability to bootstrap the calls with Mr. Kislyak onto the existing authorization obviated the need
for the “7th Floor” of the FBI to predicate further investigative efforts. In doing so, the FBI
sidestepped a modest but critical protection that constrains the investigative reach of law
enforcement: the predication threshold for investigating American citizens.
Nor did anything about the statements by Vice President Pence or Sean Spicer in mid-
January—weeks after the FBI had resolved to resurrect its dormant investigation into Mr.
Flynn—provide a separate or distinct basis for an investigation. Had the FBI been deeply
concerned about the disparities between what they knew had been said on the calls and the
representations of Vice President Pence or Mr. Spicer, it would have sought to speak with them
directly, but did not. Whether or not Mr. Flynn had been entirely candid with the future Vice
President or Press Secretary did not create a predicate for believing he had committed a crime or
was beholden to a foreign power.
The frail and shifting justifications for its ongoing probe of Mr. Flynn, as well as the
irregular procedure that preceded his interview, suggests that the FBI was eager to interview Mr.
Flynn irrespective of any underlying investigation. As is undisputed, the agents breached the
common practice of arranging for the interview through the White House Counsel. See Ex. 3 at
5-6; Ex. 4 at 5; Ex. 5 at 6. Deputy Director McCabe effectively discouraged Mr. Flynn from
procuring counsel or even notifying the White House Counsel. See Ex. 11. The interviewing
agents failed to issue the common Section 1001 admonitions about lying to investigators. See
Ex. 3 at 6; Ex. 4 at 5; Ex. 9 at 5-6; see also Ex. 6. Nor did the FBI even notify Acting Attorney
General Yates that the interview was happening until the interviewing agents were already en
16

route to Mr. Flynn. See Ex. 3 at 5-6; Ex. 4 at 4-5; Ex. 5 at 6. This gambit by the FBI left Yates
“flabbergasted” and “dumbfounded.” See Ex. 3 at 6.
Additionally, prior to the interview, there were internal FBI discussions about whether to
show Mr. Flynn the transcripts of his calls with Mr. Kislyak.5 In light of the fact that the FBI
already had these transcripts in its possessions, Mr. Flynn’s answers would have shed no light on
whether and what he communicated with Mr. Kislyak.—and those issues were immaterial to the
no longer justifiably predicated counterintelligence investigation. Similarly, whether Mr. Flynn
did or “did not recall” (ECF No. 1) communications already known by the FBI was assuredly not
material.
Under these circumstances, the Government cannot explain, much less prove to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, how false statements are “material” to an investigation that—as
explained above—seems to have been undertaken only to elicit those very false statements and
thereby criminalize Mr. Flynn. Although it does not matter that the FBI knew the truth and
therefore was not deceived by Mr. Flynn’s statements, see United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d
688, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 2011), a false statement must still “be capable of influencing an agency
function or decision,” United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations and
quotation mark omitted). Even if he told the truth, Mr. Flynn’s statements could not have
conceivably “influenced” an investigation that had neither a legitimate counterintelligence nor
criminal purpose. See United States v. Mancuso, 485 F.2d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Neither the
answer he in fact gave nor the truth he allegedly concealed could have impeded or furthered the
investigation.”); cf. United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that a

5
Priestap’s talking points, prepared in advance of a January 24 morning meeting with McCabe
reflect this internal debate.
17

lie can be material absent an existing investigation so long as it might “influenc[e] the possibility
that an investigation might commence.”). Accordingly, a review of the facts and circumstances
of this case, including newly discovered and disclosed information, indicates that Mr. Flynn’s
statements were never “material” to any FBI investigation.6
And even if they could be material, the Government does not believe it could prove that
Mr. Flynn knowingly and willfully made a false statement beyond a reasonable doubt.7 Based
on the facts of this case, the Government is not persuaded that it could show that Mr. Flynn
committed a false statement under its burden of proof. The FBI agents “had the impression that
Flynn was not lying or did not think he was lying.” Ex. 13 at 4. And the statements in question
were not by their nature easily falsifiable. In his interview, Mr. Flynn offered either equivocal
(“I don’t know”) or indirect responses, or claimed to not remember the matter in question. See
United States v. Ring, 811 F. Supp. 2d 359, 384 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that “faulty memory” is
not enough to establish “willful” lie absent proof the defendant indeed remembered the matter in

6
The statements by Mr. Flynn also were not material to the umbrella investigation of Crossfire
Hurricane, which focused on the Trump campaign and its possible coordination with Russian
officials to interfere with the 2016 presidential election back prior to November 2016. See Ex. 1
at 3; Ex. 2 at 1-2. Mr. Flynn had never been identified by that investigation and had been
deemed “no longer” a viable candidate for it. Most importantly, his interview had nothing to do
with this subject matter and nothing in FBI materials suggest any relationship between the
interview and the umbrella investigation. Rather, throughout the period before the interview, the
FBI consistently justified the interview of Flynn based on its no longer justifiably predicated
counterintelligence investigation of him alone.
7
The Government appreciates that the Court previously deemed Mr. Flynn’s statements
sufficiently “material” to the investigation. United States v. Flynn, 411 F. Supp. 3d 15, 41-42
(D.D.C. 2019). It did so, however, based on the Government’s prior understanding of the nature
of the investigation, before new disclosures crystallized the lack of a legitimate investigative
basis for the interview of Mr. Flynn, and in the context of a decision on multiple defense Brady
motions independent of the Government’s assessment of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
18

question). Combining the vague substance of the answers, the FBI’s own preliminary estimation
of Mr. Flynn’s truthfulness, the inconsistent FBI records as to the actual questions and statements
made, and Director Comey’s own sentiment that the case was a “close one,” Ex. 5 at 9, the
evidentiary problems that have emerged create reasonable doubt as to whether Mr. Flynn
knowingly and willingly lied to investigators during the interview.
Mr. Flynn previously pleaded guilty to making false statements. See Def’s Plea
Agreement, ECF Nos. 3-4. In the Government’s assessment, however, he did so without full
awareness of the circumstances of the newly discovered, disclosed, or declassified information as
to the FBI’s investigation of him. Mr. Flynn stipulated to the essential element of materiality
without cause to dispute it insofar as it concerned not his course of conduct but rather that of the
agency investigating him, and insofar as it has been further illuminated by new information in
discovery.
“The advocacy function of a prosecutor includes seeking exoneration and confessing
error to correct an erroneous conviction.” Warney v. Monroe Cty.., 587 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir.
2009). So in the final analysis, irrespective of Mr. Flynn’s plea, “prosecutors have a duty to do
justice.” Darui, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 37; see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249
(1980) (“Prosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the public interest.”) (citation
omitted). Federal prosecutors possess “immense power to strike at citizens, not with mere
individual strength, but with all the force of government itself.” Robert H. Jackson, The Federal
Prosecutor, 24 Judicature 18, 18 (1940) (address delivered at the Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys, April 1, 1940). For that reason, “the citizen’s safety lies in the
prosecutor who … seeks truth and not victims, who serves the law and not factional purposes,
and who approaches [the] task with humility.” Id. Based on a careful assessment of the balance
19

of proof, the equities, and the federal interest served by continued prosecution of false statements
that were not “material” to any bona fide investigation, the Government has concluded that the
evidence is insufficient to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government therefore
moves to dismiss the criminal information under Rule 48(a).
CONCLUSION
The Government respectfully moves under Rule 48(a) to dismiss the criminal information
against Mr. Flynn.
Respectfully submitted,
TIMOTHY SHEA
BY:_____Timothy Shea_________
United States Attorney
D.C. Bar No. 472845
20

Case 1:17-cr-00232-EGS Document 198-1 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
Crim. No. 17-232 (EGS)
MICHAEL T. FLYNN,
Defendant
[PROPOSED] ORDER
On May 7, 2020, the government filed a Motion to Dismiss the Criminal Information
Against the Defendant Michael T. Flynn, in which the government moved to dismiss with
prejudice the criminal information filed in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48 and as an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion.
Upon consideration of the request, and for the reasons stated in the government’s motion,
the government’s motion is hereby GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that criminal information filed in this case will be dismissed with
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
The Honorable Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge

EXHIBIT 1
FD-1057 (Rev. 5-8-10)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Eleotronlc Communication
Title: 11111111 Cl osing Communication Date: 01/04/2017
From: WASHINGTON FIELD
Contact: BARNETT WILL I AM J JR,
Approved By: Joe Pientka III
Drafted By: BARNETT WILL IAM J JR
Case ID#: CROSSFIRE RAZOR

FOREIGN AGENTS REGI~.TRATION ACT -
RUSSIA;
.pENSITIVE I NVE~TIGATIVE MATTER
Synopsis : To document the dl'osing of capti oned case .

:!
Details:
The FBI opene~ captioned,,case based on an art iculable

that CRQSSFIRE 'RAZOR (CR) may wi tt i ngl y or unwittingly be
involved in activity on behalt'"of .the Russian Federation which may
~; '''
cons ti tute·;··a ,£ederal crime or threat t o the national security. The FBI
predicated the , investigation on predet ermined criteria set forth by the
CROSSFIRE HURRIC~E (CH) i nv~st i gati ve team based on a n assessment o f
reliable l ead infdrmation
' ,:t
received during the course of the
investigat i on. Specifi cally, CR was cited as an adviser to t hen
Re publican preside nt ia l · candidate DONALD J. TRUMP for foreign policy
issues since February 2016; CR had ties to various state-affiliated
entities o f the Russ i a n Federat i on, as reported by open source
i nformati on ; and CR traveled to Russia in December 2015, as reported by
open source information. Additionally, CR has an active TS/SCI
clearance.
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER DOJSCO - 700023466

Titl osing Communication

Re: 01/04/2017
The goal of the investigation was to determine whether

the captioned subject, associated with the Trump campaign, was directed
and control led by and/or coordinated activities wtth ' the Russian
Federation in a manner which is a threat to the n~tional security
and/or possibly a violation of the Foreign AgentsRegistrat ion Act, 18
U. S . C sect i on 951 et seq, or other related st~tutes.
Followin g the initiation of captioned case,: the CH Team

conducted a check of logical databases .for any derogatory i ,nformation
on CROSSFIRE RAZOR. No derogatory information was identified in FBI
holdings.
'
requested th.at
The . f ound
CROSSFIRE RAZOR .
- In .,a ddition to - ' the FBI requested that -

conduct a search .<;?f it s ·qol~ings fof a p y derogatory information on
CROSSFIRE RAZOR. No derogat9ry i nformation was reported back to the
FBI.
l '
The CH inv~stigat i,:,-e ; team also addressed this
investigat ion through CHS reporting CROSSFIRE RAZOR for any derogatory
or lead infor:mat., 'i on. As such
'
CH contacted an established FBI CHS to
query about CR . During the debr i efing the CHS rela ed an incidents/he
witnessed when CROSS ~IRE:~ZOR (CR) spoke at the in the
The CHS, was unsure of the date, but noted that
CROSSFIRE RAZOR was still in his/her position within the USIC.
[Writer's note: per open source, CR spoke at on
The CHS advised that after CR spoke and socialized with
at dinner and over drinks, members of 111111
a cab to take CR to the train stat i on to bring

Closing Communication
Re: 01/04/2017
him/her t The CHS stated that a

and joined CR on t he train
was somewhat. suspi c i ous o f
been affi l iated with several prominent members of
The CHS believes that father may be a Russian
Oligarch CHS cou further
information on trip .
The CH investigat ive team checked name through

available FBI dat abases for any derogatory information with . negative
results. A formal as submitted to - for
any derogatory informati on. - report~fl no ct,ei ogatory information
in its holdings.
11111111
Analysis This analysis
utilized records as well as 11111
and - records. the FBI
initiated
if there was contact between him and CROSSFIRE RAZOR .

:~.:- "
between the two indiv~duals wa ~,. observed,J?Y the surveillance teams
covering the .event.
- In addi t i'.on
;
Following the c;:qmpilation of the above information, the CH
t eam determined t hat CR().$SFIRE RAZOR was no longer a viable candidate
as part ~ SFIRE HURRICANE umbrella case . A review of
logical l l l l l l l l l l l l l l l databases did not yield any information on
which to predicat e fur t her inves t igative e f forts. Whi le a CHS provided
some information on CR ' s interaction with ~ the absence of
der ogatory information on llll limited the invest i gat i ve va l ue o f the
information . The writer notes that since CROSSFIRE RAZOR was not
specificall y named as an agent of a foreign power by the original

Closing Communication
Re: 01/04/2017
CROSSFIRE HURRICANE predicated reporting, the absence of any derogatory

information or lead information from t hese logical sources reduced the
number of i nvestigat i ve avenues and techni ques to pursue. Per the
direction of FBI management, CROSSFIRE RAZOR was not 'i nterviewed as
part of the case closing procedure .
- The FBI is closing this investigat~.o n . If 9ew information is

identified or reported to t he FBI regardin9"the activitLes of CROSSFIRE
RAZOR, the FBI will consider reopening the investigationr.Jf warranted .
••

EXHIBIT 2
~
I Case 1:17-cr-00232-EGS Document 198-3 Filed 05/07/20 Page 2 of 3
FD- I 057 (Rev. 5-8-10)

Eleotronic Communication
Title: . . . Opening of the CROSSFIRE RAZOR Date: 08/16/2016

ion.
From:
Approved By:
.t:
NEW YORK
- . - - - I
Drafted By:
Case l:D #: CROSSFIRE RAZOR

- ENTS REGISTRATION ACT
RUSSIA;
SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER
Synopsis: 1111111111 Opening EC for the CROSSFIRE RAZOR investigation.
Full Investigation Initiated: 08/16/2016
Details:
The FBI is opening a full investigation based on
- able factual basis tha t reasonably indicates that
CROSSFIRE RAZOR (CR) may wittingly or unwittingly be
involved in activity on behalf of the Russian Federation
which may constitute a federal crime or threat to the
national securi t y. The FBI is predicating the investigation
on predetermined criteria set forth by the CROSSFIRE
HURRICANE investigative team based on an assessment of
reliable lead information received during the course of the
investigation. Specifically, CR has been c ited as an adviser
to the Trump team on foreign policy issues February 2016; he
has t i es t o v arious state-affiliated ent ities of the Russian
Declassified by FBI - C58W88B61

on 5/4/2020
This redacted version only
Opening of the CROSSFIRE RAZOR investigation.

, 08/16/2016
Federation, as reported by open source information; and he

traveled to Russia in December 2015, as reported by open
source information. Additionally, CR has an active TS/SCI
clearance.
~ The goal of the investigation is to determine

~ e captioned subject, associated with the Trump
Team, is being directed and controlled by and/or
coordinating activities with t h e Russian Federation in a
manner which may be a threat to the national securi t y and/or
possibly a violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
18 U.S.C section 951 et seq, or other related statutes.
~ As the captioned subject is prominent in a

~ olitical campaign, the FBI has categorized this
investigat ion as a sensitive investigative matter (SIM) and
considered the factors set forth in DIOG 10.1.3. Based on
the facts and circumstances provided to date, the FBI
believes that opening this investigation on captioned
subject is the least intrusive method to addressee the
serious national security ri sk posed by the activities
a l leged .
••
2
EXHIBIT 3
EXHIBIT 4
EXHIBIT 5
FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS
Thursday, March 2, 2817
U.S. House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:28 a.m., in Room
HVC-384, the Capitol, the Honorable Devin Nunes [chairman of the

committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Nunes, Conaway, King, LoBiondo,

Rooney, Ros-Lehtinen, Turner, Wenstrup, Stewart, Crawford, Gowdy,
Stefanik, Hurd, Schiff, Himes, Sewell, Carson, Speier, Quigley,
Swalwell, Castro, and Heck.
Also Present: Representative Calvert.
Staff Present: Nick Ciarlante, Chief Clerk; William
Declassified by FBI - C58W88B61

on 5/6/2020
Flanigan, Professional Staff Member; Scott Glabe, Deputy General

Counsel; Lisa Major, Professional Staff Member; Damon Nelson,
Staff Director; George Pappas, Senior Advisor; Shannon Stuart,
Budget Director; Mark Stewart, General Counsel; Michael Bahar,
Minority Staff Director; Wells Bennett, Minority Counsel; Timothy
Bergreen, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Carly Blake, Minority
Budget Director; Linda Cohen, Professional Staff Member -
Minority; Thomas Eager, Associate Professional Staff Member -
Minority; Robert Minehart, Minority Senior Advisor; Amanda
Rogers-Thorpe, Professional Staff Member - Minority; Rheanne
Wirkkala, Professional Staff Member - Minority; Kristin Jepson,
Security Director; Jeff Dressler, National Security Advisor for
the Speaker; and Wyndee Parker, Senior Policy Advisor for the
Minority Leader.
18
So when the President announced -- that is the completion of
the III calls. When the President announced that the United
States Government was going to expel Russian diplomats and take
the actions to close and to impose sanctions on some of the
intelligence leadership in Russia, we obviously were covering
very, very closely to see what reaction we would get from the
Russians; what are they going to do? So our analysts were
watching allover the country on the
Russians. And so we -- they saw this much more quickly than we
normally would, and
And then the Intelligence Community, including the FBI, was
surprised when the Russians did nothing in response to the
expulsion. One of the reasons we were was to see,
how far will they go in retaliating to us, and then what will we
do?
And so the last couple days of December and the first couple
days of January, all the Intelligence Community was trying to
figure out, so what is going on here? Why is this -- why have the
Russians reacted the way they did, which confused us? And so we
were all tasked to find out, do you have anything
that might reflect on this? That turned up these calls at the end
of December, beginning of January. And then I briefed it to the
Director of National Intelligence, and Director Clapper asked me
for copies J which I shared with him.

19
In the first week of January, .he briefed the President and
the Vice President and then President Obama's senior team about
what we had found and what we had seen to help them understand why
the Russians were reacting the way they did.
We did not disseminate this l1li in any finished
intelligence, although our people judged was appropriate, for
reasons that I hope are obvious, to have Mr. Flynn's name
unmasked. We kept this very close hold, and it was shared just as
I described.
I had not briefed the Department of Justice about this, and
found myself at the Oval Office on the 5th of January to brief the
President on the separate effort that you all are aware of by the
Intelligence Community to report on what the Russians had done
during the election. And in the course of that conversation, the
President mentioned this II1II And that was the first time the
Acting Attorney General, Sally Yates, had heard about it. So,
immediately after th~t, I briefed her about what it was. That was
on the 6th of January. So that is the first week of January.
Nothing, to my mind, happens until the 13th of January, when
David Ignatius publishes a column that contains a reference to
communications Michael Flynn had with the Russians. That was on
the 13th of January.

And then 2 days later -- I think it is Sunday the 15th of
January -- the Vice President is on the Sunday morning shows and
says that Flynn had communications with the Russians, but it was
20
about essentially nothing about sanctions, or nothing substantive.
It was about expressing condolences and -- and I forget what else
he said at that point. So that is the 15th of January.
So that begins the last week of the Obama administration.
And during that week, the then Acting Attorney General was urging
me to tell the White House that the Vice President's statements
are inaccurate and to give them a heads-up that the statements
that he had made to the public were inconsistent with what we knew
And I resisted that, for two reasons.
The first and most important reason is I worried it would step on

our investigative equities. Our investigative team wanted to
consider, so what else should we do with respect to Mr. Flynn?
And I should have said this at the beginning. At that point,
we had an open counterintelligence investigation on Mr. Flynn, and
it had been open since the summertime, and we were very close to
closing it. In fact, I had -- I think I had authorized it to be
closed at the end of January, beginning -- excuse me, end of
December, beginning of January. And we kept it open once we
became aware of these communications. And there were additional
steps the investigators wanted to consider, and if we were to give
a heads-up to anybody at the White House, it might step on our
ability to take those steps.

And, second, even if that hadn't been the case, I don't think
the FBI's job is to give prudential heads-ups. And if the

leadership of the Department of Justice wanted to do that, that
21
was certainly fine for them to do, but I didn't think it was
something that I should do.
And then the DNI and the Director of Central Intelligence
Agency, so Mr. Clapper and Mr. Brennan, both approached me on the
19th, the last evening of the Obama administration, and asked me
whether I was going to tell them about what I knew about Mr. Flynn
before they took office, and I said that I was not, given our
investigative equities, and the conversation ended there.
The administration takes office on the 28th, obviously. On
the 24th, I directed agents to go to the White House to interview
Mr. Flynn and had the Deputy Director call Mr. Flynn and say: We
want to send over a couple agents to interview you. Are you
willing to talk to them?
And he said: Sure. Send them over. I will talk to them
right now.
And we sent two of our most experienced counterintelligence
investigators over to the White House. I did not tell the
Department of Justice that I was taking that step until after I
had taken the step. And two experienced agents went over and met
Mr. Flynn alone.

The Deputy Director said: If you want to have somebody else
there, that is fine.

He said: I will meet with them alone.
And he met with the two agents and was interviewed in his
office in the West Wing and said essentially what the Vice
22
President had said on television, which is: I didn't talk to the
Russians about their expulsion of diplomats. I didn't talk to the
Russians about their -- the sanctions. I didn't talk about that
at all.
And then the agents, obviously being experienced agents,
start interviewing him, and not -- they didn't show him the
transcripts, but they started using in their questions words that
were taken directly from the transcripts: Well, did you say this,
and did you say that, and did you say this?
And he obviously began to pick up that they had something
else that was underlying their questions, and he said: Look, it
is possible. I am guessing you guys the
Russians, but -- he said: I don't remember talking about that. I
was in the Dominican Republic. I didn't get his text because I
had bad coverage there. I called him back. And I don't remember
talking to him about this. And I am sorry, but I didn't he
said: My recollection is I did not talk to him about that.
And the agents -- and the reason I mention their experience
is because I talked to them about this -- they discerned no
physical indications of deception. They didn't see any change in
posture, in tone, in inflection, in eye contact. They saw nothing
that indicated to them that he knew he was lying to them.
And they interviewed him completely, went through it all, did
not show him the transcript, 1IIIIIIII or transcripts, and then

came back and drafted a 302 and reported to me and the Deputy
23
Director.
And I then briefed the White House on the contents of what
Mr. Flynn had said. That is the 24th of January.
The 26th of January, the Acting Attorney General went over to
the White House with a career senior official from the National
Security Division and met with the White House Counsel and briefed
him on what we had learned and what we
had learned from the Flynn interview. And then they went back the
next day and continued that conversation and offered to make
available the transcripts to the White
House.
The White House assigned a lawyer named John Eisenberg, who
works for the White House Counsel, and he came over to the FBI
shortly thereafter and reviewed the transcripts of the Flynn -I
And then, on the 10th of February, the FBI carried the
transcripts -- two of our folks carried the transcripts over to

the White House and reviewed them with White House Counsel and, I
believe, the Vice President. And on the 13th of February,
Mr. Flynn resigned.

So that is the chronology , our review of
it, and then our investigative steps.

NOw, there is still, obviously, an open investigation of
Mr. Flynn that is criminal in nature. So I am not going to go
70
MR. ROONEY: Okay. Thank you.
I yield back.
THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Mr. Carson is not here. Ms. Speier.
MS. SPEIER: Thank youJ Mr. Chairman.
Thank youJ Mr. Corney. Do you believe that Mr. Flynn lied?
MR. COMEY: I don't know. I think there is an argument to be
made that he lied. It is a close one.
MS. SPEIER: So the fact that he actively was asking the
RussiansJ through the AmbassadorJ to vote against the United
States at the U.N. with regard to Israeli settlements} have you
looked further into that issue? Because that clearly involves a
private citizen conducting foreign policy.
MR. COMEY: We haven't besides obviously analyzing IIIIIIII

and interviewing him. That is one of the questions for
the Department of JusticeJ is do you want further investigation.
That would be the Logan Act angleJ not the false statements to
Federal agents angle.

MS. SPEIER: So you have not pursued that inquirYJ though?
MR. COMEY: Not beyond what I have described here.
MS. SPEIER: Are you going to?
MR. COMEY: Not unless we get the Department of Justice
directing us tOJ if they need some information to be able to
evaluate Mr. Flynn. Like I saidJ I doubt it honestly because of
the nature of the Logan Act as such. AgainJ I am not an expertJ

but I don't think it is something prosecutors have used. But it
71
is possible. That is one of the reasons we sent it over to them,
saying look, here is this old statute. Do you want us to do
further investigation?
-
-.
75
••••
••
•
MR. TURNER:
•••
When your agents went to go speak to Mr. Flynn~
76
and questioned him about the conversation, you already knew the
contents of the conversation. You had the transcript and the
agents had access to the transcript.
MR. COMEY: Correct.
MR. TURNER: So you couldn't have sent agents to Mr. Flynn
for the purposes of questioning him about the content of the

conversation because you already knew what the content was.
Correct?
MR. COMEY: Right. Our purpose --
MR. TURNER: Right. You had a transcript, so there was no
question. So right. Thank you.

So what was the purpose of the questioning? If it wasn't to
ascertain what happened in the phone conversation, of which the
contents you knew, what was the purpose to ask him these questions
about what happened in the conversation?
MR. COMEY: To find out whether there was something we were
missing about his relationship with the Russians and whether he
would -- because we had this disconnect publicly between what the

Vice President was saying and what we knew. And so before we
closed an investigation of Flynn, I wanted them to sit before him
and say what is the deal?

MR. TURNER: By publicly, you mean statements that were made
in the press.
MR. COMEY: Right. That the Vice President made on TV.
MR. TURNER: Right. Okay. But you have also made statements
86
business or government relationships, with Russia. Is that
correct?
MR. COMEY: Well the context was there was an open
counterintelligence investigation that had been open for months,
trying to figure out is there some sort of covert relationship
between Mr. Flynn and the Russian Government. And then when Mr.
Flynn has a communication with the Russian
Ambassador, and that it appears again, from what we can see
from the outside -- that he for some reason hasn't been candid
with the Vice President about this, my judgment was we could not
close the investigation of Mr. Flynn without asking him what is
the deal here. That was the purpose.
MR. SWALWELL: And do you agree with Ms. Yates's evaluation
that that made him blackmailable?
MR. COMEY: Possible. That struck me as a bit of a reach,
-
though, honestly.
-.
EXHIBIT 6
Case
Case1:17-cr-00232-EGS
1:17-cr-00232-EGS Document
Document132-3
198-7 Filed
Filed11/01/19
05/07/20 Page
Page12
2 of 6
16
F.J>.302 (Rev, 5-&-lO) • 1 of 5 •

Date ofeutry 02/14/::.:017
DRAFT DOCUMENT/DELIBERATIVE MATERIAL

Do not dis~emina.te out;:iide the FBI without the pe.rmissi9n of the originator or. program
manager.
On January 24 , 2017, Deputy Assistant Director (DAD) Peter

k II and , interviewed United States
(U . S.) National Security Advisor Michael T. FLYNN, date of birth
-
(DOB} , at . his office at the White House . After
being advised of the iden t i ties the interviewing :agents and the of
nature of the interview, FLYNN provided the following information :
FLYNN ' s first invitation to Russia occurred when he was the

· of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). FLYNN was the
first DIA Director to be invited to GRU headquarters. · During that
-
four day trip in 2013 , he partici pated -in a leadership development
program at GRU (Russian Military Intelligence) headquarters . FLYNN
received proper authorization within the U.S. Government prior to
conducting the trip . .. FLYNN could not recal l if he met Russia ' s
Ambassador . to .the United States, Sergey rvanovich KISLYAK, during
this trip . FLYNN described the Ru.ssians a.5 very appreciative of hi:s
visit . During this trip to Russia as DIA Director, FLYNN · first met
.the then- GRU Director Igor SERGUN . Following the .trip , FLYNN and
SERGUN conti.n ued their ;.relationship on at least one occas ion through ·
video teleconference (VTC) arid were planning a vi.5it for SERGUN to
travel tO ' the United States on February 28, 2014 . Russia invaded
Crimea in .the weeks prior to SERGUN ' s planned trip, SERGUN ' s trip
was cancelled, and FLYNN had no.further contact with -the GRU
Director .· FLYNN desc.ribect .SERGUN as having common ground with FJ;,YNN
in that · they had similar backgrou~ds, . their sons ,,,ere the same age,
and they had a 6onnection in fighting terrorism . SERGUN had scars
from Chechnya and they shared stories about Afghanistan . FLYNN
stated he called Ambass.ac::ior KISLYAK following SERGUN I s death in
01/24/2017 ._1 Washington, District Of Columbia, United States (In Person)
Dat~ drnftcd 01 / 24/2017

---------------------
l>y STRZOK PETER P II I
'ThisdOCUll)ml cotllaW .Dcilhct l'>OOll>meodatio.os 11~(:ooclusions of the Fl3L lt is tlte property of the FBI and i.s loanod to your agency; it and its content~ arc ttot
co be di.cribt,f.,d outside your agcocy. I
DOJSC0-700022308
I
Case
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FD-302a (Rev. 05·08·10)
Nichael Flynn ,On 01/24/2017 :Page 2 of 5
Lebanon early last year to express his condolences. FLYNN described

SERGUN as someone the U.S. could work with. FLYNN said he was not
really part of the TRUMP campaign at the time of this call to
KISLYAK.
- FLYNN stated his second trip to Russia, after he left U.S.

government service, had received so much press attention that "it
[was] unbelievable." As background, FLYNN explained that he was
never paid directly by media entities, however, he had been a
contributor to a variety of media entities including Al Jazeera,
Russia Today (RT), Sky, and MSNBC. FLYNN received a request from
his speakers bureau, Leading Authorities (LAI), to speak about
Middle East issues at the RT 10th Anniversary reception in Moscow.
FLYNN was paid for the speech by LAI. FLYNN did not know from whom
LAI received payment. FLYNN met with KISLYAK at the Russian
Ambassador's residence next to the University Club prior to this
trip to Russia. The visit was a courtesy call to the Ambassador
prior to his trip, and FLYNN took his son with him to this meeting.
The meeting occurred.in the mid-afternoon. In addition, FLYNN
received a DIA threat briefing prior to the travel.
- Prior to the Presidential inauguration, FLYNN spoke to

~ e representatives in each of approximately thirty countries'
governments. FLYNN stated the only exception to that practice was
Russia, in that FLYNN had substantive conversations only with
KISLYAK, and no other members of the Government of Russia. FLYNN's
interest in Russia was as a common partner in the war on terror.
FLYNN does not know if PUTIN and TRUMP will get along, but it is
FLYNN's job to figure out paths to work with Russia to fight
terrorism. FLYNN named the primary threats to the U.S. as the "four
plus one:" China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and ISIS. FLYNN stated
if the U.S. could neutralize one of the four, or even better,
leverage their cooperation fighting a common enemy such as
terrorism, that would be a success for U.S. national security.
- Sometime prior to Christmas, 2016, the Russian Ambassador

to Turkey was assassinated. FLYNN called KISYLAK the next day to
say he .was sorry and to reinforce that terrorism was our common
problem. FLYNN noted that it was a short call, and "that was it."
On Christmas Day, a Russian military plane crashed and killed all on
board to include what was the equivalent to the "Russian USO;" it
was the same Russian choir that sang at the RT event. FLYNN called
KISYLAK to pass his condolences, as his intent was to try to keep
the relationship with KISLYAK going. FLYNN expanded that he has no
particular affinity for Russia, but that KISLYAK was his
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Fl).J02a (R,v. - J O )
_M_i_ch_a_e_l_F_l_y_n_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .On 01/24/2017 .Page 3 of 5

counterpart,· and maintaining trusted relationships within foreign
governments is important.
- Shortly after Christmas, 2016, FLYNN took a vacation to the

Dominican Republic with his wife. On December 28th, KISYLAK sent
FLYNN a text stating, "Can you call me?" FLYNN noted cellular
reception was poor and he was not checking his phone regularly, and
consequently did not see the text until approximately 24 hours
later. · Upon seeing the text, FLYNN responded that he would call in
15-20 minutes, and he and KISLYAK subsequently spoke. .The Dominican
Republic was one hour ahead of the time in Washington, D.C. During
the call, KISYLAK asked FLYNN to set-up a VTC between
President-elect TRUMP and Russian President PUTIN on January 21st.
In addition, FLYNN and KISLYAK discussed the U.S. sending an
observer to a terrorism conference in Astana, Kazakhstan, that would
be attended by Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syrian opposition groups._
FLYNN stated he did not respond back to KISYLAK about the conference
until probably this week. FLYNN did not make the decision on who
would represent the U.S. until the 20th or 21st of January, and
finally determined an observer from the U.S. Embassy in Astana would
attend. FLYNN noted Russia wanted to take the lead for peace in the
Middle East, but the U.S. needed to be the leader, particularly to
keep Turkey under the U, S. 's wing.. FLYNN added there was a complete
Jack of engagement from the prior administration.
- The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he had any other
~ m a i l , or personal meetings with KISLYAK or other Russians.
FLYNN volunteered that after the election, he had a closed door
meeting with KISYLAK and Jared KUSHNER at Trump Tower in New York
City. KISLYAK was in New York to meet with his diplomats, and the
three had a relatively sensitive meeting. FLYNN was a late addition
to the meeting and did not participate in setting it up. FLYNN
believed the meeting took place before Thanksgiving but was unsure
of the date. FLYNN explained that other meetings between the TRUMP
team and various foreign countries took place prior to the
inauguration, and were sensitive inasmuch as many countries did not
want the then-current administration to know about them. There were
no personal relationships between the leaders of many countries and
the prior administration. FLYNN stated that he and personnel from
t_he incoming administration met with many countries "to set
expectations for them, and the expectations were set very high."
- The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled. any

discussions with KISLYAK about a United Nations (UN) vote
surrounding the issue of Israeli settlements. FLYNN quickly
DOJSCO-700022310
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FD-302a (Rev. 05-08-10)
_M_i_c_h_a_el_F_l...:y:...n_n_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .on 01/24/2017 .Page 4 of 5

1
responded, "Yes, good reminder." On the 22nd of December, FLYNN.
called a litany of countries to include Israel, the UK, Senegal,
Egypt, maybe France and maybe Russia/KISLYAK. Part of the reason
for FLYNN's calls was to conduct an exercise to see how fast the
incoming administration could get someone on the line. FLYNN
likened it to a battle drill to see who the administration could
reach in a crisis. The exercise was conducted at the campaign's GSA
transition building on 18th and I Streets N.W., which FLYNN
described as a somewhat chaotic environment. FLYNN stated he
conducted these calls to attempt to get a sense of where countries
stood on the UN vote, specifically, whether they intended to vote or
abstain.
1111111 The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he made any request

of KISLYAK to vote in a particular way or take any action. FLYNN
stated he did not. FLYNN stated he did not believe his calls to the
various countries would change anything. FLYNN recalled there
needed to be a certain number of abstention votes to alter the
outcome, and that having looked at the math at the time, he knew it
·could not be achieved. FLYNN said 14 countries were voting, and had
a recollection of the number of five votes being important. In the
end, only the U.S. abstained. FLYNN stated his calls were about
asking where countries would stand on·a vote, not any requests of,
"hey if you do this."
1111111 _The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he made any conunent

- to KISLYAK about voting in_- a certain manner, or slowing down the
vote, or if KISLYAK described any Russian response to a request by
FLYNN. FLYNN answered, "No." FLYNN stated the conversations were
along the lines of where do you stand, and. what's your position.
FLYNN heard through other channels that Egypt did not like the vote,
and believed the Egyptians of their own accord delayed the vote a
day. FLYNN again stated that he appreciated the interviewing agents
reminding him that he had another conversation with KISLYAK.
1111111 ~he interviewing agents a~ked FLYNN if ?e recalled.any

conversation with KISLYAK surrounding the expulsion of Russian
diplomats or closing of Russian properties in response to Russian
hacking activities surrounding the election. FLYNN stated that he
did not. FLYNN reiterated his conversation was about the
PUTIN/TRUMP VTC and the "Astana thing" (the Kazakhstan conference
described earlier). FLYNN noted he was not aware of the
then-upcoming actions as he did not have access to television news
in the Dominican Republic and his government BlackBerry was not
working.
DOJSCO-700022311
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FD-302a (R,v. 05-08-10)
Michael Flynn
---------------- .On 01/24/2017 . Page 5 of 5
- The interviewing agents asked FLYNN if he recalled any

conversation with KISLYAK ii:i which the expulsions were discus.sect,
where FLYNN might have encouraged KISLYAK not to escalate the
situation, to keep the Rus.sian response reciprocal, or not to engage
in a "tit-for-tat." FLYNN responded, "Not really. I don't
remember. It wasn't, 'Don't do anything.'" The U.S. Government.'s
response was a total surprise to FLYNN. FLYNN did not know about.
the Persona Non-Grata (PNG} action until it was in the media.
KISLYAK and FLYNN were starting off on a good footing and FLYNN was
looking forward to the relationship. With regard to the scope of
the Ru.ssians who were expelled, FLYNN said he did not understand
it. FLYNN stated he could understand one PNG, but not thirty-five.
- The interviewing agent.s asked FLYNN if he recalled any

conversation with KISLYAK in which KISLYAK told him the Government
of Ru.ssia had taken into account the incoming administration's
position about the expul.sions, or where KISLYAK .said the Government
of Ru.ssia had responded, or chosen to modulate their response, in
any way to the U.S.'s actions as a result of a request by the
incoming administration. FLYNN .stated it was possible that he
talked to KISLYAK on the issue, but if he did, he did not remember
doing so. FLYNN stated he was attempting to start a good
relationship with KISLYAK and move forward. FLYNN remembered making
four to five calls that day about this issue, but that the Dominican
Republic was a difficult place to make a call as he kept having
connectivity issues. FLYNN reflected and stated he did not think he
would have had a conversation with KISLYAK about the matter, as he
did not know the expulsions were coming. FLYNN stated he did not
have a long drawn out discussion with KISLYAK where he wouid have
asked him to "don't do something."
DOJSCO-700022312
EXHIBIT 7
Case
Document189-1
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Filed04/30/20
05/07/20 Page
Page10
2 of 4
12
... ..... ,,_......_

4-Jan-17 2:11 PM Strzok Hey if you havent closed don't do it yet
4-Jan-17 2:12 PM Strzok Sorry, RAZOR
4-Jan-17 2:14 PM Hey if you havent closed RAZOR, don't do so yet
4-Jan-17 2:15 PM Okay
4-Jan-17 2:15 PM
4-Jan-17 2:15 PM
4-Jan-17 2:15 PM
Still open and I'm still listed as the Case Manager (had to double check)
4-Jan-17 2:17 PM
4-Jan-17 2:18 PM r. I couldn't raise earlier. Pis keep it open for now
4-Jan-17 2:17 PM
Razor still open. :@> but serendipitously good, I guess. You want those
4-Jan-17 2:19 PM Strzok Page
4-Jan-17 2:19 PM Page Strzok hew.
4-Jan-17 2:20 PM Page Strzok But yeah, that's amazing that he is still open. Good, I guess.
Yeah, our utter incompetence actually helps us. 20% of the time, I'm
4-Jan-17 2:20 PM Strzok Page guessing:)
4-Jan-17 2:21 PM Strzok
Just need to relay to him not to close RAZOR yet. I talked with
4-Jan-17 2:21 PM
4-Jan-17 2:22 PM Oh,OK
4-Jan-17 2:22 PM Strzok What's up?
Need to decide what to do with him w/r/t the
Did DD send that material over?

has been handling RAZOR's closure - do you want me to reach
4-Jan-17 2:23 PM Strzok out to him?
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER DOJSCO • 700023473

Case
Document189-1
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Page11
3 of 4
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4-Jan-17 2:24 PM Yes

4-Jan-17 2:24 PM Will do
4-Jan-17 2:24 PM Hey don't close RAZOR
4-Jan-17 2:24 PM actually, just got him on Lyne
4-Jan-17 2:24 PM Has he been doing the bulk of the work on him?>
4-Jan-17 2:25 PM He's been doin some of the stuff more recently
Actually, his green bubble just turned yellow, pis do try and reach him
4-Jan-17 2:25 PM
4-Jan-17 2:25 PM Will do
4-Jan-17 2:27 PM ok
4-Jan-17 2:28 PM should I be concerned?
4-Jan-17 2:28 PM Possibly. Will know more in a bit
4-Jan-17 2:29 PM 1'11 lync you in 10-15
4-Jan-17 2:29 PM ok
4-Jan-17 3:59 PM
4-Jan-17 3:59 PM
4-Jan-17 3:59 PM
4-Jan-17 3:59 PM
4-Jan-17 3:59 PM
4-Jan-17 4:00 PM
4-Jan-17 4:08 PM
We'll see, about Bill. He was pretty adamant about what Andy it said with
regard to that. And he mentioned on Saturday that he had several
23-Jan-17 6:37 AM Strzok Page conversations
with Andy. Bill sense with it and he wanted to know why we had to go
aggressively doing these things, openly. I worry Bill isn 't getting the
23-Jan-17 6:37 AM Strzok Page underlying d
23-Jan-17 6:37 AM Strzok Page istinction that I think is clear. But maybe I'm wrong.

Case
Document189-1
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Filed04/30/20
05/07/20 Page
Page12
4 of 4
12
Hi - sorry I missed you yesterday. About to email you questions for Andy to
think about in advance of his call with Flynn. I'm sure he's thought of
them already, but just in case
24-Jan-17 6:46AM Strzok
24-Jan-17 9:27 AM Strzok Page @@@@ Bill just told and me that he brought up - again, th
24-Jan-17 9:27 AM Strzok Page is time in front of D . Didn 't know he was going to d
24-Jan-17 9:27 AM Strzok Page o that.
24-Jan-17 9:29 AM Page Strzok Yeah, dd is frustrated. Going into mtg.
24-Jan-17 9:29 AM Page Strzok Don 't repeat
I won 't. Bill said D started going one way and DD cut him off. I'd be
24-Jan-17 9:30AM Strzok Page frustrated too
This document pisses me off.? You didn't even attempt to make this
10-Feb-17 5:37 PM Page Strzok cogent and readable.? This is lazv work on your part.
Lisa, you didnt see it before my edits that went into what I sent you. I was
1) trying to completely re-write the thing so as to save-oice and 2)
get it out to you for general review and comment in anticipation of
needing it soon. I greatly appreciate your time in reviewing and your
10-Feb-17 10:10 PM Strzok Page edits. I incorporated them. Thank you.
10-Feb-17 10:11 PM Strzok Page shoudl say 1) trying to not completely re-write....
10-Feb-17 10:11 PM Strzok Page should
10-Feb-17 10:11 PM Strzok Page f*ck.
10-Feb-17 10:11 PM Strzok Page I did the edits better than I'm IMing

code section at question
Frcm: l'psge\'< >,\'lita

c. \1'< >'
To: Baker <@->, James A. <jame.bat"t@-
DaE: Wed,(N JanN17 09:4i!:45-0500
18 uSC 953
SUBJECT TO PROTECTiVE ORDER DOJSCO¨ 700023476

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F“ : l"strzok\' < >,\"peter p. \\" < peter.si

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D● L: Wed1 04 Jan 2017 09:52137‐ 0500
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nts: RL33265。 pdf(254.22 kB)
雲鮮棚掌諏響寵鷺幣誂窒露鳳蝋鶴雷識 1思1:亀詣鮮

1瞑翠寵電
:雪禁認:ntS
(June 25,19480 ch.645=62 Stat 744:Pub.L.103-盟。 e,Cκ X:::=§ 330016(lxЮ =Sept.13,1994,103 SLt.214ア .)
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And bemuselam mesome,an exoo8ent cRS plece on曽 ℃ Logan Actfrom 2015.Ali the loOis:atve h:story they dte
喜群毀=里 ∬
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SUBJECT TO PROTECT:VE ORDER DOJSCO‐ 700023477

RE:
﹄
砲嘘
l"page\' < >,\'lisa c. \1'< >'

Strzok <€-, Pets P. <Paer.strzok@J
Wed, O4 Jan 2017 09:59:01 {1500
You ara aweso.me. Thank you.
---Orioinal Messao+--
From:strzok, Petgf P. (CD) (FBl)
i"'iF,Yfiffi l8?i8irSfl -l-'sBLTfu,

Subjec't:
18 USC 953
Any citizen of the United Ststes, wlrerevsr he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly
ootrmenceo or canis on any cofi€sportdsncs or intercours€ with any foreign government or any officer or agpnt ther6of,
with intent to influanoe the mbazures or condud of any bae[n govemnrent or of any offcer or agent thereof,ln rubtbn to
anv disoubs or @nhoverskF wfth the United States, or to defeat the rneasures of the United Statgs, shall be fined undor
thii tdd or impdsoned not npre than tlree yeans, or both.
This section shall not abrldge ihe rfiht of a citizsn to apply., himsetf or his agent, to any fordgn-govemment or the agents
thereof for redress of any iniury whicfi he may have sustained firom such gwemrnent or any of its agents or subjecG.
(June 25, 1948, ch.645,62 Stat 7{,0; Pub. L. 1Oy322, tile )O0(lll, S330016(1XK), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.')
And because I am awesome, an excdlent CRS piece on the l-ogan Acl from 2015. All the legislaUve history they cite
does not invofue irrcoming adminishatiors. Of note, The disanss{on of whather the ac,t is cumenty vhble rnby hihge on
the fact that despim ils having b€€ri la^, fur mom han 200 yoaE, no ore has been proseanted 6r vidating it. lts ,iability
may also invofva oonsliMional issu€s, suc$ as freedom of speech ancl r[ht to tavel, mentioned abore, since these
on:stiUtional issues appoar not to ha\ra been litigabd with respea to the Logen Act.-

Logan Act
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Here's the text of the Logan Aci:
18 U.S. Cod€ S 953 - Private conespondence with foreign govemments

Any citizen of ffre United States, wheirevar he may be, utho, without auttlorlty of the United StEttos, direaty or indirec{ly
oommgncas or canies on arry conespmdenca or intorcourse with any ioreign gpvemment or any oficar or agent thereof,
wi$r intentb inffuence the mbaeuresor conduct dany foreign govertnnntbr of any ofiicer or agent thereof,ln rglation to
any disputes or conboversi* with the Unitsd Stat€s, or to defeat the measures of fre United States, shall be lined under
thiS ti0d or lmprisoned nol rpre than tlvee y@rs, or both.
This seetion Chall not abrilge the right of a citizen to apply, himself or his agent, to any foreign govemment or the agents
thereof fur rcdreas of any iniurv whicft hc mqr haw sustained ftorn such govenunent or any of its aq€nts or subiocE.
(June 25, 1948, cfi.645,-6rs6t 74/.;Pub.L.1Oy3Z2, tid€ )O0(lll, S33d0r6(rXK), Sept. 13, 1994;108 Stat. 2147.)

EXHIBIT 9
From: "\"strzok\" < >,\"peter p. \"\" < ppstrzo

To: PRIESTAP <-@->, E.W. <jcboone OFFA <-@->, JONATHAN C. <mfvara
MOYER<-@->, SALLY ANNE <jtrh >, AUTEN<-@->, BRIAN J. <jpientka
Cc: CORSI <-@->, DINA M. <dmcorsi
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2017 19:13:31 -0500
: rov1 e a defensive briefing to him about CROSS WIND and

Beyond that, I am not certain. I think my preference would be to provide him a defensive briefing about put him
on notice, and see what he does with that. If that's not possible, then c o n t i n u - e need to discuss what
happens if DOJ directs us, or directly tells, VPOTUS or anyone else about th specifically w/r/t what we do
direcUy with him. I think it will be very difficult not to do some sort of overt step w1 1m, a efensive briefing or interview
under light "de · · " · ·
------------------------
------------------------

RE: --
From: ''\"moyer\" < >,\"sally anne \"\" < sam >"

To: STRZOK <-@->, PETER P. <jcmoffa , ~GE <-@->, LISA C. <lcpage
Date: Sun, 22 Jan 2017 09:23:06 -0500
.... ---------
------------------------------------------------------
~ ~
RAZOR: Based on his position, would we usually tell him about Wind a n d . . . . . I'd be interested in letting that
play out a bit before he tells them and the whole thing goes underground. ~ a l l y tell the WH , then I think we
should do what we would normally do. At the very least, I think we need to debrief or interview Razor (unless told not to).
I thinklllllllllllltvill get to him regardless so we should try to frame them in a way we want.
Good with the plan for CROSS WIND and
--Original Message--
From: STRZOK, PETER P. (CD) (FBI)
21 , 2017
Sent: Saturday,- a n u 7:30
aPM
To: MOFFA, JO · MOYER, SALLY ANNE (OGC) (FBI); PAGE, LISA C. (OGC) (FBI)
Subject: FW: --
----------
------------------------------------------------------
To the Magnificent Three, I of course hope you comment/support/disparage all of this as you see fit.
ICHAEL F.
; RHULE,
; PIENTKA,
CROSSFIRE RAZOR: Provide a defensive briefing to him about CROSS WIND and
Beyond that, I am not certain. I think my preference would be to provide him a defensive ne mg a ou pu 1m
on notice, and see what he does with that. If that's not possible, then continue to monitor. We need to discuss what
. ...
happens if DOJ directs us, or directly tells, VPOTUS or anyone else about t h e - - specifically w/r/t what we do
directly with him. I think it will be very difficult not to do some sort of overt step~ensive briefing or interview
·1 • 11· It t · •• I· A• 1· I .• t · It t
:
------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------

Potential Qs for DD's call
From: "\"strzok\" < >,\" ter . \"\" •

To: -@-
Cc: BAKER<-@->, JAMES A.
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 06:46:58
I'm sure he's thought through these, but for DO's consideration about how to answer In advance of his call with Flynn:
Am I in trouble?
Am I the subject of an investigation?
Is it a criminal investigation?
Is it an espionage Investigation?
Do I need an attorney?
Do I need to tell Priebus? The President'?

Will you tell Priebus? The President?
Will you tell the WH what I tell you?
What happens to the infonnation/who will you tell what I tell you?
Will you need to interview other people?
Will our interview be released publicaHy? Will the substance of our interview be released?
How long will this take (depends on his cooperation - I'd plan 45 minutes)?
Can we do this over the phone?
I can explain all this right now, I did this, this, this [do you shut him down? Hear him out? Conduct the interview if he starts
talking? Do you want another agent/witness standing by In case he starts doing this?)
Thanks,
Pete

RE: Question regarding 1001
From: •
To: Page<-@->, Lisa C. <peter.s o
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 22:04:41 -0500
I haven't read the policy lately, but if I recall correctfy, you can say it at any time. I'm 90 percent sure about that, but I can
check in the am.
, •5trzok, Peter P. {CD) (FBlt
- · I have a question for you. Could the admonition re 1001 be given at the beginning at the interview? Or does it have
ffl"fflme following a statement which agents believe to be false? Does the policy speak to that? (I feel bad that I don't
know this but I don't remember ever having to do this! Plus I've only charged it once In the context of lylng to a federal
probation officer).
It seems to be if the fonner, then it would be an easy way to Just casually slip that in. "Of course as you know sir, federal
law makes it a crime to... •

Question regarding 1001
From: "\"page\•< >,\"lisa c. \"\" •

To: - peer.so
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 21 :30:41 -0500
- · I have a question for you . Could the admonition re 1001 be given at the beginning at the interview? Or does it have
ffl'fflme following a statement which agents believe to be false? Does the policy speak to that? (I feel bad that I don't
know this but I don't remember ever having to do this! Plus I've only charged it once in the context of lying to a federal
probation officer).
It seems to be if the former, then it would be an easy way to just casually slip that in. "Of course as you know sir, federal
law makes it a crime to... "

EXHIBIT 10

EXHIBIT 11
January 24, 2017
W.hat follows are notes I typed shortly after my conversation with LTG Michael Flynn. While I have
quoted directly in a few places, this represents the substance of our conversation.
On Tuesday, 01/24/2017, as 1235, LTG Michael Flynn called via secure phone from - to my
office number - .
, I told LTG Flynn that I had a sensitive matter to
discuss. I explained that in light of the significant media coverage and public discussion about his recent
contacts with Russian representatives, that Director Corney and I felt that we needed to have two of our
agents sit down with the General and hear from him the details of those conversations. LTG Flynn asked
if I was referring to his contacts with the Russian Ambassador to the United States, and I indicated that I
was.
LTG Flynn then explained that he had been trying to "build relationships" with the Russians, and that he
had calls in which he "exchanged condolences." He then stated that I probably knew what was said in
these calls because, "you listen to everything they say." I reiterat ed that in light of everything that has
been said about these contacts, the important thing now was for us to hear directly from him what he
said and how he felt about the conversations.
LrG Flynn questioned how so much information had been made pubtic and asked if we thought it had
been leaked.
I explained to LTG Flynn that my desire was to have two of my agents interview him as quickly, quietly
and discretely as possible. He agreed and offered to meet with the agents today. We had some
discussion about timing and ultimately agreed to conduct the interview at his office in the White House
at 1430 this afternoon. I explained that I thought the quickest way to get this done was to have a
conversation between him and the agents only. I further stated that if LTG Flynn wished to include
anyone else in the meeting, like the White House Counsel for instance, that I would need to involve the
Department of Justice. He stated that this would not be necessary and agreed to meet with the agents
w ithout any additional participants.
Declassified by FBI-C58W88B61
on 5/6/2020
EXHIBIT 12
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EXHIBIT 13
Case
Document198-14
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FD-302 (R<!v. 5-S-10)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVEST!GATlON
Date of t-r.tty
DOCUMENT RESTRICTED TO CASE PARTICIPANTS
(ll//FOIJO) FBI Deputy Ast1i:;;tant Direct.(1r (DAD) Peter r. St:rzok was

intexvic-wed in his tJff:j_cE~ :i.n th0 Sf,€cial counsel I z OfficE- . :Ln Washington D.
C. l?articipatin9 in the l.nt.e-rview were Senior Assistant Special Cc,1.msel
and FBI SupervL:::c1ry .Special Ag1;:nt 1'he
purp,:;:::;e of the interview was to collect certa.in informati<.,n reqart.linq
St:rz,:::k 1 ~; involv0ment in varic,u.s ,'.'l.spects of what has bec,:,me the Special
Coun.$el' s investigat:i..on. Strzok provided the fo11owln9 infor·tnatiO!':l:
- AB FBI Count:erint.elliqence DAD, Strzok had involvement in

seve:raJ. FBI investigations which were subsequently taken over by th\?
Spe-cial Counsel. Spec.ific.ally, ltBI in.\-'esti9a.tions xegardin9 then-·National
Security Advise-r, General Michael Flynni
At varlous time.s, Strz.ok and the -
Deputy Attorn>:'y General/Actihg A.ttorney General Sally Yate.:, and
-()th.er D01J repre:::ientat.ives on the entire zpan of the FBI's RussJ.an electi()n
inte1:ference / collusion invl:'stigations.
up to Acttnq N.SD
A::,sistant Attorney General Mary McCord.
'
Washin,Jtr,n, I>.i..;;trict Of <:-~.lumbia., tJnit,:;.d Stat,2,-.s (In

_0_1_,_,1_,_··1_:_:_i:_1_,_ _ 111
____________________
Pec:ion}
,
DMt"drnf1td ,)7 /_::0/;::i)l 7
by
This dot:umffil ,or.1ain11 ntilluu fCCMUlli:1tdatil:wu;: = «inr:hiUnn~ of fut, FBI. I1 i~ th~ p c ~ uf th< FBI Md lb l(Wl.o~J to ~·0111· 11gd1cy: it 11.t\d it~ co1llt11h .tlf(" l)<>t
to~ d.istnbult'-d O\lt\ide your jlgt'ucy.
DOJSC0-700021201
Case
Document198-14
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FD-30211 (Rtv. O:'.>-OS. J(I)
.On
.:,f 5
(IJ//FOUO) On January '.:":4, '..:017, 11.;.·<::a.t..0 t:d.d ::;r.r:.:<'-t t:<· :un2t'\"l."-~v1

Flynn. M,:;i";ctbe ca.llE d FJ.ynn at J.:·:::-:(1 p.m. a.rd Flynn aqr?~,:1 t(, b'2
0
int.e,rvif.'W('<l that -:iay at : : JO J:;. m, McC-1l:. may ha·.1;:, d,>cumc·nr,::-:J th,:'

1 ('
co.iyver.sctt ic,n. <~ome-y was q,:iin9 to telJ. '.:.'a.t·.,:;-.-c; r i,Jttt b(,fc,!:<::" t.L(· int~-rvi>:w,
but ;:\he ,.:,.;1}lt'.J him fir.St fc11: anctl"h7!: ~:e-8:~:;.,; l>:>f<11c· hr ha.J a ,:·1·.an,::0 t~;
DOJSC0-700021202
Case
Document198-14
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FD-30211 (~\.. 0:'!-0S-10)
Contin\lllliouofFD-302()f (0/ /FOUO) D.t.t, Peter P • .St:rz,:,k interview 'o,, 07/19/:::017 3 of 5
call. When he t.o.ld her the FBI was inter.view:tng Flynn shE- wa;:l n,:,,t
happy.
(U/ /FOl10) St):Zok and FBI SSA his interview partner, got
ac:1::e::s::: tc, the White HousE: w.ith the as:::tJ~;tance of an FBI Whi.t.t? Hou.~:e
detail<?e, Flynn met t.hem at abc11.1t '."2:15, which was earliei: than
aqr0e-d. Flynn was alone and nrela:-:ed anJ jocular." He W,:.l.nti::d to 9:i.ve
them a little tour of the- 4.r1;:a a;r,:,und his Dffice. D1..1rin9 their waik
tluou9h the Wet::::t W.ing, l?re:':iide-nt Trump and some rnove-rs who were -:..ii.:3cuss.i.ng
where to place sonv:· art work walked between Strzok and but nobody
paid attentia:,n to th€: a9ent$. Flynn did not introduce them to anyone.
{U/ /FOOO} Before the intervi.ew, McCabe, FBI General Counsel ,James Baker
and others decided the agents would not warn Flynn that it. wa::: a crime to
lie during an FBI interview because they wanted Flynn to be relaxed, and
they were concerned that giving the warnings miqht adversely affect the
rapport.
(U//FOUO) F.lynn was unquarded and clearly saw the FBI agents a.s
a.llie.s. Ht? tall:ed ab,)ut various subjects, includinq hotel:;; wh;z,r,:; they
stayed dtu.:ing the campai9n and the Pt·e3ident '.s knack for i.nt0ric,r
de:dgn. He taH:i;,d about the long hour.-::; of the job and c.omplatned about
th€' politice surrounding it, but Flynn alway:":: c-::E~emed to woi:k his way to
the subject of ter1'01·h:m. Flynn war::: so talkative, and had so rnuch time
for them, that Strzok w,::indered if the Natic,nal Security AdviBer cUd not
have m()re important. things to do tflan have.- such a relaxed; n.on-pert.in€~nt
discus.sJ.on with thE-m.
interv.i.ew and. was pri.rnarily

rc~s:p.::,nsible for taking notez and writing the FD--3D2.
(l1//FOOO) Throughout the interview, Flynn had a very 11

~rnr-e" demeanor and
did not ·give any indicatc,rs c•f d:ecE>pt.ion. Hw <lid not pctL':Hl: bi;:; wc,1:,js vr
he.zitat.1:, .i.n any of his answe-r:1. · He only hedged once, which they
DOJSCO-700021203
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FD-30211 (Rev. 05-08- lO)
ContumiltionoffD.J02()f (U/ /ltOlJO) I>AP P1:.,ter P. Strz,:it int~1:view ,On C,7/19/2017 ,J>.\p-c 4 cf 5
docum'C'nted in th0 30'.:'.. Strz.ok and bc,th had the J,mp.1:e~;si,.:,n at the
ti.@} that Flynn wa~; not lying vr did not T,hink he was lying. Flynn struct
Strzo}: as 11 bd.ght, but not profoundly sophisticated, 11
(U/ /FOUO) rhe ag<C'nts lE·ft Flynn .in a collegial, positive way.
1
'I'here wa:::
(U//FOfJO) St.rzok and retnrned to FBI Headquarter.~, and briefed

McCabe and Baker on the- interview. McCabe briefed Camey. Strzo}: wat~:
awaro2 that Baker and Principal Associate Deputy Atto1-ney General Hatt
Axel:r,:.,j later argued about the FBI' s deci.sic.,n to interview Flynn.
(U/ /FOUO) Shortly afte.r th€' interview, YateB and McCord briefed White
Huu.-:.:0 staff on the Flynn calls.
DOJSCO-700021204
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FD-3021i {Rev. 05-0S,10)
('.ontmua1ionofFD~30l oi' ("IJ / /'E'OUO} DAV f,;.ter P. .Sti: z.,::k inte-rvi~w ,On _o_7_f_l_9_i_c_O_l_·_1_. Pnl!'.:- S ,:,f 5
DOJSCO-700021205

Flynn Motion To Dismiss

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Case 1:17-cr-00232-EGS Document 198 Filed 05/07/20 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION

prosecution of this case would not serve the interests of justice.

investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Materiality is an essential element of the offense.

investigated; it requires “probative weight,” whereby the statement is “reasonably likely to

influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.” United States v.

their materiality beyond a reasonable doubt.

“A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental

circumstances. . . .” Justice Manual § 9-27.001. In the Government’s assessment—mindful of

prejudice against Mr. Flynn.

seq., or other related statutes.” Ex. 1 at 2; Ex. 2 at 2.

Counterintelligence Investigations: Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, Statement of FBI

opened an independent FBI criminal investigation.

repeatedly “morphed,” vacillating from the potential compromise of a “counterintelligence”

investigation to the protection of a purported “criminal” investigation. Ex. 3 at 5; compare Ex. 5

at 5 (“[W]e had an open counterintelligence investigation on Mr. Flynn”), with Ex. 4 at 4

James Comey, Dec. 10, 2018, 14:31-14:55; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xqGu66D6VU.

had to go aggressively doing these things, openly.” Ex. 7 at 2.

long conversation with Mr. Kislyak to “don’t do something.” Id.

Handwritten Notes of Michael Flynn Interview (January 24, 2017).

lied. It is a close one.” Ex. 5 at 9.

to “dismiss an indictment, information or complaint.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). It is also “well

discretion to refuse to grant post-conviction Rule 48(a) motion).

dismissal is part of a scheme of ‘prosecutorial harassment’ of the defendant” through repeated

with prejudice, and that is what [the defendant] wants as well”).

U.S. 598, 607 (1985).

Based on an extensive review of this investigation, including newly discovered and

serve the interests of justice.

27.220. “A determination to prosecute represents a policy judgment that the fundamental

to dismiss the criminal information under Rule 48(a).

1001(a)(2) (emphasis added). As is well-established, materiality does not equate to mere

“relevance”; rather, “[t]o be ‘material’ means to have probative weight”—that is, to be

“reasonably likely to influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made.”

Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 701 (emphasis added).

The materiality threshold thus ensures that misstatements to investigators are

merely to manufacture jurisdiction over any statement—true or false—uttered by a private

citizen or public official.

viable counterintelligence investigation—or any investigation for that matter—initiated by the

counterintelligence investigation by seeking to close that very investigation without even an

security or violated FARA or its related statutes, id. at 3.

With its counterintelligence investigation no longer justifiably predicated, the

investigation on January 4, 2017—did not warrant either continuing that existing

counterintelligence investigation or opening a new criminal investigation. The calls were

relationships with soon-to-be counterparts.

“escalating” tensions in response to U.S. sanctions in an effort to mollify geopolitical tensions

presidential election. Ex. 1 at 3.

interests or somehow exposed Mr. Flynn as beholden to Russia.

as a “counterintelligence” or a “criminal” investigation. Id.

enforcement: the predication threshold for investigating American citizens.

was beholden to a foreign power.

“flabbergasted” and “dumbfounded.” See Ex. 3 at 6.

no longer justifiably predicated counterintelligence investigation. Similarly, whether Mr. Flynn

conceivably “influenced” an investigation that had neither a legitimate counterintelligence nor

statements were never “material” to any FBI investigation.6

knowingly and willingly lied to investigators during the interview.

awareness of the circumstances of the newly discovered, disclosed, or declassified information as