FMI 3-90.

HEAVY BRIGADE
COMBAT TEAM
COMBINED ARMS
BATTALION

MARCH 2005
EXPIRES MARCH 2007

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

 This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil)
and General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (http://www.train.army.mil)
 FMI 3-90.5
Field Manual-Interim Headquarters
No. 3-90.5 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 15 March 2005
Expires 15 March 2007

Heavy Brigade Combat Team

Combined Arms Battalion

Contents
Page
PREFACE ...........................................................................................................xvi
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................xvii
CHAPTER 1 THE ROLE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM COMBINED ARMS
BATTALION....................................................................................................... 1-1
Section I – Heavy Combined Arms Battalion Mission-Essential Tasks...... 1-1
Battalion Mission-Essential Task Development ................................................. 1-1
Operational Environment.................................................................................... 1-2
Full Spectrum Operations................................................................................... 1-6
Section II – Operational Framework ............................................................... 1-7
Area of Operations ............................................................................................. 1-7
Area of Interest ................................................................................................... 1-7
Battlespace......................................................................................................... 1-7
Battlefield Organization ...................................................................................... 1-8
Decisive Operations ........................................................................................... 1-9
Shaping Operations............................................................................................ 1-9
Sustaining Operations ........................................................................................ 1-9
Main Effort ........................................................................................................ 1-10
CHAPTER 2 ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES............................................................. 2-1
Section I – Organization, Capabilities, and Limitations ............................... 2-1
Organization ....................................................................................................... 2-1
Capabilities ......................................................................................................... 2-2
Limitations .......................................................................................................... 2-2
Battlefield Focus ................................................................................................. 2-3
Section II – Duties and Responsibilities of Key Personnel.......................... 2-4
Battalion Commander......................................................................................... 2-4
Personal Staff Group .......................................................................................... 2-4
Coordinating Staff............................................................................................... 2-5
Special Staff ..................................................................................................... 2-12
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (Figure 2-2) ................................. 2-12
Infantry and Armor Companies (Figures 2-3 and 2-4) ..................................... 2-16

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

i
FMI 3-90.5

Engineer Company (Figure 2-5) .......................................................................2-16

Forward Support Company (Figure 2-6)...........................................................2-18
CHAPTER 3 BATTLE COMMAND..........................................................................................3-1
Section I – The Art of Command .....................................................................3-1
Role of the Commander......................................................................................3-1
Mission Command ..............................................................................................3-2
Location of the Commander................................................................................3-2
Combining the Art of Command and the Science of Control..............................3-3
Section II – Command and Control .................................................................3-6
The Command and Control System ...................................................................3-6
Digitization and the C2 System/Good Enough Battle Command .......................3-6
Exercising Command and Control ......................................................................3-7
Distribution of Combined Arms Battalion Command and Control ......................3-8
Section III – Planning for Operations ............................................................3-10
Information Systems Enhancement to Decision-Making ..................................3-10
The Military Decision-Making Process..............................................................3-12
The Role of ISR.................................................................................................3-13
Section IV – The Military Decision-Making Process....................................3-14
Receipt of Mission.............................................................................................3-14
Mission Analysis ...............................................................................................3-14
Course of Action Development .........................................................................3-15
Course of Action Analysis (War Game) ............................................................3-16
Course of Action Comparison ...........................................................................3-16
Course of Action Approval ................................................................................3-16
Orders Production.............................................................................................3-16
Decision-making in a Time-Constrained Environment .....................................3-16
Section V – Preparing for Operations...........................................................3-23
ISR Operations..................................................................................................3-23
Security .............................................................................................................3-23
Force Protection................................................................................................3-23
Plan Revision and Refinement..........................................................................3-24
Coordination and Liaison ..................................................................................3-24
Rehearsals ........................................................................................................3-24
Section VI – Execution ...................................................................................3-25
The C2 During Execution..................................................................................3-25
Adapting to Changes ........................................................................................3-25
Assessment.......................................................................................................3-25
Decisions...........................................................................................................3-26
Directing Action .................................................................................................3-29
Training and Performance ................................................................................3-30
CHAPTER 4 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS4-1
Section I – Fundamentals of Intelligence Synchronization ..........................4-1
Intelligence Synchronization ...............................................................................4-1
Tiers of Reconnaissance ....................................................................................4-9
Reconnaissance Operations.............................................................................4-10
Reconnaissance Guidance...............................................................................4-11
Forms of Reconnaissance ................................................................................4-12
ISR Order Development....................................................................................4-13
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Overlay........................................4-17
Enemy Situation Template................................................................................4-17
Screen...............................................................................................................4-18
Guard ................................................................................................................4-20

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 Contents

Area Security .................................................................................................... 4-24

Cover ................................................................................................................ 4-24
Section III – Reconnaissance ........................................................................ 4-24
Battalion Reconnaissance and Surveillance .................................................... 4-25
Fundamentals................................................................................................... 4-25
Capabilities ....................................................................................................... 4-27
Integration of Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron and Battalion Scout
Platoon.............................................................................................................. 4-28
Supporting Assets Normally Available to Battalion .......................................... 4-29
CHAPTER 5 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 5-1
Section I – Fundamentals of Offensive Operations ...................................... 5-1
Characteristics of Offensive Operations............................................................. 5-1
Contact Continuum............................................................................................. 5-3
Organization of Offensive Operations ................................................................ 5-3
Section II – Forms of Maneuver ...................................................................... 5-8
Envelopment....................................................................................................... 5-8
Penetration ....................................................................................................... 5-10
Turning Movement............................................................................................ 5-11
Infiltration .......................................................................................................... 5-11
Frontal attack.................................................................................................... 5-14
Sequence of Offensive Operations .................................................................. 5-14
Movement Techniques and Formations........................................................... 5-16
Section III – Types Of Offensive Operations................................................ 5-22
Movement to Contact ....................................................................................... 5-22
Approach March Technique in a Movement to Contact................................... 5-22
Integration of Supporting Elements .................................................................. 5-26
Planning............................................................................................................ 5-28
Execution .......................................................................................................... 5-34
Attacks .............................................................................................................. 5-37
Characteristics of the Attack............................................................................. 5-38
Force-oriented Attack Against a Stationary Enemy Force ............................... 5-38
Force-oriented Attack Against a Moving Enemy Force.................................... 5-46
Terrain-oriented Attacks ................................................................................... 5-53
Exploitation ....................................................................................................... 5-55
Pursuit............................................................................................................... 5-55
Special Purpose Attacks .................................................................................. 5-56
Section IV – Transitions................................................................................. 5-58
Consolidation.................................................................................................... 5-58
Reorganization ................................................................................................. 5-59
Continuing Operations...................................................................................... 5-59
CHAPTER 6 DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS .............................................................................. 6-1
Section I – Fundamentals of the Defense ...................................................... 6-1
Purpose of the Defense...................................................................................... 6-1
Organization of Defensive Actions ..................................................................... 6-1
Characteristics of the Defense ........................................................................... 6-3
Section II – Types of Defensive Operations................................................... 6-6
Area Defense...................................................................................................... 6-6
Mobile Defense................................................................................................. 6-20
Retrograde Operations..................................................................................... 6-21
Delay................................................................................................................. 6-22
Delay Organization ........................................................................................... 6-22
Delay Planning Considerations ........................................................................ 6-23

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Delay Scheme of Maneuver..............................................................................6-24

Maximizing the Use of Terrain in a Delay .........................................................6-25
Forcing the Enemy to Deploy and Maneuver in a Delay ..................................6-25
Avoiding Decisive Engagement in a Delay .......................................................6-25
Parameters of the Delay Order .........................................................................6-26
Alternate and Subsequent Positions in a Delay ...............................................6-27
Fire Support in a Delay .....................................................................................6-28
Engineer Support in a Delay .............................................................................6-29
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Support in a Delay .....................................6-30
Sustaining Operations in a Delay .....................................................................6-30
Delay Preparations ...........................................................................................6-31
Execution of a Delay .........................................................................................6-32
Withdrawal ........................................................................................................6-34
Withdrawal Organization...................................................................................6-34
Withdrawal Planning Considerations ................................................................6-36
Withdrawal Scheme of Maneuver.....................................................................6-37
Withdrawal Preparation.....................................................................................6-38
Withdrawal Execution .......................................................................................6-38
Concealing the Withdrawal ...............................................................................6-38
Disengagement in a Withdrawal .......................................................................6-39
Actions on Contact in a Withdrawal ..................................................................6-39
Terminating the Withdrawal ..............................................................................6-39
Retirement.........................................................................................................6-39
Section III – Defensive Planning Considerations ........................................6-40
Defensive Planning ...........................................................................................6-40
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield .........................................................6-41
Reserve.............................................................................................................6-43
Section IV – Sequence of the Defense..........................................................6-44
Occupation and Establishment of Security .......................................................6-44
Preparation and Continued Security Operations ..............................................6-45
Security Area Engagement ...............................................................................6-45
Main Battle Area Engagement ..........................................................................6-46
Follow-On Missions...........................................................................................6-47
Section V – Defensive Techniques ...............................................................6-47
Defense of an Area of Operations ....................................................................6-47
Defense from a Battle Position .........................................................................6-51
Reverse Slope Defense ....................................................................................6-53
Defense of a Strongpoint ..................................................................................6-55
Perimeter Defense ............................................................................................6-62
Counterattack....................................................................................................6-64
Section Vi – Countermobility, Mobility, and Survivability...........................6-66
Countermobility .................................................................................................6-66
Survivability .......................................................................................................6-72
CHAPTER 7 URBAN OPERATIONS, COMBINED ARMS BATTALION...............................7-1
Section I – Introduction ....................................................................................7-1
General Considerations of Urban Operations ....................................................7-1
Tactical Challenges.............................................................................................7-2
Heavy Maneuver Forces in Urban Operations ...................................................7-4
Section II – Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support
Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC) .................7-4
Mission ................................................................................................................7-5
Enemy .................................................................................................................7-5

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Urban Mapping ................................................................................................... 7-9

Terrain and Weather ........................................................................................ 7-14
Troops .............................................................................................................. 7-16
Civil Considerations.......................................................................................... 7-18
Section III – Controlling Urban Operations.................................................. 7-19
Enemy Focus.................................................................................................... 7-19
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements ............................................ 7-19
Task Organization of Units to Accomplish Specific Tasks ............................... 7-20
Rehearsals ....................................................................................................... 7-20
Fires and Effects Planning ............................................................................... 7-21
Field Artillery AND Mortar Support ................................................................... 7-22
Communications............................................................................................... 7-23
Weapons Effects .............................................................................................. 7-24
Section IV – Offensive Operations................................................................ 7-25
Offensive Framework ....................................................................................... 7-25
Types of Attack During Urban Offensive Operations ....................................... 7-26
Transition.......................................................................................................... 7-30
Movement to Contact (Search and Attack) ...................................................... 7-31
Attack of a Village............................................................................................. 7-31
Nodal Attack ..................................................................................................... 7-32
Section V – Defensive Operations ................................................................ 7-32
Defensive Framework ...................................................................................... 7-32
Defensive Planning........................................................................................... 7-34
Integrating the Urban Area into the Defense.................................................... 7-36
Nodal Defense.................................................................................................. 7-37
Delay................................................................................................................. 7-38
CHAPTER 8 STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS............................ 8-1
Section I – Stability Operations ...................................................................... 8-1
Purpose .............................................................................................................. 8-1
Types of Stability Operations ............................................................................. 8-3
Peace Operations............................................................................................... 8-3
Foreign Internal Defense.................................................................................... 8-5
Security Assistance ............................................................................................ 8-6
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.................................................................... 8-6
Support to Insurgency ........................................................................................ 8-6
Support to Counterinsurgency............................................................................ 8-6
Support to Counterdrug Operations ................................................................... 8-6
Combating Terrorism.......................................................................................... 8-7
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) ................................................... 8-8
Arms Control....................................................................................................... 8-8
Show Of Force.................................................................................................... 8-8
Planning Considerations .................................................................................... 8-9
Decentralized Operations................................................................................... 8-9
Rules of Engagement (ROE).............................................................................. 8-9
Rules of Interaction (ROI)................................................................................. 8-11
Force Protection ............................................................................................... 8-11
Task Organization ............................................................................................ 8-12
Media Considerations....................................................................................... 8-13
Operations with Outside Agencies ................................................................... 8-14
Specific Considerations by Functional Areas................................................... 8-14
Intelligence ....................................................................................................... 8-15
Information Operations ..................................................................................... 8-16
Maneuver.......................................................................................................... 8-16

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FMI 3-90.5

Aviation Support................................................................................................8-18
Fire Support ......................................................................................................8-18
Mobility And Survivability ..................................................................................8-18
Combat Service Support...................................................................................8-19
C2 Information Systems....................................................................................8-21
Techniques........................................................................................................8-22
Presence Patrols...............................................................................................8-22
Observation Posts.............................................................................................8-23
Providing Security for Indigenous Authorities ...................................................8-24
Static Security Posts .........................................................................................8-24
Searches ...........................................................................................................8-24
Roadblocks and Other Checkpoints .................................................................8-31
React to a Civil Disturbance..............................................................................8-33
Section II – Support Operations ....................................................................8-33
Types Of Support Operations ...........................................................................8-33
The Army’s Role in Support Operations ...........................................................8-35
Forms of Support Operations............................................................................8-36
Planning Considerations ...................................................................................8-38
Considerations for Support Operations ............................................................8-38
Planning Process ..............................................................................................8-39
Command and Control......................................................................................8-40
Maneuver ..........................................................................................................8-41
Intelligence ........................................................................................................8-41
Intelligence, Surveillance, AND Reconnaissance.............................................8-41
Fire Support ......................................................................................................8-42
Mobility And Survivability ..................................................................................8-42
Combat Service Support...................................................................................8-42
Information Operations .....................................................................................8-43
Other planning considerations ..........................................................................8-43
Pattern of Operations........................................................................................8-44
Sequence of Operations ...................................................................................8-46
Transition to Combat.........................................................................................8-48
Mission Focus ...................................................................................................8-49
Training Considerations ....................................................................................8-49
Training for Support Operations .......................................................................8-49
Training for Domestic Support Operations and Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance.........................................................................................................8-50
Additional Requirements...................................................................................8-51
CHAPTER 9 COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS.................................................................9-1
section I – Fires and Effects Support .............................................................9-1
Fires and Effects .................................................................................................9-1
Fire Support Organizations .................................................................................9-2
Fire Support Planning and Coordination.............................................................9-3
Essential Fires and Effects Tasks.......................................................................9-6
Scheme of Fires ..................................................................................................9-9
Quick Fire Planning.............................................................................................9-9
Observation Planning........................................................................................9-11
Top-Down Fire Planning ...................................................................................9-12
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)...................................................................9-14
Fire Support Coordination.................................................................................9-14
Rehearsals ........................................................................................................9-15
Clearance of Fires.............................................................................................9-17
Fire Support Assets ..........................................................................................9-21
Close Air Support/Joint Fires ............................................................................9-26

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Army Aviation ................................................................................................... 9-26

FBCB2-Generated Fire Missions ..................................................................... 9-27
Section II – Close Air Support....................................................................... 9-28
Missions............................................................................................................ 9-28
Planning Considerations .................................................................................. 9-30
Air Force Support ............................................................................................. 9-31
Close Air Support Planning Duties and Responsibilities.................................. 9-32
Forward Air Controller ...................................................................................... 9-32
Suppression Of Enemy Air Defense................................................................. 9-34
Weather ............................................................................................................ 9-34
Section III – Engineers ................................................................................... 9-34
Battalion Planning For Maneuver Support ....................................................... 9-35
Mobility.............................................................................................................. 9-36
Countermobility................................................................................................. 9-37
Survivability ...................................................................................................... 9-37
General Engineering ........................................................................................ 9-37
Geospatial Engineering .................................................................................... 9-37
Engineer Company........................................................................................... 9-38
Combat Engineer (Sapper) Platoon ................................................................. 9-38
Obstacle Section .............................................................................................. 9-38
Engineer Assets ............................................................................................... 9-39
Section IV – Air Defense Support ................................................................. 9-43
Mission ............................................................................................................. 9-44
Organizations ................................................................................................... 9-44
Air Defense Planning Considerations .............................................................. 9-45
Air and Missile Defense Officer Duties............................................................. 9-46
Offensive Considerations ................................................................................. 9-47
Defensive Considerations ................................................................................ 9-47
Air Defense Types ............................................................................................ 9-48
Air Defense Warnings and Weapons Control Status ....................................... 9-48
Air Defense Assets ........................................................................................... 9-49
CHAPTER 10 SUSTAINING OPERATIONS ............................................................................. 10-1
Section I – Sustaining Operations And Organization................................. 10-1
Overview........................................................................................................... 10-1
Sustainment Responsibilities ........................................................................... 10-4
Forward Support Company .............................................................................. 10-5
Forward Support Company Organization......................................................... 10-6
Section II. Combat Service Support Operations ....................................... 10-10
Ordnance Operations (Class V) ..................................................................... 10-10
Supply Operations (Class III, Bulk) ................................................................ 10-11
Maintenance Operations ................................................................................ 10-12
Maintenance Platoon...................................................................................... 10-14
Transportation Operations.............................................................................. 10-14
Supply and Field Services Operations ........................................................... 10-14
Human Resource Operations......................................................................... 10-21
Section III – Combat Service Support Planning ........................................ 10-24
Planning Overview.......................................................................................... 10-24
Logistics Estimate........................................................................................... 10-24
Supporting Offensive Operations ................................................................... 10-26
Supporting Defensive Operations .................................................................. 10-29
Echelon of the Trains...................................................................................... 10-32
Movement of the Trains.................................................................................. 10-33

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LOGPAC Operations ......................................................................................10-34

Combat Trains and FSC Security ...................................................................10-36
Command and Control....................................................................................10-37
Communications .............................................................................................10-37
Section IV – Reconstitution .........................................................................10-38
Reorganization ................................................................................................10-38
Regeneration...................................................................................................10-38
CHAPTER 11 COMMAND POST OPERATIONS......................................................................11-1
Section I – Battle Command And Control ....................................................11-1
Command Group/Battle Command on the Move (BCOM) ...............................11-1
Main Command Post ........................................................................................11-2
Combat Trains Command Post ........................................................................11-3
Combined arms battalion support area command post....................................11-3
Command post survivability ..............................................................................11-4
Displacement ....................................................................................................11-5
Section II – Command Post Operations .......................................................11-6
Standing Operating Procedures .......................................................................11-6
Communications ...............................................................................................11-7
Maps .................................................................................................................11-7
Communications Security .................................................................................11-8
The Battle Captain ............................................................................................11-8
Operations Sergeant Major...............................................................................11-9
Section III – Communication..........................................................................11-9
Means Of Communication ..............................................................................11-10
Section IV – Communications Systems .....................................................11-13
Combat Net Radio ..........................................................................................11-13
The Digital Battlefiled ......................................................................................11-14
Army Battle Command System Components .................................................11-15
Force XXI Battle Command Brigade And Below ............................................11-17
Joint Network Node.........................................................................................11-17
JNN network operations in the Combined Arms Battalion..............................11-19
Section V – Digital Command and Control Systems and Architecture...11-20
Signal Responsibilities ....................................................................................11-21
Integrating Digital and Analog Units ...............................................................11-21
Information Management ................................................................................11-22
Digital Standing Operating Procedure Considerations ...................................11-27
CHAPTER 12 TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS..............................................................12-1
Section I – Relief Operations .........................................................................12-1
Planning considerations....................................................................................12-1
Command and control.......................................................................................12-3
Section II – SECURITY OPERATIONS...........................................................12-3
Screen...............................................................................................................12-3
Guard ................................................................................................................12-5
Area Security.....................................................................................................12-9
Cover.................................................................................................................12-9
Section III – Battle Handover and Passage of Lines ...................................12-9
Battle Handover ................................................................................................12-9
Passage of Lines ............................................................................................12-11
Forward Passage of Lines ..............................................................................12-15
Rearward Passage of Lines............................................................................12-15
Rehearsal........................................................................................................12-16

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Section IV – Linkup Operations .................................................................. 12-16

Control During Linkup Operations .................................................................. 12-16
Forms of Linkup.............................................................................................. 12-17
Section V – River-Crossing Operations ..................................................... 12-21
General River-Crossing Considerations......................................................... 12-22
Assault OF THE Crossing Site ....................................................................... 12-23
Section VI – Combined Arms Breaching Operations ............................... 12-25
Breach Tenets ................................................................................................ 12-25
Combined Arms Breach During Deliberate Operations ................................. 12-28
Combined Arms Breach During Hasty Operations ........................................ 12-31
Section VII – Tactical Road March .............................................................. 12-35
March Elements.............................................................................................. 12-35
March Column Organization........................................................................... 12-36
Techniques ..................................................................................................... 12-37
Planning Considerations ................................................................................ 12-38
Movement Order............................................................................................. 12-38
Control Measures ........................................................................................... 12-38
Security........................................................................................................... 12-40
Section VIII – Assembly Area Operations .................................................. 12-41
Assembly Areas.............................................................................................. 12-41
Organization of Assembly Areas .................................................................... 12-42
Quartering Party ............................................................................................. 12-43
Occupation ..................................................................................................... 12-46
Actions in the Assembly Area......................................................................... 12-47
Security........................................................................................................... 12-47
Departure from the Assembly Area ................................................................ 12-49
Appendix A INTEGRATION OF HEAVY, STRYKER, AND INFANTRY MANEUVER
FORCES.............................................................................................................A-1
Appendix B AVIATION SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS........................................B-1
Appendix C OPERATIONS IN CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR
CONDITIONS .....................................................................................................C-1
Appendix D RISK MANAGEMENT AND FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE .................................D-1
Appendix E ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS .......................................................... E-1
Appendix F SNIPER EMPLOYMENT.................................................................................... F-1
Appendix G FIRES INTEGRATION .......................................................................................G-1
Appendix H DEPLOYMENT...................................................................................................H-1
Appendix I PLANNING AND OPERATIONS CHARTS........................................................ I-1
Appendix J AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT OPERATIONS .................................................... J-1
Appendix K FIELD PROCESSING DETAINEES ..................................................................K-1
Appendix L MEDIA ON THE BATTLEFIELD........................................................................ L-1
Appendix M DIGITAL COMMAND AND CONTROL REHEARSAL .................................... M-1
GLOSSARY ..........................................................................................Glossary-1
REFERENCES ..................................................................................References-1

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Figures
Figure Intro-1. Today’s Army .................................................................................................xviii
Figure Intro-2. Restructuring Today’s Army............................................................................. xx
Figure Intro-3. Modularity and the Army’s Need to Change ................................................... xxi
Figure Intro-4. UEy and UEx.................................................................................................. xxii
Figure Intro-5. From Divisions to Brigades ............................................................................xxiii
Figure Intro-6. UEy Organization ........................................................................................... xxv
Figure Intro-7. UEx Organization .......................................................................................... xxvi
Figure Intro-8. Heavy BCT ...................................................................................................xxviii
Figure Intro-9. Fires Brigade .................................................................................................. xxx
Figure Intro-10. UEx Aviation Brigade .................................................................................. xxxi
Figure Intro-11. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade ..................................................................xxxii
Figure Intro-12. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade ..............................................................xxxiii
Figure Intro-13. Sustainment Brigade..................................................................................xxxiv
Figure 1-1. Information Operations ........................................................................................ 1-5
Figure 1-2. Contiguous Versus Noncontiguous..................................................................... 1-8
Figure 2-1. Combined Arms Battalion.................................................................................... 2-2
Figure 2-2. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combined Arms Battalion ........... 2-13
Figure 2-3. Mechanized Infantry Company, Combined Arms Battalion .............................. 2-16
Figure 2-4. Armor Company, Combined Arms Battalion ..................................................... 2-17
Figure 2-5. Engineer Company, Combined Arms Battalion................................................. 2-17
Figure 2-6. Forward Support Company, Combined Arms Battalion .................................... 2-19
Figure 3-1. Visualization ........................................................................................................ 3-4
Figure 3-2. The Operations Process...................................................................................... 3-7
Figure 3-3. Cognitive Hierarchy ........................................................................................... 3-11
Figure 3-4. MDMP Steps, Inputs, and Outputs.................................................................... 3-15
Figure 3-5. The Steps in the MDMP .................................................................................... 3-27
Figure 3-6. Executing an Operation ..................................................................................... 3-30
Figure 4-1. Battalion Information Requirements .................................................................... 4-2
Figure 4-2. Intelligence Synchronization Process ................................................................. 4-3
Figure 4-3. Tiers of Reconnaissance..................................................................................... 4-9
Figure 4-4. Situation Template............................................................................................. 4-19
Figure 4-5. Rear, Flank, and Advance Guard Operations ................................................... 4-21
Figure 4-6. Reconnaissance Squadron and Heavy Combined Arms Battalion Scout
Employment During Brigade Movement to Contact ......................................... 4-28
Figure 4-7. Counterreconnaissance Organization of Brigade Reconnaissance Troop
and Heavy Combined Arms Battalion Scout Platoon....................................... 4-30
Figure 5-1. Contact Continuum.............................................................................................. 5-3
Figure 5-2. Envelopment........................................................................................................ 5-9
Figure 5-3. Penetration ........................................................................................................ 5-10
Figure 5-4. Turning Movement............................................................................................. 5-12
Figure 5-5. Infiltration ........................................................................................................... 5-13
Figure 5-6. Frontal Attack Against a Moving Enemy ........................................................... 5-14

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Figure 5-7. Combined Arms Battalion in Column Formation ...............................................5-18

Figure 5-8. Combined Arms Battalion in Wedge Formation ................................................5-19
Figure 5-9. Combined Arms Battalion in Vee Formation......................................................5-20
Figure 5-10. Combined Arms Battalion in Echelon Right Formation ...................................5-21
Figure 5-11. Combined Arms Battalion in Line Formation ...................................................5-21
Figure 5-12. Combined Arms Battalion Movement to Contact as Part of a Brigade............5-23
Figure 5-13. Combined Arms Battalion Movement to Contact.............................................5-24
Figure 5-14. Combined Arms Battalion in Retrograde .........................................................5-37
Figure 5-15. Planning the Attack ..........................................................................................5-47
Figure 5-16. Example of a Combined Arms Battalion Flank Attack .....................................5-48
Figure 5-17. Terrain-Oriented Attack....................................................................................5-54
Figure 6-1. Sample Defensive Graphics for Linear Operations ............................................. 6-4
Figure 6-2. Example of a Forward Defense With HBCT Combined Arms Battalion
and Companies Defending Forward ................................................................... 6-7
Figure 6-3. Defense in Depth ................................................................................................. 6-8
Figure 6-4. Delay from Alternating Positions........................................................................6-28
Figure 6-5. Delay from Subsequent Positions......................................................................6-29
Figure 6-6. Methods for Organizing the Detachment Left in Contact...................................6-35
Figure 6-7. Defense of an Area of Operations .....................................................................6-49
Figure 6-8. Disposition of Forces in and About a Battle Position.........................................6-51
Figure 6-9. Organization of the Reverse Slope Defense .....................................................6-54
Figure 6-10. Battalion HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Strongpoint...................................6-57
Figure 6-11. Strongpoint Fire Support Plan .........................................................................6-60
Figure 6-12. Perimeter Defense ...........................................................................................6-63
Figure 6-13. Example of an HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Obstacle Plan .....................6-67
Figure 7-1. Enemy Threat Tactics .......................................................................................... 7-6
Figure 7-2. Initial Photo Reconnaissance of Urban Area of Operations ................................ 7-9
Figure 7-3. Avenues of Approach in the Urban Area ...........................................................7-11
Figure 7-4. Sewer and Subterranean Overlay .....................................................................7-12
Figure 7-5. Enemy Overlay...................................................................................................7-13
Figure 7-6. Sample Offensive Task Organization ................................................................7-17
Figure 7-7. Dead Space .......................................................................................................7-22
Figure 7-8. Offensive Urban Operational Framework ..........................................................7-26
Figure 7-9. Isolation of an Urban Area Using the Cordon Technique..................................7-28
Figure 7-10. Securing a Foothold, Task Force Attack .........................................................7-29
Figure 7-11. Example of How to Develop a Systematic Clearance Within Assigned
Areas.................................................................................................................7-30
Figure 7-12. Graphical Control Measures to Facilitate Search and Attack Technique........7-31
Figure 7-13. Attack of a Village ............................................................................................7-33
Figure 7-14. Brigade Scheme of Maneuver Nodal Attack....................................................7-34
Figure 7-15. Combined Arms Battalion Nodal Attack...........................................................7-35
Figure 7-16. Defensive Urban Operational Framework .......................................................7-36
Figure 7-17. Integrating Urban Areas Into a Defense ..........................................................7-37
Figure 7-18. Nodal Defense, Transitional Situation .............................................................7-38

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Figure 7-19. Nodal Defense, Different Defensive Techniques ............................................ 7-39

Figure 7-20. Task Force Delay in an Urban Area................................................................ 7-40
Figure 8-1. Security Post ..................................................................................................... 8-25
Figure 8-2. Typical Organization for Search Operations ..................................................... 8-28
Figure 8-3. Conduct of a Search.......................................................................................... 8-29
Figure 8-4. Physical Layout of Roadblock ........................................................................... 8-32
Figure 9-1. Combined Arms Battalion Mortar Platoon......................................................... 9-24
Figure 9-2. Immediate Close Air Request Channels ........................................................... 9-30
Figure 9-3. Combat Engineer Company .............................................................................. 9-39
Figure 9-4. Air Defense Artillery Architecture ...................................................................... 9-44
Figure 9-5. Air Defense Artillery Battery .............................................................................. 9-45
Figure 9-6. Air Defense Early Warning ................................................................................ 9-49
Figure 10-1.CSS Operations Brigade and Below for BCT................................................... 10-2
Figure 10-2. Forward Support Company Doctrinal Template.............................................. 10-7
Figure 10-3. Forward Support Company ............................................................................. 10-8
Figure 10-4. Class V Resupply .......................................................................................... 10-11
Figure 10-5. Class III(B) Resupply..................................................................................... 10-12
Figure 10-6. Maintenance Communication Flow ............................................................... 10-13
Figure 10-7. Class I Distribution......................................................................................... 10-15
Figure 10-8. Water Distribution .......................................................................................... 10-16
Figure 10-9. Class II, III(P), and IV Operations.................................................................. 10-17
Figure 10-10. Class VIII Resupply Operations at Level I................................................... 10-19
Figure 11-1. Army Tactical Command and Control Systems ............................................ 11-11
Figure 11-2. Battalion Network Node................................................................................. 11-18
Figure 11-3. Battalion to UEx JNN Interface...................................................................... 11-20
Figure 12-1. Rear, Flank, and Advance Guard Operations ................................................. 12-6
Figure 12-2. Forward Passage of Lines............................................................................. 12-12
Figure 12-3. Rearward Passage of Lines .......................................................................... 12-13
Figure 12-4. Combat Service Support Plan for Rearward Passage of Lines .................... 12-14
Figure 12-5. Linkup of a Moving Force With a Stationary Force ....................................... 12-18
Figure 12-6. Linkup of Two Moving Units .......................................................................... 12-19
Figure 12-7. Reverse Planning Sequence......................................................................... 12-29
Figure 12-8. Example of Battalion Strip Map ..................................................................... 12-39
Figure B-1. Heavy Aviation Brigade....................................................................................... B-3
Figure B-2. Light Aviation Brigade ......................................................................................... B-4
Figure B-3. Forced Entry Aviation Brigade ............................................................................ B-5
Figure B-4. Close Combat Attack Checklist......................................................................... B-14
Figure B-5. Example of a Close Combat Attack Brief.......................................................... B-14
Figure D-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated With MDMP Tasks....................................D-2
Figure D-2. Examples of Potential Hazards...........................................................................D-3
Figure D-3. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution ...................................................D-4
Figure D-4. Effects of Sleep Loss ........................................................................................D-12
Figure D-5. Indicators of Sleep Deprivation and Fatigue.....................................................D-12
Figure D-6. Reducing the Impact of Continuous Operations...............................................D-13

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Figure E-1. Risk Assessment Matrix ......................................................................................E-3

Figure E-2. Completed Environmental Risk Assessment Matrix ...........................................E-4
Figure E-3. Overall Risk Assessment.....................................................................................E-6
Figure E-4. Overall Environmental Risk .................................................................................E-6
Figure E-5. Overall Risk Assessment Matrix....................................................................... E-15
Figure G-1. Planning Steps for Echeloning Fires.................................................................. G-7
Figure G-2. Execution Considerations—Close Air Support .................................................. G-8
Figure G-3. Execution Considerations—Shaping Fires ........................................................ G-9
Figure G-4. Execution Considerations—Actions on Objective............................................ G-10
Figure H-1. Force Projection Process ................................................................................... H-3
Figure I-1. Cover Sheet ........................................................................................................... I-1
Figure I-2. Mission Analysis Briefing Agenda.......................................................................... I-2
Figure I-3. Higher Headquarters Concept Sketch ................................................................... I-2
Figure I-4. Higher Headquarters Order ................................................................................... I-3
Figure I-5. Commander’s Initial Guidance............................................................................... I-3
Figure I-6. Terrain Analysis Worksheet ................................................................................... I-4
Figure I-7. Terrain Analysis Worksheet ................................................................................... I-4
Figure I-8. Weather Analysis ...................................................................................................I-5
Figure I-9. Enemy Composition............................................................................................... I-5
Figure I-10. Enemy Disposition/Strength Chart....................................................................... I-6
Figure I-11. Enemy Capabilities Chart .................................................................................... I-6
Figure I-12. Enemy COA #1 Chart .......................................................................................... I-7
Figure I-13. CCIR Chart........................................................................................................... I-7
Figure I-14. Event Matrix ......................................................................................................... I-8
Figure I-15. R&S Matrix ........................................................................................................... I-8
Figure I-16. Initial R&S Plan .................................................................................................... I-9
Figure I-17. Tasks and Constraints Chart ............................................................................... I-9
Figure I-18. Tasks and Constraints Chart .............................................................................I-10
Figure I-19. Current Task Organization/Combat Power........................................................ I-10
Figure I-20. CSS Status Chart............................................................................................... I-11
Figure I-21. Classes of Supply Chart .................................................................................... I-11
Figure I-22. Class III/V Usage and Protection Chart ............................................................. I-12
Figure I-23. End Item Status Chart........................................................................................ I-12
Figure I-24. Commander’s Guidance Chart ..........................................................................I-13
Figure I-25. COA Brief Agenda Chart.................................................................................... I-13
Figure I-26. Restarted Mission Statement.............................................................................I-14
Figure I-27. RCPA Matrix ...................................................................................................... I-14
Figure I-28. COA Sketch #1 .................................................................................................. I-15
Figure I-29. COA Comparison Chart ..................................................................................... I-15
Figure I-30. Decision Brief Agenda .......................................................................................I-16
Figure I-31. Light and Weather Chart.................................................................................... I-16
Figure I-32. Enemy Situation Chart ....................................................................................... I-17
Figure I-33. Commander’s Intent........................................................................................... I-17
Figure I-34. Timeline.............................................................................................................. I-18

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Figure J-1. Air Assault Planning Process ...............................................................................J-8

Figure J-2. Air Assault/Movement Coordination Checklist .....................................................J-9
Figure J-3. Recommendation Go No-Go Air Assault Chart....................................................J-9
Figure J-4. Air Assault Planning and Rehearsal Timeline ....................................................J-10
Figure K-1. DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (Front) ......................... K-6
Figure K-2. DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (Back).......................... K-7
Figure K-3. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Front) ................ K-8
Figure K-4. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Back)................. K-9
Figure M-1. Example of Equipment Listing for DC2R Functions Check............................... M-2
Figure M-2. Example of ABCS Functions Check of Messages Between Systems .............. M-3
Figure M-3. Example of FBCB2 Checklist ............................................................................ M-4
Figure M-4. Example of ABCS Checks at the Battalion Level.............................................. M-5

Tables
Table 6-1. Comparison of Methods of Delay ....................................................................... 6-27
Table 6-2. Obstacle Effects.................................................................................................. 6-68
Table 7-1. Categories of Urban Areas ................................................................................. 7-14
Table 8-1. Area Assessment Checklist................................................................................ 8-17
Table 9-1. Combined Arms Battalion Fire Support Element.................................................. 9-3
Table 9-2. Company Fire Support Teams ............................................................................. 9-3
Table 9-3. Essential Fires and Effects Tasks ........................................................................ 9-8
Table 9-4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Mortars ........................................................ 9-23
Table 9-5. Self-Destruct Windows ....................................................................................... 9-41
Table 9-6. Lethality and Density .......................................................................................... 9-42
Table 9-7. Emplacement Authority....................................................................................... 9-43
Table 12-1. Breaching Organization .................................................................................. 12-27
Table A-1 Example of Possible Infantry Maneuver Force Tasks........................................... A-3
Table A-2. Example of Possible Stryker Maneuver Force Tasks .......................................... A-4
Table A-3. Dismounted Rates of March (Normal Terrain) ................................................... A-11
Table B-1. Danger Close Ranges for Attack Helicopter Engagement................................. B-15
Table B-2. AH-64 Characteristics ........................................................................................ B-19
Table B-3. OH-58 Characteristics........................................................................................ B-20
Table B-4. UH-60 Characteristics ........................................................................................ B-21
Table B-5. CH-47 Characteristics ........................................................................................ B-22
Table B-6 Typical Helicopter Fuel Expenditure Rates and Capacities................................ B-23
Table B-7. Typical Helicopter Load Capacities.................................................................... B-23
Table B-8. Typical Planning Weights for Combat Equipment and Vehicles........................ B-24
Table B-9. Typical Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Ordnance Loads ............................ B-25
Table C-1. Characteristics of Chemical Agents .....................................................................C-2
Table C-2. MOPP Levels .......................................................................................................C-5
Table E-1. Air Pollution Risk Impact Value ............................................................................ E-8
Table E-2. Archeological, Cultural, and Historic Resources Risk Impact Value ................... E-9

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Table E-3. Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Risk Impact Value....................... E-10
Table E-4. Noise Pollution Risk Impact Value..................................................................... E-11
Table E-5. Threatened and Endangered Species Risk Impact Value ................................ E-12
Table E-6. Water Pollution Risk Impact Value .................................................................... E-13
Table E-7. Wetland Protection Risk Impact Value .............................................................. E-14
Table G-1. Commander’s Guidance for Fire Support ........................................................... G-2
Table G-2. Risk Estimate Distances for Mortars and Cannon Artillery ................................. G-5
Table J-1. AMCM Agenda .................................................................................................... J-11
Table J-2. AMCM Checklist.................................................................................................. J-12
Table K-1. Five Ss and T Method of Detainee Field Processing ...........................................K-3

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 Preface
Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 3-90.5 provides tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the
tactical employment of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion. This
publication—
Provides the doctrinal guidance for commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders
and leaders of the organizations who are responsible for conducting (planning,
preparing, executing, and assessing) HBCT combined arms battalion operations.
Serves as an authoritative reference for personnel developing doctrine (fundamental
principles and TTP) materiel, and force structure; institution and unit training; and
standing operating procedures (SOPs) for combined arms battalions operations.
This FMI addresses combined arms battalion operations for HBCTs organized under the Army
modular concept that governs the development of equipment, training, and structure for former
divisional brigades. The procedures described herein are intended as a guide and are not to be
considered inflexible. Each situation in combat must be resolved by an intelligent interpretation
and application of the doctrine set forth herein.
FMI 3-90.5 is written for the combined arms battalion commander, battle staff, subordinate
commanders, and all supporting units. The manual reflects and supports the Army operations
doctrine as stated in FM 3-0, Operations. This FMI is not intended as a stand-alone reference for
combined arms battalion operations; rather, it is to be used with existing doctrine.
This FMI is published to provide expedited delivery of doctrine urgently needed to execute
transformation to modular organizations. It has not been placed through the standard
development process but is authorized for implementation. FM 3-90.5 is under development and
will supersede this FMI before its expiration date. Send comments on this FMI to the addresses
below. The proponents will consider them for inclusion in FM 3-90.5.
The doctrine in this FMI is based on suggestions, insights, and observations developed from four
separate 3d Infantry Division HBCT rotations at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs),
conducted by Task Force Modularity Field Experimentation Project Team (FEPT), Joint and
Army Experimentation Division (JAED), Futures Center (FC), TRADOC, during FY 2004. Each
CTC rotation yielded valuable information concerning the combined arms battalion operations.
Additionally, Task Force Logistics contributed significant insights to the doctrine in this FMI.
This FMI was written in conjunction with five other FMIs relating to HBCT operations: the
HBCT, fires and effects operations; logistics; brigade troops battalion operations; and
reconnaissance squadron operations. These FMIs include not only TTP that have changed due to
the new organization but also a wide variety of TTP that, after implementing the new HBCT
organization, remain relevant and provide the required contextual frameworks.
The proponent for this publication is the US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). Submit comments and recommended changes and the rational for those changes on
DA Form 2028 and forward to Commander, USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-B, Fort Knox, KY
40121-5000 or e-mail the DA Form 2028 to Doctrine Training/Doctrine Development web site,
Doctrine Division, Chief Combined Arms Doctrine Branch at: http://knox-
www.army.mil/center/dtdd/ and Commandant, USAIS, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, GA
31905-5593 or email to [email protected].
Unless otherwise stated in this publication, the masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.

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 Introduction

SECTION I - PURPOSE
An interim field manual (FMI) is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited
delivery of urgently needed doctrine. This FMI is one of six being prepared to meet the doctrinal
requirements of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT). This FMI applies to the
transformational force across the full spectrum of military operations: peacetime military
engagement (PME), small-scale contingencies (SSCs), and major combat operations (MCO).
The doctrine contained in this FMI is approved for immediate use in training and operations.
Operational concepts described in this manual are based on decisions by the Army Chief of Staff
to reorganize the Army to a brigade-based force and to quickly implement “good enough” designs
that will be refined over time. The material provided in this FMI is considered good enough to
satisfy the requirements of the Army’s transforming organizations.
The intended audience for this publication is leaders and staff sections within transforming
units. These leaders include those in combined arms chains of command, field and company
grade officers, middle grade and senior noncommissioned officers, and battalion and squadron
command groups and staffs. This manual provides guidance for unit of employment (UEx)
leaders and staffs for training and employment of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) to
conduct close combat in offensive and defensive operations. This publication may also be used by
other Army organizations to assist in their planning for support to HBCTs.
This FMI applies to the active component (AC), reserve component (RC), and Army civilians. It
builds on the collective knowledge and experience gained through recent operations, numerous
exercises, and the deliberate process of informed reasoning. It is rooted in time-tested principles
and fundamentals while accommodating new technologies and diverse threats to national
security.
This FMI will expire after 2 years from its approved publication date. Throughout its life,
proponents should collect feedback to refine the emerging doctrine that will be incorporated into
new or revised field manuals.

SECTION II - TRANSFORMING TO MEET OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

WE ARE A NATION AT WAR

In the opening decade of the 21st century, regional instability, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), transnational threats from groups using terrorism to achieve political
objectives, the spiraling information revolution, and ongoing globalization have created a
prolonged period of conflict for the United States with great uncertainty about the nature and
location of that conflict. The multipolar world created by the breakup of the Soviet Union has
presented the US Army with both opportunities and challenges.
Current and future enemies may look different from the Soviet Union, but American interests
remain the same. Today, while peace exists between the great powers, a state of permanent
white water can be found in much of the world.
In this environment, war is the norm, and peace is the exception. Our adversaries seek adaptive
advantage through asymmetry. America has near peer competitors in niche areas, and

xx FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Introduction

conventional force on force conflicts are still possible. There is an enormous pool of potential
combatants armed with irreconcilable ideas, and our homeland has become part of the
battlespace.
Historically, conventional terrorism and threats directed at US citizens and property were
conducted outside of US borders. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that the threat to the US
homeland from transnational organizations and groups with regional agendas is very real.
The Army must be able to defuse crises and/or defeat aggression early to prevent escalation and
limit damage. To meet the requirements of the current operational environment, we need
flexible, rapidly deployable forces and sufficient depth and strength to sustain multiple,
simultaneous operations.
The Army must adapt to these challenges NOW. We are generating more versatile combat power
because:
We have extended worldwide commitments.
We will remain at war for the foreseeable future.
We must be more responsive to the needs of regional combatant commanders
(RCCs).
We must execute offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of
an integrated joint force.

DELIVERING THE RIGHT ARMY FORCES

To better meet current and future operational requirements, the United States Army is
undertaking a total organizational redesign of its combat and associated support units, while in
the midst of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). In terms of scope, the efforts to transform the
Army rival the changes wrought in the Army by Secretary of War Elihu Root a century ago in
1903. This effort involves changing how the Army conducts operations, and how it is organized
to accomplish assigned missions. The organization and doctrine of the Army that appears as the
result of transformation will not resemble that with which our nation fought the major conflicts
of the last century. (See Figure Intro-1.)

Figure Intro-1. Today’s Army

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We are seeking a campaign-quality Army with a joint and expeditionary mindset. This new
expeditionary mindset recognizes we are an Army in contact engaged in ongoing operations and
ready to respond to the next crisis as it evolves. Transformation is an attitude and spirit—
infused across the entire force—that embraces a forward-leaning, modular, joint interdependent
and capabilities-based Army led by aggressive, intelligent, and empowered Soldiers. This team
of teams will transform to an Army that will ultimately win the war on terror and provide long-
term security for the Nation.
Army transformation is a comprehensive effort intended to reinvent the Army at strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. Formations will be redesigned to provide modular, capabilities-
based organizations, increasing their relevance and responsiveness to RCCs.
Changing the organizational structure of units must be logically consistent with future force
concepts but tempered by the technological and current force capabilities that are reasonably
available in the near term. This force will be strategically responsive, networked, and fight with
a precision capabilities-based maneuver force that is dominant across the range of military
operations envisioned for the future global security environment.
Delivering the right Army forces at the right place and time is vital to the joint force
commander’s ability to defeat any enemy. As the Army repositions and reconfigures its forces,
the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and sustain forces throughout the global battlespace will be
expanded. Keeping the Army relevant and ready is about anticipation and not about preparing
for yesterday's challenges. The world is changing and the Army is responding to these changes
and positioning itself for the challenges of the future strategic environment with forces that will
be more effective in combat missions, more capable of stability operations, and far better at
interacting with other service tactical elements of the joint force.

SECTION III - A TOTAL ORGANIZATIONAL REDESIGN

MODULARITY
Modularity is the foundation for building a campaign quality Army with joint and expeditionary
capabilities. Often, commanders require a function to be performed that does not warrant the
deployment of an entire unit. However, deploying portions of units can render the remaining
elements of the parent organization incapable of performing their mission due to a lack of key
personnel and equipment
Modularity provides a force design methodology that aids in solving these dilemmas. It enhances
the Army's ability to rapidly respond to a wide range of global contingencies with a force
possessing needed functions and capabilities, while deploying a minimum of troops and
equipment. It is a methodology that puts the right amount of the needed capabilities at the right
place at the right time. At the same time, it also leaves behind the remainder of an organization
that can be deployed later or can provide mission-capable support elsewhere if needed.
Modularity is about packaging units into flexible configurations, creating more cohesive and
capable units, and adjusting the types and mix of AC and RC units (See Figure Intro-2). Modular
units are rapidly deployable, responsive, agile, tailorable, and discrete packages of land force
combat power.

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 Introduction

Figure Intro-2. Restructuring Today’s Army

The object of modularity is to provide superior tactical units that are more responsive and
provide greater mission potency for the joint force commander.
Modularity provides the methodology for the Army to achieve a force structure that will optimize
rapid assembly of mission-oriented contingency forces that are effective and efficient; while
providing a means of rapidly identifying, mobilizing, and deploying doctrinally sound,
sustainable, and fully mission-capable elements/organizations capable of operating in a joint and
combined environment (See Figure Intro-3.)

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure Intro-3. Modularity and the Army’s Need to Change

Modularity will apply to force elements, including command and control (C2) headquarters
performing missions across the range of military operations (peacetime, conflict, and war) and
force elements participating in joint, combined, multinational, and interagency operations.

MODULAR HEADQUARTERS
Since 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational
experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into loosely
linked major land, sea, and air operations, often conducted with different objectives. Today, joint
operations form an integrated joint fabric, and increasingly, operations are integrated at the
tactical level. The nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and
time. In general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in
time. At tactical and operational levels, subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areas of
operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This change is the result of
smaller and more agile forces, significant improvements in C2, and continuing integration of
joint capabilities at lower echelons. Army forces continue to increase their lethality. The
integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the effectiveness of the individual
weapon systems by many times. All these factors support Army forces executing offensive land
operations early in the campaign by introducing forces capable of maneuvering to operational
depths as part of an integrated joint force.
The operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and tailored
to the needs of the combatant commanders. Army forces must be capable of executing a full
range of military operations from theater war through smaller contingencies to humanitarian
assistance. To meet joint requirements, the Army is reorganizing its echelons above brigade.
Between now and 2010, two higher headquarters will replace the existing structure of divisions,
corps, and echelons above corps. These new headquarters are currently designated units of
employment (UE), specifically a UEx (primary warfighting) and a UEy (theater operational land
force and joint support) echelon (See Figure Intro-4). While the tendency is to think of these

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 Introduction

echelons as linear improvements to the division and corps, they are not. Both higher echelons
will be complementary, modular entities designed to employ tailored forces within integrated
joint campaigns.

Figure Intro-4. UEy and UEx

Units of employment execute offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations on land as
part of an integrated joint force. The UEx will become the principal warfighting headquarters of
the Army, exercising operational control over brigades employed in tactical engagements. The
UEy will focus primarily on the Army component responsibilities, supporting the entire theater
and the operational forces (joint, interagency, and multinational) as required by the combatant
commander.

The Brigade-Based Force

The Army will transform to a brigade-based modular Army to achieve more balance in the force,
with the ability to operate decisively in an uncertain environment against an unpredictable
threat that will make every attempt to avoid our strengths (See Figure Intro-5). This redesign
effort, as well as associated restructuring and stabilization initiatives, are important as they are
intended to sustain both the active and reserve component Army through a potentially long-
term and manpower- and resource-intensive war on terrorism.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure Intro-5. From Divisions to Brigades

The new brigade designs achieve three goals set by the Army’s Chief of Staff. This new design
will:
Increase the number of combat brigades available to the Army while maintaining
combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than that of current divisional
brigade combat teams.
Create smaller standardized modules to meet the varied demands of RCCs and
reduce joint planning and execution complexities.
Redesign brigades to perform as an integral part of the joint team. This makes
them more capable in their basic ground close combat role, able to benefit from
other service support, and able to contribute more to other service partners.
The fundamental transforming idea behind the Army’s reorganization is to organize Soldiers
into powerful and modular brigade combat beams (BCTs) with dramatically improved C2
systems. This pairing of better combat potential with superior C2 will give the brigades the
ability to gather more information faster and more reliably and to fight as a networked team of
teams internally and with teammates in the other services. This will give the new maneuver
brigades significantly greater combat power than that of contemporary ones.
The principal tactical unit of the modular Army will be the BCTs, which will be made up of
battalion-sized and company-sized subunits. Brigade-based, modular units are rapidly
deployable, lethal, responsive, agile, tailorable, and discrete packages of land force combat
power.
Today’s varying types of divisional and nondivisional BCTs will be reduced to three variants.
Two standard BCT designs will replace the task-organized combinations formed inside today’s

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 Introduction

divisions. One variant is a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), and the other is an infantry
brigade combat team (IBCT). Selected IBCTs will be organized along the standard design but
will retain the ability to conduct forced entry operations by vertical envelopment (air assault and
airborne). The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is the third type of maneuver BCT available
to the UEx commander.
These BCTs will be standing combined arms formations and will include organic battalion-sized
maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistics subunits. In contrast to current divisional
brigades, the modular force BCTs will be fixed base table of organization and equipment (TOE)
units.
With the fielding of BCTs, the Army will shift from a division-based stance to a brigade-based
posture. The Army shifts from generating and employing divisions in decisive land operations to
providing the joint commander the right mix of BCTs and appropriate C2 as part of an
integrated joint operation. Rather than providing some derivative of a division, as the Army does
now, the Army will provide a mix of capabilities, controlling headquarters, and an appropriate
commander to meet the requirements of the joint force commander, which will be driven by the
threat and mission requirements.
Despite their organizational similarity to present maneuver brigades, the transformed modular
BCTs are organized to maintain combined arms teamwork more effectively under intense stress.
Advanced C2 tools, increased reconnaissance capabilities with improved sensors, and better
precision weapons add significantly to the effectiveness of the new brigade combat teams.
These BCTs will magnify the effects of all the elements of combat power—maneuver, firepower,
protection, leadership, and information—in new ways. As their fighting systems improve over
the next decade, combat units will generate significant increases in combat power and
significant advances in the focus, discrimination, and precision of combat effects.
Lethality in combat is determined less by the total number of shooters in an organization than
by the number it can bring to bear and the accuracy with which they fire. While the shooters in
the brigades’ direct and indirect fire systems are familiar (120mm and 25mm cannons; small
arms, machineguns, grenade launchers, and antitank/antimateriel/antiair missiles; 60mm,
81mm, and 120mm mortars; and 105mm or 155mm howitzers), their effectiveness has been
substantially improved through better situational understanding (SU) and fire control tools.
To support the new heavy, infantry, and Stryker BCTs, five types of supporting brigades will be
organized to provide supporting aviation; artillery fires; sustainment; intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR); and protection. These supporting brigades are organized to perform
specific combined arms support functions.
The supporting brigades are flexibly organized to meet mission demands. Each brigade includes
a mix of organic and assigned battalions. Each can be tailored for the specific set of mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) conditions of a major operation or contingency and can be task
organized in size from a brigade-sized element down to platoon-sized or section-sized elements.
These supporting brigades provide the means to weight the decisive operation or to tailor BCTs
for specific missions.
The Army National Guard will have the same common BCT design as the active Army but will
retain a separate scout group in addition to its heavy, infantry, and Stryker BCTs. The Army
Reserve will provide an array of supporting units.

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FMI 3-90.5

SECTION IV - THE NEW ARMY FORCES

UEY
The UEy is the Army theater-level headquarters that directly supports the RCCs. The UEy
consolidates most of the supporting functions currently executed by Army corps and Army
service component commands (theater Army) into a single operational command echelon. The
UEy will be the primary vehicle for support to the entire region as well as Army, joint, and
multinational forces deployed to a joint operational area (JOA). There will be one UEy for each
RCC, and any subunified command designated by the Secretary of Defense.
The UEy commander performs the service unique functions and tasks of the Army service
component commander (ASCC) for that RCC. In major combat operations, the UEy may become
the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) and exercise operational control over
tactical forces. It can also provide the headquarters for a joint task force in smaller scale
contingencies. The UEy requires some joint augmentation to function as the JFLCC or joint task
force (JTF). The specific organization of each UEy will be based on the unique requirements of
the joint force commander/RCC and the conditions of the theater. Figure Intro-6 shows a general
regionally focused UEy C2 headquarters.

Figure Intro-6. UEy Organization

Four regionally focused commands or brigades will provide a theater base to each UEy and allow
it to support the operations of the UEx and other joint and multinational forces in the combatant
command. These supporting commands and brigades supporting each theater include a theater
sustainment command (TSC), a theater network command (TNC), a theater intelligence brigade

xxviii FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Introduction

(TIB), and a civil affairs brigade. The situation in each theater will dictate the size of the
commands and theater-level brigades that support Army forces in theater.
The UEy receives other commands and brigades as required for execution of campaigns.
Typically, these include a medical command, air and missile defense command, theater aviation
brigade, engineer brigades, military police brigades, and one or more tailored UEx. From these
forces and based on the assigned mission, the UEy may allocate additional maneuver, fires,
aviation, surveillance, maneuver enhancement, sustainment, and other functional brigades to
the UEx during the conduct of operations.

UEX
The primary tactical war fighting headquarters will be the UEx. The UEx will combine the
functions of today’s division with the tactical responsibilities of the corps. The primary task of
the UEx will be to direct the operations of the subordinate brigades and battalions. In marked
contrast to the division, the UEx will not be a fixed formation. The UEx will not have any
organic forces beyond the elements that make up the headquarters and its special troop
battalion that includes life support and maintenance, a security company, a signal company, and
a mobile command group section. Figure Intro-7 depicts a UEx organization.

Four deployable command

posts, with security, signal,
UEx
and life support provided by
the special troops battalion Organic to the UEx
ll
TAC1 TAC2 MAIN MCG STB

Assigned or attached to the UEx

X X X X X X X X
X
X SUST

A mix of assigned and A mix of assigned and

attached brigade combat attached supporting brigades
teams

Figure Intro-7. UEx Organization

The UEx will be a completely modular C2 entity designed to exercise C2 over assigned brigades.
Fully modular, the UEx headquarters is self-contained and built for today’s expeditionary
warfare. This contrasts sharply with the current division, which is the largest fixed organization
in the Army.
The modular design envisions that the UEx can control a mix of the six basic types of brigade
formations—the BCT, the aviation brigade, the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB), the
maneuver enhancement brigade (ME), the fires brigade, and the sustainment brigade. Since the

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FMI 3-90.5

UEx has no fixed structure beyond the UEx headquarters, not all of these brigades may be
present in an operation. In some operations, the UEx may control more than one of a particular
type of brigade. The UEx may also control functional groups, battalions, or even companies, but
normally, these will be task organized to one of the brigades.
The UEx conducts decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations that translate operational
directives into tactical action. The UEx is organized, manned, trained, and equipped to
accomplish the following:
• Control up to six BCTs in major combat operations but may control more in prolonged
stability operations. However, the span of command may decrease to one or two BCTs
during forcible entry operations.
• Control a tailored mix of other warfighting capabilities organized under the five
multifunctional supporting brigades. The UEy may also attach or operational control
(OPCON) functional brigades to the control of the UEx commander.
• Organizes and distribute C2 assets based on METT-TC. The UEx commander may
alternate command posts (CPs) between planning and execution, assign them to
geographically dispersed operations, or allocate them to divergent types of operations
occurring simultaneously (for example, offensive and stability operations). The
commander may also organize C2 according to major functions (such as Army forces
(ARFOR), land component, tactical controlling headquarters, etc.) or purpose (decisive,
sustaining, and shaping).
• Function as an ARFOR or JTF/JFLCC headquarters for SSCs without additional Army
augmentation. The UEx may serve as both the ARFOR and JFLCC simultaneously,
although augmentation may be required for extended operations.
• Direct mobile strike and precision strike operations through mission orders to the
aviation and fires brigades, respectively.
• Normally operate independently along a line of operation or in an area of operation (AO)
during offensive operations.
Each UEx is unique not only for a particular campaign but also for different phases of the
campaign. The higher headquarters continually tailors the UEx according to the factors of
METT-TC.
While current divisions are concerned solely with tactics, the UEx can function at the
operational level of war with little or no augmentation. It can perform as the ARFOR
headquarters for a small JTF and can function as the combined or joint force land component
command (C/JFLCC) with US Marine Corps or multinational augmentation. With other service
augmentation and special training, the UEx may even serve as a JTF headquarters.
In garrison, the UEx coordinating staff is organized into a general staff that includes G1,
personnel; G2, intelligence; G3, operations; G4, logistics; G5, plans; G6, command, control,
communications, and computer operations (C4OPS); and G7, information operations. The UEx
headquarters also includes special staff and personal staff for the commander. In contrast to
current division/corps headquarters organization, all of the special staff are organic to the UEx
headquarters. The headquarters has organic liaison teams. The UEx does not depend on any
subordinate brigade to provide elements of the special staff, and it has a security company that
can provide security platoons to its mobile elements.

HEAVY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM DESCRIPTION

The following paragraphs provide a general description of the HBCT’s capabilities, organization
and C2 relationship to the UEx. The HBCT is more deployable and more versatile and
contributes more to the joint team than the previous heavy organizations they replace. Figure
Intro-8 shows how the HBCT is organized with its organic battalions.

xxx FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Introduction

Figure Intro-8. Heavy BCT

The HBCT reduces the complexity of deployment planning and replaces the many variations of
the divisional armored and mechanized brigades. It contains the combined arms components
normally required to rapidly achieve tactical overmatch in a single formation. Robust enough to
fight with or without external support for limited periods, the HBCT can fight “off the ramp”
across the full spectrum of operations when tactically loaded.
Compared to prior divisional heavy brigade organizations, the HBCT provides more mission
potency for the cargo weight and space. Making use of higher leader to led ratios, a more stable
(and thus experienced) staff, and enhanced C2 systems, the HBCT command teams employ the
brigade’s potential more effectively. Enhanced and expanded fire and air support elements
distributed throughout the organization and greater network connectivity allows maximum use
of lethal and suppressive air support.
The HBCT is versatile. While the HBCT is optimized for high-tempo offensive operations against
conventional and unconventional forces in mixed or open terrain, it is also adept in mixed
terrain defense, urban combat, and mobile security operations (screen, guard, and cover). In
addition to offensive and defensive operations, the HBCT can conduct stability operations and
support operations.
The new modular HBCTs contribute more to the joint team. They are more effective in their
unique role of forcing a decision on enemy leaders in a broader variety of missions and
environments, and at a lower cost in supporting resources to the joint force as a whole.
The HBCT’s versatility and ability to make rapid transitions derives from its organic combined
arms composition. The HBCT’s balanced combined arms battalions need minimal
reconfiguration from mission to mission. Engineers and fire support elements are organic to the
combined arms battalions. The HBCT makes better use of nonorganic lethal and suppressive fire
support. HBCT organizations are sufficiently robust to maintain full-time all-round security for
all organic and attached elements. Additionally, there is sufficient organic support to fight and
win assigned engagements before external support is required.
To further enhance versatility, the next higher headquarters can modify the mission capabilities
of the HBCT or weight them when they are designated as the main effort by attaching combat
support mission modules to the maneuver, reconnaissance, fires, or brigade troops battalion
(BTB). Because of similarities in the structure of the functions of the infantry, Stryker and
heavy BCTs and because the battalions are combined arms modules, the higher commander can
also tailor brigades for specific missions by exchanging battalions. However, the UEx normally
avoids detaching organic forces from the BCT, instead varying the size of the AO assigned to the

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FMI 3-90.5

brigade or the distribution of tactical tasks between brigades. Circumstances may compel the
UEx to task organize the subordinate battalions between BCTs, but this is the exception, and
not the rule.

THE SUPPORTING BRIGADES

There are five new brigades that support the BCTs and execute shaping and sustaining
operations throughout the UEx AO. These brigades include aviation, fires, surveillance,
maneuver enhancement, and sustainment.
These five brigades perform the following supporting functions across the UEx AO:
• Each brigade can be tailored for the specific set of METT-TC conditions of a major
operation or contingency.
• Each can join or detach themselves from any higher headquarters easily and effectively.
• Each is self-contained and does not provide staff augmentation to the supported
headquarters.
• Each has substantial network connectivity and liaison officer (LNO) capability to support
another headquarters whether it is army, joint or multinational.
• Each can access and use joint enablers to accomplish its functions.
• Each has the means to reinforce the BCTs for specific missions.
The UEx commander may also determine that a ground maneuver unit or other joint capabilities
should be placed under the operational control of supporting brigade units of action. This
decision would be based on the type of operation (offense, defense, stability, or support) as well
as METT-TC considerations.

Fires Brigade
The organization of the fires brigade differs from currently fielded corps and division field
artillery brigades in its staff design, capacity to employ electronic warfare (EW) units and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The brigade commander performs the duties of the force field
artillery commander for the unit to which the fires brigade is assigned (UEy or UEx), providing
advice on all aspects of fires and effects employment.
Each fires brigade has an organic missile battalion. Depending on METT-TC, fires brigades are
task organized with additional long-range precision missiles, advanced cannon artillery, and
counterfire radars. Figure Intro-9 provides the fires brigade mission, shows how it is organized
with organic forces, and how it could be task organized with other assigned forces. The fires
brigade may receive OPCON of EW assets selected for their ability to engage enemy C2 systems.
The fires brigade provides fires on a planned or emergency basis at the direction of the UEx.

xxxii FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Introduction

Fires Brigade

Mission: Plan, prepare, execute and assess combined arms operations to

provide close support and precision strike for JFC, UE, maneuver UAs and
support UAs employing Joint and organic fires and capabilities.

Organic Assigned

I I II I II
HHB BSB TAB IO
Cannon
Rocket/Missile Rocket/Missile Cannon

ATK
TBD

Figure Intro-9. Fires Brigade

The primary task of the fires brigade is to plan, coordinate, and execute precision strike
operations within the UEx AO. The conduct of strike operations is predicated on the ability of
the strike headquarters to control and synchronize all elements of the strike operation with all
available lethal and nonlethal fires to deliver concentrated effects on the target. The C2
capabilities of the fires brigade allow it to plan, prepare, execute, and assess precision strike
with operational control of additional ISR and EW capabilities from the other brigades. The UEx
sends mission orders to the fires brigade specifying intended effects, additional capabilities
under the operational control of the fires brigade, and joint capabilities available for the mission.
The secondary task for the fires brigade is to provide reinforcing fires within the brigade AO.
When directed by the UEx, the fires brigade provides additional cannon or missile artillery to
support the BCT or delivers precision fires into the BCT AO as requested by the supported BCT
commander.
The fires brigade also provides reactive and proactive counterstrike operations to support the
UEx and BCTs.

Aviation Brigade
The aviation brigade supports the operations of the entire UEx with task-organized aviation
capabilities. The bulk of Army aviation combat power resides in the multifunctional aviation
brigade organized to support the UEx and the combined arms maneuver BCTs. The organization
of the aviation brigade combines a variety of battalions—attack, assault, lift, and support—
under one command.
The UEx aviation brigade is expansible and tailorable to the mission and can support multiple
BCTs. (See Figure Intro-10.) Based on METT-TC, the aviation brigade commander task
organizes available aviation resources into mission packages that are either controlled by a
supported BCT or the aviation brigade.

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FMI 3-90.5

Aviation Brigade

Mission: Plan, prepare, execute and assess aviation and combined arms
operations to support UEx and maneuver brigade scheme of maneuver to
find, fix, and destroy enemy forces at the decisive time and place.
HVY IN

AH – 48
X OH – 60
UH – 38 UH – 38
CH – 12 CH – 12
HH – 12 MF HH – 12

Organic Assigned

I II II II II
U
HHC CL IV
ASB ATK ASLT GS

Figure Intro-10. UEx Aviation Brigade

The aviation brigade receives priorities and mission orders from the UEx to conduct and support
reconnaissance, security, mobile strike, vertical maneuver, attack aviation support to close
combat, aerial sustainment, and C2 operations.
The aviation brigade plans and conducts mobile strike operations. Mobile strike operations are
extended combat operations that capitalize on the ability of attack aviation to maneuver to the
full depth of the UEx AO, deliver massed direct fire, and employ precision munitions in support.
The UEx executes mobile strikes outside of the BCT areas against targets that are capable of
maneuvering to avoid precision strikes.
The aviation brigade executes screening missions for the UEx. The aviation brigade may receive
the OPCON of ground maneuver and joint assets and capabilities to carry out these missions. It
supports other security operations; including BCTs assigned a screen, guard, or cover mission
with aviation forces. For guard and cover missions, the aviation brigade provides
reconnaissance, attack, and lift assets under the OPCON of BCTs. The aviation brigade also
supports area and route security operations conducted by the maneuver enhancement brigade.

Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BFSB)

The organization of the BFSB consists of an organic military intelligence battalion, brigade
troops battalion, and a long-range surveillance detachment. (See Figure Intro-11.) Other
surveillance and reconnaissance units are attached to the BFSB, tailored to specific operations.
The tactical function of the BFSB is to develop situational understanding over unassigned
portions of the UEx AO and support UEx-level decision processes. The BFSB directs its
capabilities to the areas external to the brigade areas. Since the BFSB will inevitably lack
sufficient assets to maintain visibility over the entire AO, the brigade commander will develop a
BFSB plan for organic and attached assets based on the ISR plan developed by the G3 and G2 of
the UEx.

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 Introduction

Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

Mission: Conducts Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence

operations to enable the UEx, JTF, or Joint Force Commander to focus
joint combat power and effects with precision to simultaneously support
current and future operations throughout the Area of Operation.
X

Organic Attached or OPCON

II II I II
R
INTEL BTB SOF UAV A

Hunter

I I I I
HHC SPT LRSD

Figure Intro-11. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

The BFSB is organized to assist the G2 in satisfying the commander’s critical information
requirements (CCIR), which include priority intelligence requirements (PIR). It becomes the
eyes and ears of the UEx within its AO. The UEx commander describes the operation and
identifies the PIR. The commander’s intent and PIR become mission orders for the BFSB
commander. The BFSB commander controls all UEx-level surveillance and reconnaissance
assets not task organized or organic to another brigade.
The BFSB commander needs wide latitude to develop the situation across the UEx AO. The size
and scope of the operation will often require the UEx to complement and reinforce the BFSB
with additional assets. The UEx also focuses the BFSB through the allocation of brigade AOs.
The BFSB has the capability to reinforce the BCT collection capabilities. When circumstances
and orders from the UEx dictate, the BFSB will reinforce brigade intelligence capabilities with
additional assets.

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

The maneuver enhancement brigade (Figure Intro-12) is designed as a multifunctional
headquarters only—it has no organic units beyond a brigade base of headquarters and support
units. However, the brigade headquarters includes air and missile defense (AMD); military
police (MP); engineer; and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) functional
operations/planning cells. One of its uses is to create a modular, tailorable, scalable protection
force for the UEx commander.
Each maneuver enhancement brigade is uniquely tailored for its mission. Typically, the
maneuver enhancement brigade includes a mix of construction engineer, CBRN defense, civil
affairs, AMD, and MP together with a tactical combat force (TCF).

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FMI 3-90.5

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

Mission: The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade enables and enhances the
full dimensional protection and freedom of maneuver of a supported Army,
joint or multinational headquarters by shaping, leveraging or mitigating the
effects of the operational environment at the tactical and operational
levels. It augments maneuver and support brigades with functional assets
to optimize the tailored capabilities of those organizations and enhance
force application, protection, and focused logistics across multiple areas
of operation and can provide a headquarters to command and control an
assigned area of operations including maneuver forces.
X

Organic Assigned Attached or OPCON

I I II
BSB MP EOD CA MAN
E

HHC

Figure Intro-12. Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

The maneuver enhancement brigade is responsible for protection outside of maneuver brigade
combat team AOs. Tailored with MP, ADA, combat engineer and combined arms battalions, it
preserves tactical or operational freedom of action within the UEx area of operations by
performing limited offensive, defensive, and stability missions on assigned routes or in a
designated rear area. It also plans, prepares, executes and assesses protection missions for other
joint, service, and functional and multinational headquarters when required.
The maneuver enhancement brigade does not supplant unit self defense responsibilities. Units
are still responsible for self-protection against Level I and some Level II threats. The maneuver
enhancement brigade complements self defense by focusing on protection across the UEx as a
war fighting function, not a piecemeal activity.
The maneuver enhancement brigade may provide tactical combat response forces within an AO,
improve and secure lines of communications (LOC), and it may be tasked to organize base
security and defense for several base clusters. It is organized and trained to execute selected
security missions including route security and key asset or point security. It normally requires
augmentation to perform area security operations. It is not organized, trained, or equipped to do
screen, guard, and cover operations.

Sustainment Brigade
The organization of the sustainment brigade is tailored with multi-functional support battalions,
each of which includes a mix of logistical capabilities (See Figure Intro-13). Specialized support
units of varying size are task organized based on METT-TC.

xxxvi FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Introduction

Sustainment Brigade

Mission: Plan, prepare, execute and assess CSS operations within

assigned AO
X
SUST

Organic Assigned Attached

X
II II
MED
BTB SPT

I I I
HHC SPT MED FIN HR AMMO TRANS MAINT S&S

Figure Intro-13. Sustainment Brigade

One or more tactical sustainment brigades move with and support the UEx. If more than one
sustainment brigade supports the UEx, the UEx staff coordinates their operations.
The sustainment brigade of the UEx provides distribution-based replenishment to the BCTs task
organized under the UEx, and area support to any other unit located within the UEx AO. The
sustainment brigade establishes temporary bases within the UEx AO to conduct mission-staging
operations (MSO) and to provide replenishment to the BCTs of the UEx.

THE FOCUS OF THIS MANUAL IS THE HBCT

This FMI describes how the combined arms battalion optimizes organizational effectiveness
while balancing lethality, mobility, and survivability against requirements for rapid strategic
deployability. This manual provides the tactics and techniques to exploit the combined arms
battalion’s range of capabilities and to ensure the combined arms battalion’s versatility across
the full range of potential requirements, from providing the security necessary to
conduct/promote stability operations and conduct operations during peacetime military
engagements to conducting MCOs against localized threats. The details of the combined arms
battalion organization and capabilities are in the ensuing chapters.

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 Chapter 1
The Role of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team
Combined Arms Battalion

The role of the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms
battalion is to fight and win engagements on any part of the battlefield.
The battalion combines the efforts of its infantry and armor companies,
engineer company, and the forward support company to execute tactical
missions as part of a HBCT or unit of employment X (UEx) operation.
America’s heavy combined arms battalions serve as a deterrent to armed
conflict and, if required, deploy worldwide and conduct full spectrum
sustained combined arms and close combat land operations to achieve
national security objectives.

SECTION I – HEAVY COMBINED ARMS BATTALION MISSION-ESSENTIAL

TASKS
1-1. This interim manual addresses the tactical employment and operation of the heavy
combined arms battalion; however, battalion commanders must read and understand FM
3-0, Operations, and FM 3-90, Tactics, as well as the other five interim modular unit of
action manuals (Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Brigade Reconnaissance Squadron, Brigade
Troops Battalion, Fires and Effects, and Sustainment) to complement this interim manual.
FM 3-0 establishes the Army’s keystone doctrine for full-spectrum operations with
warfighting as the Army’s primary focus. FM 3-0 provides overarching doctrinal direction for
conducting full spectrum operations detailed in this and other Army manuals. FM 3-90
introduces the basic concepts and control measures associated with the art of tactics, but it
cannot be read in isolation. FM 3-90 must be used with FM 3-0, the concepts in FM 3-07,
Stability Operations and Support Operations, and the plan, prepare, execute, and assess
cycle as it relates to the military decision-making process (MDMP) that is described in FM 5-
0, Army Planning and Orders Production. In recognition of the requirement for doctrine for
the emerging HBCT (units of action), this interim manual focuses on developing employment
and operations for the heavy maneuver force. Together, these publications provide the
essential framework for understanding heavy combined arms battalion operations.

BATTALION MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK DEVELOPMENT

1-2. Heavy combined arms battalions develop their mission-essential tasks list (METLs)
based on UEx war plans and external directives as described in FM 7-0, Training the Force.
Mission-essential tasks are the operational expression of the combined arms battalion’s core
competencies. They describe what well-trained, well-led, and well-equipped soldiers do to
support the Army’s mission-essential tasks of shaping the national security environment,
responding promptly to crisis, dominating land operations, and providing support to civil
authorities (as described in FM 3-0).

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FMI 3-90.5

SHAPE THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1-3. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy establish an imperative
for international engagement. The United States will remain politically and militarily
engaged in the world with our allies and will maintain military superiority over potential
adversaries. Forward basing, forward presence, and force projection enhance the ability of
US Army forces to engage other nations—their people, governments, and militaries—as a
campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. The organization of heavy
combined arms battalions provide an overwhelming military presence to deter potential
adversaries, to conduct full spectrum operations regardless of the conditions and to counter
forces hostile to the United States and its allies. HBCT combined arms battalions undertake
peacetime military engagement (PME) missions to support the regional combatant
commander’s theater engagement strategy to reassure foreign governments, build trust and
confidence with our allies, promote regional stability, reduce potential conflicts and threats,
and deter aggression and coercion.

RESPOND PROMPTLY TO CRISIS

1-4. The Army’s capability to rapidly project its forces to any operational environment
provides joint and combined military leaders the ability to increase force presence, to
increase the magnitude of the enemy’s operational dilemma, and to act decisively within the
time specified by the joint force commander (JFC). HBCT combined arms battalions must
train to rapidly deploy personnel and equipment using rail, sealift, and airlift from the home
station to a theater of operations or draw equipment from pre-positioned theater stocks
enabling them to quickly maneuver throughout the depth of the area of operations (AO).

DOMINATE LAND OPERATIONS

1-5. The threat or use of Army forces to close with and destroy enemy forces through
maneuver and precision lethal fire and effects is the ultimate means of imposing our
national will on the enemy and achieving a decisive outcome. HBCT combined arms
battalions provide the joint force commander with the ability to seize enemy territory,
destroy the enemy’s armed forces, and eliminate his means of civil population control. HBCT
combined arms battalions conduct sustained and large-scale actions in full spectrum
operations throughout the depth of the AO. Sustained land operations provide for long-term
establishment of conditions required to achieve our national security objectives and lead to
the enemy’s ultimate defeat.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-6. HBCT combined arms battalions conduct operations in an operational environment
consisting of six dimensions. Each dimension affects how the unit combines, sequences, and
conducts military operations. Commanders tailor forces, employ diverse capabilities, and
support different missions to succeed in the operational environment.

THREAT DIMENSION
1-7. Multiple threats to US national security interests exist across the entire range of
military operations. Some threats are direct, such as a cross border attack and terrorism;
others are indirect, such as coercion and insurgency aimed at our allies. Some regional
powers aspire to dominate their neighbors and have the required conventional force
capabilities. Such situations may threaten US vital interests, US allies, or regional stability.
Transnational groups conduct a range of activities (terrorism) that threaten US interests
and citizens at home and abroad. Extremism, ethnic disputes, religious rivalries,
narcoterrorism, and human disasters contribute to destabilizing governments and regions.

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 The Role of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion

Collectively, these transnational threats may adversely affect US interests and may result in
regional military involvement (as further described in FM 3-0).
1-8. In the foreseeable future, most nations will modernize and maintain a military
capability for countering regional threats or seeking opportunities to further their national
goals. Military modernization will incorporate advances in information technology, precision
strike capabilities, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and genetic engineering. Potential
US threats vary from heavy conventional units to adaptive, asymmetric forces structured for
local and regional use. Adversaries will seek and obtain technologies that challenge US
strengths in information technology, navigation, night-vision systems, and precision
targeting and strike capabilities. The proliferation of WMD and long-range delivery systems
will enable adversaries to threaten the United States and its forward-deployed forces at
greater ranges with increased lethality and precision.
1-9. Adversaries will develop their warfighting doctrine based on perceived US strengths
and vulnerabilities. We are the most watched and studied force in the world. They will try to
prevent projection of US forces and control the nature and tempo of US actions through
asymmetric operations and adaptive forces. They will attempt to counter US air operations
and neutralize US technological advantages such as precision strike capabilities.
Adversaries will use conventional and unconventional means to destroy our national will
and our capability to wage war.
1-10. Adversaries will also seek to shape the conditions to their advantage by changing the
nature of the conflict or employing capabilities that they believe will be difficult for US forces
to counter. They will use complex terrain, urban environments, and force dispersal-survival
methods to offset US advantages.
1-11. Our adversaries will continue to seek every opportunity (both foreign and domestic) to
gain an advantage over US and multinational forces. When countered, the enemy will adapt
to the changing conditions and pursue all available options to avoid destruction or defeat.
This operational environment and wide array of threats presents significant challenges to
our operations. To counter such threats, HBCT combined arms battalions will be called on to
defeat a technologically sophisticated and lethal adversary while simultaneously protecting
noncombatants and the civilian infrastructure on which they depend.

Political Dimension
1-12. Successful military operations require commanders to have a clear sense of national
and operational objectives. Leaders must understand how the use of military force fits into
the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the desired military conditions required to meet
policy objectives. Each political decision made during the conduct of military operations has
strategic, operational, and tactical implications at the battalion level. Likewise, each
strategic, operational, and tactical action directly or indirectly affects the political
dimension.

Unified Action Dimension

1-13. The US National Military Strategy (NMS) calls for Army forces to act as part of a fully
interoperable and integrated joint force. Joint force commanders synchronize air, land, sea,
space, and special operations forces to accomplish their mission. HBCT combined arms
battalions can expect to operate as a part of a campaign quality Army expeditionary force in
a joint force, unified command structure both in major combat operations (MCOs) and more
commonly in small-scale contingencies (SSCs). The HBCT combined arms battalion may
work with multinational and interagency partners to accomplish the full spectrum of
missions. HBCT combined arms battalions committed to SSCs can expect to protect
American lives and interests, support political initiatives, facilitate diplomacy, promote

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fundamental ideals, and disrupt illegal activities. Close coordination and the complete
understanding of the joint force commander’s intent are the foundation of successful unified
actions.

Land Combat Operations Dimension

1-14. Land combat continues to be the most important feature of combat operations and is
the primary function of the HBCT combined arms battalion. Land combat usually involves
destroying or defeating enemy forces or taking land objectives that reduce the enemy’s
willingness to fight. Four characteristics distinguish land combat: scope, duration, terrain,
and permanence.

Scope
1-15. Land combat involves direct and indirect combat with an enemy throughout the depth
and width of an operational area. Forces conduct simultaneous and sequential operations in
contiguous and noncontiguous AOs. Commanders maneuver forces to seize and retain key
and decisive terrain. They use the elements of combat power to defeat or destroy enemy
forces.

Duration
1-16. Land combat is repetitive and continuous. It involves rendering an enemy incapable or
unwilling to conduct further action. It may require destroying him.

Terrain
1-17. Land combat takes place amid a variety of natural and manmade features. The
complexity of the ground environment contrasts significantly with the relative transparency
of air, sea, and space. Plans for land combat must account for the visibility and clutter
provided by the terrain as well as the effects of weather and climate.

Permanence
1-18. Land combat frequently requires seizing or securing terrain. With control of terrain
comes control of populations and productive capacity. Thus, land combat makes permanent
the temporary effects of other operations.

Information Dimension
1-19. Decisive operations historically have been enabled by information superiority.
Information superiority provides commanders with accurate, timely information that
enables them to make superior decisions and act faster than their adversaries. Information
superiority, derived from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); information
management (IM); psychological operations (PSYOP); and information operations (IO),
provides a common framework for how to plan, task, and control assets; how and where to
report information; and how to use information. The information environment also includes
information derived from nongovernmental individuals and organizations (such as the
media) that produce and disseminate information that affects public opinion and can alter
the conduct and perceived legitimacy of military operations.
1-20. Information operations are the actions taken to enable, enhance, and protect the
friendly force’s ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage
over enemy forces. A successful IO program will affect our adversaries’ decision-making
processes, information, and information systems while defending our friendly decision-
making processes, information, and information systems.

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 The Role of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion

1-21. Units conduct IO across the full range of military operations from operations in
garrison through deployment to combat operations and continuing through redeployment on
mission completion. Information operations include both offensive and defensive elements
(Figure 1-1). IO provide commanders with essential tools for protecting their organizations
and systems. The overall joint force objectives (desired effects) are linked with higher
headquarters objectives (desired effects). IO objectives support these overall operational and
strategic objectives and may be designated as high as the Secretary of Defense or President.
Available resources define what the joint forces can accomplish. The combined arms
battalion may have PSYOP personnel supporting it to help the commander support the
overall force information campaign plan. The target audience may include enemy forces, the
local population, and or displaced personnel moving through or residing in the area. Target
PSYOP support to the combined arms battalion is satisfied by a series of PSYOP products
and psychological activities that can be executed within national themes and supporting
PSYOP objectives.
1-22. Information operations are one aspect of decisive operations that attempts to achieve a
desired effect in the battlespace in a nonkinetic manner. The commander’s intent should
have a measurable component of desired effects to achieve regardless of the spectrum of
conflict. The commander must be able to describe the desired kinetic (physical) as well as
nonkinetic (metaphysical: the nature of reality and relationship between mind and matter)
effects to achieve the decisive operational objective. IO are critical to ensure that the
physical effects and the metaphysical effects are linked and achieved. To be successful in
modern operations, commanders must be capable of achieving effects in both a physical
(kinetic) as well as a metaphysical sense (nonkinetic). The direction and management
(integration, synchronization, and coordination) of effects are not the responsibility of the
fire support officer (FSO) but the commander and the operations officer (S3) as it enables the
commander’s operational intent to be achieved.

Figure 1-1. Information Operations

Technological Dimension
1-23. Technology enhances leader, unit, and soldier performance and affects how Army forces
plan, prepare, and execute full spectrum operations in peace, conflict, and war. Technology
has significantly increased our ability to conduct ISR operations, and it greatly enhances the
ability to conduct battle command through modern telecommunications and microprocessing.
Munitions are increasingly lethal, and target acquisition systems are more precise. The
proliferation of advanced technology systems requires the commander to integrate the
capabilities of highly modernized organizations and less-modernized and multinational
units. Additionally, commanders must also realize that they do not have a monopoly on

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advanced technology. Even adversaries lacking any research and development program can
purchase sophisticated systems in the global marketplace and gain selected parity or
superiority to US systems.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1-24. HBCT combined arms battalions are trained and equipped to conduct full spectrum
operations across the range of military operations. Heavy combined arms battalion
commanders may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to
accomplish missions in war and in stability operations and support operations. The Army’s
mounted forces are optimized for offensive and defensive operations in an MCO but retain
the ability to conduct SSCs as well as stability operations and support operations.
1-25. Full spectrum military operations include offensive, defensive, stability operations, and
support operations. Missions in any environment require combined arms battalions to
conduct or to be prepared to conduct any combination of these primary operations:
Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their purpose is to
impose US will on the enemy for decisive victory.
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or
develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive operations alone
normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a
counteroffensive that regains the initiative.
Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing
diplomatic, civil, and military environments. Regional security is supported by a
balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity
simultaneously. Army force presence promotes a stable secure environment.
Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or
domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. Army forces
respond only when directed by the Secretary of Defense to domestic and
international requests for military support to civil authorities. Army forces operate
under the lead Federal agency and comply with provisions of US law, including the
Posse Comitatus Act and the Stafford Act.
1-26. HBCT combined arms battalions normally conduct one type of military operation at a
time. However, combined arms battalions transition from one type of operation to another as
the strategic and operational requirements change. The combined arms battalion is
organized doctrinally to conduct offensive and defensive operations. The battalion
commander will have to reorganize the battalion organization and tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) to address the operational requirements of stability operations and support
operations.
1-27. The task organization of both the HBCT and the combined arms battalion will be based
on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
and civil considerations (METT-TC) factors regardless of the mission and will be dynamically
changed to achieve the desired operational effect. Commanders must be ready to accept
augmentation to accomplish the mission and then to release the augmenting forces when no
longer required or when a higher priority mission recalls them. The concept of modularity
requires commanders at every level to assess the force structure required to achieve the
desired effects and then articulate mission requirements and the operational risk associated
with not having the right force structure to accomplish the assigned mission. Commanders
must articulate when and where they need augmentation to be effective in achieving the
desired intent and effect. Commanders must also be ready to release forces so they can move
to other modular units to accomplish other priority missions. For modularity in force
management to work, commanders and staffs must have a vision of what is required and be
able to plan with the UEx and supporting brigades so the right forces are at the right place

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 The Role of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion

and time to support the commander’s intent and to achieve the desired effect. Forces arriving
late because of poor planning and or coordination are not force multipliers but an additional
burden on the unit with the mission.

SECTION II – OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1-28. The operational framework consists of the arrangements of friendly forces and
resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or situation.
Commanders design an operational framework to accomplish their mission by defining and
arranging three components—the area of operations, battlespace, and battlefield
organization. Commanders use the operational framework to focus combat power to
accomplish their mission.

AREA OF OPERATIONS
1-29. An HBCT combined arms battalion’s AO is the geographical area assigned by a higher
commander, including the coordinated airspace above and ground below, in which the
combined arms battalion commander has responsibility and the authority to conduct
military operations.
1-30. AOs should allow the commanders to employ their organic, assigned, and supporting
systems to the limit of their capabilities. Combined arms battalion commanders normally
designate AOs for subordinate units. Commanders use control measures to describe AOs and
design them to fit the operational situation and take advantage of the units’ capabilities.
Commanders specify the minimum control measures necessary to focus combat power,
delineate responsibilities, assign geographic responsibility, and promote unified action. At a
minimum, control measures include boundaries on all sides of the AO.
1-31. Commanders typically subdivide some or all of the assigned AO by assigning
subordinate unit areas. These subordinate AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (see
Figure 1-2). When friendly forces are contiguous, a boundary separates them. When friendly
forces are noncontiguous, the concept of operation links the elements of the force, but the
AOs do not share a boundary. The intervening area between noncontiguous AOs remains the
responsibility of the higher headquarters.

AREA OF INTEREST
1-32. The HBCT combined arms battalion’s area of interest (AI) is a geographical
representation of the area from which information and intelligence are required to execute
successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. It includes any threat forces
or characteristics of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence
accomplishment of the command’s mission. A higher commander does not assign the AI. The
AI is developed by the combined arms battalion commander and his staff to help visualize
the battlefield and determine information requirements.

BATTLESPACE
1-33. Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to
successfully apply combat power, protect the force, and complete the mission. Battlespace
includes land, air, sea, space, enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the
electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the AO and AI.
1-34. Battlespace is conceptual—a higher commander does not assign it. Commanders
determine their battlespace based on their concept of operations. Commanders use their
experience, professional knowledge, and understanding of the situation to visualize and
change their battlespace as current operations transition to future operations. Battlespace

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visualization begins with a picture of the ground and successively layers enemy, friendly,
and environment over terrain visualization.
1-35. Battlespace is not synonymous with AO. Commanders visualize their battlespace to
analyze all the factors that may affect current and future operations even if they can only
directly affect those factors inside their AO. By defining their battlespace and, in particular,
their AI, commanders can focus their intelligence and intelligence operations.

Figure 1-2. Contiguous Versus Noncontiguous

BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATION
1-36. Commanders visualize their battlespace and determine how to arrange their forces.
1-37. Battlefield organization is the arrangement of subordinate forces according to purpose,
time, and space to accomplish a mission. The purpose-based framework centers on decisive,
shaping, and sustaining operations. Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield
organization by providing the common focus for all actions. However, forces act in time and
space to accomplish a purpose.
1-38. HBCT combined arms battalion commanders organize forces according to purpose by
determining whether each unit’s operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining.
Alternatively, commanders may organize forces by determining main effort and supporting
efforts. Commanders choose the technique to articulate their organization of forces based on
which best facilitates their ability to visualize, describe, and direct actions at the tactical
level. These decisions form the basis of the concept of operations. Commanders also
synchronize operations in time and space. These thought processes are especially useful in
combat operations that are generally contiguous, linear, and feature a clearly defined enemy
force.

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 The Role of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Combined Arms Battalion

DECISIVE OPERATIONS
1-39. Decisive operations directly achieve the mission and intent of the higher headquarters.
1-40. Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of battles and engagements.
There is only one decisive operation for any phase of an operation for any given echelon. The
decisive operation may include multiple actions conducted simultaneously throughout the
depth of the AO. Commanders weight the decisive operation while economizing on the effort
allocated to shaping operations.
1-41. In the offense and defense, decisive operations normally focus on maneuver.
Conversely, logistics may be decisive during the mobilization and deployment phases of an
operation or in support operations, particularly if the mission is humanitarian in nature.
1-42. A reserve is a portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear or withheld from action
at the beginning of an engagement but is available for a decisive movement. Until
committed, reserves shape through their placement within the AO while planning for and
preparing to conduct operations. When committed, they either become or reinforce the
decisive operation. Commanders can use reserves to influence circumstances or exploit
opportunities. When commanders anticipate uncertainty, they hold a greater portion of the
force in reserve to posture the force to seize and maintain the initiative as a situation
develops. Reserves deploy and reposition as necessary to ensure their protection,
availability, and prompt reaction (see Chapters 5 and 6).

SHAPING OPERATIONS
1-43. Shaping operations create and preserve the conditions for the success of the decisive
operation. Shaping operations include lethal and nonlethal activities conducted throughout
the AO.
1-44. Shaping operations support the decisive operation by affecting the enemy’s capabilities
and forces or influencing the opposing commander’s decisions. Shaping operations use the
full range of military power to neutralize or reduce enemy capabilities. They may occur
simultaneously with, before, or after initiation of the decisive operation. They may involve
any combination of forces and can occur throughout the depth of the AO. Some shaping
operations, especially those that occur simultaneously with the decisive operation, are
economy-of-force actions. If the force available does not permit simultaneous decisive and
shaping operations, the commander sequences shaping operations around the decisive
operation. A shaping operation may become the decisive operation if circumstances or
opportunity demand. In that case, commanders weight the new decisive operations at the
expense of other shaping operations. The concept of the operation clearly defines how
shaping operations support the decisive operation.
1-45. Security of the force is an essential element of all operations. Security ensures that the
force is viable to accomplish the decisive operation of the next higher headquarters. Security
protects the force and provides time for friendly forces to react to enemy or hostile activities.
It also blinds the enemy’s attempts to see friendly forces and protects friendly forces from
enemy observation and action.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
1-46. The purpose of sustaining operations is the generation and maintenance of HBCT
combined arms battalion combat power.
1-47. Sustaining operations are operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive
operations by providing service support, force protection, movement control, and terrain
management. Sustaining operations include the following elements:

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Sustaining operations provide essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks

necessary to sustain all elements of the operating forces. Sustaining operations
encompasses those activities at all levels of war that generate and maintain forces
on the battlefield.
Force protection includes measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or an
installation to defend and protect itself against all acts that may impair its
effectiveness. Force protection is a priority mission-essential task during stability
operations and support operations.
Movement control includes the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, and
security of personnel and materiel moving into, within, and out of the AO.
Maintaining movement control and keeping lines of communication (LOC) open are
critical requirements in preserving freedom of movement throughout the AO and
force protection.
Terrain management includes the process of allocating terrain, designating
assembly areas, and specifying locations for units and activities.
1-48. Sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations, although
they are not by themselves decisive or shaping. Failure to sustain the combined arms
battalion normally results in mission failure. Sustaining operations occur throughout the
AO, not just in the rear area. Sustaining operations determine how fast forces reconstitute
and how far forces can exploit success. At the tactical level, sustaining operations underwrite
the tempo of the overall operation; they assure the ability of the combined arms battalion to
take immediate advantage of any opportunity.

MAIN EFFORT
1-49. Within the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations,
commanders designate and shift the main effort.
1-50. The main effort is the activity, unit, or area that the commander determines
constitutes the most important task at that time regardless of the mission. Commanders
weight the main effort with resources and priorities. Within shaping and decisive operations,
the brigade commander may designate a main effort for each operation; however, he will
designate only one main effort per operation and shift the main effort as circumstances and
intent demand.
1-51. The main effort and the decisive operation are not always identical. Identification of
the main effort in shaping operations is a resource decision. A shaping operation may be the
main effort before execution of the decisive operation. However, the decisive operation
becomes the main effort on execution. Shifting the main effort does not normally require
changing or adjusting the plan. Commanders anticipate shifts of the main effort throughout
the operation. In contrast, changing the decisive operation from the plan requires execution
of a branch, sequel, or new plan.

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 Chapter 2
Organization and Capabilities

Heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalions are

organized to fight and win the nation’s wars, but they are equally capable
of executing stability operations and support operations as part of a joint
task force or multinational force. The HBCT combined arms battalion
combines the efforts of its mechanized infantry and tank companies,
engineer company, and forward support and headquarters companies to
execute tactical missions as part of an HBCT or UEx operation. The key
to victory is to mass the combat power of the companies quickly while
integrating and synchronizing the supporting and sustaining multipliers.
The HBCT combined arms battalion can be designated a task force when
a temporary grouping of units under one battalion-level commander is
formed to carry out a specific operation or mission. A battalion-sized unit
of the combat arms is called a battalion task force when one or more
company-sized units from another combat arms unit (or from a combat
support (CS) unit) are attached to carry out a specific operation or
mission.

SECTION I – ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

2-1. The HBCT combined arms battalion has been organized, equipped, and trained to take
advantage of the strengths of its assigned infantry, armor, engineer, and sustaining forces.
(Refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion of heavy and light force integration and
operations.) The following section describes the HBCT combined arms battalion’s unique
missions, organizations, capabilities, and limitations.

ORGANIZATION
2-2. The HBCT combined arms battalion (Figure 2-1) is organized, manned, and equipped
to conduct high-intensity combat operations continuously (see Appendix D, Section III, for
information on the effects of continuous operations). Leaders organize units according to
their directed missions and routinely augment them to improve intelligence, fire support,
engineer, air defense, information operations, and sustaining capabilities. A heavy combined
arms battalion most often accomplishes its tasks and purposes as part of a brigade operation.
Occasionally, however, a battalion task force may conduct operations directly under the
control of a UEx.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 2-1. Combined Arms Battalion

CAPABILITIES
2-3. HBCT combined arms battalions apply their combat power to:
Conduct sustained combat operations in all environments with proper augmentation
and support.
Conduct offensive operations.
Conduct defensive operations.
Accomplish rapid movement and limited penetrations.
Exploit success and pursue a defeated enemy as part of a larger formation.
Conduct security operations (advance, flank, or rear guard) for a larger force.
Conduct operations with infantry and Stryker maneuver forces.
Conduct stability operations.
Conduct support operations as part of a larger force.

LIMITATIONS
2-4. HBCT combined arms battalions have the following limitations:
Strategic lift requirements slow the deployment of heavy forces from home or
staging bases into an area of operations (AO).
Urban areas, dense jungles and forests, steep and rugged terrain, and large water
obstacles limit maneuver and the effects of firepower.

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 Organization and Capabilities

There is a high consumption of supply items, especially Classes III, V, and IX while
conducting high-intensity operations.
A requirement exists to plan for and receive augmentation based on the mission,
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) to accomplish missions. The normal organization of the
heavy combined arms battalion may be inadequate to accomplish tactical tasks in
offensive and defensive operations and may require significant reorganization and
augmentation to conduct stability operations and support operations. Assessing the
mission organization of the HBCT combined arms battalion is a critical task in
every mission analysis.

BATTLEFIELD FOCUS
2-5. The HBCT combined arms battalion is the lowest echelon at which intelligence, fire
support, maneuver, CS, and CSS are combined under a single commander. Mechanized
infantry and armored companies provide mobile, armor protected firepower for the
battalion’s mobility, survivability, lethality, and psychological effect on the situation. An
HBCT combined arms battalion uses part of the force to find and fix the enemy while the
remainder of the force attacks his weakest point—usually a flank or rear. The goal is to mass
the effects of combat power at the decisive point to accomplish the battalion’s purpose while
preserving freedom of maneuver for future operations.

OFFENSIVE FOCUS
2-6. During the offense, the HBCT combined arms battalion masses its combat power to
defeat a defending enemy force. The close fight consists of breaching enemy tactical and
protective obstacles and defeating enemy forces. Following a penetration of enemy defenses,
the battalion prepares to fight enemy reserves. The heavy combined arms battalion responds
to threats to its rear as part of the close fight. Designated battalion reserve forces react to
changing situations and exploit successes. During the HBCT combined arms battalion’s close
fight, the heavy brigade conducts its deep fight against enemy reserves, rocket/artillery
systems, radars, fixed- and rotary-wing assets, and electronic warfare and then attacks
enemy units defending in subsequent defensive positions to shape and sustain the battle.

DEFENSIVE FOCUS
2-7. During the defense, the HBCT combined arms battalion defends against and defeats
enemy attacking forces. The battalion responds to defensive rear threats as part of the close
fight and employs defensive security measures in concert with the brigade plan. The
brigade’s deep fight supports the battalion close fight by interdicting follow-on enemy
battalions, then shifting to the enemy lead unit’s battalions of the second-echelon
formations.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT FOCUS

2-8. Stability operations and support operations are two distinct and different operations.
They are seldom short term and may require reorganization of forces from traditional
missions to accomplish the mission. Rather, commanders envision simultaneous activities
and sequential stages that lead to a long-term outcome in support of the mission. For
example, stability operations may begin with an initial objective of observing a cease-fire,
then move to supporting an economic recovery program, and finally conclude with
supporting an international agency program for cultural assimilation and resolution of the
underlying conflict. (See Chapter 8 for more information on stability operations and support
operations.)

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COMMANDER’S FOCUS
2-9. The objectives of maneuver are to position friendly force strengths against enemy
weaknesses, to protect friendly weaknesses from enemy strengths, to throw the enemy off
balance, and to follow up aggressively to complete the destruction of the enemy. The HBCT
combined arms battalion commander develops his intent and concept of the operation nested
within the framework of the higher commander’s intent. The combined arms battalion
commander must clearly understand how his mission-essential tasks and purposes fit into
the intent of the brigade and UEx commanders. Since the battalion commander has to accept
some risk to mass combat power at the critical place or time—whether in the offense or
defense—this understanding enables him to seize the initiative when the opportunity allows.

SECTION II – DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONNEL

2-10. An HBCT combined arms battalion consists of task-organized companies under the
command of a battalion commander, and it participates in brigade or UEx operations in
accordance with the principles and concepts in FMI 3-90.6 and FM 71-100.

BATTALION COMMANDER
2-11. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander is responsible for everything his unit
does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility. The commander is responsible to
both his superiors and his subordinates. He increases the effectiveness of the battalion by
delegating to his subordinates the authority to accomplish their missions; holding
subordinates responsible for their actions; and fostering a climate of mutual trust,
cooperation, and teamwork. He organizes his force based on the mission of the higher
headquarters and a thorough understanding of METT-TC.

PERSONAL STAFF GROUP

2-12. The commander’s personal staff group consists of the command sergeant major (CSM)
and battalion chaplain. The commander’s personal staff group may be adjusted to reflect
evolving mission requirements to include, for example, a personal security detachment, a
legal advisor, or an interpreter.

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

2-13. The CSM is the senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) in the battalion. He focuses on
Soldier welfare and individual training as well as on how well the combined arms battalion
carries out the commander’s decisions and policies. The CSM can act as the commander’s
representative in supervising aspects vital to an operation as determined by the commander.
For example, he can help control movement through a breach in a critical obstacle or at a
river crossing, or he can help coordinate a passage of lines or quarter assembly areas. He
also plays a key role in the sustaining effort as the sustaining troubleshooter for the
combined arms battalion. The assignment of combat arms, CS, and combat service support
(CSS) Soldiers in the combined arms battalion requires the CSM to step beyond his basic
branch orientation and serve as advocate, mentor, and role model for every Soldier in the
battalion.

BATTALION CHAPLAIN
2-14. The chaplain coordinates the religious resources and operations in the battalion. The
chaplain’s specific responsibilities include the following:
Advising the commander on issues of religion (and ethics and morals as affected by
religion), including the religious needs of assigned and attached personnel.

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Providing commanders pastoral care, personal counseling advice, and the privilege
of confidentiality and sacred confidence.
Developing and implementing the commander’s religious support program.
Exercising staff supervision and technical control over religious support throughout
the battalion area of operations.
Helping the commander ensure all Soldiers have the opportunity to exercise their
religious beliefs constructively.
Informing the commander on the overall morale and climate of the battalion.
2-15. The battalion chaplain assistant’s responsibilities include the following:
Advising the chaplain on Soldier issues and perspectives.
Providing specialized assistance in areas of religious support.
Serving as the section battle staff and providing section security.
Preparing the religious support annex to the operation order (OPORD).
Safeguarding and accounting for field offerings.
Maintaining unit equipment.

COORDINATING STAFF
2-16. During the preparation for and execution of operations, staff officers have two broad
areas of responsibility. The first is to provide information, assistance, and recommendations
to the commander. The second is to supervise the preparation for and execution of the plan
within their functional areas. Specific responsibilities include anticipating requirements,
monitoring operations, taking action to support the plan, managing the information flow,
making timely recommendations, conducting coordination, synchronizing operations, and
maintaining continuity. The coordinating staff includes the executive officer (XO), S1, S2, S3,
S4, and S6. In some instances, the combined arms battalion may also be authorized an S5 to
aid in civil-military operations (CMO). (For additional information, see FM 5-0, Army
Planning and Orders Production, and FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of
Army Forces.) Knowledge of the commander’s intent guides specific decisions within the
staff’s authority. The staff operates to carry out the commander’s intent functionally.
Normally, the commander delegates authority to the staff to take final action on matters
within command policy. Assignment of staff responsibility does not include authority over
other staff officers or over any command element.

EXECUTIVE OFFICER
2-17. The XO is the principal assistant to the battalion commander. As the second in
command, the XO must be ready to assume command immediately if the commander
becomes a casualty. The XO transmits the commander’s intent for the battalion. His two
main responsibilities are to direct the operational efforts of the battalion staff and to sustain
battalion readiness.

STAFF COORDINATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

2-18. The XO is the staff coordinator and establishes staff operating procedures. He ensures
the commander and staff are informed on matters affecting the command. To coordinate and
synchronize the plan, the XO assembles and supervises the staff during the military
decision-making process (MDMP). Unless instructed otherwise by the commander, all staff
officers inform the XO of any recommendations or information they give directly to the
commander or any instructions they receive directly from the commander.

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Readiness
2-19. The XO’s second responsibility is to synchronize the sustainment of the combined arms
battalion’s readiness for operations. Depending on the battalion’s mission, this
synchronization may take place with internal assets (forward support company (FSC)) or
external assets through the brigade combat team and UEx.

S1 ADJUTANT
2-20. The S1 has responsibility for all human resource management. He also shares
supervisory responsibility for battalion sustainment operations with the S4. The S1 adjutant
responsibilities include the following:
Maintenance of unit personnel strength and supervision of human resource
management.
Supervision of medical, safety, and civilian labor assets.
Coordination of legal support through the embedded paralegal (27D) with
reachback to the legal personnel in the brigade operational law team (BOLT) of the
HBCT
Monitoring of postal services, religious support and public affairs.
Operation from the combat trains.
Repositioning, as necessary, to accomplish his mission.
Replacement policies and requirements.
Unit strength and loss estimations.
Morale and welfare support.
Battalion administration.
Administrative accountability of enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and civilian
detainees.
Casualty reporting and accountability.
Liaison with the battalion family readiness group (FRG).
2-21. The S1 NCO provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S1 and battalion command
group. The S1 NCO performs the following:
Supervises human resource management and electronic military personnel office
(eMILPO) operations.
Serves as shift NCO in charge (NCOIC) for the rear command post (CP).
Executes personnel administrative and replacement operations, including Soldier
recognition, promotion, and reduction actions.
Executes awards and evaluations program.

S2 INTELLIGENCE
2-22. The S2 collects information and applies analysis to produce intelligence to support
battalion operations.

S2 Officer
2-23. The S2’s role in mission analysis and his linkage with the S3 and fire support officer
(FSO) is vital to mission accomplishment. The S2:
Works with the commander and S3 to perform intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB).

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 Organization and Capabilities

Performs intelligence synchronization using higher collection sources, ground and

aerial reconnaissance, observation posts, target acquisition and electronic warfare
assets, the battalion scout platoon, and maneuver companies.
Prepares and disseminates intelligence products within the battalion.
Recommends to the commander priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and
generates other information requirements (IR) as part of the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIR).
Obtains and disseminates local weather information and predicts (with the
chemical officer) the probability of use and effects of enemy nuclear, biological, and
chemical (NBC) weapons.
Supervises counterintelligence efforts, intelligence training, and storage and
control of classified information.
Operates in the main CP and helps the XO and S3 monitor intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations.
Maintains the enemy situation map and analyzes enemy information.
Helps the S3 plan ISR operations, including the use of the battalion scout platoon.
Works closely with the FSO, air liaison officer (ALO), and assistant S3 to ensure
information is passed between staff sections.
Supervises supporting intelligence organizations when attached.
Monitors and maintains the required investigations, clearances, authorizations,
and the need to know for digital command and control (C2) users.

Tactical Intelligence Officer

2-24. The tactical intelligence officer (TIO) works under the supervision of the S2 and is part
of the two-person battlefield information control center (BICC). The TIO:
Performs unit intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination actions as
tasked by the S2.
Is located in the main CP.

S2 NCO
2-25. The S2 NCO provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S2 and commander. The S2
NCO:
Supervises and trains All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) operators.
Is responsible for all intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of security
programs.
Assists the S2 in product preparation and dissemination.
Executes duties specified in local SOPs (may include shift NCOIC and representing
S2 at meetings (targeting)).

S3 OPERATIONS AND TRAINING OFFICER

2-26. The S3 is the commander’s primary assistant in planning and coordinating battalion
operations. The S3:
Advises the commander on tactical operations, operational matters, organization,
and training.
Prepares the OPORD in cooperation with the other battle staff members and, in the
XO’s absence, coordinates and synchronizes the battle plan and supervises the staff
during the MDMP.
Plans and coordinates with other staff sections to publish OPORDs, fragmentary
orders (FRAGOs), and training programs.

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Integrates and synchronizes all warfighting functions (formerly battlefield

operating systems (BOS)) into the tactical plan.
Establishes priorities for communications to support tactical operations.
Coordinates with the battalion XO, headquarters commandant (headquarters and
headquarters company (HHC) commander), and S6 on the location of the main CP.
Coordinates the activities of the S2, FSO, ALO, engineer, and attached elements to
ensure their plans support the commander’s concept.
Coordinates closely with the S4, HHC commander, and the FSC commander to
ensure tactical plans are logistically supportable.
Remains forward with the commander during the fight and may be designated by
the commander to directly overwatch supporting aspects of unit operations.
Monitors the battle, ensures CS assets are provided when and where required, and
anticipates developing situations.
Ensures that the battalion scout platoon, sniper squad, and mortar platoon
operations are properly integrated into the battalion operational and sustainment
plans.
Provides the commander information that has immediate impact on the battle and
ensures that proper reports are submitted to higher and adjacent elements.
Recommends courses of action (COAs) to the commander.
2-27. Note that the old position of S3 air is no longer authorized and the S3 must ensure that
other members of the battle staff pick up the appropriate planning and coordination duties
traditionally executed by the S3 air. Examples include the FSO coordinating for close combat
attack and the S4 coordinating for aerial resupply and aerial transportation. The S3 will
become the primary coordinator for air assault/movement by ground assault forces.

Assistant S3 (A/S3)
2-28. The A/S3 is the primary assistant to the S3. The A/S3:
Coordinates battalion operations.
Is the primary assistant to the S3 during the MDMP, especially during COA
development and analysis.
Participates in battalion rehearsals.
Acts as the battalion battle captain during mission execution and helps the XO
coordinate the fight.
Assumes the S3’s duties and responsibilities in his absence.

S3 Liaison Officer
2-29. The S3 liaison officer (LNO) is the primary assistant to the A/S3. The S3 LNO:
Acts as the link to higher and adjacent ground units that require coordination
directed from the battalion operations staff.
Is Located in the main CP or at the headquarters of the adjacent/higher
headquarters.
Assists A/S3 in coordinating battalion operations.
Assists the A/S3 in planning and executing the MDMP, including COA
development and analysis.
Participates in battalion rehearsals.
Assumes the A/S3 planning duties and responsibilities in his absence.

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 Organization and Capabilities

Chemical Officer
2-30. The chemical officer (CHEMO) advises the commander on the impact of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) employment on current and future operations.
(See Appendix C for more information on CBRN conditions.) The chemical officer:
Develops the enemy’s most probable use of NBC weapons and their effects on
battalion operations.
Disseminates friendly strike warning (STRIKEWARN) messages on the use of
nuclear weapons.
Recommends reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveying requirements.
Recommends mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) and operational exposure
guidance (OEG) based on the threat analysis and higher headquarters guidance.
Maintains unit radiological dose records (by platoon).
Conducts vulnerability analyses of the unit’s positions.
Plans battalion decontamination operations (in conjunction with the S3).
Coordinates nonorganic CBRN assets (decontamination, smoke, and
reconnaissance).
Serves as an A/S3 battle captain when there is a limited NBC threat.

Chemical NCO
2-31. The chemical NCO provides technical and doctrinal advice to the CHEMO and
commander. The chemical NCO:
Serves as shift NCOIC for the main CP.
Sustains and maintains the battalion’s chemical defense equipment.
Executes CBRN reporting procedures.
Conducts liaison with supporting chemical decontamination units.

Combat Engineer Operations Officer

2-32. The combat engineer operations officer advises the battalion commander on the proper
use of the engineer company and the optimization of engineer resources in support of HBCT
combined arms battalion operations. (See Chapter 9, Section III, for more information on
engineer operations.) The combat engineer operations officer advises the battle staff and
commander in a fashion similar to the FSO. The combat engineer operations officer:
Develops plans for the use of combat engineers in support of combined arms
battalion operations. The combat engineer operations officer conducts the battle
tracking of the engineer effort in the emplacement and clearance of obstacles,
bridging and river-crossing operations, and other engineer operations.
Disseminates terrain support products in support of the battalion.
Aids the staff in analyzing terrain, templating enemy obstacles, and coordinating a
mobility and countermobility plan to support the scheme of maneuver.
Coordinates nonorganic engineer assets (bridging, combat heavy engineers, utility,
power generation, and firefighting) and is the point of contact between augmenting
engineer elements and the combined arms battalion.
Serves as an A/S3 battle captain when there are limited engineer operations.

S3 Sergeant Major
2-33. The S3 SGM acts as main CP NCOIC. The S3 SGM:
Provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S3 and battalion commander.

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Is chief advisor to the XO and S3 concerning main CP operations during planning,

preparation, and execution.
Is located in the main CP where he can best influence operations.
Is responsible for the physical setup, arrangement, and breakdown of the main CP
per battalion SOP.
Is responsible for the movement of the main CP.
Supervises all tactical operations center (TOC) personnel, including section
NCOICs.
Supervises Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) operators and radio operators.
Prepares the main CP for orders, drills, briefs, and rehearsals.
Executes the CP security plan.
In coordination with battalion XO, executes main CP site reconnaissance and
movement.
Coordinates the logistical needs of the main CP with the headquarters
commandant.

S3 Noncommissioned Officer
2-34. The S3 NCO acts as battle NCO. The S3 NCO:
Provides technical and doctrinal advice to the S3 and commander.
Serves as shift NCOIC for the main CP.
Supervises MCS and radio operators.
Prepares the main CP for orders, drills, briefs, and rehearsals.
Executes CP security and movement plans.
Briefs augmentees to battalion staff on TOC SOPs.

S4 LOGISTICS
2-35. The S4 determines logistical requirements and priorities and ties the
administration/logistical (A/L) network together.

S4 Logistics Officer
2-36. The S4 logistics officer:
Designates supply routes and locations of logistical elements (in coordination with
the S3 and FSC commander).
Prepares and develops logistical sustaining plans in concert with the current
tactical plan and anticipates future logistical needs.
Prepares and distributes logistical sustaining plans and orders when published
separately.
Is the officer in charge (OIC) of the combat trains command post (CTCP), which is
an alternate battalion CP.
Monitors the current tactical situation closely to anticipate emergency resupply
requests and support timely reorganization.
Pushes the resupply of ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies forward to the
battalion through the FSC.
Is responsible for procurement, receipt, storage, and distribution of supplies and
material.
Is responsible for transportation of units, Soldiers, and logistics items.

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 Organization and Capabilities

S4 Logistics NCO
2-37. The S4 logistics NCO provides technical advice to the S4 and the commander. The S4
logistics NCO:
Supervises the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) and Unit-
Level Logistics System (ULLS) S4 operations.
Is located in the combined arms battalion support area.
Acts as shift NCOIC for rear CP (combined arms battalion support area (CABSA)
CP).
Maintains logistics estimates.
Executes Class VII replacement.

S5 CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER

2-38. If augmented to the battalion, the civil affairs officer is the principal staff officer for all
matters concerning CMO. He advises the commander on the impact of military operations on
the civilian populace and the impact of civilians on military operations. He is responsible for
establishing the civil-military operations center (CMOC). The CMOC enhances the
relationship between military forces and civilians in the AO to help ensure the success of the
mission. For additional information, see FM 3-05.40 (41-10), Civil Affairs Operations.

S6 SIGNAL
2-39. The S6 section establishes and operates the battalion radio, satellite, and wire
communications systems. It can set up retransmission nodes and perform limited field repair
and testing of communications equipment. The section provides forward signal support
NCOs to the companies.
2-40. The S6 signal officer is the primary staff officer for all signal operations matters and
information security for the battalion. The signal officer:
Advises the commander and staff on all signal matters.
Supervises the communications activities of subordinate and attached units.
Leads the S6 section.
Exercises technical supervision over the installation and use of communication
systems.
Recommends the location for retransmission sites.
Reconnoiters possible CP sites for communications capabilities.
Recommends locations for the main CP and CTCPs to the S3.
Establishes messenger services and schedules.
Monitors communications security (COMSEC).
Maintains information systems and tactical local area network (LAN) management,
including passwords and information security.
Is responsible for secure operations of the information systems (INFOSYS) and
oversees the function of the information services support officer (ISSO) and
automation officer.
Prepares, distributes, and maintains plans, instructions, guidance, and SOPs for
C2 security.
Coordinates with the S2 to ensure users have the required security investigations,
clearances, authorizations, and need to know.
Establishes and implements the system of issuing, protecting, and changing system
passwords.

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SPECIAL STAFF
2-41. In addition to the organic assets a battalion commander controls, he may receive
various supporting units to support his mission. These assets include a wide variety of
indirect fires and aviation systems that may come from any of the UEx-level supporting
brigades. Combat or CS assets normally available to the combined arms battalion include
field artillery (FA) and close combat attack (CCA).

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

2-42. The FSO is an assigned artillery officer that is associated with the brigade fires
battalion assigned to the brigade combat team. He coordinates all fire support and effects
(lethal and nonlethal) for combined arms battalion operations. The FSO:
Advises the battalion commander and his staff on all fires and effects support
matters.
Develops and recommends high-payoff targets (HPTs) in coordination with the S2.
Develops and recommends essential fire and effects tasks (EFETs).
Recommends fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
Coordinates indirect fires across boundaries.
Trains company fire support officers.
Synchronizes all aspects of the fire support plan in coordination with the S3 during
the MDMP.

BATTALION AIR LIAISON OFFICER

2-43. The ALO is normally an Air Force officer responsible for coordinating and controlling
all close tactical air (TACAIR) support and employment of Air Force assets in support of the
battalion. The ALO:
Is responsible for the tactical air control party (TACP).
Assists the commander and S3 in planning the use of available air support.
Coordinates the employment of air support with the S2, S3, FSO, and air defense
element (if attached).
Is located forward with the commander.
Controls close air support (CAS) of the battalion.

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY (FIGURE 2-2)

HEADQUARTERS COMPANY COMMANDER

2-44. The headquarters company commander:
Is the headquarters commandant and is responsible for the command group and
main CP security and external organization.
Executes logistics for specialty platoons and the main CP.
Supervises the scout platoon, sniper squad, mortar platoon, and medical platoon as
well as the other elements attached to the battalion.
May be assigned tactical tasks as a maneuver commander by the battalion
commander using assigned (scouts and mortars) and attached platoons.

Scout Platoon
2-45. The scout platoon conducts reconnaissance and security in support of the battalion
mission. The scout platoon leader advises the commander, S2, and S3 on employing the scout
platoon. The platoon also assists in controlling battalion movements but rarely conducts

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independent platoon-level offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations. The scout platoon)

consists of a platoon headquarters and three sections. The scout platoon helps the
commander plan and execute operations by providing relevant operational information in a
timely fashion during the preparation and execution phase of a mission.

Sniper Squad
2-46. The sniper squad supports the battalion with precision long-range marksmen to
conduct surveillance and engage designated targets (lethal effects). The sniper squad leader
plans and supervises the employment of the three sniper teams. Those teams directly
support the battalion direct-fire priorities as established by the commander and S3. The
employment and support of the snipers are the responsibility of the headquarters company
commander unless the snipers are attached to support another commander.

Figure 2-2. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Combined Arms Battalion

Mortar Platoon
2-47. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, fire support weapons that are organic to
the battalion. The mortar platoon leader advises the commander, S3, and FSO on employing

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the mortar platoon. The quick response time of the mortar platoon is well suited for
providing close indirect-fire support to maneuver units, making them the commander’s most
responsive indirect-fire capability. The mortar platoon consists of two sections of two 120mm
tubes each and has a fire direction center (FDC). The mortar platoon headquarters can also
serve as an alternate CP under special circumstances for limited periods of time.

Medical Platoon
2-48. The medical platoon provides force health protection (FHP) for the battalion. The
medical platoon is organized with a headquarters section, a treatment squad, a combat
medic section, and an evacuation squad. The medical platoon:
Is responsible for providing Level I medical care, which includes emergency medical
treatment (EMT) for wounds, injuries, or illness; advanced trauma management;
disease prevention; combat stress control; casualty collection; medical evacuation
from the supported maneuver company to the battalion aid station (BAS) or
supporting treatment team; and sick call services.
Establishes the BAS where it can best support the battalion’s operations under the
directions of the battalion TOC and the CTCP.
Monitors the health and hygiene of the battalion as well as trains the battalion’s
combat lifesaver personnel.
Has trauma specialists from the combat medic section attached to each of the
maneuver platoon and company headquarters and forms what is commonly
referred to as the company medical team.
Has ambulances normally pre-positioned forward to reduce evacuation time and to
augment medical personnel attached to the maneuver companies as required.

Platoon Headquarters
2-49. The headquarters section provides for the C2 and resupply for the platoon. The platoon
headquarters is manned by the field medical assistant and the medical sergeant (platoon
sergeant). It is normally collocated with the treatment squad to form the Level I medical
treatment facility (MTF)/BAS. The platoon CP includes the plans and operations functions
performed by the field medical assistant. The platoon has access to the Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System, the battalion wire communications network
for communication with all major elements of the battalion and with supporting units.
Wireless communications for this section consists of a tactical FM radio mounted in the
platoon headquarters vehicle. The medical platoon uses an FM radio network for battalion
FHP operations.

Surgeon
2-50. The surgeon normally advises the commander on the health of the command. In the
absence of the surgeon, the physician’s assistant (PA) advises the commander and staff on
the health of the command and other FHP issues. The surgeon is assisted by the field
medical assistant and is responsible for the following:
Advises the commander on the health of the command.
Oversees medical treatment provided by the medical platoon personnel.
Supervises the medical platoon in executing its assigned mission, including FHP
planning, maintenance, and training.
Operates the BAS with the help of the physician’s assistant.
Recommends casualty collection points (CCPs) and aid station locations.
Ensures coordination for air evacuation support and provides evacuation routes to
the battalion S4 during the battle.

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 Organization and Capabilities

Is responsible for the FHP plan for the battalion and its integration into the
brigade FHP and provides FHP input to the sustaining plan.
2-51. As operational requirements or the mission change, the FHP plan must be updated.
See FM 4-02.4, Medical Platoon Leaders Handbook, for definitive information on developing
the battalion FHP plan and for a layout of the BAS.

Field Medical Assistant

2-52. The field medical assistant, a Medical Service Corps officer, is the operational and
readiness officer for the platoon. He is the principal assistant to the surgeon/platoon leader
for operations, training, and logistics. The field medical assistant coordinates FHP
operations with the battalion S3 and S4 and coordinates patient evacuation with the brigade
support battalion medical company.

Treatment Squad
2-53. The treatment squad consists of two treatment teams (Teams Alpha and Bravo). They
operate the BAS and provide Level I medical care and treatment, which includes sick call,
EMT, and advanced trauma management (ATM). Team Alpha is staffed with an operational
medicine officer (primary care physician/battalion surgeon), a health care sergeant, and two
health care specialists. Team Bravo is staffed with a PA, a health care sergeant, and two
health care specialists. The physician, PA, and health care sergeant and specialists are
trained to provide EMT and assist with ATM procedures commensurate with their
occupational specialties. Preplanned triggers initiate treatment team movement to the next
planned position; these triggers are critical to timely and successful team displacement. The
treatment teams can operate for limited times in split-team operations in direct support of
battalion units. The teams can also operate in split-team operations when the BAS must
move to a new location. One team remains at the current location and continues to treat
patients while the other team moves to the new location and establishes patient care
capabilities. Once the jump team has established a treatment capability at the new location,
the other team evacuates or returns to duty all patients and moves to the new location.
Treatment teams are also responsible for providing area support for other units and
elements operating within the battalion AO.

Combat Medic Section

2-54. Trauma specialists (company/platoon medics) are assigned to each infantry platoon and
armor company. The platoon trauma specialist normally is located with or near the rifle
platoon leader/platoon sergeant. The rifle or armor company senior trauma specialist is
normally collocated with the company first sergeant in the company trains. With assistance
from combat lifesavers, trauma specialists treat casualties and evacuate them to the CCP
and BAS. A senior trauma specialist is allocated on the basis of one per infantry/armor
company. When the company is engaged, he positions the casualty collection point (CCP) to
provide EMT and to prepare patients for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

Evacuation Section
2-55. Medical platoon ambulances provide MEDEVAC and en route care from the Soldier’s
point of injury or the company’s CCP to the BAS. The ambulance team in support of the
maneuver company works in coordination with the trauma specialists supporting the
platoons. In mass casualty situations, nonstandard evacuation platforms (vehicles/aircraft)
may be used to assist in casualty evacuation as directed by the supported commander. Plans
for the use of nonmedical vehicles to perform casualty evacuation should be included in the
battalion SOP and OPORD. From the BAS, patients are evacuated by brigade support

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medical company (BSMC) ground ambulances or supporting air ambulances back to the
BSMC Level II MTF.

INFANTRY AND ARMOR COMPANIES (FIGURES 2-3 AND 2-4)

2-56. Mechanized infantry (A Company and B Company) companies and armor (C Company
and D Company) companies fight battles by maneuver and firepower. Company commanders
directly influence the battle by employing their platoons to accomplish the mission. They are
the battalion commander’s executors of the plan. They must understand the battalion
commander’s intent and concept of the operation and be fully versed in the capabilities and
employment techniques of the combat power they control. They must be proficient in
employing the CS and sustaining assets that the battalion commander may attach to their
companies.

ENGINEER COMPANY (FIGURE 2-5)

2-57. The engineer (E Company) company supports the maneuver of the battalion with two
engineer platoons and an obstacle section. The engineer company commander serves as the
senior engineer and commander of all engineer assets assigned to the battalion. He also
provides expertise in terrain analysis and the employment of engineer assets. The engineer
company commander directly supervises the combat engineer operations officer that is
assigned to the S3 section.

Figure 2-3. Mechanized Infantry Company, Combined Arms Battalion

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Figure 2-4. Armor Company, Combined Arms Battalion

Figure 2-5. Engineer Company, Combined Arms Battalion

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FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY (FIGURE 2-6)

2-58. The FSC commander is the heavy combined arms battalion primary logistics executor.
The forward support company (F Company) has two major elements, the distribution
platoon, which moves all classes of supply to the maneuver and engineer companies, and the
maintenance platoon, which repairs (within its capability) all of the battalion’s organic
equipment. The FSC commander:
Forms the logistics packages (LOGPACs) in the battalion support area with the
company supply sergeants and the distribution platoon.
Is the direct conduit between the heavy combined arms battalion and brigade
support battalion.
Supervises the distribution platoon leader and maintenance platoon leader.
Commands the CABSA.
Is the OIC of the rear CP (CABSA) and is responsible for its security and
organization.
Is the battalion sustaining coordinator and advises commanders as well as the staff
on supply, maintenance, and support issues.
Supervises the flow of information between the CABSA and battalion CPs.
Based on METT-TC, has the flexibility to locate the unit maintenance collection
point (UMCP), assists in recovery, assists in emergency resupply, and conducts
other tasks throughout the battalion AO.
Assists in maintenance management allowing the battalion XO to coordinate the
staff and fight the battalion from the main CP.

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Figure 2-6. Forward Support Company, Combined Arms Battalion

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 Chapter 3
Battle Command

Battle command is the exercise of command in operations against a

hostile, thinking enemy. It applies the leadership element of combat
power to operations. Principally, battle command is an art that employs
skills developed by professional study, constant practice, and considered
judgment. Commanders, assisted by staff, visualize the operation,
describe it in terms of intent and guidance, and direct the actions of
subordinates within their intent. Commanders direct operations in terms
of the battlefield functional areas and directly influence operations by
their physical presence. Command of a heavy combined arms battalion
remains a personal function. The capabilities provided via satellite
communications, digital information systems as well as intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) within the command and control
(C2) system allow rapid sharing of enemy and friendly information among
all forces within the area of operation (AO) and enhance combat power by
making combat forces more lethal and survivable. In addition, digitization
provides the commander with an ability to lead and make decisions from
anywhere on the battlefield while remaining linked to ongoing planning
and preparation in the main command post (CP).

SECTION I – THE ART OF COMMAND

3-1. Command is the authority that a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by
virtue of rank and assignment. Leaders possessing command authority strive to use it with
firmness, care, and skill. Command is more an art than a science, although it exhibits
characteristics of both. The art of command requires expert performance of a specific skill
using intuitive faculties that the leader cannot gain solely by study or education. Command
also requires a conscious and skillful exercise of authority to fulfill command responsibilities
through decision-making and leadership.

ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

3-2. The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion commander’s
knowledge, experience, and personality determine how he interacts with his unit through
the C2 system. The commander decides what he needs to do to accomplish the unit mission
and the best method to use to do it, and he leads his unit to accomplish the mission. The
commander drives the process through mission command. He establishes a command climate
for his unit; prepares his unit for operations; and commands his unit during operations while
coaching, teaching and mentoring subordinates. The commander establishes and maintains
systems to meet the unique demands of the unit, the abilities and personalities of his
subordinates, and the capabilities of the equipment in the battalion. The commander refines
the battle command systems to match unit missions and personalities.

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MISSION COMMAND
3-3. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution
based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Mission orders leave the how
of mission accomplishment to the subordinates by allowing them maximum freedom of
planning and action to accomplish missions. Successful mission command results from
subordinate leaders exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to
accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. The
four elements of mission command follow:
Commander’s intent.
Subordinate initiative.
Mission orders.
Resource allocation.

COMMANDER’S INTENT
3-4. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what key tasks the unit must
do and what conditions it must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and
desired end state. The commander formulates and communicates his intent to ensure unity
of effort during operations, allowing subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative.

SUBORDINATE INITIATIVE
3-5. Initiative is the assumption of responsibility to decide and initiate independent actions
when the commander’s concept or order is no longer applicable or when an unanticipated
opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander’s intent presents itself.
Subordinates decide how to achieve their assigned missions within the delegated freedom of
action and the exercise of disciplined initiative during execution. However, they have an
absolute responsibility to fulfill the commander’s intent.

MISSION ORDERS
3-6. A mission order is a technique for completing combat orders to allow subordinates
maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions. The commander
intervenes to direct coordination, restore operations, or exploit success. At a minimum,
mission orders state the following:
Task organization.
Commander’s intent and concept of operations.
Unit mission.
Subordinate unit missions.
Mission-essential coordinating instructions.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION
3-7. The commander allocates appropriate resources to subordinates to accomplish their
missions. The commander must also consider information systems (INFOSYS) as resources
and allocate them through all levels of his command.

LOCATION OF THE COMMANDER

3-8. In the past, commanders have been torn between the conflicting requirement to
visualize the battlefield and the requirement for his presence in the main CP to participate
in the military decision-making process (MDMP). This dilemma slowed the planning and
execution of operations while frustrating the commander’s efforts to get out of the CP.

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3-9. All commanders in the HBCT combined arms battalion have the ability to visualize
their battlespace in all dimensions and to share a common operational picture (COP)
through digitization. Perhaps the largest and most immediate impact of digitization is its
effect on the operations process (plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations).
Digitization streamlines planning and preparation by allowing the near-simultaneous
transfer of information to all leaders. This transfer of information facilitates parallel
planning and preparation. Using digitized INFOSYS should compress the planning cycle for
commanders and allow planning at all levels to begin sooner. With digitization, commanders
have the ability to locate and track targets precisely and conduct simultaneous operations
employing lethal and nonlethal means while operating with joint and multinational forces.
In addition, digitization gives commanders the ability to recognize and protect their friendly
forces. The commander cannot, however, fully visualize the battlefield while directing and
synchronizing the efforts of his battalion from a computer screen at the main CP. He must
move from the main CP to assess the situation face to face with subordinate commanders
and Soldiers. The C2 system in the battalion permits a commander to position himself where
he can best command without depriving himself of the ability to respond to opportunities
and changing circumstances.
3-10. The commander can be virtually anywhere on the battlefield to best affect ongoing
operations without disrupting the planning and preparation for future operations. Near-real-
time information updates, continuous assessment, and command decisions can be briefed,
approved, and disseminated from battalion to company level via the available information
systems with the battle command system.

COMBINING THE ART OF COMMAND AND THE SCIENCE OF

CONTROL
3-11. The commander is the key to command and control in the HBCT combined arms
battalion. Foremost is his requirement to combine the art of command and the science of
control. He must use a disciplined methodology of visualizing the battlespace, describing his
visualization to subordinates, directing action to achieve results, and leading the unit to
mission accomplishment while conducting continuous assessment throughout the mission.

VISUALIZE
3-12. The commander’s visualization (Figure 3-1) is the core mental process that supports his
decision-making and by which he combines the art of command and the science of control. It
is the process of achieving a clear understanding of the current state of the battalion with
relation to the enemy and the environment, developing a desired end state that represents
mission accomplishment, and determining the sequence of activities that moves the
combined arms battalion from its current state to the end state. The commander begins to
visualize the desired end state when he receives a mission or perceives a change in the
mission. He applies his current situational understanding (SU) to the received or perceived
mission. As he analyzes or receives staff analysis of the mission, he develops a mental image
of the friendly forces in relation to the enemy, the environment, and possible future
operations at the conclusion of the operation. The commander’s visualization is his
assessment tool throughout the operation. He should focus on three main factors.

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
3-13. Situational understanding is derived from applying his judgment, experience,
expertise, and intuition to the COP and allows the commander to understand the current
state of friendly and enemy forces. Situational understanding includes physical factors,
human factors, and the relationships between friendly and enemy forces and the

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environment that represent potential opportunities or threats for the combined arms
battalion.

FEASIBLE OUTCOME
3-14. The commander must identify a feasible outcome to the operation that results in
mission success and leaves the combined arms battalion postured for the next operation.

Figure 3-1. Visualization

DYNAMICS OF OPPOSING FORCES

3-15. The commander must identify the dynamics of opposing forces throughout the sequence
of actions. This includes evaluating possible enemy reactions and friendly counteractions.
This evaluation may lead to the identification of possible critical decision points throughout
the operation.

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DESCRIBE
3-16. The commander describes his visualization continuously through the operations
process. The commander’s intent, planning guidance, anticipated decision points, and
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) all serve to guide and focus the C2
system to support his decision-making and to communicate his decision for execution.
INFOSYS are available to help the commander describe his visualization. However, he
should not accept these products unquestioned. The commander must apply his judgment,
experience, expertise, and intuition before making a decision and describing that decision to
subordinates. During preparation, the commander uses the rehearsal to identify and discuss
options at decision points, to synchronize activities in the battalion and among subordinate
units, and to add to his own visualization. The result may be further refinement of his intent
and CCIR. During execution, the commander continues to visualize the implication of events,
and he describes his conclusions to his staff and subordinates through updated CCIR and
guidance.

DIRECT
3-17. The commander directs when he has made a decision and communicates that decision
to his subordinates through an order.

Plan
3-18. Orders should enable subordinates to understand their situation, their commander’s
mission and intent, and their own mission. The order (warning order (WO) or operation
order (OPORD)) should provide unity of effort in exercising disciplined initiative by
subordinate commanders. Clear direction is essential to mission success; however,
commanders must strike a balance between necessary but minimum direction and overly detailed
direction. The commander or his staff assigns graphical, written, or procedural control
measures (permissive or restrictive) to prevent units from impeding one another and to
impose necessary coordination. The commander should impose only the minimum control
measures necessary to provide essential coordination and deconfliction among units.

Prepare
3-19. The commander must update and validate his visualization during preparations as the
results of ISR operations become available. He must determine whether new information (on
enemy forces, friendly forces, or the environment) invalidates his plan, requires him to
adjust the plan, or validates the plan with no further changes. The earlier the commander
identifies the need for modifications, the easier it is for him to incorporate and synchronize
them into his plan. He describes the implications of his updated visualization on the plan
and directs actions to effect his revisions through an order (WO, OPORD, or fragmentary
order (FRAGO)).

Execute
3-20. Execution includes a continuous process of assessing the current state of the operation
and making adjustments to exploit opportunities and to account for unforeseen enemy
actions. Combining the art of command and the science of control is most evident during
execution. The commander exercises judgment and intuition continuously, assessing the
situation and making decisions often with incomplete, conflicting, and vague information.
Waiting for perfect information is rarely an option. During execution, the commander uses
his visualization, continuously updated with a current COP, to ensure that his subordinate
units execute appropriate measures for the actual situation. A major part of the art of
command is to know when the plan must change and what criteria indicate a need for

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changes and then to determine what changes will maximize unit effectiveness. The
commander directs these actions primarily through a FRAGO.

SECTION II – COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-21. Command and control consists of two components: the commander and the C2 system.
The commander uses the C2 system to exercise C2 over forces to accomplish a mission.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

3-22. The C2 system is the arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures,
and equipment and facilities essential to the commander to plan, prepare for, execute, and
assess operations.

PERSONNEL
3-23. The C2 system in a battalion begins with people. No amount of technology can reduce
the importance of the human dimension of communication since combat involves Soldiers.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
3-24. Information management consists of information systems and relevant information
(RI). INFOSYS provide an accuracy and reliability that can accelerate decision-making
within the combined arms battalion. INFOSYS also make mission execution efficient and
effective, allowing the commanders and staffs to spend more time and energy on the art and
human dimension of command and control.

PROCEDURES
3-25. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities in the battalion to
accomplish tasks (often called standing operating procedures (SOP)). They govern actions in
the C2 system to exercise C2 effectively and efficiently. Adhering to procedures minimizes
confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance as commanders rapidly shift forces to meet
contingencies.

EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

3-26. . The equipment and facilities provide sustainment and a work environment for the
other elements of the C2 systems. The environment and facilities should be standardized as
much as possible so that the systems provide information and an environment of support in
an expected fashion that assists in making timely and accurate decisions.

DIGITIZATION AND THE C2 SYSTEM/GOOD ENOUGH BATTLE

COMMAND
3-27. The C2 system in a digitized HBCT combined arms battalion is designed to collect,
process, store, display, and disseminate the information needed to develop and refine a COP
in support of a commander’s mission. It supports a commander’s exercise of command and
control across the range of military operations.
3-28. The INFOSYS (Army Battle Command System (ABCS), Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT), FM line-of-sight
communications, very small aperture satellite communications (VSAT), Spitfire and Starfire
satellite communications, joint network node (JNN) and cell telephones) provide the
commander and staff with the ability to plan, prepare, and execute using resilient voice and
data communications networks to enable effective C2 on the battlefield. The battalion

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integrates the INFOSYS through maneuver, fires and effects, logistics, force protection,
information operations, and intelligence.
3-29. The INFOSYS in a digitized heavy combined arms battalion are organized to leverage
fully the opportunities presented by near-real-time access to all relevant information and a
near-complete COP. The INFOSYS provide all commanders in the combined arms battalion
with the capability to visualize and understand their AO in all its dimensions. It provides a
shared COP of the situation, precisely locates and tracks friendly unit locations, highlights
critical enemy locations, and synchronizes simultaneous operations with lethal and
nonlethal means. This capability allows significantly enhanced synchronization of widely
dispersed, highly mobile lethal forces in execution as well as in planning to mass effects.

EXERCISING COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-30. The combined arms battalion commander must place the C2 system into action to
exercise command and control. Exercising C2 is dynamic throughout the operations process.
3-31. Although planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur continuously in
operations, they need not occur sequentially. The combined arms battalion must prepare to
perform all four actions simultaneously, and the commander executing battle command is at
the center of the process (Figure 3-2).

Figure 3-2. The Operations Process

3-32. The operations process is execution focused rather than planning focused. INFOSYS
compress planning to allow more time to focus on execution. The INFOSYS do this in two
ways:

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The INFOSYS allow better parallel planning and collaboration among echelons in
the combined arms battalion.
The INFOSYS provide a more accurate COP, allowing forces to execute faster with
less detailed planning.

DISTRIBUTION OF COMBINED ARMS BATTALION COMMAND AND

CONTROL
3-33. The combined arms battalion’s staff sections are normally distributed among four C2
organizations: the command group, main CP, combat trains command post (CTCP), and
combined arms battalion support area (CABSA) CP. The combined arms battalion
commander organizes each CP to perform essential functions to aid him with planning and
in controlling operations. These C2 organizations are normally positioned within the
combined arms battalion’s AO to maintain flexibility, redundancy, survivability, and
mobility (see Chapter 11, Command Post Operations).

COMMAND GROUP
3-34. The command group consists of the commander and whomever else he designates. This
may include the command sergeant major, S2 and S3, fire support officer (FSO), and air
liaison officer (ALO). The command group is in direct command and control of the battalion.
The command group is not a permanent organization; rather, it is formed when the
commander goes forward to control an operation. The command group is equipped to operate
wherever the commander feels it is necessary to influence operations with rapid decisions
and orders. The commander determines the actual placement of personnel within the
command group. The command group must have a dedicated security element overwatching
it whenever it departs the main CP.
3-35. The commander fights the battle with the command group and normally positions
himself near the most critical event, usually with or near the main effort unit headquarters.
From this forward location, the commander is better able to observe critical events, maintain
communications, and sense the battle. The commander, therefore, leverages the INFOSYS to
untether himself from the main CP so he can compare battlefield reality to his visualization
of his subordinates and the terrain he is to fight on without affecting his decision-making
ability.
3-36. The commander considers the following in determining his location on the battlefield:
Linkage of the INFOSYS (ABCS (FBCB2/BFT) in digitized combined arms
battalions) to make timely decisions, including the ability to judge the progress and
condition of his forces. Within technical limitations, INFOSYS adapt to the needs of
the commander, not vice versa.
Time and location of critical events and decision points that have the greatest
impact on mission accomplishment. Ideally, the commander selects a location
where he can observe the conditions that aid in making a critical decision.
Security for the command group, including the commander’s personal protection.

MAIN COMMAND POST

3-37. The main CP is the combined arms battalion commander’s principal C2 facility. The
main CP moves as required to maintain control of the operation. In linear operations
environments, it is located behind the company CPs and, if possible, out of medium-artillery
range. In nonlinear operations (noncontiguous areas of operations), it is located where it can
best support combined arms battalion operations and where it is least vulnerable to
potential hostile actions. The combined arms battalion XO is responsible for supervising all
staff activities and functions within the main CP. The headquarters company commander is

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the headquarters commandant for the main CP and the command group. The main CP
provides the following functions:
Synchronizes combat and sustaining activities in support of the overall operation.
Provides a focal point for the development of intelligence.
Supports situational understanding for the combined arms battalion commander
and subordinates by monitoring, analyzing, and disseminating information.
Monitors and anticipates the commander’s decision points.
Plans future operations.
Monitors sustaining operations.
Coordinates with higher headquarters and adjacent units.
Keeps higher headquarters informed.
Serves as net control station for the operations and intelligence (OI) radio net and
backup net control station for the command radio net.
Provides battalion terrain management.
Provides a stable, secure planning facility.
Produces and disseminates the commander’s orders.
Plans and controls battalion ISR operations.

COMBAT TRAINS COMMAND POST

3-38. The combat trains command post (CPCT) controls and coordinates the administrative
and logistical support for the combined arms battalion. The combined arms battalion S1 and
S4 control the CTCP. The unit maintenance collection point, battalion aid station, and
forward support company (FSC) forward cell typically collocate with the CTCP. The
combined arms battalion S1 and S4 work closely with the FSC commander to coordinate
combat sustaining operations for the combined arms battalion. The CTCP serves the
following functions:
Tracks the current battle and is prepared to assume functions of main CP.
Controls sustainment operations.
Provides sustaining operations representation to the main CP for planning and
integration.
Forecasts and coordinates future requirements.
Monitors main supply routes (MSRs) and controls sustaining operations traffic.
Coordinates the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and enemy prisoners of war.

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SUPPORT AREA COMMAND POST

3-39. The CABSA CP controls the execution of resupply and maintenance support. It
coordinates with the brigade support battalion (BSB) operations section and the brigade
support medical company (BSMC). The CABSA CP:
Tracks the current battle.
Provides sustaining operations representation to the main CP for planning and
integration.
Forecasts and coordinates with the BSB for future requirements.
Monitors MSRs.
Coordinates the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and enemy prisoners of war to
the BSB.
Coordinates the movement of the combined arms battalion support area with the
main CP.
Prepares and pushes forward logistics packages (LOGPACs) to the companies.

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Secures unrepairable major end items until parts and maintenance personnel are
available.

SECTION III – PLANNING FOR OPERATIONS

3-40. Planning for operations leads to a commander making decisions during execution. At
its core, decision-making is knowing if to decide, then when, and what to decide. It includes
understanding the consequences of decisions. Decisions are the means by which the
commander translates his vision of the end state into action. Decision-making is both science
and art. Many aspects of military operations (movement rates, fuel consumption, and
weapons effects) are quantifiable and, therefore, part of the science of war. Other aspects—
the impact of leadership, complexity of operations, and uncertainty regarding enemy
intentions—belong to the art of war. The MDMP is an established and proven analytical
process. The MDMP adapts the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving. It is a tool
that assists the commander and staff in developing estimates and a plan. The digitization of
the Army and its battlefield operating systems has not changed the steps of the MDMP; it
has enhanced them. While the formal problem-solving process may start with the receipt of a
mission and have as its goal the production of an order, the analytical aspect of the MDMP is
continuous throughout operations (including execution) with constant feedback and updates
of information.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS ENHANCEMENT TO DECISION-MAKING

3-41. The INFOSYS available in digitized organizations enhance both the science and the art
of war in two primary ways.

ENHANCED SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

3-42. First, digital INFOSYS provide commanders and staffs with a better understanding of
their AO. They help collect information more effectively; process it faster and more
accurately; store it in a manner that provides instant access; display it in a more usable,
tailored, and current format; and disseminate it to the right place faster, with fewer errors
and less lag time, than analog information systems. The digital INFOSYS and information
management make estimates more accurate, complete, and current than was possible with
analog information systems. Creating and maintaining a current, complete COP is essential
to the MDMP and is the foundation for the commander’s continuing visualization and all
staff estimates. The INFOSYS that support SU follow:
FBCB2/BFT provides real-time or near-real-time SU of the location of all blue
elements that are transmitting their location, provides the common red force
situation based on the input from All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) and best
available intelligence, and also provides limited messaging capability.
Maneuver Control System-Light (MCS-L) provides the overall operational look at
the battlefield with a terrain-based view of the battlefield. MCS can show the
digital input from all ABCSs from FBCB2/BFT through Global Command and
Control-Army (GCCS-A). All ABCSs are capable of passing formatted information
from system to system.
All-Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) provides the graphical representation
of intelligence system analysis to the ABCS.
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) provides graphical
representation of the fire support systems and control measures.
Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAADC2) provides graphical
representation of the friendly air defense systems as well as the Army airspace
command and control (A2C2) measures in effect.

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Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) provides graphical

representation of the sustaining operations elements in support of the combined
arms battalion as well as information on the sustainment status of the force.

ENHANCED PARALLEL PLANNING AND COLLABORATION

3-43. The second area in which these systems improve the MDMP is in parallel planning and
collaboration. Parallel planning occurs when two echelons conduct their planning nearly
simultaneously. Parallel planning can happen only when the brigade combat team (higher
headquarters) produces timely WOs and shares information with the battalions (subordinate
headquarters) as it becomes available. Parallel planning allows each echelon to make
maximum use of time available. It requires significant interaction between echelons.
Collaboration (paragraph 3-85, Coordination and Liaison) is the real-time interaction of
commanders and staffs at two or more echelons. Collaboration is facilitated by digital
INFOSYS that allow real-time exchange of data and voice so that commanders and staffs can
work together during all aspects of planning. However, the digital INFOSYS cannot, and
should not, replace a commander’s face-to-face collaboration with his subordinates.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING ENHANCEMENTS

3-44. The digital INFOSYS improve the timelines to conduct full planning and assist the
commander with his understanding. (Figure 3-3 illustrates the cognitive hierarchy.) The
commander and staff must process the information available to them.

Figure 3-3. Cognitive Hierarchy

Processing raises the meaning of information from data to understanding. Data is

organized and processed to create databases of information. Processing takes the
data and adds meaning to the relevant information in the database using
progressively higher levels of complex and cognitive methods to create an

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operational picture. The staff then takes the operational picture and refines it
based on the commander’s guidance. The product of this refinement is a COP.
Processing also includes lower-level mechanical methods such as organizing,
collating, plotting, and arranging data and information. However, effective
processing requires analysis and evaluation (higher-level cognitive methods) for
data to become knowledge. Through its estimates, the staff creates knowledge for
the commander. The commander then applies his judgment to the staff estimates
and the COP and formulates his understanding. Processing depends primarily on
well-trained and adaptive analysts to provide insight. To achieve understanding,
decision-makers apply judgment to the knowledge and the staff estimates.
Understanding enables informed decisions with less-than-perfect data.
Understanding generates action; with understanding and a mission, a commander
can better visualize his AO and take action by issuing his commanders’ intent and
guidance and determining his CCIR.

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

3-45. The MDMP is an established and proven analytical process; however, it is a detailed,
deliberate, and sequential process optimally used when adequate planning time and
sufficient staff support are available to develop and thoroughly examine numerous friendly
and enemy courses of action (COAs). The commander and staff typically conduct this
examination when developing the commander’s visualization and operation plans, when
planning for an entirely new mission, and during extended operations. The underlying
concurrent processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), risk assessment (see
Appendix D, Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance, and Appendix E, Environmental
Considerations), targeting, force protection, and military deception planning provide the
information that is used as part of the standardized planning in the MDMP. The MDMP
helps the commander and staff examine a specific situation and reach a logical decision by
applying thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge. The
MDMP is the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is based. The
products created during the MDMP can and should be used during subsequent planning
sessions when time may not be available for a thorough reexamination but when significant
parts of existing information and analysis of METT-TC factors have not changed
substantially.
3-46. The MDMP relies on doctrine, especially the terms and symbols (graphics) consolidated
in FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics (September 2004). The professional
understanding of a defined common lexicon particular to the profession of arms (joint forces)
and the Army is essential to the MDMP. Using approved terms and symbols facilitates the
rapid and consistent assessment of the situation and the creation and implementation of
plans and orders by minimizing confusion over the meanings of terms and symbols used in
the process.
3-47. Advantages of using the unabbreviated MDMP follow:
It analyzes and compares multiple friendly and enemy COAs in an attempt to
identify the best possible friendly COA.
It produces the greatest coordination and synchronization and minimizes the risk
of overlooking a critical aspect of the operation.
It results in a detailed OPORD or operation plan (OPLAN).
3-48. The disadvantage of using the unabbreviated MDMP is that it is a time-consuming
process.

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ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER

3-49. The commander is in charge of the military decision-making process. He decides what
procedures within the MDMP to use in each situation, including whether to use collaborative
planning. The commander’s intent is the driving force behind the MDMP, which hinges on a
clear articulation of the commander’s visualization. The INFOSYS provide the commander
with an unprecedented level and quality of information that help focus his attention on the
critical elements of the situation and enable him to understand better the environment in
which he is operating.
3-50. The commander is personally responsible for planning, preparing, and executing
operations. From start to finish, the commander’s personal role is central. His participation
in the process provides focus and guidance to the staff; however, there are responsibilities
and decisions that are the commander’s alone. The amount of his direct involvement is
driven by the time available, his personal preferences, and the experience and accessibility of
the staff. The less time available and the less experienced the staff, the greater the
commander’s involvement. When the commander is linked with his staff by the INFOSYS,
he is more accessible and has more tools to provide guidance and to stay involved in the
process regardless of his location within the AO.
3-51. During the MDMP, the commander uses the entire staff to explore the full range of
probable and likely enemy and friendly COAs and to analyze and compare his own
organization’s capabilities with those of the enemy. This staff effort has one objective: to
integrate information collectively with sound doctrine and technical competence, which
assists the commander in his decisions and ultimately leads to effective execution. Through
the use of INFOSYS, the commander guides not only the staff but also subordinate
commanders. He also uses the INFOSYS to access additional data from national or higher
echelons to help in analyzing both the environment in which he is operating and the enemy.
The commander and staff must identify the changes to the task organization that are
required to accomplish the mission. The staff and commander must identify modular units
required to accomplish the mission; identify modular augmentees that are excess to the
METT-TC requirements of the combined arms battalion and need to return to their parent
unit; and prepare a risk analysis that addresses the risk to mission accomplishment if
modular augmentation is not executed.
3-52. The executive officer manages, coordinates, and disciplines the staff’s work and
provides quality control. He must understand the commander’s guidance and intent because
he supervises the entire process. The XO ensures the staff has the information, guidance
from the commander, and facilities that it needs. He determines timelines for the staff,
establishes briefback times and locations, enforces the information management plan, and
provides any unique instructions to guide the staff in completing the MDMP process.
3-53. WOs are used to facilitate parallel planning. By issuing guidance and participating in
formal and informal briefings, the commander and XO guide the staff through the decision-
making process. In a collaborative environment, the commander can extend this
participation directly to subordinate commanders and staffs. Such interaction helps the staff
and subordinates to resolve questions and involves all staff and subordinates in the complete
process. The selected COA and its implementing OPORD are directly linked to how well both
the commander and the staff accomplish each step of the MDMP.

THE ROLE OF ISR

3-54. The combined arms battalion commander deploys the ISR assets (primarily the scout
platoon and any assets allocated from the HBCT military intelligence (MI) company) early in
the planning process to facilitate early intelligence collection. However, the scout platoon
should not be deployed without first considering, as a minimum, the doctrinal ISR concepts

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found in Chapter 4 as well as the HBCT collection plan that incorporates the efforts of the
combined arms battalion scout platoons, the surveillance assets of the MI company, and the
brigade reconnaissance squadron (BRS).
3-55. The commander and staff analyze the information collected from the scout platoon as
well as other brigade ISR assets (MI company and BRS) and incorporate this information
into the planning process. The commander and staff ensure ISR operations reporting is
continuous during planning, preparation, and execution of the mission. Information collected
during ISR operations may result in initial plans or COA being modified or even discarded.
The earlier the need for operational planning modifications can be identified, the easier it is
to incorporate and synchronize the modifications into the planning process. Further, when
the situation changes, the commander must modify his ISR objectives accordingly.
3-56. ISR assists MDMP significantly in developing COAs. Conducted early in the planning
process, it can help confirm or deny the commander’s initial assessment (visualization).
Information may also allow him to focus immediately on a specific COA or to eliminate COAs
that reconnaissance shows to be infeasible.
3-57. When conducting ISR operations, the commander must determine if the benefits
outweigh the risks. During defensive operations, stability operations, and support
operations, the ISR operations can often be conducted with little risk. During offensive
operations, ISR operations involve substantial risk.

SECTION IV – THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

3-58. The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process. The complete
MDMP is described in FM 5-0. It is a seven-step process that is summarized in this section.
Each step of the MDMP builds on the outputs from previous steps, and each step, in turn,
produces its own output that drives subsequent steps (Figure 3-4). Errors committed early in
the process affect later steps. Each staff section does estimates, and estimates go on
continuously to provide important inputs to the MDMP. Estimates and database updates
support the planning process as well as mission execution.

RECEIPT OF MISSION
3-59. The staff receives a new mission from higher headquarters, or the commander
recognizes an opportunity that requires a significant change to the current operation. The
staff begins to collect the data and resources necessary to conduct mission analysis. The XO
develops the timeline to structure the staff’s efforts, and the combined arms battalion
commander issues initial guidance to his staff that focuses them on developing initial CCIR,
authorized movement, level of detail required in the MDMP, and initial reconnaissance
requirements. The result of this step is a WO that alerts subordinate units to an impending
mission change.

MISSION ANALYSIS
3-60. Mission analysis defines the tactical problem and begins the process of determining
feasible solutions. Analysis of the higher headquarters mission is the start point that
generates the IPB. It then analyzes the specified, implied, and essential tasks laid out in the
higher headquarters order. It reviews the available assets, identifies critical facts and
assumptions, and evaluates risk. The results of mission analysis are the initial CCIR, an ISR
plan, the combined arms battalion mission, the battalion commander’s initial intent for the
operation, and the battalion commander’s guidance for the staff on developing COAs. These
products are distributed to subordinates in the form of WO #2, including orders to initiate
reconnaissance operations. Mission analysis should also generate a request for modular

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forces required by METT-TC to accomplish the mission as well as a risk assessment that
addresses the outcome if the modular augmenting forces are not available or are late.

Figure 3-4. MDMP Steps, Inputs, and Outputs

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

3-61. The staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. This begins with analyzing
relative combat power and generating maneuver options. The staff arrays initial forces to
accomplish critical tactical tasks and develops the scheme of maneuver that synchronizes the
tasks using the battlefield framework. The final result is a COA statement and sketch that
clearly portray how the combined arms battalion will accomplish the mission and explains

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the scheme of maneuver. The COA statement and sketch serve as the basis for the COA
analysis war game.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS (WAR GAME)

3-62. The staff develops a set of standards used to evaluate each COA. The standards may be
based on the principles of war, commander’s guidance, doctrinal principles for the operation
being conducted, or whatever measure is deemed important by the battalion commander.
The staff conducts a war game of each COA using a methodology of action, reaction, and
counteraction. This process allows the staff to view the likely outcome of the battle, allocate
resources, synchronize battlefield operating systems (BOS), and develop control measures.
The results of each war game are assessed using evaluation criteria established by the
commander and are recorded for comparison against other COAs.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

3-63. The staff evaluates each COA and compares it against the others to determine which
one best accomplishes the mission without undue risk. Each COA is briefed to the battalion
commander, and the staff makes its recommendation on the most preferred option.

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

3-64. The combined arms battalion commander selects a COA, modifies it as required to
better meet his intent, or rejects them all and has the staff develop new ones. The
commander then finalizes his intent and CCIR based on the chosen COA. He gives guidance
to the staff on the type of order to produce, rehearsals to conduct, and priorities for combat
support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets. The staff issues WO #3 reflecting
these changes.

ORDERS PRODUCTION
3-65. The staff finalizes the plan based on the battalion commander’s approval guidance and
prepares to publish a written order, brief an oral order, transmit a digital order, or a
combination thereof. The order includes graphical overlays and staff annexes as appropriate.

DECISION-MAKING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

3-66. The MDMP is the foundation on which planning in a time-constrained environment is
based. The products created during the MDMP can and should be used during subsequent
planning sessions when time may not be available for a thorough reexamination but when
significant parts of existing information and analysis of the factors of METT-TC have not
changed substantially. The focus of any planning process should be to develop quickly a
flexible, tactically sound, fully integrated, and fully synchronized plan that increases the
likelihood of mission success with the fewest possible casualties. However, any operation
may go beyond the initial plan. The most detailed staff estimates cannot anticipate every
possible branch or sequel, enemy action, unexpected opportunity, or change in mission
directed from higher headquarters. Fleeting opportunities or unexpected enemy actions may
require a quick decision to implement a new or modified plan. The battalion commander
decides how to abbreviate the MDMP. What follows are suggested techniques and
procedures that will save time. They are not exhaustive or the only ways to save time, but
they have proven useful. These techniques are not necessarily sequential in nature, and not
all of them are useful in all situations. What works for a unit depends on its proficiency and
the factors of METT-TC in a given situation. The battalion commander can use these or
techniques of his own choosing to abbreviate the process.

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TRAINING FOR THE MDMP

3-67. Before a unit can conduct decision-making in a time-constrained environment, it must
master all of the steps in the MDMP. A unit can only shorten the MDMP if it fully
understands the role of every step of the process and the requirements to produce the
necessary products. Training on these steps must be thorough and result in a series of staff
battle drills that can be tailored to the time available. Training on the MDMP must be
stressful and replicate realistic conditions and timelines. Although the task is difficult, all
staffs must be able to produce a simple, flexible, tactically sound plan in a time-constrained
environment. Any METT-TC factor, but especially limited time, may make it difficult to
follow the entire MDMP. An inflexible process used in all situations will not work. The
MDMP is a sound and proven process that can be modified with slightly different techniques
to be effective when time is limited. There is still only one process, however, and omitting
steps of the MDMP is not the solution. Anticipation, organization, and prior preparation are
the keys to success in a time-constrained environment.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
3-68. The MDMP is abbreviated when there is too little time for a thorough and
comprehensive application of the process. The most significant factor to consider is time
available. It is the only nonrenewable—and often the most critical—resource. Four primary
techniques to save time follow:
The first is to increase the combined arms battalion commander’s involvement,
allowing him to make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed
briefings after each step.
The second technique is for the commander to become more prescriptive in his
guidance by limiting options. This saves the staff time by focusing members on
those things the battalion commander feels are most important.
The third technique, and the one that saves the most time, is for the commander to
limit the number of COAs developed and war gamed. The battalion commander can
also direct only one COA for the staff to refine if he has personally and mentally
conducted the MDMP to come up with his acceptable COA.
The fourth technique is maximizing parallel planning with the brigade. Although
parallel planning is the norm during the MDMP, maximizing its use in a time-
constrained environment is critical.
3-69. In a time-constrained environment, the importance of WOs increases as available time
decreases. A verbal WO now, followed by a written order later (or posted to a database), is
worth more than a written order 1 hour from now. The same WOs used in the MDMP should
be issued when abbreviating the process. In addition to WOs, units must share all available
information with subordinates, especially IPB products, as early as possible. The digital
INFOSYS greatly increase this sharing of information and the commander’s visualization
through collaboration with his subordinates.
3-70. While the steps used in a time-constrained environment are the same, many of them
may be done mentally by the combined arms battalion commander or with less staff
involvement than during the MDMP. The products developed when the process is
abbreviated may be the same as those developed for the MDMP; however, they may be much
less detailed and some may be omitted altogether. Unit SOPs tailor this process to the
battalion commander’s preference for orders in this environment.
3-71. When developing the plan, the staff may initially use the MDMP and develop branches
and sequels. During execution, they may abbreviate the process. A unit may use the
complete process to develop the plan while a subordinate headquarters abbreviates the
process.

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Advantages of abbreviating the MDMP. The advantages of using the abbreviated

MDMP include the following:
It maximizes the use of available time.
It allows subordinates more planning and preparation time.
It focuses staff efforts on the commander’s specific and directive guidance.
It facilitates adaptation to a rapidly changing situation.
It compensates for an inexperienced staff.
Disadvantages of abbreviating the MDMP. The disadvantages of using the
abbreviated MDMP include the following:
It is much more directive and limits staff flexibility and initiative.
It does not explore all available options when developing friendly COAs.
It may result in only an oral OPORD or FRAGO.
It increases the risk of overlooking a key factor or failing to uncover a
significantly better option.
It may decrease the coordination and synchronization of the plan.
Benefits of saving time on MDMP steps. The benefits of saving time on the MDMP
steps include the following:
It refines more thoroughly the commander’s plan.
It conducts a more deliberate and detailed war-gaming session.
It considers in detail potential branches and sequels.
It focuses more on actually rehearsing and preparing the plan.

THE COMMANDER’S ROLE

3-72. The combined arms battalion commander decides what adjustments to make to the
MDMP, giving specific guidance to the staff to focus the process and save time. If the
commander has access to only a small portion of the staff or none at all, he will need to rely
even more on his own expertise, intuition, creativity, and understanding of the environment
and the art and science of warfare. He may have to decide on his COA, mentally war game
the outcome, and confirm his decision to the staff all in a relatively short time. If so, his
decision will be based more on his experience than on a formal integrated staff process. The
commander may elect to have the staff spend most of its time developing, refining, and war
gaming his COA rather than developing multiple COAs.
The commander should avoid changes to his guidance unless a significantly
changed situation dictates major revisions. Frequent minor changes to the
guidance can result in lost time as the staff makes constant minor adjustments to
the plan.
The commander may consult with subordinate commanders before making a
decision. Subordinate commanders are closer to the fight and can more accurately
portray the enemy’s situation and that of their own unit. Additionally, consulting
with subordinates gives them insight into the upcoming operation and allows them
to maximize parallel planning. Using the digital INFOSYS (primarily FBCB2)
greatly enhances this concept of maximizing parallel planning between the
combined arms battalion and the subordinate units.
The commander must also give guidance to the staff on what modular augmentees
should be considered in future planning. The commander must ensure that the
request for modular forces required to accomplish the mission is properly addressed
to the HBCT and the UEx and includes as risk assessment that addresses
combined arms battalion mission accomplishment if the modular augmentees are
not available or are late in their employment by the combined arms battalion.

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In situations where the combined arms battalion commander must decide quickly,
he should contact his higher headquarters and advise them of his selected COA, if
time is available, because it may affect the branches and sequels that his superiors
are planning. However, the commander should not sacrifice exploiting an
opportunity if he cannot contact higher headquarters.

THE STAFF’S ROLE

3-73. The importance of staff estimates increases as time decreases. Decision-making in a
time-constrained environment almost always takes place after a unit has entered the AO
and has begun to execute operations. This means that the IPB, an updated COP, and some
portion of the staff estimates should already exist. Detailed planning before operations
provides the basis for information that the commander will need to make decisions as
operations continue. Staff members must keep their estimates up to date so that when
planning time is limited, they can provide accurate assessments quickly and move directly
into COA development. When time is short, the commander and staff use as much of the
previously analyzed information and products from earlier decisions as possible. Although
some of these products may change significantly, many (such as the IPB that is continuously
updated) remain the same or require little change.
The staff must use every opportunity to maximize parallel planning with the
brigade headquarters. Maximizing parallel planning can save significant time, but
if not carefully managed, it can also waste time. As a general rule, the staff must
never get ahead of the higher headquarters in the planning process. The majority of
the planning time should be spent developing the foundation of the plan, such as
mission analysis. The staff should not develop and analyze COAs without specific
guidance and approval from higher headquarters.
Collaborative planning may be used to further speed up decision-making.
Collaborative planning facilitates subordinate parallel planning and takes
advantage of the subordinates’ intimate knowledge of their AO and associated
threats and opportunities. The brigade commander may direct that his
headquarters and a combined arms battalion headquarters collaborate.
Collaborative planning among staffs is plausible; however, there will often be
tension between taking a battalion or company commander away from an ongoing
fight and the need to involve him in collaborative planning. Only the higher
commander can determine which takes precedence and require a subordinate
commander to participate in a collaborative planning session.

RECEIPT OF MISSION
3-74. This part of the process does not change in a time-constrained environment. However,
the battalion commander decides at this step whether to abbreviate the MDMP and, if so,
specifies how he wants to do it.

MISSION ANALYSIS
3-75. The commander’s direct involvement is essential to saving time during mission
analysis. He must personally supervise and manage the mission analysis. If time is not
available to conduct a detailed mission analysis, the commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders (if collaborative tools are available) perform a rapid mission analysis. In
extreme circumstances, mission analysis may be a mental process conducted by the
commander and key staff. This should be the exception rather than the norm.
The IPB process requires constant attention. Many delays during mission analysis
can be traced to poorly conducted IPB. The S2 and staff must quickly update the
IPB based on the new mission and changed situation. This is critical to focus ISR

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assets, especially the scout platoon and other ISR assets, early to collect
information that confirms adjustments to the initial plan. Event templates must be
as complete as possible prior to the mission analysis briefing. Because event
templates are the basis for war gaming, they must be constantly updated as new
information becomes available.
Staff officers conduct as formal a mission analysis briefing as time allows. However,
they may be forced to brief their estimates orally, covering only information that
has changed from the last staff estimate while placing the remainder of the
information on a shared database. When severely time constrained, they brief only
critical information that directly affects the new mission. If the battalion
commander has been directly involved in the mission analysis, he may decide to
skip the mission analysis briefing completely.

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE
3-76. One way to save time is in the issuance of the commander’s guidance. The elements of
the battalion commander’s guidance may be the same as the MDMP, but the guidance is
much more detailed and directive. The commander can provide detailed information
outlining what he expects in each COA developed, including tentative task organization,
decision points, and scheme of maneuver. He may also determine which enemy COAs he
wants to war game as well as the branches or sequels he wants incorporated in each COA.
Detailed guidance keeps the staff focused by establishing parameters within which to work.
Commander’s guidance must be constantly reviewed and analyzed. As the situation changes
and information becomes available, the commander may need to update or alter his
guidance. This type of detailed guidance limits the staff’s flexibility and initiative to save
time, but it allows the staff more time to synchronize the COA during the war-gaming
session. Once the guidance is issued, the staff immediately sends a WO to subordinate units.
Alternatively, if subordinate commanders and staffs are part of a collaborative process, they
get this updated guidance during the collaborative session. However, the staff must still
capture this guidance and publish it in a WO.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

3-77. A significant amount of time is gained by increased battalion commander involvement
in COA, resulting in detailed and directive commander’s guidance. The greatest savings in
time for the MDMP comes from the commander directing the staff to develop only a few
COAs (or a single COA) instead of many.
The combined arms battalion commander and selected staff (including selected
subordinate commanders and staffs, if collaborative tools are available) save
additional time by conducting a hasty war game once the COAs are developed. The
hasty war game allows the battalion commander to determine if he favors one or
more COAs out of several proposed. It develops and matures one or more COAs
before the detailed war-gaming session. If the battalion commander cannot be
present during the hasty war-gaming session, then the staff conducts a COA
backbrief to the commander after the hasty war game. From the hasty war-gaming
session, the battalion commander can make an early decision, allowing him to
refine his COA and make any necessary adjustments before the detailed war game.
In extreme situations, this may be the only opportunity to conduct the war-game
process.
The hasty war game can also be used to select a single COA for further
development. A commander’s early decision to go with a single COA allows the staff
and subordinates to focus on the selected COA instead of on multiple COAs. It also
allows the staff to concentrate on synchronizing the COA rather than on continuing
to develop it during the detailed war-gaming session.

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When time is severely limited, the quickest process comes from the battalion
commander personally deciding to immediately begin developing one COA with
branch plans against the enemy’s most probable COA. This decision is often
intuitive and relies on the battalion commander’s experience and judgment to
render a quick decision. The commander determines which staff officers are critical
to assist him in this process, depending on the type of operation being planned. The
minimum is normally the XO, S3, S2, and FSO. The commander may also include
subordinate commanders, if available, either in person or through collaborative
tools. This team must quickly develop a flexible COA that it believes will
accomplish the mission. In this case, the battalion commander mentally war games
one or more COAs, selecting the first one that appears to solve the problem for the
staff to refine.
Limiting the number of COAs developed carries with it the risk of overlooking a
significantly better COA. Developing only one COA is a risky approach. It provides
the staff with little flexibility to apply its creativity and to explore options.
Ensure full development of each COA that incorporates all BOS to prevent any
COA development from occurring during COA analysis. The more a staff
synchronizes a COA in this step, the less a staff does during COA analysis.

COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

3-78. The battalion commander and staff must war game the COAs to ensure all elements
are fully integrated and synchronized. An early decision to limit the number of COAs to be
war gamed or to develop only one COA saves the greatest amount of time in this process.
When war gaming the COAs, it is best to do so against all feasible enemy COAs. However,
the commander can save additional time by having the staff war game against a smaller
number of enemy COAs. At a minimum, the actions at the decisive point must be war gamed
against the enemy’s most probable COA.
The battalion commander’s direct involvement saves significant time in this step by
allowing the staff to focus on only the most essential aspects of the war game. The
commander can supervise the war gaming session and be prepared to make
decisions, provide guidance, delete unsatisfactory concepts, and assist in keeping
the staff focused.
If the commander is present during the war gaming of multiple COAs, he may
identify the COA he favors. He can then discard unwanted COAs, allocating more
time to refine the one selected.
The commander must always assess risk. By limiting the number of COAs, he has
increased risk to the command. He must evaluate the COA to ensure it will not
render the force incapable of anticipated operations or lower the unit’s combat
effectiveness beyond acceptable levels.
The staff should use the box technique, focusing first on the decisive action such as
actions at the objective or the engagement area. If time permits, the staff war
games other critical events or boxes as well. The commander and staff must
identify and prioritize the critical events they want analyzed. Analyzing essential
tasks can identify these critical events.
Staff officers save time if they specifically define and limit the evaluation criteria
before they begin the war-gaming session. The battalion commander can greatly
increase effectiveness here by specifying the most critical factors and their
weighting to his selected COA. Significant factors can be quantified, if possible, and
limited to the four or five most important based on the mission statement,
commander’s intent, and commander’s guidance.
The staff works to support the commander’s plan. However, as the staff refines the
plan, it cannot become so biased that it develops a plan that is infeasible and

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unsupportable. If the staff determines that it cannot support the commander’s plan,
a new COA must be developed.
The use of recorders during planning is particularly important. Recorders should be
trained to capture coordinating instructions, subunit tasks and purposes, and
information required to synchronize the operation during the war-gaming session.
If a good record of the critical information is developed, a portion of the order is
written before the planning process is complete. Digital INFOSYS greatly simplify
this process as information can be entered in preformatted forms in shared
databases that represent either briefing charts or actual appendices to orders. Each
staff section should have formats available per battalion SOP to facilitate a
networked production of orders.
The location used for the war-gaming session must be prepared and configured by
the time the staff is ready to conduct the war-gaming session. Charts and boards
must be clean and ready for use. The blown-up terrain sketch and enemy situation
templates must be prepared and present for the war-gaming session. Digital
products must be updated, digital terrain maps for the area of operations must be
loaded in the appropriate INFOSYS, and automated tools (if available) for war
gaming must have correct data entered.
When only one COA is developed per commander’s guidance, the purpose of the
COA analysis is to verify, refine, synchronize, and integrate the commander’s COA
and recommend modifications as necessary. However, the analysis should follow
the detailed war-gaming process as much as possible to assist the commander in
visualizing the outcome and identifying potential branches and sequels. As time
allows, the staff can further war game and develop these branches and sequels.
In a severely time-constrained environment and if automated tools are available,
units may combine the war-gaming process with the rehearsal in a virtual
environment, including the battalion commander, staff, and subordinate
commanders. A significant benefit to this technique is that it allows the
subordinate commanders to control their units during the war-gaming process.

COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

3-79. If the battalion commander decides to war game only one COA or if he chooses one
during the war-gaming session, no COA comparison is needed. If multiple COAs have been
war gamed and the battalion commander has not made a decision, the staff must conduct the
COA comparison. Limiting the evaluation criteria and weighting factors are the only
significant shortcuts in this step. Every COA must be evaluated against a minimum of three
criteria: suitability to accomplish the mission, feasibility to accomplish the mission, and
acceptability to accomplish the mission.

COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

3-80. If the battalion commander has observed and participated in the planning process, the
decision may be rapidly apparent and the commander can make it on the spot. If the
commander has not participated in the process to this point or has not made a decision, a
decision briefing is required. Good COA comparison charts and sketches assist the
commander in visualizing and distinguishing between COAs. The staff must ensure the
COAs meet the COA criterion, complete. Time can also be saved by limiting the COA briefing
to only the decisive action or selected critical points. If only one COA was developed, no
decision is required unless the developed COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or
unacceptable. If this occurs, another COA must be developed.

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ORDERS PRODUCTION
3-81. In a time-constrained environment, time is important and a verbal FRAGO may be
issued first versus a written order. However, the staff must capture all the information in
any verbal orders and WOs and deliver a written order to follow up on any previously issued
orders. Once the decision is made that a verbal order is not issued, the staff immediately
sends out a WO.

SECTION V – PREPARING FOR OPERATIONS

3-82. Preparing for operations includes activities conducted by the combined arms battalion
before executing to improve its ability to conduct an operation. At a minimum, these
activities include plan refinement, rehearsals, ISR operations, coordination, inspections, and
movement. Preparation for operations occurs any time the combined arms battalion is not
executing a mission. Ideally, preparation begins with the receipt of an order (as does
planning) and ends as execution begins. Assessment during preparation monitors the
progress of readiness to conduct. The commander evaluates preparations against his criteria
for success to determine variances and to forecast the significance of those variances for
mission accomplishment.

ISR OPERATIONS
3-83. During preparation, the combined arms battalion commander answers some of his
CCIR and improves his intelligence about the enemy and terrain through his available ISR
assets (most likely the scout platoon). An ISR operation is planned and executed with the
same level of importance as any operation. ISR operations are not static, one-time efforts
that achieve a single goal and then end. As the scout platoon (or other available ISR assets)
gathers information (answering the CCIR), the battalion staff should modify the collection
plan to account for new information requirements or modified CCIR and to redirect efforts to
collect additional information. The battalion commander and staff must continuously review
IPB products against the current situation; they redirect the scout platoon or other ISR
assets to focus on the most important unknowns remaining, emphasizing the current CCIR.
The battalion commander must balance his need for information with the ability of the scout
platoon to gather it, the risk to the scout platoon during collection, the ability to sustain the
scout platoon over time and distance, the requirement to have the scout platoon available at
critical times and places to support the decisive action, and the availability (time, type, and
quantity) of other ISR assets.

SECURITY
3-84. Security of the battalion during preparation prevents surprise and reduces uncertainty
through local security and operations security (OPSEC). Local security and OPSEC prevent
the enemy from discovering the combined arms battalion plan and protect the force from
unforeseen enemy actions. The goal in conducting security operations is to prevent the
enemy from gathering essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). Security is a
dynamic effort that anticipates and prevents enemy intelligence-gathering efforts.

FORCE PROTECTION
3-85. Force protection includes a combination of active and passive measures to deter, defeat,
or mitigate enemy actions. It is not a discrete mission assigned to a single subordinate unit
but a continuous effort executed by the entire combined arms battalion and all of its
subordinate units regardless of their mission, location, or threat. The commander and staff
develop and initiate actions during planning but conduct the actions during preparation and
execution.

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FMI 3-90.5

PLAN REVISION AND REFINEMENT

3-86. The combined arms battalion commander adjusts plans based on new information. The
enemy is also acting while the combined arms battalion is preparing for an upcoming
operation. As assumptions prove true or false, as the scout platoon (or other ISR assets)
confirms or denies enemy actions and dispositions, and as the status of subordinate units
change, the combined arms battalion commander determines whether the new information
invalidates the plan, requires him to adjust the plan, or validates his plan.

COORDINATION AND LIAISON

3-87. During preparation, the combined arms battalion conducts necessary coordination with
higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting units. Coordination includes the establishment of all
communications links to guarantee continuous contact during execution and may include
sending and receiving liaison teams. This is especially critical when the combined arms
battalion is a subordinate element of a brigade or UEx that lacks the same INFOSYS (digital
or analog) as the HBCT combined arms battalion and when units who lack the same
INFOSYS are subordinated to the combined arms battalion. Coordination is essential for
synchronization during execution.

COORDINATION
3-88. Exchanging information is critical to successful coordination. Coordination may be both
internal and external. Internal coordination occurs within the combined arms battalion staff.
External coordination involves subordinate and supporting units or staffs and higher
headquarters. Coordination has four objectives.
It ensures an understanding of the commander’s intent and an understanding of
subordinate and supporting unit roles.
It ensures that all affected and interested personnel have been consulted or
informed so they may respond as desired or adjust their plans and actions.
It avoids conflict and duplication of effort among subordinate units, reducing the
risk of fratricide and the expenditure of resources.
It ensures that the commander and staff consider all relevant factors and
effectively employ all available assets.

LIAISON
3-89. Liaison provides a means of direct communications between headquarters. Liaison may
begin with planning and continue throughout preparation and execution. The battalion
commander must ensure that the liaison officers sent to higher and adjacent units clearly
understand his intent and are tied back to their parent command to report back on the
planning at the gaining headquarters. Liaison is a two-way street of information.

REHEARSALS
3-90. The intent of a rehearsal is to practice actions to improve performance during
execution. The extent of rehearsals depends on the time available. Rehearsals allow
participants to become familiar with the plan and to translate the plan into a visual
impression that orients them to the environment and other units when executing.
Rehearsals imprint a mental picture of the sequence of key actions within the upcoming
operation. Rehearsals also provide a forum for coordination among subordinate and
supporting leaders. Rehearsals emphasize times, locations, and solutions for coordinating
actions to achieve synchronization at critical points during execution. The battalion’s
leadership rehearses the plan against a wide range of likely enemy COAs that cause the
combined arms battalion to execute various maneuver options at different times and

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locations. The goal is to exercise the battalion’s C2 system and subordinate commanders
against potential situations that may arise during execution and force decision-making
under the anticipated conditions of the battle. This promotes flexibility and agility while
reinforcing the commander’s intent.
3-91. The commander seeks to rehearse the operation from initiation to occupation of the
final objective or limit of advance (LOA). Often, due to time constraints, the commander
prioritizes the maneuver options and enemy COAs to be rehearsed based on the time
available. The focus of the rehearsal is locating the enemy, developing the situation,
executing a maneuver option, and exploiting success. The rehearsal must consider the
potential of encountering stationary or moving enemy forces.

SECTION VI – EXECUTION
3-92. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the
mission using situational understanding to assess progress and make decisions. Inherent in
the dynamic nature of execution is deciding to execute planned actions as well as deciding to
adjust the plan based on changes in the situation. Combining the art of command and the
science of control is most evident during execution. The commander exercises judgment and
intuition continuously, assessing the situation and making decisions, often with incomplete,
conflicting, and vague information. During execution, the commander uses his visualization,
continuously updated with a current COP, to assess the progress of operations. His CCIR,
continuously updated during the operation, guides updates to his situational understanding.
Decision-making during execution follows the assess, decide, and direct model with the
MDMP at its core.

THE C2 DURING EXECUTION

3-93. During execution, the C2 system (paragraph 3-22) must continuously manage relevant
information. It must compare the COP against the commander’s intent, identify variances
from the plan, and recommend ways for the commander to correct or exploit the variances.
Finally, the C2 system must direct actions to counter unforeseen enemy or friendly actions
and to exploit opportunities.

ADAPTING TO CHANGES
3-94. There are two methods for the combined arms battalion to adapt to changes. The first
method begins during planning and consists of anticipating changes and developing
branches and sequels to the plan to deal with them. Anticipating changes does not end with
planning; it continues throughout preparation and execution. The second method of adapting
to changes is improvising, taking action, or adopting solutions to unforeseen changes during
the operation. While improvisation is not the preferred method, situations frequently arise
requiring its use. The real difference between the two methods is time. Anticipation occurs
when enemy actions are foreseen early enough to develop an analytical response.
Improvisation occurs when the enemy action is unexpected and does not allow time for the
formal planning of a response.

ASSESSMENT
3-95. Assessing an operation during execution is an essential and continuous task. It is a
deliberate comparison of previously templated outcomes to actual events using the
commander’s criteria for success to judge operational success at any point during the
operation. The commander and staff assess the probable outcomes of the ongoing operation
to determine whether changes are required to accomplish the mission, to react to unforeseen

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threats, or to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities. The commander uses SU to assess

the ongoing operation to determine if the current plan is (or is not) still valid.

MONITORING THE OPERATION

3-96. The battalion commander and staff monitor the ongoing operation to determine if it is
progressing satisfactorily according to the current plan (including any FRAGO that may
have modified it). The staff monitors the facts and assumptions that were the basis of the
plan to ensure they remain valid or to see a need for new facts and assumptions that might
affect current and future operations. Monitoring uses RI to develop a clear understanding of
the current state of the battalion in relation to the enemy and the environment. The staff
processes this RI and presents it to the commander as a clear operational picture.

EVALUATING THE CRITERIA FOR SUCCESS

3-97. The battalion commander and staff continue to evaluate the commander’s criteria for
success during execution. The staff must continually update their staff estimates and their
sources of assessment to supplement and support the commander’s visualization. Assessing
success results in one of two outcomes.
The operation is progressing satisfactorily and observed variances between
expectations and the current situation are minor or within acceptable levels.
Progress meets the commander’s intent, and the concept of operations is still
relevant to the situation. The result is that the operation continues as planned and
leads to decisions foreseen by the plan.
The operation as a whole is not proceeding according to expectations. The observed
variances endanger the success of the operation. This assessment can result from
unforeseen enemy successes or friendly failures, and it also can result if
performance of critical indicators is much better than expected, presenting a
significant opportunity to the combined arms battalion. The commander makes a
decision to eliminate the threat or to take advantage of the unforeseen opportunity.

DECISIONS
3-98. The combined arms battalion commander should be ready to modify his plan if it is
necessary to save the force, to accomplish the mission, or to achieve greater success.
Adhering to a plan when the situation has changed can waste resources and opportunities.
The flexibility to adapt to changing situations is the hallmark of a good commander. The
combined arms battalion must train to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities and to
leverage the available INFOSYS to disseminate decisions quickly. The commander makes
two basic types of decisions during execution: execution decisions and adjustment decisions.

EXECUTION DECISIONS
3-99. Execution decisions implement anticipated actions and are directed by the order. The
most basic form of this type of decision is applying combat power or conducting activities as
outlined within the plan or within the commander’s intent. Executing branches and sequels
are execution decisions (Figure 3-5).

Critical Routine Functions

3-100. The combined arms battalion must accomplish routine tasks during execution.
Although these tasks occur routinely, the commander must consciously consider them during
execution. Failure to consider these routine tasks can waste resources, squander
opportunities, or lead to mission failure.

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 Battle Command

Conduct continuous ISR operations. ISR is a continuous process, feeding the

commander’s situational understanding and his decision-making. The combined
arms battalion commander should never keep the scout platoon and other ISR
assets in reserve. During execution, these assets should be focused on answering
the CCIR and looking for opportunities for the combined arms battalion to exploit.

Figure 3-5. The Steps in the MDMP

Adjust IR and CCIR based on the situation. The commander and staff must continue to
review the CCIR during execution. The staff continues to analyze IR against the
mission and updated commander’s intent to identify those indicators that may
directly affect the commander’s decision-making. As CCIR are answered or the
situation changes, the commander must develop new CCIR. The staff must
disseminate these new CCIR to subordinate and supporting units. The staff must
develop a new collection plan and allocate assets (scout platoon or other ISR assets)
to answer the new CCIR.
Track the battle. Battle tracking is monitoring designated elements of the COP that
are tied to the commander’s criteria for success. Battle tracking requires special
attention from all staff officers. The XO and S3 must continue to monitor the
progress of movement and recommend changes as required.
Refine the targeting process. The battalion commander’s decisions provide the basis
for targeting decisions made in support of the continuing operation. The
commander remains alert to situations when he must give or modify targeting
guidance to the staff. His guidance synchronizes the targeting process to continue
achieving effects (lethal and/or nonlethal) on the enemy.

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Manage the movement and positioning of CS and CSS units. Massing the effects of
combat power at a decisive point requires not only the maneuver of combat forces
but also the movement of CS and CSS forces. Sustaining forces must not interfere
with the movement of combat forces to the decisive point. In the heat of executing a
mission, it is easy to lose sight of the time required to reposition CS and CSS forces.
The battalion commander and staff must ensure that the movement of combat
units does not outpace the movement of sustaining units. The commander’s
visualization should include the time required to move all combined arms battalion
assets to get to the right place at the right time.
Continue terrain management. The combined arms battalion commander and staff
must carefully track the location and land utilization of all units within the AO.
Deconflicting land use among units in the combined arms battalion AO is difficult
but necessary during execution. The staff must ensure that adequate space,
including the use of routes, is available at the right time to support critical
activities. The commander’s visualization should determine what space is required
for what force at what time to support the decisive action.

Planned Actions
3-101. The commander and staff must recognize that a particular event or action directed by
the OPORD has met preconditions (events or triggers) for execution and direct the execution
of this planned action. Modifying planned actions to fit the current situation is still
considered a planned action. Branches and sequels to an order (or plan) are planned actions.

ADJUSTMENT DECISIONS
3-102. Adjustment decisions modify the plan to respond to unanticipated threats or
opportunities. Typically, a commander’s adjustment decision requires further
synchronization across the functional areas. The commander describes his visualization of
the adjustment through additional guidance. He must pay particular attention to the effects
of adjustment decisions on targeting and give sufficient guidance to support the targeting
process. Adjustments take one of three forms: reallocation of resources, changing the
concept, and changing the mission.

Reallocation of Resources
3-103. The simplest adjustment is to reallocate resources. The battalion commander can
allocate additional combat support or reinforce a combat unit with additional combat forces.
The commander should reinforce success if it creates the opportunity for more success.

Changing the Concept

3-104. Changing the concept of the operation adjusts the way in which the operation is
conducted without changing the mission. Most often, this modifies the decisive action to
exploit an unforeseen opportunity or to counter an unexpected threat. An important
adjustment decision is the commitment of the battalion reserve. Employing the reserve
successfully requires anticipation and visualization. These allow the commander to task
organize, position, and move the reserve force in a manner that minimizes any loss of
momentum with their commitment.

Changing the Mission

3-105. If the battalion commander sees during execution that he cannot resolve a problem to
accomplish his mission by reallocating resources or changing the concept, he may opt to
change his mission. He should only do this as a last resort, and the change to the mission

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 Battle Command

must still accomplish the higher commander’s intent. Synchronizing the combined arms
battalion’s new actions with higher, lower, and adjacent units is the greatest challenge this
type of decision presents.

Adjustment Decision Methods

3-106. When making adjustments to a unique or complex situation, the MDMP is preferred
if time is available. When there is not sufficient time for the MDMP or during fast-paced
combat operations, decision-making may become more intuitive for the battalion
commander. Intuitive (or recognition) decision-making emphasizes the commander’s
knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intellect, boldness, perception, and character.
Using the MDMP. The commander may opt to use an abbreviated MDMP, focusing
the staff on one COA. This method also uses intuitive decision-making. It begins
with the commander using his current SU to visualize and mentally formulate a
single COA that solves the unforeseen problem. He directs the staff to analyze and
refine the COA. The commander resolves any inadequacies the staff detects
through its analysis by revising or modifying the given COA rather than developing
a new one.
Recognition decisions. This type of decision-making requires the greatest
involvement of the battalion commander and the least involvement from the staff.
It relies on the commander’s experience in the use of intuitive decision-making to
be successful. The commander visualizes the solution to a problem immediately,
with little or no analysis of alternatives or outcomes. Recognition decisions do not
necessarily follow the MDMP; however, the commander’s decisions are well
grounded in an understanding of the enemy and terrain, the updated commander’s
estimate and staff estimates, and the OPORD that began the operation (Figure
3-6). This approach focuses on SU, assessing significant variances, and selecting or
refining an acceptable decision mentally instead of comparing multiple options to
select the optimal answer.

DIRECTING ACTION
3-107. Any decision to change a plan requires a change in the application of combat power
and a resynchronization to mass effects on the enemy. The combined arms battalion
commander must direct action that applies combat power to effect execution or adjustment
decisions. The FRAGO is the normal means to direct changes during execution. Digital
INFOSYS give the C2 system the capability to automate orders (and graphics) production
and dissemination, especially for execution.

SYNCHRONIZE OPERATIONS
3-108. After the combined arms battalion commander makes a decision during execution,
the staff must resynchronize the ongoing operation to maximize the application of combat
power against the enemy. This resynchronization includes informing subordinates, adjacent
units and higher headquarters, integrating assets, incorporating the decision into the
targeting process, and deconflicting subordinate actions. The staff can use digital INFOSYS
to reduce duplication, confusion, and problems that may occur from the change.
Resynchronization should be used only to the extent required to ensure mission
accomplishment. Excessive synchronization may waste valuable resources and opportunities.

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Figure 3-6. Executing an Operation

MAINTAIN CONTINUITY
3-109. Continuity (making as few changes as necessary) allows for a greater chance of
successful execution. Continuity does not inhibit flexibility; the battalion commander and his
staff should only make the changes to current operations necessary to solve a problem.
Maintaining the current plan as much as possible allows subordinates to focus on only a few
discrete changes. The commander and staff should avoid changes that may preclude options
for future operations.

TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE

3-110. The ability to accomplish unit tasks successfully lies in the training level of the
Soldiers and the leaders’ mastery of the leader tasks. The entire unit must master new
procedures to acquire the full advantage of digitization once they have mastered the analog
methodology.
3-111. Digitization’s largest impact is on the commanders and leaders in the practice of
command and control. Integrating this new digitized equipment into the operations process
poses a challenging problem for future commanders and leaders.
3-112. Executing battle drills or any other type of operation using digitized equipment and
procedures at first may seem more difficult and dangerous than existing methods. It is
imperative that commanders, leaders, and Soldiers understand both the advantages and the
limiting factors of digitization and apply the advantages while overcoming the initial
complicating difficulties. Adapting to digital INFOSYS is a continuing process for
commanders and staff at every level as new equipment and processes are tested, proven, and
fielded to combat units.

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 Chapter 4
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

All heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalions conduct
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations to produce
intelligence on the enemy, environment (including weather and terrain),
and civil considerations necessary to assist the commander in developing
situational understanding (SU) and making decisions. ISR operations
begin during mission analysis based on fully developed collection plans.
ISR operations are a commander’s function supported by the entire staff
and subordinate units. ISR operations develop, synchronize, and integrate
intelligence from a multitude of collection sources to answer the battalion
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). ISR collection
operations are multifaceted, and their integration eliminates unit and
functional stovepipes for planning, reporting, and processing information
and producing intelligence. ISR operations must be nested with the
collection plans of every echelon from battalion to UEx. Integration of the
brigade reconnaissance squadron and UEx reconnaissance assets with the
battalion assets ensures mutual security and the ability to maintain the
collection initiative.

SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION

4-1. The HBCT combined arms battalion conducts ISR operations to answer the battalion
information requirements (Figure 4-1) and to facilitate targeting while filling voids in
operational information. Timely and accurate intelligence encourages audacity and can
facilitate actions that may negate enemy superiority in personnel and materiel. Timely and
accurate intelligence normally depends on aggressive and continuous ISR. A fully developed
ISR order is required to meet the battalion information requirements. Understanding the
fundamentals of intelligence synchronization is essential to the development of an effective
ISR order (see FM 3-90, Chapters 12 and 13).

INTELLIGENCE SYNCHRONIZATION
4-2. This chapter describes the fundamentals of intelligence synchronization; collection
assets; techniques for ISR planning; and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for ISR
execution. Intelligence synchronization is a cyclic process that:
Seeks to define what information is required.
Determines the best method to collect the information.
Allocates assets to gather information.
Disseminates intelligence derived from that information to commanders and staff.
Assesses the value of intelligence and ultimately repeats the cycle.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 4-1. Battalion Information Requirements

4-3. The result is a continuous feed of relevant information that facilitates the commander’s
SU that ultimately allows him to make better decisions. The intelligence synchronization
process is shown in Figure 4-2. ISR is a continuous process that involves the entire staff. The
combined arms battalion S3 is the chief ISR integrator. He is assisted primarily by the
battalion S2 in concert with the remainder of the staff. The battalion XO supervises
synchronization of the battalion ISR plan and its subsequent execution.

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 Intelligence, Suveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

Figure 4-2. Intelligence Synchronization Process

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FMI 3-90.5

CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

4-4. With staff participation, the intelligence officer supports the ISR effort by focusing on
collecting, processing, and analyzing intelligence products and on the critical needs of the
commander. The operations officer, in coordination with the intelligence officer, tasks and
directs the available ISR assets to answer CCIR. Through various detection methods and
systematic observation, reconnaissance and surveillance obtains the required information. A
continuous process, this task has four subtasks: perform intelligence synchronization,
perform ISR integration, conduct tactical reconnaissance, and conduct surveillance. (See FM
7-15, ART 1.3, and FM 3-90.)

Perform Intelligence Synchronization

4-5. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, synchronizes the entire collection
effort to units and higher echelon units and organizations and intelligence reach to answer
the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requirements
(IR). (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.1.)
4-6. The intelligence officer, with staff participation, supports the S3 in orchestrating the
entire ISR effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and
higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the CCIR and other
intelligence requirements. Intelligence synchronization activities include the following:
Conducting requirements management (RM): Anticipate, develop, analyze,
validate, and prioritize intelligence requirements. Recommend PIR to the
commander. Manage the commander’s intelligence requirements, requests for
information (RFIs) from subordinate and lateral organizations and tasks from
higher headquarters. Eliminate satisfied requirements and add new requirements
as necessary.
Developing indicators.
Developing specific IR (specific information requirements (SIR)).
Converting the SIR into intelligence tasks or ISR
Converting the SIR (See Figure 4-2 for the ISR task development process.) The S2
assigns intelligence production and reach tasks to subordinate intelligence
elements or personnel, submits RFI to higher and lateral echelons, and coordinates
with (or assists) the S3 to develop and assign ISR tasks.
Comparing the ISR tasks to the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR
assets (in coordination with the operations officer).
Forwarding SIR that cannot be answered by available assets to higher or lateral
organizations as RFI.
Assessing collection asset reporting and intelligence production to evaluate the
effectiveness of the ISR effort.
Maintaining SU to identify gaps in coverage and the need to cue or redirect ISR
assets.
Updating the intelligence synchronization plan. The S2 manages and updates the
intelligence synchronization plan as PIR are answered and new requirements arise.
4-7. The S2 generally follows six considerations in planning intelligence synchronization
and ISR activities: anticipate, integrate, prioritize, balance, control, and reach. Refer to FM
34-2 for more information regarding intelligence synchronization.
Anticipate. The intelligence staff must recognize when and where to shift collection
or identify new intelligence requirements. The overall intent of this principle is to
identify a new or adjust an existing requirement and present it to the commander
for approval before waiting for the commander or his staff to identify it.

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Integrate. The battalion intelligence staff must be fully integrated into the unit’s
orders production and planning activities to ensure early identification of
intelligence requirements. Early and continuous consideration of collection factors
enhances the unit’s ability to direct collection assets in a timely manner, ensures
thorough planning, and increases flexibility in selecting assets.
Prioritize. Prioritize each intelligence requirement based on its importance in
supporting the commander’s intent and decisions. Prioritization, based on the
commander’s guidance and the current situation, ensures that limited ISR assets
and resources are directed against the most critical requirements.
Balance. ISR capabilities complement each other. The intelligence staff should
resist favoring or becoming too reliant on a particular unit, discipline, or system.
Balance is simply planning redundancy, when required, eliminating redundancy
when not desired, and ensuring an appropriate mix of ISR assets or types. The
intelligence synchronization matrix (ISM) is useful in determining or evaluating
balance.
Control. To ensure timely and effective responses to intelligence requirements, a
unit should first use ISR assets it controls. These assets usually are more
responsive to their respective commander and also serve to lessen the burden on
the ISR assets of other units, agencies, and organizations.
4-8. The intelligence staff develops a prioritized list of what information needs to be
collected and produced into intelligence. Additionally, the intelligence staff dynamically
updates and adjusts those requirements in response to mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)
adjustments and changes. This list is placed against the latest time intelligence is of value to
ensure intelligence and information is reported to meet operational requirements. (See FM
7-15, ART 1.3.1.)
4-9. An effective discussion of ISR must include an understanding of the CCIR. The CCIR
are elements of information required by commanders that affect decision-making and dictate
the successful execution of missions. The commander decides what information is critical,
based on experience, the mission, the higher commander’s intent, and the staff’s input
(initial IPB, information, intelligence, and recommendations). Refer to FM 3-0 for more
information regarding CCIR.
4-10. Based on the CCIR, two types of supporting IR are generated: PIR and friendly forces
information requirements (FFIR). However, commanders may determine that they need to
know whether one or more essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) have been
compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated EEFI. In those cases,
commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIR.
4-11. IR are all of the information elements required by the commander and his staff for the
successful planning and execution of operations; that is, all elements necessary to address
the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations (METT-TC). Vetting by the commander or his designated
representative turns an IR into either a PIR or an intelligence requirement. IR are developed
during course of action (COA) analysis based on the factors of METT-TC.
4-12. PIR are those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and
stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making. PIR are associated with a
decision based on action or inaction or the battlespace that will affect the overall success of
the commander’s mission. The commander designates intelligence requirements tied directly
to his decisions as CCIR (PIR and FFIR). Answers to the PIR help produce intelligence
essential to the commander’s SU and decision-making. For information on PIR development,
see FM 34-2.

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FMI 3-90.5

4-13. The S2 recommends to the commander those IR produced during the MDMP that meet
the criteria for PIR. They do not become CCIR (PIR and FFIR) until approved by the
commander. Additionally, the commander may unilaterally designate PIR. The IR that are
not designated by the commander as PIR become intelligence requirements. The intelligence
requirement is a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of the battlespace or
threat that the intelligence battlefield operating systems (BOS) must fill.
4-14. The S3 then tasks the unit’s assets to answer both the PIR and intelligence
requirements through the ISR plan. PIR should address the following:
Ask only one question.
Support a decision.
Identify a specific fact, event, activity (or absence thereof) that can be collected.
If linked to an enemy course of action (ECOA), indicate an ECOA prior to, or as
early as possible in, its implementation.
Indicate the latest time information is of value (LTIOV). The LTIOV is the absolute
latest time the information can be used by the commander in making the decision
the PIR supports. The LTIOV can be linked to time, an event, or a point in the
battle or operation.
4-15. The staff also develops FFIRs that, when answered, provide friendly force information
that the commander and staff need to achieve SU and to make decisions.
4-16. EEFI establish friendly information to protect, not information to obtain, and is
separate from CCIR. Commanders may determine that they need to know whether one or
more EEFI have been compromised or that the enemy is collecting against a designated
EEFI. In those cases, commanders may designate that question as one of their CCIR, which
generates PIR and/or FFIR. For example, a commander may determine that, if the enemy
discovers the location and movement of the friendly reserve, the operation is at risk. In this
case, the location and movement of the friendly reserve are EEFI. He designates
determining whether the enemy has discovered the location and movement of the friendly
reserve as one of his CCIR. That CCIR, in turn, generates PIR and FFIR to support staff
actions in determining whether the EEFI has been compromised.
4-17. The entire unit staff develops its IR and determines how best to satisfy them. The staff
uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to collect information. The intelligence
synchronization plan includes all assets that the operations officer can task or request and
coordination mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the AIs. (See FM 7-15, ART
1.3.1.2.)
4-18. The intelligence synchronization plan, often presented in a matrix format as an ISM,
aids in synchronizing the entire ISR effort with the overall operation and the commander’s
decisions and/or decision points (DPs). The intelligence synchronization plan is often
produced in conjunction with the ISR plan. However, before performing intelligence
synchronization and finalizing the intelligence synchronization plan, the S2 must have the
following:
The CCIR (PIR and FFIR).
A prioritized list of the remaining intelligence requirements.
Evaluated ISR assets and resources.
All of the assigned ISR tasks.

Perform ISR Integration

4-19. The operations officer, in coordination with the intelligence officer and other staff
members, orchestrates the tasking and directing of available ISR assets to answer the CCIR.
The operations officer, with input from the intelligence officer, develops tasks from the SIR

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that coincide with the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets and the
LTIOV. Intelligence requirements are identified, prioritized, and validated, and an ISR plan
is developed and synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.2, and
FM 3-90.)
4-20. The S3, in coordination with the S2 and other staff members, orchestrates the tasking
and directing of available ISR assets to answer the PIR, FFIR, and IRs. The result of this
process is the forming of the ISR plan. The ISR plan provides a list of all the ISR tasks to be
accomplished. The S2 and the G3/S3 develop tasks from the SIR. These tasks are then
assigned based on the capabilities and limitations of the available ISR assets and the
LTIOV.
4-21. The operations officer is responsible for developing the ISR plan. The entire unit staff
analyzes each requirement to determine how best to satisfy it. The staff receives orders and
RFIs from both subordinate and adjacent units and higher headquarters. The ISR plan
includes all assets that the operations officer can task or request and coordination
mechanisms to ensure adequate coverage of the area of interest (AI). (See FM 7-15, ART
1.3.2.1, and FM 3-90.)
4-22. The ISR plan is usually produced as the ISR annex to an operation order (OPORD)
(Annex L, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). Refer to FM 5-0 for specific and
authoritative information on the ISR annex. ISR is a continuous combined arms effort led by
the operations and intelligence staffs in coordination with the entire staff that sets
reconnaissance and surveillance in SU and the fidelity of the COP about the enemy and
terrain through the deployment of his ISR assets. Commanders integrate reconnaissance
and surveillance to form an integrated ISR plan that capitalizes on their different
capabilities. The ISR plan is often the most important part of providing information and
intelligence that contributes to answering the CCIR. For the S2, an effective ISR plan is
critical in answering the PIR. Also see FM 3-55 for more information on the ISR plan.
4-23. The ISR plan is not a military intelligence (MI)-specific product—the battalion S3 is
the staff proponent of the battalion ISR plan—it is an integrated staff product executed by
the unit at the direction of the commander. The S2, however, must maintain his SU to
recommend to the commander and S3 changes or further developments of the ISR plan.
Based on the initial IPB and CCIR, the staff—primarily the S2—uses the ISR plan based on
the available ISR assets. The S3 turns this into an initial ISR annex that tasks ISR assets as
soon as possible to begin the collection effort.
4-24. The S3, assisted by the S2, uses the ISR plan to task and direct the available ISR
assets to answer the CCIR (PIR and FFIR) and intelligence requirements. Conversely, the
staff revises the plan as other intelligence gaps are identified if the information is required
to fulfill the CCIR or in anticipation of future intelligence requirements. With staff
participation, the S2 intelligence officer synchronizes the ISR effort through a
complementary product to the ISR plan—the intelligence synchronization plan.
4-25. The operations officer updates the ISR plan based on information he receives from the
intelligence officer. The operations officer is the integrator and manager of the ISR effort
through an integrated staff process and procedures. As PIR are answered and new
information requirements arise, the intelligence officer updates intelligence synchronization
requirements and provides the new input to the operations officer who updates the ISR plan.
He works closely with all staff elements to ensure the unit’s organic collectors receive
appropriate taskings. This ISR reflects an integrated collection strategy and employment,
production, and dissemination scheme that will effectively answer the commander’s PIR.
(See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.2.2, and FM 3-90.)

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FMI 3-90.5

Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance

4-26. Conducting tactical reconnaissance is to obtain, by visual observation or other detection
methods, such as signals, imagery, measurement of signature or other technical
characteristics, human interaction and other detection methods, information about the
activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy concerning the meteorological,
hydrographic, or geographic characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular
area. This task includes the conduct of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
reconnaissance and the tactical aspects of special operations forces (SOF) special
reconnaissance. The five subtasks follow:
Conduct a zone reconnaissance.
Conduct an area reconnaissance.
Conduct a reconnaissance in force.
Conduct a route reconnaissance.
Conduct a reconnaissance patrol.
4-27. Note that this task branch includes techniques by which ART 1.1.4.1 (Collect Police
Information) may be performed (FM 7-15).
4-28. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other
detection methods information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential
enemy and about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of an AO.
MI personnel and organizations can conduct reconnaissance through obtaining information
derived from signals, imagery, and measurement of signatures, technical characteristics,
human interaction, and other detection methods. When performing reconnaissance, it is
important to conduct the following:
Orient the reconnaissance asset on the named area of interest (NAI) and/or
reconnaissance objective in a timely manner.
Report all information rapidly and accurately.
Complete the reconnaissance mission not later than the time specified in the order.
Answer the requirement that prompted the reconnaissance task.

Conduct Surveillance
4-29. Conducting surveillance is to systematically observe the airspace, surface, or
subsurface areas, places, persons, or things in the AO by visual, aural (audio), electronic,
photographic, or other means. Other means include space-based systems and special CBRN,
artillery, engineer, SOF, and air defense equipment. (See FM 7-15, ART 1.3.4, and FM 3-90.)
4-30. Note that this task is a technique by which ART 1.1.4.1 (Collect Police Information)
may be performed.
4-31. Conducting surveillance is systematically observing the airspace, surface, or subsurface
areas, places, persons, or things in the AO by visual, natural, electronic, photographic, or
other means. Surveillance activities include the following:
Orienting the surveillance asset on the NAI and/or the surveillance objective in a
timely manner.
Reporting all information rapidly and accurately.
Completing the surveillance mission not later than the time specified in the order.
Answering the requirement that prompted the surveillance task.

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TIERS OF RECONNAISSANCE
4-32. Tiers of reconnaissance are procedures that are used to better illustrate how ISR
operations contribute to the commander’s ability to see the battlefield and what types of
information (CCIR and IR) are needed and when. Tiers of reconnaissance are based on
offensive reconnaissance planning. (See Figure 4-3.)

Figure 4-3. Tiers of Reconnaissance

TIER 1
4-33. Tier 1 reconnaissance occurs before the operation commences and primarily answers
voids in information (IR). Tier 1 reconnaissance generally entails basic scout missions (route
and zone reconnaissance) that facilitate the unit getting from the assembly areas (AAs) or
attack positions to the objective.

TIER 2
4-34. Tier 2 reconnaissance occurs preferably before but may also occur as the battalion main
body begins execution. Tier 2 confirms the ECOA and validates the battalion base plan of
attack. Tier 2 answers CCIR (such as DP-Tiger Strike North or Tiger Strike South) but also
answers IR (maneuver event-driven targeting) that support battalion indirect-fire planning.

TIER 3
4-35. Tier 3 is primarily surveillance and occurs during the operation. Tier 3 confirms the
enemy’s reaction to the friendly base plan (his branches) and provides the commander the

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critical information (CCIR) he needs to make decisions (DPs). Tier 3 DPs are usually
maneuver-based (such as DP-Tiger Trap North) or targeting-based (DP to commitment of
field artillery (FA) or air assets to destroy a high-value target (HVT)).

TIER 4
4-36. Tier 4 reconnaissance occurs after the decisive operation. While Tier 3 is both
reconnaissance (focused on future operations, generally answering IR) and surveillance
(maintaining contact with the enemy), Tier 4 restarts the reconnaissance cycle for follow-on
operations.

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS
4-37. Reconnaissance is an operational mission designed to obtain information on the enemy
or characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance is the precursor to all operations and
may be accomplished through passive surveillance, technical means, human interaction, or
by fighting for information. (See FM 17-95.) Successful reconnaissance operations are
planned and performed with six reconnaissance fundamentals in mind.

ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

4-38. The battalion commander focuses the reconnaissance effort on the specific (critical)
areas or objectives for which information is needed. The reconnaissance objectives are based
on the PIR established by the commander and serve to prevent wasted effort and time on
areas that are not important to the planning and decision cycle.

MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

4-39. The battalion must seek ways to include all of its subordinate elements into the
reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) effort and include those instructions and
requirements to those elements in the operation plan (OPLAN).

GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT

4-40. Contact with the enemy or reconnaissance objective is critical to collecting information.
Once contact is established, the enemy or location must be continuously monitored until the
requirement is met or contact is handed over from one observer to the next. Close
coordination is required in passing an enemy from one observer to another and eventually to
the follow-on maneuver elements.

DEVELOP THE SITUATION

4-41. During reconnaissance operations, it is important to rapidly gain SU to provide the
battalion commander with the information he needs to effectively maneuver the battalion.
Reconnaissance assets must be prepared to alter their plans and react to a changing
battlefield environment in support of the commander’s intent. This may require them to
adjust execution as the situation becomes clearer.

REPORT ALL INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

4-42. Combat information is extremely time sensitive; information loses its relevance as it
ages. The commander and staff develop a plan to employ the heavy combined arms battalion
based on information requirements that must be fulfilled. Delayed, inaccurate, or
misdirected information may lead to missed opportunities or poor decisions. The SIR
developed by the S2 help subordinates focus on the information required for decision-
making.

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RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

4-43. The freedom to maneuver is essential to successful reconnaissance operations. Planners
must anticipate tactical developments and constantly develop COAs that avoid decisive
engagement of reconnaissance assets (especially the battalion scout platoon) and preserve
them for future operations. Reconnaissance assets that become engaged usually fail in their
primary task, are unavailable for subsequent tasks, and often risk bringing on a larger
engagement not envisioned by the commander.

RECONNAISSANCE GUIDANCE
4-44. The battalion commander must provide specific guidance to the reconnaissance force.
The commander’s guidance for reconnaissance includes focus, tempo, and engagement
criteria. This guidance is an extension of the commander’s intent and is designed to focus the
reconnaissance commander’s efforts in relationship to the combined arms battalion mission.

FOCUS
4-45. Focus is the expression of what types of information the battalion commander is most
concerned. The commander’s focus for reconnaissance usually falls in three general areas:
CCIR, targeting, and voids in information.
4-46. The commander’s focus allows reconnaissance to prioritize taskings and narrow the
scope of operations. An operation may have a terrain focus where status of routes, bridges,
and obstacles are more important than the enemy. Conversely, the operation may focus on
the enemy where locating his security zone, main body, and reserves are essential.
Additionally, commanders may express the focus in terms of reconnaissance information pull
and push.

Reconnaissance Pull
4-47. Reconnaissance pull is used when the enemy situation is not well known and or the
situation is rapidly changing. The commander uses ISR assets to confirm or deny initial PIR
prior to the decision on a COA or maneuver option, thus pulling the battalion to the decisive
point on the battlefield. Success of the reconnaissance pull requires an integrated
reconnaissance plan that can be executed prior to the commander having to make a COA
decision.

Reconnaissance Push
4-48. Reconnaissance push is used once the commander is committed to a COA or maneuver
option. The commander pushes his ISR assets forward, as necessary, to gain greater
visibility on specific NAIs to confirm or deny the assumptions on which the COA is based.
Information gathered during reconnaissance push is used to finalize the combined arms
battalion plan.

TEMPO
4-49. The commander establishes the time requirements he envisions for the reconnaissance
force and expresses them in a statement that describes the degree of completeness,
covertness, and potential for engagement he is willing to accept. The following describes the
rate battalion commanders use to control the momentum of reconnaissance operations.
Deliberate. Operations are slow, detailed, and broad-based. They require the
accomplishment of numerous tasks. This is a description of the degree of
completeness required by the commander. Significant time must be allocated to
conduct a deliberate reconnaissance.

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Rapid. Operations are fast paced, focused on key pieces of information, and entail a
small number of tasks. This is a description of the degree of completeness required
by the battalion commander. It describes reconnaissance operations that must be
performed in a time-constrained environment.
Stealthy. Operations are conducted to minimize chance contact and prevent the
reconnaissance force from being detected. They are often conducted dismounted
and require increased allocation of time for success. This is a description of the
level of covertness required by the commander.
Forceful. Operations are conducted without significant concern about being
observed. They are often conducted mounted or by combat units serving in a
reconnaissance role. It is also appropriate in stability operations or support
operations where the threat is not significant in relationship to the requirement for
information. This is a description of the level of covertness required by the
commander.
Aggressive. Operations have permissive engagement criteria and allow the
reconnaissance commander to engage in combat to meet his IR. This is a
description of the potential for engagement.
Discrete. Operations have restrictive engagement criteria and restrain the battalion
reconnaissance forces from initiating combat to gain information. This is a
description of the potential for engagement.

ENGAGEMENT CRITERIA
4-50. The battalion commander establishes what enemy forces he expects reconnaissance
forces to engage and with what level of force. This decision assists the reconnaissance
leadership in planning direct and indirect fires and establishing bypass criteria. It is
particularly important when the reconnaissance force is augmented with combat systems to
conduct reconnaissance in force or security operations.

FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE
4-51. To logically group SIR and taskings into unit missions for subordinate commanders,
the battalion commander uses one of four forms of reconnaissance (see FM 17-95) to further
refine the scope of the subordinate reconnaissance commander’s mission and give it a spatial
relationship. The four forms of reconnaissance are route, area, zone, and reconnaissance in
force.

ROUTE
4-52. A route reconnaissance is an operation focused on obtaining detailed information on a
specific route and all adjacent terrain from which the enemy could influence the route. The
route may be a road or an axis of advance. Route reconnaissance is performed to ensure that
the route is clear of obstacles and enemy and that it will support planned movement. A route
reconnaissance may be performed as part of an area or zone reconnaissance. The following
are critical tasks associated with a route reconnaissance:
Assess trafficability of the route.
Locate enemy forces that can influence movement on the route.
Identify lateral routes in the area of responsibility.
Classify bridges.
Identify overpasses, underpasses, and culverts that might restrict access.
Clear or locate bypasses to any defiles.
Locate mines, obstacles, or barriers.
Locate bypasses around builtup or contaminated areas.

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Identify existing or potential civilian use of routes.

Identify enemy’s ability to deny use of routes through use of civilian interference.

AREA
4-53. An area reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning
the terrain or threat activity within a prescribed AI. The reconnaissance of the area can be
conducted by maneuvering elements through the area or by establishing observation posts
(OPs) within or external to the AI.

ZONE
4-54. A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtain detailed information concerning all
enemy forces, routes, obstacles, and terrain within a zone defined by boundaries. A zone
reconnaissance is assigned when the situation is vague or when information about cross-
country trafficability is desired. It is appropriate when previous knowledge of the terrain is
limited or when combat operations have altered the terrain. The reconnaissance may be
enemy oriented or terrain oriented. A zone reconnaissance is deliberate and time consuming.
Critical tasks associated with both zone and area reconnaissance include the following:
Determine location and strength of enemy forces.
Reconnoiter terrain for its impact on the operation.
Locate and determine the extent of contaminated areas.
Locate bypasses to all natural or manmade obstacles.
Classify all bridges, underpasses, overpasses, and culverts.
Conduct route reconnaissance as required.
Identify the location and disposition of population

RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
4-55. A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test
the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reaction or to obtain other information. A commander
uses a reconnaissance in force when the enemy is known to be operating within an area and
the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other means. A unit may also conduct
a reconnaissance in force in restrictive terrain where the enemy is likely to ambush smaller
reconnaissance forces. A reconnaissance in force is an aggressive reconnaissance conducted
as an offensive operation in pursuit of clearly stated CCIR. The overall goal of a
reconnaissance in force is to determine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited. It differs
from other reconnaissance operations because it normally is conducted only to gain
information about the enemy and not the terrain. The battalion may require significant
augmentation with combat elements to successfully conduct a reconnaissance in force.
Specific tasks include the following:
Penetrate the enemy’s security zone to determine its size and depth.
Determine the location and disposition of enemy main positions.
Attack the enemy’s main positions to cause the enemy to react with local reserves,
counterattack forces, fire support assets, or specific weapon systems.
Determine weaknesses in enemy dispositions that can be exploited.

ISR ORDER DEVELOPMENT

4-56. Reconnaissance is the precursor to all operations. As such, the development of the ISR
order (Step #9 Mission Analysis—Determine the Initial ISR Plan) is one of the most critical
steps in the battalion military decision-making process (MDMP).

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4-57. The battalion’s MDMP formally begins with the receipt of the brigade OPORD.
However, brigade WO #1 and #2 may provide the staff with sufficient information to start
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). Once the staff receives a finalized COA and
specified tasks found in WO #3 and the brigade OPORD, the staff can begin the formal
mission analysis. However, when parallel and collaborative planning is used, the commander
and staff have already begun to identify initial PIR and IR early in the process. These IR are
included in the commander’s initial guidance to the staff for development of the ISR plan.
The commander’s initial guidance to the staff includes the following:
How to abbreviate the MDMP.
Initial time allocation.
Initial ISR planning guidance to staff and or initial reconnaissance to begin
(usually based on required movement).
Authorized movement.
Additional tasks the commander wants the staff to do.
4-58. The battalion commander’s initial ISR planning guidance includes the commander’s
initial IR based on his analysis and his staff’s initial assessment. These IR are primarily
planning focused from the IPB process. The two basic IPB-generated IR are the result of
terrain and enemy analysis.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS
4-59. The terrain analysis may generate uncertainties about the terrain that can affect how
the battalion plans for the operation. This analysis should also be conducted to determine
the effects of terrain and the effects of weather on the threat’s potential courses of action.

ENEMY ANALYSIS
4-60. The battalion commander and staff develop enemy COAs and prioritize them in the
order of probability; this, in turn, forms the basis for determining the IR for the ISR assets.
ECOAs take the form of situation templates (SITTEMPs), which evolve into the initial event
template. This initial event template focuses only on identifying which of the predicted COAs
the enemy has adopted. (See FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.) The
initial event template forms the base of the ISR graphics. Later in the process, the event
template will be refined to support the commander’s decision-making during execution—the
decision support template (DST). The development of the situation templates and the event
template is not the sole responsibility of the S2 but, rather, is a collective staff task. The
following are examples (not all-inclusive) of staff input to ECOA development, SITTEMP,
and event template development and reconnaissance objectives:
Enemy air threat:
Likely air corridors.
Likely timing of air strikes or air assault operations.
Likely targets and objectives of enemy air operations.
How the enemy air defense is organized to protect its forces.
Whether the enemy will use air in reconnaissance or counterreconnaissance
role.
Enemy fire support threat:
Where are enemy target acquisition assets (such as radar)?
Where will the enemy deploy his artillery?
Determine HVTs (further develop into high-payoff targets (HPTs) during the
war-gaming and targeting process).
How deep can his indirect fires range?

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Enemy mobility threat:

Where will enemy emplace obstacles (protective, tactical, situational)?
Time required to emplace each type of obstacle.
Time required to breach obstacles.
Time required to entrench a mechanized company.
Ability to bridge different size rivers and streams and time required for each.
Enemy weapons of mass destruction (WMD)threat:
Enemy capabilities to employ CBRN weapons and obscurants.
Types of delivery systems, including minimum and maximum ranges.
Enemy CBRN protection capabilities.
Indicators of preparations to employ CBRN weapons.
Friendly assets the enemy is likely to consider HPTs for CBRN targeting.
Existing contaminated areas that may indicate the COA adopted by enemy.
Enemy information operations threat:
Ability to locate or intercept friendly information systems.
Speed that the enemy can collect, process, and target communication and C2
sites.
Ability to link collection systems to fires.
Deployment patterns of signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection systems.
Techniques of electronic deception or network attack.
Determine capability to conduct propaganda against friendly and neutral
targets (media analysis)
Civil Affairs (CA):
What is the political situation in the AO?
What factions are friendly, neutral, or enemy?
Where are areas that civilians gather to protest or demonstrate?
From whom or where is information gained on particular AOs?
4-61. Once integration of the ISR plan is completed, it must be synchronized (scheme of
support) with the functional areas to ensure all provisions are made for its success.
4-62. Synchronization considerations include the following:
Location, mission, and specific instructions regarding brigade reconnaissance
assets, including the brigade reconnaissance squadron and other higher ISR assets.
Specific instructions to battalion maneuver assets (maneuver support, fire control
measures, extraction considerations, for example).
Required air support (air defense artillery (ADA) warning network, Army airspace
command and control (A2C2) measures, use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)).
Required fire support (essential fire and effects task (EFET) considerations and
coordination measures).
Required mobility/countermobility/survivability support.
Required logistics support to include Classes III and V and medical and
maintenance.
Required INFOSYS support (long-range communications equipment,
retransmission, C2 locations, and compatibility, language interpreters, for
example).
4-63. During the mission analysis brief or shortly after, the battalion commander approves
the initial ISR plan. Following plan approval, Tier 1 reconnaissance begins. In a time-
constrained environment, dissemination of the order may be as simple as an overlay and

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matrix sent to the battalion scout platoon and other participating assets via liaison officer
(LNO) or digital means. However, the preferred method of dissemination is for the staff to
brief ISR assets in conjunction with order and graphic dissemination. This method is best
because it also provides the battalion commander the opportunity to personally convey his
focus for reconnaissance to the scout platoon and other assets. The ISR plan includes the
following:
Brigade mission.
Brigade commander’s intent.
Reconnaissance objectives for the battalion
CCIR.
Focus, tempo, and engagement criteria.
Specified reconnaissance tasks.
Fires plan.
Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan.
Resupply plan.
Camouflage/deception plan.
A communications plan.
4-64. Under normal circumstances, ISR assets receive the mature ISR plan through FRAGOs
that adjust their collection requirements and execution based on the war game and DST.
Additionally, the mature ISR plan is not only included but also integrated into the battalion
scheme of maneuver to ensure full synchronization between ISR and maneuver:
The product of mission analysis is used to develop the ISR order.
The ISR order addresses all aspects of the reconnaissance operation, including
insertion methods, supporting fires, CASEVAC and combat service support (CSS),
and extraction contingencies.
The commander’s guidance for reconnaissance includes focus, tempo, and
engagement criteria.
The battalion’s initial counterreconnaissance plan is also part of the ISR order.
4-65. Other essential products in the ISR order include the ISR graphical overlay, the enemy
SITTEMP, and the ISR tasking matrix.

TYPES OF RECONNAISSANCE
4-66. The battalion S2 coordinates reconnaissance requirements with the S3, who supervises
the scout platoon during its operations. The platoon may report directly to the battalion
commander. Whether mounted or dismounted, reconnaissance requires the same
preparation and stealth as any other operation. The three types of reconnaissance
operations—route, zone, and area—require similar techniques, but the mission dictates the
type of information required.

Route Reconnaissance
4-67. A route reconnaissance obtains detailed information about specific routes. Examples
include road and bridge classification; obstacles; chemical or radiological contamination;
proximity of enemy; and terrain that, if occupied or controlled by the enemy, affects battalion
movement. The number of routes reconnoitered by the battalion scout platoon depends on
the length of the routes, the enemy situation, and the nature of the routes themselves. When
enemy contact is likely or expected or when the route is long and stretches through difficult
terrain, the entire scout platoon may be required for that one route. If routes are short and
enemy contact is unlikely, the platoon can reconnoiter as many as three routes (one for each
section) but no more.

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Zone Reconnaissance
4-68. A zone reconnaissance involves the detailed reconnaissance of an entire zone defined by
boundaries. Its purpose is to obtain detailed information on all enemy, terrain, and routes
within the zone. The battalion commander states his intent for a zone reconnaissance, which
may be to determine the best routes, to move through the zone, or to locate an enemy force.
4-69. The commander normally assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when the enemy
situation is unclear or when he desires information on cross-country trafficability. The width
of a zone that a scout platoon reconnoiters depends on the type of enemy force and terrain.
4-70. The zone to be reconnoitered is defined by lateral boundaries, a line of departure, and
the objective. The objective provides a termination point for the mission and might be
occupied by the enemy. A phase line can also be used as a termination point.

Area Reconnaissance
4-71. An area reconnaissance obtains information about a specified area such as a town,
ridge, woods, or other feature critical to operations. The battalion commander must specify
exactly what to look for and why. The area to be reconnoitered is designated by a boundary
line that encircles it. Area reconnaissance differs from zone reconnaissance in that the unit
moves to the assigned area by the most direct route. Once in the area, the scout platoon
reconnoiters in detail using zone reconnaissance techniques.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE OVERLAY

4-72. The ISR overlay expresses the ISR order in graphic form. If it is transmitted over
digital systems, it may need to be broken into component parts to speed transmission and
reduce clutter. For example, it could be broken into one overlay showing the basic
operational graphics and boundaries, one overlay showing infiltration graphics, and one
overlay showing sensor locations and range fans (see Figure 4-4). Regardless of its
component parts, the ISR overlay should contain the following:
Friendly boundaries and phase line (PL).
NAIs/target areas of interest (TAIs).
Limits of advance (LOAs) and limits of reconnaissance (LORs).
Counterreconnaissance AOs for all units.
Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
Graphics depicting zone, area, or route reconnaissance.
Routes, start points (SPs), release points (RPs), and checkpoints.
Primary and alternate observation posts (OPs) locations.
Ambulance exchange points (AXP) and logistics release points (LRPs).
Planned or existing obstacles.
Scan sectors for sensors.
UAV flight paths.
Retransmission locations.

ENEMY SITUATION TEMPLATE

4-73. The S2 develops an enemy SITTEMP for the ISR operation that focuses on the enemy’s
reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance efforts. It is designed to aid in planning friendly
infiltration and survivability by identifying enemy actions that will impact on friendly
reconnaissance efforts (see Figure 4-4). The enemy SITTEMP should include the following:
Locations of known and suspected enemy locations.

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Suspected enemy boundaries.

Enemy avenues of approach for the main body with time phase lines (TPLs).
Likely enemy reconnaissance and infiltration routes with TPLs.
Likely enemy OPs and patrols.
Enemy artillery range fans.
Known and templated obstacles.

SCREEN
4-74. The primary task of a screening force is to observe, identify, and report information.
The screening force protects the main body, impedes and harasses the enemy with
supporting indirect fires, and destroys enemy reconnaissance elements within its capability.

HEAVY COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SCREEN

4-75. At the battalion level, the scout platoon normally performs screen missions. When the
terrain provides multiple enemy avenues of approach, the battalion commander may attach
the scout platoon to a company team to conduct a screen. The screening force generally
establishes a series of OPs and conducts patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the
assigned sector.

COMPANY TEAM SCREEN

4-76. A company team may be directed to conduct a screen in support of battalion offensive
and defensive operations. When given a forward screen mission, the company team moves as
in a movement to contact.

PLANNING A SCREEN
4-77. When assigning a screen mission to a company team, the heavy combined arms
battalion commander or S3 designates the general trace of the screen and the time it must
be established. The initial screen line should be forward of the general trace but should
remain within range of supporting artillery. Screen lines are depicted as battalion phase
lines; passage graphics must be included in the operations overlay. Graphics rules for a
screen follow:
Designate the left and right limits of the screen as well as a phase line for the near
boundary. This phase line can also become the on-order battle handover line (BHL).
Confirm which unit has responsibility for the area between the screening force’s
rear boundary and the main battle area (MBA). This should be the company team
that occupies the sectors behind the screen.
Designate general locations for OPs that enable observation of the avenues of
approach into the sector.
Select routes or sectors to facilitate rearward displacement.
Augment the security force as needed to provide intelligence, engineer, signal, and
sustaining operations support.

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Figure 4-4. Situation Template

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
4-78. The S2 designates which NAI the company team must observe and when while
screening for the battalion. The S2 does not dictate the location of company team elements or
how the company team maintains surveillance of the NAI. Once the screen force commander
positions his unit, he informs the S2 of its primary, alternate, and subsequent locations.

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MANEUVER
4-79. Generally, the best unit configuration for the screen mission is a mechanized infantry
company team. The ability to place infantry squads on the ground and conduct surveillance
operations and active patrolling is an essential passive aspect of the screen mission. A tank
platoon may be employed as part of the company team to destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance
vehicles during the counterreconnaissance fight.

FIRE SUPPORT
4-80. The battalion fire support officer (FSO) prepares for the screen mission as he would for
a defense in sector. He uses the enemy situation template as a guide to plan fires to interdict
enemy maneuver elements. He plans protective fires for all screen force positions; this helps
prevent screening force elements from becoming decisively engaged with the enemy.
Accurate indirect fire is essential to the destruction of the enemy reconnaissance effort. The
FSO conducts a time-distance analysis covering the enemy’s probable rate of advance and
the time of flight of artillery or mortars. If available, Knight teams from the brigade fires
battalion may be added to the screen force for use against enemy vehicles.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
4-81. Generally, the engineer effort is dedicated to the heavy combined arms battalion’s main
defensive area. If available, some engineer effort may be dedicated to the forward screen.
The battalion obstacle plan should not be so severe that it alters enemy movement
significantly prior to its engagement by forces in the MBA. The obstacles found forward of
the MBA should be designed to delay enemy reconnaissance elements temporarily and assist
in their destruction. Point-type targets along restrictive portions of the enemy’s avenues of
approach are examples of obstacles that may be bypassed yet offer a target to weapons
covering the obstacle.

LOGISTICS
4-82. The battalion logistics planners must plan for responsive and flexible support that may
require the immediate resupply of ammunition and evacuation of casualties and equipment
on contact. Lateral supply routes to each battle position are identified during the planning
process. Moreover, on-order control measures, LRPs, unit maintenance collection points
(UMCPs), and AXPs are essential to the screening operation. Emergency resupply vehicles
carrying ammunition and other quickly expendable supplies, plus refuelers, are prepared to
respond to sudden requisitions due to enemy contact. Once the battalion begins the fight,
evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged equipment occurs along lateral supply
routes.

GUARD
4-83. A guard mission is assigned to protect the force by observing the enemy, reporting
pertinent information, and fighting to gain time. The guard force differs from a screen force
in that the guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, repel, or fix the lead
elements of an enemy ground force to prevent it from engaging the main body with direct
fires. The guard force normally deploys over a narrower front than a comparably sized
screening force, allowing greater concentration of combat power. The guard force routinely
engages enemy forces with both direct and indirect fires and operates in range of the main
body’s indirect-fire weapons. The guard force commander must understand fully the degree
of security his unit provides the larger unit. This understanding is critical because, as the
battle progresses, the higher unit commander may require the degree of security to change
(for example, from early warning to detailed and aggressive security for the main body).

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Three types of guard operations are conducted in support of a stationary or moving friendly
force (Figure 4-5): rear, flank, and advance guard.

Figure 4-5. Rear, Flank, and Advance Guard Operations

ADVANCE GUARD
4-84. The advance guard moves ahead of the main force to ensure its uninterrupted advance,
to protect the main body against surprise, to facilitate its advance by removing obstacles and
repairing roads and bridges, and to cover the deployment of the main body as it is committed
to action. The advance guard is a task organized, combined arms unit or detachment that
precedes a column or formation.
4-85. The advance guard is normally conducted as a movement to contact. Generally, a heavy
combined arms battalion receives an advance guard mission when the BCT moves as part of
the UEx main body in a movement to contact. In deploying an advance guard, the brigade
ensures the heavy combined arms battalion has priority of fires from the brigade fires
battalion. Unlike a movement to contact, however, the advance guard clears the axis of
enemy elements to allow the unimpeded movement of the heavy combined arms battalion
main body. The security force develops the situation to hand over the enemy to the heavy
combined arms battalion. The advance guard can conduct hasty attacks if it has sufficient
tactical intelligence to overwhelm the enemy.
4-86. Depending on the commander’s estimate of the situation, a heavy combined arms
battalion conducting an advance guard normally conducts a movement to contact with
company teams advancing on axes, in AOs, or (rarely) along directions of attack.
4-87. Based on METT-TC, trail elements of the advance guard must ensure they maintain
adequate distance forward of the main body’s lead elements to ensure freedom of maneuver
for the main body. The battalion commander establishes phase lines to control the movement
of the main body and the advance guard. Advance guard units remain within the brigade
fires battalion’s artillery range.
4-88. The advance guard force attempts to destroy enemy forces through hasty attacks. It
may be necessary for the heavy combined arms battalion to mass at certain locations,
destroy the enemy, report, and continue with its mission. If enemy resistance is well

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prepared and cannot be destroyed, the combined arms battalion reconnoiters to identify a
bypass route for the main body; to report enemy size and location; and, when given
permission by the brigade commander, to fix and bypass the enemy. Following attacking
forces are responsible for destroying the bypassed enemy. The main body commander may
elect not to bypass the enemy but to conduct a deliberate attack. In this case, the advance
guard keeps the enemy contained and prepares to pass main body elements through to
eliminate the enemy.

REAR GUARD
4-89. When a UEx conducting a movement to contact requires rear area security, a heavy
combined arms battalion may receive a rear guard mission. The rear guard protects the rear
of the UEx main body and all combat support (CS) and CSS elements in the main body. The
rear guard may accomplish the mission by conducting an attack, a defense, or a delay. A
combined arms battalion conducting a rear guard operation follows the same axis of advance
as the protected force at a distance prescribed by the main body commander and normally
within artillery range. The battalion commander establishes company team battle positions
or sectors. When using sectors, he designates phase lines and checkpoints to control
movement. The rear guard’s responsibility begins at the main body rear boundary and
extends as far from this boundary as the factors of METT-TC allow.

FLANK GUARD
4-90. A heavy combined arms battalion may receive a flank guard mission during a UEx
movement to contact. The flank guard is responsible for clearing the area from the UEx main
body to the flank guard’s designated positions. The combined arms battalion must be
prepared to operate on a frontage that is greater than for other tactical operations. Usually,
the area extends from the lead forward screen, along the flank of the formation, to either the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or the rear of the moving formation, tying in with the
rear guard. Due to the complexities of this operation, the following detailed discussion of
flank guard operations is provided.

Templates and Analysis

4-91. Once the heavy combined arms battalion receives a flank guard mission, the S2
determines the type of threat facing the battalion during its movement. This information is
critical to the commander in his selection of appropriate formation and movement
techniques. The IPB must incorporate the entire AO, with analysis of the mobility corridors
and avenues of approach extending from the FEBA to the objective. The S2 produces a
situational template and an event template. He develops and inputs an R&S plan with
specific reconnaissance objectives for subordinate units as the enemy overlay. Subordinate
units verify the S2’s situational template during reconnaissance and periodically send enemy
overlay updates back to the S2. The staff develops the DST to assist the commander in
assessing the situation and making decisions.

Formation and Movement Techniques

4-92. From the intelligence estimate, the battalion commander determines the formation and
movement technique, accounting for the enemy situation and main body disposition.
Movement techniques include the following:
Alternate bounds. The commander uses this technique when he anticipates strong
enemy action against the flank. It requires slow movement by the main body.
Successive bounds. The commander uses this technique when he expects enemy
action against the flank to be light and movement of the main body to include
frequent short halts.

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Moving guard. The commander uses this technique when he expects no enemy
action on the flank, and the main body will move with all possible speed. In the
moving guard, an armor heavy company team executes the forward screen mission
while traveling as in a movement to contact. The battalion mortar platoon follows
the forward screening company team to provide support. The battalion scout
platoon, normally with an armor section under operational control (OPCON),
conducts a flank screen outside the tentative battle position line. The remaining
company teams travel in column, along an axis or in sector, behind the forward
screen. The commander uses this technique when the greatest enemy danger
appears to be from the front.

Fire Support
4-93. The battalion FSO plans the flank guard operation the same as any offensive
operation. Based on the IPB, he targets those enemy avenues of approach that threaten the
force. He targets known and suspected enemy positions along the axis of advance or in the
heavy combined arms battalion zone to support the forward screening element. During the
operation, the battalion executes its fire support plan as it would in movement to contact and
defensive operations. On the forward screen, as the heavy combined arms battalion
encounters enemy positions and subsequently destroys or fixes and bypasses them, it uses
mortars or artillery to suppress the position. Should the enemy attempt to attack from the
flank, the battalion executes the fire support plan as it would for defensive operations to
support the defense or delay.

Engineer Support
4-94. The battalion engineer company commander has two missions to consider in planning
the flank guard mission: mobility and countermobility operations. Engineers organize as
they would for a movement to contact and request additional engineer support through the
BCT. Usually, the engineers follow the lead element and assist in negotiating any obstacles
that prevent continued advance. The battalion obstacle plan could include rapidly emplaced
obstacles through FASCAM, Ground-Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS), or other
assets coordinated from the UEx. Engineers also identify key bridges or other potential
obstacles during the planning process so they can render them unusable for enemy
maneuver. Above all, the engineers develop and coordinate a plan allowing the responsive
emplacement of obstacles on short notice.

Logistics
4-95. Logistics planners have the same difficulties as in planning a movement to contact. The
battalion must have responsive and flexible support that may require the immediate
resupply of ammunition and evacuation of casualties and equipment on contact. The plan
must identify lateral supply routes to each battle position. On-order control measures, LRPs,
UMCPs, and AXPs are essential to the operation. As the battalion begins its movement, the
battalion trains should travel abreast of the flank guard unit (close to the main body) to
avoid exposing CSS elements to the enemy. Emergency resupply vehicles carrying
ammunition and other quickly expendable supplies, plus refuelers, must be ready to respond
to sudden requisitions due to enemy contact. Once the battalion begins the fight, evacuation
of wounded personnel and damaged equipment occurs along lateral supply routes all the way
to the main body if that is where the brigade support battalion is located. Otherwise, the
evacuation is back along the axis of advance.

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Orientation of Forces
4-96. A unique aspect of the flank guard mission is the orientation of the forces and the
direction they may be ordered to screen. While the force maneuvers forward along its
assigned axis of advance or zone, battalion phase lines control the movement of the company
team elements. There should be a phase line on either side of each company team’s battle
position. The battle positions are generally larger than in a purely defensive mission, partly
due to the large frontage the heavy combined arms battalion must cover in the flank guard
mission. Once an element detects the enemy and company teams adopt hasty defensive
positions, these phase lines become boundaries for controlling the defensive battle. This
gives the battalion commander the option of designating company team sectors in addition to
the battle positions already identified. Similarly, control of the battalion reserve is
accomplished through phase lines and checkpoints regardless of the actual direction of the
maneuver. As a minimum, the following control measures are included:
Phase lines (revert to boundaries on contact).
Battle positions.
Target reference points (TRPs).
Axis of advance.
Axis of advance of main body.
Objectives (if used).

AREA SECURITY
4-97. Area security refers to a force’s mission to secure a specific area. Area security actions
could include area reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, equipment, facilities
(including airfield and seaports), main supply routes, lines of communication, and critical
points. The heavy combined arms battalion is most often employed as an advance guard for a
BCT, as part of a covering force for a UEx, or as an area security force during a stability
operations or support operations.

COVER
4-98. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. Unlike
screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained and capable of
operating independently of the main body to develop the situation early and deceive,
disorganize, and destroy enemy forces. Cover may be an offensive or defensive mission. The
requirements placed on the covering force, the command and control structure necessary for
the forces involved, and the large AOs involved require an adequate level of command for
successful accomplishment. The heavy combined arms battalion performs screen and guard
missions; however, covering force operations are normally a mission for a task-organized
brigade for the UEx. A covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with
enemy forces; therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage
the enemy and still accomplish its mission. Elements from the UEx, including artillery,
engineers, air defense, intelligence resources, and CSS, should be requested to support the
cover mission.

SECTION III – RECONNAISSANCE

4-99. Reconnaissance and surveillance assets obtain information about the enemy or the
physical makeup of a particular area by visual or other detection methods. Successful R&S
collects quick, accurate information about the enemy and terrain. R&S plans are designed to
tell the commander what he needs to know in time for him to act and do as much as possible
ahead of time. R&S is part of a larger, ongoing collection process that receives its direction

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from the mission, the commander’s need for information, and, by extension, the IPB process.
These processes outline the who, what, where, when, and why of collecting intelligence.

BATTALION RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

4-100. Heavy combined arms battalion R&S operations are a broad category of activities
designed to support battalion intelligence development, planning, and decision-making.
Reconnaissance is a combined arms maneuver operation that employs the battalion’s
reconnaissance assets to use visual or other detection methods to observe NAIs and TAIs to
collect combat information. Surveillance involves the systematic observation of an NAI by
visual, electronic, photographic, or other means. The heavy combined arms battalion S2
section analyzes and evaluates combat information collected by the scout platoon and other
assets, resulting in combat intelligence. The goal of combat intelligence is to answer the
battalion commander’s PIR and other intelligence requirements to enable timely and
effective decision-making.

FUNDAMENTALS
4-101. Successful battalion reconnaissance depends on the following fundamentals:
Appropriate reconnaissance forward.
Reconnaissance focused on PIR, IR, and DPs.
Reconnaissance initiated early and conducted continuously.
Integration of battalion reconnaissance with brigade reconnaissance.
Integration of the staff in reconnaissance planning.
Reconnaissance planned from the beginning.
Maximized reconnaissance assets.
Information reported, analyzed, and disseminated rapidly and accurately.

APPROPRIATE RECONNAISSANCE FORWARD

4-102. Battalion commanders normally do not hold scout platoons and reconnaissance
assets in reserve. The fluid and nonlinear nature of the modern battlefield requires that
reconnaissance be continuous and aggressive throughout the AO. In some situations, the
critical reconnaissance objectives may not be forward of the maneuver forces.

RECONNAISSANCE FOCUSED ON PIR, IR, AND DPS

4-103. The reconnaissance or collection plan should focus on the collection of information
required to support the PIR and provide observation of the DPs on the battlefield. The PIR
derived from the battalion commander’s critical information requirements identify the
information on the enemy that the commander needs to support his battlefield visualization
and to make critical decisions. The PIR help the commander filter information available to
him by defining what is important to mission accomplishment. The battalion commander
and S2 use PIR to focus collection efforts, which is vital considering the limited number of
reconnaissance assets available at the combined arms battalion level. Focusing the
reconnaissance ensures that the commander’s PIR and IR are answered and prevents
wasting assets used in looking for the wrong information. In addition to battalion PIR, there
are also PIR from the brigade and higher that influence the focus of the battalion
reconnaissance efforts.

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RECONNAISSANCE CONDUCTED CONTINUOUSLY AND EARLY

4-104. R&S and security are continuous processes that should be conducted 24 hours a day.
For security and surveillance missions, the scout platoon should be augmented with
elements from maneuver company teams or snipers.

R&S STAFF INTEGRATION

4-105. The S2 and S3 rely on the entire staff to assist in the planning and execution of the
battalion reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
4-106. The S6 informs the S2 of enemy signals collection and target capabilities and
vulnerabilities of friendly R&S assets.
4-107. The FSO coordinates fires and effects to support R&S assets and recommends
necessary restrictive fire measures for troop safety. He also collects and reports information
on nonlethal targets and capabilities.
4-108. The commander or platoon leader of a designated R&S asset plans fires and targets
for the element.
4-109. The combat engineer operations officer collects and reports information on terrain
and obstacles.
4-110. The CBRN officer requests and coordinates for CBRN data collection and informs the
S2 of any CBRN obstacles critical to R&S units in their missions.
4-111. The ALO provides air movement and close air support, if requested.
4-112. Sustaining operations support considerations for R&S include the following:
Developing SOPs for load plans of outposts, to include:
Establishing CSS procedures for both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance
missions.
Establishing CSS procedures for air versus ground insertion of reconnaissance
assets.
Developing procedures for both aerial and ground sustainment.
Developing resupply techniques, to include:
Using multiple and or false landing zones away from outposts as cache dropoff
points.
Predetermining the locations and times for resupply of Classes I, III, IV, V, VII,
and XI.
Establishing locations for caches on successive missions and or insertions.
4-113. Force health protection (FHP) considerations include the following:
Determining the FHP requirements.
Deploying trauma specialist and medical assets in direct support of reconnaissance
operations, as required and appropriate.
Planning for CASEVAC/extraction operations.
Developing FHP standing operating procedures (SOP) for supporting
reconnaissance elements deployed deep into enemy territory.
Selecting evacuation sites. (Remember that all cache sites are potential CASEVAC
sites.)
Developing TTP for cross-forward line of own troops (FLOT) casualty extraction.
Establishing the time for pickup and the pickup point for aerial extraction of
casualties. (The last known or reported location is normally the aerial pickup point,

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and the best time is 30 minutes prior to beginning morning nautical twilight
(BMNT) or 30 minutes after ending evening nautical twilight (EENT).)
Developing a detailed plan for ground extraction to escort to casualty exchange
point.
Conducting rehearsals for day and night extractions.
Requesting escort.
4-114. If a member or members of the reconnaissance element become casualties during
reconnaissance missions, initial care will be self-aid, combat lifesaver (CLS) advanced first
aid, or emergency medical treatment (EMT) from a trauma specialist. Trauma specialists
may be deployed as riders in one scout vehicle, or an ambulance team may be in support. See
FM 4-02.4 for additional information on providing FHP for the reconnaissance elements.

MAXIMIZE RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

4-115. The battalion must maximize the capabilities of its limited reconnaissance assets. It
must ensure that collection requirements specify exactly what needs to be collected and
where and when it needs to be collected and reported for the battalion to conduct its
operations. Additionally, the battalion S2 must make sure he does not send the scout platoon
to obtain information that may already be available through brigade assets. Close
coordination and integration with the brigade S2 is required to ensure that the brigade and
battalion assets are not being double-tasked to find the same information.

RAPID AND ACCURATE REPORTING, PROCESSING, AND DISSEMINATION

4-116. The heavy combined arms battalion scout platoon and other assets tasked to conduct
reconnaissance must report what they observe accurately and in a timely manner. Digital
INFOSYS speed both the accuracy of the intelligence gathered as well as the timeliness with
which it can be sent. Once the combat information arrives, the battalion S2 rapidly evaluates
and disseminates it to the companies and passes it on to the brigade using FM voice or
digitally through remote workstations (RWSs) and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and
Below (FBCB2) System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT).

CAPABILITIES
4-117. The scout platoon is the heavy combined arms battalion’s primary means of
conducting reconnaissance and surveillance. The scout platoon provides early warning and
helps control movement of the battalion or its elements. The scout platoon is normally under
battalion control but may be attached to another battalion unit for certain operations. The
reconnaissance elements are finders, not fighters. They are the eyes and ears, not the fists,
of the heavy combined arms battalion.

CONSIDERATIONS
4-118. The following considerations apply to employment of the scouts:
The distance scouts can operate away from the main body is restricted to the range
of communications and the range of supporting indirect fire.
Scout platoons can be easily overtasked since they have only six reconnaissance
platforms with which to conduct reconnaissance.
Scouts are limited in their ability to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance units.
R&S missions are usually continuous operations that require careful planning for
the employment, sustainment, and recovery of Soldiers.
With only three men in each team, scout platoons are limited in their ability to
conduct dismounted operations.

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INTEGRATION OF BRIGADE RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON AND

BATTALION SCOUT PLATOON
4-119. There are numerous ways the heavy combined arms battalion scout platoon and the
reconnaissance troops of the brigade combat team’s reconnaissance squadron can work
together to perform their reconnaissance missions.

IN THE OFFENSE
4-120. During a brigade movement to contact, the BRS is normally forward of the heavy
combined arms battalions. During the approach to the objective phase, the BRS and heavy
combined arms battalion scouts may do the following (Figure 4-6):
The BRS may hand over key OP positions to battalion scouts as they advance
through sector.
The BRS may vector the battalion scouts into position and keep them informed
about terrain, enemy positions, and obstacles that have already been found.
Heavy combined arms battalion scouts can provide overwatch for the BRS as they
move to their next series of OPs or conducting reconnaissance of the area or zone.

Figure 4-6. Reconnaissance Squadron and Heavy Combined Arms Battalion

Scout Employment During Brigade Movement to Contact

IN THE DEFENSE
4-121. In the defense, the primary mission of the battalion scout platoon is to provide
security and early warning for the battalion. Heavy combined arms battalion scouts may also
be integrated into the brigade counterreconnaissance mission. Battalion scouts and brigade
BRS provide stealthy observation and early warning of the enemy’s reconnaissance
elements. The scout teams locate the enemy reconnaissance forces and then vector the
counterreconnaissance elements to them (Figure 4-7). The battalion scouts maintain a low

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 Intelligence, Suveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations

signature by not engaging any targets. Tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) in the
counterreconnaissance team kill the enemy reconnaissance. The data provided by
digitization allows the battalion scouts and counterreconnaissance element to execute a
much more fluid and dynamic counterreconnaissance fight with less chance of fratricide.
4-122. The employment and coordination of the heavy combined arms battalion scouts and
brigade reconnaissance squadron in the counterreconnaissance operation is unit plan and
SOP driven. BRS and battalion scouts can be employed in depth to provide multiple screens
for the counterreconnaissance force. The BRS and counterreconnaissance elements occupy
the most forward positions. Battalion scouts screen behind the brigade
counterreconnaissance force with each heavy combined arms battalion employing a platoon-
sized counterreconnaissance force to its front.
4-123. Unit SOP must address procedures for inoperative scout communications systems.
Scouts with inoperative systems risk fratricide; the command post should account for them
by analog methods and with manual input of platforms into the informational picture.
Command posts must also have some method of tracking the operational status of each
scout’s FBCB2/BFT systems.
4-124. For the heavy combined arms battalion scout platoon and BRS to work together, the
heavy combined arms battalion and brigade combat team staffs need to coordinate the
following:
Communications and digital architecture.
Command and control architecture.
Terrain management.
NAI coverage and intelligence gaps.
Fire support control measures.
Fratricide avoidance measures.

SUPPORTING ASSETS NORMALLY AVAILABLE TO BATTALION

4-125. Heavy combined arms battalion commanders may have access to R&S assets from
brigade and higher, including UAVs, reconnaissance troops (from BRS), and possibly Army
aviation reconnaissance assets working forward of the battalion lead elements. Building the
R&S plan forces consideration of maneuver, fire support, engineer placement, and command
and control to link the plan seamlessly to the security force and maneuver plans. Higher
headquarters normally specifies a time to forward a copy of the plan. The S3/S2 should push
the security assets out as soon as possible; the sooner the reconnaissance and surveillance
assets are out looking, the more time they have to find what the commander needs. Without
a basic R&S plan, INFOSYS SOPs regarding default addressing, message preferences, and
filter settings, reconnaissance efforts become fruitless and frustrating. The battalion can use
an SOP to start early reconnaissance and update the units with fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs) as the R&S plan is completed. Commanders specify limits of responsibility for
early reconnaissance, updating them as needed.

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Figure 4-7. Counterreconnaissance Organization of Brigade Reconnaissance

Troop and Heavy Combined Arms Battalion Scout Platoon

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 Chapter 5
Offensive Operations

Offensive action is the decisive form of battle. The primary purpose of the
offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy force. A commander
may also take offensive actions to deceive or divert the enemy, deprive
him of resources or decisive terrain, develop intelligence, or hold an
enemy in position. Even in the defense, offensive action is normally
required to destroy an attacker and exploit success. The key to a
successful offensive operation is to identify the enemy’s decisive point and
choose a form of maneuver that avoids the enemy‘s strength and masses
overwhelming combat power to achieve a result with respect to terrain,
enemy, and time that will accomplish the unit’s purpose. This chapter
discusses the basics of the offense, which apply to all offensive actions. It
discusses the concept of coordinated mechanized infantry and armor
attacks by the combined arms battalion of the heavy brigade combat team
(HBCT) as well as the planning and conduct of offensive operations. The
four types of offensive actions are movement to contact, attack,
exploitation, and pursuit. The heavy combined arms battalion seizes,
retains, and exploits the initiative in conducting offensive operations.
Offensive operations are either force oriented (focused on the enemy) or
terrain oriented (focused on seizing or securing terrain and facilities).
Most offensive operations at combined arms battalion level combine
distinct subunit operations that have force or terrain orientations.

SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-1. The HBCT combined arms battalion gains and maintains the initiative and keeps
constant pressure on the enemy throughout his battlespace. The combined arms battalion
transitions from one offensive action to another without pausing. Planning and preparing for
the next operation and for follow-on operations occur simultaneously with execution of the
current action.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-2. Success in offensive operations depends on the proper application of the fundamental
characteristics of the offense discussed in the following paragraphs. The combined arms
battalion’s ability to maneuver mounted or dismounted makes flexibility a key attribute.

SURPRISE
5-3. A force achieves surprise by attacking the enemy at a time or place and in a manner for
which the enemy is not physically or mentally ready. The combined arms battalion
commander must have sufficient information for a clear understanding of his current state
in relation to the enemy and environment, a sound understanding of what the end state is
for the assigned mission, and a vision of how to move his force from the current situation to

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the end state. Surprise is more readily attainable because of the heavy combined arms
battalion’s information dominance, flexibility, and mobility. A heavy combined arms
battalion achieves surprise by:
Gaining and maintaining information dominance by conducting thorough
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and counterreconnaissance
efforts.
Striking the enemy from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time through
the unique combination of rapid mounted movement and the ability of units to
cross any type of terrain.
Quickly changing the tempo of the operations.
Being unpredictable.

CONCENTRATION
5-4. A force achieves concentration by massing the effects of combat power. Superior timing,
precision maneuvers, and speed, facilitated by shared information dominance, allows the
combined arms battalion commander to mass the effects of his forces when and where
appropriate and to shift from one objective or direction to another quickly. Because the
combined arms battalion commander has the advantage in information being received, he
has a better understanding of the effects of his action (seeing success or the need to continue
an attack) and can apply available combat power more efficiently and focus his main effort
more effectively. Once it gains success, the combined arms battalion can quickly disperse, if
needed, to avoid enemy counteractions, again under control enabled by understanding. A
heavy combined arms battalion achieves concentration through the following:
Careful planning and coordination based on a thorough terrain and enemy analysis
plus accurate, timely reconnaissance.
Designation of a main effort and allocation of resources to support it.
Continuous information flow.
Positioning of units that allows them to mass effects.

TEMPO
5-5. Tempo is the ability to adjust the rate of operations relative to battle circumstances
and relative to the enemy’s capability to sense and react. It is the controlled rate of military
action. While a rapid tempo is often preferred, the tempo should be adjusted to ensure
synchronization. The goal is to keep pressure on the enemy whether it is done quickly or
slowly. Controlling and altering tempo promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off balance,
denies the enemy freedom of action, and contributes to the security of the combined arms
battalion. The combined arms battalion’s advanced information systems and rapid mobility
capabilities facilitate a rapid mounting tempo while permitting the synchronization
necessary for a rapid execution tempo.

AUDACITY
5-6. Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed. Audacity inspires Soldiers to
overcome adversity and danger. Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive
action and increases the chance for surprise. It depends on the combined arms battalion
commander’s ability to see opportunities for action, to decide in time to seize opportunities,
and to accept the risks. Leaders must understand when and where to take risks, plan for
them, and execute boldly. The sharing of combat information electronically between leaders
at all echelons reduces the risk but does not eliminate the many uncertainties associated
with battle. Digitization improves the commander’s ability to make quick situational

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 Offensive Operations

assessments, to conduct on-the-spot risk assessments, and to make bold decisions based on
near-real-time information.

CONTACT CONTINUUM
5-7. Traditionally, the heavy combined arms battalion made contact with the scout platoon
and lead company to develop the situation while in contact with the enemy. The lead
company then fixed the enemy, allowing the remainder of the combined arms battalion to
maneuver against an assailable flank. This method was based on the combined arms
battalion’s ability to overwhelm the enemy with greater available combat power. With the
reduction of combat power and additional information systems (INFOSYS) in the combined
arms battalion, a new method of making contact is required. This new contact continuum
consists of understanding the situation and maneuvering to a position of advantage to make
contact with the enemy on the combined arms battalion’s terms (Figure 5-1). Within this new
contact continuum, the combined arms battalion can mass overwhelming combat power at
the decisive point to achieve its purpose more efficiently and effectively. The combined arms
battalion commander must also consider that the brigade reconnaissance squadron may
provide the first situational understanding (SU) of the enemy or may be in contact with the
enemy, allowing the combined arms battalion to maneuver out of contact to a position to
initiate first contact with the enemy on the best terms for the combined arms battalion.

Figure 5-1. Contact Continuum

ORGANIZATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-8. Commanders organize forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit’s
operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. The purpose-based framework centers on
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield

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organization by providing the common focus for all actions. However, forces act in time and
space to accomplish a purpose. These decisions form the basis of the concept of operations.
Alternatively, commanders may choose to use the decisive point, main effort, or supporting
effort methods to articulate their organization of forces if this better facilitates their ability
to visualize, describe, and direct actions, especially since combined arms battalions operate
at the tactical level of war. Commanders also synchronize operations in time and space.
When circumstances require a spatial reference between friendly and enemy forces,
commanders may describe them in terms of deep, close, and rear areas. These spatial
categories are especially useful in combat operations that are generally contiguous, linear,
and feature a clearly defined enemy force.

DECISIVE OPERATIONS
5-9. Decisive operations directly achieve the mission and intent of the higher headquarters.
Decisive operations conclusively determine the outcome of battles and engagements. There is
only one decisive operation for any major operation, battle, or engagement for any given
echelon. The decisive operation may include multiple actions conducted simultaneously
throughout the depth of the area of operations (AO). Commander’s weigh the decisive
operation while economizing on the effort allocated to shaping operations.
5-10. In the offense and defense, decisive operations normally focus on maneuver.
Conversely, logistics may be decisive during the mobilization and deployment phases of an
operation or in support operations, particularly if the mission is humanitarian in nature.
5-11. A reserve is a portion of a body of troops that is kept to the rear or withheld from action
at the beginning of an engagement but remains available for a decisive movement. Until
committed, reserves shape through their placement within the AO while planning for and
preparing to conduct operations. When committed, they usually either become the decisive
operation or reinforce the decisive operation. Commanders can use reserves to influence
circumstances or exploit opportunities. When commanders anticipate uncertainty, they hold
a greater portion of the force in reserve to posture the force to seize and maintain the
initiative as a situation develops. Reserves deploy and reposition as necessary to ensure
their protection, availability, and prompt reaction.

SHAPING OPERATIONS
5-12. Shaping operations create and preserve the conditions for the success of the decisive
operation. Shaping operations include lethal and nonlethal activities conducted throughout
the AO. They support the decisive operation by affecting the enemy’s capabilities and forces
or influencing the opposing commander’s decisions. Shaping operations use the full range of
military power to neutralize or reduce enemy capabilities. They may occur simultaneously
with, before, or after initiation of the decisive operation. They may involve any combination
of forces and occur throughout the depth of the AO.
5-13. Some shaping operations, especially those that occur simultaneously with the decisive
operation, are economy-of-force actions. If the force available does not permit simultaneous
decisive and shaping operations, the commander sequences shaping operations around the
decisive operation. A shaping operation may become the decisive operation if circumstances
or opportunity demand. In that case, commanders weigh the new decisive operations at the
expense of other shaping operations. The concept of the operation clearly defines how
shaping operations support the decisive operation.
5-14. Security is an important shaping operation. Security enables the decisive operation of
the next higher headquarters. Security protects the force and provides time for friendly
forces to react to enemy or hostile activities. It also blinds the enemy’s attempts to see
friendly forces and protects friendly forces from enemy observation and fires.

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SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-15. The purpose of sustaining operations is the generation and maintenance of combat
power. Sustaining operations are operations at any echelon that enable shaping and decisive
operations by providing logistics support and rear area and base security, movement control,
terrain management, and infrastructure development.
5-16. Sustaining operations generate and sustain combat power. While balancing the
necessity of security, sustaining operations provide essential capabilities, functions,
activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of the operating forces in theater.
Sustaining operations encompass those activities at all levels of war that generate and
maintain forces on the battlefield.
5-17. Rear area and base security include measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or
an installation to defend and protect itself against all acts that could impair its effectiveness.
It has four components: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response force
operations, and combined arms tactical combat force (TCF) operations. (See FM 100-7,
Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations.)
5-18. Movement control includes the planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, and security
of the movement of personnel and materiel into, within, and out of the AO. Maintaining
movement control, keeping lines of communication (LOC) open, and obtaining host nation
support are critical requirements in preserving freedom of movement throughout the AO.
5-19. Terrain management includes the process of allocating terrain, designating assembly
areas, and specifying locations for units and activities. The process includes grouping units
together to form bases and designated base clusters as necessary.
5-20. Infrastructure development applies to all fixed and permanent installations,
fabrications, or facilities that support and control military forces. Infrastructure
development focuses on facility security modifications and includes area damage control
(ADC) and repairs.
5-21. Sustaining operations are inseparable from decisive and shaping operations, although
they are not by themselves decisive or shaping. Failure to sustain operations normally
results in mission failure. Sustaining operations occur throughout the AO, not just within
the rear area. Sustaining operations determine how quickly forces reconstitute and how far
forces can exploit success. At the tactical level, sustaining operations underwrite the tempo
of the overall operation; they assure the ability to take advantage of any opportunity
immediately.

MAIN EFFORT
5-22. In a combined arms battalion, there is only one main effort, which includes the main
attack and may include one or more supporting efforts. All other elements of the combined
arms battalion support the main effort. In planning the scheme of maneuver, the main effort
must have sufficient combat power and support to accomplish its mission. The main effort
accomplishes the combined arms battalion’s purpose, normally at the decisive point. After
designating the main effort, the combined arms battalion commander ensures all available
resources are focused on supporting it and places the bulk of the offensive capability at his
disposal into it. To weight the main effort, the commander may perform the following:
Assign the main attack to the company with the greatest combat power.
Allocate additional combat platoons in task organization to weight the main effort.
Attach combat support elements in direct support of the main effort.
Position overwatch or support by fire elements to support the main effort.

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Assign priority of fires (artillery, mortars, psychological operations (PSYOP), and

joint fires/close air support (CAS)) and priority of targets.
Coordinate adjacent unit or attack helicopter support by fire.
Assign priority of sustaining operations to sustain the main effort.
Narrow the scope of the main effort’s responsibility in terms of geographical area or
specified tasks.
5-23. Enemy actions, minor changes in the situation, or lack of success by other elements
must not divert forces from the main effort. The commander commits the main effort at the
decisive point where the unit’s total combat power can be massed to achieve decisive results
with respect to terrain, the enemy, and time to achieve the unit’s purpose. Once committed,
the unit may conduct the following:
Secure key and or decisive terrain.
Seize key and or decisive terrain.
Destroy designated enemy forces.
5-24. If the situation changes so that the actions originally anticipated as decisive are no
longer feasible or relevant, the combined arms battalion commander may change the unit
designated to conduct the main effort during the course of an operation. Rapidly shifting the
main effort as changes in the situation occur is challenging. Time and distance factors
determine which forces the combined arms battalion commander uses if he shifts the main
effort.

RESERVE
5-25. The combined arms battalion designates a reserve when the brigade combat team
(BCT) has no reserve or an inadequate reserve or when faced with an uncertain situation
that requires flexibility in the plan. The combined arms battalion reserve provides additional
combat power during critical points in the fight, the ability to exploit the success of the main
effort, and a hedge against uncertainty. The reserve should be sized to mitigate risk and
based on the level of detail known about the enemy. The combined arms battalion’s
information dominance over the enemy allows the commander to capitalize on the
capabilities of digitization to apportion his available troops to the tasks required to affect his
concept of attack. The composition of the reserve is based on the firepower, mobility, and
type of forces needed to meet its anticipated mission requirements based on the enemy. Solid
intelligence can lead the commander to concentrate his committed units against specific
enemy weak points and identify reserve requirements. The composition of the reserve should
be discussed and agreed on by the brigade commander to reflect the organization of the
HBCT as a two combined arms battalion organization. The brigade commander should
provide specific guidance to the combined arms battalions regarding the composition of the
reserve as well as the rules for the use of the reserve.
5-26. The combined arms battalion reserve can be as small as an infantry platoon. The
commander and staff must look for opportunities to use other assets, such as fires and
situational obstacles, to assist with the reserve mission. To generate larger ground
maneuver reserves, the combined arms battalion commander must redirect committed
elements after they have accomplished their initial tasks or when the enemy’s defeat frees
them for other tasks. The designation of the engineer company as the combined arms
battalion reserve should be avoided as it commits the engineer force to a specific mission and
the engineers are not organized (too small), trained, or equipped to exploit the success of the
main effort and continue the combined arms battalion attack.
5-27. The speed and agility of the combat platoons allow them to be committed, withdrawn,
redirected, and recommitted during the fight. The rotation of units into the reserve role
requires the best possible information available. Moving a unit from one area (left to right or

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front to rear) requires everyone in the unit to know where he is, where the enemy is, and
where other friendly units are. Additionally, the movement of ground forces over the
distances expected in the expanded battlespace requires time. The time and distance
relationship for both mounted and dismounted actions, especially under limited visibility
conditions and rough terrain, is a key factor in determining which units the commander can
realistically consider as a possible reserve force.
5-28. The combined arms battalion reserve follows the main attack at a distance sufficient to
keep it from interfering with the movement of the lead company and to maintain its freedom
of maneuver. The reserve maintains the flexibility to shift to a supporting attack if the main
effort changes.
5-29. The reserve commander must understand the commander’s intent, especially the
decision points and conditions for commitment of the reserve. The reserve commander must
remain updated on the situation and possess the same common operational picture (COP) as
the combined arms battalion commander.

FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

5-30. In exploitation and pursuit operations, the heavy combined arms battalion is normally
employed by BCTs and UEx in a follow and support role. Follow and support is a task in
which a committed force follows and supports the unit conducting the main attack. A follow
and support task is assigned to a unit to prevent the unit conducting the main attack
(usually the combined arms battalion main effort) from having to commit its combat power
away from its primary task. A follow and support force executes one or more of the following
tasks:
Destroy bypassed enemy forces.
Block movement of enemy reinforcements.
Secure routes or key terrain.
Clear obstacles or reduce additional obstacle lanes.
Guard or secure enemy prisoners, key areas, and installations.
Recover friendly battle losses.
Control refugees.
Reinforce the main effort.
5-31. When operating as a follow and support force, the combined arms battalion’s movement
techniques are similar to those used in a movement to contact. The combined arms battalion
coordinates plans with the unit (another combined arms battalion or the brigade
reconnaissance squadron) it follows. Both units exchange situation reports frequently to
coordinate operations.

FOLLOW AND ASSUME

5-32. Follow and assume is a task in which a committed force follows another force, normally
the main effort, and is prepared to assume the mission of the other force if that force is fixed,
halted, or unable to continue. The follow and assume force maintains contact with the trail
elements of the other force and monitors all combat information and intelligence. It can
maintain this contact through digital tools or by physical contact. The COP should provide
the same picture of the battle to the follow-on force as is available to the lead force.
5-33. The follow and assume force is prepared to conduct a forward passage of lines but
should attempt to pass around a flank of the lead force when assuming its mission.
Additionally, the following force avoids becoming decisively engaged with enemy forces
bypassed by the force it is following. The combined arms battalion S2 must ensure that the
following force is provided current information and disposition of the bypassed enemy forces

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as well as a current picture of the enemy forces the lead element faces and those it expects to
face.
5-34. Crucial actions to support the commitment of the follow and assume force include the
following:
Maintain current information on the enemy and friendly situation.
Shift observers and reconnaissance assets as required.
Develop graphic control measures to ensure a rapid passage of lines or passing on a
flank.
Ensure terrain is allocated for rapid movement while maintaining force protection.
Be prepared for the shift in priority of support. Reposition assets and retask
organize as required.
Activate emergency resupply operations as necessary.
Establish direct-fire control measures and fire support coordination measures
(FSCMs) such as restrictive fire lines (RFLs).

SECTION II – FORMS OF MANEUVER

5-35. The heavy combined arms battalion uses the five basic forms of maneuver during an
attack: envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack. The
commander selects a form of maneuver as a foundation on which to build a course of action
(COA). Each form of maneuver is discussed in the following segments. Commanders should
consider that maneuver by the heavy combined arms battalion will be conducted with four
companies—two tank and two mechanized infantry within the constraints of a HBCT with
two combined arms battalions. Commanders should consider that operations will be
conducted with the HBCT reconnaissance squadron conducting operations to support the
HBCT operational objectives. Last, commanders should consider that the combined arms
battalion may be augmented by modular force enablers.

ENVELOPMENT
5-36. Envelopment is normally the preferred form of maneuver. It seeks to apply strength
against weakness. Envelopment avoids the enemy’s front where forces are most protected,
attention is focused, and fires are most easily concentrated. The attacker attempts to fix the
defender with supporting attacks while he maneuvers the main attack around the enemy’s
defenses to strike at the flanks, rear, or both. The combined arms battalion’s intelligence
capabilities enable it to strike from an unexpected direction or against an enemy weakness,
forcing the enemy to fight along unprepared, lightly defended, or undefended avenues of
approach. The combined arms battalion fixes the enemy force with a small force and then
attacks with the preponderance of available combat power against the enemy force’s flank or
rear.
5-37. Envelopments may be conducted against a stationary or moving enemy force.
Sometimes the enemy exposes his flank by his own forward movement, unaware of his
opponent’s location. In a fluid battle, the combination of air and indirect fires may isolate the
enemy on unfavorable terrain and establish conditions for maneuver against an assailable
flank or rear. The attacker needs to be agile enough to concentrate his forces and mass his
combat power before the enemy can reorient his defense (Figure 5-2).

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Figure 5-2. Envelopment

5-38. When the combined arms battalion conducts envelopment, one or more companies
make supporting attacks to fix the enemy while other company teams of the combined arms
battalion maneuver against the enemy’s flank or rear. The supporting attack must have
sufficient combat power to keep the enemy engaged while the enveloping force maneuvers to
close with the enemy.
5-39. Variations of the envelopment include the double envelopment and encirclement.

DOUBLE ENVELOPMENT
5-40. The attacker seeks to pass at the same time around both flanks of the enemy. This type
of envelopment requires two assailable flanks, precise coordination, sufficient combat power,
and detailed timing. A combined arms battalion seldom attempts the double envelopment on
its own. The potential for fratricide increases significantly with this form of envelopment.

ENCIRCLEMENT
5-41. Encirclement occurs when the defender has lost all ground routes of evacuation and
reinforcement. Combined arms battalion fires must be synchronized to complete the
destruction of the encircled force. Friendly forces must be positioned to block or interdict the
enemy’s attempt to break through the encirclement. Encirclements are likely to be made
during an exploitation or pursuit. Combined arms battalions participate in encirclements as
part of a larger force.

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PENETRATION
5-42. In a penetration, the attacker concentrates forces to strike at an enemy weak point and
break through the position to rupture the defense and break up its continuity. The attacker
then uses the gap created to pass forces through to defeat the enemy through attacks into his
flanks and rear. A successful penetration depends on the attacker’s ability to suppress
enemy weapon systems, to concentrate forces and effects to overwhelm the defender at the
point of attack, and to pass sufficient forces through the gap to defeat the enemy quickly. A
penetration is normally attempted when enemy flanks are unassailable or when conditions
permit neither envelopment nor a turning movement such as an attack against the enemy’s
main defensive belt (Figure 5-3).

Figure 5-3. Penetration

CONCENTRATION
5-43. The penetration of an enemy position requires a concentration of combat power (fires
and effects) to permit continued momentum of the attack. The attack should move rapidly to
destroy the continuity of the defense since, if it is slowed or delayed, the enemy will be
afforded time to react. If the attacker does not make the penetration sharply and secure
objectives promptly, the penetration is likely to resemble a frontal attack. This may result in
high casualties and permit the enemy to fall back intact, thus avoiding destruction.

PENETRATION STEPS
5-44. A penetration is conducted in three steps:
Step 1: Penetrating the main line of resistance. A heavy company can execute the
initial penetration with the combined arms battalion concentrating fires and effects
on the penetration point. It breaches the enemy’s obstacles using mine plows or

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dismounted infantry squads, depending on the extent and composition of the

obstacles. Additional engineer support may be required from the UEx.
Step 2: Widening the gap to secure the flanks. The combined arms battalion seizes
enemy positions behind the obstacles and widens the shoulders of the penetration
to allow assaulting forces room to attack deep objectives. The combined arms
battalion continues to mass fires to ensure success and to maintain the momentum
of the attack.
Step 3: Seizing the objective and subsequent exploitation. Exploitation of the
penetration is made as the company completes the destruction of the enemy and
attacks to secure deeper objectives. Objectives for the assaulting force are deep
enough to allow an envelopment of the rest of the enemy position and should
facilitate attack by fire against second-echelon enemy positions and enemy
counterattack routes. The combined arms battalion must continue to integrate fires
and effects as well as follow-on forces to accomplish the mission.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-45. To allow a penetration, the terrain must facilitate the maneuver of the penetrating
force. The concentration of the combined arms battalion is planned to penetrate the defense
where the continuity of the enemy’s defense has been interrupted, such as gaps in obstacles
and minefields or areas not covered by fire. If the mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis
identifies multiple weaknesses in the enemy’s position, multiple penetrations should be
considered. When essential to the accomplishment of the mission, intermediate objectives
should be planned for the attack. Additional engineer support from the UEx may be required
to breach the enemy main line of resistance.

TURNING MOVEMENT
5-46. In a turning movement (Figure 5-4), the unit passes around and avoids the enemy’s
main force and then secures an objective that causes the enemy to move out of its current
position or divert forces to meet the threat. The combined arms battalion conducts a turning
movement as part of a larger unit’s operation. This movement allows the unit, brigade or
higher to fight the repositioning enemy forces on terms and conditions that are favorable.
The combined arms battalion can also conduct a turning movement with subordinate
company teams.

INFILTRATION
5-47. Infiltration (Figure 5-5) is a form of maneuver in which combat elements conduct
undetected movement (mounted or dismounted) through or into an area occupied by enemy
forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy’s rear. The commander uses
infiltration to:
Attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear.
Secure key terrain in support of the main effort.
Disrupt enemy rear operations.
Relocate the combined arms battalion by moving to battle positions around an
engagement area.
Reposition to attack vital facilities or enemy forces from the flank or rear.
Harass and disrupt the enemy’s logistics.

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Figure 5-4. Turning Movement

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
5-48. The commander avoids alerting the enemy of his intentions by positioning maneuver
and artillery units and the effects of fires in support of the infiltration. Infiltration is
normally used in conjunction with some other form of maneuver. An infiltration should be
planned during limited visibility through areas the enemy does not occupy or cover by

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surveillance and fire. Planning should incorporate infiltration lanes, rally points along the
route or axis, and contact points. Single or multiple infiltration lanes can be planned.

Figure 5-5. Infiltration

Single Infiltration Lane

5-49. A single infiltration lane:
Facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly of the combined arms battalion.
Is less susceptible to detection.
Reduces the area for which detailed intelligence is required.
Takes longer to move the force through enemy positions.

Multiple Infiltration Lanes

5-50. Multiple infiltration lanes:
Reduce the possibility of compromising the entire combined arms battalion.
Facilitate expeditious movement.
Are more difficult to control.

VEHICLE LAAGER
5-51. The combined arms battalion has the ability to laager its vehicles and proceed on foot
to areas that place the enemy at a disadvantage. On completion of the mission, the vehicles
can be brought forward, and the combined arms battalion will be positioned to conduct
follow-on operations. The commander avoids alerting the enemy of his intentions by
positioning maneuver and artillery units and the effects of fires in support of the infiltration.
Infiltration is normally used in conjunction with some other form of maneuver.

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FRONTAL ATTACK
5-52. The frontal attack (Figure 5-6) is the least desirable form of maneuver and is often the
most costly since it exposes the majority of the attack force to the concentrated fires of the
defenders. It can be used where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and
the initiative. The combined arms battalion may conduct a frontal attack against a
stationary or moving enemy force. Unless frontal attacks are executed with overwhelming
speed and strength against a weaker enemy, they are seldom decisive. The combined arms
battalion attacks the enemy across a wide front and along the most direct approaches. It
uses a frontal attack to overrun and destroy a weakened enemy force or fix an enemy force.
Frontal attacks are used when commanders possess overwhelming combat power and the
enemy is at a clear disadvantage or when fixing the enemy over a wide front is the desired
effect and a decisive defeat in that area is not expected. The frontal attack may be
appropriate:
In an attack or meeting engagement where speed and simplicity are paramount to
maintaining battle tempo and, ultimately, the initiative.
In a supporting attack to fix an enemy force.

Figure 5-6. Frontal Attack Against a Moving Enemy

SEQUENCE OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-53. The commander and staff consider both preparation for operations as well as execution
as they plan an offensive mission.

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PREPARATION
5-54. The heavy combined arms battalion conducts extensive reconnaissance of the objective
to support the commander’s decisions of how to employ his combat power against the enemy.
The combined arms battalion commander normally does not make final decisions as to the
exact conduct of the operation until ISR operations develop the enemy situation. The
commander and staff direct and supervise mission preparations to prepare the combined
arms battalion for the battle. The combined arms battalion employs security forces to protect
and conceal attack preparations from the enemy. Preparation time is also used to conduct
precombat checks and inspections, rehearsals at all levels, and sustaining operations
activities.

EXECUTION
5-55. Execution generally consists of the following four sequential events:
Movement to the line of departure.
Approach to the objective.
Actions on the objective.
Consolidation and reorganization.
5-56. These events may be controlled through the use of phasing and graphic control
measures. The combined arms battalion prepares for follow-on missions as directed by
higher headquarters.

Movement to the Line of Departure

5-57. When attacking from positions not in contact, combined arms battalions often stage in
rear assembly areas, road march to attack positions behind friendly units in contact with the
enemy, conduct forward passage of lines, and begin the attack. (See Chapter 12, Section VII,
Tactical Road Marches, and Section VIII, Assembly Area Operations). When attacking from
positions in direct contact, the line of departure is the same as the line of contact (LD=LC).

Approach to the Objective

5-58. The combined arms battalion commander and staff plan the approach to the objective
to ensure security, speed, and flexibility. They select routes (direction of attack or axis of
advance), techniques, formations, and methods (mounted or dismounted) that best support
actions on the objective. All leaders must recognize this portion of the battle as a fight, not a
movement. The combined arms battalion may have to fight through enemy combat forces,
obstacles, artillery strikes, security elements, possible spoiling attacks, and other combat
multipliers to reach the initial objective. The commander employs techniques that avoid the
enemy’s strength when possible and conceal the combined arms battalion’s true intentions.
The combined arms battalion commander tries to deceive the enemy as to the location of the
main effort, uses surprise to take advantage of his initiative in determining the time and
place of his attack, and uses indirect approaches when available to strike the enemy from a
flank or the rear. The combined arms battalion must develop a fires plan, a casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC) plan, and a complete CSS plan during this phase of the operation.
Although the unit may not expect contact prior to LC, it must be prepared for it. The
approach phase is terminated when the combined arms battalion reaches the objective
terrain or decisively engages the enemy force.

Actions on the Objective

5-59. During an offensive operation, the combined arms battalion’s objective may be terrain
or force oriented. Terrain-oriented objectives usually require the combined arms battalion to

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seize or secure a designated area. However, to gain a terrain-oriented objective often

requires fighting through enemy forces. If the objective is an enemy force, an objective area
may be assigned for orientation, but the combined arms battalion’s effort is focused on the
enemy’s actual location. The enemy may be a stationary or moving force. Actions on the
objective start when the combined arms battalion begins echeloning its fires onto the
objective. This action usually occurs with preparatory fires while the combined arms
battalion is still approaching the objective. Actions at the objective phase terminate when
the unit reaches the limit of advance and begins consolidation and reorganization.

Consolidation and Reorganization

5-60. The combined arms battalion reorganizes and consolidates as required by the situation
and mission. The consolidation and reorganization plan needs to be as detailed as the
assault plan.
Consolidation. Consolidation consists of actions taken to secure and strengthen the
objective and defend against enemy counterattack. The unit providing the
supporting effort during the assault may or may not join the assault force on the
objective. Planning considerations should include the following:
Unit locations.
Sectors of fire.
Forces oriented on enemy.
Counterattack routes.
Provisions to facilitate transition to follow-on operations.
Reorganization. Normally conducted concurrently with consolidation, reorganization
occurs as necessary to prepare the unit for follow-on operations. Detailed planning
provides the combined arms battalion a plan for evacuating and recovering
casualties, recovering damaged equipment, providing for prisoners of war, and
integrating replacement personnel.
5-61. The consolidation and reorganization phase terminates when the combined arms
battalion is ready to continue the attack or conduct a brigade directed follow-on mission.

Follow-On Missions
5-62. The combined arms battalion executes follow-on missions as directed by the higher
commander (HBCT/infantry brigade combat team (IBCT)/Stryker brigade combat team
(SBCT) or UEx). The most likely mission is to continue the attack. Other missions may
include supporting a passage of lines for a follow-on force, defending, or participating in an
exploitation or pursuit. The combined arms battalion develops plans for follow-on missions
based on the higher headquarters plan, the higher commander’s intent, and the anticipated
situation.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES AND FORMATIONS

5-63. The selection of movement techniques and attack formations for the combined arms
battalion depends on the factors of METT-TC.

MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
5-64. The movement techniques used are traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding
overwatch. The combined arms battalion does not usually move as a unit using one
movement technique. However, when moving as a unit along a single avenue, the combined
arms battalion commander designates the movement technique to be used by the lead units
based on the likelihood of enemy contact. For example, the combined arms battalion may be

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moving to contact in column formation while the lead company team may be in a wedge
formation using traveling overwatch. Movement techniques are used when not in contact
with the enemy; they end on encountering any situation that requires an active or passive
response to the enemy under the seven forms of contact (visual; physical; indirect; obstacles;
aircraft; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) conditions; or electronic
warfare) when the unit begins its actions on contact and the overwatching force begins its
suppressive fires (maneuver). The combined arms battalion should try to make enemy
contact with the smallest possible force. This technique allows the majority of the combined
arms battalion the freedom to maneuver against the enemy force.

FORMATIONS
5-65. The combined arms battalion may move in any one of these basic formations: column,
wedge, vee, echelon, and line. The combined arms battalion may use more than one
formation in a given movement, especially if the terrain changes during the movement. For
example, the battalion commander may elect to use the column formation during a passage
of lines and then change to another formation, such as a wedge. Other factors, such as the
distance of the move or enemy dispositions, may also prompt the commander to use more
than one formation. Distances between units depend on METT-TC.

Column Formation
5-66. The combined arms battalion moves in column formation (Figure 5-7) when early
contact is not expected and the objective is far away. The combined arms battalion’s lead
element normally uses traveling overwatch while the following units travel. The column
formation:-
Facilitates speed of movement, ease of control, and usefulness in close terrain.
Provides for quick transition to other formations.
Requires flank security.
Provides the majority of firepower to flanks.

Wedge Formation
5-67. The wedge formation (Figure 5-8) postures the combined arms battalion for enemy
contact on its front and flanks. The force uses the wedge when enemy contact is possible or
expected but the location and disposition of the enemy is vague. When not expecting enemy
contact, it may use the wedge to cross open terrain rapidly. The wedge formation:
Facilitates control and transition to the assault.
Provides for maximum firepower forward and good firepower to the flanks.
Requires sufficient space to disperse laterally and in depth.

Vee Formation
5-68. The vee formation (Figure 5-9) postures the combined arms battalion with two
companies abreast and two maneuver companies trailing. This arrangement is most suitable
to advance against an enemy known to be to the front of the combined arms battalion. The
combined arms battalion may use the vee when enemy contact is expected and the location
and disposition of the enemy is known, with the two trailing companies available to
maneuver out of contact. The vee formation:
Is hard to orient; control is more difficult in close or wooded terrain.
Requires the combined arms battalion to rely more on Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT) for control.
Provides for good firepower forward and to the flanks.

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Figure 5-7. Combined Arms Battalion in Column Formation

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Figure 5-8. Combined Arms Battalion in Wedge Formation

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Figure 5-9. Combined Arms Battalion in Vee Formation

Echelon Formation
5-69. The echelon formation (Figure 5-10) arranges the combined arms battalion with the
company teams in column formation in the direction of the echelon (right or left). The
combined arms battalion commonly uses the echelon when providing security to a larger
moving force. The echelon formation:
Provides for firepower forward and in the direction of the echelon.
Facilitates control in open areas but makes it more difficult in heavily wooded
areas.

Line Formation
5-70. The line formation (Figure 5-11) postures the combined arms battalion with company
teams on line and abreast of one another. Since it does not dispose company teams in depth,
the line formation provides less flexibility of maneuver than other formations. The battalion
uses the line in an assault when it requires continuous movement with maximum firepower
to the front.

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Figure 5-10. Combined Arms Battalion in Echelon Right Formation

Figure 5-11. Combined Arms Battalion in Line Formation

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SECTION III – TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

5-71. At the combined arms battalion level, the offense takes the form of either a deliberate
or a hasty operation, such as a movement to contact, attack, exploitation, or pursuit across
the full spectrum of conflict.
Hasty operations. The combined arms battalion conducts a hasty offensive
operation after a successful defense or as part of a defense; as a result of a
movement to contact, a meeting engagement, or a chance contact during a
movement; or in a situation where the unit has the opportunity to attack
vulnerable enemy forces.
Deliberate operations. A deliberate offensive operation is a fully synchronized
operation that employs all available assets against the enemy’s defense in
accordance with the rules of engagement (ROE). Deliberate operations are
characterized by detailed planning based on available information, thorough
reconnaissance, preparation, and rehearsals. The combined arms battalion may
also be given the mission to conduct special purpose attacks such as a raid,
demonstration, spoiling attack, or counterattack. Attacks, exploitations, and
pursuits may be conducted sequentially or simultaneously throughout the AO.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
5-72. The combined arms battalion conducts movement to contact when the tactical situation
is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact. Its purpose is to gain or reestablish
contact with the enemy. Combined arms battalions conduct movement to contact
independently or as part of a larger force. A combined arms battalion is normally given a
movement to contact mission as the lead element of a brigade attack or as a counterattack
element of a BCT or UEx (Figure 5-12). A properly executed movement to contact develops
the combat situation and maintains the commander’s freedom of action after making contact.
This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative. The movement to contact
terminates with the occupation of an assigned objective or when enemy resistance requires
the combined arms battalion to deploy and conduct an attack to continue forward movement.
5-73. The superior intelligence and acquisition capabilities available to the BCT and
combined arms battalion are likely to make movements to contact less common and change
the nature of the meeting engagements that used to normally end a movement to contact.
However, depending on the available intelligence assets, the effectiveness of the collection
plan, the time available to develop the situation, and the enemy’s success in masking his
dispositions, the combined arms battalion may still be forced to conduct a movement to
contact.
5-74. An exploitation or pursuit by the combined arms battalion’s parent BCT is likely to
require a movement to contact by the combined arms battalion, at least initially. A combined
arms battalion given a movement to contact mission is assigned an AO or an axis of advance
and an objective at a depth to ensure contact with the enemy. The combined arms battalion
conducts movement to contact in a manner that allows it to maneuver to develop the
situation fully, to maintain freedom of action, and, if possible, to defeat the enemy once
contact is made.

APPROACH MARCH TECHNIQUE IN A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

5-75. The combined arms battalion normally organizes into a security force, an advanced
guard, the main body, and flank and rear guards (Figure 5-13).

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Figure 5-12. Combined Arms Battalion Movement to Contact as Part of a Brigade

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Figure 5-13. Combined Arms Battalion Movement to Contact

SECURITY FORCE
5-76. The security force for the combined arms battalion is normally the scout platoon.
Engineers and forward observers (FOs) are attached to the security force as necessary. The
security force normally has initial priority of indirect fires. The mission of the security force
is to determine the size, activity, location, and depth of the enemy force. Other tasks include
the following:
Reconnaissance of routes, bridges, and roads.
Reconnaissance of obstacles and restrictive terrain.

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Surveillance of named areas of interest (NAIs).

5-77. The security force must cover the frontage of the combined arms battalion axis of
advance. The combined arms battalion avoids decisive engagement, but once it finds the
enemy, it must keep him under surveillance and report his activity.
5-78. The security force must be far enough ahead of the advance guard to provide adequate
warning and sufficient space for them to maneuver. However, the security force must not be
so far ahead that the advance guard cannot rapidly assist it in disengaging from the enemy
should that become necessary. The advance guard keys its movement on the movement of
the security force.
5-79. The combined arms battalion security force must be able to receive the latest
information available from the brigade reconnaissance squadron as well as information
available from the brigade S2 and military intelligence (MI) company as well as other
battlefield surveillance assets. With this information, the security force can confirm
intelligence provided by these assets and greatly reduce the risks and unknowns normally
associated with a movement to contact mission.

ADVANCE GUARD
5-80. The advance guard for a combined arms battalion is usually a company team. Its
composition depends on the METT-TC factors. In open terrain, it may move mounted; in
restricted, close, complex, or urban terrain, dismounted movement with vehicles in the
overwatch is a better choice. The engineers follow or are attached to the lead elements. The
two lead company teams are task organized accordingly when a combined arms battalion
moves in parallel columns.
5-81. The advance guard operates forward of the battalion main body to provide security for
the main body and ensure its uninterrupted advance. It protects the main body from
surprise attack and develops the situation to protect the deployment of the main body when
it is committed to action. The advance guard does this by rapidly developing the situation on
encountering the enemy’s lead elements; destroying reconnaissance, ambushes, or delaying
enemy forces; and marking bypasses for or reducing obstacles. The advance guard:
Maintains combat information of the entire combined arms battalion, especially the
security force.
Reports enemy contact to the battalion commander.
Collects and reports all information about the enemy.
Selects tentative fighting positions for following battalion units.
Attempts to penetrate enemy security elements and reach or identify the enemy
main force.
Destroys or repels all enemy reconnaissance forces.
Prevents enemy ground forces from engaging the main body with direct fires.
Locates, bypasses, or breaches obstacles along the main body’s axis of advance.
Executes tactical tasks, such as fix, seize, or block, against enemy forces to develop
the situation for the main body.
Ensures that all pertinent information is passed to the rest of the battalion via
FBCB2/BFT and FM voice.
5-82. Until the main body is committed, the advance guard is the battalion commander’s
main effort. Priority of fires shifts to the main body once committed. In planning the
movement to contact, each contingency operation should revolve around the actions of the
advance guard. The battalion lead elements must be prepared to execute battle drills,
especially those involving obstacle reduction and actions on contact.

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MAIN BODY
5-83. The main body keys its movement to the advance guard. It maintains information of
the advance guard’s activities via FM cross talk or its digital tools, primarily FBCB2/BFT.
This digital capability allows the battalion main body to key its movement on the advance
guard while utilizing terrain and distance for force protection. The main body, remaining
attuned to the advanced guard’s situation, provides responsive support when the advance
guard is committed.
5-84. The main body contains the bulk of the combined arms battalion’s combat elements and
is arrayed to achieve all-round security. The combat elements of the main body are prepared
to deploy and attack rapidly, giving them the flexibility to maneuver rapidly to a decisive
point on the battlefield to destroy the enemy.
5-85. The use of standard formations and battle drills allows the battalion commander, based
on the information available to him through the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), to
shift combat power rapidly on the battlefield. Company teams employ the appropriate
movement techniques within the battalion formation. Company commanders, based on their
knowledge of the battalion’s situation, anticipate the battalion commander’s decisions for
commitment of the main body and plan accordingly.

FLANK AND REAR SECURITY

5-86. To provide flank security, platoon-size elements from one or more of the company
teams in the battalion main body provide a flank guard under company team control. These
elements remain at a distance from the main body, which allows the combined arms
battalion time and space to maneuver to either flank. Flank security elements also operate
far enough out to prevent the enemy from placing direct or observed indirect fires on the
main body. Indirect fires are planned on major flank approaches to enhance security. One
platoon pulled from the main body may provide security, but combat forces are not normally
available to perform this mission. The combined arms battalion attains rear security by
rapid forward movement. This rapid movement forward gives the enemy less time to react or
reposition forces to attack the combined arms battalion.

INTEGRATION OF SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

5-87. The combined arms battalion commander determines how to integrate and maximize
the employment of his additional combat enablers while conducting offensive operations in
coordination with the BCT.

FIELD ARTILLERY
5-88. Priority targets and the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) are allocated to the
reconnaissance and security force and the advance guard. The BCT provides direct support
field artillery support from the fires battalion. The brigade positions field artillery units to
provide continuous indirect fires for the moving combined arms battalion. Given the
brigade’s emphasis on proactive counterstrikes and the likelihood for operating in close
terrain, the combined arms battalion must rely on its organic mortars.

MORTARS
5-89. The combined arms battalion mortars may be placed under the operational control of
the advance guard, based on METT-TC, to provide responsive fires and smoke to support
initial actions on contact.

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AIR
5-90. Close air support from joint air forces as well as close combat attack support from Army
aviation, if available, interdicts enemy counterattack forces or destroys defensive positions.

ENGINEERS
5-91. Priority of engineer support is to mobility. Elements of the engineer company may join
the reconnaissance and security force to reconnoiter obstacles, based on METT-TC.
Engineers may travel with the advance guard to assist in mobility of the advance guard and
main body. (Refer to Chapter 12 and FM 3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, for a
detailed discussion of combined arms breaching operations.) Situational obstacles are
planned to support the security forces and the advance guard.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-92. The object of sustaining operations is to provide support as far forward as possible
without disrupting operations. The priority is to move Class V forward and to evacuate
casualties rearward. The forward support company (FSC) accomplishes its core functions
through centralization of support, which provides the maneuver commander with increased
efficiency and effectiveness in the flow of support and supplies. Centralized support also
allows the FSC commander to weight the battle logistically or surge as required. The Battle
Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3) and the near-real-time information provided
by FBCB2/BFT enhance centralization of support.
5-93. In offensive operations, the FSC may push emergency resupply of Classes III and V
forward to logistics release points as needed. The combined arms battalion commander,
executive officer (XO), and S4 may determine that the mission requires additional support of
Classes III and V, which can be pushed forward, uploaded, and positioned at the combat
trains.
5-94. Field maintenance teams (FMTs) from the FSC are placed forward, usually down to the
company. These FMTs are controlled by the company XO and first sergeant (1SG) that
communicate with the CTCP to ensure FMT activities are coordinated. The FMTs evacuate
nonrepairable equipment (due to time constraints or the lack of required parts) to the unit
maintenance collection point (UMCP). UMCPs provide support to the FMTs as needed, and
the FMTs evacuate equipment to the UMCP that cannot be repaired within 24 hours.
UMCPs should be located on the main axis or main supply routes. The S4 may request heavy
equipment transport (HET) to assist in rearward evacuation.
5-95. When developing force health protection (FHP) for offensive operations, it must be
responsive to several essential characteristics. As operations achieve success, the areas of
casualty density move away from the supporting medical treatment facility (MTF) (combined
arms battalion). This causes the routes of CASEVAC to lengthen. The heaviest patient
workloads occur during disruption of the enemy’s main defenses, at terrain or tactical
barriers, during the assault on final objectives, and during enemy counterattacks. The
accurate prediction of these workload points by the FHP planner is essential if CASEVAC
operations are to be successful. As advancing combat formations extend control of the battle
area, supporting medical elements have the opportunity to clear the battlefield. This
facilitates the acquisition of the battle wounded and reduces the vital time lapse between
injury and treatment.
5-96. The battalion surgeon, assisted by the battalion physician’s assistant (PA), field
medical assistant, and the platoon sergeant, is responsible for the FHP plan for the
combined arms battalion. The foundation of the battalion FHP plan is the battalion
commander’s guidance and the brigade FHP plan. As operational requirements or the
mission changes, the FHP plan must be updated. (See FM 4-02.4 for information on planning

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FHP for the combined arms battalion, military decision-making process (MDMP), COA, and
medical troop-leading procedures.)
5-97. The combined arms battalion has four ambulance squads consisting of two M113A3
ambulances per squad. The maneuver team 1SG has operational control of the squads
attached to the company. The battalion commander may choose to locate three or four
ambulances forward with the main effort while the remaining ambulances support the other
elements or await dispatch at the battalion aid station at the combat trains. Treatment
squads trail the main body or can conduct split-team operations. In the offense, the factors of
METT-TC determine whether casualties are evacuated by ambulance to a casualty collection
point or an ambulance exchange point. The brigade support medical company (BSMC) will
normally position ambulances forward with the BAS Level I MTFs. As required, ambulance
exchange points (AXPs) may be established to expedite the medical evacuation of casualties
from the combined arms battalion Level I MTF back to the BSMC Level II MTF.
5-98. In offensive operations, it may be difficult to maintain lines of communication. Support
elements must be prepared to quickly reposition to maintain continuous support to the
combined arms battalion.

PLANNING
5-99. Planning for movement to contact is flexible and promotes subordinate initiative.
Planning begins by developing the concept of the operation with a focus on ultimate control
of the objective and conducting a reverse planning sequence from the objective to the LD.
This is accomplished by developing a simple scheme of maneuver, issuing a clear
commander’s intent, and developing plans to execute likely maneuver options that may occur
during execution. Increased emphasis is placed on developing an aggressive and flexible
reconnaissance effort that is linked to the commander’s priority intelligence requirements
(PIR), which normally focus on locating and gathering information about the enemy’s
strength, disposition, and activities.

INTELLIGENCE, RECONNAISSANCE, AND SURVEILLANCE

5-100. The first consideration for a movement to contact is ISR planning. The BCT plays a
major role based on the assets available and its links to UEx and higher ISR assets. The
combined arms battalion is one of several elements executing the brigade’s offensive plan,
and the combined arms battalion’s ISR plan must be integrated, synchronized, and
coordinated with the brigade reconnaissance squadron and other elements executing the
brigade’s ISR plan.
5-101. The first priority is to determine anticipated enemy locations, strengths, and actions.
Potential enemy mission, intent, objectives, defensive locations, use of key terrain, avenues
of approach and routes, engagement areas, population, and obstacles are among the items
that must be identified early and incorporated into the ISR plan. Because the brigade is
filling information gaps and establishing conditions for gaining information dominance, this
is a period of intense use of information systems. Information must be gathered, analyzed
into intelligence, fused with other intelligence assets, and disseminated on a timely basis
with those who can act on the information. This intelligence, available through All-Source
Analysis System (ASAS), must be distributed throughout the combined arms battalion.
5-102. Various elements within the combined arms battalion conduct ISR operations.
Scout platoon. The scout platoon has the Soldiers that are best trained to function as
the eyes and ears for the combined arms battalion. It is the element that can be
committed the quickest. Scouts are used to cover areas of interest and to link with
the brigade reconnaissance squadron. They are also used to confirm and identify
enemy locations, orientations, and dispositions. Scouts report their observations

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and significant changes in enemy activity before, during, and after the movement
to contact.
Snipers. Each sniper team, especially during patrolling or while manning
observation posts (OPs), is a source of information that needs to be integrated into
the overall intelligence-gathering effort. The sniper squad is trained and well
equipped to man OPs in support of the ISR effort. (See Appendix F, Sniper
Employment.)
5-103. Rapid exchange of relevant information between the combined arms battalion,
reconnaissance squadron, and the BCT is required. Intelligence-gathering actions result in
information dominance and, once established, can convert the movement to contact into an
attack.

MANEUVER
5-104. The plan for a battalion movement to contact should be flexible and promote
subordinate initiative. Developing a simple scheme of maneuver, issuing a clear
commander’s intent, and developing plans to execute likely maneuver options that may occur
during execution contribute to flexibility and subordinate initiative. Commanders should
consider that four maneuver companies (two tank and two mechanized infantry) may be
available to support movement to contact and that combined arms battalion operations will
be conducted with the HBCT reconnaissance squadron supporting HBCT objectives.
Commanders must visualize the battlespace and employ the right force mix at the right
place and time to best achieve the desired effect.
5-105. In developing his concept, the battalion commander anticipates where he is likely to
meet the enemy and then determines how he intends to develop the situation that leads to
an attack under favorable conditions (actions on contact). The commander must attempt to
visualize this process during his mission analysis and take into account his active and
passive responses to enemy contact. The commander focuses on determining the battalion’s
organization and formation that best retains his freedom of action on contact and supports
his concept against known or anticipated enemy forces.
5-106. The battalion commander and his staff develop plans for the maneuver options of
attack, report and bypass, defend, and retrograde based on the higher commander’s intent
and the situation. They define the conditions in terms of the enemy and friendly strengths
and dispositions that are likely to trigger the execution of each maneuver option. They
identify likely locations of engagements based on known or suspected enemy locations. The
commander states the bypass criteria for the advance guard. He must recognize the loss of
tempo created by fighting every small enemy force encountered with the lead element. The
advance guard may attack small enemy forces that it can quickly destroy without losing
momentum, but larger or more stubborn enemy forces are best bypassed and destroyed by
the main body.
5-107. Areas of likely contact, known enemy positions, and areas that are potentially
dangerous to the combined arms battalion (such as potential ambush locations, obstacles,
and open areas) require close planning consideration. The staff must carefully plan actions
for moving through these danger areas quickly and securely.
5-108. The scheme of maneuver covers the combined arms battalion’s actions from LD to
consolidation and reorganization. The scheme of maneuver paragraph should address the
following:
Task and purpose of subordinate elements.
Actions at known or likely enemy contact locations.
Scheme of fires.
Direct fire, indirect fire, and nonlethal fire control measures.

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CCIR.
Methods for moving through and crossing dangerous areas.
The battalion’s formation and known locations where the formation will change.
Actions and array of forces at the final objective or limit of advance (LOA).
Decision point (DPs) and criteria for execution of maneuver options that may
develop during execution.
Purpose of operation.
Decisive point.
Form of maneuver.
5-109. The following fundamentals guide the development of the scheme of maneuver for a
movement to contact:
Focus all efforts on finding the enemy by developing a strong reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition effort and employing robust security forces.
If possible, make contact with electronic means first. If that is not possible, make
contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with protecting the force.
Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive
engagement of the main body. This procedure allows the commander maximum
flexibility to develop the situation.
Task-organize the force and use movement formations that enable the combined
arms battalion to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.
Maintain the ability to mass fires and effects rapidly in any direction.
Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
Maintain contact, once gained, regardless of the maneuver option adopted.
Rely on standing operating procedures (SOPs) and drills to develop the situation
and maintain tempo. The key is swift massing of all available combat power
against the enemy once contact is made.
Develop a flexible scheme of maneuver since the location of the engagement with
the enemy is not known. Flexibility is achieved by incorporating multiple DPs and
triggers into the plan based on where engagements are likely.

FIRE SUPPORT
5-110. The following are key considerations for the fire support (FS) plan:
Facilitate responsive and decentralized fires by a clear understanding of the
essential fire and effects tasks (EFETs) for each phase of the operation, an
understanding that is critical to the success of the FS plan. (See Appendix G, Fires
Integration.) Once it makes contact, the combined arms battalion shifts control of
all available fires to the observer, who is in the best position to control fires against
the enemy.
Plan targets based on known or suspected enemy locations and danger areas and to
support future operations and refine targets based on the reconnaissance effort as
the operation progresses.
Maximize the use of priority targets along the axis of advance and plan triggers to
put these targets into effect and cancel them based on the movement of the
combined arms battalion.
Ensure immediate responsive fire support to the lead elements by assigning
priority of fires to the ISR operations and/or to the advance guard.
Position observers effectively and maximize the use of lead maneuver forces to call
for fires since they often have the best view of the enemy. Observers must
understand the EFETs for each phase of the operation.

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Synchronize the movement and positioning of artillery, mortars, and PSYOP assets
with the tempo of the combined arms battalion and the FS requirements.
Attempt to echelon indirect fires to provide maximum suppression to the objective.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
5-111. The following are key considerations for the scheme of engineer operations:
Task organize engineer forces well forward to support potential breaching
operations. (Refer to Chapter 12 and FM 3-34.2 for a detailed discussion of
combined arms breaching operations.)
Use the advance guard, which is normally the priority for support, to task organize
with additional mobility assets and engineer forces.
Ensure the reconnaissance plan integrates the collection of obstacle and terrain
intelligence.
Maintain the flexibility to mass engineers to breach complex obstacles.
Plan obstacle belts, obstacle control measures, and situational obstacles to support
flank security and develop and adjust obstacle locations and triggers for execution
based on the combined arms battalion’s movement and the enemy situation.
Develop plans for the handover of marked obstacles, lanes, and bypasses.
Consider the requirement for route maintenance, clearance, and repair.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL SUPPORT

5-112. The following are key considerations for CBRN planning. (See also Appendix C.)
Ensure the scout platoon is prepared for CBRN reconnaissance tasks.
Disseminate CBRN threats, once detected, immediately throughout the brigade.
Integrate and synchronize the use of smoke to support critical actions such as
breaching or assaults and ensure artillery and mortar smoke complement each
other.
Develop decontamination plans based on the commander’s priorities and
vulnerability analysis and disseminate planned and active sites via FM or
FBCB2/BFT.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
5-113. Priority of PSYOP support is to mobility. The PSYOP team may join the
reconnaissance and security force to determine population behavior or disposition that could
be a friendly force mobility obstacle. The PSYOP team may travel with the advance guard to
assist in clearing the routes of civilians or surrendering enemy forces for the advance guard
and main body.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-114. The following are key considerations for the sustaining operations plan:
Continuously update the sustaining operations plan based on near-real-time status
of units and ensure the sustaining operations plan is responsive and flexible
enough to support all maneuver options.
Plan support from initiation of the operation to the final objective or LOA.
Support the combined arms battalion using the FSC for Class I, Class II, Class V,
and maintenance and repair parts support.

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Integrate backup support from the brigade support battalion to include deployment
of a forward logistics element to provide Class III, Class V, FHP, and maintenance
and repair parts to reinforce the support provided by the FSC.
Weigh the risks that extended distances create for security of main supply routes
(MSR) and sustaining operations assets based on the potential of undetected or
bypassed enemy forces.
Use all available assets to develop and maintain an accurate enemy picture behind
the lead maneuver elements.
Plan and rehearse actions for enemy contact.
Plan and coordinate the locations, displacements, and routes of sustaining
operations assets to maintain responsive support.
Plan and coordinate for aerial resupply.
Anticipate logistical needs based on type/duration of operation.

PREPARATION
5-115. During preparation for movement to contact, the battalion continues progress toward
establishing information dominance. The primary concerns are that the battalion
commander and staff receive the latest information and that plans are updated to reflect the
changes. The battalion commander must ensure that his subordinates understand his
concept and intent and their individual missions as new information becomes available. He
normally uses backbriefs and rehearsals to ensure his intent is understood and all actions
are integrated and synchronized. Simple, flexible plans that rely on SOPs and are rehearsed
repeatedly against various enemy conditions are essential to success.

INSPECTIONS
5-116. The battalion commander inspects subordinate unit preparations to ensure they are
consistent with his intent and concept of operations. He emphasizes subordinate plans to
move through danger areas, conduct actions on contact, and transition into a maneuver
option. The battalion commander ensures each subordinate force understands its assigned
mission during the movement to contact and the potential maneuver options that may
develop during execution.

REHEARSALS
5-117. The combined arms battalion’s leaders rehearse the plan against a wide range of
likely enemy COAs that would cause the battalion to execute various maneuver options at
different times and locations. The goal of rehearsals is to prepare the battalion’s subordinate
commanders for potential situations that may arise during execution and force them to make
decisions under the anticipated conditions of the battle. This promotes flexibility and agility
while reinforcing the commander’s intent. The commander seeks to rehearse the operation
from initiation to occupation of the final objective or LOA. Often, due to time constraints, the
commander prioritizes the maneuver options and enemy COAs to be rehearsed based on the
time available. The focus of the rehearsal is locating the enemy, developing the situation,
executing a maneuver option, and exploiting success. The rehearsal must consider the
potential of encountering stationary or moving enemy forces. Other actions to consider
during rehearsals follow:
Actions to cross known danger areas.
The advance guard making contact with a small enemy force.
The advance guard making contact with a large force beyond its capabilities to
defeat.

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The advance guard making contact with an obstacle the ISR force has not identified
and reported.
A flank security force making contact with a small force.
A flank security force making contact with a large force beyond its capability to
defeat.
Actions to report and bypass an enemy force (based on the bypass criteria).
Transition into a maneuver option.

RECONNAISSANCE
5-118. The brigade and combined arms battalion ISR effort, a key part of the execution,
begins during preparation for the movement to contact. The primary focus of the ISR effort is
to locate the enemy.

Locate the Enemy

5-119. The brigade reconnaissance squadron, supported by higher level collection assets,
seeks to locate the enemy well ahead of the BCT. This provides the brigade time to update
plans, attack the enemy deep in the brigade’s battlespace, select favorable terrain and
positions for the direct-fire engagement, position observers, and deploy prior to contact.
5-120. When they detect enemy forces, reconnaissance and surveillance assets shift to
determine the full extent of the enemy’s strength and disposition. Reconnaissance assets
gather vital intelligence on the enemy force and attempt to determine the enemy forces’
vulnerabilities, such as an exposed flank. The brigade hands over located enemy positions in
the combined arms battalion’s area to the battalion scout platoon using FBCB2/BFT, FM
radio, or face-to-face coordination. The scout platoon must ensure that it shares a common
situation understanding of the battalion area of operations with the brigade reconnaissance
elements. If the scout platoon encounters obstacles, it determines size, location, and
composition and seeks bypasses. If it finds a bypass, the battalion scouts assist in guiding
following units to the bypass. If it cannot find a bypass, the scout platoon advises the
battalion commander on locations for a breach and assists in guiding forces to the breach
site.
5-121. The combined arms battalion advance guard maintains contact with the scout
platoon to coordinate combat actions and exchange relevant information. As the battalion
scout platoon locates enemy positions, it hands these locations off to the advance guard. In
some cases, elements of the battalion scout platoon maintain contact with the enemy and
guide the advance guard maneuver forces. Regardless of the technique used, these actions
should be rehearsed and closely coordinated during execution to prevent fratricide and
confusion.

Support the Combined Arms Battalion’s Movement

5-122. The battalion scout platoon emphasizes terrain and obstacle reconnaissance
primarily focused along the combined arms battalion’s axis of advance. The scout platoon
seeks to identify and confirm restrictive terrain, trafficability of roads and routes, conditions
of bridges, and locations of fording sites. The scout platoon also reconnoiters potentially
dangerous areas such as obstacles, defiles, likely enemy positions, or possible ambush sites.
If the battalion scout platoon cannot clear these areas, the advance guard must assume a
more deliberate movement technique.

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Support Actions on Contact

5-123. Once a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) element locates an enemy force, the
combined arms battalion continuously observes it. Reconnaissance assets assist friendly
forces by guiding them along the best routes to engage the enemy. As contact develops,
reconnaissance assets at every level report enemy actions and battle damage assessment
(BDA).

EXECUTION
5-124. The combined arms battalion moves rapidly to maintain the advantage of an
appropriate tempo. However, the battalion commander must balance the need for speed with
the requirement for security. This decision is based on the effectiveness of the ISR effort,
friendly mobility, effects of terrain, and the enemy’s capabilities. The digital situational
understanding available in combined arms battalion and subordinate company teams allows
close tracking of the movement and location of the battalion units. Location and movement of
the battalion security forces are continually monitored through voice reports or FBCB2/BFT
to ensure adequate security for the main body and to ensure the security forces are within
supporting range of the main body, mortars, and artillery. The movement of the engineer
company and FSC are controlled by the combined arms battalion, adjusting their movements
to meet support requirements, avoid congestion of routes, and ensure responsiveness.

ACTIONS AT OBSTACLES
5-125. Obstacles pose a significant threat to the combined arms battalion’s momentum.
Once a combined arms battalion element detects an obstacle, it immediately distributes its
location and description on FM radio or digitally. The battalion quickly seeks a secure and
favorable bypass. If a bypass is available, the unit in contact with the obstacle exploits and
marks the bypass; it also digitally distributes the bypass around the obstacle as soon as
possible. Enemy forces normally cover obstacles with fires. Units should approach all
obstacles and restrictive terrain with the same diligence with which they approach a known
enemy position.
5-126. When the combined arms battalion must breach, it takes the steps to execute the
breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA) to create
a breach lane and continue the movement to contact. Engineer forces from the main body
support the breach effort by creating lanes, improving the marking of lanes, and guiding the
main body through the obstacle.
5-127. When the obstacle is civilians, PSYOP assets may be employed to clear the obstacle
by redirecting the civilians away from the route of advance. It may be considered that the
enemy may cover this type of obstacle with both lethal and nonlethal fires to degrade
clearing efforts.

DESTRUCTION OF SMALL ENEMY FORCES

5-128. The combined arms battalion destroys small enemy forces with a combination of fires
(both lethal and nonlethal) and maneuver. Depending on the battalion commander’s bypass
criteria, the advance guard may fix small enemy forces identified by the R&S force. Once it
fixes the enemy, the advance guard leaves a small combat force to contain the enemy until
the main body can destroy it.
5-129. The advance guard must provide the location of such a fixed enemy force to the
battalion S3 and S2, who then distribute the information to all units in the battalion via FM
or digital means. Detailed cross talk between main body commanders and fixing force
commanders is critical to coordinate actions and avoid fratricide. The fixing force directs or

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guides the main body elements to the best location to attack the enemy force. Once the
battalion destroys the enemy, all forces quickly move to continue the advance.

REPORT AND BYPASS

5-130. When conducting a movement to contact as part of a larger force, the higher
commander (brigade/UEx) establishes bypass criteria that allow the combined arms
battalion to report and bypass enemy forces of a specific size. When an enemy force meets
the bypass criteria, the combined arms battalion fixes the enemy force and leaves a small
force to maintain contact while the remainder of the battalion continues the advance. Once
bypassed, the destruction of the enemy force becomes the responsibility of the combined
arms battalion’s higher commander (brigade/UEx).
5-131. Bypassed forces present a serious threat to forces that follow the maneuver elements,
especially sustaining operations elements. It is imperative that the bypassed enemy forces’
locations and strengths are distributed throughout the combined arms battalion to enable
following units to move around these threats.

MEETING ENGAGEMENT
5-132. A meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when the combined arms
battalion, not completely deployed for battle, collides with and engages a sizable enemy force
at an unexpected time and place or as the result of a movement to contact. The enemy force
may be moving or stationary. The goal, once in contact, is to maneuver quickly to overcome
the enemy before he can react. This requires the battalion commander to keep his force in a
posture ready to react immediately to contact and develop the situation. Subordinate
companies must quickly react to contact, develop the situation, report, and gain a position of
advantage over the enemy to give the battalion time and space to act effectively. The
combined arms battalion’s success depends on its subordinate units’ ability to develop the
situation effectively. The steps to do this follow:
When initial contact is made, the first unit to engage the enemy must quickly
determine the size and activity of the enemy force and avoid being fixed or
destroyed. If possible, the friendly force that makes initial contact avoids detection.
If the enemy is moving, the friendly force making initial contact determines the
direction of movement and the size and composition of the force. Forward observers
place fires on the lead enemy forces. Speed of decision and execution is critical
when the enemy is moving.
If the enemy is stationary, the friendly force determines whether the enemy force is
occupying prepared positions and whether they are reinforced by obstacles and
minefields. The friendly force attempts to identify antitank weapon positions, the
enemy’s flanks, and gaps in his positions.
The battalion advance guard moves quickly to overpower and destroy platoon-sized
and smaller enemy security forces. Larger enemy forces normally require
deployment of the main body. The advance guard protects the main body by fixing
enemy forces larger than platoon size, which allows the battalion main body to
retain its freedom to maneuver.
In developing the situation, the advance guard commander maintains pressure on
the enemy by fire and maneuver. He probes and conducts a vigorous
reconnaissance of the enemy’s flanks to determine the enemy’s exact location,
composition, and disposition. The advance guard immediately transmits this
information to the battalion commander and main body units.
The battalion commander uses this information to develop a plan of action by
selecting a maneuver option from the several actions-on-contact options developed
during planning.

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MANEUVER OPTIONS
5-133. Timely and accurate intelligence will facilitate the combined arms battalion
commander in his selection of the appropriate maneuver option. Normally, the battalion
commander makes the final decision for execution of a maneuver option based on the
progress of the initial engagement of the advance guard. The battalion movement to contact
generally ends with the commitment of the main body. The following paragraphs provide a
general description of the options that may develop after a movement to contact.

Bypass
5-134. If rapid forward movement is required and the brigade commander has authorized
bypass of enemy forces, the combined arms battalion can bypass. If the size and mobility of
the bypassed force represents a threat, the combined arms battalion must fix or contain the
enemy force until released by the BCT.

Hasty Ambush
5-135. Ambush is effective against a moving or infiltrating force that is not aware of the
presence of the combined arms battalion. Instead of immediately engaging the enemy, the
advance guard (and possibly the entire battalion) moves into hasty attack-by-fire positions
oriented on an engagement area. This option is enabled by the information available from
FBCB2/BFT and the speed and accuracy with which fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and
other instructions can be passed. When most of the enemy is in the engagement area, the
battalion uses massed fires and maneuver to attack the enemy.

Attack
5-136. The battalion commander directs an attack when the combined arms battalion has
greater combat power than the enemy or when he assesses that the battalion can reach a
decisive outcome. The battalion commander quickly develops a scheme of maneuver and
concept of fires for the attack and digitally distributes orders to subordinate companies. The
battalion commander employs fires, CAS, and situational obstacles. He controls the
movement, deployment, and possible changes to the task organization of the combined arms
battalion forces. The envelopment is normally the most desirable form of maneuver and is
used when there is sufficient maneuver space. The battalion commander normally seeks to
envelop the enemy force by fixing or blocking the bulk of the enemy force and then attacking
a vulnerable flank. A penetration is normally used against a stationary enemy force that
does not have an assailable flank, such as one in a perimeter defense. After a successful
attack, the battalion may continue the movement to contact or execute other missions as
directed by the brigade commander.

Defend
5-137. The battalion commander directs a defense when the combined arms battalion has
insufficient combat power to attack or when the enemy’s superior strength forces the
combined arms battalion to halt and prepare for a more deliberate operation. The battalion
maneuvers to the best available defensible terrain—either to the front or rear. The battalion
commander may direct the advance guard or another security force to delay an enemy attack
to provide time for establishment of the battalion defense. Companies quickly deploy,
establish security, array forces, and develop fire and obstacle plans. Special emphasis is
placed on flank protection and adjacent unit coordination. As the enemy attacks, the
battalion commander repositions and maneuvers forces to defeat the enemy through massed
fires, situational obstacles, and counterattacks. The battalion commander seeks to defeat an
attacking enemy force and create the opportunity for offensive action. In some cases, the

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combined arms battalion may need to retain its position to allow the brigade commander
time to commit additional forces.

Retrograde
5-138. The battalion commander directs a retrograde (Figure 5-14) when the combined arms
battalion lacks the combat power to attack or defend, improve a tactical situation, or prevent
a worse situation from developing. Lead elements of the battalion establish initial defensive
positions while nonessential combat support (CS) and sustaining operations assets reposition
to the rear. Indirect fires, obstacles, and smoke are employed to assist forward elements with
disengagement and displacement. Combined arms battalions in contact avoid becoming
decisively engaged.

Figure 5-14. Combined Arms Battalion in Retrograde

ATTACKS
5-139. An attack at the combined arms battalion level is a type of offensive action
characterized by close combat, direct fire, maneuver, and support from indirect fires. When
the battalion commander decides to attack, he must mass the effects of overwhelming
combat power against a portion (or portions) of the enemy force or terrain with a tempo and
intensity that the enemy cannot match. Information dominance enables the battalion
commander to choose the places where he wants to attack the enemy, places where the
enemy is weak and least prepared for an attack and where the combined arms battalion has

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the greatest opportunity for success. The following paragraphs discuss the tactics for
conducting:
A force-oriented attack against a stationary enemy force.
A force-oriented attack against a moving enemy force.
A terrain-oriented attack.
5-140. Attacks range along a continuum defined at one end by FRAGOs that direct the rapid
execution of battle drills by forces immediately available and at the other end by detailed
plans and orders. These attacks rely more on an implicit understanding than on electronic
communication with detailed orders and appropriate branches and sequels that make
understanding explicit. At one extreme of the continuum, the combined arms battalion
discovers the general enemy situation through a movement to contact and launches an
attack as a continuation of the meeting engagement to exploit a temporary advantage in
relative combat power and to preempt enemy actions. At the other extreme of the continuum,
the combined arms battalion moves into an attack from a reserve position or assembly area
with detailed knowledge of the enemy, a task organization designed specifically for the
attack, and a fully rehearsed plan. Most attacks fall somewhere between the two ends of the
continuum.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ATTACK

5-141. As discussed earlier, the objective of an attack may be force or terrain oriented. A
terrain-oriented objective requires the combined arms battalion to seize or secure a
designated geographical area. A force-oriented objective requires the combined arms
battalion to focus its efforts on a designated enemy force. The enemy force may be stationary
or moving. All attacks depend on synchronization for success. They require planning,
coordination via digital or analog means, and time to prepare.
5-142. By properly leveraging the digital INFOSYS and sensors, the battalion commander
and staff are able to obtain near-real-time knowledge of enemy composition, locations,
activity, and probable intentions. The information systems available to the combined arms
battalion facilitate detailed planning, but the substance of sound planning depends on the
abilities of a well-trained commander and staff. With the information available, the battalion
commander is better able to war game and plan his actions against an enemy force from
either stationary or moving command and control (C2) platforms. While the combined arms
battalion plans, the enemy will improve his defenses, disengage, or conduct spoiling attacks
of his own. Clearly, planning must be accomplished in the shortest time possible and must
accommodate changes based on what the enemy does.
5-143. The battalion commander and his staff translate the assigned mission from the BCT
into specific missions for subordinate company teams. The staff immediately forwards these
missions, along with the appropriate portions of the brigade’s plans and orders, digitally to
subordinate company teams to facilitate parallel planning. Commanders at all levels work
together to develop the best plans. This requires sharing information freely between the
command posts. The goal is not just to reduce the time required to produce and distribute
the plans; the real goal is to produce a better plan by including input from adjacent, higher,
and lower elements. Additionally, this collaboration promotes buy-in and understanding of
the plan, thereby enhancing preparation and execution.

FORCE-ORIENTED ATTACK AGAINST A STATIONARY ENEMY

FORCE
5-144. The combined arms battalion may attack a stationary enemy force as part of a
counterattack, a spoiling attack, or an initial attack against an enemy defense. The

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combined arms battalion may also attack a stationary force as part of a brigade movement to
contact or exploitation.

PLANNING
5-145. The focus of planning at the battalion level is to develop a fully synchronized plan
that masses all available combat power against the enemy.

SCHEME OF MANEUVER
5-146. The combined arms battalion directs its main effort against an objective, ideally an
enemy weakness, which will cause the collapse of the enemy defense. The combined arms
battalion seeks to attack the enemy’s flanks, rear, or supporting formations. By doing so, the
combined arms battalion retains the initiative and reduces its own vulnerabilities.
5-147. The commander seeks to identify a poorly defended avenue of approach, a small unit
lacking mutual support within the enemy defense, or a weak flank that he can exploit to
gain a tactical advantage. When attacking a well-prepared enemy defense, the battalion
commander normally plans to isolate and then destroy small vulnerable portions of the
enemy defense in sequence. The commander and staff develop the plan using a reverse
planning process from actions on the objective back to the LD or assembly area. They
incorporate plans for exploiting success and opportunities that may develop during
execution. They emphasize synchronization of mounted and dismounted movement,
maneuver, fires, and support throughout the attack.
5-148. The commander and staff must consider the enemy’s strength and obstacles to
determine when and where the combined arms battalion may need breaching operations.
The size of the enemy force overwatching the obstacle drives the type of breach the combined
arms battalion conducts and whether the battalion can conduct a successful breaching
operation. The commander and staff consider the enemy’s ability to mass combat power,
reposition his forces, or commit his reserve. The combined arms battalion then develops a
scheme of maneuver to mass sufficient combat power at an enemy weakness. The location
selected for breaching and penetration depends largely on a weakness in the enemy’s defense
where its covering fires are limited.
5-149. The reverse planning process is an essential tool in building an effective plan to
attack a defending enemy. By starting with actions on the objective and working back to the
LD, the staff can allocate combat power, mobility assets, and indirect fires (suppression and
obscuration).

FIRE SUPPORT
5-150. The following are considerations for the FS plan:
Position fire support assets to support the reconnaissance effort.
Use deception fires to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main effort.
Plan suppressive and obscuration fires at the point of penetration.
Plan suppressive and obscuration fires in support of breaching operations.
Plan fires in support of the approach to the objective. These fires engage enemy
security forces, destroy bypassed enemy forces, and screen friendly movement.
Synchronize fires on the objective to achieve the effects of suppress, neutralize, and
destroy critical enemy forces that can most affect the combined arms battalion’s
closure on the objective.
Plan fires beyond the objective to support an attack or defense.
Use indirect fires and CAS to delay or neutralize repositioning enemy forces and
reserves.

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Plan locations of critical friendly zones (CFZs) to protect critical actions and high-
value targets (HVTs), such as support forces, breaching efforts, and artillery assets.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
5-151. Maintaining the mobility of the combined arms battalion in offensive operations is
critical. The battalion engineer must plan and allocate mobility resources to the security
force, advance guard, and main body. The security force has just enough mobility resources
to cover its own movement and to complete the reconnaissance mission. The advance guard
needs enough resources to conduct breaching operations, such as opening lanes through
obstacles for the main body to pass. (Refer to Chapter 12 and FM 3-34.2 for a detailed
discussion of combined arms breaching operations.) If the obstacle is complex or covered by a
relatively larger force, the main body deploys to conduct a breaching operation. Engineer
task organization is based on supporting the combined arms battalion breaching operations
with minimal engineer assets under battalion control to transition to a breach in support of a
deliberate attack, if needed. The combined arms battalion uses situational obstacles to
attack an enemy’s vulnerability or specific COA and can use situational obstacles to help
secure the battalion flanks. The following are considerations for the scheme of engineer
operations:
Plan for adjustment of the breach location based on the latest obstacle intelligence.
Ensure information on obstacles receives immediate battalion-wide dissemination,
including supporting platforms and units.
Ensure digital terrain support system (DTSS) products are available and
distributed on point of penetration, planned breach locations, and possible
bypasses.
Ensure adequate mobility support is task organized well forward during the
approach to the objective to support breaching requirements for complex obstacles.
Mass engineers to support breaching operations.
Support assaulting forces with engineers to breach enemy protective obstacles.
Ensure adequate guides, traffic control, and lane improvements to support
movement of follow-on forces and sustaining operations traffic.
Use situational obstacles for flank security.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL SUPPORT

5-152. The following are considerations for CBRN:
Ensure the reconnaissance platoon is prepared for CBRN reconnaissance tasks.
Disseminate any detected CBRN threats throughout the battalion immediately via
FBCB2 and FM voice.
Integrate and synchronize the use of smoke to support critical actions such as
breaching or assaults and ensure artillery, mortar, and mechanical smoke are
complementary.
Develop decontamination plans based on the commander’s priorities and
vulnerability analysis and disseminate planned and active decontamination sites
via FBCB2.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
5-153. The following are considerations for the sustaining operations plan:
Integrate the movement and positioning of sustaining operations assets with the
scheme of maneuver to ensure immediate support of anticipated requirements.

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Ensure adequate sustaining operations support to the reconnaissance and

surveillance effort. The S4 must plan well and integrate timely resupply and
evacuation support of forward reconnaissance and surveillance assets into the ISR
plan. He focuses on medical evacuation, especially air evacuation.
Plan immediate support to high-risk operations such as breaching or assaults
through the forward positioning of support assets.
Plan for reorganization on or near the objective once the combined arms battalion
secures the objective and articulate clear priorities of support during
reorganization.

PREPARATION
5-154. The combined arms battalion uses available time prior to the force-oriented attack to
conduct extensive reconnaissance, precombat checks and inspections, and rehearsals while
concealing attack preparations from the enemy. The battalion commander and staff refine
the plan based on continuously updated intelligence. They use digital tools to allow
subordinate company teams maximum time to prepare. Subordinates conduct parallel
planning and start their preparation for the attack immediately after the battalion issues a
FRAGO. As more intelligence becomes available, the battalion commander revises orders
and distributes them via FM or FBCB2/BFT, thereby giving subordinates more time to
prepare for the attack. Regardless of the time available, the battalion commander must
conduct detailed planning and supervision of subordinate preparations.

INSPECTIONS
5-155. The battalion commander supervises subordinate troop-leading procedures to ensure
planning and preparations are on track and consistent with his intent. The commander may
inspect subordinate unit order briefs and rehearsals. He focuses his inspections on the main
effort and critical events such as assaults, breaching operations, and passages of lines. Since
the battalion commander cannot be everywhere at once, he maximizes the use of other key
leaders and technology to assist him. Subordinate orders, provided digitally (when possible)
back to the combined arms battalion staff, allow the staff to check for congruence with the
battalion plans.

REHEARSALS
5-156. The combined arms battalion usually conducts rehearsals, but the type and rehearsal
technique may vary based on time available. During the combined arms rehearsal (CAR), the
battalion S2 portrays a thinking, uncooperative enemy with emphasis on enemy
repositioning, employment of fires, and commitment of reserves. The primary focus of the
rehearsal is actions on the objective. Each subordinate commander addresses the conduct of
his mission as the rehearsal progresses. The rehearsal places special emphasis on timing of
actions and the coordinated maneuver of forces. All subordinate commanders must
accurately portray how long it takes to complete assigned tasks and how much space is
required by their force. Direct- and indirect-fire plans are covered in great detail, including
the massing, distribution, shifting, lifting, and control of fires. The commander ensures
subordinate plans are coordinated and consistent with his intent. The rehearsal also covers
the following:
Plans to execute follow-on missions or exploit success.
Likely times and locations where a reserve is needed.
Execution of the FS plan, including shifting fires, employing CAS, adjusting
FSCMs, employing PSYOP, and positioning observers.
Breaching operations.
Passages of lines.

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Contingency plans for actions against enemy counterattacks, repositioning,

commitment of reserves, or use of CBRN capabilities.
Consolidation and reorganization.
Execution of branches or sequels assigned by brigade.
Execution of the sustaining operation plan (OPLAN), including UMCP, casualty
evacuation (CASEVAC), movement of combat trains, and emergency resupply
usage and movement.

RECONNAISSANCE
5-157. Effective and current intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful attack. Before
mounting an attack, the commander needs to determine the enemy’s strength and
disposition. In an attack, the entire intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
process must rapidly respond to the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
The BCT provides most of the information available to the combined arms battalion
commander and staff through FM updates and cross talk as well as ASAS updates based on
the brigade’s collection plan and the actions of the brigade reconnaissance squadron. The
battalion commander must receive an accurate picture of the enemy’s defense so he can
decide on a COA and act faster than the enemy can react. Often, the brigade reconnaissance
squadron can provide the best information to focus the combined arms battalion’s attack.
5-158. When preparing for an attack, the battalion commander and staff participate in
development of the ISR plan. This is a well-resourced and coordinated reconnaissance effort
that provides a detailed picture of the enemy situation prior to execution of the attack. This
reconnaissance effort must include redundant information-gathering systems to ensure
continuous flow of information to the battalion and, correspondingly, to the brigade. The
combined arms battalion commander uses this intelligence to decide on a COA and make
refinements to the plan. The ISR effort also provides him continuous updates during the
attack so he can adjust execution of the operation based on the enemy’s reactions.

ENEMY’S CURRENT ARRAY OF FORCES

5-159. The intelligence available to the combined arms battalion comes from a continuous
stream of information that begins with ISR systems, such as the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), battalion scouts, and the
brigade reconnaissance squadron, to establish the intelligence links to the combined arms
battalion.
5-160. The first priority is to confirm information available on the enemy’s composition,
disposition, capabilities, and most probable COA. The next priorities are the effects of
weather and terrain and how the enemy is likely to fight. The S2 attempts to identify what
the enemy will do and what information the combined arms battalion needs to confirm about
the enemy’s action. The battalion ISR effort focuses on identifying indicators required for
confirming the enemy’s actual COA. This information is vital for developing and refining
plans. Ideally, the combined arms battalion does not make final decisions on how to execute
the attack until it can identify the current array of enemy forces. Key areas to identify for a
defending enemy force include the following:
Composition, disposition, and capabilities of enemy forces along a flank or at an
area selected for penetration.
Composition, disposition, and capabilities of security forces.
Location, orientation, type, depth, and composition of obstacles.
Locations of secure bypasses around obstacles.
Composition, disposition, and capabilities of defending combat formations within
the enemy’s MBA.

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Composition, disposition, capabilities, and location of reserves.

Location of routes the enemy may use to counterattack or reinforce his defense.
Types of enemy fortifications and survivability efforts.
5-161. Reconnaissance forces patrol to gain intelligence. As time permits, reconnaissance
assets observe the enemy defense from advantageous OPs to locate gaps, identify weapon
systems and fighting positions, view rehearsals and positioning, and determine the enemy’s
security activities and times of decreased readiness. The S2 must discern any enemy
deception efforts, such as phony obstacles, dummy emplacements, and deception positions,
designed to confuse an attacker.

ENEMY ENGAGEMENT AREAS

5-162. The battalion commander, supported by the S2, seeks to define the limits of the
enemy engagement areas. This includes locations where the enemy can mass fires, weapon
ranges, direct-fire integration with obstacles, ability to shift fires, and mutual support
between positions. This analysis requires effective terrain analysis, confirmed locations of
enemy weapons systems (by system type), and a good understanding of the enemy’s tactics.
Reconnaissance forces report locations, orientation, and composition of defending weapon
systems and obstacles. The analysis of the enemy’s direct and indirect fire and obstacle plan
assists the commander in determining when the combined arms battalion must deploy, how
to time and use indirect fires, how to avoid maneuvering inside the enemy’s engagement
area (EA), and how feasible the enemy scheme of maneuver is. The use of long-range indirect
fires allows the commander to shape what the enemy can do relative to engagement areas.
Key to such actions is the emplacement of complex obstacles.

ENEMY’S VULNERABILITIES
5-163. The intelligence system and ISR effort also seek to identify enemy vulnerabilities,
which may include the following:
Gaps in the enemy’s defense.
Exposed or weak flanks.
Enemy units that lack mutual support.
Unobserved or weakly defended avenues of approach to the enemy’s flank or rear.
Covered and concealed routes that allow the combined arms battalion to close on
the enemy.
Weak obstacles or fortifications in an enemy defense, especially along a flank.

SUPPORT ON THE APPROACH TO THE OBJECTIVE

5-164. Reconnaissance elements initially focus on the enemy’s security forces forward of his
main defense to locate his positions and obstacles along the combined arms battalion’s
planned routes of advance. Reconnaissance forces also locate gaps and routes that allow
them to infiltrate into the enemy main defensive area or rear area. The ISR effort seeks to
locate enemy forces that may reposition and affect the battalion’s approach to the enemy’s
main defense. Successful attacks depend on reconnaissance forces’ directing indirect fires on
targets in the enemy’s rear that isolate the enemy’s frontline forces and prevent them from
being reinforced. A rapid, secure advance to the enemy’s main defense depends on the
reconnaissance effort’s locating enemy security forces and obstacles.

EXECUTION
5-165. The battalion commander positions ISR assets to maintain observation of enemy
reactions to the battalion’s maneuver on the objective. Reconnaissance assets focus on areas

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that the enemy will likely use to reposition forces, commit reserves, and counterattack. As
the force-on-force engagement on the objective develops, reconnaissance elements report
enemy reactions, repositioning, and BDA. Reconnaissance elements target and engage
enemy repositioning forces, reserves, counterattacking forces, and other high-payoff targets
(HPTs) with indirect fires. Early identification of enemy reactions is essential for the
combined arms battalion’s ability to maintain the momentum and initiative during the
attack.

Approach to the Objective

5-166. During the approach, the combined arms battalion is ready to:
Bypass or breach obstacles.
React to artillery, chemical strikes, air attack, and electronic warfare (EW).
Transition to different formations based on the terrain and enemy situation.
Employ forces to screen or guard flanks that may become exposed or threatened
during the approach.
Avoid terrain features that are likely enemy artillery reference points, locations for
chemical strikes, or locations for situational obstacles.
Destroy or force the withdrawal of opposing enemy security forces.
Minimize the effects of enemy deception.
5-167. When the situation permits, a defending enemy generally establishes a security and
disruption area around his forces to provide early warning of an attack, deny friendly
reconnaissance, and disrupt the friendly forces’ attack. The strength of the enemy’s security
area depends on the time available, forces available, and his doctrine or pattern of
operations. The combined arms battalion must counter the effects of enemy security forces to
ensure an unimpeded and concealed approach. Before the attack, reconnaissance forces seek
to locate enemy security forces. Once located, the commander has the following options
available:
Destroy them immediately with indirect fires and CAS (preferred option).
Destroy them with indirect fires and CAS during the approach to the objective.
Conduct limited objective attacks prior to execution of the main attack.
Employ a strong advance guard to destroy or force the withdrawal of enemy
security forces during the approach to the objective.
5-168. The combined arms battalion must maintain a steady, controlled movement. Speed
and dispersion, facilitated by close coordination and communication, are the norm with
massing of weapons’ effects to destroy the enemy’s defense. If the formation is too slow or
becomes too concentrated, it is vulnerable to massed enemy fires.

Actions on the Objective

5-169. The battalion commander maneuvers combat forces and employs fires, situational
obstacles, and smoke to create favorable conditions for decisive maneuver against the enemy.
The commander commits maneuver forces and fires to isolate, then rupture, a small
vulnerable portion of the enemy’s defense to gain a flank or create a penetration. The
combined arms battalion achieves final destruction of the enemy force through the attack of
assaulting forces.

Fires
5-170. The combined arms battalion employs fires to weaken the enemy’s position and set
the conditions for success prior to closure within direct-fire range of the enemy.

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5-171. Initially, preparatory fires focus on the destruction of key enemy forces that can most
affect the scheme of maneuver. For example, during an attack to penetrate an enemy
defense, the initial focus of preparatory fires is to destroy the enemy positions at the selected
point of penetration. Preparatory fires may also:
Weaken or neutralize enemy reserves.
Emplace artillery-delivered situational obstacles to block enemy reserve routes into
the objective.
Deceive the enemy as to the battalion’s actual intentions.
Destroy enemy security forces.
Obscure friendly movements and deployment.
5-172. The coordination between fires and maneuver is critical. As maneuver forces
approach the enemy defense, the commander shifts fires and smoke to suppress and obscure
the enemy. Proper timing and adjustment of fires enable a secure closure by the maneuver
force on the enemy’s positions. The COP provides maneuver force locations and allows its
movement to be timed so that it can rapidly close on the enemy’s position with minimum
exposure to enemy fires. The commander must monitor the success of the preparatory fires
to determine whether adequate conditions exist for commitment of the force. Reconnaissance
elements provide BDA to the commander to assist him in making this decision. The
commander may need to adjust the speed of the combined arms battalion’s approach to the
objective.

Fix
5-173. The combined arms battalion can fix the bulk of the enemy forces into given positions
or pursue a COA that limits the options available to the enemy.
5-174. In limiting the options available to the enemy, the objective is to reduce the
uncertainty during the battle. The primary goal is to isolate the unit targeted for destruction
by preventing the enemy from laterally repositioning or reinforcing it.
5-175. A company (team) normally fixes the enemy force by attacking an objective that
isolates a portion of the enemy’s defense. In open terrain, the most common task for the
supporting force is to fix the enemy with direct and indirect fire. In more complex terrain,
the supporting force may need to seize terrain or destroy key enemy forces in limited
objective attacks. Demonstrations and feints may also fix the enemy. The use of fires and
CAS is vital in attacking enemy forces and reserves in depth to prevent their commitment
against the combined arms battalion.
5-176. Before commitment, forces remain dispersed and outside the enemy’s direct fire
engagement line, and they avoid exposing themselves to enemy observation. Forces not yet
committed use this time to conduct final preparations and make adjustments to their plans.
A key action during this time is the update of intelligence on enemy locations and conditions.
The S2 should have an updated intelligence summary available just prior to the battalion’s
crossing the LD. The commander uses assault positions, phase lines, terrain index reference
system (TIRS), or checkpoints to control the positioning of the forces not yet committed.
Commanders throughout the combined arms battalion continuously assess the situation.
Subordinate commanders anticipate decisions by the battalion commander based on tactical
information received. The commander commits subordinate forces when the desired levels of
enemy suppression, destruction, and obscuration are achieved. Timely reporting, cross talk,
accurate assessments, and sharing of information by subordinate commanders are
paramount.

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Decisive Maneuver
5-177. The attacker must be agile enough to concentrate his forces and mass his combat
power by decisive maneuver before the enemy can reorient his defense.
5-178. Normally, the destruction of a defending enemy force dictates an assault of the
objective. The supporting force shifts direct and indirect fires and repositions as required to
support the maneuver of assaulting forces. As the assaulting force is committed, the
battalion commander and staff ensure that current information is available on the following:
Locations and types of enemy contact on the objective.
Locations of reconnaissance forces.
Locations of lanes and obstacles, including lane markings.
Recognition signals and guides.
Specific routes to use for the approach.
Locations and orientations of fires from friendly forces.
Additions or modifications of graphic control measures.
Forward line of own troops (FLOT).
5-179. The previously dispersed assaulting force quickly assembles into combat formations
and rapidly maneuvers to destroy the enemy forces and clear assigned objectives. The
assaulting force moves along covered and concealed routes to an exposed enemy flank,
created penetration, or other position of advantage. Smoke assists with concealing the
movement of assaulting forces. The assault includes destruction of defending forces and
clearance of trenches and fortifications and may involve a combination of mounted and
dismounted movement. The battalion commander’s main focus is maintaining the
momentum and security of the assaulting force. The ISR effort continues to report enemy
repositioning, BDA, and enemy counteractions to the assault. The combined arms battalion
limits enemy repositioning and massing against assaulting forces through intense
supporting fires and CAS, a rapid assault, and employment of smoke.

FORCE-ORIENTED ATTACK AGAINST A MOVING ENEMY FORCE

5-180. The combined arms battalion is likely to attack a moving enemy force, especially
during a counterattack, spoiling attack, or exploitation or as a result of a movement to
contact.

PLANNING
5-181. In a force-oriented attack against a moving enemy force, the combined arms battalion
normally organizes in the same manner as a movement to contact. Key planning
considerations (Figure 5-15) are discussed below.

Where to Fight the Enemy

5-182. The decision on where to fight the enemy requires the commander have information
dominance over the enemy. The commander bases his decision on a clear understanding of
the effects of the terrain, the enemy situation, and what the enemy is expected to do. The
battalion commander and his staff select the most advantageous location to fight the
engagement and then determine other possible locations where the engagement may occur
based on a slower- or faster-than-expected enemy advance or the enemy’s use of an unlikely
avenue of approach. They identify these areas as objectives or AOs. The battalion
commander and staff must develop control measures to help coordinate actions throughout
the combined arms battalion’s battlespace. The battalion commander, assisted primarily by
the S3 and S2, develops DPs for the commitment of the combined arms battalion to each
location based on relative locations and rates of movement of the combined arms battalion

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and the enemy. The S2 carefully selects NAIs to identify the enemy’s rate and direction of
movement to support the commander’s decision of where to fight the engagement.

Figure 5-15. Planning the Attack

Maximizing the Advantages of the Terrain

5-183. The battalion commander uses the terrain to maximize the combined arms
battalion’s freedom of maneuver and lethality while limiting the freedom of maneuver
available to the enemy. He looks for avenues of approach that allow the combined arms
battalion to strike the enemy from a flank or the rear. One or two company teams block the
enemy’s advance while the other company teams attack into the enemy’s flank. In this
example, the terrain prevents the enemy from moving away from the main attack while also
protecting the combined arms battalion’s flank from an enemy attack (Figure 5-16).

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Figure 5-16. Example of a Combined Arms Battalion Flank Attack

5-184. Although he develops plans to fight the enemy at the most advantageous location for
the combined arms battalion, the commander retains enough flexibility to attack the enemy
effectively regardless of where the engagement develops. The COP provides subordinate
commanders the same picture available to the combined arms battalion commander and
enables them to anticipate changes to the base plan. The scheme of maneuver includes
provisions to fight the enemy in other AOs or objectives. For simplicity, the commander
seeks to keep the scheme of maneuver in each AO or objective as similar as possible.
5-185. In some situations, such as a movement to contact, the combined arms battalion may
have constraints in the time or ability to select when and where to fight a moving enemy
force. If so, the commander orders the combined arms battalion into the attack by using a
FRAGO based on his personal assessment and physical view of the battlefield. As the
intelligence community pushes for information, the commander quickly deploys and
maneuvers the combined arms battalion to develop the situation and defeat the enemy.

Fire Support
5-186. The following are key considerations for the FS plan:
Use fires to affect the enemy’s maneuver well forward of the combined arms
battalion, disrupting the enemy’s formations and timetable.
Destroy HPTs and security forces.
Carefully plan triggers, observer locations, and targets to maintain flexibility and
ensure achievement of required effects prior to contact with the enemy.

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Coordinate and synchronize with brigade the movement and positioning of artillery
(coordinate terrain requirements) to support EFETs within each objective or AO
and to engage HPTs before the enemy enters the selected objective or AO.
Retain flexibility to mass fires at the decisive point where the battle may occur.
Plan triggers to put targets into effect and cancel them based on the combined arms
battalion’s movement and the commander’s decision of where to fight the enemy.
Synchronize the movement and positioning of the mortar platoon with the scheme
of maneuver.
Synchronize the movement and positioning of PSYOP assets with the scheme of
maneuver.

Engineer Support
5-187. The following are key considerations for the scheme of engineer operations:
Task-organize engineer forces well forward to support breaching.
Normal priority of support is to the lead company team.
Be prepared to bypass or breach enemy situational obstacles.
Integrate situational obstacles with fires to affect the movement of the enemy in
support of the commander’s intent.
Plan obstacle belts, obstacle control measures, and situational obstacles to support
flank security.
Develop and adjust obstacles and triggers for execution based on the combined
arms battalion’s movement and the enemy situation.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Support

5-188. The CBRN assets are employed in a similar manner to their employment in an attack
against a stationary force. Smoke and CBRN reconnaissance assets typically support the
main effort.

Sustaining Operations
5-189. The following are key considerations for the sustaining operations plan:
Continuously update the sustaining operations plan, ensure the sustaining
operations plan is responsive and flexible enough to support all maneuver options,
and plan support from initiation of the operation to the final objective or LOA.
Integrate refueling and resupply operations with the scheme of maneuver.
Weigh the risk the extended distances create for security of MSRs and sustaining
operations assets based on the potential of undetected or bypassed enemy forces.
Use all available assets to develop and maintain an accurate enemy picture behind
the lead maneuver elements.
Plan and rehearse for enemy contact.
Plan and coordinate the locations, displacements, and routes of sustaining
operations assets to maintain responsive support.
Plan and develop triggers for activating and deactivating collection points and
logistics release points (LRPs) based on the combined arms battalion’s scheme of
maneuver.
Plan MEDEVAC, resupply, and equipment recovery to support anticipated
engagements within each AO or objective.

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PREPARATION
5-190. Preparation for an attack against a moving enemy force may be limited because the
opportunity to attack the enemy at the appropriate time and place depends on the enemy’s
movement. This forces the combined arms battalion to focus the preparation on executing
fires and maneuver actions within each AO or objective. The battalion commander prioritizes
each AO or objective area to ensure the battalion prepares for the most likely engagements
first. The battalion commander must ensure all subordinate companies and supporting
forces understand their role in each AO or objective area and the decision point for execution
of each. The leaders of the battalion rehearse actions for each COA against various enemy
conditions to promote flexibility and initiative consistent with the commander’s intent.
Repetitive rehearsals against likely enemy actions are essential for success at all levels.

Reconnaissance
5-191. The battalion ISR effort focuses on answering the CCIR to support the battalion
commander’s decisions on when and where to initiate fires, where to fight the enemy, and
how best to maneuver the battalion against the enemy. The S2 develops NAIs to identify
enemy actions and decisions that indicate the enemy’s selected COA. The following are key
intelligence considerations for attacking a moving enemy force.

Understand the Effects of the Terrain

5-192. The battalion commander must understand the effects of terrain on the battalion and
the enemy. This has the greatest impact on deciding where to fight the enemy. The S2
conducts a detailed terrain analysis and specifically identifies the following:
Locations and tactical advantages of key terrain.
Avenues of approach and mobility corridors for both enemy and friendly forces.
Advantageous locations for the combined arms battalion to fight the engagement.
Danger areas where friendly or enemy forces may become vulnerable. (Examples
include restricted terrain, chokepoints, obstacles, terrain that naturally exposes a
flank, and areas dominated by key terrain.)
Likely rates of movement for both forces.

Anticipate the Enemy’s Selected COA

5-193. The IPB details how the enemy is likely to move and fight. It emphasizes the enemy’s
likely formations and routes and how he will attempt to fight the ensuing meeting
engagement.
5-194. The analysis illustrates the enemy’s expected rate of movement and how the enemy
force is likely to be arrayed based on a detailed terrain and time-distance analysis. The
enemy normally has three general COAs:
Assume a hasty defense either before or after initial contact to retain control of
defensible terrain or limit the advantages the combined arms battalion may have.
Attack to defeat or penetrate the combined arms battalion.
Attempt to delay or bypass the combined arms battalion.
5-195. The S2 develops enemy COAs based on the enemy’s likely objective, capabilities,
strength, and known tactics. The S2 determines those enemy actions that may indicate the
enemy’s selection of a COA and ensures observers are positioned to detect and report these
indicators. The S2 must always portray the enemy’s flexibility, likely actions, and available
maneuver options. The goal is to identify the enemy’s most likely COA and have the
battalion anticipate and prepare for it.

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Gain and Maintain Contact

5-196. Preferably, the combined arms battalion establishes contact with the enemy using
digital sensor platforms well before it makes physical contact. The combined arms battalion,
with support from the BCT, receives intelligence from battlefield surveillance assets such as
UAVs, access to JSTARS, and other sensors used to track the moving enemy force.
Intelligence gathered by these sensors helps the combined arms battalion direct ground
reconnaissance assets to advantageous positions to observe and report information on the
enemy. Once contact with the enemy is made, the combined arms battalion maintains it
through the destruction of enemy forces.
5-197. The information gained from the sensors as well as ground reconnaissance elements
must be shared with all elements of the combined arms battalion as quickly as possible.
Information requirements normally include the following:
The enemy’s rate and direction of movement.
The enemy’s formation, strength, and composition, which includes locations of
security forces, main body, reserves, and artillery formations.
Enemy actions and decisions that indicate a future enemy action or intention.
Location of enemy HPTs.
Location, type, and activity of enemy key combat multipliers the combined arms
battalion commander intends to attack, such as artillery, engineers, air defense,
and logistics.
Enemy vulnerabilities such as exposed flanks or force concentrations at obstacles.

Support the Combined Arms Battalion’s Movement

5-198. Reconnaissance and surveillance forces move well forward of the combined arms
battalion. They reconnoiter obstacles and areas that may slow the combined arms battalion’s
movement and disrupt the timing and planned location of the attack. They seek to detect
obstacles, contaminated areas, enemy security forces, and suitable routes for the battalion’s
use.

Report Enemy Actions on Contact

5-199. As the engagement develops, friendly reconnaissance assets continue to report enemy
actions, BDA, and locations. Reconnaissance assets must occupy positions that provide good
observation of the engagement and are survivable throughout the course of the engagement.

EXECUTION
5-200. The following considerations apply to the conduct of the attack.

Maximize the Approach to the Objective

5-201. The combined arms battalion moves with deliberate speed. By gaining contact with
the enemy force quickly through the reconnaissance and surveillance force, the brigade can
use long-range fires and CAS to destroy and disrupt the enemy throughout his formation.
5-202. The combined arms battalion deploys, masses effects, and destroys the remaining
enemy before he can adequately react. The battalion commander adjusts the speed of the
combined arms battalion to ensure that fires have set appropriate conditions and that the
battalion arrives at the designated EA at the proper time in relation to the enemy. Effective
reporting and analysis of the enemy’s rate and direction of movement by R&S elements are
critical to the timing of the attack.

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5-203. The battalion commander seeks to conceal the movement of the battalion from the
enemy to maintain surprise. The combined arms battalion, moving dispersed, masks its
movement and maximizes its use of routes that provide cover and concealment. The use of
all current information available to enhance positive control of movement formations by all
subordinate units is essential to the combined arms battalion’s ability to mass against the
enemy. The battalion employs a robust reconnaissance effort to detect and destroy enemy
security forces that may warn the enemy force of friendly actions.

Take Action on the Objective

5-204. The combined arms battalion creates favorable conditions for decisive action by
weakening and disrupting the enemy’s formation, destroying his security forces, and fixing
the enemy’s main body. The combined arms battalion achieves final destruction of the enemy
through its main body’s attack.

Disrupt and Weaken the Enemy’s Formation

5-205. The combined arms battalion employs direct and indirect fires reinforced with
situational obstacles to set the conditions for EA fights, disrupting and weakening the enemy
before he gets to the EA. Indirect fires should provide time for the combined arms battalion
to maneuver before contact. Scouts normally control these initial fires for the battalion.

Defeat Enemy Security Forces

5-206. The enemy normally employs security forces to protect his main body. The enemy’s
ability to seize the initiative often rests on the success of his security forces. The combined
arms battalion must avoid, destroy, or fight through the enemy’s security forces to gain
contact with the bulk of the enemy force. The battalion commander employs fires in
conjunction with his advance guard to defeat the enemy’s security forces so the combined
arms battalion’s main body can decisively attack the bulk of the enemy force. Ideally, the
combined arms battalion’s advance guard attacks the enemy’s forward or flank security
forces to develop the situation. The battalion commander weights the advance guard with
maneuver forces and indirect fires to destroy the enemy’s security force rapidly and gain
contact with the enemy’s main body before the enemy can effectively react.

Fix the Enemy

5-207. The combined arms battalion normally fixes the enemy main body to create the
conditions for the main body’s attack. Normally, the battalion’s advance guard executes this
task once it destroys the opposing enemy security force. Indirect fires against the lead enemy
forces allow the advance guard to deploy and gain contact with the enemy main body. The
advance guard commander keeps the battalion commander informed of the enemy’s strength
and actions. It is paramount that the battalion commander receives accurate and timely
reports and analysis of the enemy situation. Reconnaissance elements assist the advance
guard commander in providing accurate information to the battalion commander. The
battalion commander must know the enemy main body’s strength, disposition, and reactions.
He uses this information to make final adjustments to the battalion main body’s attack.

Maneuver the Main Body

5-208. As the advance guard develops the situation, the battalion commander begins to
maneuver the main body to a favorable position for commitment.
5-209. The commander positions the combined arms battalion to attack the enemy
formation from an assailable flank where its total combat power can be massed against an
enemy weakness to reach a quick decision. Rapid movement and massed fires characterize

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this battalion-level attack. Indirect fires shift to suppress the enemy force that directly
opposes the main body’s attack. The battalion main body strikes the enemy force with
overwhelming strength and speed. As the main body maneuvers against the enemy, the
battalion FSO adjusts FSCMs to provide continuous support and ensure force protection.
5-210. If the battalion commander determines the enemy force is attempting to bypass or
avoid contact, he immediately directs indirect fires to delay and disrupt the enemy’s
movement away from the combined arms battalion. The commander maneuvers his forces to
quickly destroy or penetrate any enemy forces attempting to fix or delay the combined arms
battalion and strikes the bulk of the evading enemy force from the flank or rear.
5-211. Current tactical information is paramount to the battalion commander for the rapid
commitment of fires and maneuver forces during these decisive maneuvers. All commanders
involved must know the location of enemy and friendly forces and have their subordinates
ready to execute the battalion commander’s decisions. Proper use of the COP enhances the
coordination and integration of all elements.

TERRAIN-ORIENTED ATTACKS
5-212. Terrain-oriented attacks require the combined arms battalion to seize or secure a
designated area to support future operations. The battalion attacks to seize terrain-oriented
objectives for many reasons, for example:
To seize key terrain or structures such as bridges, airfields, or public services to
support follow-on operations.
To seize terrain such as chokepoints or routes to block enemy withdrawals,
reinforcements, or movements against the brigade’s main effort.
To secure an area to allow future operations such as a lodgment area.
5-213. The combined arms battalion plans and executes terrain-oriented attacks (Figure
5-17) in the same manner as attacks against enemy forces. The major distinction in a
terrain-oriented attack is that the combined arms battalion focuses its efforts on the seizure
and holding of terrain instead of the total destruction of the enemy. The battalion
commander plans and controls the attack to gain control of the terrain as quickly as possible
and conducts only necessary actions against the enemy. Success of the mission does not
normally entail decisive action against all enemy forces within the AO. The combined arms
battalion attacks only those enemy forces that directly affect the seizure of the objective or
that may impact on the future operation. Other key planning considerations that differ from
force-oriented attacks are discussed in the following paragraphs.

RECONNAISSANCE
5-214. The ISR effort, as in other attacks, capitalizes on all the battlefield surveillance
assets available to the BCT as well as those that belong to the combined arms battalion to
identify the enemy situation on the objective and any sizable enemy forces within the
battalion’s battlespace. Combined arms battalion ground reconnaissance elements occupy
advantageous positions to gain observation and report information on the enemy.
5-215. The battalion commander must consider enemy forces within his battlespace,
specifically in areas outside his AO but inside his area of interest (AI) that may react to the
combined arms battalion’s seizure of the objective. Once the battalion locates enemy forces,
reconnaissance forces seek to determine the full extent of the enemy’s strength and
disposition as well as possible bypasses the combined arms battalion may exploit.
5-216. The battalion commander, assisted by the S2, seeks to identify the possible reactions
of enemy forces to the battalion’s attack. The plan should retain the necessary flexibility to
succeed against all likely enemy reactions. As the S2 develops enemy COAs, he must identify

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those indicators that reveal the enemy’s commitment to a future action. He normally
considers enemy actions to defend in place, reinforce threatened enemy units, counterattack,
delay, or possibly withdraw.

Figure 5-17. Terrain-Oriented Attack

DEGREE OF RISK
5-217. The battalion commander must determine the degree of tactical risk he is willing to
accept by leaving or bypassing enemy forces in the combined arms battalion’s AO. He bases
this decision on the higher commander’s intent and established bypass criteria, the enemy’s
capabilities, and the commander’s assessment of the situation. The battalion commander
must recognize the potential effects that bypassed enemy forces may have on the combined
arms battalion’s sustaining operations and future operations. The battalion commander
normally employs economy-of-force missions to contain, guard, or fix bypassed enemy forces.
The tactical risk imposed by these bypassed forces is reduced by accurate and timely
reporting of their locations and status by way of FBCB2/BFT throughout the combined arms
battalion, especially to the elements moving behind the maneuver forces in the battalion’s
AO. Once the combined arms battalion secures the objective, other forces or fires can destroy
bypassed enemy forces or force their surrender.

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SEIZURE OF THE OBJECTIVE

5-218. Once it seizes the objective, the combined arms battalion conducts a hasty defense of
the area to prevent the enemy from recapturing it by counterattack. The battalion
commander seeks to position his forces in a manner that best defends the objective while
allowing a rapid transition to follow-on operations. Battalion reconnaissance and security
forces push forward of the objective to identify any enemy forces approaching the secured
objective. Battalion engineers provide countermobility and survivability support as required.
Battalion mortars may displace forward at this time to provide extended coverage beyond
the objective to defeat potential reserve/counterattack forces.

EXPLOITATION
5-219. Exploitation is not normally conducted below the brigade (HBCT/IBCT/SBCT) level.
Exploitation often follows a successful attack to take advantage of a weakened or collapsed
enemy. The purpose of exploitation can vary, but it generally focuses on capitalizing on a
temporary advantage or preventing the enemy from establishing an organized defense or
conducting an orderly withdrawal. To accomplish this, the BCT (or higher level unit) attacks
rapidly over a broad front to prevent the enemy from establishing a defense, organizing an
effective rear guard, withdrawing, or regaining balance. The BCT secures objectives, severs
escape routes, and may destroy all enemy forces. Failure to exploit success aggressively gives
the enemy time to reconstitute an effective defense or regain the initiative by a
counterattack.
5-220. The conditions for exploitation develop quickly. Often, the lead combined arms
battalion in contact identifies the collapse of the enemy’s resistance. The brigade commander
must receive accurate assessments and reports of the enemy situation to capitalize on the
opportunity for exploitation. Typical indications of the conditions for exploitation include the
following:
A significant increase in enemy prisoners of war (EPWs).
An increase in abandoned enemy equipment and materiel.
The overrunning of enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and logistics sites.
A significant decrease in enemy resistance or in organized fires and maneuver.
An intermixing of support and combat vehicles in formations and columns.
An increase in enemy rearward movement, especially of reserves and FS units.
5-221. Should the combined arms battalion conduct exploitation as part of a larger
operation, it may have the mission to seize a terrain-oriented objective. In this case, the
combined arms battalion avoids decisive engagement and moves to the objective as quickly
as possible. If assigned a force-oriented objective, the battalion seeks and destroys enemy
forces anywhere within its AO. The exploitation ends when the enemy reestablishes its
defense; all organized enemy resistance breaks down; or the friendly force culminates
logistically or physically.

PURSUIT
5-222. The combined arms battalion does not conduct a pursuit as an independent action.
Even at the brigade level, the risks associated with a pursuit operation generally outweigh
the benefits. However, if provided aviation assets or additional ground maneuver units, the
BCT can conduct a pursuit. If so, the combined arms battalion can serve as the direct-
pressure force or the encircling force.
5-223. A pursuit is ordered when the enemy can no longer maintain a coherent position and
tries to escape. Once ordered, the COP between the friendly direct-pressure and encircling

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forces is critical for the necessary synchronization. The brigade’s mission is the destruction of
the enemy rather than avoiding enemy contact.
5-224. The direct-pressure force organizes for a movement to contact and prepares to
conduct a series of hasty attacks. Encirclement results when a force is able to sever the
enemy’s LOC and prevent his reinforcement or escape. The encircling force must have
greater mobility than the enemy. The encircling force is usually created from uncommitted
forces and must be strong enough to protect itself from the enemy’s reserves and what is left
of the enemy’s main body. The direct-pressure force must track the movement of and
coordinate with the encircling force. Timing is key to success of the mission, and INFOSYS
are key to this synchronization. The encircling force should be prepared to conduct a hasty
defense until the direct-pressure force succeeds in destroying or forcing the enemy to
surrender. The ultimate goal of a pursuit is to fix the enemy between the direct-pressure
force and the encircling force and then to destroy the enemy.

SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

5-225. The combined arms battalion can launch attacks with various purposes to achieve
different results. These forms of attack include raids, feints, demonstrations, counterattacks,
and spoiling attacks.

RAIDS
5-226. A raid is a deliberate attack that involves the swift, temporary penetration of enemy
territory for a specific mission. A raid usually ends with a planned withdrawal. Raids are
usually small-scale attacks requiring detailed intelligence, preparation, and planning.
Typical raid missions accomplish the following:
Capture prisoners, installations, or enemy materiel.
Destroy enemy materiel or installations.
Obtain specific information on an enemy unit such as its location, disposition,
strength, or operating scheme.
Deceive or harass enemy forces.
Liberate captured friendly personnel.
5-227. The raiding force may vary in size from an infantry platoon to a combined arms
battalion task force. It may operate within or outside the combined arms battalion’s
supporting range. The raiding force moves to its objective (either mounted or dismounted) by
land, air, or water for a quick, violent attack. Once it completes the raid mission, the raiding
force quickly withdraws along a different route. The following are specific planning
considerations for a raid mission:
Conduct detailed reconnaissance and maintain constant surveillance of the raid
objective to ensure the enemy situation remains unchanged and within the
capability of the raiding force. Support from outside the combined arms battalion
helps to provide the intelligence needed to plan and conduct a raid successfully.
Position FS systems to provide immediate responsive fires during the approach,
actions on the objective, and withdrawal. Interdiction fires, deception fires,
counterstrikes, and situational obstacles reduce the enemy’s ability to react to the
raid.
Ensure proper security because the raiding force is vulnerable to attack from all
directions.
Establish clear abort criteria for the raid. These may include loss of personnel,
equipment, or support assets as well as changes in the enemy situation.
Develop contingency plans for contact prior to and after actions on the objective.

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Plan casualty evacuation and raiding force extraction throughout the entire depth
of the operation.
Plan rally points for units to assemble to prepare for the attack or to assemble after
the mission is complete and the force is ready to withdraw.
Consider logistical factors such as the types and numbers of vehicles and weapons
that the raiding party will have, movement distance, length of time the raiding
party will operate in enemy territory, and expected enemy resistance. Aircraft or
linkup provides CASEVAC or resupply of the raiding force, if required, during the
withdrawal.
Conduct withdrawal over a different route than that used to approach the objective.
5-228. The combined arms battalion may participate in an artillery raid as part of a UEx
operation. In such an operation, the combined arms battalion supports the positioning of
artillery. If necessary, the combined arms battalion fights through enemy forces to get the
artillery unit to the position required to strike the enemy deep as part of the UEx effort to
set the conditions for an attack at its level.

FEINTS
5-229. A feint is a form of an attack intended to deceive the enemy and, with limited contact,
draw attention and combat power (if possible) away from the main effort. Feints must be of
sufficient strength and composition to cause the desired enemy reaction. Feints must appear
real; therefore, some contact with the enemy is necessary. The feint is most effective under
the following conditions:
When it reinforces the enemy’s expectations.
When it appears to be a definite threat to the enemy.
When the enemy has a large reserve that it has consistently committed early.
When there are several feasible COAs open to the attacker.
5-230. The purposes of a feint may include the following:
To force the enemy to employ his reserves away from the main effort or to remain
in position.
To attract enemy supporting fires away from the main effort.
To force the enemy to reveal defensive fires or weaknesses.
To accustom the enemy to shallow attacks in order to gain surprise with another
attack.
5-231. Planning for a feint mission follows the same sequence as any other attack. Special
planning considerations include the following:
Ensure the feint is resourced to appear as the main effort or as a significant threat
to the enemy.
Establish clear guidance regarding force preservation.
Ensure adequate means of detecting the desired enemy reaction.
Designate clear disengagement criteria for the feinting force.
Assign attainable objectives.
Issue clear follow-on missions to the feinting force.

DEMONSTRATIONS
5-232. A demonstration is a form of an attack used for deception. It is made with the
intention of deceiving the enemy; however, contact with enemy forces is not sought.
Demonstrations support a UEx plan; combined arms battalions do not conduct
demonstrations alone. Demonstrations must be clearly visible to the enemy without being

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transparently deceptive in nature. Demonstration forces use fires, movement of maneuver

forces, smoke, EW assets, and communications equipment to support the deception plan.
Planning considerations include the following:
Establish a LOA for demonstration forces that allows the enemy to see the
demonstration but not to engage it effectively with direct fires.
Establish other security measures necessary to prevent engagement by the enemy.
Employ demonstrations to reinforce the enemy’s expectations and contribute to the
main effort.
Develop contingency plans for enemy contact to avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Issue clear follow-on missions to the demonstration force.
Establish the means to determine the effectiveness of the demonstration and assess
its effect on the enemy.

COUNTERATTACKS
5-233. A counterattack is an attack launched from the defense to defeat an attacking enemy
force or regain key terrain and ultimately regain the initiative. The counterattack is often
the deciding action in the defense and becomes the main effort on commitment. The
commander may plan counterattacks as part of the combined arms battalion’s defensive
plan, or the combined arms battalion may be the counterattack force for the BCT or UEx.

SPOILING ATTACKS
5-234. A spoiling attack is an attack launched from the defense to disrupt the enemy’s
attack preparations. Spoiling attacks focus on the enemy’s critical systems and forces that
have the greatest impact on his ability to mount an attack. Lucrative targets include C2
systems, intelligence assets, FS, and logistics. Spoiling attacks may be conducted as often as
needed to deny adequate attack preparation to the enemy. The combined arms battalion
normally conducts a spoiling attack as part of the higher headquarters operation. Spoiling
attacks are planned and executed in the same manner as an attack.

SECTION IV – TRANSITIONS
5-235. The combined arms battalion spends minimum time after concluding an engagement
or actions on the objective to consolidate and reorganize before continuing the attack. If
consolidation and reorganization are required, the commander decides the best time and
location to facilitate future operations and provides force protection. The combined arms
battalion must maintain a high degree of security when performing consolidation and
reorganization activities.

CONSOLIDATION
5-236. Consolidation is the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured
position. The combined arms battalion may need to consolidate to reorganize, avoid
culmination, prepare for an enemy counterattack, or allow time for movement of adjacent
units. The combined arms battalion makes consolidation plans for every mission, updates
them during the attack, and passes them to units as the attack is completed. Actions during
consolidation include the following:
Establishing contact (electronic, physical, or both) with adjacent friendly units.
Reestablishing communications (if required).
Eliminating pockets of enemy resistance.
Establishing security consistent with the threat.
Preparing defensive positions.

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Clearing obstacles or improving lanes to support friendly movement and

reorganization activities.
Planning and preparing for future operations.
Destroying captured enemy equipment and processing EPWs.
Maintaining contact with the enemy and conducting reconnaissance.
Cross leveling and conducting emergency resupply.
5-237. The combined arms battalion maintains contact with the enemy by redirecting the
scout platoon, directing small-unit patrols, pulling the latest intelligence from the higher
brigade S2, and possibly conducting limited objective attacks.

REORGANIZATION
5-238. Reorganization planning begins before and continues during the attack as losses
occur. Company teams must feed reports to the combined arms battalion as losses occur so
that the information entered into the sustaining operations system allows reporting of
casualties and movement of needed resupply and or replacements forward to arrive as the
battalion begins reorganization. The combined arms battalion immediately takes all
measures required to maintain its combat effectiveness or return to a specified level of
combat capability. If extensive reorganization is required, the combined arms battalion
conducts it during consolidation. Reorganization tasks include the following:
Establishing, if required, new tactical internet, unit task organization (UTO), and
digital connectivity.
Establishing and maintaining security.
Reestablishing the combined arms battalion chain of command, key staff positions,
and C2 facilities lost before or during the battle.
Treating and evacuating casualties.
Recovering and repairing damaged equipment as necessary.
Redistributing ammunition, supplies, and equipment as necessary.
Conducting resupply and refueling operations.
Repositioning C2 facilities, communications assets, and logistics for future
operations.
Reorganizing company teams and platoons if losses have occurred.

CONTINUING OPERATIONS
5-239. For all missions assigned, the combined arms battalion should plan for exploiting
success. However, at the conclusion of an engagement, the commander may be forced to
defend. The battalion commander considers the higher commander’s concept of operations,
friendly capabilities, and the enemy situation when making the decision to defend or
continue offensive operations.

DEFEND
5-240. The combined arms battalion conducts a defense when directed by higher
headquarters to repel an enemy counterattack, to avoid culmination, or to complete
reorganization activities. The combined arms battalion occupies the most defensible terrain,
which may require the battalion to attack to seize defensible terrain. Normally, the
combined arms battalion pushes its scout platoon out to establish a security area to provide
reaction time and early warning of enemy actions. Subordinate company teams occupy
designated AOs, quickly array forces, and develop fire plans. Normally, the battalion
commander seeks to array company teams to achieve an adequate level of defense and
facilitate future operations. Battalion engineers provide survivability support and emplace
obstacles as required to support the defense.

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 Chapter 6

Defensive Operations

The immediate purpose of defensive actions is to resist, defeat, or destroy

an enemy attack and gain the initiative for the offense. Defensive
operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop
conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive actions alone are
not decisive; they must be combined with or followed by offensive action.
The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion defends
temporarily to create the conditions necessary to resume offensive
operations to defeat the enemy decisively. As part of the HBCT, the
combined arms battalion may defend, conduct retrograde operations,
counterattack, or perform security operations or economy-of-force tasks.
Often, a defensive engagement requires the combined arms battalion to
execute several of these tasks over its course. Even within the conduct of
a brigade defense, the heavy combined arms battalion exploits
opportunities to conduct offensive operations in its area of operations
(AO) to deprive the enemy of the initiative and create the conditions to
assume the offensive.

SECTION I – FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

6-1. The main purpose of the defense is to force or deceive the enemy into attacking under
unfavorable circumstances, defeat or destroy his attack, and regain the initiative for the
offense. The defending commander seeks to dictate where the fight will occur, preparing the
terrain and conditions to his advantage while simultaneously denying the enemy adequate
intelligence. Defense is a temporary measure used to identify or exploit enemy weakness.
Use of the defense provides the opportunity to transition to the offense. In general, the
HBCT combined arms battalion defends to:
Defeat or destroy an attacking enemy.
Increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate his forces.
Gain time.
Deny enemy entry into an area or retain terrain.
Economize forces in one area to apply decisive force elsewhere.
Prepare to resume the offensive.
Develop favorable conditions for offensive actions.
Reduce the enemy’s capability for offensive operations.

ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSIVE ACTIONS

6-2. Defensive operations are organized around a framework of a security area and a main
battle area (MBA). The BCT commander must organize the defense based on his two organic

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heavy combined arms battalions, the two-battery artillery battalion, and reconnaissance
squadron. The BCT commander must request additional engineers and other combat
multipliers from the UEx to properly accomplish the assigned defense mission or may have
to request an adjustment of the defensive sector based on his ability to cover it. The
traditional doctrinal distances of a brigade defense must be reduced when executed by two
combined arms battalions heavy brigade, as increased digital awareness and the presence of
the brigade reconnaissance squadron will not offset only eight maneuver companies to
execute the BCT defense.

SECURITY AREA
6-3. The BCT normally establishes a security force in front of the main defense to provide
early warning, reaction time, and initial resistance to the enemy. Depending on the brigade
commander’s guidance and plan, the heavy combined arms battalion has several possible
security force missions and options. The HBCT combined arms battalion may:
Establish a battalion security area layered behind the BCT’s security area to add
depth to the effort.
Secure its own flanks and rear while BCT assets conduct the primary security area
effort forward of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
Conduct its own security effort in the absence of a higher echelon security force.
Provide units for the BCT security force. This could include the battalion scout
platoon, mortar platoon, or both; maneuver platoons or companies; or the entire
HBCT combined arms battalion.

Security Area Definition

6-4. The brigade commander defines the BCT’s security area, the battle handover line from
BCT to heavy combined arms battalion, the exact trace of the FEBA, and where he envisions
the main battalion-level fight will occur. From this, the combined arms battalion commander
can determine how to structure his security area and the array of forces to employ. If the
combined arms battalion commander must organize his own security force, he chooses from
three basic options:
Use the scout platoon only as a screening force.
Use the scout platoon in conjunction with the battalion mortars or a company
(team) (or in combination) in a guard mission.
Use a company (team) with or without the scout platoon and mortars in a guard
mission.

Specific Guidance and Tasks

6-5. No matter what task organization he implements, the battalion commander should
provide the force with specific guidance and tasks, which may include the following:
Duration of the mission.
Results to be achieved against the enemy.
Specific commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) with associated
named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs).
Avenues of approach to be monitored with priority intelligence requirements (PIR)
and last time information is of value (LTIOV).
Sustaining operations.
Disengagement and withdrawal criteria and rearward passage coordinating
instructions.
Follow-on tasks or missions.

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Simultaneous Missions
6-6. Using combined arms battalion resources to establish a security area while
simultaneously requiring the battalion to defend the MBA is risky and divides the attention
of the commander. Whenever possible, this should be avoided.

MAIN BATTLE AREA

6-7. The BCT and its heavy combined arms battalions deploy the bulk of their combat
power in the MBA. The brigade MBA extends from the FEBA to the rear boundary of the
forward combined arms battalions. HBCT combined arms battalion MBAs are subdivisions
of the brigade’s MBA. The FEBA marks the foremost limit of the areas in which the
preponderance of ground combat units deploy, excluding the areas in which security forces
are operating. The BCT commander assigns the combined arms battalion MBAs by
establishing unit boundaries. Brigade and heavy combined arms battalion commanders
establish defensive AOs, battle positions, or strongpoints to implement their concepts of
operations. As in all operations, commanders promote freedom of action by using the least
restrictive control measures necessary to implement their tactical concepts (Figure 6-1).

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSE

6-8. Much like offensive operations, the HBCT combined arms battalion differs from its
more traditional counterparts in its operational style as well as the forces available to
prepare and execute the defense. The characteristics of the defense remain largely
unchanged. Due to its advantages in information, lethality, and mobility, the heavy
combined arms battalion can defend in linear as well as nonlinear frameworks. The
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities provided by brigade, as well
as those within the heavy combined arms battalion structure, enable the battalion to locate
and discern the enemy’s main and supporting efforts. Preparation, security, disruption,
massing precise effects, and flexibility continue to characterize HBCT combined arms
battalion defensive operations.

PREPARATION
6-9. Against an opponent operating in a more conventional style, the HBCT combined arms
battalion commander determines likely enemy avenues of approach, likely enemy schemes of
maneuver, where to kill the enemy, integration of obstacles, unit positioning, integration of
indirect fires, and he assigns missions accordingly. The battalion S2, S3, and functional area
representatives execute the military decision-making process (MDMP) under the XO’s
supervision for the commander’s approval. The battalion command and control (C2)
architecture allows the commander to circulate on the battlefield while issuing guidance and
approving products throughout the process. The staff is able to interface with BCT and UEx
for sophisticated analysis of enemy courses of action (COAs) and friendly plans. Additional
defensive preparations include the following:
Designate a reserve.
Conduct rehearsals, including employment of the reserve and counterattack forces.
Position forces in depth.
Reinforce terrain with obstacles to favor the defender.

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Figure 6-1. Sample Defensive Graphics for Linear Operations

SECURITY
6-10. Since a force defends to conserve combat power for use elsewhere or at a later time,
commanders must always secure the force. The combined arms battalion ensures security by
employing reconnaissance elements (battalion scouts) throughout the depth and breadth of
its assigned AO. Deception and information operations aid in securing the force and confuse
the enemy as to the combined arms battalion’s manner of defense. The combined arms
battalion secures the force through integrated, synchronized, and coordinated security
operations, tying together the BCT reconnaissance squadron, battalion scouts, and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as well as UEx ISR assets.

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DISRUPTION
6-11. Defenders disrupt an attacker’s tempo and synchronization by countering his initiative
and preventing him from massing overwhelming combat power. Disruption attacks the
enemy’s will to fight. Fires, scatterable mines, unexpected defensive positions, local
counterattacks at all levels, and attacks delivered by a highly mobile striking force combine
to disrupt the enemy’s attack and break his will to continue offensive operations.
Repositioning forces, aggressive local force protection measures, and random employment of
roadblocks, ambushes, checkpoints, and information operations combine to disrupt the
threat of asymmetrical attack. Attacks on these elements disrupt enemy efforts to fight as a
combined arms team. Maneuver units deceive the enemy as to the nature of their defense
and employ local combined arms counterattacks to break the tempo of his attack. The BCT’s
integrated ISR capability produces dominant situational understanding (SU) that allows the
commander to see and prevent the enemy from fully preparing his attack.

MASSING EFFECTS
6-12. The HBCT combined arms battalion shapes and decides the battle by massing
(focusing, distributing, and shifting) the effects of overwhelming combat power (direct fire,
indirect fire, and obstacles). Effects should be synchronized around engagement areas (EAs)
in time and space and be rapid and unexpected so that they break the enemy’s offensive
tempo and disrupt his attack. The heavy combined arms battalion should use its digital SU
to assess the enemy and friendly situation and mass effects. Digital SU enables the
commander to see the enemy first and then focus friendly effects and combat power to defeat
the enemy attack.
6-13. The battalion commander employs integrated ISR to shift the effects of fires and
maneuver forces so that they are repeatedly focused and refocused to achieve decisive,
destructive, and disruptive effects on the enemy’s attack. The commander must be audacious
in achieving overwhelming combat effects at the decisive point by employing dominant SU to
take acceptable risks in other areas.
6-14. The critical planning piece for both maneuver and fire support during defensive
operations is EA development. Although EAs may also be divided into sectors of fire, it is
important to understand that defensive systems are not designed around the EAs but,
rather, around avenues of approach. EAs and sectors of fire are not intended to restrict fires
or cause operations to become static or fixed; they are used only as a tool to concentrate fires
and to optimize their effects. The seven steps listed below represent a way to build an EA.
Although listed sequentially, some steps (marked by an asterisk) can and should be done
concurrently.
Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
Determine likely enemy scheme of maneuver.
Determine where to kill the enemy.
Plan and integrate obstacles.*
Emplace weapon systems.*
Plan and integrate indirect fires.*
Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.

FLEXIBILITY
6-15. The defender gains flexibility by sound preparation, disposition in depth, retention of
reserves, and effective C2. The defense is characterized by rapid simultaneous and
collaborative planning with flexible execution. Contingency planning permits flexibility.
Flexibility also requires that the commander see the battlefield to detect the enemy’s scheme

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of maneuver early. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) determines likely enemy
actions, and reconnaissance efforts confirm or deny enemy COAs.

SECTION II – TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-16. There are three types of defensive actions: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde
operations. Each of these types of defensive actions contains elements of the others and
usually contains both static and dynamic aspects. HBCT combined arms battalions serve as
the primary maneuver elements or terrain-controlling units for the BCT in all types of
defensive operations. They may defend AOs or positions or may serve as security forces or
reserves as part of the brigade coordinated defense.

AREA DEFENSE
6-17. The area defense concentrates on denying an enemy force access to designated terrain
for a specific time. Outright destruction of the enemy may not be a criterion for success. The
focus is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually
supporting positions and controlling the terrain between positions. The defeat mechanism is
fires into EAs, usually supplemented by intervention of a reserve. The commander uses his
reserve force to reinforce fires, add depth, block penetrations, restore positions, or
counterattack to destroy enemy forces and seize the initiative. Area defenses are conducted
when:
The mission requires holding certain terrain for a specific period of time.
There is enough time to organize the position.
The HBCT combined arms battalion or BCT has less mobility than the enemy.
The terrain limits counterattacks to a few probable employment options.
The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few well-
defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy’s maneuver.
6-18. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander generally selects one of two general
techniques for an area defense—forward or defense in depth. However, the higher
commander may define the general defensive scheme for the combined arms battalion. The
specific mission may impose constraints such as time, security, and retention of certain areas
that are significant factors in determining how the HBCT will defend.

FORWARD DEFENSE
6-19. Due to its inherent lack of depth, the forward defense is the least preferred option. The
intent of a forward defense is to limit the terrain over which the enemy can gain influence or
control. The HBCT combined arms battalion deploys the majority of its combat forces near
the FEBA with the scout platoon establishing a relatively narrow security area (Figure 6-2).
The combined arms battalion fights to retain these forward positions and may conduct
counterattacks against enemy penetrations or destroy enemy penetrations in forward EAs.
While the battalion may lack depth, companies and platoons must build depth into the
defense at their levels. The combined arms battalion can expect to conduct a forward defense
for protection of critical assets or other forces or for political purposes such as defending an
ally’s threatened border. A combined arms battalion may defend forward under the following
conditions:

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Figure 6-2. Example of a Forward Defense With HBCT Combined Arms Battalion and
Companies Defending Forward

Terrain forward in the AO favors the defense.

Strong existing obstacles, such as a river, are located forward in the AO.
The assigned AO lacks depth due to the location of the area or facility to be
protected.
Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO is limited.
Higher headquarters directs the combined arms battalion to retain or initially
control forward terrain.

DEFENSE IN DEPTH
6-20. A defense in depth is the preferred option when tactical conditions allow. It reduces the
risk of the attacking enemy quickly penetrating the defense and affords some initial
protection from enemy indirect fires. It also limits the enemy’s ability to exploit a
penetration through additional defensive positions employed in depth. The defense in depth
provides more space and time to exploit intelligence and fire support assets to reduce the
enemy’s options, weaken his forces, and set the conditions for destruction. It provides the
commander with more time to gain information about the enemy’s intentions and likely

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future actions by taking full advantage of information systems (INFOSYS) and ISR
capabilities before decisively committing to a plan of his own. It also allows the HBCT
combined arms battalion to execute decisive maneuver by effectively repositioning
companies to conduct counterattacks or to prevent penetrations (Figure 6-3).

Figure 6-3. Defense in Depth

PLANNING
6-21. The battalion commander must consider all the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and
weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to
determine how best to concentrate his efforts and economize forces. Detailed analysis of
terrain may be the most important process that the commander and his staff complete. A
successful defense relies on a complete understanding of terrain to determine likely enemy
COAs and the optimal positioning of the HBCT combined arms battalion assets to counter
them. The commander’s keys to a successful area defense follow:
Capability to concentrate effects.
Depth of the defensive area.
Security.
Ability to take full advantage of the terrain.
Flexibility of defensive operations.
Timely resumption of offensive action.

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Security
6-22. Security is one of the first planning considerations for the HBCT combined arms
battalion. The brigade reconnaissance squadron, possibly with augmentation, precedes the
combined arms battalion to clarify the tactical situation. The battalion commander must give
the scout platoon specific PIR to allow for an efficient occupation of the AO and to position
itself for the preparation and execution of the area defense. On a noncontiguous battlefield, a
security force must be positioned between the protected force and the known or suspected
enemy locations. Tactical UAVs can be used to augment security operations in
noncontiguous operational areas.

Maneuver
6-23. In noncontiguous operations, the HBCT combined arms battalion often must defend
either on a broad front or in an AO so large that employing units in mutually supporting
positions is unrealistic. This requires a judicious effort by the battalion commander and his
staff in determining the positioning of maneuver forces. The combined arms battalion has
the unique ability to defend in restricted and severely restricted terrain with infantry while
also being able to cover mounted avenues of approach or open areas effectively with tanks
and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs). During the terrain analysis, the battalion commander
and staff must look closely for chokepoints, intervisibility lines, and reverse slope
opportunities to take full advantage of the combined arms battalion’s capabilities to mass
firepower while providing protection for the infantry.
6-24. Once the battalion commander has assigned areas of operations to his maneuver units,
he must determine any potential gaps between units. The HBCT combined arms battalion
should plan to cover these gaps with reconnaissance assets, aggressive patrolling from the
companies, and local observation posts. The combined arms battalion must plan local
counterattacks to isolate and destroy any enemy that manages to penetrate through a gap in
the AO. The commander should also plan to reposition units not in contact to mass the
effects of combat power against an attacking enemy.
6-25. The need for flexibility through the mobility of mechanized forces requires graphic
control measures to assist in C2 during local counterattacks and repositioning of forces.
Specified routes, phase lines (PLs), attack-by-fire positions, EAs, target reference points, and
other fire control measures are required for the effective synchronization of maneuver.
Operations by digital units still require graphical control measures to ensure that mutual
understanding and unit-to-unit coordination is achieved.

Positioning the Reserve

6-26. The battalion commander must designate and position the reserve in a location where
it can effectively react to several contingency plans. He must consider terrain, trafficability
of roads, potential EAs, probable points of enemy penetrations, and commitment time. The
brigade commander may direct the size of reserve as well as the location of the reserve. With
only eight maneuver companies in the two heavy combined arms battalions, the brigade
commander may find himself with limited options regarding the size, composition, and
assigned missions to the reserve. Battalion commanders must clearly understand the
brigade commander’s intent and directives in regard to reserves to ensure that the brigade
objectives are met. The reserve should be positioned outside the enemy’s direct-fire range in
a covered and concealed position. Information concerning the reserve may be considered
essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and protected from enemy reconnaissance.
The commander may choose to position his reserve forward initially to deceive the enemy or
to move the reserve occasionally to prevent it from being targeted by enemy indirect fires.

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6-27. The size of the reserve depends on the size of the area covered in the defense and the
clarity of expected enemy action. The HBCT combined arms battalion may need to defend an
AO so large that only local reserves are feasible due to reaction time and the number of
potential enemy COAs. The BCT may require attack aviation as a reserve due to the size of
the BCT AO and enemy situation. The brigade reconnaissance squadron, in conjunction with
the battalion scout platoon and other ISR assets, should be able to clarify enemy intentions
by gathering intelligence on the massing of forces, electronic signals, and troop movement.
This intelligence leads to SU and allows the commander to better focus his efforts to properly
position the reserve as well as focus and mass joint fires to defeat the enemy.
6-28. The combined arms battalion commander must give specific planning guidance to the
battalion reserve, including priority for planning. METT-TC may require that a battalion
commander designate a reserve that may be called on to accomplish tasks that include
focusing on the MBA and responding to other missions necessary to assist the battalion in
accomplishing its mission. The reserve retains flexibility through offensive action. To
generate larger ground maneuver reserves, the combined arms battalion commander will
have to redirect company or platoon committed elements after they have accomplished their
initial tasks or when the enemy’s defeat frees them for other tasks.
6-29. The speed, agility, and digitization at the unit level allow platoons and sometimes
companies to be committed, withdrawn, redirected, and recommitted during the fight. This
use of the reserve requires the best possible SU and a common operational picture (COP)
that is constantly updated with accurate enemy intelligence. Moving a unit from one area
(left to right or front to rear) requires each Soldier in the unit to know where he is as well as
where both the enemy and friendly forces are located.
6-30. Additionally, the movement of ground forces over the distances expected in the
expanded battlespace requires time. The time and distance (TDIS) relationship, especially
under limited visibility conditions and rough terrain, is a key factor in determining which of
the combined arms battalion units can realistically be considered for a reserve mission that
will require a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing multiple missions.
6-31. During preparation of the heavy combined arms battalion defense, the battalion
reserve may conduct other tasks. The battalion commander may initially position his reserve
in a forward location to deceive the enemy, obscure subordinate boundaries, or show
strength in an area where he intends to accept risk. The reserve may initially serve in the
combined arms battalion’s forward security area and provide area security for the logistics
sites or unoccupied areas of the battalion’s AO. However, the battalion commander must
consider the impact of these types of missions on his reserve force’s ability to prepare for its
critical role as the reserve during the MBA engagement.
6-32. The commander of the battalion reserve should also expect to receive specific decision
points and triggers for employment on each contingency. This allows the reserve commander
to conduct quality rehearsals and to anticipate his commitment as he monitors the fight.

Fire Support
6-33. The heavy combined arms battalion uses its organic 120mm mortars and the BCT
organic artillery for immediate fire support The FSO must thoroughly plan to mass organic
as well as joint fires to successfully execute the defense. The following are considerations for
the fire support plan:
Allocate initial priority of fires to the forward security force.
Plan targets along enemy reconnaissance mounted and dismounted avenues of
approach.
Engage approaching enemy formations at vulnerable points along their route of
march with indirect fires and CAS, if available.

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Plan the transition of fires to the MBA fight.

Develop clear triggers to adjust fire support coordination measures and priority of
fires.
Ensure integration of fires in support of obstacle effects.
Ensure integration of fires with battalion counterattack plans and repositioning
contingency plans.

Engineer Support
6-34. The transition to countermobility and survivability requires detailed planning at the
combined arms battalion level to ensure organic and augmenting engineers have adequate
time for troop-leading procedures. The two organic engineer companies in the HBCT must be
augmented with engineers from the UEx maneuver enhancement brigade to prepare the
brigade defense. Significant planning is required to optimize the work of the organic
engineer companies and to rapidly and efficiently employ augmenting modular engineers.
(Refer to Section VI for a detailed discussion of mobility, countermobility, and survivability
planning factors.) The following are key considerations:
Sight situational obstacles early.
Plan multiple locations to support depth and flexibility in the defense.
Ensure adequate security for obstacle emplacement systems.
Integrate triggers for execution of situational and reserve obstacles in the decision
support template.
Focus the countermobility effort to shape the enemy’s maneuver into positions of
vulnerability.
Ensure adequate mobility support for withdrawing security forces, the reserve, and
repositioning of MBA forces.
Ensure integration of survivability priorities for critical systems and units.

Aviation Support
6-35. In defensive operations, the speed and mobility of aviation can help maximize
concentration and flexibility. During preparation for defensive operations, aviation units
may support the heavy combined arms battalion commander with aerial reconnaissance and
fires.
6-36. During the defense, UEx aviation brigades can conduct close combat attack against
enemy concentrations and moving columns. Attack helicopter elements can be employed to
attack follow-on echelons before they can move forward to the close battle. Aviation forces
may also conduct screening operations, conduct guard operations of an open flank in
conjunction with ground forces, and serve as the brigade reserve.
6-37. Attack helicopters routinely support security area operations and mass fires during the
MBA fight. Synchronization of aviation assets into the defensive plan is critical to massing
fires and to preventing fratricide. Detailed ground-air integration and coordination is
necessary to ensure efficient use of aviation assets (see Appendix B). If the heavy combined
arms battalion is assigned aviation assets, it must give careful consideration to EA
development and involve the direct-fire planning and the supporting aviation unit through
its aviation liaison officer (LNO) in the planning process.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Support

6-38. Plans must be made for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
reconnaissance at likely locations for enemy employment of chemical agents as well as the
use of smoke to support disengagement or movement of forces.

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Sustaining Operations
6-39. Plans must be made to support the primary and alternate main supply routes (MSRs)
for the full depth of the defense, to coordinate MSRs to avoid interfering with maneuver or
obstacle plans, to specify routes for contaminated equipment movement, and to also consider
the use of prestocked classes of supply (Classes IV and V) in the defense.

Force Health Protection

6-40. Force health protection (FHP) considerations for defensive operations include the
following:
Enemy actions and the maneuver of combat forces complicate forward area patient
acquisition.
Medical personnel are permitted much less time to reach the patient, complete vital
emergency medical treatment (EMT), and remove him from the battle site.
Heaviest patient workloads, including those produced by enemy artillery and
CBRN weapons, can be expected during the preparation or initial phase of the
enemy attack and in the counterattack phase.
The enemy attack can disrupt ground and air routes and delay evacuation of
patients to and from treatment elements.
The depth and dispersion of the defense create significant time and distance
problems for evacuation assets.
The enemy exercises the initiative early in the operation, which could preclude
accurate prediction of initial areas of casualty density. This fact makes the effective
integration of air assets into the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) plan essential.

Civilian Concerns
6-41. Consideration of the higher headquarters (UEx) rules of engagement (ROE) and
limitations are necessary, particularly civilian effects and restrictions on fires and types of
weapons. Regardless of whether civilians are removed from the area or protected in their
homes, their movement and protection is a concern to the HBCT combined arms battalion. In
some cases, the heavy combined arms battalion may have to arrange for supply,
transportation, and medical care for civilians.
6-42. Restrictions may exist regarding use of cluster munitions, mines, nonlethal gas, smoke,
and even mortar fires. Firing into towns or in the vicinity of refugees may be prohibited.
Historical and cultural features may be protected. All of this can influence the design of the
defense.
6-43. The availability of civilian assets and any limitations on their use must be considered,
including the following:
Law enforcement support.
Movement control.
Transportation assets.
Preclusion of area damage.
Telecommunications security.
Emergency supplies.
Medical support.
Decontamination support.

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PREPARATION
6-44. During the preparation phase, the commander and staff monitor preparatory actions
and track the higher and adjacent unit situations and the enemy situation. They must
update and refine plans based on additional reconnaissance and updated intelligence
information. They conduct much of the preparation phase simultaneously with security
operations, continuing even as forward-deployed forces gain contact with the enemy.
Throughout the preparation phase, the battalion commander, company commanders, and
key staff members should physically inspect preparatory activities. Weapons positioning,
obstacle siting, direct- and indirect-fire plans, sustaining operations, and Soldiers’ knowledge
of their missions are all critical checks.

Rehearsals
6-45. The heavy combined arms battalion and subordinate units should conduct rehearsals to
practice their defense against multiple enemy COAs. The type of rehearsal executed must
consider time, preparation activities, and operations security (OPSEC). Rarely will the heavy
combined arms battalion be able to conduct a full-force rehearsal given the tempo of
operations and the potentially large size of the AO. It may be better for key leaders to
conduct a map or terrain board rehearsal at night in a command post (CP) or tent to focus
their attention during daylight on inspecting preparations and working with subordinate
leaders. The rehearsal should cover the following:
Reconnaissance and security operations.
Battle handover and passage of lines.
MBA engagement.
Reserve employment options.
Actions to deal with enemy penetrations, major enemy efforts along areas of risk, or
flank avenues of approach.
Sustaining operations, particularly casualty evacuation, emergency resupply
operations, vehicle recovery, and unit reorganization.
Execution of follow-on missions to exploit defensive success.
Integration of aviation assets, if available.

Monitoring Preparation
6-46. As subordinate units position their elements and execute defensive preparations, the
heavy combined arms battalion staff monitors and coordinates their activities and the
overall situation. The battalion commander and command sergeant major (CSM) must
personally visit key areas to ensure that the defensive plan is being executed as well as look
for gaps and seams in the battalion and brigade plans.
6-47. The battalion S2 closely monitors the enemy situation and focuses on indicators that
reveal the enemy’s likely time and direction of attack. The battalion staff continually
analyzes this assessment to determine the effects on preparation time available. The
battalion commander must update his PIR as the situation changes and be prepared to
adjust the reconnaissance effort to answer those questions.
6-48. The battalion S3 closely monitors the status of rehearsals and updates the plan as
needed based on continuously updated intelligence and the status of preparations.
6-49. The battalion XO analyzes the status of logistics and readiness of equipment in the
heavy combined arms battalion to determine any required adjustments to the plan or task
organization.

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6-50. The combat engineer operations officer monitors the progress of all engineer efforts
within the battalion AO. He continually projects the end state of this effort based on the
current and projected work rates. He must identify potential engineer shortfalls early and
determine how to request and shift assets to make up for the shortfalls or recommend where
to accept risk.
6-51. As the enemy closes on the heavy combined arms battalion’s AO, the battalion begins
final preparations that typically include the following:
Final coordination for battle handover and passage of lines.
Positioning of situational obstacle employment systems.
Verification of information system status.
Evacuation of unused Classes IV and V (obstacle materiel and ammunition) to
prevent capture or loss to enemy action.
Withdrawal of engineer forces from forward areas.
Linkup of sustaining operations assets with reserve or other supported combat
forces (if not previously accomplished).
Review of the reconnaissance plan to ensure it still meets the commander’s PIR.
Final positioning or repositioning of reconnaissance assets, security forces, and
observers.
Positioning of engineer teams to close lanes in obstacles or execute reserve
obstacles.
Execution of directed, reserve, or situational obstacles.
Periodic situation updates and issuing of final guidance to subordinates.
6-52. This time may also be used to register indirect-fire targets with mortars, if not already
done. The commander may also conduct a final radio, digital, or map rehearsal with key
leaders.

Security Area Actions

6-53. Once battalion security area forces have moved into sector, actions in the security area
predominantly focus on reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, target acquisition, reporting,
delay of the enemy main body, and battle handover. The battalion’s security area forces must
integrate their actions with friendly forces forward of them, maintaining information flow
and security. The heavy combined arms battalion’s elements may have to execute battle
handover with friendly forward elements and assist them in executing a rearward passage.
This is especially likely if the fire elements are assets other than the brigade reconnaissance
squadron, which must move through the heavy combined arms battalion area to recover and
prepare for another mission. Similarly, battalion security area forces must coordinate and
cross talk with the elements to their rear. Eventually, they must execute a rearward passage
or move to the flanks of the main battle area. On avenues of approaches that the enemy does
not use, it is usually advantageous to leave elements of the security force forward to preserve
observation and access to enemy flanks.

Reconnaissance
6-54. The reconnaissance effort in the security area provides the commander information to
support his decision-making, early warning and reaction time, and target acquisition.
Guided by the commander’s CCIR, the ISR plan, and the fire support plan, reconnaissance
assets provide information that includes the following:
Location, movement, and destruction of reconnaissance assets.
Speed, direction, composition, and strength of enemy formations.

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Locations of high-payoff targets (HPTs) such as artillery and rocket units, bridging
assets, and C2 nodes.
Enemy actions at decision points.
Enemy flanking actions, breaching operations, force concentrations, and
employment of combat multipliers.
Battle damage assessment (BDA).
Movement of follow-on forces.
6-55. The battalion staff must integrate the information provided by the security forces with
information received from higher and adjacent units, other subordinates, and sources such
as Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and UAVs.
6-56. The total reconnaissance effort must support the commander’s decision-making. In an
area defense, the battalion commander’s critical decisions normally include the following:
Initiation and employment of fires against enemy formations.
Modifications or adjustments to the defensive plan.
Execution of situational obstacles.
Withdrawal of forward security forces.
Commitment of the reserve, counterattack, or both.
6-57. The combined arms battalion commander establishes the criteria for the battle
handover prior to the MBA fight, including where it will pass through and designates routes
and contact points. The handover is normally forward of the FEBA where elements of the
reconnaissance units are effectively overwatched by direct fires of the forward combat
elements of the combined arms battalion. The heavy combined arms battalion ensures
coordination is conducted with the reconnaissance units and the battalion’s company
commanders that will be directly involved in the passing of the reconnaissance elements.
This coordination is best established as an SOP to facilitate rapid accomplishment.
Coordination normally includes the following:
Establishing communications.
Providing updates on both friendly and enemy situations.
Coordinating passage.
Collocating C2.
Dispatching representatives to contact points and establishing liaison.
Establishing recognition signals.
Checking status of obstacles and routes.
Establishing fire support (FS), engineer, and sustaining operations requirements.
Defining exact locations of contact points, lanes, and other control measures.
Synchronizing actions to assist the reconnaissance element’s rearward passage of
lines in or out of contact.

Battle Handover
6-58. The battle handover is the transfer of responsibility for the battle from the BCT’s
security area elements to the heavy combined arms battalion. The higher commander
(brigade combat team) who established the security force prescribes criteria for the handover
and designates the location where it will pass through, routes, contact points, and the battle
handover line. The battle handover line is normally forward of the FEBA where the direct
fires of the forward combat elements of the combined arms battalions can effectively
overwatch the elements of the passing unit. The BCT commander coordinates the battle
handover with the heavy combined arms battalion commanders. This battle handover

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coordination overlaps with the coordination for the passage of lines, and the two should be
conducted simultaneously. Coordination normally includes the following:
Establishing communications, including ensuring linkage on the tactical internet
and effective data overlap (ensuring elements in different units can see each other
in the COP).
Providing updates on both friendly and enemy situations facilitated through the
addition of appropriate CPs and leaders to the message groups on situation reports
and updates.
Coordinating passage, which includes identifying passage points and lanes and
exchanging or disseminating digital graphics of these and obstacle overlays. (If
either unit is not equipped with Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT), the coordination requires traditional
passage of lines procedures.)
Collocating C2. (This coordination is not required if both units are digitally
compatible, but it is desirable.)
Dispatching representatives to contact points and establishing liaison. (If the
passing unit is not FBCB2/BFT-equipped, the stationary unit should provide digital
escorts to gain limited information of the passing unit.)
Coordinating recognition signals.
Reporting status of obstacles and routes, including digital overlays.
Coordinating fire support, engineer, and sustaining operations requirements,
giving particular attention to casualty and equipment evacuation requirements.
Coordinating actions to assist the security force with breaking enemy contact.
Coordinating and exchanging maneuver, obstacle, and fire plans.
Coordinating location of and communications means to any stay-behind elements.
(These must be integrated into fire support coordination measures to establish no-
fire areas (NFAs).)
6-59. Within the heavy combined arms battalion, the battle handover between the battalion
security elements and the companies is far less formal or complicated. Elements must
identify rearward passage points and lanes, and the passing elements need to coordinate
their movement with the companies covering them and through which they are moving.
Frequently, the first elements to displace are the maneuver forces that were executing
counterreconnaissance tasks, moving to initial defensive positions in the MBA, or acting as
the battalion or brigade reserve. The battalion scout platoon normally displaces to vantage
points on the flanks, moves to establish surveillance on other avenues of approach, or
infiltrates to other areas in the combined arms battalion AO.
6-60. When battle handover occurs within the heavy combined arms battalion, the MBA
companies:
Assist passage of lines and disengagement.
Gain and maintain contact with enemy forces as battle handover occurs.
Maintain security.
Close lanes, execute reserve obstacles, and emplace situational obstacles in the
security area as the passing force withdraws.

Security Area Engagement

6-61. Engagements in the combined arms battalion security area are normally limited.
Counterreconnaissance forces focus on locating and destroying enemy reconnaissance
elements. As the enemy closes into the security area, observers initiate indirect, close combat
attack as well as joint fires and execute situational obstacles. The focal points are normally

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early warning and identification of the enemy main and supporting efforts for the
commander to make decisions and position forces.

Main Battle Area Engagement

6-62. The defensive battle is decided in the MBA by the actions of the heavy combined arms
battalions and companies and their sustaining operations units.

Maneuver
6-63. During the MBA engagement, the BCT and heavy combined arms battalions shift
combat power and priority of fires to defeat the enemy’s attack. This may require the
following:
Adjustment of subordinates’ AOs and missions.
Repositioning of forces.
Shifting of the main effort.
Commitment of the reserve.
Modification of the original plan.
6-64. Forward forces, obstacles, and fires within the MBA normally break the enemy’s
momentum, reduce his numerical advantage, and force his troops into positions of
vulnerability. The heavy combined arms battalion masses fires (direct and indirect) to
destroy attacking enemy forces as they enter the engagement areas.
6-65. Depending on the defensive scheme, the heavy combined arms battalion may conduct
delay operations, capitalizing on movement and repeated attacks to defeat the enemy, or it
may fight primarily from a single series of positions.

Cohesion
6-66. The HBCT combined arms battalion must maintain a cohesive defense if it is to
remain viable. This does not mean, however, that the battalion forces must be massed close
together. Companies can maintain cohesion with forces dispersed by maintaining tactical
cross talk among subordinates and continual tracking and digital reporting of the enemy.
The battalion staff and commanders must continually assess the enemy’s options and
movement while identifying means to defeat them. With forces widely dispersed, continual
assessment of time, distance, and trafficability factors is essential. To maintain defensive
cohesion, company commanders must keep their movement, positioning, and fires consistent
with the commander’s defensive scheme.

Threats to HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Logistics Sites

6-67. During the MBA fight, protection of logistics sites is necessary to ensure freedom of
maneuver and continuity of operations. Because allocating forces against threats to HBCT
combined arms battalion logistics sites diverts combat power from the MBA, the battalion
commander carefully weighs the need for such diversions against the possible consequences
to the overall operation. To make such decisions wisely, the battalion commander requires
accurate information to avoid late or inadequate responses and to guard against overreacting
to exaggerated reports.
6-68. Generally, the HBCT combined arms battalion support area (CABSA) and combat
trains rely on positioning, movement and self-protection for survival. Sustaining operations
are established in covered and concealed areas away from likely enemy avenues of approach.
They also establish and maintain perimeter security and early warning OPs, integrating
heavy weapons, vehicles and crews that are in the rear for repair operations. Sustainment
nodes must be postured to move on short notice as the security battle begins.

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6-69. Early warning to the forward support company (FSC) and sustainment units in the
rear is critical to their survival in the event of a penetration of the MBA or enemy attack
from an unexpected area. Sustaining operations plans and rehearsals must address actions
to be taken in the event of an attack, including defensive measures, displacement criteria,
routes, rally points, and subsequent positions to which to move.

Penetrations
6-70. Unless the brigade plan makes other provisions, each HBCT combined arms battalion
commander is responsible for controlling enemy advances within his AO. If the enemy
penetrates the defense or a penetration appears likely, the combined arms battalion
commander repositions forces or commits his reserve to block the penetration or to reinforce
the area where a penetration appears imminent. Simultaneously, the combined arms
battalion commander allocates all indirect fires to support the threatened area. Additionally,
he must alert the brigade commander to the threat and advise that he has committed his
reserve force (if applicable). The battalion commander may have to commit his engineers to
assist in containing the penetration or constitute a new reserve.
6-71. If a penetration threatens the heavy combined arms battalion, the brigade commander
may take several actions to counter the situation. In order of priority, he may do any or all of
the following:
Allocate priority of all available indirect fires, including close air support (CAS) and
Army aviation, to the threatened unit. This is the most rapid and responsive means
of increasing the combat power of the threatened unit.
Direct or reposition adjacent units to engage enemy forces that are attacking the
threatened unit. This may not be possible if adjacent units are already decisively
engaged.
Commit the brigade reserve to reinforce the threatened unit.
Commit the brigade reserve to block, contain, or destroy the penetrating enemy
force.
Accept penetration of insignificant enemy forces and maintain contact with them as
they move deeper into the MBA for eradication later by BCT elements.
6-72. When a penetration occurs, units within the MBA continue to fight, refusing their
flanks and engaging the enemy’s flanks and rear. The penetrated force must attempt to hold
the shoulders of the penetration to prevent the area of penetration from widening and to
protect adjacent unit flanks. Adjacent units must take immediate action to secure their
exposed flanks, which may include conducting security missions or establishing blocking
positions. Adjacent units may also need to reposition forces, readjust subordinate AOs and
tasks, or commit their reserve. MBA forces attempt to reestablish contact across the area of
penetration when possible.

Counterattack
6-73. The HBCT combined arms battalion may conduct local counterattacks to restore or
preserve defensive integrity. Unless defensive operations have left the combined arms
battalion largely unscathed, it usually lacks the ability to conduct a significant counterattack
by itself. Within the context of the brigade’s operations, a defending heavy combined arms
battalion may execute a counterattack in support of the BCT’s defensive posture as part of a
larger force seeking to complete the destruction of the enemy’s attack or as part of a
transition to offensive operations.

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Defense of an Extended Area of Operations

6-74. With situational dominance, air superiority, access to dynamic obstacles, extensive
long-range fire support, and an inferior enemy, the brigade may be called on to defend in a
greatly enlarged AO. When it does so, the HBCT combined arms battalions defend as semi-
independent entities, aware of their surroundings in great detail and supported with
responsive fires and military intelligence (MI) assets but without direct contact with one
another and beyond the immediate support of reserve forces. Essentially, these operations
are area defenses with exceptionally low force-to-space ratios and are high risk. Given the
two combined arms battalions and only eight organic maneuver companies, the brigade
should not assume this high-risk mission without significant engineer augmentation,
extensive dedicated UEx and joint fires, and the support of the UEx commander.
6-75. Heavy combined arms battalions defending in extended AOs base their operations on
superior intelligence, tactical agility, long-range fires, and continuous freedom of action.
Based on a defensive concept that clearly divides responsibilities between brigade
headquarters and the HBCT combined arms battalions, they employ massed long-range fires
and other combat effects to immobilize, disorganize, and destroy enemy forces across a broad
area. Close combat in these operations is limited to short, violent counterattacks or direct-
fire ambushes against damaged, vulnerable fragments of the enemy’s force.
6-76. Heavy combined arms battalion plans for defense in an extended AO resemble tactical
delays: battalion commander’s position companies to deny key terrain, to observe the enemy
at long range, and to move as necessary to attack the enemy with long-range fires while
preserving their freedom of action. Rather than consistently withdrawing under pressure,
the heavy combined arms battalion advances, displaces laterally, and withdraws as the
enemy loses forces or gains ground. The combined arms battalion may use routes, PLs, AOs,
and directions of attack to control the movement of companies and platoons.
6-77. The BCT and UEx staffs must assure that heavy combined arms battalions defending
in an extended AO maintain a highly accurate view of the enemy, the environment, and
significant civilian factors. Some high-level sensors and their downlinks may be directly
assigned to the combined arms battalions to support extended operations. Elements of the
brigade reconnaissance squadron and UEx aviation brigade assist the heavy combined arms
battalions in defending these large areas, assuming responsibility for specified enemy forces
as the situation develops. Maintaining contact with the enemy and sustaining observation of
every part of the AO is of special importance in a defense of this type. Losses of
reconnaissance coverage demand immediate command attention and place the defense at
risk.
6-78. A defense in an extended AO heavily tasks the combined arms battalion fire support
officer (FSO). His fire support teams (FISTs) are widely separated and may require
simultaneous high-priority support. Additionally, he commonly must coordinate joint fires
and attack helicopter support. The FSO’s workload can be reduced by a concept of fire
support that assigns a large part of the coordination responsibility to the brigade fires and
effects coordinator, but he may also be heavily tasked because of the BCT’s expanded AO.
The dedication of attack aviation to the brigade reserve mission may reduce the availability
of close combat attack support for the defense.
6-79. The heavy combined arms battalion’s understanding of the terrain, weather, and radio-
electronic environment is crucial to its success. To exploit superior SU, the combined arms
battalion must understand the mobility potential of the area and maintain current
intelligence that confirms the status of obstacles and routes. The battalion must anticipate
changing weather and visibility conditions accurately and in time to adjust its dispositions
without losing control of the defended area. It must foresee and prepare counteractions to
enemy air assaults or strikes against chokepoints in the depth of the defended area.

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6-80. Threats to friendly communications also pose special problems for the HBCT combined
arms battalion when it defends in an extended AO. Digitized and secure C2 assets are
essential to defending effectively in a large AO. BCT and UEx signal officers (S6/G6) must
provide redundant radio satellite communications networks to assure that current
intelligence and orders reach the heavy combined arms battalion, which then distributes
them to the companies. The battalion must establish priorities for information transfer and
C2 to allow it to continue operating if the signal system is impaired. Special means of
maintaining contact with all friendly forces—retransmission stations, relays, and additional
radios—merit attention in planning for operations in an extremely large AO.
6-81. When defending in extended areas, the HBCT combined arms battalion performs land
management tasks in many cases that are more typical of brigade operations. Positioning
brigade sensors, forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) for the UEx aviation brigade,
field artillery systems, aid stations, sustaining operations collection and supply points, and
CPs far enough forward to function may necessitate positioning them in the battalion AO.
While the heavy combined arms battalion should not be required to defend such sites, it
must track their movements and occupation of positions in the battalion AO to ensure proper
clearance of fires in the battalion area.
6-82. The battalion sustaining operations effort also demands special planning and nearly
flawless execution. The distances between companies, mortar positions, CPs, and other
battalion elements adds considerably to the time necessary to move supply, maintenance,
and medical support teams from the forward support and headquarters companies. Moving
support elements over those distances consumes more fuel and parts and calls for sustaining
operations leaders who can move quickly and adapt to friendly maneuver while en route
across open spaces between units. Planners must provide for emergency resupply of fuel and
ammunition, and battalion elements must be trained to receive it.
6-83. MEDEVAC assumes special importance because of the moral imperative of caring for
wounded Soldiers and the difficulty inherent in widely dispersed operations. In some cases,
defending over extended frontages and depths requires that additional medical
augmentation units or elements be positioned with those units inside the heavy combined
arms battalion AO.
6-84. Transitioning to the offense depends on defeating the enemy decisively and recognizing
that defeat promptly. Transitioning from defense of an extended area to a smaller AO may
require reinforcement of the combined arms battalion or narrowing of its AO. The BCT
commander must provide the planning and warning orders (WOs) that precede these
transitions. Heavy combined arms battalion and company commanders must be capable of
confirming sensor indications of enemy conditions and ready to recommend as well as
execute transition to the offense as they sense the enemy’s defeat.

MOBILE DEFENSE
6-85. The mobile defense concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a
decisive counterattack. The focus is on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing him to
advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force. The
striking force is a dedicated force composed of the bulk of the combat power and weighted
with the majority of the available combat multipliers. A fixing force shapes the battlefield
and the enemy, setting the conditions for the striking force.

DEPTH
6-86. A mobile defense requires considerable depth in the AO for the commander to shape
the battlefield, causing the enemy to extend his lines of communication and support, expose
his flanks, and dissipate his combat power. The terrain must allow the commander to

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maneuver to attack an enemy flank or rear. A UEx most frequently conducts a mobile
defense, but the brigade is also capable of doing so. This defensive technique can only be
used if the BCT has withdrawn elements of the combined arms battalion combat power for
the brigade reserve or if there is dedicated UEx aviation to augment the brigades striking
force.

FIXING FORCE
6-87. HBCT combined arms battalions participate in a brigade mobile defense as an element
in a fixing force conducting a delay or area defense or as an element of a striking force
conducting offensive operations. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion on offensive operations.) The
heavy combined arms battalion most often conducts a force-oriented attack against a
stationary enemy that the area defense and brigade reserve has stopped. The combined arms
battalion might conduct a force-oriented (counter) attack against a moving enemy if the area
defense cannot stop the enemy’s advance. During these attacks, the heavy combined arms
battalion might act as the BCT security force, main body, or reserve.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
6-88. The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away
from the enemy (FM 3-0 and FM 3-90). The enemy may force these operations, or a
commander may execute them voluntarily. In either case, the higher commander of the force
executing the operation must approve the retrograde (FMI 3-90.6, The Heavy Brigade
Combat Team). Retrograde operations are conducted to improve a tactical situation or to
prevent a worse situation from developing. HBCT combined arms battalions normally
conduct retrograde operations as part of a larger force but may conduct independent
retrograde operations as required, such as when conducting an area or point defense.
Regardless of the circumstances, the combined arms battalion’s higher headquarters must
approve the operation.
6-89. Retrograde operations accomplish the following:
Resist, exhaust, and defeat enemy forces.
Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
Avoid contact in undesirable conditions.
Gain time.
Disengage a force from battle for use elsewhere in other missions.
Reposition forces, shorten LOC, or conform to movements of other friendly units.
6-90. The three forms of retrograde operations follow:
Delay. This operation trades space for time and preserves friendly combat power
while inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.
Withdrawal. A withdrawal is a planned, voluntary disengagement from the enemy,
which may be conducted with or without enemy pressure.
Retirement. A retirement is an operation in which a force that is not in contact with
the enemy moves to the rear in an organized manner.
6-91. Note that maintaining morale is essential among subordinate leaders and troops in a
retrograde operation. Movement to the rear may seem like a defeat or a threat of isolation
unless Soldiers have confidence in their leaders and know the purpose of the operation and
their roles in it.

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FMI 3-90.5

DELAY
6-92. In a delay, the HBCT combined arms battalion trades space for time and inflicts
maximum damage on the enemy while avoiding decisive engagement at the combined arms
battalion level. It is critical that the brigade commander’s intent defines what is more
important in the mission—time, damage to the enemy, or force protection. Inflicting damage
is normally more important than gaining time. The brigade commander establishes risk
levels for each delay, but maintaining maneuver freedom of action and avoiding decisive
engagement are ordinarily of ultimate importance. The BCT may execute a delay when it
has insufficient combat power to attack or defend or when the higher unit’s plan calls for
drawing the enemy into an area for a counterattack as in a mobile defense. Delays gain time
to:
Allow other friendly forces to establish a defense.
Cover a withdrawing force.
Protect a friendly force’s flank.
Allow other forces to counterattack.

FORMS OF DELAY
6-93. Based on the commander’s intent and METT-TC, the two types of delay missions are
delay within an area of operations or delay forward of a specific control measure.

Delay Within an Area of Operations

6-94. The HBCT combined arms battalion may be assigned a mission to delay within an area
of operations. The higher commander normally provides guidance regarding intent and
desired effect on the enemy, but he minimizes restrictions regarding terrain, time, and
coordination with adjacent forces. This form of a delay is normally assigned when force
preservation is the highest priority and there is considerable maneuver depth to the BCT’s
or UEx’s area of operations.

Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time

6-95. The HBCT combined arms battalion may be assigned a mission to delay forward of a
specific control measure for a specific period of time. This mission is assigned when the
brigade or heavy combined arms battalion must control the enemy’s attack and retain
specified terrain to achieve some purpose relative to another element, such as setting the
conditions for a counterattack, for completion of defensive preparations, or for the movement
of other forces or civilians. The focus of this delay mission is clearly on time, terrain, and
enemy destruction. It carries a much higher risk for the combined arms battalion with the
likelihood of all or part of the unit becoming decisively engaged. The timing of the operation
is controlled graphically by a series of PLs with associated dates and times to define the
desired delay-until period.

CULMINATION OF THE DELAY

6-96. Delay missions usually conclude in one of three ways—a defense, a withdrawal, or a
counterattack. Planning options should address all three possibilities.

DELAY ORGANIZATION
6-97. The heavy combined arms battalion’s organization of its forces depends on how the
brigade combat team has structured its forces (unless the combined arms battalion operates
independently). The BCT normally organizes into a security force (using the brigade
reconnaissance squadron), main body, and reserve, but a wide AO may preclude the use of

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brigade-controlled security forces and reserves. In this case, the BCT may direct the
combined arms battalion to organize its own security, main body, and reserve forces—the
same as if the battalion were operating independently. The brigade commander can
designate a combined arms battalion as the security or reserve force for the BCT. If the
heavy combined arms battalion has to establish a security force, it needs to coordinate
directly with the brigade reconnaissance squadron for battle handover and uses the scout
platoon as a screen force positioned to observe the most likely enemy avenues of approach
and to initiate indirect fires to slow and weaken the enemy. Initially, the combined arms
battalion main body usually locates well forward in the AO and then fights from a series of
subsequent positions. The reserve force, normally one or two platoons, is used to defeat
enemy penetrations or to assist units with breaking contact.

DELAY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-98. The delay requires close coordination of forces and a clear understanding by
subordinates of the scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent. The potential for loss of
control is high in delay operations, making cross talk and coordination between subordinate
leaders extremely important. Subordinate initiative is critical, but it must be in the context
of close coordination with others. Plans must be flexible, with control measures throughout
the AO, allowing forces to be maneuvered to address all possible enemy options.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
6-99. The commander determines the end state of the delay based on the higher
commander’s intent and specific parameters of the higher headquarters delay order. The
commander considers the factors of METT-TC, especially the effects of the terrain, to
identify advantageous locations from which to engage the enemy throughout the depth of the
AO. Specific delay planning considerations the commander and staff must determine include
the following:
Force array and allocation of combat multipliers, particularly fires and obstacles.
Where and when to accept decisive engagement.
Acceptable level of risk for each subordinate force.
Form of delay and control measures (company delay in AO, control by battle
positions, or some other method).
Integration of obstacle intent and essential fire and effects tasks (EFETs).
Likely subsequent mission, transition points, and conditions.

HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION ORDER

6-100. The combined arms battalion order must clearly articulate the parameters of the
delay mission. The following is an example of a brigade delay mission issued to a
subordinate heavy combined arms battalion. Example: 3-6 IN (who) delays (what) forward of
PL BLUE (space) until 010400 Sep XX (time) to allow the remainder of the brigade to
complete defensive preparations (why).

EFFECTS OF TERRAIN
6-101. The battalion staff analyzes the effects of terrain and the anticipated enemy situation
to identify positions that offer the best opportunity to engage, delay, and inflict damage on
the enemy force. As the staff develops delay positions and control measures, it calculates
enemy closure rates and compares them to friendly displacement rates between positions.
Time and space factors dictate the amount of time subordinate units have to engage the
enemy and move before becoming decisively engaged. The staff calculates these factors for
each avenue of approach; it develops triggers for displacement to positions in depth.

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ENEMY VULNERABILITIES
6-102. The staff analyzes the terrain and expected enemy situation to identify advantageous
locations from which to engage the enemy at existing obstacles such as chokepoints or urban
or complex terrain. It also considers possible locations to plan counterattacks. Situational
and event templates must tell the commander and staff where the enemy is likely to be at
certain times. This helps them decide where to emplace obstacles, where to mass fires, and if
or where decisive engagement is likely or required.

MANEUVER CONSIDERATIONS
6-103. The battalion staff considers maneuver actions, fires, obstacles, and the employment
of other supporting assets necessary to degrade the enemy’s mobility and to support friendly
forces’ disengagement to subsequent positions. This is especially critical at locations and
times when companies or the entire combined arms battalion may become decisively engaged
with the enemy. As the staff develops and refines the plan, it develops decision points for key
actions, including triggers for the employment of fires and situational or reserve obstacles;
displacement of subordinate units to subsequent positions; and movement of indirect fire
assets, C2 facilities, and sustaining operations units. The staff also selects routes for
reinforcements, artillery, CPs, and sustaining operations elements to use and synchronizes
their movements with the delaying actions of forward units. The staff and commander need
to request augmentation from the UEx regarding fires, maneuver enhancement, aviation,
sustainment, and reconnaissance to ensure that the delay is a success.

DELAY SCHEME OF MANEUVER

6-104. The scheme of maneuver must allow the heavy combined arms battalion to dictate
the pace of the delay and maintain the initiative. The battalion commander selects positions
that allow his forces to inflict maximum damage on the enemy, support their disengagement,
and enable their withdrawal. He may choose to delay from successive or alternating delay
positions, depending on the strength of the companies and the width of the AO.

AREAS OF OPERATIONS
6-105. At the BCT level, areas of responsibility are defined by establishing AOs for each
heavy combined arms battalion and developing control measures to ensure adequate control
while supporting decentralized freedom of action. The brigade normally assigns deep,
parallel AOs to delaying combined arms battalions. Each enemy avenue of approach is
assigned to only one subordinate unit. Boundaries are used to define battalion AOs. When
boundaries are drawn, terrain that provides fields of fire and observation into an area is
assigned to the unit responsible for that AO or battle position (BP). The brigade commander
may also use PLs to control the timing and movement of delaying units. Doing so constrains
combined arms battalion commanders to delaying on or forward of those lines at least until
the specified time. Contact points and other control measures are established to support
flank unit coordination. The battalion commander and his staff make provisions for
coordinated action along avenues of approach that diverge and pass from one subordinate
AO to another.

CONTROL MEASURES
6-106. The HBCT combined arms battalion organizes its maneuver in a similar fashion. The
battalion commander may decide to add additional control measures, including PLs, BPs,
EAs, or attack by fire positions that allow the commander to direct the fight more closely and
give subordinates a clearer picture of how he envisions fighting the delay.

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DELAY POSITIONS.
6-107. When determining the scheme of maneuver, positions should incorporate as many of
the following characteristics as possible:
Good observation and long-range fields of fire.
Covered or concealed routes of movement to the rear.
A road network or areas providing good cross-country trafficability.
Existing or reinforcing obstacles to the front and flanks.
Maximized use of highly defensible terrain.

MAXIMIZING THE USE OF TERRAIN IN A DELAY

6-108. Delay positions should be on terrain that controls likely enemy avenues of approach,
allows engagements against the enemy where his movement is most canalized, and
facilitates maximum delay with minimum forces. Long-range direct fires are highly desirable
because they force the enemy to deploy and move carefully and because they reduce the
likelihood of unintended decisive engagement of companies and platoons. Integrating force
positioning and movement with terrain, fires, and situational obstacles helps inflict
maximum damage on the enemy while allowing friendly freedom of maneuver and
disengagement. If not constrained by commander’s guidance and (ROE), the cover and
movement restrictions of urban areas should be extensively exploited if they cannot be
readily bypassed.

FORCING THE ENEMY TO DEPLOY AND MANEUVER IN A DELAY

6-109. Engagement at maximum ranges of all weapons systems causes the enemy to take
time consuming measures to deploy, develop the situation, and maneuver to drive the
delaying force from its position. An aggressive enemy commander will not deploy if he
correctly determines that friendly forces are delaying; he will use his mass and momentum
to develop sufficient pressure to cause friendly forces to fall back or become decisively
engaged. Therefore, the delay must include the deadly integration of direct and indirect fires
and situational obstacles to make the enemy doubt the nature of the friendly mission and
leave him no choice but to deploy and maneuver.

AVOIDING DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT IN A DELAY

6-110. A key to a successful delay is to maintain a mobility advantage over the attacking
enemy and avoid decisive engagement. The HBCT combined arms battalion improves its
mobility by:
Maintaining contact with the enemy, maintaining reconnaissance and security on
flanks, and coordinating with adjacent units to prevent forces from being isolated.
Reconnoitering routes and BPs.
Improving routes, bridges, and fording sites between delay positions as time and
resources permit.
Using indirect fires and obstacles to support disengagement and to cover movement
between positions.
Task organizing and positioning breaching assets within subordinate formations to
breach enemy scatterable mines rapidly.
Using multiple routes.
Controlling traffic flow and restricting refugee movements to unused routes.
Keeping logistical assets uploaded and mobile.
Caching ammunition on rearward routes and ensuring that units know the
locations of these supply points (create a supply point icon in FBCB2). If possible,

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the supply point should be guarded and prepared for destruction if not used by
delaying forces.
Task organizing additional medical and equipment evacuation assets to the
combined arms battalions to increase their ability to disengage and displace
rapidly.
6-111. The HBCT combined arms battalion degrades the mobility of the enemy by:
Maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy throughout the AO.
Attacking logistics as well as maneuver and fire support assets.
Occupying and controlling chokepoints and key terrain that dominates high-speed
avenues of approach.
Destroying enemy reconnaissance and security forces, which blinds the enemy and
causes him to move more cautiously.
Engaging at maximum ranges.
Employing a combination of directed situational and reserve obstacles.
Employing indirect fires, smoke, and CAS, if available.
Using deception techniques such as dummy positions.

PARAMETERS OF THE DELAY ORDER

6-112. As previously noted in “Delay Planning Considerations,” an order for a delay mission
must specify certain parameters.

FIRST PARAMETER—LOCATION
6-113. First, an order must direct one of two alternatives—delay throughout the depth of
the AO or delay forward of a specific line or area for a specific period of time. A mission of
delay within an AO implies that force integrity is a prime consideration. In this case, the
HBCT combined arms battalion delays the enemy as long as possible while avoiding decisive
engagement. If the delaying force is ordered to hold the enemy forward of a given PL for a
specified time, mission accomplishment outweighs preservation of the force’s integrity. Such
a mission may require the force to defend a given position until ordered to displace.

SECOND PARAMETER—ACCEPTABLE RISK

6-114. The second parameter the order must specify is acceptable risk. Acceptable risk
ranges from accepting decisive engagement in an attempt to hold terrain for a given period
of time to avoiding decisive engagement to maintain the delaying force’s integrity. The depth
available for the delay, the time needed by the higher headquarters, and subsequent
missions for the delaying force determine the amount of acceptable risk.

THIRD PARAMETER—FIGHTING POSITIONS

6-115. The order must specify whether the delaying force may use the entire AO or whether
it must delay from specific BPs. A delay using the entire AO is preferable, but a delay from
specific positions may be required to coordinate two or more units in the delay.

OTHER PARAMETERS
6-116. The combined arms battalion order and commander’s intent should define for the
companies what the scheme of maneuver is, what the priorities are, and how much freedom
the subordinate leaders have in maneuvering their forces. The combined arms battalion
commander usually gives a company commander little freedom, specifying constraints on
maneuver and requirements for coordination unless the company is delaying on an avenue of

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approach that is essentially isolated. The battalion commander defines the criteria for
disengagement, criteria for movement to subsequent positions, areas or a series of battle
positions, checkpoints, or PLs from which, or forward of which, the companies must fight.

ALTERNATE AND SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS IN A DELAY

6-117. In planning, if the commander chooses to delay using battle positions, he can use
either alternate positions or subsequent positions. In both techniques, the delaying forces
maintain contact with the enemy between delay positions. Table 6-1 shows the advantages
and disadvantages of the two techniques.

Table 6-1. Comparison of Methods of Delay

Method of Delay Use When Advantages Disadvantages

Delay from subsequent AO is wide. Reduced fratricide risk. Limited depth to the delay
positions. Forces available are not Ease of C2. positions.
adequate to be positioned Repeated rearward Easier to penetrate or
in depth. passages not required. isolate units.
Less time available to
prepare each position.
Less flexibility.
Delay from alternate AO is narrow. Allows positioning in More difficult C2.
positions. Forces are adequate to depth. Requires continuous
be positioned in depth. Harder for enemy to coordination.
isolate units. Required passage of
More flexibility. lines, increasing
vulnerability and fratricide
potential.

DELAY FROM ALTERNATE POSITIONS

6-118. In a delay from alternate positions (Figure 6-4), two or more units in a single AO
occupy delaying positions in depth. As the first unit engages the enemy, the second occupies
the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the operation. The first
force disengages and passes around or through the second force. It then moves to the next
position and prepares to reengage the enemy while the second force takes up the fight. Both
the brigade and combined arms battalion can use this scheme of maneuver. At the BCT
level, if the AO is narrow, the brigade employs heavy combined arms battalions in depth
occupying alternate positions. This enables the BCT to develop a strong delay with forces
available to counterattack or assist in the disengagement of the combined arms battalion in
contact. At the battalion level, using alternate positions helps maintain pressure on the
enemy and helps prevent platoons or companies from being decisively engaged. A delay from
alternate positions is particularly useful on the most dangerous avenues of approach because
it offers greater security and depth than a delay from subsequent positions. However, it also
poses the highest potential for fratricide and vulnerability as units pass through or near
each other.

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Figure 6-4. Delay from Alternating Positions

DELAY FROM SUBSEQUENT POSITIONS

6-119. The HBCT combined arms battalion uses a delay from subsequent positions (Figure
6-5) when the assigned AO is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single
tier of positions. This is the more common form of a delay operation given the expanded
battlespace in which the BCT and heavy combined arms battalions normally operate. In a
delay from subsequent positions, the majority of forces are arrayed along the same PL or
series of BPs. The forward forces delay the enemy from one PL to the next within their
assigned AOs. At battalion level, this is the least preferred method of delaying since there is
a much higher probability of forces becoming isolated or decisively engaged, particularly if
the delay must be maintained over more than one or two subsequent positions. Additionally,
the HBCT combined arms battalion has limited ability to maintain pressure on the enemy as
it disengages and moves to subsequent positions unless it has been allocated additional (and
adequate) indirect-fire support.

FIRE SUPPORT IN A DELAY

6-120. Key considerations for the fire support plan include the following:
Attack the enemy throughout the AO.
Engage the enemy with fires to inflict casualties and disrupt his approach before he
reaches friendly delaying positions and plan final protective fires (FPFs) for each
series of delaying positions to support disengagement.

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Mass fires on HPTs and canalizing terrain to limit the momentum of the enemy’s
attack.
Ensure fires are tied to obstacles.
Plan and designate priority targets along routes from one delaying position to the
next.
Mass all available fire support (lethal and nonlethal) to support disengagements.
Use smoke to screen friendly movements and for deception.

Figure 6-5. Delay from Subsequent Positions

ENGINEER SUPPORT IN A DELAY

6-121. In addition to the limited organic engineer support to the heavy combined arms
battalion, key planning considerations for the scheme of engineer operations include the
following:
Immediate request for augmenting engineer resources from the UEx-level
maneuver enhancement brigade.

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When operating over a wide AO, task organize countermobility assets to teams,
decentralizing control and execution.
Task organize mobility assets to teams to support mobility requirements.
Consider logistical requirements and support of sustaining operations assets in
task-organizing mobility assets.
Develop the obstacle plan to support disengagement of delaying forces and to shape
the enemy’s maneuver to meet the commander’s intent and consider
countermobility requirements for all delaying positions throughout the depth of the
AO.
Integrate scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) at delay positions to support
disengagement and movement to subsequent positions.
Consider the impact of the obstacle effort on the movement of friendly forces and
future operations and develop obstacle restrictions, establish lanes and guides, and
employ situational or reserve obstacles to support mobility requirements.
Provide for closing lanes behind friendly forces with scatterable or hand-emplaced
mines.
Develop clear criteria for execution of situational and reserve obstacles and
integrate decisions for their execution in the decision support template.
Construct survivability positions in depth, as required, to support repositioning
forces.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL SUPPORT IN A DELAY

6-122. Brigade-level METT-TC planning defines CBRN operations in the delay. HBCT
combined arms battalions may coordinate for CBRN reconnaissance assets if available from
the UEx-level maneuver enhancement brigade. Decontamination operations in the delay
focus on individual and crew operational decontamination procedures until the conclusion of
the operation when thorough decontamination can be accomplished. If smoke generators are
available from the maneuver enhancement brigade, the combined arms battalion may
employ them for deceiving the enemy, obscuring movement and positions, or obscuring
portions of the battlefield to reduce enemy visibility and ease of movement.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS IN A DELAY

6-123. Sustaining operations for a delay is particularly complex. Maintaining
communications within the sustaining operations system, accurately tracking the battle,
maintaining personnel accountability, and anticipating support requirements are especially
important. Keeping the sustaining operations assets mobile and supplies uploaded is a key
planning consideration. Other considerations include the following:
Providing FHP for the delay may also be difficult since enemy actions and the
maneuver of combat forces complicate forward area acquisition of patients.
Planning considerations for FHP should include the following:
Position ambulances with each of the companies and request medical
treatment and evacuation support from the brigade support medical
company (BSMC) as required.
Integrate the evacuation routes with the obstacle plan.
Mark casualty collection points (CCPs) and evacuation routes for day and
night operations.
Position treatment elements forward but to the rear of the maneuver forces.
Establish alternate treatment sites with triggers to reposition.

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Plan for the use of both standard and nonstandard evacuation platforms.
Rehearse casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures, including standard
and nonstandard platforms.
Observe time and the means available to remove patients from the
battlefield. In either a stable situation or in the advance, time is important
only as it affects the physical well being of the wounded. In a delay, time is
important. As available time decreases, the use of nonstandard evacuation
platforms will increase, and maneuver companies must be prepared to
withdraw, moving their casualties with them.
Integrate the effective use of air assets into the MEDEVAC plan is essential.
Task organize additional ambulances and recovery vehicles to the maneuver
companies and request heavy equipment transporters (HETs) to support rapid
evacuation of damaged equipment.
Emphasize maintenance support forward with short evacuation times; use all
available assets (including firepower-damaged vehicles) to evacuate (tow) damaged
vehicles to the rear. Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) is a procedure
that can be used during a delay to rapidly return disabled equipment to the
battlefield by expediently fixing, bypassing, or jury-rigging components. It also
includes the use of cannibalization of equipment. It restores the minimum essential
combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable the
equipment to self-recover. Crews, field maintenance teams, and recovery teams use
BDAR. The battalion commander establishes guidelines for BDAR in unit SOPs
and combat orders. However, emergency destruction of equipment may have to
occur if time and evacuation capability are limited and the result would be that
goods and equipment would become available to the enemy.
Synchronize refueling and resupply operations with the scheme of maneuver and
the anticipated enemy situation to ensure continuity of support, increase
emergency Class III and V supplies positioned forward, and position the CABSA
farther to the rear so that it supports the end state rather than requiring it to be
moved several times during the conduct of the delay.
Do not coordinate for supply throughput too far forward, which might cause assets
to be caught in the fight or to add to route congestion. Depending on the situation,
this may not apply during the initial preparations for the delay.
Plan routes for sustaining operations assets that do not conflict with maneuver
elements.

DELAY PREPARATIONS
6-124. Defensive preparations discussed in Section II also apply during the conduct of a
delay.

INSPECTIONS
6-125. The commander inspects planning and preparations of his subordinate units to
ensure the following:
Maneuver, fire, and obstacle plans are consistent with his intent.
Flank coordination between delaying elements is conducted to maintain cohesion
and mutual support during the delay.
Defensive preparations proceed according to established timelines.
All leaders have a clear understanding of the scheme of maneuver and the
commander’s intent.

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REHEARSALS
6-126. When conducting a rehearsal for a delay, key leaders practice the operation against
all feasible enemy COAs to promote flexibility of decision-making, plans, and execution. The
commander examines each subordinate unit’s plan as they fight the delay during the
rehearsal and pays close attention to the following:
Direct and indirect fire instructions.
Timing of movements and delaying actions from one position to the next, with
special attention paid to the disengagement criteria.
Means and methods of disengaging from the enemy and maintaining contact with
the enemy as the force moves to subsequent positions.
Execution of situational and reserve obstacles, including closure of lanes.
Movement times, routes, and positioning of sustaining operations assets.
6-127. The commander also rehearses plans to deal with potential reverses, enemy
penetrations, and unanticipated decisive engagement. The rehearsal serves to synchronize
further the movement of combat forces and sustaining operations units. It is especially
important to portray movement times and required routes realistically during the rehearsal
to identify potential conflicts.

EXECUTION OF A DELAY
6-128. The HBCT combined arms battalion moves key forces and support to prepare for the
delay. This initial movement includes movement into the security area and MBA.

SECURITY AREA ACTIONS

6-129. If the BCT creates a security area force for a delay using the brigade reconnaissance
squadron, the heavy combined arms battalion may position the scout platoon in a screen
behind the brigade security force to maintain observation, provide early warning, and
continue to observe for indirect fires to continue the disruption and attrition of the attacking
enemy. As the enemy closes into and through the security area, the screening forces move
back through or around the initial main body positions to subsequent positions that allow
them to observe the MBA and assist in the disengagement and movement of forces to their
next positions.

MAIN BATTLE AREA ENGAGEMENT

6-130. The HBCT combined arms battalion forces the enemy to deploy and attack by its use
of fires and obstacles, massing effects quickly for a short period to inflict the maximum
damage on the enemy at the maximum range. To avoid decisive engagement, the heavy
combined arms battalion must disengage before the enemy can breach obstacles or mass
effective fire on the delay position. Observers positioned to the flanks in depth continue to
track the enemy and shift indirect fires as friendly forces delay to subsequent positions.
Companies may move by bounds within the combined arms battalion to maintain direct fires
on the enemy and cover movement. Short, intense engagements at near maximum range
with sustained indirect fires and covering obscurants are the key to successful delay
operations.

CONTROLLING THE DELAY

6-131. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander must closely control the disposition,
displacement, and maneuver of his forces to maintain the cohesion of the delay operation
and keep the entire battalion synchronized with the remainder of the brigade. FBCB2/BFT
represents a major advantage in force tracking. Given the potential for loss of positive

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control, it is critical that the battalion commander clearly establish parameters for
displacement. The command group must be positioned forward to make timely calls on the
repositioning of the forces by seeing the fight firsthand rather than relying solely on a digital
representation.
6-132. As the delay is executed, the heavy combined arms battalion and company
commanders must continually assess their situation and requirements to displace with the
following considerations:
What are the size, activity, and location of attacking enemy forces?
Are elements of the heavy combined arms battalion threatened with decisive
engagement or bypass?
What is the status of adjacent units?
What are the disengagement criteria?
Are supporting assets, particularly artillery and mortars, postured to support
movement? If not, how long will it take them to be ready?
Are the obstacles supporting the present position still intact and effective?
Are direct and indirect fires effective?
How strong is this position in relation to other positions the force might occupy?
What is the ammunition status?
Are displacement routes clear?
6-133. The HBCT combined arms battalion must always make decisions about displacement
and timing in the context of the commander’s intent and priority for the delay (for example,
is time more important than force preservation, or vice versa?). In many instances, the heavy
combined arms battalion or elements of it must accept decisive engagement to execute the
mission and then break contact as the situation permits or in conjunction with another
force’s counterattack.

COUNTERATTACKS
6-134. The HBCT combined arms battalion can rarely execute a substantial counterattack
during a delay by itself unless it is part of the larger brigade scheme of maneuver. Generally,
counterattacks executed by the heavy combined arms battalion in its own scheme of
maneuver are platoon-sized to possibly company-sized counterattacks to support
disengagement of forces or to destroy penetrations. Whenever possible, the BCT executes
counterattacks to counter penetrations, to gain a temporary degree of initiative or freedom of
action, and to avoid a predictable pattern of operation.

DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT
6-135. The HBCT combined arms battalion and companies avoid becoming decisively
engaged except when necessary to prevent the enemy from reaching a specified area too
early or when a part of the force must be risked to protect the entire force. If elements of the
heavy combined arms battalion are threatened with decisive engagement or have become
decisively engaged, the commander may take actions to support their disengagement. In
order of priority, he may do any of the following:
Allocate priority of all supporting fires to the threatened unit. This is the most
rapid and responsive means of increasing the unit’s combat power.
Employ CAS or attack helicopters to suppress the enemy and restore freedom of
maneuver to the battalion.
Reinforce the unit. In a delay mission, particularly over a wide AO, the heavy
combined arms battalion may not be able to do this quickly enough with ground
maneuver forces.

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Conduct a counterattack to disengage the unit.

6-136. Once forces have become decisively engaged, they must not break contact without
adequate measures by the combined arms battalion to prevent the enemy from rapidly
pursuing and destroying the force piecemeal.

TERMINATE THE DELAY

6-137. A delay mission ends with another planned mission such as a defense, withdrawal, or
attack. Ideally, a BCT or heavy combined arms battalion that has been delaying conducts a
rearward passage of lines through the established defense of another friendly force. The
combined arms battalion executes its actions in the context of the brigade’s actions. If it
defeats the enemy attack during the delay, the BCT may:
Maintain contact while another force counterattacks.
Withdraw to perform another mission.
Transition to the offense.
6-138. In all cases, the battalion commander must plan for the expected outcome of the
delay based on the situation and the higher commander’s plan.

WITHDRAWAL
6-139. Withdrawal is a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an
enemy force. Withdrawals may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. The two
types of withdrawals are assisted and unassisted.

ASSISTED
6-140. The assisting force occupies positions to the rear of the withdrawing unit and
prepares to accept control of the situation. It can also assist the withdrawing unit with route
reconnaissance, route maintenance, fire support, and sustaining operations. Both forces
closely coordinate the withdrawal. After coordination, the withdrawing unit delays to a
battle handover line (BHOL), conducts a rearward passage of lines, and moves to its final
destination.

UNASSISTED
6-141. The withdrawing unit establishes routes and develops plans for the withdrawal, then
establishes a security force as the rear guard while the main body withdraws. Sustaining
operations elements normally withdraw first, followed by combat forces. To deceive the
enemy as to the friendly movement, the brigade or heavy combined arms battalion may
establish a detachment left in contact (DLIC) if withdrawing under enemy pressure. As the
unit withdraws, the DLIC disengages from the enemy and follows the main body to its final
destination.

WITHDRAWAL ORGANIZATION
6-142. As with the delay, how the HBCT combined arms battalion structures its force is a
function of how the brigade combat team organizes. The BCT normally organizes into a
security force, main body, and reserve. It may elect to use a single heavy combined arms
battalion or elements of a combined arms battalion as the security or reserve force. It may
also organize a DLIC or stay-behind forces, if required by the enemy situation. If operating
independently, the HBCT combined arms battalion organizes itself in the same manner.
FBCB2/BFT is a major asset in withdrawals, and the combined arms battalion should plan
for its continuous operations before withdrawals.

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SECURITY FORCE
6-143. The security force maintains contact with the enemy until ordered to disengage or
until another force takes over the task. It simulates the continued presence of the main body,
which requires additional allocation of combat multipliers beyond that normally allocated to
a force of its size. When withdrawing under enemy pressure, the security force establishes or
operates as a DLIC to provide a way to break contact from the enemy sequentially. When
conducting the withdrawal without enemy pressure, the security force acts as a rear guard
because the most probable threat is a pursuing enemy.

DETACHMENT LEFT IN CONTACT

6-144. The DLIC is an element that is left in contact as part of the previously designated
(usually rear) security force while the main body conducts its withdrawal. Its purpose is to
remain behind to deceive the enemy into believing the brigade or heavy combined arms
battalion is still in position while the majority of the unit withdraws. The DLIC should be
one of the strongest of the subordinate units with the most capable leadership. It will be the
unit under the greatest pressure, and the success of the withdrawal often depends on its
effectiveness. The commander must establish specific instructions about what to do if the
enemy attacks and when and under what circumstances to delay or withdraw. The BCT
organizes a DLIC in one of three ways (Figure 6-6).

Figure 6-6. Methods for Organizing the Detachment Left in Contact

Single HBCT Combined Arms Battalion

6-145. A single heavy combined arms battalion operates as the detachment left in contact,
allowing the remainder of the BCT to withdraw. This is the most effective option since it
provides for effective task organization and C2.

DLIC Element Formed from Each HBCT Combined Arms Battalion

6-146. Each combined arms battalion provides forces for the DLIC mission covering the BCT
withdrawal. The resulting DLIC element then operates under the brigade’s control. This is

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the least desirable option since it complicates C2 and task organization and requires
significant changes to the communications architecture. The BCT most commonly uses this
option when the subordinate HBCT combined arms battalions have lost significant portions
of their C2 capabilities.

HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Control of Separate DLICs

6-147. Each HBCT combined arms battalion establishes and controls its individual DLIC,
covering the BCT’s withdrawal. The BCT uses this option when it is operating over a wider
area or one with multiple corridors in the withdrawal AO. This method allows for effective
dispersion of forces while maintaining standard C2 relationships.

COMPANY DLIC
6-148. When the HBCT combined arms battalion has its own DLIC (paragraphs 6-144 and
6-146 above), it normally gives the mission to a company. Again, the company left in contact
should be the most capable of the subordinate units. The combined arms battalion should
establish an advance guard on its route of movement. The battalion may designate a
company or the scout platoon reinforced with tanks, infantry, and mortars as the advance
guard. The combined arms battalion should task organize both the DLIC and the advance
guard with engineers, assigning mobility assets to the advance guard as well as obstacle and
mobility assets to the DLIC. The heavy combined arms battalion main body consists of the
remaining companies, command posts, sustaining operations assets, remaining engineers,
and the mortars if they are not task organized to support either the DLIC or the advance
guard. The combined arms battalion may designate a reserve platoon from the single
company in the main body. To create flank security, it uses uncommitted elements of the
main body.

WITHDRAWAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

6-149. Because the force is most vulnerable if the enemy attacks during the withdrawal, the
commander and staff normally plan for a withdrawal under enemy pressure. They also
develop contingency plans for a withdrawal without enemy pressure.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-150. During planning, the commander and staff specifically consider the following:
Disengagement criteria (time, friendly situation, enemy situation).
A deliberate break in contact from the enemy.
A deception to conceal the withdrawal for as long as possible.
Rapid displacement of the main body, safeguarded from enemy interference.
Selection and protection of withdrawal routes and alternates.
Siting of obstacles behind the DLIC to complicate pursuit.

COMMANDER’S INTENT
6-151. The battalion commander develops his vision of the battle based on withdrawing
under enemy pressure. He must determine the composition and strength of the security
force, main body, and reserve. The commander must clearly define how he intends to deceive
the enemy as to the execution of the withdrawal, how he intends to disengage from the
enemy (use of maneuver, fires, and obstacles), and the final end state of the operation in
terms of time, location, and disposition of forces.

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WITHDRAWAL SCHEME OF MANEUVER

6-152. A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted and may take place with or without
enemy pressure. The plan considers which of the variations the heavy combined arms
battalion faces based on the higher headquarters order and the enemy situation.

ASSISTED WITHDRAWAL
6-153. In an assisted withdrawal, the battalion staff coordinates the following with the
assisting force:
Actions of the assisting security force that the heavy combined arms battalion will
pass through or around.
Reconnaissance of withdrawal routes.
Designation of forces to secure chokepoints or key terrain along the withdrawal
routes.
Designation of elements to assist in movement control, such as traffic control
points.
Designation of required combat and sustaining operations to assist the
withdrawing combined arms battalion in disengaging from the enemy.

UNASSISTED WITHDRAWAL
6-154. In an unassisted withdrawal, the HBCT combined arms battalion establishes its own
security and disengages itself from the enemy. It reconnoiters and secures routes that it uses
in its rearward movement while sustaining itself during the withdrawal.

WITHDRAWAL UNDER ENEMY PRESSURE

6-155. In a withdrawal under enemy pressure, all units other than the rear guard or DLIC
withdraw simultaneously when available routes allow. Several factors influence the decision
to withdraw simultaneously:
Subsequent missions.
Availability of transportation assets and routes.
Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
Level and nature of enemy pressure.
Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.

Transition
6-156. The element that will be the DLIC or rear guard must transition to cover the HBCT
combined arms battalion’s AO. Simultaneously, the heavy combined arms battalion must
prepare its sustaining operations assets and the remainder of the force to begin a rapid
withdrawal to the rear. The combined arms battalion should seek to move on two routes to
gain speed and shorten formations. Using more than two routes exceeds the ability of the
combined arms battalion to maintain security. Often, only a single route will be available.

Breaking Contact
6-157. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander essentially has two options for
breaking contact—break contact using deception and stealth or break contact quickly and
violently under the cover of supporting fires reinforced by obstacles to delay pursuit. He
bases his choice on the factors of METT-TC and the resources available.

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WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT ENEMY PRESSURE

6-158. When conducting a withdrawal without enemy pressure, the commander can focus
the plan on the best method to displace forces rapidly. He has the option of taking calculated
risks that increase his force’s displacement capabilities. He may order the main body to
conduct a tactical road march instead of moving in tactical formations, or he may move on as
many routes as are available with reduced security to gain speed.

WITHDRAWAL PREPARATION
6-159. The commander prepares the HBCT combined arms battalion for the withdrawal
through inspections and rehearsals in the same fashion as discussed with other defensive
operations. Inspections for this mission focus on subordinate unit preparations to ensure a
clear understanding of the scheme of maneuver and commander’s intent. During an assisted
withdrawal, the commander ensures adequate coordination for battle handover and passage
of lines. The focus of the rehearsal for the withdrawal is actions to maintain security,
disengagement from the enemy, and the movement of forces. Key leaders or liaisons from the
assisting force should attend the rehearsal. The commander ensures control measures,
including fire support coordination measures, to fully support the withdrawal. Leaders
rehearse the plan against the full range of possible enemy actions. They rehearse
contingencies for reverting to a delay, committing the reserve, and reacting to enemy
interdiction of movement routes.

WITHDRAWAL EXECUTION
6-160. Execution of the heavy combined arms battalion withdrawal essentially follows the
following pattern:
Task organizing and positioning security and deception forces.
Planning for the locations of key personnel to control the withdrawal.
Reconnoitering withdrawal routes and subsequent positions.
Preparing obstacles to support the DLIC and withdrawal.
Preparing wounded Soldiers and damaged equipment and nonessential supplies for
movement.
Moving nonessential sustaining operations units to the rear.
Positioning MPs and other assets for traffic control.
Initiating movement, leading with forward security forces.
DLIC’s breaking of contact and movement as a rear guard.

CONCEALING THE WITHDRAWAL

6-161. The first priority is to conceal the withdrawal from the enemy. As the brigade or
heavy combined arms battalion initiates the initial movement of forces, it must take
measures to deceive the enemy and to maintain OPSEC. The following actions assist in
maintaining OPSEC:
Maintenance of the defensive pattern of the whole force across the AO simulated by
the DLIC.
Maintenance of communications and information security.
Avoidance of establishing patterns of movement that may indicate friendly
intentions.
Establishment of security focused on destroying enemy reconnaissance forces.
Use of multiple withdrawal routes.
Movement during limited visibility and along covered and concealed routes.

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DISENGAGEMENT IN A WITHDRAWAL
6-162. The security force remains in position and maintains a deception while the main
body moves as rapidly as possible rearward to intermediate or final positions. After the main
body withdraws a safe distance, the battalion commander orders the security force to begin
its rearward movement. Once the security force begins moving, it assumes the duties of a
rear guard. The security element must balance security and deception with speed as it
disengages. It maintains tactical movement and security techniques until it is clear that the
enemy is not pursuing and contact has been broken; it then withdraws as rapidly as possible.
The main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to designated positions. It may occupy a
series of intermediate positions before completing the withdrawal. Sustaining operations
units, along with their convoy escorts, usually move first and precede combat units in the
movement formation. Commanders enforce the disciplined use of routes and control
measures during the withdrawal. Despite confusion and enemy pressure, subordinate units
must follow specified routes and movement times.

ACTIONS ON CONTACT IN A WITHDRAWAL

6-163. Security forces counter any enemy attempts to disrupt the withdrawal or pursue the
brigade or heavy combined arms battalion. If the security force and the reserve cannot
prevent the enemy from closing on the main body, the battalion commander commits some or
all of the main body to prevent the enemy from interfering further with the withdrawal. The
main body delays, attacks, or defends as required by the situation. In this event, the
withdrawal resumes at the earliest possible time. If the enemy blocks movement to the rear,
friendly forces shift to alternate routes and bypass the interdicted area. Alternatively, they
may attack through the enemy.

TERMINATING THE WITHDRAWAL

6-164. Once the brigade or HBCT combined arms battalion successfully disengages from the
enemy, it normally has the following options:
Rejoin the overall defense.
Transition into a retirement.
Continue moving away from the enemy and toward its next mission area.
6-165. The higher headquarters defines the next mission. Follow-on missions are normally
planned as the withdrawal is being planned or executed.

RETIREMENT
6-166. A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a force that is not in contact with the
enemy moves to the rear in an organized manner. The HBCT combined arms battalion
conducts a retirement as part of the brigade to reposition for future operations.

ORGANIZATION
6-167. The BCT normally organizes into security elements and a main body. A subordinate
heavy combined arms battalion may serve either as a security element or as a part of the
main body. The combined arms battalion normally organizes itself with security, main body,
and reserve elements, depending on the situation and where the battalion is in the
movement scheme. The formation and number of columns employed depend on the number
of available routes and the potential for enemy interference. The battalion commander
typically wants to move his major elements to the rear simultaneously.

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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-168. The battalion commander and staff develop a movement plan based on the terrain,
friendly situation and commander’s guidance, and enemy situation. They develop the
movement formation and order of movement to balance the need for security and speed.
Battalion security forces protect the main body from surprise, harassment, or attack by any
pursuing enemy forces. Normally, each march column maintains an advance guard, rear
guard, and flank security, depending on the situation with adjacent friendly forces and the
likelihood of enemy interference. The main body may organize into an approach march or
tactical road march if speed is most important and the need for security is low.

PREPARATION
6-169. During preparations for retirement, BCT and heavy combined arms battalion units
conduct rehearsals and prepare for movement. Units maintain OPSEC and security
operations and dispatch advance parties and quartering parties as required.

EXECUTION
6-170. During a retirement, the brigade and its heavy combined arms battalions normally
move to assembly areas to prepare for future operations. HBCT combined arms battalions
move in accordance with established movement times and routes. Strict adherence to the
movement plan is essential to avoid congestion. The battalion staff closely supervises the
execution of the movement plan. Sustaining operations units usually move to the rear first.

SECTION III – DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

DEFENSIVE PLANNING
6-171. Planning a defensive operation is a complex effort requiring detailed planning and
extensive coordination. In the defense, synchronizing the effects of the combat and
supporting systems of the HBCT combined arms battalion allows the commander to apply
overwhelming combat power against selected advancing enemy forces to unhinge the enemy
commander’s plan and destroy his forces. All defensive operations are a mix of static and
dynamic actions. As a defensive operation evolves, the commander knows he will probably
need to shift his decisive and shaping operations to press the fight and keep the enemy off
balance.

COMMANDER’S VISION
6-172. The first step is the expression of the commander’s visualization of anticipated enemy
actions integrated with the staff’s IPB. The heavy combined arms battalion IPB and the BCT
IPB should not differ significantly, giving the battalion commander and staff a clear
understanding of how the brigade commander envisions the enemy will fight and his plan for
the operation. From that visualization, the combined arms battalion commander and staff
refine the IPB to focus on the details of the operation in the battalion AO. The BCT
commander normally defines where and how the brigade will defeat or destroy the enemy.
The heavy combined arms battalion commander defines how he envisions the battalion will
execute its portion of the BCT fight.

HOW AND WHERE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY

6-173. The battalion commander and staff base their determination of how and where to
defeat the enemy on where they believe the enemy will go, the effects of terrain, and friendly
forces available. The brigade commander may define a defeat mechanism that includes the

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use of single or multiple counterattacks to achieve success. The combined arms battalion
commander and staff analyze their unit’s role in the BCT fight and determine how to achieve
success. In an area defense, the heavy combined arms battalion usually achieves success by
massing the cumulative effects of obstacles and fires to defeat the enemy forward of a
designated area, often in conjunction with a brigade counterattack. In a delay operation, the
combined arms battalion achieves success by combining maneuver, fires, obstacles, and
avoidance of decisive engagement until conditions are right to achieve the desired effect of
gaining time or shaping the battlefield for a higher echelon counterattack.

FORCES AND ASSETS AVAILABLE

6-174. The battalion commander and staff analyze the forces and assets available, with
particular attention to the obstacle resources and fire support allocated by the BCT. The
staff must define the engineer, chemical smoke, and fire support requirements in terms of
capability. For example, they should define engineer capability in terms of the number of
obstacles of a specific effect engineers can emplace in the time available. Fire support
analysis should include the number of targets to be engaged, at what point in the battle they
should be engaged, and with what expected result. The battalion commander and staff must
identify additional essential units from the UEx to make the defense a success.

EFFECTS
6-175. With a definitive understanding of the assets available, the battalion commander and
staff determine what effects forces, fires, and obstacles must achieve on enemy formations
(by avenue of approach) and how these effects will support the brigade’s and battalion’s
defeat mechanism. They define the tasks and purpose for subordinate units and establish
priorities for sustaining operations. The battalion staff develops obstacle and fire support
plans concurrently with the defensive force array, again defining a task and purpose for each
obstacle and target in keeping with the commander’s stated EFETs and intended obstacle
effects. The desired end state is a plan that defines how the commander intends to mass the
effects of direct and indirect fires with obstacles and use of terrain to shape the battlefield
and defeat or destroy the enemy.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

6-176. As with all tactical planning, IPB is a critical part of defensive planning. It helps the
commander to define where to concentrate combat power, where to accept risk, and where to
plan potential decisive actions. To aid in the development of a flexible defensive plan, the
IPB must present all feasible enemy COAs. The essential areas of focus follow:
Analyze terrain.
Determine enemy force size and likely COAs with associated decision points.
Determine enemy vulnerabilities.

ANALYZE TERRAIN
6-177. The battalion staff determines ground and airmobility corridors and avenues of
approach to determine where the enemy can maneuver to reach his likely objectives and to
identify limitations on friendly maneuver and positioning. Identification of terrain that
creates potential enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities for friendly attack, such as
chokepoints, is critical. The BCT engineer can assist the combined arms battalion staff’s
terrain analysis team by providing terrain analysis products utilizing the digital terrain
support system (DTSS), which can help in identifying critical terrain as well as in
positioning weapon systems and ISR assets. Once they receive their AO for reconnaissance
or preparation, subordinate units can conduct their own terrain analysis using physical
reconnaissance and the line-of-sight analysis function in FBCB2. The terrain analysis must

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achieve a level of fidelity that allows for effective positioning of direct-fire weapon systems
and observers. It must identify intervisibility lines, fields of fire, and dead spaces and
integrate the effects of weather. The BCT staff can assist the battalion staff by supplying
weather impact on trafficability, visibility, and systems operations through data generated
by the integrated meteorological system (IMETS) at UEx. The result of the terrain analysis
should be a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) and identification of defensible
areas. The battalion staff should transmit results of the analysis digitally to subordinate
units. When it has analyzed the assigned AO, the battalion staff should expand its analysis
to adjacent AOs and areas forward and to the rear of the assigned AOs in which the heavy
combined arms battalion may operate as the brigade operation progresses.

DETERMINE ENEMY FORCE SIZE, LIKELY COAS, AND DECISION POINTS

6-178. The battalion staff determines the size enemy force that each avenue of approach and
mobility corridor can support. The expected size of the enemy force drives determination of
friendly force allocation, fires, and obstacle effort. It also assists the commander and staff in
understanding how the enemy will utilize his forces and the terrain. The enemy COAs
developed must be feasible and reflect the enemy’s flexibility and true potential. All COAs
should define the following:
Likely enemy objectives.
Enemy composition, disposition, and strength.
Schemes of maneuver, including routes, formations, locations, and times the enemy
may change formations, possible maneuver options available to the enemy, and key
decision points.
Time and distance factors for the enemy’s maneuver through the area of operation.
Likely employment of all enemy combat multipliers, including artillery, air defense,
obstacles, chemical strikes, dynamic obstacles, and attack aircraft.
Likely use of all enemy reconnaissance assets and organizations, including likely
reconnaissance objectives, reconnaissance avenues of approach, times to expect
enemy reconnaissance, and likely locations of enemy observers and observation
posts.
Identification and likely locations of enemy high-value targets (HVTs), such as
artillery formations, reserves, and C2 nodes.
Likely locations, compositions, strengths, employment options, and time and
distance factors for enemy reserves and follow-on forces.
Locations of enemy decision points that determine selection of a specific course of
action.
Likely breach sites and points of penetration.
6-179. The battalion staff should graphically portray the results of this IPB step on a
situation template with a COA statement and appropriate notes. The S2 and staff use this to
develop the initial intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operation order (OPORD)
that initiates reconnaissance and security operations. As planning progresses, they must
update the ISR OPORD, including fire support operations (see Chapter 4, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations). The staff should distribute all products
digitally to the entire staff and subordinate units to support parallel planning.

DETERMINE ENEMY VULNERABILITIES

6-180. The battalion staff identifies potential enemy vulnerabilities based on enemy tactics,
friendly and enemy capabilities, terrain, and weather. Seeking to engage the enemy where
the terrain puts him at a disadvantage, the staff identifies the following:

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Restricted terrain that may slow the enemy’s attack, cause a separation of forces,
create difficulties in C2, or force the enemy to conduct defile drills (for example,
narrow valleys, passes, or urban areas).
Chokepoints or natural obstacles that may cause a loss of momentum, a potential
fragmenting of forces, or a vulnerable concentration of forces (for example, rivers
and canals).
Terrain that canalizes enemy formations into areas that provide defending forces
good fields of fire, observation, and flanking fires.
Areas dominated by key or defensible terrain that allows massing of fires.
6-181. To be successful at providing IPB products to support the commander and
subordinate units, the entire staff must participate as a whole. They must be knowledgeable
in friendly and enemy capabilities and terrain analysis and be able to execute the process
rapidly. The results must be detailed, understandable, legible, and disseminated quickly to
support planning at all echelons.

RESERVE
6-182. The reserve is a force withheld from action to be committed at a decisive moment. It
provides the commander the flexibility to exploit success or deal with a tactical setback and
the flexibility to respond in situations where there is a great deal of uncertainty about the
enemy. Normally, the battalion commander can only allocate a platoon as a reserve;
however, platoons lack the depth and C2 to often be effective. This further decreases the
ability of the heavy combined arms battalion to respond to tactical emergencies or to exploit
success. It increases the significance of the brigade combat team’s reserve element, operating
over an extended area with only eight maneuver companies. On the modern battlefield,
situational obstacles, fires, CAS, and attack aviation will increasingly be used to augment
brigade reserve forces. Brigade and battalion commanders must give serious thought as to
how to establish a reserve in a two combined arms battalion BCT and at what level to
maintain C2 to accomplish the mission.
6-183. The choice of a force designated to be a reserve depends on the factors of METT-TC.
Generally, a tank platoon is most useful as the combined arms battalion reserve because of
its mobility, firepower, and limited obstacle-breaching capability. In close terrain against an
enemy with dismounted infantry, an infantry force may be best suited. In compartmented or
restricted terrain against a mechanized enemy, mobile Javelin teams can be an effective
reserve force.
6-184. The reserve’s likely tasks are issued as planning priorities and may include one or
more of the following:
Counterattack locally.
Defeat enemy air assaults
Block enemy penetrations.
Reinforce a committed element.
Protect rear area operations.
Secure high-value assets.
6-185. During the defensive preparation phase, the battalion commander may employ his
reserve in other tasks, such as conducting security operations or assisting security of
battalion logistics sites. The commander must balance these uses of the reserve with the
need to protect his reserve as well as the reserve commander’s requirement to conduct troop-
leading procedures, coordination, and reconnaissance. For the reserve to be effective at the
right place and time, it must be ready and focused on the correct mission.

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6-186. The battalion commander and staff must determine where and under what
conditions the reserve force is likely to be employed to position it effectively and give it
appropriate planning priorities. The reserve force commander must analyze his assigned
planning priorities, conduct the coordination with units that will be affected by his maneuver
and commitment, and provide information to the battalion commander and staff on routes
and employment times to designated critical points on the battlefield.

SECTION IV – SEQUENCE OF THE DEFENSE

6-187. The HBCT combined arms battalion may assume a defensive mission following an
attack of its own or in anticipation of an enemy attack. The following general sequence of
operations applies to planning and executing all defensive operations: occupation and
establishment of security, preparation and continued security operations, security area
engagement, main battle engagement, and follow-on missions.

OCCUPATION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY

6-188. Normally, the BCT has established some form of security using the brigade
reconnaissance squadron before the combined arms battalion moves into the area. However,
the combined arms battalion must still provide for its own security, especially on expanded
or complex terrain. If transitioning from an offensive operation, the BCT and heavy
combined arms battalions establish the security area well beyond where the MBA is desired
to prevent the enemy from observing and interrupting defensive preparations and
identifying unit positions. If the brigade cannot push the security force forward for
counterreconnaissance purposes, the heavy combined arms battalions may have to hold their
positions initially as they transition and then withdraw units to the defensive MBA,
establishing a security force in the process. UAVs should be considered to augment friendly
forces in the establishment of the security area.

MOVEMENT INTO AN UNSECURED AO

6-189. If the HBCT combined arms battalion is moving into an unsecured AO, it may lead
with the scout platoon, possibly reinforced with tanks or infantry elements and mortars.
Depending on the situation, the heavy combined arms battalion may send a company to
secure the area. The mission of the battalion security force is to clear the area, check for
contaminated areas and obstacles, and establish security for the main body. After clearing
the battalion’s logistics sites and the area where the companies will be positioned, the
security force should position itself to:
Prevent enemy observation of defensive positions.
Defeat infiltrating reconnaissance forces.
Prevent the enemy from delivering direct fires into the HBCT combined arms
battalion defenses.
Provide early warning of the enemy’s approach.

POSITIONING OF FORCES
6-190. The positioning of the battalion security elements must be integrated into the
security operations of the HBCT and adjacent combined arms battalions. In contiguous or
linear defenses, the brigade commander normally organizes and defines the security area
forward of the FEBA, assigning the combined arms battalions AOs of the battlefield to
prevent gaps in the BCT security. The key is to integrate security operations at the brigade
level and again at the battalion level, using all available resources to execute security
operations.

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LEADERS’ RECONNAISSANCE
6-191. When feasible, the battalion commander and subordinate leaders conduct a
reconnaissance of the AO to develop most of the plan based on their view of the actual
terrain. The commander and staff develop a plan for the leaders’ reconnaissance that
includes provisions for security, leaders and key staff members required to participate,
designation of a recorder, areas to be reconnoitered, and time allocated for the
reconnaissance. When available, the commander may use aviation assets to conduct the
leaders’ reconnaissance.

PREPARATION AND CONTINUED SECURITY OPERATIONS

6-192. Preparation of the defense includes planning and plan refinement, positioning of
forces, constructing obstacles, planning and synchronizing fires, positioning logistics, and
conducting inspections and rehearsals. Throughout the preparation phase, security
operations must continue without interruption. The brigade reconnaissance squadron may
be assigned any combination of screen, guard, and area security missions. The battalion
scout platoon may be positioned to screen for the battalion and provide early warning along
most likely enemy avenues of approach, reinforced in depth with sections or platoons from
the companies.

SECURITY
6-193. Security is a consideration throughout the AO. The battalion must array security
forces in depth to provide protection and to reduce the potential for enemy infiltration. It
must also secure the MBA to prevent enemy reconnaissance, reduction of obstacles,
targeting of friendly positions, and other disruptive actions. Companies must secure
obstacles, battle positions, and hide positions. Elements in the combined arms battalion
must provide their own security, augmented by combat vehicles that are being repaired.
With extended lines of communication, the combined arms battalion may also secure
logistical elements moving forward from the brigade support area (BSA) to support the
forward battalions.

DISPERSION
6-194. Friendly forces should be widely dispersed and hidden to reduce vulnerability and aid
in OPSEC.

INTEGRATION
6-195. Reconnaissance and ground maneuver units should be integrated into the battalion
security forces. Reconnaissance forces primarily locate enemy elements and attack them
with indirect fires but do not engage in direct-fire attack except in self-defense. The battalion
commander and staff establish the C2 headquarters and communications architecture for
the security force. (This can be one of the most challenging missions in terms of tactical
internet management.)

SECURITY AREA ENGAGEMENT

6-196. The HBCT combined arms battalion normally does not have a significant security
area engagement requirement as this is largely the domain of the brigade for shaping the
battlefield and setting favorable conditions for the close fight. The heavy combined arms
battalion may execute some engagement tasks in the security area to support its own or the
higher headquarters defensive scheme. These tasks may include the following:

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EXECUTION OF PLANNED INDIRECT FIRES

6-197. The combined arms battalion’s plan for indirect fires usually consists of security force
elements or a company FIST’s execution of one or two indirect-fire targets on a primary
enemy avenue of approach. This may be in support of the higher headquarters scheme of
fires since the BCT usually controls artillery and joint fires throughout most of the
engagement.

EXECUTION OF SITUATIONAL OBSTACLES

6-198. The HBCT combined arms battalion may be tasked by brigade or have integrated
into its defensive scheme the use of rapidly emplaced situational obstacles to execute in the
security area. These obstacles serve to force premature enemy deployment, slowing the
enemy to allow for more effective engagement with indirect fires while forcing premature
expenditure of enemy engineer assets. These obstacles are usually planned and triggered
relative to specific enemy attack options and are related to accomplishing a specific EFET.
Maneuver forces may be employed forward to cover them with direct fires and then
withdraw to positions in the MBA.

EXECUTION OF DELAY OPERATIONS THROUGH THE SECURITY AREA AND INTO THE
MBA
6-199. The HBCT combined arms battalion may support its own or the BCT’s scheme of
maneuver by fighting a delay through the depth of the security area and into the MBA. The
purpose may be to take advantage of restricted avenues of approach, to set the conditions for
a counterattack, or to avoid a decisive engagement until favorable conditions have been set.

BATTLE HANDOVER
6-200. The HBCT combined arms battalion may assume control of the FEBA fight from the
brigade reconnaissance squadron/security force as it withdraws. Transferring responsibility
from the security force (reconnaissance squadron) to the combined arms battalion on the
FEBA requires firm, clear arrangements for assuming command of the action, for
coordinating direct and indirect fires, for the security force’s rearward passage of lines, for
closing lanes in obstacles, and for detailed movement planning that clears the security force
out of the battalion AO with minimal interference with the defense.

TRANSITION
6-201. As security area engagements transition into the MBA, security area forces withdraw
to initial MBA or reserve positions. Some elements may maneuver to the flanks to maintain
surveillance on enemy avenues of approach, providing early warning and execution of fires
against following enemy forces.

MAIN BATTLE AREA ENGAGEMENT

6-202. The HBCT combined arms battalion seeks to defeat the enemy’s attack forward of or
within the MBA. If the combined arms battalion can bring sufficient firepower to shape the
enemy in the security area fight, an MBA engagement may not occur. If so, then the brigade
can rapidly transition and move its combined arms battalions into a strong counterattack.
However, the brigade and the HBCT combined arms battalions normally defend over a large
area, and enemy strength often forces an MBA engagement. The combined arms battalion
commander plans an MBA engagement as a combined arms fight, integrating both direct
and indirect fires, reinforced with obstacles and organic mortars. The BCT continues to focus
artillery, joint fires, and attack aviation in an effort to engage the enemy continuously
throughout the depth of the battlefield; therefore, fire support to the combined arms

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battalions may be limited to critical points and times in the MBA fight. Combining all
available fires with maneuver, obstacles, and reserve elements, the combined arms battalion
commander seeks to destroy the enemy or force his transition to a retrograde or hasty
defense. The brigade normally specifies control measures to coordinate and focus the
defensive operation.

FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS
6-203. Following a successful defense, there may be a period of confusion that the defender
can exploit. Given the information capabilities of the heavy combined arms battalion and the
BCT, counterattacks can be executed quickly, based on branches and sequels to the plan,
before the enemy can secure his gains or organize a defense. METT-TC, ISR results, and the
higher commander’s concept of operations dictate the combined arms battalion’s follow-on
mission. If the situation prevents offensive action, the heavy combined arms battalion
continues to defend. As in the initial establishment of the defense, gaining security area
space is critical. A local friendly counterattack can provide space for reestablishing a security
area and time to reorganize. Any attack option must pay particular attention not only to the
terrain and enemy but also to friendly obstacles (and their destruction times if applicable)
and areas where dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) or bomblets have
been used. If the heavy combined arms battalion or brigade cannot counterattack to gain
adequate security space, then the BCT may have to direct one combined arms battalion to
maintain contact with the enemy and guard the AO while others move to reestablish the
defense farther to the rear. Whether continuing to defend or transitioning to offensive
operations, the heavy combined arms battalion must quickly reorganize. Key reorganization
tasks include the following:
Establishing and maintaining security.
Reestablishing C2 and communications architecture.
Reorganizing platoons and companies.
Treating and evacuating casualties.
Conducting emergency resupply.
Recovering damaged equipment and initiating repair operations.
Processing enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and detainees.
Refining and updating the COP.

SECTION V – DEFENSIVE TECHNIQUES

6-204. The battalion HBCT combined arms battalion normally defends using one of five
basic techniques of defense:
Defend an AO.
Defend a battle position.
Defend a reverse slope.
Defend a strongpoint.
Defend a perimeter.
6-205. The BCT normally assigns the heavy combined arms battalion an AO to defend.

DEFENSE OF AN AREA OF OPERATIONS

6-206. A defense in an AO provides the greatest degree of freedom of maneuver and fire
planning within a specific area. The brigade most often uses this method of control when it
has an adequate amount of depth and width to the battlefield and does not desire decisive
engagement early in the MBA fight. The HBCT frequently assigns defense of an AO to

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combined arms battalions. Less frequently, a heavy combined arms battalion commander
may assign his companies AOs to defend. PLs, EAs, BPs, and obstacle belts help coordinate
forces and achieve synchronized action. During defensive preparations, the commander and
key staff officers use backbriefs, inspections, and rehearsals to ensure that the defensive
operation is coordinated and that unacceptable or unintended gaps do not develop. Use of
AOs allows flexibility and prevents the enemy from concentrating overwhelming firepower
on the bulk of the defending force. Forces defending against an enemy with superior mobility
and firepower must use the depth of their positions to defeat the enemy. The depth of the
defense must come from the initial positioning of units throughout the AO, not from
maneuvering. A properly positioned and viable reserve enhances depth (Figure 6-7).

POSITIONS
6-207. An HBCT combined arms battalion defending an AO against a mounted enemy uses
a series of mutually supporting antiarmor positions. These should be located on armor-
restricted terrain, protected by infantry, and strengthened by obstacles.

SECURITY
6-208. The defense of an AO is more effective against armor but more vulnerable to infantry
attack or combined arms action, which can be directed against one position at a time.
Position preparation must emphasize all-round security and mutual support.

DEPLOYMENT IN DEPTH
6-209. Forces deployed in depth must confront the enemy with effective fires from multiple
locations as he tries to maneuver. The AO is organized around dispersed, small units that
attack the enemy throughout the depth of his formations. The focus of this defense technique
is the enemy force. Mines and other obstacles, infantry positions, and patrols can close gaps
that fire cannot cover effectively due to terrain masking or heavily wooded areas. The
commander can position dismounted infantry along mounted avenues of approach within
restricted terrain, thereby maximizing its capabilities. The battalion commander can
position mounted forces either to engage armor and mechanized forces with antiarmor
weapons or to provide rapid maneuver in the form of counterattacks.

ENGAGEMENT OPTIONS
6-210. The commander has two engagement options when defending an AO. He chooses the
appropriate one based mainly on the restrictions of the terrain and his expectation of
achieving surprise. The first option is to begin engaging at maximum optimum range, based
on the terrain and available weapon systems. The second option is to allow the enemy to
move within direct-fire range of antiarmor weapons and machineguns. The combined arms
battalion then engages the enemy with violent hasty and deliberate counterattacks designed
to destroy the enemy from any direction. In restrictive terrain, this option denies a more
mobile enemy force any firepower or mobility advantage.

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Figure 6-7. Defense of an Area of Operations

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Engage Throughout the Depth/Width of the Attacker

6-211. The defender initiates fires at long ranges with field artillery, tactical aircraft, and
attack helicopters to begin to break up the continuity of the attack. When the enemy enters
the engagement range of the combined arms battalion’s organic weapons, antiarmor
weapons engage him from multiple unexpected directions and destroy him, disrupt enemy
synchronization, and destroy key vehicles.

Allowing Limited Penetration of the AO

6-212. This technique is offensively oriented. It allows for planned penetrations, ambushes,
and counterattacks throughout the enemy formation. A forward array of forces cannot
defend armor approaches. Such an array can be overrun or penetrated rapidly while under
massive artillery, smoke, and direct-fire suppression. To avoid penetration, the heavy
combined arms battalion must array forces in depth. Concentrating the heavy combined
arms battalion on narrow fronts is risky.

PLANNING
6-213. The battalion commander considers the following factors when facing a mostly
mechanized or armored enemy.

Mounted Avenues of Approach

6-214. Avenues of approach determine enemy mounted avenues of approach and the size
force that can move on each. The battalion commander or S3 estimates the maximum
number of vehicles the enemy can deploy at one time on given avenues of approach and the
length of time this target array would be exposed.

Engagement Areas
6-215. An EA is a terrain-based fire control measure situated along an enemy avenue of
approach. Commanders design EAs to destroy a designated enemy force by massing the
effects of a majority of their available systems. The size and shape of the area is determined
by the degree of maximum range intervisibility from respective weapon systems and the
number of units available.

Massing of Tank, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Antitank Fires

6-216. Battalions should plan to mass antiarmor fires by assigning target EAs, primary and
alternate sectors of fire, and target reference points (TRPs).

Obstacle Planning and Integration

6-217. Battalions should plan obstacles to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the enemy and protect
positions. Encountering these obstacles increases enemy exposure time and enhances the
effects of direct and indirect fires.

Integrated Fire Support

6-218. CAS sorties should be planned to provide rapid and concentrated aerial-delivered
firepower in the first, crucial engagements of the battle. Mortars and artillery increase the
effects of antiarmor weapons by suppressing enemy overwatch elements, forcing enemy
armor to button up. Attack helicopters rapidly mass antiarmor and antipersonnel weapons
and provide security on flanks and other unoccupied areas.

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DEFENSE FROM A BATTLE POSITION

6-219. A battle position is a general location and orientation of forces on the ground from
which units defend. HBCT combined arms battalion-sized to platoon-sized units can use BPs
(Figure 6-8).

USE OF BATTLE POSITIONS

6-220. Use of battle positions reduces the instructions needed to move a defending force.
BPs are often used as graphic control measures for a FRAGO and are identified by number,
letter, name, or a combination thereof.

Figure 6-8. Disposition of Forces in and About a Battle Position

THREE LEVELS OF PREPARATION FOR A BATTLE POSITION

6-221. The three levels of preparation for a BP are occupy, prepare, and reconnoiter. The
use of on-order BPs with the associated tasks of prepare or reconnoiter adds flexibility and
depth to the defensive plan.

Occupy
6-222. This is complete preparation of the position from which the company will initially
defend. The position is fully reconnoitered, prepared, and occupied before the “defend not
later than (NLT)” time specified in the combined arms battalion OPORD. The company must

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rehearse the occupation, and the commander must establish a trigger for occupation of the
position.

Prepare
6-223. The unit fully reconnoiters the position and the corresponding EA, marking vehicle
positions in the BP and fire control measures in the EA. From the BP, the unit must
accomplish all actions to enable it to execute the mission immediately on occupation.
Planning, coordination, and rehearsals are required for the unit to displace to the BP and
accomplish the mission from it. Within time constraints, the unit digs in survivability
positions, constructs fighting positions, designates TRPs, develops direct- and indirect-fire
plans, emplaces obstacles, clears fields of fire, and prestocks ammunition. Prepare missions
are normally critical to the defense. A unit assigned such a mission must maintain security
on the position and on the routes to it.

Reconnoiter
6-224. The unit fully reconnoiters the EA and BP, planning tentative unit positions in the
BP and establishing limited fire control measures in the EA. The unit must coordinate and
plan for defense from this position. Leaders reconnoiter, select, and mark positions, routes,
and locations for security elements. They coordinate movement and other actions, such as
preparing obstacles and occupation plans, with other elements of the heavy combined arms
battalion.

MANEUVER
6-225. The battalion commander can maneuver his elements freely within the assigned BP.
To comply with the commander’s intent, units can maneuver outside the BP to adjust fires or
to seize opportunities for offensive action. Combined arms battalion security and sustaining
operations assets are often positioned outside the BP with approval from the headquarters
assigning the BP.

SPACE ALLOCATION
6-226. The battalion commander allocates space to subordinate elements within the BP area
based on the space available and the relative danger of nuclear and chemical attack. The
combined arms battalion commander thinks two levels down or in terms of platoon BPs
when he selects a BP for subordinate companies. He must allow enough space on each BP for
dispersed primary, supplementary, and alternate positions for key weapons. The battalion
commander can vary the degree of maneuver elements in the battalion BP by allocating
larger company BPs. Battle positions can also reflect positions in depth. They may take a
shape other than the standard oblong shape, which suggests a linear defense within the BP.
Large positions also increase dispersion in a nuclear and chemical environment. The
commander can combine AOs and BPs in the battalion AO to suit the tactical situation.

TYPES OF BATTLE POSITIONS

6-227. There are four types of battle positions: primary, alternate, supplementary, and
subsequent.

Primary Positions
6-228. Primary positions cover the enemy’s most likely avenue of approach into the area. A
primary position is the best position from which to accomplish the assigned mission.

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Alternate Positions
6-229. Alternate positions are those assigned for use when the primary position becomes
untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task. These positions allow the
defender to carry out his original task, such as covering an avenue of approach or
engagement area. Alternate positions increase the defender’s survivability by allowing
engagement of the enemy from multiple positions and movement to other positions in case of
suppressive or obscuring fires.

Supplementary Positions
6-230. Supplementary positions are designated to cover avenues of approach that are not
expected to be the enemy’s primary avenue.

Subsequent Positions
6-231. Subsequent positions are those to which the unit expects to move during the course of
the battle. The defending unit may have a series of subsequent positions (particularly in
delay operations), each with associated primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.

REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

6-232. A reverse slope defense is organized to use a topographical crest to mask the defender
from the attacker’s observation and from supporting direct fire (Figure 6-9).

CONDITIONS
6-233. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander may adopt a reverse slope position
for elements of the battalion when:
Enemy fire makes the forward slope untenable.
Lack of cover and concealment on the forward slope makes it untenable.
The forward slope has been lost or has not yet been gained.
The forward slope is exposed to enemy direct-fire weapons fired from beyond the
effective range of the defender’s weapons. Moving to the reverse slope removes the
attacker’s standoff advantage.
The terrain on the reverse slope affords better fields of fire than the forward slope.
The defender must avoid creating a dangerous salient or reentrant in friendly lines.
Surprising and deceiving the enemy as to the true location of the battalion
defensive positions is essential.

ADVANTAGES
6-234. Some advantages of a reverse slope defense follow:
Enemy ground observation of the battle area is masked, even from surveillance
devices and radar.
Enemy direct-fire weapons cannot effectively fire on the position without coming
within range of the defender’s weapons.
The enemy must try to breach obstacles on the reverse slope within direct-fire
range of all the defender’s weapons. (The attacker cannot locate these obstacles
until he encounters them, thus reducing his reaction time and maneuver space.)
The enemy is deceived as to the strength and location of defensive positions.
Enemy indirect fire is less effective since he cannot see the defender.
The defender gains tactical surprise.

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The lack of enemy ground observation allows more freedom of movement in the
battle area.
Tanks, BFVs, Javelins, and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW)
missile systems, if positioned properly, can mass fires on the reverse military crest;
infantry small-arms weapons can contribute their close fires to the battle.
The unit can dig in more quickly even when the enemy is approaching because the
slope of the hill covers and conceals the unit from the direct fire and observation of
approaching enemy ground forces. Defenders can concentrate on position
preparation.
The terrain protects the unit from the blast and thermal effects of enemy or
friendly force nuclear weapons.

Figure 6-9. Organization of the Reverse Slope Defense

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DISADVANTAGES
6-235. Some disadvantages of a reverse slope follow:
Observation of the enemy may be limited, and the defender may be unable to cover
obstacles to the front by direct fire.
The topographical crest may limit the range of important direct-fire weapons.
These weapons may have to locate separately from the dismounted infantry
elements to exploit their range.
The enemy holds the high ground in an attack. His attack is downhill; the
counterattack is uphill. This may provide a psychological advantage to the enemy.
Because the reverse military crest must be controlled, the effectiveness of the
reverse slope defense is reduced during limited visibility.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSIVE POSITION

6-236. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander organizes the defensive position in
accordance with procedures that apply to all defensive techniques.

Forward Edge of the Position

6-237. The forward edge of the position should be within small-arms range of the crest. It
should be far enough from the crest that fields of fire allow the defender time to place well-
aimed fire on the enemy before he reaches friendly positions.

Flanking Fires
6-238. A reverse slope position is most effective when units on adjacent terrain can place
flanking fires on the forward slope.

Security Force
6-239. The units should establish a security force to the front to stop or delay the enemy,
disorganize his attack, and deceive him as to the location of the defensive position. When
this security element withdraws, the unit must maintain observation, indirect fire, and
security to the front.

Observation Posts
6-240. The unit establishes OPs on or forward of the topographical crest. This allows long-
range observation over the entire front and indirect-fire coverage of forward obstacles. OPs
are usually provided by the reserve and may vary in size from a few Soldiers to a reinforced
squad. They should include forward observers. At night, their number should be increased to
improve security.

DEFENSE OF A STRONGPOINT
6-241. A strongpoint is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing
obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain (FM
3-90). The mission to create and defend a strongpoint implies retention of terrain to stop or
redirect enemy formations. A strongpoint defense at the combined arms battalion level
requires extensive preparation time, significant engineering support, and Class IV resources
to construct. The surveillance, target acquisition, and information-sharing capabilities of the
tank enable it to destroy enemy combat vehicles rapidly and at long range. As a reserve, an
armor company’s capabilities enable rapid movement from hide positions to attack by fire
positions. Mechanized company teams or HBCT combined arms battalions may be given

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strongpoint missions in rare instances, but again, the static nature of the operation and the
resources required to conduct the strongpoint make it an unusual mission assignment.
HBCT combined arms battalion strongpoints can be established in isolation when tied to
restrictive terrain on their flanks or on armor high-speed avenues of approach tied to unit
defensive positions on the strongpoint flanks. A bypassed strongpoint exposes enemy flanks
to attacks from friendly forces inside and outside the strongpoint.

PLANNING A STRONGPOINT DEFENSE

6-242. The HBCT combined arms battalion pays a high cost in manpower, equipment,
material, and time to construct a strongpoint. It takes several days of dedicated work to
construct one. Strongpoints sacrifice the inherent mobility advantage of heavy forces.

Enemy Assault
6-243. When the enemy cannot easily bypass a strongpoint, the defending unit should
expect and be ready to repel repeated enemy dismounted assaults. The strongpoint will
probably receive intensive artillery attacks and must be prepared with overhead cover.
Multiple positions in the strongpoint provide defense in depth. Combat vehicles committed to
the strongpoint defense use multiple firing positions while infantry squads use positions tied
together with trenches. An HBCT combined arms battalion assigned a strongpoint mission:
Plans movement to alternative positions in the strongpoint.
Coordinates with forces outside the strongpoint, especially counterattack forces.
Plans direct fires in detail and receives fire support priority.
Establishes a small reserve to counter penetrations and, when appropriate, attack
outside the strongpoint.

Mutual Support
6-244. All positions in a strongpoint are mutually supporting (Figure 6-10). Positioning
must allow massing of the fire of two or more units against an assault and prevent the
enemy from isolating positions and defeating them in detail. Sectors of fire help coordinate
and mass fires between positions. Avenues of approach into and around the strongpoint that
cannot be covered by forces in primary positions must be kept under surveillance and
covered by supplementary positions prepared in as much detail as time permits and occupied
on order.

Forces Operating Outside the Strongpoint

6-245. In some situations, the HBCT combined arms battalion defends from a strongpoint
with forces operating outside the strongpoint. Battalion security forces may operate forward
or perform economy-of-force missions. On their return to the strongpoint, security forces
either screen a secondary avenue of approach or occupy a position in depth.

Infantry Squads
6-246. The battalion commander may separate the BFVs and infantry squads, placing the
infantry squads on restrictive terrain with the BFVs deployed in positions in depth to
support by fire. Alternate and supplementary positions are planned throughout the
strongpoint and AO. Mortars operate in split section on the reverse slope or in a builtup area
in the center of the strongpoint. Combat trains, with emergency resupply of Classes III and
V, are placed in prepared defilade positions or buildings in the strongpoint. Supplies are pre-
positioned near primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. The BCT provides units to
keep the main supply route open.

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Figure 6-10. Battalion HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Strongpoint

Armor Heavy Reserve

6-247. As in the defense of a battle position, an armor heavy company team could serve as
the strongpoint defending team. The surveillance, target acquisition, and information-
sharing capabilities of the tank enable it to destroy enemy combat vehicles rapidly and at
long range. As a reserve, its capabilities enable rapid movement from hide positions to attack
by fire positions.

Security Force
6-248. The commander may use a mechanized heavy company team as part of the security
force to provide intelligence through contact and spot reports. The company team assigned
the security mission screens the combined arms battalion AO or along the most dangerous
avenue of approach. This company team provides early warning to the battalion, destroys
enemy reconnaissance elements, and helps shape the battlefield so the enemy is directed
against the strongpoint.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR A STRONGPOINT

6-249. The strongpoint represents the culmination of the brigade staff IPB and the
commander’s estimate of the situation. Based on a METT-TC analysis, the brigade

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commander identifies the decisive terrain that, if seized by the enemy, would result in the
BCT’s defeat. This decisive terrain is the strongpoint.

Terrain Analysis
6-250. The battalion S2 analyzes the terrain in a detailed manner. Unlike other types of
defense, the strongpoint must be defensible in 360 degrees. As a result, the terrain analysis
must be conducted with the understanding that enemy offensive operations, from an
infiltration to a major attack, could appear from any direction (multiple avenues of
approach).

ISR Operation Order

6-251. The ISR OPORD is essential to the strongpoint’s effectiveness. Some reconnaissance
assets (UAVs) may be able to operate outside the position to provide initial early warning. If
the strongpoint becomes encircled, the unit must be able to anticipate the actions of the
enemy and respond internally. OPs positioned outside the strongpoint must be sustainable
should the strongpoint become surrounded. The battalion should have a plan for bringing
patrols or other reconnaissance assets into the position despite enemy presence.

MANEUVER CONCEPT
6-252. The strongpoint defense is the most labor-intensive operation an HBCT combined
arms battalion commander may execute. Despite its static nature, the construction of a
strongpoint defense must allow for maximum flexibility. The key to an effective and
sustainable strongpoint defense is to have a solid direct- and indirect-fire plan coupled with
properly constructed fortifications. The battalion commander must take a personal interest
in the interface between combat and sustaining operations elements.

Positions
6-253. The selection of company combat and sustaining operations positions is the first
priority of the combined arms battalion commander. He must plan so his weapon systems
can engage the enemy effectively along the major expected enemy avenue of approach. The
S2’s line-of sight analysis, the IPB, and the brigade obstacle plan determine these positions.
The actual construction of the combined arms battalion EA and the direct-fire control
measures are identical to that discussed in earlier sections. The considerations for weapon
systems employment, however, may be different, particularly with respect to the lack of
depth in the strongpoint itself. In a strongpoint, it is much more difficult to achieve depth of
fires than in AO defensive operations. Generally, infantry squads secure the outskirts
alongside or slightly to the left or right front of the perimeter.

Battle Position Selection

6-254. Once the battalion commander has determined the locations suitable for each type of
weapon system, he selects the company BPs. He must address several considerations before
finalizing the BPs:
First, how much firepower is needed to cover the enemy avenue of approach?
Second, how can BPs be selected so they can be responsive to enemy attacks from
other directions?
Third, what task organization is best suited to the terrain and meets the security
needs of the HBCT combined arms battalion?

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Reserve
6-255. In a strongpoint defense, it is important to maintain a reserve that can react to
enemy activity against the position. The reserve may be mounted, dismounted, or both. The
reserve may:
Block an enemy penetration of the perimeter.
Reinforce a position or section of the defense.
Counterattack to restore a portion of the strongpoint.

STRONGPOINT FIRE SUPPORT

6-256. Dominating terrain features, mounted and dismounted avenues of approach, and
likely enemy avenues of approach hidden from direct observation should be targeted. In this
way, the fire support plan will help keep the enemy at a distance from the strongpoint
(Figure 6-11).
6-257. If the enemy is able to reach the strongpoint in significant strength, the close-in fire
support plan is essential to the integrity and survivability of the position. Fires must be
planned on obstacles close to the position, even if they are danger close. Evacuation of the
position may become necessary during the battle. If fires are planned on the position, the
unit can destroy the enemy and reoccupy the positions for continued defense.
6-258. If 360-degree indirect mortar support is required, the mortar tubes are dismounted
from the vehicles so they can respond easily to calls for fire in any direction. If the mortar
tubes remain in the tracks, firing in some directions will be difficult without moving the
vehicle. The vehicles should remain in proximity to the tubes, dug in, and serving as an
ammunition storage facility. Figure 6-11 illustrates the overall combined arms battalion fire
support plan.

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Figure 6-11. Strongpoint Fire Support Plan

STRONGPOINT ENGINEER SUPPORT

6-259. The engineer company commander accompanies the combined arms battalion
commander on the reconnaissance of the strongpoint area. He plans indirect fires and
scatterable mines to slow, disrupt, and canalize the advancing enemy and prepares the

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position to make it physically impassable to tanks and to enhance the killing power of
antitank weapons with obstacles. Based on the commander’s guidance and priority, the
engineer commander determines emplacement priority for fighting positions and obstacles
and allocates the assets needed to accomplish the mission. Strongpoints are constructed from
inside to outside. Regardless of the configuration of the strongpoint, the following are
essential tasks to perform:
Prepare obstacles to prevent their being overrun by tanks.
Prepare hull-down positions for fighting vehicles.
Emplace obstacles at optimum weapons range.
Construct protected routes between positions.
Plan and coordinate for scatterable mines.

STRONGPOINT SUSTAINING OPERATIONS

6-260. The HBCT combined arms battalion S4 helps plan for the following aspects of
sustaining operations in a strongpoint. The battalion must provide a robust slice of the
combined arms battalion sustaining operations forward in the strongpoint from the CABSA.

Cache
6-261. The S4 examines the engineer’s strongpoint construction plan and determines the
best places to cache ammunition and supplies. The units refine the cache plan by positioning
smaller caches adjacent to individual crew-served weapons. Once the unit caches have been
identified or sited, the battalion S4 develops a resupply plan. Combined arms battalion
caches must be dispersed throughout the strongpoint to prevent a loss due to a single
detonation.

Medical Support
6-262. The force health protection plan must take into consideration whether to use a
consolidated battalion aid station (BAS) or whether to push medical support forward. The
time and distance factors to the perimeter should be considered when placing treatment
facilities. A four-man litter team on average terrain can travel 900 meters and return in 1
hour. A six-man litter team in mountainous terrain can travel approximately 350 meters and
return in 1 hour. The BAS should be dug in, with easy access to each supported unit, water
supply, and generator. If possible, a bunker will be made available to the BAS. In an
elongated strongpoint, the BAS may split its treatment teams to provide support from two
locations.

Refuel Points
6-263. Even though vehicles in the position are static, they still burn significant amounts of
fuel during idling, particularly while running their thermal sights. The battalion must
develop a refueling plan.

Combat Trains CP
6-264. The combat trains command post (CTCP) is dug in separately from the battalion CP.
It serves as the alternate CP should the main CP be destroyed. It is positioned away from
the main CP but in proximity to the aid station and supply activities. The CTCP must
establish redundant communications with the main CP so that direct communication via
land line, for example, is possible between the two headquarters.

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STRONGPOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-265. The commander develops his strongpoint defense plan by using the terrain to its
utmost advantage. The battalion commander must be able to traverse the strongpoint and
respond to an attack from any direction. His observation posts must afford the opportunity to
observe the battle. Communication wire must be buried deep in the strongpoint and field
phones made available throughout the position.

PERIMETER DEFENSE
6-266. A perimeter defense is a defense oriented in all directions (Figure 6-12). The HBCT
combined arms battalion uses it for self-protection. The battalion establishes a perimeter
defense when it must hold critical terrain in areas where the defense is not tied in with
adjacent units. The battalion may also form a perimeter when it has been bypassed and
isolated by the enemy and must defend in place. These differences are in contrast to the
strongpoint defense, in which the position is tied in with the rest of the defense and
considerable time and resources are spent to hold the ground.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
6-267. While in a perimeter defense, the HBCT combined arms battalion should consider
the following:
Place security as far out as possible.
Position armor and antiarmor weapons in protected positions and concentrate their
fires on armor avenues of approach.
Maintain an armor pure or armor heavy reserve.

RETENTION OF KEY TERRAIN

6-268. The combined arms battalion retains terrain key to future operations such as linkup,
extraction, or breakout. The battalion commander employs a security force outside the
perimeter for early warning. He augments the security force with mounted or dismounted
patrols and OPs controlled by subordinate companies on the perimeter. Periodic patrols
cover areas that stationary elements cannot observe.

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Figure 6-12. Perimeter Defense

HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION RESERVE

6-269. The battalion reserve defends a portion of the second line of defense behind the
perimeter elements. The reserve must have the mobility to react to enemy action in any
portion of the perimeter. It is positioned to block the most dangerous avenue of approach and
is assigned on-order positions on other critical avenues. If the enemy penetrates the
perimeter, the reserve blocks the enemy penetration or counterattacks to restore the
perimeter. After committing the reserve, the commander immediately designates a new
reserve force to meet other threats.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

6-270. If the combined arms battalion forms the perimeter because of isolation, then combat
and sustaining operations elements from other units come under the tactical command of the

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senior combat commander in the perimeter. The commander assigns them missions based on
support capabilities.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
6-271. Sustaining operations elements may support from inside the perimeter or from
another location depending on the mission and status of the combined arms battalion, the
type of transport available, the weather, and the terrain. All sustaining operations assets
inside the perimeter should be in a protected location from which they can provide
continuous support. Since resupply may have to be done by air, the position should include
or be near a landing zone (LZ) or drop zone (DZ). Resupply is often by air. The availability of
LZs and DZs protected from the enemy’s observation and fire is a main consideration in
selecting and organizing the position. Since aerial resupply is vulnerable to weather and
enemy fires, commanders must emphasize supply economy and protection of available
stocks.

COUNTERATTACK
6-272. The HBCT combined arms battalion may conduct local counterattacks to restore or
preserve defensive integrity. Unless defensive operations have left the combined arms
battalion largely intact or with sufficient combat power, the HBCT combined arms battalion
usually lacks the ability to conduct a significant counterattack by itself.
6-273. Counterattacks are conducted to take advantage of an attacking enemy’s weakened
condition by striking against his flanks or rear or to deny the enemy commander the
momentum and initiative. Within the context of the defending combined arms battalion, it
may execute a counterattack to support the brigade’s defensive posture as part of a larger
force seeking to complete the destruction of the enemy’s attack or as part of a transition to
offensive operations. Counterattacks are also conducted to dislodge an enemy from within
the perimeter of a battalion defensive position. As the enemy’s advance is slowed and
weakened, his maneuver options become less available. As a result, the enemy may
transition to a hasty defense along the forward line of own troops (FLOT) or may attempt to
gain a foothold within a battalion’s defensive position from which he can defend. This
situation allows the battalion commander to seek decisive opportunities to counterattack the
enemy with all available force and ultimately secure the initiative of the battle.
6-274. Timing is critical to a counterattack. If committed too soon, reserves may not have
the desired effect or may not be available for a more dangerous contingency. If committed too
late, they may be ineffective. Once committed, counterattack forces may penetrate the
enemy’s flanks and attack the enemy’s artillery and logistics areas or penetrate the enemy’s
flanks and attack them from the rear. Both actions are decisive and will create grave concern
for the enemy. Adequate warning time must be given to the reserve. The reserve cannot
remain ready to go indefinitely. A rested reserve force will perform better than one that has
been on 1 hour alert for the previous 48 hours. Reserve commanders and staffs must closely
monitor the flow of the battle to be ready for commitment.
6-275. The combined arms battalion may decide to use the reserve as a counterattack force
to penetrate enemy forces or defeat the attacker. Basic guidelines for counterattacks include
the following:
Attack one objective at a time and weight it with all available combat power and
fires and avoid piecemeal commitment of the counterattacking force. Once
committed, the counterattack force is normally the main effort.
Determine movement times based on routes available and develop clear decision
points (DPs) for when and where to launch the counterattack.

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Defeat the targeted enemy force before being attacked by subsequent enemy forces.
Indirect fires and situational obstacles may delay follow-on attacking enemy forces.
Determine and recognize enemy deception efforts aimed at causing the premature
or indecisive commitment of the reserve.
Seek to avoid the enemy’s strength. The most effective attacks are against exposed
enemy flanks and/or rear. Attacks from an unexpected direction at the point and
time of the enemy’s greatest vulnerability have the best potential for success.
Take advantage of the protection and concealment offered by the terrain and/or
limited visibility.
Maintain flexibility. Although counterattack plans are developed during the
planning process, the counterattack force must be prepared to quickly attack at
different times and locations based on the actual situation. Anticipation of events, a
clear understanding of the commander’s intent, and a heavy reliance on SOPs
greatly increase the agility of the counterattack force.
When feasible, launch counterattacks around other committed units rather than
through them. This reduces the vulnerability and time-consuming coordination
associated with a passage of lines.
Consider the strength, disposition, and location of the enemy’s reserve. If the
reserve is committed before the enemy reserve is committed, the combined arms
battalion may lack the ability to counter the enemy reserve. If the enemy’s reserve
is uncommitted, the battalion must take measures to prevent its decisive
commitment into the battle. Fires, situational obstacles, and CAS may be able to
delay, neutralize, or destroy the enemy reserve, providing time for the combined
arms battalion to counterattack and recover its reserve.
6-276. The battalion commander uses DPs and NAIs (developed during construction of the
decision support template (DST)) in conjunction with ISR and battlefield results ascertained
via reports and the COP to trigger execution of a counterattack. The commander and staff
consider the enemy situation and estimate time and space factors relating to the movement
of enemy forces. The staff considers time and space requirements for the counterattack force
to close on the enemy force, attack, and then withdraw or consolidate before follow-on enemy
echelons can interfere. The staff considers the likely strength and composition of the
targeted enemy force to determine supporting efforts, fires, and obstacles required for
supporting the counterattack objective. It considers what likely interdiction against enemy
reserves and follow-on forces is necessary. The staff must determine what the reserve will do
once it has completed the counterattack. If the mission of the counterattack force is to stay
and defend against another enemy echelon (such as when MBA forces are weak and the
reserve is still strong), it must have time to gain good defensible positions before follow-on
enemy echelons can interfere. If the reserve is to withdraw after its mission and continue to
serve as the battalion reserve, the plan must address its reconstitution. The counterattack
plan must address the following:
Tasks and purpose of the counterattack force.
Tasks and purpose of the counterattack force once the counterattack is completed.
Commander’s intent.
Planning assumptions, including the size and shape of the assumed penetration or
salient; the strength, composition, and disposition of the enemy force; and the
status of forces in the MBA.
Supporting efforts, units, fires, and obstacles that will support the counterattack.
Adequate control measures, such as routes, axes of advance, boundaries, restrictive
fire lines (RFLs), objectives, EAs, and limits of advance (LOAs).
Adequate fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and Army airspace
command and control (A2C2) measures.

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Specific control measures and procedures for a passage of lines.

Traffic control plans for ensuring movement routes remain open.
6-277. Effective counterattacks require detailed coordination and refinement, including
reconnaissance of routes and positions, rehearsals, verification of time and space factors, fire
planning, and coordination with adjacent units. Counterattack plans are rehearsed during
the day and night. The counterattack force should mark routes, establish guides, and
improve routes to ensure smooth execution. The reserve commander coordinates with
adjacent HBCT combined arms battalions for the following:
Movement and attack routes.
Passage of lines, if required.
Location and orientation of friendly positions and units.
Actions for continuation of the attack to or beyond the FEBA.
Coordination of key control measures, including boundaries, objectives,
checkpoints, and the LOA. This also includes coordination of fires (TRPs, EAs, and
RFL).
Location of forward observers, scouts, reconnaissance assets, and communication
and digital nodes.
Location of obstacles and obstacle lanes guides and far and near land markings.
6-278. The battalion commander may commit the reserve to contain enemy penetrations
when the enemy’s strength prevents the combined arms battalion from launching a decisive
counterattack. During planning, the staff can prepare for penetrations by analyzing enemy
COAs and friendly weaknesses to anticipate possible locations of penetration. During
planning, the staff war games possible enemy penetrations. It considers the actions and
routes of the assumed penetrating enemy force to identify favorable terrain for countering it.
The staff develops these areas as BPs, EAs, or objectives and then assigns the reserve the
appropriate planning priorities to respond to the possible penetration. The staff defines
routes, control measures, and FSCMs needed to control the attack. Hypothetical enemy
penetrations must be considered, graphically displayed, and given to all combined arms
battalion company commanders. Company commanders use this information in their
planning. Although plans are developed in advance, the heavy combined arms battalion
must be prepared to counter unexpected enemy penetrations wherever they occur.

SECTION VI – COUNTERMOBILITY, MOBILITY, AND SURVIVABILITY

6-279. Much of the strength of a defense rests on the integration and construction of
reinforcing obstacles, exploitation of existing obstacles, and actions to enhance the
survivability of the force through construction of fighting positions and fortifications. The
commander’s intent focuses on mobility and survivability planning through his articulation
of obstacle intent (target, relative location, obstacle effect) and priorities and the
establishment of priorities for survivability and mobility. Guided by that intent, the heavy
combined arms battalion engineer develops a scheme of engineer operations that includes
engineer task organization, priorities of effort and support, subordinate engineer unit
missions, and mobility and survivability instructions for all units. Chapter 9 contains
information on engineer systems and capabilities.

COUNTERMOBILITY
6-280. The commander and staff develop the obstacle plan concurrently with the fire
support plan and defensive scheme, guided by the commander’s intent. (Figure 6-13
illustrates an example of an HBCT combined arms battalion obstacle plan.) They must
integrate into the ISR OPORD the use of intelligent minefields, if allocated. The

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commander’s intent for countermobility should contain three elements: target, effect, relative
location.

Figure 6-13. Example of an HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Obstacle Plan

TARGET
6-281. The target is the enemy force that the commander wants to affect with fires and
situational obstacles. The commander identifies the target in terms of the size and type of
enemy force, the echelon, the avenue of approach, or a combination of these aspects.

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EFFECT
6-282. This is the intended effect that the commander wants the obstacles and fires to have
on the targeted enemy force. Tactical obstacles produce one of the following effects: block,
turn, fix, or disrupt (Table 6-2). The obstacle effect drives integration and focuses
subordinate fires and the obstacle effort.

Table 6-2. Obstacle Effects

Obstacle Purpose Fires and Obstacles

Effect Obstacles Must: Characteristics
Break up enemy formations. Cause the enemy to deploy Do not require extensive
Interrupt the enemy’s early. resources.
timetable and C2. Slow part of his formation Difficult to detect at long
Cause premature while allowing part to range.
DISRUPT advance unimpeded.
commitment of breach
assets.
1 Cause the enemy to
piecemeal his attack.
Slow an attacker within an Cause the enemy to deploy Arrayed in depth.
area so he can be destroyed. into attack formation before Span the entire width of the
Generate the time necessary encountering the obstacles. avenue of approach.
FIX for the friendly force to Allow the enemy to advance Must not make the terrain
disengage. slowly in an EA or AO. appear impenetrable.
2 Make the enemy fight in
multiple directions once he is
in the EA or AO.
Force the enemy to move in Prevent the enemy from Tie into impassable terrain at
the direction desired by the bypassing or breaching the the anchor point.
friendly commander. obstacle belt. Consist of obstacles in depth.
Maintain pressure on the Provide a subtle orientation
TURN
enemy force throughout the relative to the enemy’s
turn. approach.
3 Mass direct and indirect fires
at the anchor point of the
turn.
Stop an attacker along a Prevent the enemy from Must tie into impassable
specific avenue of approach. bypassing or penetrating terrain.
Prevent an attacker from through the belt. Consist of complex obstacles.
passing through an AO or Stop the enemy’s advance. Defeat the enemy’s mounted
BLOCK
EA. Destroy all enemy breach and dismounted breaching
Stop the enemy from using efforts. effort.
4 an avenue of approach and
force him to use another
avenue of approach.

RELATIVE LOCATION
6-283. The relative location is where the commander wants the obstacle effect to occur
against the targeted enemy force. Whenever possible, the commander identifies the location

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relative to the terrain and maneuver or fire control measures to integrate the effects of
obstacles with fires.

TACTICAL OBSTACLES
6-284. Obstacles are force-oriented combat multipliers. The battalion employs tactical
obstacles to influence the enemy’s ability to move, mass, and reinforce directly. Tactical
obstacles are integrated into the scheme of maneuver and fires to produce specific obstacle
effects. Obstacles alone do not produce significant effects against the enemy; obstacles must
be integrated with fires to be effective. The engineer section in Chapter 9 provides tables and
specific information on engineer capabilities and obstacle effects. The following are the three
types of tactical obstacles: directed, situational and reserve.

Directed
6-285. The brigade directs obstacles as specified tasks to the HBCT combined arms
battalion through the use of obstacle belts. The combined arms battalion may use the same
technique but more likely will be specific about the location and type of obstacle. The
commander may use directed obstacles or obstacle groups to achieve specific obstacle effects
at key locations on the battlefield. In this case, the staff plans the obstacle control measures
and resources as well as determines measures and tasks to subordinates to integrate the
directed obstacles with fires.

Situational
6-286. Situational obstacles are obstacles that the brigade or HBCT combined arms
battalion plans and possibly prepares before an operation; however, they do not execute the
obstacles unless specific criteria are met. Situational obstacles are be-prepared obstacles and
provide the commander flexibility for employing tactical obstacles based on battlefield
developments. The commander may use engineer forces to emplace tactical obstacles rapidly,
but more often, he relies on scatterable mine systems. The brigade staff normally plans
situational obstacles to allow the brigade commander to shift his countermobility effort
rapidly to where he needs it the most based on the situation. Execution triggers for
situational obstacles are integrated into the decision support template. (See Chapter 9,
Section III, and FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, Chapter 7, for situational
obstacles.) Situational obstacles must be well integrated with tactical plans to avoid
fratricide. Given the changes in engineer force structure, tactical concepts, and capabilities,
situational obstacles are increasingly used instead of conventionally emplaced obstacles.

Reserve Obstacles
6-287. Reserve obstacles are obstacles for which the commander restricts execution
authority. These are on-order obstacles. The commander specifies the unit responsible for
constructing, guarding, and executing the obstacle. Examples of reserve obstacles include
preparing a bridge for destruction or an obstacle to close a lane. Units normally prepare
reserve obstacles during the preparation phase. They execute the obstacle only on command
of the authorizing commander or when specific criteria are met. (See FM 90-7, Chapter 6, for
specific considerations for planning reserve obstacles.) It is critical for the unit to understand
and rehearse actions to execute reserve obstacles. Note that in addition to tactical obstacles,
units also employ protective obstacles. Protective obstacles are a key component of
survivability operations, providing friendly forces with close-in protection. (See FM 90-7.)

OBSTACLE GROUPS
6-288. Obstacle groups are one or more individual obstacles grouped to provide a specific
obstacle effect. HBCT combined arms battalions integrate obstacle groups to ensure that

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companies plan individual obstacles that support the scheme of maneuver. Companies
integrate individual obstacles with direct- and indirect- fire plans to achieve the specified
obstacle group effect.
6-289. Obstacle groups normally attack the maneuver of enemy forces. Normally,
commanders plan obstacle groups along enemy battalion assembly area (AAs) as defined by
company mobility corridors. They may plan a group along a company-sized AA. Unlike
obstacle zones or belts, obstacle groups are not areas but are relative locations for obstacle
construction. Obstacle groups are represented by obstacle effect symbols (block, fix, turn,
disrupt) on combined arms battalion graphics; however, commanders may refine obstacle
group symbology with individual obstacle graphics if the plan requires specific obstacle
types.
6-290. Heavy combined arms battalion commanders plan obstacle groups within assigned
obstacle zones or belts. When given a belt with an assigned effect, the combined arms
battalion commander may use any combination of group effects if the sum effect of all groups
achieves the overall effect of the belt.
6-291. Obstacle groups impose strict limitations on company commanders to preserve the
link between obstacle effects and the fire plan. The limitations are similar to the limitations
imposed by a BP. A group does not give the exact location of obstacles in the group just as a
BP does not show the exact location of each weapon in the company. The company
commander and the emplacing engineer coordinate these details directly. Company
commanders may make changes to obstacles and fire control measures based on the reality
of the terrain. These changes must be coordinated with and tracked by the combined arms
battalion commander and staff to maintain the fidelity of the desired obstacle group effect
and integration into the battalion scheme of maneuver.
6-292. HBCT combined arms battalions do not normally assign a company more than one
obstacle group; however, a company may effectively fight two groups at a time if the terrain
supports it. To mass fires on an obstacle group, more than one company often covers a single
obstacle group within an EA. In these cases, the commander responsible for establishing the
EA is also responsible for integrating the obstacle group. Normally, the HBCT combined
arms battalion commander or S3 plays a significant role in building and synchronizing an
EA covered by two or more companies.
6-293. Obstacle groups, resource factors, and standard individual obstacles are the basis of
combined arms battalion obstacle logistics planning. They enable the commander and staff
to allocate the necessary resources to each obstacle group, EA, or company BP. These tools
also enable the staff to identify critical shortfalls, plan the flow of materials within the
battalion area, and schedule resupply.

TACTICAL OBSTACLE PLANNING

6-294. Detailed obstacle planning begins during COA development. The engineer focuses on
the following five specifics in his scheme of engineer operations (SOEO) for the obstacle plan.

Direct- and Indirect-Fire Analysis

6-295. The direct- and indirect-fire analysis examines how engineers can best use obstacles
to enhance the direct- and indirect-fire plan. The engineer must have a fundamental
understanding of the direct- and indirect-fire and maneuver plans and the combined arms
battalion’s organization of the EA to integrate obstacles effectively with the direct- and
indirect-fire plan. The engineer must consider battalion EAs, TRPs, indirect-fire targets, unit
locations, enemy formations, AAs, and the commander’s obstacle intent to integrate
obstacles effectively. Synchronization of direct and indirect fires with obstacles multiplies
the relative effect on the enemy.

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Obstacle Intent Integration

6-296. The battalion engineer plans directed establishment of obstacle groups during the
COA development process. Obstacle groups integrated into the COA sketch graphically
depict the commander’s obstacle intent to support the maneuver plan. Obstacle groups
target specific enemy elements based on the situation template (SITTEMP). The engineer
generally allocates an obstacle group against a combined arms battalion-sized AA with
respect to the EAs, TRPs, indirect-fire targets, unit locations, enemy formations, and AAs
assessed during the direct-fire analysis. This process parallels the staff’s placement of a
company against the same sized enemy force. The intent of the obstacle group supports
subordinate unit task and purpose. The engineer recommends specific obstacle group effects
to the commander based on terrain, resources, time available, and the commander’s obstacle
intent.

Obstacle Priority
6-297. The battalion staff determines the priority of each obstacle group. The commander’s
intent and the most likely enemy COA clearly influence the priority. The obstacle priority
should reflect the combined arms battalion’s most critical obstacle requirement. The
battalion engineer considers flank protection, weapon types and ranges, and the overall
commander’s intent for the entire force before placing obstacle priority on the main EA.
Priorities assist the engineer in allocating resources and ensuring that the most critical
obstacle groups are constructed first.

Mobility Requirements
6-298. The engineer identifies combined arms battalion mobility requirements by analyzing
the scheme of maneuver; counterattack options; reserve planning priorities; sustaining
operations movement requirements; and adjacent and higher unit missions, maneuver, and
movement. The engineer integrates this analysis into obstacle group planning and avoids
impeding friendly maneuver whenever possible. Because the bulk of the engineer force is
committed to countermobility and survivability during defensive preparation, the battalion
commander uses clear obstacle restrictions on specific areas within the combined arms
battalion AO to maintain mobility. If obstacles must be constructed along a mobility corridor
that primarily supports friendly movement, the combined arms battalion must plan and
rehearse a lane or gap and associated closure procedures. These lanes or gaps may be closed
with situational or reserve obstacles.
6-299. Beyond preparing and marking lanes and gaps through obstacles, engineers normally
perform mobility tasks once defensive preparations are complete. Mobility assets may then
be positioned to counter templated enemy situational obstacles or be task organized to the
reserve, counterattack force, or any other unit that must maneuver or move subsequent to
the execution of the defense. To do this effectively, the engineers and the supported
maneuver unit must integrate, prepare, and rehearse. Since this manner of mobility support
is critical to the success of the maneuver plan, timely linkup and coordination must be
factored into the overall defensive preparation timeline.
6-300. Sometimes, the heavy combined arms battalion may require significant mobility
support during defensive preparation. Examples may include route clearance, road repair or
maintenance, and LZ and pickup zone (PZ) clearance. Additional engineers will be required
from the brigade and UEx to perform this type of mobility support, but they clearly cannot
concurrently prepare the defense and execute these tasks. Thus, the HBCT combined arms
battalion requires augmentation from a UEx maneuver enhancement brigade.

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SURVIVABILITY
6-301. Survivability operations in support of ground maneuver elements are increasingly
limited given force structure and tactical concepts. Digging in combat vehicles is a technique
that still has value in many situations, but the increasing need for mobility in defensive
operations and the proliferation of precision munitions reduce the effectiveness of static,
dug-in forces. Survivability efforts in the HBCT combined arms battalion should focus on
protection of assets that must remain relatively static (such as communications nodes),
support of logistical and decontamination operations, and survivability for defending
dismounted infantry.

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 Chapter 7
Urban Operations, Combined Arms Battalion

Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of

gravity and sources of national strength. Cities are population centers;
transportation and communication hubs; key nodes of industrial,
financial, and information systems; seats of government; and repositories
of wealth. Because of the changing nature of society and warfare,
deployments into urban operational environments have become more
frequent, and this trend is likely to continue. The purpose of such
deployments is to neutralize or stabilize extremely volatile political
situations, to defeat an enemy force that has sought protection afforded
by urban terrain, or to provide assistance to allies in need of support. This
chapter provides guidance necessary for planning and executing missions
in an urban environment. The brigade combat team (BCT) is the primary
headquarters around which units are task organized to perform urban operations
(UO). Detailed information on urban operations can be found in FM
3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (28 February
2002).

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION
7-1. Urban operations are defined as military operations conducted in a topographical
complex and adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and high population
density are the dominant features. An urban area is a topographical complex where
manmade construction and the population are the dominant features. Urban terrain
confronts commanders with a combination of difficulties rarely found in other environments.
Cities vary immensely, depending on their history, the cultures of their inhabitants, their
economic development, the local climate, the available building materials, and many other
factors. This variety exists not only among different cities but also within any particular
urban area. The urban environment, like all environments, is neutral and affects all sides
equally. The side that can best understand and exploit the effects of the urban area has the
best chance of success.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS OF URBAN OPERATIONS

7-2. The increasing world population and accelerated growth of cities makes UO a reality.
Urban operations are significantly more complex than can be described in this chapter as
they mix extremely complex terrain; severe restrictions on rules of engagement (ROE)
because of proximity to civilians on the battlefield; conflicting social, political and cultural
factors in the area of operations; general lawlessness and insurgents in the area of
operations; and the influence of the international media. Urban operations are much more
difficult to master in comparison to maneuver warfare in open terrain. Most stability
operations and support operations will have an urban operation component. Operations in
urban areas usually occur when:

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The combined arms battalion is assigned an objective that is within an urban

area—cannot bypass.
The urban area is key (or decisive) in setting or shaping the conditions for current
or future operations.
The urban area is in the path of a general advance and cannot be surrounded or
bypassed.
Political or humanitarian concerns require the control of an urban area or
necessitate operations within it.
Defending from urban areas supports a more effective overall defense or cannot be
avoided.
Occupation, seizure, and control of the urban area will deny the enemy control of
the urban area and the ability to impose its influence on both friendly military
forces and the local civilian population, thereby allowing friendly forces to retain
the initiative and dictate the conditions for future operations.
Stability operations require military forces to conduct urban security operations in
support of campaign objectives.
Support operations require military forces to conduct humanitarian support
operations in support of national objectives.

ORGANIZATION
7-3. A heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion is well suited for urban
operations because the density of infantry matches the numerous infantry-specific tasks
associated with conducting operations in urban terrain.

DIGITIZED FORCES
7-4. Digitized battalions derive considerable advantages from their Army Battle Command
System (ABCS) equipment in urban operations. While the Maneuver Control System (MCS)
and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System/Blue Force Tracker
(BFT) do not depict the multiple levels of urban fighting and do not show precise detail in
builtup area mapping, the ability to transfer digital information quickly and to maintain
current information throughout the combined arms battalion still represents a notable
improvement over analog systems.

TACTICAL CHALLENGES
7-5. The heavy combined arms battalion faces a number of challenges during the planning
and execution of UO. The most likely challenges are discussed in the following paragraphs.

CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS

7-6. The combined arms battalion must be prepared to conduct UO in both contiguous and
noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs).

Contiguous Operations
7-7. Contiguous operations are military operations that the combined arms battalion
conducts in an AO that facilitates mutual support of combat and sustaining operations
elements. Contiguous operations have traditional linear features, including identifiable,
contiguous frontages and shared boundaries between forces. For combined arms battalions,
contiguous operations are characterized by relatively close distances among adjacent
battalions, supporting brigade assets, and subordinate units and elements.

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Noncontiguous Operations
7-8. In noncontiguous operations, the combined arms battalion may be required to operate
independently, removed from brigade sustaining operations elements by distance and time.
Additionally, subordinate companies may operate in isolated pockets, connected only
through the integrating effects of an effective concept of operations. Noncontiguous
operations place a premium on initiative, effective information operations (IO), decentralized
security operations, and innovative logistics measures. Noncontiguous operations complicate
or hinder mutual support of combat, sustaining operations elements because of extended
distances, and security risks associated with movement between subordinate units and
elements.

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL THREATS

7-9. In addition to being required to face symmetrical (conventional) threats, the combined
arms battalion must be prepared to face threats of an asymmetrical (unconventional) nature.

Symmetrical Threats
7-10. Symmetrical threats are generally linear in nature and include those threats that
specifically confront the combined arms battalion’s combat power and capabilities. Examples
of symmetrical threats include conventional enemy forces conducting offensive or defensive
operations against friendly forces.

Asymmetrical Threats
7-11. Asymmetrical threats are those that are specifically designed to avoid confrontation
with the combined arms battalion’s combat power and capabilities. These threats may use
the civilian population and infrastructure to shield their unconventional capabilities from
combined arms battalion fires. Asymmetrical threats may attack both the combined arms
battalion and civilian population with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Asymmetrical
threats are most likely to focus on soft targets and be based in urban areas to take
advantage of the density of civilian population and infrastructure. Examples of asymmetrical
threats include terrorist attacks, information warfare (including computer network attack),
criminal activity, guerrilla warfare, and environmental attacks.

QUICK TRANSITION FROM STABILITY OPERATIONS OR SUPPORT OPERATIONS TO

COMBAT OPERATIONS AND BACK
7-12. Stability operations and, to a lesser extent, support operations are missions that may
transition to combat operations and back. The combined arms battalion must always retain
the ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations. Preserving the ability to transition
allows the combined arms battalion to maintain the initiative while providing force
protection. Commanders should consider planning a defensive contingency with on-order
offensive missions in case stability operations and support operations deteriorate.
Subordinate commanders and leaders must be fully trained to recognize activities that would
initiate this transition.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
7-13. Urban operations are usually conducted against enemy forces fighting in close
proximity to civilians. ROE and other restrictions on the use of combat power are more
restrictive than in other conditions of combat (see FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in
Urban Terrain).

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HEAVY MANEUVER FORCES IN URBAN OPERATIONS

7-14. Although the close combat phase of UO is infantry-centric, armor and mechanized
units operate as an integral force in urban operations. Armor and mechanized units are the
optimal force to isolate, as well as prevent isolation, during urban operations. Second, armor
and mechanized forces operate with infantry forces, executing the close fight by providing
precise and overwhelming firepower as well as the ability to maneuver to gain a positional
advantage over the enemy. However, dismounted infantry are required to successfully
operate in, above, and below an urban environment.

ISOLATION
7-15. As part of brigade shaping operations, isolation is defined as a tactical task to seal off
an enemy from his sources of support, deny freedom of movement, and prevent an enemy
from having contact with other forces. HBCT combined arms battalions are well suited to
execute this task in an urban environment because they posses the speed, firepower, and
protection necessary to shape the urban area for offensive and defensive operations. If the
attacker fails to isolate the urban area, the defender can reinforce and resupply his forces
protracting the operation and significantly decreasing the attacker’s resources and his will to
continue. If the defender allows himself to be isolated, the attacker seizes the initiative and
forces the defender to take risky actions (such as a breakout or counterattack) to survive.
Complete isolation of an urban area is an extremely personnel intensive operation, and
commanders need to be conservative in their expectations of their ability to truly isolate an
area.

CLOSE COMBAT
7-16. Historically, the close fight in urban combat has consisted of street-to-street fighting,
resulting in high casualties and high expenditures of personnel resources. HBCT combined
arms battalions use maneuver and situational understanding (SU) to position forces to
accomplish their assigned missions in urban environments. However, to control an urban
area, stay-behind forces are required to secure vertically and horizontally the hard-fought
gains of the HBCT. Commanders should request augmentation from infantry brigade combat
teams (IBCTs) for urban operations.

SECTION II – MISSION, ENEMY, TERRAIN AND WEATHER, TROOPS AND

SUPPORT AVAILABLE, TIME AVAILABLE, AND CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
(METT-TC)
7-17. Planning and preparation for UO are generally the same as for operations on open
terrain; however, intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is disproportionately
important due to the complexity of urban terrain. For the battalion commander and staff to
develop an effective course of action (COA), the combined arms battalion must conduct
aggressive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Urban operations
require significant human intelligence (HUMINT) reconnaissance because sensors and other
technological devices are not as effective in urban environments (thus the attraction of urban
areas to the asymmetrical threat). ISR operations can take the form of stealthy surveillance
teams, tactical questioning of noncombatants, and reconnaissance of key terrain and
avenues of approach. Using ISR assets (unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)) and satellite
imagery, the staff can develop urban maps that include a common reference system (such as
numbering buildings) to assist subordinate units’ command and control (C2). The
commander and staff must also take into account special considerations when operating in
an urban environment and exploit nontraditional sources of information and influence,

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including local police, civic authorities, and religious and cultural leaders. This section
provides special METT-TC factors for UO.

MISSION
7-18. The combined arms battalion must close with and defeat the enemy to be decisive in
UO. Close combat in UO is resource intensive, requires large numbers of properly trained
and equipped forces, and has the potential for high casualties. Therefore, the combined arms
battalion must use close combat as its decisive operation only after shaping the urban area
through aggressive ISR, isolation, precision fires, and maneuver.

OBJECTIVE
7-19. The battalion commander and staff must clearly understand the purpose of the
operation. The battalion’s objective may be terrain or force oriented. The battalion
commander must consider whether committing his force to combat in urban areas is required
or beneficial for achieving his intent. Once committed, it is difficult to extract from urban
operations.

INTENT
7-20. During planning for offensive operations, the battalion commander and staff must
consider the overall purpose and intent of the operation and define what is required. For
example, the commander must determine if clearing means every building, block by block, or
seizing a key objective that may require clearing only along the axis of advance. Often, the
combined arms battalion can integrate urban areas into the defensive scheme to develop a
stronger defense.

ENEMY
7-21. The combined arms battalion commander and staff must consider the strength,
composition, disposition, and activities of the enemy. They must consider both conventional
and unconventional enemy forces and the tactics the enemy may employ in an urban
environment. Enemy tactics may range from ambushes and snipers to large-scale
conventional actions conducted by heavy forces. The IPB must address the known and
potential tactics and vulnerabilities of all enemy forces and threats operating within and
outside the urban area. The IPB must consider the three-dimensional environment of urban
areas: airspace, surface, and subsurface. It should also consider the political, racial, ethnic,
tribal, cultural, and religious factors that influence the enemy. (See FM 34-130, Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield, for a detailed discussion of urban IPB.)
7-22. The increasing availability of sophisticated technology has created unorthodox
operational approaches that can be exploited by potential opponents. These approaches seek
to counter the technological and numerical advantages of US joint systems and forces and to
exploit constraints placed on US forces due to cultural bias, media presence, ROE, and
distance from the crisis location.
7-23. Offsetting their inherent weaknesses, enemy forces seek an advantage in urban terrain
to remain dispersed and decentralized, adapting their tactics to provide them the best
success in countering a US response. Threats, in addition to conventional forces, may consist
of the following:
Unconventional forces.
Paramilitary forces.
Militia and special police organizations.
Organized crime organizations.

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7-24. These enemy forces range from unconventional elements equipped with small arms,
mortars, machineguns, antiarmor weapons, mines, and improvised explosive devices to
capable mechanized and armor forces equipped with current-generation equipment. Urban
environments also provide many passive dangers such as disease from unsanitary conditions
and psychological illnesses. While the active threats vary widely, many techniques are
common to all. The enemy may employ a series of threat tactics during urban operations
(Figure 7-1).

Figure 7-1. Enemy Threat Tactics

Use the Population to Advantage

7-25. The populace of a given urban area represents key terrain as the side that manages the
populace best has a distinct advantage. Future urban battles may see large segments of the
populace remaining in place. Combined arms battalions involved in urban operations must
conduct missions in and among the residents of the area.
7-26. Enemy forces may use the population to provide camouflage, concealment, and
deception for their operations. Guerrilla and terrorist elements may look no different from
any other members of the community. Even conventional and paramilitary troops may have
a civilian look. Western military forces adopted the clean-shaven, close-cut hair standard at

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the end of the 19th century to combat disease and infection, but 21st century opponents might
grow beards as well as wear civilian-looking clothing and other nonmilitary characteristics.
7-27. The civilian population may also provide cover for enemy forces, enhancing the ability
of the enemy to close with friendly positions. Enemy forces may take advantage of US moral
responsibilities and attempt to make the civilian population a burden on the Army’s
logistical and force protection resources. They may move refugees into friendly controlled
sectors, steal from US-paid local nationals, and hide among civilians during offensive
operations.
7-28. The civilian population may also serve as an important intelligence source for the
enemy. Enemy forces may manipulate local hires serving among US Soldiers, civilians with
access to base camp security perimeters, and refugees moving through friendly controlled
sectors to provide information on friendly force dispositions, force protection measures,
combat readiness, and operational intent. In addition, enemy special purpose forces and
hostile intelligence service assets may move among well-placed civilian groups. Because US
forces employ local civilians to perform services to establish a rapport with the populace,
enemy forces infiltrate these sources of employees to close the distance with friendly forces.
This requires friendly forces to ensure proper vetting is conducted prior to employment.

Win the Information War

7-29. Enemy forces may try to win the information war in direct opposition to the combined
arms battalion’s operations, and urban operations offer a ripe environment for extensive
information operations.
7-30. Portable video cameras, Internet access, commercial radios, graffiti, and cellular
telephones are all tools that permit enemy forces to tell their story. American atrocities may
be staged and broadcast around the world. Electronic mail may be transmitted to
sympathetic groups to help undermine resolve. Internet websites provide easy worldwide
dissemination of enemy propaganda and misinformation. Hackers may gain access to US
sites to manipulate information to the enemy’s advantage. The enemy may use cell phones
as a local tactical communications system reporting on US forces and coordinating responses
to friendly operations.
7-31. The enemy may make skillful use of the news media. Insurgent campaigns, for
example, need not be tactical military successes; they need only make the opposition’s
campaign appear unpalatable to gain domestic and world support. The media coverage of the
Tet Offensive of 1968 affected the will of both the American people and their political
leadership. Although the battle for Hue was a tactical victory for the United States, the
North Vietnamese clearly achieved strategic success by searing the American consciousness
with the high costs of urban warfare. It should be expected that the enemy will turn US
information operation gaffes, miscues, and IO fratricide against the friendly force.

Manipulate Key Facilities

7-32. Enemy forces may identify and quickly seize control of critical components of the urban
area to help them shape the battlespace to their own ends. Telephone exchanges provide
simple and reliable communications that can be easily secured with off-the-shelf
technologies. Sewage treatment plants and flood control machinery can be used to
implement WMD strategies or to make sections of the urban area uninhabitable. Media
stations significantly improve the information operations of the controlling force. Power
generation and transmission sites provide a means to control significant aspects of civilian
society over a large area.

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Use the Three Dimensions of Urban Terrain

7-33. The enemy thinks and operates throughout all dimensions of the urban environment—
ground level as well as above and below ground level. Upper floors and roofs provide the
urban enemy force excellent observation points and are beyond the maximum elevation of
armored vehicles’ weapons. Rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) shots from upper floors strike
the tops of friendly armored vehicles in vulnerable points. Basements also provide firing
points below many armored vehicle weapons’ minimum depressions and strike at weaker
bottom armor. Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the
AO. Conventional lateral boundaries often do not apply as enemy forces control some stories
of a building while friendly forces control other stories of the same building.

Employ Urban-Oriented Weapons

7-34. Whether they are purpose-built or adapted, many weapons may have greater than
normal utility in an urban environment, while others may have significant disadvantages.
Urban enemy weapons are much like the nature of urbanization and the urban environment:
inventive and varied. Small, man-portable weapons, along with improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), can dominate the urban environment. Examples of enemy weapons favored in UO
follow:
Weapons with no minimum depression or no maximum elevation.
Weapons with little or no back blast (gas-metered, soft launch, and so on).
Mortars.
Sniper rifles.
Machineguns.
Grenades.
Grenade and rocket launchers.
Flame and incendiary weapons.
RPGs and other shoulder-fired antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).
Riot control and tranquilizer gases.
Mines and booby traps.
Improvised explosive devices

Engage the Entire Enemy Force

7-35. Enemy forces may hug friendly combined arms battalions operating in an urban area to
avoid the effects of high-firepower standoff weapons systems. They may also try to keep all
or significant portions of the combined arms battalion engaged in continuous operations to
increase the battalion’s susceptibility to stress-induced illnesses and fight the battalion until
it is out of ammunition and fuel. UO, by their nature, produce an inordinate amount of
combat stress casualties, and continuous operations exacerbate this problem. The enemy
may maintain a large reserve to minimize the impact of this on its own forces.

Focus Attacks on Service Support and Unprotected Soldiers

7-36. Enemy forces may prey on Soldiers poorly trained in basic combat skills. Ambushes
may focus on these Soldiers while they are conducting resupply operations or moving in
poorly guarded convoys like the 507th Maintenance Company convoy during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Urban operations are characterized by the isolation of small groups and
navigational challenges, and the enemy may use the separation this creates to inflict
maximum casualties even when there is no other direct military benefit from the action.

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URBAN MAPPING
7-37. Before entering an urban environment, the combined arms battalion obtains or
develops urban maps to assist in C2. The BCT should attempt to gain access to city planner
or civil engineer maps to provide detailed information on the urban area to the battalions.
The urban maps, whether digital or sketched, include a reference system to identify
buildings and streets (Figure 7-2). Standardized naming conventions should be simple to
allow for ease of navigation and orientation in the urban environment (odd number buildings
on left side of street, even numbers on right side). Street names should not be used as
references because the enemy can remove or change street signs to confuse friendly forces.
Potential sources for maps include Falcon View, satellite imagery, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), and local purchase.

Figure 7-2. Initial Photo Reconnaissance of Urban Area of Operations

7-38. Initial map and aerial photograph reconnaissance can identify key terrain and other
important locations in the AO. These include the following:
Safe havens.
Hospitals.
Police stations.
Embassies.
Other friendly facilities.
Religious sites
Hazardous areas.
Construction sites and industrial complexes.
Dangerous intersections.

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Bridges.
Areas of high crime.
Major terrain features.
Parks.
Industrial complexes.
Airports.
7-39. The urban map also facilitates control by tracking units with greater detail and
obtaining precise location updates when digital systems (which produce the common
operational picture (COP)) may be affected by urban terrain. The combined arms battalion
uses ISR assets to confirm and update its urban maps using the engineer tools in the
battalion command post (CP). These improved maps are critical since most existing maps do
not provide the level of detail necessary to conduct tactical operations. Specifically, the
brigade assesses avenues of approach in the urban AO. Included with the maps are overlays
that categorize sections of the urban area by ethnicity, religious affiliation, and other
prevailing characteristics that could affect operations (Figures 7-3, 7-4, and 7-5).

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Figure 7-3. Avenues of Approach in the Urban Area

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Figure 7-4. Sewer and Subterranean Overlay

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Figure 7-5. Enemy Overlay

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TERRAIN AND WEATHER

7-40. An urban area is a concentration of structures, facilities, and people that form the
economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area. Combined arms battalion operations
are affected by all categories of urban areas (Table 7-1). Cities, metropolises, and
megalopolises with associated urban sprawl cover hundreds of square kilometers. Battalions
normally operate in these urban areas as part of a larger force. Extensive combat in these
urban areas involves units of UEx level and above.

Table 7-1. Categories of Urban Areas

Villages The combined arms battalion AO may contain many villages.

Combined arms battalions and company teams bypass, move
(Population of 3,000 through, defend from, and attack objectives within villages as a
inhabitants or less) normal part of brigade operations.
Operations in such areas normally involve brigades or UExs.
Towns Combined arms battalions may bypass, move through, defend in,
(Population over 3000 up to or attack enemy forces in towns as part of UEx operations.
100,000 inhabitants) Operations in these areas normally require the full commitment of
brigades or UExs.
Cities Extensive combat in large cities involves UExs and larger
(Population of 100,000 to 1 formations. Combined arms battalions may fight adjacent to, on
million inhabitants) the edges of, or inside cities.

Metropolis Extensive combat in large cities involves UExs and larger

(Population over 1 million to formations. Combined arms battalions may fight adjacent to, on
10 million) the edges of, or inside cities.

Megalopolis Extensive combat in large cities involves UExs and larger

(Population over 10 million formations. Combined arms battalions may fight adjacent to, on
inhabitants) the edges of, or inside cities.

TERRAIN
7-41. A detailed analysis of the urban area and surrounding terrain is vital to the success of
any operation in an urban area (see FM 2-0, Intelligence). The combined arms battalion
commander must understand the elements of the urban infrastructure that are necessary for
achieving the intent and end state of the BCT’s mission. Military maps normally do not
provide sufficient detail for terrain analysis of an urban area. Recent aerial photographs and
other current intelligence products are critical. Maps and diagrams of the city from other
sources, such as local governments, tourist activities, or law enforcement services can be
useful. Map products developed by the NGA can be specifically tailored for the AO.
7-42. The S2 should obtain maps and diagrams of the following:
Subway systems, railways, and mass transit routes.
Underground water, sewer, and utility systems.
Electrical distribution systems, power stations, and emergency services.
Fuel supply and storage facilities.
Facilities for mass communications, such as cellular phones, computer hubs, radios,
and telephones.
Public administration buildings, hospitals, and clinics.

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7-43. The terrain analysis should also identify the following:

Structural characteristics of buildings, bridges, and transportation networks.
Roads, highways, rivers, streams, and other waterways that may be used as high-
speed avenues of approach.
Analysis of the natural terrain surrounding the urban area (observation and fields
of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach
(OCOKA)).
Analysis of the urban area itself, including street patterns, structure types, and
available maneuver space. (See FM 34-130.)
Covered and concealed approaches to the urban area.
Key and decisive terrain inside and outside the urban area.
Identification of buildings, areas, or facilities protected by the law of land warfare
or restricted by current ROE (such as churches, medical facilities, historic
monuments, and other facilities dedicated to arts and sciences), provided they are
not being used for military purposes. (See FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.)
Stadiums, parks, open fields, playgrounds, and other open areas that may be used
for landing zones or holding areas.
Locations of prisons and jails.
Potential host nation support facilities such as quarries, lumber yards, major
building supply companies, and warehouses.
Power lines, telephone lines, and raised cables that may be hazards to helicopters.
Significant fire hazards and locations of toxic industrial materials (TIM).
Weather effect products from topographic models or historical sources (for example,
effects of heavy rains on local areas).
7-44. A close relationship with the local government and military forces can be beneficial.
They can provide information about population, fire-fighting capabilities, locations of TIM,
police and security capabilities, civilian evacuation plans, location of key facilities, and,
possibly, current enemy activities. They may also be able to provide translators.
7-45. An infrastructure analysis of the urban area is also important. Because urban
infrastructures vary greatly, a comprehensive list cannot be provided. However, common
characteristics include the following:
Urban street patterns and trafficability.
Sources of potable water.
Bulk fuel and transport systems.
Communications systems.
Rail networks, airfields, canals and waterways, and other transportation systems.
Industries.
Power (including nuclear) and chemical production facilities and public utilities.

WEATHER
7-46. Weather analyses that are important to combined arms battalion operations include
visibility, winds, precipitation, and temperature and humidity.

Visibility
7-47. Light data have special significance during urban operations. Night and periods of
reduced visibility (including fog) favor surprise, infiltration, detailed reconnaissance, attacks
across open areas, seizure of defended strongpoints, and reduction of defended obstacles.
However, the difficulties of night navigation in restricted terrain, without reference points

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and near the enemy, forces the combined arms battalion to rely on simple maneuver plans
with easily recognizable objectives. Friendly forces must also consider artificial illumination
in urban operations. This illumination may come from street lamps (may be automatic)
street lights, business lights, home lighting, or reflections. This may cause adjustments to
the use of night-vision devices

Winds
7-48. Wind chill is not as pronounced in urban areas. However, the configuration of streets,
especially in close-orderly block and high-rise areas, can cause wind canalization. This
increases the effects of the wind on streets that parallel the wind direction while cross-
streets remain relatively well protected. Because of these factors, swirling winds occur, and
the wind speed and direction may continually change. This factor also affects the use of
smoke for both friendly and enemy forces. Downwind predictions for chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) and TIM are also difficult.

Precipitation
7-49. Rain or melting snow often floods basements and subterranean areas, such as subways,
and also makes storm and other sewer systems hazardous or impassable. Chemical agents
and other TIM are washed into underground systems by precipitation. As a result, these
systems may contain toxic concentrations much higher than surface areas and may become
contaminated hot spots. These effects become more pronounced as chemical agents or TIM
are absorbed by brick or unsealed concrete sewer walls.

Temperature and Humidity

7-50. Air inversion layers are common over cities, especially cities located in low-lying
“bowls” or in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, chemical agents, and other pollutants,
reducing visibility and often creating a greenhouse effect, which causes a rise in ground and
air temperatures. The heating of buildings during the winter and the reflection and
absorption of summer heat make urban areas warmer than surrounding open areas during
both summer and winter. This difference can be as great as 10 to 20 degrees and can add to
the already high logistics requirements of urban combat. Summer heat, combined with the
physical requirements of urban combat, can cause severe heat-related injuries. Changes in
temperature as a result of air inversions can also affect thermal sights during crossover
periods of warm to cold and vice versa.

TROOPS
7-51. During UO, the combined arms battalion is often augmented with additional assets,
which may include engineers, Stryker companies, and infantry companies. Army aviation,
field artillery (FA), military police (MP), public affairs (PA), psychological operations
(PSYOP), civil affairs (CA), smoke, decontamination, and long-range surveillance (LRS)
assets, when available, may also support the combined arms battalion under brigade control.
(Figure 7-6 shows a sample task organization.) Actual task organizations depend on METT-
TC.

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Figure 7-6. Sample Offensive Task Organization

TROOP DENSITY, EQUIPMENT, AND AMMUNITION

7-52. Troop density for offensive missions in urban areas can be as much as three to five
times greater than for similar missions in open terrain. Troops require additional equipment
such as ladders, ropes, grappling hooks, and other entry equipment. The ammunition
consumption rates for small arms, grenades (all types), Claymore mines, ATGMs, 25mm and
120mm high explosive (HE), and explosives can be four times the normal daily rate. The
battalion staff must ensure the continuous supply of Classes I, III, V, and VIII and water to
forward units. Supplies should be configured for immediate use and delivered as far forward
as possible to supported units.

STRESS
7-53. The battalion commander and staff must consider the effects of prolonged combat on
Soldiers. The battalion surgeon must ensure that he participates in the early planning for
operations in the urban area. To develop a comprehensive, effective, and synchronized force
health protection (FHP) plan, the battalion surgeon must know and understand the
battalion commander’s intent and guidance. Further, the battalion surgeon and the medical
platoon personnel must be included in the combined arms rehearsal to ensure the FHP plan
is synchronized with the tactical plan. (See FM 4-02.4 for information on FHP support in
urban operations.) Continuous close combat produces high psychological stress and physical
fatigue. Rotating units committed to combat for long periods can reduce stress. Leaders
should take extra effort and time to train and psychologically prepare Soldiers for this type
of combat.

DISCIPLINE
7-54. Maintaining discipline is especially important in UO. All commanders must ensure
their Soldiers understand and follow the established ROE. The law of land warfare prohibits
unnecessary injury to noncombatants and needless damage to property. The rules of
engagement and rules of use of deadly force may restrict the commander’s use of certain

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weapons, munitions, and tactics. Combat in urban areas has a slower tempo and increased
use of methodical, synchronized missions. In planning UO, the battalion commander and
staff must take these factors into account. Planning must allow more time for thorough
reconnaissance, subordinate unit rehearsals, sniper and countersniper operations,
demolitions, breaching, fire fighting, entry and movement techniques, fighting position
construction, booby-trap recognition and neutralization, combat lifesaver training, and crowd
control.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
7-55. The battalion commander and staff must understand the composition, activities, and
attitudes of the civilian population in the urban area, including the political, religious, and
cultural infrastructure. Various options are available to the battalion commander to control
the impact of civilians in the AO. These include screening civilians, prohibiting unauthorized
movement, diverting or controlling refugee movements, and evacuation. Understanding the
urban society requires comprehension of the following:
Living conditions.
Cultural distinctions.
Ethnicity.
Factions.
Religious beliefs.
Political affiliation.
Grievances.
Attitudes toward US forces (friendly, hostile, or neutral).
Effectiveness of local government structure.

CURFEW AND EVACUATION

7-56. A battalion commander with the mission of defending an urban area may need to
establish a curfew to maintain security or to aid in control of military traffic. (Curfews are
not imposed as punishment. They are normally established to reduce noncombatant
casualties and provide a measure of force protection.) A commander can require civilians to
evacuate towns or buildings if the purpose of the evacuation is to use the town or building for
imperative military purposes, to enhance security, or to safeguard those civilians being
evacuated. If the battalion commander takes this action, he must specify and safeguard the
civilian evacuation routes. Combined arms battalions may also be involved in securing
routes and possibly safeguarding food, clothing, and medical and sanitary facilities.
Evacuated civilians must be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area
have ceased and the area is safe. The battalion staff must plan for and coordinate the
movement and evacuation of civilians to ensure their actions do not interfere with the
military operation. The combined arms battalion staff and supporting civil affairs units
working with local officials coordinate the movements of civilians.

RESISTANCE GROUPS
7-57. The combined arms battalion may encounter civilian resistance groups whose actions
may range from providing the enemy with supplies, services, and noncombatant support to
actively fighting against friendly forces. Members of such resistance groups should be dealt
with in accordance with applicable provisions of the law of war. Battalion commanders
should seek guidance from the Judge Advocate General (JAG) concerning the detention and
disposition of persons participating in acts harmful to friendly forces. The battalion S2 must
work with PSYOP and civil affairs units to identify these threats and recommend, within the
ROE, the appropriate preemptive action or response. The activities of friendly resistance

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groups may also benefit friendly forces. They may provide HUMINT; act as guides, liaisons,
or translators; and provide subject matter expertise on local public facilities such as
refineries, power plants, and water works. They may also provide active resistance against
the enemy.

SECTION III – CONTROLLING URBAN OPERATIONS

7-58. Urban operations require centralized planning and decentralized execution. Therefore,
the combined arms battalion staff must develop a detailed plan that synchronizes the
battlefield operating systems to meet the commander’s intent and provide subordinate units
with the means to accomplish the mission. Visualizing and controlling military operations in
an urban environment is difficult and requires planning that is enemy focused and
extremely flexible.

ENEMY FOCUS
7-59. During the mission analysis, the urban operations plan should focus on the factors of
METT-TC. The plan is oriented on the enemy rather than on the terrain. The urban terrain
factors must be used to defeat the enemy. Considerations include the following:
Thorough evaluation of the urban area’s related terrain and enemy may take much
longer than in other environments. This time factor also affects friendly planning
efforts.
The enemy’s location, strength, and capabilities must be determined, and a plan
must be developed to defeat his direct and indirect fire systems.
The focus must be on the axis of advance of the enemy’s weaknesses while
maintaining adequate force protection measures. When possible, multiple and
supporting axes of advance must be employed.
The objective area must be divided into manageable smaller areas that facilitate
company maneuver.
The objective area must be isolated and a foothold established at the point of entry.
The location chosen for the foothold must allow for expansion.
The brigade and battalion maneuver plans directly affect the company’s schemes of
maneuver. Every platoon in the combined arms battalion must know what enemy
targets will be engaged by brigade and combined arms battalion assets.

COMMANDER’S CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

7-60. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) directly affect a
commander’s decisions and dictate the successful execution of tactical operations. The
combined arms battalion staff must develop the components of the CCIR that facilitate the
battalion commander’s ability to make decisions affecting the plan during urban operations.
Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) are separate from CCIR, although they
become a commander’s priorities when he states them. EEFI help commanders understand
what enemy commanders want to know about friendly forces and why. EEFI tell the
battalion commander what cannot be compromised. Friendly forces information
requirements (FFIR) are information that the commander and staff need about the forces
available for the operation. The following paragraphs are examples of priority intelligence
requirements (PIR), EEFI, and FFIR that would help the commander in an urban
environment.

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PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

7-61. PIR are intelligence requirements that a commander has anticipated and that have
stated priority in collection management task planning and decision-making. Examples
include the following:
Is the enemy using avenue of approach one to infiltrate into the battalion area of
operations?
Does mobility corridor three (Third Street) restrict movement of friendly armored
and wheeled vehicles?
Is there an enemy strongpoint located between Third Street and Fifth Street along
Third Avenue?
Does the enemy have air defense assets positioned along air avenue of approach
two?

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

7-62. EEFI are critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would
subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit the success of the operation. Therefore,
they must be protected from detection. Examples include the following:
Have any of the battalion command nets been compromised?
Have the lines of communication (LOCs) been disrupted and, if so, where?
Has the enemy located my Q36?

FRIENDLY FORCES INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

7-63. FFIR are information the commander and staff need about the friendly forces available
for the operation. Examples include the following:
Scouts captured or compromised.
Main bridge locations along the ground route that have been blown.
Operation order (OPORD) compromised.
Loss of cryptographic equipment.

TASK ORGANIZATION OF UNITS TO ACCOMPLISH SPECIFIC TASKS

7-64. Urban operations may require unique task organizations (Figure 7-6). For example,
urban operations provide one of the few situations where infantry and armor elements may
be effectively task organized below platoon levels. Combined arms battalion commanders
must consider providing assets where they will be needed to accomplish specific tasks. All
phases of mission execution must be considered when developing task organization. Changes
in task organization may be required to accomplish different tasks during mission execution.
Figure 7-6 shows a sample task organization for a heavy BCT combined arms battalion task
force conducting offensive urban operations that consists of a main effort, two supporting
efforts, and a reserve. Note that the task organization shown in Figure 7-6 may change after
the assault when the combined arms battalion reorganizes for follow-on missions.

REHEARSALS
7-65. After developing a thorough, well-synchronized plan, combined arms battalion
commanders should require subordinate units to conduct combined arms rehearsals (CAR)
at the levels at which the operations will occur, including all phases of the operation. When
conducted properly, CARs identify potential problems in synchronization among maneuver,
combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements. CARs provide a means for
units that seldom operate together to train collective skills. Rehearsals should start early in
the troop-leading process. Some rehearsals can start shortly after receipt of warning orders

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(WOs). Subordinate units can rehearse drills, such as breaching, clearing buildings, and
moving between buildings, before receiving a detailed plan. Infantry can also rehearse
aspects of operating close to armored vehicles. The combined arms battalion commander and
staff must allocate sufficient time to subordinate units to conduct rehearsals. Rehearsals for
subordinate units to consider include the following:
Communications procedures.
Direct fire control plan.
Fires (lethal and non-lethal effects).
Breaching.
Maneuver.

FIRES AND EFFECTS PLANNING

7-66. Often, the role of fires in UO is to get the maneuver force into or around the urban area
with minimal casualties so that the battalion commander has the maximum combat power to
close with the enemy and finish the fight. The fire support officer (FSO) develops essential
fire and effects task (EFET) to support the maneuver plan. The FSO may also plan and
coordinate nonlethal capabilities for the battalion commander. Civil affairs and PSYOP
assets should be coordinated with the appropriate C2 warfare or information operations
planning headquarters (BCT and UEx). When planning the use of indirect fires, battalion
commanders must consider the following. (See FM 3-06.11, Appendix K, for additional
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).)
Forward observers (FOs) should be positioned where they can get the maximum
observation so target acquisition and adjustments in fire can best be accomplished.
This is not necessarily on tops of buildings.
Commanders must understand ammunition effects to correctly estimate the
number of volleys needed for the specific target coverage. Also, the effects of using
white phosphorus (WP) may create unwanted smoke screens or limited visibility
conditions that could interfere with the tactical plan. Commanders must also
consider the rubble that will be created by both direct as well as indirect fires in an
urban area and its effect on future operations.
FOs must be able to determine dead space in urban terrain. Dead space is the area
in which indirect fires cannot reach the street level because of buildings. This area
is a safe haven for the enemy. For mortars, the dead space is about one-half the
height of the building (Figure 7-7).
Mortar crews should plan to provide their own security.
Commanders must give special consideration to where and when mortars are to
displace while providing immediate indirect fires to support the overall tactical
plan. Combat in urban areas adversely affects the ability of mortars to displace
because of rubble and the close nature of urban combat.
Precision fire provided by aviation close combat attack or joint fires may be the
most effective method to engage observable targets and minimize collateral
damage.

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Figure 7-7. Dead Space

FIELD ARTILLERY AND MORTAR SUPPORT

7-67. Appropriate fire support coordination measures are essential because fighting in urban
areas results in opposing forces fighting in close combat. When planning for fire support in
an urban area, the following should be considered:
Target acquisition may be more difficult because of the increased cover and
concealment afforded by the terrain. Ground observation is limited in urban areas.
Adjusting fires is difficult since buildings block the view of adjusting rounds;
therefore, the lateral method of adjustment may be most useful.
Initial rounds are adjusted laterally until a round impacts on the street
perpendicular to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Airburst rounds are
best for this adjustment. The adjustments must be made by sound. When rounds
impact on the perpendicular street, they are adjusted for range. When the range is
correct, a lateral shift is made onto the target, and the gunner fires for effect.
Special considerations apply to shell and fuse combinations when buildings limit
effects of munitions:
Careful use of variable time (VT) is required to avoid premature arming.
Indirect fires may create unwanted rubble and collateral damage.
The close proximity of enemy and friendly troops requires careful coordination
of effects.
WP may create unwanted fires and smoke.
Fuse delay should be used to penetrate fortifications or tops of buildings.
Illumination rounds can be effective; however, friendly positions should remain
in shadows, and enemy positions should be highlighted. Tall buildings may
mask the effects of illumination rounds. Illumination rounds fired to burn on
the ground or on a building can also be used to mark targets for aerial support.
VT, time, and improved conventional munitions (ICM) are effective for clearing
enemy positions, observers, and antennas from rooftops.
Swirling winds may degrade smoke operations.
Scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) may be used to impede enemy movements.
SCATMINE effectiveness is reduced when delivered on a hard surface.
Target acquisition is difficult in urban terrain because the enemy has many covered
and concealed positions and movement lanes. The enemy may be on rooftops, in

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buildings, and in sewer and subway systems. Aerial observers are extremely
valuable for targeting because they can see deep to detect movements, positions on
rooftops, and fortifications. Targets should be planned on rooftops to clear away
enemy FOs as well as communications and radar equipment. Targets should also
be planned on major roads, at road intersections, and on known or likely enemy
positions. Artillery should be employed in the direct-fire mode to destroy
fortifications, especially when assaulting well-prepared enemy positions. Also,
restrictive fire support coordination measures, such as a restricted fire area or no-
fire area, may be needed to protect civilians and critical installations.
Mortars are well suited for combat in urban areas because of their high rate of fire,
steep angle of fall, and short minimum range. (See Chapter 9, for additional
information.)
Self-propelled 155mm howitzers are effective in neutralizing concrete targets with
direct fire. Concrete-piercing 155mm rounds can penetrate 36 inches of concrete at
ranges up to 2,200 meters. The mounted .50-caliber machinegun can also be used
as direct-fire support and can penetrate most non-load-bearing walls. Infantry
must closely protect howitzers when used in the direct-fire mode since they do not
have any significant protection for their crews.
Forward observers must be able to determine where and how large the dead spaces
are. This area is a safe haven for the enemy because he is protected from indirect
fires. For low-angle artillery, the dead space is about five times the height of the
building. For high-angle artillery, the dead space is about one half the height of the
building (Figure 7-7).
Aerial observers are effective for seeing behind buildings immediately to the front
of friendly forces. They are extremely helpful when using the ladder method of
adjustment because they may actually see the adjusting rounds impact behind
buildings. Aerial observers can also relay calls for fire when communications are
degraded due to power lines or masking by buildings. Illumination rounds fired to
burn on the target can mark targets (both visual and infrared (IR)) in the daylight
amid the smoke and dust of urban combat.
Radar may locate many artillery and mortar targets in an urban environment
because of the high percentage of high-angle fires. If radar is sited too close behind
tall buildings, it will be masked and loses some effectiveness. However counter
strike may be limited by ROE and fear of collateral damage.
The use of airburst fires is an effective means of clearing snipers and observers
from rooftops.

COMMUNICATIONS
7-68. One of the biggest challenges for a combined arms battalion staff is to maintain
communications with subordinate elements. Buildings and electrical power lines reduce the
range of digital communications and FM radios. Remoting radio sets or placing antennas on
rooftops can solve the range problem for CPs and trains. Companies do not have the assets to
ensure continuous communications, so the battalion staff must plan for continual movement
of battalion assets, including additional remote stations to support company operations.

WIRE
7-69. Wire is a secure and effective means of communications in urban areas. Wires should
be laid underground, overhead on existing poles, or through buildings to prevent vehicles
from cutting them.

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MESSENGERS AND VISUAL SIGNALS

7-70. Messengers and visual signals can also be used in urban areas. Messengers must plan
routes that avoid the enemy. Routes and time schedules should be varied to avoid
establishing a pattern. Visual signals must be planned so they can be seen from the
buildings.

SOUND
7-71. Sound signals are normally not effective in urban areas due to the amount of
surrounding noise.

EXISTING SYSTEMS
7-72. If existing civilian or military communications facilities can be captured intact, they
can also be used by the combined arms battalion. An operable civilian phone system, for
instance, can provide a reliable, although nonsecure, means of communication. Use of news
media satellite communications in the immediate area of operations for other-than-
emergency communications must be coordinated through the S1 or civil affairs officer.

WEAPONS EFFECTS
7-73. The characteristics and nature of combat in urban areas affect the results and
employment of weapons. Leaders at all levels must consider the following factors in various
combinations.

SURFACES
7-74. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic of urban targets. Rounds rarely impact
perpendicular to these flat surfaces but, rather, at some angle of obliquity. This reduces the
effect of a round and increases the threat of ricochets and fragmentation.

RANGES AND ENGAGEMENT TIME

7-75. Engagement times are short, and ranges are close in urban areas. About 90 percent of
all targets are located 50 meters or less from the identifying Soldier. Minimum arming
ranges and troop safety from back blast or fragmentation effects must be considered.

DEPRESSION AND ELEVATION LIMITS

7-76. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall buildings
form deep urban canyons that are often safe from indirect fires. Some weapons can fire
rounds to ricochet behind cover and inflict casualties. Target engagement from horizontal
and vertical oblique angles demands superior marksmanship skills.

OBSCURATION
7-77. Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall buildings, and
the lack of light penetrating inner rooms combine to reduce visibility and increase a sense of
isolation. Added to this is the masking of fires caused by rubble and manmade structures.
Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.

CONFUSION
7-78. Urban fighting often becomes a confused melee with several small units attacking on
converging axes. The risks from friendly fires, ricochets, and fratricide must be considered
during planning. Control measures must be continually adjusted to reduce the risks. Soldiers

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and leaders must maintain a sense of situational understanding and clearly mark their
progress in accordance with unit SOPs to avoid fratricide.

BUILDINGS
7-79. Both the shooter and target may be inside or outside buildings. They may be inside the
same building or in separate buildings. The enclosed nature of combat in urban areas means
the weapon’s effect, such as muzzle blast or back blast and penetration from room to room,
must be considered as well as the round’s impact on the target. Usually, manmade
structures must be attacked before enemy personnel inside are attacked. Weapons and
demolitions may be chosen for employment based on their effects against masonry and
concrete rather than against enemy personnel.

SECTION IV – OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7-80. Military references addressing “modern experiences in city combat” as far back as 1942
discuss shock units or special assault teams being used by attackers (and often defenders)
with great success. These assault teams are characterized by the integration of combined
arms and typically contain infantry with variable combinations of armor, artillery, or
engineers. The following passage illustrates combined arms operations conducted in an
urban combat environment during World War II:
The battalion plan of action was as follows: one platoon of
Company“F,” with a light machine gun section, would stage the initial
diversionary attack. It would be supported by two tanks and two tank
destroyers, who were instructed to shoot at all or any suspected
targets. Observation posts had been manned on a slag pile to support
the advance with 81-mm mortar fire...The platoon action was to be the
first step...to reduce the town of Aachen. ...the remainder of our zone of
action...would be cleared by Companies “F” and “G,” who would
execute a flanking attack, jumping off abreast of each other through the
area secured by the Company “F” platoon...Preparatory fire by medium
artillery was to be planned...Mortar observers would accompany each
company...Tanks and tank destroyers were assigned to each company...
LTC Darrel M. Daniel, Commander, 2nd Bn, 26th Inf Regt,
October 1944, Battle of Aachen

OFFENSIVE FRAMEWORK
7-81. Figure 7-8 depicts the urban operational framework as it applies to offensive operations
and shows the tactical tasks of subordinate units. While the elements of the operational
framework are not phases, tactical tasks may become phases at the battalion level and
below, based on METT-TC factors. Properly planned and executed offensive operations
involve all tactical tasks shown. They may be conducted simultaneously or sequentially,
depending on the METT-TC. During offensive operations, the combined arms battalion
commander’s intent normally includes the following:
Synchronizing precision fires, information operations, and nonlethal capabilities.
Isolating decisive points.
Using superior combat power to destroy high-payoff targets (HPTs).
Using close combat, when necessary, against decisive points.
Transitioning quickly to stability or support operations.

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TYPES OF ATTACK DURING URBAN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7-82. Offensive operations in an urban area are planned and implemented based on the
factors of METT-TC. At the combined arms battalion level, the offense takes the form of an
attack.

Figure 7-8. Offensive Urban Operational Framework

ATTACK UNDER HASTY CONDITIONS

7-83. Combined arms battalions conduct an attack after a successful defense or as part of a
defense; as a result of a movement to contact, a meeting engagement, or a chance contact
during a movement; or in a situation where the unit has the opportunity to attack vulnerable
enemy forces. The attack in an urban area differs because the close, complex nature of the
terrain makes command, control, and communications, as well as massing fires to suppress
the enemy, more difficult. In urban areas, incomplete information, intelligence, and
concealment may require the maneuver unit to move through, rather than around, the
friendly unit fixing the enemy in place. Control and coordination become important to reduce
congestion at the edges of the urban area.

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ATTACK UNDER DELIBERATE CONDITIONS

7-84. An attack during deliberate operation is a fully synchronized operation that employs
all available assets against the enemy’s defense (in accordance with the ROE). It is
characterized by detailed planning based on available information, thorough reconnaissance,
preparation, and rehearsals. Given the nature of urban terrain, the attack of an urban area
is similar to the techniques employed in assaulting a strongpoint. At the combined arms
battalion level, attack of an urban area usually involves the sequential execution of the
following tactical tasks.

Reconnoiter the Objective

7-85. This involves making a physical reconnaissance of the objective with combined arms
battalion assets and those of higher headquarters as the tactical situation permits. It also
involves making a map reconnaissance of the objective and all the terrain that will affect the
mission and an analysis of aerial imagery, photographs, or any other detailed information
about the buildings and other appropriate urban terrain. Additionally, any human
intelligence collected by reconnaissance and surveillance units, such as the battalion scout
platoon, snipers, and brigade reconnaissance squadron, should be considered during the
planning process.

Move to the Objective

7-86. This may involve moving through open terrain, urban terrain, or both. Movement
should be made along covered and concealed routes and as rapidly as possible without
sacrificing security. It can involve moving through buildings, down streets, in subsurface
areas, or a combination of all three.

Isolate the Objective

7-87. Isolation begins with the efforts of special operations force (SOF), PSYOP teams, and
civil affairs units controlled by higher headquarters to influence enemy and civilian actions.
7-88. The battalion commander should consider employing PSYOP teams, if available, to
disseminate appropriate messages to the enemy or civilian populace directing the enemy to
surrender and the civilian population not to interfere with military operations.
7-89. In certain situations requiring precise fire, snipers and designated marksmen can
provide an excellent method of isolating key areas while simultaneously minimizing
collateral damage and noncombatant casualties.
7-90. Isolating the objective also involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the
enemy cannot supply, reinforce, or withdraw its defenders. It also includes selecting terrain
that provides the ability to place suppressive fire on the objective. Combined arms battalions
may be required to isolate an objective as part of the overall brigade operation or to do so
independently (Figure 7-9). Depending on the tactical situation, companies in the combined
arms battalion may have to isolate an objective by infiltration.
7-91. Cordon and attack is a tactical task given to a unit to prevent enemy withdrawal from
or reinforcement of a position. A cordon is a type of isolation. It implies seizing or controlling
key terrain or mounted and dismounted avenues of approach. Figure 7-9 shows a heavy
brigade combat team attacking to seize and clear OBJ EAGLE using the cordon and attack
technique. The first combined arms battalion cordons OBJ EAGLE by occupying battle
positions; the second combined arms battalion seizes OBJ EAGLE. Skillful application of
fires and other combat multipliers may also defeat the enemy and preclude close combat. In
the example shown in Figure 7-9, the battle positions are oriented to place fires on the
enemy leaving OBJ EAGLE and to prevent its withdrawal from the objective area. The

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factors of METT-TC determine the mission end state and how the battle positions are
oriented. Additional direct-fire control measures, such as target reference points,
engagement areas, and indirect fire control measures, can focus fires and assist in canalizing
the enemy into desired areas.

Figure 7-9. Isolation of an Urban Area Using the Cordon Technique

Secure a Foothold
7-92. Securing a foothold involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides cover from
enemy fire and a location for attacking troops to enter the urban area. The size of the
foothold depends on the factors of METT-TC. For example, as one of the combined arms
battalion companies attacks to gain a foothold, it should be supported by suppressive fire
and obscurants. In the example shown in Figure 7-10, the center combined arms battalion
conducts a supporting attack to seize OBJ DOG and the battalion commander has
determined that two intermediate objectives are necessary to seize OBJ DOG.

Clear the Objective

7-93. The commander may decide to clear only those parts of the area necessary for the
success of his mission if:
An objective must be seized quickly.

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Enemy resistance is light or fragmented.

The buildings in the area have large open areas between them. (In this case, the
commander clears only those buildings along the approach to his objective or only
those buildings necessary for security.)
7-94. The combined arms battalion may have a mission to systematically clear an area of all
enemy forces. Through detailed analysis, the battalion commander may anticipate that he
will be opposed by a strong, organized resistance or will be in areas having strongly
constructed buildings close together. He may assign his company teams areas within the
battalion AO to conduct systematic clearing (Figure 7-11).

Figure 7-10. Securing a Foothold, Task Force Attack

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Figure 7-11. Example of How to Develop a Systematic Clearance Within Assigned Areas

Consolidate or Reorganize and Prepare for Future Missions

7-95. Consolidation occurs immediately after each action. Reorganization and preparation for
future missions occurs after consolidation. Many of these actions occur simultaneously.
7-96. Consolidation provides security, facilitates reorganization, and allows the combined
arms battalion to prepare for counterattack. Rapid consolidation after an engagement is
extremely important in an urban environment.
7-97. Reorganization actions (many occurring simultaneously) prepare the unit to continue
the mission. The combined arms battalion prepares to continue the attack or prepares for
future missions, including the possible transition to stability operations and support
operations.

TRANSITION
7-98. During transition, the combined arms battalion continues to use all sustaining
operations assets, consistent with the mission end state and ROE, to move from offensive
operations to stability operations or support operations. The ultimate goal is to return the
urban area to civilian control. During this step, the roles and uses of SOF, sustaining
operations units (CA, PSYOP, medical, and MP) become more important with the
requirements to maintain order and stabilize the urban area. These assets normally support
the combined arms battalion’s transition efforts under brigade control. The battalion staff, in
coordination with the brigade staff, must prepare to transition from being a supported force
to being the supporting force.

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MOVEMENT TO CONTACT (SEARCH AND ATTACK)

7-99. Figure 7-12 depicts a movement to contact in an urban area using the search and
attack technique. The combined arms battalion uses search and attack when its knowledge
of the enemy is unclear and it must make contact. The battalion normally employs this
technique against a weak enemy force that is disorganized and incapable of massing
strength, such as urban insurgents or gangs. The combined arms battalion divides its portion
of the AO into smaller areas and coordinates the movement of companies into sector. The
battalion can either assign sectors to specific companies or control their movement by
sequential or alternate bounds within the battalion sector. During a mission of this type
(search and attack), the urban environment makes finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy
difficult. For example, movement of units may become canalized due to streets and urban
canyons created by tall buildings. The application of firepower may become highly restricted
based on the ROE. The use of HUMINT in this type of action becomes increasingly more
important and can be of great assistance during the find portion of the mission. This mission
requires close coordination between infantry and armored vehicles as they move through and
search the urban area.

Figure 7-12. Graphical Control Measures to Facilitate Search and Attack Technique

ATTACK OF A VILLAGE
7-100. The combined arms battalion may have to conduct an attack of a village that is
partially or completely surrounded by open terrain. (Figure 7-13 shows a battalion

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conducting such an attack.) After considering the factors of METT-TC, the combined arms
battalion performs the tactical tasks (specifically, reconnoiter the objective, move to the
objective, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, clear the objective, and consolidate,
reorganize, and prepare for future missions).

NODAL ATTACK
7-101. The combined arms battalion may receive the mission to seize a key node (or nodes)
as part of a brigade operation. A node is defined (DOD) as a location in a mobility
(transportation) system where movement originates, is processed for onward movement, or
terminated (terminals, airports, seaports, bridges). Nodal attacks are used to deny the
enemy key infrastructure. They may require a designated rapid response element (or
elements) in reserve in the event that enemy forces mass and quickly overwhelm an
attacking combined arms battalion. Normally, the reserve is planned at brigade level, but
combined arms battalions executing a nodal attack independently must plan for a designated
rapid response reserve element. The duration of this attack should not exceed the combined
arms battalion’s self-sustainment capability. In certain situations, the combined arms
battalion may have to seize nodes independently. Nodal attacks are characterized by rapid
attacks followed by defensive operations. The enemy situation must permit the attacking
force to divide its forces and seize key nodes. Multiple attacks (as depicted in Figure 7-14
and Figure 7-15) require precise maneuver and supporting fires. The combined arms
battalion may receive a nodal attack mission before an anticipated stability operation or
support operation or when isolation of an urban area is required so other units can conduct
offensive operations inside the urban area. Figure 7-14 shows a brigade conducting multiple
nodal attacks. Figure 7-15 shows a combined arms battalion executing a nodal attack. If the
air defense situation is permissive, the HBCT brigade commander should consider using
simultaneous attack from the air as well as ground using augmenting infantry and Army
aviation.

SECTION V – DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

7-102. An area defense concentrates on denying an enemy force access to designated terrain
for a specific time and is the type most often used for defending an urban area. The mobile
defense concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive
counterattack. A UEx most frequently conducts a mobile defense, but the brigade is also
capable of conducting a mobile defense. Mechanized and armor forces participate in mobile
defenses as an element in the fixing force conducting a delay or area defense or as an
element of the striking force conducting offensive operations. In an urban area, the defender
must take advantage of the abundant cover and concealment. He must also consider
restrictions to the attacker’s ability to maneuver and observe. By using the terrain and
fighting from well-prepared and mutually supporting positions, a defending force can inflict
heavy losses on, delay, block, or fix a much larger attacking force.

DEFENSIVE FRAMEWORK
7-103. Normally, the combined arms battalion conducts defensive operations as part of a
BCT. The brigade can conduct the full range of defensive operations within a single urban
area or in an AO that contains several small towns and cities using the elements of the
urban operational framework shown in Figure 7-16. The BCT avoids being isolated through
security operations. It assigns defensive missions to subordinate combined arms battalions
to achieve the commander’s intent and desired end state. Well-planned and executed
defensive operations have four elements: assess, shape, dominate, and transition. During
defensive operations, the brigade commander seeks to:
Avoid being isolated by the enemy.

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Defend key and decisive terrain, institutions, or infrastructure.

Use offensive fire and maneuver to retain the initiative.

Figure 7-13. Attack of a Village

7-104. Combined arms battalions conduct defensive operations by conducting

counterreconnaissance missions and patrols (avoiding isolation); assigning battle positions or
sectors to companies (defending); and consolidating or reorganizing and preparing for follow-
on missions (transitioning).

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Figure 7-14. Brigade Scheme of Maneuver Nodal Attack

DEFENSIVE PLANNING
7-105. Combined arms battalions defending in urban areas must prepare their positions for
all-round defense. Subordinate units must employ aggressive security operations that
include surveillance of surface and subsurface approaches. Battalions must constantly patrol
and use observation posts (OPs) and sensors to maintain effective security. They must take
special measures to control enemy combatants who have intermixed with the local
population and civilian personnel who may support the enemy.
7-106. Defensive fire support in urban operations must take advantage of the impact of
indirect fires on the enemy before he enters the protection of the urban area. Fire support
personnel at all levels must coordinate and rehearse contingencies that are inherent to
nonlinear fire support coordination measures and clearance of fires. The FSO also plans and
coordinates nonlethal capabilities for the battalion. Civil affairs and PSYOP assets should be
coordinated with the existing support plans.

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Figure 7-15. Combined Arms Battalion Nodal Attack

7-107. In planning a defense in an urban area, the combined arms battalion staff must
identify the following:
Positions and areas that must be controlled to prevent enemy infiltration.
Sufficient covered and concealed routes for movement and repositioning of forces.
Structures and areas that dominate the urban area.
Areas, such as parks and broad streets, that provide fields of fire for tanks and
antiarmor weapons.
Areas to position artillery assets.
Locations of friendly snipers.
C2 locations.
Protected areas for sustaining operations activities.
Suitable structures that are defensible and provide protection for defenders.
Contingency plans in the event that the battalion must conduct breakout
operations.
Plans for rapid reinforcement.
Significant mounted avenues of approach.

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Figure 7-16. Defensive Urban Operational Framework

INTEGRATING THE URBAN AREA INTO THE DEFENSE

7-108. The combined arms battalion may integrate villages and small towns into the overall
defense, based on higher headquarters’ constraints and applicable ROE (Figure 7-17). A
defense in an urban area or one that incorporates urban areas normally follows the same
sequence of actions and is governed by the principles contained in Chapter 6. When
defending on predominately urban areas, the battalion commander must consider that the
terrain is more restrictive due to buildings that are normally close together. This usually
requires a higher density of troops and smaller company team sectors or battle positions
than in open terrain.

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Figure 7-17. Integrating Urban Areas Into a Defense

NODAL DEFENSE
7-109. Figure 7-18 depicts a transitional situation where the combined arms battalion
moves from an offensive to a defensive operation. The BCT mission may contain factors that
require varying defensive techniques by the subordinate battalions under the brigade’s
control. Figure 7-19 shows a nodal defense where combined arms battalions employ different
defensive techniques to achieve the BCT commander’s desired end state. The brigade
commander’s intent is to safeguard the key nodes (key civil infrastructure) seized during the
offensive operation to return the infrastructure of this particular urban area back to civilian
control eventually. Each combined arms battalion employs a different defensive technique:
strongpoint, perimeter, and battle position.

TASK ORGANIZATION
7-110. Companies may have to be task organized to conduct the specific missions assigned
by the combined arms battalion commander in a nodal defense.

SYMMETRICAL AND ASYMMETRICAL THREATS

7-111. The combined arms battalion is likely to respond to both symmetrical and
asymmetrical threats within the AO. The defensive techniques chosen by subordinate
companies should allow them to respond to the specific threats in their respective AOs,
battle positions, or sectors. Snipers and designated marksmen should be deployed to deal
with the threat.

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Figure 7-18. Nodal Defense, Transitional Situation

BOUNDARY CHANGES
7-112. Again, based on the combined arms battalion commander’s intent and the defensive
scheme of maneuver, boundary changes may be required to give companies more or less
maneuver space.

ROE MODIFICATION
7-113. The ROE may require modification based on the type of mission to be conducted. The
ROE may become more or less restrictive based on METT-TC factors. Commanders and
leaders must ensure that the ROE are clearly stated and widely disseminated at the
beginning and conclusion of each day. Note that the digital force has the potential to provide
accurate enemy information that can enhance and facilitate targeting and obstacle
placement. The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Guardrail, UAVs
(if present), and other reconnaissance assets can significantly improve the enemy targeting
capability of the unit.

DELAY
7-114. The purpose of a delay is to slow the enemy, cause enemy casualties, and stop the
enemy (where possible) without becoming decisively engaged or bypassed. The delay can be

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 Urban Operations, Combined Arms Battalion

oriented either on the enemy or on specified terrain such as a key building or manufacturing
complex.

Figure 7-19. Nodal Defense, Different Defensive Techniques

AMBUSHES AND BATTLE POSITIONS

7-115. The combined arms battalion conducts a delay in an urban area from a succession of
ambushes and battle positions (Figure 7-20). The width of the combined arms battalion AO
depends on the amount of force available to control the area, the nature of the buildings and
obstacles along the street, and the length of time that the enemy must be delayed.

Ambushes
7-116. The combined arms battalion plans ambushes on overwatching obstacles. Ambushes
are closely coordinated but executed at the lowest levels. The deployment of the battalion is
realigned at important cross-streets. The combined arms battalion can combine ambushes
with limited objective attacks on the enemy’s flanks, employing tanks and Bradley fighting
vehicles (BFVs) along with dismounted infantry and snipers. These limited attacks are
usually effective in the edge of open spaces (parks, wide streets, and so on).

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Figure 7-20. Task Force Delay in an Urban Area

Battle Positions
7-117. The combined arms battalion should place battle positions where heavy weapons,
such as tanks, BFVs, antiarmor weapons, and machineguns, have the best fields of fire. Such
locations are normally found at major street intersections, in parks, and at the edge of open
residential areas. The combined arms battalion should prepare battle positions carefully and
deliberately, reinforce them with obstacles and demolished buildings, and support them
using artillery and mortars. The combined arms battalion should position battle positions to
inflict maximum casualties on the enemy and cause him to deploy for an attack.

TWO DELAYING ECHELONS

7-118. The combined arms battalion is most effective when deployed in two delaying
echelons that alternate between conducting ambushes and fighting from battle positions. As
the enemy threatens to overrun a battle position, the company disengages and delays back
toward the next battle position. As the withdrawing company passes through the next
defending company to the rear, it establishes another battle position. The combined arms

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battalion uses smoke and demolitions to aid in the disengagement. Security elements on the
flank can help prevent the enemy from out-flanking the delaying force. A small reserve can
react to unexpected enemy action and conduct continued attacks on the enemy’s flank.

ENGINEERS
7-119. The engineer effort should be centralized at first to support the preparation of battle
positions, then decentralized to support the force committed to ambush.

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 Chapter 8
Stability Operations and Support Operations

This chapter discusses both stability operations and support operations at

the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion level.
US forces are employed in these operations to promote and protect US
national interests by influencing political, civil, and military
environments and by disrupting specific illegal activities. Army forces
must remain versatile and have the flexibility to transition from
traditional combat to nontraditional stability operations. The combined
arms battalion normally performs these types of operations as part of a
larger, multinational, or joint force but could be required to work
independently. Army forces are highly suited for these types of operations
because they are trained, equipped, and organized to control land,
populations, and unstable situations for extended periods of time. The
depth and breadth of Army core competencies provide resources for the
regional combatant commander’s theater engagement plan and prevent
regional instability from escalating into war.

SECTION I – STABILITY OPERATIONS

8-1. Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the
threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a
combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities, and coercive actions in
response to crises (FM 3-0). Army force presence promotes a secure environment in which
diplomatic and economic programs designed to eliminate root causes of instability may
flourish. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning
assets in an area of operations (AO). Army forces have the ability to establish and maintain
a credible presence as long as necessary to achieve the desired effects. Army force presence
as part of a regional combatant commander’s theater engagement plan (TEP) often keeps
regional instability from escalating into war.

PURPOSE
8-2. The overarching purpose of stability operations is to promote and sustain regional and
global stability. Army forces conduct stability operations in crisis situations to avoid
hostilities and establish the conditions for peacetime developmental and cooperative
activities. Army forces will conduct regional stability operations before, during, and after
offensive and defensive operations. In a crisis situation, a stability operation can deter
conflict or prevent escalation. During hostilities, a stability operation can help keep armed
conflict from spreading. Following hostilities, a stability operation can provide a secure
environment in which civil authorities can work to regain civil control. Demonstrating the
ability to conduct offensive and defensive combat operations underlies successful stability
operations.
8-3. Stability operations are inherently complex and place greater demands at the small-
unit level. Junior leaders are required to develop engagement skills while maintaining

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warfighting skills. Capable, trained, disciplined, and high-quality leaders, Soldiers, and
teams are especially critical to the success of stability operations. Soldiers and units at every
level must be flexible and adaptive while maintaining core competencies. Stability
operations often require the mental and physical agility to shift from noncombat to combat
operations and back again while meeting the strategic and operational objectives.
8-4. Stability operations demonstrate American resolve through the commitment of time,
resources, and forces to establish and reinforce diplomatic and military ties. Military forces
conduct stability operations to accomplish one or more of the following activities:
Protect US national interests.
Promote peace and deter aggression.
Satisfy US treaty obligations or enforce agreements and policies.
Reassure allies, friendly governments, and agencies.
Encourage a weak or faltering government.
Maintain or restore order.
Protect life and property.
Demonstrate resolve.
Prevent, deter, or respond to terrorism.
Reduce the threat of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to
regional security.
Promote freedom from oppression, subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
Promote sustainable and responsive institutions.
8-5. Stability operations may include both developmental and coercive actions.
Developmental actions enhance a host nation government’s willingness and ability to care
for its people. Coercive actions apply carefully prescribed limited force or the threat of force
to change the environment of the AO. For example, rapidly responding to a small-scale
contingency operation can diffuse a crisis situation and restore regional stability.
8-6. Stability operations complement and are complemented by offensive, defensive, and
support operations. Stability operations help restore law and order during support
operations in unstable areas. Similarly, offensive and defensive operations may be necessary
to defeat an adversary’s intent on preventing the success of a stability operation. The ability
of Army forces to stabilize a crisis is related to its ability to attack and defend. For example,
shows of force often precede offensive and defensive operations in attempts to deter
aggression and provide opportunities for diplomatic and economic solutions.
8-7. Stability operations vary by type and are further differentiated by the specific factors of
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC). The HBCT combined arms battalion performs many familiar
core tactical missions and mission-essential tasks during stability operations. The purposes
of operations, the special constraints on commanders, and the unique missions and tasks,
however, differentiate stability operations from other operations. It is imperative that Army
forces maintain the ability and flexibility to execute offensive and/or defensive operations
within stability operations
8-8. Ideally, the HBCT combined arms battalion receives advance notice of stability
operations missions and has time to modify its mission-essential task list (METL) and
complete a preparatory training program before deploying. In other cases, the combined
arms battalion may deploy and assume stability operations responsibilities on short notice.
In those cases, the combined arms battalion relies on its training in the fundamental tasks
(such as command and control (C2), patrolling, reporting, establishing observation posts
(OPs), maintaining unit security, and force protection) and trains to mission-specific tasks
during the operation.

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8-9. In stability operations, commanders must emphasize cooperating and communicating

with joint headquarters, multinational units, civilian authorities, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and agencies. Additionally, close association with the population of the
AO typifies many stability operations. Some considerations that assist the combined arms
battalion in developing concepts and schemes for executing stability operations include the
following:
Leveraging interagency, joint, and multinational cooperation.
Enhancing the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation.
Understanding the potential for unintended consequences of the combined arms
battalion’s actions.
Displaying the capability to use force in a nonthreatening manner.
Acting decisively to prevent escalation.
Applying force selectively and discriminately.
Conducting operations in a media rich environment.

TYPES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

8-10. Stability operations typically fall into 10 broad types that are neither discrete nor
mutually exclusive. For example, a force engaged in a peace operation may also find itself
conducting arms control or a show of force to set the conditions for achieving an end state.
This section provides an introductory discussion of stability operations; for more detailed
information, refer to FM 3-0, FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, and FMI 3-07.22
Counter Insurgency Operations—Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq (November 2004).
Types of stability operations follow:
Peace operations (PO)
Foreign internal defense (FID).
Security assistance (SA).
Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA).
Support to insurgencies.
Support to counterdrug (CD) operations.
Combating terrorism.
Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).
Arms control.
Show of force.

PEACE OPERATIONS
8-11. Peace operations are the most common stability operation the HBCT combined arms
battalion executes because they support strategic and policy objectives and the diplomatic
activities that implement them. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace
enforcement operations (PEO), and operations to support diplomatic efforts. Although the
United States normally participates in PO under the sponsorship of the United Nations or
another multinational organization, it reserves the right to conduct PO unilaterally.
Optimally, forces should not transition from one PO role to another unless there is a change
of mandate or a political decision with appropriate adjustments to force structure, rules of
engagement (ROE), and other aspects of the mission. Nevertheless, just as in other
operations, it is crucial that commanders and staffs continually assess the mission. In PO,
this translates into planning for possible or likely transitions. Examples include
transitioning from a US unilateral operation or multinational coalition to a UN-led coalition,
from combat to noncombat operations, or from military to civilian control.

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FMI 3-90.5

PEACEKEEPING
8-12. Peacekeeping operations are military operations that are undertaken with the consent
of all major parties to a dispute and designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of
agreements (such as a ceasefire or truce) and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-
term political settlement (FM 3-07). Before PKO begin, a credible truce or ceasefire is in
effect, and the belligerent parties consent to the operation.
8-13. In peacekeeping operations, the HBCT combined arms battalion must use all its
capabilities short of coercive force to gain and maintain the initiative. The combined arms
battalion may be assigned various missions designed to monitor peace and stability and to
improve the humanitarian environment. The following are examples of PKO missions
conducted by a HBCT combined arms battalion:
Deter violent acts through the physical presence of the PKO force at critical
locations.
Conduct liaison with disputing parties.
Verify the storage or destruction of military equipment.
Verify disarmament and demobilization of selected disputing forces.
Negotiate and mediate with disputing parties.
Investigate alleged ceasefire violations, boundary incidents, and complaints.
Collect information about the disputing parties, using all available assets.
Contend with ambiguous, tense, or violent situations without becoming a
participant in compliance with the ROE and mission orders.
Provide security for prisoner of war exchange.
Supervise disengagements and withdrawals by disputing parties.
Assist civil authorities.
Support local elections.
Provide relief to refugees and internally displaced persons.
Assist with demining operations.
Restore emergency and basic civil infrastructure functions.
Transition to peace enforcement or combat operations. (The HBCT combined arms
battalion must train to ensure the force has the ability to respond to a contingency
plan requiring an increase in the use of force.)
8-14. JP 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations, and FM 3-07
provide additional details on PKO-related tasks. Army forces conducting PKO rely on the
legitimacy acknowledged by all major belligerents and international or regional
organizations to obtain objectives. Army forces do not use deadly force unless required to
defend their Soldiers or accomplish the mission. Intelligence and information operations (IO)
are important to PKO to provide force protection and situational understanding (SU) and to
ensure the success of subordinate PKO-related efforts.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT
8-15. Peace enforcement operations involve the application of military force or the threat of
military force to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or
restore peace and order. By definition, PEO are coercive in nature and rely on the threat or
use of force. However, the impartiality with which the peace force treats all parties and the
nature of its objectives separates PEO from war. PEO support diplomatic efforts to restore
peace and represent an escalation from peacekeeping operations.
8-16. In peace enforcement operations, the combined arms battalion may use force to coerce
hostile factions into ceasing and desisting violent actions. Usually, these factions have not

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consented to intervention, and they may be engaged in combat activities. A HBCT combined
arms battalion conducting a peace enforcement operation must be ready to apply elements of
combat power to achieve the following:
Forcible separation of belligerents.
Establishment and supervision of protected areas.
Sanction and exclusion zone enforcement.
Movement denial and guarantee.
Restoration and maintenance of order.
Protection of humanitarian assistance.
Relief to refugees and internally displaced persons.
Support for the return of refugee operations.
8-17. The nature of PEO dictates that Army forces assigned a PEO mission be capable of
conducting combat operations. Maintaining and demonstrating a credible combat capability
are essential for successful PEO. Units must be able to apply sufficient combat power to
protect themselves and accomplish assigned tasks forcefully. Units must also be ready to
transition quickly to peacekeeping, offensive, or defensive operations if required.

OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

8-18. Military support of diplomatic efforts improves the chances for success in the peace
process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve
viable political settlements. In addition to or as an integral part of PO, Army forces may
conduct operations to support diplomatic efforts to establish order before, during, and after
conflict. While these activities are primarily the responsibility of civilian agencies, the
military can support these efforts within its capabilities. Army forces may support
diplomatic initiatives such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building.
Preventive diplomacy consists of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a
predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence (JP 3-07).
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of
peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that
led to it (JP 3-07).
Peace building consists of postconflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and
economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and
institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07).

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

8-19. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a
government in any action programs taken by another government to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JP 1-02). The main objective of FID is
to promote stability by helping a host nation establish and maintain institutions and
facilities responsive to its people’s needs. Army forces in FID normally advise and assist host
nation forces conducting operations to increase their capabilities.
8-20. When conducting FID, Army forces provide indirect support, direct support, military
supplies, military advice, tactical and technical training, and intelligence and logistics
support to help a host nation. Generally, US forces do not engage in combat operations as
part of a FID. However, on rare occasions when the threat to US interests is great and
indirect means are insufficient, US combat operations may be directed to support a host
nation’s efforts.
8-21. The combined arms battalion’s primary roles in nation assistance operations are
usually similar to its roles in peace-building operations. If involved in these operations,

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combined arms battalions are most likely to provide forces in support of operations rather
than lead the effort themselves. Army forces conduct FID operations in accordance with JP
3-07.1 and FM 3-07.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE
8-22. Army forces support security assistance efforts by training, advising, and assisting
allied and friendly armed forces. SA includes the participation of Army forces in any of a
group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training,
and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in
furtherance of national policies and objectives (JP 3-07).

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

8-23. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs provide assistance to the host nation
populace in conjunction with military operations and exercises. In contrast to humanitarian
and disaster relief operations, HCA programs are planned activities. These actions are
limited to the following categories:
Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country.
Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
Well-drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY
8-24. The United States supports insurgencies that oppose regimes that threaten US
interests or regional stability. The United States supports only those forces that consistently
demonstrate respect for human rights. While any Army force can support an insurgency,
Army special operations forces (SOF) almost exclusively receive these missions. Given their
training, organization, and regional focus, SOF are well suited for these operations.
Conventional US forces supporting insurgencies may provide logistics and training support
but normally do not conduct combat operations.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERINSURGENCY
8-25. Military support to counterinsurgencies is based on the recognition that military power
alone is incapable of achieving true and lasting success. More specifically, American military
power cannot ensure the survival of regimes that fail to meet the basic needs of their people.
Support to counterinsurgency includes FID, security assistance, and humanitarian and civic
assistance (JP 3-07).

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

8-26. Counterdrug operations are always conducted to support one or more governmental
agencies. These include the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Department of State, Drug
Enforcement Agency, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the
Department of Homeland Security. Whether operating in the United States or in a host
nation, Army forces do not engage in direct combat action during counterdrug operations.
Units that support counterdrug operations must be fully aware of legal limitations regarding
the acquisition of information on civilians, both US and foreign. Typical support to
counterdrug operations includes the following activities:
Detection and monitoring drug trade.
Host nation support (HNS).
Command, control, communications, and computers (C4) support.

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 Stability Operations and Support Operations

Intelligence support.
Planning support.
Logistics support.
Training support.
Manpower support.
Research, development, and acquisition.
Reconnaissance.
8-27. When operating inside the United States and its territories, counterdrug operations are
considered support operations and are subject to restrictions under the Posse Comitatus Act.

COMBATING TERRORISM
8-28. Enemies who cannot compete with conventional forces to achieve their objectives often
turn to terrorism. Terrorist attacks often create a disproportionate effect and must be dealt
with on multiple levels of response. Every unit must aggressively employ force protection
measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts. Terrorists
are always looking for soft targets to accomplish their objective to destabilize the
environment and discredit the government. Terrorism includes the following:
Arson.
Hijacking transportation platforms.
Maiming—creating needless casualties.
Seizure of key infrastructure.
Assassination.
Hostage taking for political purpose.
Sabotage.
Hoaxes to discredit government forces.
Bombing.
Kidnapping for raising money.
Raids and ambushes to discredit government forces or to capture equipment.
Use of WMD.
Physical threatening of an individual and his or her family.

COUNTERTERRORISM
8-29. Counterterrorism (CT) refers to offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorism (JP 1-02). CT is a specified mission for selected special-mission units
(SMUs) that are specifically organized and trained to combat terrorism. Commanders who
employ conventional forces to strike against organized terrorist forces operating in their AO
conduct a conventional offensive operation, not counterterrorism. An HBCT combined arms
battalion normally does not participate in direct CT operations other than establishing a
secure operational environment for SMUs to operate or conducting supporting operations to
create a diversion for SMUs. If employed against terrorist forces within an AO, the combined
arms battalion is conducting offensive operations and not conducting counterterrorism as CT
is a specific mission task for SMUs.

ANTITERRORISM
8-30. Antiterrorism includes defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of
individuals and property to terrorist attacks, including limited response and containment by
local military forces (JP 1-02). Typical antiterrorism actions include the following:
Coordination with local law enforcement.

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FMI 3-90.5

Hardening of facilities.
Physical security actions designed to prevent unauthorized access or approach to
facilities.
Crime prevention and physical security actions that prevent theft of weapons,
munitions, identification cards, and other materials.
Policies regarding travel, size of convoys, breaking of routines, host nation
interaction, and off-duty restrictions.
Protection from weapons of mass destruction.
Aggressive information operations campaign.
Civil-military operations to deny local support for terrorists

NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS (NEO)

8-31. Army forces conduct NEO to support the Department of State in evacuating
noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from locations in a foreign nation to the
United States or an appropriate safe haven. Normally, these operations involve US citizens
and designated citizens of the host nation or Third World countries whose lives are in danger
either from the threat of hostilities or from a natural disaster. The NEO may take place in a
permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment and can be either unopposed or resisted by
hostile crowds, guerrillas, or conventional forces. Most often, the evacuation force
commander has little influence over the local situation. Removing designated US and
friendly citizens from the threatened area expands options available to friendly diplomatic
and military authorities to restabilize the local situation. The Department of State is the
supported commander for NEO, and the NEO force commander may not have the authority
to use military measures to preempt hostile actions yet he must be prepared to defend both
the evacuees and his force. A key factor in NEO planning is correctly appraising the
political-military environment in which the force will operate. The NEO can be a prelude to
combat actions, a part of deterrent actions, or a part of peace operations, and therefore, the
combined arms battalion commander must include NEO in the list of possible stability
operations that he may be required to support.

ARMS CONTROL
8-32. HBCT combined arms battalion forces can assist in arms control operations by locating,
seizing, and destroying ordinance, weapon systems, and WMD. There will be an arms control
component to every peace operation. Other actions include escorting authorized deliveries of
weapons and materiel (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use,
inspecting and monitoring production and storage facilities, and training foreign forces in
the security of weapons and facilities. Arms control operations are normally conducted to
support arms control treaties and peace enforcement mechanisms. Forces may conduct arms
control during combat or stability operations to prevent escalation of the conflict and reduce
instability, including the mandated disarming of belligerents as a component of a peace
operation. The collection, storing, and destruction of conventional munitions and weapon
systems can deter belligerents from reinstigating hostilities and, therefore, may be critical to
the success of peace operations. Arms control may also consist of executing an arms-for-
money exchange program to reduce the number of arms in a given environment.
Safeguarding captured or found arms caches will also prevent belligerents from resourcing
any bellicose activities.

SHOW OF FORCE
8-33. A show of force is an operation designed to demonstrate US resolve. The show of force
involves increased visibility of US deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation

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 Stability Operations and Support Operations

that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives (JP

1-02). The show of force can influence other government or political-military organizations to
respect US interests and international law. The HBCT combined arms battalion may take
part in a show of force by participating in a temporary buildup in a specific region,
conducting a combined training exercise, or demonstrating an increased level of readiness.
The United States conducts shows of force for three principal reasons:
To bolster and reassure allies.
To deter potential aggressors.
To gain or increase influence.
8-34. Although actual combat is not desired when conducting a show of force, the combined
arms battalion commander must be prepared for an escalation to combat.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8-35. Stability operations, with the exception of specific actions undertaken in combating
terrorism, support to counterdrug operations, and noncombatant evacuation operations tend
to be decentralized operations over extended distances and times. As such, the combined
arms battalion’s activities consist largely of separated small-unit operations conducted
across an assigned sector or AO. The HBCT combined arms battalion must conduct these
operations with consistency, impartiality, cultural sensitivity, and absolute discipline to
encourage cooperation from indigenous forces, garner popular support, and demonstrate
American resolve.

DECENTRALIZED OPERATIONS
8-36. Subordinate commanders need maximum flexibility in executing their missions. The
higher commander should give them specific responsibilities and ensure they understand his
intent.
8-37. Commanders must achieve mass, concentration, and their objective and must not
become so decentralized as to piecemeal their efforts. The combined arms battalion creates a
common operational picture (COP) for stability operations with the understanding that the
enemy force may be difficult to show because of the lack of discernable size or recognizable
equipment. Therefore, the combined arms battalion must utilize both analog and digital
systems to give the commander and force the required SU to command and control
decentralized elements of the battalion while still retaining the flexibility to quickly mass
overwhelming forces at the decisive point in the AO.
8-38. Given the volatile and politically charged nature of most stability operations,
individual and small-unit actions can have consequences disproportionate to the level of
command or amount of force involved. The level of media in the operational area will create
an influencing force that may be used by the enemy to support his operations. Therefore, in
some cases, tactical operations and individual actions can have strategic consequences.
Preventing these problems requires disciplined, knowledgeable leaders and Soldiers at every
level who clearly understand the operational environment and the combined arms battalion
commander’s intent.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

8-39. The ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that explain the
circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate and continue combat
engagement with opposition encountered. The ROE reflect the requirements of the law of
war, operational concerns, and political considerations when military force shifts from peace
activities to combat operations and back to the peace phase of an operation. These

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requirements are the primary means the commander uses to convey legal, political,
diplomatic, and military guidance to the military force for handling the crisis in peacetime.
8-40. Tactical and legal channels cooperate closely when formulating ROE. The commander
determines the desired intent of the ROE; the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) puts that intent
into legal terms.
8-41. Generally, the commander permits a wider use of military force in wartime through
ROE. The ROE restrict the use of military force to achieve the political objectives. In all
operations, every commander and Soldier has the inherent right of self-defense and,
regardless of the ROE, may take proportional measures of self-defense if legitimately
threatened or attacked. In all operations, the commander is legally responsible for the care
and treatment of civilians and property in the AO until transferred to proper government
control. The ROE assist the commander in fulfilling these responsibilities. They vary in
different conflicts and often change during the respective phases from combat or crisis
through peace building or nation assistance. Even during a single phase of operation, the
rules are amended at different levels of command, which may result in confusion. ROE are to
be protected as an essential element of friendly information (EEFI) to ensure that the threat
does not know of the restrictions on the use of force by friendly elements.
8-42. The ROE must be consistent with training, equipment capabilities, and national
guidance so it would not be unusual for every element of a multinational force to be
operating under different national ROE. When necessary, command guidance clarifies both
the ROE specifics on the use of force. While the rules must be tailored to the situation, the
combined arms battalion commanders should observe that nothing in such rules negates the
command responsibility to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defense,
allowing Soldiers to protect themselves from deadly threats. The ROE may rule out the use
of some weapon systems and impose special limitations on the use of weapons as
inappropriate to the operational environment. Examples include the requirements for
warning shots, single-shot engagements, and efforts to wound rather than kill. A combined
arms battalion deploying for stability operations must train its Soldiers to interpret and
apply the ROE effectively. It is imperative for everyone to understand the ROE since small-
unit leaders and individual Soldiers must make ROE decisions promptly, correctly, and
independently.
8-43. The ROE are normally developed with political considerations in mind and come from
decisions made at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level. Changes to the ROE can result from
immediate tactical emergencies at the local level. The commander must request changes to
the ROE when the local situation is beyond the considered scope of the ROE developed by
the force commander. Changes are requested through the operational chain of command and
must be approved by the designated authority, usually UEx or joint force command.
Commanders at all levels must know the request channels for ROE as well as the procedures
to obtain approval for recommended changes to the ROE as the process is slow and the
friendly force may be at risk if the commander has not considered the request for change of
ROE. Situations requiring an immediate change to the ROE could include introduction of
combat forces from a hostile nation, attacks by sophisticated weapons systems, including
WMD, or incidents resulting in loss of life. These situations should be war gamed and special
instructions included in all operation orders (OPORDs) and/or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs)
that specifically state when and how commanders at all levels can adjust the ROE.
8-44. The ROE are established for, disseminated down to, and understood by individual
Soldiers. However, the ROE cannot cover every situation. Soldiers at all levels must
understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly despite any military disadvantage
that may occur. The force commander responsible for ROE formulation should consider
including an intent portion that describes the desired end state of the operation as well as
conflict termination considerations. The intent portion should provide a framework for a

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measured response (gradual increase) in the use of force. These considerations assist
commanders and leaders at all levels in situations not clearly addressed in an OPORD. ROE
must be an integral part of all predeployment training and must be reviewed with Soldiers
with every change.

RULES OF INTERACTION (ROI)

8-45. The ROI embody the human dimension of stability operations; they lay the foundation
for successful relationships with the myriad of civilian factions and individuals that play
critical roles in these operations. Stability operations are conducted in an environment of
extensive civilian interface, and Soldiers must understand that they are there to help the
local populace, sometimes in spite of a hostile environment. The ROI encompass an array of
interpersonal communication skills such as persuasion and negotiation. These skills are the
tools that the individual Soldier needs to deal with, the nontraditional threats that are
prevalent in stability operations, including political friction, unfamiliar cultures, and
conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the Soldier’s survivability by improving his SU.
The ROI are based on the applicable ROE for a certain operation. The ROI must be tailored
to the specific regions, cultures, and populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, ROI
can be effective only if they are thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the
unit.

FORCE PROTECTION
8-46. Force protection requires special consideration in stability operations. Opposing forces
may seek to kill or wound US Soldiers for political purposes rather than tactical objectives.
Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment,
and supplies by integrating force protection considerations into all aspects of operational
planning and execution. Commanders and leaders throughout the combined arms battalion
must deliberately analyze their missions and environments to identify threats to their units.
Leaders then must make their Soldiers aware of the dangers and create safeguards to
protect them and the force. Commanders must always consider the aspects of force
protection and how they relate to the ROE, including the following:
Cooperation with the host nation.
Avoid becoming a lucrative target or developing a predictable pattern of activities.
Include security in each plan, standing operating procedures (SOP), OPORD, and
movement order.
Develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and OPSEC.
Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit’s location.
Constantly maintain and project an image of disciplined professionalism and
readiness.
Consider force protection throughout the range of military operations and base the
degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.
Force protection consists of OPSEC, deception, health and morale, safety, and
avoidance of fratricide.

OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

8-47. OPSEC considerations include the following:
Communications security is as important in stability operations as it is in
conventional military operations. Belligerent parties can monitor cell telephones
and nonsecure radios.
Maintaining neutrality contributes to protecting the force. In stability operations,
the entire force safeguards information about deployment, positions, strengths, and

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equipment of the friendly force from the other side. If one side suspects that the
friendly force is giving information to the other side, either deliberately or
inadvertently, one or both parties to the dispute may become uncooperative and
jeopardize the success of the operation, thus putting the friendly force at risk from
this loss of legitimacy.
The force must take precautions to protect positions, headquarters, support
facilities, and base camps. These precautions may include obstacles and
fortifications. Units also practice alert procedures and develop drills to occupy
positions rapidly. A robust engineer force provides support to meet survivability
needs.
Friendly forces establish and maintain roadblocks. If military police (MP) units are
unavailable, other forces may assume this responsibility. As a minimum, the area
should be highly visible and defensible with an armed overwatch to protect the
roadblock force.
The most proactive measure for survivability is individual awareness by Soldiers in
all circumstances. Soldiers must look for things out of place and patterns preceding
aggression. Commanders should ensure Soldiers remain alert, do not establish a
routine, maintain disciplined professional appearance and bearing, and keep a
nonantagonistic profile.

HEALTH AND MORALE

8-48. Stability operations often require special consideration of Soldier health, welfare, and
morale factors to keep the battalion in the physical, mental, and emotional condition to
support long-term operations. Stability operations frequently involve deployment to an
austere, immature theater with limited life support infrastructure and a frustrating mission
that requires both a mature and responsible chain of command to maintain the battalion as
a trained and ready fighting force. Commanders must consider these factors when assigning
missions and planning rotations of units into and within the theater.

SAFETY
8-49. Commanders in stability operations may reduce the chance of mishap by conducting
risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and
seeking advice from local personnel. The safety program should begin with training
conducted before deployment and be continuous. Training includes the effect on safety of
factors, such as the environment, terrain, road conditions and local driving habits, access to
or possession of live ammunition, unlocated or uncleared minefields, and special equipment
such as armored vehicles and other systems that present special hazards. Commanders must
make safety a priority as loss through accident will reduce the operational capability as well
as morale of the battalion. Accidents are a measure of the training, discipline, and
professionalism of the battalion.

AVOIDANCE OF FRATRICIDE
8-50. Most measures taken to avoid fratricide in stability operations are no different than
those taken during combat operations. However, commanders must consider other factors
such as local hires or NGO personnel that may be as much at risk as US forces. Accurate
information about the location and activity of both friendly and hostile forces and an
aggressive airspace management plan assist commanders in avoiding fratricide.

TASK ORGANIZATION
8-51. In conducting stability operations, the HBCT combined arms battalion commander
organizes his forces for the type of mission they must perform, integrating attached assets

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and the elements from higher headquarters to accomplish the mission. The combined arms
battalion organization must enable the unit to meet changing situations; thus, the battalion
commander must consider which resources to allocate to company control and which to the
control at battalion level. Task organization and support arrangements change frequently
during long-term stability operations and should be expected. Commanders must frequently
shift the support of engineers, medical units, and aviation units from one area or task to
another to meet operational requirements.

AUGMENTATION
8-52. The unique aspects of stability operations may require individual augmentees and
augmentation cells to support unique force-tailoring requirements and personnel shortfalls.
Augmentation supports coordination with the media, government agencies, NGOs and other
multinational forces, and civil-military elements. METT-TC considerations drive
augmentation, and so, the battalion must have established programs to receive, care for, use
in a meaningful way, and release augmentees after mission completion. The reception and
integration of augmentees into the combined arms battalion is a measure of the
professionalism and discipline of the force. Augmentees must not be allowed to become
personally separate from the battalion to ensure that they have the emotional support and
identity of belonging to the organization. Augmentees cannot help the battalion if they are
on the outside.

LIAISON
8-53. Commanders may consider task organizing small liaison teams to deal with situations
that develop with the local population. Teams can free up maneuver elements and facilitate
negotiation. Teams must have linguists and personnel who have the authority to negotiate
on the behalf of the chain of command. Unit ministry teams, engineers, civil affairs (CA)
personnel, counterintelligence personnel, linguists, and logistics personnel may be
candidates for such teams. Commanders must provide augmenting team members with
resources and quality of life normally provided to their own Soldiers. Augmentees cannot
help the battalion if they are treated differently than the battalion they are trying to
support.

MEDIA CONSIDERATIONS
8-54. The presence of media in the operational area is a reality that confronts every Soldier
involved in stability operations and support operations. (See Appendix XX for additional
information.)
8-55. All leaders and Soldiers are subject to instantaneous worldwide scrutiny as a result of
the growth of news coverage via international television and radio broadcasts as well as the
Internet. Those opposed to the operation or who are anti-US may interpret or embellish
interviews or reports to imply that the operation counters official US policy and may damage
the nation’s interests and international standing. The media may be seen as the enemy if the
force does not effectively deal with this component of IO.
8-56. Soldiers in the combined arms battalion must learn how to deal effectively with
broadcast and print reporters as well as photographers and cameramen. Training should
cover any information restrictions imposed on the media and how to recognize media and
their equipment in the operational area. Soldiers must also gain an understanding of which
subjects they are authorized to discuss and which ones they must refer to higher authorities,
such as their chains of command or the public affairs office (PAO). PAO personnel usually
issue daily command guidance dealing with these subjects.

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8-57. Commanders must establish OPSEC guidance regarding the information (both written
and visual) that they allow Soldiers to post on the Internet. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the enemy posted a number of pictures on their IO web sites that had obviously
been pulled from Soldiers’ open web sites. Commanders must effectively manage the OPSEC
posture of the force while not restricting their Soldiers’ constitutional rights of free speech.
Commanders must integrate the use of cell telephones and personal e-mail into the unit
OPSEC program. When in doubt, force protection takes precedence and our Soldiers
understand this.

OPERATIONS WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

8-58. US Army units conduct certain stability operations in coordination with a variety of
outside organizations and agencies. These include other US armed services or government
agencies as well as international organizations (including NGOs, private volunteer
organizations (PVOs), and UN military forces or agencies). Coordination and integration of
civilian and military activities must take place at every level. Operational and tactical
headquarters plan their operations to complement those of government and private agencies.
Likewise, military commanders need to make clear to other agencies their own objectives
and operational schemes within the limits of OPSEC. There must be an element of trust
between elements as the safety and security of many NGOs and PVOs are based on their
independence from military forces. On the other hand, the positive efforts of NGOs and
PVOs may be significant multipliers in operational areas. Coordinating centers, such as the
civil-military operations center (CMOC), are designed to provide the mechanism to optimize
the efforts of the outside agencies and military forces. These operations centers should
include representatives from as many agencies as required. Commanders must consider that
the agenda of every NGO and PVO may not complement US objectives, and some may be
front operations for the opposing force as the opposing force competes with us to establish
the operational environment.

SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS BY FUNCTIONAL AREAS

8-59. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander must clearly understand the mission
and the situation, and he must ensure the battalion staff and subordinate units understand
these as well. They must plan for continuous stability operations and, as is the norm for
offensive and defensive operations, planning and preparation time is often limited. The
stability operations plan must facilitate adjustment based on changes in the situation. The
commander and his staff must consider the following:
The mission (what the force is expected to do).
The AO (size, location, terrain, and weather).
The political, economic, military, and geographical situation in their AO.
Local customs, cultures, religions, ethnic groups, and tribal factions.
The importance of force protection, OPSEC, physical security, and permissible
protection measures.
The ROE and appropriate actions to take concerning infringements and violations
of agreements.
Physical considerations (minefields, bridges, road conditions, and existing
infrastructure).
Security operations.
Use of additional assets such as intelligence, public affairs (PA), CA, psychological
operations (PSYOP), engineers, and MPs.
Other elements (NGOs and PVOs) operating in the AO

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8-60. The combined arms battalion commander influences and shapes the AO for mission
success by ensuring the battalion plan is nested in the BCT plan and effectively using buffer
zones to separate belligerent factions, establishing checkpoints to control movement through
and within the battalion area, and conducting cordon and search operations to isolate and
locate belligerents. To plan effective stability operations, the battalion commander must
consider his AO and the environment (both positive and negative aspects). All planning
should include a reserve of appropriate size to respond to tactical emergencies or separate
hostile parties before potentially violent situations grow out of control. The reserve must
have the ability to quickly respond anywhere in the battalion area and handle any
unforeseen crisis. The reserve may also be called on by the BCT commander to respond out of
battalion sector.

INTELLIGENCE
8-61. The development of intelligence plays an important role in the HBCT combined arms
battalion’s successful accomplishment of a stability mission. The battalion commander must
task organize the intelligence effort since the traditional intelligence apparatus is geared for
operations against large-scale military formations and equipment. The battalion commander
uses every element available to collect information to help the unit accomplish its mission.
The commander uses intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) elements in
compliance with the ROE and legal controlling authority. Every member of the combined
arms battalion plays a role in gathering information to support mission requirements. The
battalion commander uses the S2 and the battalion intelligence section to manage and form
intelligence collection teams. They manage the intelligence collection effort to ensure every
member of the battalion understands the intelligence required and plays an active role in the
collection of that information. Intelligence collection elements normally available to the
battalion include the scout platoon, maneuver companies, elements attached to or supporting
the battalion, and Soldiers on patrols in OPs, at checkpoints, and conducting operations.

OTHER COLLECTION ELEMENTS

8-62. In addition to organic elements, the combined arms battalion may have interrogation,
counterintelligence, or signal intelligence elements from the BCT, the UEx, or
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade if attached.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

8-63. The attitudes and perceptions of the local populace in the AO are important in helping
the combined arms battalion commander decide how to use his forces to accomplish his
objectives. HUMINT, whether collected by combined arms battalion or supporting elements,
is a primary means to understand the attitudes and perceptions of the local populace as well
as the locations and the operations of opposing forces. The success of the battalion in
conducting stability operations will largely be determined by the amount and quality of
information it receives from HUMINT sources in the battalion area.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD APPLIED TO STABILITY

OPERATIONS
8-64. The combined arms battalion commander uses the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) process and the intelligence cycle as cornerstones for successful stability
operations just as in high-intensity offense and defense operations. IPB and the intelligence
collection can help the commander determine who the enemy is, what capabilities the enemy
has, and where he can find the enemy. In an asymmetrical environment, the intelligence
focus is on pattern analysis versus predictive analysis because the enemy order of battle
(OB) is ill defined. Stability operations are intelligence based, and therefore, intelligence

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serves as the basis for creating the combined arms battalion concept of operations and
allocating forces available for operations. (See FM 34-130 for more information on IPB and
how it applies to stability operations.) Although some of the traditional IPB products, such
as the warfighting templates, may not be directly applicable, the methodology remains
intact. The development of detailed priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information
requirements (IR) enables all personnel in the AO to gather critical information to support
the battalion develop intelligence. An important part of IPB is to assess the area in which
the combined arms battalion will be operating and what the positive, neutral, and negative
aspects of the AO are. (See Table 8-1 for an area assessment checklist.)

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
8-65. The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority, a condition that allows
commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. It facilitates more effective decision-
making and faster execution. IO involve constant efforts to deny adversaries the ability to
detect and respond to friendly operations, while simultaneously retaining and enhancing
friendly force freedom of action. When expeditiously exploited, IO provide a potent
advantage that facilitates rapid military success with minimal casualties. Effective IO and
information management allow commanders to take advantage of opportunities, while
denying adversary commanders the information needed to make timely and accurate
decisions or leading them to make decisions favorable to friendly forces. The combined arms
battalion commander may have PSYOP, CA, PA, and OPSEC elements attached or operating
in the AO to support the friendly force objectives and may have to provide security for them.
IO must be conducted within the ROE, ROI, and nested in the operational and IO plans of
higher headquarters. Battalions may conduct direct IO supported by PSYOP teams. The
battalion commander must make sure that the IO themes and messages from higher
headquarters complement the local message and vice versa. IO fratricide happens when one
friendly message counters another friendly message, which in turn defeats every message—
the right message and the wrong message. The wrong message will probably be adopted by
the enemy and used against friendly forces with the credibility attached as having come from
our organizations. IO fratricide destroys friendly force credibility and wastes the
opportunity.

MANEUVER
8-66. Maneuver in stability operations is similar to maneuver in traditional combat
operations, with extensive emphasis on security. The intent is to create a stable environment
that allows peace to take hold while ensuring the force is protected.

BATTALION MANEUVER
8-67. Maneuver in stability operations is often decentralized to the company or platoon level.
As required, these units receive augmentation from support forces such as engineers,
logistics, and medical personnel. The battalion commander must be prepared to rely on every
element in the battalion AO, including sustaining operations elements to assist the
maneuver forces when the need arises. When new operational requirements develop, the
sustaining operations elements must be ready to shift priorities and conduct nonstandard
operations to accomplish the mission.

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Table 8-1. Area Assessment Checklist

Refugee Interaction
Where are the refugees originally from?
What is the size of the original population?
What are the size and population of the surrounding countryside the village services?
What is the size of the refugee population?
Why did they come here?
What is the relationship of the village with the surrounding villages? Are they related? Do they support each
other? Are they hostile? Is any portion of the population discriminated against?
Food and Water
What is the food and water status of the village?
Where do they get their food?
What other means of subsistence are available?
Are the villagers farmers or herders?
What is the status of their crops or herds?
What is the quality of the water source?
Medical Surveillance
What is the medical status of the village?
What services are available in the village? In the surrounding countryside?
Is there evidence of illness or starvation?
What portion of the population is affected?
What is the death rate?
What diseases are present in the village?
Civil-Military/Nongovernmental Organizations
What civilian and military organizations exist in the village or surrounding countryside?
Who are their leaders?
Which organization, if any, does the local populace support?
United Nations or Other Relief Agencies
What NATO, UN, or other relief agencies operate in the village?
Who are their representatives?
What services do they provide?
What portion of the population do they service?
Do they have an outreach program for the surrounding countryside?
Commerce
What commercial or business activities are present in the village?
What services or products do they produce?
Miscellaneous
Determine the groups in the village in the most need. What are their numbers? Where did they come from? How
long have they been there? What are their specific needs?
What civic employment projects would village leaders like to see started?
Determine the number of families in the village. What are their family names? How many in each family?
What food items are available in the local market? What is the cost of these items? Are relief supplies being sold
in the market? If so, what items, from what source, and at which price?
What skilled labor or services are available in the village?
What are the major roads and routes through the village? How heavily traveled are they? Are there chokepoints
or bridges on the routes? Are there alternate routes or footpaths?
What is the size of any transient population in the village? Where did they come from and how long have they
been there?

COMBAT MANEUVER
8-68. Maneuver may involve combat. The combined arms battalion uses only the level of
force necessary to resolve the crisis and reestablish local stability. Depending on the ROE,
the combined arms battalion may precede the use of force with a warning or the use of
nonlethal means, employing lethal means only if a belligerent does not stop interfering. The
methods employed to reduce the crisis could take the form of separating belligerent forces or
maneuvering HBCT elements to provide security. A show of force or demonstration may be
all that is necessary, or the combined arms battalion may employ patrolling, searches,

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negotiation and mediation, information gathering, strikes and raids, or combat operations to
accomplish the mission.

FORCE PROTECTION
8-69. Protecting friendly forces is critical in stability operations. To establish and maintain a
stable environment in the operational area, friendly forces must establish and sustain a safe
environment. Disarming the local population may be a command priority to establish and
maintain a safe and stable environment. Friendly forces may become a target for terrorists
and criminals, and special care must be given to Soldier standards in wearing body armor,
preparing hardened vehicles for movement, and hardening unit locations. Reaction to small-
arms engagements, attacks by rocket-propelled grenades, and use of improvised explosive
devices should be part of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used to protect the
force.

AVIATION SUPPORT
8-70. Combat aviation units deployed into the area of operation with early entry ground
forces can be a significant deterrent on the indigenous combatants, particularly if these
factions have armored or mechanized infantry forces that may be at risk to attack from the
air. Observation, lift aircraft with embarked infantry, or attack helicopters may be employed
to act as a tactical command force (TCF) or as a reaction force against enemy threats.
Aviation may also conduct reconnaissance and surveillance over wide areas and provide the
HBCT with a means for visual route reconnaissance. Utility helicopters provide an excellent
enhanced C2 capability to stability operations as they can stand off for extended periods of
time. Medium-lift helicopters can move large numbers of military and civilian peace
enforcement personnel and deliver military and humanitarian supplies when surface
transportation is unavailable or routes become impassable. The speed, shock, and versatility
of aviation can be offset by loss to enemy ground fire, so the protection of the aviation force is
just as important as the ground force in the AO.

FIRE SUPPORT
8-71. Although fire support (FS) planning for stability operations is the same as for
traditional combat operations, the use of FS may be restricted and limited. The battalion
commander integrates FS into his tactical plan in accordance with the ROE and restrictions
imposed by higher headquarters as well as the physical and cultural limitations of the AO,
such as no-fire zones, presence of noncombatants, and religious shrines. Special
considerations include the following:
Procedures for the rapid clearance of fires—US and multinational.
Close communication and coordination with host country officials.
Increased security for indirect firing positions.
Restricted use of certain munitions such as cluster munitions and scatterable
mines.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

8-72. Mobility in the combined arms battalion AO may be restricted due to poorly developed
or significantly damaged road systems, installations, infrastructure, and airfields. Before the
battalion can maneuver effectively, the AO must be prepared to support that maneuver.
Limited infrastructure and restricted mobility couples with the need, and the need for the
battalion to maneuver effectively may cause the BCT and UEx to augment the HBCT
combined arms battalion with additional engineer assets.

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8-73. Engineers play a major role in stability operations by constructing base camps,
upgrading the transportation infrastructure, conducting bridge reconnaissance, assisting in
civic action by building or repairing health and education facilities for the civilian populace,
and reducing the mine threat. Additionally, if the AO is heavily saturated with mines,
engineers can be used to establish a mine action center (MAC) to provide centralized control
for demining operations. Factors that help determine the amount of engineer support the
combined arms battalion receives include the following:
Terrain in the AO.
Minefields in the AO
Type and location of obstacles in the AO.
Engineer assets available.
Duration of the operation.
Environmental considerations.
Water supply and location.
Sewage and garbage facilities.
Local power facilities.
Fire-fighting capabilities.
Basic country infrastructure (road, bridge, rail, airfield, and port capability),
including contracted engineering support.
Friendly force protection and quality-of-life requirements
8-74. Regardless of combined arms battalion requirements, there may not be enough
engineer assets, including civilian contract engineer support, available. This situation may
require combined arms battalion elements to construct their own force protection
fortifications and assist with other engineer tasks within their capabilities. In prioritizing
the use of engineers or the use of organic forces to accomplish engineer tasks, the combined
arms battalion commander emphasizes the strengthening of force protective measures.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8-75. The HBCT combined arms battalion’s ability to sustain itself in the AO depends on the
theater’s maturity, the sustaining operations structure, and the time flow of forces. Refugees,
an inadequate infrastructure, and demands by the host nation and coalition partners can
make logistical support complex. Commanders must consider that much of the support will
be contracted to civilian organizations and much may be executed by local elements as part
of a nation-building design.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
8-76. General principles to consider when planning sustaining operations for stability
operations include the following:
Ability to implement logistical support in any stability operations area.
Ability of the combined arms battalion to provide its own support.
Ability of higher headquarters to provide support.
Availability of local supplies, facilities, utilities, services, and transportation
support systems by contract or local purchase.
Availability of local facilities such as all weather major roads, ports, airfields, and
communications systems.
Local capabilities for self-support to facilitate the eventual transfer of
responsibilities to the supported nation for development or improvement.
Availability of resources.

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Seasonal climatic requirements—heating/cooling requirements as well as flooding

or dust storms.

AUGMENTATION
8-77. To make up for inadequate logistical and health service infrastructures in the AO, the
combined arms battalion may be augmented with additional sustaining operations elements.
Some or all of these sustaining operations elements may precede combat elements into the
AO. In addition to supporting the combined arms battalion, sustaining operations elements
may provide support for the following:
Allied or indigenous governmental agencies.
Allied or indigenous civilians.
Allied or indigenous military forces.
US governmental agencies.
US civilian agencies and personnel.
Other US military forces.
US-backed personnel and organizations.
International civilian and governmental agencies.

FORCE HEATH PROTECTION (FHP)

8-78. In stability operations, the brigade deploys with its organic medical assets. In addition,
the brigade support medical company (BSMC) is augmented with a forward surgical team
and an air ambulance platoon currently called a forward support medical evacuation team
(FSMT). FHP for the combined arms battalion in stability operations depends on the specific
type of operations, anticipated duration of the operations, number of personnel deployed,
theater evacuation policy, medical troop ceiling, and anticipated level of violence. Additional
FHP elements that may be found operating in the BCT or battalion AO could include
veterinary services, preventive medicine (PVNTMED), hospital, laboratory,
combat/operational stress control, and dental support units. For definitive information on
FHP for stability operations, see FM 8-42 (FM 4-02.42), Combat Health Support in Stability
Operations and Support Operations. See AR 40-3 for information on emergency medical
treatment for local national civilians during stability operations.

CONTRACTING
8-79. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier and can augment existing sustaining
operations capabilities. Weak logistical infrastructures in the AO may make it necessary to
use contracting for some supplies and services. If the battalion commander knows that
contracting functions may have to be performed, he obtains guidance from higher
headquarters concerning contracting during the initial planning stages. Contracting can
allow the battalion commander to buy his way out of trouble, but if not managed properly,
contracting problems can buy the commander into serious trouble. Hostilities can cause
interruptions in the delivery of any contracted services, such as food and water, so the
combined arms battalion must be prepared to support itself and provide necessary support to
attached and supporting forces as well as the local populace for limited periods of time. A
good plan anticipates large consumption rates of Class I, III, IV, and VIII supplies and
provides for reserve stocks of nonperishables for emergencies. Caution must be taken when
hiring services from the local populace. The combined arms battalion must have valid and
effective vetting processes to ensure friendly forces do not hire questionable resources.

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C2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS
8-80. Battalion and brigades do not normally perform the function of a joint headquarters. If
there is no joint task force (JTF) for the operation, a C2 from the UEx performs the role of
the JTF to integrate the other service components. This allows the combined arms battalion
to focus on the control of its company teams. If a battalion operation follows a SOF unit or
operation, it should request a SOF liaison team before arrival in the operational area. The
combined arms battalion coordinates with SOF through the JTF. If there is no JTF, the
battalion contacts the SOF through the embassy security assistance office.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-81. The joint force commander develops and articulates a desired end state in terms of
measurable military and socioeconomic conditions that have the greatest potential for
lasting stability in the area. The battalion commander and staff determine the required
sequence of tasks and objectives the combined arms battalion must accomplish to meet the
end state requirements. Other critical actions include moving into the AO, establishing a
base of operations and sustainment for the combined arms battalion, and implementing
appropriate force protection policies. As the immediate situation stabilizes, the combined
arms battalion conducts follow-on actions to restore order and local government, assist in
repairing infrastructure, remove weapons, and disarm factions. The commander and staff
assign objectives and AOs, allocate forces, and establish control measures for subordinate
forces to accomplish their missions.
8-82. To keep the HBCT combined arms battalion focused throughout the operation, the
commander and staff develop a concept of the operation that establishes measurable
objectives and timelines to meet the desired end state. The concept should cover the entire
duration of the operation from deployment to the end state, defining how the combined arms
battalion will accomplish its assigned mission. The commander uses FRAGOs and
subsequent OPORDs to control execution of each phase of the operation and various
missions as required. The commander and staff must be careful to avoid mission creep as the
criteria for the end state change and not be frustrated when the mission and measurement of
effectiveness change reflecting changes in political and military situations.
8-83. The commander and staff coordinate combined arms battalion plans and actions with
the higher headquarters, adjacent units, and government and NGOs in the AO to ensure
unified effort and gain the most from combined actions. Use of liaison officers (LNOs) is vital
to success when attempting to gain cooperation from multiple elements.

COMMUNICATIONS
8-84. Communications abilities may be augmented to effect long-range communications and
proper liaisons. The battalion commander and staff consider equipment compatibility, crypto
use, information sharing, and security measures when working with SOF, joint forces, and
multinational forces. The complexity of the communications architecture in stability
operations may result in the battalion using both analog and digital systems security fire-
walled from nonsecure civilian systems to effect routine coordination in the AO.

INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS
8-85. The combined arms battalion staff uses the IPB techniques to portray the intelligence
estimate for the commander. Population status, ethnicity, and socioeconomic factors take on
increasing importance in portraying the situation to the commander. Enemy doctrinal
information may be scarce by the nature of the threat. HUMINT is a major focus to develop
information on the threat, and the intelligence effort must be continuous to protect the force

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and drive friendly operations. (See ST 2-91.1, Intelligence Support to Stability Operations
and Support Operations, for more information.)

Organizations
8-86. Organization sources include all host country military and civilian intelligence systems
as well as US and allied intelligence sources. The commander should feel free to task
organize his forces to support the development of intelligence. It may require Soldiers to
work outside their normal combat skill if those skills are not mission essential to support the
operation. Examples include conversion of the fire support teams into intelligence support
personnel when the likelihood of indirect fire use is low.

Collection
8-87. Tactical collection includes all sources that produce information. Technological
capabilities may not provide a significant advantage in some environments because of the
lack of technology in the AO. An intelligence database on the threat may or may not apply,
or be available, to the tactical commander. If not, the battalion with the support of the BCT
will have to develop the intelligence database for the AO and then continuously revise it as
new information becomes available. The focus of the IPB and the main source of intelligence
in stability operations is often HUMINT. Every Soldier must be a collector of information
and then must provide that information in a timely and accurate form to the intelligence
collection team.

Restrictions
8-88. Internal and external legal restrictions may exist on the dissemination of information
during stability operations. Gathering information on and within another country during
stability operations has both cultural as well as political sensitivity.

Emphasis
8-89. The intelligence effort must have continued emphasis. Before force commitment, the
combined arms battalion must effectively collect, process, and focus intelligence to support
planning, training, and operational requirements. During stability operations, intelligence
determines the proper COA.

TECHNIQUES
8-90. During stability operations, the combined arms battalion may conduct patrols, man
observation posts, guard local officials, maintain static security posts, conduct searches and
roadblocks, react to civil disturbance, conduct counterinsurgency operations, and conduct
checkpoint operations to accomplish the mission. Additionally, indigenous authorities or
other high-ranking officials may require the protection of the battalion during movement
through or within the area of operations.

PRESENCE PATROLS
8-91. The combined arms battalion may direct its subordinate companies to conduct patrols,
either mounted, dismounted, or by aircraft. Although the patrols are conducted overtly, the
companies take all precautions to protect the Soldiers on patrol. A presence patrol must be
readily identifiable as such by all parties and must conduct movement openly. The patrol
wears distinctive items of uniform, such as the American flag to emphasize US force
presence. Patrols can accomplish the following:
Deter potential truce violations by maintaining a presence.

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 Stability Operations and Support Operations

Cover gaps between fixed OPs.

Confirm reports from OPs.
Investigate alleged breaches of the armistice.
8-92. A patrol must do the following:
Avoid deviating from the planned route.
Record in writing and sketch all observations.
Halt when challenged, identify itself, and report any attempt to obstruct its
progress.
Record any changes in the disposition of the opposing forces.
Avoid establishing patterns.

OBSERVATION POSTS
8-93. Observation posts are an especially important element of the combined arms
battalion’s effort to establish and maintain operational security. OPs provide protection
when long-range observation from current positions is not possible. The combined arms
battalion may task the companies to employ OPs, either mounted or dismounted, as the
situation dictates.
8-94. OPs are sited for maximum view of the surrounding area, for clear radio
communications, and for defensibility. OP locations are recorded, and the commander must
authorize any relocation. Soldiers man the OPs at all times and access is limited to
authorized personnel only. The mission of the OP is to report the following:
Movement of belligerent military forces, including unit identification, time,
direction, and other details that the OP can ascertain.
Shooting, hostile acts, or threats directed against the peacekeeping force or
civilians.
Any improvement to defensive positions of a former belligerent.
An overflight by unauthorized aircraft, either military or civilian, including the
time, direction, aircraft type, and nationality.
Any observed violations of an armistice agreement.
8-95. The peacekeeping force ensures its safety through security, self-defense, and force
protection. Conspicuous marking on installations, vehicles, and personnel are a source of
protection. The peacekeeping force maintains its legitimacy and acceptability to the former
belligerents through its professional, disinterested, and impartial conduct of the
peacekeeping mission. However, factions in the former belligerents’ armed forces, in the
civilian population, or among other interested parties may want to disrupt the peacekeeping
operation and subvert the diplomatic process. Therefore, the peacekeeping force must be
prepared to defend itself and must actively pursue any element that is attempting to create
instability.
8-96. The combined arms battalion must strictly follow the ROE, ROI, and rules on the use of
force (RUF). The battalion will maintain a ready reserve that can reinforce an OP or aid a
patrol in distress. Field fortifications, barriers, and well-sited weapons must protect
installations, and the combined arms battalion must take active precautions to protect
personnel and facilities from terrorist attacks. A peacekeeping force must fight defensive
engagements only when it cannot avoid such engagements. The commander must be
prepared to recommend withdrawal of the force when a serious threat appears. However, the
inherent right of self-defense is never offered up.

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PROVIDING SECURITY FOR INDIGENOUS AUTHORITIES

8-97. Indigenous authorities or other high-ranking officials may require the protection of a
military escort when moving within the AO. Principles for mission execution follow (the
same principles apply to security for the battalion command group):
The strength of the escort required depends on the circumstances in AO.
The escort force should provide an armored vehicle as optional transportation for
officials.
Additional vehicles must provide support to the vehicle carrying the officials
throughout the move. Each additional vehicle should have automatic weapons and
Soldiers designated to provide security for the officials.
The escort force protects the officials in the event at an attack. It gets the official
vehicle out of the danger area as quickly as possible. The escort force must develop
and rehearse contingency plans, alternate routes, and actions in case of attack.
Before starting the move, the escort commander briefs the officials about what will
be done in the event of an attack. Regardless of the officials’ seniority, the escort
commander is in command of the move.

STATIC SECURITY POSTS

8-98. A static security post (Figure 8-1) is any security system organized to protect critical
fixed installations—military or civil—or critical points along lines of communication such as
terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions.
8-99. The size of the post depends on the mission, the size and characteristics of the threat
force, the attitude of the civil populace, and the importance of the item being secured. The
post varies from a two-man bridge guard to a reinforced company team securing a key
communications center or civilian community. The combined arms battalion coordinates
establishment of security posts with the host nation.
8-100. The organization of a static security post varies with its size, mission, and distance
from reinforcing units. For security reasons, static security posts in remote areas are larger
than the same type post would be if located closer to supporting forces. It is organized for the
security of both the site and the security force. The combined arms battalion must establish
reliable communications between remote static security posts and the parent unit’s base.
8-101. The combined arms battalion must control access by indigenous personnel to the
security post. The battalion screens and evacuates people living near the static position, and
HUMINT sources along the routes of approach should be evaluated for threat information
regarding battalion operations in the AO.
8-102. The commander must give all possible consideration to force protection and
secondarily to Soldier comfort during the organization and preparation of the security post.
Even under the best conditions, morale suffers among Soldiers who must operate for
prolonged periods in small groups away from their parent organization in a high threat area,
so the command must have a security post rotation plan.
8-103. If the static security post is far removed from other combined arms battalion units
and could be isolated by threat operations, the battalion prestocks it with sufficient
quantities of supplies to allow for sustained operations. A static security post should never
have to depend on the local populace for supplies.

SEARCHES
8-104. Searches are an important aspect of populace and resource control. The need to
conduct search operations or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. A

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search can orient on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain. A search usually involves both
civil police and Soldiers from the heavy combined arms battalion.

Figure 8-1. Security Post

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8-105. Misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations; thus,
Soldiers must conduct and lawfully record the seizure of contraband, evidence, intelligence
material, supplies, or other minor items for them to be of future legal value. Proper use of
authority during searches gains the respect and support of the people.
8-106. Authority for search operations is carefully reviewed. Military personnel must
perform searches only in areas in military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful). They
must conduct searches only to apprehend threat suspects or to secure evidence proving an
offense has been committed.
8-107. Search teams have detailed instructions for handling controlled items. Lists of
prohibited or controlled distribution items should be widely disseminated and onhand during
searches. The combined arms battalion contacts military or civil police who work with the
populace and the resource control program before the search operations begin (or
periodically if search operations are a continuing activity). Units must consider the effect of

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early warning on the effectiveness of their operation (cordon and knock versus cordon and
search).
8-108. Language difficulties can interfere when US forces conduct search operations
involving the local populace. The US units given a search mission must include interpreters
to work with local civilians and law enforcement authorities.
8-109. The combined arms battalion conducts search operations slowly enough to allow for
an effective search but rapidly enough to prevent the enemy from reacting to the threat of
the search.
8-110. Soldiers use minimum-essential force to eliminate any active resistance encountered.
8-111. Searchers can return to a searched area after the initial search to surprise and
eliminate insurgents or their leaders who might have either returned or remained
undetected during the search.
8-112. The combined arms battalion should develop plans for securing the search area
(establishing a cordon) and for handling detained personnel. Those plans must consider local
cultural sensitivities to ensure that search operations do not do more damage than good.
8-113. Smuggling operations are a major means of financing and sustaining continued
hostilities during peace operations. Failure to disrupt or stop smuggling operations hinders
mission success. Special IPB emphasis must be directed toward determining the following:
Which smuggled items to focus on?
Smuggling techniques or deceptions used.
Smuggling transportation assets used.
Identifying threat adaptations to US security measures.
Specialized search techniques to detect smuggling.
Identifying entry points, dropoff points, delivery sites, or locations for
transshipment of contraband.

PROCEDURES
8-114. Search procedures follow:
Search of individuals. In all search operations, leaders must emphasize that anyone in
an area to be searched could be an insurgent or a sympathizer. To avoid making an
enemy out of a suspect who may support the host country government, searchers
must be disciplined and respectful of local culture. The greatest caution is required
during the initial handling of a person about to be searched. One member of the
search team covers the other member, who makes the actual search. (FM 3-19.40,
Military Policy Internment/Resettlement Operations, and STP 19-95B1-SM
Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill Level 1, discuss the procedure for
searching people.) Units may consider using digital cameras for photographing
search operations on static OPs or in routine searches to maintain a database on
local nationals and to assist in future training.
Search of females. The enemy will use females for all types of tasks when they think
searches might be a cultural threat. To counter this, use female Soldiers as
searchers. If female searchers are not available, use doctors, medics, or members of
the local populace.
Search of vehicles. Searching vehicles may require equipment such as detection
devices, mirrors, and tools. Specially trained dogs can locate drugs or explosives. A
thorough search of a vehicle is a time-consuming process, and leaders must
consider the effect on the population. Use of a separate vehicle search area can help
avoid unnecessary delays.

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Search of urban areas. These searches are also referred to as cordon and search
operations. The principles, C2, and procedures for this type of search are discussed
in the following paragraph. When intelligence identifies and locates members of the
insurgent infrastructure, an operation is mounted to neutralize them. This
operation should be done by police acting on the warrant of a disinterested
magistrate and based on probable cause. In the more violent stages of an
insurgency, emergency laws and regulations may dispense temporarily with some
of these legal protections. The goal is to use the least severe method to accomplish
the mission adequately. Care should be taken to preserve evidence for future legal
action. If local police are not available or capable of executing the mission, then the
combined arms battalion will execute the urban search operation.

CORDON AND SEARCH

8-115. These operations require superb discipline and particular attention to detail. A
cordon and search involves two incendiary processes in the operational AO: limiting freedom
of movement and searching dwellings. These two actions provide a clear potential for
negative consequences; thus, organizing cordon and search elements requires extensive
mission tailoring. Commanders must always be prepared for a civil disturbance or hostile
reaction. The commander should divide the area to be searched in a builtup area into zones
and assign a search party to each. The cordon consists of two parts (an outer and inner
cordon). The outer cordon is usually the responsibility of the parent headquarters as it
requires a considerable amount of assets to effectively control it. The outer cordon consists of
a security element (to encircle the area, to prevent entrance and exit, and to secure open
areas) augmented with the necessary combat multipliers (based on METT-TC) such as
linguists and CA specialists. The inner cordon is established by the unit assigned the search
mission. The higher headquarters must also establish a reserve element to assist either
element as required (Figures 8-2 and 8-3).

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 8-2. Typical Organization for Search Operations

Establishing the Cordon

8-116. An effective inner and outer cordon is critical to the success of the search effort.
Cordons are designed to isolate the area to be searched to protect the forces conducting the
operation. Leaders should always plan for checkpoints and/or roadblocks, patrols, aerial
surveillance, engineers, PSYOP, search and entry teams, MPs, and documentation teams.
Integration of combat multipliers is critical to success. In remote areas, the combined arms
battalion may establish the cordon without being detected. The use of limited visibility aids
in the establishment and security of the cordon but makes it difficult to control and appears
to be heavy handed. The combined arms battalion must enforce the ROE and should develop
plans to handle detained personnel. Infantrymen accompany police and intelligence forces to
identify, question, and detain suspects. Infantry may also conduct searches and assist in
detaining suspects under police supervision; their principal role, however, is to reduce any
resistance that may develop and to provide security for the operation. Use of force is kept to
a minimum. Deployment for the search should be rapid, especially if the enemy is still in the
area to be searched. Ideally, the entire area should be surrounded at once. Observed fire
covers any gaps. The security element surrounds the area while the search element moves
in. Members of the security element orient mainly on people evading the search in the
populated area. The security element can also cut off any insurgents trying to reinforce
others within the area, isolating the search area internally and externally. Checkpoints and
roadblocks are established. Subsurface routes of escape in builtup areas, such as subways
and sewers, may also need to be searched and blocked.

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Figure 8-3. Conduct of a Search

Conducting the Search

8-117. A search of a builtup area must be conducted with as limited inconvenience to the
populace as possible. The search should inconvenience the populace enough for them to
discourage insurgents and sympathizers from remaining in the locale but not enough to
drive them to collaborate with the enemy as a result of the search. A large-scale search of a
builtup area is a combined civil police and military operation. Such a search should be
planned in detail and rehearsed while avoiding physical reconnaissance of the area just
before the search. Aerial photographs can provide information needed about the terrain. In
larger towns or cities, the local police might have detailed maps showing relative sizes and
locations of buildings. As with any military operation, mission analysis is critical. For
success, the search plan must be simple and the search conducted swiftly and professionally.
The search element is organized into teams. These teams can include personnel and special
equipment for handling prisoners, interrogations, linguists, documentation (using a recorder
with a camera), demolitions, PSYOP and civil affairs, mine detection, fires and effects,
employment of scout dogs, and tunnel reconnaissance. Three basic methods are used to
search the populated area.
Assemble inhabitants in a central location if they appear to be hostile. This method
provides the most control, simplifies a thorough search, denies insurgents an
opportunity to conceal evidence, and allows for detailed interrogation. Depending
on the objective of the search, a personnel search team may be necessary in this
central location. This method has the disadvantage of taking the inhabitants away
from their dwellings, thus encouraging looting which, in turn, engenders ill feelings
against the combined arms battalion. The security element is responsible for
controlling the inhabitants. The search element can escort individuals back to their

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dwellings so they can be present during the search or they can be left in the central
location.
Restrict inhabitants to their homes. This prohibits movement of civilians, allows
them to stay in their dwellings, and discourages looting. The security element must
enforce this restriction. The disadvantages of this method are that it makes control
and interrogation difficult and gives inhabitants time to conceal evidence in their
homes.
Control the heads of the households. The head of each household is told to remain
in front of the house while everyone else in the house is brought to a central
location. The security element controls the group at the central location and
provides external security. During the search, the head of the household
accompanies the search team through the house. Looting is reduced, and the head
of the household sees that the search team steals nothing. This is the best method
for controlling the populace during a search.

Searching a House
8-118. The object of a house search is to look for controlled items and to screen residents to
determine if any are suspected insurgents or sympathizers. A search party assigned to
search an occupied building should consist of at least one local policeman, a protective escort
for local security, and female searchers. If inhabitants remain in the dwellings, the
protective escort must isolate and secure the inhabitants during the search. Escort parties
and transportation must be arranged before the search of a house. Forced entry may be
necessary if a house is vacant or if an occupant refuses to allow searchers to enter. If the
force searches a house containing property while its occupants are away, it should secure the
house to prevent looting. Before US forces depart, the commander should arrange for the
community to protect such houses until the occupants return. Photos should be taken of any
confiscated material, and a hand receipt should be given to the owner of the property.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
8-119. The reserve element is a mobile force positioned in a nearby area. Its mission is to
help the search and security elements if they meet resistance beyond their ability to handle.
The reserve element can replace or reinforce either the search or security elements if the
need arises. Soldiers should treat any enemy material found, including propaganda signs
and leaflets, as if it is booby-trapped until inspection proves it safe. Underground and
underwater areas should be searched thoroughly. Any freshly excavated ground could be a
hiding place as Saddam Hussein’s underground hiding place demonstrated. Soldiers can use
mine detectors to locate metal objects underground and underwater. Reserve elements
should maintain the same task organization as the cordon and search elements.

AERIAL SEARCH OPERATIONS

8-120. Search units mounted in armed helicopters take full advantage of the mobility and
firepower of these aircraft.
8-121. Airmobile combat patrols conducting an aerial search reconnoiter an assigned area or
route in search of enemy forces. When a patrol locates an enemy force, the patrol may engage
it from the air or may land infantry and engage it on the ground. This technique is less
effective in areas of dense vegetation or when a significant man-portable air defense threat
is present.
8-122. Airmobile combat patrols should be used only when sufficient intelligence is available
to justify their use. Even then, ground operations should be used to complement such
patrols.

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APPREHENDED INSURGENTS
8-123. Certain principles govern actions taken when insurgents desert or surrender
voluntarily and indicate, at least in part, their attitudes and beliefs have changed. In this
situation they are confined only for screening and processing. They are kept separate from
prisoners who exhibit no change in attitude. (Detainee operations are discussed in Appendix
K.)

CAPTURED INSURGENTS
8-124. Captured insurgents who retain their attitude of opposition are turned over to the
host nation civil authorities.

ROADBLOCKS AND OTHER CHECKPOINTS

8-125. Roadblocks and checkpoints are among the most visible and important actions
performed during stability operations (Figure 8-4). Checkpoints in proximity of zones of
separation offer a myriad of planning concerns. There is a high potential for junior leaders
and Soldiers to make decisions with international importance—in essence a number of junior
ambassadors. Therefore, establishment and continual analysis of standing operating
procedures is critical to ensuring equity and support. A related aspect of populace and
resource control mentioned previously is the control of transportation. Individuals and
vehicles may be stopped during movement to assist in individual accountability, capture
enemy personnel, or control the trafficking of restricted material. The ability to establish
roadblocks and checkpoints is an important aspect of movement control and area denial. The
fundamentals of searches, discussed previously, apply to roadblocks and checkpoints also.
(FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, provides more information about roadblocks and
checkpoints.)
8-126. Roadblocks and checkpoints help prevent smuggling operations and stop the
movement of known or suspected insurgents. They should be manned by host nation police
(when applicable) in conjunction with UN monitors to stop vehicles and pedestrians and
conduct searches as required by conditions. They must take care to maintain legitimacy by
not targeting specific groups. Either host country or friendly combat forces defend these
roadblocks and checkpoints from enemy attack. If police strength is insufficient for the
number of positions required, friendly forces can operate them. Whenever US Army forces
operate roadblocks and checkpoints, host country police or other forces should be present to
conduct the actual stop and search. US forces should establish communications with other
elements of the site but should also remain in contact with their own chain of command. The
same principles apply to waterways as to land lines of communication.
8-127. Roadblocks should be established in locations where approaching traffic cannot
observe them until it is too late to withdraw and escape. When possible, roadblock locations
must be periodically relocated to mitigate bypassing and targeting by enemy forces. Narrow
defiles, tunnels, bridges, sharp curves, and other locations that channel traffic are the
preferred sites. Constructed, nonexplosive obstacles slow traffic, restrict it to a single lane,
and bring it to a halt. An area off the main road should be used to conduct a detailed search
of suspect vehicles and people and to avoid unduly delaying innocent traffic. A small reserve
using hasty field fortifications in nearby defended areas should provide immediate support
to operating personnel in case of attack. A larger reserve, which serves a number of posts,
should be capable of rapid reinforcement.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 8-4. Physical Layout of Roadblock

8-128. US forces should fill the reserve role in combined operations with host nation
personnel. The reserve is vulnerable to being set up or ambushed, especially if an enemy has
observed rehearsals. The enemy may hit multiple locations simultaneously to test
responsiveness or to aid his future planning.
8-129. Outside of normal military concerns of planning, reconnaissance, security, and
actions on the objective, units must have knowledge of civil authorities, factional boundaries,
significant cultural sites, linguist use, and the local populace and geography. Further, it is

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imperative that leaders who are responsible for checkpoints appraise higher headquarters of
problems and render specific recommendations for mission accomplishment.

REACT TO A CIVIL DISTURBANCE

8-130. To prevent or mitigate a civil disturbance, units must remain flexible in order to
change tactics as necessary. Units must use speed in deployment, arrest, apprehension, and
reaction to change through proper positioning of forces. Effective use of combat multipliers
such as PSYOP, CA, host nation police, and linguists can prevent many incidents from
happening or escalating to dangerous levels. A disciplined show of force is often more
effective than using the force. The mnemonic device of IDMM (isolate, dominate, maintain,
multidimensional-multiecheloned) can assist units planning for civil disturbances:
Isolate the trouble spot in time and space from outside influence or interaction.
Dominate the situation through an appropriate show of force and control of
information
Maintain SU with aerial assets, NGOs, HUMIT, PSYOP, CA, and linguists and
disseminate information
Multidimensional-multiecheloned actions are essential; for example, use CA to
negotiate and NGOs to remind parties of possible consequences.

SECTION II – SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-131. Support operations involve Army forces providing essential supplies, capabilities, and
services to help civil authorities deal with noncombat situations beyond their control. In
most cases, Army forces focus on overcoming conditions created by natural or manmade
disasters. Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly, but Army activities in
support operations most often involve setting the conditions that facilitate the ability of civil
authorities or NGOs to provide the required direct support to the affected population.
Support operations missions vary by type and are further differentiated by the specific
factors of METT-TC. Support operations usually require the HBCT combined arms battalion
to perform common tactical missions and tasks but also call on it execute unique missions
and tasks.

TYPES OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-132. The types of support operations are domestic support operations (DSOs) and foreign
humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations. DSOs and FHAs share four forms of operations,
which occur to varying degrees in both:
Relief operations.
Support to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-
yield explosive consequence management (CBRNE-CM).
Support to civil law enforcement.
Community assistance.
8-133. The US Army conducts DSOs in the United States and its territories, using both
active and reserve components. It conducts FHA operations abroad and under the direction
of a regional combatant commander in support of the Department of State. Since domestic
emergencies can require Army forces to respond with multiple capabilities and services, they
may conduct the four forms of support operations simultaneously during a given operation.

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DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-134. DSOs supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments and NGOs
within the United States. During DSOs, the US military always responds in support of a
lead Federal agency (examples include Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for
disaster relief or Department of the Interior for wild land fire fighting). DSOs also include
those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to foster mutual
assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or
preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil
emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies or major disasters. A
presidential declaration of an emergency or disaster area usually precedes a DSO.
8-135. The US military provides domestic support primarily in accordance with a DOD
directive for military assistance to civil authorities. The military assistance to civil authority
directive addresses responses to both natural and manmade disasters and includes military
assistance with civil disturbances, counterdrug activities, counterterrorism activities, and
law enforcement.
8-136. In accordance with the US Constitution, civilian government is responsible for
preserving public order. However, the Constitution does allow the use of military forces to
protect Federal and civilian property and functions. The Posse Comitatus Act restricts the
use of the military in Federal status and prevents it from executing laws and performing
civilian law enforcement functions within the United States.
8-137. DSOs focus on the condition of all types of natural and manmade properties with the
goal of helping to protect and restore these properties, as requested. Typically,
environmental operations are conducted in response to such events as forest and grassland
fires, hazardous material releases, floods, and earthquakes.
8-138. At the onset of DSOs that involve the provision of medical care, criteria for eligibility
of care must be established and disseminated to all medical units and elements. A
determination must also be made as to when this eligibility ends and when the patients once
again become the responsibility of the local medical infrastructure. Further, a determination
must be made as to what supplies and services are reimbursable and what government
agency or organization is responsible for this reimbursement. For additional information on
domestic support operations pertaining to disaster assistance, see FM 100-19, Domestic
Support Operations, FM 8-42 (FM 4-02.42), Combat Health Support in Stability Operations
and Support Operations, and the Federal Response Plan for Public Law 93-288, as amended.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

8-139. US forces conduct FHA operations outside the borders of the United States or its
territories to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic
conditions, such as human suffering, disease, or deprivation, that might present a serious
threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property.
8-140. The US military typically supplements the host nation authorities in concert with
other governmental agencies, NGOs, PVOs, and unaffiliated individuals. The majority of
FHA operations closely resemble domestic support operations; however, the lead Federal
agency is always the Department of State. The distinction between the domestic and foreign
assistance is the legal restrictions applied to US forces inside the United States and its
territories. Posse Comitatus does not apply to US forces overseas.
8-141. FHA operations are limited in scope and duration. They focus exclusively on prompt
aid to resolve an immediate crisis. Crises or disasters caused by hostile individuals or
factions attacking its government are normally classified as stability operations rather than

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support operations. In environments where the situation is vague or hostile, support

activities are considered a subset of a larger stability or offensive or defensive operation.

THE ARMY’S ROLE IN SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-142. The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations.
Instead, Army elements and forces, tailored for warfighting, are rapidly adapted and task
organized to dominate a crisis or disaster situation. In support operations, Army forces apply
decisive military capabilities to set the conditions for the supported civil authorities to
achieve success. Army forces have a functional chain of command, reliable communications,
and well-trained, well-equipped forces that can operate and sustain themselves in an austere
environment with organic assets.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
8-143. The ROE and rules on use of force established for support operations must be
consistent with training and equipment capabilities. For example, shoot to wound is not an
effective instruction unless Soldiers have been trained in this skill. When necessary,
command guidance clarifies the ROE to include specific rules for use of deadly force. While
the rules must be tailored to the situation, combined arms battalion commanders should
observe that nothing in such rules negates their obligation to take all necessary and
appropriate action in self-defense, allowing Soldiers to protect themselves from deadly
threats. A combined arms battalion deploying for support operations must conduct
predeployment training for its Soldiers to interpret and apply the ROE effectively. It is
imperative for everyone to understand the ROE since small-unit leaders and individual
Soldiers must make ROE decisions promptly and independently.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

8-144. US forces involved in support operations, both DSOs and FHA, execute a combination
of multiple overlapping activities. Forces must conduct support operations with consistency
and impartiality to encourage cooperation from indigenous forces and the population and to
preserve the legitimacy of the overall effort. The actions of squads, platoons, or even
individual Soldiers take place under the scrutiny of many interested groups as well as media
and can have disproportionate effects on mission success. Therefore, high levels of discipline,
training, and a thorough understanding of mission outcome are necessary for effective
support operations.

MISSION TRAINING
8-145. A sound foundation in combat mission training as well as basic military skills and
discipline underpins the combined arms battalion’s ability to successfully perform support
operations missions, but many of the key individual and collective skills differ and must be
trained for before deployment. HBCT combined arms battalions use most of their regularly
trained METL movement and security tasks in support operations missions, but they modify
those tasks for the special conditions of their mission. They also train leaders and Soldiers
for unique tasks necessary to the certain types of operations that they are assigned.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
8-146. The mission, the terms governing the Army’s presence in the AO, the character and
attitude of the population, the military and civilian organizations cooperating with the
combined arms battalion, the physical and cultural environments, and a host of other factors
combine to make each support operations mission unique. With the exception of specific
actions undertaken in counterterrorism operations, support to counterdrug operations, and

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noncombatant evacuation operations, support missions tend to be decentralized and highly

structured. An HBCT combined arms battalion’s activities consist in large part of directing
the operations of their companies and supporting units within a sector or AO in accordance
with a detailed OPORD.

FORMS OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-147. Support operations may be independent actions, or they may complement offensive,
defensive, and stability operations. Most offensive, defensive, and stability operations
require some form of support operations before, during, and after execution. Support
operations generally fall into four categories:
Relief operations.
Support to incidents involving CBRNE-CM.
Support to civil law enforcement.
Community assistance.

RELIEF OPERATIONS
8-148. In general, the actions performed during relief operations are identical in both DSOs
and FHA operations. The actions can be characterized as either humanitarian relief, which
focuses on the well-being of supported populations, or disaster relief, which focuses on
recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or manmade disaster. Relief operations
accomplish one or more of the following:
Save lives.
Reduce suffering.
Recover essential infrastructure.
Improve quality of life.

Disaster Relief
8-149. Disaster relief encompasses those actions taken to restore or recreate the minimum
infrastructure to allow effective humanitarian relief and set the conditions for longer term
recovery. This includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions
plus security measures necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population from
additional harm. Disaster relief may involve repairing or demolishing damaged structures;
restoring or building bridges, roads, and airfields; and removing debris from critical routes
and relief sites.

Humanitarian Relief
8-150. Humanitarian relief focuses on life-saving measures to alleviate the immediate needs
of a population in crisis. It often includes the provision of medical support, food, water,
medicines, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating or cooking fuel. In some cases, it involves
transportation support to move affected people from a disaster area.

SUPPORT TO INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

8-151. Military operations assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and
infrastructure before an attack by supporting domestic preparedness and critical asset
protection programs. If an attack occurs, military support responds to the consequences of
the attack.

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Domestic Preparedness
8-152. The Army’s role in facilitating domestic preparedness is to strengthen the existing
expertise of civil authorities. This is done in the two primary areas of response and training.
Response is the immediate reaction to an attack, and training includes what happens after
the attack.

Protection of Critical Assets

8-153. This program identifies critical assets and assures their integrity, availability,
survivability, and capability to support vital DOD missions across the full spectrum of
military operations. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric power, gas and oil,
banking and finance, transportation, water, and emergency services. An attack on any of
these assets may disrupt civilian commerce, government operations, and the military.

Response to WMD Incidents

8-154. The initial response to use of WMD is primarily from local assets, but sustained
Army participation may be required soon afterward. The Army’s capabilities in this
environment —follow:
Detection.
Triage treatment.
Decontamination and medical care, including assessment.
Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
Hospitalization.
Follow-up on victims of chemical and biological agents.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT

8-155. Support to domestic civil law enforcement generally involves activities related to
counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, civil disturbance operations, or general support.
Army support may involve providing resources, training, or direct support. Federal forces
remain under the control of their military chain of command at all times while providing the
support.

Support to Counterterrorism
8-156. Unless authorized by the President (or a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)),
Army forces do not conduct domestic counterterrorism, but they may provide support to lead
Federal agencies during crisis and consequence management of a terrorist incident. Army
forces may provide assistance in the areas of transportation, equipment, training, and
personnel to the lead Federal agencies. When terrorists pose an imminent threat to US
territory, its people, or its critical assets, the US military may conduct support operations to
counter these threats using ground, air, space, special operations, or maritime forces. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for crisis management in the United
States and its territories.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

8-157. Army support to domestic counterdrug operations is limited and usually restricted to
the areas of transportation, equipment, training, and personnel to the lead Federal agencies
in a support role.

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Civil Disturbance Operations

8-158. The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when local and state
law enforcement agencies are unable to resolve a civil disturbance. Federal Army forces
assist in restoring law and order when the magnitude of a disturbance exceeds the
capabilities of local and state law enforcement agencies, including the National Guard. Army
participation requires presidential proclamation and is limited to apply the minimum force
necessary to restore order to the point where civilian authorities no longer require military
assistance.

General Support
8-159. The Army may also provide training, share information, and provide equipment and
facilities to Federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies.

COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE
8-160. Community assistance involves a broad range of activities designed to strengthen the
relationship between the Army and the American people. These projects should exercise
individual Soldier skills, encourage teamwork, challenge leader planning and coordination
skills, and result in accomplishments that are measurable. Example activities include youth
physical fitness programs, medical readiness programs, and antidrug programs. Direct
military support to private organizations is governed by regulation, and commanders must
gain approval for all support to private organizations from UEx-level headquarters.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
8-161. The planning and execution of support operations are fundamentally similar to
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing offensive, defensive, and stability operations.
However, while each support operation is unique, the following four broad considerations can
help forces develop mission-specific concepts and schemes for executing support operations.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-162. Whether they confront the complications of floods, storms, earthquakes, riots,
disease, or other humanitarian crises, the HBCT combined arms battalion combines the
usual strengths of the mounted and dismounted forces. Although it has limited numbers of
medical and engineer elements, the combined arms battalion brings to the operation its
outstanding abilities to organize and supervise operations, collect and distribute
information, and communicate, as well as large numbers of highly disciplined and motivated
Soldiers. The following four broad imperatives that pertain to support operations help forces
plan and execute support operations:
Provide essential support to the largest number of people.
Coordinate actions with other agencies.
Establish measures of effectiveness (success).
Transfer responsibility to civilian agencies as soon as possible.

PROVIDE ESSENTIAL SUPPORT TO THE LARGEST NUMBER OF PEOPLE

8-163. Commanders must allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest good.
Additionally, commanders require an accurate assessment of what needs to be done to
employ military power effectively. In some cases, the HBCT combined arms battalion can
accomplish this task using warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques.
Commanders determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people in
the most efficient way. They usually focus initial efforts on restoring vital services, which

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include food and water distribution, medical aid, power generation, search and rescue, and
firefighting.

COORDINATE ACTIONS WITH OTHER AGENCIES

8-164. Domestic support operations are typically joint and interagency, and foreign
humanitarian assistance operations are usually multinational as well. Unity of effort
between the military and local authorities requires constant communication to ensure that
tasks are conducted in the most efficient and effective way and resources are used wisely.
Battalions should be prepared to provide liaison teams to coordinate best use of the battalion
with lead Federal agencies.

ESTABLISH MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)

8-165. A critical aspect of mission handover back to the lead Federal agency or foreign
officials is to have objective standards for measuring progress and effectiveness. These MOE
determine the degree to which an operation is accomplishing its established objectives. For
example, an MOE might be a decrease in the number of deaths caused by starvation. This is
an indicator that food convoys are reaching the designated areas. These measures are
situationally dependent and must be adjusted as the situation changes and guidance from
higher headquarters is developed.

TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY TO CIVILIAN AGENCIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

8-166. Support operations planning must always include the follow-on actions of the civilian
agencies and the host nation to restore conditions to normal. The following considerations
determine handover feasibility:
Condition of supported population and governments.
Competing mission requirements.
Specified and implied commitment levels of time, resources, and forces.
Maturity of the support effort.
Declaration of mission accomplishment by the lead federal agency.

PLANNING PROCESS
8-167. The combined arms battalion staff uses the standard Army planning process modified
for use in a support environment.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS
8-168. The battalion planning staff considers the following:
Specialized support operations terminology in the mission and tasks assigned to
the HBCT combined arms battalion for purposes of mission analysis and COA
development.
Command relationships, especially in multinational operations and in support to
US civil authorities.
Presence of, activities of, and the combined arms battalion’s relationship to NGOs
and PVOs in the AO.
The political, economic, military, and environmental situation in the AO.
Local customs, cultures, religions, ethnic groups, tribes, and factions.
Force protection measures.
ROE and other restrictions on operations.

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Terrain, weather, infrastructure, and conditions unique to the AO and the nature of
the operation.
Security operations.
Availability or need for specialized units such as PA, CA, PSYOP, chemical defense,
engineers, MPs, and others.

ATTACHED ELEMENTS
8-169. Combined arms battalions involved in support operations are normally reinforced
with engineers and may also have troops attached. MPs; additional medics; and CA, PA,
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), counterintelligence, and PSYOP teams often support
combined arms battalions in support operations. Since these units are not commonly part of
combined arms battalions in combat operations, the staff and company team commanders
must learn the organizations, capabilities, limitations, and specific missions of attached
organizations before employing them. In some cases, protecting those elements imposes an
additional load on the maneuver companies. Additionally, if attached units do not possess
digital information systems such as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) System, they need liaison teams or instrumented units of the combined arms
battalion to accompany them.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-170. Standard command and staff doctrine applies to support operations C2. Orders,
estimates, planning guidance, rehearsals, and backbriefs are all useful in directing support
operations. The need for mutual understanding between all members of the command group
is as great in support operations as in combat operations.

COOPERATION
8-171. As in other cases, cooperation with foreign headquarters and other services or
agencies imposes special requirements for training, coordination, and liaison.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-172. The combined arms battalion’s C2 systems yield significant advantages in planning
and conducting support operations. Operation of these systems depends on communications
architecture provided by the brigade or higher level of command. Use of nontactical or other
nonstandard communications is likely in a multinational operation or in support to civil
authorities in the United States. If this is the case, then combined arms battalion
commanders and staff leaders need training in operating these nonstandard tools. In the
early and concluding stages of an operation, the information system structure may permit
only limited use of Army Battle Command System (ABCS) platforms. The combined arms
battalion’s plan for C2 must take nonstandard communications into account and provide for
alternate means of communication or full reliance on tactical systems. Digitized connectivity
to higher levels of command and to the information support structure multiplies the
effectiveness of the combined arms battalion and must be established as soon as possible.

LIAISON TEAMS
8-173. Digitally equipped liaison teams can be extremely useful in providing a common view
of the situation for headquarters attached to the combined arms battalion. HBCT combined
arms battalions must staff their liaison teams with the right personnel and identify their
special mission needs and possible requirements for additional teams as early as possible.

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MANEUVER
8-174. In support operations, where area responsibilities, movements, and control of terrain
are sensitive and hazards are sometimes widely scattered, the combined arms battalion
needs detailed information on its AO and commonly uses detailed operations control
measures. Combined arms battalion leaders must clearly delineate and ensure Soldiers
throughout the battalion understand routes, installations, hazards, the geographical
responsibilities of company teams, boundaries, and other control measures. Leaders must
also clearly communicate special control measures such as curfews, restrictions on
movements, and prohibition of weapons to all concerned.

INTELLIGENCE
8-175. Intelligence collection and distribution systems facilitate support operations in the
same general way they support other operations. The S2 uses the battalion’s organic
collection assets to gather critical information on enemy or criminal forces and on the AO
according to the PIR established by the commander. The S2 then distributes intelligence to
the combined arms battalion as it is developed. The HBCT combined arms battalion’s All-
Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS-L) is an important means of maintaining a current
view of the situation. In support operations conducted where combat is not taking place,
there may be no enemy force present that is capable to show on ASAS-L. Intelligence
operations during some multinational support operations will be proscribed or severely
limited. In some cases, intelligence operations may be replaced with neutral, self-defensive
information collection operations in recognition of concerns for national sovereignty.

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

8-176. A coordinated ISR effort is as critical to the combined arms battalion’s success in
support operations as during combat operations. Information gathering is a constant process
that is guided by the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) and is normally
embodied in an information collection plan. Traditional combat-focused IPB and collection
priorities have to be adjusted to reflect the requirements of support operations. The battalion
commander may employ scouts, sensors, patrols, engineers, and liaison teams to achieve his
support mission modified ISR aims. The battalion scouts play a dedicated role in ISR, but
every Soldier and unit in the HBCT combined arms battalion has some responsibility for
observing and reporting the information required to conduct support operations. Therefore,
the battalion commander’s PIR must be known throughout the combined arms battalion and
revised as often as necessary to assure that Soldiers know what information is of greatest
importance.

COLLECTION ASSETS
8-177. The brigade reconnaissance squadron, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other
military intelligence collectors can directly support the combined arms battalion
commander’s PIR in some cases. In any case, the combined arms battalion will receive useful
information from those sources.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
8-178. HUMINT is of special importance in support operations IPB and ISR. In many cases,
HUMINT specialists augment the BCT and the combined arms battalion. The battalion S2
normally receives some support from these teams and must be knowledgeable in their
employment and present tasking requirements to the BCT for the utilization of the tactical
HUMINT teams.

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FIRE SUPPORT
8-179. Fire support (FS) planning while conducting support operations is integrated into
force protection operations as the situation warrants. Basic fire planning considerations for
direct- and indirect-fire weapons remain valid force-protection measures. Accuracy and
timeliness of FS assumes a greater than normal importance during support operations
because of the importance of safeguarding the population and preventing collateral damage.
The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) gives the commander and the
battalion fire cell (BFC) exceptionally clear and timely information on all aspects of FS. Fire
planners in the digitized BFC must make special provisions for integrating fires from analog
units, from fire support units of other armies, and from the naval and air components.
Because the need for massed FS during domestic support operations is near zero, the
personnel associated with FS tasks should be task organized into other command priority
tasks such as intelligence support. The same guidance on use of FS personnel should be
applied to international support tasks, assuming that the need for FS is low.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

8-180. Mobility and survivability generally constitute major activities in support operations
missions, especially at the outset. Force protection may make large initial demands on both
combat and construction engineers during FHA missions. Mobility for the force and the
population is also an issue early in many support operations as roads and bridges require
repair, rubble clearing, and hazardous area marking or clearing. BCT combined arms
battalions can expect heavy commitments to securing engineer operations in the early stages
of operations where enemy interference is possible. Even in mature support operations,
engineer operations typically remain active. Support operations are commonly supported
with attached combat engineer units as well as construction engineers and contracted
civilian engineers.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

8-181. Combat service support for support operations usually requires substantial tailoring
to adapt to unique mission requirements; logistical requirements vary considerably between
types of support operations. Support operations commonly take place in areas where local
resources and infrastructure are scarce, damaged, or fully devoted to the civilian population.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS SUPPORT

8-182. Combined arms battalions should anticipate the attachment of specialized elements
to the combined arms battalion forward support company for the operation.

SUSTAINING OPERATIONS CHALLENGES

8-183. The chief sustaining operations challenges of support operations are to anticipate
needs and to integrate nondigital elements and sources into the support operation.
Information needs include the following:
Resources available in theater.
Status of critical supply items and repair jobs.
Nature and condition of the infrastructure.
Capabilities of general support sustaining operations units.
Mission tasks.
Overall material readiness of the combined arms battalion.

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FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

8-184. In support operations, the combined arms battalion also deploys with its organic
medical assets for support operations. In addition, the combined arms battalion is
augmented with a forward surgical team (FST) and a forward support medical evacuation
platoon. Additional FHP assets may be task organized to support the battalion mission.
Support operations may include disaster relief and refugee operations. Humanitarian and
civic assistance programs must be in compliance with Title 10, United States Code, Sections
401, 401(E),(5), and Section 2551. For additional information on selected sections of Title 10,
US Code, see Appendix L of FM 8-42 (FM 4-02.42). Also, see FM 8-42 for FHP of disaster
relief or refugee operations.

CONTRACTING
8-185. In most cases involving support operations, contracting augments organic sustaining
operations. Combined arms battalions may encounter contractor-provided services and
supply operations throughout support operations environments. The S4 and battalion
commander must understand the terms and limitations of contracts and contractor support.

LIAISON WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

8-186. Nonstandard supporting relationships and close coordination with civil authorities
demand use of liaison teams to assure effective communications.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS
8-187. Information operations shape the perceptions of friendly, neutral, and hostile forces.
The force commander employs PSYOP, CA, PA, and OPSEC as part of his IO. The combined
arms battalion commander supports the higher commander’s IO plan, carrying out tasks
assigned to the battalion and acting independently within the higher commander’s intent
and the practical constraints of the battalion’s organic resources. Because support operations
are complex and usually decentralized, and often critical to the force’s perceived legitimacy,
the IO messages of continuity and consistency are extremely important. The combined arms
battalion must present its position clearly using IO (PAO and PSYOP) to ensure that the
interested public (both in the United States and in the AO respectively) understand it. The
battalion commander must be aware of theater positions and interests and of the effects of
events on the perceptions of his troops, his opponents, and the population in general. He
must understand the positions of and information environment created by the following:
Neutral parties.
Warring or formerly warring factions.
The population and its major segments.
Other agencies working in the AO.
Media.
Information gathered by elements of the combined arms battalion.
8-188. Note that in support operations conducted within the United States and its
territories, military PSYOP personnel and assets may assist the IO plan but will not attempt
to influence the US population.

OTHER PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

FORCE PROTECTION
8-189. Force protection requires special consideration in support operations because threats
may be different and because, in some cases, enemy or criminal forces may seek to kill,

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wound, or capture US Soldiers for political purposes or steal supplies and equipment. HBCT
combined arms battalion leaders must identify threats to their units, make Soldiers aware of
the dangers, and create safeguards to protect them. Terrorist and guerrilla operations are of
special concern. Commanders must also consider environmental threats such as diseases and
climatic hazards; special dangers such as chemical contamination, unexploded ordnance, and
weakened bridges and buildings; and criminal violence.

FORCE GUIDELINES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

8-190. Limitations on action from orders and ROE are the norm in support operations.
Broad limitations may consist of restrictions on mounted patrolling at particular times and
in specified areas, prohibitions on crossing political boundaries, and requirements to refrain
from apprehending or limiting the movement of designated groups or individuals. They may
originate in law, treaty, and settlement terms and in commanders’ guidance. While ROE
vary considerably among situations, they always allow Soldiers to protect themselves from
deadly threats.

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
8-191. Legal restrictions apply to all Army operations, including support operations. Legal
restrictions relevant to support operations missions may include the Law of Land Warfare;
the Uniform Code of Military Justice; treaty agreements; and Federal, state, and foreign law.
The brigade and higher SJAs play important roles in planning and conducting these
missions. In some cases, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) provides direct support to the
combined arms battalion in the form of legal officers or enlisted legal assistants.

MEDIA INTEREST
8-192. Media interest in support operations is normally high. Casualties and damage attract
immediate attention and can affect the public’s perception of the success and discipline of the
force. Soldiers and leaders must be sensitive to civilian concerns, media interests, and the
way in which the political positions of factions within the AO affect their actions. (See
Appendix L on media operations.)

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING
8-193. Situational understanding allows the HBCT combined arms battalion commander to
anticipate developments and act to prevent incidents, to protect his Soldiers or the
population, and to forestall greater loss or damage. Maintaining superior SU requires careful
analysis of the combined arms battalion’s information needs and a mission-specific IPB
supported by a collection plan that fully utilizes all the combined arms battalion’s organic
and supporting assets. The brigade S2 supports the combined arms battalion commander’s
information needs and contributes to his SU by integrating and analyzing information
collected from the BCT’s various intelligence sources (the military intelligence company,
HUMINT, signals intelligence (SIGINT), UAVs).

PATTERN OF OPERATIONS
8-194. While support operations vary greatly in every mission, the combined arms battalion
can expect events to follow a broad pattern of response, recovery, and restoration (including
redeployment).

RESPONSE
8-195. As part of a response, the combined arms battalion enters the affected area, normally
under brigade control, and makes contact with other relief organizations. Planning for the

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operation, staging command posts into the area, establishing security, deploying the
combined arms battalion, and initiating contacts with supported activities and other parts of
the relief force occur during this phase of operations. The combined arms battalion may
make its chief contributions in this phase as its Soldiers are usually among the first relief
forces to arrive in the AO. The combined arms battalion C2 structure gives it early robust
ability to communicate and coordinate. Further, the HBCT combined arms battalion’s ability
to reconnoiter and gather information makes it useful in the initial efforts of civilian
authorities to establish understanding and control of the area and to oversee critical actions.
Typical requirements of the response period follow:
Search and rescue.
High-volume emergency medical treatment.
Hazard identification.
Initiation of information operations.
Food and water distribution.
Collection of displaced people in temporary shelters.
Support to law enforcement agencies.
Repair of power generation and distribution systems.
Clearance and repair of roads, railways, and canals.
Fire fighting, CBRN and hazardous industrial waste decontamination, and flood
control.

RECOVERY
8-196. Once the combined arms battalion operation is underway, recovery begins. With
initial emergencies resolved and a working relationship between all parties in place, there
should be steady progress in relieving the situation throughout this phase of operations. The
combined arms battalion is fully deployed in this phase, and its work includes coordination
with its parent headquarters, supported groups, and other relief forces as well as daily
allocation of battalion assets to recovery tasks. The combined arms battalion’s task
organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and support
changes based on analysis of the measures of effectiveness. Security, maintenance, effective
employment of resources, and Soldier support all need continuing attention. Medical officers
should monitor and assist the battalion commander in maintaining the health of the
command, as well as counteracting the psychological effects and preventing posttraumatic
stress problems associated with disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering. Unit
leaders should conduct frequent after-action debriefings to allow their Soldiers to talk about
what they are doing and what they are seeing. Soldiers exhibiting signs of excessive stress,
fatigue, or any uncharacteristic behaviors should be referred to mental health for additional
stress debriefings. Typical support tasks include the following:
Continuing and modifying information operations.
Resettling people from emergency shelters to their homes.
Repairing infrastructure.
Contracting to provide appropriate support (when feasible).
Restoring power, water, communication, and sanitation services.
Removing debris.
Investigating crimes and supporting law enforcement agencies.
Transferring authority and responsibility to civil authorities.
Planning for redeployment.

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RESTORATION
8-197. Restoration is the return of normalcy to the area. As civil authorities assume full
control of remaining emergency operations and normal services, the combined arms
battalion transfers those responsibilities to replacement agencies and begins redeployment
from the area. During restoration, the commander should consider issues such as the
following:
Transfer of authority to civil agencies.
Transition of C2 for agencies and units that remain in the area.
Movement plans that support redeployment and continued recovery in the area.
Staging of C2 out of the area.
Accountability of property or transfer of property to the community if authorized.
Force protection during movement.

SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS
8-198. Generally, support operations have the following sequence:
Movement into the AO.
Establishment of a base of operations.
Maintenance of stability or support.
Terminating operations.
8-199. In every part of the sequence, there are special considerations for digitized units
initiating an operation or replacing another unit that has performed the mission before
them.

MOVEMENT INTO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

8-200. C2 considerations normally include using advance parties or liaison teams,
establishing command posts, and sequencing the arrival of key leaders. Combined arms
battalion commanders must prepare a complete plan for establishing control of the AO that
includes a concept for phased installation of signal and C2 information systems (INFOSYS).
Transfer of authority (TOA) from the unit in place to the arriving unit and methodical,
accountable handover of the AO is also of primary interest. Detailed rehearsals and mock
drills held in preparation for this task are a regular part of preparatory training. Mission
CCIR should guide staff specialists as they build databases and map displays to support the
operation that must be modified from major combat operational techniques and procedures.
The commander’s PIR should determine the order in which critical information (for example,
enemy dispositions, locations of hazards, and communities in greatest need of support) is
assembled and distributed. Because they create superior information awareness, the assets
of the digitized HBCT combined arms battalion generally facilitate faster, more secure
performance of key tasks. For instance, digitized C2 INFOSYS simplify the processes of
opening routes, repairing bridges, clearing obstacles, establishing security, and imposing
movement control.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BASE OF OPERATIONS

8-201. Security, support, and continuous operations are the primary considerations during
the establishment of a combined arms battalion base of operations. The battalion must
maintain security continuously and may spend its first days of operation exclusively
establishing and securing its bases.

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Occupation
8-202. During the response phase, the combined arms battalion moves in accordance with
the controlling headquarters order, employing advance parties and quartering parties as
necessary. The combined arms battalion may move to an assembly area in the affected area
initially or may occupy its AO directly from the march. Establishing communications across
the AO, refueling vehicles and recovering any inoperable equipment, establishing logistical
facilities and medical aid stations, and reconnoitering the area are all early priorities for the
battalion. The combined arms battalion must complete these preliminary tasks as quickly as
possible to assume the mission promptly. In some cases, the battalion must defer operations
until it completes such tasks.

Battalion Operational Focus

8-203. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander, the principal staff officers, and
company commanders vigorously engage in making personal contact with supported groups,
partners in the operation, and community representatives early in the response phase.
Executive officers and staff assistants are, therefore, responsible for much of the internal
activity of the combined arms battalion during response operations.

Security
8-204. Security of the combined arms battalion is important during all phases of the
operation but especially during arrival and organization. In addition to direct threats to the
Soldiers of the unit, the commander must also understand and provide for normal
environmental hazards and special conditions caused by the emergency itself, such as
disease, chemical residue, mines, and damaged infrastructure. Health care is an important
aspect of force protection during support operations.

24-Hour Operations
8-205. Organizing the battalion command post for 24-hour operations in nontactical support
operations requires early command attention. A detailed SOP, complete operations maps,
and special provisions for communications, inspections, reporting, and adjusting security
levels are necessities. Establishing a high standard for operations from the outset is key both
because of the general sensitivity of support operations and because of the battalion’s special
vulnerabilities in its first days of the mission.

Equipment Substitution
8-206. In some cases, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) or other
light wheeled equipment replaces the heavy equipment of the HBCT combined arms
battalion to facilitate movement, limit the damages to infrastructure, or present a less
threatening appearance. In the case of such substitutions, operator and maintenance
training is necessary well before the combined arms battalion assumes the mission. The
battalion may have to modify sustaining operations to support the new vehicle fleet. If the
combined arms battalion replaces an analog unit or a different size organization, it may have
to modify base camp layouts or even reduce the number of operating bases.

MAINTENANCE OF SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-207. Steady-state mission performance differs in each instance. Support operations have a
varied duration and characteristically orient on relieving crises in an area or population.

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Protect the Force

8-208. Force protection remains the number one priority throughout support operations,
and threats are constantly reassessed. The combined arms battalion must maintain
consistency in dealing with the population and in enforcing policy over time. Likewise, the
battalion commander must ensure maintenance of troop information and discipline
throughout the operation. The battalion should perform internal reviews and after-action
reviews (AARs) and seek outside inspection of critical functions to assure that its standards
of security and performance remain high throughout the full course of the mission. Involving
Soldiers in AARs and circulating lessons learned throughout the combined arms battalion
are means of preventing complacency, boredom, and lapses in security.

Readiness
8-209. During some support operations, the combined arms battalion must retain its
readiness to transition to conventional combat operations. It must maintain and rehearse
reaction forces and provisions for increased levels of security in base camps, at observation
posts, and in patrols to assure readiness. Commanders should continually review their
operations to detect patterns, vulnerabilities, or complacency that a threat might exploit.
Commanders must be sensitive to perceptions that Soldiers are not fully supporting relief
operations if there is an overemphasis on combat readiness. Force protection can never be
sacrificed; however, the unit will lose the information operation if unit efforts are seen as
self-serving rather than assisting those needing support.

TERMINATING OPERATIONS
8-210. Support operations end in different ways. Crises may be resolved, or a continuing
support operation may be handed over to a replacement unit, a multinational force, a police
force, or civil authorities. Missions of short duration or narrow scope (such as support to civil
authorities) may end with the completion of the assigned task. The constant evaluation of
the support measures of effectiveness tell the command how well the support task is being
accomplished and how close the mission is to completion.

With Transfer of Control

8-211. Transferring control of an AO or an operation to a follow-on force requires detailed
coordination to assure that all relevant information passes to the relieving commander or the
other authority assuming responsibility. This procedure entails transfer of databases, maps,
inventories, records, and equipment. In cases where the combined arms battalion uses
unique files and systems, staff leaders and commanders may have coordinate extensively to
assure that their successors possess and understand all critical information.

Without Transfer of Control

8-212. If the combined arms battalion leaves the AO without replacement, it must plan for
an orderly, secure departure that protects the force throughout the operation and sustains
sufficient C2 INFOSYS in the AO until withdrawal is complete. In redeployment, force
protection and accountability for Soldiers, systems, and materiel are always a concern.

TRANSITION TO COMBAT
8-213. In some support operations (typically those that take place in an active combat
theater), the HBCT combined arms battalion must remain prepared to defend itself or to
attack forces that threaten the command. This applies differently in each operation. It may
mean maintaining a reserve or a quick reaction force within the combined arms battalion. It
may even compel the combined arms battalion to dispose its forces in ways that allow

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immediate transition from support operations to combat. Additionally, the combined arms
battalion must address the considerations of transitioning to less restrictive ROE to address
the changing environment.

MISSION FOCUS
8-214. Because of their size and resources, companies should be assigned a single mission. If
they are performing support operations tasks, they are normally capable of only self-defense
and limited offensive actions. To improve their ability to transition to combat, the battalion
commander may designate a company as the reserve, position a company to defend or secure
the AO, or discontinue most support operations tasks and position all his companies in a
tactical assembly area, ready to respond to anticipated enemy action.

REACTION TIME
8-215. States of increased alert or readiness can reduce reaction time for a transition from
support operations to combat. Contingency plans covering the most likely combat actions are
necessary in preparing for this transition. Rehearsals assure better reaction and deter
enemies from overt action.

READINESS PRESERVATION
8-216. Passive measures that preserve readiness include dispersion of forces, operation of
the early warning systems, and force protection measures affecting arming and moving of
troops. Active measures include positioning of field artillery, engineer, tank, and infantry
companies, along with the preparation of contingency plans.

MAINTENANCE OF COP
8-217. The combined arms battalion’s ability to maintain current information; distribute
information, orders, and graphics; coordinate fires, aviation, and close air support; direct
sustaining operations precisely; and gain information dominance facilitate its transition
from support operations to combat. By maintaining current contingency plans, alert staffs
and commanders, as well as well-trained and informed Soldiers, the combined arms
battalion can meet combat challenges ably on short notice.

TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS
8-218. The battalion task force must conduct support operations with consistency and
impartiality to encourage cooperation from indigenous forces and the population and to
preserve the legitimacy of the overall effort. The actions of squads, platoons, or even
individual Soldiers take place under the scrutiny of many interested groups and can have
disproportionate effects on mission success. Therefore, high levels of discipline and training
and a thorough understanding of mission outcome are necessary for effective support
operations.

TRAINING FOR SUPPORT OPERATIONS

8-219. A sound foundation in combat mission training as well as basic military skills and
discipline underpins the combined arms battalion’s ability to perform support operations
missions. However, many of the key individual and collective skills for support operations
differ from combat tasks and must be trained for deliberately. Combined arms battalions use
most of their regularly trained movement and security tasks in support operations missions,
but they modify these tasks for the special conditions of their specific mission. They also
train leaders and Soldiers for unique tasks necessary for a certain type of operation.

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MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

8-220. Support operations tasks are not usually included in an HBCT combined arms
battalion’s METL unless the battalion has been specifically assigned a support operations
mission or its commander has determined that the likelihood of such assignment warrants
dedicated training. Training for support operations, therefore, begins with the perception or
assignment of a mission. Notification for support operations employment normally requires
rapid reaction to an emergency but sometimes may allow for deliberate preparation.

DELIBERATE PREPARATION
8-221. In the case of deliberate preparation, a commander can anticipate a minimum of 1 to
2 weeks of mission training. This training may include a structured mission rehearsal
exercise, in-country orientation, and leader reconnaissance of the AO. Classes on the AO and
the mission, training in the ROE and in use of special equipment, and familiarization with
the other organizations present in the area may be part of this training. Reviews of Army
lessons learned and preparation of families and the rear detachment also accompany this
training.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
8-222. In the event of an emergency or other time-constrained event, the battalion
commander must respond immediately to mission requirements. In cases such as Hurricane
Andrew, wild land fire fighting, and the Rwandan relief mission, commanders relied on
SOPs, general military skills, and the discipline of their troops. Conditions vary from case to
case in this kind of reaction, but commanders can generally draw on Army lessons learned,
general purpose TTP, and maps prepared for training and intelligence from the projected AO
to identify the most critical training requirements. The combined arms battalion must
address these in order of priority as time allows. Platoon and squad leaders can teach Soldier
skills and individual readiness training during deployment. Every operation differs in its
details. Techniques that are effective in one theater are not necessarily effective elsewhere.
Situational factors, from cultural practices to geography and from coalition makeup to ROE,
represent substantial differences that training programs must take into account.

SUPPORT OPERATIONS TASK ORGANIZATIONS

8-223. Many support operations modify headquarters and unit organizations. New staff
positions may be added to the combined arms battalion (CA, PSYOP, and PA are common).
Unfamiliar organizations may be added to the task organization and the companies, and
platoons of the combined arms battalion may be reequipped and partially reorganized to
meet mission requirements or to conform to mission requirements. In such cases, conducting
staff drills, learning to operate new equipment, and practicing operations in new unit
configurations must figure into battalion and company training plans.

TRAINING FOR DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS AND FOREIGN

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
8-224. Training for DSO and FHA operations routinely requires cooperation with civil
authorities and normally involves operating under special legal restrictions. DSO and FHA
training may address the following:
Orienting troops and leaders on legal restrictions and requirements.
Preparing troops and leaders for hazards in the AO.
Protecting humanitarian relief efforts.
Organizing and conducting convoys with civilians and civilian vehicles.

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 Stability Operations and Support Operations

Supporting CA and PA operations.

Organizing and securing relief centers.
Assisting in logistical support and construction engineer operations.
Supporting the coordination of nonmilitary organizations.
Familiarizing troops with mission-specific tasks such as fire fighting, flood control,
hazardous material clean-up, riot control, protection of endangered groups or
individuals, assistance to civilian law enforcement officials, and resettlement
actions.

ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS
8-225. Almost all support operations missions also require the following:
Orienting leaders and Soldiers to the mission.
Familiarizing troops with the area and cultures.
Adapting standard tactical practices to the conditions of the mission.
Adapting combat support and sustaining operations to the requirements of the
mission.
Understanding and applying ROE.
Providing for force protection.
Conducting effective media relations.
Collecting information.
Disciplined and professional response to the requirement by unit Soldiers.

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 Chapter 9
Combat Support Operations

The commander of a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms

battalion uses multipliers to enhance the combat power of his maneuver
company teams. The addition of enablers to command and control (C2)
systems enhances the commander’s ability to integrate these assets into
the combined arms battalion’s scheme of maneuver. Sustaining
operations elements provide increased situational understanding (SU) to
stay abreast of the tactical situation and assist the commander in
applying superior combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield.

This chapter describes the capabilities and limitations of elements that

support the digitized HBCT combined arms battalion. The battalion
commander is responsible for the integration and synchronization of all
available sustaining operations elements with available combat assets to
accomplish his assigned mission. These considerations ultimately dictate
the relationships and responsibilities of attached sustaining operations
assets.

SECTION I – FIRES AND EFFECTS SUPPORT

9-1. Fires and effects support is the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire weapons,
armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of the commander’s scheme
of maneuver. In the past, the combined arms battalion commander employed these means to
suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemy targets or assets. In the more modern concept of
shaping with fires and effects, the focus is on accomplishing essential fires and effects tasks
(EFETs). In other words, where are the critical places on the battlefield that the commander
wants to influence the battle with focused lethal and nonlethal effects? Each EFET is
directly related to a maneuver purpose and has a specific purpose and an end state that
relates in time and space to an enemy formation or function. Digital information systems
(INFOSYS) have the potential to enhance greatly the combined arms battalion’s ability to
focus fires, but they do not increase the lethality of munitions or the amount of munitions
available to the battalion commander. INFOSYS, however, provide the commander with
improved SU that enhances his ability to exploit his battlespace rapidly with both lethal and
nonlethal effects.

FIRES AND EFFECTS

9-2. Fires and effects refer to the application of collective firepower, coordinated and
delivered by ground, sea, and aerial platforms in an integrated and synchronized manner.
The term fires includes all line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight systems delivering lethal or
nonlethal fires and applies to the full spectrum of military operations.
9-3. The Army must be dominant across the whole spectrum of conflict. It must always be
prepared to fight at the high end of that spectrum but is equally likely to conduct operations
in mid- to low-intensity conflicts. Thus, forces that provide fires must be able to operate and

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coordinate throughout the full spectrum of domains (space, information, air, sea, and land)
regardless of the level of conflict. Fires must focus on the concentration of the right effects
and not on the concentration of forces.
9-4. Fires and effects tasks have not changed. Their first priority is to support forces in
contact. Fire support (FS) organizations and units must still help shape the battlespace,
provide force protection, and set conditions for the ground maneuver forces they support.
Artillery units and mortars must be prepared to provide fires in close support of a maneuver
unit as it closes with and completes the destruction or defeat of an enemy force. Modern
weaponry, space exploitation, real-time knowledge, speed, and munitions now allow for
widely dispersed and noncontiguous forces conducting simultaneous decisive operations
throughout the entire maneuver unit’s area of operations (AO).

FIRE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

9-5. The FS organizations in HBCT combined arms battalions and companies are shown in
Tables 9-1 and 9-2. Every maneuver (heavy, Stryker, infantry) battalion has an organic
battalion fires cell to support operations. The battalion fires cell has field artillerymen who
are specialists in working with all of the components of the FS system. These artillerymen
also coordinate and integrate the functioning of the C2 system, target acquisition (TA)
systems, and FS means as they relate to the FA system.
9-6. The combined arms battalion fire support officer (FSO) supervises FS activities. These
include planning, coordinating, and integrating FS operations, including lethal (including air
and naval gunfire) and nonlethal support. The FSO is trained to facilitate the coordination
and execution of the FS system in support of the combined arms battalion’s operations.
9-7. The battalion fires cell is designed to help the battalion commander and staff integrate
fire support into all plans. The major functions of the battalion fires cell follow:
Plan, control, and synchronize all lethal and nonlethal effects.
Recommend priorities and allocate available FS resources to support the combined
arms battalion.
Coordinate the targeting process within the battalion main CP.
Coordinate with the brigade Army airspace command and control (A2C2) element
regarding artillery firing unit locations, changes to fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs), and airspace coordination measures (ACMs).
Coordinate air support through the Air Force tactical air control party (TACP).
Coordinate suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) or joint suppression of enemy
air defense (JSEAD) operations (or both) in support of the battalions use of
aviation.
Coordinate combat aviation employment with FS operations with the brigade
aviation element (BAE).
Coordinate and integrate mortar fires into the battalions concept of operations,
including developing mortar EFETs.

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Table 9-1. Combined Arms Battalion Fire Support Element

BATTALION FIRES CELL

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (CPT)
ASST FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (1LT)
FIRE SUPPORT NCO (SFC)
TARGETING NCO (SFC)
FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST (SPC)
FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST (PFC)

Table 9-2. Company Fire Support Teams

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (MECH CO)

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (1LT)
FIRE SUPPORT SERGEANT (SSG)
FORWARD OBSERVER (1@ PLT) (SGT)
FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST (1@PLT) (SPC)
RADIO TELE OPERATOR (1@ CO FSO) (PFC)
RADIO TELE OPERATOR (1@PLT) (PFC)

FIRE SUPPORT TEAM (ARMOR CO)

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER (1LT)
FIRE SUPPORT SERGEANT (SSG)
FIRE SUPPORT SPECIALIST (SPC)
RADIO TELE OPERATOR (PFC)

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING AND COORDINATION

9-8. Fire support planning and coordination ensure that all available fire support is
synchronized in accordance with the commander’s concept of operations. The key to effective
integration of fire support is the thorough inclusion of fire support in the planning process
and a vigorous execution of the plan supported by an aggressive coordination effort.

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

9-9. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of the planning and military decision-making
process as it applies to the combined arms battalion as a whole. In this section, the primary
focus is a detailed discussion of the FS planning process. FS planning is the process of
analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. The goal of FS planning is to integrate
fires and effects into the fight to optimize combat power. It is performed concurrently with
the military decision-making process (MDMP). Effective FS planning places the right
elements of the FS system in the right place at the right time in accordance with the
commander’s intent. The following basic principles of FS planning apply:
Plan early and continuously.

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Follow the commander’s targeting guidance.

Exploit all available targeting assets.
Consider the use of all available FS means, both lethal and nonlethal.
Use the lowest echelon capable of furnishing effective support.
Use the most effective FS means.
Furnish the type of fire support requested.
Avoid unnecessary duplication.
Consider airspace coordination.
Provide adequate fire support.
Provide rapid and effective coordination.
Remain flexible.
Provide for the safeguarding and survivability of friendly forces and installations.
Plan fires before, on, and beyond the objective.
9-10. The effectiveness of FS planning and the FS system depends on the successful
performance of the four basic tasks: support forces in contact, support the concept of
operations, synchronize fire support, and sustain fire support.
Support forces in contact. Supporting forces in contact includes the allocation of
weapon systems and sorties to subordinate elements that actually engage the
enemy. Supporting forces in contact usually means providing responsive fire
support that protects and ensures freedom of maneuver to forces in contact with
the enemy.
Support the concept of operations. Supporting the concept of operations means
providing fire support for contingencies that relate to the commander’s concept of
the operation. FS assets must be identified and marshaled for execution at the
right time and place. The brigade commander must allocate enough fire support to
the combined arms battalion commander so that he can influence the battle as
necessary.
Synchronize fire support. Fires and effects are synchronized through FS coordination,
beginning with the brigade commander’s estimate and concept of the operation.
The combined arms battalion FSO assists the battalion commander in integrating
all fire support with the appropriate battlefield systems. These systems include
intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility and survivability, air defense, combat
service support (CSS), and battle command.
Sustain fire support. Combat sustainment includes all activities necessary to support
battles, engagements, and related actions. A battalion can realize the full combat
potential of its forces and achieve synchronization in its operations only when
combat sustainment is planned, coordinated, and executed efficiently. Planners
must formulate tactical plans to reflect logistics limitations and exploit logistics
capabilities.

Brigade
9-11. The brigade plays a vital role in battalion FS planning and execution. The brigade is
the provider of effects and, through EFETs, ensures the nesting of fires. The HBCT develops
a synchronized brigade scheme of maneuver and concept of effects and translates that
concept into a scheme of effects by assigning FS tasks and allocating assets and effects to
subordinates. As part of the concept of fires, it is the brigade’s responsibility to set conditions
for and provide indirect fires to the battalion for the close or direct firefight. Fires to support
the battalion close fight are provided for a specific period of time or a specific purpose. The
HBCT must clearly specify priority of fires and, through EFETs, provide fires and effects for
the combined arms battalion. Refinements to the HBCT scheme of fires from subordinate

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units will be integrated via EFETs. Finally, the HBCT integrates the movement of artillery
units with the scheme of maneuver. (See FM 3-90.6, The Heavy Brigade Combat Team,
Chapter 9, for a detailed discussion of FS planning at the brigade level.) The HBCT’s role in
FS planning includes the following tasks:
Synchronize the HBCT concept of fires with maneuver concept.
Set conditions for the combined arms battalion close fight.
Provide force protection to the HBCT through both a proactive and reactive
counterstrike.
Develop a HBCT scheme of fires and assign tasks to subordinates.
Provide fires for the close fight.
Integrate FS refinements from subordinates.
Integrate and synchronize the movement of artillery units with the scheme of
maneuver.

Combined Arms Battalion

9-12. The HBCT allocates fire support to combined arms battalions in accordance with the
brigade plan. Therefore, the combined arms battalion must clearly understand both the
HBCT concept of fires (and how it is synchronized to support the brigade scheme of
maneuver) and the combined arms battalion’s role in the execution of its portion of the
brigade scheme of fires. With understanding of the brigade plan, the combined arms
battalion must develop its own concept of fires. This concept normally involves assigned
tasks from the brigade scheme of fires and targets to support the combined arms battalion
close fight. This may require only the refinement of a brigade target or may require the
combined arms battalion to submit new targets to support the battalion commander’s
scheme of maneuver. Additionally, the combined arms battalion must plan the
synchronization of mortar fires with the scheme of maneuver, integrate the mortars into the
scheme of fires, and synchronize their movement with the scheme of maneuver. The
combined arms battalion develops a scheme of fires to support both those tasks assigned by
HBCT and those targets developed by the combined arms battalion. It then issues the fires
and effects support plan (FESP) to its subordinates and incorporates bottom-up refinement
to support the company commanders’ schemes of maneuver. Finally, the combined arms
battalion forwards its concept of fires and target refinements to the HBCT and ensures the
plan is clearly understood through rehearsals. The combined arms battalion’s role in FS
planning includes the following:
Understand the integration of the HBCT scheme of fires and maneuver.
Understand the combined arms battalion’s role in the HBCT scheme of fires and
maneuver.
Execute the combined arms battalion’s portion of the HBCT scheme of fires.
Develop a combined arms battalion concept and scheme of fires.
Integrate and refine brigade targets for the close fight.
Plan for the synchronization of the combined arms battalion mortars with the
scheme of fires and their movement with the scheme of maneuver.
Incorporate bottom-up refinement from the companies.
Forward the combined arms battalion concept of fires and target refinements to
brigade.
Conduct rehearsals.

Combined Arms Battalion Commander

9-13. The key role of the combined arms battalion commander in indirect fire planning is the
synchronization of fires with maneuver. Fires and maneuver must be thought of together.

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Commanders must first decide precisely what they want their fires to accomplish. If the
commander thinks maneuver first and then tries to add fires later, he will have difficulty
synchronizing them. Once he has decided what he wants fires to accomplish, the commander
must take an active role in developing the combined arms battalion concept of fire support.
He must clearly articulate to the staff, not just the FSO, the sequenced essential fires and
effects tasks in terms of desired effects for each target, the purpose of each target as it
relates to the scheme of maneuver, the method he would like to use to achieve the desired
effects, and the end state he wants for each target. The battalion commander must also
ensure that mortar fires are clearly synchronized with the scheme of maneuver and that the
concept of fires and their movement are synchronized with maneuver. Once the combined
arms battalion scheme of fires is finalized, it is essential that the battalion commander
clearly articulates to the brigade commander and brigade staff the importance of those fires
to the combined arms battalion scheme of maneuver and the impact on mission success if
those fires are not received. In most cases, if a combined arms battalion EFET is not
included as a brigade EFET, the likelihood of getting the target fired by artillery or close air
support (CAS) is greatly diminished.

Imperatives
9-14. The FS planning process has four imperatives:
FS planning must be a part of the MDMP and mirror the steps of the existing
planning process.
FS planning must integrate the targeting process and its functions of decide,
detect, deliver, and assess.
FS planning must support and be integrated with the reconnaissance and
surveillance (R&S) plan. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
plan is a key link between the MDMP, FS planning, and targeting. The ISR plan
links acquisition assets to finding specific enemy formations or required
information to answer the commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).
The result of the FS planning process is an effective, integrated, and executable
plan:
An effective plan clearly defines and focuses on achieving the effects required
against the identified high-payoff targets (HPTs).
An integrated plan provides the focus and timing for acquisition and attack
systems to achieve a unified effect on HPTs.
An executable plan ties detect-and-deliver assets to the HPTs and includes
assessment of effects achieved.

ESSENTIAL FIRES AND EFFECTS TASKS

9-15. A commander may assign fire tasks to subordinate units, request they be performed by
higher and adjacent units or other combined or joint forces, or plan for his own assets to
execute them. Fires can accomplish EFETs during any phase of the operation. An essential
fires and effects task can, but does not necessarily, equate to a target, group, or series. For
example, an EFET may be the activation of a critical friendly zone for a weapons-locating
radar. The establishment of EFETs does not equate to developing a task or target for each
phase of the operation. To develop EFETs that mass effects at the decisive points, the
commander and effects coordinator (ECOORD) must first visualize the fight. The
commander and FSO can then state what the clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable
objective is for fires. This objective should center on the desired effects on an enemy
formation or function (for example, destroy a company-sized element at the obstacle). These
objectives drive not only the delivery of fires but also all the other aspects of fighting with

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fires, including the positioning of sensors and delivery assets. These objectives become the
essential fires and effects tasks for the operation.

DEFINITION OF ESSENTIAL FIRES AND EFFECTS TASKS

9-16. An EFET is a mission fire support must accomplish to support a combined arms
operation. Failure to achieve an EFET may require the commander to alter his tactical or
operational plan. A fully developed EFET has a task, purpose, method, and effects (Table 9-
3). The task describes what targeting effect fires must achieve on an enemy formation’s
function or capability. The purpose describes how the task contributes to maneuver. The
method describes how the task will be accomplished by assigning responsibility to sensors or
units and delivery assets and providing amplifying information or restrictions. Effects
quantify successful accomplishment of the task. Essential fires and effects tasks can be
placed into one of five categories:
Close support fires. These lethal or nonlethal fires support the maneuver of and
protect ground forces in contact from attack by enemy mounted and dismounted
platforms. Close support fires are grouped into three types: obstacle breach,
obstacle protection, and force protection.
Suppression of enemy air defense. These lethal or nonlethal fires support the
maneuver of and protect aerial forces in contact from engagement by enemy air
defense systems or surface-to-air ground fire from mounted or dismounted
platforms.
Fires to support information operations. These lethal or nonlethal fires attack the
enemy’s ability to make decisions and enhance the friendly commander’s ability to
gain information. Fires to support information operations are grouped into two
types: reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.
Counterstrike. These lethal or nonlethal fires attack the enemy’s capability to
conduct non-line-of-sight fires.
Shaping. These lethal fires attack an enemy force’s ability to maneuver, protect and
sustain, or deliver fires by the physical destruction of air, mounted, and
dismounted systems. Strike fires attack a specific enemy force or function and
restrict the enemy commander’s ability to bring it into the fight. These fires are
grouped into three types: fixed, stationary, or moving targets.

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Table 9-3. Essential Fires and Effects Tasks

Describes the objectives that fires must achieve against a specific enemy formation or capability
Task (objective, formation, and function). Objective: Disrupt, delay, limit, or destroy. Formation: A
specific element or subelement of the enemy. Can be a specific vehicle type or target type.
Function: A capability of the formation that is needed for it to achieve its primary task and
purpose.
Describes the maneuver or operational purpose for the task. This should identify as specifically as
Purpose possible the maneuver formation that will leverage the targeting effect and describe in space and
time what the effect will accomplish.
Describes how the task and purpose will be achieved. It ties the detect function with the deliver
Method function in time and space and describes how to achieve the task (priority, allocation, and
restrictions). Priority: Details the HOW of the EFET. It can assign a priority of fires, observers, or
other acquisition means. Allocation: Describes the allocation of FS assets to accomplish the
mission. Restrictions: Outlines any limitations or restrictions that may affect the accomplishment
of the mission.
Attempts to quantify the successful accomplishment of the task. Provides the basis for the assess
Effects function and the decision to reattack or not.

EFFECTS
9-17. Inherent to the purpose of an EFET is the final effects of that task on the enemy. The
effects statement is the most important aspect of the EFET because the commander’s
guidance and the planning process revolve around the desired effect on the enemy—not
friendly actions. Targeting objectives provide a method for describing, in a measurable and
relevant standard, the successful accomplishment of an EFET. The objectives of targeting
are to disrupt, divert, delay, limit, defeat, or destroy those enemy capabilities that could
interfere with achieving friendly objectives. These should not be confused with attack
criteria (harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy) that are attack criteria used to determine
the degree or duration of effects on a target. Targeting objectives refer to the commander’s
attack guidance and the desired effects of target attack on the enemy.
9-18. When developing attack guidance and preparing to build an Advanced Field Artillery
Tactical Data System (AFATDS) database and the supporting targeting objectives,
commanders must specify the end state or effects required in terms of time and space. For
example, when the commander wants a force delayed, he must specify what force the fires
will delay, where, and for how long. Commanders determine what effects they require to
support the purpose of the essential fires and effects task. For example, if close support fires
on a friendly obstacle will delay the enemy and allow a friendly reserve force to reposition,
the commander must determine how long fires must delay the enemy at the obstacle. The
attack guidance must be clearly defined. Neutralize and suppress are attack criteria and
may also be considered when setting attack criteria in AFATDS.
9-19. The following are specific definitions for each of the targeting objectives:
Disrupt The objective of disrupt is to break apart, disturb, or interrupt an enemy
function. For example, the commander may want to disrupt the enemy’s ability to
counterattack. The attack guidance matrix (AGM) may direct the suppression,
neutralization, or destruction of specific targets essential to the enemy’s
counterattack capability.
Divert. The objective here is to force an enemy to alter a particular course of action
(COA) once he is already in his execution phase.
Delay. Delay slows the arrival of a unit on the battlefield.
Limit. This objective restricts the enemy’s capability to pursue a particular COA.
Defeat. This objective prevents the enemy from accomplishing a COA or function.

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Destroy. This objective prevents the enemy from accomplishing any COA or
function. This term has a variety of joint definitions that are service particular.
9-20. Ultimately, the force commander must be fully aware of the various service and
battlefield functional area definitions (for example, artillery destruction is 30 percent while
Army aviation destruction is 70 percent).
9-21. Development of EFETs is the key to helping the commander maintain a focus of fires
expressed in clear, measurable terms.

SCHEME OF FIRES
9-22. The scheme of fires is a supporting element of the concept of operations and articulates
the focus of fires. The scheme of fires must describe what fires must do (EFETs) to achieve
the commander’s intent. In other words, the scheme of fires describes, in sequential order
and detail, where the commander intends to influence or win the battle with fires. It is the
concept of fires and explains what essential support tasks must be accomplished to support
the scheme of maneuver.
9-23. The scheme of fires must include the purpose as well as the who, what, when, and
where for each task. The FSO develops the how during the tactical planning process and
details it in the remainder of the plan. The scheme of fires must also identify all essential
fires and effects tasks. They provide the purpose, method, and end state that each fires task
must accomplish.
9-24. Essential fires and effects support tasks become the focal point of fires. The scheme of
fires further refines the focus of top-down fire planning by concentrating on the essential
tasks that fires must perform. It provides the purpose, objective, method, and effects for
those tasks in clear, measurable, and understandable terms.

QUICK FIRE PLANNING

9-25. The purpose of quick fire planning is to prepare and execute fire support quickly in
anticipation of an impending operation. The combined arms battalion FSO must ensure that
the HBCT fires battalion S3, fire direction center (FDC), mortar platoon, combined arms
battalion staff, and company commanders and fire support teams (FISTs) understand the
quick fire plan and how it is used.

QUICK FIRE PLANNING TECHNIQUES

9-26. Quick fire planning techniques constitute an informal fire plan. Quick fire planning
differs from deliberate fire planning in that a bottom-up process is used rather than a top-
down process. In the quick fire plan, the FSO is responsible for the following:
Identifying targets in the target list to be engaged.
Allocating all FS assets available to engage the targets in the plan.
Preparing the schedule of fires.
Disseminating the schedule to all appropriate FS agencies for execution.

QUICK FIRE PLANNING SEQUENCE

9-27. Six steps are in the quick fire planning sequence:
Operation order (OPORD). In receiving the OPORD, the FSO obtains the following
decisions from the battalion commander:
Targets to be engaged.
Desired effects on targets.
Order and timing of target engagement.

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Duration of fires.
H-hour.
Priority of fires.
Priority for targeting.
Priority for execution.
Time check.
Estimated rate of movement.
Need for target adjustment.
Concept of the operation, including objective and defensive positions, maneuver
control measures, and obstacles.
Assets. Find out what assets are available for the operation. Concurrently, send a
warning order (WO) to all attack agencies. These include the fires battalion S3,
mortar platoon leader, air liaison officer (ALO), and brigade aviation element
officer (if any are applicable). Obtain the following information:
From the HBCT fires battalion: the firing units that will be designated to fire in
the quick fire plan schedule.
From the combined arms battalion commander: the availability of the mortar
platoon (company FSO to battalion FSO for the mortars if a company team
operation) for inclusion as a firing unit into the schedule of fires.
From the battalion fires cell: CAS mission information. Coordinate CAS
requirements with the ALO (for example, aircraft type, ordnance, time on
station, laser codes, and control procedures).
Targets. Plan targets in accordance with the scheme of maneuver, commander’s
guidance, and allocated assets. Include the following:
Assets to be used.
Munitions mix.
Shell-fuze combinations.
Duration of fire for each target.
Time to fire.
Dissemination. After receiving the commander’s approval, disseminate the fire plan
to attack systems, higher headquarters fires and effects cells (FECs), and those who
will implement the plan (forward observers (FOs), company commanders, FISTs,
scouts). Whenever possible, send the quick fire plan digitally or use DA Form 5368
(Quick Fire Plan) to the fires battalion and the mortar platoon leader.
Subordinates. Make sure the subordinate FSOs and FISTs understand the fire
plan. As a minimum, cover the following:
Positions or locations of FSOs and observers during the conduct of the
operation.
Who is to initiate the fire plan or initiate the fire request on specific on-call
targets within the fire plan? Include the agency to be contacted, when the
target is to be initiated, and the communications net to be used.
Which unit has priority of fires or priority targets, if applicable.
The use of methods of control in modifying the plan should it become necessary
during execution.
The elements available when additional targets of opportunity arise during the
execution of the plan.
If time allows, conduct a rehearsal to ensure comprehension of the plan. Inform the
commander when the FESP is ready. Review the FESP and modify it as necessary.

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Triggers. Triggers are a physical point on the ground or an action or event that
mandates an FS action to be initiated. During offensive operations, a trigger is
often a maneuver action or event. In the defense, a trigger is more often a physical
spot on the ground. The sequence for trigger development follows:
Determine the position on the ground where you want fires to impact on the
enemy or to silhouette the enemy.
Determine the enemy rate of movement. This may be done by estimation, on
the basis of past experience, from doctrinal literature, or from scout reports of
enemy speed.
Determine the time of flight of the rounds from the weapon system firing the
mission.
Determine the processing time. Processing time is the time required from the
call for fire to rounds being fired from the weapon system.
Determine the total mission time. The total mission time is time of flight plus
processing time.
Place the trigger point the required distance from a planned target location
based on the following: total mission time x speed of enemy = required distance.

OBSERVATION PLANNING
9-28. The observation plan, as an integral portion of the EFET, should provide the task and
purpose for each phase of the operation. The observation plan should be synchronized with
the scheme of maneuver during the MDMP. The observation plan is developed in concert
with the S2 and S3 using TerraBase computer programs to assist with position selection.
The FSO should plan to have observers in position to support the maneuver commander’s
intent and each EFET. The observation plan should address where the observer needs to be,
security, communications, how the observer gets into position, what the observer is to
accomplish, and disengagement criteria if necessary.
9-29. The following steps are used in observation planning:
Identify the requirements for an observation post (OP). The requirement for an OP is
identified during the war game. The OP may be required to execute the ISR plan,
trigger artillery, or call for CAS.
Conduct terrain analysis. Run the TerraBase shot from where the observer needs to
see (named area of interest (NAI), target area of interest (TAI), or artillery target)
to determine the possible OP locations that have line of sight to the area that needs
to be observed.
Allocate the asset. The asset should be chosen based on the mission of the OP. If
laser designation is required, then the following are required: an observer equipped
with laser locator designator, a FIST for execution of artillery targets, an enlisted
tactical air controller (ETAC) for CAS, and a scout for observation.
Select the OP. The OP should be selected from the possible OPs developed during
terrain analysis. The mission and capabilities of the asset on the OP should be
considered (for example, angle-T, limited visibility, range of thermals,
communications requirements). The enemy situation and force protection is a
primary consideration.
Plan for insertion and occupation of the OP. First, determine the method of
insertion (for example, air, mounted, or dismounted). Next, plan routes,
checkpoints, pickup zones (PZs), and landing zones (LZs).
Make necessary coordination. If required, coordinate the passage of the OP through
friendly forces.

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Support the insertion and occupation plan. Plan indirect fires, electronic warfare
support, medical support, extraction, security, and resupply. Supervise and execute
the plan.
9-30. An observation planning issue that must be addressed at combined arms battalion level
is who owns and positions the organic FISTs: the combined arms battalion commander or
company commander. The company commander needs the FISTs to assist in his fire support
planning and to trigger targets assigned to the company for execution in accordance with the
battalion scheme of fires. The combined arms battalion commander or FSO may want to
dictate FIST positioning to ensure it is in the proper position at the right time to execute
combined arms battalion directed targets.
9-31. In most cases, how the FISTs are employed and who they work for depends on the
amount of certainty of the combined arms battalion mission.
In a movement to contact, the combined arms battalion should leave control of the
FIST with the company team because the situation is unclear.
In the defense, where targets are fully synchronized with the combined arms
battalion scheme of maneuver, the best course of action may be to put all of the
FISTs under centralized control with the combined arms battalion dictating where
they will be positioned.
In a deliberate attack, the combined arms battalion should consider task organizing
the FISTs to meet specific mission requirements. This may mean either FISTs
working in pairs and moving by bounding overwatch to maintain constant
observation or providing the support by fire (SBF) or breach force with a second
FIST to provide redundancy at the point of penetration.
Given the expanded battlespace that the combined arms battalion will be operating
over, it may also be impractical to separate the FIST from its company to execute
maneuver battalion missions.
9-32. Regardless of how the maneuver battalion commander chooses to employ his FIST, the
battalion staff must, at a minimum, provide the FIST with a tentative OP and movement
plan. The combined arms battalion staff, using its TerraBase products, should provide the
company FIST with proposed OP locations (with routes to and from these locations) from
which the FIST can best execute its assigned combined arms battalion mission or support its
company scheme of maneuver.

TOP-DOWN FIRE PLANNING

9-33. To enhance the focus of fires, formal fire planning is conducted through a deliberate
top-down process with bottom-up refinement. This process occurs primarily during the
decide phase of the decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A) methodology. The primary
advantage of top-down fire planning is that the maneuver commander develops the fire
support plan early, allowing the fires battalion staff to plan concurrently. This process also
allows for quick development of a workable plan that focuses the fires effort exactly where
the maneuver commander wants it on the battlefield (essential fires and effects tasks). The
dissemination of the plan down and the refinement of that plan up does not stop until the
established cutoff time.
9-34. Digitized systems facilitate the dissemination of plans, provide the commander with
near-real-time information on the status of fire support, and allow him to modify and shift
the focus of fires as the situation develops. The combined arms battalion commander can
quickly assess where the focus of fires needs to be.
9-35. Top-down fire planning is based on the concept that the plan originates at higher levels
and is refined at lower levels. At the HBCT combined arms battalion level, the commander
receives the top-down fire plan from brigade. This plan focuses the FS effort exactly where

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the brigade commander wants it on the battlefield (essential fires and effects tasks). It
provides detailed execution guidance, develops EFETs, allocates resources, assigns target
execution responsibility, and fully supports the combined arms commander’s scheme of
maneuver. The combined arms battalion FSO, after receiving this plan, can begin working
early to refine targeting information based on how the maneuver battalion commander
intends to integrate his plan into the brigade plan.
9-36. Top-down fire planning is a continuous process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling
fire support. It determines:
How fire support will be used and what the essential fires and effects tasks are.
What types of targets will be attacked—resulting in the HPT list (decide).
What type of targets will not be attacked (decide).
What collection assets are available to acquire and track the targets (detect/track).
What assets will be used to attack different targets; what munitions, what effects,
and when they will be engaged (deliver).
System preferences for various targets.
What assets are available to verify (assess) effects on the target.
9-37. Note that when planning fires, it is essential to address the following aspects of each
essential fires and effects task and target: purpose, location, trigger, shooter and backup
shooter, communications structure, rehearsal, and delivery assets. If each of these is not
identified, planned, resourced, and rehearsed, the successful accomplishment of that
essential fires and effects task is at risk.
9-38. Planning must be flexible to accommodate unexpected and rapid changes. The brigade
plan contains only those essential fires and effects tasks necessary to support the brigade
commander’s guidance for fire support. Remaining assets are allocated to the subordinate
battalion commanders according to the priorities for fire support. In turn, each combined
arms battalion commander develops a fires and effects support plan to support the assigned
essential fires and effects tasks and his scheme of maneuver. He may allocate any assets not
planned for down to the companies for their planning and execution.
9-39. The allocation of resources in top-down fire planning should be more than the mere
blind allocation of a number of targets for planning without regard for the purpose and
achievable effects during that part of the operation. Allocations at each level should
emphasize the purpose, planning, and execution of fire tasks. For example, allocating three
targets to a company team commander for planning does not give him the possible purposes
of those targets. However, allocating a subordinate a fire task in the form of a TAI for the
destruction of a platoon during a certain portion of the operation better accounts for the
relationship of fires in time and space. The brigade assigns execution responsibility down to
the combined arms battalion. The battalion commander must then assign responsibility
within his command. Primary and backup observers must be established.
9-40. Bottom-up refinement is a key element of top-down fire planning. During the decision-
making process, targets and any decentralized digital links are planned on the basis of map
reconnaissance and situational templates. Targets must be refined on the basis of the
reconnaissance effort, actual occupation of the terrain, and updated intelligence. Digital
systems and focusing fires through essential fires and effects tasks enhance the refinement
effort. With the establishment of essential fires and effects tasks early in the planning
process, company FISTs can be proactive in their refinement and planning. Targets that
facilitate the accomplishment of essential fires and effects tasks can be nominated during
the bottom-up refinement early in the planning process.
9-41. In most cases, if fire support targets need refinement, it is better to delete the obsolete
target and plan a new target with a new target number. This prevents confusion by

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observers and firing units who may receive two grid locations for the same target number. A
technique used by many units is to use every fifth target number initially in planning. For
example, the initial targets for a plan may be AB 5000 and AB 5005. Then, as those targets
are refined, the next higher target number is available for use. For example, if the targets
above were refined once they would be changed to AB 5001 and AB 5006. This allows for the
tracking of a target as it is refined to help eliminate any confusion as to the original purpose
of that target.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (BDA)

9-42. BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of
military force, either lethal or nonlethal, against a target. BDA is primarily an intelligence
responsibility but requires coordination with operational elements to be effective.
Commanders use BDA to get a series of timely and accurate snapshots of their effects on the
enemy. This helps determine when or if the targeting objectives are being met. BDA also
helps determine if restrike or a change in munition or shell/fuse combination is necessary.
The targeting team must keep the following BDA principles in mind:
BDA must measure things that are important to the commander, not make things
important that are easily measurable.
BDA must be objective.
The degree of reliability and credibility of BDA relies largely on collection resources
and their quality as well as quantity.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION

9-43. FS coordination is the continuous process of implementing FSEP and managing all
available FS assets. Coordination involves operational, tactical, and technical considerations
and the exercise of FS C2. It provides a way to deconflict attacks, reduce duplication of effort,
facilitate shaping of the battlefield, and avoid fratricide. Coordination procedures must be
flexible and responsive to change, with simplified arrangements for approval or concurrence.
FS personnel must clearly understand the commander’s intent. The combined arms battalion
commander, through his staff, liaison, and coordination elements, ensures synchronization of
available FS assets to place the right attack means on the correct target at the precise time.
To achieve synchronization and effects coordination, particularly in joint operations, the
combined arms battalion commander and the staff must have a thorough knowledge of all
components’ basic doctrine, major systems, capabilities and limitations, and often the
component’s tactics, techniques, and procedures. Some general guidelines for FS
coordination during offensive or defensive operations follow:
Position fire delivery units effectively.
Coordinate use of CAS to support the commander’s intent.
Ensure FSOs and observers know the exact locations of maneuver boundaries and
other FSCMs.
Position observers in redundancy where they can see their assigned targets and
trigger points, communicate with FS assets, and respond to the maneuver
commander.
Establish final protective fires or priority targets.
Plan illumination to facilitate direct fire during limited visibility.
Provide common survey data to mortars.
Provide meteorological (MET) data to mortars.
Use a fire support execution matrix (FSEM) to execute FS.
Remain flexible to branches or sequels to the current plan. Fight the enemy, not
the plan.

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Develop and disseminate field artillery (FA)-delivered family of scatterable mines

(FASCAM) safety boxes in coordination with the engineer and S3.
Coordinate with the fires battalion TOC to develop the attack guidance matrix
using munitions effects. Compute ammunition requirements to suppress,
neutralize, or destroy expected enemy target categories. Provide these results to
the commander so that he can formulate his commander’s attack guidance.
Disseminate target priorities to the lowest levels of the maneuver force, FS staff,
and mortars.
State the commander’s attack guidance by defining how, when, with what
restrictions, and in what priority the commander wants to attack different targets.
Require subordinates to finish refinement by cutoff time.
Determine the risk the commander is willing to accept concerning indirect fires on
close contact.
Verify or correct target locations and trigger points during refinement.
Use FSEM to brief the fires portion of the OPORD during a combined arms
rehearsal.
Ensure battalion fires cell and maneuver commanders clearly understand methods
to be used for battle tracking and clearance of indirect fires.
Verify range of counterstrike radar and artillery/mortar coverage based on shell or
fuze and charge.
Explain FS combat power in terms the maneuver commander understands,
including the following:
The number and types of missions.
Battery, battalion, and mortar volleys by type of ammunition and effects
expected.
Minutes of smoke and allocation.
Minutes of illumination and allocation.
Number of available FASCAM minefields by size, type, density, and safety
zone.

REHEARSALS
9-44. Rehearsals are an integral part of the planning process. The battalion FSO must
participate in the maneuver commander’s rehearsal. Rehearsals improve total
comprehension of the plan. Participants who are unclear on specific portions of the plan find
answers through the repetitiveness afforded by rehearsing the operation. Combat rehearsals
are conducted to help a unit gain agility, ensure synchronization, increase initiative, and
improve depth of knowledge through practice. Both FS and maneuver actions should be
rehearsed to reinforce the scheme of maneuver and fires and effects plan. Rehearsals should
both practice and test the plan. Rehearsal procedures should be established as part of unit
SOPs. As a minimum, SOPs should identify the following:
Who will participate in the rehearsal?
What should be rehearsed?
What is the sequence of the rehearsal?
What is the priority of methods for rehearsals (suitable or actual terrain, model,
map, sand table, wire, or radio)?

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COMBINED-ARMS REHEARSALS
9-45. Key players include all commanders and fire support personnel, the maneuver staff,
mortar platoon leader, chemical officer, signal officer, ALO, aviation liaison officer (LNO) (if
attached), scout platoon leader, and engineer officer.
9-46. Normally, the unit S3 drives the rehearsal using a synchronization matrix, execution
checklist, or both; the FSO uses his FSEM. Thus, the rehearsal normally includes recitation
or performance of the following:
Actions to occur.
Possible friendly initiatives.
Possible reactions to enemy initiatives.
Control measures.
Significant events that are to occur in relation to time or phases of the operation.
9-47. For each phase or time period of the operation, the FSO should, as a minimum, perform
the following:
Verify grid locations for all critical targets.
Verify trigger points for each target.
Verify engagement criteria.
Confirm primary and backup observers for each target.
Verify primary and backup communications links for each observer.
Verify that each target has a task and purpose (what effects are to be achieved).
Verify the method of engagement (at my command, time on target, or when ready).
Verify that attack guidance (such as shell-fuze combination, number of volleys, and
units to fire) is specified for each target.
Verify the movement plan, specifying when and where units and observers will
move.

FIRE SUPPORT REHEARSALS

9-48. Even when units conduct combined maneuver and FS rehearsals, all members involved
in providing fire support sometimes cannot be present, and units generally do not rehearse
refinements or changes made to the plan. Therefore, combined rehearsals are normally
followed by fire-support-only rehearsals that include all FS executers from the observer to
the delivery asset, when possible. These serve to refine the FESP, ensure understanding by
all FS personnel, and prove the feasibility of executing the current plan. The brigade FEC
and the fires battalion commander participate in these FS rehearsals at the HBCT level. The
combined arms battalion FSO and FIST should, if at all possible, participate in the HBCT FS
rehearsal. However, it may be necessary for the combined arms battalion FSO to conduct his
own internal battalion FS rehearsal either before or after the brigade FS rehearsal.
9-49. FS rehearsals are executed using the FSEM as a script for executing fires to support
the scheme of maneuver. The fires battalion uses and verifies the FA support plan.
9-50. The battalion FSO establishes the time for all key participants to conduct the
rehearsal. The FSO begins the rehearsal by announcing key times or phases of the operation.
Each participant then executes the actions he will take, normally just short of actually
delivering fires on the appropriate target.
Effects coordinators. FSOs verify they can observe their assigned targets and
trigger points, fire their assigned targets, place FSCM into effect, and make reports
on which the system depends for its combat information.
Fire support teams. FISTs do the same as FSOs, while ensuring high-priority
missions (such as final protective fires (FPFs) or priority targets) are loaded in the

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buffers of their digital message devices and ensuring that signals for lifting and
shifting fires are understood.
Air liaison officer. The ALO monitors airspace coordination, clears aircraft to
depart the initial point, calls for target marking and marking of friendly locations,
and requests initiation of SEAD.
Fires battalion and mortar platoon/section leaders. Firing unit leaders monitor and
ensure that:
Units are displaced to support the plan.
The FDC issues fire orders and passes messages to observers.
Radars are cued on assigned azimuths.
Firing unit FDCs compute firing data and issue fire commands, acknowledge
FSCM changes, and ensure they can fire their assigned targets.
Howitzer and mortar section leaders determine whether ammunition is on
hand and whether assigned position areas (PAs) support the mission.
9-51. If a combined maneuver and fire support rehearsal has not been conducted, the FSO
should also cover the information listed in paragraphs 9-44 through 9-52. FS personnel may
also rehearse alternative friendly COAs (branches and sequels to the plan) if time permits.
9-52. Rehearsals can conclude with a summary of each unit’s status (to include firing unit
ammunition status) and location. This facilitates planning for future operations.

CLEARANCE OF FIRES
9-53. The execution of the scheme of fires must provide for the clearance of fires. Clearance
of fires ensures that fires attack enemy capabilities at the time and place and with the
effects the commander desires without resulting in casualties to friendly forces or
noncombatants. Clearance of fires may be accomplished through a staff process, through
control measures, embedded in automated battle command systems, or through active or
passive recognition systems. During planning and execution, the commander can use all
these means in various combinations to set the conditions for clearance of fires. Even with
automated systems, clearance of fires remains a command responsibility at every level, and
each commander must assess the risk and decide to what extent he will rely on automated
systems to assist in the clearance of fires. The battalion commander is responsible for the
clearance of fires within the combined battalion AO. He normally delegates coordination
responsibility to the combined battalion FSO, who establishes the mechanism the combined
arms battalion will use to clear fires.

MANEUVER CONTROL MEASURES

9-54. The first step in clearance of fires is the use of maneuver control measures. Boundaries
serve as both permissive and restrictive measures. If no boundaries are established, then the
next higher headquarters must clear all fires short of the fire support coordination line
(FSCL) or coordinated fire line (CFL). Thus, boundaries should be used whenever possible
because they allow the unit that owns the ground to engage targets quickly, requiring
coordination and clearance only within that organization. Boundaries divide up battlespace
and define responsibility for clearance of fires.

FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

9-55. The second step in effective clearance of fires is the proper use of FSCMs. Permissive
FSCMs (FSCLs and CFLs) should be established far enough out to protect ground forces.
Forces beyond either of those FSCMs should be protected with a restrictive measure, such as

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a no-fire area. Note that a CFL applies only to surface-to-surface fires; therefore, all CAS
missions must be cleared.

PRECLEARANCE
9-56. The third step is to make a determination as to which fires can be precleared. In the
following specific instances, fires can be cleared during the planning phase:
Fires into a planned call for fire zone (CFFZ) resulting from a radar acquisition
from that planned CFFZ.
Fires on a preplanned target, with a definable trigger, against a specific enemy,
and according to the concept of fires.

CLEARANCE OF FIRES DRILL

9-57. Clearance of fires should be a drill in all command posts and operation centers. The
best method is a redundant drill where a call for clearance is transmitted over two nets: the
FS net and a maneuver net (both higher and lower units).

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY
9-58. Positive clearance of fires is normally facilitated through prior planning, rehearsals,
and careful placement of FSCMs. However, the clearance of targets of opportunity often
presents challenges. Fires on targets of opportunity must be delivered on short notice
without undue delay and without jeopardizing friendly force security. For positive clearance
of fires, the following should be obtained:
The best available method of target location.
Positive identification of targets as enemy.
Eyes on target if at all possible.
Clearances from appropriate external elements if target is outside unit boundaries.

AFATDS AND CLEARANCE OF FIRES

9-59. All fires must be cleared. Units can use a combination of digital and analog methods to
clear fires. Even with the enhanced information offered by digital systems, there will be
instances where fires require voice coordination before clearance.

COORDINATION
9-60. Coordination is required when the effects area around the target violates one or more
FSCMs or zones of responsibility (ZORs). When coordination is required before firing a
mission, the unit establishing the FSCM or the unit responsible for the ZOR must approve a
coordination request.

TARGET PROCESSING GUIDANCE AFFECTING COORDINATION

9-61. The minimum safe distance is used to determine which targets require coordination
due to their proximity to friendly units. The system looks at FSCMs in the database and
adds the buffer distance to the aim point of a mission to determine if a violation has
occurred. This guidance should be a matter of SOP.

PRECLEARANCE
9-62. During the planning process, commanders should consider the FS tasks that can be
precleared. Precleared fires are specified FS tasks. During the planning process, the
commander can leverage the capabilities of digital systems to set the conditions required for

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the execution of that task without clearance confirmation at the time of execution. Examples
of preclearance conditions that a commander can set include the following:
The fires do not violate any established maneuver control measure or FSCM.
The observer executing the fires has positive identification of the target and it
meets the established engagement criteria.
The observer executing the target meets established position location parameters
that ensure accurate target location.
The execution of and the digital links established for the mission have been
planned and rehearsed prior to the operation.

FBCB2/BLUE FORCE TRACKER AND CLEARANCE OF FIRES

9-63. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System/Blue Force
Tracker (BFT) do not prevent fratricide. They do, however, provide a powerful tool to reduce
the risk of fratricide. Being able to see where other friendly vehicles are positioned on the
battlefield facilitates recognition of friend from foe. However, every friendly vehicle on the
battlefield may not appear on FBCB2/BFT screens. There will be friendly vehicles that are
not equipped with FBCB2/BFT, dismounted troops, and vehicles whose systems are down or,
based on the network, do not appear on other units’ FBCB2/BFT screens. Although
FBCB2/BFT can help with reducing incidents of fratricide, it does not replace the need to
train crews to recognize enemy vehicles and use common sense before engaging.
9-64. FBCB2/BFT can be used to facilitate the clearance of indirect fires, but it should not be
used as the sole means for clearing fires. Every friendly vehicle operating within the AO will
not appear on FBCB2/BFT screens. This is especially true of dismounted scouts, long-range
surveillance detachments, dismounted brigade reconnaissance squadron sections, and
dismounted infantry. Once separated from their vehicles, these elements no longer generate
an icon on FBCB2/BFT.
9-65. Friendly filter settings and latency rate also affect the accuracy of the FBCB2/BFT
picture of where friendly units and vehicles are located. For example, a vehicle that has its
FBCB2 update filter setting set to 1 hour or 1,000 meters can move up to 1,000 meters from
its last updated position without FBCB2 reporting that it has moved. The latency rate of
BFT is not real time so what is on the screen is always old information. This could easily
place the vehicle within the impact area of an indirect-fire mission. The echelon and unit
type filter settings on FBCB2 can also cause a friendly unit icon not to appear on an FBCB2
screen.
9-66. All these limitations of FBCB2/BFT must be considered in establishing the unit SOP on
how to use the system to facilitate the clearance of indirect fires. Fire support coordination
measures and positive control of fires are still necessary. Plan no-fire areas over dismounted
positions, especially those forward of the line of departure or battle positions. If the fire
mission plots on top of a friendly icon, then it should not be shot without coordination. If
there is no icon on or near the target grid and the unit calling for fires has eyes on the
enemy, then it is probably safe to shoot unless there are friendly dismounted soldiers
operating in the area. If the unit calling for fires does not have eyes on the target, then use
FBCB2/BFT to locate the closest friendly unit to the target grid to see if they can get eyes on
the target or if the fire mission will affect any of their elements.
9-67. FBCB2/BFT cannot be used as the sole means for clearing fires, but it can be used to
deny fires. It does not replace the need for positive clearance of fires, use of fire support
coordinating measures (critical friendly zones (CFZs) and censor zones (CZs)), or eyes on the
target.

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RADAR ZONES
9-68. At the combined battalion level, two types of zones are most important: critical friendly
zones and censor zones. It is the combined battalion FSO’s and FS NCO’s responsibility to
ensure CFZs are planned at places critical to the maneuver commander’s force protection
plan, refined during the rehearsal process, and adjusted during the fight to ensure they are
emplaced where the critical friendly elements are located. If no radar zones are established,
counterstrike radars will still acquire targets (if they are cueing) and will pass the
intelligence to the artillery TOC (they can be converted to a call for fire (CFF) and fired at
that time). All the establishment of CFZs and CFFZs does is change the format of the
Firefinder report to a CFF and place a higher priority on it. This method allows the AFATDS
to handle the CFF as soon as it is received. Still, the proper establishment of radar zones can
expedite the reactive counterstrike process.

CRITICAL FRIENDLY ZONE

9-69. The CFZ designates the highest priority friendly locations of the maneuver commander
and provides the most responsive priority of fires from the counterstrike radars (Q-37/Q-36).
Cued radars detecting incoming rounds into the zones immediately generate a priority
request for fire. The combined battalion FSO should recommend to the combined battalion
commander positioning of allocated CFZs and their size for best responsiveness. The
combined battalion should plan and request CFZs to protect assembly areas, TOCs, SBF
positions, breach sites, passages through chokepoints, refuel and rearm sites, and other
troop concentrations.
During offensive operations, the combined battalion should consider breach sites
and attack by fire support by fire locations.
During defensive operations, the combined battalion should consider battle
positions and key observer positions.

CENSOR ZONE
9-70. A CZ is used to designate an area from which the commander does not want to attack
targets. At the combined battalion level, this zone is used to help protect the combined
battalion mortar section. On a fluid and nonlinear battlefield, the combined battalion
mortars can occupy positions or execute fire missions that a friendly counterstrike radar
could misidentify as hostile. In these situations, a CZ covering the mortars, coupled with the
establishment of a no-fire area around the mortar position, dramatically reduces the risk of
fratricide.

RADAR ZONES
9-71. Radar zones should meet the following guidelines:
Does it meet the commander’s guidance for force protection?
Do I have a good trigger to turn it on?
Does it fit the scheme of maneuver?
Is there a firing unit in range with the correct ammunition?
Does it meet the following guidelines:
Zones cannot intersect or touch another zone.
Must have minimum of three points and a maximum of six points.
Grid coordinates must be listed in sequence (clockwise or counterclockwise).
Grid coordinates cannot be outside the search sector (except CFZs).

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MANAGEMENT
9-72. The combined battalion FSO and battalion fires cell are responsible for managing radar
zones allocated to the combined arms battalion and requesting zones if the battalion
commander does not feel he has been allocated sufficient coverage to protect his force.
During the planning process, the commander should provide guidance on the use of radar
zones, and the FSO and staff should plan the location of the zones and when they need to be
active. During execution, the FSO and battalion fires cell must track the battle to activate
and deactivate zones and adjust zone location as necessary to meet the commander’s intent.
For example, the combined arms battalion is allocated two CFZs to protect its support by fire
position and breaching forces during a deliberate attack. These CFZs should not be activated
until the forces they are designed to protect actually occupy the SBF position and establish
the breach site. The combined arms battalion fires cell then must confirm the planned zones
cover where the friendly forces actually are on the battlefield. This can be done either by the
common operational picture (COP) provided by FBCB2/BFT or through voice reports. If the
planned zones do not protect the designated force, the battalion fires cell must contact the
fires battalion S2/target processing section to move the zones. The battalion fires cell is also
responsible for deactivating the zones when the unit moves and they are no longer required
or they have accomplished their task and purpose.

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

9-73. Field artillery is the maneuver commander’s principal means for providing indirect-fire
support to his maneuver forces. Field artillery can neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy
direct-fire forces; attack enemy artillery and mortars; and deliver scatterable mines to
isolate and interdict enemy forces or protect friendly operations. Field artillery elements
within maneuver organizations serve as the integrating center for all elements of fire
support. Field artillery delivery systems include cannon, rockets, and missiles. These
systems can provide fires under all conditions of weather and in all types of terrain. They
can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace. Field artillery units are usually
as mobile as the units they support. They are organized for combat to provide responsive and
effective FA fires and to coordinate all fire support.

CANNON
9-74. FA has various cannon systems designed for supporting specific types of maneuver
operations. These systems are complemented by a wide variety of munitions to attack the
multitude of target types.

Paladin, M109A6
9-75. The M109A6 Paladin howitzer found in the fires battalion is an armored, full-tracked
howitzer carrying 37 complete conventional rounds and two Copperhead projectiles. The
Paladin uses an automatic fire control system (AFCS) that provides position location and
directional reference, a ballistic computer for onboard technical fire control, and gun drive
servos that automatically lay the gun for deflection and elevation. The Paladin is
accompanied by a full-tracked, aluminum armored field artillery ammunition supply vehicle
(FAASV) with the capacity to hold 90 complete conventional rounds and 3 Copperhead
rounds. The Paladin and the FAASV make up the howitzer section. A remotely operated
travel lock allows the crew to emplace and displace without dismounting from the vehicle.
The Paladin has a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute for the first 3 minutes,
followed by a 1 round per minute sustained rate of fire. The M109A6 fires the full
complement of 155mm ammunition with a maximum range of 22 kilometers for unassisted
projectiles, 30 kilometers for the rocket-assisted projectile (RAP) and 27 kilometers for the
base-burn dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (BBDPICM).

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MULTIPLE-LAUNCHED ROCKET SYSTEM

9-76. The following types of multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs) are available for fire
support from the fires brigade associated with the UEx:
M270/M270A1 MLRS self-propelled loader-launcher (SPLL). The M270 MLRS is a
mobile, self-propelled, self-loading, multiple-launch rocket system. It provides
mobile long-range artillery rocket and missile support for ground forces. The
M270A1 is capable of firing the entire MLRS family of munitions, including all
Army tactical missiles. The M270A1 is capable of holding either two launch pod
containers of six rockets per container or two guided missile launch assemblies
containing one missile each. With the M26A1 extended-range rocket, the MLRS
SPLL can fire 12 rockets in 60 seconds at multiple aim points out to a range of 50
kilometers. It also has the capability of firing two missiles aimed at one or two
separate aim points in 20 seconds.
High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). HIMARS is a highly mobile,
quickly deployed, rapid-fire, surface-to-surface rocket and guided missile system. It
complements cannon artillery and MLRS fires to attack the enemy deep and HPTs,
fire counterstrikes, and suppress enemy air defenses. The HIMARS battalion can
be attached to a fires brigade associated with a UEx. HIMARS batteries and
platoons may be attached to other artillery units (such as cannon battalions) to
form a fire support task force. The HIMARS is a wheeled version (5-ton family of
medium tactical vehicles (FMTV)) of the MLRS designed to meet the increased
mobility and transportability requirements for global contingencies. The HIMARS
also provides inter- and intra-theater FS deployability by C-130 or larger aircraft.
The C-130 has a short takeoff and landing capability on airfields unsuited for other
airlift resources and permits rapid insertion of HIMARS into a contingency area
and redeployability of HIMARS to critical areas within the theater of operations.
The HIMARS can fire all the current and near-term MLRS family of munitions.
The HIMARS launcher uses onboard tactical fire control and position-locating
systems that are comparable to the M270 improved position determining system
launcher. Unlike the M270, however, the HIMARS launcher loader module holds
only one rocket or missile pod.

MORTARS
9-77. Mortars provide immediate and close supporting fires to the maneuver forces in
contact. Maneuver unit mortars provide close, immediately responsive fire support for
committed maneuver battalions and companies as well as the reconnaissance squadron.
These fires harass, suppress, neutralize, and destroy enemy attack formations and defenses;
obscure the enemy’s vision; and otherwise inhibit his ability to acquire friendly targets.
Mortars can also be used for final protective fires, smoke, and illumination.
9-78. Mortars are organic to all combined arms battalions and reconnaissance squadrons.
The combined arms commander decides how and when mortars, as a key fire support asset,
will be integrated into his battle plan. However, since they are fire support assets, the FSO
should give advice and make recommendations to the commander on use of mortars. The
amount of control the FSO has over the employment of available mortars is a matter for the
supported unit commander to decide. The battalion commander should require that the same
rigor is applied to mortar planning as any other part of the FS system. EFETs should be
planned and coordinated for the mortars, with them fully integrated into the battalion
digital C2 and FESP. The commander may specify mortar support for subordinate units by
changing the command relationship, assigning priority of fires, or assigning priority targets.
9-79. Mortars are high-angle, relatively short-range, high-rate-of-fire, area-fire weapons.
Their mobility makes them well-suited for close support of maneuver. They are ideal

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weapons for attacking targets on reverse slopes, in narrow gullies, in ditches, in urban
operations, and in other areas that are difficult to reach with low-angle fire. However, their
ammunition-carrying capacity limits mortar periods of firing (Table 9-4).

Table 9-4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Mortars

Advantages Limitations
Fast response rate Short range
High rate of fire Limited ammunition carrying capacity
Fire from deep defilade Ammunition resupply
Fire without FDC Less accurate in high winds
High-angle fire Detected by radar
Attack targets on reverse slopes Ineffective against point targets
Simplicity Lack of organic survey and
meteorological data

9-80. The HBCT combined arms battalion mortar platoon has four mortar squads, each with
one 120mm M120 mortar, a single FDC, and a headquarters consisting of a platoon leader,
platoon sergeant, and two enlisted drivers/radio-telephone operators (RATELOs) (Figure
9-1). The M120 mortar is capable of firing 15 rounds per minute for the first minute with a
sustained rate of fire of 4 rounds per minute after the first minute. It is capable of firing high
explosives (HE), illumination, and white phosphorus (WP) rounds to a maximum range of
7,200 meters. The M120 mortar with base plate weighs 320 pounds and is transported in the
M1064 mortar carrier. The mortar platoon is organic to the combined arms battalion
headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).
9-81. This mortar platoon organization is a reduction in size from the Army of Excellence’s
division organization, which contained six mortar squads and two FDCs. This reduction in
combat power and C2 structure has a significant impact on the platoon’s employment
flexibility and the support provided to the combined arms battalion. The platoon can still be
deployed in sections but with significant limitations. Fires from a single section are limited,
and without the second FDC, one section has to compute its own technical firing data. The
lack of a second FDC affects the section’s battle tracking, responsiveness, ability to accept
and apply meteorological messages from the direct support artillery battalion, and accuracy.
The reduction of the platoon’s combat power by one-third also reduces its ability to provide
fires in support of the scheme of maneuver. The platoon can deliver 30 fewer rounds per
minute at its maximum rate of fire and 8 fewer rounds per minute at its sustained rate of
fire. Mortar final protective fires (FPF) and smoke screens are also one-third smaller. A
range and lateral spread illumination mission requires all four squads to shoot illumination
and could affect the platoon’s ability to execute an HE or a WP mission in conjunction with
the illumination.

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Figure 9-1. Combined Arms Battalion Mortar Platoon

9-82. These limitations, however, are not insurmountable. They can be overcome with
detailed planning and coordination. The mortar platoon must be given specific tasks that are
within its capabilities to accomplish. Synchronization of the mortar fire plan and scheme of
maneuver with the combined arms battalion fire plan and scheme of maneuver are critical to
realizing the full potential that the mortar platoon brings to the battlefield. The mortar
platoon leader must participate in the combined arms battalion planning process and
rehearsals; this is the only way the combined arms battalion can ensure the mortar platoon
can accomplish its essential fire support tasks and provide immediately responsive fires to
the combined arms battalion.
9-83. The combined arms battalion mortar platoon provides the commander with the
following:
An organic indirect-fire capability that is always present and always responsive to
the maneuver commander regardless of the changing demands placed on any
supporting field artillery.
Supporting fire that is immediately at hand and close to the company and combined
arms battalion fight. The mortar section or platoon is aware of the local situation
and ready to respond quickly without lengthy coordination.
Unique plunging fires that complement, but do not replace, the heavier fires of
supporting field artillery, close air support, and naval gunfire.
Weapons whose high rate of fire and lethality fill the gap between the fields
artillery fires’ shift to deeper targets and the assault elements’ closing onto the
objective.
A solid base of fire on which to anchor his maneuver against the critical point of
enemy weakness.
9-84. Mortars allow the maneuver commander to place killing indirect fires on the enemy
quickly, independent of whether the commander has been allocated supporting artillery by
the HBCT. Heavy forces use carrier-mounted mortars to allow the mortar platoon to move

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cross-country at speeds compatible with the battalion combined arms battalion. All mortar
sections and platoons exist to provide immediate, organizationally responsive fires that can
be used to meet the rapid changes in the tactical situation on the battlefield.
9-85. The three primary types of mortar fires follow:
High explosive. HE rounds are used to suppress or kill enemy dismounted infantry,
mortars, and other supporting weapons and to interdict the movement of men,
vehicles, and supplies in the enemy’s forward area. Bursting WP rounds are often
mixed with HE rounds to enhance their suppressive and destructive effects.
Obscuration. Obscuration rounds are used to conceal friendly forces as forces
maneuver or assault and to blind enemy supporting weapons. Obscuration can be
used to isolate a portion of the enemy force while it is destroyed piecemeal. Some
mortar rounds use bursting WP to achieve this obscuration; others employ more
efficient technology. Bursting WP is also used to mark targets for engagement by
other weapons, usually aircraft, and for signaling.
Illumination. Illumination rounds are used to reveal the location of enemy forces
hidden by darkness. They allow the commander to confirm or deny the presence of
the enemy without revealing the location of friendly direct-fire weapons.
Illumination fires are often coordinated with HE fires both to expose the enemy and
to kill or suppress him.

MORTARS IN THE COMBINED ARMS BATTALION CLOSE FIGHT

9-86. Suppressing the enemy inhibits his fire and movement while allowing friendly forces to
gain a tactical mobility advantage. In the company- and battalion-level battle, mortar fire
acts both as a killer of enemy forces and as an enhancer of friendly mobility.
9-87. Mortars provide the commander with immediately responsive fires to support the
combined arms battalion scouts’ infiltration and exfiltration and the counterreconnaissance
force during security operations.
9-88. FA assets at all levels are limited. For brigade and UEx commanders to concentrate
offensive combat power at the critical point, they must decentralize elsewhere. Some
maneuver units will always have less artillery support than others. Mortars compensate for
this and reduce the degree of combat risk.
9-89. Combined arms battalion mortars allow brigade commanders to divert field artillery
fire support for limited periods to win the critical fight elsewhere.
9-90. Mortars contribute to the combined arms battalion’s direct firefight by forcing
mechanized enemy forces to button up, obscuring their ability to employ supporting fires and
separating their dismounted infantry from their armored personnel carriers (APCs) and
accompanying tanks. The combined arms battalion’s direct fires become more effective when
used against buttoned-up enemy armor.
9-91. Heavy mortars can penetrate tops of buildings and destroy enemy field fortifications,
preparing the way for the dismounted assault force.
9-92. Mortars guarantee the combined arms battalion and company commanders the ability
to cover friendly obstacles with indirect fire, regardless of the increasing calls for artillery
fire against deep targets or elsewhere on the battlefield.
9-93. Mortar fire combines with the FPF of a company team’s machineguns to repulse the
enemy’s dismounted assault. This frees artillery to attack and destroy follow-on echelons,
which are forced to slow down and deploy as the ground assault is committed. Mortars can
use the protection of deep defilade to continue indirect-fire support even when subjected to
intense counterstrike.

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9-94. Mortars can provide obscuration and suppression to protect the combined arms
battalion during the attack or to support it when breaking contact with the enemy in the
defense or movement to contact.
9-95. Mortars can fire directly overhead of friendly troops from close behind the forward
elements. This allows combat power to be concentrated and synchronized on close terrain.
9-96. Whenever possible, commanders should use their mortars first because, in most
situations, the fires can be cleared and fired faster than other fire support assets. When
deploying, commanders should consider the following:
Register as soon as possible and, if possible, in every position.
Anticipate ammunition requirements. Local unit ammunition caches may have to
be established to aid in distribution.
Echelon mortars with other fire support assets in the attack.
Make sure the mortar platoon understands the scheme of fires. Include the mortar
platoon in the planning process, backbriefs, rehearsals, and communications
exercises. Put them into and provide them with a FSEM.
Coordinate for survey and meteorological support from the fires battalion (at a
minimum, plan for a declination station).

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/JOINT FIRES

9-97. Air Force, Navy, Marine, or allied aircraft may provide CAS missions—also called joint
fires. Most modern aircraft have an inherent flexibility that allows them to be used in
different roles as the situation dictates. This means that an aircraft can perform missions
other than the mission for which it was specifically designed. To obtain the most use from
the air assets available, the joint forces commander (JFC) apportions air assets against
various missions. The types of aircraft used for combat air operations vary widely; however,
they can be categorized in broad terms as fighter, bomber, attack, or reconnaissance. See
Section II for a discussion of CAS and joint fires.

ARMY AVIATION
9-98. Army aviation units perform the full spectrum of combat and sustainment missions.
Aviation units destroy enemy forces by fire and maneuver; perform target acquisition and
reconnaissance; enhance C2; and move personnel, supplies, and equipment in compliance
with the overall scheme of maneuver. In support of the fire support mission, aviation
functions in the following roles:
Aerial observation and calls for fire.
Insertion of Knight/combat observation lazing teams (COLTs).
Air movement of weapons systems and ammunition.
Air reconnaissance.
Intelligence electronic warfare (EW).
Attack helicopter operations.
Aerial mine delivery.
Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).
Search and rescue.
C2 for joint air attack team (JAAT) operations.
Provide BDA.
9-99. Army aviation has the capability to reach quickly and move throughout the depth and
breadth of the battlefield. This mobility and flexibility aid the combined arms commander in
seizing or retaining the initiative (see Appendix B).

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FBCB2-GENERATED FIRE MISSIONS

9-100. Through synchronization of intelligence and fire support, tailored fire mission
processing links can be established to expedite the engagement of selected HPTs.
Digitization gives the commander the ability to tailor fire mission threads better to meet a
variety of needs. FBCB2 provides a basic CFF capability but does not currently link an
FBCB2-equipped observer digitally to a fire support C2 node with AFATDS until the FBCB2
CFF reaches the FBCB2-to-AFATDS jump point in the combined arms battalion fires cell.
An observer can send an FBCB2/BFT CFF directly to the combined arms battalion fires cell
at the main CP where it will automatically enter AFATDS. However, as a cautionary note,
this method can bypass both the commander or unit that the fires are intended to support as
well as the fire support element designated to manage fires for the supported maneuver
commander. It should be used only as a backup to the primary method discussed below.

PRIMARY CFF PROCEDURE FOR THE COMBINED ARMS BATTALION AND ITS
COMPANIES
9-101. The norm for fire missions should be that they enter AFATDS at the lowest level
possible so that AFATDS can apply the commander’s guidance to the request for fire and the
fires cell at each level can manage the mission for the commander. Therefore, a CFF that
originates at the platoon level should be sent to the company FIST via FM voice. The FIST
can quickly enter the fire mission into the AFATDS lightweight computer unit (AFATDS-
LCU). The forward observer system (FOS) software enables an efficient entry into AFATDS
so that FSOs in the fire support chain can manage the fires and apply the commander’s
guidance before the request is sent to the next echelon.

EXECUTION OF INDIRECT FIRES

9-102. A well-developed scheme of fires establishes the specific task, purpose, method, and
desired effects for all planned indirect-fire missions, with the task, purpose, and effects tied
to the scheme of maneuver. To be most effective, fire missions should be initiated based on
specific enemy or friendly events. For example, obscuration and suppressive fires on a
defending enemy should begin before the friendly unit comes within the direct-fire range of
the enemy to allow enough time for fires to become effective or adjusted before direct-fire
contact is made. The trigger to initiate these fires is based on the movement and positioning
of some element of the combined arms battalion. In this example, the indirect fires on the
enemy position are initiated when the lead company of the combined arms battalion crosses
a phase line, grid line, or some other designated point on the battlefield.

EVENT-DRIVEN TRIGGERS AND FBCB2/BFT

9-103. Using event-driven triggers, coupled with the friendly COP, allows the execution of
the indirect fires to be tied to the scheme of maneuver effectively. Being able to watch the
progress of the battle on the FBCB2/BFT screen allows the indirect-fire delivery unit to
prepare to execute the mission and be ready to shoot as soon as the event trigger is reached.
The executing unit should still make a final decision to execute the mission (has the
situation changed so that the fires are no longer required or are they required somewhere
else?) and transmit a CFF.

EVENT TRIGGERS AT END OF MISSION

9-104. Event triggers can also be used to end a fire mission. For example, an obscuration
mission is planned to screen the movement of a company team over an exposed piece of
ground. Tracking the progress of the unit using FBCB2/BFT not only tells the commander

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when to initiate the mission but also tells him when the unit has completed the movement or
maneuver and possibly if the purpose of the mission has been accomplished.

ASSET POSITIONING AND CFZS

9-105. The COP provided by FBCB2/BFT can also be a valuable tool in managing both asset
positioning and critical friendly zones. The battalion fires cell can track the location of the
mortar platoon, supporting artillery assets, and observers as they maneuver across the
battlefield. This information helps commanders and leaders make decisions on adjusting
positioning and movement plans during execution. Being able to see (in near real time)
where units are in relationship to the enemy, friendly maneuver units, and where they need
to be to execute their assigned mission allows commanders to make timely decisions and
fight the enemy and not the plan. This visualization of the battlefield can also facilitate the
execution of the counterstrike battle through the management of CFZs. If entered in
FBCB2/BFT as an overlay, the planned CFZs can be displayed and compared to where the
units they are designed to support are actually located. If the CFZ is not positioned correctly
or the unit has moved, the combined arms battalion FEC can quickly adjust the CFZ to the
correct location.

FBCB2 AND FS PLANNING

9-106. FBCB2/BFT enables the battalion fires cell to disseminate critical information from
the fire support plan rapidly down to each platform on the battlefield during top-down
planning. A limitation, however, is that as targets and plans are refined in AFATDS, they
are not automatically updated in FBCB2/BFT. The FSO must closely control input into the
FBCB2 fire support and airspace overlay to ensure they stay updated with all refinements. A
technique is to use the FBCB2/BFT overlays to disseminate information down and pass all
the bottom-up refinements through AFATDS. Once the refinements are reviewed, approved,
and entered into AFATDS, the FSO can create an updated overlay to disseminate back
down. Keeping each system up to date affects the refinement cutoff time for bottom-up
refinement. The battalion fires cell needs time to update both systems.

SECTION II – CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

9-107. CAS is defined as air strikes on hostile surface forces that are in close proximity to
friendly forces. CAS can be employed to blunt an enemy attack; to support the momentum of
the ground attack; to help set conditions for combined arms battalion and brigade operations
as part of the brigade’s overall counterstrike fight; to disrupt, delay, and destroy enemy
second- echelon forces and reserves; and to provide cover for friendly movements. CAS
sorties and joint fires are generally allocated to brigades only. For best results while
avoiding mutual interference or fratricide, aircraft are kept under detailed integration (part
of the Air Force’s combat air system). The effectiveness of CAS is directly related to the
degree of local air superiority attained. Until air superiority is achieved, competing demands
between CAS and counterair operations may limit sorties apportioned for the CAS role. CAS
is the primary support given to committed brigades and maneuver battalions by Air Force,
Navy, and Marine aircraft. BCTs can request air reconnaissance and battlefield air
interdiction missions through the UEx, but these missions are normally planned and
executed at UEx level with the results provided to the brigade commander and his staff.

MISSIONS
9-108. CAS is most often planned and controlled at the brigade level. However, this does not
preclude the combined arms battalion from requesting CAS, receiving immediate CAS
during an operation, or being assigned execution responsibility for a brigade-planned CAS

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mission. CAS is another means of indirect-fire support available to the brigade and
battalions. In planning CAS missions, the commander must understand the capabilities and
limitations of close air support and synchronize CAS missions with both the battalion fire
plan and scheme of maneuver. CAS capabilities and limitations (windows for use, targets,
observers, airspace coordination, and so on) present some unique challenges, but the
commander and staff must plan CAS with maneuver the same way they do other indirect
fires. Depending on the situation and availability of CAS assets, the combined arms
battalion may be allocated CAS missions or be assigned execution responsibility for a
brigade CAS mission. More likely, however, CAS can be handed off to the combined arms
battalion when the HBCT has no viable target or in response to the combined arms
battalion’s request for immediate air support. If this happens, the battalion must have a plan
that synchronizes CAS with maneuver and the scheme of fires. The combined arms battalion
must also consider having the ETAC operate as a forward air controller (FAC) in the
observation plan.

PREPLANNED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

9-109. Battalion planners must forward CAS requests as soon as they can be forecast. These
requests for CAS normally do not include detailed timing information because of the lead
time involved. Preplanned CAS requests involve any information about planned schemes of
maneuver, even general information that can be used in the apportionment, allocation, and
distribution cycle. Estimates of weapons effects needed by percentage (for example, 60
percent antiarmor and 40 percent antipersonnel), sortie time flows, peak need times, and
anticipated distribution patterns are vital to preparing the air tasking order. ALOs and S3s
at all planning echelons must ensure that this information is forwarded through higher
echelons in accordance with the air tasking order (ATO) cycle.

Categories
9-110. Preplanned CAS may be categorized as follows:
Scheduled mission. This mission calls for a CAS strike on a planned target at a
planned time.
Alert mission. This mission calls for a CAS strike on a planned target or target area
to be executed when requested by the supported unit. This mission usually is
launched from a ground alert (scramble), but it may be flown from an airborne alert
status. Alert (on-call) CAS allows the ground commander to designate a general
target area within which targets may need to be attacked. The ground commander
designates a conditional period within which he later determines specific times for
attacking the targets.

Request Channels
9-111. There are specific request channels for preplanned CAS. Requests for preplanned
tactical air support missions are submitted to the battalion fires cell. The commander, ALO,
and S3 at each echelon evaluate the request; coordinate requirements such as airspace, fires,
and intelligence; consolidate; and, if approved, assign a priority or precedence to the request.
The ALO then forwards approved requests to the next higher echelon. To plan CAS, the ALO
must work closely with the S3 and the FSO.

Engagement Alternatives
9-112. The CAS aircraft assigned to attack preplanned targets may be diverted to higher
priority targets. For this reason, the FSO should plan options for the engagement of CAS
targets by other FS assets.

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IMMEDIATE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

9-113. Immediate requests are used for air support mission requirements identified too late
to be included in the current air tasking order. Those requests initiated below battalion level
are forwarded to the combined arms battalion CP by the most rapid means available. At
battalion level, the commander, FSO, ALO, and S3 consider each request. Approved requests
are transmitted by the TACP over the Air Force air request net (Figure 9-2,) directly to the
air support operations center (ASOC) collocated with the UEx CP. The TACP at each
intermediate headquarters monitors and acknowledges receipt of the request. Silence by an
intermediate TACP indicates approval by the associated headquarters unless disapproval is
transmitted. The ASOC coordinates with the UEx ALO and brigade and battalion fires cells
for all air support requests initiated by the UEx. Meanwhile, intermediate TACPs pass the
request to the associated headquarters G3 or S3 for action and coordination. All echelons
coordinate simultaneously.
9-114. If any Army echelon above the initiating level disapproves a request or substitutes
another support means (for example, Army aviation or field artillery), the TACP at that
disapproving headquarters notifies the ASOC at UEx and the originating TACP, which
notifies the requester. When the UEx commander or his representative approves the request,
the ASOC initiates the necessary action to satisfy the request. If all distributed sorties are
committed, the UEx commander can request additional sorties from the next higher echelon,
when appropriate. If the ASOC has no CAS missions available, it can, with Army
concurrence, divert sorties from lower priority targets or request support from lateral or
higher commands.

Figure 9-2. Immediate Close Air Request Channels

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
9-115. CAS mission success directly relates to thorough mission planning based on the
following factors and considerations. The S3 and FSO are responsible for working with the
combined arms battalion ALO before and during tactical air (TACAIR) operations. Since
there are no digital links with the TACP or supporting aircraft, he must consistently keep
the ALO informed of the ground tactical situation through digital and conventional means
and A2C2 deconfliction.

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When operating in the combined arms battalion’s AO, CAS aircraft are under the
positive control of one of the TACP FACs. FACs monitor the ground tactical
situation, review digital system information, and monitor conventional voice radio
nets of the supported ground or maneuver commander to prevent fratricidal air-to-
surface or surface-to-air engagements.
Other planning factors include time available for planning, C2 procedures,
communications, and terrain.

AIR FORCE SUPPORT

9-116. Air Force elements are attached to the HBCT combined arms battalion to plan,
control, and direct CAS. The ALO and the TACP are the typical Air Force elements attached
to the combined arms battalion.

AIR LIAISON OFFICER

9-117. ALOs are provided to Army maneuver units from UEx to combined arms battalion
levels. The ALO is responsible for supervising the TACP and coordinating CAS with the
battalion fires cell and S3. The ALO is the senior Air Force representative for the TACP
supporting the combined arms battalion. The ALO is normally located with the command
group during tactical operations.

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

9-118. TACPs are provided to Army maneuver unit headquarters at UEx through combined
arms battalion levels. TACPs provide direct interaction with the supported maneuver units
and should be highly visible to Army commanders and readily available to assist in the
integration and synchronization of airpower with land force fire and maneuver.
9-119. The supported unit’s ALO is the commander of the TACP. TACPs at UEx through
brigade levels function primarily in an advisory role. These sections provide Air Force
operational expertise for the support of conventional Army planning and operations. They
are the point of contact to coordinate local air defense and airspace management activities.
Their function is specifically to assist Army planners in the preparation of the Army’s plan to
integrate CAS into the overall scheme of fires and maneuver. They coordinate preplanned
and immediate air requests and assist in coordinating air support missions with appropriate
A2C2 elements. Combined arms battalion TACPs have the added responsibility of terminal
attack control.
9-120. TACPs coordinate activities through an Air Force air request net and the advanced
airlift notification net. The TACP performs the following functions:
Serves as the Air Force commander’s representative, providing advice to the
combined arms battalion commander and staff on the capabilities, limitations, and
employment of air support, airlift, and reconnaissance.
Provides a coordination interface with respective fires cell and A2C2 cells, assists
in the synchronization of air and surface fires and preparation of the air support
plan, and provides direct liaison for local air defense and airspace management
activities.
Integrates into the staff for air support planning for future operations and advises
on the development and evaluation of CAS, interdiction, reconnaissance, and
JSEAD programs.
Provides appropriate final attack control for CAS and operates the Air Force air
request net.

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9-121. TACPs are manned at the following levels:

UEx: One ALO, four fighter liaison officers (FLOs), two theater airlift liaison
officers (TALOs), and six enlisted tactical air C2 specialists.
Brigade combat team: One ALO, one FLO, and four tactical air C2 specialists.
Combined arms battalion: One ALO and two tactical air C2 specialists.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT PLANNING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

9-122. The ALO and members of the combined arms battalion TACP provide the necessary
expertise for the control and application of tactical airpower. The ALO serves as the primary
tactical airpower advisor for the combined arms battalion while TACP FACs provide final
control for CAS missions executed in the combined arms battalion’s AO. Their collaborative
working relationship established with the brigades and combined arms battalions provides a
working knowledge of ground operations and enhances their ability to integrate TACAIR
operations with ground schemes of maneuver effectively.

FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER

9-123. The primary responsibility of TACP FACs includes the positive control of CAS
aircraft flying missions in support of ground operations. Using their knowledge of ground
operations, they are also better able to provide the requested effects and troop safety
necessary to avoid fratricidal engagements. The following paragraphs discuss FAC
procedures and responsibilities.

TROOP SAFETY
9-124. The safety of ground forces is a major concern during day and night CAS operations.
Fratricidal engagements are normally caused by the incorrect identification of friendly
troops operating in an AO or a failure to mark the boundaries of the friendly unit
adequately. The use of proper authentication and ground marking procedures assures that a
safe separation exists between the friendly forces and the impact area of aerial-delivered
munitions. Proper radio procedures and markings assist the FACs and the strike aircraft in
the positive identification of ground forces and their operational boundaries.

IDENTIFICATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES

9-125. FBCB2/BFT and the data it provides related to the disposition and location of
friendly units enhances safety margins and reduces the potential of fratricidal engagements
during joint air attack team or TACAIR operations. Friendly unit locations and boundaries
can be marked using flashing mirrors, marker panels, smoke, as well as direction and
distance from prominent land features or target marks. Strobe lights are good markers at
night and in overcast conditions. They can be used with blue or infrared filters and can be
made directional using any opaque tube. Any light that can be filtered or covered and
uncovered can be used for signaling aircraft or marking friendly locations.

TARGET ACQUISITION
9-126. Targets that are well camouflaged, small and stationary, or masked by hills or other
natural terrain are difficult for fast-moving aircraft to detect. Marking rounds (rockets) fired
from aerial platforms or artillery can enhance target acquisition and help ensure first-pass
success.

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TARGET IDENTIFICATION
9-127. Strike aircraft must have a precise description of the target and know the location of
friendly forces in relation to terrain features that are easily visible from the air. Airborne
FACs are generally assigned an AO and become intimately familiar with its geographical
features as well as the unit operating within the AO.

FINAL ATTACK HEADING

9-128. Choice of the final attack heading depends on considerations of troop safety, aircraft
survivability, enemy air defense locations, and optimum weapons effects. Missiles or bombs
are effective from any angle. Cannons, however, are more effective against the sides and rear
of armored vehicles.

S3
9-129. The S3 plans for and requests the use of CAS and attack helicopters to support the
commander’s concept of the operation.

S2
9-130. The S2 provides information on the avenues of approach, target array, terrain, and
weather as it applies to the time and location of the JAAT operation.

FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

9-131. The FSO performs the following tasks:
Determines the need, availability, and positioning of artillery, commensurate with
the enemy update, to support the JAAT.
Coordinates with the aviation representative to provide call signs and frequencies
to the supporting FDC.
Helps the TACP deconflict the initial points from artillery positions and develop
airspace coordination areas (ACAs) to support the mission.
Determines the need for SEAD.
Determines when and how priorities of fires shift.
Recommends FSCMs to enhance the success of the mission.
Establishes a quick fire channel if necessary.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OFFICER

9-132. If there are air and missile defense (AMD) elements attached to the combined arms
battalion, the air and missile defense officer (AMDO) performs the following duties:
Coordinates to ensure that the AMD assets know the location of air corridors,
battle positions, initial points, and ACAs.
Ensures these assets are informed of friendly air operations and their integration
into the battle.
Advises the combined arms battalion when to employ combined arms for air
defense (CAFAD).
Passes directed early air warning to combined arms battalion.
Tracks the air battle.
Advises the combined arms battalion on the use of passive and active AMD
measures.
Plans and coordinates use of airspace with the aviation officer.

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TACTICAL AIR CONTROL PARTY

9-133. The TACP performs the following duties:
Develops contact points, initial points, and ACAs in coordination with the FSO and
the AMDO (if attached).
Disseminates contact points, initial points, and ACAs to the ASOC, the ground
liaison officer, and wing operations center for preflight briefing.
Helps coordinate aircraft forward to the appropriate contact point or initial point
and then hands them off to the aviation commander conducting the JAAT
operation.

SUPPRESSION OF ENEMY AIR DEFENSE

9-134. SEAD operations target all known or suspected enemy air defense sites that cannot
be avoided and that are capable of engaging friendly air assets and systems, including
suppressive fires. The battalion fires cell integrates SEAD fires into an overall fire plan that
focuses fires according to the commander’s guidance. Synchronization of SEAD fires with the
maneuver plan is accomplished using procedural control (an H-hour sequence), positive
control (initiating fires on each target as the lead aerial platforms pass a predetermined
reference point or trigger), or a combination of the two. Regardless of the technique, the FSO
planning the SEAD must conduct detailed planning and close coordination with the ALO,
Army aviation LNO (if available), S3, S2, AMDO (if attached), fires battalion S3/fire
direction officer (FDO), and battalion fires cell. Plans for SEAD operations are coordinated
and synchronized over the tactical internet (TI) using the AFATDS, All-Source Analysis
System (ASAS), FBCB2, Maneuver Control System (MCS), and Aviation Mission Planning
System (AMPS).

WEATHER
9-135. Weather is one of the most important considerations when visually employing aerial-
delivered weapons. Weather can hinder target acquisition and identification, degrade
weapon accuracy and effectiveness, or negate employment of specific aerial munition types.
The S3 can request Integrated Meteorological System (IMETS) data from the UEx G2 to
gain highly predictive and descriptive weather information for specific time periods and
locations within the combined arms battalion’s AO. This data improves his ability to
determine when CAS can be used. IMETS provides weather data based on inputs from the
air weather services and meteorological sensors. This system is currently located at the UEx,
but it interfaces with the ABCS and disseminates weather information down to combined
arms battalions via the warfighter associate. IMETS predicts weather effects on a specific
mission, desired AO, or particular system. IMETS also provides weather hazards for
different elevations, surface temperatures in a specific AO, and wind conditions.
Meteorological satellite (METSAT) data may also be obtained to show regional cloud cover
with high- and low-pressure systems annotated.

SECTION III – ENGINEERS

9-136. Combat engineers perform essential engineer tasks to support heavy combined arms
battalions in executing mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. The combined
arms battalion uses engineers to shape the AO to provide freedom of maneuver for friendly
forces, denying movement to the enemy and protecting friendly forces from the effects of
enemy weapon systems. A combat engineer company is organic to the HBCT combined arms
battalion, but it must be augmented for many missions. Depending on the mission analysis
and availability, additional engineers may be attached to the heavy combined arms battalion
as appropriate to accomplish the mission. When augmenting engineers are task organized to

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the heavy combined arms battalion, the senior engineer (organic or augmenting) acts as the
battalion staff engineer and assists the combat engineer operations officer and battalion
battle staff in planning and integrating engineer operations. For more specific information
on engineer integration, refer to FM 5-71-2, Armored Task Force Engineer Combat
Operations.

BATTALION PLANNING FOR MANEUVER SUPPORT

9-137. The combined arms battalion staff plans, coordinates, integrates, and synchronizes
mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations throughout the battalion’s
battlespace. In addition, the battalion staff must coordinate all military and civilian engineer
efforts within the battalion’s AO. Details on staff engineer responsibilities can be found in
FM 5-71-2.

MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY SYNCHRONIZATION
9-138. The combined arms battalion staff is responsible for ensuring that the functional
areas are integrated and synchronized within the battalion’s plan. The staff synchronizes the
plan and assists the commander in managing its execution. The staff promotes
synchronization by maintaining a COP of all friendly and enemy engineer efforts in the AO.
For specifics on combat engineer functions, refer to FM 3-34.2.
9-139. Mobility operations preserve friendly force freedom of maneuver. Mobility missions
include breaching and clearing obstacles, maintaining battlefield circulation, providing
assault or dry gap crossing, and identifying routes around contaminated areas.
9-140. Countermobility denies mobility to enemy forces. It limits the maneuver of enemy
forces and enhances the effectiveness of fires. Countermobility missions include obstacle
building and smoke generation.
9-141. Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of enemy weapon
systems and from natural occurrences. Hardening of facilities and fortification of battle
positions are active survivability measures. Military deception, operations security (OPSEC),
and dispersion can also increase survivability.

ESSENTIAL MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY TASKS

9-142. An essential mobility/survivability task (EMST) is a specified or implied functional
area-specific task that is critical to mission success. Ultimately, it allows the battalion to
maneuver the main effort to achieve its task and purpose. It may be accomplished directly in
support of the main effort or one of its supporting efforts. Identification of the essential tasks
helps to focus the development of plans, staff coordination, and allocation of resources. The
combat engineer operations officer identifies the EMSTs. Failure to achieve an EMST may
require the combined arms battalion commander to alter his tactical or operational plan.
9-143. A fully developed EMST has a task, purpose, method, and effects—just like fire
support tasks. The task describes what objective (breach, reduce, block, turn, fix, disrupt,
clear, obscure) must be achieved to support friendly formations or what it will do to an
enemy formation’s function or capability. The purpose describes why the task contributes to
maneuver and is nested with the maneuver task and purposes. The method describes how
the task will be accomplished by assigning responsibility to maneuver units, supporting
units, or delivery assets and by providing amplifying information or restrictions. The effect is
the general narrative of what the commander wants to happen.
9-144. The approved EMSTs are described in the concept of operations paragraph within the
base order. The concept of operations includes the logical sequence of EMSTs that, when
integrated with the scheme of maneuver, will accomplish the mission and achieve the

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commander’s intent. The scheme of engineer operations describes the detailed, logical
sequence of all mobility, countermobility, and survivability operations; general engineer
tasks; decontamination, smoke, and geospatial engineering tasks; and their impact on
friendly and enemy units. It details how the engineers expect to execute the plan to
accomplish the commander’s EMSTs.

TASK ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEERS

9-145. Engineer units serve two roles in the combined arms battalion. The first and most
important role is as a force enabler. In this role, the engineer company resources maneuver
companies with engineer assets to enable them to accomplish their assigned tasks. The
second role is that of a force provider. In this role, the engineer company executes assigned
tasks within the framework of the scheme of operations. Clearly identifying the EMSTs
across the width and depth of the battlefield drives the logical task organization of
mobility/survivability assets. Engineers execute essential unit tasks to support the
accomplishment of essential mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. Engineer
elements should be task organized because an EMST dictates an essential unit task.

MOBILITY
9-146. At the tactical level, superior mobility is critical to the success of the force. Mobility
facilitates the momentum and freedom of movement and maneuver of forces by reducing or
negating the effects of existing or reinforcing obstacles. Within this context, the emphasis of
engineer integration is on mobility operations. Due to the full spectrum capability of a
combined arms battalion and the nonlinear, asymmetric nature of the threat, the potential
exists for the force to encounter a wide variety of existing and reinforcing obstacles. To
counter this potential, the commander, staff, and task organized engineers plan, organize,
and prepare to perform mobility tasks using the full range of organic and augmentation
mobility assets. These mobility tasks include clearing combined arms routes, combined arms
breaching, and maintaining area mobility.

ROUTE CLEARANCE
9-147. Route clearance is a combined arms operation typically executed by a maneuver
company or battalion. Engineers reduce or clear obstacles as part of a route clearance
mission. Maneuver units must clear lines of communication (LOC) of obstacles and enemy
activity that disrupt battlespace circulation. Maneuver units must conduct route clearance to
ensure that LOC enable safe passage of combat and sustaining operations elements.
Clearance operations are normally conducted in a low threat environment. The significant
difference between breaching and clearing operations is that breaching usually occurs during
an attack (while under enemy fire) to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle.
Route clearance focuses on opening LOC to ensure the safe passage of combat and support
organizations within an AO. Details on route clearance are covered in FM 3-34.2.

COMBINED ARMS BREACHING

9-148. Engineers reduce lanes in obstacles as part of a combined arms operation. Because of
the potentially asymmetrical, nonlinear nature of operations, engineers must be prepared to
perform mounted and dismounted reduction tasks using manual, mechanical, and explosive
reduction means. Through reverse breach planning, the staff identifies critical mobility
tasks, allocates reduction assets, and determines the breach organization (support, assault,
and breach force). Keys to allocating reduction assets include identifying all reduction tasks
within the AO, matching specific reduction assets to each task, and planning 50-percent
redundancy in reduction assets for each task. For more specific information on combined
arms breaching, refer to FM 3-34.2.

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AREA MOBILITY
9-149. Generating and sustaining combat power requires the combined arms battalion to
maintain area mobility. Area mobility operations include clearing unexploded ordnance,
clearing residual minefields, tracking dirty battlefield effects, and main supply route (MSR)
repair and maintenance. Limited organic assets necessitate augmentation to preserve area
mobility. The combined arms battalion staff identifies shortfalls in capability and
coordinates with the brigade to request additional engineer assets.

COUNTERMOBILITY
9-150. Countermobility is the augmentation of natural or manmade terrain (urban) with
obstacle systems and integrated with direct- and or indirect-fire systems to disrupt, fix, turn,
or block the enemy while the maneuver commander destroys his combat capabilities with
increased time for target acquisition. The combined arms battalion commander and staff
integrate obstacles within the maneuver plan, enforcing adherence to obstacle emplacement
authority and obstacle control measures. Task-organized engineers construct conventional
minefields; ground emplaced scatterable minefields, special munitions, and explosive and
nonexplosive obstacles in support of the scheme of maneuver. (FM 5-102 is the primary
reference for countermobility planning.)

SURVIVABILITY
9-151. Survivability encompasses the development and construction of protective positions
such as earth berms, dug-in positions, and overhead protection as a means to mitigate the
effectiveness of enemy weapon systems. Significant survivability efforts require engineer
augmentation. The combined arms battalion staff must plan and prioritize survivability
efforts. The plan should specify the level of survivability for each battle position and the
sequence in which it receives support (if available). Additional considerations for
survivability planning include C2 of digging assets, site security, sustainment operations
(fuel, maintenance, and Class I), and movement times between battle positions. (FM 3-
34.112 is the primary reference for survivability planning.)

GENERAL ENGINEERING
9-152. General engineering encompasses those tasks that establish and maintain
infrastructure required for conducting and sustaining military operations. Such tasks
include construction and repair of LOC, main supply routes, airfields, utilities, and logistical
facilities. Due to the organization of the engineer company, general engineering tasks
require augmentation from outside the HBCT. (FM 5-104, General Engineering, is the
primary reference for general engineering planning.)

GEOSPATIAL ENGINEERING
9-153. Geospatial engineering is the collection, development, dissemination, and analysis of
positionally accurate terrain information that is tied to some earth reference to provide
mission tailored data, tactical decision aids, and visualization products that define the
character of the AO for the maneuver commander. The combined arms battalion staff should
identify required tactical decision aids and coordinate with HBCT for the necessary products.
Products commonly provided include common map backgrounds, line-of-sight analysis, cross-
country mobility overlays, artillery slope overlays, and specialized imagery products. (FM 3-
34.230 is the primary reference for geospatial engineering planning.)

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ENGINEER COMPANY
9-154. HBCT combined arms battalions have an organic mechanized engineer company to
support the full range of military operations. Based on the combined arms battalion’s
mission and the overall HBCT plan, the combined arms battalion may require additional
engineer support. The engineer company is the lowest engineer echelon that can plan and
execute continuous 24-hour operations in support of the maneuver force. The engineer
company is ideally suited for integration into combined arms battalion operations. It is an
agile organization that enables freedom of maneuver on the battlefield within the combined
arms team framework. Its structure and operational characteristics enhance force
momentum and lethality and increase the synchronization of engineer actions within the
combined arms battalion’s battlespace.
9-155. The engineer company conducts engineer battlefield functions for the combined arms
battalion, focusing on mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. As a combat
multiplier, the engineer concentrates his efforts on maintaining the combined arms
battalion’s freedom of maneuver and lessening the enemy’s ability to mass and maneuver on
the battlefield. Combat engineers shape terrain and create obstacles to enhance the battle
effectiveness of fire and maneuver. Their efforts are designed to support forward fights.

ORGANIZATION
9-156. The engineer company has a company headquarters, two combat engineer platoons,
and an obstacle section (Figure 9-3). The company can be organized to operate as an
engineer-pure element, or it can receive a cross-attached tank or infantry platoon. The
company headquarters includes the commander, the first sergeant (1SG), an operations
officer/XO, an operations NCO, a supply sergeant, and an nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) sergeant. The company headquarters commands and controls the unit’s tactical
employment and administrative operations. The engineer company CP can be integrated as
an element of the combined arms battalion main CP. The engineer company XO/operations
officer and operations NCO provide continuous integration and synchronization of engineers
to the combat engineer operations officer in the battalion staff (S3) while the company
commander advises the combined arms battalion commander of the best use of engineers.

COMBAT ENGINEER (SAPPER) PLATOON

9-157. The combat engineer platoon is normally the lowest level engineer unit that can
effectively accomplish independent missions and tasks. It is a basic unit capable of
maneuvering during combat operations, and it can fight as part of the engineer company or
as part of a maneuver company team. The combat engineer platoon consists of a platoon
headquarters section and three engineer squads (Figure 9-3). On the battlefield, the combat
engineer platoon can expect rapid and frequent movement. It prepares to fight both mounted
and dismounted during various situations. The combat engineer platoon frequently receives
augmentation in the form of special equipment from the obstacle section. Engineer squads
can be task organized for special missions of limited duration such as engineer
reconnaissance missions. Task organizing below platoon level degrades the engineer platoon
leader’s ability to mass critical engineer assets during operations.

OBSTACLE SECTION
9-158. The obstacle section is a unique element that contains specialized engineer heavy
equipment to support mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks in support of the
combined arms battalion. The section has a section leader, two small emplacement
excavators (SEEs) and three armored combat earthmovers (ACEs).

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Figure 9-3. Combat Engineer Company

9-159. The obstacle section is structured to focus on reinforcing terrain with obstacles to
attack the enemy’s ability to maneuver. The section sergeant is responsible for C2 of the
obstacle section and provides liaison with the supported maneuver unit. The obstacle section
is not organized to operate independently like the combat engineer platoons. It provides the
combined arms battalion commander with specialized equipment to conduct both offensive
and defensive operations based on METT-TC. The obstacle section normally operates in one
of the following roles:
Supported by a combat engineer platoon.
In task organized sections in support of the engineer platoon or company.
Task organized to a maneuver company team within the combined arms battalion.

ENGINEER ASSETS
9-160. The engineer assets that may be available for supporting the HBCT combined arms
battalion include organic engineer company equipment, as well as modular pack mine
systems (MOPMSs), FASCAM, and the hand-emplaced Raptor. These assets are discussed
below.

ORGANIC COMBAT ENGINEER COMPANY EQUIPMENT

9-161. The engineer company supporting the combined arms battalion normally has the
following organic equipment.
Armored combat earthmover. The M9 ACE, with its front-end blade and rear-end
winch, can travel at 30 mph and is primarily designed to provide responsive

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earthmoving capability during mobility operations. It is capable of filling crater and

antitank ditches, removing rubble and debris from roads and trails, and reducing
(skimming) surface-laid minefields during offensive operations (however, it is
slower and substantially less survivable than a tank plow or roller). In the defense,
its primary purpose is to construct hasty vehicle fighting positions. It can also
assist attached dozers in constructing antitank ditches and hull- or turret-depth
vehicle fighting positions.
Small emplacement excavator. The SEE is an all-purpose wheeled engineer vehicle
that can be configured with a variety of interchangeable tools like a backhoe and a
front-end loader. The SEE provides forward combat troops with the capability to
support units by digging individual fighting positions, bunkers, CPs, and other
positions for combat equipment.

SCATTERABLE MINES
9-162. Scatterable mines (SCATMINEs) are remotely delivered or dispensed by aircraft,
artillery, missiles, or ground dispensers and laid without pattern. All US SCATMINEs have
a limited active life and self-destruct after that life has expired. The duration of the active
life varies with the type of delivery system and mine.
SCATMINEs, with their flexibility and rapid emplacement capabilities, provide the
commander with a means to respond to a changing enemy situation. They enable
the commander to emplace minefields rapidly in enemy-held territories,
contaminated territories, and other areas where it is impossible for engineers to
emplace conventional minefields. Some systems allow for rapid emplacement of
minefields in friendly areas.
During the war gaming process, the combat engineer operations officer, in
conjunction with combined arms battalion S3, S2, and FSO, identifies the
requirement to respond to an enemy action with SCATMINEs. He then determines
the minefield location, size, density, emplacement and self-destruct times, delivery
method, and the trigger (decision point) for execution.

SCATMINE CAPABILITIES
9-163. SCATMINEs can be emplaced more rapidly than conventional mines, so they provide
a commander with greater flexibility and more time to react to changes in situations. The
commander can use SCATMINEs to maintain or regain the initiative by acting faster than
the enemy. Using SCATMINEs also helps preserve countermobility resources that can be
used to conduct other operations on the battlefield. With the reduction in the size of engineer
units, SCATMINEs are increasingly important.

Remote Placement
9-164. All SCATMINEs are rapidly emplaced. This enhances battlefield agility and allows
the maneuver commander to emplace mines to best exploit enemy weaknesses. SCATMINEs
can be used as tactical or protective obstacles. When used tactically, they attack enemy
formations directly through disrupt, fix, turn, and block obstacles. As tactical obstacles, they
can be either directed or situational. Modern fusing, sensing, and antihandling devices
(AHDs) improve the ability of SCATMINEs to defeat enemy attempts to reduce the
minefield.

Increased Tactical Flexibility

9-165. On expiration of the self destruct time, the minefield is cleared by self-detonation,
and the commander can move through an area that was previously denied to enemy or
friendly forces. In many cases, the self-destruct period may be set at only a few hours. This

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feature allows for effective counterattacks to the enemy’s flank and rear areas. Table 9-5
defines when certain mines begin self-destruction and when destruction is complete.

Table 9-5. Self-Destruct Windows

Self-Destruct Time Self-Destruct Window Begins

4 hours 3 hours 12 minutes
48 hours 38 hours 24 minutes
5 days 4 days
15 days 12 days

Efficiency
9-166. SCATMINEs can be emplaced by a variety of delivery methods. Fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, artillery, manpack, or ground vehicles can deploy them. They satisfy the high-
mobility requirements of modern warfare and reduce manpower, equipment, and tonnage
requirements with their emplacement.

Increased Lethality
9-167. SCATMINEs use an explosive technique that produces a full-width kill. The effect
produces a mobility kill against a vehicle’s engine, track, or drive-train, or it produces a
catastrophic kill by setting off the onboard ammunition, killing or incapacitating the crew or
destroying the vehicle’s weapons systems. SCATMINEs are designed to destroy any tank
currently available.

SCATMINE LIMITATIONS
9-168. Limitations of SCATMINEs follow:
Extensive coordination. Because SCATMINEs are a dynamic weapon system, proper
coordination with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units is extremely important.
To prevent friendly casualties, all affected units must be notified of the location and
the duration of scatterable minefields. The organic engineer company does not have
any capability to emplace SCATMINEs, and that capability will have to come from
the maneuver enhancement brigade associated with the UEx.
Proliferation of targets. SCATMINEs are regarded by some commanders as easy
solutions to tactical problems. Target requests must be carefully evaluated, and a
priority system must be established because indiscriminate use of weapon systems
results in rapid depletion of a unit’s basic load. Controlled supply rates (CSRs) are
likely to be a constraint in all theaters.
Visibility. SCATMINEs are highly effective, especially when fires and obscurants
strain the enemy’s C2. SCATMINEs lay on the surface of the ground, but they are
relatively small and have natural coloring.
Accuracy. SCATMINEs cannot be laid with the same accuracy as conventionally
emplaced mines. Remotely delivered SCATMINE systems are as accurate as
conventional artillery-delivered or tactical aircraft-delivered munitions.
Orientation. Between 5 and 15 percent of SCATMINEs come to rest on their edges
and are misorientated. Mines with spring fingers are in the lower percentile of
misorientation, and mines landing in mud, sand, or snow more than 10 centimeters
deep are in the higher percentile of misorientation. When employing area denial
artillery munitions (ADAMs) or remote antiarmor mine systems (RAAMs) in more
than 10 centimeters of snow or mud, high-angle fire should be used and the number
of mines should be increased to offset loss due to orientation. Snowmelt shifting
sand may also cause the mines to change positions and activate AHDs.

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Lethality and density. Scatterable minefields are employed to reduce the enemy’s
ability to maneuver, mass, and reinforce against friendly forces. They increase the
enemy’s vulnerability to fires by producing specific obstacle effects (disrupt, fix,
turn, or block) on the enemy’s maneuver (Table 9-6). To achieve this effect,
individual minefields must be emplaced with varying degrees of lethality.
Changing the minefield density is a primary way to vary the lethality and the
effect. If the obstacle is not resourced or insufficient density is achieved, the
planned lethality will not be achieved. There is a direct correlation between the
obstacle effect and the minefield density. To achieve the tactical-obstacle effect, use
the guidance in Table 9-6 when selecting minefield density.

Table 9-6. Lethality and Density

Disrupt Turn
Low density. High density.
Probability of encounter: 40 to 50 percent. Probability of encounter: 75 to 85 percent.
Linear density: 0.4 to 0.5 mine per meter. Linear density: 0.9 to 1.1. mines per meter
Fix Block
Medium density. High density.
Probability of encounter: 50 to 60 percent. Probability of encounter: 85+ percent
Linear density: 0.5 to 0.6 mines per meter. Linear density: More than 1.1 mines per meter

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SCATMINES

9-169. Due to the delivery means, C2 of SCATMINEs is more complex than with
conventional mines. SCATMINEs are dynamic weapon systems because they can be rapidly
emplaced and then cleared by way of their self-destruct capability. In addition, the physical
boundary of a scatterable minefield is not clearly defined. These characteristics require
impeccable coordination to ensure that all friendly units know where mines are located,
when they will be effective, and when they will self-destruct.

EMPLACEMENT AUTHORITY
9-170. The UEx commander has emplacement authority for all scatterable minefields within
the UEx AO. He may delegate this authority to lower echelons according to the guidelines in
Table 9-7. Based on how the commander wants to shape the battlefield, he must specifically
delegate or withhold the authority to employ SCATMINE systems. The commander’s
guidance concerning SCATMINEs is found in the unit’s OPORD or operation plan (OPLAN).
Additional information is included in engineer and FS annexes, if used.

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Table 9-7. Emplacement Authority

System Emplacement
Ground or artillery-delivered, The UEx command may delegate emplacement authority to
with self-destruct time greater division level, who may further delegate to brigade level.
than 48 hours (long duration)
Ground or artillery-delivered, The UEx commander may delegate emplacement authority
with self-destruct time of 48 to division level, who may further delegate it to brigade
hours or less (short duration) level, who may further delegate to battalion level.
Aircraft-delivered (Gator), Emplacement authority is normally at UEx, theater, or army
regardless of self-destruct time. command level, depending on who has air-tasking
authority.
Helicopter-deliver (Volcano), Emplacement authority is normally delegated no lower than
regardless of self-destruct time. the commander who has command authority over the
emplacing aircraft.
MOPMS when used strictly for Emplacement authority is usually granted to the company
a protective minefield. or base commander. Commanders at higher levels restrict
MOPMS use only as necessary to support their operations.

COORDINATION
9-171. The FSO is involved in planning artillery-delivered (ADAM and RAAM)
SCATMINEs, and the ALO is involved in planning air-delivered (Gator) SCATMINEs. The
engineer has primary responsibility for planning and employing SCATMINE systems. It is
vital that coordination be conducted with all units and subunits that will be affected by the
employment of SCATMINEs. A scatterable minefield warning (SCATMINEWARN) is sent to
all affected units before the emplacement of the minefield.

SECTION IV – AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT

9-172. Early engagement of enemy aircraft is a critical air defense mission. Air defense of
the HBCT is provided by the joint force air component command through integrated air
defense built on both airborne and stationary platforms. If mission analysis shows that
additional ground-based air defense of the combined arms battalion is required, short-range
air defense (SHORAD) units are requested through the HBCT from the UEx. The following
paragraphs discuss the employment of attached short-range air defense units in support of
the combined arms battalion on a mission-required basis.
9-173. Air attack information is received and processed by the forward- located Sentinel
elements in the UEx AO and air battle management operations center (ABMOC). External
and internal air track information is correlated by the Sentinel and FAADC2 and
subsequently transmitted to the handheld terminal unit (HTU) of the firing units and the
brigade’s FAADC2 attached SHORAD elements. The FAADC2 manages engagement
operations, which involves taking sensing data from organic, Patriot, and joint sensors and
passing this information to the SHORAD weapons for engagement. The air and missile
defense workstation (AMDWS) manages force operations, which involves managing
SHORAD assets by knowing the status, location, and posture of all assets in relation to the
battalion maneuver plan. This ensures that they can be properly supported and sustained
and can provide the best coverage for the battalion. This information is subsequently
transmitted to subordinate units via FBCB2/BFT; otherwise, the units use the Enhanced
Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) and FM systems (Figure 9-4).

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Figure 9-4. Air Defense Artillery Architecture

MISSION
9-174. Air defense artillery (ADA) protects the force and selected assets from aerial attack
and surveillance. The primary aerial threats that must be countered by SHORAD systems
are UAVs, rotary-wing aircraft, and fixed-wing aircraft.

ORGANIZATIONS
9-175. If the mission analysis and enemy threat requires air defense support, then the
HBCT is typically supported by an attached air defense battery (when ground-based air
defense is required) (Figure 9-5). A combined arms battalion is typically supported in those
circumstances by an attached Linebacker platoon, consisting of four firing units and a C2
vehicle. The platoon is organized into a headquarters section and two maneuver sections. Air
defense commanders may modify platoon organizations to fit specific mission requirements.
The platoon may operate in a direct support (DS) role to the combined arms battalion but is
more commonly in a general support (GS) role under control of the air defense battery
commander at the HBCT level.

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 Combat Support Operations

Figure 9-5. Air Defense Artillery Battery

AIR DEFENSE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

9-176. The combined arms battalion commander and his attached AMDO integrate the
firepower of all available fire systems to defeat the enemy air threat. AMD employment
guidelines are used as aids for positioning individual air defense firing units. The six AMD
employment guidelines follow:
Early engagement. Firing units must be positioned where they can engage enemy air
platforms before the enemy can release his ordnance on or gain intelligence about
friendly forces. With the mobility provided by the Linebacker, firing units should be
located well forward and integrated into the supported combined arms battalion’s
scheme of maneuver. In missions of defending a static asset, firing units should be
positioned forward of the supported force along likely enemy air avenues of
approach.
Weighted coverage. Once the supported force commander designates his main effort,
Linebacker firing units should be positioned along the most likely air avenues of
approach to support the commander’s main effort. This massing of firepower
increases the Linebacker platoon’s probability of killing enemy air targets. It is
extremely important that detailed, in-depth air intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) is developed before deciding where to weight coverage of air
defense assets. Air defense focuses its efforts on the most likely avenues of
approach along the supported force commander’s designated main effort.
Depth. Depth is achieved by positioning firing units so enemy air platforms
encounter a continuous volume of fire as they approach the protected force or asset.
The Linebacker platoon leader achieves depth by positioning his assets so that they
can provide continuous fires along enemy air avenues, destroying the enemy as it
advances toward the protected force or asset. Depth is maximized through the
integration of all air defense weapons. Additional air defense assets on the
battlefield (such as Stinger teams, Avenger firing units, high-to-medium altitude
air defense (HIMAD) assets, and combined arms air defense efforts from ground
forces) contribute to the creation of air defense depth on the battlefield.
Balanced fires. Positioning air defense weapons to distribute fire equally in all
directions creates balanced fires. Except for the mission of defense of a static asset
where no clear avenues of approach are identified, this guidance is seldom
employed. As an example, on a flat, open battlefield characteristic of some desert

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environments, no specific air corridor exists. In this situation, planning for

balanced fires may be viable.
Mutual support. Mutual support is achieved by positioning weapons to complement
fires from adjacent firing units, thus preventing the enemy from attacking one
position without being subjected to fire from one or more adjacent positions. Mutual
support enhances volume of fire and covers the dead space of adjacent units. The
planning range for mutual support for Stinger systems is approximately 2,000
meters.
Overlapping fires. Because of the combined arms battalion’s extended battlespace and
a scarcity of available Stinger systems, the air defense planner should attempt to
enhance air defense protection by positioning firing units so that engagement
envelops overlap. The planning range for overlapping fires for Stinger systems is
approximately 4,000 meters.
9-177. The FAADC2 system greatly enhances the AMDO’s ability to use these guidelines.
The greatest impact is on early engagement. Air defense firing units must be positioned so
they are capable of engaging enemy aircraft prior to the ordnance release line (ORL). The
determination of enemy air avenues of approach and ordnance loads comes from the air IPB.
The HTU enhances early warning and engagement and is issued to all air defense firing
units, including the platoon leaders. It enables the firing units to receive early warning (40
kilometers out), air tracks (data) from the sensor, which in turn receives external air tracks
(data) from the ABMOC. The sensor correlates external (ABMOC) track data with its own
local data and broadcasts that data to its air defense battery, platoons, sections, firing units,
and HBCT air defense LNOs. The HBCT combined arms battalion and direct support air
defense firing units still broadcast flash precedence FM voice early warning to maneuver
elements.
9-178. The additional feature of early warning distance (from enemy aircraft to the air
defense firing unit) is enhanced by the fact that the HTU enables the air defense firing unit
to see 360 degrees out under ideal situations (20 kilometers light and special divisions
interim sensor (LSDIS) and 40 kilometers ground-based sensor (GBS)). ADA must still be
attentive and suspect those areas where a popup or masked area (blind spot between the
HTU at the firing unit or platoon CP and the sensor) might exist and allow the enemy to
reach those locations undetected.
9-179. Linebackers normally accompany the combined arms battalion main body or reserve
while the combined arms battalion displaces. Ultimately, Linebacker positioning is
determined by the factors of METT-TC, the IPB, and the combined arms battalion
commander’s priorities. The Linebacker platoon may be task organized to provide direct
support to the combined arms battalion or task organized into sections to support individual
company teams. In either case, the attached combined arms battalion AMDO must retain
the flexibility to mass assets at the critical time and place them on the battlefield to defeat
the air threat. FAADC2 allows the AMDO to push assets out to a broader area of coverage to
provide more firepower forward, facilitate earlier engagement, and cover the flanks.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE OFFICER DUTIES

9-180. When an air defense platoon is attached to the combined arms battalion, the platoon
leader also serves as the battalion AMDO. The AMDO must participate in the MDMP as an
integral member of the combined arms battalion staff. The AMDO should work closely with
the S2 during the IPB process and is best suited to prepare and brief the air IPB. Airspace or
the aerial dimension of the battlefield is the most dynamic and fast-paced of the three
dimensions. The most significant threats that must be evaluated at the combined arms
battalion level for aerial IPB are UAVs, fixed-wing aircraft, and rotary-wing aircraft.

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 Combat Support Operations

9-181. The AMDO’s mission analysis should cover the following areas:
Air threat overview. Air avenues of approach, type of air threat, probable threat
objective, and potential to support the maneuver forces.
Specified, implied, and essential tasks. From the air defense perspective (for
example, early warning).
Constraints and restrictions. Initial air defense warning status, weapons control
status, and systems limitations.
Forces available. SHORAD, HIMAD, and sensor coverage.
Platoon status. Personnel, maintenance posture, weapons status, and missile
supply.
Issues. Coordination with brigade (for example, missile supply).
9-182. The AMDO also performs the following duties:
Assists the S3 in planning and executing the air defense portion of the operation.
Advises the commander and S3 on the employment of air defense assets.
Coordinates with the S3, FSO, and ALO for the appropriate air defense posture and
A2C2.
Controls integration of air defense elements and early warning systems.
Recommends priorities to the commander:
Threat: Reverse target value analysis.
Criticality: Force or asset that is essential to mission accomplishment.
Vulnerability: Susceptibility to surveillance and attack.
Recouperability: In terms of time and equipment.
9-183. The AMDO/platoon leader is also responsible for the execution of the air defense
plan. He must monitor the positioning and coverage provided by his platoon and other
assets, recommending changes to the plan based on the enemy threat and changes in the
scheme of maneuver. FBCB2/BFT allows the AMDO to track his platoon assets visually to
ensure proper position and coverage for the protected force. In most situations, the
information provided by FBCB2/BFT allows the supporting platoon to perform a general
support mission to the combined arms battalion rather than task organizing the platoon to
the maneuver company teams. This allows the AMDO to command and control the
supporting assets and frees subordinate company team commanders of this requirement.

OFFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
9-184. In offensive operations, air defense units move so they are best positioned to protect
the supported force. Weighting the main effort must be considered. The air defense plan
must support the supported commander’s scheme of maneuver. Air defense priorities are
established to ensure effective and continuous support for the offensive operation. Bradley
Stinger fighting vehicles (BSFVs) or Linebackers normally accompany the main body or
combined arms battalion reserve, but ultimately, BSFV or Linebacker positioning is
determined by the factors of METT-TC. The BSFV or Linebacker platoon normally provides
direct support coverage to the combined arms battalion. Priorities for protection may include
maneuver elements, fire support, engineer elements, C2 nodes, and logistics assets. Unit
SOP and mission-specific IPB developed during the planning process determine priorities for
air defense for each mission.

DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS
9-185. The air defense plan must address air defense coverage during all phases of the
defense. The number one challenge to the Linebacker platoon is to deny the enemy’s use of
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) air assets. SHORAD assets focus

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on the main air avenues of approach. Lateral coordination with adjacent units is required to
preclude gaps in the defense. The 25mm automatic gun and 7.62mm coaxial machinegun on
the Linebacker may be used against ground targets for self-defense. Normally, in a
counterattack, Linebackers travel with the counterattack force or operate from overwatch
positions to protect the counterattack force from enemy aerial platforms.

AIR DEFENSE TYPES

9-186. The HBCT combined arms battalion AMDO adapts the air defense posture based on
the type of supporting assets the HBCT has attached. The combined arms battalion always
uses a combination of active and passive measures to protect itself against air attack.

ACTIVE AIR DEFENSE

9-187. Active air defense is direct action taken by all weapon platforms to destroy enemy
aircraft or reduce their effectiveness in the delivery of aerial munitions or forces. For
example, a large volume of fire from organic small arms (M4, M16, M249, M240, and caliber
.50) can destroy attacking aircraft or disrupt their attack. Tank main guns and Bradley
25mm guns can also engage attacking rotary-wing aircraft effectively. Specifically, the
proximity fuze in the M830A1 multipurpose antitank (AT) round can sense an air target and
cause detonation as the round nears the aircraft. (See general rules for engaging aircraft in
FM 44-8, Combined Arms for Air Defense.)

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

9-188. The two types of passive air defense measures are cover and concealment and
damage limitation. Cover and concealment is used to avoid being detected by the enemy.
Damage-limiting measures are taken to avoid damage from air attack, such as vehicle
dispersion, camouflage, and dug-in fighting positions with overhead protection.

AIR DEFENSE WARNINGS AND WEAPONS CONTROL STATUS

9-189. HBCT combined arms battalion leaders should ensure their subordinates understand
the air threat and air threat warning conditions.
9-190. Air defense conditions are stated in the OPORD:
Red indicates the attack is imminent by hostile aircraft or missiles.
Yellow indicates that an attack is probable by hostile aircraft or missiles.
White indicates that an attack is not likely by hostile aircraft or missiles.
9-191. A local air defense warning (LADW) describes the air threat in the immediate area
(Figure 9-6). LADWs are designed to alert a particular unit, several units, or an area of the
battlefield of an impending air attack. Units use LADWs to alert Army units about the state
of the air threat in terms of “right here and right now.” They can be used in conjunction with
air defense warnings (ADWs). Examples of LADWs follow:
Dynamite indicates an attack is in progress.
Look out indicates an attack is possible.
Snowman indicates an attack is not likely.

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 Combat Support Operations

Figure 9-6. Air Defense Early Warning

9-192. Weapons control status (WCS) determines the conditions for using weapons against
enemy aircraft:
Weapons free. Soldiers may fire at any target not positively recognized as
friendly.
Weapons tight. Soldiers may fire only at targets recognized as hostile.
Weapons hold. Soldiers do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal
order.

AIR DEFENSE ASSETS

9-193. The following assets may be attached to support the HBCT combined arms battalion
as part of an attached platoon:
Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle. The BSFV provides the air defender with armor
protection and gives him the ability to maneuver with the supported force and
position the Stinger system forward on the battlefield. The Stinger team must
dismount to fire its missiles. The BSFV carries a basic load of six Stinger missiles
as its primary air defense weapon. The BSFV’s 25mm chain gun can be used to
augment the Stinger and cover dead space to a range of 2,000 meters. The vehicle
also carries five TOW missiles.
Bradley Linebacker. The Bradley Linebacker replaces the BSFV’s TOW system with
four ready-to-fire Stinger missiles housed in the standard vehicle-mounted
launcher (SVML). The Bradley Linebacker, with its ability to shoot on the move,
eliminates the need for the Stinger team to dismount from the vehicle, providing a
significantly increased capability over the BSFV.
Avenger. The Avenger weapon system is a lightweight, day or night, limited
adverse-weather firing unit employed to counter low-altitude aerial threats
mounted on a high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). The fire
unit has two turret-mounted SVMLs, a .50 caliber machinegun (M3P), a forward-
looking infrared (FLIR) sight, a laser rangefinder (LRF), and an identification,
friend or foe (IFF). The gyrostabilized turret is mounted on the HMMWV. The fire
unit can launch a missile or fire the machinegun on the move or from a stationary
position with the gunner in the turret. It can also be remotely operated from a
location up to 50 meters away. Onboard communications equipment provides for

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radio and intercom operations. The system is capable of climbing a 31-degree slope
at 4 mph and traversing a 22-degree side slope from either side of the vehicle.
Stinger missile. The Stinger is a short-range, heat-seeking guided missile that can be
either shoulder-fired (MANPADS) or fired from the SVML on the Bradley
Linebacker. It is designed to counter the threat of advance helicopters, UAVs,
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), high speed maneuvering aircraft, and cruise
missiles. The Stinger has a range in excess of 4 kilometers.
Man-portable system. The Stinger can be employed as a man-portable air defense
system (MANPADS). The two-man Stinger team, consisting of a gunner and a team
chief, is transported in a HMMWV or BSFV.

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 Chapter 10
Sustaining Operations

The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion

requires independent logistical systems and procedures, and this
requirement poses new challenges for sustaining functions and leaders.
With the development of new digital methods of sharing information such
as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System
and Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), leaders at
battalion and company levels can provide the foresight and
responsiveness necessary to anticipate and maintain the high operations
tempo of battalion operations. The concepts and organizational structures
found in this chapter reflect a paradigm shift from the supply-based
sustaining system of the Army of Excellence (AOE) to a technology-
enhanced, distribution-based sustaining system. A distribution-based
logistics system combines information capabilities with efficient delivery
systems to form an efficient distribution pipeline. Direct throughput of
supplies from the UEx and brigade combat team (BCT) to the battalion or
company team is the rule rather than the exception with distribution-
based logistics. The forward support company (FSC) is the cornerstone of
the distribution-based logistics system. Essentially all the logistical
elements that were in the AOE combined arms battalion headquarters
company (except medical) are now organized as part of the FSC found in
the HBCT combined arms battalion.

SECTION I – SUSTAINING OPERATIONS AND ORGANIZATION

10-1. As much as possible, the burden of sustaining operations is removed from the company
commander and placed under the control of the combined arms battalion. The maneuver
company commander concentrates on fighting his unit to accomplish the tactical mission.
The sustainment responsibility at company level is primarily to report status, supervise
operator-level maintenance, request support, and ensure that sustaining operations are
properly executed in the company’s area.

OVERVIEW
10-2. Regardless of the brigade sustainment structure, the battalion commander ensures
that support is provided not only for his organic and attached elements but for any
supporting units as well. The battalion S4 coordinates support for the attachments and
verifies who is to provide this sustainment and how support for attachments is to be
requested. When a large unit attachment joins the HBCT combined arms battalion, the
attachment should bring an appropriate slice of support assets from its parent unit. These
sustainment assets are controlled by the FSC commander like the rest of the combined arms
battalion sustainment elements. The attached unit leader must coordinate with the heavy
combined arms battalion S1 and furnish him a copy of his unit battle roster as well as
provide the combined arms battalion S4 the status of all key elements of equipment.

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Thereafter, the attached unit submits reports and requests for resupply according to the
HBCT combined arms battalion standing operating procedures (SOP).
10-3. In heavy combined arms battalions, sustainment assets are assigned to the FSC, except
for the medical platoon, which is assigned to the headquarters company. The focal point for
combat service support (CSS) is at the battalion combat trains command post (CTCP). The
CTCP, under the supervision of the battalion S4, anticipates, requests, coordinates, and
supervises execution of CSS either by headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) or
FSC assets (Figure 10-1).

Figure 10-1.CSS Operations Brigade and Below for BCT

10-4. Key sustainment functions include logistics support (supply, transportation,

maintenance, and field services), human resource support (personnel, legal, religious, and
public affairs) and force health protection (FHP) (treatment, evacuation, medical supply, and
preventive medicine).
10-5. Major logistics functions include the following:
Supply. The supply function acquires, receives, and issues all classes of supply
required by the HBCT combined arms battalion.
Transportation. The transportation function moves units, personnel, equipment,
and supplies as required to support the concept of operations.
Maintenance. The maintenance function keeps equipment and weapons in a
serviceable, operational condition and conducts battle damage assessment (BDA)
and repair as necessary.

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 Sustaining Operations

Field services. This function includes graves registration, clothing exchange, bath,
salvage, laundry, textile renovation, airdrop and airlift, and bakery.
Human resources (HR). HR includes a variety of functions that support a
commander’s ability to accomplish his mission and contribute to the welfare and
morale of the soldier.
10-6. Major HR functions include the following:
Personnel and administration services, which include strength and personnel
accountability, replacement operations, casualty reporting, casualty tracking,
awards and decorations, and personnel management.
Chaplain activities, which include conduct of services, personal and religious
counseling, and pastoral care.
Legal services.
Finance services.
Public affairs.
Postal services.
Enemy prisoner of war (EPW) accountability and support.
10-7. Major force health protection functions include the following:
Treatment to include Level II medical treatment facility (MTF), deployment of
treatment teams for Level I area support and may be augmented with Level II plus
treatment (Level II plus is provided by a forward surgical team).
Medical evacuation (organic ground ambulance and air ambulances in direct
support from the aviation brigade, general support aviation battalion, air
ambulance company).
Preventive medicine.
Operational dental care (routine and emergency care).
Combat operational stress control.
Class VIII resupply support and blood at the BSMC Level II MTF.
Patient holding.
10-8. The heavy combined arms battalion receives service support from various elements,
depending on the sustainment organizational structure at brigade and UEx level. The
battalion XO is responsible for coordinating all sustainment in the heavy combined arms
battalion, and the S4 identifies the logistical requirements for maneuver plans and provides
the requirements to the FSC commander. The FSC provides all support (less medical) to the
heavy combined arms battalion and is the sustainment operator at the battalion level. The
principal source of external support to the combined arms battalion is the brigade support
battalion (BSB). It is organized with a headquarters company, maintenance company,
distribution company, and a medical company to provide direct support (DS) as well as
centralized sustainment support to the BCT. Additional sustainment must be requested from
a UEx-level sustainment brigade.
10-9. The increasing use of assured communications and improvements in digital
information technology provide the sustainment operator (FSC commander) and the
battalion S4 the information dominance and digital tools needed to tailor the support
package. Through near-real-time information, the combined arms battalion battle staff is
able to make timely adjustments in its support requirements. BCS3 and FBCB2 are combat
multipliers that provide logistics status and information in support of sustainment planning
and operations. BCS3 receives subordinate unit logistical reports from combined arms
battalion FBCB2 terminals, and it transmits reports and requirements to echelons-above-
brigade support elements. The S1 and S4 link their FBCB2 terminal to the brigade BCS3.
They use this terminal to input data into the BCS3 network to conduct personnel

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transactions and to coordinate and receive supplies. The very small aperture terminal
(VSAT) (laptop computer) links Unit-Level Logistics System-Ground (ULLS-G) with the
national supply management systems to provide immediate feedback on Class IX
requisitions. Supplies and other sustainment services are requested by using Standard Army
Management Information System (STAMIS) such as ULLS-G, Standard Army Retail Supply
System (SARSS), Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), Supply Property Book
System-Revision (SPBS-R), Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support-Assemblage
Management, and Theater Army Medical Management Information Systems (TAMMIS)
Customer Assistance Module (TCAM) as well as Standard Installation Personnel System
(SIDPERS) for human resource transactions. The battalion S1 also uses the nonsecure
internet protocol router network (NIPRNET) to access electronic military personnel office (e-
MILPO) operations to conduct routine personnel transactions. The battalion S1 and S4 use
their FBCB2 logistics reports to provide input to both the brigade S1 and S4 as well as the
combined arms battalion FSC.

SUSTAINMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
10-10. The primary sustainment functions required by the HBCT combined arms battalion
include casualty treatment and evacuation, resupply operations, maintenance activities, and
human resource support. The combined arms battalion S1 and S4 sections collocate to form
the rear CP in the CTCP. The following have the primary responsibility for sustainment:
S1 Section. The S1 section is responsible for human resource management and the
general administration of the combined arms battalion. The S1 is assisted by the
senior human relations sergeant and the human resources NCOs. The S1 section
has personnel at both the CTCP and the combined arms battalion support area
(CABSA). The S1 and his staff in the CTCP primarily perform the critical tasks of
strength accountability and casualty reporting as well as CP functions. The S1
personnel in the CABSA perform replacement operations, administrative services,
personnel actions, legal services, and finance services. The S1 also has primary
staff responsibility for EPW accountability and medical planning. He coordinates
with the S2 (forward in main CP) for interrogation of prisoners and the S4 for
processing captured equipment and transportation requirements. The S1
coordinates with the medical platoon leader to ensure that patient treatment,
evacuation, and accountability are planned and coordinated throughout the HBCT
combined arms battalion area.
Medical platoon. The HHC medical platoon sorts, treats, and evacuates casualties
or returns them to duty. It stocks medical supplies for the HBCT combined arms
battalion and provides all Class VIII support. It is also responsible for maintaining
and evacuating battalion medical equipment. The evacuation section’s survivability
and mobility are increased by the use of M113 track ambulances. The medical
platoon leader (the battalion surgeon), with the aid of a physician’s assistant and
field medical assistant, operate the BAS. The field medical assistant, a Medical
Service Corps officer, coordinates the operations, administration, and logistics of
the medical platoon. His duties include planning, coordinating, and synchronizing
FHP operations in the battalion and with the brigade support medical company
(BSMC). He also coordinates for patient evacuation and ensures FHP coverage for
the company teams.
S4 section. The S4 focuses on planning sustainment operations, identifying
requirements, and coordinating for support through the FSC commander. The S4
concentrates on seven classes of supply: Classes I, II, III, IV, V, VII, and IX. The
FSC distribution platoon leader coordinates the requisition, receipt, preparation,
and delivery of Classes I, III, and V. This is done at the direction of the FSC
commander. The supply section of the distribution platoon coordinates the

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 Sustaining Operations

requisition, receipt, and delivery of Classes II, IV, VII, and IX. The S4 section
coordinates for maps and water while the distribution platoon manages battalion
stockage and distribution of water and maps.
Water is obtained from the water supply point in or near the combined arms
battalion support area or from forward sources tested and approved by the
supporting preventive medicine element.
Maps are stocked by a UEx-level sustainment brigade, and they are requested
through the BSB. The S2 is responsible for distributing maps as required.
Classified maps are obtained through G2 channels.

FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY

10-11. The FSC commander is the sustainment operator for the HBCT combined arms
battalion. The FSC is tasked and emplaced by the combined arms battalion commander. The
FSC provides field maintenance and all classes of supply, minus medical, to the combined
arms battalion while the battalion headquarters company medical platoon provides Level I
medical support to the supporting FSC. The FSCs accomplish their core functions through
centralization of support. Centralization of support accomplishes the dual functions of
providing the combined arms battalion commander with greater mobility as well as
increased efficiency and effectiveness in the flow of support and supplies. Centralized
support allows the BSB commander to cross level between forward support and weight the
battle logistically or surge, as required. Centralization of support is enhanced through
employment of maturing technology available to the UEx logisticians. The FSC has the
capability to command, control, and integrate attached support units from UEx or UEy.
Equipped with FBCB2, the FSC has the capability to provide near-real-time information on
the battlefield, which greatly assists in the support effort.
10-12. The FSC is a multifunctional unit that includes a food service section, distribution
platoon, and maintenance platoon organized to provide support to a combined arms
battalion. Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), the FSC is located 4 to 12 kilometers behind
its supported HBCT combined arms battalion in the CABSA. The maneuver unit company
supply sergeants are located in the CABSA with the FSC and the battalion S4
noncommissioned officer in charge NCOIC. They assemble company logistics packages
(LOGPACs), preconfigured company combat loads, and then move their vehicles forward to
the logistics release point. The company first sergeant (1SG) or his representative meets the
LOGPACs and guide them to the company resupply point.
10-13. Based on METT-TC, the S4 has the flexibility to locate the unit maintenance
collection point (UMCP) recovery, emergency resupply of Class III and V, and other assets
throughout the battalion area of operation (AO). The battalion also normally locates its aid
station (Level I medical treatment facility (MTF)) within the combat trains for force
protection and proximity considerations. Maintenance support teams from the FSC are
habitually associated with each company under the supervision of the company 1SG and
technical supervision of the maintenance control officer. The 1SG also has under his control
the combat medical team with armored ambulance capability from the HHC in the combat
trains. Casualties are evacuated by track ambulance to the casualty collection point (CCP)
where they are consolidated and further evacuated back to Level I MTF/BAS. The balance of
the maintenance platoon operates under the direction of the maintenance platoon leader at
the CABSA.
10-14. There is no dedicated medical support to the FSC, and therefore, the medical field
assistant and the FSC commander must coordinate medical coverage for both the CABSA as
well as the elements at the combat trains.

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FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY ORGANIZATION

FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY HEADQUARTERS SECTION

10-15. This section coordinates and provides technical supervision for the FSC’s
sustainment mission (Figures 10-2 and 10-3). This mission includes DS supply, field
maintenance and recovery operations, the coordination of transportation and field/food
services. The FSC performs the following general tasks:
Coordinates and provides technical support to the combined arms battalion.
Advises the combined arms battalion commander on sustainment requirements
versus available assets.
Determines sustainment requirements in coordination with the BSB operations
section, combined arms battalion S4, and logistics representatives from attached
units.
Provides input to the combined arms battalion logistics estimate and service
support paragraph of the operation order (OPORD).
Plans and monitors support operations and makes necessary adjustments to ensure
support requirements are met.
Plans and coordinates allocation of available CSS resources.
Tracks available assets through subordinate company teams, BSB support
operations section, combined arms battalion S4, and other units.
Requests backup support when needed.
Recommends support priorities and enforces priorities received from higher
headquarters.
Coordinates with the S3, S4 and HHC commander on CABSA locations.
Plans and executes contingency operations as required.
Coordinates with the S3 and S4 on primary and alternate routes into the combined
arms battalion support area.
Establishes and monitors brigade and battalion logistics situation report
(LOGSITREP), logistics status (LOGSTAT), and logistics spot reports in accordance
with an SOP.
Plans future logistics operations in coordination with the S4.
Develops and maintains tactical and CSS overlays.
Develops the CSS synchronization matrix.
Keeps the BSB abreast of the logistics situation and future support requirements.

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 Sustaining Operations

Figure 10-2. Forward Support Company Doctrinal Template

10-16. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander must ensure that the FSC is tightly
integrated into the combined arms battalion’s operations as the battalion commander is
responsible for the positioning, movement, and external security of the FSC.
10-17. The BSB provides limited backup support to the FSC when requirements exceed its
capabilities. The CSS structure’s capability to project, receive, and support the HBCT
combined arms battalion directly affects the effectiveness of the combined arms battalion
and its ability to accomplish its mission.

FOOD SERVICE SECTION

10-18. The FSC food service section provides Class I food service and food preparation (from
the CABSA). The food service section can prepare and deliver hot meals to the maneuver
company teams. It distributes prepackaged food, prepared food, or both from the CABSA. It
can provide one heat-and-serve meal and one cook-prepared (A or B ration) meal per day.

DISTRIBUTION PLATOON
10-19. The distribution platoon provides supply and transportation support to the HBCT
combined arms battalion. It has a platoon headquarters section, Class III transportation
section, general supply section, and Class V transportation section.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 10-3. Forward Support Company

Platoon Headquarters Section

10-20. The distribution platoon headquarters section manages the distribution of supplies
coming from or passing through the FSC in support of the HBCT combined arms battalion.
The section utilizes ULLS-G/SAMS-1 to provide supply receipt and issue management for all
classes of supplies except Class VIII (medical—managed by the medical platoon). This
facilitates on-site item management. This section performs the following functions:
Operates the ULLS-G/SAMS-1 (Note that the ULLS-G/SAMS-1 will be replaced by
SAMS-1E that does both functions as well as receipt processing of supplies
(SARSS).)
Maintains a current listing for all on-hand commodities.
Processes receipts, issues, and turn-ins.
Processes turn-ins to maintenance (for repairable items).
Establishes facilities for limited storage, receipt, and issue of all supported
commodities.
Performs limited storage, receipt, and issue of all supported commodities.
Delivers issued assets (LOGPAC) and pickup retrogrades (turn-ins to maintenance
or for disposal).

Distribution Section
10-21. The distribution section is responsible for supporting all classes of supply (except
Class IX) coming from or passing through the FSC in support of a heavy combined arms
battalion. This includes retail refuel operations from organic assets and ammunition
resupply. The distribution section has the ability to conduct simultaneous Class III and V

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 Sustaining Operations

support to the company teams, HHC, and the FSC itself. The platoon is equipped with the
following (the number of personnel and trucks varies slightly in each section based on the
augmentation from the HBCT BSB):
Palletized load system (PLS) trucks.
2,500-gallon fuel truck tankers.
Family of medium tactical vehicles cargo trucks.

MAINTENANCE PLATOON
10-22. The maintenance platoon provides field maintenance to the HBCT combined arms
battalion. The platoon has a headquarters section, maintenance control section,
service/recovery section, maintenance section, and company field maintenance teams (FMTs)
(mechanized/armor/engineer). The maintenance platoon provides C2 and reinforcing
maintenance to the FMTs. The FMTs provide field maintenance and battle damage
assessment and repair (BDAR) forward to the company teams. As the FSC commander task
organizes the support force, all or part of an FMT goes with the company teams to maintain
habitual support. The platoon maintains a limited quantity of combat spares (prescribed load
list (PLL) and shop/bench stock) in the maintenance control section. The maintenance
platoon operates the unit maintenance collection point in the combat trains or combined
arms battalion support area, depending on METT-TC (most often in combat trains). The
maintenance platoon performs field maintenance on all HBCT combined arms battalion
equipment as far forward as the situation allows (except communications security
(COMSEC) and medical equipment). When a company is detached from the battalion, the
FSC commander detaches a supporting maintenance package that includes the personnel,
tools, test equipment, and PLL stocks necessary to support the company.

Headquarters Section
10-23. The maintenance platoon headquarters section provides command, control, and
supervision for all administrative functions of the platoon. With guidance from the FSC
commander, the headquarters section monitors established maintenance priorities, provide
recommendations for reinforcing support, as well as plans and conducts all necessary
training activities.

Maintenance Control Section

10-24. The maintenance control section is the primary manager for all field maintenance in
the HBCT combined arms battalion. The maintenance control section performs all of The
Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) and dispatching operations and tracks
scheduled services for the combined arms battalion using ULLS-G. All company team ULLS-
G boxes and PLL clerks are collocated with the maintenance control section. The
maintenance control officer manages the ULLS-G operators. The ULLS-G clerks operating
each company box process each DA Form 5988-E (Equipment Inspection Maintenance
Worksheet) completed by the operator or crew and verified by the FMT. The maintenance
control section is normally located in the CABSA.

Maintenance Section
10-25. The maintenance section provides field maintenance for the HBCT combined arms
battalion. The section also provides maintenance support to elements attached to the
combined arms battalion and provides reinforcing maintenance to the FMTs. The
maintenance section is split with elements at the combat trains and CABSA.

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Service/Recovery Section
10-26. The service/recovery section provides recovery support to elements of the combined
arms battalion. This section also provides limited reinforcing recovery support to FMTs. The
major equipment in this section consists of welding shops, wheeled wreckers, and M88
armored recovery vehicles. When reinforcing recovery support is required, FMTs request
support from the maintenance control section.

Company Field Maintenance Teams

10-27. The HBCT combined arms battalion’s first level of support comes from the FMTs,
which are organized to provide field maintenance (organizational and DS maintenance
levels) for all combat platforms organic to the companies (mechanized/armor/engineer). The
company commander sets the FMT’s priorities for his company, and the FMT operates under
the control of the company 1SG while supervised by the FMT maintenance NCOIC. FMTs
carry limited onboard combat spares to help facilitate repairs forward. If inoperable
equipment is not repairable by the FMT, due either to METT-TC or a lack of repair parts,
the FMT uses recovery assets to recover the equipment to the UMCP or designated linkup
point. FMTs are fully integrated into the combined arms units operational plans. Major
equipment in the FMT includes the following:
M113 personnel carrier.
M88A2 recovery vehicle.
5-ton cargo truck.
Contact maintenance truck.
Forward repair system.

SECTION II. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

10-28. At the tactical level, CSS elements provide centralized support that is coordinated
and tailored for the warfighter. They control austere supply inventories and the
maintenance, transportation, personnel, medical, finance, and field service capabilities
necessary to satisfy specific tactical requirements. Digital information systems (BCS-3)
enable the sustainment leadership in the HBCT combined arms battalion to anticipate,
diagnose, and monitor the status, control, and flow of support assets that are required to
support the immediate CSS situation. This information is essential during deployment as
the organization arrives in its assigned AO. (See Appendix H, Deployment.) Even with these
advanced capabilities, the combat service support system is challenged to sustain the HBCT
combined arms battalion in full spectrum operations. This section addresses the six essential
support (sustainment) functions of ordnance, supply, maintenance, transportation, field
services, and human resource operations.

ORDNANCE OPERATIONS (CLASS V)

10-29. Units report on-hand ammunition status to the 1SG, with an information copy going
to the company commander. The 1SG consolidates the unit’s on-hand quantities and
forwards them to the S4 using FM radio, hard copy turned in at the logistics release point
(LRP), or using rollup procedures in the LOGSTAT in FBCB2, with information copies to the
FSC. Company commanders indicate in their LOGSITREP any critical ammunition
shortages or forecasted changes in ammunition requirements. By continuously analyzing the
combined arms battalion ammunition status, the S4 can recommend cross leveling between
companies or request for additional Class V from the CABSA. The CABSA CP determines
whether the request can be filled at its level. If so, it tasks the distribution platoon to supply
and deliver the Class V. If the FSC cannot fill the request from CABSA stocks, it forwards
the request to the BSB support operations officer (SPO) located at the brigade support area

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 Sustaining Operations

(BSA). (Refer to Figure 10-4 for an example of Class V distribution to the HBCT combined
arms battalion.)
10-30. The S4 determines when there is a change in mission or continuous support
ammunition resupply requirements based on information provided in the situation report
(SITREP), LOGSTAT, and guidance received from the HBCT combined arms battalion
commander and S3.
10-31. The S4 ascertains whether the request is normal resupply or an emergency
requirement. Submission of daily LOGSTATs in accordance with unit SOPs addresses
normal resupply, although the S4 may submit a request to the brigade
administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC)/BSB support operations.
10-32. The S4 submits company rollups for ammunition resupply to the brigade S4 through
the battalion LOGSTAT report. The brigade S4 consolidates the ammunition requests and
passes the consolidated request to the support operations officer located in the supporting
BSB. The BSB SPO then requests the ammunition support from the UEx ammunition officer
located in the Class V section of the UEx support operations section.

Figure 10-4. Class V Resupply

SUPPLY OPERATIONS (CLASS III, BULK)

10-33. The BSB is responsible for receipt, storage, issue, quality control, delivery, and
dispensing of Class III(B). It provides direct support resupply to the FSCs and area support
to brigade units. It provides a normal half-day supply to the FSCs using supply point
distribution.
10-34. The FSC distribution platoon is responsible for delivery of Class III(B) to the HBCT
combined arms battalion. The FSC’s heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs)
conduct resupply fuel operations for the companies.

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FMI 3-90.5

10-35. Fuel status is initiated at the platoon or company level and reported to the 1SG.
Information copies are furnished to commanders at each echelon. The 1SG consolidates on-
hand quantities and submits the fuel status to the battalion S4, with an information copy to
the FSC support operations section via FBCB2. In the absence of reports, the S1, S4, and
FSC should anticipate unit requirements when assembling LOGPACs.
10-36. The battalion S4s submit their forecasts and status reports to the brigade S4 and the
FSC, which in turn pass the request along to the BSB SPO. The BSB support operations
section submits the consolidated forecast and requirements to the UEx G4 fuels operations
section.
10-37. For emergency resupply, the units request fuel via FM voice on the battalion
administrative/logistics net followed with an FBCB2 call for support (CFS) (if equipped). If
the FSC cannot fill the request, it forwards the request to the BSB support operations
section with a copy to the brigade S1/S4. (Refer to Figure 10-5 for an example of Class III(B)
distribution to the combined arms battalion.)

Figure 10-5. Class III(B) Resupply

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS
10-38. The overarching principle of performing maintenance as far forward as possible on
the battlefield remains unchanged in HBCT combined arms battalion operations. Mechanics
accomplish their mission by using advanced diagnostics and prognostics to diagnose the
major component fault and then replace the component under the replace-forward concept.
Replace forward focuses on on-system maintenance tasks or those tasks that can be
performed at the breakdown site (if possible) or at the UMCP. An operator performs
preventive maintenance checks and service (PMCS), and the faults are transmitted using
electronic technical manual-interface (ETM-I). Depending on the urgency of the fault, the
operator may notify the company FMT via FM radio or FBCB2 (if equipped). The FMT

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 Sustaining Operations

diagnoses the fault and identifies the Class IX required. If the part is on hand, the FMT
repairs the fault. If the part is not on hand, a request is passed to the FSC maintenance
control section in the CABSA. The maintenance control section determines whether the part
is on hand in the supporting PLLs. If on-hand, it is released; if not, the maintenance control
section requests the part via ULLS-G or SAMS. These requests are forwarded to the
SARSS-1 located in the BSB (Refer to Figure 10-6 for typical maintenance communication
flow within the UEx).

Figure 10-6. Maintenance Communication Flow

COMPANY FIELD MAINTENANCE TEAMS

10-39. The FMTs are the first level of support for the HBCT combined arms battalions. If
the time, tools, test equipment, and parts are available, the team repairs the equipment,
returning it to mission-capable status. Most of the support during combat, however, consists
of BDAR, diagnostics, and on-system maintenance through the replacement of line
replacement unit (LRU) components. The FMTs operate from the combat trains and directly
support the company team. The FMT NCOIC, who coordinates all support requirements
with the company team, controls the movement of the FMTs as directed by the company
1SG. The FMTs respond to the company’s voice or FBCB2 (if equipped) requests for support.
The FMTs do not carry large quantities of Class IX but do carry limited combat spares and
selected LRUs (tailored to their supported unit) to facilitate repairs forward. When the
workload exceeds the FMTs’ capabilities, they request reinforcement through the
maintenance platoon’s maintenance control section located in the UMCP or combined arms
battalion support area. The maintenance platoon provides limited Class IX support and can
provide additional repair and recovery support.

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FMI 3-90.5

MAINTENANCE PLATOON
10-40. The maintenance platoon (minus) is positioned in the UMCP to provide C2 and
backup maintenance to the company FMTs. Backup maintenance support is provided to the
FSC by the balance of the maintenance platoon at the CABSA. Additionally, the BSB can
provide a combat authorized stockage list (ASL) that includes major assemblies, key fighting
vehicle LRU components and may position maintenance assets from the BSB maintenance
company forward in the CABSA.

TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS
10-41. The FSC is responsible for the movement, materiel management, and maintenance
evacuation functions for the HBCT combined arms battalion. The S4 coordinates with either
the CABSA CP to synchronize the delivery of all classes of supply with units. Requirements
not within the CABSA capabilities are transferred to the BSB SPO. The combined arms
battalion CTCP schedules and synchronizes transportation support. The CABSA CP
coordinates inbound and outbound shipments with the BSB movement control NCO.
10-42. FBCB2 allows for the connectivity and visibility of assets and support for current and
future operations. Additionally, the Movements Tracking System (MTS) provides near-real-
time visibility of the Global Positioning System (GPS) location of the transportation
resources throughout the BSA.
10-43. The battalion S3 plans, coordinates, and controls tactical movement for the HBCT
combined arms battalion. The battalion S3 plans unit movements, and the S4 normally
coordinates them. The S4 is the logistical movement manager for the combined arms
battalion.
10-44. The FSC distribution platoon provides the primary source of transportation and
executes transportation missions for the HBCT combined arms battalion. The S4
consolidates support requirements and passes them to the CABSA CP for execution. The S4
also maximizes the use of returning vehicles by coordinating with company to return
recoverable parts to the CABSA.
10-45. When units require additional transportation support, they submit a request to the
S4. The S4 coordinates with either the FSC CP or coordinates with the BSB support
operations section for additional assets if required. Information is also provided to the
brigade S4 so that he has overall knowledge of activity within his respective area.

SUPPLY AND FIELD SERVICES OPERATIONS

10-46. Sustainment functions include Classes I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX, plus field
services (bath and laundry), religious, postal, finance, and legal services.

CLASS I
10-47. The food service section (from the FSC) provides consolidated food preparation for the
HBCT combined arms battalion. The FSC has the ability to prepare meals forward in each
company team area based on METT-TC; however, the food service section normally operates
from the CABSA. The food service section cooks unitized group ration A (UGR-A) or B (UGR-
B) or heats the heat-and-serve meal in its organic mobile kitchen. Food can be packed in
insulated food containers and sent with the LOGPACs to company team locations where
company team soldiers serve the meals.
10-48. The supported force’s head count determines the quantity of rations requested.
Platoons transmit head counts for rations through the company to the battalion S4. The S4
consolidates all subordinate unit head counts and transmits the total projected head count to

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 Sustaining Operations

the FSC for LOGPAC build. (Refer to Figure 10-7 for an example of the typical Class I
distribution system.)
10-49. When the unit is engaged in combat, the ration-supplement health care package
(HCP) is usually issued with the rations. These supplement HCPs should not be confused
with Class VI supplies, which include toilet articles and confections.
10-50. There is no organic water purification capability within the FSC. In the brigade, the
BSB can purify water, store it as well as distribute it in hardwall tankers. Maneuver
company supply sergeants are required to fill their water trailers at the CABSA. The BSB
and UEx-level sustainment brigade has the ability to store limited quantities of water in
bags mounted on trailers or in hardwall tankers.

Figure 10-7. Class I Distribution

10-51. The primary method of water distribution is via supply point in the UEx-level
sustainment brigade quartermaster company. (Refer to Figure 10-8 for typical water
distribution operations.) In an arid environment, a UEy-level theater sustainment command
arid environment water team augments the UEx-level sustainment brigade and BSBs to
increase water storage capabilities for water storage and distribution.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 10-8. Water Distribution

10-52. Bottled water may be locally procured or shipped from outside the theater of
operations. Bottled or packaged water is particularly well suited for reception, staging,
onward movement, and integration (RSOI) and initial operations but may be routinely
issued throughout an operation or conflict depending on the situation. It is normally
requisitioned and distributed along with Class I.

CLASSES II, III(P), AND IV

10-53. Classes II, III(P), IV, and unclassified maps include a wide variety of supplies and
equipment from clothing and tools to packaged petroleum products and barrier materials.
Units continue to request supplies and materiel through the appropriate STAMIS (ULLS-S4
to SARSS-1 or Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A)). (Refer to Figure 10-9 for an
example of the typical flow of Class II, III(P) and IV.)
10-54. The FSC distribution platoon maintains limited stockage supporting the HBCT
combined arms battalion. Company 1SGs consolidate requests and pass the requirements to
the company supply sergeant at the CABSA. The supply sergeant submits these requests via
ULLS-S4. Unclassified maps and Class IV barrier materials follow the same requisition flow
as Classes II, III(P), and IV supplies. Maps are issued through supply point distribution to
supported units according to established tables of allowances or to fill special requirements.
Classified maps are handled through S2 channels. Class IV countermobility materials are
throughput to either an engineer pickup point or site of emplacement.

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Figure 10-9. Class II, III(P), and IV Operations

CLASS VI
10-55. Class VI supplies are those items used for personal hygiene, comfort, and welfare.
They include such things as candy, gum, dental care products, soap, and stationery. Initially,
the soldiers carry these personal items with them. As the supply system adjusts to demand,
resupply is by ration-supplement HCP where personal demand items are issued
gratuitously. Issue of Class VI items at battalion level follows SOP (and theater policy),
normally through S4 channels or coincides with the delivery of the Class I LOGPAC. When
the situation permits, tactical field exchanges provide services to specified units or troop
concentrations.

CLASS VII
10-56. Class VII items are intensively managed and are normally command controlled.
Class VII replacements are based on combat losses reported through command or operations
(S3) channels. This permits the commanders at all levels to remain apprised of the
operational status of subordinate equipment. It also ensures distribution of items to those
units having the most critical need. Weapon systems such as tanks are intensively managed
by weapon system replacement operations (WSRO). If the item is a WSRO, the primary
linkup points of the item with its crew may occur in the CABSA or in designated assembly
areas. Class VII requests are filled as combat loss reports and are passed from company level
to the battalion S4. The battalion S4 consolidates the company rollups and submits them to
the brigade S4.

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CLASS VIII
10-57. Class VIII items can be requisitioned as routine resupply or as immediate resupply
by the battalion medical platoon to the medical company in the brigade support battalion
using the automated TCAM.

Routine Requisitions
10-58. Routine requisitions from maneuver battalion medical platoons for Class VIII
resupply are via a digital, voice, or paper request and sent to the highest supporting supply
support agency (SSA) and the medical logistics management center (MLMC). If the Class
VIII digital system TCAM is down, the FBCB2 could be used to a request for Class VIII
supply. Also, voice procedures for requisitioning of Class VIII need to be addressed in the
tactical standing operating procedure (TSOP). For voice, the best method is to establish a 20-
to 30-line sheet with numbered resupply items listed. For example, line 1 would be cravats,
line 2 would be ringers 1000 ml, and so forth. The radio report would be given a standard
report name in the communications SOP. When the individual calls in the request, he would
state “Report XXX, line 1-15, line and so forth.

Emergency Class VIII Requisitions

10-59. Emergency requisitions from combined arms battalion medical platoons are
submitted to the BMSO. If the BMSO is unable to fill the request, the requisition is
forwarded to the highest level supporting SSA and MLMC for action. Emergency requisitions
from BMSO are sent through the BSB support operations medical logistics officer (MLO) to
the highest level supporting medical logistics (MEDLOG) element for immediate resupply.
The MLO maintains a critical shortage list of Class VIII items to ensure visibility of the
requisitions and updates the brigade surgeon section (BSS) daily on the critical Class VIII
items list. This is accomplished utilizing Telnet into TAMMIS. The health services medical
officer of the BMSO maintains a record of the requisition until it is filled and notifies the
MLO when these requisitions are shipped to the requestor. All emergency requests received
by the supporting MEDLOG element are processed for shipment by the most expedient
transportation available. The support operations MLO reports all emergency Class VIII
requests to the HBCT BSS.

Delivery of Class VIII

10-60. Routine delivery of Class VIII to the requesting medical units in the HBCT is
accomplished by LOGPACs and nonmedical transports. Shipment of these Class VIII
LOGPACs from the MEDLOG element is coordinated with the UEx movement control officer
(MCO). The management and intransit visibility of Class VIII delivery is accomplished
through document number, transportation number tracking and radio frequency (RF) tags.
The systems that work together to provide this management and coordination are TAMMIS,
Transportation Coordinator’s Automates Information for Movement System (TC-AIMS),
MTS, and Global Traffic Network (GTN). These systems are located in the MEDLOG
element and the BSB support operations section AO. In some cases, delivery of medical
materials into the HBCT AO may also be achieved through use of the directed Class VIII
resupply using medical evacuation resources that are returning to the HBCT’s medical units.
From the BMSO, delivery of Class VIII to combined arms battalion medical platoons via
LOGPAC or nonmedical transports is coordinated by the BMSO with the BSB MLO. For
directed Class VIII resupply, transmission of data is by FBCB2, voice over internet protocol
(VOIP), joint network node (JNN), mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) or AM radio if
allowed. Note that if MSE is used, the unit must accomplish prior coordination with the
brigade G6 to obtain a net encryption system or other encryption hardware system to send
data. The BMSO uses the current MEDLOG system, FBCB2, radios and telephones, FAX,

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 Sustaining Operations

and TCAMs or GCSS-A for requisitioning and monitoring Class VIII requirements for the
HBCT.

Figure 10-10. Class VIII Resupply Operations at Level I

CLASS IX
10-61. The maintenance control section of the FSC is responsible for combat spares,
including maintaining PLLs and shop supply items. Both of these inventories have different
requirements for adding and maintaining parts on inventory.
10-62. The FSC maintenance control section in the CABSA manages the PLL using the
ULLS-G; it manages the shop stock using the SAMS-1. With the fielding of GCSS-A, the
maintenance modules consolidate ULLS-G and SAMS-1 functionality. This combination
gives the PLL clerks the ability to manage all combat spares for the HBCT combined arms
battalion. Combat spares consist of a broad but shallow inventory of high-use, combat-
essential parts that support the replace-forward maintenance system.
10-63. As mentioned earlier, the maintenance platoon (minus) is positioned behind the
FMTs in the UMCP. This platoon provides C2 and backup maintenance to the FMTs. The
maintenance platoon (minus) also establishes the UMCP.

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10-64. The maintenance platoon provides all TAMMS and coordinates with the UEx-level
sustainment brigade or contractor support for scheduled services for HBCT combined arms
battalion equipment. The platoon focuses on the forward maintenance effort to maintain
maximum combat power. The combined arms battalion XO determines the maintenance
platoon’s priorities to support future operations.
10-65. The maintenance control section receives, stores, and issues combat spares for the
company team.

FIELD SERVICES

Mortuary Affairs
10-66. Unit responsibilities include initial recovery, search, and identification of deceased
personnel. The unit evacuates deceased personnel to the nearest mortuary affairs support
collection point. The unit transmits initial findings of its search-and-recovery teams to the
mortuary affairs team.
The BSB’s support operations section coordinates the transportation of remains
within the BSA. All personal effects found on the remains accompany the deceased
when evacuated.
The recommended method of evacuation of remains is air evacuation in
coordination with the HBCT combined arms battalion S4.
The maneuver unit transmits evacuation requests to the battalion S4. The S4 then
coordinates with the FSC distribution platoon for evacuation.
If evacuation requirements exceed the distribution platoon’s capabilities, the FSC
goes to the BSB support operations section to coordinate for additional lift.

Airdrop
10-67. The unit sends requests for airdrop of supplies or equipment to the battalion S4, who
forwards them to the brigade S4 and BSB support operations section. The brigade S4 and
BSB support operations section coordinate to make the appropriate coordination with the
UEx G3 and G4.

Laundry and Shower

10-68. The unit sends requests for laundry and showers to the battalion S4, who forwards
them to the brigade S4 and BSB support operations section. The brigade S4 and BSB
support operations section coordinate with a UEx- level sustainment brigade support
operations section and the G4.

Religious Support
10-69. The combined arms battalion chaplain is the staff officer responsible for
implementing the religious program. This program includes the following:
Worship opportunities.
Administration of sacraments.
Rites and ordinances.
Pastoral care and counseling.
Development and management of the unit ministry team.
Advice to the commander and staff on matters of morals.
Advice to the commander and staff on matters of morale as affected by religion.
Ministry to casualties, including support of combat shock casualty treatment.

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 Sustaining Operations

10-70. The chaplain’s assistant is trained to assist the battalion chaplain in religious
support and is essential to the religious support mission. The assistant advises the chaplain
on matters of soldier morale and serves as liaison with enlisted soldiers. The chaplain’s
assistant also advises the commander in the absence of the chaplain. The chaplain’s
assistant provides force protection for the unarmed chaplain.

Postal Services
10-71. Mail is the soldier’s link to family and friends. Inefficient distribution of mail can
quickly undermine morale. In the early stages of a conflict, postal services to individuals are
usually restricted to personal mail that conforms to the free mailing privilege. The brigade
S1 establishes a daily mail schedule. Outgoing mail is consolidated at the CABSA human
resources (S1) section before being forwarded to the brigade S1. Battalion S1 personnel drop
outgoing and pick up incoming mail at the brigade S1 section. E-mail service should be made
available to Soldiers in a mature operational environment; however, the battalion
commander must address operations security (OPSEC) considerations associated with
unclassified e-mail.

Finance Services
10-72. The mission of finance support organizations during conflict is to provide high-
priority support to the Soldier on an area basis. This means the same finance unit supports
all Soldiers within a geographical locale, regardless of unit affiliation. During deployments,
mobile pay teams from a UEx-level sustainment brigade finance organization provide
support to the brigade. Individual Soldiers are given the choice of receiving a specified
amount of combat pay or cashing personal checks or other negotiable instruments for the
same specified amount or less. The battalion S1 coordinates with the brigade S1 for the
support of the mobile pay teams.

Legal Services
10-73. Detailed brigade judge advocates provide or coordinate all legal support to the
brigade. Legal NCOs and specialists in the heavy combined arms battalions provide
paralegal support for the battalion. The US Army Trial Judiciary and US Army Trial
Defense Service are independent organizations that provide military judge and trial defense
services to the brigade.

HUMAN RESOURCE OPERATIONS

10-74. Manning the HBCT combined arms battalion is the process of getting the right
Soldier to the right place at the right time and with the right capabilities. The connectivity
between smart cards, BCS3 personnel module, Tactical Personnel System (TPS), the
Integrated Total Army Personnel Database (ITAPDB), e-MILPO and Defense Integrated
Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) on the internet, and FBCB2 enables the S1 to
manage personnel resources through all operational phases. These capabilities provide the
commander with near-real-time personnel information and accurate personnel accounting
and are the foundation for successful casualty operations and replacement operations.

CRITICAL MANNING TASKS.

10-75. Critical manning tasks are predicting, resourcing, monitoring, assessing, and
adjusting. These tasks are iterative and do not follow a prescribed order or sequence.

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Predicting
10-76. The S1 must complete a loss estimate based on enemy and friendly force capabilities.
This estimate provides planning parameters for replacements, medical facility and support
requirements, and graves registration and mortuary affairs assets. Automation allows the
personnel planner to anticipate casualties using the digitized capabilities of the Army
Casualty Information Processing System (ACIPS) and FBCB2 to anticipate casualties.

Resourcing
10-77. S1 planners fill units to their authorized strength according to the commanders’
priorities. This is the commanders’ “troops available” part of the METT-TC formula and is an
essential part of the commanders’ combat power visibility. Troops available include Soldiers,
contractors, civilians, and personnel from other services and forces. The S1 then recommends
available resource allocation of available resources to meet current and future requirements.

Monitoring
10-78. The task of strength monitoring begins with establishing the unit strength baseline.
The battalion S1, under the brigade S1’s direction, manifests all deploying personnel. He
transmits this information to the brigade- and UEx-level personnel operators performing
manning tasks. The deployed database and personnel asset visibility data establishes the
strength baseline. The S1 maintains unit status using manning updates primarily through
standard unit reporting.

Assessing
10-79. The S1 matches current and projected assets required to fight, maintain operations
tempo (OPTEMPO), and achieve operational success. The S1 then determines the personnel
required to maintain combat power in accordance with the commander’s priorities and
intent. He then recommends to the commander the method for individual personnel
replacement.

Adjusting
10-80. While predictive manning is critical to sustaining the future fight, all human
resource leaders must be able to adjust manning plans quickly based on changing needs or
capabilities and to support the commander’s intent.

HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION PERSONNEL ACTIONS

10-81. When soldiers deploy to an AO, the battalion S1 manifests Soldiers to create the
deployed database. Once the S1 establishes that baseline, units can report changes
(exception reporting) to the baseline through a personnel situation report (PERSITREP).

HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION S1 RESPONSIBILITIES

10-82. The S1 is the commander’s principal staff officer for human resource support. He
advises the commander on human resource support matters. FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine,
establishes the foundation for the personnel support activities of personnel organizations
(including S1 sections) and authorities. The S1 coordinates human resource services,
personnel support, finance services, chaplain activities, command information services,
medical services, and legal services support. He prepares the unit human resource support
SOP. In conjunction with the S4, he also prepares the administration and logistics (A/L)
portion of the unit tactical orders. He participates in the OPORD process and develops

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human resource support annex materials. He coordinates human resource support with
other staff elements and pays particular attention to mortuary affairs and medical support.

ADDITIONAL SERVICES
10-83. Personnel (S1) sections provide additional services at the home station. When
deployed, the S1 performs postal operations, essential human resources (awards, promotions,
evaluations, reassignments, and military pay), and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR)
support. To maximize this capability, personnel systems, including TPS, ITAPDB, and the
BCS3 personnel module are utilized.

Before Operations
10-84. The S1 creates a deployed database through the manifest process. Before
deployment, the S1 receives a download of all deploying personnel in the units and uploads
this data into TPS. The S1 or human resource detachment uses TPS, BCS3, and the
Manpower Army Requirements Criteria (MARC) identification (ID) card that all deploying
Soldiers possess to compile a manifest of personnel. A member of the manifest team operates
a TPS terminal on the on-ramp of the transportation asset. As each person enters the
gateway, he inserts his MARC ID card into a scanner. The scanner reads the ID card bar
code and identifies the personnel being deployed. Using the manifests from the different
serials, TPS creates the HBCT combined arms battalion’s deployed database. After
completing the manifest, the S1 produces the deployed personnel roster. The deployed
personnel roster contains the name, grade, battle roster number, duty military occupational
specialty (DMOS), gender, and unit of each individual manifested. TPS sorts this roster by
last name and first name. Key personnel players use this roster to obtain personnel
information on Soldiers. The primary use is to determine a battle roster number for Soldiers,
which enables the completion of duty status reports.

During Operations
10-85. As casualties occur, the platoon sergeant informs the company 1SG of the casualty
via the most expedient method available (FBCB2 or FM voice). Using the PERSITREP, the
1SG submits a duty status change directly to the S1 on all casualties. Attached elements
report to the supported unit for manning activity requirements. Throughout this process, the
S1 can monitor, assess, and adjust the command’s personnel status.

After Operations
10-86. The S1 reviews updated personnel strength figures through FBCB2 or TPS and
reorganizes units based on the commander’s assessment from the strength data. The S1 also
uses TPS data information to decide where to return soldiers to duty or request and assign
replacements. He uses by-name accountability to monitor his manning requirements.
DIMHRS provides data to strategic assignment systems. The S1 updates duty status
changes through FBCB2 or TPS. The S1 depends on his TPS database for detailed personnel
data. The S1 is responsible for tracking Soldier in-patient status when they leave the Level I
medical treatment facility. The S1 uses the Patient Accounting and Reports Real-Time
Tracking System (PARRTS) (used by medical personnel) to track patients evacuated to Level
III combat support hospitals and medical treatment facilities. PARRTS is a web-based Army
program developed by the Patient Administration System and Biostatistics Activity
(PASBA). It offers casualty location and medical condition information. The brigade S1 and
brigade surgeon also use PARRTS to locate and get updates on the condition of HBCT
Soldiers.

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SECTION III – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING

10-87. The battalion S4, S1, FSC commander, and XO are the principal sustainment
planners. The XO, operating from the battalion main CP, monitors sustainment operations
and ensures appropriate synchronization of support. The S4 and S1 and the FSC commander
maintain a continuous CSS estimate during all operations. They use the CSS estimate to
determine CSS capabilities, anticipate support requirements, identify and resolve shortfalls,
and develop support plans. They integrate all planning to develop and synchronize CSS with
maneuver and fire plans. Sustainment planners must thoroughly understand the mission,
tactical plans, and HBCT maneuver battalion commander’s intent. They must know the
following information:
Mission, task organization, and concept of operations for all subordinate units in
the HBCT combined arms battalion.
Brigade sustainment plans.
Known and anticipated branch plans and sequels.
The density of personnel and equipment of each subordinate unit.
Known and anticipated enemy situation and capabilities.
Unit basic loads.
Mission-related consumption rates.

PLANNING OVERVIEW
10-88. Sustainment planners must understand the combined arms battalion’s current and
projected CSS capabilities. They use information collected from operational, personnel, and
logistics reports to determine the personnel, equipment, and supply status of each unit
within the HBCT combined arms battalion. They consider the disposition and condition of all
supporting CSS units as well as individual unit-level capabilities. They analyze this data
and the current situation to determine the HBCT combined arms battalion’s logistical
capabilities and limitations. This data is provided to the commander in the form of a logistics
estimate.

LOGISTICS ESTIMATE
10-89. A logistics estimate is an analysis of logistics factors affecting mission
accomplishment. Logistics planners use these estimates to recommend courses of action
(COAs) and to develop plans to support selected concepts of operation. The key concerns of
combined arms battalion sustainment planners are the status of supply Classes III, IV, and
V and the operational status of tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs), and other combat
vehicles. Logistics estimates at the combined arms battalion level are rarely written. They
are frequently formulated in terms that answer the following questions:
What is the current and projected status of maintenance, supply, and
transportation?
How much of what is needed to support the operation?
How will it get to where it is needed?
What external (BSB) support is needed?
Can the requirements be met using LOGPAC operations or are other techniques
necessary?
What are the shortfalls and negative impacts?
What COAs can be supported?
10-90. Sustainment planners must anticipate and understand the support requirements of a
tactical plan or COA. The S4 analyzes all COAs and modifications to current plans. He

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assesses their sustainment feasibility, identifies support requirements, and determines

requirements for synchronization. The S4, like the commander, must visualize how the
battle will unfold to determine critical requirements for each sustainment function. He
logically considers the requirements for each sustainment function during the operational
phases of before (prior to commitment), during (commitment to battle), and after
(reconstitution and future missions). He analyzes each COA or plan and considers the
following:
Type and duration of the operation.
Task organization, tasks, and CSS requirements of subordinate forces.
Ramifications of tactical operations such as river crossings, tactical pauses, long
movements, preparatory fires or defenses.
Need for special equipment, supplies, or services.
Requirements to separate, disassemble, reconfigure, uncrate, or transload supplies
above normal requirements.
Requirements for reconstitution.
Required varieties and quantities of all classes of supplies, especially III, V, and IX.
Requirements for support of reconnaissance forces, security operations, or
deception efforts.
Need for Class IV and V obstacle material.
Pre-positioned stockage requirements.
Emergency resupply requirements.
10-91. The S4’s analysis also includes estimated attrition based on likely outcomes of
subordinate missions. Analysis of estimated attrition primarily focuses on critical systems
such as tanks, BFVs, and engineer systems. The S1 assists by projecting potential personnel
losses. To perform this analysis, the S1 and S4 use current unit personnel and equipment
densities, standard planning factors, the BCS3 COA planning function, historical data, or
any combination of these. This projection helps the commander understand the potential
losses and associated risks of each COA.
10-92. To understand the HBCT combined arms battalion’s capabilities and determine
support requirements, sustainment planners should apply a METT-TC analysis to the
situation. The following are examples of general support considerations for tactical
operations:
Mission considerations include the following:
Combined arms battalion mission and commander’s intent.
Concept of the operations and enemy disposition
Higher headquarters’ mission and concept of operation.
Higher headquarters’ concept of support.
Type and duration of the operation.
Commander’s tracked items list (CTIL)
Controlled supply rate.
Required supply rate.
Enemy considerations include the following:
Enemy capabilities and tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
Enemy avenues of approach.
Enemy unconventional tactics that could threaten sustainment operations.
Anticipated number of EPWs.
Troops and support available considerations include the following:
Combined arms battalion task organization to include supporting units.

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FMI 3-90.5

Location and condition of all units, including sustainment units.

Current and projected status of personnel, equipment, and classes of supply.
Availability and status of services.
Unit-level sustainment capabilities.
Terrain and weather considerations include the following:
Effects of weather and terrain on support operations.
Additional sustainment requirements of the HBCT combined arms battalion
due to weather and terrain.
Condition of infrastructure such as roads and bridges.
Time available considerations include the following:
Impact on the ability to replenish supplies.
Planning and preparation time for support units.
Impact of time on support requirements and distribution methods.
Civil considerations include the following:
Host nation support and contract services.
Impact of civilian and refugee movement.
Potential for hostile reactions by civilians against sustainment operations.
US (civilian) contractors on the battlefield.
10-93. The S4 must balance support requirements with available capabilities. He considers
existing stockage, anticipated receipts, capacities, and capabilities. He must assess the
status of all sustainment functions required to support the combined arms battalion and
compare them to available capabilities. He identifies potential shortfalls and recommends
actions to eliminate or reduce their effects on the operation.
10-94. When a support shortfall is identified, the planning staff takes every action available
to eliminate or reduce its effect. The staff must understand its potential impact on the force,
the risk it presents to mission accomplishment, its duration, and what requirements exceed
the unit’s capabilities. It analyzes the shortfall to determine its cause (for example, battle
losses, supply availability, resource availability, equipment, time, people, or distribution
shortfall). The staff considers the following actions to resolve a shortfall:
Shift supplies or assets by phase of the operation.
Request support or an additional asset from higher headquarters.
Use alternate distribution methods.
Consider pre-positioning supplies or attaching additional CSS capabilities to
subordinate forces.
Modify the COA or plan.
10-95. Based on the CSS estimate, the S4/S1 develop support plans. The overall
sustainment plan is briefly described in the concept of support. The concept of support
provides all commanders and staff sections with a general understanding of the
commander’s priorities and how the operation will be logistically supported. Detailed CSS
plans are outlined in a support annex to the OPORD or as part of a fragmentary order
(FRAGO). The FSC commander also issues an OPORD to all units under his control. The
FSC commander, in conjunction with the S4 and XO, closely monitors the implementation of
the sustainment plan. He adjusts support operations or shifts resources to account for a
change in METT-TC factors or to replace lost sustainment capabilities.

SUPPORTING OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

10-96. The main purpose of sustainment operations in the offense is to maintain the
momentum of the attack. If offensive momentum is not maintained, the enemy may recover

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from the shock of the first assault, gain the initiative, and mount a successful counterattack.
Therefore, the sustainment priority must be to maintain the momentum of the attack. A key
part of the plan is the support overlay produced by the S4. The overlay ensures that both the
supported units and the FSC know the location of all support assets in relation to the
maneuver units and maximizes the support given. The support overlay can be sent digitally
via FBCB2 or distributed manually. To maintain mobility and keep up with the maneuver
units, the combined arms battalion support area remains uploaded as much as possible. A
well-defined SOP or plan should determine when and how the combined arms battalion
support area moves in relationship to the battalion main body. The battalion support area
commander (FSC commander) must maintain the lines of communication and supplies with
the BSB. The FSC commander must be able to determine and recommend to the S3 the
proper positioning and movement windows for the combined arms battalion support area so
uninterrupted support continues. The distribution platoon must be ready to push immediate
resupply forward quickly. Additionally, the combined arms battalion combat trains should be
postured to provide immediate maintenance, recovery, medical, and Class III/V support.

ANTICIPATE
10-97. Logistics planners must be proactive in planning sustainment operations. The
sustainment system must be flexible to support contingencies or future operations.
Anticipating the HBCT combined arms battalion’s support requirements is crucial to
maintaining the momentum of offensive operations. Some considerations for anticipating
sustainment in the offensive include the following:
Increased consumption of Classes III, V, and IX.
Resupply operations.
Heavy requirements on HBCT combined arms battalion transportation assets.
An increase in equipment maintenance requirements.

CLASS V
10-98. Special considerations concerning Class V availability are necessary before and
during offensive operations. Some of those considerations include the following:
Ensure subordinate units are fully resupplied with Class V before to the operation.
The combined arms battalion should carry additional stockage of critical
ammunition.
Use and request preconfigured combat loads.
Ensure resupply of special Class V requirements.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
10-99. Planning considerations for maintenance support in offensive operations follow:
Ensure rapid repair and return of non-mission-capable equipment to support the
operation.
Establish command maintenance priorities based on what systems and units are
critical to the success of the operation.
Emphasize BDAR.
Plan a series of maintenance collection points.
Establish criteria for requesting additional recovery assets.
Identify critical combat spares and have them ready to move forward on short
notice.

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FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

10-100. Ineffective FHP during offensive operations can slow the advance and significantly
detract from mission accomplishment. Some considerations in planning FHP include the
following:
Anticipate the potential of high casualty rates and decrease long evacuation times.
Place attached or assigned BSB medical assets as far forward as possible.
Ensure all company team ambulance squads have a full basic load of supplies
before the operation begins.
Position prepackaged sets of Class VIII supplies at the BAS.
Ensure responsive medical support is established for battalion scouts and other
forward reconnaissance elements.
Position additional ground evacuation assets at the BAS.
Identify and coordinate ambulance exchange point (AXPs) (clean and dirty) along
the axis of advance and on the objective.
Identify nonmedical transportation assets to support mass casualty evacuation
situations.
Ensure integration of air ambulance support, including coordination of Army
airspace command and control (A2C2) requirements.
Establish clear lines of authority and criteria to execute a medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) mission.
Identify pickup zones (PZs) and landing zones (LZs) along the axis of advance to
support MEDEVAC operations.

CLASS III
10-101. Immediate resupply of Class III is critical in offensive operations. Some planning
considerations include the following:
Ensure all units are topped off with fuel and are carrying their basic load of
petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) package products before execution.
Ensure all forward stocks are resupplied and the Class III point is prepared to
move forward rapidly.
Set up tactical refueling points and refuel-on-the-move (ROM) sites.
Plan refueling operations based on the consumption estimates for each individual
company and attached unit.

SYNCHRONIZED SUPPORT
10-102. The most successful operations are those that are synchronized. Considerations for
the synchronization of support follow:
Plan support and resupply operations based on anticipated support needs of each
subordinate unit.
Integrate refueling and resupply operations with the scheme of maneuver to ensure
proper timing and to avoid interfering with likely or planned maneuver actions.
Plan for refueling and resupply operations as far forward as possible in covered and
concealed locations.
Plan triggers for activating and deactivating CCPs, AXPs, detainees/EPWs, and
LRPs based on the combined arms battalion’s scheme of maneuver.
Coordinate the locations, displacements, and routes of support assets and units to
maintain responsive support.

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Include security of the main supply routes (MSRs) in the tactical plan to minimize
the risk to support elements.
Ensure open lines of communications and coordination are maintained with the
FSC and or BSB support operations section and the brigade movement control
officer on all information regarding throughput deliveries.
When planning subsequent positions, consider throughput delivery schedules.
Consider force protection for all supporting elements.

SECURITY
10-103. As discussed previously, support assets are vulnerable and may need security
support. Possible security considerations include the following:
Ensure adequate security of routes and support assets based on the potential
threat of undetected enemy forces.
Conduct rehearsals so that dedicated security forces (if available) and support units
are prepared for enemy contact.
Anticipate the need for route clearance and reconnaissance to support the
movement of wheeled vehicles based on the terrain and roads available. (This is
especially true if CSS traffic moves across previous enemy positions that may
contain obstacles and large amounts of unexploded ordnance.)
Ensure CSS preparations for the mission do not give away tactical plans.

SUPPORTING DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

10-104. The aim of sustainment operations in the defense is to support defensive
preparations, security operations, the main battle area engagement and transition to
subsequent missions. A plan to support the mobility, countermobility, and survivability
effort in the combined arms battalion’s AO is critical. Class IV supplies should be pushed
from a UEx-level maneuver enhancement brigade directly to the emplacement site. Class V
is given the highest priority of all critical supplies during defensive operations. The
increased expenditures of ammunition significantly affect transportation assets. Use
throughput supply to expedite deliveries as far forward as possible. As in offensive planning,
the S4 prepares and distributes the support overlay. It includes MSRs, Class IV and V
stockage points, and LRPs. In the defense, sustainment units are positioned farther to the
rear to avoid interfering with the movement of maneuver units between positions and the
forward movement of the counterattack force. The following paragraphs describe
sustainment considerations during the defense.

ANTICIPATION OF REQUIREMENTS
10-105. The following areas require proactive planning:
Anticipate increased consumption of Classes IV, V, and VIII; a decrease in Class III
requirements; and the potential for mass casualties.
Establish mass casualty criteria for the combined arms battalion and company
commanders.
Anticipate the immediate requirement to replenish ammunition and provide
additional ammunition stocks based on subordinate unit tasks.
Anticipate that the demand for decontamination and chemical protection
equipment may increase.
Estimate the requirements for Class IV and V obstacle materials and push
materials forward early to facilitate defensive preparations.

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Plan and allocate additional Class III and maintenance support for engineer assets
during the preparation phase.

POSITIONING
10-106. Sustainment assets are most vulnerable in defensive operations. Properly
positioning these assets can deter detection by the enemy. The following are considerations
for positioning support assets:
Avoid positioning support sites and units along enemy ground or air avenues of
approach, in the vicinity of artillery units, or near templated enemy chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) target areas.
Coordinate movement and terrain requirements with maneuver plans and the
positioning of other units such as artillery.
Position the combined arms battalion support area and CSS units as far to the rear
as possible but close enough to provide responsive support.
Periodically move combat trains and other S assets, based on the threat level, to
decrease their vulnerability of detection.
Maximize the use of cover and concealment, dispersion, and the protection provided
by the terrain.

AVOIDING PATTERNS
10-107. Creating patterns of support increases the risk to sustainment units. Some
recommendations include the following:
Avoid setting patterns of support to decrease vulnerability to enemy interdiction.
Vary LOGPAC times and LRP locations.
Consider conducting LOGPACs and other routine CSS activities during limited
visibility.
Maintain OPSEC.

PROVIDING SUPPORT IN DEPTH

10-108. The support structure must support the entire defense. Suggested ways to
accomplish this include the following:
Ensure the initial focus of support is to the defensive preparation effort.
Ensure maintenance, resupply, and evacuation plans support security forces and
forward reconnaissance assets. As the battle develops, the CSS priorities normally
shift to support the combined arms battalion’s main battle area.
Ensure MSRs support the entire scheme of maneuver, including all contingencies,
subsequent positions, and counterattack options.
Plan alternate and contaminated MSRs for contaminated equipment and casualties
to provide flexibility.
Develop and rehearse triggers for the movement, displacement, and evacuation of
support sites based on the enemy situation and the scheme of maneuver.

CLASSES IV (OBSTACLE MATERIAL AND V)

10-109. The proper placement and resupply of obstacle materials is critical to a successful
defense. Some placement and handling considerations follow:
Identify Class IV and V requirements to support company teams and directed
obstacle belts early in the planning process.

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Identify locations of combined arms battalion Class IV and V points early by

coordinating with the engineer company.
Push materials forward as soon as possible.
Ensure Class IV and V points are centrally located to support directed obstacle
belts while remaining concealed from the enemy.
Ensure materiel handling equipment is positioned at each Class IV and V point.
Coordinate sufficient maneuver support to organize materials and uncrate mines,
cut overhead cover for fighting positions, and load material onto haul assets.
Closely track the usage of Class IV and maintain the flexibility to shift materials
based on refinements to the plan, changes in the situation, and the progress of
obstacle construction, including protection of Class V from indirect fire.
Plan to withdraw unused Class IV and V supplies based on an event trigger to
prevent the loss of unused materials.
Consider attaching additional transportation assets to engineers to support the
movement of obstacle materials to construction sites.
Maximize the use of UEx sustainment brigade throughput to transport Class IV
and V supplies directly to combined arms battalion Class IV and V points.

CLASS V
10-110. Improperly resupplying Class V in defensive operations results in mission failure.
Some planning considerations include the following:
Push as much Class V forward as possible based on the commander’s priorities of
support and the anticipated ammunition requirements of each unit.
Prestock ammunition at primary and subsequent positions and ensure it is
properly guarded and stored.
Ensure the resupply plan supports specialized ammunition requirements of all
units, such as engineers.
Maintain emergency resupply stocks within the combat trains and with the
combined arms battalion support area in depth.

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT
10-111. Responsive maintenance support speeds up the return of essential combat systems
to battle. Maintenance planning should include the following:
Maintenance priorities approved or established by the commander.
Maintenance teams dispatched as far forward as possible to reduce the
requirement to evacuate equipment. The thrust of the maintenance effort is to
replace forward and fix rear.
Rapid evacuation of damaged equipment from the UMCP to the BSA in the event
defending forces must reposition.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION

10-112. FHP planning is critical to provide rapid treatment and avoid confusion. Planning
factors for FHPfollow:
Position AXPs and medical evacuation assets to support timely casualty movement.
Coordinate evacuation routes and plans with maneuver plans and obstacle
locations.
Develop a contingency plan for the loss of one or both aid stations.
Ensure medical support to and support elements such as C2 facilities, engineers,
and communication nodes.

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Maximize the use of nonstandard ambulances to replace lost ambulances or provide

additional evacuation support.
Always plan for mass casualties and ensure that adequate evacuation means,
including air transportation, are identified and rehearsed.

ECHELON OF THE TRAINS

10-113. The trains are echeloned into combat trains under the control of the S4 and a
combined arms battalion support area under the control of the FSC commander.
10-114. The most forward CSS elements are a medical evacuation team (routinely attached
to the company) and the company field maintenance team under the control of the company
1SG. The 1SG positions these elements, tasks the medical evacuation team, and establishes
priority of work for the company FMT.
10-115. When operating in echeloned trains, the company supply sergeant usually operates
from the combined arms battalion support area. Coordination between the company supply
sergeant and the 1SG is conducted through the CTCP over the A/L net or FBCB2 and is
supplemented by face-to-face coordination during LOGPAC operations.
10-116. The combined arms battalion combat trains normally include the CTCP, BAS, and
other medical platoon elements, decontamination assets, all uploaded Class III and V
vehicles, and the UMCP along with any supporting elements forward from the BSB. The
combat trains are controlled by the S4, and the S1 assists. Elements of the combat trains
operate on the A/L net and are linked to the company 1SGs via FBCB2.
10-117. The combined arms battalion combat trains should be close enough to the forward
line of own troops (FLOT) to be responsive to the forward units but not within range of
enemy direct fire. The combat trains can expect to move frequently to remain in supporting
distance of the combat elements. The following factors govern the positioning of the combat
trains:
Communications are required between the CTCP, the main CP, and the combined
arms battalion support area CP.
Room for dispersion and cover and concealment from both air and ground
observation are desired.
The ground must support vehicle traffic.
A suitable helicopter landing site should be nearby.
Routes to LRPs or to company team positions must be available.
Movement into and out of the area must not be restricted.
10-118. Builtup areas controlled by friendly forces are good locations for trains. They
provide cover and concealment for vehicles and shelter that enhances light discipline during
maintenance. When builtup areas are used, combined arms battalion trains elements should
occupy buildings near the edge of the area to preclude being trapped in the center.
10-119. The UMCP is established and supervised by the maintenance platoon leader to
provide forward maintenance support to the HBCT combined arms battalion. It is normally
located near or within the combined arms battalion combat trains. The UMCP and combined
arms battalion combat trains may combine to form a base cluster for defense.
10-120. Generally, the combined arms battalion support area is commanded by the FSC
commander and includes the FSC, the battalion S1section, the S4 NCOIC, the mess section,
the company supply sections, and the remainder of those elements of the maintenance that
are not forward. The CABSA is normally located 4 to 12 kilometers from frontline units.

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MOVEMENT OF THE TRAINS

10-121. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander directs the movement of combat
trains and CABSA in the battalion OPORD. The XO, S4, and FSC commander plan the
execution of the movement of the trains to ensure responsive forward support. The
displacement of the battalion support area must be carefully coordinated with the tactical
scheme of maneuver, location of the BSA and MSRs, communications links, establishment of
digital nodes, priorities of support, and time available for UEx sustainment brigade
throughputs and displacement. It is important for the combined arms battalion staff to
understand the impact of UEx sustainment brigade throughput delivery schedules during
the planning process. Movement of the trains or the FSC may severely constrain the
maneuver commander’s plan unless each echelon of support is considered during the planned
or emergency move.
10-122. Security of sustainment assets is a major consideration. The combined arms
battalion has sufficient transportation assets to move its support personnel and equipment
in one lift. However, downloaded supplies at supply points and disabled equipment at
maintenance sites create mobility problems and, therefore, security problems. The battalion
staff must closely monitor mobility status and anticipate mobility problems well in advance
to develop solutions. For transportation requirements beyond the heavy combined arms
battalion’s capability, the S4 must coordinate for external support with the BSB support
operations section.
10-123. In addition to conducting planned moves, both the combat trains and the combined
arms battalion support area should have an SOP for conducting emergency moves.
Emergency moves normally occur when the trains or support area must relocate quickly to
avoid a significant enemy threat. The combined arms battalion designates alternate
trains/CABSA locations and sufficient movement routes. Alternate trains/CABSA locations
should be coordinated with the XO, staff, FSC commander, and BSB commander of the
impending move.
10-124. SOPs and sustainment operational logistics (OPLOG) plans ensure adequate
means are employed to detect enemy threats early enough to avoid loss of the combined arms
battalion’s support capabilities. Observation equipment and weapons on disabled vehicles
should be incorporated into sustainment defensive plans. Emergency movement plans are
disseminated in the combat trains by the S4 and CABSA by the FSC commander to all
combined arms battalion support elements in an OPORD. Leaders reconnoiter movement
routes and alternate locations to ensure suitability. Emergency plans are rehearsed as time
allows.

MOVEMENT OF TRAINS WITHIN THE HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION FORMATION

10-125. This technique is used when the likelihood of enemy contact is minimal, logistical
demands are light, and the combined arms battalion (or separate units) can use basic loads
and organic recovery assets to satisfy initial requirements. Sufficient time must be allowed
for the combined arms battalion support area to establish services and resupply from the
BSB prior to mission execution. FSC elements are dispersed within march columns and are
secured by other elements of the HBCT combined arms battalion. This technique provides
timely movement and march security but precludes any meaningful support until movement
ceases. This technique may be useful during tactical road marches or approach marches.

HBCT CABSA DISPLACEMENT BY BOUNDS

10-126. Critical CSS assets are divided and displaced by successive bounds from one
combined arms battalion support area location to a new CABSA location. The FSC
commander normally moves with the forward logistics element (FLE) to ensure rapid setup

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of the displacing echelon. This technique provides more responsive support by minimizing
the throughput distances to FSC elements. It also enhances the survivability of logistical
assets by positioning them in different areas. Because of echelonment, C2 of the FSC
operations may be degraded. A heavy reliance on unit movement and security SOPs,
communications links, and OPLOG plans is vital to ensure smooth displacement of the FSC.

LOGPAC OPERATIONS
10-127. The most efficient resupply of forward HBCT combined arms battalion units is
accomplished by logistics packages. Security of resupply operations is a major consideration,
and convoys must be planned and executed as tactical operations.
10-128. LOGPACs are organized in the combined arms battalion support area by the
company supply sergeant under the supervision of the FSC commander and the distribution
platoon leader. LOGPACs are organized for each company team and separate element in the
combined arms battalion and moved forward at least daily for routine resupply. When
possible, all LOGPACs are moved forward in a march unit under the control of the
distribution platoon leader with supplemental security. Special LOGPACs are organized and
dispatched as required by the tactical situation and logistical demands.
10-129. The S4 must plan and coordinate LOGPAC operations to ensure that they fully
support the commander’s tactical plans.
10-130. The HBCT combined arms battalion SOP establishes the standard LOGPAC.
Normally, a company team LOGPAC includes the following elements:
Unit supply truck. This vehicle contains the Class I requirements based on the
ration cycle—normally one hot meal and two meals, ready-to-eat, (MREs) per man.
The supply truck tows a water trailer and carries some full water cans for direct
exchange. In addition, the truck carries any Class II supplies requested by the unit,
incoming mail, and other items required by the unit. The truck may also carry
replacement personnel.
POL trucks. Bulk fuel and packaged POL products are on these vehicles.
Ammunition trucks. These vehicles contain a mix of ammunition for the weapon
systems of the company team. The unit SOP establishes a standard load; reports
and projected demands may require changes to this standard load.
Vehicles carrying additional supplies and replacements. These vehicles join the
LOGPAC as coordinated by the distribution platoon leader and supply sergeant.
Security. Supplemental security (designated by the battalion logistics plan) is
required for LOGPACs to move forward in the battalion area.
10-131. LOGPACs for platoon-sized attachments are usually loaded on a single truck.
Water and Class III resupply is often accomplished by using 5-gallon cans and pods mounted
on trailers.
10-132. When the company team LOGPAC has been formed, it is ready to move forward
under the control of the supply sergeant. The distribution platoon leader normally organizes
a convoy for movement of all company LOGPACs under his control; in emergencies, he
dispatches unit LOGPACs individually. The convoy may contain additional vehicles such as
a maintenance vehicle with Class IX to move to the UMCP or an additional ammunition or
fuel vehicle for the combat trains. The LOGPACs move along the MSR to an LRP where the
unit 1SG or a unit guide takes control of the company LOGPAC.
10-133. From the LRP, the company 1SG or guide controls the LOGPAC and conducts
resupply as described in FM 3-90.1, Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. The
unit 1SG informs his supply sergeant of requirements for the next LOGPAC. The supply

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sergeant collects outgoing mail, personnel, and equipment for movement to the rear. The
LOGPAC then follows unit SOP and returns to the LRP and then to the CABSA.
10-134. LRP locations are determined by the S4 based on the tactical situation. They
should be well forward and easily located. Normally, two to four LRPs are planned. LRPs, as
well as the MSR, combat trains, and battalion support area are included on the operations
overlay, if possible. The CTCP notifies subordinates and the CABSA CP well in advance
which LRPs will be used. The LOGPAC convoy arrival time at the LRP and the length of
time it remains normally are established by SOP. If the tactical situation dictates otherwise,
the S4 must determine the time and notify units accordingly. LOGPACs may be scheduled to
arrive shortly after arrival at a battle position or intermediate objective. Armor units also
require more frequent Class III resupply. Subordinates must ensure that the resupply
vehicles are returned to the LRP as soon as possible so that the vehicles can return to the
battalion support area and begin preparation for the next mission. Class III and V vehicles
never sit empty. If the LOGPACs cannot be completed on schedule, the CTCP must be
notified.
10-135. At least one senior representative from the combat trains (S4, S1, or senior NCO)
should be present at the LRP while it is in effect. His purpose is to meet with the unit 1SGs
and distribution platoon leader for coordination of logistical requirements to ensure that the
LOGPAC release and return takes place efficiently and to ensure that force protection at the
LRP is maintained. A brief meeting is normally held immediately before the 1SG picks up
his LOGPAC. Coordination may include the following:
Changes in logistical requirements reflecting any last-minute task organization.
Reports on personnel, logistics, and maintenance from the 1SGs.
Confirmation of receipt of digital LOGSITREPs (if FBCB2 equipped).
Firsthand updates on the tactical situation and logistical status.
Delivery, receipt, and distribution of unit mail.
10-136. The company team supply sergeant or distribution platoon leader moves the
LOGPAC from the LRP back to the combined arms battalion support area. The supply
sergeant and distribution platoon leader then begin organization of the next LOGPAC.
10-137. Resupply of the scout and mortar platoons, the main CP, combat trains, and
attached support units must be planned and coordinated. The HHC 1SG coordinates security
and supervises resupply of these elements with the HHC supply sergeant.
10-138. The platoon sergeant of these elements or senior NCO at a facility must report his
requirements to the HHC 1SG or to the CTCP. The most desirable method of resupply is to
form small LOGPACs for these elements, which the platoon sergeant picks up at the LRP in
the same manner as a company 1SG. Attachments larger than a platoon must come to the
HBCT combined arms battalion with sufficient CSS vehicles to carry their LOGPACs.
10-139. In some cases, the HHC 1SG delivers the LOGPAC to the main CP, combat trains,
and scout and mortar platoons. Attachments can receive resupply at one of these locations or
as previously coordinated.
10-140. Another option is for attachments to be resupplied from a nearby company team
LOGPAC. The S4 coordinates this resupply before the LOGPACs are dispatched.
10-141. Resupply operations for the scout platoon pose several unique problems. Special
procedures may be necessary to resupply the scout platoon, including the following:
Resupplying the platoon by having each vehicle individually pull off line and move
to a resupply site. (This method may be feasible when the platoon is performing
security for a stationary force.)

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Resupplying the platoon near the combat trains as the platoon repositions between
missions.
Designating one Class III vehicle in the combat trains to fuel the platoon on short
notice.
10-142. Units in direct support or under the operational control (OPCON) of the HBCT
combined arms battalion are responsible for the coordination of resupply of their elements
operating forward with the HBCT combined arms battalion, except as noted:
The HBCT combined arms battalion provides engineer materials (Classes IV and
V) to supporting engineer units. Additionally, engineer units under OPCON of the
HBCT combined arms battalion receive Class I, III, V, and IX support to the
maximum extent possible. This support is coordinated through or directed by
brigade before the OPCON directive becomes effective.
The parent unit S4 or company commander of the supporting element coordinates
with the HBCT combined arms battalion S4 commander on resupply of the forward
elements. Normally, the supporting units’ resupply elements assemble in the BSA
and move to the combined arms battalion support area. The FSC commander then
dispatches these resupply elements forward, along with the HBCT combined arms
battalion LOGPACs, to the LRP. At the LRP, the platoon sergeant of the forward
supporting element takes control of the resupply element. These resupply elements
maintain contact with the CTCP while forward in the battalion area. If coordinated
between the supporting parent unit and the HBCT combined arms battalion, the
resupply of these forward elements is directly managed by the HBCT combined
arms battalion. The parent unit must provide the additional logistical assets
necessary to supplement the HBCT combined arms battalion’s capabilities. No
matter how support was coordinated, any element within the HBCT
combined arms battalion AO must either be under the combined arms
battalion commander’s control or at least remain in contact with the
combined arms battalion CTCP to avoid interfering with combined arms
battalion operations.
10-143. While the LOGPACs are the preferred methods of resupply, there will be times
when other methods of resupply are required:
Resupply from the combat trains (emergency resupply). The combat trains have a
limited amount of Classes III and V for emergency resupply. The S4 coordinates
emergency resupply from the combat trains and then refills or replaces the combat
trains’ assets.
Prestocking. Prestocking is the placing and concealing of supplies on the battlefield.
This is normally done during defensive operations when supplies are placed in
subsequent battle positions.
Mobile pre-positioning. This is similar to prestocking except that the supplies
remain on the truck, which is positioned forward on the battlefield

COMBAT TRAINS AND FSC SECURITY

10-144. Combat support elements behind the FLOT form base clusters and must be
prepared to defend themselves against guerrillas and partisans and forces that have broken
through or bypassed the defense. Force protection in both fixed sites as well as for elements
moving in the AO is a requirement that leaders must constantly check. The enemy will look
for soft targets and routine security to attack.
10-145. When trains are echeloned, the S4 is responsible for securing the combat trains,
and the FSC commander is responsible for securing the combined arms battalion support
area.

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 Sustaining Operations

10-146. A perimeter defense is normally planned in all trains areas, and elements in the
trains are assigned a specific sector to defend. Mutually supporting positions that dominate
likely avenues of approach are selected for vehicles armed with heavy machineguns and
automatic grenade launchers. Reaction forces and observation posts are established based on
the unit SOP. To enhance security, an alarm or warning system is arranged. Sector sketches,
fire plans, and obstacle plans should be prepared. Rehearsals are conducted to ensure that
all personnel know the part they play in the defensive scheme. The officer in charge at each
location establishes a shift schedule for operations and security on a 24-hour basis.
10-147. Every element leaving the combat trains must have dedicated security and a
designated leader to command the security of the moving element.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

10-148. CSS command and control is the responsibility of the HBCT combined arms
battalion XO. The S4 routinely coordinates all logistics operations based on the XO’s
guidance. C2 facilities are the CTCP and the combined arms battalion support area.
10-149. The CTCP includes the S4 CP carrier (M1068) (with enough S1 and S4 personnel
cross trained to ensure continuous operation). The combat trains must stay abreast of the
tactical situation and task organization; monitor the HBCT combined arms battalion
command net to identify CSS requirements; and receive requests, reports, and requirements
from combined arms battalion subordinate elements to be prepared to assume the role as the
alternate main CP. Subordinate requirements are analyzed, consolidated, and forwarded to
the battalion support area or to the appropriate supporting agency. The FSC commander
coordinates and directs elements in the battalion support area to take action to meet the
forward units’ requirements.
10-150. The combined arms battalion support area CP is the coordination and control
center for the FSC and the HBCT combined arms battalion and company supply sections.
Personnel from these sections operate the battalion support area CP under the supervision
of the FSC commander. The FSC commander coordinates all requirements for combined
arms battalion organic and attached elements with all units in the CABSA and parent units
as necessary. The FSC commander coordinates, monitors, and controls all CSS movement
between the HBCT support area and the CABSA. The S4 monitors the location of all CSS
elements in the battalion area so that he can redirect assets as required.

COMMUNICATIONS
10-151. At HBCT combined arms battalion level, CSS communications may be by any
combination of FM radio, digital connectivity, courier, or wire. FBCB2 is the primary means
of CSS communication within the battalion and ABCS is the method to pass information to
the BCT.
10-152. The CTCP is the net control station (NCS) for the battalion A/L net. The S4, S1,
FSC commander, maintenance platoon leader, distribution platoon leader, medical platoon
leader, company 1SGs, and others (as required) operate in the HBCT combined arms
battalion A/L net. The CTCP also operates in the brigade A/L net and in the HBCT combined
arms battalion command net.
10-153. Communications are critical to expedite the sustainment effort. Unit 1SGs must
report their losses and requirements as soon as practical. When use of radio or FBCB2 is not
possible, messages are sent with resupply or evacuation vehicles. The CTCP and CABSA CP
maintain control of vehicles moving forward to the LRPs. The HBCT combined arms
battalion SOP establishes procedures for resupply without request in the event
communications fail.

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SECTION IV – RECONSTITUTION
10-154. Planners must be prepared for mass casualties, mass destruction of equipment,
and the destruction or loss of effectiveness of entire units. This section discusses
reconstitution and shows how the HBCT combined arms battalion or company teams that
have been catastrophically depleted or rendered ineffective are returned to combat
effectiveness. Reconstitution consists of the actions to restore companies to a desired level of
combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources.
Reconstitution differs from sustaining operations in that it is undertaken only when a unit is
at an unacceptable level of combat readiness. Sustainment operations are routine actions to
maintain combat readiness. Commanders reconstitute by either reorganization or
regeneration.

REORGANIZATION
10-155. Reorganization is the action taken to shift resources within a degraded company to
increase its combat power. Measures taken include cross-leveling equipment and personnel,
matching operational weapons systems with crews, or forming composite companies.
10-156. Immediate battlefield reorganization is the quick and often temporary restoration
of companies conducted during an operation; for example, reorganizing on the objective and
implementing the established succession of command.
10-157. Deliberate reorganization is a permanent restructuring of the unit. It is the type of
reorganization considered during reconstitution planning. Deliberate reorganization is
supported with higher echelon resources (such as maintenance and transportation) and
additional replacements and other resources may be made available. Deliberate
reorganization must be approved by the parent-unit commander one echelon higher than
that reorganized. For example, the HBCT combined arms battalion commander cannot
approve the deliberate reorganization of an attached company, but the parent battalion
commander or the brigade commander can approve it.

REGENERATION
10-158. Regeneration is incremental or whole-unit rebuilding through large-scale
replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; reestablishing or replacing essential
command, control, and communications; and conducting the necessary training for the
rebuilt unit. The unit must be removed from combat to be regenerated. The UEx is
responsible for the regeneration of battalions. To regenerate a unit, the UEx commander
must balance priorities for supplies, equipment, or other CSS, and he must task the support
organizations to provide direct support

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 Chapter 11
Command Post Operations

The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalions use
echeloned command and control (C2) to plan and direct operations. Battle
command is tailored to meet the requirements of each operation. The
battalion command group normally operates forward on the battlefield
and consists of the commander and those selected to assist in controlling
the operational and sustaining elements of the battalion. The commander
determines the composition, nature, and tasks of the command group
based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) analysis. As
a minimum, the command group performs the following:
● Integrates battalion assets in support of operations.
● Controls operations.
● Maintains situational understanding.
● Provides close situation information to the main CP.

SECTION I – BATTLE COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-1. The commander and S3 monitor the battle, develop the situation, analyze courses of
action (COAs), and control the companies. This section addresses battle command and the
systems that assist the commander in seeing the battlefield and leading the battalion as it
conducts operations.
11-2. Battle command is the art and science of applying leadership and decision-making to
achieve mission success enabled by technology while synchronizing C2 with maneuver and
information. HBCT combined arms battalion C2 consists of the key personnel, equipment,
and command posts (CPs) from which the battalion commander, assisted by the battle staff,
directs operations and sustains the force. Battle command is exercised from the command
group, main CP, the combat trains command post (CTCP), and the combined arms battalion
support area (CABSA) CP. During stability operations and support operations, the battalion
may combine combat trains and the battalion support area if the combined arms battalion
operates out of a forward operating base. METT-TC dictates the organization of C2
personnel and facilities.

COMMAND GROUP/BATTLE COMMAND ON THE MOVE (BCOM)

11-3. The command group accompanies the battalion commander forward to assist with
command and control of the operation. The command group must be able to move freely with
protection throughout the battalion operational area while maintaining awareness of the
enemy and friendly situation. BCOM provides the commander the ability to synchronize the
elements of battalion combat power and joint fires. At the battalion level, BCOM is provided
to the command group by use of the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
System or Blue Force Tracker (BFT) in conjunction with FM radios (can be conducted from
the air by use of Army airspace command and control (A2C2) package in UH-60). The

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composition of the command group depends on the situation (METT-TC) and the desires of
the commander. The command group generally consists of the commander, S3, fire support
officer (FSO), air liaison officer (ALO), and crews from the assigned command group tracked
vehicles. There is no requirement for these leaders to collocate; the commander may be in
one part of the combined arms battalion area of operations (AO) while the S3 is in a separate
part of the AO. During stability operations and support operations, the command group has
those that are essential to the specific operations, including, for example, the battalion
surgeon, battalion staff judge advocate (SJA), civil affairs (CA) officer, and the contracting
officer.
11-4. The command group fights the battle either on the move or forward with the company
maneuver elements. The battalion commander positions himself so that he can see the battle
and issue appropriate orders at critical times. Seeing the battle does not mean simply
positioning the command group in a location to observe decision points and critical actions. It
implies that the command group is in a position to receive reports (digital and analog) on
those key indicators that the battalion commander has discussed with his subordinate
commanders (commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)) and that, on receipt of
these reports, the battalion commander is in a position to order decisive action. The FSO
must be in a position to coordinate indirect and joint fires and respond to changes in the
situation or mission with recommended changes to the fire support plan. The ALO must be
in a position to see the battlefield to coordinate joint fires, shift preplanned close air support
(CAS) targets, and advise the commander on CAS issues.
11-5. The command group normally operates in two to three armored vehicles modified with
digital systems and radios for C2. The crews of the tracked vehicles in the command group
assist in operating radios and digital systems, posting maps and charts, moving the vehicles,
and providing immediate security, thus freeing the command group to concentrate on the
battle. External security must be provided for the command group from maneuver elements
as crews of the command group vehicles primarily support battle command rather than
engaging in local fights.
11-6. The command sergeant major (CSM) is not normally restricted to operate from the
command group and is usually sent by the battalion commander to the key location in the
battalion AO that requires mature senior leadership and command oversight. METT-TC
dictates command group manning requirements. While major combat operations (MCO)
mandate the commander have immediate access to the FSO and ALO, stability operations
and support operations may call for the chaplain, lawyer, surgeon, interpreters, contracting
officer, public affairs officer, personal security, and CA advisor to be part of the command
group.

MAIN COMMAND POST

11-7. The main CP includes the designated Soldiers, equipment, and facilities (tactical
operations center (TOC)) employed in commanding and controlling operations for the HBCT
combined arms battalion. The primary considerations in positioning the main CP are
survivability, communications, and accessibility. Main CP vehicles and personnel should be
restricted to as few as possible to allow rapid displacement but robust enough to properly
support battalion C2. The personnel who operate the main CP must be organized to provide
both security and operations on a 24-hour basis. This requires enforcement of a sleep plan to
preserve the ability of main CP personnel to maintain continuous operations and force
protection. (See Appendix D, Section III.) An internal set of standing operating procedures
(SOPs) must establish the organization and operation of the main CP. The main CP must
maintain continuous communication and coordination with the companies and higher
headquarters. (Refer to Appendix I for examples of charts that can assist in C2 and in
maintaining information as to the current status of the battlefield.) The TOC is an integral

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part of the main CP and is the control, coordination, and communications center for HBCT
combined arms battalion operations. The TOC consists of the S2 and S3 sections, fires cell
(FC), representatives from other attached elements, and the command group (when this
group is not located forward—when the command group is forward, the battalion executive
officer (XO) leads operations from the TOC). The TOC performs the following:
Maintains contact and coordination with higher and adjacent headquarters.
Plans and synchronizes decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
Plans and synchronizes close operations, joint fires, integrating sustainment into
the maneuver plan.
Analyzes and disseminates tactical information concerning both enemy and
friendly situations.
Plans future operations.
Receives operations and sustainment status reports.

COMBAT TRAINS COMMAND POST

11-8. The CTCP is the coordination center for combat service support (CSS) for the battalion.
Normally, the S4 is responsible for directing operations, movement, and security of the
combat trains. The S4 continually assesses the situation, anticipates the needs of units, and
prepares to push support forward. Anticipating requirements is the key to successful CSS.
The CTCP uses an internal SOP to govern its operation and to outline duties of the
personnel manning it. The CTCP has the following functions:
Plans and coordinates sustainment for tactical operations.
Serves as alternate command post for the main CP.
Prepares to shift support if the main effort changes.
Monitors the ability of sustainment systems to support the operation.
Reports to the main CP any change in the ability of sustainment systems to support
the operation.
Maintains logistics status reports on all organic, attached, combat, and
sustainment units operating with the battalion.
Aggregates the reported logistics data to report to higher headquarters.
Ensures personnel accountability of all assigned or attached personnel.
11-9. The S4 assesses the logistical posture of maneuver units, anticipates requirements, and
pushes support forward as the tactical situation permits. The S1 monitors the tactical
situation and relays medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) requests to the battalion aid station.
The S1 uses this information to initiate personnel replacement operations, and the S4 uses
the information to initiate supply and equipment replacement operations.
11-10. The CTCP also monitors the current tactical situation on the command net and
FBCB2/BFT to assume its function as the alternate main CP. Tactical situation maps and
charts in the CTCP are continuously updated based on information gathered from these
sources.

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SUPPORT AREA COMMAND POST

11-11. The CABSA command post is commanded by the forward support company (FSC)
commander and is located between the CTCP and the brigade support area (BSA).
11-12. The CABSA CP has the FSC commander, FSC first sergeant (1SG), headquarters and
headquarters company (HHC) XO, and the elements of the S1 and S4 sections not located in
the combat trains. The CABSA CP coordinates the collection and movement of sustainment
to forward elements of the battalion. It controls and coordinates activities of the CABSA,

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including operations of the distribution platoon, elements of the maintenance platoon,

company supply sergeants, and the battalion human resources center. The CABSA CP
monitors the battalion administration and logistics (A/L) net and maintains an FM and
digital communications link with the brigade support battalion (BSB).
11-13. In the CABSA, logistics packages (LOGPACs) are formed by the FSC and unit supply
sergeants and delivered by the distribution platoon and company supply sergeants. The
CABSA CP is responsible for organizing and dispatching the LOGPACS to the forward units.
11-14. While conducting stability operations and support operations from a fixed secure site,
the battalion may combine the combat trains and CABSA into one support CP to meet the
long-term, secure support planning and operational requirements.

COMMAND POST SURVIVABILITY

11-15. CP survivability depends on deliberate force protection measures as well as
concealment and mobility. The best way to protect a CP is to prevent the enemy from finding
it. Good camouflage and proper noise, light, and signal discipline enhance the security
provided by a good location and physical security. Assuming that concealment and mobility
are not enough, deliberate full-time force protection of the CP is the responsibility of the
commander. The battalion commander requires a dedicated security element to travel with
the command group, as well as dedicated security for each of the CPs. The HHC commander
as headquarters commandant is specifically responsible for the external operations of the
main CP and support to the command group.

LOCATION
11-16. The best place to conceal a CP is in friendly builtup areas. When a builtup area is not
available, a CP should be located on a reverse slope with as much natural cover and
concealment as is available. CPs should avoid key terrain features such as hilltops and
crossroads. CPs should be located on ground that is trafficable, even in poor weather (think
about flooding and mud signatures). Other considerations for positioning CPs include the
following:
Ensure line-of-sight communications with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
Ensure that the assent angle for satellite communications (joint network node
(JNN)) is not masked by terrain or vegetation.
Mask signals from the enemy collection.
Use terrain for passive security (cover and concealment).
Collocate with tactical units for mutual support and local security.
Avoid possible enemy target reference points (TRPs) for enemy artillery and CAS.
Locate the CP near an existing road network out of sight from possible enemy
observation (again think of mud signatures on the road network that lead directly
to the CP).

ACCESS
11-17. CPs should be centered in the AO whenever possible. They should be near, but not
next to, an all-weather, high-speed avenue of approach with no more than one or two routes
leading into the CP. These routes should provide cover, concealment, and access to other
routes of communication. When possible, a helicopter landing zone should be nearby.
Emergency evacuation of the CP must be planned and rehearsed.

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SIZE
11-18. The area selected must be large enough to accommodate and conceal all CP elements.
This includes liaison teams from other units; communications support; and eating, sleeping,
latrine, and maintenance areas. Sufficient area must be available for positioning security
and vehicle dismount points and for parking.

SHELTER
11-19. Dryness and light are vital when working with computers and maps and producing
orders and overlays. CPs should be sheltered from weather conditions and should have lights
for night work with proper light discipline exercised. Buildings are the best choice, but if
none are available, CPs operate from their organic vehicles or tents. Heat and cooling should
be prime considerations according the local weather requirements. Thought needs to be
given to the effects of adverse weather on the CP and the ability to operate without the main
effort of the CP being directed to life support.

OPERATIONS SECURITY
11-20. The following paragraphs outline operations security (OPSEC) considerations for
positioning CPs:
There should be no signs advertising CP locations. Disperse CP vehicles, and
thoroughly camouflage all vehicles and equipment. Maintain noise and light
discipline. Watch for mud trails that lead directly to the CP.
A dedicated external CP security force is required, and it must have
communications with the CPs as well as clear understanding of both the chain of
command and the rules of engagement (ROE). Establish security force positions as
in defensive posture, with a 360-degree perimeter and located far enough out to
prevent enemy fires on the CPs. The security force should have antitank weapons
to protect CPs from enemy armor and vehicle assaults. The HHC commander must
establish a CP reaction force and rehearse the execution of the perimeter defense.
Internal CP security and access control is provided by off-shift personnel.
In general, positioning CP assets off major enemy mounted avenues of approach
reduces the enemy threat. Units should position CPs so the enemy bypasses them.
An observation post (OP) should secure any remote antennas located outside the
headquarters defensive perimeter.
All subordinate units and elements of the CP must receive near and far recognition
signals. The CP uses these signals, challenges, and passwords to control external
access into its perimeter. Internal access to the CP must be controlled to ensure
that unauthorized and nonessential personnel are not allowed in the CP. Make
sure there are precoordinated mechanisms to mark the CP as friendly for
supporting aircraft.
In case of artillery or air attack, a designated rally point and an alternate CP
should be at least 500 to 1,000 meters away.

DISPLACEMENT
11-21. CPs may displace as a whole or, more often, by echelon. Displacement as a whole is
normally reserved for short movements, with communications maintained by alternate
means and minimal risk of degrading CP operations. The headquarters company commander
as headquarters commandant plans and executes displacement of the battalion
headquarters.
11-22. An advanced element of the CP, called a jump CP, moves to the new location, sets up
operations, and takes over operational control (OPCON) of the battle from the main CP. The

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remaining portion of the CP then moves to rejoin the jump CP. The jump CP has the
necessary vehicles, personnel, and equipment to assume CP operations while the remainder
moves. At battalion level, the jump CP normally comes from within the main CP.
11-23. The battalion XO or S3 selects a general location for the jump CP site. The jump CP
can be accompanied by a quartering party, which may consist of a security element as well
as personnel and equipment for quartering the remainder of the CP. The signal officer, who
is usually part of the quartering party, ensures communications on all nets are possible from
the new site. When the jump CP becomes operational, it also becomes the net control station
for the unit. The remainder of the CP then moves to rejoin the jump CP.
11-24. Another technique of displacement is to hand off control to the command group or
CTCP and move the main CP as a whole. The command group can also split, with the
commander moving with the main effort and the S3 moving with the supporting effort.

SECTION II – COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

11-25. Each CP must be organized to permit continuous operations and the rapid execution
of the C2 process. METT-TC dictates manning and operational tempo to support C2 in the
command posts.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

11-26. SOPs for each CP should be established, known to all, and rehearsed. These SOPs
should include the following:
The organization and setup of each CP, including leader responsibilities.
Plans for teardown and displacement of the CP.
Eating and sleeping (safety) plans during CP operations.
CP shift manning and operating guidelines.
Physical security plans for the CP.
Priorities of work during CP operations.
Loading plans and checklists.
Orders production.
Techniques for monitoring enemy and friendly situations—digital and analog.
Posting of CP map boards and status boards
Maintenance of CP journals and logs.
Maintenance of vehicles, generators, and heaters/air conditioning
Priorities for establishing communications—analog/digital/satellite
Settings on digital systems to filter information.
11-27. It will be years before all the Army is completely digitally equipped, and even then,
some elements operating in a joint or coalition environment will not have digital
connectivity. The staff must recognize that integrating an analog unit into the HBCT
combined arms battalion information system architecture requires the retention of most of
the analog information management techniques. In essence, two control systems (digital and
analog) must be in operation in the battalion CPs, with particular attention paid to keeping
the analog units informed of all the relevant information that is flowing digitally. (See
Section IV, Communications Systems, for additional information.) The heavy combined arms
battalion tactical C2 SOP should include the following:
Production and distribution of hard copy as well as digital orders and graphics.
Increased graphic control measures. Digital units tend to use less graphic control
measures due to increased situational understanding (SU) of unit locations.

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Receiving standardized voice as well as analog and digital reports.

Equipping liaison officer (LNO) teams with digital systems to give analog units
limited connectivity.
11-28. The SOPs must have the flexibility to adjust to the METT-TC situations of stability
operations and support operations. The SOPs must have the flex to adjust to new units and
new information requirements in long-term AOs.

COMMUNICATIONS
11-29. Command posts monitor voice communications nets, receive analog and digital
reports, and process information to satisfy CCIR. This information is maintained on maps,
charts, and logs as well as digital information systems. Each staff section maintains daily
journals to log messages and radio traffic as part of the unit operational history. The unit
history must be maintained for the duration of the operation and beyond to serve as a
command history of what happened and actions taken to resolve operational situations.
Special attention must be paid to capture digital information for the history of operations
(because of the absence of a paper trail).

MAPS
11-30. CPs maintain information as easily understood map graphics and charts. Status
charts can be combined with situation maps to give commanders friendly and enemy
situation snapshots for the planning process. This information must be updated continuously
and every update date/time marked so that the timeliness of the information can be
evaluated. Digital information is normally displayed on a command map background and
can be viewed either from computer screens or projected onto larger screens/boards for
common SU. Digital systems allow the commander and battle staff to quickly enlarge or
tightly focus the view of the operational areas through the use of zoom-in/zoom-out
selections. Commanders must clearly define the information required to lead the battalion as
digital systems can generate large volumes of interesting but not necessarily useful
information. Standard filter settings must be applied to digital systems to ensure the correct
level of information is available on the screens.
11-31. For simplicity, all map boards in every battalion CP should be the same size and
scale, and overlay mounting holes should be standard on all map boards. This allows easy
transfer of overlays from one board to another. Map boards must be kept up to date as digital
systems other than FBCB2 and BFT do not work on the move and do not broadcast the most
current and updated locations of all units due to latency.
11-32. The following procedures for posting friendly and enemy information on the map will
aid commanders and staff officers in following the flow of battle:
All graphics should be posted on an overlay. Friendly and enemy unit symbols
should be displayed on clear acetate placed on the operations overlay. These
symbols can be marked with regular stick cellophane tape, push pins, or marking
pen.
The exact unit location is indicated by the lower left-hand corner of the symbol.
Units normally keep track of subordinate units two levels down. This may be
difficult during the conduct of combat operations. It may be necessary to track
locations of immediate subordinate units instead.

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COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY
11-33. The commander must understand the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of
the CP communications systems and ensure the employment of effective communications
control and security as an essential function of CP operations.

RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
11-34. Nonsecure radio transmissions should be brief to reduce the electronic warfare (EW)
signature. Using secure operational and numerical codes (frequency hopping) reduces the
chance of enemy detection. (See FM 1-02 for standard operations code words) When feasible,
use low-power transmissions and terrain to mask signals from enemy direction-finding
equipment. Use couriers, wire, or tactical internet (TI) (voice over internet protocol (VOIP)
telephones and Army Battle Command System (ABCS)) for lengthy messages. Units must
practice the discipline of using signal operations instructions (SOI), proper operational
terms, and unit SOPs to protect operational information.

PHYSICAL SECURITY
11-35. Physical security protects cryptographic systems (secure telephones and signal
encryption equipment) and classified documents from capture or loss. Before vacating an
area, inspect it for any materials that could provide friendly information to the enemy—all
operational information should be classified to maintain OPSEC. Wire lines and fiber optic
cables must be patrolled to prevent enemy tapping. When SOI codes or cryptographic
equipment is lost or captured, report the facts immediately to the next higher command. The
unit SOP must contain instructions for destruction of equipment and classified documents to
prevent their capture or use by the enemy. Units must have SOP measures to destroy
classified material. Everything coming out of the CP should be shredded for OPSEC
purposes.

THE BATTLE CAPTAIN

11-36. The focus of the TOC staff is on collecting the critical information the commander
needs to fight the battle. Information flow is a constant problem in most TOCs, especially
since everyone in the TOC must maintain a common operational picture (COP). The battle
captain’s role is to plan, coordinate, integrate, supervise, and maintain the vertical and
horizontal communications flow throughout the TOC to ensure the successful
accomplishment of all assigned missions. The TOC battle captain assists the commander,
XO, and S3 by being the focal point in the TOC for communications, coordination, and
information management. The battle captain is also the TOC officer in charge (OIC) in the
absence of the commander, XO, and S3.
11-37. The battle captain has the overall responsibility for the smooth functioning of the
TOC facility and its staff elements. The operations sergeant major (SGM) is the battle
captain and the noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of the TOC. His range of
responsibility includes the following:
Maintaining continuous operations of the TOC while static and mobile.
Battle-tracking the current situation.
Ensuring communications are maintained with and between all stations and that
all messages and reports are properly acknowledged, routed, and actioned per SOP.
Assisting the XO with coordination of TOC staff functions to ensure a smooth and
continuous information flow between the staff sections of the TOC.
Processing essential data from the incoming flow of information to ensure all
tactical and logistical information is gathered and provided to the TOC staff, S3,
and XO on a regular basis.

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 Command Post Operations

Internal operations for the TOC, including its physical security and maintenance of
noise and light discipline.
Ensuring mobility of the TOC, including configuration, equipment, and training to
facilitate rapid movement.
Conducting TOC battle drills and enforcing the TOC SOP.
11-38. The battle captain ensures that all staff elements in the TOC understand their
actions in accordance with the SOP and provides coordination for message flow, staff
briefings, updates to TOC charts, and other coordinated staff actions. As a focal point in the
TOC, the battle captain processes essential information from incoming data; assesses it;
ensures dissemination; and makes recommendations to the commander, XO, and S3.
11-39. Information management in the TOC can include processing journals, message
forms, reports, FRAGOs, and requests for information. The battle captain ensures the
consistency, accuracy, and timeliness of information leaving the TOC, including preparing
and dispatching FRAGOs and warning orders (WOs). In addition, he monitors and enforces
the updating of charts and status boards necessary for battle management and ensures this
posted information is timely, accurate, and accessible.
11-40. To function effectively, the battle captain must have a working knowledge of digital
and analog C2 systems and their operational status, know all the staff elements in the TOC,
understand unit SOPs, and ensure the TOC staff uses them to support operations. He must
know the current plan and task organization of the unit and understand the commander’s
intent. In addition, the battle captain must understand the limits of his decision-making and
action authority.
11-41. The battle captain must be integrated into the decision-making process and know
why certain key decisions were made. He must know the technical aspects of the battle plan
and understand the time-space relationship to execute any specific support task. He must
understand and enforce the battle rhythm—the standard events or actions that happen
during a normal 24-hour period—and ensure the TOC staff is effective throughout the
period. Battle captains use their judgment to adjust TOC activities and events to accomplish
the TOC mission across different shifts, varying tactical circumstances, and changes in TOC
location. At shift change, there must be a review of the current situation (friendly and
enemy), future plans, and working actions per unit SOP. The relieving shift battle captain
must accept responsibility for C2 as well as working actions before the relieved element
departs the command post.

OPERATIONS SERGEANT MAJOR

11-42. The operations sergeant major is the senior NCOIC in the main CP and is
responsible for running the CP. He is responsible for the proper manning, training,
equipment, execution of operations, and movement of the command post (both command
group and main). The operations SGM is responsible for ensuring that both unit standards
and SOPs (including movement setup, maintenance of power and climate control, and
internal security) are adhered to by all assigned and attached personnel. The success of
operations in the CP can be directly attributed to how well the operations SGM runs the CP.

SECTION III – COMMUNICATION

11-43. Communication is the means through which C2 is exercised. Soldiers throughout the
battalion must know both the chain of command and succession of command in the unit.
There must be open lines of communication up, down, and laterally. To ensure that the
battalion maintains effective communication, the commander should:

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Provide for redundancy in communications means by having backup at key

locations.
Make sure subordinates know what to do during interruptions in communications.
All must understand that, with the exception of FBCB2 and BFT, digital systems
as well as JNN satellite communications do not work on the move. Therefore, there
will be planned communications outages and standard procedures for reentering
the (digital) communications nets as well as standard procedures to capture
information that moved in the network during the outages.
Ensure SOP specifies immediate actions in case of jamming, including prearranged
frequencies to switch to and code words.
Avoid overloading the communications systems. Use them only when necessary.
Practice disciplined communications procedures by eliminating nonessential
conversations.
Ensue that all understand the order of responsibilities for communications (higher
to lower…left to right), as follows:
Senior to subordinate.
Supporting to supported.
Reinforcing to reinforced.
Passing to passed (for forward passage of lines).
Passed to passing (for rearward passage of lines).
Left to right.
Rearward to forward.
11-44. All units must take immediate action to restore lost communications. These same
responsibilities apply to establishing liaison between headquarters.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
11-45. As the Army proceeds in the 21st century, digital communications upgrades will
continue to change the nature of operations at the battalion level. The information
battlefield will see rapid dissemination of products up and down the chain of command and
to adjacent units.
11-46. The Army shares a common picture of the battlespace regardless of task organization
using FBCB2, BFT, and ABCS. (However, at this time, the IP addresses in the digital
architecture are relatively fixed.) ABCS continues to be refined as the integration of six
functional area control systems (Figure 11-1) provide situational information and decision
support to the operating systems at UEx and below (from UEx down to platoon level). Other
communications means include couriers, sound and visual signals, cell/satellite/voice over IP
telephones, radios, and JNN satellite communications. (Digital systems will be discussed in
depth in follow-on paragraphs.)

WIRE
11-47. Wire is normally used for internal communications in the CP area, assembly areas,
and defensive positions. Wire takes more time to plan, install, and recover, but it provides
reliable secure communications if time and the tactical situation permit its installation.

COURIER
11-48. Couriers are used between C2 facilities and between higher and lower headquarters.
Couriers are slower and more vulnerable to loss than other means of communications but
can be used when other means cannot be used. When authorized, motorcycle, all-terrain
vehicle, or Gator, messengers can be used between the CPs, trains, higher headquarters, and

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units. Messengers should be instructed on destruction procedures to prevent enemy capture

of messages. Personal security is a requirement for messengers.

Figure 11-1. Army Tactical Command and Control Systems

SOUND AND VISUAL

11-49. Sound and visual signals may be included in signal operating instructions (SOI)
extracts or unit SOPs. Sound signals include metal-on-metal, vehicle horns, whistles, and
bells. Visual signals include lights, flags, glint tape, uniform and equipment markings, arm-
and-hand signals, and pyrotechnics.

TELEPHONE LINES
11-50. Commercial local telephone lines can be used with permission of higher
headquarters. If used, it should be assumed the enemy can monitor all calls made using
commercial telephone lines. Units need to exercise control over the use of both commercial

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cellular and satellite telephones also assuming that the signals can be intercepted. Secure
telephones should be used at every opportunity—secure telephone unit (STU) and secure
telephone equipment (STE) telephones must be used in training so that their use during
operations is trained to standard. Voice over IP telephones that come as part of the JNN
package will meet the communications requirements between friendly headquarters.

RADIO
11-51. In digital units, radio should be the primary means of communication after the unit
makes contact—information prior to contact should move digitally. Interunit radios (both
secure and nonsecure) are common throughout the battalion and are the basis to conduct
operations. Nonsecure radios must be assumed to be monitored by the enemy.

ARMY TACTICAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

11-52. The principal Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) automation
components of the ABCS in the upper element of the TI that are found in the battalion
follow:
MCS (Maneuver Control System).
AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Data System).
FAADC2 (Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control).
ASAS (All-Source Analysis System).
BCS3 (Battle Command Sustainment Support System).

FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

11-53. FBCB2 provides awareness of both the friendly and enemy situation as well as battle
command information to selected leaders in platoons and companies that are in the net with
the leadership of battalions and brigade on the lower tier of the TI.

BLUE FORCE TRACKER

11-54. BFT provides units with a limited COP of locations of friendly ground forces much
like FBCB2. BFT has less messaging capability, is satellite based, and has a longer latency
rate for information. BFT is not limited to the fixed internet protocol addresses and shows all
friendly emitters regardless of task organization.

GOOD ENOUGH BATTLE COMMAND

11-55. As a lesson learned from recent combat operations, new standards for minimum
distribution of BFT has been established to bridge the gap between the Army Master
Fielding Plan for ABCS and a fully digitized Army. Good enough battle command brings
horizontal proliferation of digital battle command throughout the field Army, but on a
limited basis. Initially, BFT will be fielded to battalions with fewer than a dozen units to
cover company command and battalion command connectivity. At the objective state, there
will be more than 70 BFTs in a battalion.

JOINT NETWORK NODE

11-56. In the fall of 2004, the Army began training and distributing the JNN-satellite based
communications system at BCT and UEx. The HBCT possesses multiple communications
capabilities to connect to the UEx. There is commercial time distance multiple access
(TDMA) and frequency division multiple access (FDMA) multichannel Ku-band tactical
satellite (TACSAT) for high bandwidth voice, video, and data requirements and single-
channel TACSAT radio assets for lower bandwidth, highly mobile voice and data

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communications. Maneuver battalions use the small command post node (battalion network
node) (BNN)) to connect to the JNN (at BCT level) for access to the global information grid
(GIG). Modular units will turn in their mobile subscriber equipment (Army Common User
System (ACUS)) and move from a land radio-based communication to a satellite-based
communications system. BNN provides voice over internet protocol (VOIP) telephone service
as well as high-speed data transmission, but it only works from fixed-site locations and
requires FM tactical radio support to fill in the gaps while the system is moved to support
operations.

SECTION IV – COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

11-57. Communications is the means by which the commander projects his command and
control across the width and depth of the battlefield. The ABCS encompasses all Army
communications and consists of the following subordinate systems: Army Global Command
and Control System (AGCCS) at the operational level (UEx) and theater level (UEy) and the
Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) at operational level (UEx and below).
The JNN is the emerging communications structure that will bring the battalion into the
GIG via dedicated satellite communications system. In the interim, the heavy combined
arms battalion must be capable of operating in legacy systems as well as JNN.
Communications currently available to the HBCT combined arms battalion fall under one of
the subsets of the ATCCS:
Combat net radio (CNR).
Army Common User System (ACUS).
Army Data Distribution System (ADDS).
Battalion network node (BNN) segment of JNN

COMBAT NET RADIO

11-58. The primary means of tactical communication for the combined arms battalion is
CNR. This family of push-to-talk radios includes the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne
Radio System (SINCGARS), improved high-frequency radio (IHFR), and single-channel
TACSAT radios.

SINCGARS
11-59. SINCGARS is the primary means of communications available to the HBCT
combined arms battalion. Although primarily a voice transmitter, SINCGARS can also be
used to pass limited data transmissions. The planning range for this system is a maximum of
10 kilometers dismounted and 35 kilometers mounted. The range can be extended through
use of retransmission equipment or antennas such as the OE-303. SINCGARS, through
CNR, can provide access into the ACUS via the KY-90 combat net radio interface (CNRI).
The KY-90 is installed on the battlefield by the signal company at BCT. The SINCGARS
radio nets, typically installed by battalion, are C2, intelligence and operations (O/I), and A/L.
The combined arms battalion also enters and monitors nets established by its higher
headquarters. When establishing SINCGARS nets for CP operations, remoting the antennas
limits the enemy’s ability to direction-find the CP location, but it increases the force-
protection profile as the remote system has to be protected.

IMPROVED HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO

11-60. Using IHFR provides a versatile capability for short- and long-range communications
and provides longer range than SINCGARS. High frequency (HF) is the only tactical
communications asset that may achieve long-range communications independent of
terrestrial or satellite relays. HF is also useful where line of sight (LOS) cannot be achieved.

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HF communications may be either voice or secure data, but the distribution of this
equipment is limited to one or two sets per combined arms battalion. Radio remains the most
detectable means of electronic communications and is subject to both intentional and
unintentional electronic interference.

TACTICAL SATELLITE
11-61. The use of TACSAT radio gives the commander the greatest range. The TACSAT
radio transmits in the UHF/VHF range, requiring the antenna to have assent angle LOS
with the satellite. Satellite access time must be requested in advance of use from the UEx
G6. The battalion may be issued satellite communication (SATCOM) iridium telephones for
contingency A/L coordination purposes. As with TACSAT radios, SATCOM telephones also
require LOS to the servicing satellite and proper access codes to work. The logistics
community (FSC/BSB) uses very small aperture terminal (VSAT) satellite communications
system to send supply requisitions over BSC3 direct to the national supply system and to
maintain the logistics COP.

ARMY COMMON USER SYSTEM

11-62. Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) provides the ACUS as the common
communications system in the field Army and will remain in use until JNN is completely
fielded. Signal companies install the backbone node centers (NCs) while small extension
nodes (SENs) and radio access units (RAUs) provide access for the combined arms unit.

MOBILE SUBSCRIBER RADIO TELEPHONE

11-63. The mobile subscriber radio terminal (MSRT) is the primary MSE equipment
available to the HBCT combined arms battalion. It consists of a VHF radio and a digital
secure voice telephone (DSVT). The MSRT automatically selects random channels for each
call and chooses the lowest effective radio frequency transmit level. The MSRT can be
installed in a vehicular configuration, remote from the vehicle, or in a stand-alone mode
when used with an appropriate power supply. The MSRT must be within 15 kilometers of a
RAU site to communicate. MSE distribution in an HBCT combined arms battalion is usually
limited to two or three MSRTs.

DIGITAL VOICE NONSECURE TELEPHONE

11-64. The digital voice nonsecure telephone (DVNT) is a four-wire nonsecure telephone
terminal that requires collocation with a small extension node (SEN) to connect to the MSE
network. The SEN provides connection to the tactical packet network (TPN) for the HBCT
combined arms battalion computers. Using the TPN allows the combined arms battalion to
connect commercial computers or Army systems (ASAS or Maneuver Control System (MCS))
to the MSE network. Typically, combined arms battalion operations do not include task
organization of a SEN for combined arms battalion use, and the first SEN access normally
available may found in the brigade rear.

THE DIGITAL BATTLEFILED

11-65. The information battlefield will see rapid dissemination of products up and down the
chain of command and to adjacent units. The Army will share a common picture of the
battlespace regardless of task organization. The principal ATCCS automation components of
the ABCS follow:
MCS.
AFATDS.
FAADC2.

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ASAS.
BCS3.
FBCB2.

ARMY BATTLE COMMAND SYSTEM COMPONENTS

11-66. The ABCS consists of the ATCCS subcomponents, the FBCB2 System, and the TI.
The ATCCS components have traditionally been stovepipe systems in their development,
with limited interface capability to other digital systems. With version 6.0 software in late
1999, the systems began migration to a joint common database (JCDB) to improve interface
capability and achieve functional commonality. By late 2004, version 6.4 of the software was
the standard. The ATCCS components are the primary digital communication systems
between CPs. FBCB2 is the primary digital system for communication and transmission of
situational information data at brigade level and below. The ATCCS components discussed
below have embedded battle command software that allows interface with FBCB2.

COMBINED ARMS CONTROL SYSTEM

11-67. The MCS is the hub of the ABCS component in each command post. It is the primary
system for the creation and dissemination of orders, graphics, and operations-related
reports. MCS automatically receives friendly joint forces positioning data generated by
FBCB2-equipped or embedded-battle-command (EBC)-equipped platforms of subordinate
units resulting in the friendly picture. EBC is a software subcomponent of MCS. It is a
derivative of FBCB2 software and allows MCS to exchange reports and graphics with
FBCB2 systems. At battalion level, MCS performs the following primary functions:
Receives orders and graphics from higher and adjacent units.
Creates and disseminates orders and graphics to subordinate, higher, and adjacent
units. Near-term ability to interface graphics and orders to FBCB2 and platform
EBC is limited.
Extracts information from other systems to display a picture of the battlefield that
may include friendly and enemy situational information, terrain, friendly graphics,
artillery range fans, air and missile defense (AMD) umbrellas, obstacles and
contaminated areas, C2 nodes, and supply nodes.
Sends and receives reports.
11-68. Two MCS systems are located in the main CP. One is used primarily for generation
and transmission of orders and messages; the other normally is set to display enemy and
friendly situational information and friendly graphics to allow the staff to track the battle.
11-69. There are limitations in the automatic generation of friendly situational information.
Obviously, forces that are not equipped with FBCB2 or are not transmitting to the TI will
not automatically appear in the situational information picture and must be manually input
into MCS by the operations section. Operators may also manually input friendly icons via
FBCB2 or ASAS. Therefore, the COP will be as good as the manual input of nondigital blue
forces and all red forces reported from subordinate units.

ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS SYSTEM

11-70. ASAS supports intelligence operations, providing linkage to strategic and tactical
intelligence sensors and sources. ASAS’s primary functions include the following:
Data access, database development, and correlation capabilities.
Creation and dissemination of intelligence reports, templates, and annexes.
Receipt of intelligence reports from a variety of sources (including FBCB2 and
other digital systems) and display and management of the enemy picture.

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Collection management.
Support of targeting functions.
Linkage to the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (depends on other systems and capabilities
normally not available below brigade level).
11-71. The battalion has a single ASAS system located in the S2 platform at the main CP.
The S2 uses ASAS to receive intelligence reports from all sources and to create and manage
the correlated enemy situational information picture, which the other ATCCS components in
the CP can access. Additionally, the S2 routinely sends the ASAS picture he generates down
to subordinate units via FBCB2. He also sends the situational information picture to
brigade, where it is integrated into the brigade-level enemy situational information picture
by the brigade S2 section.

ADVANCED FIELD ARTILLERY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM

11-72. AFATDS provides automated capabilities to control fire support operations. Located
in the fire support element (FSE) platform at the main CP and in the supporting artillery
battalion CP, the system provides the ability to:
Create and disseminate fire support orders, graphics, and control measures to
assist in the clearance of fires.
Receive and process calls for fire from other digital systems and target acquisition
radars.
Manage mission allocation.
Monitor firing unit status and locations.
Transmit and receive reports and free-text messages.
Display the enemy and friendly situational information pictures from MCS and
ASAS.
Provide integrated fires and intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) management
in conjunction with ASAS.

FORWARD AREA AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-73. FAADC2 is the collection of computer and communication systems used to control air
defense elements and create the air battle picture. It serves to integrate sensors (Airborne
Warning and Control System (AWACS), Patriot, Sentinel) with short-range air defense
(SHORAD) weapon systems. The long-range air picture is created from information received
from AWACS aircraft transmitted on the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
(JTIDS) radios, and from the UEx’s Sentinel air acquisition radars transmitted through the
ground-based sensor (GBS). Air track data is sent via the Enhanced Position Location
Reporting System (EPLRS) and SINCGARS radios to individual firing elements (Linebacker,
Avenger, and Stinger teams). The total FAADC2 system provides real-time enemy air
engagement operations, airspace situational information, and air threat early warning. FM
voice remains the primary means for transmitting initial air threat warnings for the near
term. FBCB2 is the secondary method and is capable of displaying both visual and audible
alerts to crews.

BATTLE COMMAND SUSTAINMENT SUPPORT SYSTEM

11-74. BCS3 provides logistics status and information in support of sustainment planning
and operations. The system receives subordinate unit logistical reports from FBCB2 and
other BCS3 terminals, and it transmits reports and requirements to echelons-above-brigade
support elements. The S1 and S4 sections in the CTCP have a BCS3 terminal with FBCB2.
It uses this terminal to receive digital logistical and situation reports from units within the

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battalion and to input data into the BCS3 network to conduct personnel transactions and to
request, coordinate, and receive supplies. The FSC uses VSAT to transmit BCS3 data
directly back to the national supply systems.

FORCE XXI BATTLE COMMAND BRIGADE AND BELOW

11-75. The FBCB2 hardware is a mix of commercial, ruggedized, and militarized computers
installed in vehicles at brigade and below. When available, the FBCB2 can be connected to
the precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) and other embedded platform interfaces,
such as the Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS). FBCB2 is common to all
aspects of the digitized battlefield and platforms found in platoons and companies in fully
digitized units.
11-76. FBCB2 uses the variable message format (VMF) to send and receive messages
horizontally and vertically on the battlefield, regardless of task organization. VMF improves
current configurations in which the battlefield operating systems (BOS) automation systems
do not communicate to each other. This provides communication and processing capabilities
to the warfighter, which yields significant advantages in two key areas:
Situational information. Situational information is a state of understanding gained
from knowledge based on accurate and real-time information of friendly, enemy,
neutral, and noncombatant locations. It consists of a COP of the battlefield scaled
to specific levels of interest and needs.
Command and control. C2 is direction by a commander over assigned forces in
accomplishing a mission. A commander employs C2 functions as he plans, directs,
and controls forces and operations to accomplish a mission.
11-77. FBCB2 provides each echelon with battlefield situational information two echelons
up and down and one adjacent unit left and right. FBCB2 significantly improves the
effectiveness of the force by providing up-to-date combat situation information based on
echelon and location, including the following:
Friendly and enemy positions.
Air and ground unit positions.
Maps, terrain, and elevation.
11-78. FBCB2 also provides rapid generation and dissemination of messages and
acknowledgments, include the following:
Orders and requests.
Fires and alerts.
Reports.
Rapid generation and dissemination of overlays on the situation picture.
Semiautomatic exchange of selected mission-critical data between the FBCB2 and
the ABCS component systems.
11-79. For any task reorganization, FBCB2 hosts affected by the task reorganization must
receive new initialization data. Transfer of the modified initialization data occurs through
signal channels to the ultimate users. The reconfiguration of the system architecture to add
new digital units and delete departing digital units is time consuming and requires a digital
C2 rehearsal to ensure that the system meets the architecture redesign before beginning
the combat operation.

JOINT NETWORK NODE

11-80. The JNN is the communications package that will serve as the LandWarNet
(replaces MSE) and enables the heavy combined arms battalion, BCT, UEx, and UEy

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headquarters to connect independently into the GIG or communicate directly into a joint
headquarters. The JNN has the voice and data switching equipment, which allows
independent operations and enables both circuit switching and IP-based networking. The
JNN at UEx level will work with existing terrestrial transport (high-capacity line-of-sight
(HCLOS) and LOS antennas), ground mobile forces (GMF), TSC-85/93), secure mobile
antijam reliable tactical terminal (SMART-T), commercial Ku-band satellite, or Ka-band
satellite (when available). The Ku-band satellite terminal uses commercial bandwidth and
satellites to fill an existing military satellite capabilities gap and comes in three sizes to
perform three different missions. The large terminal, a 3.7-meter dish, is used with the unit
hub node (UHN) at UEx and BCT levels. The medium terminal is used with the JNN. The
small terminal is used with the battalion node or small CP node. The medium and small
terminal will use a 2.4-meter dish.

BATTALION NETWORK NODE/SMALL COMMAND POST NODE

11-81. The BNN is fielded to the battalion-level headquarters and is highly maneuverable,
simple to use, and quick to set up. The BNN consists of a support vehicle, one 2.4-meter
satellite dish on a trailer, and two transit cases (Figure 11-2). The BNN operates in the
TDMA satellite architecture to provide secret (Secret Integrated Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET)) and nonsecure (Nonsecure Integrated Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET))
data and VOIP telephone services. This architecture allows the battalion data network to
mesh into the GIG through either a UHN or a JNN.

Figure 11-2. Battalion Network Node

THE COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SIGNAL OFFICER (S6) IN JNN UNIT

11-82. The battalion S6 has overall authority and responsibility for the communications
assets and the operations within the combined arms battalion AO. The S6 must work closely
with higher and adjacent headquarters to ensure efficient communications employment
throughout the BCT AO. Each combined arms battalion has an organic small CP node

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 Command Post Operations

assigned to the battalion that enables wideband beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) access to the
brigade network and limited Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) services
(SIPRNET, VOIP telephones, and NIPRNET with locally purchased equipment). Current
modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) battalion S6 personnel will operate
the small CP node without additional personnel.

JNN NETWORK OPERATIONS IN THE COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

11-83. The lowest echelon unit capable of wideband access to the GIG is the combined arms
battalion. Before JNN, battalions were limited to LOS communications systems, such as
combat net radios (SINCGARS, HF, etc.), EPLRS, and narrowband satellite systems
(Spitfire, international maritime satellite (INMARSAT), etc.). They also had limited access to
the MSE and the tri-service tactical communications (TRI-TAC) networks via the MSRT and
CNR interface. These connections provided voice and limited data connectivity to the
commander. Maneuver and support battalions will gain this wideband capability via the
JNN small CP node. The small CP node provides secret data and VOIP telephone service
across a 4 mbps TDMA connection. This architecture allows the battalion data network to
access the GIG through JNN at the BCT. (See Figure 11-3.)
11-84. At the battalion level, basic operators (military occupation specialty (MOS) 25F and
25B) are in charge of setting up the basic communications package to support data and VOIP
telephone service to their headquarters. Since the requirements are small, the packages
supporting these requirements have been tailored for a limited capability that is easy to set
up and manage. Setup for the network is a standard procedure that consists of powering the
system, pointing to the satellite, and connecting the data equipment for needed dial tone or
e-mail/organizational message traffic.
11-85. The battalion S6 section has a laptop computer loaded with the necessary software
applications to monitor and manage the battalion’s K/U-band satellite connection to the wide
area network (WAN). The requirements, inherent in the configuration, monitoring,
management, and reconfiguration of the battalion local area network (LAN), will be executed
by the S6 using the Integrated System Control (Version) 4 (ISYSCON (V) 4. The battalion S6
is responsible for ensuring that every system within the battalion’s operational control is
included in the databases that support the construction of the network architecture that
enables battle command. The battalion S6 is responsible for coordinating with the unit of
action (UA)S/UEx G6 for the development of the network architecture. The network
configuration databases used in the execution of the LAN management requirements will be
controlled at the UEx level by the G6. When a BCT is operating as an entity independent of
a UEx, these controls will reside with the BCT S6. There are few foreseeable instances when
such control would be delegated to an S6 at battalion level.
11-86. Closely related to basic configuration and management is the need for information
assurance (IA). IA comes in two categories: offensive and defensive operations. To perform a
defense in depth, the battalion communications team sets up a firewall to protect the
network inside the battalion TOC. This firewall is configured with similar steps and
guidance from the brigade NETOPS cell. Although reconfiguration may be needed, this
firewall is set on an existing standard, minimizing changes required. The battalion’s
protective measures consist of software patches on all information technology systems, solid
antivirus updates, and the monitoring for unusual data traffic or strange usage patterns.

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FMI 3-90.5

GMF
EHF SATCOM
K/U Band SATCOM
Bde Private Network

Figure 11-3. Battalion to UEx JNN Interface

11-87. Content staging is conducted at the battalion level in two areas: common user
services and ABCS setup. The file server is used to share critical information inside the TOC
and with the battalion’s higher headquarters. This push-pull staging system should be used
for all normally occurring reports, orders, or statistics. The backup domain controller allows
all members of the battalion TOC to access the brigade’s information network without
having to expend external bandwidth to gain access. The controller verifies user names and
passwords without leaving the site, minimizing overhead traffic.
11-88. ABCS receives data from a higher echelon that collects all data from BFT and other
ABCS programs. The collection/dissemination server resides at either brigade or UEx. The
battalion runs its ABCS via thin client replication to populate the COP.

SECTION V – DIGITAL COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND

ARCHITECTURE
11-89. This section provides basic information on the digital C2 systems and architecture
that support brigade C2 operations.

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SIGNAL RESPONSIBILITIES
11-90. Key personnel include the combined arms battalion signal officer (S6), unit signal
support systems specialists, TOC LAN manager, and ABCS administrator.

BATTALION S6 (C4 OPERATIONS OFFICER)

11-91. The battalion S6 manages the operations of communications systems received from
the brigade communications systems to support the HBCT combined arms battalion. He has
OPCON of any attached signal personnel from the BCT. The battalion S6:
Participates in the planning and operations process of the combined arms battalion.
Coordinates closely with the brigade signal officer (BCT S6) on planning and
operating the TI as it relates to the combined arms battalion.
Understands the capabilities and operation of all communication and automation
equipment in the combined arms battalion.
Advises the combined arms battalion staff on communications matters.
Receives and validates EPLRS very high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC)
requirements and provides these to the brigade signal officer.
Maintains the status of communications systems operating in the combined arms
battalion.
Exercises supervisory responsibility for training and assigning the signal support
system specialists MOS 25U in the combined arms battalion.
Develops a concise signal annex and communications/digital node architecture
overlay to the combined arms battalion operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order
(OPORD).
Tracks COMSEC distribution within the heavy combined arms battalion.
Tracks all signal and digital nodes in the combined arms battalion AO.

UNIT SIGNAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS.

11-92. The unit signal support system specialists assigned to all units accomplish system
maintenance and TI system initialization and reinitialization functions as required.

TOC LOCAL AREA NETWORK MANAGER

11-93. The HBCT combined arms battalion S3 is responsible for ensuring the TOC LAN
(which supports all ABCS component systems) is properly integrated to provide
synchronization of information needed for successful battle command execution.

ABCS SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR

11-94. The system administrator is responsible for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of an ATCCS ABCS computer host. Each ABCS component system (ASAS,
AFATDS, BCS3, FAADC2, and MCS) assigns a senior operator to serve as system
administrator.

INTEGRATING DIGITAL AND ANALOG UNITS

11-95. It will be several years before the majority of the Army (active component
(AC)/reserve component (RC)) is digitally equipped. Even then, the brigade will operate with
elements without digital equipment, especially in joint or coalition environments. National
Guard and Army Reserve units, light forces, and supporting UEx combat support and
combat service support units are the most likely types of analog units with which brigades

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FMI 3-90.5

and battalions will operate. Procedures for integrating digital and analog units are essential
for success.
FM and MSE are the primary communications mediums with the analog unit until
JNN is fully fielded.
Hard copy orders and graphics are required for analog units.
Graphical control measures require the level of detail necessary to support
operations of a unit without situational information. In general, this requires more
control measures tied to identifiable terrain.
Digitally equipped LNO teams are critical to assist analog units.
The combined arms battalion staff must recognize that integrating an analog unit
into a digital unit requires retention of most of the analog control techniques. In
essence, two control systems must be in operation, with particular attention paid to
keeping the analog units informed of all pertinent information that flows digitally.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
11-96. The battalion commander has seven information needs that must be met in the
command post:
Friendly locations
Current enemy situation (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).
Running estimate (combat power/CCIR/staff estimates).
Graphic control measures.
Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
Commander’s situation reports (SITREPs).
Fire support coordination measures.
11-97. The following paragraphs discuss information management considerations and
techniques for digital C2 procedures as well as for integrating analog and digital units in the
battalion C2 structure. The potential of these systems to contribute to battlefield lethality,
tempo, and ability to dominate is enormous. Digital C2 systems bring a dramatic increase in
the level of situational information units may achieve. They can significantly speed the
process of creating and disseminating orders, allow for extensive data basing of information,
and increase the speed and fidelity of coordination and synchronization of battlefield
activities. At the same time, achieving the potential of these systems requires extensive
training, a high level of technical proficiency by both operators and supervisors, and the
disciplined use of detailed SOPs. Communications planning and execution to support the
digital systems are significantly more demanding and arduous than are required for units
primarily relying on FM and MSE communications. The requirement for digital units to
validate the digital unit architecture to ensure that the system communicates to the
battalion cannot be overstated.

FM OR DIGITAL
11-98. Whether to use FM or digital means for communication is a function of the tactical
situation and SOPs. Even though both systems are critical for effective C2, FM remains the
primary method for control at battalion level and below during operations, with additional
support from the situational information display provided by FBCB2 or EBC. Some general
considerations can help guide the understanding of when to use which mechanism at what
time.
11-99. FM is the primary method of communications between battalion and brigade and
when elements are in enemy contact. Before and after an engagement, the staff and
commanders use digital systems for disseminating orders and graphics and conducting

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 Command Post Operations

routine reporting. During operations, however, the battalion staff uses a combination of
systems to report and coordinate with higher and adjacent units.
11-100. Staffs at higher echelons, particularly UEx and brigade levels, must remain
sensitive to the difficulty and danger of using digital systems when moving or in contact.
They should not expect digital reports under those conditions. Digital reporting builds the
COP (particularly the posting of enemy icons based on reports), and failure to render such
reports results in an incomplete and inaccurate COP. Additionally, the units must build the
COP as the action occurs to provide the commander with a COP that contains relevant
information that leverages his decision-making. Other general guidelines include the
following:
Initial contact at any echelon within the battalion should be reported on FM voice;
digital enemy spot reports should follow as soon as possible to generate enemy
situational information.
Elements moving about the battlefield (not in CPs) use FM voice unless they can
stop and generate a digital message or report.
Emergency logistical requests, especially casualty evacuation requests, should be
initiated on FM voice with a follow-up digital report if possible.
Combat elements moving or in contact should transmit enemy spot reports on FM
voice; their higher headquarters should convert FM reports into digital spot reports
to generate situational information. At company level, the XO and the 1SG convert
the reports.
Calls for fire on targets of opportunity should be sent on FM voice; company fire
support teams (FISTs) submit digitally to AFATDS.
When equipped with the far target locator (FTL), vehicle crews should engage the
target with the FTL and select the call for fire message button on the spot report
(SPOTREP), enabling a digital call for fire.
Planned calls for fire from FISTs in the initial part of an engagement should be
sent digitally.
Routine logistical reports and requests should be sent digitally.
Routine reports from subordinates to battalion before and after combat should be
sent digitally.
Orders, plans, and graphics should be sent digitally, accompanied by an FM voice
call to alert recipients that they have critical information being sent to them.
Additionally, the transmitting element should request a verbal acknowledgement of
both receipt and understanding of the transmitted information by an appropriate
Soldier (usually not the computer operator).
The transmission of a battalion order via FBCB2 is time consuming and difficult to
read and manipulate. FBCB2 best handles short FRAGOs and WOs.
Obstacle and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)-1 reports should be sent
initially by voice, followed by digital reports to generate a geo-referenced
situational information message portraying the obstacle or contaminated area
across the network.

FRIENDLY SITUATIONAL INFORMATION

11-101. The creation of friendly situational information is extensively digitized, requiring
minimal manipulation by CPs or platform operators. Each platform creates and transmits its
own position location and receives the friendly locations (displayed as icons) of all the
friendly elements in that platform’s WAN. This does not mean that all friendly units in the
general vicinity of that platform are displayed, since some elements may not be digitized or
in that platform’s digital network. For example, a combat vehicle in a battalion will probably

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not have situational information on a UEx fires brigade artillery unit operating nearby since
the two are in different networks. The situational information generated from individual
FBCB2- or EBC-equipped platforms is transmitted to CPs through the TOC server to MCS.
The other ATCCS components can access the friendly situational information picture
through MCS.
11-102. Commanders must recognize limitations in the creation of friendly situational
information that results from vehicles or units that are not equipped with FBCB2 or BFT.
Two aspects to consider follow:
Not all units will be equipped for years to come, particularly in the RC. With more
than 60 percent of the logistical units and supporting artillery in the Army Reserve
or National Guard, it is inevitable that analog units will operate in the brigade and
battalion AO.
Dismounted soldiers are not equipped with a digital device that transmits
situational information.
11-103. Ways to overcome these shortfalls follow:
A digitally equipped element tracks the location of specified nondigital elements
(dismounted forces) and manually generates and maintains an associated friendly
icon. As an example, the mechanized company XO can generate an icon for
dismounted squads.
The main CP tracks analog units operating with the combined arms battalion and
generates associated friendly icons.
A digitally equipped platform acts as a liaison or escort for analog units moving or
operating in the combined arms battalion area. Battalion and higher elements
must be informed of the association of the LNO icon with the analog unit.
Friendly situational information should not be used to clear fires since all elements
will not be visible. Friendly situational information can be used to deny fires and
can aid in the clearance process, but it cannot be the sole source for clearance of
fires. This holds true for all ABCS systems.

ENEMY SITUATIONAL INFORMATION

11-104. The hardest and most critical aspect of creating the situational information picture
is creating the picture of the enemy. The enemy situational information picture at brigade
and battalion levels is the result of multiple inputs—FM spot reports, UAVs, and JSTAR
reports; reports from FBCB2-equipped platforms in subordinate units;, electronic or signal
intelligence feeds; and inputs from the S2 section. Enemy situational information generation
is a complex process that is partially automated but requires a great deal of work and
attention to detail to get right and more work to maintain relevance.
11-105. Generation of the enemy situational information picture occurs at all echelons. At
battalion level and below, the primary mechanism for generating situational information is
FBCB2 (or EBC). When an observer acquires an enemy element, he creates and transmits a
spot report, which automatically generates an enemy icon that appears network wide. Only
those in the digital address group to whom the report was sent receive the text of the report,
but all platforms in the network can see the icon. As the enemy moves or its strength
changes, the observer must update this icon. If the observer must move, he ideally passes
responsibility for observing the enemy icon element to another observer. If multiple
observers see the same enemy element and create multiple reports, the battalion or brigade
S2 (or some other element that has the capability) must eliminate the redundant icons.
11-106. FBCB2 spot reports must include the higher headquarters S2 in the address group
for the data to be routed through the TOC server into ASAS to feed the larger intelligence
picture. FM reports received at a CP can be manually input into the ASAS database by the

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 Command Post Operations

S2 section. FBCB2 and FM voice reports are the primary source of enemy situational
information for fighting the close and rear battles.
11-107. At brigade level, the S2 section and the military intelligence (MI) company receive
ASAS intelligence feeds from higher and adjacent units along with feeds from JSTARS,
UAVs, and the common ground station (CGS). They enter enemy information from these
sources into the ASAS database and send this information via ASAS to the battalion S2s.
These feeds, along with FM voice and FBCB2 reports, are the primary source of enemy
situational information for executing the brigade deep fight and providing combined arms
battalions a picture of what is coming into their areas.
11-108. Fusion of all the intelligence feeds is normally done at brigade and UEx levels. The
brigade S2 routinely (every 30 minutes to every hour) sends the updated enemy situational
information picture to subordinate units down to platform level. Since the fused ASAS
database is focused on the deeper areas of the battlefield and its timeliness may vary,
battalion scouts need to rely both on the FBCB2-generated intelligence picture as well as
their own observations to avoid being surprised. Combined arms battalion leaders and staffs
refer occasionally to the ASAS-generated intelligence picture to keep track of enemy forces
that will be encountered in the near future but that are not yet part of the battalion close
fight.
11-109. As information systems develop further in the future, the generation of enemy
situational information will be increasingly automated. However, the success of the
intelligence effort depends primarily on the ability of staffs to analyze enemy activities
effectively, to develop and continuously refine effective intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB); to create and execute effective collection management plans; and, most
important, to integrate, synchronize, and coordinate the intelligence efforts with the
operational effort. Automation and displays can contribute enormously to the ability to
disseminate information and display it in a manner that aids comprehension, but
information generation must be rapid and accurate for it to be useful. Information must also
be accompanied by analysis; pictures alone cannot convey all that is required, nor will they
be interpreted the same by all viewers. S2s must be particularly careful about spending too
much time operating an ASAS terminal while neglecting the analysis of activities for the
brigade and subordinate commanders and staffs.
11-110. The enemy situational information picture usually is incomplete and less current
than friendly situational information. The timeliness and accuracy of the enemy picture
always must be scrutinized. Units must use the picture to focus observers and orient the fire
support process, but they should not use it as the sole source for generating indirect fire
support target location data—it usually will not be timely enough.

GRAPHICS AND ORDERS

11-111. All ATCCS components effectively support the creation and transmission of
doctrinal field orders. The brigade staff sections normally develop their portions of orders
and send them to the BCT S3 where they are merged into a single document and
transmitted to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units. In creating orders, the tactical
internet does not possess high transmission rates like civilian e-mail. Orders and graphics
must be concise to reduce transmission times. Orders transmitted directly to FBCB2-
equipped systems (as all subordinate leaders in the battalion have) must meet the size
constraints of the order formats in FBCB2 and EBC. Graphics and overlays should be
constructed with the same considerations for clarity and size. Situational information
reduces the need for control measures to some degree, but the staff must always consider the
integration of analog units and that situational information may not always be available to
all elements.

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FMI 3-90.5

GRAPHICS
11-112. When creating graphics on an ATCCS component, the primary users will be
FBCB2-equipped. The following guidelines apply:
Create control measures relative to readily identifiable terrain, particularly if
analog units are part of the task organization.
Boundaries are important, but digital units tend to disregard them initially until
multiple units have to operate in near proximity or until it becomes necessary to
coordinate fires or movement of other units.
Intent graphics that lack the specificity of detailed control measures are an
excellent tool for use with WOs and FRAGOs and when doing parallel planning.
Follow them with appropriately detailed graphics as required.
Standardized colors must be used to differentiate units. This should be articulated
in the brigade SOP and established at brigade level. For example, brigade graphics
may be in black, HBCT combined arms battalion A in purple, reconnaissance
squadron in magenta, and HBCT combined arms battalion B in brown. This adds
considerable clarity for the viewer. Subordinate battalion and company colors
should be specified and standardized.
Traditional doctrinal colors for other graphics (green for obstacles, yellow for
contaminated areas, and so on) should be used, but an SOP should be developed
that uses the color capabilities of the systems to identify both templated actions or
activities (such as proposed obstacles and templated enemy actions or positions)
and executed or actual activities (emplaced obstacles and observed enemy).

OVERLAYS
11-113. When creating overlays, use multiple smaller overlays instead of one large overlay
to speed transmission times. System operators can open the overlays they need, displaying
them simultaneously. This technique also helps operators in reducing screen clutter.
The S3 should create the initial graphic control measures (boundaries, objectives,
and phase lines) on a single overlay and distribute it to the staff. This overlay
should be labeled as the operations overlay with the appropriate order number.
Staff elements should construct their appropriate graphic overlays using the
operations overlay as a background but without duplicating the operations overlay.
This avoids unnecessary duplication and increase in file size and maintains
standardization and accuracy. Each staff section labels its overlay appropriately
with the type of overlay and order number (for example, fire support, OPORD X-
XX).
Before overlays are transmitted to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units, the
senior battle captain or the XO checks them for accuracy and labeling. Hard copy
(traditional acetate) overlays are required for the CPs and any analog units.
Personnel transmit graphics for on-order missions or branch options to the plan
before the operation, as time permits. If time is short, they transmit graphics with
warning orders.

ACETATE AND MAPS

11-114. The advent of digitization does not mean that acetate and maps have no use and
will disappear, at least not in the near future. Maps still remain the best tool when
maneuvering and fighting on the battlefield or for controlling and tracking operations over a
large area. The combination of a map with digital situational information and terrain
database is ideal; both are required and extensively used.

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 Command Post Operations

DIGITAL STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE CONSIDERATIONS

11-115. The following paragraphs contain information regarding digital operations that are
relevant for the brigade and combined arms battalion tactical SOPs. Most of the digital
operating procedures must be established at brigade level to achieve standardization and
effective C2. As units have different mission requirements and technical changes occur, they
should experiment with these guidelines.

FILTER SETTINGS
11-116. To achieve a common picture, all FBCB2/ATCCS platforms must have the same
situational information filter settings. This is particularly important for the enemy
situational information picture so that, as icons go stale, they purge at the same time on all
platforms. Standard filter settings based on the nature of the enemy’s operation should be
established in unit SOPs and be the same throughout the brigade. For enemy offensive
operations, the filter setting times should be short; for enemy defensive operations, the
setting times should be longer, reflecting the more static nature of the enemy picture.
11-117. Standard filter setting may need to be adjusted based on the terrain and the
mission. In compartmented, difficult terrain, longer settings are more appropriate, perhaps
10 minutes for the attack. In wide-open, fast-paced operations in the desert, however,
shorter settings in the 5-minute range may be more appropriate. Also, as the enemy
transitions from offensive to defensive operations, the decision should be made at brigade
level to change to the appropriate standard filter setting.
11-118. The standardization of friendly filter settings is of equal importance in maintaining
a common situational information picture throughout the force. FBCB2 provides three
methods for updating individual vehicle locations: time, distance, and manually. When the
system is fully operational, it automatically updates friendly icons using time, distance
traveled, or both, based on the platform’s friendly situational information filter settings.
These settings should be standardized across the force based on both the mission and the
function of the platform or vehicle, with shorter refresh rates for combat vehicles and
vehicles that frequently move versus longer refresh rates for fairly static vehicles such as
TOCs. Tailoring the frequency of these automatic updates also reduces the load on the
tactical internet, freeing more capacity for other types of traffic.
11-119. The friendly icon refresh rate may also change as the battle is executed. This is
especially true in the transition from the offense to the defense or vice versa. The
standardization of friendly situational filter settings is probably most effectively done at the
brigade level using the brigade tactical SOP (TSOP). There are no set rules for what these
settings should be; they must be established based on the unit’s experience in using FBCB2
and the capacity of the TI. The capability to update a vehicle’s position manually should be
used only when a platform’s system is not fully functional and has lost the ability to
maintain its position within the system.

REPORTING
11-120. It may not be advantageous to have all platforms on the battlefields end spot
reports digitally. This can lead to multiple reports of the same enemy element and contribute
to an already confused and indecipherable intelligence picture. Defining who within the
brigade can initiate digital spot reports can help eliminate this problem. One technique is to
limit the creation of enemy icons via digital spot reports to reconnaissance elements (brigade
reconnaissance squadron and battalion scouts) and the company leadership (commander,
XO, or 1SG). Others report on FM to their higher headquarters, which creates and manages
the icon. This also helps those who execute the direct firefight by moving the digital
reporting responsibility to someone who is somewhat removed from the fight. At company

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level, the XO, 1SG, or CP personnel become the primary digital reporters. These
assignments cannot be completely restrictive. Unit SOPs and command guidance must allow
for and encourage soldiers who observe the enemy and know they are the sole observer
(because there is no corresponding enemy icon displayed in the situational information
picture) to create a digital spot report. Brigade and battalion SOPs should define the
schedule for report submissions, the message group for the reports, and the medium (digital
system or verbal) to be used.

UPDATES
11-121. A routine schedule of system updates must be established. For example, the S2
section should continuously update the ASAS database and should transmit the latest ASAS
situational information picture to the network every 30 minutes during operations if the
battalion commander, S3, or scouts need it. Also, staff sections should print critical displays
on an established schedule. These printed snapshots of situational information can be used
for continuity of battle tracking in the event of system failures and can contribute to after-
action reviews (AARs) and unit historical records.

ORDERS AND OVERLAYS

11-122. SOPs should define the technical process for creating, collating, and transmitting
orders and overlays, both analog and digital. Date-time annotations on every product must
be standardized and mandated to ensure the value of the information.

FILING SYSTEM NAMING CONVENTION

11-123. For interoperability and clarity, brigade SOPs should define the naming convention
and filing system for all reports, orders, and message traffic. This significantly reduces time
and frustration associated with lost files or changes in system operators.

COLOR STANDARDS
11-124. As discussed previously, SOPs should define colors used in graphics down to team
level.

DATABASES
11-125. C2 systems will inevitably migrate to a web-based capability, allowing information
to be data based and then accessed by users as needed or when they are able to retrieve it.
Commanders should establish standard guidelines for setting FBCB2 default addresses in
their units. For example, the S2 may transmit an intelligence summary to all subordinates,
and inevitably, some will lose the file or not receive it. The S2 can simultaneously post that
same summary to his homepage so users can access it as required. If this technique is used,
there are a some key things to note:
Posting a document to a homepage does not constitute communications. The right
people must be alerted that the document is there and available. Acknowledgement
of understanding the information constitutes effective communication. The battle
staff must chase units if required to secure acknowledgement of communications.
Documents should be concise and simple. Elaborate PowerPoint slide briefings take
days to transmit because of the size of the files, collapsing the TI. Gaudy graphics
and templates are a no-go because of the bandwidth they waste.
The amount of information data based and who has access must be carefully
controlled, both to maintain security and to keep from overloading the TI.

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TRAINING
11-126. Maintaining readiness to conduct digital C2 requires four levels of digital training
readiness. Digital systems require extensive individual and collective training to achieve
their operational potential to meet the commander’s information requirements.
Operator. Soldier operators must be able to establish, maintain, and optimize the
relevant digital systems in the CPs. Individual operator training is either
conducted as part of system new equipment training or as part of a sustaining
digital training.
Maintainer. Maintainers administer C2 systems and provide system and network
support to other digital systems in an operational environment. Maintainers are
trained either at the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) school
system or through local systems administrator courses.
Leader. Within the digital environment, the leaders must have the ability to
operate a digital system at a functional level as well as understand both the
vertical and horizontal relationship of the systems in the C2 network. Leaders must
be able to operate (at basic level) and integrate digital systems as well as supervise
and train digital operators on C2 operations. Leader training is conducted at the
operator level, the executive level, and collectively as part of battle staff training.
Collective training. Collective training includes battle staffs, crews, teams, sections,
cells, and organizations, which must train both individually and collectively to
optimize operational capabilities. Commanders should look to their battle command
training center for live, virtual, and constructive training environments to support
battalion collective training.

DIGITAL COMMAND AND CONTROL REHEARSALS (DC2R)

11-127. Just as radio nets must conduct communications checks as they are established,
digital nets must be checked to ensure vertical as well as horizontal connectivity. Every
element of the digital architecture must be checked to ensure that they can send and receive
all categories of messages and digital information (from every other element of the
architecture). Detailed discussion of DC2R is at Appendix K.

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 Chapter 12
Tactical Enabling Operations

Tactical enabling operations are specialized missions that are planned

and conducted to achieve or sustain a tactical advantage; they are
executed as part of an offensive, defensive, stability, or support mission.
The fluid nature of the modern battlefield increases the frequency with
which the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion
must plan and execute enabling operations such as passage of lines, relief
operations, obstacle reduction, linkup operations, and high-value asset
security. At the heavy combined arms battalion level, digital information
systems such as Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and Army Battle Command System
(ABCS) facilitate the planning and execution process of these often
complex and decentralized operations. This chapter establishes
techniques and procedures unique to the HBCT combined arms battalion
that can be applied to these specialized missions.

SECTION I – RELIEF OPERATIONS

12-1. A relief is an operation in which one unit replaces another in combat. The incoming
unit assumes responsibility for the mission and the assigned area of operation (AO). A relief
in place may be conducted at any point during offensive or defensive operations. Relief
operations are normally executed during limited visibility to reduce the possibility of
detection. FBCB2/BFT enhances the planning and execution of relief operations while the
Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) aids in differentiating friendly from enemy
as units conduct the linkup and passage of lines. This greatly reduces fratricide potential
and expedites forward movement since the relieved force can monitor the progress of the
linkup force and provide protective fires or adjust fire control measures predicated on the
speed with which the linkup force is moving. To facilitate and ensure successful operations,
the linkup and relieved force commanders and staffs exchange as much information as
possible to prevent the inadvertent engagement of friendly forces by either direct- or
indirect-fire systems during relief operations. Digitally equipped units can pass this
information through an exchange of FBCB2/BFT overlays that clearly define friendly
positions, fire support (FS) control measures, obstacles, linkup points, and signals.
Nondigitized (adjacent) units should exchange this information through liaison personnel
and conventional acetate overlays. Collocation of command posts (CPs) for both types of
units is recommended during the relief.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
12-2. On receipt of the order to conduct the relief, the incoming HBCT combined arms
battalion commander and staff establish continuous liaison with the stationary unit through
an exchange of liaison personnel and a digital exchange of information pertinent to the relief
operations (for units in the same digital architecture). Commanders and staffs emphasize
communications, reconnaissance, and transfer of command. If possible, the relieving unit

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FMI 3-90.5

should collocate with the main command post (CP) to facilitate continuous information
exchanges relative to the occupation plan, FS plan, and intelligence updates that include
past, present, and probable enemy courses of action (COAs). Although digitization allows
coordination without physically locating together, face-to-face coordination reduces any
potential misunderstandings related to relief preparation or the forthcoming operations.
Before contact with the stationary unit, the relieving force digitally receives the combined
arms graphics, fire plan, and current enemy situation by way of FBCB2 or Maneuver Control
System (MCS) overlays. Responsibility for the area is transferred as directed by the senior
common commander, normally when the incoming unit has a majority of his fighting force in
place and all communications systems (voice and digital) are operating. When planning the
relief, the battalion staff should consider the realities of risk management and fratricide
avoidance (Appendix D) in determining the most appropriate method for executing the relief.

RELIEVING COMPANIES ONE AT A TIME

12-3. This method is the most deliberate and time consuming. It involves sequentially
relieving maneuver companies one at a time. Separate routes to the rear of the relieved
companies’ locations are planned for each maneuver company and placed on the operations
overlay. To avoid cluttering the FBCB2/BFT display, only the routes of the relieving force
are included on the operations overlay. Routes are labeled sequentially and correspond to the
order in which the company executes them during the relief. When the lead relieving
company reaches its release point, its platoons move to the positions they will occupy. Crews
exchange range card and FS information, and the relieved unit then moves to the rear to its
next location. When the lead relieving company is in position, the next relieving company
moves along its designated route to relieve its counterpart, repeating the relief process. This
process repeats until each company has been relieved. If transfer of supplies from the
relieved unit is directed, the battalion S4 coordinates a transfer point to execute the
exchange.

RELIEVING UNITS AT THE SAME TIME

12-4. This method is the fastest, but it risks revealing friendly unit intentions. To expedite
the relief, the in-place battalion prepares FBCB2/BFT overlays to depict current friendly
graphics, FS measures, and the latest enemy situation update. These overlays are passed to
the relieving force before the two forces make contact. Once the two command groups
collocate and exchange plans, relief occurs at the same time at each location. The units of the
relieving and relieved battalions execute a move at the same time along different routes.
Relieved units withdraw as soon as they are relieved and do not wait for other units of the
battalion to be relieved. The control measures at the battalion level are identical to those
used for a sequential relief (one unit at a time).

RELIEVING UNITS BY OCCUPYING IN-DEPTH AND ADJACENT POSITIONS

12-5. This technique requires sufficient terrain to accommodate positioning of two like-sized
units at the same time. In this case, the relieving unit must locate where it can observe and
provide protective direct and indirect fires for the relieved unit using the relieved units’ fire
plans. This procedure requires that relieving company and battalion commanders conduct a
detailed physical reconnaissance of the battle position (BP) with their counterpart from the
in-place unit. Commanders and staffs enter information gathered from the physical
reconnaissance (for example, BPs, target reference point (TRPs), and routes into and out of
the area) on FBCB2/BFT operations overlays and share them throughout the relieving unit
during the planning and troop-leading procedures (TLP) process.

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CONDUCTING THE RELIEF

12-6. Execution of the relief follows one of the three previous techniques. During the relief,
the command group and the staff in the main CP monitor the progress of the relief through
FBCB2/BFT. To facilitate uninterrupted fires and effects to support the relief, indirect-fire
assets should be the last units relieved regardless of the relief technique used. Throughout
this process, the battalion may have to observe radio-listening silence until control of the
position passes to the commander of the relieving force. When the companies are set and the
relieved unit withdraws from the BP, company commanders send the battalion S3 an FBCB2
spot report (SPOTREP) indicating that the company is defending.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12-7. If either force makes direct-fire contact with an enemy force during the relief, it
immediately notifies the other unit and the higher headquarters by FM voice
communications. It then follows this voice report up with an FBCB2-generated contact
report or SPOTREP so that the precise location of the enemy force (enemy icon) is displayed
on FBCB2. If responsibility for the sector has not passed, the relieving combined arms unit
becomes under the operational control (OPCON) of the relieved unit. The assets and staff of
the relieved unit become OPCON to the relieving unit when the responsibility for the sector
has passed to the relieving combined arms battalion.

SECTION II – SECURITY OPERATIONS

12-8. The purposes of security operations are to provide early and accurate warning of enemy
operations, to provide the protected force with time and combined arms space to react to the
enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to employ the protected force
effectively. A battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) does not normally conduct security
operations for the UEx (the BFSB does not have the organic combat power), and therefore,
the UEx tasks a BCT or aviation brigade to conduct security operations in the UEx AO.
Heavy combined arms battalions may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear
of a larger force (UEx). Security operations provide reaction time, combined arms space, and
protection to the main body. Security operations are characterized by aggressive armed
reconnaissance aimed at reducing terrain and enemy unknowns, gaining and maintaining
contact with the enemy to ensure continuous information, and providing early and accurate
reporting of combat information to the protected force. Security operations forces orient in
any direction from a stationary or moving force. Security operations are designed to deny the
enemy intelligence information concerning the friendly force. Security operations contain
both passive and active elements and normally include combat action to seek, destroy, or
repel enemy reconnaissance units. The HBCT combined arms battalion performs three
primary types of security missions: screen, guard, and area security. The combined arms
battalion normally participates in security operations only as part of a larger element.

SCREEN
12-9. The primary task of a screening force is to provide early warning. It observes,
identifies, and reports enemy actions. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any
security mission. Generally, a screening force engages and destroys enemy reconnaissance
elements within its capabilities but fights otherwise only in self-defense.

COMBINED ARMS BATTALION SCREEN

12-10. At the battalion level, the scout platoon normally performs screen missions. When
the terrain provides multiple enemy avenues of approach, the battalion commander may
attach the scout platoon to a company to conduct a screen. The screening force generally

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FMI 3-90.5

establishes a series of observation posts (OPs) and conducts patrols to ensure adequate
surveillance of the assigned sector.

COMPANY SCREEN
12-11. A company may be directed to conduct a screen in support of heavy combined arms
battalion offensive and defensive operations. When given a forward screen mission, the
company moves as if executing a movement to contact.

PLANNING A SCREEN
12-12. When assigning a screen mission to a company, the heavy combined arms battalion
commander designates the general trace of the screen and the time it must be established.
The initial screen line should be forward of the general trace but remain within range of
supporting artillery and heavy combined arms battalion mortars. Screen lines are depicted
as phase lines; passage graphics are included in the overlay. Other planning considerations
follow:
Designate the left and right limits of the screen as well as a phase line for the near
boundary. This phase line can also become the on-order battle handover line.
Confirm which unit has responsibility for the area between the screening force’s
rear boundary and the main battle area (MBA). This should be the company that
occupies the sectors behind the screen.
Designate general locations for OPs that enable observation of the avenues of
approach into the sector.
Select routes or sectors to facilitate rearward displacement.
Augment the security force as needed to provide intelligence, engineer, air defense,
signal, and combat service support.
Ensure rearward passage of lines (RPOL) planning and rehearsals are executed.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
12-13. The battalion S2 designates which named area of interest (NAI) the company must
observe and when. The S2 does not dictate the location of company elements or how the
company maintains surveillance of the NAI. Once the screen force company commander
positions his elements, he informs the S2 of their primary, alternate, and subsequent
locations.

MANEUVER
12-14. Generally, the best unit configuration for the screen mission is a mechanized infantry
company team. The ability to place infantry rifle squads on the ground and conduct
surveillance operations and active patrolling is an essential passive aspect of the screen
mission. The tank platoon may be employed as part of the screen force to destroy the enemy’s
reconnaissance vehicles during the counterreconnaissance fight.

FIRES AND EFFECTS

12-15. The fire support officer (FSO) prepares for the screen mission as he would for a
forward defense. He uses the enemy situation template as a guide to plan fires to interdict
enemy combined arms elements. He plans protective fires for all screen force positions; this
helps prevent screening force elements from becoming decisively engaged with the enemy.
When practical, all indirect fire systems should register their fires. Accurate indirect fire is
essential to the destruction of the enemy reconnaissance effort. The FSO conducts a time-
distance analysis covering the enemy’s probable rate of advance and the time of flight of

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 Tactical Enabling Operations

artillery or mortars. If available, fire support teams (FISTs) from the brigade fires battalion
may be added to the screen force for mass fire against enemy vehicles.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
12-16. Generally, the engineer effort is dedicated to the heavy combined arms battalion’s
main defensive area. If available, some engineer effort may be dedicated to the forward
screen. This may include engineer squads or sections attached with the screen force to
emplace obstacles or allocation of family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) to the screen force.
The obstacle intent is to disrupt enemy reconnaissance elements forward of the MBA.
Typically, the disrupt obstacles that are emplaced are conventional point minefields or wire
obstacles that are overwatched by observers and targeted by indirect-fire assets.

LOGISTICS
12-17. The logistics planners must plan for responsive and flexible support that may require
the immediate resupply of ammunition and evacuation of casualties and equipment on
contact. Lateral supply routes to each battle position are identified during the planning
process. Moreover, on-order control measures, logistics release points (LRPs), unit
maintenance collection points (UMCPs), and ambulance exchange points (AXPs) are
essential to the operation. Emergency resupply vehicles carrying ammunition, fuel, and
other quickly expendable supplies are prepared to respond to sudden requisitions due to
enemy contact.

GUARD
12-18. A guard mission is assigned to protect the force by observing the enemy, reporting
pertinent information, and fighting to gain time. The guard force differs from a screen force
in that it contains sufficient combat power to defeat, repel, or fix the lead elements of an
enemy ground force to prevent it from engaging the main body with direct fires. The guard
force normally deploys over a narrower front than a comparably sized screening force,
allowing greater concentration of combat power. The guard force routinely engages enemy
forces with both direct and indirect fires and operates in range of the main body’s indirect-
fire weapons. The guard force commander must understand fully the degree of security his
unit provides the larger unit. This understanding is critical because, as the battle progresses,
the higher unit commander may require the degree of security to change (for example, from
early warning to detailed and aggressive security for the main body). There are three types
of guard operations conducted in support of a stationary or moving friendly force (Figure 12-
1): rear, flank, and advance guard.

ADVANCE GUARD
12-19. The advance guard moves ahead of the main force to ensure its uninterrupted
advance, to protect the main body against surprise, to facilitate its advance by removing
obstacles and repairing roads and bridges, and to cover the deployment of the main body as
it is committed to action. The advance guard is a task-organized, combined arms unit or
detachment that precedes a column or formation.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 12-1. Rear, Flank, and Advance Guard Operations

12-20. The advance guard is normally conducted as a movement to contact. Generally, an

HBCT combined arms battalion receives an advance guard mission when the brigade combat
team moves as part of the UEx main body in a movement to contact. In deploying an advance
guard, the brigade ensures the heavy combined arms battalion has priority of fires from the
BCT fires battalion. Unlike a movement to contact, however, the advance guard clears the
axis of enemy elements, within its capability, to allow the unimpeded movement of the main
body combined arms battalions. The advance guard develops the situation to hand over the
enemy to the combined arms battalion.
12-21. Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), trail elements of the advance guard must
ensure they maintain adequate distance forward of the main body’s lead elements to ensure
freedom of maneuver for the main body. These distances are reduced in close terrain and in
low visibility conditions. The heavy combined arms battalion commander establishes phase
lines to control the movement of the main body and the advance guard. Further, the
battalion commander must take into consideration the range of supporting indirect fires.
12-22. The advance guard force attempts to destroy enemy forces through hasty attacks. It
may be necessary for the HBCT combined arms battalion to mass at certain locations,
destroy the enemy, report, and continue with its mission. If enemy resistance is well
prepared and cannot be destroyed, the combined arms battalion reconnoiters to identify a
bypass route for the main body, to report enemy size and location, and (when given
permission) to fix and bypass the enemy. The follow-on attacking forces are responsible for
destroying the bypassed enemy. The main body commander may elect not to bypass the
enemy but to attack. In this case, the advance guard keeps the enemy contained and
prepares to pass main body elements through to eliminate the enemy.

REAR GUARD
12-23. When a UEx conducting a movement to contact requires rear security, an HBCT
combined arms battalion may receive a rear guard mission. The rear guard protects the rear
of the main body and all sustaining elements in the main body. It may accomplish this by
conducting an attack, a defense, or a delay. A heavy combined arms battalion conducting a
rear guard operation follows the same axis of advance as the protected force at a distance

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prescribed by the main body commander and normally within artillery range. The combined
arms battalion commander establishes company battle positions or AOs. When using AOs,
he designates phase lines and checkpoints to control movement. The rear guard’s
responsibility begins at the main body rear boundary and extends as far from this boundary
as the factors of METT-TC allow.

FLANK GUARD
12-24. An HBCT combined arms battalion may receive a flank guard mission during a UEx
movement to contact. The flank guard is responsible for clearing the area from the UEx main
body to the flank guard’s designated positions. The heavy combined arms battalion must be
prepared to operate on a frontage that is greater than for other tactical operations. Usually,
the area extends from the lead forward screen, along the flank of the formation, to either the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or the rear of the moving formation, tying in with the
rear guard. Due to the complexities of this operation, the following detailed discussion of
flank guard operations is provided.

Templates and Analysis

12-25. Once the HBCT combined arms battalion receives a flank guard mission, the S2
determines the type of threat facing the battalion during its movement. This information is
critical to the commander in his selection of appropriate formation and movement
techniques. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) must incorporate the entire
area of operations with analysis of the mobility corridors and avenues of approach extending
from the FEBA to the objective. The battalion S2 uses the combined arms battalion staff
engineer’s terrain analysis and produces both situational and event templates. The S2
develops and inputs an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan with
specific reconnaissance objectives for subordinate units as the enemy overlay. Subordinate
units verify the S2’s situational template during reconnaissance and periodically send enemy
overlay updates back to the S2. The staff develops the decision support template (DST) to
assist the commander in assessing the situation and making decisions.

Formation and Movement Techniques

12-26. From the intelligence estimate, the commander determines the formation and
movement technique, accounting for the enemy situation and main body disposition.
Movement techniques include alternate bounds, successive bounds, and moving guard.
Alternate bounds. The commander uses this technique when he anticipates strong
enemy action against the flank. It requires slow movement by the main body.
Successive bounds. The commander uses this technique when he expects enemy
action against the flank to be light and movement of the main body to include
frequent short halts.
Moving guard. The battalion commander uses this technique when he expects no
enemy action on the flank and the main body will move with all possible speed. In
the moving guard, an armor-heavy company team executes the forward screen
mission while traveling as in a movement to contact. The mortar platoon follows
the forward screening company to provide support. The scout platoon, normally
with an armor section under OPCON, conducts a flank screen outside the tentative
battle position line. The remaining companies travel in column, along an axis or in
sector, behind the forward screen. The commander uses this technique when the
greatest enemy danger appears to be from the front.

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Fires and Effects

12-27. The battalion fires cell plans guard operations the same as any offensive operation.
Based on the IPB, the battalion fires cell targets those enemy avenues of approach that
threaten the guard force. The battalion fires cell targets known and suspected enemy
positions along the axis of advance or in the combined arms battalion zone to support the
forward screening element. During the operation, the combined arms battalion executes its
FS plan as it would in movement to contact and defensive operations. On the advance guard,
as the heavy combined arms battalion encounters enemy positions and subsequently
destroys or fixes and bypasses them, it uses HBCT artillery to suppress the enemy positions.
Should the enemy attempt to attack from the flank, the combined arms battalion executes
the FS plan as it would for defensive operations to support the defense or delay.

Engineer Support
12-28. The battalion engineer considers the factors of METT-TC when conducting reverse
planning of the flank guard missions. The engineer must identify all mobility as well as
countermobility requirements of the task force. Based on this analysis, engineer forces are
typically task organized throughout the depth of the battalion formations to maintain
maximum flexibility with priority of effort to mobility then countermobility. Priority of
support is typically provided to the lead company of the task force. Priority of work is to
identify, mark, and bypass obstacles. If bypasses are not available, then company or
battalion breaches are conducted. Countermobility obstacle plans are centered on the rapid
emplacement of situational obstacles by the limited organic systems. Successful execution of
combined arms battalion situational obstacles occurs through thorough planning,
preparation, and rehearsals by the combined arms team to refine effective triggers to
emplace the obstacles.

Logistics
12-29. Logistics planners have the same difficulties as in planning a movement to contact.
They must plan for responsive and flexible support that may require the immediate resupply
of ammunition and evacuation of casualties and equipment on contact. Planners identify
lateral supply routes to each battle position during the planning process. On-order control
measures, LRPs, UMCPs, and AXPs are essential to the operation. As the heavy combined
arms battalion moves tactically, the battalion trains should travel close to the main body to
avoid exposing sustaining elements to the enemy. Emergency resupply vehicles carrying
ammunition, fuel, and other quickly expendable supplies are ready to respond to sudden
requisitions due to enemy contact. Once the combined arms battalion begins the fight,
evacuation of wounded personnel and damaged equipment occurs along lateral supply routes
all the way to the main body if that is where the support company is located. Otherwise, the
evacuation is back along the axis of advance.

Orientation of Forces
12-30. A unique aspect of the flank guard mission is the orientation of the forces and the
direction they may be ordered to screen. While the force maneuvers forward along its
assigned axis of advance or zone, phase lines control the movement of the company elements.
There should be a phase line on either side of each company’s BP. The BPs themselves are
generally larger than in a purely defensive mission, partly due to the large frontage the
combined arms battalion must cover. Once an element detects the enemy and companies
adopt hasty defensive positions, these phase lines become boundaries for controlling the
defensive battle. This gives the battalion commander the option of designating company
sectors in addition to the BPs already identified. Similarly, control of the reserve is

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accomplished through phase lines and checkpoints regardless of the actual direction of the
combined arms. As a minimum, the following control measures are included:
Phase lines (revert to boundaries on contact).
Battle positions.
Target reference points.
Axis of advance.
Axis of advance of main body.
Objectives (if used).

AREA SECURITY
12-31. Area security refers to a force’s mission to secure a specific area. Area security
actions could include area reconnaissance and security of designated personnel, equipment,
facilities (including airfield and seaports), main supply routes, lines of communication, and
critical points. The HBCT combined arms battalion is most often employed as an advance
guard for a brigade combat team, as part of a covering force for a UEx, or as an area security
force during stability operations or support operations.

COVER
12-32. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. Unlike
screening or guard forces, a covering force is tactically self-contained and capable of
operating independently of the main body to develop the situation early and deceive,
disorganize, and destroy enemy forces. Cover may be an offensive or defensive mission. The
requirements placed on the covering force, the C2 structure necessary for the forces involved,
and the large areas of operations involved require an adequate level of command for
successful accomplishment. The HBCT combined arms battalion performs screen and guard
missions. Covering force operations are normally executed by a task-organized brigade for
the UEx. A covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with enemy
forces; therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage the
enemy and still accomplish its mission. Field artillery (FA), engineers, intelligence resources,
and sustainment should be planned to support the cover mission.

SECTION III – BATTLE HANDOVER AND PASSAGE OF LINES

12-33. Battle handover is a coordinated operation executed to sustain continuity of the
combined arms fight and to protect the combat potential of both forces involved. Battle
handover is usually associated with the conduct of a passage of lines.

BATTLE HANDOVER
12-34. Battle handover may occur during either offensive or defensive operations. During
defensive operations, it is normally planned and coordinated in advance to facilitate
execution and usually involves a rearward passage of lines. In the offense, it is situation
dependent and often initiated by a fragmentary order (FRAGO). Battle handover normally
occurs in the offense when one unit passes through or around another unit. Tactical and
digital standing operating procedures (SOPs) containing clear, simple, standardized
procedures and control measures enhance the ability of units to coordinate and synchronize
actions quickly without experiencing a corresponding loss in momentum.
12-35. Battle handover occurs along a line forward of the stationary force. The brigade
commander establishes this line in consultation with both stationary and passing battalion
commanders. The stationary battalion commander normally determines the battle handover
line (BHL) location. This line is forward of the FEBA in the defense or the forward line of

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own troops (FLOT) in the offense. The BHL is located where elements of the passing
combined arms battalion can be effectively overwatched by direct fires or supported by
indirect fires of the forward combat element of the stationary combined arms battalion until
the battle handover is complete.
12-36. Physical handover normally occurs in the battle handover zone. Events may dictate
that a force break contact forward of or behind the BHL; for example, when there is a gap
between echelons of the attacking enemy force. Close coordination (physical, digital, or FM
voice) between the battalions involved in the handover allows them to coordinate and
execute this process at the small-unit level.
12-37. The battle handover operation begins on order of the brigade commander of the units
involved or when a given set of conditions occurs. Defensive handover is complete when the
passing battalion is clear and the stationary battalion is ready to engage the enemy. These
actions may occur at the same time. Offensive handover is complete when the passing
battalion crosses the BHL. The BHL is normally considered the line of departure (LD) for the
attacking battalion. Until the handover is complete and acknowledged by the commanders,
the battalion commander in contact is responsible for coordinating the fight.
12-38. Coordination for battle handover flows from the battalion commander out of contact
to the battalion commander in contact. The coordination for a battle handover overlaps with
the coordination for a passage of lines; the coordination for both should be accomplished at
the same time. The tactical standing operating procedure (TSOP) (brigade or UEx) should
outline these coordination requirements to facilitate rapid accomplishment.
12-39. Digital information systems assist the battalion staff in its coordination and
synchronization efforts for the operation. Each unit transmits or delivers a complete copy of
its OPORD and overlays by either digital (FBCB2 or MCS) or conventional (hard copy and
acetate overlay) means. Any changes made after initial distribution are updated
immediately. The coordination effected between the two commanders includes the following:
Establishing digital and FM voice communications.
Providing updates of both friendly and enemy situations (digital, voice, and
graphical).
Coordinating passage points and routes and ensuring these are displayed on
operational overlays (digital and conventional).
Collocating C2 and exchanging liaison personnel (if required).
Coordinating fires and fire control measures (direct and indirect) and ensuring
these are displayed on operational overlays (digital and conventional).
Providing updated obstacle overlays including self-destruct date-time groups of
emplaced FASCAM obstacles.
Determining the need for and dispatching contact point representatives.
Establishing and coordinating recognition signals (conventional).
Exchanging locations of obstacles and related covering fires.
Exchanging route information to include way points.
Determining sustainment requirements.
12-40. Due to the fluid nature of a battle handover, commanders can use digital systems to
speed the planning, coordination, and execution processes. FM voice should be planned; if
digital capabilities are hampered, then FM should be utilized in coordinating and executing
battle handovers.

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PASSAGE OF LINES
12-41. A passage of lines is the coordinated movement of one or more units through another
unit. It is normally conducted when at least one METT-TC factor does not permit the bypass
of a friendly unit. A passage of lines is a complex operation requiring close supervision and
detailed planning, coordination, and synchronization between the battalion commanders of
the unit conducting the passage and the unit being passed. The primary purpose of a
passage of lines is to transfer responsibility (forward or rearward) for an area from one unit
to another (Figures 12-2 and 12-3). A passage of lines may be conducted to:
Continue an attack or counterattack.
Envelop an enemy force.
Pursue a fleeing enemy.
Withdraw covering forces or MBA forces.

PLANNING
12-42. The UEx or brigade plans and conducts a battalion-level passage of lines. Units
involved in a passage of lines must conduct detailed coordination to ensure they maintain
positive control to avoid fratricide, speed the passage, and reduce vulnerability to enemy
attack. The HBCT combined arms battalion S2 and staff conduct the IPB, and the S3
prepares his tentative plan based on stationary force restrictions, the IPB, and parameters
established by the battalion commander. The S3s of the passing battalion and stationary
battalion coordinate routes, checkpoints, linkup points, and passage points via FBCB2, MCS,
or conventional means. Planners must evaluate the following basic considerations and
integrate them into the planning process.
Terrain management and control measures. Terrain management is critical to
successful completion of a passage of lines. Terrain is controlled through the
sharing of digital overlays that contain the following:
Routes (primary and alternate).
Checkpoint data.
Friendly and enemy unit locations and status.
Passage points.
Fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
Obstacle types and locations.
Sustainment locations and descriptions.
Liaison. Stationary and passing battalions exchange information by way of
extensive and detailed coordination and liaison before mission execution.
Communications. Communication architectures, digital systems, communications
security (COMSEC) instructions, recognition signals, and communications
procedures and requirements must be identified, synchronized, and integrated into
the operation plan (OPLAN). Communications ensure units share data and
pertinent combat information and maintain a common operational picture (COP).
Mission transition. Plans for the conduct of the passage must facilitate transition to
the subsequent missions of both the passing and stationary battalions.

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Figure 12-2. Forward Passage of Lines

Exchange of zone, sector, or AO control. Control of the zone, sector, or AO passes from
one battalion to the other at a time and place directed by the higher common
commander or as mutually agreed on by the stationary and passing battalion
commanders.
Routes. The passing battalion moves on multiple routes through the passed
battalion and avoids the use of assembly areas. It does not halt within the passed
battalion’s forward positions.
Employment of deception and smoke. Deception and smoke operations can deceive the
enemy as to actual unit locations and passage points.
Control measures. Established graphic control measures can ensure positive control
of both the stationary and passing units.
Location of stationary battalion and obstacles. The location and obstacle emplacement of
the stationary battalion may impact planning and execution of the forward passage
of lines.
12-43. Note that the terrain and number of the passage lanes determine the speed and
disposition of the passing battalion as it crosses the LD. When conducting a forward passage
in preparation for a deliberate attack, it may be important to create passage lanes with
sufficient width to allow the passing force to move in a tactical formation appropriate to the
operation, such as company or platoon wedge.

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Figure 12-3. Rearward Passage of Lines

FIELD ARTILLERY ACTIVITIES.

12-44. The passing battalion FSO reviews the FESP of the stationary unit and conducts
direct coordination to ensure that a clear understanding exists between the passed and
passing units on the established FSCMs. He does so through the transfer of digital FS
overlays between the two fires elements (battalion fires cells) via the Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Procedures to establish FS battle handover or
transfer of control are also identified and approved by the combined arms commander.
Terrain and route management for artillery batteries and their support assets are especially
important due to potential terrain limitations and must be coordinated at the brigade level.
All artillery units, including reinforcing and direct support (DS) reinforcing units, must be
positioned to support the passage if enemy contact is possible during the operation.

ENGINEER ACTIVITIES
12-45. A passage of lines may require either the reduction of some obstacles or the opening
and closing of lanes through friendly obstacles. The passing battalion engineers must
coordinate with the stationary unit engineer via digital means or face-to-face meeting. As a
minimum, this coordination must address the following:
Location and status of friendly and enemy tactical obstacles.
Routes and locations of lanes and bypasses through friendly and enemy obstacles.
Responsibility to close lanes through obstacles.
Transfer of obstacle and passage lane responsibilities.
Description of lane marking materials.
Description of far and near recognition markers.

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SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES
12-46. The sustainment plan is integral to a successful passage of lines. Sustainment assets
are positioned to support the passage. UMCPs and emergency refueling points are positioned
where they can best keep lanes open and vehicles moving. Figure 12-4, shows the
sustainment plan for a rearward passage of lines.

FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION ACTIVITIES

12-47. Conducting a passage of lines presents a challenge for the force health protection
(FHP) planner. There will be a number of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) units using the
same air and road networks. Coordination and synchronization are essential if confusion is
to be avoided. The medical elements of the stationary force should provide area support to
the force passing through; this allows continued mobility for the moving force. Examples of
information that should be coordinated include the following:
Radio frequencies and call signs.
Operation plans and TSOPs.
Location of medical treatment facilities (MTFs).
Location of casualty collection points (CCPs) and ambulance exchange points
(AXPs).
Main supply route, forward arming and refueling points, and A2C2 data.

Figure 12-4. Combat Service Support Plan for Rearward Passage of Lines

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FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

12-48. In a forward passage of lines conducted as part of a brigade attack, both the
stationary and passing battalion commanders must be aware of the passing battalion’s
objective. This awareness is especially important if the stationary battalion must provide
supporting fires. The stationary battalion and forward passing unit, through an exchange of
combat information, share data needed to affect a passage of lines in a timely and safe
manner.
12-49. On receipt of an order, the passing battalion commander begins preparing his
passage of lines plan by conducting a reconnaissance while concurrently updating the
information received from the stationary battalion. For example, the passing HBCT
combined arms battalion receives a digital operations overlay that delineates routes to the
contact points as well as the location of the actual linkup site. The heavy combined arms
battalion commander and staff of the passing unit meet representatives from the stationary
battalion at designated contact points to conduct coordination. During the physical
reconnaissance, the passing battalion S3 updates the initial operations overlay,
incorporating information received from the stationary battalion by adding pertinent control
measures. On completion, the passing battalion S3 forwards this overlay to the main CP.
Based on this information, the passing battalion staff completes development of the plan.
Once approved by the battalion commander, additional control measures are added to the
operations overlay as necessary to complete the plan.
12-50. The passing battalion main CP forwards the validated operations overlay update
composing information from the stationary and passing battalions, brigade, and subordinate
units to the liaison teams. This technique allows the passing S3 and battalion commander to
develop their scheme of combined arms for the passage of lines on a digital overlay
concurrent with reconnaissance. At the conclusion of the reconnaissance and subsequent
coordination with the stationary battalion, the revised passing battalion plan is distributed
digitally by way of FBCB2/BFT to subordinate units and higher headquarters.

REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

12-51. Typically, a rearward passage of lines occurs within a defensive framework in which
elements of the covering force operate forward of the MBA. MBA forces are the stationary
unit in a rearward passage of lines. The covering force withdraws through them, handing off
control of the fight at the BHL.
12-52. To facilitate a rearward passage of lines, the stationary force commander designates
the following:
BHL.
Contact points forward of the BHL.
Passage points along the FEBA.
Lanes to the rear of the MBA.
12-53. Once he prepares the overlay, the stationary commander transmits it and any
amplifying information to the passing force commander by way of FBCB2 or MCS.
12-54. During a passage of lines, friendly unit density in a relatively small combined arms
space may cause problems in the ability of the commanders to maintain the COP in relation
to both the passed and passing units. The stationary and passing commanders should
determine the best method of exercising C2 to avoid slowing the tempo of the operation and
to reduce fratricide potential.

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REHEARSAL
12-55. During the rehearsal, the combined arms battalion commander ensures that each
organization knows when and where to move as well as how to execute the required
coordination. Digital communications checks ensure connectivity and interoperability. Other
rehearsal items include the following:
FS observation plan, target execution, communication linkages, and mutual
support operations. Confirm FSCMs. Review unit routes and positioning.
Locations and descriptions of obstacles, lanes, bypasses, and markings. Confirm
locations of any engineer stockpiles.
Passage points, routes, and recognition procedures. Confirm these and review
numbers of vehicles by type expected at each passage point. Rehearse route
management, contact points, and use of guides.
Locations for and movement of sustainment units. Rehearse these, along with
mutual support arrangements and any transfer of supplies.
Locations of aid stations, AXPs, and casualty evacuation procedures. Rehearse
these.

SECTION IV – LINKUP OPERATIONS

12-56. Linkup operations, which join two or more friendly forces, are conducted to:
Complete the encirclement of an enemy force.
Assist breakout of an encircled friendly force.
Join an attacking force with a force operating in the enemy’s rear area.
Make contact with other forces on a noncontiguous battlefield.
12-57. Before commencing a linkup operation, the headquarters elements of the stationary
force and linkup force must share data including COMSEC procedures and digital graphic
overlays consisting of the following:
Primary and alternate linkup points.
Checkpoints and way points information.
Unit disposition and activity (friendly and enemy).
Locations and types of obstacles.
Fire control measures, including restrictive fire lines (RFLs).

CONTROL DURING LINKUP OPERATIONS

12-58. The stationary and linkup force must maintain positive control during linkup
operations to prevent inadvertent fratricidal engagements. They use FBCB2/BFT, ABCS,
and FM voice systems as required to share combat information and to identify friend from
foe positively. It is imperative that both the linkup and stationary units conduct precombat
communications checks before the operation begins to ensure that connectivity and
interoperability between digital systems are established and maintained.
12-59. The S6s of the two linkup units are integral to successful linkup operations when
both units are digitally equipped. These officers must ensure that units address both
primary and alternate forms of communications during planning and that they synchronize
both manual and digital systems used in support of the linkup operation and integrate these
into the linkup plan.
12-60. Special requirements related to digital operations must be identified. The following
are examples:
Exchange of unit internet protocol (IP) address databases.

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Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced

Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radio hop set data.
COMSEC requirements.
Positioning of EPLRS position server links.
Modifications to digital communications structure (digital architecture).

FORMS OF LINKUP
12-61. Linkup operations take one of two forms:
Linkup of a moving force and a stationary force
Linkup of two moving forces.

LINKUP OF A MOVING FORCE WITH A STATIONARY FORCE

12-62. To ensure the friendly forces join without engaging one another, linkup points are
selected at locations where the axis of advance of the linkup force intersects the security
elements of the stationary force (Figure 12-5). These points must be readily recognizable to
both forces and should be posted on both digital overlays and conventional maps in case of
digital communications loss. Alternate points are chosen so the units are prepared in case
enemy activities cause linkup at places other than those planned. The number of linkup
points selected depends on the terrain and number of routes used by the linkup force.
12-63. The communications section is critical to linkup operations. Digital communications
are used to transmit and share combat information data. However, use of digital means
depends on METT-TC factors and the ability to maintain digital linkages between the
moving unit and stationary unit.
12-64. To facilitate a rapid passage of lines and to avoid inadvertent engagement of friendly
forces, personnel in the linkup force must be thoroughly familiar with recognition signals
and plans. As required, stationary forces assist in the linkup by opening lanes in minefields,
breaching or removing selected obstacles, furnishing guides, providing routes with
checkpoints, and designating assembly areas.
12-65. When linking up with an encircled force, the combined arms battalion carries as
much supply material as possible during the linkup operation. This material includes
Classes I, III, V, and VIII. If an enemy force has encircled the stationary force, the battalion
carries additional supplies and material requested through to the brigade S4 before the
linkup takes place. The HBCT combined arms battalion S4 ensures that each company has
received the FBCB2 sustainment overlay depicting main supply routes (MSRs), traffic
control points, AXPs, and UMCPs.

LINKUP OF TWO MOVING UNITS

12-66. Linkup between two moving units is one of the most difficult operations (Figure
12-6). It is normally conducted to complete the encirclement of an enemy force. Primary and
alternate linkup points for two moving forces are established on boundaries where the two
forces are expected to converge. As linking units move closer, positive control is coordinated
to ensure they avoid firing on one another and to ensure the enemy does not escape between
the two forces. Again, using digital systems facilitates planning, synchronization, execution,
and fratricide avoidance. However, digital architecture limitations may mandate that analog
procedures be the primary method of coordination.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure 12-5. Linkup of a Moving Force With a Stationary Force

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Figure 12-6. Linkup of Two Moving Units

ACTIONS FOLLOWING LINKUP

12-67. When the linkup is complete, the linkup force may join the stationary force, pass
through the stationary force, go around the stationary force, or continue the attack.
12-68. If the linkup force is to continue operations with the stationary force, a single
commander for the overall force is designated. Objectives for the linkup provide for
dispersion in relation to the stationary force. The linkup force may immediately pass
through the perimeter of the stationary force, be assigned objectives within the perimeter, or
be assigned objectives outside the perimeter, depending on the mission.
12-69. When the brigade directs a linkup operation, it normally establishes an RFL for both
battalions to ensure positive control and reduce the risk of fratricide. It transmits these
RFLs to both units by way of a digital overlay, and they are subsequently adjusted and
overlays updated as one force moves toward the other. This process continues until a single
RFL is established between the forces. Usually, this is the point on the ground where the two
forces plan to establish contact.

PLANNING
12-70. The linkup is a complex operation requiring detailed planning and coordination.
Plans for a linkup are coordinated as far in advance as possible. The two forces carefully
define and coordinate their schemes of combined arms with certain attention given to
graphic control measures, communications, and the subsequent mission to be performed by
each force after linkup operations are completed. Alternate linkup points are planned and
lend flexibility to the overall operation.

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12-71. The two units establish liaison during planning and continue it throughout the
operation. Liaison parties must have the capability to communicate digitally with their
parent unit through the tactical internet (TI). As the distance closes between the forces, the
requirement to track movement through FBCB2 and maintain close liaison increases. Use of
Army aircraft can improve and expedite this process.
12-72. Linkup operations frequently require a passage of lines. Once through friendly lines,
the combined arms battalion moves out as in an exploitation to effect the linkup. Speed,
aggression, and boldness characterize this action. If possible, the linkup force avoids enemy
interference with its mission and concentrates its efforts on completing the linkup. If enemy
forces threaten the successful accomplishment of the mission, they are either destroyed or
bypassed and reported.
12-73. The headquarters (brigade/UEx) directing the linkup operation must establish
command relationships and responsibilities for the forces involved. Both the linkup force and
the force with which linkup is to be made should remain under the control of the directing
headquarters. Operational plans must prescribe the primary and alternate day and night
identification and recognition procedures, vehicle systems, and manmade materials used to
identify friend from enemy.
12-74. The communications plan includes all essential frequencies, secure variables, IP
addresses, and communications need lines to maintain communications between the two
forces.
12-75. Logistical support requirements may be greater during linkup operations than
during other offensive actions. Additional considerations for planning logistical supporting
linkup operations include the following:
Resupply of stationary unit.
Fuel requirements.
Duration the objective is to be held (METT-TC).
Operations after the linkup is completed (for example, attack, withdraw, or defend).
Transportation requirements for special purpose forces (for example, infantry, air
assault, or special operation forces (SOF)).
Lines of communications (LOC) security requirements.
12-76. Supply requirements for a linkup operation may exceed the organic transportation
capability of the HBCT combined arms battalion. The battalion may have to request
additional transport vehicles from higher headquarters, Army aviation support, or both.
12-77. In linkup operations involving airborne and air assault units, or units assaulting the
objective area, they have priority for supply by air. Supplies for the ground linkup forces
normally move by land transportation. However, when the linkup and an airborne or air
assault force plan to defend the objective area jointly, supplies for the linkup force maybe
flown into the objective area and stockpiled.
12-78. Evacuation of equipment, Soldiers wounded in action (WIA), and enemy prisoners of
war (EPWs) may create major problems for the linkup force. If supply routes are open,
normal evacuation procedures apply. When ground routes are not secure, helicopters maybe
used for the evacuation of casualties and prisoners. Damaged equipment may be moved
forward with the linkup forces until it can be evacuated at the first suitable opportunity.

PREPARATION
12-79. Due to the time-sensitive nature of linkup operations, the battalion commander
issues his order digitally. If time is available, he conducts a rehearsal at higher (controlling)
headquarters. If time is not available, the brigade commander walks the linkup battalion

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commander through the operation. The HBCT commander stresses the linkup and
coordination required to reduce the potential for fratricidal engagements between the linkup
forces. In addition, he ensures that each battalion commander is prepared to respond to an
enemy meeting engagement or attack before the linkup. The battalion FSO is an integral
member of the team that plans linkup operations. He is responsible for the coordination,
synchronization, dissemination, and monitoring of relevant portions of the fires and effects
support plan (FESP) and FSCMs. He advises the commander on the conditions and methods
for changing the FESP or control measures.

EXECUTION
12-80. Depending on the enemy situation and METT-TC, the initial conduct of the linkup
operation may be identical to an exploitation or attack. During the operation, the brigade
commander monitors the progress and execution through data passed using FBCB2 and
other ABCSs to ensure positive control measures established are followed or adjusted as
required. Adjustments made to the OPLAN are coordinated and synchronized by way of
digital systems. If a FRAGO is passed by FM voice, a digital follow-up is entered and
transmitted through FBCB2 to ensure all units are aware of the change. The following
paragraphs discuss the digital procedures that may be used when friendly forces are
conducting a linkup.
12-81. As the linkup forces begin their combined arms, they establish digital and FM voice
communications and maintain them throughout the operation. As each force maneuvers,
progress is tracked by way of FBCB2, and adjustments to the linkup plan are made as
METT-TC dictates. For example, if two forces are involved in the operations and one is
unable to travel at a speed commensurate with the plan, the linkup location may require
adjustment.
12-82. In nondigitized units, as the linkup forces near each other, the speed (momentum) of
the operation may be slowed to maintain positive control and to prevent fratricide. In this
case, commanders must be vigilant and ensure enemy forces do not slip between the two
closing forces. Momentum of a linkup operation should not slow for the digitized HBCT
combined arms battalion since the maneuver and movement of all forces can be tracked by
way of FBCB2 and other ABCSs.
12-83. The HBCT combined arms battalion fires cell changes or activates the FS control
measures established for the operations based on the progress of the forces and the enemy
situation. All changes are provided to the battalion fires cells of the maneuver units involved
in the linkup through FBCB2 or AFATDS. As the maneuver units draw closer to one
another, coordinated fire lines (CFLs) are canceled and a restrictive fire line (RFL) is placed
into effect to prevent fratricide between the converging forces. Once the linkup has occurred,
FS for the brigade is organized as per the higher headquarters plan for future operations.
12-84. The heavy combined arms battalion commander positions himself to observe the
progress of the operation and maintains both digital and FM voice communications with the
S3. The commander of a digitized battalion is more flexible in positioning since he can
maintain a composite picture of the progress of both maneuver units digitally and adjust the
linkup plan as required. The S3 is positioned based on the operational concerns expressed by
the battalion commander. For example, if a certain flank is of concern to the commander
during the operation or a supporting attack is required to penetrate the enemy’s lines, then
the battalion S3 is located where he can best influence the battalion’s secondary action.

SECTION V – RIVER-CROSSING OPERATIONS

12-85. HBCT combined arms battalions do not make deliberate or retrograde river crossings
independently; these are centralized operations where the controlling echelon is a UEx or

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HBCT. River crossings require extensive engineer augmentation from a maneuver

enhancement brigade. (For a detailed discussion of these operations, see FM 90-13, River-
Crossing Operations.) The three types of river-crossing operations are hasty, deliberate, and
retrograde.

GENERAL RIVER-CROSSING CONSIDERATIONS

12-86. HBCT combined arms battalions routinely make hasty river crossings and reorganize
on the far side to maintain the momentum of operations. The information provided through
ABCS reduces uncertainty about the enemy and friendly situation, enabling the battalion to
move rapidly to undefended or lightly defended crossing sites where it uses all available
means to push its companies across the river and onto objectives on the far side.
12-87. A hasty river crossing is a continuation of an attack across the river, with no
intentional pause at the water to prepare, so that there is no loss of momentum. This
technique is possible when enemy resistance is weak and the river is not a severe obstacle.
12-88. HBCT combined arms battalions cross in their respective zones at multiple points
and as quickly as possible. The combined arms battalion may require the use of organic,
existing, or expedient crossing means. Additional bridging support from the UEx will be
necessary when bridging requirements exceed the capability of engineers augmenting the
battalion. Bridge companies are controlled at the UEx level. Their support is available only
when headquarters has taken purposeful action to position the assets at the right time and
place to assist a combined arms battalion’s hasty crossing. The heavy combined arms
battalion must coordinate for support through the brigade early in the planning process.
12-89. Small gaps, streams, and small rivers that prohibit vehicles from advancing are
encountered more frequently than large gaps and rivers that require extensive bridging.
12-90. When terrain or enemy conditions dictate, each HBCT combined arms battalion must
request mobile crossing assets to enable it to install bridges quickly, cross small gaps, and
recover the bridges for future crossings. Follow-on bridges, such as the medium-girder bridge
(MGB), may need to be positioned at these gaps before assault bridges are removed so that
following forces and support units can maintain the pace of the heavy combined arms
battalion. The two types of hasty crossings are dry-gap and wet-gap crossings.

HASTY DRY-GAP CROSSING

12-91. Antitank ditches and craters are normally what HBCT combined arms battalions
encounter as a dry-gap obstacle. Dry riverbeds may also present a crossing problem to
vehicles. HBCT combined arms battalions can use their organic M9 armored combat
earthmover (ACE) to push down the sides of ditches or to fill in craters. Substantial fill
material placed in the dry gaps allows the passage of combat vehicles. Follow-on forces can
improve and maintain the crossing site for wheeled-traffic use. For larger dry gaps,
streambeds, antitank (AT) ditches, craters, canals, partially blown bridges, and similar
obstacles, an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) will have to be requested through the
BCT from the UEx. When available, an AVLB can be launched in 2 to 5 minutes and
retrieved in 10 minutes. An AVLB crosses gaps of up to 17 meters in length (without
prepared abutments) with a military load classification of 70. A Wolverine has increased
capability; it crosses gaps up to 24 meters with a military load classification of 70. Bridges
should be left in place across the gaps only as long as it takes to cross the HBCT combined
arms battalion, then replaced with other fixed bridging, if necessary. The need for bridging
must be identified well before the operational need develops, or the momentum of the
operation will come to a halt.

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HASTY WET-GAP CROSSING

12-92. Bank conditions, the depth and width of the wet gap, and the current’s velocity
determine whether the HBCT combined arms battalion can cross its vehicles by fording,
swimming, or using other bridging assets. Identifying wet gaps early and deploying the
required bridging resources allow hasty crossings of known or anticipated gaps to occur. The
following are general planning factors for hasty wet-gap crossings. In-depth crossing site
considerations and planning factors for commanders and staffs are found in FM 90-13,
Chapter 7.
12-93. Because vehicles drain rapidly when exiting water obstacles, initially firm banks
tend to deteriorate rapidly from multiple uses of the same exit point. The existence of mud or
surface irregularities further degrades the percent of the slope that vehicles can overcome.
When selecting a fording site in a wet-gap crossing, the depth of the water is the most
significant factor. The depth of the water in one crossing area may change due to bottom
surface mud or irregularities (boulders and potholes).
12-94. If possible, the HBCT combined arms battalion crosses the water obstacle at multiple
points across a broad front by swimming or fording mounted or dismounted forces. It makes
the crossing as soon as its elements reach the obstacle. As the bulk of the combined arms
battalion crosses the water, minimum forces remain to secure the crossing sites.
12-95. The HBCT combined arms battalion may use expedient crossing means if they are
readily available and can be transported to the crossing site. Battalion scouts and other
reconnaissance elements should note construction material or existing features that could be
used as expedient crossing devices. These include culvert pipe, lumber or cut timber, or war-
damaged equipment. The pipe links system, which consists of bundles of 8-inch, high-density
plastic pipes chained together, can fill gaps up to 9 meters deep and support up to 70 tons.
12-96. A well-practiced SOP reduces the necessary planning and preparation time. A concise
order clearly articulating the battalion commander’s intent allows exploitation wherever
subordinate units successfully force a crossing. When possible, advance elements seize
existing crossing means intact and ahead of the main body.
12-97. When facing negligible or light enemy resistance on both banks, the force does not
have to clear all enemy forces from the river to conduct a hasty crossing. It capitalizes on the
speed of the crossing and the limited ability of the enemy to oppose the crossing effectively.

ASSAULT OF THE CROSSING SITE

12-98. An HBCT combined arms battalion assault across a river normally includes an attack
to secure terrain on the exit bank. This may involve an air assault by infantry elements, an
assault crossing using engineer pneumatic boats, or an infiltration by swimming or rope
bridges. Regardless of crossing technique, dismounted infantry and engineers constitute the
HBCT combined arms battalion’s assault force.

AIR ASSAULT CROSSING

12-99. An air assault is the fastest crossing method but may be high risk. The following
considerations apply when planning an air assault as part of the HBCT combined arms
battalion river crossing. (Refer to Appendix J and FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations, for
detailed discussion of air assault operations.) Air assault forces:
Require indirect air approaches to avoid detection.
Provide the element of surprise.
Give greater flexibility to emplaced personnel and equipment.

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Provide the rapid insertion of forces into the area where the enemy is located, if a
landing zone (LZ) is available.
Are greatly affected by weather and dust conditions.
Require a high air and missile defense (AMD) priority at the river, requiring
suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) efforts.
Require the separation of troops from their vehicles and equipment.
Are vulnerable to armored counterattacks and require a quick ground linkup.

RUBBER-BOAT CROSSING
12-100. The following considerations apply when using rubber boats in an assault crossing.
Rubber boats:
Offer great opportunity for surprise in a silent-paddle crossing.
Are a relatively fast means of crossing, especially when using outboard motors.
Maneuver well in the water.
Require limited, if any, entry-bank preparation and no preparation on the exit
bank.
Require the separation of troops from their vehicles and heavy equipment.
Have limited carrying capacity, particularly AT weapons.
Provide limited protection, mobility, firepower, and communications on the exit
bank.

ORGANIZATION FOR BOAT CROSSING

12-101. The specific organization used depends on METT-TC factors, particularly the size
of the bridgehead, the distance to exit-bank objectives, and the nature of the enemy’s
defense. Regardless of these factors, the HBCT combined arms battalion organizes into
support and assault forces and is assisted in the assault by other units in support by fire
positions.

Support Force
12-102. The support force is normally the Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) and tanks of the
company team whose infantry is conducting the assault crossing. This force establishes a
support by fire position along the friendly bank before the assault. It uses night-vision and
thermal sights to locate enemy positions. It also develops a fire plan to engage these
positions and to provide suppressive fires on all suspected positions. When directed to
engage, the support force destroys all known and suspected positions. The assault force
commander, usually the combined arms battalion commander, directs the support force
commander, usually the battalion XO, to lift or shift suppressive fires as necessary.
Supporting artillery and the mortar platoon provide indirect FS and effects.

Assault Force
12-103. The first assault wave moves the force across covertly. This force attempts to
provide sufficient security on the far shore so that the second and later assault waves can
cross if surprise is lost. Each assault company team receives engineers that accompany the
assault force to its objective, helping it fight through obstacles and prepared defenses. The
engineers help the assault force establish hasty defenses after it has seized its objectives.
The first assault wave carries the following:
Rifle platoons.
Attached assault engineers.
Forward observers.

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Company command group.

12-104. The organization of the first wave permits rapid deployment of the force into a
tactical formation on the far shore. Individual boatloads retain unit integrity at the lowest
level. The two basic boatload configurations are the rifle squad boat and the rifle platoon
headquarters boat.
12-105. The first wave of the assault may consist of company team flotillas crossing on line.
HBCT combined arms battalions do not have a prescribed crossing formation. Each company
team crosses in its own AO and attacks its own objectives.
12-106. Platoon boat groups form into company team flotillas. The company team
commander commands the guide boat in the center platoon. The company team command
group disperses between boats, filling in vacant boat positions.
12-107. The second wave carries company team aid stations and may include the combined
arms battalion command group. If sufficient AMD systems are in place to cover the crossing
area, the brigade may release some of the augmenting AMD teams to cross in the second
wave as man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) teams. The second wave also
transports additional material and ammunition that is not required for the initial assault
but is necessary to establish a defense. This may include antiarmor weapons, mortars,
ammunition, laser designators, mines, or pioneer tools.
12-108. The immediate movement of some AT weapons across to support the assault
element is essential if an armor threat exists. Engineers concentrate on moving antiarmor
systems or vehicles carrying heavy weapons across immediately after the second wave.
Engineers begin bank preparations on both the near and far shore using hand tools and
heavy equipment where possible. They may ford an M9 ACE or deep ford a bulldozer to get a
winch capability to the far shore. If necessary, BFVs can ford with towing assistance. If
absolutely necessary, rafting can be used, but this is a high-risk deliberate operation and is
vulnerable to enemy indirect- and direct-fire systems. (For a detailed description of assault
crossing techniques and procedures, see FM 90-13.)

SECTION VI – COMBINED ARMS BREACHING OPERATIONS

12-109. Obstacle breaching is the employment of a combination of tactics and techniques to
project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. Success depends on the HBCT combined
arms battalion effectively applying the breaching fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure,
reduce, and assault (SOSRA). Breaching is a synchronized combined arms operation under
the control of a maneuver commander. Breaching operations begin when friendly forces
detect an obstacle and initiate breaching fundamentals (SOSRA) and end when friendly
forces destroy the enemy on the far side of the obstacle or when battle handover has occurred
between a unit conducting the breaching operation and follow-on forces. Effective breaching
operations allow friendly combined arms in the face of obstacles.

BREACH TENETS
12-110. Successful breaching operations are characterized by applying breach tenets. The
tenets are applied whenever an obstacle is encountered, whether friendly forces are
conducting an attack or route clearance operations. The breach tenets follow:
Intelligence.
Breaching fundamentals.
Breaching organization.
Mass.
Synchronization.

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INTELLIGENCE
12-111. Critical to a commander’s success is the ability to identify how the enemy applies
obstacles to the terrain. The commander and staff conduct IPB to develop initial situation
templates (SITTEMPs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Intelligence gathered
by reconnaissance forces is essential to developing a finalized SITTEMP and final point of
breach locations. Unverified enemy SITTEMPs may cause friendly forces to deploy to reduce
obstacles early, waste mission time attempting to locate nonexistent obstacles, develop COAs
using ineffective obstacle reduction methods, or become surprised by an obstacle.
Augmentation of reconnaissance forces by engineer squads or sections may be utilized as
part of the overall ISR plan. Examples of obstacle intelligence (OBSTINTEL) requirements
follow:
Location of existing or reinforcing obstacles.
Orientation and depth of obstacles.
Soil conditions (determines ability to use mine plows).
Lanes or bypass locations.
Composition of minefields (buried or surface laid antitank and antipersonnel
mines.
Types of mines and fuses (determines effectiveness of mechanical or explosive
reduction techniques).
Composition of complex obstacles.
Location of direct- and indirect-fire systems overwatching obstacle.

BREACHING FUNDAMENTALS
12-112. The breach fundamentals—SOSRA—always apply; however, they must adapt to
the varying factors of METT-TC:
Suppression protects friendly forces reducing and maneuvering through an
obstacle. Successful suppression typically initiates the rest of the actions at the
obstacle.
Obscuration degrades enemy observation and target acquisition of the enemy
forces while concealing friendly force reduction and assault activities.
Obscuration planning factors include wind direction, type of obscuration systems
available (mechanical smoke, artillery-delivered, mortar-delivered, smoke pots),
and the capabilities and limitations of these systems. Typically, the most effective
placement of obscuration is between the obstacle and the overwatching enemy
forces.
Friendly forces secure the point of breach to prevent enemy forces from interfering
with the reduction of lanes and passage of assault forces. The breach force must be
resourced with sufficient combat power to secure the point of breach.
Reduction is the creation of lanes through an obstacle. Reduction can not be
accomplished until effective suppression and obscuration is achieved and the point
of breach secured. The breach force will reduce, proof, and mark the required
number of lanes to pass the assault force through the obstacle.
Follow-on forces will continue to improve and reduce the obstacle when required.
The assault force’s primary mission is to seize terrain on the far side of the
obstacle to prevent the enemy from placing or observing direct and indirect fires on
the reduction area.

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BREACHING ORGANIZATION
12-113. Commanders develop COAs that organize friendly forces into a support force, a
breach force, and an assault force to quickly and effectively execute the breach fundamentals
(Table 12-1):
Support force responsibilities are to isolate the reduction area with direct and
indirect fires, suppress enemy direct and indirect fire at the point of breach, and
control obscuration.
The breach force must have sufficient combat power to secure the point of breach as
well as sufficient reduction assets to reduce the required number of lanes through
the obstacle. Critical fire zones (CFZs) should be activated at the point of breach
before commitment of the breach force to protect it from enemy indirect fires.
The assault force’s primary mission is the destruction of enemy forces on the far
side of the obstacle to prevent the enemy from placing direct fires on the breach
lanes.

Table 12-1. Breaching Organization

Breaching
Organization Breaching Fundamentals Responsibilities
Suppress enemy direct-fire systems covering the
Suppress reduction area.
Support force Obscure Control obscuring smoke.
Prevent enemy forces from repositioning or
counterattacking to place direct fires on the
breach force.
Suppress (provides additional Create and mark the necessary lanes in an
suppression) obstacle.
Breach force Obscure (provides additional Secure the near side and far side of an obstacle.
obscuration in the reduction Defeat forces that can place immediate direct fires
area) on the reduction area.
Secure (provides local security) Report the lane status and location.
Reduce
Destroy any enemy forces capable of placing
direct fires on the reduction area from the far side
Assault force Assault of an obstacle.
Suppress (if necessary) Assist the support force with suppression if the
enemy is not effectively suppressed.
Be prepared to breach follow-on and protective
obstacles after passing through the reduction
area.

MASS
12-114. The support force achieves mass by fixing and isolating enemy forces on the far
side of the obstacle. The breach force achieves mass by planning 50 percent redundancy of
breach assets, creating one vehicle lane per each assaulting company-sized element, and
creating two lanes separated by 800 to 1000 meters (terrain dependent) to pass the task
force. The assault force achieves mass by projecting a 3:1 combat power ratio at the point of
penetration (typically one isolated enemy platoon in an enemy company-sized defense for a
task force breach).

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SYNCHRONIZATION
12-115. Synchronization of all combined arms elements to successfully achieve the breach
fundamentals is essential. Commanders achieve synchronization through detailed reverse
planning of offensive operations (from the objective back to the assembly area) by issuing
clear subordinate unit instructions, planning effective C2, and ensuring their forces are well
rehearsed. Detailed reverse planning is initiated during IPB and development of enemy
SITTEMP. The scheme of combined arms, engineer operations, fires, air defense, and actions
at the obstacle are all based on this common SITTEMP. For example:
Actions on the objective determine the size and composition of the assault force
based on desired 3:1 combat power ratio.
The size of the assault force determines the number and location of breach lanes
required.
Lane requirements and disposition and composition of the obstacles determine the
mobility asset requirement of the breach force.
The enemy’s ability to interfere with the breach force at the point of breach
determines size and composition of the security element within the breach force.
The enemy’s ability to mass fires on the point of breach determines the amount of
suppression required as well as the size and composition of the breach force.
12-116. HBCT combined arms battalion reverse planning begins with actions on the objective
and continues to its deployment from tactical assembly areas to identify all mobility
requirements. Reverse planning should include enemy special munition capabilities and
effects (Figure 12-7).

COMBINED ARMS BREACH DURING DELIBERATE OPERATIONS

12-117. The following paragraphs discuss the detailed planning, preparation, and execution
necessary in conducting a combined arms breach during deliberate operations.

PLANNING
12-118. Planning a breaching operation begins with the battalion and engineer estimates.
The HBCT combined arms battalion S2 templates the enemy’s order of battle, and the
battalion combat engineer operations officer assesses its engineer capabilities. Both the
engineer and S2 doctrinally template the enemy’s tactical and protective obstacles. The
battalion staff develops COAs using the templates, and the engineer operations officer
develops his scheme of engineer operations for each COA. After selecting a COA, the
battalion commander must carefully allocate available assets to the breach, assault, and
support forces to ensure that they can accomplish their assigned tasks.
12-119. Identifying the enemy’s vulnerability is important so that the force can mass direct
and indirect fires and combined arms against that weakness. The combined arms battalion
isolates a portion of the enemy to achieve the desired combat ratio at the point of assault. It
achieves mass by hitting the enemy from multiple directions and by narrowing attack zones
to concentrate its force against a smaller defending element.

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Figure 12-7. Reverse Planning Sequence

12-120. When the attack requires breaching two or more complex obstacle systems, the
battalion commander must retain enough engineers and sufficient breaching assets to
reduce subsequent obstacles. The commander must not commit all the engineers to breach
the first obstacle system unless he is willing to risk his capability to breach follow-on
obstacles. Depleted engineer forces need significantly more time to conduct follow-on
breaches. The battalion commander needs to request additional engineers from the UEx
based to support the brigade’s mission.
12-121. In task organizing for a combined arms breach during a deliberate operation, the
combined arms battalion commander considers having a support force task organized with
weapons capable of a high volume of direct suppressive fires. The breach force disposition
and composition is METT-TC dependent and determined by combat power required to secure
the point of breach and the reduction assets required to create the lanes.
12-122. The battalion commander maneuvers his combat power to create sufficient
suppression and security for the breach to be successful. Adequate suppression, obscuration,
and security trigger the commitment of assault and breach forces. When the breaching site is
free of direct fires, the commander deploys the breach force to create lanes through the

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obstacle. The commander must sense the progress of the breach so he can decisively commit
the balance of the force through the obstacle to continue the mission.
12-123. The breach and assault forces may require fires and smoke under their control in
addition to that controlled by the support force. The support, breach, and assault forces place
direct fires on enemy positions. This makes synchronization of direct and indirect fires
extremely complex. Fire control must be planned in detail using simple and well-understood
control measures carefully rehearsed.
12-124. When a brigade conducts a combined arms breach during a deliberate operation or
plans to conduct a passage of lines of a large force after a breach, breach plans must include
detailed planning for the staging and movement of follow-on forces and equipment.

PREPARING
12-125. The HBCT combined arms battalion continues an aggressive intelligence collection
plan using scout platoons, engineers, patrols, and aerial reconnaissance. The S2 and the
battalion engineer continually refine the template based on hard intelligence. The combined
arms battalion may adjust task organization as it uncovers more details of the defense and
obstacle system. It also uses this information during the combined arms rehearsals.
12-126. Continuous and aggressive intelligence-gathering operations update the enemy
template as information becomes available. These changes are reflected as soon as possible
in the rehearsal area. If updates become available after the last rehearsal, this data must be
passed immediately to the affected force elements, especially the breach force.
12-127. The combined arms battalion meticulously plans, manages, and controls the
rehearsals. The battalion S3 allocates time for each unit to perform a combined arms
rehearsal (CAR). When possible, the force rehearses the operation under the same conditions
expected during the actual engagement, including battlefield obscuration; darkness;
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) posture; and inclement weather. The
rehearsal site reflects the actual obstacle system in as much detail as possible. The force
chooses terrain as similar as possible to that of the operational area and constructs a
practice obstacle system based on OBSTINTEL. Rehearsals include a leader and key
personnel walkthrough as well as individual rehearsals by support, breach, and assault
forces.
12-128. When the force commander rehearses the breaching operation, he also rehearses
several contingency plans. The contingencies should include possible enemy counterattacks
by counterattack forces and attack by enemy indirect-fire systems (artillery, rockets, attack
helicopters, and other air assets). Rehearsals also include enemy use of CBRN munitions.

COLLECTING OBSTACLE INTELLIGENCE

12-129. The success of combined arms breaching during a deliberate operation depends
heavily on the success of the ISR plan. The scheme of combined arms is based on known and
templated intelligence of enemy positions and obstacles. NAIs are developed to confirm or
deny the template. As confirmed intelligence reports come in, the template and ISR plan are
updated and revised. The S2 develops the collection plan, with the scout platoon
concentrating on confirming enemy locations. The engineers focus on gathering intelligence
on obstacle orientation and composition as well as on the types of fortifications the HBCT
combined arms battalion may encounter. Confirmed intelligence is used to refine the task
organization of support, breach, and assault forces and the scheme of combined arms.

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EXECUTING
12-130. The force crosses the LD organized to conduct the combined arms breach. If the
battalion encounters obstacles en route, it executes the breach with this organization. On
arrival, the combined arms battalion’s scout platoon adjusts artillery fires on the enemy
positions to cover deployment of the support force. The support force moves into position and
establishes its support-by-fire (SBF) position. Breach and assault forces move into position
and prepare to execute their tasks. The battalion commander continues to incorporate last-
minute information into his plan and makes final adjustments of positions and locations.
12-131. The support force occupies its SBF position and immediately begins suppressing
with a volley of fires. The support force battalion fires cell and combined arms battalion FSO
execute group targets planned on enemy positions. Mortar and artillery smoke are adjusted
to obscure the breaching site from enemy target acquisition. The breach force begins
movement once suppression and smoke are effective, based on clearly defined commitment
criteria. Timing is critical since the high volume of suppressing fires and smoke can be
sustained only for a short duration. SBF positions have interlocking sectors of fires and are
positioned to ensure suppression of the enemy’s positions.
12-132. Once suppression and obscuration have built to effective levels, the breach force
moves forward to the breaching site. The engineers create the lanes, while the combined
arms breach force provides for local security. As they finish the lanes, engineers create and
send a digital overlay to assist the assault and following forces in maneuvering to the lanes.
The assault force penetrates the objective after receiving the order from the battalion
commander. Due to the complexity of the breach, the C2 systems spread out to ensure
synchronization. The battalion S3 controls the multicompany support force while the
combined arms battalion commander positions himself where he can best control the entire
breaching operation.

CONTINUING THE ATTACK

12-133. The enemy obstacle system acts as a chokepoint and is dangerous even after the
HBCT combined arms battalion has overcome the defenses.
12-134. The combined arms battalion constructs additional lanes to speed the passage of
follow-on forces. Next, it widens the lanes to allow two-lane traffic through the obstacles and
constructs switch lanes to prevent blocking by disabled vehicles or artillery fires. Deliberate
marking and fencing systems are installed, and military police assets (from brigade)
establish the necessary traffic control. Eventually, follow-on engineer forces clear the
obstacles and eliminate the chokepoint. After passage through the lanes, the combined arms
force continues its mission.
12-135. Both the breaching and follow-on force must be aware of the potential for the
enemy to reseed breached obstacles with remotely delivered scatterable mines
(SCATMINEs) or other rapidly emplaced obstacles. The breaching commander may develop
a response plan and position remaining mobility assets in the vicinity of the breach lanes to
rebreach, repair, or improve lanes as necessary. In addition, the commander may develop a
reaction plan for combined arms or other forces that encounter a reseeded portion of the
obstacle while passing through the lane. The commander of the follow-on force, regardless of
the reported status of the breach lanes he is about to pass through, should organize mobility
assets forward in his formation that are prepared to rebreach, repair, or improve these lanes
as necessary.

COMBINED ARMS BREACH DURING HASTY OPERATIONS

12-136. Hasty operations are conducted when the enemy situation is vague, and the
commander may be required to execute the combined arms breach with his current task

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organization. Therefore, the HBCT combined arms battalion commander must either task
organize his subordinate company teams with sufficient combat power to conduct company
team-level breaching operations or have a plan that allows for the flexible application of
combat power necessary to execute breaching operations. When conducting offensive
operations such as a movement to contact, while participating in an exploitation or pursuit,
and when conducting passage of lines (forward or rearward) and movements through defiles,
the combined arms battalion commander must address breaching operations. The battalion
breach planning considerations and process discussed previously apply to combined arms
breach planning during hasty operations as well. The only difference is the organizational
echelon at which the breach is planned, prepared for, and executed.

PLANNING
12-137. Breach planning begins with IPB and engineer battlefield assessment (EBA) as
part of the command and engineer estimate. The battalion S2 and engineer jointly develop a
SITTEMP of the enemy disposition, most probable COA, and OBSTINTEL. The SITTEMP is
the focal point of force allocation and breach planning. If little is known about the situation,
the S2 and the engineer identify areas where the enemy is likely to use obstacles or has used
obstacles in recent operations. The engineer and battalion S3 should also request
information from higher headquarters on recent friendly use of obstacles in the AO.

HBCT Combined Arms Battalion Task Organization

12-138. Subsequent to COA development, the battalion commander and staff anticipate
where units are most likely to encounter obstacles based on the scheme of combined arms
and SITTEMP. From this analysis, the battalion commander refines his task organization, if
necessary, to apply the combat power required to execute the SITTEMPed breach.
Additionally, the battalion combat engineer recommends a task organization of engineer
platoons and critical breaching equipment to create enough lanes for the breaching unit. He
maintains a mobility (engineer) reserve under his control that can create additional lanes for
follow-on forces. This mobility reserve can also mass mobility assets if the combined arms
battalion must transition to a deliberate operation. The battalion FSO designs his fire plan
to provide priority of fires and smoke to company teams likely to conduct a breach. Above all,
the commander task organizes company teams for the mission first. He then modifies the
task organization where necessary to provide company teams with the additional forces
needed to conduct independent breaching operations as part of the battalion effort.

Company Team Task Organization

12-139. A force plans for the hasty operation breach by appropriately task organizing
subordinate task forces or company teams. The subordinate commander develops the details
necessary for success. In an HBCT combined arms battalion hasty operation breach, the
company team commander further task organizes his force and designates specific support,
breach, and assault forces. Since conducting the breach involves only committing the combat
power within the company team, the team commander incurs the responsibility to develop
plans that synchronize the breaching effort and achieve the breaching fundamentals
(SOSRA). The assault force moves through the lanes, deploys, and continues the attack to
destroy the defending enemy forces. Company team breach planning is deliberate. It
requires the company commander to develop a team scheme of combined arms or an
immediate action drill that maneuvers support, breach, and assault forces (platoons) to
apply SOSRA breaching fundamentals on obstacle contact (Table 12-1). If the enemy
situation is unknown, then support, breach, and assault forces execute their missions on
order as part of an action-on-contact drill.

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PREPARING
12-140. Preparation for the breach focuses on subordinate battalion or company-level
rehearsals. The success of the combined arms battalion breach depends on the ability of
company teams to react quickly to enemy or obstacle contact. The HBCT combined arms
battalion assists company teams in preparing for the mission by constructing and managing
rehearsal sites that team commanders can use to drill their units on actions on contact and
at obstacles. The battalion combat engineer operations officer ensures that engineer platoons
and breaching equipment link up with combined arms units early to maximize the
opportunity to rehearse as a combined arms team. Company team commanders include their
complete task organization in all orders, briefbacks, rehearsals, and precombat inspections
(PCIs). The combined arms battalion minimizes the time spent on battalion rehearsals and
briefbacks to allow company team commanders more time with their units. During battalion
rehearsals, discussion centers on how critical breaching assets will shift to support company
team breaching operations and on the transition to a deliberate breach.

COLLECTING OBSTACLE INTELLIGENCE

12-141. The ability of the force to collect timely and accurate OBSTINTEL, both before and
during the attack, has tremendous impact on the success of the breach. A combined arms
battalion commander elects to breach when the situation is vague or when intelligence
indicates that a company team can overwhelm enemy obstacles and fires. The breach will
fail if the company team does not have enough combat power to suppress the enemy’s fires or
enough breaching equipment to reduce the obstacles. Therefore, the size of the enemy force
and the type of obstacle are priority information requirements for reconnaissance.
12-142. Engineer forces are attached to the battalion scout platoon to gather detailed
intelligence on obstacle locations, composition, and orientation. Like any specialized
collection asset, the engineer squad works for the scout platoon leader and is integrated into
the total battalion collection plan. The battalion S2 and engineer provide the scout platoon
with specific NAIs for the engineer squad to reconnoiter. The squad sends its reports on the
scout platoon net.
12-143. OBSTINTEL collection is particularly difficult when the breach is part of a
movement to contact. Although engineers may be attached to the scout platoon, their ability
to close with and gather detailed OBSTINTEL in time for the advance guard or main body to
react is limited. Furthermore, organizing for a breach in a movement to contact quickly
consumes the number of engineers available for the reconnaissance effort. The commander
must weigh the effects that dedicating an engineer squad to reconnaissance will have on his
organization and its ability to transition to a deliberate breach against the effect this will
have on other engineer missions.
12-144. A breaching element must continue to gather intelligence and develop the situation
during the attack. Early detection of obstacles is essential for maintaining momentum and
for the timely commitment of engineers.

EXECUTING
12-145. Execution of the breach is the responsibility of the subordinate commander. The
company team commander applies the SOSRA breaching fundamentals by synchronizing the
efforts of his vehicles, infantry, indirect fires, and engineer assets. When breaching during a
hasty operation, the company team commander achieves synchronization by executing well-
rehearsed actions at obstacles. Platoons execute their support, breach, and assault missions
as part of the scheme of combined arms when the company team’s breach is part of the
combined arms battalion plan of attack.

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12-146. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander has two roles in a breach during
hasty operations. Both are crucial to company team breaching efforts. First, he ensures that
the company team receives the appropriate level of combat power and engineer assets, as
well as the planned priority of indirect fires and smoke, but he still allows the company team
commander to fight his battle. Second, the commander ensures that the additional combat
power and mobility assets required to transition to a battalion deliberate operation breach
are positioned to assume the responsibilities of the breach force. The commander closely
monitors the company team breaching effort so he can decisively commit his force to the
breach, if necessary, with minimal loss of momentum.
12-147. During hasty operations, such as movement to contact or pursuit, the breach is
normally conducted when no obstacle bypasses are found. The breach maintains the
momentum of the attack by denying the enemy time to mass forces to cover the obstacles.
Proper integration of engineers and breaching assets into combined arms battalion and
company team formations (positioned forward and organized in a manner that allows
efficient introduction of the required breaching assets) is critical to the success of the breach.
Because the exact location and nature of enemy forces and obstacles are unknown, engineers
and breaching assets must be distributed carefully to allow the commander to move securely
while maintaining forward-deployed breach and assault forces.
12-148. An HBCT combined arms battalion needs at least one lane for each assaulting
company team (vehicle mounted) and one footpath per assaulting platoon (dismounted). The
distance between lanes is inherently tied to the scheme of maneuver, the complexity of the
terrain, and the composition and disposition of the overwatching force. General guidelines
for the distance between lanes are 800 to 1000 meters between vehicle lanes (based on the
complexity of the terrain and the probability of enemy SCATMINE employment) and up to
100 meters between footpaths (normally based on the ability of the support force to achieve
suppressive fires). Constructing and marking each vehicle lane requires an engineer squad
from the maneuver enhancement brigade engineers reinforced with breaching equipment
task organized to the company team executing the breach. A third squad is required to
provide depth and flexibility to the combined arms battalion mobility effort. A main effort
combined arms battalion, therefore, integrates an engineer platoon throughout its combined
arms formations when task organizing for breaching operations during hasty operations.
Supporting an HBCT combined arms battalion breaching operation with fewer engineers
decreases the probability of success.
12-149. Engineer integration into HBCT combined arms battalion formations must provide
lead company teams with immediate breaching capability and maintain the flexibility to
shift assets to where they are needed. Engineer platoons reinforced with special breaching
assets from the combined arms enhancement brigade engineer units are integrated directly
into the combat formations of the lead company teams. An engineer squad is maintained
under HBCT combined arms battalion control as a mobility reserve. This squad maneuvers
at the center of the combined arms battalion formation or as an echelon of the company team
that is most likely to need engineer support. The engineer platoon leader moves with the
combined arms battalion, positioning himself where he can best control assets under his
control and track the efforts of his detached platoons.
12-150. The tactical situation often requires an HBCT combined arms battalion to modify
its combat formation. Combined arms units train constantly to accomplish this quickly and
efficiently; field standing operating procedures (SOPs) outline required actions in great
detail. Engineers integrating into the formation must adjust rapidly to maintain engineer
and breaching assets with lead company teams. Transition from a vee formation to a column
formation and vice versa is not complicated; engineers remain integrated in lead company
team formations. Transitioning from a wedge to a column, however, can be more difficult.
Ideally, a transition to a column formation should result in engineers supporting the first
two company teams in the column.

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12-151. Regardless of which formation the heavy combined arms battalion uses, the
battalion combat trains usually travel just in front of or just behind the trail company team.
Combat trains usually transport critical engineer Class V materials, such as an emergency
resupply of demolitions for the engineer force. The battalion commander, engineer, and S4
anticipate when these assets might be used and develop a plan for rapidly moving them
forward.
12-152. Integrating engineers into the force continues at the company level. The company
team commander determines which combat formation is appropriate for each phase of the
attack. The engineer platoon leader must fully understand the company team scheme of
maneuver and which formations it will use, and he must anticipate changes in formation.
Close coordination between the engineer and combined arms company team commanders is
vital to ensure support is at the right place at the right time.
12-153. An engineer platoon normally maneuvers with M113s and ACEs (augmenting the
platoon move) behind the company team. The engineers remain one terrain feature back,
guiding on the trail element, and are always within support range.
12-154. For definitive information on how force health protection is provided for breaching
operations, see FM 4-02.4. In addition, plans must be in place for clearing casualties off the
battlefield since increased numbers of casualties should be anticipated during a breach
operation. Each company team requires an ambulance for casualty evacuation.

SECTION VII – TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

12-155. The HBCT combined arms battalion conducts two kinds of movement:
administrative and tactical. An administrative movement considers tactical implications, but
its primary emphasis is on expediting movement and conserving time and energy.
Administrative movements are based on the assumption that contact with the enemy during
or shortly after the move is unlikely. A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to
relocate units in a combat zone to prepare for combat operations. Tactical road marches must
have a synchronized plan incorporating all battlefield operating systems (BOS) elements.
This movement must be planned for as if it were an offensive operation. Although hostile
contact is not anticipated, the unit must maintain security measures and be prepared to
react to enemy contact. At battalion level and higher, the S3 is responsible for planning
tactical road marches. The S4 has primary staff responsibility for planning administrative
movements, but he coordinates his plans with all other staff members.

MARCH ELEMENTS
12-156. The elements of a road march include the march column, serial, and march unit.

MARCH COLUMN.
12-157. A march column includes all elements using the same route for a single movement
under control of a single commander. A battalion may march over multiple routes to reduce
closing time. A large march column may be composed of a number of subdivisions, each
under the control of a subordinate commander.

SERIAL
12-158. A serial is a subdivision of the march column. It consists of elements of a march
column moving from one area over the same route at the same time. All the elements move
to the same area and are grouped under a serial commander. A serial may be divided into
two or more march units.

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MARCH UNIT
12-159. A march unit is the smallest subdivision of a march column and normally consists
of no more than 25 vehicles using the same route for a single movement. It moves and halts
under control of a single commander (squad, section, platoon, or company) using voice and
visual signals. It uses radio only when it can use no other means of communication.

Prior to Executing the Movement

12-160. Before starting a march, each march unit of a serial reconnoiters its route to the
start point and determines the exact time to reach it. The movement order states the time
the serial will arrive at and clear its start point. The serial commander then determines and
announces the times for march units of his serial to arrive at and clear the start point.
Arrival time at the start point is critical. Each march unit must arrive at and clear the start
point on time; otherwise, movement of other elements may be delayed.

During the Movement

12-161. During movement, march units move at the constant speed designated in the order,
maintaining proper interval and column gap. Elements in a column of any length may
simultaneously encounter many different types of routes and obstacles, resulting in different
parts of the column moving at different speeds at the same time. This can produce an
undesirable accordion-like action or whip effect. The movement order gives march speed,
rate of march, and maximum catch-up speed. March units report crossing each control point
as directed by the march order. They maintain air and ground security during the move.

MARCH COLUMN ORGANIZATION

12-162. March columns, regardless of size, are composed of four elements: reconnaissance
party, quartering party, main body, and trail party. March columns are organized to
maintain unit integrity and to maintain a task organization consistent with mission
requirements. An element or a group of elements in a march column receives a numerical or
alphabetical designation for planning, scheduling, and controlling.

RECONNAISSANCE PARTY
12-163. Engineer and other support assets may augment the reconnaissance party. It
performs route reconnaissance to determine travel time, capacities of underpasses and
bridges and locations of ferries and fords; it identifies critical points, including chokepoints
and obstacles. Route reconnaissance confirms and supplements data from map studies,
higher headquarters, and air reconnaissance. Instructions to the reconnaissance party
should state the nature and extent of information required and the time and place the report
is to be submitted.

QUARTERING PARTY
12-164. The quartering party normally consists of representatives from company teams or
attached units. It reconnoiters the new area, marking unit positions and guiding the march
column elements into these new positions as they arrive. (See Section II for additional
information on quartering party responsibilities when occupying an assembly area.)

MAIN BODY
12-165. March units of the main body consist of individual combined arms units with their
trains, battalion mortars, any attachments, the battalion CP, and the battalion trains.

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Vehicles carrying petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) that require refueling during
nontactical marches may move ahead of schedule to establish a service station refuel point.

TRAIL PARTY
12-166. The trail party normally consists of elements of the battalion maintenance platoon
and medical support. The trail party is the last march unit in a battalion serial, consisting of
elements of the maintenance platoon. The function of the trail party is to recover disabled
vehicles. A security element such as an additional mechanized infantry platoon should
accompany the trail party for protection.

Mechanical Failures
12-167. If a vehicle cannot be repaired or towed, it is moved off the road and into a secure
area. The drivers and crew members, supplied with sufficient food, water, and ammunition,
secure the vehicle. The maintenance platoon leader reports the location and reason for
leaving the vehicle behind to the forward support company commander and battalion S4.

Recovery
12-168. Once the trail party completes the road march, maintenance priority becomes the
recovery of disabled vehicles. A tactical road march is not complete until all march units and
vehicles arrive at the destination.

TECHNIQUES
12-169. The purpose of conducting a road march is to relocate rapidly, not to gain contact
with the enemy. Road marches are performed at fixed speeds and during timed intervals.
The road march must be organized to meet mission requirements and provide organizational
control. The three basic types of techniques are closed column, open column, and infiltration.

CLOSED COLUMN
12-170. Closed column is normally used during limited visibility or on poorly marked or
congested roads. It is characterized by vehicle intervals of 25 to 50 meters. This technique
takes maximum advantage of the traffic capacity of the route but provides little dispersion of
vehicles.

OPEN COLUMN
12-171. In open column, the distance between vehicles is increased for greater dispersion.
It is characterized by vehicle distance of approximately 50 to 200 meters; however, the
factors of METT-TC determine actual dispersion. Open column is normally used during
daylight but may be used at night with blackout lights or thermal vision equipment. Open
column is normally used on well-marked routes with good visibility.

INFILTRATION
12-172. Infiltration has no defined structure. During a move by infiltration, vehicles are
dispatched individually, in small groups, or at irregular intervals at a rate that keeps the
traffic density down and prevents undue vehicle massing. Infiltration provides the best
possible passive defense against enemy observation and attack. It is suited for tactical
marches when sufficient time and road space are available and when maximum security,
deception, and dispersion are desired or directed.

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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
12-173. Road marches require extensive planning. Commanders and staff use the military
decision-making process (MDMP) to determine how best to execute a move from one point to
another. (Refer to FM 4-01.30, Movement Control, for a detailed discussion of movement
planning considerations, terms, and movement time computation.)

FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION

12-174. The following factors are considered when planning a road march:
Requirements for the movement.
Organic and nonorganic movement capabilities.
Unit movement priorities.
Enemy situation and capabilities, terrain conditions, and weather.
Organization of the HBCT combined arms battalion.
Security measures before and during the movement and at the destination.
Assembly of the march units.
Actions at the destination.

SEQUENCE OF ROAD MARCH PLANNING

12-175. When preparing for a tactical road march, the battalion uses the following
sequence of march planning, as time permits:
Prepare and issue an oral warning order as early as possible to allow subordinates
time to prepare for the march.
Analyze routes designated by higher headquarters and specify organization of the
march serial.
Prepare and issue the march order.
Prepare a detailed movement plan and assembly area plan.
Organize and dispatch reconnaissance and quartering parties as required.

MOVEMENT ORDER
12-176. The movement order format is the same for administrative and tactical
movements. The movement order is prepared as an annex to an operation order (OPORD), as
a separate OPORD, or as a FRAGO.

CONTROL MEASURES
12-177. The commander uses the control measures discussed in the following paragraphs to
assist in controlling the battalion during the road march.

GRAPHICS
12-178. Road march graphics should include, at a minimum, the start point (SP), release
point (RP), and route.

Strip Map
12-179. The HBCT combined arms battalion strip map should depict the following (Figure
12-8):
Start point.
Release point.

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Scheduled halts.
Convoy routes.
Major cities and towns.
Critical points and checkpoints.
Distance between CPs.
North orientation.

Figure 12-8. Example of Battalion Strip Map

12-180. A start point is a well-defined point on a route at which movement of vehicles falls
under the control of the movement commander. It is at this point that the column is formed
by the successive passing, at an appointed time, of each of the elements comprising the
column. The SP should be an easily recognizable point on the map or on the ground. It
should be far enough from the assembly area to allow units to be organized and moving at
the prescribed speed and interval when the SP is reached.
12-181. A release point is a well-defined point on a route at which the elements comprising
a column return to the authority of their respective commanders. At the RP, each element
continues its movement toward its own destination. Multiple movement routes from the RP
enable units to disperse rapidly and navigate to their assembly areas or AOs.
12-182. Scheduled halts may be needed to provide rest, mess, refuel on the move sites, and
maintenance. Dining and refueling halts should coincide, if possible.
12-183. Critical points or checkpoints on a route are places used for information references,
places where obstructions or interference with movement might occur, or places where
timing may be a critical factor. They are also used as a control measure for control and
maintenance of the schedule. Guides or signs may be used at designated critical points
and/or checkpoints to ensure the smooth flow of movement.

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Digital Overlays
12-184. Digital overlays on FBCB2/BFTenhance mounted navigation. They display
waypoints and other information concerning unit locations along the route of march and
facilitate maintaining a COP.

COMMUNICATIONS
12-185. Messengers and visual signals are the preferred means of communication during
tactical road marches. Because the enemy has radio direction-finding equipment, the HBCT
combined arms battalion uses radio only in emergencies and when it can use no other means
of communication. The HBCT combined arms battalion can also use road guides to pass
messages from one march unit to a following march unit. Because of the need to stay off the
radio, road guides are important in controlling the speed of march units and the interval
between them.

TRAFFIC CONTROL
12-186. The headquarters element controlling the march may post road guides and traffic
signs at designated traffic control points. At critical points, guides assist in creating a
smooth flow of traffic along the march route. Military police, members of the battalion scout
platoon, or designated elements from the quartering party may serve as guides. They should
have equipment or markers that will allow march elements to identify them in darkness or
other limited visibility conditions. There is normally an RP for every echelon of command
conducting the road march. Traffic problems may arise if actions at each of these points are
not well rehearsed.

SECURITY
12-187. During tactical movement, march units maintain security through observation,
weapons orientation, dispersion, and camouflage. Commanders assign sectors of observation
to their personnel to maintain 360-degree observation. Main weapons are oriented on
specific sectors throughout the column. The lead elements cover the front, following elements
cover alternate flanks, and the trail element covers the rear.

HALTS
12-188. March elements must be prepared to conduct both scheduled and unscheduled
halts.
Scheduled halts are planned along the march route for maintenance and rest or to
maintain timing per level movement orders. At scheduled halts, vehicles and
soldiers move to the side of the road while maintaining march dispersion. Local
security is set up immediately, and drivers perform during-operations maintenance
checks. The unit is ready to move at a moment’s notice.
Unscheduled halts and actions may be caused by unforeseen developments such as
obstacles, traffic congestion, or equipment failure. The first priority at a halt is
security.

AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

12-189. Planning for AMD and implementing all forms of air defense security measures are
imperative to minimize the battalion’s vulnerability to enemy air attack. If there is a
significant air threat, additional AMD must be requested from the UEx through the HBCT.
The battalion commander must ensure that both passive and active air defense measures are
implemented at every level. Each vehicle in a motor march has an air guard to provide air

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security. Specific vehicles may be designated as air guard vehicles performing air rather
than ground observation. If attacked by hostile aircraft during the march, the march unit
under attack moves off the road into a quick defensive posture and immediately engages the
aircraft with all available automatic weapons. The rest of the battalion moves to covered and
concealed areas until the engagement ends.

OBSTACLES
12-190. The heavy combined arms battalion should bypass obstacles reported by the scout
platoon if possible. If it cannot bypass obstacles, the lead march unit goes into a defense to
cover and overwatch and breaches the obstacle, working with engineers if available. As the
lead march unit breaches the obstacles, the other march units move at decreased speed or
move off the road and monitor the battalion command net.

ENEMY INDIRECT FIRE

12-191. Should the HBCT combined arms battalion come under attack by enemy indirect
fire during the road march, the unit in contact continues to move. The remainder of the
battalion attempts to bypass the impact area.

DISABLED VEHICLES
12-192. Disabled vehicles must not obstruct traffic. They are moved off the road and their
status reported immediately. Security is established, and guides are posted to direct traffic.
If the operator repairs the vehicle, it rejoins the rear of the column. If the operator cannot
repair the vehicle, trail party maintenance elements pick it up.

RESTRICTIONS
12-193. Restrictions are points along the route of march where movement may be hindered
or obstructed. These points can include bridges, intersections, ferries, and bypasses. The
march planner should stagger start times or adjust speeds to compensate for restrictions, or
he should plan to halt the column en route until the restriction is over.

LIMITED VISIBILITY
12-194. Units must be able to operate routinely under limited visibility conditions caused
by darkness, smoke, dust, fog, heavy rain, or heavy snow. Limited visibility decreases the
speed of movement and increases the difficulty in navigating, recognizing checkpoints, and
maintaining proper interval between units. To overcome C2 problems caused by limited
visibility, commanders may position themselves just behind lead elements. More restrictive
control measures, such as additional checkpoints, phase lines, and use of a single route, may
become necessary.

SECTION VIII – ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS

12-195. An assembly area is a location where a force prepares or regroups for further
action. While in assembly areas, units execute the organization, maintenance, resupply, and
personnel actions necessary to maintain the combat power of the force. Designation and
occupation of an assembly area may be directed by a higher headquarters or by the unit
commander during relief or withdrawal operations or unit movements.

ASSEMBLY AREAS
12-196. Assembly areas are areas occupied by forces where enemy contact is likely and
commitment of the unit directly from the assembly area to combat is possible or anticipated.

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Examples of units likely to be in assembly areas include units designated as tactical

reserves, units completing a rearward passage of lines, units preparing to move forward to
execute a forward passage of lines followed by offensive operations, units performing tactical
movements, and units conducting reconstitution. Assembly areas should provide the
following:
Concealment from air and ground observation.
Cover from direct fire.
Terrain masking of electromagnetic signal signature.
Sufficient area for the dispersion of subunits and their vehicles consistent with the
enemy and friendly tactical situation.
Areas for unit trains, maintenance operations, and C2 facilities.
Suitable entrances, exits, and internal routes. (Optimally, at least one all-weather
paved surface road transits the assembly area and connects to the MSR in use.)
Terrain allowing the observation of ground and air avenues of approach into the
assembly area.
Good drainage and soil conditions that support unit vehicle movement.

ORGANIZATION OF ASSEMBLY AREAS

12-197. Battalion tactical assembly areas may be organized using one of three methods.

METHOD 1—BATTALION SECTOR

12-198. The combined arms battalion may occupy a portion of the perimeter of a brigade
assembly area. It does so by arraying companies, generally on a line oriented on avenues of
approach into the assembly area. Leftmost and rightmost units tie in their fire plans and
areas of observation with adjacent units. Depending on the tactical situation and width of
the area assigned to it, the HBCT combined arms battalion may maintain a reserve.
Battalion trains are located to the rear of the companies. The battalion mortar platoon and
the main CP are located centrally in the assembly area where they can communicate and
support units by fire. The battalion scout platoon screens along the most likely or most
dangerous avenue of approach.

METHOD 2—COMPANY SECTORS

12-199. The combined arms battalion may assign sectors to subordinate companies and
require them to tie in their fires and observation with each other. The main CP, trains, and
mortar platoon are located near the center of the assembly area. Ideally, company sectors are
assigned to balance the task organization against the appropriate enemy avenue of
approach. The scout platoon occupies observation posts at key points around the entire
perimeter of the battalion or screens along the most dangerous or likely avenue of approach.
This method configures the HBCT combined arms battalion in a perimeter defense with
companies oriented outward. This is the most common organization of battalion assembly
areas.

METHOD 3—INDIVIDUAL ASSEMBLY AREA

12-200. The combined arms battalion may assign separate individual assembly areas to
subordinate companies, which establish their own 360-degree security. Areas between
companies are secured through surveillance and patrolling. The main CP, trains, and heavy
mortar platoon establish positions central to outlying companies. Note that the battalion
usually establishes echelons of trains by locating the field trains with the combined arms
battalion support area (CABSA) and positioning the combat trains centrally within the
assembly area. However, when the HBCT is located in the rear area and not designated as a

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tactical reserve, the brigade does not form a brigade support area. In this case, the combined
arms battalion establishes unit trains in the center of its assembly area.

QUARTERING PARTY
12-201. A quartering party is a group of unit representatives dispatched to a probable new
site of operations to secure, reconnoiter, and organize an area before the main body’s arrival
and occupation. Unit SOPs establish the exact composition of the quartering party and its
transportation, security, communications equipment, and specific duties. Quartering parties
typically reconnoiter and confirm the route and tentative locations previously selected from
map reconnaissance. Quartering parties also serve as a liaison between their parent
headquarters and the quartering party of their higher headquarters to change unit locations
in the assembly area based on the results of their reconnaissance.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
12-202. The battalion S2 routinely receives intelligence information from brigade
headquarters throughout the combined arms battalion’s deployment and operations. From
this information, the S2 determines the characteristics and likelihood of the air and ground
threat to the quartering party during its movement to and occupation of the assembly area.
This information assists the battalion staff and the quartering party officer in charge (OIC)
in determining the mode of transportation and security required and the desirability of
maintaining the quartering party in the assembly area during the movement of the rest of
the battalion.
12-203. The quartering party typically moves to the new assembly area by infiltration. For
security, it may move with another subunit quartering party, depending on the likelihood of
enemy contact. In this case, it may be necessary to move as a march unit of a tactical road
march if the number of vehicles exceeds local SOP restrictions on vehicular infiltration.
Ideally, the quartering party moves over the routes to be used by the combined arms
battalion and executes a route reconnaissance and time-distance check.
12-204. The quartering party typically includes an OIC or noncommissioned officer in
charge (NCOIC) and representatives from the battalion main CP, battalion trains, and the
battalion subunits. The assistant S3, headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) first
sergeant (1SG), S1, S3 sergeant major (SGM), and command sergeant major (CSM) are
potential quartering party leaders.
12-205. Composition of maneuver company quartering parties is usually determined by the
company commander but may be specified by the battalion commander. HHC
representatives typically include NCOs from key support sections such as communications,
maintenance, or supply. Representatives from the mortar platoon and the scout platoons are
also represented in the quartering party.
12-206. The main CP quartering party identifies potential CP locations based on tactical
requirements such as cover and concealment and the line-of-sight signal requirements of FM
radios.
12-207. An alternative technique is to send the battalion’s M1068 with the quartering
party to establish command and control while the battalion main body is moving. If planning
time is short, key members of the staff can move with the quartering party. This enables the
staff to begin detailed planning immediately on arrival in the assembly area. This technique
also facilitates transitions to new missions by pre-positioning key staff members so planning
can occur concurrently with the movement of the main body.
12-208. When the combined arms battalion employs echeloned trains, a combat train’s
representative accompanies the quartering party, and another quartering party is formed for

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the field trains. Unit SOP establishes the composition, deployment, and actions of the field
trains quartering party.
12-209. If the HBCT combined arms battalion moves and occupies its assembly area as part
of a brigade, the HBCT makes all coordination for fire support. If the combined arms
battalion moves and occupies the assembly area without FS planning by its higher
headquarters, it conducts its own FS coordination.
12-210. During its planning, the battalion staff must determine combat service support
requirements for the quartering party. The estimate of necessary supplies and equipment
must cover the entire quartering party, including accompanying staff section representatives
and sustainment assets.
12-211. The quartering party may move under radio listening silence or other emission
restrictive posture, especially during movement to tactical assembly areas.

PREPARATION
12-212. The quartering party OIC or NCOIC plans his operations through coordination
with battalion staff officers.

Intelligence
12-213. The battalion S2 ensures the quartering party OIC and or NCOIC is aware of the
current enemy situation, probable enemy courses of action, the weather forecast, and the
terrain and vegetation likely en route to and in the new assembly area.

Combined Arms
12-214. The OIC or NCOIC coordinates with the battalion S3 to determine the mission of
the quartering party, whether the quartering party is to remain in the assembly area and
await the remainder of the combined arms battalion, and the route and movement
restrictions to be used by the quartering party. The OIC or NCOIC ensures subordinate unit
quartering parties know where and when the battalion quartering party will be located in
the assembly area.

Engineer Support
12-215. The battalion engineer coordinates with the quartering party OIC or NCOIC to
determine whether sending engineer personnel with the quartering party for the
reconnaissance and evaluation of routes, bridges, and cross-country mobility is recommended
or required.

Command and Control

12-216. After the quartering party OIC or NCOIC has completed his planning, he
assembles the members of the quartering party at a time and place of his choosing to brief
them. This briefing follows the standard five-paragraph field order format. Emphasis is on
actions at halts and critical areas, actions of the quartering party in the assembly area,
contingency plans, and procedures to request and receive sustainment. He should cover in
detail MEDEVAC procedures, actions on contact, and actions to take if separated from the
quartering party.

Execution
12-217. The following considerations apply to quartering party execution:

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Maneuver
12-218. The quartering party navigates by infiltration to the assembly area, generally
along one route. If the quartering party moves along a route to be used by the main body and
the main body has not yet sent a reconnaissance party forward, the quartering party
conducts a route reconnaissance during its movement. The quartering party may also
execute a time-distance check of the designated route. Driving the march speed of the
combined arms battalion’s main body march units, the OIC or NCOIC notes the time and
actual vehicle odometer distances between the CPs along the route. He reports these times
and distances to the main CP after moving through the RP.
12-219. On arrival in the assembly area, the quartering party navigates to assigned
positions and executes the required reconnaissance. The quartering party also has the
following responsibilities at the assembly area:
Determines locations for individual vehicles.
Identifies unit left and right limits of fire, records this information, and sends
updates to the unit’s commander.
Determines the location for the main CP and records it.
Verifies subordinate unit locations and sectors of fire to ensure there are no gaps in
coverage.
Ensures necessary routes are cleared.
Transmits changes or updates to the main CP to alert the main body to changes in
the route and assembly area.
12-220. If reconnaissance of proposed locations reveals the area is unsuitable for
occupation, the quartering party OIC or NCOIC attempts to adjust unit locations in the area
assigned. If such adjustments do not correct the problem, he immediately notifies the
battalion S3 or commander.
12-221. If an element of the main CP has accompanied the quartering party, it moves to the
location reconnoitered by its representative and establishes forward C2 for the combined
arms battalion. Representatives organize their respective areas by selecting and marking
positions for vehicles and support facilities. If designated, guides move on order to
preselected checkpoints or RPs to await main body march unit elements.
12-222. If the combined arms battalion quartering party is not going to remain in the
assembly area, it does not depart the assembly area until all subordinate unit quartering
parties have reported. The unit quartering parties should provide the results of their
reconnaissance and identify requested changes to their tentative locations.
12-223. Each commander or unit leader must decide if and when guides are required to
assist in occupying the assembly area. Normally, the use of guides is planned for occupations
during periods of limited visibility.

Engineer Support
12-224. In some cases, mobility support is required to repair or replace damaged bridging
or roadways where no feasible bypass is available. Engineer units supporting the combined
arms battalion may accompany the quartering party to execute mobility operations.

Sustainment
12-225. Sustainment operations assets may accompany the quartering party. Sustainment
elements generally conduct resupply and maintenance operations for the quartering party at
scheduled halts or in the new assembly area.

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FMI 3-90.5

OCCUPATION
12-226. Units position themselves in assembly areas in accordance with their parent unit’s
tentative plan. Quartering parties typically guide units into position. The units accomplish
occupation smoothly from the march without halting or bunching of units at the RP.
Subordinate units normally establish routes and separate SPs and RPs for march elements
that extend from the march column’s route or RP toward the march units’ assembly area
positions. This technique clears the route quickly, maintains march unit command and
control, and prevents bunching of units at the march column RP. The combined arms
battalion begins movement to the assembly area with an updated movement route, specific
coordinates for vehicle locations, and a confirmed defensive scheme for occupation of the
assembly area. This enables the combined arms battalion to transition quickly from the road
march into the actual occupation while maintaining overall security for the main body.

INTELLIGENCE
12-227. The battalion S2 assists in planning the assembly area occupation by identifying
enemy avenues of air and ground approach into the new assembly area and the degree and
type of rear area threat to the combined arms battalion in its new location. The S2 also
identifies and disseminates the security requirements for the combined arms battalion and
begins preparing the ISR plan for the assembly area. In coordination with the S3, the S2
makes preliminary plans for reconnaissance and surveillance tasks to be assigned to
subunits in the combined arms battalion, including the scout platoon.

MANEUVER
12-228. The battalion commander or S3 chooses a method for occupation (whole battalion
assembly area or separate subunit assembly areas) and tentative subunit locations based on
METT-TC. He then considers selecting tentative assembly area locations. To operate
effectively in the assembly area, selected subunits may have specific positioning
requirements, such as being near mess units, near water for decontamination, or on
hardstand for field maintenance. Based on METT-TC, the commander or S3 develops
contingency plans that address the possibility of significant enemy contact in the assembly
area. Time available and the likelihood of enemy contact determines the level of detail in
contingency plans. These plans typically include FS plans and alternate assembly areas or
rally points in case the combined arms battalion is forced out of its initial assembly area.

FIRE SUPPORT
12-229. FS requirements are coordinated with units already positioned near the new
assembly area. Support shortfalls between requirements and availability are coordinated
with either higher or adjacent units. FS planning includes support for combined arms
battalion contingency plans in case of enemy ground contact.

ENGINEER SUPPORT
12-230. The type and extent of engineer support required in the assembly area depends on
the anticipated length of stay, type and degree of enemy threat, terrain in the assembly area,
and the follow-on mission of the combined arms battalion. The battalion is responsible for all
mobility and survivability tasks in the assembly area.

AIR DEFENSE
12-231. Depending on the commander’s stated priority of protection, air defense assets
available from maneuver enhancement brigade are located with supported HBCT combined
arms battalion subunits or in separate locations under combined arms battalion control.

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 Tactical Enabling Operations

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

12-232. The battalion S4 recommends sustainment positioning and typically positions the
combat trains near the battalion main CP to allow wire communications between them.
Support elements position themselves in relation to the battalion tactical operations center
(TOC) and the mortar platoon.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12-233. The battalion XO, S6, and S2 determine tentative locations for battalion C2
facilities from map reconnaissance based on METT-TC. The overriding consideration for
selecting these locations is the ability of the various CPs to communicate higher, lower, and
laterally. Establishing the main CP in the new assembly area should occur early in the
occupation so subunit CPs can locate based on their requirement to communicate with the
main CP.

ACTIONS IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA

12-234. The HBCT combined arms battalion focuses all actions in the assembly area on
preparing for future operations, including resupply, personnel replacement, maintenance,
reorganization, rest, and future operations planning.
12-235. The combined arms battalion initiates administrative personnel actions in the
assembly area if time permits.
12-236. Maintenance activities concentrate on deadline faults and those degrading the
unit’s ability to shoot, move, and communicate. The battalion pays special attention to those
maintenance tasks that are too time consuming or difficult to perform during combat
operations.
12-237. The units conduct resupply actions in the assembly area to replenish items used in
previous operations, assemble stocks for future operations, and replace damaged and
contaminated supplies as required. Refueling during the move to the assembly area is easier
and faster than refueling after arrival in the assembly area.
12-238. The unit conducts planning and preparation for future operations concurrently
with maintenance and administrative activities.
12-239. The unit may require training if issued new or modified equipment while in the
assembly area. Small-unit training may be necessary if large numbers of replacement
personnel are introduced into the unit, especially if significant numbers of key leaders are
replaced.

SECURITY
12-240. Security comprises measures taken by a military unit to protect itself against
surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, sabotage, or annoyance that may
impair its effectiveness. Security is essential to the protection and conservation of combat
power. It may be achieved by establishing and maintaining protective measures or through
deception operations designed to confuse and dissipate enemy attempts to interfere with the
force being secured. Effective security prevents the enemy from gaining an unexpected
advantage over friendly forces.

SECURITY IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA

12-241. Forces in tactical assembly areas are provided a degree of security by their
separation from the line of contact and by the presence of other units between them and the
enemy. In UEx rear areas, security is provided through rear battle contingency plans. If the

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FMI 3-90.5

assembly area is well forward, security is provided by proximity to other combat or support
units. In keeping with their mission and the tactical situation, units in tactical assembly
areas employ active security measures. These measures include reconnaissance and
patrolling, visual and electronic surveillance of ground and air avenues of approach, and
establishment of OPs. Regardless of the security that may be provided by other units or
agencies, the commander takes whatever actions or precautions he deems necessary to
secure his command.

POSITIONING OF COMPANIES
12-242. The HBCT combined arms battalion positions companies with respect to avenues of
approach and access routes into the assembly area. Companies tie in their fires, observation,
and patrolling with one another. This is fairly simple for the combined arms battalion
because the companies typically occupy a portion of a battalion perimeter and are
immediately adjacent to another company. Companies exchange sector sketches, fire plans,
and patrolling plans with adjacent units.

POSITIONING OF THE SCOUT PLATOON

12-243. The scout platoon may be positioned in one of three ways to enhance the security of
the HBCT combined arms battalion:
It can form a screen astride the most likely or dangerous avenue of approach.
It can establish several temporary OPs and conduct patrols between them to
provide a thin screen line that surrounds the entire assembly area.
It can be positioned to observe an area that cannot be seen by other units in the
assembly area.

OPERATIONS SECURITY
12-244. The HBCT combined arms battalion practices the usual operations security
(OPSEC) measures to enhance the security of the unit while in the assembly area. OPSEC
includes active and passive measures that attempt to deny the enemy information about
friendly forces. Units in the battalion practice noise and light discipline, employ effective
camouflage, and eliminate or reduce radio traffic. Other electronic transmissions such as
jammers and radar are also restricted in the assembly area. Units may construct and employ
unidirectional antennas to reduce electronic signatures.

NONCOMBATANTS
12-245. Movement of civilians and refugees near assembly areas is strictly controlled to
prevent enemy sympathizers or covert agents from obtaining information about the
combined arms battalion. Units may remove or cover unit markings and uniform patches in
some cases to retain unit anonymity. When possible, the unit conducts rehearsals in areas
not subject to enemy observation and performs extensive movements and resupply under
limited visibility. Battalion OPSEC measures need to be tied into the higher headquarters
deception efforts.

ISR PLAN
12-246. The battalion ISR plan directs the employment of intelligence assets under
battalion control and assigns intelligence and security tasks to subordinate units. Companies
typically provide security patrols to their fronts and establish OPs in accordance with the
ISR plan. The scout platoon also conducts reconnaissance and security tasks in accordance
with the ISR plan. Patrols may be established to maintain contact between units when
companies occupy separate assembly areas.

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DEPARTURE FROM THE ASSEMBLY AREA

12-247. The planning considerations for occupying the assembly area are based largely on
the anticipated future missions of units. Units are positioned in the assembly area so they
can depart the assembly area en route to their assigned tactical missions without
countermarching or moving through another unit.

PLACEMENT OF START POINT

12-248. Units departing the assembly area must hit the SP at the correct interval and
speed. To achieve this, the SP must be located a sufficient distance from the assembly area
to allow units to combined arms out of their positions and configure for the road march
before reaching the SP. The SP for an HBCT combined arms battalion movement should be
located an adequate distance from the assembly area to permit the companies to attain
proper speed and interval before crossing it.

LIAISON OFFICERS
12-249. When unit-to-unit dispersion or terrain in the assembly area prohibits visual
contact, liaison officers (LNOs) maintain contact between departing units and return to their
parent units to initiate movement at the correct time.

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 Appendix A
Integration of Heavy, Stryker, and
Infantry Maneuver Forces

Employing heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) maneuver forces with

modular infantry and Stryker maneuver forces is a combat multiplier.
These operations take advantage of the infantry maneuver unit’s ability
to operate in restricted terrain (such as urban areas, forests, and
mountains), the speed, armor protection, and density of dismounted
infantry in Stryker maneuver units, with the mobility and firepower
inherent in heavy maneuver units. To ensure heavy maneuver and
infantry or Stryker maneuver assets are integrated and synchronized,
forces should be mutually supporting based on the commander’s concept
of employment. This appendix addresses conditions heavy maneuver
battalion commanders must consider when planning and executing two
types of tactical operations when provided an infantry or Stryker
company and when operating as part of an infantry brigade combat team
(IBCT) or Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT).

SECTION I – ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

A-1. Across the spectrum of operations, there is an overlap in which heavy, Stryker, and
infantry maneuver forces can operate. The use of a mixed force in this overlap takes
advantage of the strengths of both forces and offsets their respective weaknesses.
Heavy/infantry operations occur when a heavy maneuver battalion has infantry maneuver
battalion forces attached. Heavy/Stryker operations occur when a heavy maneuver battalion
has Stryker maneuver battalion forces attached. Infantry/heavy operations occur when a
heavy maneuver force is under the operational control (OPCON) of an infantry maneuver
battalion as part of an IBCT. Stryker/heavy operations occur when a heavy maneuver tank
or mechanized infantry force is under the OPCON of a Stryker maneuver battalion as part of
a SBCT. The integration of heavy, Stryker, and infantry forces can take advantage of the
enemy force’s structure to attack the enemy’s weaknesses and seize the initiative.

HEAVY, STRYKER, AND INFANTRY FORCE OPERATIONS

A-2. The potential to use heavy, Stryker, and infantry forces together to capitalize on each
other’s strengths, offset weaknesses, and attack the perceived weaknesses of any hostile
force is unlimited. The interjection of infantry or Stryker forces in a HBCT allows a flexible
response to increasing tensions and a rapid response in the face of a sudden all-out attack.

FACTORS OF METT-TC
A-3. Heavy, Stryker, and infantry forces are not routinely mixed but can be effective given
the proper situation and support. The decision to cross-attach forces is based on UEx-level
war planning or on the initiation of a BCT commander’s request for augmentation from an
IBCT or SBCT. In all cases, the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and

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support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) drive the decision to
mix forces together.

ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES

A-4. One advantage of mixing forces is greater tactical flexibility for the maneuver
commander.
In the offense, an infantry force can infiltrate by ground to seize and hold restricted
terrain, allowing the heavy maneuver battalion task force to move faster, or the
infantry force can air assault into the enemy’s rear, disrupting his defenses to
create an exploitable weakness. In the defense, the infantry force can defend in
restricted terrain and allow the heavy maneuver battalion task force to mass its
heavy systems along the enemy’s primary mounted avenue of approach.
Stryker maneuver forces have the mobility of heavy forces and the numbers of
dismounted infantry equal to an IBCT. Additionally, they can execute tasks that
heavy forces may not have the manpower or training to perform, such as attacking
in restricted terrain to defeat enemy infantry in prepared positions.
The challenges of heavy, Stryker, and infantry maneuver operations are to
understand the capabilities and limitations of each type of force and plan
accordingly. To ensure effective integration of heavy, infantry, or Stryker assets,
forces should be mutually supporting based on the commander’s concept of
employment.

INFANTRY MANEUVER FORCES MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND

LIMITATIONS
A-5. The heavy maneuver battalion commander and staff must understand the organization
of the infantry maneuver battalion that may be attached or OPCON to the heavy maneuver
battalion task force.

MISSIONS
A-6. The missions given to an infantry maneuver force in heavy/infantry operations must
consider the potential of enemy’s potential superiority in armor, mobility, and firepower. The
infantry maneuver battalion must offset its vulnerabilities with dispersion, cover and
concealment and use of close and hindering terrain to slow the enemy. Table A-1 shows
possible infantry maneuver force tasks.

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Table A-1 Example of Possible Infantry Maneuver Force Tasks

Heavy Task Force Missions Light Infantry Company Task

Movement to contact Clear and secure restricted areas; follow and support.
Attack Air assault to fix or destroy enemy targets; infiltrate or air assault to
seize objectives; breach obstacles; create a penetration.
Exploitation Secure lines of communication (LOC); air assault to seize terrain or
attack enemy forces.
Pursuit Clear bypassed forces; air assault to block enemy escape.
Follow and support Secure key terrain and LOC; provide rear area security.
Defense Block dismounted avenues; perform security tasks; occupy
strongpoint; ambush; provide rear area security; conduct military
operations on urbanized terrain.
Linkup Serve as follow-up echelon.
Demonstration Conduct display operations.
Retrograde operations Provide rear area security; clear routes; occupy positions in depth;
perform reconnaissance or deception; conduct stay-behind
operations.

CAPABILITIES
A-7. Infantry maneuver forces have the capabilities to perform the following actions:
Seize, occupy, and hold terrain.
Move on foot or by aircraft, truck, or amphibious vehicle.
Move in all types of terrain.
Conduct operations with heavy or Stryker forces.
Conduct covert breaches.
Conduct air assault operations.
Take part in counterinsurgency operations within a larger unit.
Rapidly accept and integrate augmenting forces.

LIMITATIONS
A-8. Infantry maneuver forces have the following limitations:
They must depend on nonorganic transportation for rapid movement over long
distances.
Without protective clothing, they are vulnerable to the effects of prolonged
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) exposure.
They require external support when they must operate for an extended period.
Unless dug in with overhead cover, they are extremely vulnerable to indirect fires.
Unless dug in, they are vulnerable in open terrain to long-range direct fires.
They also have less (latent) awareness of the enemy and friendly situation because
of the lack of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System/Blue
Force Tracker (BFT) in the dismounted force.

INFANTRY MANEUVER BATTALION ORGANIZATION

A-9. The infantry maneuver battalion is organized with a headquarters company; three rifle
companies, a weapons company, and a forward support company (engineers are at BCT
level).

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FMI 3-90.5

Headquarters company in an infantry battalion is organized exactly like that in a

heavy maneuver battalion except that it is high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled
vehicle (HMMWV) based and does not have tank and Bradley master gunners.
The infantry company has three platoons and a 60mm mortar section—a total of
141 Soldiers. The rifle platoons (39 Soldiers) are organized into three squads and a
weapons squad, which controls the platoon’s two M240B machineguns and two
Javelins. Each rifle squad has two fire teams.
The infantry weapons company has four wheeled assault platoons equipped with
four HMMWVs per platoon that mount either TOW, MK-19, or .50-caliber
machineguns, depending on METT-TC.
The infantry battalion forward support company is organized like the heavy
forward support company (FSC) with the exception that there is additional truck
transportation to carry infantry Soldiers and reduced recovery capability. It is not
reasonable for a heavy maneuver battalion commander to expect the infantry
maneuver battalion to send all its organic transportation to carry an infantry
company to support heavy maneuver operations as there are only 23 transport
trucks in an infantry maneuver battalion.

STRYKER MANEUVER FORCES MISSIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND

LIMITATIONS
A-10. The heavy maneuver battalion commander and staff must understand the
organization of Stryker forces that may support the heavy maneuver battalion task force and
Stryker forces that may be attached or OPCON to the heavy maneuver battalion task force.

MISSIONS
A-11. The missions given to a Stryker force in heavy maneuver operations must consider the
potential of the enemy’s superiority in armor, mobility, and firepower. The Stryker battalion
must offset its vulnerabilities with speed, dispersion, cover and concealment, and use of close
and hindering terrain to slow the enemy. Table A-2 shows possible Stryker tasks.

Table A-2. Example of Possible Stryker Maneuver Force Tasks

Heavy Task Force Stryker Company Task

Movement to contact Clear and secure; follow and support.
Attack Infiltrate to seize objectives; breach objectives; create a penetration.
Exploitation Secure LOC; follow and support.
Pursuit Clear bypassed force; block enemy escape.
Follow and support Secure key terrain and LOC; provide rear area security.
Defense Block avenues of approach; occupy strongpoint; ambush, provide rear area
security.
Linkup Serve as linkup element.
Demonstration Conduct demonstration; conduct display operations.

CAPABILITIES
A-12. Stryker forces have the capabilities to perform the following actions:
Seize, occupy, and hold terrain.
Move on foot or by Stryker vehicle.
Move in all types of terrain.
Conduct operations with heavy and infantry maneuver forces.
Conduct covert breaches.
Take part in counterinsurgency operations within a larger unit.

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 Air Assault/Movement Operations

Rapidly accept and integrate augmenting forces.

LIMITATIONS
A-13. Stryker forces have the following limitations:
Stryker vehicles are vulnerable to tank, antitank,and artillery fires
They require external sustainment support with a unique ASL when they must
operate for an extended period using contractor maintenance.

STRYKER MANEUVER BATTALION

A-14. The Stryker maneuver battalion is organized much the same as a heavy maneuver
battalion with the exception that there are mobile gun systems with the maneuver
companies to provide direct fire support. The engineers and antitank elements in an SBCT
are retained at brigade level.
Headquarters company in a Stryker maneuver battalion is organized exactly like a
heavy maneuver battalion except for the tank and Bradley master gunners.
The Stryker infantry company (169 Soldiers) has three platoons, a mobile gun
system platoon, mortar section, fire support team (FIST), and a headquarters
section. The rifle platoons are organized into three squads and a weapons squad to
employ the platoon’s two M240B machineguns. Each nine-man rifle squad has two
fire teams. Each Stryker vehicle carries a M19 automatic grenade launcher or .50-
caliber machinegun fired as a remote weapon system from the vehicle. The SBCT is
fully digitized with ABCS as well as FBCB2.
The mobile gun system platoon has three vehicles with a 105mm autoloader gun
that is designed to provide direct assault fire to destroy obstacles and the enemy
using high-explosive, plastic (HEP); high-explosive antitank (HEAT); and canister
rounds. The MGS is not a tank or dedicated antiarmor system. The SBCT has an
antitank company equipped with nine TOW-equipped Strykers.
The Stryker maneuver battalion forward support company is organized exactly as
the heavy FSC except that contract maintenance personnel perform maintenance
on the Stryker vehicles and there is no recovery element in the FSC as Strykers
perform self and buddy recovery.

SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A-15. Employment of heavy, Stryker and infantry forces requires thorough integration of the
units to be effective. This section focuses on planning considerations for integrating
maneuver forces. The integration of Stryker maneuver forces into an HBCT requires little
operational change with the exception of the understanding the limitations that Strykers
bring regarding antitank capabilities and contract fighting vehicle maintenance. The
integration of an infantry maneuver force presents mobility, protection, and firepower
differentials that must be addressed separately.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

A-16. The directing headquarters designates command relationships between
infantry/Stryker maneuver forces and the heavy maneuver battalion task force. The
command relationship between an infantry/Stryker unit and a heavy unit can be either
attached or OPCON. An infantry unit attached to a heavy unit can normally be adequately
supported, but attachment of a Stryker unit will require it to bring a segment of contractor
support with it to the heavy maneuver battalion task force. Attachment of a heavy maneuver

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unit to an infantry or Stryker unit, however, requires considerable sustainment support from
the heavy unit’s parent organization or from higher-level support assets.

COMMUNICATIONS
A-17. Infantry maneuver units normally have considerably less digital and long-range
communications capability than their heavy/Stryker counterparts. A gaining heavy
maneuver unit must, therefore, thoroughly analyze the communications requirements of
operations with an infantry maneuver unit to determine the offsets. Although Stryker
maneuver units are fully digital, their system architecture may prohibit rapid digital
integration into the heavy maneuver battalion’s digital architecture and will require
deliberate coordination.

LIAISON OFFICERS
A-18. Units conducting infantry/Stryker/heavy operations normally exchange liaison officers
(LNOs) who assist in operational planning, coordinate the development of orders and
overlays, and serve as advisors to the counterpart units. In addition, leaders from the
attached unit may be required to perform special functions in the infantry/Stryker/heavy
configuration to capitalize on collective strengths and offset weaknesses. The difference
between the levels of digitization has to be addressed through the liaison officer to ensure
that differences in awareness of friendly and enemy situation are understood.

INTELLIGENCE
A-19. Detailed intelligence is critical in integrating infantry maneuver forces with
Stryker/heavy maneuver forces. Infantry maneuver forces orient on concentrations of enemy
units, including counterattack forces and artillery and air defense assets. They also focus on
the enemy’s dismounted avenues of approach and landing zones (LZs) and pickup zones
(PZs). Stryker units focus on the same mobility and enemy factors as heavy maneuver units.

MANEUVER
A-20. The heavy maneuver unit commander can use an infantry and/ or Stryker maneuver
forces to fix the enemy, allowing the balance of heavy forces to maneuver. Whether it
conducts the fixing operation or maneuver, the infantry force requires the advantage of close
terrain for optimal conditions. Stryker vehicles provide troop protection from indirect fire but
are not fighting vehicles like tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Stryker weapon systems
are designed to provide support for dismounted operations. The following maneuver
considerations apply in infantry/Stryker/heavy employment.

OPERATIONAL TEMPO
A-21. The differences between the operational tempo of infantry maneuver forces and those
of heavy/Stryker maneuver forces are always key considerations, as are rehearsal schedules.
An early rehearsal may be required to allow infantry and heavy forces to take part jointly
and to resolve the operational differences effectively. Task organization should take place as
early as possible to facilitate multiple rehearsals, SOP reviews, orders development, and
then operational execution to recognize the differences in mobility and troop protection. A
separate digital command and control rehearsal (DC2R) is mandatory for the joining unit
and every element being integrated into the existing digital architecture.

EMPLOYMENT
A-22. The infantry maneuver force is best suited to close and restricted terrain, where it can
impede the enemy’s mobility and nullify his ability to use long-range weapons and

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 Air Assault/Movement Operations

observation assets. Stryker units are best used where their armored vehicles offer speed,
mobility, and direct fire in support of dismounted operations. Heavy forces are best suited to
open terrain and using speed and heavy firepower to offset fewer dismountable infantrymen.

MOVEMENT
A-23. To help prevent detection, leaders should plan the movement of infantry to coincide
with limited visibility conditions, such as darkness, severe weather, smoke, or fog. Stryker
forces can be deployed under the same conditions as heavy forces and may be able to cover
terrain that tracked vehicles find unsuitable. (See Appendix M, Digital Command and
Control Rehearsal (DC2R).

FIRES
A-24. Direct and indirect fires should be mutually supporting during integrated operations.
The heavy force can use its long-range direct fires to provide suppression, allowing infantry
and Stryker units to maneuver. Conversely, infantry forces can provide overwatch or support
by fire to the heavy or Stryker force, allowing tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) or
Stryker vehicles to maneuver in restricted terrain.

INFILTRATION
A-25. Heavy and Stryker units can assist infiltration by augmenting security at the line of
departure (LD). They can use their thermal capability to scan the area for enemy forces and
can provide direct fire support as necessary. Stryker forces are noteworthy for quiet and
quick movement and may be considered for mounted infiltration missions.

FIRE SUPPORT
A-26. The heavy maneuver forces must recognize that dismounted infantry operations focus
on stealth, which might not allow for preparatory and other preliminary fires. Fire support
available to each force must be integrated into the fire support plan. Planners must know
the organizations, capabilities, and limitations of all forces involved, particularly their
digital and nondigital capabilities. During planning and preparation, a liaison team helps
synchronize fire support. Restrictive fire control measures must be jointly developed and
understood by everyone.

AIR DEFENSE
A-27. Air defense assets may be attached to the maneuver force to fight and provide
protection within the scope and design of any organization. Because infantry forces
frequently maneuver in restricted terrain, attached Avenger and BSFV coverage may not be
feasible. In such operations, attached man-portable Stingers may be required to support the
infantry maneuver force.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

A-28. A common obstacle plan must be developed for integrated infantry/Stryker/heavy
operations. Infantry forces may be used to reduce obstacles and clear chokepoints for the
Stryker and heavy maneuver forces. In breaching operations, infantry forces must ensure
the breach is large enough for the widest vehicle in the operation. Survivability remains the
priority for infantry forces, which must prepare to take advantage of the engineer assets
available to the heavy maneuver forces. In both the IBCT and SBCT, the organic engineers
are limited to one company per BCT, so it is not reasonable to assume that a large engineer
element will come to the heavy maneuver battalion with cross-attached infantry or Stryker
forces.

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NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL

A-29. The infantry maneuver force lacks decontamination equipment and is more limited in
a CBRN environment than the heavy or Stryker force. Infantry maneuver force Soldiers
need to carry individual protective clothing in addition to their standard loads, which affects
the speed, workload, and mobility of the infantry force. When higher headquarters cannot
provide transportation assets, planners should arrange for heavy force unit vehicles to help
transport the infantry maneuver force CBRN equipment. A heavy maneuver battalion task
force also has expedient devices and water-hauling capabilities it can use to offset infantry
force CBRN shortfalls. Transporting these items with heavy maneuver assets reduces the
load of infantry maneuver force. Commanders must consider METT-TC and must plan
linkup points to ensure the infantry unit obtains these critical items as it needs them.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

A-30. Infantry maneuver units are not organized, equipped, or trained to meet the support
requirements of a heavy force or a Stryker force without significant support from the UEx
sustainment brigade. Heavy units, however, should be able to provide support to an infantry
element without augmentation. Stryker maneuver forces bring their unique support
requirements, including contract maintenance and unique authorized stockage list (ASL).
For a more detailed discussion of sustainment considerations, refer to Section V of this
appendix.

SECTION III – OPERATIONS

A-31. Employment of heavy, Stryker and infantry forces requires thorough understanding of
tactical employment of each type force during the conduct of the offensive or defensive
operations. This section focuses on tactical employment of combined heavy/Stryker and
infantry forces during combat operations.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A-32. The fundamentals, principles, and concepts discussed in Chapter 5 apply to infantry
and Stryker maneuver as well as to heavy force offensive operations. While combining these
forces in the offense can work many different ways, the following are some of the most
common examples.

HEAVY FORCE SUPPORT, INFANTRY/STRYKER FORCE ASSAULT

A-33. Tanks, BFVs, and Stryker vehicles support by fire while the infantry/dismounted
infantry assaults the objective. The vehicles fire from hull-defilade positions until the
dismounted assault force masks their fires. This is the most effective method when enemy
antitank weapons or obstacles prohibit them from moving to the objective.
This method may incorporate a feint to deceive the enemy as to the location of the
main attack. If so, the heavy/Stryker force supporting attack is timed to divert the
enemy’s attention from the infantry force’s assault. The fires of the heavy/Stryker
force may also cover the sound of the infantry’s approach or breach. Close
coordination is vital for effective fire control.
This method may vary when either the terrain or disposition of the enemy limits
the ability of the heavy/Stryker force to support the infantry’s attack. In this case,
the heavy force may be tasked to suppress or fix adjacent enemy positions or to
accomplish other tasks to isolate the objective area.

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SIMULTANEOUS ASSAULT
A-34. With this method, infantry/Stryker and heavy maneuver forces advance together, with
infantry and vehicles moving at the same speed. The vehicles may advance rapidly for short
distances, stop and provide overwatch, then move forward again when the infantry comes
abreast. Tanks are best suited to assault under fire. Mechanized infantry and Stryker
vehicles may also be used in this manner but only when the threat of antitank fires is small.
If an antitank threat exists, infantry usually leads while the vehicles follow to provide fire
support. This method can also exploit digitally enabled graphic control measures to minimize
fratricide risks and maximize the effects of direct and indirect fires.
Simultaneous assault may be used when the enemy situation is vague, when the
objective is large and consists of either open and restricted terrain, or when
visibility, fields of fire, and the movements of the heavy force are restricted. These
conditions exist during periods of restricted visibility and in restricted terrain, such
as in urban areas and wooded areas. The vehicles provide immediate close direct
fires, and the infantry protects the vehicles from individual antitank measures.
This method sometimes requires infantry to follow a safe distance behind the
tanks, BFVs or Strykers for protection from frontal fires. This is true when the
main enemy threat is small-arms fire. From behind the fighting vehicles, the
infantry can protect the flanks and rear of the vehicles from enemy handheld
antitank weapons.
Simultaneous assault may require infantry and heavy forces to advance together in
operations that require long, fast moves. Infantrymen ride on the armored vehicles
or trucks until they make contact with the enemy. Although this is a quick way to
move, it exposes infantry to enemy fire, particularly airburst munitions, and may
interfere with the operation of fighting vehicles.

ASSAULT FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS

A-35. With this method, heavy/Stryker and infantry maneuver forces converge on the
objective from different directions. BFVs, tanks, Strykers, and infantry advance by different
routes and assault the objective at the same time. For this synchronization to succeed, the
infantry elements maneuver and close on their assault position, ideally under cover of
darkness or poor weather. The synchronization of the assault provides surprise, increases
fire effect, and maximizes shock action. Planning, disseminating, and rehearsing the
coordination of direct- and indirect-fire measures are critical in this type of operation.
Assault from different directions is effective when using tanks, BFVs, and Strykers
and when two conditions exist. First, terrain must be at least partly open and free
from mines and other armored vehicle obstacles. Second, supporting fires and
smoke must effectively neutralize enemy antitank weapons during the brief period
required for the tanks/BFVs/Strykers to move from their assault positions to the
near edge of the objective.
This method requires coordination of infantry and heavy/Stryker maneuver forces
to provide effective fire control on the objective. Digitally enabled LNO teams with
the infantry maneuver force will help increase that force’s awareness of the enemy
and friendly situation and minimize the risks of fratricide. When conditions
prohibit the armored vehicles from advancing rapidly, infantry should accompany
them to provide protection.

EXPLOITATION
A-36. Exploitation follows success in battle. The heavy force is usually the most capable
exploitation force. It takes full advantage of the enemy’s disorganization by driving into his
rear to destroy and defeat him. A heavy force operating as a team (BFV- and tank-equipped

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units) may exploit the local defeat of an enemy force or the capture of an enemy position.
This type of operation prevents reconstitution of enemy defenses, prevents enemy
withdrawal, and secures deep objectives. A common combination is a heavy task force
reinforced by an attached infantry or Stryker maneuver company, engineers, and other
supporting units. The infantry may be transported in armored vehicles or trucks or may ride
on the tanks. Riding on tanks reduces road space, decreases supply problems, and keeps the
members of the team together. Infantry leaders ride with the corresponding tank unit
commanders. The task force commander must weigh the likelihood of enemy contact against
the need for speed. However, this technique reduces tank speed, cross-country movement
options, and tank crew ability to rapidly engage the enemy with direct fires.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
A-37. The combination of infantry/Stryker and heavy maneuver forces is well suited to
conduct defensive operations. The heavy maneuver force provides a concentration of
antiarmor weapons and the capability to counterattack by fire or maneuver rapidly. The
infantry maneuver force can occupy strongpoints, conduct spoiling attacks, and conduct stay-
behind operations. The Stryker maneuver force would be best used like the infantry force.
The fundamentals, principles, and concepts discussed in Chapter 6 apply to combined
infantry and heavy force defensive operations.

INFANTRY FORCE IN DEPTH, HEAVY/STRYKER FORCE FORWARD

A-38. The mechanized infantry, armored, and/or Stryker maneuver force covers forward of
an infantry maneuver unit’s defense, masking the location of the infantry unit. While
passing through the infantry unit’s positions, heavy maneuver and/or Stryker units provide
most of their own overwatch protection. Careful planning is required for battle handover to
the infantry unit. Infantry maneuver unit direct-fire overwatch weapons that are able to
support from inside the battle handover line are limited. To solve this problem, the heavy
maneuver and/or Stryker maneuver force can provide some direct-fire overwatch assets to
augment the infantry maneuver force.

INFANTRY FORCE FORWARD, HEAVY/STRYKER FORCE IN DEPTH

A-39. The heavy/Stryker force assumes positions in depth behind the infantry unit’s defense.
The infantry unit’s forward deployment shapes the battlefield for decisive action by the
heavy forces. The infantry unit leaves an enemy avenue of approach into the heavy force’s
engagement area. At the same time, the infantry unit prevents the enemy from using
restricted terrain. If the enemy penetrates the infantry unit, the heavy/Stryker force
counterattacks, destroying the enemy or blocking him until additional units can be
repositioned to destroy him. To support the counterattack, the infantry maneuver unit
identifies the location of the enemy’s main effort; slows his advance; and focuses on
destroying enemy command, control, and sustainment elements. The infantry maneuver unit
can guide the counterattacking force through restricted terrain to surprise the enemy on his
flank.

INFANTRY FORCE TERRAIN-ORIENTED, HEAVY/STRYKER FORCE ENEMY-ORIENTED

A-40. Terrain oriented refers to area defense; enemy oriented refers to mobile defense. With
this method, the entire force defends along the forward edge of battle area (FEBA). The
infantry maneuver force, whether used as a flanking or covering force or positioned in depth,
places its elements to use restricted terrain effectively. The heavy/Stryker maneuver force
keeps its freedom of maneuver. To protect the infantry maneuver force, contact points
between infantry and heavy/Stryker forces should be in restricted terrain. An infantry

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maneuver unit may defend to hold terrain while the tanks, BFVs, and Strykers maneuver to
destroy the enemy from the flanks or rear.

STRONGPOINT
A-41. The infantry maneuver unit, with additional assets, occupies a strongpoint. The
strongpoint forces the enemy into the heavy force’s engagement area.

STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS
A-42. The infantry maneuver unit occupies hide positions well forward of the FEBA. As the
enemy passes, the infantry force attacks the enemy’s command, control, support, and
sustainment elements. The heavy/Stryker maneuver force defends against enemy maneuver
forces.

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
A-43. Retrograde operations include delays and withdrawals, which gain time and avoid
decisive action. Heavy/Stryker maneuver forces are employed against the enemy forces and
avenues of approach that most threaten the operation. To move to subsequent positions,
infantry maneuver forces may need additional transportation assets, including helicopters.
Basic movement techniques include maneuver and a reverse bounding overwatch.
Heavy/Stryker maneuver forces with small infantry force units mounted, along with infantry
scout platoons and antitank elements, move to subsequent delay positions under the cover of
mutually supporting forces.

SECTION IV – ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A-44. The following additional considerations apply in infantry/ Stryker/heavy operations.

MOVEMENT RATES
A-45. Commanders of heavy forces often overestimate (or simply fail to recognize) the speed
with which dismounted elements can move. Numerous factors can affect the rate of march
for infantry forces: tactical considerations, weather, terrain, march discipline,
acclimatization, availability of water and rations, morale, individual Soldiers’ self-
confidence, and individual loads. Table A-3 summarizes dismounted rates of march for
normal terrain. The normal distance covered by a dismounted force in a 24-hour period is
from 20 to 32 kilometers, marching from 5 to 8 hours at a rate of 4 kph. A march in excess of
32 kilometers in 24 hours is considered a forced march. Forced marches increase the number
of hours marched, not the rate of march, and can be expected to impair the unit’s fighting
efficiency. Absolute maximum distances for dismounted marches are 56 kilometers in 24
hours, 96 kilometers in 48 hours, or 128 kilometers in 72 hours. Stryker units generally
move as fast as heavy maneuver battalions.

Table A-3. Dismounted Rates of March (Normal Terrain)

Roads Cross Country

Day 4.0 kmph 2.4 kmph
Nigh 3.2 kmph 1.6 kmph
t

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FMI 3-90.5

TANK-MOUNTED INFANTRY
A-46. An additional maneuver consideration for an infantry/heavy operation is the decision
of whether to move infantrymen on tanks. This mode of transportation can be difficult, but it
is possible. It does, in fact, afford some significant advantages. The infantry mounted on
tanks can provide additional security for the heavy maneuver force. When the heavy
maneuver force stops or executes a breach or other tactical task, infantry assets are readily
available to provide support and security. The heavy maneuver force commander must weigh
the potential dangers of carrying tank-mounted infantrymen against the advantages of
mobility and security they can provide. For specific procedures and safety considerations
involved in mounting infantry on tanks, refer to FM 3-20.15.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
A-47. Initially, most infantrymen are not familiar with the hazards that may arise during
operations with tanks, BFVs, and other armored vehicles. The most obvious of these include
the dangers associated with main-gun fire and the inability of armored vehicle crews to see
people and objects near their vehicles. Leaders of heavy, Stryker, and infantry units must
make sure that their troops understand the following points of operational safety.

DISCARDING SABOT
A-48. Tank sabot rounds and BFV antipersonnel rounds discard stabilizing petals when
fired, creating a down-range hazard for infantry. The aluminum petals of the tank rounds
are discarded in an area extending 70 meters to the left and right of the gun target line out
to a range of 1 kilometer. The danger zone for BFV rounds extends 30 degrees to the left and
right of the gun target line, out to 200 meters from the vehicle. Infantrymen should not be in
or near the direct line of fire for the tank main gun or BFV cannon unless they are under
adequate overhead cover.

NOISE
A-49. Tank and MGS main guns create noise in excess of 140 decibels. Repeated exposure to
this level of noise can cause severe hearing loss and even deafness. In addition, dangerous
noise levels may extend more than 600 meters from the tank. Single-layer hearing
protection, such as earplugs, allows infantrymen to work within 25 meters of the side or rear
of the tank without significant hazard.

GROUND MOVEMENT HAZARDS

A-50. Crewmen on tanks, Strykers, and BFVs have limited abilities to see anyone on the
ground, to the side, or to the rear of the vehicle. As a result, vehicle crews and dismounted
infantrymen share responsibility for avoiding the hazards this may create. Infantrymen
must maintain a safe distance from armored vehicles at all times. In addition, when they
work close to an armored vehicle, dismounted Soldiers must ensure that the vehicle
commander knows their location at all times.
A-51. A related hazard is that M1-series tanks and Strykers are deceptively quiet and may
be difficult for infantrymen to hear as they approach. As noted, vehicle crews and
dismounted infantrymen share the responsibility for eliminating potential dangers in this
situation.

M1 EXHAUST PLUME HAZARD

A-52. M1-series tanks have an extremely hot exhaust plume that exits from the rear of the
tank and angles downward. This exhaust is hot enough to burn skin and clothing.

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TOW MISSILE SYSTEM

A-53. The TOW missile system has a dangerous back blast area extending 75 meters to the
rear of the vehicle in a 90-degree cone. The area is divided into a 50-meter danger zone and a
25-meter caution zone.

SECTION V – COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A-54. Sustainment operations planning and execution are critical elements for integration of
infantry, Stryker, and heavy maneuver forces. The IBCT is not organized, equipped, or
trained to meet the support requirements of a heavy company team, whereas the SBCT and
HBCT can accept either Stryker or heavy forces with some sustainment augmentation.
Sustainment operations may be further complicated if the heavy/Stryker force is operating
across a large geographical area to meet the demands of a decentralized mission. The
following discussion covers sustainment operations considerations that may affect
infantry/Stryker/heavy maneuver operations.

PLANNING AND INTEGRATION

A-55. Infantry/heavy operations may require the heavy maneuver force to integrate into the
IBCT organization early in the deployment phase. In turn, this may require sustainment
assets to move into the theater of operations early as well, usually at the same time as the
C2 elements. Specific support requirements, including needed quantities of supplies, depend
on the mission and must be planned and coordinated as early as possible. In addition,
because the IBCT does not have the required logistical redundancy to sustain the heavy
company team, it is imperative that mission requirements calling for UEx sustainment
operations assets are identified early in the planning process.

SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS
A-56. Operations with an IBCT create many unique supply considerations for the heavy
maneuver force. The sheer bulk and volume of supplies required by the heavy maneuver
force merit special attention during the planning and preparation phases. The following
paragraphs examine some of these supply-related considerations.

CLASS I
A-57. Class I food requirements are determined based on the heavy maneuver force’s
personnel strength reports. This process may be complicated by unique mission
requirements imposed on the heavy force, such as rapid changes in task organization or
dispersion of subordinate companies over a wide area.

CLASS II
A-58. Many Class II items required by tank and BFV crews, such as specialized tools and
Nomex clothing may be difficult to obtain in an infantry organization. Although such items
can be ordered through normal supply channels, the heavy maneuver force may face
significant delays in receiving them. To overcome this problem, the heavy maneuver force
should identify any potential shortages and arrange to obtain the needed supplies before
leaving its parent organization.

CLASS III
A-59. The fuel and other petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) products required by the
heavy maneuver force are extremely bulky; they present the greatest sustainment

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challenges in planning and preparing for infantry/heavy operations. Transportation support

must be planned carefully. For example, planners must consider the placement of fuel heavy
expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs) during all phases of the operation. They must
also focus on general-use POL products, such as lubricants, that are not ordinarily used by
the IBCT. As noted previously, the heavy maneuver force should stock its basic load of these
items as well as make necessary resupply arrangements before attachment to the IBCT.

CLASS IV
A-60. The heavy maneuver force does not have any unique requirements for barrier or
fortification materials. The main consideration is that any Class IV materials that the
commander wants may have to be loaded and carried prior to attachment.

CLASS V
A-61. Along with POL products, ammunition for the heavy maneuver force presents the
greatest transportation challenge in infantry/heavy operations. Planning for Class V
resupply should parallel that for Class III; key considerations include anticipated mission
requirements and the availability of HEMTTs. Ammunition may be pre-stocked based on
expected consumption rates.

CLASS VI
A-62. Infantry/heavy operations create no unique requirements for personal demand items
and sundries.

CLASS VII
A-63. Class VII consists of major end items, such as float tanks, Strykers, or BFVs. The
handling of these items requires thorough planning to determine transportation
requirements and positioning in the scheme of the operation.

CLASS VIII
A-64. The heavy maneuver force involved in infantry/heavy operations may deploy with
additional Class VIII to sustain projected METT-TC requirements.

CLASS IX
A-65. Repair parts for combat vehicles are essential to the sustainment of the heavy
maneuver force. PLL and ASL stockage levels must be carefully considered before
infantry/heavy operations begin. The heavy maneuver force may find it advantageous to
prestock selected items to meet its anticipated needs.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A-66. A heavy maneuver force can satisfy the sustainment needs of an infantry/Stryker force
more easily than an IBCT can satisfy the needs of a heavy task force or company team.

HEAVY MANEUVER FORCE WITH INFANTRY/STRYKER COMPANY

A-67. Except for mortar rounds, the heavy maneuver unit can provide all munitions the
infantry/Stryker company needs. The S4 must plan to receive and move 120mm mortar and
Stryker MGS 105mm main gun ammunition as well as 81mm or 60mm mortar munitions.

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INFANTRY BRIGADE WITH HEAVY TASK FORCE OR COMPANY TEAM

A-68. Adding a heavy maneuver force to an IBCT significantly increases the fuel,
ammunition, and maintenance that must be delivered to the IBCT brigade support battalion.
The IBCT lacks the transportation required to support even a small heavy force, particularly
the HETs, for armored vehicle evacuation. The heavy maneuver battalion S4 must
constantly anticipate the heavy maneuver battalion’s needs to allow the IBCT S4 more time
to react. Support packages may be required for the heavy element that is attached or under
OPCON of the infantry force. The preferred method of command relationship is OPCON,
which permits the heavy maneuver force to continue receiving support from its BSB. The
support package may need to include fuel, HEMTTs and operators, HETs with drivers,
tracked ambulances, and maintenance support teams.

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 Appendix B
Aviation Support of Ground Operations

Army aviation’s greatest contribution to the battlefield is providing the

ground maneuver commander the ability to apply decisive combat power
at critical times virtually anywhere on the battlefield. This combat power
may be in the form of direct fire support from aviation maneuver units,
the insertion of overwhelming infantry forces, or artillery fires delivered
by way of air assault. This versatility gives the maneuver commander a
decisive advantage on the battlefield. Ground maneuver commanders
synchronize aviation maneuver with ground maneuver to enhance
offensive and defensive operations. This synchronization allows the
ground maneuver commander to shape the battlefield and to influence
events throughout his AO.

SECTION I – AVIATION BRIGADE ORGANIZATIONS

AVIATION ORGANIZATIONS—GENERAL
B-1. Multifunctional brigades at the UEx level are able to perform all aviation missions with
little or no external augmentation. They contain a variety of different airframes and
battalions to perform these missions. Brigades assigned to echelons above UEx are
considered functional aviation brigades.
B-2. Functional aviation brigades at the UEy level are more specialized with limited
battalions and airframes to focus on specific aviation support missions. Each brigade differs
in both form and function with different capabilities and subordinate units. They do not
contain attack reconnaissance battalions (ARBs) or attack reconnaissance squadrons (ARSs).
B-3. The aviation brigades is to be modular, scalable, and tailorable so that they can task
organize as required to conduct reconnaissance, security, air assault, close combat attack
(CCA), mobile strike, and maneuver sustainment support.
B-4. In the modular aviation brigade structure, an air traffic services (ATS) company has
been added to the general support aviation battalion (GSAB) to provide ATS, and a forward
support company (FSC) has been added to each aviation battalion to provide sustainment
support. For communications support, a network support company has been added to the
aviation support battalion (ASB).
B-5. The numbers and types of subordinate battalions or squadrons are based on the
brigade’s mission. Separate companies may be assigned, attached, or under operational
control (OPCON) to brigades, but they present challenges for command and control (C2) as
the brigade staff must also prepare plans and orders on the level of detail normally found at
the battalion level.

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AVIATION BRIGADE TYPES AND ORGANIZATIONS

GENERAL
B-6. The transformation force consists of eight distinct types of aviation brigades. The heavy
brigade combat team (HBCT) will work most often with the three aviation brigades marked
with asterisk in the following list. They may work directly with the HBCT or form aviation
task forces to support the HBCT for specific missions for specific periods of time.
z Heavy aviation brigade.*
z Light aviation brigade.*
z Forced entry aviation brigade. *
z Corps aviation support brigade (CASB).
z Theater support aviation brigade (TSAB).
z Aviation expeditionary brigade (National Guard/homeland defense) .
z Heavy aviation brigade. (National Guard division)
z Army special operations aviation regiment. (ARSOAR).
B-7. Subordinate battalions found in UEx aviation brigades include the following:
z Light attack reconnaissance squadron (ARS) equipped with 30 OH-58Ds.
z Heavy attack reconnaissance battalion (ARB) equipped with 24 AH-64Ds.
z Assault helicopter battalion (AHB) equipped with 30 UH-60Ls (FM 3-04.113).
z General aviation support battalion (GSAB) equipped with 8 UH-60Ls, 12 CH-47s,
and 12 HH-60s.
z Aviation support battalion (ASB). (FM is TBP).
B-8. The following paragraphs describe the three types of aviation brigades that are most
likely to support HBCT operations or form aviation battalion task forces to support HBCT
operations.

HEAVY AVIATION BRIGADE

Mission
B-9. The heavy aviation brigade’s table of organization and equipment (TOE) mission is to
find, fix, and destroy enemy forces using maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power
at the critical time and place as an integrated member of the combined arms team. This
brigade (Figure B-1) destroys enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect. It
conducts reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations and provides C2 support. It conducts
air movement operations, aerial delivery of mines, and aeromedical support. See FM 3-
04.111 for additional details.

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

Figure B-1. Heavy Aviation Brigade

Organization
B-10. The heavy aviation brigade has an HHC, two heavy ARBs, an AHB, a GSAB, and an
ASB.

Fundamentals
B-11. A heavy aviation brigade does not have any organic ground combat forces. The brigade
can perform screen operations, guard operations when augmented, and participate in cover
missions.
B-12. The heavy aviation brigade supports the UEx scheme of maneuver by facilitating
ground maneuver through aviation operations. Utility and heavy helicopters allow the
brigade to move forces and materiel quickly throughout the battlespace. Attack
reconnaissance aircraft focus on providing quick reaction fire support through CCA to
friendly maneuver forces in contact and mobile strikes against high-value targets (HVTs).

LIGHT AVIATION BRIGADE

Mission
B-13. The light aviation brigade’s TOE mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces using
maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power at the critical time and place as an
integrated member of the combined arms team. This brigade (Figure B-2) destroys enemy
forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect. It conducts R&S operations, air assault and air
movement operations, and aerial delivery of mines. It also provides C2 and aeromedical
support. See FM 3-04.111 for additional details.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure B-2. Light Aviation Brigade

Organization
B-14. The light aviation brigade has a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), two
light ARSs, an AHB, a GSAB, and an ASB.

Fundamentals
B-15. A light aviation brigade can perform screen operations, guard operations when
augmented, and participate in cover missions.
B-16. The light aviation brigade supports the UEx scheme of maneuver by facilitating
ground maneuver through aviation operations. Utility and heavy helicopters allow the
brigade to move forces and materiel quickly throughout the battlespace. Attack
reconnaissance aircraft focus on R&S missions to protect maneuvering forces and quick
reaction fire support through CCA once enemy contact is established.

FORCED ENTRY AVIATION BRIGADE

Mission
B-17. The forced entry aviation brigade’s TOE mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy
forces using fire and maneuver to concentrate and sustain combat power to support division
operations. This brigade (Figure B-3) destroys threat forces using fire, maneuver, and shock
effects. It conducts R&S operations and provides C2 support. It conducts air assault and air
movement operations, aerial delivery of mines, and aeromedical support. See FM 3-04.111
for additional details.

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

Figure B-3. Forced Entry Aviation Brigade

Organization
B-18. The forced entry aviation brigade has an HHC, one heavy ARB, one light ARS, an
AHB, a GSAB, and an ASB.

Fundamentals
B-19. The forced entry aviation brigade‘s primary role is to deploy quickly into a point of
entry and provide aviation combat, CS, and CSS in support of decisive, shaping, and
sustainment operations. The brigade may deploy into multiple, unimproved points of entry
using force to overwhelm hostile antiaccess capabilities.

Aviation Battalions and Squadrons

B-20. Aviation battalions and squadrons plan, coordinate, and execute operations. They
create opportunities for commanders to disrupt the enemy’s decision-making process, forcing
him to make decisions that disrupt initial plans. The battalion or squadron—through
coordination, liaison, C2, and situational understanding (SU)—helps set the conditions for
the force’s success.

ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS

B-21. There are three distinct types of attack reconnaissance battalions or squadrons. The
distinction between the heavy ARB and the light ARS is that a heavy ARB has 24 AH-64s
and a light ARS has of 30 OH-58Ds.
z Heavy attack reconnaissance battalion (ARB).
z Light attack reconnaissance squadron (ARS).
z Regimental aviation squadron (light ARS).
B-22. The primary missions of the ARB and ARS are reconnaissance, security, and the
destruction of enemy forces through CCA and mobile strike. The ARB and the ARS perform
the following missions.

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FMI 3-90.5

z Conduct reconnaissance operations to find/fix the threat, to assist in building and

sharing the common operational picture (COP), and to focus combat power at the
decisive point at the right time.
z Conduct security operations to provide reaction time, maneuver space, and
protection to air-ground maneuver.
z Destroy enemy forces through the use of aerial firepower, mobility, and shock
effect.

ASSAULT HELICOPTER BATTALION

B-23. The fundamentals, mission, and organization of the AHB are relatively the same
whether it is part of a heavy, light, or forced entry aviation brigade. The AHB’s primary role
is to plan, execute, and logistically support operations. The two basic fundamental tasks
common to each AHB include air assault and sustainment. In the sustainment role, the AHB
provides support to the air assault operation first, then to division. The AHB can also
provide aircraft for general support missions when available. See FM 3-04.113 for additional
details.
B-24. UEx aviation brigades have one AHB. Corps aviation brigades have two AHBs. The
AHB at all echelons consists of an HHC, an FSC, three assault companies, and an ASC.
B-25. The primary mission of the AHB is to move the combat elements of a combined arms
battalion (CAB) in one lift, augmented as necessary by CH-47 aircraft from the GSAB and to
extend tactical reach of the maneuver commander, negate effects of terrain, seize key nodes,
achieve surprise, and isolate or dislocate enemy forces. The battalion also conducts
numerous other missions as described below.

GENERAL SUPPORT AVIATION BATTALION

B-26. The fundamentals, mission, and organization of the GSAB are relatively the same
whether it is part of a UEx or UEy level aviation brigade.
B-27. Each UEx has one GSAB. Each GSAB consists of an HHC, an FSC, a general support
aviation company (GSAC), a heavy helicopter company, an aeromedical evacuation company,
an ATS, and an ASC.
B-28. The mission of the GSAB is to conduct general aviation support; provide airborne C2;
provide air transport of personnel, equipment, and supplies; conduct aerial sustainment
operations; support air assault operations as required; and provide medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC) support throughout the applicable area of responsibility (AOR).

SECTION II – BRIGADE AVIATION ELEMENT AND AVIATION LIAISION

TEAMS
B-29. As a part of Army Transformation, each BCT will have a brigade aviation element
(BAE). The BAE is a planning and coordination cell with the major function of incorporating
aviation into the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. The BAE focuses on providing
employment advice and initial planning for aviation missions, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), airspace planning and coordination, synchronization with the air defense manager
(ADM), the air liaison officer (ALO), and the fires and effects coordinator (ECOORD). The
BAE also coordinates directly with the aviation brigade or the supporting aviation task force
for detailed mission planning.
B-30. The BAE does not take the place of aviation task force involvement in the planning
process. It assists the BCT in aviation planning and provides the aviation brigade or the

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

supporting aviation task force leadership with BCT mission information. It is critical that
aviation commanders and S3s participate and lead aviation mission planning in support of
the BCT.
B-31. The BAE is organized and equipped to support the BCT, and it has a sufficient
number of personnel for 24-hour operations. It uses the Army Battle Command System
(ABCS), which can network with the joint planning and communications architecture.
Currently, the BAE has a major, a captain, a senior warrant officer, and three enlisted
Soldiers.
B-32. The BAE is involved in the mission from receipt of the warning order (WO) from
higher headquarters through planning; movement to the port of embarkation (POE);
deployment; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) into the force; the
military decision-making process (MDMP); combat operations; and redeployment,
reintegration, reconstitution and retraining (R4).

RESPONSIBILITIES
B-33. The BAE provides the following:
Integration and synchronization of aviation into the BCT commander’s scheme of
maneuver.
A focus on incorporating aviation into the commander’s plan.
Coordination directly with aviation brigades.
Close integration/synchronization with the ALO and ECOORD.
Employment advice and planning for the reconnaissance and attack elements,
assault helicopters, airborne C2 assets, heavy helicopters, MEDEVAC helicopters,
and UAVs.
Army airspace command and control (A2C2) planning; coordination and airspace
deconfliction for combined arms; joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM)
operations.

AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER TEAMS

B-34. Although the BAE conducts many of the functions traditionally performed by liaison
officers (LNOs); aviation LNO teams remain a critical part of the process and thus must be
staffed appropriately.
B-35. While the BAE works directly for the BCT commander as a permanent member of his
staff; aviation LNO teams represent the supporting aviation task force at a designated
maneuver headquarters for the duration of a specific operation.
B-36. If collocated with the BAE, the LNO team normally works with the brigade aviation
officer as a functioning addition to the BAE staff section. Effective employment of LNOs is
imperative for coordination and synchronization. Often, aviation LNO teams coordinate with
the BAE and proceed to a supported ground maneuver battalion; for example, an aviation
LNO team in support of an infantry battalion performing an air assault to seize a key piece
of terrain as a part of a mechanized BCT scheme of maneuver.

Responsibilities
B-37. LNO teams maintain and provide current:
Aviation unit locations.
Aircraft/equipment status.
Crew availability and fighter management cycle status.
Class III/V status.

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FMI 3-90.5

Mission-essential task list (METL) training status.

Continuous updates to the aviation commander and staff on the BCT’s plan.

SECTION III – ARMY AVIATION BRIGADE MISSIONS

GENERAL
B-38. Aviation brigades are tailored to execute operations that support the unit to which
they are assigned. The principal role of the brigade is to set the conditions for success for its
units. The aviation brigade can employ other combined arms elements conducting ground
operations and can operate semi-independently or as a part of a joint force.
B-39. Based on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), the aviation brigade commander task
organizes available aviation resources into mission packages that are either controlled by a
supported brigade combat team or the aviation brigade.
B-40. Aviation conducts missions across the full spectrum of operations from stability
operations and support operations to major combat operations (MCO) and provides the force
missions of attack (mobile strike and CCA); reconnaissance and security; air assault/air
movement; airborne C2; support to command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); A2C2; personnel recovery;
MEDEVAC; and maneuver sustainment support. See FM 3-04.111 for additional details.
B-41. Aviation units operate within the framework of the ground regime. As fully integrated
members of the combined arms team, aviation units conduct combat, combat support (CS),
and combat service support (CSS) operations 24 hours a day across the entire length and
breadth of the area of operations (AO). The aviation task force supporting the HBCT
primarily conducts reconnaissance, security, and close combat support for the HBCT. Each
aviation brigade or aviation battalion task force is tailored for specific missions. However,
each brigade or battalion task force accepts other organizations and performs missions not
necessarily defined in the TOE mission statement.

ARMY AVIATION BRIGADE MISSIONS

ATTACK
B-42. The aviation brigade has the organic capability to strike an enemy throughout the
depth of the corps AO from multiple directions, either in support of the BCTs or
independently in noncontiguous battlespace. Attack reconnaissance aircraft carry a
combination of missiles, rockets and conventional ammunition to destroy high-priority
targets, shield the maneuver forces as they move out of contact, and enable shaping of the
battlespace. In addition to the traditional attack functions, the attack reconnaissance unit
executes all the functions that air cavalry has performed throughout the history of Army
aviation. As an armor killer, it is deadly against massed moving targets and is also effective
against enemy field artillery, air defense, communications, logistics units, and point targets
(bunkers, caves, windows in buildings). The attack reconnaissance unit cannot occupy
terrain; however, it can deny terrain for a limited period of time with direct and indirect
fires. Attack reconnaissance aircraft provide a highly mobile and lethal attack capability
against selected targets. Attack reconnaissance units also make an excellent reserve or quick
reaction force for the supported commander.
B-43. The mobile strike capability of the aviation brigade, particularly when coupled with
Army and joint fires and effects, provides the commander a significant capability to extend
the battle to the maximum range of organic and supporting sensors. The aviation brigade

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

headquarters has the inherent staff planning experience to support maneuver, the
synchronization and integration of joint effects, and the ability to control mobile strike
operations.
B-44. Maneuver brigades are designed around close combat. The UEx will normally conduct
mobile strike operations outside the maneuver brigade areas against targets that are
capable of maneuvering to avoid precision strikes. These extended combat operations
capitalize on the ability of aviation forces to maneuver to the full depth of the UEx AO.
B-45. The UEx does not directly control aviation teams or task forces but directs mobile
strikes through mission orders to the aviation brigade. Aviation brigades plan and conduct
mobile strikes. For the conduct of mobile strikes, the aviation brigade will normally have
OPCON of those assets (such as fires and battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) needed to
conduct the mission.
B-46. Even with a sound decision and the battlefield shaped for decisive action, executing an
effective mobile strike operation is difficult. Conducting mobile strikes at the BCT level is
problematic and should not be the norm. When the BCT is assigned an aviation battalion
task force, the BCT commander will have the responsibility for the detailed planning,
preparation, and coordination necessary for a successful aviation mobile strike. The
expertise required for this type of precision operation will not reside at the BCT level.
B-47. Close combat attack is discussed in Section IV.

RECONNAISSANCE
B-48. Attack reconnaissance aircraft are employed to support the commander’s scheme of
maneuver and significantly extend the battlespace of both the BCT and echelons above the
BCT. Attack reconnaissance aircraft assist in locating the threat, building and sharing the
COP, enhancing force protection, enabling freedom of movement, clearing the way for air
assault and aerial mining missions, securing routes for aerial/ground resupply, and allowing
the commander to focus combat power at the decisive point and time. Sensor video recording
capability can provide the supported commander excellent reconnaissance and battle
damage assessment (BDA) information.
B-49. Attack reconnaissance assets can fight for information. They can work through and
counter enemy deception efforts, provide an expedient and reliable means of assessing
terrain that the enemy is trying to configure to his advantage, can further develop the
situation, and can effectively disseminate real-time information to commanders. The organic
weapon systems of attack reconnaissance aircraft enhance the synergy achieved through
employment of external fires and effects that gives commanders at all levels a robust
counterreconnaissance capability.

SECURITY
B-50. The aviation brigade or ARB task force supporting the BCT can conduct security
operations. Each can accomplish screen and guard operations and cover security operations
with augmentation for the latter two. Security operations are particularly valuable during
early entry operations when the COP is degraded and when the dynamics of the battlefield
change faster than expected. The combination of attack reconnaissance aircraft and UAVs
enable commanders at all levels to quickly move or deploy interactive and interpretive
intelligence collectors over great distances to provide early warning and gain and
disseminate a timely picture of the battlefield. These aircraft can quickly transition from a
reconnaissance/counterreconnaissance or security mission to an economy-of-force or attack
mission to provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for air-ground operations.

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FMI 3-90.5

AIR ASSAULT AND AIR MOVEMENT

B-51. Aviation brigade utility and heavy helicopter assets provide the maneuver commander
the ability to sustain continuous offensive or defensive operations and to conduct brigade-
level air assaults. Air assault operations extend the tactical reach of the maneuver
commander, negate effects of terrain, seize key nodes, attain the advantage of surprise, and
dislocate or isolate the enemy. The aviation brigade at the UEx level has the organic
capability to air assault the dismounted elements of a combined arms battalion and its
required support equipment in a single lift and to provide air assault security. Forward
arming and refueling points (FARPs) emplaced by lift aircraft and ground assets enable
aviation to support and sustain operations throughout the AO. Additionally, heavy lift
helicopters are capable of transporting internal and external cargo in a variety of
configurations to meet the CS and CSS requirements of both the BCT and echelons above
BCT.
B-52. Air assault/movement for the heavy combined arms battalion is discussed at Appendix
J of this FMI.

AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

B-53. Air traffic services assets provide A2C2 and ATS support to enable commanders to
orchestrate the air and ground maneuver, lethal and nonlethal fires, and air defenses to
conduct decisive operations. ATS support is provided through automated airspace planning
and en route services, terminal control tower, precision recovery, and airfield operations
services throughout the BCT and UEx AO. These assets provide ATS and A2C2 support
through the Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) throughout the corps AO. TAIS is
the A2C2 node of the ABCS. A2C2 cells organic to the battle staff at brigade and above will
assist in deconflicting, synchronizing, and integrating all airspace requirements throughout
the joint battlespace, including UAVs. A2C2 cells will develop and maintain a real-time,
single-integrated air picture (SIAP) through multipath communications with all members of
the air-ground team, allowing unhindered simultaneous access to the airspace across the full
spectrum of operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

B-54. The Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S), a UH-60-based package,
represents a significant enhancement to the commander’s ability to command and control
forces. The A2C2S has five operational roles:
Battle command on the move (BCOM) platform.
Ground tactical command post (CP).
Jump tactical operations center (TOC).
Early entry CP.
First responder during national disasters.
B-55. On-board communications linkages allow the commander to be continuously in contact
with committed forces untethered to a static operations center, maintain situational
understanding (SU), issue and receive fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) with graphics,
synchronize fires and maneuver, and extend his coverage throughout the entire battlespace.
A2C2Ss are normally found in the general support aviation company (GSAC) of the aviation
brigade.

MEDICAL EVACUATION/CASUALTY EVACUATION

B-56. Evacuation of casualties is the responsibility of the health service support (HSS)
system. Air evacuation is the preferred method of evacuation of seriously wounded and ill

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

soldiers. The UEx aviation brigade has an organic aeromedical evacuation company. Air
ambulance assets of the aeromedical evacuation company can collocate with HSS
organizations, the aviation task force, or higher headquarters to provide air ambulance
support throughout the corps AO. MEDEVAC aircraft are equipped with medical personnel
and equipment that enables en route care of casualties. Utility and heavy helicopter units
conduct casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) operations when medical aircraft are inadequate or
not readily available.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY
B-57. Joint doctrine defines personnel recovery (PR) to include combat search and rescue
(CSAR); search and rescue (SAR); survival evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); and
coordination of forcible recovery operations. All component commanders are responsible for
establishing and coordinating PR operations. For the BCT, the UEx has additional
communications linkages and detection capabilities, which may enable the rescue operation
to be performed more safely and efficiently within the constraints of METT-TC. The UEx will
then augment subordinate elements with the required assets to accomplish the mission. UEx
PR operations will be conducted primarily in support of their own operations (downed Army
aircrew recovery) and provide mutual PR support at both the intra- and inter-service levels
as required. Additionally, PR contingencies will be incorporated into all mission plans,
special instructions (SPINS) will be issued for each plan, and the brigade will be prepared to
generate PR support requests.

DOWNED AIRCRAFT RECOVERY

B-58. The BAE coordinates downed aircraft recovery team (DART) operations when
adequate resources are available. The aviation brigade coordinates DART operations when
in the vicinity.

REAR AREA OPERATIONS

B-59. Maneuver sustainment and support operations are normally conducted in the rear
area. There may or may not be ground maneuver forces in the rear area. Aviation units
provide a flexible mix of capabilities to effectively handle the full range of threats to the rear
area. Reconnaissance, attack, and lift capabilities provide agile, responsive support of rear
area operations and may be performed by aviation units above the BCT level.

AERIAL MINE DELIVERY

B-60. Mine delivery operations are generally controlled at the UEx level. Aerial mine
delivery is an assault helicopter mission that may be conducted by AHB assets at either
level. The aviation brigade has the capability, with proper coordination, to support a UEx
mission or to support a corps mission anywhere in the AO.

SUMMARY OF AVIATION BRIGADE MISSIONS BY TYPE

Combat Missions
B-61. Aviation combat missions include the following:
Reconnaissance.
Security.
Air assault.
Close combat attack.
Mobile strike.

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FMI 3-90.5

Combat Support (CS) Missions

B-62. Aviation CS missions include the following:
Command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I).
Air movement.
Personnel recovery operations.
Aerial mine delivery operations (Volcano).
MEDEVAC operations.

Combat Service Support (CSS) Missions

B-63. Aviation CSS missions include the following :
Air traffic services.
Aerial sustainment.
Downed aircraft recovery.
Casualty evacuation operations.
Rear area operations.

TIME REQUIRED TO PLAN

B-64. Planning considerations for operations that include aviation assets are similar to
those of any tactical operation. The two primary factors are the higher commander’s intent
and the METT-TC factors, but others, such as CSS and risk analysis, must be integrated
from the start. Two specific areas in the planning process are of critical importance to the
battalion: request procedures for aviation support and the integration of aviation and ground
forces.
B-65. Planning time is critical for every type of military mission. While aviation units can
move rapidly, planning time is essential for coordination, clearing routes, mission briefings
to Soldiers and leaders, and unit SOP compliance. WOs maximize time available by allowing
subordinate units to prepare for pending action. Planning and operations are greatly
simplified by SOPs that are understood, followed, and internalized through training.

SECTION IV – CLOSE COMBAT

B-66. Close combat is inherent in maneuver and has one purpose: to decide the outcome of
battles and engagements. It is carried out with direct-fire weapons and supported by indirect
fire, close air support (CAS), and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat defeats or
destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. The range between combatants may
vary from several thousand meters to hand-to-hand combat. During close combat, attack
reconnaissance aircraft may engage targets that are near friendly forces, thereby requiring
detailed integration of fire and maneuver of ground and aviation forces. To achieve the
desired effects and reduce the risk of fratricide, air-ground integration must take place down
to company, platoon, and team levels. Close combat engagements also require a higher
training standard for aerial weapons delivery accuracy.

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK

B-67. For aviation units, close combat attack is defined as a hasty or deliberate attack in
support of units engaged in close combat. During CCA, armed helicopters engage enemy
units with direct fires that impact near friendly forces. Targets may range from a few
hundred meters to a few thousand meters. CCA is coordinated and directed by a team,
platoon, or company-level ground unit using standardized CCA procedures in unit SOPs.

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

B-68. Effective planning, coordination, and training between ground units and armed
aircraft maximize the capabilities of the combined arms team while minimizing the risk of
fratricide. The key to success for enhancing air-ground coordination and the subsequent
execution of the tasks involved begins with standardizing techniques and procedures. The
end state is a detailed SOP between air and ground maneuver units that addresses the CCA
situation. This procedure is best suited for units that maintain a habitual combined arms
relationship during training and war.
B-69. To prepare for close combat, basic tasks, such as how to find a ground unit’s position
at night, must be solved during home station training. Operations in unfamiliar terrain must
not be hampered by the question of how to find the unit. It is found by one of the various
methods already practiced in training.

DIRECT FIRES CALLED BY THE GROUND COMMANDER IN CLOSE COMBAT

B-70. The air mission commander (AMC) and ground unit key leaders must consider the
risk to friendly forces before weapon selection and engagement. If friendly forces may be in
the lethality zone, the ground leader must be precise in describing the target that he wants
aircraft to engage and should warn aircrews of the proximity of those forces. The aviation
leader must be aware of his aircrews’ skills in delivering fires near friendly forces.

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK BRIEFING

B-71. The CCA briefing (Figure B-4) follows the joint standard nine-line format with minor
modifications for Army helicopters. The briefing provides clear and concise information in a
logical sequence that enables aircrews to employ their weapons systems. It also provides
appropriate control to reduce the risk of fratricide. Figure B-5 shows an example of a
briefing.

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FMI 3-90.5

CLOSE COMBAT ATTACK BRIEFING

(Omit data not required. Do not transmit line numbers. Units of measure are standard
unless otherwise specified. *Denotes minimum essential in limited communications
environment. BOLD denotes readback items when requested.)

Terminal controller: This is

(Aircraft call sign) (Terminal controller)

*1. IP/BP/ABF or friendly location:

(Grid, known point or terrain feature)
*2. Heading to target: (magnetic)
(Specify from IP/BP/ABF or friendly location)
*3. Distance to target: (meters)
(Specify from IP/BP/ABF or friendly location)
4. Target elevation: (feet mean sea level)

*5. Target description:

*6. Target location:

(Grid, known point or terrain feature)

7. Type of target mark: Code: (day/night)

(WP, laser, IR, beacon) (Actual code)

Laser to Target Line: degrees

*8. Location of friendlies:

(Omit if previously given--grid, known point, or terrain feature)

Position Marked By:

9. Egress direction:
(Cardinal direction not over threats)

Remarks (as appropriate):

(Threats, restrictions, danger close, attack clearance, SEAD, abort codes, hazards)

Time on target (TOT):

or time to target (TTT): Standby plus hack.

Note: When identifying position coordinates for joint operations, include the map datum
data. DESERT STORM operations have shown that simple conversion to latitude/longitude
is not sufficient. The location may be referenced on several different databases;
for example, land-based versus sea-based data.

Figure B-4. Close Combat Attack Checklist

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

Figure B-5. Example of a Close Combat Attack Brief

B-72. Danger close ranges for armed helicopter weapons are in Table B-1. FM 3-09.32 (FM
90-20) has additional information. Engagements at ranges danger close or short of danger
close require extreme close coordination and positive identification. Crews must take special
precautions when delivering direct fires on targets within these ranges but are not
prohibited from delivering at ranges short of danger close. Accurate delivery of munitions is
essential when engaging at danger close ranges and requires higher crew training
standards.

Table B-1. Danger Close Ranges for Attack Helicopter Engagement

Weapon Description Danger Close in Meters

2.75-inch Rocket with various warheads.
200
rockets Area weapon.
Precision-guided.
Hellfire 75
Point weapon.
20mm
Guns.
25mm 150
Area weapons.
30mm

B-73. Time is a primary constraining factor for coordinating direct fires in close combat.
METT-TC dictates how coordination between the commander in contact and the AMC is
accomplished. Face-to-face coordination is preferred but is rarely possible in CCA situations.

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FMI 3-90.5

B-74. In the hasty CCA—to take advantage of targets of opportunity or assist ground units
under pressure—coordination is usually accomplished by radio.

TARGET ENGAGEMENT
B-75. A potential target may seem lucrative because of its apparent location and activity,
but visual acquisition and activity do not mean positive identification. If there is no
immediate threat from a specific target and it is not positively identified, aircrews do not
shoot until all possible measures to identify are taken. Before the armed helicopter team
engages, the target must be confirmed by the aircrew and friendly unit in contact.
B-76. During engagement, open communication and continuous coordination with friendly
ground elements are required to ensure the desired effect. Coordination of the direct and
indirect fires from all participants produces the most efficient results in the least amount of
time with the least risk to all. This coordination includes CAS and any nonlethal methods
that may be employed.

BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT/REATTACK

B-77. The AMC provides a BDA to the ground commander who determines if a reattack is
required to achieve his desired end state. Support continues until the desired effect is
achieved.

EMERGENCY COORDINATION MEASURES

B-78. Aviators may be required to assist ground personnel who are not fully familiar with
aviation assets. Key personnel who habitually handle coordination for aviation support may
become casualties or simply not be available. These situations require close attention,
careful communications, and initiative on the part of the aviator to place fire on targets or
deliver other support as necessary. An assault pilot may be required to coordinate for an
attack mission or call for indirect fire support. An attack pilot may have to assist in
extracting personnel.
B-79. Pilots must ask appropriate questions of the requestor, with emphasis on positive
identification of location. Possibilities include the following questions:
Where is ground unit’s position? What are the GPS coordinates? Are those
coordinates verified with another GPS?
Can the ground unit mark its position with smoke, tracers, or other methods? (If
smoke is used, aircrew verifies color after deployment.)
What assistance does the ground unit need (fire support, extraction, or resupply)?
Where is the target? What are the grid coordinates or the relationship of the target
to a readily identifiable natural or manmade feature?
How far the target is from the ground unit and in what direction? If the observer is
not familiar with meters, aircrews ask the observer to try football or soccer field
lengths to estimate distances.
What is the target? Is the target personnel, vehicles, equipment, or buildings?
What is the size of the enemy force, and what is it doing?
B-80. Aviators may have to fly helicopters near friendly troops to deliver ordnance onto the
target. Factors that can reduce the potential for fratricide include the following:
Precision-guided munitions.
Fire support coordination measures.
Planned or hasty coordination and control measures.
Knowledge of the ground tactical plan.

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

Knowledge of the exact location of friendly troops.

Knowledge of the exact location of aircraft.
Positive identification of targets.
Familiarity between the supported unit and the aviation unit.

REVIEW OF MAJOR COORDINATION POINTS

B-81. In review, when an attack unit integrates into the ground scheme of maneuver,
mission success requires detailed coordination between the attack unit and the ground unit
already engaged in close combat.
The maneuver brigade provides the aviation brigade or task force with the
information available on locations, routes, and communications before the attack
team’s departure from its assembly area.
The holding area is a concealed position where final coordination is made with the
unit in contact before the attack team launches its attack. The aerial holding area
is a point in space within the ground battalion’s AO that is oriented toward the
enemy to allow the attack team to receive requests for CCA and expedite the
attack. The aerial holding area may be an alternate battle position outside the
enemy’s direct and indirect fire weapon ranges.
The attack team coordinates directly with the lowest level unit in contact. The
preferred method of coordination is face to face; however, due to time constraints,
radio coordination on the ground company FM command net may be the only
method allowed.
The ground maneuver leaders and attack pilots must understand the ground effects
of the attack team’s weapon systems.
Final coordination with the ground maneuver unit includes agreeing on a method
of identifying the friendly and enemy positions.
The means of identifying friendly positions should take advantage of the forward-
looking infrared (FLIR), thermal imaging sensor (TIS), and night-vision goggle
(NVG) capabilities of the attack team.
The battle position or attack by fire (ABF) position should be offset from the ground
maneuver unit to maximize the effects of its weapons and to minimize the risk of
fratricide. The ground commander should inform direct support artillery and
organic mortars of these positions to deconflict indirect fires into his sector or zone.
After completion of the CCA, the attack team leader provides a BDA report to the
ground maneuver commander.

SECTION V – AIRCRAFT PLANNING FACTORS AND CHARACTERISTICS

GENERAL
B-82. The following definitions and explanations apply to the information in this appendix:

DETECTION
B-83. The ability to classify a target as having military interest.

RECOGNITION
B-84. The ability to classify a target by category such as wheeled, armored personnel carrier
(APC)/infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), air defense, or artillery.

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IDENTIFICATION
B-85. The ability to determine the actual type of vehicle, such as M1 Abrams, ZSU 23-4,
BMP-2, M-109.

INFRARED CROSSOVER
B-86. Forward-looking infrared radar (FLIR) detects the difference in the emission of heat
objects. On a hot day, the ground may reflect or emit more heat than the suspected target. In
this case, the environment will be hot and the target will be cool. As the air cools at night,
the target may lose or emit heat at a lower rate than the surrounding environment. At some
point, the emission of heat from both the target and the surrounding environment may be
equal. This is infrared crossover and makes target acquisition/detection difficult to
impossible. Infrared crossover occurs most often when the environment is damp/wet. This is
because the water in the air creates a buffer in the emissivity of objects. This limitation is
present in all systems that use FLIR for target acquisition.

AH-64 CHARACTERISTICS

GENERAL
B-87. This section addresses considerations for employment of the Longbow Apache (Table
B-2). It also explains the basics of Longbow Apache warfighting—the building blocks of how
the Longbow Apache is employed in combat. Exploiting its new capabilities requires the
review and modification of operational concepts, tactics, and integration with other
battlefield operating systems (BOS). New concepts for target management and employment
must be used. These new concepts are essential to exploit the system capabilities and fully
capitalize on the potential effectiveness and lethality of the Longbow Apache attack unit.

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS
B-88. The AH-64D Longbow Apache provides a quantum leap in capability over the AH-64A.
Part of that leap is the ability of the Longbow company to maintain a common tactical
picture and unprecedented situational understanding.

FIRE CONTROL RADAR

B-89. Central to the capabilities of the Longbow Apache is its fire control radar (FCR). The
Longbow system consists of an integrated FCR, along with a radar frequency interferometer
(RFI). The FCR enables Longbow Apache helicopters to detect, classify, prioritize, and
engage targets with radar frequency (RF) Hellfire missiles without visually acquiring the
target. Since line of sight to the target is not mandatory, Longbow Apache crews may also
employ the RF Hellfire missile during periods of poor visibility when laser, optical, and FLIR
sensors are degraded. The RFI can detect and identify radar systems and display targeting
information on the same screen as the information from the FCR. The FCR will not identify
friend or foe other than air defense unit (ADU) weapons, which are identifiable by their
distinctive radar signatures detected by the RFI system.

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Table B-2. AH-64 Characteristics

AH-64 CHARACTERISTICS
Armament:
Missile Range (Hellfire): 8000 m
Rocket Range (Hydra 70): 6600m–9000 m
Gun Range (30mm API, HEI): 3000 m

Optics:
TADS/Day TV (Low Light, Daytime): Detection 10+ km
Recognition 8-10 km
Identification 5–7 km

TADS/FLIR (Day, Night, Weather):

Detection 10+km
Recognition 5–6 km
Identification 90–1200m
(Condition Dependent)

Navigation Equipment:
Heading Attitude Reference System (Combination of Inertial
Navigation and Doppler Navigation); can slave TADS to a grid
the operator inputs.
Flight Characteristics:
Max Speed (Level): 164 knots
Normal Cruise Speed: 100 knots

Additional Capabilities:
Aircraft can be configured with an external 230-gallon fuel tank
to extend its range on attack missions or with up to 4 230-
gallon fuel tanks for ferrying/self-deployment missions.
Limitations:
Threat ID; IR Crossover; Weather may inhibit Hellfire
engagements (Seeker must be able to see the laser
designated spot); Overwater operations severely degrade
navigation system; PNVS cannot detect wires or other small
obstacles.

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OH-58D CHARACTERISTICS
B-90. This section addresses considerations for employment of the Kiowa Warrior (Table
B-3).

Table B-3. OH-58 Characteristics

OH-58 CHARACTERISTICS
Armament:
Missile Range (Hellfire): 8000 m

Missile Range (ATA Stinger): 5000 m

Rocket Range (Hydra 70): 7000 m

Gun Range (.50 Cal):

1600 m

Optics—Mast-Mounted Sight (MMS):

Thermal Imaging System:
Detection 10+ km

Recognition 6–7 km

Identification 3 km

Television Sensor (TVS):

Detection 8+ km

Recognition 7 km

Identification 4–6 km

Laser Rangefinder/Designator:
Maximum ranging distance 9.99 km
Lasing a known point will update the Navigational System.
Maximum designating distance limited only by TlS/TVS.

Pilots use AN/AVS-6 to fly the aircraft at night

Navigation Equipment:
Inertial Navigation System/Embedded Global Positioning
System (INS/GPS) in Romeo model aircraft or Attitude and
Heading Reference System (AHRS) is similar to AHAB but
considered better in Alpha model aircraft.
Can slave MMS to grid input by operator.

Flight Characteristics:

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 Aviation Support of Ground Operations

OH-58 CHARACTERISTICS
Max Speed (Level): 125 knots
Normal Cruise Speed: 80 knots

Additional Capabilities:
Aircraft is equipped with Airborne Target Hand-Over System.
This system takes targeting data from the AHRS and MMS
and transmits it digitally (secure or unsecure) to TACFIRE,
BCS, Improved Data Modem (IDM)-equipped CAS aircraft,
and ATHS-equipped Apaches (fielded with Longbow).
Limitations:
Threat ID; IR Crossover; weather may inhibit Hellfire
engagements (Seeker must be able to see the laser
designated spot); Overwater operations severely degrade
navigation system.

UH-60 CHARACTERISTICS
B-91. This section addresses considerations for employment of the Black Hawk helicopter
(Table B-4).

Table B-4. UH-60 Characteristics

UH-60 CHARACTERISTICS
Armament:
2 x M60D (7.62 MGs) (Self-protection only)

Optics:
Pilots use AN/AVS-6 to fly the aircraft at night

Navigation Equipment:
Doppler Navigation Set or GPS

Flight Characteristics:
Max Speed (Level): 156 knots

Normal Cruise Speed: 120–145 knots.

With external slingloads: 90 knots.
Additional Capabilities:
The External Stores Support System (ESSS) allows
configuration for extended operations without refueling (5+
hours) (2 X 230-gallon fuel tanks). The ESSS also allows
configuration for ferry and self-deployment flights (4 X 230-
gallon fuel tanks).
The enhanced C2 Console provides the maneuver commander
with an airborne platform that can support 6 secure FM radios,
1 HF radio, 2 VHF radios, and 2 UHF radios.

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UH-60 CHARACTERISTICS
Can be configured with the Volcano Mine Dispensing System.
Requires 8 hours to install.
Capable of inserting and extracting troops with Fries/Spies.

Limitations:
Use of the ESSS for fuel limits access to the cabin doors for
troops and bulky cargo or litters. It also greatly decreases the
payload.
UH-60A cannot slingload a TOW HMMWV.
Cruise speed is greatly decreased by light, bulky slingloads
(less than 80 knots).

CH-47 CHARACTERISTICS
B-92. This section addresses considerations for employment of the Chinook helicopter (Table
B-5).

Table B-5. CH-47 Characteristics

CH-47 CHARACTERISTICS
Armament:
2 M60D 7.62 MGs (Self-protection only)

Optics:
Pilots use AN/AVS-6 to fly the aircraft at night

Navigation Equipment:
Doppler Navigation Set or GPS

Flight Characteristics:
Max Speed (Level): 170 knots
Normal Cruise Speed: 120–145 knots

Additional Capabilities:
The aircraft can be configured with additional fuel for either
mobile FARE system (Fat Cow) or for ferrying/self-deployment
missions.
Aircraft has an internal load winch to ease loading of properly
configured cargo.
The CH-47D can slingload virtually any piece of equipment in
the light infantry, airborne or air assault divisions.
Limitations:
Cruise speed is greatly decreased by light, bulky slingloads (less
than 80 knots).

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TYPICAL FUEL EXPENDITURE RATES AND CAPACITIES

B-93. Table B-6 shows typical rates of fuel expenditures per helicopter and fuel capacities
without additional tanks.

Table B-6 Typical Helicopter Fuel Expenditure Rates and Capacities

Typical Helicopter Fuel Expenditure Rates

Average Gallons Per
Helicopter Fuel Capacity
Hour
AH-64 175 370
OH-58D 44 112
OH-58D (Armed) 110 112
UH-60 178 362
CH-47 514 1030

STANDARD LOAD CAPACITIES

B-94. The BAE should have a copy of standard operator manuals (-10s) for each type of
helicopter. Although an aircraft may be capable of carrying more than is indicated on these
lists, safety, loading procedures, space limitations, and other factors play a great part in
determining authorized loads for each helicopter. Environmental conditions and
configuration constraints affect the authorized cargo load (ACL) for each aircraft. This
information must be updated and obtained from each unit periodically or when there is an
obvious change.

Table B-7. Typical Helicopter Load Capacities

Typical Helicopter Load Capacities

Empty Weight Plus Crew
Type Max Gross Weight Max Sling Load
and Fuel
UH-60A 14,000 22,000 8,000
UH-60L 14,250 23,000 9,000
CH-47D 30,000 50,000 26,000

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FMI 3-90.5

Table B-8. Typical Planning Weights for Combat Equipment and Vehicles

Combat Vehicle and Equipment Weights

Vehicle/Equipment Weight In Pounds
M998 HMMWV 7,535
M996 TOW HMMWV 8,095
M149 WATER BUFFALO (EMPTY) 2,540
(LOADED) 6,060
M101A1 ¾-TON TRAILER (EMPTY) 1,350
(LOADED) 2,850
500-GALLON FUEL DRUM (EMPTY) 275
(FULL) JP 3,625
M102 105MM HOWITZER 3,360
M119 105MM HOWITZER 4,000
M114A1 155MM HOWITZER 15,200
M198 155MM HOWITZER 15,740
M167 VULCAN (TOWED) 3,260
A22 BAG (LOADED) 2,200
CONEX, STEEL, EMPTY 2,140
CONEX, ALUMINUM, EMPTY 1,560
CONEX (EITHER) MAX LOAD 6,500
SCAMP CRANE 14,600
ONE MIL-VAN 4,710
ELECTRONIC SHOP WITH WHEELS 3,940
TOOL SET, SHOP WITH WHEELS 3,030
SHOP, PORTABLE, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE (EMPTY) 4,220
(LOADED) 5,425
M1008 PICK-UP (EMPTY) 5,900
(LOADED) 8,800
JD-550 DOZER 16,800

ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT MUNITIONS LOADS

B-95. As with the assault and general support aviation battalion helicopter units, the BAE
must coordinate with the attack reconnaissance helicopter units to determine standard
munitions and fuel loads for those type assets. See Table B-9 for typical attack
reconnaissance helicopter ordnance loads.

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Table B-9. Typical Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Ordnance Loads

Typical Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Ordnance Loads

Aircraft Gun 2.75-InchRockets Missiles

AH-64 (STANDARD) 1,200 38 8 HELLFIRE
AH-64 (HEAVY) 1200 16 HELLFIRE
OH-58D 500 7
OH-58D 14
OH-58D 500 2 ATAS
OH-58D 4 HELLFIRE

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 Appendix C
Operations in Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Conditions

The purpose of using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons is

the same as for any other weapons: to produce casualties, destroy or
disable equipment, and disrupt the enemy’s operations. Chemical and
biological agents and nuclear weapons may be employed by the enemy
together and normally supplement conventional weapons. Planning must
routinely address the use of each of these as well as protective measures
against enemy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons or industrial agents found in the operational area.

SECTION I – CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR

BATTLEFIELD
C-1. The integration of CBRN weapons as well as contamination caused by industrial
incidents into tactical operations is described as the CBRN-contaminated battlefield.

COMMAND
C-2. The heavy combined arms battalion commander prepares his units and personnel to
operate in a CBRN environment. To do this, he ensures the heavy combined arms battalion
takes the proper protective measures, including the following:
CBRN vulnerability analysis.
Dispersion and use of terrain as shielding.
Continuous CBRN monitoring with detection equipment.
Assumption of the appropriate mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level.

STAFF
C-3. For CBRN operations, the battalion chemical officer provides technical advice to the
heavy combined arms battalion commander and the remainder of the battalion staff. The
CBRN staff officer performs the following:
In conjunction with the S2, templates strikes and develops predictions on the
effects of enemy CBRN weapons and industrial chemical threat on heavy combined
arms battalion operations.
Disseminates information received via the CBRN warning and reporting system
(CBRNWRS).
Recommends reconnaissance, monitoring, and surveying requirements.
Recommends MOPP and operational exposure guidance based on the S2’s threat
analysis and higher headquarters guidance.
Maintains records of unit contamination, including radiological dose records.
Conducts vulnerability analysis of unit positions.

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Plans heavy combined arms battalion decontamination operations in conjunction

with the S3.
Coordinates for nonorganic CBRN assets (decontamination, smoke, and
reconnaissance) support.
Acts as the liaison between attached chemical units and the S3.
Makes recommendations regarding the information release to Soldiers and local
civilians regarding CBRN operations. (The UEx must be prepared with information
operations plan to address CBRN operations.)

CHARACTERISTICS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS

C-4. Chemical agents cause casualties, degrade performance, slow maneuver, restrict
terrain, and disrupt operations (Table C-1). They can cover large areas; can be delivered as
liquid, vapor, or aerosol; and can be disseminated by artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles,
aircraft spray, bombs, land mines, covert means, or industrial accident.

Table C-1. Characteristics of Chemical Agents

Agent Nerve Blood Blister Choking

Protection Mask and BDO Mask and BDO Mask Mask
Detection M8A1, M256A1, CAM, M256A1, CAM, M256A1 Odor (freshly
M8 and M9 paper M8 and M9 mowed hay
paper
Symptoms Difficult breathing, Burning eyes, Convulsions Coughing,
drooling, nausea, stinging skin, and coma nausea, choking,
vomiting, convulsions, irritated nose headache, and
and blurred vision tight chest
Effects Incapacitates Blisters skin, Incapacitates Floods and
damages damages lungs
respiratory
tract
First aid Mark 1 NAAK As for second- None Keep warm and
and third- avoid movement
degree burns
Decon M291 and flush eyes M291 and flush None None
with water eyes with water

CHARACTERISTICS OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

TOXINS
C-5. Toxins are poisonous substances produced from living organisms. Characteristics of
toxins follow:
Can be synthesized (artificially produced).
Mirror the symptoms of nerve agents.
Present 8 to12 hours of tactical concern (some are changed by sunlight).
Can be fast acting (neurotoxins) or slower acting (cytotoxins).

PATHOGENS
C-6. Pathogens are infectious agents that cause disease in man and animals, such as
bacteria, viruses, and rickettsia. The following are characteristics of pathogens:

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 Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Conditions

Delayed reaction (incubation 1-21 days).

Multiply and overcome natural defenses.
Inhalation is the primary mode of exposure.

PROTECTION FROM BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

C-7. The following offer protection against biological agents:
Up-to-date immunizations.
Good hygiene.
Area sanitation.
Physical conditioning.
Water purification.
Food sanitation
Use of chemoprophylaxis as directed.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS

C-8. Nuclear weapons are much more destructive than conventional weapons. Blast, nuclear
and thermal radiation, and electromagnetic pulse are of primary concern:
Blast. High-pressure shock wave crushes structures and causes significant damage
at extended ranges.
Thermal radiation. Intense heat and extremely bright light causes burns,
temporary blindness, and dazzle at extended ranges.
Nuclear radiation. Energy released from a nuclear detonation produces both local
and downwind fallout in the form of initial and residual radiation, both of which
cause casualties.
Electromagnetic pulse. Surge of electrical power occurs within seconds of a nuclear
detonation and damages electrical components in operational equipment (radios,
radar, computers, and vehicles) and weapon systems (TOW, Javelin, aircraft, tanks,
and artillery ballistic computers) at extended ranges.

PROTECTION FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK

C-9. Cover/shielding offers the best protection from the immediate effects of a nuclear attack.
This includes cover in fighting positions, culverts, and ditches. Soldiers should cover exposed
skin and stay down until the blast wave passes and debris stops falling. Immediately after a
nuclear attack, continuous radiation monitoring should begin.

Monitoring
C-10. FM 3-3, Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance, describes monitoring
techniques, correlation factor data, and recording forms. Monitoring may be periodic or
continuous.
Periodic. Units conduct periodic monitoring during nuclear warfare. All units
routinely (at least once an hour) monitor a designated point in their respective
areas. The CBRN defense annex of the unit SOP gives detailed guidance on
monitoring procedures.
Continuous. All units initiate continuous monitoring when they receive a fallout
warning, when a unit is on an administrative or tactical move, when a nuclear
burst occurs, when radiation levels above one centigray (cGy) per hour are detected
by periodic monitoring, and on order of the battalion commander. Continuous

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monitoring stops on instructions from the commander or higher headquarters or

when the dose rate falls below one cGy per hour (except for units on the move).

Operational Exposure Guidance (OEG)

C-11. Operations in a nuclear environment are complicated by the necessity to control
exposure of personnel to nuclear radiation. OEG determines the maximum radiation dose to
which units may be exposed and still accomplish a mission. Determination of this dose is
based on the accumulated dose or radiation history of the unit.

SECTION II – TENETS OF CBRN DEFENSE

C-12. To protect the force, the three tenets of CBRN defense follow:
Contamination avoidance.
Protection.
Decontamination.

CONTAMINATION AVOIDANCE
C-13. Avoiding CBRN attacks and hazards is the key to CBRN defense. Avoidance allows
commanders to shield soldiers and units.

ACTIVE AND PASSIVE MEASURES

C-14. Contamination avoidance involves both active and passive measures. Passive
measures include training, camouflage, concealment, hardening positions, and dispersion.
Active measures include detection, reconnaissance, alarms and signals, warning and
reporting, marking, and contamination control. Units should be aware that operations in
industrial areas may involve a CBRN threat.

CBRN Reconnaissance
C-15. CBRN reconnaissance is the detection, identification, reporting, and marking of CBRN
hazards. CBRN reconnaissance consists of search, survey, surveillance, and sampling
operations. Due to limited availability of the M93 FOX reconnaissance vehicle (BCT
resource), consider alternate means of conducting CBRN reconnaissance (such as scouts,
military police, engineers, and maneuver units). As a minimum, consider the following
actions when planning and preparing for CBRN reconnaissance:
Use the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process to orient on named
areas of interest (NAIs).
Pre-position reconnaissance assets to support requirements.
Establish command and support relationships.
Assess the time and distance factors for the conduct of CBRN reconnaissance.
Report all information rapidly and accurately.
Plan for resupply activities to sustain CBRN reconnaissance operations.
Determine possible locations for postmission decontamination.
Plan for fire support requirements.
Plan fratricide prevention measures.
Establish medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) procedures.
Identify CBRN warning and reporting system procedures and frequencies.

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Table C-2. MOPP Levels

Level MOPP MOPP MOPP MOPP MOPP MOPP Mask

Equip Ready 0 1 2 3 4 Only
Mask Carrie Carrie Carrie Carrie Worn Worn Worn**
d d d d *
BDO Ready Avail* Worn Worn Worn Worn
* *
Overboots Ready Avail* Avail* Worn Worn Worn
* * *
Gloves Ready Avail* Avail* Avail* Avail* Worn
* * * * *
Helmet Ready Avail* Avail* Worn Worn Worn
Cover * * *
*Items available to Soldier within 2 hours with replacement available within
6 hours.
**Items must be positioned within arm’s reach of the Soldier.
***Never “mask only” if nerve or blister agent is used in AO.

CBRN PROTECTION
C-16. CBRN protection is an integral part of operations. Techniques that work for avoidance
also work for protection (shielding soldiers and units and shaping the battlefield). Other
forms of protection involve sealing or hardening positions; protecting soldiers; assuming
appropriate MOPP levels (Table C-2); reacting to attack; using pretreatments, barrier
creams, and chemoprophylaxis; and using collective protection. Individual protective items
include the protective mask, battle dress overgarments (BDOs), overboots, and gloves. The
UEx or higher level commander establishes the minimum level of protection. Subordinate
units may increase this level as necessary but may not decrease it. BDOs may be worn for 30
days in an uncontaminated environment or for 24 hours once contaminated.

DECONTAMINATION
C-17. Use of CBRN weapons creates unique residual hazards that may require
decontamination. In addition to the deliberate use of these weapons, collateral damage,
natural disasters, and industrial emitters may require decontamination. Contamination
forces units into protective equipment that degrades performance of individual and collective
tasks. Decontamination restores combat power and reduces casualties that may result from
exposure, thus allowing commanders to sustain combat operations. Use the four principles of
decontamination when planning decontamination operations:
Decontaminate as soon as possible.
Decontaminate only what is necessary.
Decontaminate as far forward as possible (mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, and time available (METT-T) dependent).
Decontaminate by priority.
C-18. The three levels of decontamination follow:
Immediate decontamination. Immediate decontamination requires minimal
planning and is a basic soldier survival skill. Personal wipe down removes
contamination from individual equipment using the M291 kit. For individuals
unable to perform self-decontamination, buddy aid decontamination is performed.
Operator spray down uses the onboard decontamination apparatus with DS2 to

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FMI 3-90.5

decontaminate surfaces that an operator must touch or contact to operate the

equipment.
Operational decontamination. Operational decontamination involves MOPP gear
exchange and vehicle spray down. MOPP gear exchange is most effective when
performed within the first 6 hours of being contaminated; it must be completed
within 24 hours of being contaminated. Vehicle wash down removes gross particle
contamination and limits the spread of contamination.
Thorough decontamination. Thorough decontamination involves detailed troop
decontamination (DTD) and detailed equipment decontamination (DED). Thorough
decontamination is normally conducted as part of reconstitution or during breaks in
combat operations. Support from a chemical decontamination platoon is required.
C-19. Decontamination planning considerations include the following:
Plan decontamination sites throughout the width and depth of the sector.
Tie decontamination sites to the scheme of maneuver and templated CBRN strikes.
Apply the principles of decontamination.
Plan for contaminated routes.
Plan logistics and resupply of MOPP, mask parts, water, and decontamination
supplies.
Consider medical concerns, including treatment and evacuation of contaminated
casualties.
Plan for site security.
C-20. Patient decontamination is conducted at the battalion aid station or at the
decontamination area. See FM 3-5, NBC Decontamination, and FM 4-02.7, Health Service
Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment, for detailed information.
Nonmedical personnel perform patient decontamination under medical supervision.

C-6 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Appendix D
Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

The primary objective of risk management and fratricide avoidance is to

help units protect their combat power through accident prevention,
enabling them to win the battle quickly and decisively with minimum
losses. This appendix focuses on two topics: risk management and the
avoidance of fratricide. Risk is the chance of injury or death for
individuals and of damage to or loss of vehicles and equipment. Risk, or
the potential for risk, is always present in every combat and training
situation. Risk management must take place at all levels of the chain of
command during each phase of every operation; it is an integral part of
planning. The heavy combined arms battalion commander, company
commanders, staff, and all Soldiers must know how to use risk
management, coupled with fratricide avoidance measures, to ensure the
heavy combined arms battalion executes the mission in the safest possible
environment within mission constraints. For additional information on
risk management, refer to FM 100-14, Risk Management.

SECTION I – RISK MANAGEMENT

D-1. Risk management is the process of identifying and controlling hazards to conserve
combat power and resources. Leaders (including the staff) must always remember that the
effectiveness of the process depends on never approaching risk management with one size
fits all solutions to the hazards their units face. They must consider the essential tactical
and operational factors that make each situation unique. There are five steps of risk
management. This five-step process is integrated into the military decision- making process
(MDMP) (Figure D-1).

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FMI 3-90.5

Risk Management Steps

Step 3
Military Decision- Develop
Making Process Controls Step 5
Step 1 Step 2 and Make Step 4 Supervise
Identify Assess Risk Implement and
Hazards Hazards Decisions Controls Evaluate
Mission Receipt X
Mission Analysis X X
COA Development X X X
COA Analysis X X X
COA Comparison X
COA Approval X
Orders Production X
Rehearsal1 X X X X X
Execution and Assessment1 X X X X X
1
All boxes are marked to emphasize the continued use of the risk management process throughout the mission.

Figure D-1. Risk Management Steps Correlated With MDMP Tasks

STEP 1, IDENTIFY HAZARDS

D-2. A hazard is a source of danger. It is any existing or potential condition that could result
in injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or
some other form of mission degradation. Hazards arise in both tactical and training
operations. Leaders must identify the hazards associated with all aspects and phases of the
mission, paying particular attention to the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Risk
management must never be an afterthought; leaders must begin the process during MDMP
(troop-leading procedures for company and below) and continue it throughout the operation.
Figure D-2 lists possible sources of risk the battalion might face during a typical tactical
operation. The list is organized according to the factors of METT-TC.

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Sources of Battlefield Risk

Mission
Duration of the operation.
Complexity or clarity of the plan. (Is the plan well developed and easily understood?)
Proximity and number of maneuver units.
Enemy
Knowledge of the enemy situation.
Enemy capabilities.
Availability of time and resources to conduct reconnaissance.
Terrain and Weather
Visibility conditions, including light, dust, fog, and smoke.
Precipitation and its effects on mobility.
Extreme heat or cold.
Additional natural hazards (broken ground, steep inclines, and water obstacles.
Troops and Support Available
Equipment status.
Morale.
Experience units conducting the operation have working together.
Soldier and leader proficiency.
Soldier and leader rest situation.
Degree of acclimatization to environment.
Impact of new leaders and crew members.
Time Available
Time available for planning and rehearsals.
Time available to conduct the mission.
Civil Considerations
Applicable rules of engagement (ROE) and rules of interaction (ROI).
Potential stability operations and support operations involving contact with civilians (such as noncombatant
evacuation operations (NEOs), refugee or disaster assistance, or counterterrorism).
Potential for media contacts or inquiries.

Figure D-2. Examples of Potential Hazards

STEP 2, ASSESS HAZARDS TO DETERMINE RISKS

D-3. Hazard assessment is the process of determining the direct impact of each hazard on an
operation (in the form of hazardous incidents).
Determine which hazards can be eliminated or avoided.
Assess each hazard that cannot be eliminated or avoided to determine the
probability that the hazard will occur.
Assess the severity of hazards that cannot be eliminated or avoided. Severity,
defined as the result or outcome of a hazardous incident, is expressed by the degree
of injury or illness (including death), loss of or damage to equipment or property,
environmental damage, or other mission-impairing factors (such as unfavorable
publicity or loss of combat power).
Taking into account both the probability and severity of a hazard, determine the
associated risk level (extremely high, high, moderate, or low). Figure D-3
summarizes the four risk levels.
Based on the factors of hazard assessment (probability, severity, and risk level, as
well as the operational factors unique to the situation), complete risk management

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FMI 3-90.5

worksheet. (Refer to FM 100-14 for an example of a completed risk management

worksheet.)

Risk Level Mission Effects

Extremely high (E) Mission failure if hazardous incidents occur in execution.
High (H) Significantly degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards. Not
accomplishing all parts of the mission or not completing the mission to standard (if
hazards occur during mission).
Moderate (M) Expected degraded mission capabilities in terms of required mission standards.
Reduced mission capability (if hazards occur during the mission).
Low (L) Expected losses have little or no impact on mission success.

Figure D-3. Risk Levels and Impact on Mission Execution

STEP 3, DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE RISK DECISIONS

D-4. Step 3 consists of two substeps: develop controls and make risk decisions. This step is
done during the COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval steps
of the MDMP.
Develop controls. Controls are the procedures and considerations the unit uses to
eliminate hazards or reduce their risk. After assessing each hazard, develop one or
more controls that will either eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability,
severity, or both) of potential hazardous incidents. When developing controls,
consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard itself.
Make risk decisions. A key element in the process of making a risk decision is
determining whether accepting the risk is justified or, conversely, is unnecessary.
The decision-maker must compare and balance the risk against mission
expectations and then decide if the controls are sufficient and acceptable and
whether to accept the resulting residual risk. If the risk is determined unnecessary,
the decision-maker directs the development of additional controls or alternative
controls; as another option, he can modify, change, or reject the selected course of
action (COA) for the operation.

STEP 4, IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

D-5. Implementing controls is the most important part of the risk management process. It is
the chain of command’s contribution to the safety of the unit. Implementing controls includes
coordination and communication with appropriate superior, adjacent, and subordinate units
and with individuals executing the mission. The battalion commander must ensure that
specific controls are integrated into operation plans (OPLANs), operation orders (OPORDs),
standing operating procedures (SOPs), and rehearsals. The critical check for this step is to
ensure that controls are converted into clear, simple execution orders understood by all
levels. If the leaders have conducted a thoughtful risk assessment, the controls will be easy
to implement, enforce, and follow.
D-6. Examples of risk management controls include the following:
Thoroughly brief all aspects of the mission, including related hazards and controls,
and ensure that subordinates know the plan.
Allow adequate time for rehearsals at all levels.
Drink plenty of water, eat well, and get as much sleep as possible (at least 4 hours
in any 24-hour period).

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Enforce speed limits, use of seat belts, and driver safety.

Establish recognizable visual signals and markers to distinguish maneuvering
units.
Enforce the use of ground guides in assembly areas and on dangerous terrain.
Limit single-vehicle movement.
Establish SOPs for the integration of new personnel.

STEP 5, SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

D-7. During mission execution, leaders must ensure their subordinates properly understand
and execute risk management controls. Leaders must continuously evaluate the unit’s
effectiveness in managing risks to gain insight into areas that need improvement.
Supervision. Leadership and unit discipline are the keys to ensuring
implementation of effective risk management controls. All leaders are responsible
for supervising mission rehearsals and execution to ensure standards and controls
are enforced. In particular, NCOs must enforce established safety policies as well
as controls developed for a specific operation or task. Techniques include spot
checks, inspections, siituation reports (SITREPs), confirmation briefs, and
supervision. During mission execution, leaders must continuously monitor risk
management controls to determine whether they are effective and to modify them
as necessary. Leaders must also anticipate, identify, and assess new hazards. They
must ensure that imminent danger issues are addressed on the spot and that
ongoing planning and execution reflect changes in hazard conditions.
Evaluation. Whenever possible, the risk management process should also include
an after-action review (AAR) to assess unit performance in identifying risks and
preventing hazardous situations. Leaders should then incorporate lessons learned
from the process into unit SOPs and plans for future missions.
Commander’s guidance. The battalion commander gives the company commanders
and staff direction, sets priorities, and establishes the command climate (values,
attitudes, and beliefs). Successful preservation of combat power requires him to
imbed risk management into individual behavior. To fulfill this commitment, the
commander must exercise creative leadership, innovative planning, and careful
management. Most importantly, he must demonstrate support for the risk
management process. The commander and others in the chain of command can
establish a command climate favorable to risk management integration by taking
the following actions:
Demonstrating consistent and sustained risk management behavior through
leading by example and stressing active participation throughout the risk
management process.
Providing adequate resources for risk management. Every leader is responsible
for obtaining the assets necessary to mitigate risk and for providing them to
subordinate leaders.
Understanding their own and their Soldier’s limitations, as well as their unit’s
capabilities.
Allowing subordinates to make mistakes and learn from them.
Preventing a zero defects mindset from creeping into the unit’s culture.
Demonstrating full confidence in subordinates’ mastery of their trades and
their ability to execute a chosen COA.
Keeping subordinates informed.
Listening to subordinates.

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FMI 3-90.5

Leader responsibility. For the commander, his subordinate leaders, and individual
Soldiers, responsibilities in managing risk include the following:
Make informed risk decisions; establish and then clearly communicate risk
decision criteria and guidance.
Establish clear, feasible risk management policies and goals.
Train the risk management process. Ensure that subordinates understand the
who, what, when, where, and why of managing risk and how these factors apply
to their situation and assigned responsibilities.
Accurately evaluate the unit’s effectiveness as well as subordinates’ execution
of risk controls during the mission.
Inform higher headquarters when risk levels exceed established limits.

SECTION II – FRATRICIDE AVOIDANCE

D-8. Fratricide avoidance is a complex problem defying simple solutions. Fratricide can be
defined broadly as employing friendly weapons and munitions with the intent of killing the
enemy or destroying his equipment or facilities but resulting in unforeseen and
unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel. This section focuses on actions leaders
can take to reduce the risk and occurrence of fratricide using current resources.

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

D-9. The modern battlefield is more lethal than any in history. The tempo of operations is
rapid, and the nonlinear nature of the battlefield creates command and control challenges for
unit leaders. The accuracy and lethality of modern weapons make it possible to engage and
destroy targets at extended ranges. However, the ability of US forces to acquire targets using
thermal imagery and other sophisticated sighting systems exceeds its capability to identify
these targets accurately. Consequently, friendly elements can be engaged unintentionally
and destroyed in a matter of seconds. Added to this is battlefield obscuration, which becomes
a critical consideration whenever thermal sights are the primary source of target
identification. Rain, dust, fog, smoke, and snow degrade identification capability by reducing
the intensity and clarity of thermal images. On the battlefield, positive visual identification
cannot be the sole engagement criteria at ranges beyond 1,000 meters. The common
operational picture (COP) is essential and must be maintained throughout any operation.

RISK IDENTIFICATION AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES

D-10. Reduction of fratricide risk begins during the planning phase of an operation and
continues through preparation and execution. Risk identification must be conducted at all
levels during each phase and the results clearly communicated up and down the chain of
command so risk assessment can begin. The following paragraphs cover considerations
influencing risk identification and focus on measures the leader can implement to make the
identification process more effective and help prevent friendly fire incidents from occurring.

PLANNING PHASE
D-11. A thoroughly developed, clearly communicated, and completely understood plan helps
minimize fratricide risk. The following factors affect the potential for fratricide in a given
operation:
Clarity of the enemy situation.
Clarity of the friendly situation.
Clarity of the commander's intent.
Complexity of the operation.

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Planning time available at each level.

D-12. Graphics are a basic tool commanders at all levels use to clarify their intent, add
precision to their concept, and communicate their plan to subordinates. Graphics can be a
useful tool in reducing the risk of fratricide. Each commander must understand the
definitions and purposes of operational graphics and the techniques of their employment.
(See FM 1-02 for the definitions of each type of graphic control measure.)

PREPARATION PHASE
D-13. Confirmation briefs and rehearsals are primary tools for identifying and reducing
fratricide risk during the preparation phase. The following are considerations for their use:
Confirmation briefs and rehearsals ensure subordinates know where fratricide
risks exist and what to do to reduce or eliminate them.
Briefbacks ensure subordinates understand the commander’s intent. They often
highlight areas of confusion or complexity or planning errors.
The type of rehearsal conducted determines the types of risks identified.
Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and involve all key players.
The following factors may reveal fratricide risks during rehearsals:
Number and type of rehearsals.
Training and proficiency levels of units and individuals.
The habitual relationships between units conducting the operation.
The physical readiness (endurance) of the troops conducting the operation.

EXECUTION PHASE
D-14. During execution, in-stride risk assessment and reaction can overcome unforeseen
fratricide risk situations.
The following are factors to consider when assessing fratricide risks:
Intervisibility between adjacent units.
Amount of battlefield obscuration.
Ability or inability to identify targets positively.
Similarities and differences in equipment, vehicles, and uniforms between
friendly and enemy forces.
Vehicle density on the battlefield.
The tempo of the battle.
Maintaining the COP at all levels and at all times is another key to fratricide
reduction as an operation progresses. Units develop and employ effective
techniques and SOPs to aid leaders and crewmen in this process, including the
following:
Monitoring the next higher radio net.
Radio cross talk between units.
Accurate position reporting and navigation.
Training, use, and exchange of liaison officers.

FRATRICIDE REDUCTION MEASURES

D-15. The following measures provide a guide to actions that can reduce fratricide risk. Use
of these measures is not required, and these measures are not intended to restrict initiative.
Apply them as appropriate based on the specific situation and METT-TC factors:

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FMI 3-90.5

Identify and assess potential fratricide risks in the estimate of the situation.
Express these risks in the OPORD or fragmentary order (FRAGO).
The unit leadership must focus on areas such as current intelligence, unit locations
and dispositions, denial areas (minefields and family of scatterable mines
(FASCAM)), contaminated areas such as improved conventional munitions (ICMs)
and CBRN, SITREPs, and METT-TC factors.
Ensure positive target identification. Review vehicle and weapon ID cards. Know at
what ranges and under what conditions positive identification of friendly vehicles
and weapons are possible.
Establish a command climate that stresses fratricide prevention. Enforce fratricide
prevention measures and emphasize the use of doctrinally sound tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP). Ensure constant supervision in the execution of
orders and the performance of all tasks and missions to standard.
Recognize the signs of battlefield stress.
Maintain unit cohesion by taking quick, effective action to alleviate fratricide.
Conduct individual, leader, and collective (unit) training covering fratricide
awareness, target identification and recognition, and fire discipline.
Develop a simple, decisive plan.
Give complete and concise mission orders.
Use SOPs that are consistent with doctrine to simplify mission orders.
Periodically review and change SOPs as needed.
Strive for maximum planning time for you and your subordinates.
Use common language and vocabulary and doctrinally correct standard terminology
and control measures, such as fire support coordination line, zone of engagement,
and restrictive fire lines.
Ensure thorough coordination is conducted.
Plan for and establish effective communications (to include visual).
Plan for collocation of command posts whenever it is appropriate to the mission,
such as during a passage of lines.
Designate and employ liaison officers (LNOs) as appropriate.
Ensure rules of engagement (ROE) are clear.
Include fratricide risk as a key factor in terrain analysis (observation and fields of
fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach
(OCOKA)).
Conduct rehearsals whenever the situation allows time to do so.
Be in the right place at the right time. Use position location and navigation devices
(Global Positioning System (GPS) and position navigation (POSNAV)); know your
location and the locations of adjacent units (left, right, leading, and follow-on)
through use of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)
System/Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and other means. Synchronize tactical
movement.
Plan and brief operations security (OPSEC), especially when utilizing dismounted
operations (challenge and password, sign and countersign).
Include discussion of fratricide incidents in AARs.
Ensure fire commands are accurate, concise, and clearly stated. Make it mandatory
for Soldiers to ask for clarification of any portion of the fire command that they do
not completely understand.
Stress the importance of the chain of command in the fire control process; ensure
Soldiers get in the habit of obtaining target confirmation and permission to fire
from their leaders before engaging targets they assume are enemy elements.

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Know who will be in and around the AO.

FRATRICIDE RISK CONSIDERATIONS

D-16. The checklist below, which parallels the five-paragraph OPORD, contains key factors
and considerations in fratricide prevention. This is not a change to the OPORD format but is
a guide for use during OPORD development to ensure fratricide prevention measures are
included. It is not a strict directive. The factors and considerations are listed where they
would likely appear in the OPORD, but they may warrant evaluation during preparation of
other paragraphs.

TASK ORGANIZATION
D-17. Questions:
Has the unit worked under this task organization before?
Are SOPs compatible with the task organization (especially with attached units)?
Are special markings or signals (for example, cats’ eyes, chemlites, or panels)
needed for positive identification of uniforms and equipment?
What special weapons and equipment are to be used? Do they look or sound like
enemy weapons and equipment?

SITUATION
D-18. Enemy forces:
Weather:
What are the expected visibility conditions (light data and precipitation) for the
operation?
What effects will rain, heat, and cold have on Soldiers, weapons, and
equipment?
Terrain:
Do you know the topography and vegetation (urban, mountainous, hilly, rolling,
flat, desert, swamp/marsh, prairie/steppe, jungle, or open woods) of the
expected AO?
Have you evaluated the terrain using the factors of OCOKA?
D-19. Friendly forces:
Among the allied forces, are there differences (or similarities with enemy forces) in
language, uniform, and equipment that could increase fratricide risk during
combined operations?
Could differences in equipment and uniforms among US Armed Forces increase
fratricide risk during joint operations?
What differences in equipment and uniforms can leaders stress to help prevent
fratricide?
What is the friendly deception plan?
What are the locations of your unit and adjacent units (left, right, leading, and
follow-on)?
What are the locations of neutrals and noncombatants?
What are the locations of your own forces?
What is the status of training activities?
What are the levels of individual, crew, and unit proficiency?
Will fatigue be a factor for friendly forces during the operation? Has an effective
sleep plan been developed?

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FMI 3-90.5

Are friendly forces acclimatized to the AO?

What is the age (new, old, or mixed) and condition of equipment in friendly units?
What is the status of new equipment training?
What are the expected MOPP requirements for the operation?
D-20. Attachments and detachments:
Do attached elements understand pertinent information regarding enemy and
friendly forces?
Will gaining units provide this pertinent information to detached elements?
Are communications systems compatible (digital/analog)?
D-21. Mission. Do all elements clearly understand the mission and all associated tasks and
purposes?
D-22. Execution: Concept of the operation:
Maneuver: Are the main and supporting efforts identified?
Fires (direct and indirect):
Are priorities of fires identified?
Have target lists been developed?
Have the fire execution matrix and overlay been developed?
Have locations of denial areas (minefields and FASCAM) and contaminated
areas (ICM and CBRN) been identified?
Are the locations of all supporting fire targets identified in the OPORD and
OPLAN overlays?
Are aviation and close air support (CAS) targets clearly identified?
Has the direct fire plan been developed?
Have final protective fires (FPFs) been designated?
Are the requirements for accurate predicted fire met or do we have to adjust
fire?
Engineer tasks:
Are friendly minefields, including FASCAM and ICM dud-contaminated areas,
known?
Have obstacles and the approximate time needed for reduction or breaching of
each been identified?
Tasks to each subordinate unit: Are friendly forces identified, as appropriate, for
each subordinate maneuver element?
Tasks to sustainment operations units: Have locations of friendly forces been
reported to sustaining units?
D-23. Coordinating instructions:
Will rehearsals be conducted? Are they necessary? Are direct and indirect fires
included?
Is a confirmation brief necessary?
Are appropriate control measures clearly explained and illustrated in the OPORD
and overlays? Have they been disseminated to everyone who has a need to know?
What is the plan for using these control measures to synchronize the battle and
prevent fratricide?
Are the locations for UEx slice elements in the brigade battlespace posted and
disseminated?
Have target and vehicle identification drills been practiced?

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Do subordinate units know the immediate action, drill, or signal for “CEASE-FIRE”
and “I AM FRIENDLY” if they come under unknown or friendly fire? Is there a
backup?
Is guidance in handling dud munitions, such as ICM and cluster bomb units (CBU),
included?
D-24. Service support:
Does everyone know trains locations and identification markings?
Do medical and maintenance personnel know the routes between train units?
D-25. Command and signal:
Command:
What are the locations of the commander and key staff members?
What are the chain of command and the succession of command?
Signal:
Do instructions include backup code words and visual signals for all special and
emergency events?
Do instructions cover how to identify friendly forces to aircraft?
Do they include backup code words and visual signals for all special and
emergency events?
Are signal operations instructions (SOI) distributed to all units with a need to
know, such as higher, lower, adjacent, leading, and follow-on elements?

SECTION III – CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

D-26. The heavy combined arms battalion often operates for extended periods of time in
continuous operations. Continuous operations are combat operations continuing at the same
high-intensity level for extended periods. (For more information on the effects of continuous
operations refer to FM 6-22.5, Combat Stress.) Leaders and Soldiers may have opportunities
for sleep, but this sleep may be brief or fragmented, and there likely will be periods of
sustained operations characterized by little opportunity for leaders and Soldiers to get more
than a few minutes of sleep. This continuous cycle of day and night operations and the
associated stress of combat cause degradation in performance over time. Reducing this
impact on performance is a significant challenge for the command and control system.

EFFECTS OF CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

D-27. Continuous operations force leaders and Soldiers to perform under adverse conditions
that cause degradation in performance. The most significant factor leading to this
degradation is the loss of sleep. Figure D-4 shows the effects of sleep loss. Other contributing
factors include low light levels, limited visibility, disrupted sleep routines, physical fatigue,
and stress.

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FMI 3-90.5

After 24 hours Deterioration in performance of tasks that are inadequately or newly learned,
that are monotonous, or that require vigilance.
After 36 hours A marked deterioration in ability to register and understand information.
After 72 hours Performance on most tasks will be about 50 percent of normal.
3 to 4 days The limit for intensive work, including mental and physical elements. Visual
illusions are likely at this stage, or earlier, especially in NBC.
Between 0300 and 0600 hours Performance is at its lowest ebb.

Figure D-4. Effects of Sleep Loss

INDICATORS OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION AND FATIGUE

D-28. To minimize the effects of sleep loss, all commanders must be able to recognize the
signs of sleep loss and fatigue. Figure D-5 shows the indicators of sleep deprivation and
fatigue.

Physical changes Body swaying when standing.

Vacant stares.
Pale skin.
Slurred speech
Bloodshot eyes.
Mood changes Less energetic, alert, and cheerful.
Loss of interest in surroundings.
Possible depressed mood or apathetic and more irritable.
Early morning doldrums Required more effort to do a task in the morning than in the afternoon,
especially between 0300 and 0600.
Communication problems Unable to carry on a conversation.
Forgetfulness.
Difficulty in speaking clearly.
Difficulty in processing Slow comprehension and perception.
information Difficulty in assessing simple situations.
Requireslonger to understand information.
Impaired attention span Decreased vigilance.
Failure to complete routines.
Reduced attention span.
Short-term memory loss.
Inability to concentrate.

Figure D-5. Indicators of Sleep Deprivation and Fatigue

REDUCING THE IMPACT OF CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS

D-29. Figure D-6 shows the measures that may reduce the negative impacts of continuous
operations.

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 Risk Management and Fratricide Avoidance

Sleep Scheduling Countermeasures

Adequate 4 hours of continuous sleep every 24 Give simple, precise orders.
hours (likely to maintain adequate Increase use of written orders.
performance over several weeks). Cross check.
Sleep wakefulness A small amount of sleep relative to that Plan more time for completion of all
lost is beneficial. tasks.
Recovery 10 hours uninterrupted sleep required for Enforce adequate food and water
full recovery after 48–72 hours without intake.
sleep. Develop and enforce sleep plans.
Catnaps (10 to 30 minutes) Catnaps are beneficial, but the only truly Good physical fitness slows the
effective remedy is sleep. effects of sleep loss and fatigue.
Timing Consistent timing of sleep and wakeup Increase use of confirmation briefs.
times will contribute to successful
adjustment to an arduous regimen.
NOTE: After 48-72 hours without sleep, Soldiers become militarily
ineffective. After 5 to 7 days of partial sleep deprivation, alertness and
performance decline to the same low level as seen following 2 to 3 days
without sleep.

Figure D-6. Reducing the Impact of Continuous Operations

SLEEP DENIAL
D-30. Commanders and leaders often regard themselves as being the least vulnerable to
fatigue and the effects of sleep loss. Tasks requiring quick reaction, complex reasoning, and
detailed planning, however, make leaders the most vulnerable to the effects of sleep
deprivation. Leaders must sleep. The display of sleep denial as an example of self-control by
leaders is extremely counterproductive and dangerous to the effectiveness of the unit. Our
Soldiers demand that their leaders give good orders, and that is possible only when leaders
are properly rested.

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 Appendix E
Environmental Considerations

Preparation to conduct operations in any environment can incorporate the

necessary environmental awareness with minimal additional planning.
Many aspects of environmental protection discussed in this appendix will
appear to be common sense and will most likely be a part of the heavy
brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion’s standing
operational activity. This appendix is a guide by which to attain a balance
between accomplishing the mission and protecting environmentally
sensitive areas. Environmental considerations may be essential to
successful operations in stability operations and support operations and
must be considered as part of an effective information operations
campaign plan that stresses the interest of US forces in the quality of life
in the operational environment.

PREPARATION
E-1. Advanced preparation is key to successful mission completion, and the same holds true
for environmental awareness and protection. The HBCT combined arms battalion
commander should be aware of the publications governing environmental protection. All
heavy combined arms battalion staffs (company and above) should designate an
environmental compliance officer/NCO to serve as the unit’s point of contact (POC). This
person is responsible for environmental education, SOP updates, preparation of
environmental risk assessments, and incident reporting. Commanders should refer to FM 3-
100-4, Environmental Considerations in Military Operations, for guidelines and procedures
for applying risk management to identify actions that may harm the environment and steps
that can be taken to minimize or prevent damage. Note that FM 3-100.4 gives specific
guidance on environmental protection, and the combined arms battalion commander should
ensure compliance with that guidance. This appendix is intended to supplement, not replace,
FM 3-100.4.

CONDUCT OF THE MISSION

E-2. Protecting the environment is always difficult, and protecting the environment while
conducting operations against a hostile force is not always possible. The HBCT combined
arms battalion must deploy and operate with minimal environmental damage to
demonstrate that US military forces are responsible stewards of the earth’s resources.
Commanders must initiate environmental control measures and establish appropriate
protection levels without detracting from mission accomplishment. Environmental concerns
pertaining to a mission should be incorporated into the mission briefing based on the factors
of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and
civil considerations (METT-TC). Some of the factors affecting the battalion mission briefing
include mission, geographical location, time of the year, and those in the following
paragraphs:

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FMI 3-90.5

MISSION
Identify and assess known environmental risks during planning.
Determine the environmental impact on mission execution.
Specify those areas to avoid and minimize the effect on the unit’s scheme of
maneuver.
Provide maps and/or sketches with detailed areas of environmental concern.
Emphasize the importance of every Soldier playing an active role in identifying and
reporting new environmental risk elements.
Respond rapidly and effectively to all hazardous waste accidents.

ENEMY
Identify areas of probable environmental contamination that could affect friendly
force movement.
Evaluate intelligence reports of enemy equipment and/or capabilities and how they
could be employed against the environment.
Develop enemy target options to minimize environmental effects.
Maneuver enemy action away from environmentally sensitive areas, when feasible.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

Provide recommended paths of movement to avoid environmentally sensitive areas.
Emphasize navigation accuracy and identify well-defined terrain features.
Obtain and analyze predominant and developing weather patterns to diminish
possible environmental risks.

TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE

Develop a briefing for all Soldiers that highlights and defines the environmental
concerns and points of interest.
Provide a detailed and accurate SOP that identifies guidelines for avoiding risk
areas while allowing for mission accomplishment.
Anticipate areas of probable risk and brief Soldiers on how to prevent damage.
Incorporate environmental risk scenarios into rehearsals, if possible, to reinforce
Soldier response and promote the decision-making process to changing
environmental risks.
Require accurate and timely reports that pertain to any environmental issues,
friendly or enemy.

TIME
Maximize planning time and minimize complexity of mission brief.
Rehearse various mission profiles that emphasize adjusting for changing
environmental factors while maintaining the desired momentum.

CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS
Avoid unnecessary damage and limit environmental impact to civil infrastructure
due to the collateral damage of HBCT combined arms battalion operations.
Determine how proposed HBCT combined arms battalion actions will affect the
civilian population to determine the proportionality of the environmental effects
versus the mission benefit.
Evaluate what civil environmental factors the enemy may consider his high-value
targets (HVTs) and integrate this information into the plan.

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 Environmental Considerations

RISK ASSESSMENT
E-3. The environmental risk assessment considerations contained in this appendix address
the potential impact of the HBCT combined arms battalion’s mission on the environment.
The heavy combined arms battalion commander adds other considerations to address local
conditions or different mission activities. Using a scale of 0 (no probability of environmental
damage) to 5 (extremely high probability of environmental damage), he rates the specific
activities the HBCT combined arms battalion will perform during an operation. The
commander performs this evaluation for each of seven environmental areas. Using sound
judgment, the battalion commander considers the conditions under which the HBCT
combined arms battalion will operate. He then applies this value to the risk assessment
matrix. Figure E-1, is an example of a risk assessment matrix and is formatted to allow local
reproduction, as required. Refer to Figure E-2 as an example of a completed matrix for the
environmental area of air pollution. The values assigned are not absolute; different
commanders will assign different ratings for the same activity—it is a judgment call based
on the commander’s assessment.

Environmental Area: Rating

Unit Activity Risk Impact

(Circle One Number in Each Row)

Movement of heavy vehicles and systems 5 4 3 2 1 0

Movement of personnel and light 5 4 3 2 1 0

vehicles/systems

Activities of assembly area 5 4 3 2 1 0

Field maintenance of equipment 5 4 3 2 1 0

Maintenance conducted in locally constructed 5 4 3 2 1 0

maintenance facilities with hard stand

Figure E-1. Risk Assessment Matrix

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
E-4. Knowledge of environmental factors is essential to planning and decision-making. With
this knowledge, the HBCT combined arms battalion commander can quantify risks, detect
problem areas, reduce risk of injury or death, reduce property damage, and ensure
compliance with environmental regulations. He should complete environmental risk
assessments before conducting operations or logistical activities. The environmental risk
assessment matrix provides a deliberate approach to assessing the risk posed by HBCT
combined arms battalion mission activities on specific environmental areas. (Figure E-2
shows an example of a completed risk assessment for air pollution.) The matrix has four
components:
Environmental area.
HBCT combined arms battalion mission activities.

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FMI 3-90.5

Risk impact.
Risk rating.

Environmental Area: AIR POLLUTION Rating 15

Unit Activity Risk Impact
(Circle One Number in Each Row)

Movement of heavy vehicles and systems 5 4 3 2 1 0

Movement of personnel and light 5 4 3 2 1 0

vehicles/systems

Activities of assembly area 5 4 3 2 1 0

Field maintenance of equipment 5 4 3 2 1 0

Maintenance conducted in locally constructed

maintenance facilities with hard stand 5 4 3 2 1 0

Figure E-2. Completed Environmental Risk Assessment Matrix

ENVIRONMENTAL AREAS
E-5. The risk assessment matrix assesses risk in seven environmental areas. The HBCT
combined arms battalion commander and staff should develop one matrix for each. These
areas follow:
Air pollution.
Archeological, cultural, and historical resources.
Hazardous materials and hazardous waste.
Noise pollution.
Threatened and endangered species.
Water pollution.
Soil, vegetation, and wetland protection.

HBCT COMBINED ARMS BATTALION MISSION ACTIVITIES

E-6. The risk assessment matrix used in this manual considers five HBCT combined arms
battalion activities. These activities are generic, and the HBCT combined arms battalion
may modify them to meet its mission requirements and local conditions. These missions
follow:
Movement of heavy vehicles and systems.
Movement of personnel and light vehicles and systems.
Activities of the assembly area.
Field maintenance of equipment.
Maintenance in locally constructed maintenance facilities with hard stand.

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 Environmental Considerations

E-7. Examples of other activities the HBCT combined arms battalion might add follow:
Direct and indirect weapons firing.
Unexploded ordnance (UXO) operations.
Aviation support and operations.
Medical support and operations.
Mines and demolition.
Obscurant operations.
Waterborne or amphibious operations.
Limited visibility operations.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations.

RISK IMPACT VALUE

E-8. The risk impact value estimates the probability that the HBCT combined arms
battalion’s mission will have a negative impact on a particular environmental area. It is a
judgment for which the numeric value (0 to 5) most closely reflects the conditions under
which the HBCT combined arms battalion is operating. The value is not an absolute, and
different commanders might assign different values for the same mission. The risk impact
value is a judgment call based on the assessment of the potential for environmental damage.
The criteria shown in Tables E-1 through E-7, help commanders evaluate the probability of
occurrence. In filling out the matrix, the commander or staff officer circles the value selected
for each operation (Figure E-2).

RISK RATING
E-9. The HBCT combined arms battalion commander rates the risk for each environmental
area (each matrix) by adding the circled risk impact values (Figure E-3). A blank copy of the
overall risk assessment graph is provided for photocopying (Figure E-5,). The HBCT
combined arms battalion commander develops a risk assessment of the entire mission by
adding the risk ratings for the individual matrixes on one form. The overall environmental
risk falls into one of four categories: low, medium, high, or extremely high (Figure E-4).
Activities with an extremely high probability of environmental damage require Army forces
(ARFOR)/UEx approval.

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FMI 3-90.5

Maintenance
Conducted in
Movement Locally
of Constructed
Movement Personnel Maintenance
of Heavy and Light Assembly Field Facilities
Vehicles/ Vehicles/ Area Maintenance with Hard Risk
Systems Systems Activities of Equipment Stand Rating
Air Pollution 3 1 5 4 2 15
Archeological
and Historical 3 3 0 1 0 7
Sites
Hazardous
Materials and 2 1 1 2 0 6
Hazardous
Waste
Noise Pollution 1 0 1 0 0 2
Threatened
and
Endangered 1 1 0 0 0 2
Species
Water Pollution 5 2 3 2 0 12
Wetland
Protection 5 2 1 2 0 10
Overall Rating 20 10 11 11 2 54

Figure E-3. Overall Risk Assessment

Category Range Environmental Damage Decision-Maker

Low 0–58 Little or None Unit Commandeer
Medium 59–117 Minor Next Higher Command
High 118–149 Significant ARFOR/UEx
Extremely High 150–175 Severe ARFOR

Figure E-4. Overall Environmental Risk

RISK REDUCTION
E-10. The commander addresses each environmental area to reduce risks associated with
the mission. While he considers all risk values above 0, he obviously spends more time on
risk values of 5 than he does on those valued at 1. If the overall risk is low or medium, the
commander will still review any areas rated high or extremely high. He should use his
judgment in altering the mission to reduce the risk in this specific area. Many environmental
risk reduction measures are simply extensions of good management and leadership
practices. Commanders can effectively manage environmental risks using the following six
steps:
Step 1. Identify hazards to the environment during mission analysis. Consider all
activities that may pollute air, soil, and water. Also consider activities that may
degrade natural or cultural resources.
Step 2. Assess the probability of environmental damage or violations with
environmental risk assessment matrices.

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 Environmental Considerations

Step 3. Make decisions and develop measures to reduce high risks. Risk reduction
measures can include the following:
Rehearsals.
Changing locations or times of operations.
Increasing supervision.
Step 4. Brief chain of command, staff, and appropriate decision-makers on proposed
plans and residual risk.
Step 5. Integrate environmental measures into plans, orders, SOPs, and rehearsals.
Inform subordinates, down to individual Soldier level, of risk reduction measures.
Step 6. Supervise and enforce environmental standards. Hold those in charge
accountable for environmental risk reduction.

RESIDUAL RISK
E-11. Even with all practicable risk reduction measures in place, some risk will remain. This
residual risk requires leader attention. Unit commanders inform the chain of command and
appropriate decision-makers of residual risk and its implications for the mission. They also
inform their subordinates and focus command and control efforts onto those portions of the
mission.

SUMMARY
E-12. Unit commanders use environmental risk assessment to estimate the potential impact
of a mission on the environment. The environmental risk assessment will allow leaders and
their staffs to identify potential environmental problems before they occur. The process also
allows the commander to identify and manage residual risk.

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Table E-1. Air Pollution Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Current or forecasted weather conditions will contribute to brush fires (dry and windy).
AO is susceptible to brush fires.
AO lacks vegetation/pavement and is susceptible to dust formulation.
Vehicles and equipment are not reliable or well maintained
Soldiers are not proficient/experienced in the mission being conducted.
Command and control is marginal.
Sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Extensive use of external combustion equipment or explosives, incendiary devices, or flares is planned.
4 Current or forecasted weather conditions could contribute to brush fires.
AO is susceptible to brush fires.
AO is susceptible to moderate dust formulation.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
Some high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Some use or external combustion equipment explosives, incendiary devices, or flares is planned.
3 Weather is favorable for the mission; winds are within safe operating limits.
AO is safe from brush fires.
Soldiers are briefed on hazards of brush fires.
Command and control is adequate
2 AO is safe from brush fires.
AO is not susceptible to dust formulation.
Soldiers are briefed on hazards of brush fires.
Soldiers are environmentally conscientious.
Command and control is good.
1 AO is not susceptible to brush fires.
Fires are limited, controlled, and allowed only in authorized areas.
CS (riot control chemical agent) and obscurants are strictly controlled.
Vehicles and equipment are well maintained and in good operating order.
Soldiers are environmentally conscientious.
Soldiers are thoroughly familiar with fire restrictions.
Command and control is excellent.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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 Environmental Considerations

Table E-2. Archeological, Cultural, and Historic Resources Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Low-visibility, night, or sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
AO has many archeological, cultural, or historic resources.
Archeological, cultural, and historic resources are neither identified nor marked off limits.
Command and control is marginal.
Soldiers are not familiar with the AO.
4 AO has some archeological, cultural, and historic resources.
Archeological, cultural, and historic sites are marked off limits.
Limited visibility operations are planned.
Command and control is adequate.
Soldiers are not familiar with the AO.
3 Archeological, cultural, and historic sites are identified and marked off limits.
Soldiers have been briefed on off limits sites in AO.
No low-visibility or night operations are planned.
Command and control is adequate.
2 Archeological, cultural, and historic sites are identified and marked off limits.
No low-visibility or night operations are planned.
Command and control is good.
Soldiers are familiar with the AO.
1 Archeological, cultural, and historic sites are identified and marked off limits.
Soldiers avoid sites during training, operations, and logistical activities.
Soldiers are proactive in recognizing, safeguarding, and reporting signs or evidence of possible
archeological artifacts or sites.
Command and control is effective.
Soldiers are thoroughly familiar with the AO.
Current or forecasted weather conditions are not an adverse factor.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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Table E-3. Hazardous Materials and Hazardous Waste Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Low-visibility, night, or sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Operations are planned close to surface water sources.
Current or forecasted weather conditions are harsh.
Soldiers’ experience with responding to hazardous materials (HM) or hazardous waste (HW) spills is
limited or untested.
Command and control is marginal.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
4 Some high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Operations close to water sources are planned.
Current or forecasted weather conditions are marginal.
Some individuals are HM/HW qualified.
3 Soldiers are environmentally conscientious but not trained.
Key HM/HW personnel are available during operations and maintenance activities.
Adequate spill cleanup materials are available.
Command and control is adequate.
Current or forecasted weather conditions are not a factor.
2 Routine operations are planned (Soldiers have adequate rest).
Key HM/HW individuals will oversee high-risk HM/HW operations and maintenance activities.
Soldiers are environmentally sensitive and HM/HW trained.
Current or forecasted weather conditions are not a factor.
Command and control is excellent.
1 Soldiers dealing with HM/HW are well trained and experienced.
Combined arms battalion HM/HW SOP is current (includes accurate HM/HW inventory and location),
and fire department is provided with this inventory and location of HM/HW.
Command and control is excellent.
HM/HW is transported according to SOP.
Tempo of operations and maintenance is routine.
AO is well maintained, and unit maintains good housekeeping practices.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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 Environmental Considerations

Table E-4. Noise Pollution Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned with noise-generating equipment and activities
(artillery, tracked vehicles, weapons firing, construction equipment, aircraft, and power-generation
equipment).
Operations are conducted in close proximity to the civilian populace.
Command and control is marginal.
Soldiers’ proficiency in the operation being conducted is marginal.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
High OPTEMPO limited visibility operations are planned.
4 High OPTEMPO operations are planned with limited noise-generating activities (artillery, tracked
vehicles, weapons firing, construction equipment, aircraft, and power-generation equipment).
Command and control is adequate.
Operations are conducted in close proximity to the civilian populace.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
Reduced levels of limited visibility operations are planned.
3 Level of noise-generating equipment is routine (wheeled vehicles, small generators, and small-arms
fire).
Civilian populace will be nominally affected.
Command and control is adequate.
Limited visibility operations may be conducted.
2 Level of noise generated is nominal.
Command and control is good.
Soldiers are environmentally conscientious.
Limited visibility operations are not likely.
1 Minimum operations or maintenance activities are planned.
Command and control is highly effective.
Operations are conducted away from civilian populace.
Limited visibility operations are not planned.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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FMI 3-90.5

Table E-5. Threatened and Endangered Species Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are not identified.
Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are not marked off as a restricted area.
Command and control is marginal.
Sustained low-visibility or night operations are planned.
Sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Soldiers are not familiar with the AO.
4 Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are marked off.
Limited visibility operations are planned, and the Soldiers are inexperienced.
Command and control is adequate.
Soldiers are not familiar with the AO.
3 Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are marked off.
Soldiers are briefed on threatened and endangered species.
Limited visibility operations are planned with experienced Soldiers.
Command and control is adequate.
2 Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are identified.
Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are marked off.
Limited visibility operations are not planned.
Command and control is good
Soldiers are familiar with the AO.
1 Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are identified.
Soldiers know and recognize threatened and endangered species.
Threatened and endangered species’ habitats are marked off as restricted/off-limits areas.
Soldiers avoid threatened and endangered species’ habitats during operations (when possible based on
the factors of METT-TC) and logistical activities.
Command and control is effective.
Soldiers are thoroughly familiar with the AO.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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 Environmental Considerations

Table E-6. Water Pollution Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Maneuver will cause significant terrain damage.
Potential hazardous waste spills most likely will affect surface waters (wetlands, groundwater, streams,
ditches, sewers, or drains).
Limited visibility operations are planned.
Soldiers’ environmental proficiency is low.
Command and control is marginal.
Sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Hazardous waste spill response is marginal or untested.
Hazardous waste spill response material is not available.
4 Maneuver will cause some terrain damage.
Potential spill hazard is minimal; it will not affect surface waters, wetlands, groundwater, streams,
ditches, sewers, or drains.
High OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Soldiers’ environmental proficiency is somewhat low.
Command and control is marginal.
3 Potential hazardous waste spills will pose no potential contamination of any water source.
Routine operations are planned.
Soldiers are environmentally sensitive.
Command and control is adequate.
Weather will not adversely affect operations.
2 Potential hazardous waste spills will pose no potential contamination of any water source.
Routine operations are planned.
Soldiers are environmentally sensitive.
Command and control is good.
Soldiers are trained in spill-response duties.
Hazardous waste spill control material is readily available.
1 No potential for hazardous waste spill.
Soldiers are very environmentally aware.
Command and control is high.
Soldiers maintain good housekeeping practices.
Equipment is well maintained.
Collection of maintenance wastes is managed properly.
0 No risk/not applicable.

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FMI 3-90.5

Table E-7. Wetland Protection Risk Impact Value

Value Contributing Factors

5 Sustained high OPTEMPO operations are planned.
Command and control is marginal.
Current or forecasted weather conditions will cause operations to adversely affect wetlands.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
Soldiers’ proficiency in the operation being conducted is marginal.
Field service or maintenance may have to be done near wetlands.
Hazardous waste spill response is marginal.
Hazardous waste spill response materials are not available.
4 Limited visibility operations are planned.
Command and control is adequate.
Soldiers are not familiar with the AO.
Soldiers lack environmental awareness.
Field service or maintenance may have to be done near wetlands.
3 Soldiers have been briefed on susceptibility of wetlands to damage.
Limited visibility or night operations are not planned.
Command and control is adequate.
2 Soldiers are environmentally conscientious.
Limited visibility operations are not planned.
Command and control is good.
Soldiers are familiar with the AO.
1 Maintenance is conducted only in approved areas.
Wetland areas and boundaries are identified.
No refueling will be conducted in wetland areas.
Streams/ditches will be crossed at designated crossing sites.
Command and control is excellent.
Soldiers are environmentally conscientious.
Soldiers are familiar with AO.
Collection of maintenance wastes is managed properly.
0 No risk/not applicable

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 Environmental Considerations

Maintenance
Conducted
Movement in Locally
of Constructed
Movement Personnel Field Maintenance
of Heavy and Light Assembly Maintenance Facilities
Vehicles/ Vehicles/ Area of with Hard Risk
Systems Systems Activities Equipment Stand Rating

Air Pollution

Archeological
and Historical
Sites

Hazardous
Materials and
Hazardous
Waste
Noise Pollution

Threatened and
Endangered
Species

Water Pollution

Wetland
Protection

Overall Rating

Figure E-5. Overall Risk Assessment Matrix

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 Appendix F
Sniper Employment

Snipers play an important role in the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT)
combined arms battalion. They give the battalion commander accurate,
discriminatory, long-range lethal small-arms fire. The best use of sniper
fire is against key targets that other available weapon systems may be
unable to destroy due to their range, size, or location; visibility; security
and stealth requirements; avoidance of collateral damage; intensity of
conflict; or rules of engagement. The techniques snipers use enable them
to gather detailed, critical information about the enemy as a secondary
role. The effectiveness of a sniper is measured by more than casualties or
destroyed targets. Commanders know snipers also affect enemy activities,
morale, and decisions. Knowing snipers are present hinders the enemy’s
movement, creates confusion and continuous personal fear, disrupts
enemy operations and preparations, and compels the enemy to divert
forces to deal with the snipers. (See FM 23-10.)

SNIPER TEAMS
F-1. Snipers avoid sustained battles. They operate in three-man teams, each consisting of a
team leader, a sniper, and an observer. The team is typically armed with both M107 and
M24 sniper rifles as well as M4 carbines with a M203 grenade launcher per team. Team
members are cross-trained and help each other with range estimation, round adjustment,
and security. The heavy combined arms battalion has three sniper teams and is led by the
sniper squad leader.

EMPLOYMENT
F-2. The battalion sniper squad leader controls sniper teams from a central location
executing the battalion commander’s orders and intent. Once deployed, snipers generally
operate independently. They must understand the battalion commander’s intent, his concept
of the operation, and the purpose for their assigned tasks. This allows the teams to exercise
initiative within the framework of the commander’s intent and to support the commander’s
concept and accomplishment of the unit’s mission. Snipers are effective only in areas that
offer good fields of fire and observation. They must have the freedom of action to choose their
own positions once on the ground. The number of sniper teams participating in an operation
depends on their availability, the expected duration of the mission, and the enemy’s
strength. As with fire support assets, sniper teams rely on secure, reliable communications,
often over greater distances than typical maneuver elements.

SECURITY ELEMENT
F-3. Sniper teams should infiltrate with a security element (squad or platoon) whenever
possible. This allows the teams to reach their areas of operation faster and safer than if they
operated alone. The security element also protects the snipers during operations. When
moving with a security element, snipers follow the following guidelines:

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FMI 3-90.5

The security element leads the sniper team into its area of operations providing all-
round security to the snipers.
Snipers must appear to be an integral part of the security element. To do so, each
sniper carries his weapon system in line with and close to his body to hide the
weapons outline and barrel length. Snipers also conceal from view all sniper-unique
equipment (optics and ghillie suits).
The snipers’ uniforms must be the same as those of security element members.
Snipers and element members maintain proper intervals and positions in the
element formation.

SNIPER ESTIMATE
F-4. History has proven that commanders need education on the proper use of snipers. If
battalion commanders know the abilities and limitations of a sniper, the sniper can
contribute significantly to the fight. Snipers should be considered as an effects-producing
system and often should be considered as the lethal effects system of choice.

Mission
F-5. The sniper’s primary mission is to support combat operations by delivering precise
lethal fire from concealed positions. The mission assigned to a sniper team for a particular
operation consists of the tasks the battalion commander wants the sniper team to accomplish
and the reason (purpose) for it (desired effect). The battalion commander must decide how he
wants his sniper team to affect the battlefield. Then, he must assign missions to achieve this
effect.
The battalion commander should assign priorities to targets so snipers can avoid
involvement in sustained engagements. Regardless of the target priorities, the
sniper team must be free to change targets to support the commander’s intent.
The battalion commander may describe the effect or result he expects and allow the
sniper team to select key targets.
The battalion commander may assign specific types of targets to achieve an effect.
For example, if he wants to disrupt the defensive preparations of the enemy, he
may task snipers to kill bulldozer operators and other engineer equipment
operators. He may task them to disable enemy vehicles carrying supplies, or he
may task them to engage enemy soldiers digging enemy defensive positions.
The battalion commander may assign specific targets. These can include enemy
leaders, command and control operators, antitank guided missile gunners, armored
vehicle commanders, or weapon crews. In cases where large crowds pose a threat to
US forces, snipers can single out selected individuals. In populated areas where US
forces need to keep casualties to a minimum, snipers can be assigned to kill enemy
snipers. Snipers can be particularly effective in stability operations where the
application of force must be applied with precision.

Enemy
F-6. The battalion commander must consider the characteristics, capabilities, strengths,
weaknesses, and disposition of the enemy. Is the enemy force heavy or light, rested or tired,
disciplined or not? Is it motorized infantry or towed artillery? Is it well supplied or short of
supplies? Is it patrolling aggressively or lax in security? Is it positioned in assembly areas or
dug in? The answers to questions like these help the commander determine the enemy’s
susceptibility and reaction to effective sniper operations. A well-rested, well-led, well-
supplied, and aggressive enemy with armored protection poses a greater threat to snipers
than an enemy that is tired, poorly led, poorly supplied, lax, and unprotected. The battalion
commander needs to know if enemy snipers are present and effective since they can pose a

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 Sniper Employment

significant danger to his operations and his snipers. The commander must consider the
enemy’s directed-energy weapons capability (lasers) since snipers are particularly vulnerable
to these due to their use of optical devices as well as emerging acoustic countersniper
technology.

Terrain
F-7. The battalion commander must evaluate and consider the terrain in and en route to the
sniper’s area of operations, the time and effort snipers will expend getting into position, and
the effects of weather on the sniper and his visibility. Snipers prefer positions at least 300
meters from their target area. Operating at this distance allows them to avoid effective fire
from enemy rifles while retaining much of the 800- to 1,000-meter effective range of the
sniper rifle. Snipers need areas of operations with adequate observation, fields of fire, and
good firing positions as well as multiple covered and concealed ingress/egress routes. Urban
terrain considerations include the following:
Construction of buildings: The M107 rifle is more effective in cinderblock type
construction; however, the M24 reduces chance of collateral damage in flimsy
construction.
Typical height of buildings: The tallest building does not provide the best firing
platform.
Egress routes: While there are many ways out of a wooded area, buildings usually
offer one to three viable exit routes.
Infrastructure: Civil infrastructure may obscure line of sight (power poles and lines,
street lights, etc.).

Troops
F-8. The battalion commander must decide how many sniper teams to use depending on
their availability, the duration of the operation, expected opposition, and the number and
difficulty of tasks and targets assigned. Commanders must consider the snipers’ level of
training and physical conditioning and remember the effects of these human factors on
sniper operations.

Time Available
F-9. The battalion commander must consider how much time the snipers will have to achieve
the result he expects. He must allocate time for snipers to plan, coordinate, prepare,
rehearse, move, and establish positions. The commander must understand how the snipers’
risk increases when they lack adequate time to plan or to perform other tasks such as move
to the area of operations. The amount of time a sniper team can remain in a position without
loss of effectiveness due to eye fatigue, muscle strain, or cramps depends mostly on the type
of position it occupies. Generally, snipers can remain in an expedient position for 6 hours
before they must be relieved. They can remain in belly positions or semipermanent hides for
up to 48 hours before they must be relieved. Normal mission duration times average 24
hours. (FM 23-10 provides guidance on sniper position considerations, construction, and
preparation and occupation times.) Movement factors for snipers moving with a security
element are the same as for any dismounted infantry force. When snipers move alone in the
area of operations, they move slowly; their movement can be measured in feet and inches.
The sniper team is the best resource in determining how much time is required for their
movement.

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FMI 3-90.5

OFFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT
F-10. Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy to destroy his capability and will to
fight. By killing enemy targets that threaten the success of the attack, the sniper can play a
major role in offensive operations.

OFFENSIVE MISSIONS
F-11. During offensive operations, snipers perform the following:
Conduct countersniper operations.
Overwatch movement of friendly forces and suppress enemy targets that threaten
the moving forces.
Place precision fire on enemy crew-served weapons teams and into exposed
apertures of bunkers.
Place precision fire on enemy leaders, armored vehicle drivers or commanders,
forward observers, and other designated personnel.
Place precision fire on small, isolated, bypassed forces.
Place precision fire on targets threatening a counterattack or fleeing.
Assist in screening a flank using supplemental fires or augment reconnaissance
forces.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
F-12. During a movement to contact, snipers move with the lead element, or they can be
employed 24 to 48 hours before the unit’s movement to:
Select positions.
Gather information about the enemy.
Deny enemy access to key terrain through controlled precision fires, preventing
enemy surprise attacks.

DISMOUNTED ASSAULT
F-13. During a mounted attack, fast movement limits the snipers role; however, snipers can
provide effective support during a dismounted assault.
Enemy contact may force the friendly mounted element to dismount and continue
moving dismounted to the objective. Snipers placed with lead elements move to
positions that allow them to overwatch the dismounted movement of the element
and provide long-range small-arms fire. Sniper teams are most effective where:
BFVs and tanks are ineffective; that is, where these vehicles cannot provide
overwatching fires, such as in urban areas or restricted terrain.
The enemy situation may present an unacceptable risk to vehicles occupying
hull defilade positions.
Vehicle movement could compromise the stealth of the dismounted force.
Multiple avenues must be overwatched.
Snipers may also be placed with a mounted support element assigned to suppress,
fix, or isolate the enemy on the objective. The sniper rifle’s precision fire and lack of
blast effect allow the sniper to provide closer supporting fires for assaulting
Soldiers than the mounted support element can provide. The difference in their
weapons’ effective ranges requires the snipers and the mounted support element to
seek support by fire positions at different ranges when terrain allows. Long after
BFVs and tanks are forced to shift or lift their supporting fires, snipers can

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selectively fire on close-in targets threatening the assault. These targets may be
gunners of enemy crew-served weapons or enemy soldiers in fortified positions.
If time permits, snipers may be deployed as soon as the element reaches the
dismount point. Because the snipers’ weapons have better optics and longer ranges
than other types of small arms, they can provide additional long-range observation
and precision fire on any enemy targets that may appear. To increase security,
snipers may cover different sectors than the mounted elements.
Snipers may move with the dismounted element toward the objective; occupy a
close-in support by fire position where they can help suppress or destroy targets
threatening the assault of the dismounted element; or move with the dismounted
element onto the objective to provide close-in precision fire against enemy fortified
positions, bunkers, and trench lines. Selection of the sniper support by fire position
depends on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The closer snipers are to the
objective area, the greater the chance they will be discovered and lose their
effectiveness.
If mounted elements appear on the battlefield at the same time snipers arrive, the
snipers’ security and potential for surprise are degraded. To increase security and
surprise, snipers may move covertly into position in an objective area well before
the main attack and mounted forces arrive. Ideally, a sniper team going in early
moves with infiltrating dismounted infantry. This is faster and more secure than
moving alone. After the snipers are in position, dismounted infantrymen may
remain nearby as additional security, but they are more likely to have other
supporting tasks to perform. The proximity of dismounted infantry enhances
security.
After their fires are masked by the movement of friendly elements, snipers must
reposition as soon as possible. The speed of mechanized assaults may prevent
snipers from firing from more than one support position. The commander must
carefully evaluate where snipers will be most useful. If he wants to use snipers in
several different places or if he wants them to contribute throughout the attack, he
should provide transportation to enable them to move quickly, stealthily, and safely
on the battlefield.
On consolidation, snipers may displace forward to new positions that are not
necessarily on the objective. From these positions, the snipers provide precision fire
against bypassed enemy positions, enemy counterattack forces, or other enemy
positions that could degrade the unit’s ability to exploit the success of the attack.

Raids
F-14. During a raid, sniper teams can join with either the security element or the support
element to:
Cover avenues of approach and escape that lead in and out of the objective over
friendly routes of withdrawal to the rally point.
Provide long-range fires on the objective.

ACTIONS AGAINST FORTIFIED AREAS

F-15. Assaulting forces usually encounter some type of fortified positions prepared by the
defending force. These can range from field-expedient, hasty positions produced with locally
available materials to elaborate steel and concrete emplacements complete with turrets,
underground tunnels, and crew quarters. More elaborate positions are likely when the
enemy has had significant time to prepare his defense. He may have fortified weapons

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emplacements or bunkers, protected shelters, reinforced natural or constructed caves,

entrenchments, and other obstacles.

ENEMY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

F-16. The enemy tries to locate these positions so they are mutually supporting and arrayed
in depth across the width of his sector. He tries to increase his advantages by covering and
concealing positions and preparing fire plans and counterattack contingencies. Fortified
areas should be bypassed and contained by a small force.

SNIPER SUPPORT
F-17. The sniper’s precision fire and observation capabilities are invaluable in the assault of
a fortified area. Precision rifle fire can easily detect and destroy pinpoint targets that are
invisible to the naked eye. The sniper’s role during the assault of a fortified position is to
deliver precision fire against observation posts, exposed personnel, and the embrasures, air
vents, and doorways of key enemy positions. The commander plans the order in which
snipers should destroy targets. Their destruction should systematically reduce the enemy’s
defense by destroying the ability of enemy positions to support each other. Once these
positions are isolated, they can be reduced more easily. The battalion commander must
decide where he will try to penetrate the enemy’s fortified positions and then employ his
snipers against those locations. Snipers can provide continuous fire support for both
assaulting units and other nearby units when operating from positions near the breach point
on the flanks. Sniper fires add to the effectiveness of the entire unit; the commander can
employ snipers in situations where other resources cannot be used for various reasons.

SNIPER PLAN
F-18. The sniper team bases its plan on information available. The enemy information it
needs includes the following:
Extent and exact locations of individual and underground fortifications.
Fields of fire, directions of fire, locations and number of embrasures, and types of
weapon systems in the fortifications.
Locations of entrances, exits, and air vents in each emplacement.
Locations and types of existing and reinforcing obstacles.
Locations of weak spots in the enemy’s defense.

DEFENSIVE EMPLOYMENT
F-19. Snipers may effectively enhance or augment any unit’s defensive fire plan. After
analyzing the terrain, the sniper team should recommend options to the battalion
commander.

DEFENSIVE TASKS
F-20. The sniper team can perform the following tasks during defensive operations:
Cover obstacles, minefields, roadblocks, and demolitions.
Perform counterreconnaissance (kill enemy reconnaissance elements).
Engage enemy observation posts, armored vehicle commanders exposed in turrets,
and antitank guided missile (ATGM) teams.
Damage the optics on enemy vehicles to degrade their movement.
Suppress enemy crew-served weapons.
Disrupt follow-on units with long-range small-arms fire.

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PRIMARY POSITIONS
F-21. Snipers are generally positioned to observe or control one or more avenues of approach
into the defensive position. Due to the types of weapon systems available, snipers may be
used against secondary avenues of approach. Sniper employment can increase all-round
security and allow the commander to concentrate his combat power against the most likely
enemy avenue of approach. Snipers may support the heavy combined arms battalion by
providing extra optics for target acquisition and precise long-range fires to complement those
of the M249, M240B, and M2 machineguns. This arrangement seeks to maximize the
effectiveness of all the unit’s weapon systems. Snipers in an economy-of-force role may cover
dismounted enemy avenues of approach into the battalion’s positions.

ALTERNATE AND SUPPLEMENTARY POSITIONS

F-22. Snipers establish alternate and supplementary positions for all-round security.
Positions near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are vulnerable to concentrated
attacks, enemy artillery, and obscurants. Multiple sniper teams, if used, can be positioned
for surveillance and mutual fire support. If possible, they should establish positions in depth
for continuous support during the fight. The sniper’s rate of fire neither increases nor
decreases as the enemy approaches. Sniper teams systematically and deliberately shoot
specific targets, never sacrificing accuracy for speed.

KEY TERRAIN
F-23. The battalion commander can position snipers to overwatch key obstacles or terrain
such as river-crossing sites, bridges, minefields, or anything that canalizes the enemy
directly into engagement areas. Snipers are mainly used where weapon systems are less
effective due to security requirements or terrain. Even though weapon systems with greater
range and optics capability than the snipers’ weapons are available to the commander, he
may be unable to use them for any of several reasons. They might present too large a firing
signature, be difficult to conceal well, create too much noise, or be needed more in other
areas. Sniper team members provide the commander with better options regarding
observation and greater killing ranges than do other Soldiers.

FORCE SECURITY
F-24. Snipers can be used as an integral part of the security effort. They can help acquire
and destroy targets, augment the security element by occupying concealed positions for long
periods, observe and direct indirect fires (to maintain their security), and engage targets.
Selective long-range sniper fires are difficult for the enemy to detect. A few well-placed shots
can disrupt enemy reconnaissance efforts, force him to deploy into combat formations, and
deceive him as to the location of the main battle area. The snipers’ stealth skills counter the
skills of enemy reconnaissance elements. Snipers can be used where scout or rifle platoon
mobility is unnecessary, freeing the scouts and riflemen to cover other sectors. Snipers can
also be used to direct ground maneuver elements toward detected targets. This also helps
maintain security so ground maneuver elements can be used against successive echelons of
attacking enemy. Snipers can be the most effective countersniper force in the battalion,
providing advice regarding enemy sniper employment tactics, techniques, and procedures.

STRONGPOINT EMPLOYMENT
F-25. Snipers should be tasked to support any unit defending a strongpoint. The
characteristics of the sniper team enable it to adapt to perform independent harassing and
observation tasks in support of the force in the strongpoint, either from inside or outside the
strongpoint.

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REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

F-26. Snipers can provide effective long-range fires from positions forward of the
topographical crest (or on the counter slope if the unit is occupying a reverse slope defense).

RETROGRADE EMPLOYMENT
F-27. The sniper team must know the concept, intent, scheme of maneuver, withdrawal
times or conditions and priorities, routes, support positions, rally points, and locations of
obstacles. Both engagement and disengagement criteria must be planned and coordinated to
ensure snipers achieve the desired effect without compromising their positions.

FORCE ENEMY DEPLOYMENT

F-28. Snipers can help the delaying force cause the enemy to deploy prematurely during
retrograde operations. They help by inflicting casualties with accurate, long-range small-
arms fire. When the enemy receives effective small-arms fire from unknown positions, he is
likely to assume he is near an enemy position (most likely one with ATGMs) and to begin
maneuvering to a position of advantage against the perceived threat. Using a sniper team,
the battalion commander can achieve the same effect he could with another infantry unit.
The snipers’ stealth also gives them a better chance of infiltrating out of positions close to
the enemy.

REPOSITIONING
F-29. Delaying forces risk being bypassed or overtaken by attacking enemy forces.
Commanders may provide transportation to move snipers to successive positions. Vehicles
must remain in defilade positions to the rear of the sniper position, or they must occupy
different positions away from the snipers’ area of operations to avoid compromising the
snipers’ position. In either case, a linkup point, egress routes, and conditions for executing
the linkup must be fully coordinated. Commanders may also provide communications assets
to the sniper team to facilitate control and movement.

INFILTRATION
F-30. Snipers may be required to infiltrate back to friendly positions. Their infiltration
plans must be fully coordinated to avoid fratricide when they try to reenter a friendly
position. When planning successive positions, the battalion commander must realize the
sniper team may be unavailable for use if it is destroyed or is having difficulty disengaging
from an enemy force. The commander must consider carefully how and where he wants
snipers to contribute to the operation. Planning too many positions for the sniper team in a
fast-paced retrograde may result in failure.

SNIPER TASKS
F-31. Snipers may be assigned any of the following specific tasks:
Delay the enemy by inflicting casualties.
Observe avenues of approach.
Cover key obstacles with precision fire.
Direct artillery fire against large enemy formations.

URBAN OPERATIONS EMPLOYMENT

F-32. The value of the sniper to a unit conducting urban operations depends on several
factors, including the type of operation, level of conflict, and ROE. Where ROE allow

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destruction, the snipers may not be needed since other weapon systems available to a heavy
combined arms battalion have greater destructive effect. But where ROE prohibit collateral
damage, snipers may be the most valuable tool the commander has to employ.

URBAN TERRAIN
F-33. Sniper effectiveness depends partly on the terrain. The characteristics of an urban
area degrade control. To provide timely and effective support, the sniper must have a clear
understanding of the scheme of maneuver and battalion commander’s intent.
Observation and fields of fire are clearly defined by roadways, but rooftops,
windows, and doorways limit surveillance. Each requires constant observation. The
effects of smoke from military obscurants and burning buildings can degrade what
otherwise appears to be an excellent vantage point. All-round defense becomes even
more important because the enemy can fire from many directions and because
enemy infiltration attempts must be countered.
Cover and concealment are excellent for both the attacker and defender. The
defender has a decisive advantage. The attacker normally exposes himself during
movement through the area.
Avenues of approach inside buildings are best. Movement there is less easily
detected than movement through the streets. The sniper must be conscious of all
avenues of approach and must be prepared to engage targets that appear on any of
them.

POSITIONING
F-34. Snipers should be positioned in buildings of masonry construction that offer long-
range fields of fire and all-round observation. The sniper has an advantage because he does
not have to move with, or be positioned with, lead elements. He may occupy a higher position
to the rear or flanks and some distance away from the element he is supporting. By
operating far from the other elements, a sniper avoids decisive engagement but remains
close enough to kill distant targets threatening the unit. Snipers should not be placed in
obvious positions (such as on top of the tallest structure and rooftops) since the enemy often
observes these and targets them for destruction. Indirect fires can generally penetrate
rooftops and cause casualties in top floors of buildings. Snipers should not be positioned
where there is heavy traffic because these areas invite enemy observation as well.

MULTIPLE POSITIONS
F-35. Snipers should operate throughout the area of operations, moving with and supporting
the company teams as necessary. Some teams may operate independent of other forces. They
search for targets of opportunity, especially for enemy snipers. Since a single position may
not afford adequate observation for the entire team without increasing the risk of detection
by the enemy, the team may occupy multiple positions. Separate positions must maintain
mutual support. Each team should also establish alternate and supplementary positions.

TASKS
F-36. The battalion commander may assign the following tasks to snipers:
Conduct countersniper operations.
Kill targets of opportunity. (The sniper team assigns priorities to these targets
based on an understanding of the commander’s intent; for example, engaging
enemy snipers, then leaders, vehicle commanders, radio men, sappers, and
machinegun crews, in that order.)
Deny enemy access to certain areas or avenues of approach (control key terrain).

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Provide fire support for barricades and other obstacles.

Maintain surveillance of flank and rear avenues of approach (screen).
Support local counterattacks with precision fire.

STABILITY OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

F-37. Snipers can be valuable to units conducting stability operations and support
operations. Since ROE normally limit collateral damage and civilian casualties, snipers can
selectively kill or wound key individuals who pose a threat to friendly forces. This selective
engagement avoids unacceptable civilian casualties or collateral damage. Targets often hide
in the midst of the civilian populace, which makes them virtually invulnerable to US forces
that cannot destroy these targets without causing innocent casualties. An example would be
a lone gunman in a crowd who fires at Soldiers manning a roadblock. The Soldiers must first
identify the gunman (this is nearly impossible from their vantage point). Then, without
hurting innocent bystanders, they must stop him from continuing to fire or from fleeing. This
is an easier task for an overwatching sniper than for infantry on the ground. The sniper can
look down on the crowd, use his optics to scan continuously, and employ precision fire to
eliminate the identified enemy without harming bystanders. Though other unit optical
systems may supplement the surveillance effort (Javelins and TOWs from the ground or
from the upper floors of buildings), they do not engage the target because of the risk of
innocent casualties. After identifying the target, Javelins and TOWs still need time to guide
a precision weapon or maneuver a unit to address the target. The sniper rifle provides the
commander the only system that can both identify and engage the target.

RIVER CROSSINGS
F-38. Sniper teams, by virtue of their observation and precision fire capabilities, are
uniquely adaptable to the initial stages of a river crossing. They are normally employed in
general support of the heavy combined arms battalion both before and during the crossing.

POSITIONING
F-39. Snipers assume positions across the total width of the crossing area (if possible) before
the crossing. Their main task is to observe. They report all sightings of enemy positions and
activity immediately and provide a stealthy observation capability not otherwise available to
the commander. Their stealth prevents the enemy from learning key facts like what type of
unit is trying to cross. The snipers supplement normal reconnaissance assets.

CROSSING SUPPORT
F-40. Snipers provide support during the crossing by continuing to observe and suppress
enemy observation posts and other key targets that heavier supporting elements might
overlook. The snipers’ ability to continue to provide close-in suppressive fire makes
continuous fire support possible up to the moment elements reach the far side and begin
their movement to establish the bridgehead line. Snipers should be positioned as early as
possible, preferably as part of the reconnaissance force. Their movement across the river
must also be planned in advance. How they will get across and where their subsequent
positions will be must be coordinated. Generally, they displace once friendly elements reach
the far side.

INSERTED FORCE SUPPORT

F-41. Snipers expand the capability of the inserted force to engage threatening targets at
long ranges. Once on the far side, snipers may screen the flank or rear of the crossing force,
infiltrate to destroy key targets (such as a demolition guard or fortified emplacement), or

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man observation posts well to the front of the crossing force. This placement increases both
early warning time and the crossing force’s ability to disrupt enemy counterattack forces.

PATROLLING
F-42. The effective employment of sniper teams with any size or type of patrol is limited
only by the terrain and the patrol leader’s ingenuity. Snipers must know and be able to apply
all aspects of patrolling.

RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS
F-43. Snipers normally remain with the security element during reconnaissance patrols. If
terrain permits, snipers can provide long-range support to enable the reconnaissance
element to patrol farther from the security element. To prevent compromise of the
reconnaissance element’s position, snipers fire only in self-defense or when ordered by the
patrol leader. Normally, the only appropriate time to fire at a target of opportunity is when
extraction or departure from the position is imminent and firing will not endanger the
success of the patrol.

RAID PATROLS
F-44. Sniper employment on a raid depends on the time of day and the size of the patrol.
When the patrol needs maximum firepower and its size must be limited, snipers may be
excluded. If, on the other hand, the patrol needs long-range precision fire and its size
permits, sniper teams may be attached to the security element. If appropriate, the sniper
team may be attached to the support element to help provide long-range supporting fires.
When attached to the security element, the sniper team helps observe, helps prevent enemy
escape from the objective area, and helps cover the withdrawal of the assault force to the
rally point. When the element withdraws from the rally point, the sniper team may stay
behind to delay and harass enemy counteraction or pursuit.

AMBUSH PATROLS
F-45. During ambushes, snipers are positioned in areas that afford observation and fields of
fire on terrain features the enemy might use for cover after the ambush has begun. The
snipers’ long-range capability allows them to be positioned away from the main body. Sniper
fires are coordinated into the fire plan. Once the signal to initiate fires is given, snipers add
their fires to the rest of the patrols. Snipers shoot leaders, radio operators, and crew-served
weapons teams. If the enemy is mounted, every effort is made to kill drivers of the lead and
trail vehicles to block the road, prevent escape, and create confusion. Snipers may remain in
position to cover the withdrawal of the patrol.

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 Appendix G
Fires Integration

Synchronization between fires and maneuver is critical to mission

success. The planning process must integrate these functions into a
single, coordinated effort. After planning guidance is issued to the
battalion fire support officer (FSO), the entire staff must work to ensure
that the technical and procedural aspects of fire support are understood
and crafted in a way that maximizes the effects while complementing the
maneuver plan. The heavy combined arms battalion commander has the
challenge to achieve synchronization in fire and maneuver. While success
in any battle, engagement, or operation is never guaranteed, success is
much more likely for the commander who can synchronize military
actions.

COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE FOR FIRE SUPPORT

G-1. The battalion commander’s early and continuous involvement in the fire and effects
support plan is essential to ensure that fires are properly synchronized with the maneuver
plan. At a minimum, the battalion commander must articulate what he wants from the
indirect assets in the form of a task and purpose for fires at each critical event on the
battlefield. The commander’s guidance for fire support becomes the basis for the heavy
combined arms battalion concept of fires and the fires paragraph in the operation order
(OPORD) (Table G-1).
G-2. It is important for the FSO and the battalion commander to have a common
understanding of what fires must do to support the operation before the FSO begins to
develop the plan. The battalion staff (with the commander’s approval) may further define the
initial essential fire and effects tasks (EFETs) as the military decision-making process
(MDMP) progresses, but the more clearly the commander defines them initially, the more
focused and effective fire support planning will be.
G-3. A task for fire support describes a targeting effect against a specific enemy formation’s
function or ability. The purpose describes how this effect contributes to accomplishing the
mission within the intent. The battalion commander’s initial planning guidance for fire
support becomes the basis for the concept of fires and the fires paragraph. Synchronization
in the plan depends largely on the commander’s ability to issue planning guidance to the
staff members, which causes them to develop integrated courses of action (COAs).

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Table G-1. Commander’s Guidance for Fire Support

EFSTs: What fire support is to accomplish, providing task and purpose at a minimum.
Focus for Fires: Focus by phase of the battle and linked to specific events.
Targets: The type of target to be engaged and the desired effect on each.
Force Protection Priorities: The priorities for protecting friendly forces and for counterfire.
Restrictions and Priorities for Special Munitions: Include use of smoke, SCATMINEs, Copperheads, or
illumination.
Observer Plan: Employment of COLTs, Knight/Striker teams, etc.
Radar Guidance: Establishment of radar zones, security of radar systems.
Fire Support Coordination Measures:
ROE Guidance: Protected target list.
Engagement Criteria: Guidance of size and type of units to be engaged at selected points in the operation.

G-4. As EFETs are determined during the MDMP using a top-down planning, bottom-up
refinement process, fires are integrated into the scheme of maneuver. If the staff has
thoroughly war gamed possible enemy and friendly COAs, the resultant fire support plan is
focused; that is, it provides the effects desired by the commander to accomplish the mission.
During execution, the only thing that should be allowed to desynchronize the plan is enemy
actions not previously considered. Since this almost always occurs, the battalion commander
must have a system in place to immediately make D3A (decide, detect, deliver, assess)
decisions, to disseminate them, and to execute them. The battalion focuses on fighting the
enemy (not the plan) in accordance with the commander’s guidance.
G-5. In terms of a brigade versus battalion fight, there is only one fire plan. The top-down
plan developed and refined during the MDMP and preparation phase should incorporate
EFETs supporting brigade and battalion (and company) schemes of maneuver. As fires shift
from deeper to closer targets, execution responsibility tends to shift from brigade to heavy
combined arms battalion. In executing the fire plan, brigade does not hand fires off to
subordinate headquarters; it hands off the responsibility for executing certain EFETs to
subordinate headquarters. In this manner, brigade fires remain synchronized with brigade
maneuver while still supporting subordinate maneuver units. The expected conflict between
simultaneously attacking targets the heavy combined arms battalion wants attacked by fires
and attacking targets the brigade wants attacked by fires must be planned for and war
gamed in the MDMP.

PLANNING AND INTEGRATION OF FIRE SUPPORT EFFECTS

G-6. The planning and integration of fire support effects occurs during steps three and four
(COA development and COA analysis) of the MDMP.
G-7. As the battalion staff begins COA development, the FSO (based on initial fire support
guidance from the battalion commander) conceptualizes how to integrate fires into the
developing concept of operations. The FSO uses the approved EFETs and the battalion
commander’s guidance for fire support to develop where and how he recommends the
allocation of fire support assets to each COA. The output for this step is a draft fire support
plan for each COA.
G-8. The FSO and staff conduct the following actions during COA development.
They determine where to find and attack EFET formations. The battle staff
determines where the enemy formations identified by the commander can be found
and attacked. The staff graphically portrays these locations using target areas of
interest (TAIs) or engagement areas (EAs).

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They identify high-payoff targets (HPTs) in EFET formations (target value

analysis). Certain subelements, capabilities, or equipment sets within the EFET
formations may be more vulnerable to attack with fires and or may provide the best
effects if attacked. This process results in identifying or refining the HPTs.
G-9. The battalion FSO uses products from brigade-level target value analysis to assist him
in the targeting process (decide phase) during COA development. These products include the
following:
The high-payoff target list (HPTL) is a prioritized list of HPTs.
The attack guidance matrix (AGM) addresses which targets will be attacked, how
and when they will be attacked, and the desired effects.
The target selecting system (TSS) addresses the accuracy and time criteria that
must be met before targets can be attacked.
G-10. Note that at the heavy combined arms battalion level, the FSO will rarely develop his
own HPTL, AGM, or TSS. Examples of targeting products developed at brigade level can be
found in FM 3-09.22. For further explanation of these products, refer to FM 3-09.22.
G-11. The battalion staff quantifies effects for EFETs and success. It focuses on what must
be accomplished to achieve the EFET. If desired effects cannot be achieved with the assets
allocated, the staff must rework the method or request additional assets.
G-12. The heavy combined arms battalion staff plans methods for EFETs (allocate assets to
acquire/allocate assets to attack). This step involves allocating or assigning assets to detect
and track HPTs. The heavy combined arms battalion S2, S3, and FSO work together as they
build this part of the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan. They then determine who
can execute the task based on the battalion scheme of maneuver, acquisition asset
capabilities, and the priorities of the collection plan. The FSO must consider asset general
movement and positioning requirements (for example, forward observers (FOs), fire support
teams (FISTs), or combat observation lasing teams (COLTS) to enable execution of fires with
refinements made during war gaming.
G-13. The battalion staff integrates triggers with maneuver COAs. The synchronization of
maneuver and fire support is essential for success. The FSO must understand the relative
timing of maneuver and fires and establish triggers that reflect this. For example, “When the
lead company crosses Phase Line Dog, the obscuration smoke will be fired at grid NK
124757.” Triggers are further refined during the COA analysis war-gaming process and
during the combined arms rehearsals.
G-14. The staff uses battle calculus to test feasibility. As the FSO and battle staff develop
COAs, they must apply doctrinal or measured rates, planning factors, speeds, and other data
to ensure the plan is feasible.
G-15. The FSO assists the S2 in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan
development. He coordinates with the S2 and S3 to ensure there are adequate, redundant
collection assets to find, track, and attack the HPTs in the fire support plan.
G-16. The commander and staff must integrate the task force mortar platoon into the fire
plan:
The mortar platoon leader must be actively involved in developing the fire support
plan.
The battalion commander should integrate the mortar platoon at each phase of the
operation.
The mortar platoon requires a copy of the fire support execution matrix to assist in
technical data processing.

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G-17. The result of the above listed actions is the output of a draft fire support plan for each
COA, branch plan, or sequel. EFETs should be clearly identified. The draft battalion fire
support plan will include the following:
Draft fires paragraph/concept of fires.
Draft fire support execution matrix (FSEM) that graphically communicates the
details of the fires paragraph. It ties executors to targets relative to time and or
events of the scheme of maneuver.
Draft target list worksheet and overlay that provides detailed description of
targets; tentative target locations based on intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB); and, in modified form, the task and purpose of each target and
link to the EFET it supports. The overlay provides a graphic depiction of the target
locations.
ISR plan. The FSO assists the S2 and S3 in its development.
G-18. During COA analysis, the staff refines the necessary details of the concept of the
operation. During the war-game process, targets and triggers are refined. As the battle staff
conducts an action-reaction-counteraction drill to cause and respond to enemy acts, the war
game provides the FSO with the opportunity to finalize targeting decisions (refine targets
and establish primary and alternate executors and their triggers), visualize and synchronize
the fire support plan with maneuver, test and refine the fire support plan, and modify the
plan based on the above. Based on the issues identified by the war game, the FSO and staff
can modify the draft fire support plan and products.
G-19. During COA analysis, the following actions occur:
Finalize HPTL and other targeting decisions.
War game fire support plan against enemy COA.
Modify and or refine fires products.
G-20. Based on the above actions, the output of the COA analysis is a refined fires product,
including the following:
Fire support annex.
FSEM.
Target list.
Target list overlay.
G-21. On completion of the OPORD, the commander must ensure that the fires plan, which
may be well synchronized in the OPORD, is similarly well synchronized during the execution
of the mission. He ensures fires synchronization after the issuance of the OPORD by
supervising the following activities:
Active participation during the maneuver and fires rehearsals.
Backbriefs from subordinate leaders on their understanding and execution of the
fires plan.
Ground reconnaissance with his subordinate leaders to ensure that the observation
plan is properly positioned to obtain desired results.

OBSERVATION AND TARGET EXECUTION PLANNING AND

PREPARATION
G-22. Company commanders often find themselves as the observer (and executor) of
battalion fires. Understanding the concept of echelonment of fires is critical for the indirect-
fire plan to be effectively synchronized with the maneuver plan. The purpose of echeloning
fires is to maintain constant fires on an objective while using the optimum delivery system
up to the point of its risk estimate distance (RED) in combat operations or minimum safe

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 Fires Integration

distance (MSD) in training. Echeloning fires provides protection for friendly forces as they
move to and assault an objective, allowing them to get in close with minimal casualties. It
prevents the enemy from observing and engaging the assault by forcing the enemy to take
cover, allowing the friendly force to continue the advance unimpeded.
G-23. The concept behind echeloning fires is to begin attacking targets on or around the
objective using the weapon systems with the largest RED combat (or MSD training). As the
maneuver unit closes the distance (that is, crosses the RED line) en route to the objective,
the fires lift (or shift). This triggers the engagement of the targets by the delivery system
with the next largest RED combat (or MSD training). The length of time to engage the
targets is based on the rate of the friendly force’s movement between the RED combat (or
MSD training) trigger lines. The process continues until the system with the least RED
combat (or MSD training) lifts, and the maneuver unit is close enough to make its final
assault and clear the objective.
G-24. The RED combat (or MSD training) takes into account the bursting radius of
particular munitions and the characteristics of the delivery system and associates this
combination with a percentage for the probability of incapacitation of Soldiers at a given
range. The RED combat (or MSD training) is defined as the minimum distance friendly
troops can approach the effects of friendly fires without suffering appreciable casualties of
0.1 percent or higher probability of incapacitation.

WARNING
Risk estimate distances are for combat use and do not represent the
maximum fragmentation envelopes of the weapons listed. Risk estimate
distances are not minimum safe distances for peacetime training use.

G-25. The casualty criterion is the 5-minute assault criterion for a prone Soldier in winter
clothing and helmet. Physical incapacitation means that a Soldier is physically unable to
function in an assault within a 5-minute period after an attack. A probability of
incapacitation value of less than 0.1 percent can be interpreted as being less than or equal to
one chance in one thousand (Table G-2).

Table G-2. Risk Estimate Distances for Mortars and Cannon Artillery

Risk Estimate Distances (Meters)

10% PI 0.1% PI
System Description 1/3 2/3 Max 1/3 2/3 Max
Range Range Range Range Range Range
M224 60mm mortar 60 65 65 100 150 175
M252 81mm mortar 75 80 80 165 185 230
M120/121 120mm mortar 100 100 100 150 300 400
M102/M119 105mm howitzer 85 85 90 175 200 275
M109/M198 155mm howitzer 100 100 125 200 280 450
155mm DPICM 150 180 200 280 300 475

G-26. Using echelonment of fires within the specified RED combat (or MSD training) for a
delivery system requires the unit to assume some risks. The maneuver commander
determines by delivery system how close he will allow fires to fall in proximity to his forces.
The maneuver commander makes the decision for this risk level, but he relies heavily on the
FSO’s expertise.

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FMI 3-90.5

G-27. The following are the planning steps when echeloning fires (Figure G-1).
Step 1. The FSO must determine what fire support assets (lethal and nonlethal) are
available for the preparation. The FSO should consider the following:
Does the naval gunfire (NGF) gun-target line support use of naval surface fire
support (NSFS) in the preparation?
Submit the preplanned close air support (CAS) request within the correct air
tasking order (ATO) cycle.
Identify and adjust for ammunition constraints and limitations (controlled
supply rate may restrict or limit the use of certain types of ammunition).
Dud rates and self-destruct times of improved conventional munitions. These
types of munitions may be best suited to the flanks and beyond the objective
and not on the objective.
Step 2. Verify risk estimate distances and commander’s attack criteria. Risk
estimate distance allows the commander to estimate the risk in terms of percent of
friendly casualties that may result from the employment of lethal fires with close
proximity of friendly forces. Risk estimate distances are based on the amount of
risk the maneuver commander is willing to accept. The risk is usually expressed as
the probability of incapacitation, which is the probability that a Soldier will suffer
an incapacitating injury.
Step 3. Plan targets on the objective, to the flanks of the objective, and beyond the
objective. Timely and accurate intelligence is critical to this step. Weapons and
ammunition should be matched to the appropriate target.
Step 4. Develop a communications plan to support the fires. The preparation may
involve many fire support assets over a considerable distance; reliable and
redundant means of digital and voice communications are essential. Consider
establishing both a ground and air retransmission capability.
Step 5. Determine the rate of movement of the force. This will vary depending on
the type maneuver force and terrain; a heavy combined arms force will travel much
farther and faster than an infantry maneuver force. A combination of heavy and
light forces will also be different. The S2’s IPB should assist in determining a
reasonable rate of movement. Caution is advised, as any movement rate
determined can change. Close monitoring of subordinate units’ movements is
necessary, and FSOs must develop a plan to alter the schedule of fires based on the
movement rate.
Step 6. Develop the schedule of fires. Normally, fires begin before H-hour and may
extend beyond it. Firing may start at a prescribed time, or it may be held on call
until needed. The preparation may be phased as follows:
Phase 1—Attack of fire support means and observation capabilities, including
field artillery headquarters and command posts. Consider adding air defense
targets in this phase as well.
Phase 2—Attack of main command posts, communications facilities, assembly
areas, and reserves.
Phase 3—Attack of defensive areas in the forward positions and targets that
pose an immediate threat to attacking units or forces. The attacking force is
most vulnerable to counterattack during reorganization. Include defensive fires
in the plan to cover this phase.
Step 7. Brief the plan. The FSO should backbrief the commander and S3 prior to
completing the scheduling worksheets. During the fire support portion of the
OPORD brief, be thorough; it is critical that the subordinate commanders
understand the preparation sequence and their responsibilities. A sketch may be
helpful.

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 Fires Integration

Step 8. Complete the scheduling worksheets and ensure all elements receive a copy.
Step 9. Rehearse and refine the plan. The rehearsal should cover all EFETs and not
just the echelonment of fires.

1. Determine what assets, including ammunition, are required and what assets are currently available or
allocated.
2. Verify risk estimate distances and attack criteria with the commander.
3. Plan targets.
4. Develop a communications plan.
5. Determine what the rate of movement will be.
6. Develop the schedule of fires and decide how the preparation schedule will be initiated.
7. Brief the plan/confirm the method with the commander.
8. Complete the scheduling work sheets.
9. Rehearse and refine the plan.

Figure G-1. Planning Steps for Echeloning Fires

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS
G-28. When the lead elements of the heavy combined arms battalion approach the
designated phase line en route to the objective, the FSO begins the preparation. Lead
element observers and/or company FISTs track movement rates and confirm them for the
battalion FSO. The battalion FSO may need to adjust the plan during execution based on
unforeseen changes to anticipated movement rates. (Refer to Figures G-2, G-3, and Figure
G-4.)
G-29. As the unit continues its movement toward the objective, the first delivery system
engages its targets. It maintains fires on the targets until the unit crosses the next phase
line that corresponds to the RED combat (or MSD training) of the weapon.
G-30. To maintain constant fires on the targets, the unit must start the next asset before the
previous asset lifts. This ensures no break in fires, enabling the friendly forces’ approach to
continue unimpeded. However, if the unit rate of march changes, the fire support system
must remain flexible to the changes.
G-31. The FSO lifts and engages with each asset at the prescribed triggers, initiating the
fires from the system with the largest RED to the smallest. Once the maneuver element
reaches the final phase line to lift all fires on the objective, the FSO shifts to targets beyond
the objective.

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Figure G-2. Execution Considerations—Close Air Support

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 Fires Integration

Figure G-3. Execution Considerations—Shaping Fires

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure G-4. Execution Considerations—Actions on Objective

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 Appendix H
Deployment

The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) combined arms battalion is

required to be ready for global force projection to fight and win our
nation’s battles. To meet the global force projection requirements, the
combined arms battalion as part of a HBCT must be ready to meet all
joint force deployment timelines and activities. Peacetime preparation, in-
depth coordination, rehearsals, and knowledge are necessary if the heavy
combined arms battalion is to meet its deployment mission timelines.

SECTION I – FORCE PROJECTION

H-1. Force projection is the demonstrated ability to alert, mobilize, deploy rapidly, and
operate effectively anywhere in the world. Force projection is the military component of
power projection and is truly a joint activity.

FORCE PROJECTION PROCESS

H-2. Force projection encompasses a series of processes that occur in a continuous,
overlapping, and iterative sequence (see Figure H-1) with the end state being a combat-
ready force that can be employed by a joint force commander to achieve national objectives.

MOBILIZATION
H-3. Mobilization is the process by which the Armed Forces or parts of them are brought to a
state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of
the reserve component (RC) as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and
materiel. Mobilization of RC forces as a primary mission of installation elements utilizes a
significant portion of installation manpower, support capability, and energy. Mobilization is
a competing activity with the deployment of forces, and therefore, the heavy combined arms
battalion may find limited support for its deployment. Mobilization is complete when forces
are deployed.

DEPLOYMENT
H-4. Deployment is the movement or relocation of forces and materiel from their home
stations to the desired area of operations (AOs). There will be competing requirements to
simultaneously move joint forces by surface transportation (rail and road), ship, and airplane
(both military and civilian). The power projection capabilities of each installation are vastly
different in regard to access to rail, port facilities, and airports with military capabilities. In
addition to the competition for facilities, there will be competition in the joint force for the
type and amount of available transportation. Transportation priority is assigned according to
the planned and validated requirements of the supported regional component commander.
Therefore, the heavy combined arms battalion must be ready to load with the planned and
validated personnel and equipment at the right place and right time. Not being ready to load
or preparing more equipment that authorized by the joint force means mission failure.

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Deployment is complete when forces have been reassembled to standard, and the unit has
completed transfer of authority for employment by the joint force commander.

EMPLOYMENT
H-5. Employment is the application of force or forces to attain specified military objectives.
Employment plans determine the scope of mobilization, deployment, sustainment, and
redeployment activities. Employment is complete when the strategic and operational
objectives of the force have been met and the joint force commander directs either change of
mission or redeployment.

SUSTAINMENT
H-6. Sustainment is the provision and protection of personnel, logistics, and other support
required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment of
the mission or the national objective.

REDEPLOYMENT
H-7. Redeployment is the transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to
another area for the purpose of employment or return to home station. Redeployment is also
planned by the joint force commander and may involve fewer resources and different
priorities for transportation than did the deployment plan. Redeployment includes the
return to readiness activities at home station for personnel, equipment and demobilization of
RC personnel. Redeployment is complete when the unit is ready for immediate deployment
in support of national security objectives.

DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT INTERRELATIONSHIP

H-8. Deployment and employment are inextricably linked and directly impact each other;
neither can be planned successfully without a firm grasp of the other. Consequently, the
operational speed and tempo reflect the ability of the deployment pipeline to deliver combat
power where and when the joint force commander wants it. Any disruption in the
deployment timeline accordingly impacts on employment. The validated requirements of the
joint force commander drive deployment plans based on when the joint force commander has
force requirements. That may frustrate combat force commanders when they find that the
priority and energy of the installation and transport platforms go to RC or sustainment units
to support early deployment of port opening packages and support joint reception, staging,
and onward integration (JRSOI) in theater. Heavy combined arms battalion leaders must
understand that, if the support package is not deployed before the maneuver forces, the
battalion will not be able to conduct sustained operations in theater until support is
established. Commanders must plan for the best utilization of their unit’s preparation time
with the understanding that their equipment must be ready first and personnel to follow
later.

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 Deployment

Figure H-1. Force Projection Process

SECTION II – DEPLOYMENT PHASES

H-9. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to a specific operational area to
conduct operations outlined in a plan or order. It encompasses all activities from origin or
home station through destination, specifically including intracontinental US, intertheater,
and intratheater movement legs. Each brigade, UEx, and deploying UEy unit will have
different requirements for the available time to prepare a unit for deployment. Commanders
and staff officers must be thoroughly knowledgeable in the deployment steps outlined by the
higher headquarters and the installation. Unit deployments consist of three distinct and
interrelated phases in support of the joint force commander’s deployment plan:
Predeployment activities taken at home stations.
Movement to port of debarkation (POD) (fort-to-port and port-to-port activities).
Reception, staging, onward movement and integration (port to destination).

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FMI 3-90.5

PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
H-10. The Army meets the challenge of strategic responsive by decreasing the amount of
time required at home station to execute all predeployment activities and being ready to load
when the joint force commander’s plan requires. Predeployment activities are those actions
taken to prepare the unit for deployment. These tasks are essentially readiness of personnel
and equipment performed at the home station before and during the predeployment phase to
prepare forces for deployment. These tasks are conducted before and after the issuing of a
warning order (WO) or alert notification. Predeployment activities are not limited to the
deploying unit but include supporting units as well as the installation staff and agencies.

PLANNING AND TRAINING VALIDATION

H-11. The heavy combined arms battalion conducts peacetime training on those mission-
essential task list (METL) tasks it expects to execute in wartime. In addition to its METL
tasks, the unit focuses on the individual and collective tasks that support its wartime
mission. The heavy combined arms battalion, with assistance from the higher headquarters,
prepares mobilization and deployment plans and deployment training to meet expected
deployment requirements. Typical planning and training includes the following:
Predeployment training and preparation.
Unit movement officer (UMO) and NCO activities.
Unit load team training and vehicle marking.
Hazardous materials (HAZMAT) cargo certification.
Air load planning for all validated vehicles and equipment.
Soldier readiness preparations (SRP) and personnel asset inventory (PAI).
Deployment exercises and or rehearsals are conducted.
Family readiness group (FRG) meetings.
Higher headquarters and BCT war plans review and intelligence updates.
Classes III, V, and VIII deployment stocks reviewed and/or updated.
Stocks of Class IV blocking, bracing, and tiedown materials are verified.
Requests for batteries and other prescribed load list (PLL)/authorized stockage list
(ASL) shortages are submitted.
Individual and crew-served weapons qualifications are conducted and theater-
specific training certified.
Access rosters for personnel requiring access to secure facilities are submitted.

ALERT
H-12. The alert phase begins with the receipt of a WO for deployment. Based on the joint
force commander’s mission requirements and time-phased force and deployment data list
(TPFDDL), the heavy combined arms battalion may have from hours to several days from
notification to movement. Specific activities during this phase include the following:
Receipt and verification of deployment orders.
Recall of the unit soldiers.
Initiation of x-hour sequence of events.
Completion of SRP activities.
Upload of vehicles with equipment.
Configure pallets and containerized loads.
Issue communications security (COMSEC) materials.
Issue movement orders and instructions.

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 Deployment

Prepare manifest lists for movement of personnel and equipment.

Transfer all nondeploying equipment to rear detachment.
Update critical equipment shortage lists.
Pick up ammunition from the ammunition supply point (ASP).
Conduct OPSEC sweeps of the brigade area.
Conduct analysis of UEx deployment order (DEPORD).
Upload contingency stocks for Class I and chemical defense equipment (CDE).
Conduct personal property inventories of deploying Soldiers.
Prepare Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement
System (TC-AIMS II) and military shipping labels for all vehicles and personnel.

DEPLOYMENT
H-13. At receipt of the DEPORD, the heavy combined arms battalion takes the necessary
steps to clear the installation, finalize deployment plans, conduct any final coordination with
the higher headquarters or installation, and deploys an advance party to the aerial port of
debarkation (APOD) according to the validated requirements of the joint force commander.
Other activities include the following:
Leaders conduct a reconnaissance of all deployment nodes and rehearsal of
deployment activities.
Battalion S4 conducts coordination with brigade, UEx, and installation
transportation offices for movement times and routes from brigade marshalling
areas to the APOD/seaport of debarkation (SPOD).
Rear detachment confirms barracks security, personally owned vehicle (POV)
storage areas, and stay-behind equipment storage and accountability.
Soldiers move from the battalion areas to the deployment nodes.

PLANNING AND TRAINING VALIDATION

H-14. During this phase, the heavy combined arms battalion must complete all theater
training and preparation certifications in anticipation of deployment. The unit must take all
possible steps and actions to reduce the number of excess predeployment activities. There
generally is not time for good ideas in the readiness validation phase as the unit will be
preparing equipment at the same time it is preparing personnel for deployment. The time
spent to complete or redo any of the predeployment training and preparations increases the
time before the unit is ready for employment or adds to the time before the unit can be
employed in theater.

MOVEMENT TO PORT OF EMBARKATION

H-15. Early deploying units will move directly from their home stations with equipment and
vehicles via air mission command airlift into the theater of operations for immediate
employment. These units are primarily airborne or air assault infantry forces comprising the
rapid deployment force. Heavy units will send their equipment from the home station to a
port of embarkation (POE) for onward movement or fall in on pre-positioned stocks in
theater. Once the unit completes all training and certification, the personnel will move into
the theater via airlift and fall in on their equipment at the in-theater POD.
H-16. Most of the heavy combined arms battalion vehicles and equipment will be rail loaded
from the installation directly to a seaport of embarkation (SPOE) for movement to the
theater. Heavy combined arms battalion commanders make sure the following is performed:
Ensure verification of route and movement times with the UEx transportation
officer.

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FMI 3-90.5

Conduct a route reconnaissance to POE.

Properly mark all unit vehicles, containers, and deploying equipment with unit
identification.
Check for security of onboard equipment and equipment listed in the table of
organization and equipment (TOE).
Prebrief all drivers and vehicle commanders.
Provide strip maps to all vehicles.
Ensure verification of vehicle load plans and weight.
Support joint inspection (JI) of vehicles and equipment to airport/seaport
authorities.
Ensure center-of-gravity markings and weight are on all vehicles and trailers.
Ensure that 100 percent of all blocking, bracing, and tiedown equipment is
available and serviceable.
Verify that HAZMAT items are identified and properly labeled.
Ensure that vehicles are reduced to lowest possible dimensions.
Ensure that vehicles and fuel cans are filled to three-fours full.
Ensure that vehicle antennas are removed and radios are waterproofed.
Verify that all vehicle drivers are licensed for their vehicle.
Ensure generators are purged.
H-17. The heavy combined arms battalion planners must ensure that all coordination and
activities are completed prior to the arrival of the unit’s vehicles at the rail-loading site. This
is usually completed during the predeployment phase. However, unit planners should expect
problems, delays, and confusion at the POE. The heavy combined arms battalion will not be
the only unit deploying or attempting to coordinate movement activities. Planners should
know the locations of staging/marshalling areas, know the joint inspection criteria, and
understand the entire movement plan. Battalion commanders and leaders should take
positive actions to facilitate the movement of the unit by being present at critical times,
always having communications with the POE authorities and facilities to take care of the
Soldiers.
H-18. This phase begins with the departure of battalion equipment from the POD (either by
sea, rail, or air) and ends with the arrival at the POE. At this point, all battalion personnel
are either conducting final training with borrowed equipment, en route to the POE via
air/sea lift, or waiting in theater for the equipment to arrive. The battalion commander keeps
in close contact with the movement officer and tracks the status of equipment movement. On
arrival at the POE, the battalion commander immediately checks with the movement office
to verify the expected time of equipment arrival. Load teams and drivers should be standing
by ready to assist with the download of equipment on arrival. If traveling with the
battalion’s equipment, the commander or movement officer coordinates with the flight crew,
train engineer, or ship’s cargo loading officer to make periodic checks of the unit’s
equipment. Generally, if the equipment is prepared correctly prior to departure, it will travel
without any mishaps (plan on poor en route weather). The commander’s main concern should
be for the welfare and morale of the accompanying Soldiers. He keeps the Soldiers informed
of where the battalion is going and what is going to happen when it arrives at the POE. The
battalion will move in a series of air movements, and the key leaders must be distributed
across all of the deploying forces to maintain en route command and control.

RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

H-19. On arrival in the theater, the heavy combined arms battalion receives its equipment
and makes preparations for integration into the joint force commander’s plans. During this

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 Deployment

phase, the unit can expect early deployed sustainment elements to assist in processing the
heavy combined arms battalion through the POD. This process is known as reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI):
Reception is the process of unloading personnel and material from strategic seaport,
marshaling the deploying units, transporting them to staging areas, if required,
and providing life support to deploying personnel.
Staging is the process of assembling, holding, and organizing all arriving personnel
and equipment into units and forces for movement. During staging, the commander
incrementally builds combat power and prepares units for onward movements
while providing life support until the unit becomes self-sufficient.
Onward movement is the movement of units and accompanying material from
reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly areas. This includes
moving nonunit personnel to gaining commands and moving sustainment material
from reception facilities to distribution sites.
Integration is the synchronized transfer of authority (TOA) over units and forces for
employment in theater by the joint force commander.
H-20. As the initial step in the introduction of combat power, reception can determine the
success or failure of an entire operation. Battalion commander actions during the reception
phase must be thoroughly planned and carefully executed as there will be a number of
competing units on site in varying degrees of completion of RSOI. Reception from strategic
lift assets will be near the APOE and should provide all of the life support and force
protection required until the heavy combined arms battalion equipment and vehicles arrive.
H-21. Prior to departing the APOD/SPOD for the assembly area, the commander should
ensure that all heavy combined arms battalion equipment and personnel are ready for
operations. This is a commander’s only chance to get things to standard prior to departure.
RSOI considerations include the following:
Verification and accountability of all sensitive items and keys to all vehicles and
equipment.
Top off of all vehicle fluids.
Issue and upload all ammunition.
Receive all classes of supply and water.
Complete all vehicle preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and order
needed parts.
Conduct communication checks on all radios.
Receive updates on the condition of the local security and threat.
Verify routes, checkpoints, and assembly areas.
Conduct necessary repairs to equipment.
Receive specialized theater-specific equipment issue.
Conduct digital network exercise to ensure that the digital architecture is
functioning properly.
H-22. When the heavy combined arms battalion has reassembled its personnel and
equipment and is ready for employment, it is nominated for TOA from the deploying Army
force commander to the joint force commander. The heavy combined arms battalion
commander will receive mission orders prior to TOA and will spend his time concurrently
building combat power and preparing for operations. In this phase, the battalion executive
officer and command sergeant major (CSM) may be best used in building unit combat power
while the commanders and staff are refining the operational plans. Successful employment
will be based on both a successful RSOI as well as a well-planned and executed TOA. The
deployment of the unit is complete when TOA is complete.

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 Appendix I
Planning and Operations Charts

The combined arms battalion often operates for extended periods of time
in continuous operations. Continuous operations are combat operations
continuing at the same high-intensity level for extended periods. Figures
I-1 through I-37 provide examples of planning and operations charts that
can enhance the capability of leaders to sense the battlefield during
extended combat or tactical operations and reduce degradation in
performance over time. Battalion commanders must modify their
information requirements based on the mission and unit situation and
clearly state what information is required to support situational
understanding (SU) and decision-making. The curse of digitization is that
the staff can and will overwhelm the commander with interesting but not
necessarily relevant information unless the battalion commander clearly
establishes his critical information requirements. Long and irrelevant
briefings reflect the commander’s failure to define his information
requirements. See also FM 3-90.3, Appendix H, Planning and Operations
Status Charts.

Figure I-1. Cover Sheet

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure I-2. Mission Analysis Briefing Agenda

Figure I-3. Higher Headquarters Concept Sketch

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-4. Higher Headquarters Order

Figure I-5. Commander’s Initial Guidance

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure I-6. Terrain Analysis Worksheet

Figure I-7. Terrain Analysis Worksheet

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-8. Weather Analysis

Figure I-9. Enemy Composition

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure I-10. Enemy Disposition/Strength Chart

Figure I-11. Enemy Capabilities Chart

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-12. Enemy COA #1 Chart

Figure I-13. CCIR Chart

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Figure I-14. Event Matrix

Figure I-15. R&S Matrix

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-16. Initial R&S Plan

Figure I-17. Tasks and Constraints Chart

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Figure I-18. Tasks and Constraints Chart

Figure I-19. Current Task Organization/Combat Power

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-20. CSS Status Chart

Figure I-21. Classes of Supply Chart

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Figure I-22. Class III/V Usage and Protection Chart

Figure I-23. End Item Status Chart

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-24. Commander’s Guidance Chart

Figure I-25. COA Brief Agenda Chart

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Figure I-26. Restarted Mission Statement

Figure I-27. RCPA Matrix

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Figure I-28. COA Sketch #1

Figure I-29. COA Comparison Chart

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Figure I-30. Decision Brief Agenda

Figure I-31. Light and Weather Chart

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 Planning and Operations Charts

Figure I-32. Enemy Situation Chart

Figure I-33. Commander’s Intent

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Figure I-34. Timeline

I-18 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Appendix J
Air Assault/Movement Operations

Air assault is not a mission-essential task list (METL) requirement for

the heavy combined arms battalion conducting high-intensity combat;
however, there may be missions in stability operations where the heavy
combined arms battalion with proper training, equipment augmentation,
and coordination may conduct air assault/movement operations. When
the heavy combined arms battalion executes an air assault operation, the
rifle companies form the primary ground assault force. Other air assault
missions for the heavy combined arms battalion may include insertion of
the battalion scout platoon and/or attached infantry from an infantry
brigade combat team (IBCT). In most cases, the air operation concludes
with a linkup operation between infantry and mounted forces.

SECTION I – AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

J-1. Situations favoring an air assault operation include those in which the enemy has a
vulnerable area suitable for air assault, surprise can be achieved, and enemy air defenses
are weak or can be effectively suppressed. Commanders may use air movement to rapidly
transfer forces or equipment (within the lift capability of the aircraft) throughout the
operational area in a permissive air threat environment. Planning for air assault and air
movement follow the same steps and require the same decision criteria.

AIR MISSION ANALYSIS AND CONSIDERATIONS

J-2. Although heavy combined arms battalion rifle companies are not frequently employed
in air assault operations, such operations, conducted on a limited scale, may be the decisive
form of combat. Typical air assault operations conducted by heavy combined arms battalion
forces include river-crossing operations, seizure of key terrain, rear area combat operations
as the tactical command force (TCF), and raids. The heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) can
exploit the mobility and speed of organic or supporting helicopters to reinforce a threatened
sector in the defense or place combat power at a decisive point on the battlefield by air
movement. For this reason, the heavy combined arms battalion must be ready to conduct air
operations. Most air operations in the HBCT area of operations should be done as an air
movement rather than an air assault since the heavy combined arms battalion is not
organized to conduct or sustain air assault operations without augmentation from the IBCT.
If a tactical situation requires the combat insertion of a ground fighting force, the HBCT
commander should immediately request modular infantry forces from an IBCT with an air
assault METL being assigned the mission. Air assault is far more complicated and tactically
risky than just kicking the tires and lighting the fire to ride a helicopter into a hot landing
zone with blazing guns.
J-3. When a heavy combined arms battalion is considered for use in an air
assault/movement, the disposition of the unit’s armored vehicles is a point of serious
consideration. The combat vehicles of the heavy combined arms battalion air operation force
(minus) can be:

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Attached for movement to another heavy combined arms unit to link up later with
the ground assault element.
Left in an assembly area until the ground assaulting element returns to the heavy
combined arms battalion.
Repositioned to provide supporting fires for adjacent units or the ground assault
force.
J-4. Other considerations for the use of heavy combined arms forces in an air
assault/movement mission include the following:
Ground mobility is limited once the unit is inserted unless vehicles are provided.
Communication range is limited to that of portable radios. An aerial command and
control (C2) platform will have to accompany the air assault/movement force and
remain on station to maintain contact with the rest of the heavy combined arms
battalion until linkup can be effected.
Range of the scout platoon is limited unless its vehicles are lifted into the objective
area.
Antiarmor capability of the ground assault force is reduced to Javelins carried by
the air movement force and attack aviation.
Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) is limited to that carried by
the ground assault force. Casualties will require aerial medical evacuation
(MEDEVAC).
Aerial lines of communications must be planned for sustainment of the air
movement.
Fire support will be limited to the range of the mortars and artillery in range since
the HBCT has neither air transportable mortars nor artillery.
J-5. All other mission analysis factors are in FM 90-4 and are not unique to heavy combined
arms forces deployed in this role but also apply to the IBCT and Stryker brigade combat
team (SBCT). If the conditions for the air assault/movement are not acceptable, feasible, and
suitable, then the mission should be a no-go, and alternative plans should be developed to
achieve the desired effect.

AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT BATTALION ORGANIZATION

J-6. As with all operations, the heavy combined arms battalion will task organize to meet
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC) and operational considerations. It may be augmented with
modular infantry combined arms forces or artillery from the IBCT to exploit the opportunity
that air assault/movement offers the HBCT.

ACTIONS OF THE BATTALION TO SUPPORT AIR ASSAULT/

MOVEMENT
J-7. The battalion operation order (OPORD) should reflect detailed planning for actions of
the entire force, not only the ground assault force, including the stay behinds from the heavy
combined arms battalion. This planning should emphasize C2 relationships, operational
restrictions due to limited numbers of dismounted infantry, and linkup procedures. Should
the heavy combined arms battalion be tasked to perform linkup operations with its air-
deployed rifle companies, operation and combined arms control of its combat vehicles (BFVs)
must be planned carefully. Battalion task force (minus) combat vehicles can be used for
feints and deception operations prior to linkup with their deployed forces, but caution must
be exercised in the split command and control of these separate operations.

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SECTION II – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

J-8. The heavy combined arms battalion commander and staff should review the following
planning considerations during the military decision-making process (MDMP) leading to an
air assault/movement operation.

INTELLIGENCE
J-9. The primary enemy tactics against air assault/movement operations can be broken
down into four major areas:
Air defense fires (including small arms).
Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft attack on friendly airlift assets.
Electronic warfare to disrupt air-to-surface coordination and linkup operations.
Enemy reaction to landing zone (LZ) operations (counterattack and attack by fire).
J-10. The commander and staff must understand the capabilities and limitations of enemy
aircraft in the AO and take all measures to minimize the risk of encounter. They must
analyze enemy capabilities to interdict friendly LZs with enemy counterattack ground forces,
artillery, and close air support (CAS) during every phase of the air assault/movement
operation.

COMBINED ARMS
J-11. Habitual relationships and the integration of modular infantry combined arms forces
and Army aviation allow IBCT and supporting elements to strike rapidly over extended
distances. These habitual relationships for air assault/movement do not generally exist for
the HBCT, and therefore, the planning and coordination of the air operation requires
extraordinary attention to detail. To provide the surprise and shock effect that can comes
from air assault/movement, the required ground assault combat power should be delivered to
the objective area as early as possible, consistent with aircraft and pickup zone capabilities.
Attack helicopters, if available, are used primarily in an antiarmor role at the LZ and
integrated into the tactical plan of the ground assault force commander. However, during the
early phase of air assault/movement operations, attack helicopters support the lift and
assault force by applying direct and indirect fires. Air assault/movement forces operate
relatively free of the terrain influences (no- go terrain—rivers, swamps, mountains, urban
areas) that restrict surface operations. Air assault/movement forces are best employed to
locate and defeat vulnerable enemy forces or to seize terrain objectives preventing enemy
withdrawal, reinforcement, and supply as well as the shifting and reinforcement of enemy
reserves. In high-intensity conflict, air assault operations are high risk and, therefore,
should not be entered into lightly as they can be either win-big or lose-big operations.
Commanders must be ready to declare no-go to air assault/movement operations if the
conditions for success are not right.

FIRE SUPPORT
J-12. Fire support planning must provide for suppressive fires along flight routes and in the
vicinity of LZs. Priority of fires must be the suppression of enemy air defenses. Displacement
of fire support assets and resupply in the HBCT is restricted to ground movement unless
towed artillery units that are air assault capable are attached to the HBCT. The use of
helicopters as prime movers for artillery will cut into the lift capability of the ground assault
force and that diversion in terms of available lift, station time, and fuel consumption must be
planned. Suppression of suspected air defense artillery (ADA) along flight routes is vital to
the success of an air assault/movement operation and if suppression of enemy air defense
(SEAD) is not the HBCT high-priority target, then the air mission is a no-go. Naval gunfire

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(NGF) support and Air Force CAS may be available to augment available artillery in
application of joint suppression of enemy air defense (JSEAD).

ENGINEER SUPPORT
J-13. Engineers in an air assault/movement operation assist mobility by constructing or
expanding helicopter pickup zones (PZs)/LZs and forward arming and refueling points
(FARPs) and rehabilitating existing forward aviation maintenance sites. Engineers as
Sappers assist in breaching obstacles and should be a part of the air assault/movement
ground assault force.

AIR DEFENSE
J-14. ADA assets provide protection against low-flying enemy aircraft and attack helicopters
at the PZs/LZs and FARPs. Early warning of enemy air is broadcast over the UEx early
warning net. Attached Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (BSFVs) or Linebackers are used
primarily to support PZ operations, and man-portable Stingers may accompany the assault
ground force to help secure the LZs.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

J-15. Support of aviation units is extensive. Consider that aviation elements will use a
significant mount of fuel moving to the PZ before the movement of the ground assault force
begins. FARPs are necessary to maintain the fast pace of air assault/movement operations
with multiple turns required to insert and support the ground assault force. The heavy
combined arms battalion forward support company (FSC) will have to prepare push
packages of supplies, material, fuel, and ammunition for movement by helicopter to support
the ground assault force.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

J-16. The key to successful air assault operations lies in precise, centralized planning and
aggressive, decentralized execution. The availability of aviation assets is normally the major
factor in determining task organization. Task organization must be determined and
announced early in the planning process by both the aviation brigade as well as the
controlling headquarters of the ground assault force. Units must maintain tactical integrity
throughout an air assault operation. Squads are normally loaded intact on the same
helicopter to ensure unit integrity on landing. (Paragraph J-67 below addresses the loading
of personnel in helicopters.)
J-17. Special coordination is required to ensure that there is a clearly understood chain of
command during air assault/movement operations since they involve two different
organizations coming together temporarily to accomplish a mission (three organizations if a
linkup is planned).
The air mission commander (AMC) is responsible for planning and coordinating the
aerial aspects of the air assault/movement.
The air assault/movement commander is responsible for the planning and
coordination of the mission.
The ground assault commander is the leader of the force being transported by air to
the ground objective.
J-18. It must be crystal clear as to who is in command of the air mission force; the ground
assault force; the linkup force; and the overall operation.
J-19. The heavy combined arms battalion is responsible for planning and executing company-
sized air assault/movement operations, and the BCT is responsible for coordinating

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battalion-sized air assaults/movements. If a battalion linkup is planned with an air

assault/movement force, then the BCT should be planning and controlling the convergence of
these two ground fighting forces.
J-20. It would be difficult for a heavy combined arms battalion to plan and coordinate the
ground and air aspects of the heavy combined arms portion of an air assault/movement while
simultaneously planning and coordinating the ground tactical portion of the air
assault/movement portion of the operation.
J-21. The optimal solution would be for a heavy combined arms battalion commander and
staff (linkup force) to coordinate with a modular infantry maneuver battalion commander
and staff (ground assault force) under the control of the BCT with the air mission
commander (normally aviation battalion commander and staff). The BCT commander will
have to decide if the air assault/movement is the BCT main effort under his control or a
supporting effort under the C2 of the BCT deputy commanding officer (DCO)
J-22. Special planning must consider the station time and range of the C2 platform flying in
support of the operation. The C2 platform does not fly the air assault/movement routes and
can stand off in the vicinity of the LZ, but the distances, fuel dictated station time, and orbit
location in relation to the supporting artillery gun-target line to the LZ and SEAD targets
must be considered to ensure that there is continuous C2 for the air assault/movement.

PLANNING TASKS
J-23. Assault aviation:
Receives warning order from higher headquarters.
Directs activities to prepare company for air assault operations.
Issues warning order and initial planning guidance to subordinates.
Develops plan to select aircrews and configure aircraft for mission requirements.
Maintains contact/communications with supported unit and higher headquarters,
ensuring optimum reaction time to respond to mission changes.
Commander or designated representatives attend air mission coordination meeting
(AMCM) and/or air mission brief (AMB), if applicable.
J-24. The assault battalion S3 (or aviation task force S3) and the infantry battalion S3:
Coordinate all phases of the air assault with supported unit and higher
headquarters.
Develop air assault plan and air movement table (AMT).
Advise air assault task force commander (AATFC) on all aspects
(capabilities/limitations) of available resources and helps develop mission plan.
Provide information on number of mission aircraft as well as passenger and cargo
capabilities.
Select suitable PZ/LZs for loading and landing phases of the air assault, if
available.
Select primary LZs and alternates with available information.
Select times for staging, loading, movement, and landing phases of the air assault.
Coordinate for air assault security.
Brief scheme of maneuver to flight lead.
J-25. The battalion fires support officer (FSO) develops fire support plan, including
coordinatinig it with attack reconnaissance helicopter support.
J-26. The brigade aviation officer (BAO):

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Ensures higher headquarters obtains Army airspace command and control (A2C2)
control measures and integrates the planned operation into A2C2 system of the
brigade and higher.
Coordinates FSO and supporting attack reconnaissance aviation units to finalize
fire support plan.
Coordinates with FSO/attack reconnaissance elements to lift or shift fires as
necessary.
J-27. The S6 develops the communications card for the mission.
J-28. The flight lead:
Uses available intelligence to select flight routes that avoid known hazards and
ADA locations.
Selects primary and alternate flight routes and coordination points and complies
with personnel recovery plan.
Receives thorough terrain analysis and available information from the S2.
Plans mission to ensure aircraft survivability.
Selects safest terrain flight techniques compatible with mission requirements.
Conducts aircrew briefing in conjunction with company commander/platoon
leaders.
J-29. The maneuver battalion :
Plans for integration and fire control of direct- and indirect-fire assets (UH60,
AH64, OH-58D, mortars, and artillery) for the ground tactical plan.
Plans for communications between flight crews and transported unit signals and/or
codes for alternate door exit, alternate LZ landing, location of the LZ (six digit grid)
if different from the planned location.
Plans for signals/markings used by ground forces (if already in the LZ) to designate
friendly and enemy forces.
Plans for casualty evacuation plan, including markings and position of aircraft and
casualty collection point.
Plans for downed aircraft procedures, including zeroing of communications security
(COMSEC) equipment, location of first-aid kits and fire extinguishers, and recovery
plan.
Establishes abort criteria for landing on the alternate LZ, changing the mission,
and extracting units in contact.
Plans for in-flight communications between chalks/serials, C2 aircraft, assault
aircraft, and attack reconnaissance aircraft using organic assets and/or assets on
the aircraft such as external antenna.
J-30. The supported unit S-2 provides intelligence products to supporting unit for air mission
planning.

PREPARATION AND COORDINATION TASKS

J-31. The aid mission commander is responsible for the aircrew brief to assault and aircraft
commanders.
J-32. The maneuver battalion:
Develops the bump plan and provides it to aviation liaison officer (LNO) or BAO.
Establishes and maintains communicataions with fire support element (FSE).
Ensures unit is in PZ posture in accordance with the mission plan.

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EXECUTION TASKS

STAGING
J-33. Company/battalion conducts staging operations.
J-34. Aircraft depart assembly area and move over designated routes to PZ (if not collocated).
J-35. On arrival at PZ, flight lead or AMC links up with ground commander at PZ control.
J-36. Company/battalion arrives at staging area at time designated in the AMT.
J-37. Aircraft laager/park tactically and orient on assigned security perimeter from ground
tactical commander, as required.
J-38. AMC establishes contact with supported unit/LNO to get updated information/
intelligence, finalize route planning, and rehearse.
J-39. Supported battalion S3 with aviation LNO and flight lead finalize LZs and routes.
J-40. Supported battalion XO is PZ control officer.
J-41. Assault aviation company conducts loading of supported unit and provides static load
training as time permits.
J-42. Supported infantry company/battalion executes bump plan as required.

AIR ASSAULT
J-43. Assault and cargo helicopters conduct air assault of the supported unit.
Insert pathfinders and air traffic services.
Insert long-range survellience detachments (LRSD).
Execute false insertions.
Insert assault infantry elements.
Reposition artillery.
Haul internal and external loads of vehicles, ammunition, and supplies.
Perform casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
J-44. Attack reconnaissance helicopters provide the following.
Screen of forward, flanks, and rear as necessary.
Observation of named areas of interest (NAIs) and target areas of interest (TAIs).
Escort of assault and cargo helicopters.
LZ preparatory fires.
Overwatch of ground elements.
Preparatory fires on objectives.
Close combat attacks (CCAs) in support of ground elements in contact.
Assistance with indirect-fire observation and control.
Defeat of enemy counterattacks.

FIRE CONTROL MEASURES/TASKS

J-45. During initial serial insertion, AATFC controls all fires. Attack reconnaissance
aviation, fire support, and door gunners engage targets as planned in the initial order and
AMB. Prior to first serial arriving on the LZ, weapon status is free in accordance with the
fire plan and control measures (restrictive fire areas (RFAs), no-fire areas (NFAs)).

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J-46. All fires in and around the LZ are controlled and cleared by the ground commander
once troops are on the ground.
J-47. Status of all weapons on subsequent serials is tight. Use of target designators, A/N
PAQ4 and GCP-1A/B, is also tight with specific control by the ground commander.
J-48. Each chalk carries primary and alternate day/night markers to designate its position.
Markers must be visible to both ground and air observation. Examples include VS-17 panel,
smoke, glint tape, infrared (IR) strobelights, MRE heaters, etc.

SECTION III – AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT PLANNING STAGES

J-49. The successful execution of an air assault/movement depends on a careful mission
analysis by the both the supported and supporting commanders and staff and a detailed,
precise reverse planning sequence. The five basic plans that comprise an air assault
operation follow:
Ground tactical plan.
Landing plan.
Air movement plan.
Loading plan.
Staging plan (Figure J-1).
J-50. In heavy combined arms battalion operations, the ground tactical plan also normally
includes a linkup plan. Air assaults/movements are planned in reverse order, beginning with
the ground tactical plan and working in a reverse sequence to the staging plan (Figures J-2,
J-3, and J-4).

Figure J-1. Air Assault Planning Process

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Figure J-2. Air Assault/Movement Coordination Checklist

Figure J-3. Recommendation Go No-Go Air Assault Chart

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Figure J-4. Air Assault Planning and Rehearsal Timeline

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 Air Assault/Movement Operations

AIR MISSION COORDINATION MEETING (AMCM) AGENDA

J-51. Table J-1 is a sample AMCM agenda that can be used in its current form or modified by
the user as desired. The AMCM is simply the agenda for a working meeting; it is not the
agenda of a brief.

Table J-1. AMCM Agenda

AMCM AGENDA
ROLL CALL BAO/S3
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE (AVIATION FOCUSED) TF S2
WEATHER (AVN FOCUSED) SWO
GROUND TACTICAL PLAN AND FIRE SUPPORT (AASLT SPECIFIC) CAB S3
LANDING PLAN (BY LZ) CAB S3
AIR MOVEMENT PLAN (ROUTES) ASLT LNO
ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE AVIATION CONCEPT (EN ROUTE AND LZ) ATK LNO
FIRES (PZ, SEAD, LZ PREP) FSO
C2 PLAN TF S6
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC PLAN HSSO
FARP PLAN ASLT LNO
LOAD PLAN (DETAILED) BAO/S3
REVIEW DECISIONS CAB S3
S3 CLOSING COMMENTS CAB S3

J-52. If scout or pathfinder insertions are conducted, also cover the following:
Emergency extraction plan/trigger.
Alternate communications plan and rehearsals.
Communications check.
Final coordinations with the teams.
J-53. For an artillery raid, include the following:
Laager time/location.
Trigger for extraction.

AIR MISSION COORDINATION MEETING CHECKLIST

J-54. The AMCM checklist is used to ensure that all elements important to the mission are
addressed during the meeting. The supporting aviation unit will complete the italicized-bold
entries and the supported infantry unit will complete all others. See Table J-2 for a sample
AMCM checklist.

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Table J-2. AMCM Checklist

AMCM CHECKLIST
1. MISSION #:
2. SUPPORTED UNIT:
3. SUPPORTING UNIT:
4. TIME REQUIRED:
5. MISSION (AND CONCEPT SKETCH):
6. #/TYPE OF AIRCRAFT:
7. H-HOUR:
8. PICK-UP TIME WITH REHEARSAL TIME BUILT IN:
9. PZ LOCATION (AND SKETCH):
10. PZ FREQUENCY A. UNIT
B. AIRCRAFT
11. PZ CALL SIGN A. UNIT
B. AIRCRAFT
12. PZ MARKING (DAY/NIGHT)
13. LANDING HEADING
14. LANDING FORMATION
15. DOOR ENTRY
16. NUMBER OF TROOPS TOTAL
17. NUMBER OF TROOPS PER AIRCRAFT
17. NUMBER/TYPE CARGO LOADS
18. TAKEOFF DIRECTION
19. TAKEOFF FORMATION
20. FALSE LZ GRID
21. ROUTE
22. TIME OF FLIGHT
23. LZ GRIDS (Primary and Alternates)
24. LZ SKETCHES:
25. LZ MARKING (DAY/NIGHT)
26. LZ FREQUENCY AND CALL SIGN (IF PATHFINDERS ARE AVAILABLE)
27. ATTACK RECONNAISANCE AVN CONCEPT
28. LZ PREP FIRES
29. LANDING HEADING
30. LANDING FORMATION
31. WEAPONS STATUS
32. DOOR EXIT
33. TAKE-OFF DIRECTION
34. NUMBER OF TURNS REQUIRED
35. ABORT CRITERIA
36. WEATHER CALL TIME
37. BUMP PLAN
38. ABN FREQ
39. CAN/CMD FREQUENCIES
40. CODE WORDS
41. GO / NO GO CRITERIA

Air Mission Commander’s Initials_________ Infantry Battalion S3 Initials_________

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THE AIR MISSION BRIEF (AMB)

J-55. The AMB is a coordinated staff effort where the AATFC approves the air assault plan.
The AMB is a focused adjunct to the BCT OPORD. It highlights air assault requirements to
the AATF’s aviation and ground units. The term “AMB” is used to mean both the written
product and the briefing itself.
J-56. The AMB should not be a working meeting. An OPORD should have already been
published. Therefore, the AMB is essentially a backbrief to the BCT commander. The AMB
should focus on assault and attack reconnaissance concepts, sequence of events, and why the
staff developed the sequence for the mission. The slightest change in serial separation, LZs,
or other elements of the mission can significantly affect the rest of the plan. See Appendix B
for a sample AMB format.
J-57. Changes to the mission after the AMB must be approved by the brigade commander. It
is difficult to resynchronize the many different combat systems in the short time that
remains between the AMB and mission execution.

AIR MISSION BRIEF PRODUCTS

J-58. Seven basic documents form the backbone of the AMB.
Air movement table (AMT): The AMT regulates the sequence of flight operations
from PZ to LZ.
Tadpole diagram: The tadpole diagram describes lift compositions. One is prepared
for each lift.
Communications card: The communications card is a consolidated summary of call
signs and nets.
Pickup zone diagram: The PZ diagram graphically shows the pickup zone. One is
prepared for each PZ.
Landing zone diagram: The LZ diagram graphically depicts the landing zone. One
is prepared for each primary and alternate LZ. Pilots must have these on their
kneeboards.
Attack reconnaissance sketches: Kneeboard scheme of maneuver concept sketches
for attack reconnaissance aviation are prepared by each infantry battalion for each
company-sized element in the aviation TF. The infantry battalion S3 provides these
concept sketches to the attack reconnaissance aviation S3 at the brigade combat
team rehearsal. These sketches assist to counter the potential for fratricide during
close support operations and are included as enclosures to the AMB.
Route cards: Route cards include the planning data for every ingress and egress
route for the operation.

OTHER CHECKLISTS
J-59. The air assault execution checklist and the mission checklist for air assault operations
permits brief, informative radio transmissions on crowded nets. An example execution
checklist is included as an eighth document, although it will not be available at the AMB. A
draft checklist will be available at the aviation TF rehearsal, with the final version
distributed before execution.

FORWARD ARMING AND REFUELING POINT SKETCH

J-60. If the mission involves a FARP, sketches of each should be included as a document of
the AMB and should be in the kneeboard packet.

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FIRE SUPPORT INFORMATION

J-61. The AATF staff should include FSCMs and a ground tactical plan (GTP) overlay in the
AMB packet.

AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT FORCE KEY PERSONNEL

J-62. The heavy combined arms battalion commander and staff is responsible for planning
the air assault/movement operation and the accompanying ground operations, developing
the air assault/movement plan in conjunction with the assault helicopter unit, synchronizing
all elements of support from the maneuver, and allocating the necessary resources to the air
assault/movement task force (AATF) to ensure successful execution of the operation.

AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT TASK FORCE COMMANDER

J-63. The AATFC is normally the battalion commander when a company or larger force is to
be inserted as a ground assault force. He has overall responsibility for the planning and
execution of the air assault/movement from the supported units’ commander’s perspective.
The brigade commander will assume this role when a battalion or larger force is inserted.

AIR MISSION COMMANDER

J-64. The supporting helicopter unit provides an AMC. For air assaults/movements
conducted by a company from the general support aviation battalion (GSAB), the aviation
battalion commander may designate an aviation company commander as the AMC. However
if the heavy combined arms battalion is providing the ground assault force, the GSAB
battalion commander and staff will most likely assume C2 of the air mission because of the
lack of air assault/movement experience resident in the HBCT.

AVIATION LIAISON OFFICER

J-65. The supporting aviation unit should provide an air mission liaison officer to the air
assault/movement task force commander and staff. The air mission liaison officer should be
considered a special staff officer in the air assault/movement task force. The role of the air
mission liaison officer is to advise the air assault/movement task force on all matters relating
to Army aviation and to jointly develop, along with the air assault/movement task force staff
and brigade aviation element (BAE), the detailed plans necessary to support the air
assault/movement operation. During the execution phase, the air mission liaison officer
should be available to assist the air assault/movement task force commander or the S3 in
coordinating the employment of aviation assets.

AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT AIRCRAFT

J-66. Utility helicopters and cargo helicopters are the primary aircraft used in air
assault/movement operations.

UTILITY HELICOPTERS
J-67. The primary mission of the utility helicopter (UH) in the air assault/movement is to
move troops. With the seats installed, the allowable cargo load (ACL) for the UH-60 is 11
combat-loaded Soldiers. If the seats are removed, the ACL increases to approximately 16
combat-loaded Soldiers. (The ACL then will depend on the type equipment being carried by
the Soldiers.) The UH-60 can also carry external loads of most of the equipment common to
the IBCT.

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CARGO HELICOPTERS
J-68. The cargo helicopter also provides the air assault/movement task force with the
capability of moving the most troops and equipment in support of the air assault/movement.
In a troop carrying mode, the CH-47D’s ACL is approximately 31 combat-loaded Soldiers.
The CH-47 can also carry external loads of all the equipment common to the IBCT and some
of the wheeled vehicles of the HBCT. Use of CH-47 in cross-forward line of own troops
(FLOT) operations may be restricted if the enemy air defense posture is prohibitive due to
the size, maneuverability, and availability of the CH-47. Air operations in mountainous
terrain may require the use of CH-47 aircraft only due to its ability to operate above 10,000
feet.

GROUND TACTICAL PLAN

J-69. The foundation of a successful air assault/movement is the ground tactical plan. All
other air assault/movement planning stages are based on the ground tactical plan, which
specifies actions in the objective area that will lead to accomplishment of the mission. The
ground tactical plan addresses the following areas:
Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.
Areas of operations with graphic control measures.
Task organization to include command relationships.
Location and size of reserves.
Fire support to include graphic control measures.
Combat service support.
J-70. Note that the air assault/movement task force staff prepares the ground tactical plan
with input from all maneuver elements and in sufficient detail to facilitate understanding by
subordinate commanders. It is imperative that all aircrews know the ground tactical plan
and the ground commander’s intent.

COMMANDER’S INTENT
J-71. The air assault/movement task force commander must articulate his intent for the air
assault/movement early in the planning process. Air assault/movement planning often
begins after the air assault/movement task force commander issues his intent even though
the ground tactical plan may not be complete. The commander’s intent for the air
assault/movement allows air mission planners to understand the method and end state as
well as piece together the subsequent plans. The commander’s intent for the air
assault/movement includes items such as whether the ground assault force will land on the
objective or land near it to be able to maneuver to the objective. The commander’s intent for
the air assault/movement may include surprise as a critical element, which leads to the
development of both the FS and SEAD plans.

ORGANIZATION FOR COMBAT

J-72. The mission, enemy situation, terrain, maneuver forces, and fire support assets all help
air assault/movement planners determine the task organization for combat. Planners
emphasize the following:
Maximizing combat power in the assault to heighten surprise and shock effect.
This is especially important if the air assault force plans to land on or near the
objective.
Ensuring the ground assault force inserts enough combat power to accomplish
initial objectives quickly.

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FMI 3-90.5

The ground assault force must be massed in the LZ and build up significant combat
power early to prevent being defeated by repositioning mobile enemy forces.
Ensuring the ground assault force has sufficient assets to sustain it until linkup.

SCHEME OF MANEUVER
J-73. The air assault/movement task force commander develops a scheme of maneuver to
accomplish his mission and seize assigned objectives. Scheme of maneuver development by
the air assault/movement task force headquarters allows subsequent planning phases of the
air assault/movement to be accomplished and must be done prior to development of the air
movement and landing plans. Development of the ground tactical plan need not be complete
to begin air mission planning. As a minimum, the air assault/movement task force
commander must provide the ground scheme of maneuver for air mission planning to begin.
Planners should not wait for the completed OPORD to begin planning. The air
assault/movement task force staff and aviation units can begin air mission planning as soon
as the commander approves the general scheme of maneuver.

FIRE SUPPORT
J-74. The amount of artillery available to support the air assault/movement and the locations
of supporting artillery units are critical factors in determining the ground tactical plan. The
range of self-propelled artillery may restrict its use by the HBCT to support of extended air
assault/movement and may require the HBCT to request air transportable artillery from the
UEx if forward firing positions are required to provide SEAD or fire support at the landing
zone and objectives. Lack of fire support en route to and at the objective may be a mission
no-go.
J-75. During the ground fight, attack helicopters may assist the ground assault force
commander by providing reconnaissance in the vicinity of the LZs, destroying repositioning
forces, destroying counterattacking forces, and calling for and adjusting fire on targets of
opportunity. A shift in C2 and priority of fire support from the air mission commander to the
ground assault force commander (or the linkup force) is critical and must be planned as well
as rehearsed in detail. During an air assault/movement with multiple lifts, the attack
helicopters support both the air assault/movement and ground fight. (Some elements provide
reconnaissance and security for the lift element; other elements screen for the ground
assault force.) Synchronization of the air attack assets must be precise and detailed to
eliminate confusion and to avoid disrupting the air assault/movement flow as the attack and
C2 elements rotate off station to refuel and or rearm.

LANDING PLAN
J-76. The scheme of maneuver and the ground tactical plan directly affect the selection of
LZs, the landing formation, and the amount of combat power airlifted into the LZ. The
landing plan must be planned in conjunction with the development of the ground tactical
plan and must support the ground assault force commander’s intent and scheme of
maneuver. The landing plan outlines the distribution, timing, and sequencing of aircraft into
the LZ.

LANDING ZONE SELECTION

J-77. In coordination with the AMC, air mission LNO, and brigade aviation element, the air
assault/movement task force commander selects primary and alternate LZs. The number of
selected LZs is based on the ground scheme of maneuver and LZ availability. The air mission
planners advise the air assault/movement task force commander on LZ suitability. The
considerations for selecting suitable landing zones include the following:

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 Air Assault/Movement Operations

Location. The LZ must be in an area supporting the ground tactical plan of the air
assault/movement task force. It may be located on the objective, close by, or at a
distance.
Capacity. The selected LZ must be big enough to support the number of aircraft
required to support the air assault/movement.
Enemy disposition and capabilities. The AMC must consider enemy air defense
locations and weapon ranges and the ability of the enemy to reposition ground
forces to react to the air assault/movement.
Unit tactical integrity. Squads land in the LZ intact, and platoons land in the same
serial. This ensures fighting unit integrity during the ground assault.
Supporting fires. LZs selected must be in range of supporting fires (artillery, CAS,
and NGF).
Obstacles. LZ selection considers existing obstacles on the LZ as well as plans for
reducing them. LZs should be selected beyond enemy obstacles.
Identification from the air. The LZ should be identifiable from the air if possible.

FAILURE TO SELECT A SUITABLE LZ MAY BE AN AIR ASSAULT/

MOVEMENT NO-GO

ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT OF THE LANDING PLAN

J-78. During execution of the landing plan, the attack helicopters can provide overwatch of
the LZs, conduct a reconnaissance of the egress flight routes, call for fire (if designated to do
so), and set up a screen for supporting the ground assault force commander during the
ground tactical plan. The AMC must ensure the missions of the attack aircraft are
synchronized with the station time of the assault and C2 helicopters.

AIR MOVEMENT PLAN

J-79. The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical and landing plans. It specifies
the schedule and provides instructions for the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies
from the PZ to the LZ. It provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, air control
points, aircraft speeds, altitudes, formations, and fire support. The air assault/movement
task force commander develops the air movement plan in conjunction with the AMC and
flight lead aircrew. The air movement plan results in the production of the air movement
table.
J-80. Selection of flight routes is always based on the factors of METT-TC. The air
assault/movement task force staff, with the assistance of the brigade aviation element and
the AMC considers the location of friendly troops, enemy disposition, air defense systems,
terrain, and the locations of the PZ and LZ to select the best flight route. Selected flight
routes should always be laid over the enemy situational template produced by the S2 to
ensure the flight route selected avoids known or suspected enemy positions.
J-81. Failure to select acceptable, feasible and suitable flight routes may be an air
assault/movement no-go.
J-82. The air assault/movement task force staff and the AMC select primary and alternate
flight routes. Alternate flight routes provide the assault force a preplanned, precoordinated
method of moving from the PZ to LZ if the primary route becomes compromised.
J-83. Flight routes that pass through adjacent unit sectors must be coordinated by the BAE
and approved by the adjacent unit to avoid potential fratricide.

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FMI 3-90.5

J-84. When selecting flight routes, the AMC and air assault/movement task force staff must
consider the following:
Airspace management.
Support of the landing plan.
Enemy capabilities.
Fire support.
Flight route distance.
J-85. Attack helicopters can be used in support of the air movement as the air assault
security force. During the air movement phase, the air assault security forces provide
reconnaissance and security for the assault helicopters.
J-86. The air mission commander must determine the minimum air assault/movement force
required to accomplish the mission. If the air mission commander cannot generate the
number of aircraft required to accomplish the mission than the mission may be a no-go.

LOADING PLAN
J-87. The air assault/movement task force commander bases the loading plan on the air
movement and ground tactical plans. The loading plan ensures troops, equipment, and
supplies are loaded on the correct aircraft. It establishes the priority of loads, the bump plan,
and the cross loading of equipment and personnel. Detailed load planning ensures the air
assault/movement task force arrives at the LZ configured to support the ground tactical plan.
A bump plan ensures essential troops and equipment are reloaded ahead of less critical loads
in case aircraft are lost in the loading phase. Planning for loading must include the
organization and operation of the PZ (to include external loads and FARP operations if
collocated with PZ), the loading of aircraft, and the bump plan.

PICKUP ZONE SELECTION

J-88. The first step in the loading plan is selection of suitable primary and alternate PZs.
Selection of PZs is based on the following:
METT-TC.
Commander’s intent.
Location of ground assault forces in relation to PZs.
Size and capabilities of available PZs.
Number of PZs.
Proximity to troops.
Accessibility.
Vulnerability to attack.
Surface conditions (dust)

FAILURE TO SELECT AND/OR MAINTAIN ACCEPTABLE

CONDITIONS AT THE PZ MAY BE AN AIR ASSAULT/MOVEMENT NO-
GO.

PICKUP ZONE CONTROL

J-89. Once the air assault/movement task force commander selects the PZ, the PZ control
officer (PZCO) (normally the heavy combined arms battalion XO) organizes, controls, and
coordinates PZ operations.

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 Air Assault/Movement Operations

AVIATION INVOLVEMENT
J-90. The assault helicopter unit must ensure aviation expertise (air mission liaison officer)
is present on the PZ to assist the PZCO to run safe operations and keep the operation on
schedule.

PICKUP ZONE COMMUNICATIONS

J-91. Communications must be used on the most secure means available. PZ operations may
be conducted under radio listening silence to avoid electronic detection. This requires
detailed planning and rehearsal. If under radio listening silence, it is imperative that
aircrews remain on schedule to allow the PZCO to maintain a smooth flow of troops from the
PZ. PZ communications are accomplished on the established PZ control net, with FM
transmissions kept to a minimum. Special coordination is required to execute the bump plan
under radio listening silence.

PICKUP ZONE MARKING

J-92. The PZCO directs the marking of the PZ so it is identifiable from the air. Far and near
recognition signals are needed, especially at night, to allow pilots to orient on the PZ quickly.
Touchdown points must be clearly marked and sling load sites marked differently than
personnel load points. The PZCO must ensure no other lighting is on the PZ.

DISPOSITION OF LOADS ON THE PICKUP ZONE

J-93. Personnel and equipment must be positioned on the PZ to conform to the landing
formation. Flight crews must understand the loading plan on the PZ and be prepared to
accept troops and equipment immediately on landing. PZ sketches depicting locations of
loads in the PZ assist flight crews in loading troops and equipment quickly once the aircraft
arrive in the PZ. Flight crews should be provided a PZ diagram.

ATTACK HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT OF THE LOADING PLAN

J-94. During the loading phase, the attack helicopters assist by providing overwatch of the
PZs and conducting a route reconnaissance of the air assault flight routes.

STAGING PLAN
J-95. The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the proper order for
movement of ground assault personnel and aircraft to the PZ. Loads must be ready before
the aircraft arrive at the PZ. During mission planning, the PZCO determines the time
required to set up the PZ and selects times the PZ will be established (based on the air
assault H-hour).

MISSION PLANNING
J-96. Mission planning includes coordination between the air assault/movement task force
commander and the AMC, development of the aviation OPORD, issuance of the OPORD, and
rehearsals.

ROUTES TO THE PICKUP ZONE

J-97. The AMC must select flight routes to the PZ that allow the aircraft to arrive at the PZ
on time and in the proper landing direction and configuration to accept loads.

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 Appendix K
Field Processing Detainees

PURPOSE
K-1. This appendix provides guidance on field processing detainees.

GENERAL
K-2. There will be times when US forces capture and detain detainees or other individuals
who may pose a threat to US personnel or security.
K-3. Detainee is a term used to refer to any person captured or otherwise detained by an
armed force (JP 1-02). AR 190-8, FM 3-19.40, and international law (including the Law of
War and the Geneva Conventions) address legal requirements, policy, procedures, planning
factors, and responsibilities for handling detainees. The Geneva Conventions Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War and Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War are the Geneva Conventions most applicable in detainee operations.
K-4. Detaining personnel carries with it the responsibility to guard, protect, and account for
them. All persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in US Armed Forces custody must
receive humane care and treatment. Further, to the extent permitted by the military
situation, all detainees must be afforded protection from the effects of the conflict. US forces
are obligated to protect detainees against all acts of violence, including murder, rape, forced
prostitution, assault, theft, insults, public curiosity, photographing, filming/videotaping for
other than administrative purposes, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. The inhumane
treatment of detainees is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or by deep
provocation.
K-5. Any act or allegations of inhumane treatment by US or coalition/allied personnel or by
other persons must be promptly reported through the chain of command to Headquarters,
Department of the Army, as a serious incident report, thoroughly investigated, and where
appropriate, remedied by corrective action. Inhumane treatment is punishable under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Abuse detracts from mission accomplishment and
intelligence collection efforts.

PLANNING FOR DETAINEE OPERATIONS

K-6. Detainee operations are resource intensive and highly sensitive. Holding detainees
longer than a few hours requires detailed planning to address the extensive requirements of
the Geneva Conventions for proper administration, treatment, protection, security, and
transfer of custody of detainees.
K-7. UEy/UEx-level commanders may authorize holding detainees at the point of capture
for extended periods that exceed evacuation standards outlined in JP 3-63 and FM 3-19.40.
In cases where detainees are held at the point of capture for reasons other than exigent
circumstances, the custodial unit will provide the same standards of protection and care as a
designated internment facility per AR 190-8. Commanders responsible for handling
detainees should:

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FMI 3-90.5

Include military police in their task organization. (DoDD 2310.1 states that
detainees shall be turned over to military police as soon as possible.)
Ensure clear delineation of the interdependent and independent roles of those
Soldiers responsible for custody of the detainees and those responsible for any
interrogation mission.
Ensure resources necessary to provide the support required by regulation and law.
Routinely consult their supporting brigade operational law team (BOLT) during the
planning and execution of detainee operations.
Additional planning considerations may include site selection of collection
point/holding area, construction materials (engineer support), sanitation
requirements, medical support, transportation considerations, public affairs, and
legal support.

FIELD PROCESSING DETAINEES

K-8. Provided necessary resources are available, military police will normally operate a
detainee initial collection point (DICP) or a detainee holding area (DHA) from which to hold
detainees. Detainees are held at the DICP for no more than 24 hours and held at the DHA
for no more than 72 hours. Subsequently, detainees are transported to a strategic
internment facility (SIF) where they are given an internment serial number (ISN).
K-9. Processing begins when US forces take custody of an individual whose liberty has been
deprived for any reason (capture, internment, temporary restriction). The term “point of
capture” refers to the location where US forces first take custody of an individual. Field
processing is accomplished at the point of capture and aids in security, control, initial
information collection, and providing for the welfare of detainees.

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 Field Processing Detainees

K-10. Capturing units field process detainees using the method outlined in Table K-1.

Table K-1. Five Ss and T Method of Detainee Field Processing

Action Description
Search Search each captive for weapons, items of intelligence value, and items that would make escape
easier or compromise US security interests. Confiscate these items. Prepare a receipt when taking
property. Note: When possible, conduct same gender searches. When not possible, perform mixed
gender searches in a respectful manner. Leaders must carefully supervise Soldiers to prevent
allegations of sexual misconduct.
Captives may keep the following items found in a search:
• Protective clothing and equipment that cannot be used as a weapon (such as helmets,
protective masks and clothing) for use during evacuation from the combat zone.
• Retained property, such as ID cards or tags, personal property having no intelligence value
and no potential value to others (such as photos, mementos, etc.), clothing, mess
equipment (except knives and forks), badges of rank and nationality, decorations, religious
literature, and jewelry. (Personal items, such as diaries, letters, and family pictures may be
taken by MI teams for review, but are later returned to the proper owner.)
• Private rations of the detainee.
Confiscate currency only on the order of a commissioned officer (AR 190-8) and provide a receipt and
establish a chain of custody using DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document) or any other
field expedient substitute.
Silence Silence the detainees by directing them not to talk. Gags may be employed if necessary (ensure
detainee can breathe after application).
Segregate Segregate detainees based on perceived status and positions of authority. Segregate leaders from the
remainder of the population. Segregate hostile elements, such as religious, political, or ethnic groups
hostile to one another. For their protection, normally segregate minor and female detainees from adult
male detainees.
Safeguard Safeguard the detainees. Ensure detainees are provided adequate food, potable water, clothing,
shelter, and medical attention. Ensure detainees are not exposed to unnecessary danger and are
protected (afforded the same protective measures as the capturing force) while awaiting evacuation.
Do not use coercion to obtain information from the captives. Provide medical care to wounded and/or
sick detainees equal in quality to that provided to US forces. Report acts or allegations of abuse
through command channels, to the supporting judge advocate, and to the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command.
Speed to a Evacuate detainees from the battlefield as quickly as possible, ideally to a collection point where
Safe military police take custody of the detainees. Transfer custody of all captured documents and other
Area/Rear property to the US forces assuming responsibility for the detainees.
Tag Use DD Form 2745 (Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag, Figure K-3) or a field expedient
alternative and include the following information:
• Date and time of the capture.
• Location of the capture (grid coordinates).
• Capturing unit.
• Circumstances of capture. Indicate specifically why the person has been detained. Use
additional documentation when necessary and feasible to elaborate on the details of
capture.
• Documentation should answer the five Ws—who, what, where, why, and witnesses.
• Use a form, such as a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement) or an appropriate field expedient,
to document this information.
• List all documents and items of significance found on the detainee.
Attach Part A, DD Form 2745, or an appropriate field expedient capture card to the detainee’s clothing
with wire, string, or another type of durable material. Instruct the captive not to remove or alter the tag.
Maintain a written record of the date, time, location, and personal data related to the detention. Attach
a separate identification tag to confiscated property that clearly links the property with the detainee
from whom it was seized.

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FMI 3-90.5

RESOURCES FOR FIELD PROCESSING OF DETAINEES

K-11. Documenting details surrounding the detention and preserving evidence aid in
determining if further detention is warranted, in classifying the detainee, in developing
intelligence, and in prosecuting detainees suspected of committing criminal acts. Record
these details on the DD Form 2745 (Figure K-3, Capture Tag), DA Form 2823 (Sworn
Statement), DA Form 4137 (Figure K-1, Evidence/Property Custody Document) locally
developed forms, or other appropriate field expedient substitutes. When the detaining units
suspects a detainee may be responsible for a war crime or some other inhumane act,
document the following information:
Full name, rank, and unit of the Soldier who captured the detainee.
Circumstances surrounding the detention.
Indicate and describe any apparent injuries (photograph if feasible). Explain how
injuries occurred.
Thorough description of victims and witnesses. Take statements from these
individuals to document their observations and knowledge of the incident.
Descriptive information for all vehicles or other equipment related to the detention.
Thorough description of any contraband. Ensure all seized items are recorded on a
DA Form 4137 or appropriate field expedient substitute and that a chain of custody
is maintained as property is transferred. Photograph contraband if it cannot
accompany the detainee; e.g. an improvised explosive device destroyed on site.
Full name, rank, unit or organization, phone number, and other contact
information for any interpreter or other person present during the detention.
Any information the detainee volunteers.

PERSONNEL
K-12. MP Soldiers shall be in the task organization for any mission likely to result in
detaining personnel.
K-13. Consider including interpreters or linguists to support the operation. These assets
can assist greatly in tactical questioning and screening of detainees.
K-14. Ensure Soldiers know to consult with their supporting BOLT for advice on
compliance with legal requirements. At all times, detainees will be treated in a humane
manner, regardless of the circumstances or environment.

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

K-15. The following items may be helpful in searching and securing detainees,
safeguarding their property, and ensuring the safety of Soldiers:
Plastic bags may be used to segregate, store, and protect a detainee’s property.
Permanent markers may be used to annotate identifying information on containers
of detainee property.
Flexi-cuffs (national stock number 8465-0007-2673) may be used to restrain
detainees (use restraints in a humane manner).
Flexi-cuff cutters should be used to cut flexi-cuffs. Do not use knives or other
cutting devices. Flexi-cuff cutters are designed to prevent injury.
Latex or rubber gloves should be provided to Soldiers for their protection.
Goggles with lenses blackened or cloth may be used to blindfold detainees for
security reasons.and not for punishment.
Still and video cameras may be used to document the scenes where individuals
were detained, detainee injuries, and evidence.

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REFERENCES AND FORMS

K-16. A few references and forms will aid in maintaining required information about the
detainees, accountability of property, and proper treatment of detainees. The most important
of these items are DD Form 2745 (Figure K-3), DA Form 2823, DA Form 4137 (Figure K-1),
and AR 190-8. Chapter 7, Internment and Resettlement, of FM 3-19.40 also provides
information useful to any Soldiers capturing or handling detainees. Army forms can be
accessed at the Army Publishing Directorate website (http://www.apd.army.mil/). Because
access to such forms may not be feasible at the point of capture in an operational
environment, leaders must ensure they are familiar with the essential information that must
be documented and be prepared to use appropriate field expedient substitutes to record such
information.

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure K-1. DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (Front)

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 Field Processing Detainees

Figure K-2. DA Form 4137, Evidence/Property Custody Document (Back)

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FMI 3-90.5

Figure K-3. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Front)

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 Field Processing Detainees

Figure K-4. DD Form 2745, Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag (Back)

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 Appendix L
Media on the Battlefield

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-1. Commanders must plan on the media being present throughout their operational area
and embedded in unit operations. Modern news reporting provides instant coverage of
military operations and can turn minor tactical events into international events with
strategic implications. National and international media coverage will result in defense
policy decisions at the highest level, profoundly influence external public support, and
impact the behavior of all audiences—military and civilian—within the operation’s area of
interest. Effectively planned, resourced, and executed, media activities can be a force
multiplier, leveraging global influence, and enhancing command credibility. Media
operations also can be a disaster if they are not planned, resourced, or executed properly.
Engaging the media serves the best interests of the Army, our Soldiers, and their families as
you share the story of the mission you are executing. Media operations is a related activity to
information operations (IO), and therefore, media coverage and IO plans must be mutually
coordinated and synchronized to ensure that they are complementary and do not result in IO
fratricide—where one message kills another message.

FUNDAMENTALS OF DEALING WITH THE MEDIA

1-2. Supporting media operations fulfills the Army’s obligation to keep the American people
and the Army family informed. It helps establish confidence in America’s Army and its
readiness to conduct operations in peacetime and war. Newspapers, magazines, radio,
television, and electronic media are independent conduits of information to the world. They
provide news, analysis, interpretation, and commentary and serve as a forum for ideas,
opinions, and public debate. What appears in the media shapes perceptions, attitudes, and
opinions and can have a direct impact on mission success.
1-3. The vast majority of both civilian and military media representatives are committed to
providing responsible, accurate, balanced coverage. Although there are exceptions, most
media representatives are focused on achieving a credible information presentation. To
accomplish this, media representatives investigate issues, ask tough, challenging questions,
and pursue verifiable answers. They seek information, interpretation, and perspective on
operations. The level of knowledge of military operations will vary among the media, and it
will take patience and maturity to share the confidence of your unit operations while
ensuring operations security (OPSEC) and translating operational details into a form that is
understandable by the media and their audience. Army leaders at all levels need to educate
media representatives and support their efforts to provide an accurate, balanced, and
credible presentation of timely information.
1-4. The challenge for commanders and personnel supporting media at unit level is to plan
and execute tactical operations, safeguard friendly forces while ensuring that the media
have the opportunity to get their message out. The need to plan for media coverage in
tactical operations derives from the fact that, in most situations, media representatives will
be present in an area of operations before the arrival of Army forces and will not leave until
the mission is complete. The media will know the area of operations, key personalities, and
opinion leaders and, because they are covering the story as it evolves, will have an

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FMI 3-90.5

understanding of, and opinion about, the military, political, and social situation. You can
work with the media or have them work against the command message and suffer the
consequences. Not engaging the media means that they will tell their story without your
input.
1-5. Media representatives will cover the deployment of Army forces, their arrival in the
area, and their initial conduct and remain as long as the story is of interest. Some home
station media will be interested in deploying with local units and being embedded with
them. Commanders should refer all media requests to the BCT and UEx public affairs (PA)
sections with the full understanding that accredited media will probably be escorted down to
battalion level to get the Soldier’s story. The UEx commander will only allow embedded
media in units that he has confidence will take care of the media and stay on the command
message (public affairs guidance (PAG)). Media may build long-term relationships with units
and their leaders that endure past current circumstances. Joe Galloway’s (United Press
International) close ties to the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, from its action in the Ia Drang
Valley in Vietnam continues 40 years after the battle.
1-6. There are three types of media that a battalion commander may engage in the
operational area:
Embedded: They reside with a unit for an extended period (defined in Operation
Iraqi Freedom as 72 hours or more). Embedded media are governed by ground rules
that define working relationships.
Accredited/registered: They have been vetted by the PA staff at brigade level or
above and are normally issued written credentials reflecting coordination to cover
units within the command.
Unilateral: They are media that do not seek military public affairs credentials or
registration. Absent credentials, unilaterals are only accorded the access granted to
local nationals.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ELEMENTS

1-7. The austerely staffed PA sections organic to BCT and UEx headquarters will nearly
always be overwhelmed trying to meet media requirements. More than 65 percent of the
total public affairs force and 85 percent of the deployable PA table of organization and
equipment (TOE) unit structure is positioned in the US Army Reserve and Army National
Guard. These reservists must be seamlessly integrated with the active component and
focused on supporting the overall Army goals and objectives. Media operations, therefore,
rely on augmentation from units in the field to accomplish the Army battlefield PA mission.
1-8. In headquarters without organic PA sections (battalions and some brigades), the
commander is responsible for PA and must plan as well as execute PA operations. The
appointment of the right officer or senior NCO to plan for and supervise the execution of the
battalion public affairs program is critical to the success of the information operations plan.
The DOD Media Guidelines below lay out in general terms the command responsibilities for
media operations in the unit area. Regardless of the echelon, the PA section’s primary
responsibility is to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE (PAG)

1-9. PAG is the operational tool that guides unit commanders regarding IO plans and policy
as well as the command message during major military operations, exercises, and
contingencies. On receipt of the warning order, the commander should request PAG from
higher headquarters. PAG may be included in alert notification or operational orders.
Commanders must ensure that they understand PAG and adhere to the UExs information
plan.

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 Media on the Battlefield

1-10. The essential elements of PAG for operational commanders are:

References: List the essential documents, messages, or policies on which the PAG is
based.
Information: This paragraph should describe significant or anticipated problems
associated with the operation. The information in this paragraph is not for release
and will remain classified.
Public affairs approach: The PAG will recommend the PA approach—either passive
or active—the UEx commander will usually make the final decision on the
command PA approach.
Active approach: This involves efforts made to stimulate public or press
interest, such as distributing press releases and advisories. This paragraph also
states who will make the initial announcement of the operation, the preferred
method, and the preferred time and date. The active approach is recommended
whenever media coverage of units is desired (e.g., major training exercises).
Passive approach: No action is taken to generate media and/or public interest
in an issue or activity, except in response to specific inquiries. If a passive
approach is desired, the PAG will specify that the guidance is for response to
query (RTQ) only. The PAG also specifies who is authorized to respond for the
command. For example: “Only commanding general may RTQ.” To de-
emphasize an event, it is best to authorize release or RTQ at the lowest possible
level.
Questions and answers (Q&As): This paragraph contains a list of probable
Q&As that enable the user to respond to the majority of anticipated questions.
They should not be given to media as handouts in their entirety and should be
tailored to the situation and unit activities (if they apply).
Contingency statement: This paragraph contains a statement to be used before
the release of the final PAG. For example, as a matter of policy, we do not
discuss troop movements or operations until they have been formally
announced.

DOD MEDIA GUIDELINES

1-11. The DOD Media Guidelines, issued as Change 3 to DOD Directive 5122.5, provide the
following guidelines for coverage of DOD combat operations:
Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of US
military operations.
Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering US military operations.
But pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a
military operation (based on the ability to move and safeguard the media). Pools
should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24
to 36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the
principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area.
Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific
events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.
Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the US military and will be
required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect US
forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension
of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalists involved. News
organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to
combat operations and then make them familiar with US military operations.
Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations
restriction may limit access in some cases.

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FMI 3-90.5

Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with
the reporting process.
Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders will permit journalists to ride
on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible
for the transportation of pools.
Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to
enable timely, secure compatible transmission of pool material and will make these
facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases
when Government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any
other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated
by news media organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in
battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES
1-12. Before accepting media into the operational area, the commander must ensure that:
Media are not exposed to classified information. If media accompany units on
combat operations, there must be agreement on the restriction on the release of
operational information. Commanders must consider the friendly forces
information requirements (FFIR) as a baseline of what is not releasable.
Know the definitions:
On the record—the reporter uses everything you say and attributes it to you by
name and title.
Off the record—the reporter should not use anything you say. Go off the record
only if the information is vital to the reporter’s understanding of the situation.
However, some media consider nothing to be off the record.
Background—the reporter will use the information but will not attribute it to
you. The term “an Army spokesman” may be used based on agreement between
you and the reporter.
Media must agree not to release casualty information and comply with the
directives and timelines associated with the release of casualty information (24
hours following the confirmed notification of next of kin).
Media are safeguarded and not allowed to constitute an operational risk to friendly
forces.
Media understand that violation of the operational guidelines may result in the loss
of accreditation and military support (only General Court-Martial Authority can
withdraw accreditation).
Media are debriefed with the reminder of the operational sensitivity of the
information that they have been exposed to based on their association with the
unit.
Media dos:
Take every opportunity to tell your unit’s story.
Set the ground rules for the interview and terminate the interview if you feel
that the ground rules have been violated.
Be ready to answer the questions (who, what, when, where, and why).
Discuss only matters of which you have personal knowledge. You may talk
about individual responsibility, expertise, and personal experiences. You may
also discuss unclassified information about general missions, training, weapons
and equipment and transportation. You may use your name and hometown in
interviews, but you also have the option to use only your first or last name or
refuse to be identified at all.

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 Media on the Battlefield

Approximate numbers of vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and personnel involved

in operations. Specific numbers are not authorized for release at unit level.
If you can not answer a question explain why, (I don’t know….I won’t speculate
…. I can’t answer that because of security concerns).
Remember that everything you say is on the record. Once the words leave your
mouth, there is no way to get them back in your control.
Verify the media’s identity and credentials before talking to them.
Be cautious about what you say to ensure that your words cannot be twisted
into a sound bite or taken out of context.
Be ready to report to your higher headquarters the questions asked and the
answers provided.
Immediately report to higher headquarters any unregistered media you
encounter.
Stay in your lane, which really means only discuss what you have direct
personal knowledge of; don’t speculate and make sure that you stay on message
as stated in the PAG.
Media don’ts:
Do not lie or attempt to use the media as part of a deception plan.
Do not discuss political or foreign policy matters.
Do not discuss the rules of engagement (ROE) or rules on use of deadly force.
Do not discuss operational capabilities, exact numbers, troop strength, size,
location and unit disposition, or future operations.
Do not speculate, repeat rumors, or answer hypothetical questions.
Do not confiscate camera or sound equipment, film or recording medium,
notebook, or videotapes from the media. If you believe that media has captured
a sensitive event, immediately report that belief to your commander.
Do not allow the media to be armed. It is a violation of The Hague and Geneva
Conventions, and media lose their status as noncombatants if armed. Protective
body armor is encouraged so that they gain an appreciation for how Soldiers
are equipped.
Do not allow the media to photograph or interview detainees or prisoners.
Do not allow the media to photograph special operations or intelligence
personnel or equipment due to OPSEC.
Do not allow media to report on ongoing rescue or recovery operations for
missing personnel.
Do not allow the media to violate operational noise or light discipline (including
smoking).

EMBEDDED MEDIA
1-13. Embedding media at battalion level is now routine, so coverage of your operations can
be a force multiplier as you gain positive coverage for your community, strengthen local
media relations, and improve morale for your Soldiers and their families. Before accepting
embedded media, commanders need to know the rules to stay out of trouble.

EMBEDDING RULES
1-14. Transportation. Congress gave DOD stringent guidance on using government aircraft
to fly media anywhere. Here are some of the important points from AR 360-1, Army Public
Affairs Program. Review them before making any commitments to local media:

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FMI 3-90.5

Military transportation will not compete with commercial carriers when the public
affairs objectives of the proposed travel can be accomplished through the use of
commercial carriers.
Travel or transportation may be authorized in connection with an assignment to
cover an Army program or operation when travel is an integral part of the story
and is provided on a space-available basis.
Nonlocal travel by all news media representatives must be approved by OASD-PA.
All local travel or transportation requests for national media must be brought to
the attention of HQDA OCPA.
Travel or transportation for public affairs purposes must be primarily in the
interest of DA or the DOD.
No commitment of military transportation for public affairs purposes will be made
until the request has been coordinated and approved.
Invitational travel orders covering transportation will be issued by the command
with primary interest.
1-15. If you prepare each news media travel request, (local or nonlocal) in accordance with
AR 360-1, it will stand up to both congressional and public scrutiny.
1-16. Support. Keep these points in mind as you develop your planning and coordination
checklist:
The deploying unit must agree to sponsor the media when they deploy and while
they are in country.
The deploying unit must agree to provide aircraft seats on the unit’s flight to the
area of operations in coordination with the supporting USAF command.
The deploying unit agrees to provide media escorts (to go with them and stay with
them). Accredited media will be accorded all courtesies and privileges as equivalent
grade of O-4 for messing and billeting. However, media will carry their own bags
and provide all of their professional materials and supplies.
The UEx and UEy headquarters must agree to support the media and coordinate
approval from the joint task force public affairs.
Before any warning or execute orders are ever issued, survey your media and find
out who may be interested in going with your unit should they be deployed. Let
them know in advance what will be required.
Up-to-date visa and passport.
Immunizations and statement of medial health.
Basic military training (first aid and actions under direct/indirect fire).
Personal and professional equipment.
Approximate costs, including a return commercial flight if military flights are
not available.
Signing Hold Harmless and Not to Sue Agreements as well as agreement to
reimburse for any lost or damaged Government-issued equipment (helmet, body
armor, protective mask, etc.).
Signing release from responsibility agreement with each service that provides
transportation (Army helicopters, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy
transports).
Once theater requirements have been confirmed, the UEx should prepare
invitational travel orders (ITO) for media who will likely be embedded.
Have a plan that will ensure coverage of your unit from your embedded media and
work with your higher headquarters to market products coming out of theater,
ensuring that the media messages support the UEx information plan.

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 Media on the Battlefield

All unit members must be familiar with PAG, embedding ground rules, the role of
embedded media, and what actions to take if classified or sensitive information is
disclosed.
1-17. The sample request below for embedded media lays out much of the coordination and
support agreements required to gain approval from Department of the Army.

SAMPLE Request

FROM CRD THIRD INF DIV FT STEWART GA//PAO//

HQ DA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA-POPD//
INFO JCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OASD/PA/DPL//
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//PAO//
COMUSARCENT-CDRUSATHIRD FT MCPHERSON GA//PA//
USCINCTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCPA//
USACOM NORFOLK VA//JO1PA//
UNCLAS

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF NON-LOCAL MEDIA TRAVEL TO SWA AND TRAVEL
CLEARANCES RMKS/1. THIS HQ PROPOSES TO EMBED MEDIA WITH A DEPLOYMENT
OF THE 3D ID SCHEDULED TO DEPLOY TO THE SWA THEATER OF OPERATIONS ON
APPROXIMATELY XX MAR ON AN AIR FORCE CRAFT. REQUEST APPROVAL AND
THEATER AND COUNTRY CLEARANCES FOR THE NON LOCAL TRAVEL OF THE
FOLLOWING NEWS MEDIA FROM FORT STEWART TO SWA AND POTENTIAL RETURN.
REQUEST THEATER CLEARANCE FOR NEWS MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES (NMRS) AND
MEDIA TRAVEL IN AND OUT OF THE OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH AREA OF
OPERATION.
PERTINENT INFORMATION IS IN NAME/ORGAN/SSAN/PASSPORT NUMBER FORMAT.

Jim Doe COLUMBUS (GA) LEDGER-ENQUIRER/SSN 000-00-000 US PASSPORT 111-11-98

Susan Doe/SAVANNAH (GA) SAVANNAH TIMES/SSN OO1-01-001
US PASSPORT 111-12-98
Steve Smith/CPT/HQ, 2D BDE, 3 ID/ESCORT OFFICER
SSN 234-23-2345

2. MEDIA HAVE AGREED TO REMAIN WITH THE UNIT FOR APPROXIMATELY TEN
DAYS AND WILL PROVIDE CRITICALLY NEEDED HOMETOWN, FORT STEWART AND
ARMYWIDE COVERAGE OF 3D ID TO FAMILIES, THE FORT STEWART CIVILIAN WORK
FORCE AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. REPORTERS HAVE AGREED TO COVER
PORTIONS OF AIR FORCE SUPPORT TO 3D ID UNITS WHILE IN TRANSIT. REPORTERS
WILL TRAVEL ON A USAF C5 FROM HUNTER ARMY AIRFIELD TO SWA. REPORTERS
WILL STAY WITH THE 3D ID IN BASE CAMP. 3D ID PAO HAS AGREED TO SUPPORT
MEDIA TRANSPORT IN AND OUT OF THE BASE CAMP TO COVER FIELD TRAINING AND
UNIT OPERATIONS IN THEATER.

3. UNIT COMMANDER AND THE ASSIGNED ESCORT OFFICER HAS ENSURED

REPORTERS WILL COMPLETE THEATER SPECIFIC IRT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
REPORTERS HAVE PASSPORTS, VISAS, ACCREDITATION, IMMUNIZATIONS AND
APPROPRIATE CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT. FORT STEWART PAO WILL PREPARE
INVITATIONAL TRAVEL ORDERS UPON RECEIPT OF TRAVEL APPROVAL. MAJ XXXX,
3D ID PAO, WILL ESCORT MEDIA IN TRANSIT. REPORTERS WILL ACCOMPANY AN MP
COMPANY IN TRANSIT.

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FMI 3-90.5

4. REPORTERS HAVE BEEN BRIEFED THAT DEPLOYMENT DATE MAY FLUCTUATE

AND RETURN FLIGHTS ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE. REPORTERS
HAVE AGREED TO PAY IN FULL FOR TRANSPORTATION BACK TO THE UNITED
STATES.

5. WHEN MEDIA FLIGHT IS APPROVED AND TRAVEL CLEARANCES GRANTED,

REQUEST THAT AMC PA GRANT MMO/MEGP STATUS, INCLUDING AUTHORIZATION
FOR REPORTERS TO GATHER MATERIAL, FILM, VIDEO AND/OR STILL PHOTO
COVERAGE ON AMC MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION XXXXXX. REPORTERS
WILL OBSERVE ALL USAF SAFETY REGULATIONS PER DOD INST. 4515.3r. TRAVEL IS
ON A NON-REIMBURSABLE, NON-INTERFERENCE WITH MISSION BASIS. MEDIA WILL
NOT BE GIVEN ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR MATERIALS.

6. FOCUS OF MISSION REMAINS REGIONAL/HOMETOWN NEWS COVERAGE OF 3D ID

SOLDIERS PARTICIPATING IN OPERATION XXXXXX WHILE PROVIDING REPORTERS
WITH A COMPLETE ORIENTATION ON THE COMPLEXITIES OF MILITARY
DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING THE TRANSCOM/AMC MISSION. TRAVEL BY MILITARY
AIRCRAFT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE STORY AND REPORTERS INTEND TO
INTERVIEW CREWMEMBERS, PILOTS, FLIGHT ENGINEERS, AND LOADMASTERS
DURING FLIGHTS, AND ALCC GROUND STAFF AT ENROUTE STATIONS. ESCORT
OFFICER WILL BRIEF AIRCREW MEMBERS THAT REPORTERS ARE PRESENT AND
THAT CONVERSATIONS OR ACTIONS OF THE CREW MAY RESULT IN ARTICLES,
PHOTOS OR VIDEO PRESENTATIONS.

7. ACCREDITIED MEDIA WILL IS ACCORDED ALL COURTESIES AND PRIVILEGES AS

EQUIVALENT GRADE OF O-4 FOR MESSING AND BILLETING.

8. POC AT THIS HQ IS MR XXXXXX, COMM (404) 464-5686 OR DSN 367-5686.

L-8 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Appendix M
Digital Command and Control Rehearsal

BACKGROUND
M-1. An early lesson learned in the digitization of the Army is that the complex digital
communications systems have to be checked for proper connectivity and functional
integration throughout the entire digital architecture before the commander can digitally
communicate with confidence. The digital command and control rehearsal (DC2R) was
developed as a step-by-step check of the individual and collective functioning of the Army
Battle Command Systems (ABCS) (the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
(FBCB2) System through the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)) to validate the
architecture, troubleshoot the system, and provide warmup training for the digital operators.
When the DC2R is not conducted and the digital system placed under load points, system
failure will frustrate both the users and commanders.

WHAT IS A DC2R?
M-2. A DC2R is a deliberate step-by-step establishment and load test of the digital
communications architecture that validates the systems in the architecture and the ability to
correctly pass digital messages. The technique described is only one way to approach the
problem, and all units should tailor the DC2R technique to meet their requirements.

PHASE 1: VALIDATE THE ARCHITECTURE

M-3. The first step in the DC2R is to verify the digital systems architecture to ensure that
there is a plan to communicate with the units in the task organization and higher
headquarters. Since our internet protocol based unit addressing system does not allow for
dynamic changes of units entering and leaving the task organization, the importance of
validation of the digital architecture is the foundation for success. The architecture
validation builds the rehearsal plan since the architecture drives the test load regarding the
numbers and types of systems as well as the messaging interface required by the different
ABCS (FBCB2 through GCCS). Part of the architecture validation is a system-by-system,
platform-by-platform (vehicles) check to ensure that each individual system has all of the
required component parts and they work. The digital architecture is a chain in that any
missing link will cause the chain to fail. The diagram at Figure M-1 shows an example of the
systems equipment checks that must be done to validate equipment in the architecture.

PHASE 2: CONNECTIVITY TESTING

M-4. Once the architecture has been validated, connectivity testing of the upper and lower
tactical internet (TI) begins in each of the battlefield functional areas. The diagrams at
Figures M-2, M-3, and M-4 show a standard TI test load of the messaging in each of the
ABCS. In the course of load testing, the quality of the messages must be affirmed. Any
problems that are discovered must be recorded and resolved before the system is declared to
be functioning properly. Every problem that is resolved must be retested to ensure that the
fix meets the architecture standards.

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FMI 3-90.5

PHASE 3: FIX PROBLEMS AND RECHECK

M-5. The final phase of the DC2R is to recheck each fix and then to retest the system as a
whole to ensure connectivity and stability. A fix plan must be developed to ensure that
problems are solved in a fashion that strengthens the digital chain. When conducting
exercises based on simulations, an integration plan of the simulation and simulation feeds
into the digital communications systems must also be built into the test and fix plans for the
simulation-based exercise to work.

Figure M-1. Example of Equipment Listing for DC2R Functions Check

M-2 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Digital Command and Control Rehearsal

Figure M-2. Example of ABCS Functions Check of Messages Between Systems

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 M-3

FMI 3-90.5

Figure M-3. Example of FBCB2 Checklist

M-4 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Digital Command and Control Rehearsal

Figure M-4. Example of ABCS Checks at the Battalion Level

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 M-5

This page intentionally left blank.
 Glossary
A/EGM attack/effects guidance matrix
A/L administrative/logistical; administration and logistics
A/S3 assistant S3
A2C2 Army airspace command and control
AA assembly area; avenue of approach
AAFES Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAIS Army Automation Information System
AAR after-action review
AATF air assault/movement task force; air assault task force
AATFC air assault task force commander
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABE assistant brigade engineer
ABF attack by fire
ABMOC air battle management operations center
AC active component
ACA airspace coordination area
ACE armored combat earthmover
ACIPS Army Casualty Information Processing System
ACK acknowledge
ACL allowable cargo load
ACM airspace coordination measure; aircraft control measure
ACP air control point
ACT analysis and control team
ACUS Army Common User System
ADA air defense artillery
ADACP Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Control
ADAM area denial artillery munitions; area denial antipersonnel mine
ADAMS Airborne Data Analysis and Monitoring System
ADAPC alcohol and drug abuse prevention control
ADC area damage control; analog-to-digital converter
ADCON administrative control; advise all concerned
ADDS Army Data Distribution System
ADO air defense officer
ADP Automated Data Processing
ADU air defense unit
ADW air defense warning
AECOORD assistant effects coordinator
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-1

FMI 3-90.5

AFATDS- LCU AFATDS-lightweight computer unit

AFCS automatic fire control system
AFFS Army Field Feeding System
AFSP Army Food Service Program
AGCCS Army Global Command and Control System
AGM attack guidance matrix
AHB assault helicopter battalion
AHD antihandling device
AI area of interest
AIMI aviation intensively managed items
AIS automation information system
AIT automatic identification technology
ALO air liaison officer
ALOC administrative and logistics operations center;
administrative/logistics operations center
AM amplitude modulation
AMB air mission brief
AMC air mission commander; Aviation Maintenance Company; Army
Materiel Command; Air Mobility Command
AMC-LSE Army Materiel Command-Logistics Support Element
AMCM air mission coordination meeting
AMD air and missile defense
AMDO air and missile defense officer
AMDWS air and missile defense workstation
AMED Army Medical Department
AMEDD Army Medical Department
AMO Automation Management Office
AMPS Aviation Mission Planning System
AMSS Army Materiel Status System
AMT air movement table
ANCD automated network control device
ANGLICO air and naval gunfire liaison company
AO area of operations
AOAP Army Oil Analysis Program
AOE Army of Excellence
AOI area of interest
AOR area of responsibility
APC armored personnel carrier
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APOE aerial port of embarkation

Glossary-2 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

AR Army regulation; armor

ARB attack reconnaissance battalion
ARC attack reconnaissance company
ARFOR Army forces
ARNG Army National Guard
ARS armed reconnaissance squadron
ARSOF Army special operations forces
AS autonomous system
ASAS All Source Analysis System
ASAS-L All-Source Analysis System-Light
ASAS-RWS All-Source Analysis System-Remote Workstation
ASCC Army service component command
ASL authorized stockage list
ASOC air support operations center
ASP ammunition supply point
ASR air support request; alternate supply route
ASWBL Armed Services Whole Blood Processing Laboratory
AT antitank; antiterrorism
ATCC air traffic control center; airborne transmitter control center
ATCCS Army Tactical Command and Control System
ATGM antitank guided missile
ATHP ammunition transfer holding point
ATI artillery target intelligence
ATM advanced trauma management
ATO air tasking order
ATP ammunition transfer point (graphics)
ATS air traffic services
AUTL Army Universal Task List
AVIM aviation intermediate maintenance (graphics)
AVLB armored launched bridge
AVN aviation
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
AXP ambulance exchange point
B bulk
BAE brigade aviation element
BAO brigade aviation officer
BAS battalion aid station
BBDPICM base-burn dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
BC battle command
BCOC base cluster operations center

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-3

FMI 3-90.5

BCOM battle command on the move

BCIS Battlefield Combat Identification System
BCOTM battle command on the move
BCS3 Battle Command Sustainment Support System
BCT brigade combat team
BD battlefield distribution
BDA battle damage assessment
BDAR battle damage assessment and repair
BDE brigade
BDO battledress overgarment
BER bit error rate; basic encoding rules; bit error ratio
BF battle fatigue
BFA battlefield functional area
BFC battalion fire cell
BFT binary file transfer; Blue Force Tracker
BFSB battlefield surveillance brigade
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BFVS Bradley Fighting Vehicle System
BHL battle handover line
BHOL battle handover line
BICC battlefield information control center
BIDS Biological Identification Detection System
BII basic issue items
BIT built in test
BITE built in test equipment
BJA baseline jamming assets
BLAST blocked asynchronous transmission
BLOS beyond line of site
BMIS-T Battlefield Medical Information System-Telemedical
BMNT beginning morning nautical twilight
BMSO brigade medical support office
BN battalion
BNN battalion network node
BOLT brigade operations legal team; brigade operational law team
BOS battlefield operating systems (now called warfighting functions)
BP battle position
BRS brigade reconnaissance squadron
BRT brigade reconnaissance team
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion

Glossary-4 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

BSFV Bradley Stinger fighting vehicle

BSMC brigade support medical company
BSOC battalion support operations center
BSS brigade surgical section; brigade surgeon section
BSTB
BTB brigade troops battalion
BUB battle update briefing
CofS chief of staff
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4 command, control, communications, and computers
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance
C4OPS command, control, communications, and computers operations
CA civil affairs
CAB combined arms battalion
CABSA combined arms battalion support area
CACOM (theater) civil affairs command
CAFAD combined arms for air defense
CAISI CSS Automated Information System Interface
CAISI/VSAT CSS Automated Information System Interface very small aperture
terminal
CANTCO can’t comply
CAR combined arms rehearsal
CAS close air support
CASEVAC casualty evacuation
CASI/NES CSS Automated Information Management Interface/Network
Encryption System
CATK counterattack
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE-CM chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and high-yield
explosive consequence management
CBRNWRS Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and
Reporting System
CBT combat trains (graphics)
CBU cluster bomb unit
CCA close combat attack
CCCP chemical casualty collection point
CCI controlled cryptographic items

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-5

FMI 3-90.5

CCIR commander’s critical information requirements

CCL combat configured load
CCP casualty collection point
CD Counterdrug
CDE chemical defense equipment
CDR commander
CE communications electronics
CEB clothing exchange and bath
CERP commander’s emergency response program
CFF call for fire
CFFZ call for fire zone
CFL coordinated fire line; coordination fire line
CFS call for support
CFV cavalry fighting vehicle
CFZ critical friendly zone; critical fire zone
CGS common ground station
cGy centigray—refers to levels of radiation (1cGy = 1 Rad) 1 unit of
absorbed radiation. (NATO & DoD)
CHE container handling equipment
CHEMO CHEMO chemical officer
CHL combat health logistics
CHS combat health support
CHU container handling unit
CI counterintelligence
CIP combat identification panel
CK containerized kitchen
CL closed loop; control language; computational linguistics; conversion
loss; central line; chemical laser; chief of logistics; control level
CLS combat lifesaver
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CMT common military training; career management training; critical
military target
CNR combat net radio
CNRI combat net radio interface
Co company (graphics)
COA course of action
COCOM combatant commander
COE common operational environment
COLT combat observation lazing team
COMMEL communications/electronics

Glossary-6 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

COMSEC communications security

CONOPS continuity of operations/contingency operations
CONUS continental United States
COP comman operating picture
COSC combat operations stress control
COTS commercial off the shelf
CP command post
CPHD Copperhead
CPT captain
CRO combat replenishment operation
CROP containerized roll-In/roll-out platform
CRP common relevant picture
CS combat support
CSM command sergeant major
CSR controlled supply rate
CSS combat service support
CSSAMO CSS automation management officer
CT counterterrorism
CTA common table of allowances
CTC combat training center
CTCP combat trains command post
CTD charge transfer device; concealed target detection
CTIL commander’s tracked items list
CTOC corps tactical operations center
CULT common use land transportation
CZ censor zone
D3A decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DA PAM Department of the Army Pamphlet
DA battle damage assessment; Department of the Army
DAMMS-R Department of the Army Movement Management
DART disaster assistance response team (graphics)
DBSS Defense Blood Standard System
DC distribution company
DC2R digital command and control rehearsal
DCO deputy commander for operations; deputy commanding officer
DCPC direct combat position code; direct combat probability code
DED detailed equipment decontamination
DEPORD deployment order
DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System
DISN Defense Information Systems Network

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-7

FMI 3-90.5

DLIC detachment left in contact

DMC distribution management center
DMLSS-AM Defense Medical Logistic Standard-Assemblage Management
DMOS duty military occupational specialty
DNBI disease and nonbattle injuries
DNVT digital, nonsecure voice telephone
DoD Department of Defense
DOD Department of Defense
DODAAC Department of Defense Activity Address Code
DODAC Department of Defense Ammunition Code
DODIC Department of Defense Identification Code
DP decision point
DPD deployed personnel database
DPICM dual-purpose improved conventional munitions
DPL distribution platoon leader
DS direct support
DSO domestic support operation
DST decision support template
DSVT digital secure voice telephone
DTD detailed troop decontamination
DTG date time group
DTS data transmission system; data transfer system
DTSS Digital Terrain Support System
DVE driver vision enhancer
DVNT digital voice nonsecure telephone
DZ drop zone
E extremely high (risk)
EA engagement area; electronic attack
EAB echelons above brigade
EBA engineer battlefield assessment
EBC embedded battle command
EBO effects based operations
ECCM electronic counter measures
ECO environmental compliance officer/emergency control officer
ECOA enemy course of action
ECOORD effects coordinator
EEFI essential elements of friendly information
EEI essential elements of information
EENT ending evening nautical twilight
EFAT essential field artillery task

Glossary-8 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

EFET essential fire effects task; essential fire and effects task
eMILPO electronic military personnel operations; electronic military
personnel office
EMST essential mobility/survivability task
EMT emergency medical treatment
ENY enemy (graphic)
EO electro-optical
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EOH equipment on hand
EPLRS Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ERF environment relative factors
ESSS external stores support system
ETA estimated time of arrival
ETAC enlisted terminal air controller; enlisted tactical air controller
ETACCS enlisted tactical air command and control specialist
ETM Electronic Tech Manual
ETM-I electronic technical manual-interface
ETOT extended time over target
EVNT ending evening nautical twilight
EW electronic warfare
1SG first sergeant
F&E fires and effects
FA field artillery
FAADC2 Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (Systems)
FAADC3I Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence
FAASV field artillery ammunition supply vehicle
FAC forward air controller
FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne)
FARE forward area refueling equipment
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FASCAM family of scatterable mines
FASMS Forecast/Allocation Submission Management System
FASP field artillery support plan
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below [System]
FBCB2/BFT Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System/Blue Force
Tracker
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBSA fires battalion support area
FCR fire control radar

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-9

FMI 3-90.5

FCS fire control system

FD functional description
FDC fire direction center
FDMA frequency division multiple access
FDO fire direction officer
FDRP first destination reporting point
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FEC fires and effects cell
FECE fires and effects coordination element
FED forward entry device
FEEM fires and effects execution matrix
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FESP fires and effects support plan
FFAR folding-fin aerial rocket
FFE fire for effect
FFIR friendly forces information requirements
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FHPO force health protection officer
FID foreign internal defense
FIST fire support team
FLD field (graphics)
FLE forward logistics element
FLIR forward looking infrared
FLO fighter liaison officer
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual; frequency modulated
FMC fully mission capable
FMI field manual-interim
FMT field maintenance team
FMTV family of medium tactical vehicles
FO forward observer
FOB forward operations base
FOS forward observer system
FP force protection
FPF final protective fires
FPL final protective line
FPOL forward passage of lines
FRAGO fragmentary order
FRCP flatrack collection point

Glossary-10 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

FRG family readiness group

FRIES fast rope insertion extraction system
FRS forward repair system
FS fire support
FSB forward support battalion
FSC forward support company
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordination measure; forward support medical company
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSMC forward support medical company
FSMT forward support medical evaluation team; forward support medical
evacuation team
FSO fire support officer
FSSP fuel system supply point
FST forward surgical team
FSV fire support vehicle
FTL far target locator
FU firing unit
FWF former warring factions
FXXI Force XXI
G/VLLD ground/vehicle vehicular laser locator designator
GBS ground based sensor
GCCS-A Global Command and Control System-Army
GEMSS Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering System
GIG global information grid
GMF ground mobile forces
GOTS government off the shelf
GPS Global Positioning System
GRP group
GRS graves registration service; generalized retrieval system; general
records schedules
GS general support
GSAB general support aviation battalion
GSAC general support aviation company
GSE ground support equipment
GSR ground surveillance radar
GT gun target
GTN Global Transportation Network; Global Traffic Network
GTP ground tactical plan

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-11

FMI 3-90.5

GWOT global war on terrorism

H high (risk)
HA hasty attack; holding area
HAVECO have complied
HAZMAT hazardous materials
HBCT heavy brigade combat team
HCA humanitarian and civic assistance
HCLOS high capacity line of sight
HCP health care package
HE high explosive
HEAT high explosive, antitank
HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
HEP high explosive, plastic
HERCULES heavy equipment recovery combat utility lift and evacuation
HET heavy equipment transport
HF high frequency
HHB headquarters and headquarters battery
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHT headquarters and headquarters troop
HIMAD high-to-medium-altitude air defense
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
HM hazardous materials
HMMWV high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle
HNS host nation support
HPT high payoff target
HPTL high payoff target list
HQ headquarters
HR human resources
HRS heavy reconnaissance squadron
HSSO health services support operations
HTU handheld terminal unit
HUMINT human intelligence
HVT high value target
HvyHC heavy helicopter company
HW half wave; hardware; hazardous waste
IA information assurance
IAW in accordance with
IBCT infantry brigade combat team
IBS integrated broadcast service
ICM improved conventional munitions

Glossary-12 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

ICW in coordination with

ID identification
IDMM isolate, dominate, maintain, multidimensional-multiecheloned
IED improvised explosive device
IETM interactive electronic technical manual
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFOR Implementation Force
IFSAS Interim Fire Support Automation System
IFTE Integrated Family of Test Equipment
IFV infantry fighting vehicle
IHFR improved high frequency radio
IMETS Integrated Meteorological System
IMINT imagery intelligence
INC interface network controller
INFOSYS information systems
INMARSAT international maritime satellite
INS inertial navigation system
INTSUM intelligence summary
IO information operations
IOCOORD information operations coordinator
ION input/output node
IP internet protocol; initial position
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPS intelligence production support
IR information requirements; infrared; intelligence requirements
IREMBASS Improved Remotely Monitored Battlefield Sensor System
ISB Intelligence Systems Board; intermediate staging base
ISG information systems group
ISM intelligence synchronization matrix
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISSO information services support officer
ISYSCOM integrated system control
ISYSCON(V)4 Integrated System Control (Version) 4
IT information technology
ITAPDB Integrated Total Army Personnel Database
ITO invitational travel orders
ITV in transit visibility
IV intervisibility; intermediate voltage; inventory variance
IVIS Intervehicular Information System

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FMI 3-90.5

JAAT joint air attack team

JAG judge advocate general
JCDB joint common database
JCMOTF joint civil military operations task force
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint forces commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JI joint inspection
JIM joint, interagency, multinational
JMC joint military commission
JMeWS joint medical workstation
JNN joint network node
JOA joint operational area
JPOTF joint psychological operations task force
JRSOI joint reception, staging, and onward integration
JSEAD joint suppression of enemy air defense
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JTACP joint tactical air control party
JTF joint task force
JTOC joint tactical operations command; joint target oversight council
JTTP joint tactics, techniques, and procedures
KCLFF kitchen combat level field feeding
KIA killed in action
L low (risk)
LADW local air defense warning
LAN local area network
LAR logistical assistance representative
LC line of contact
LCC land component commander
LDB local database
LD line of departure
LD/LC line of departure/line of contact
LEIOV latest event information of value
LEN large extension node
LERSM Lower Echelon Reporting and Surveillance Module
LHS load handling system
LIN line item number
L-IPB logistics-intelligence preparation of the battlefield
LLDR lightweight laser designator rangefinder

Glossary-14 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

LMCS Land Missile Combat System

LMTV light/medium tactical vehicles
LNO liaison officer
LOA limits of advance
LOC lines of communication
LOD level of detail; line of demarcation; line of departure
LOG logistics
LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOGPAC logistics package
LOGPAD logistics helipad
LOGSA Logistics Situation Awareness/Logistics Support Agency
LOGSITREP logistics situation report
LOGSTAT logistics status
LOR limits of reconnaissance
LOS line of sight
LP listening post
LPB logistics preparation of the battlefield
LPP logistics release point
LRAS3 Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System
LRF laser rangefinder
LRF/D laser range finder/designator
LRP logistics release point
LRRS long range radar station
LRS long range surveillance
LRSD long range surveillance detachment
LRU line replacement unit
LSDIS light and special divisions interim sensor
LTACFIRE Lightweight Tactical Automation System
LTF logistics task force
LTIOV last/latest time information is of value
LTO logistics task order
LZ landing zone
M moderate (risk)
M3 maintenance and materiel management
MA mortuary affairs
MAC mine action center
MACOM major command
MACP mortuary affairs collection point
MANPADS man-portable air defense system
MARC manpower Army requirements criteria

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-15

FMI 3-90.5

MASINT measurement and signature intelligence

MB maneuver battalion
MBA main battle area
MBCOTM mounted battle command on the move
MBSA maneuver battalion support area command post
MC movement control; medical company
MC4 medical communications for combat casualty care
MCG mobile command group
MCL mission configured load
MCM multicapable maintainer
MCO major combat operations; movement control office; movement control
officer
MCOO modified combined obstacle overlay
MCS Maneuver Control System; maintenance control section
MCS-L Maneuver Control System-Light
MCSR Mission Condition Status Report
MCT movement control team
MDMP military decision-making process
ME maneuver enhancement (brigade)
MEDEVAC medical evacuation
MEDLOG medical logistics
MEDSUP medical supply
MES medical equipment set
METL mission-essential task list
METSAT meteorological satellite
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available,
time available, and civil considerations
MFR memorandum for record
MGB medium-girder bridge
MGRS military grid reference system
MGS mobile gun system
MH mental health
MHE materials handling equipment
MI Co military intelligence company
MI military intelligence
MIA missing in action
MIC/HIC mid-intensity/high-intensity conflict
MICLIC mine clearing line charge
MICO military intelligence company
MILVAN military van

Glossary-16 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

MKT mobile kitchen trailer

MLO military liaison officer; medical logistics officer
MLRS multiple-launched rocket system
MMMB medical material management branch
MMS mast-mounted sight
MMSO maneuver and mobility support operations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOEI measure of effectiveness indicator
MOOTW military operations other than war
MOP measure of performance
MOPMS modular pack mine system
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
MOS military occupational specialty
MOU memorandum of understanding
MP military police
MRE meals, ready to eat
MRO materiel release order
MSD minimum safe distance
MSE mobile subscriber equipment
MSO mission staging operations
MSR main supply route
MSRT mobile subscriber radio telephone
MST maintenance support team
MSU major subordinate unit; medical supply unit
MTF medical treatment facility
MTOE modified table of organization and equipment
MTS Movement Tracking System
MTV medium tactical vehicles
MTW major theater of war
MWR morale, welfare, and recreation
NAI named area of interest
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAID navigation aid
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
NBCI National Broadcasting Company Internet/Interactive
NBCRS nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological simulation; Nuclear,
Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance System
NBCWRS Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Warning and Reporting System
NC node center
NCA National Command Authority (Use Secretary of Defense or
President, DOD, or Secretary of Defense, As per JCS letter dated

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-17

FMI 3-90.5

01Jan02).
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NCS net control station
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NETCOM network command
NETOPS network operations
NFA no-fire area
NG National Guard
NGF naval gunfire
NGFS naval surface fire support
NGIA National Geospatial Imagery Agency
NGLO naval gunfire liaison officer
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIMA National Imagery Mapping Agency
NIPRNET nonsecure internet protocol router network
NLOS night line of sight
NLT no later than
NMC nonmission capable
NODLR night observation device, long range
NOE nap-of-the-earth
NORMA nature of the target, obstacle clearance, range to target, multiple
firing positions, adequate area for proper dispersion between aircraft
NP neuropsychiatry services
NRT near real time
NRTS not repairable this station
NSC net control station
NSFS naval surface fire support
NSL nonstockage list
NSN national stock number
NTDR near-term digital radio
NVG night-vision goggles
O&I operations and intelligence
O/I operations and intelligence
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles and movement, and cover and concealment
OB order of battle
OBJ objective (graphics)
OBSTINTEL obstacle intelligence
OCIE organizational clothing and individual equipment
OCOKA observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key

Glossary-18 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

terrain, and avenues of approach

OCPA Office of the Chief of Public Affairs
ODS Operation Desert Shield
OE operational environment
OEG operational exposure guidance
OI operations and intelligence
OIC officer in charge
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
ONA operational net assessment
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPLAW-JA operations law-judge advocate
OPLOG operational logistics
OPLOG-PLANNE operations logistics planner
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OPTEMPO operations tempo
ORGWON organization work order number
ORL ordnance release line
OST order ship time
P&A Personnel and Administration
PA physician’s assistant; position area
PAC personnel and administration center
PAG public affairs guidance
PAI personnel asset inventory
PAM pamphlet
PAO public affairs officer; public affairs office
PARC principal assistant responsible for contracting
PARRTS Patient Accounting and Reports Real-Time Tracking System
PASBA Patient Administration System and Biostatistics Activity
PASR personnel accounting strength report
PBO property book officer
PCC pre-combat check; primary control center
PCI precombat inspection
PDD presidential decision directive
PDF protective defensive fires
PEL priority effects list
PEO peace enforcement operations
PERSITREP personnel situation report

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-19

FMI 3-90.5

PGM precision-guided munition

PIR priority intelligence requirements
PKO peacekeeping operations
PL phase line, platoon leader
PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver
PLL prescribed load list
PLS pallet logistics system; palletized load system
PLS-E Palletized Load System-Enhanced
PM provost marshall/program manager
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME peacetime military engagement
PMM preventative medicine measures
PO peace operations
POC point of contact
POD port of debarkation
POE port of embarkation
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POM preparation for overseas movement
POSNAV position navigation
POV personally owned vehicle
PP passage point
PR personnel recovery
PROPHET programmed reviewing, ordering, and forecasting inventory
technique
PS physical security;
PSD personnel security detachment
PSG platoon sergeant
PSNCO personnel staff noncommissioned officer
PSS personnel service support
PSYACTS psychological operations actions
PSYOP psychological operations
PVNTMED preventive medicine
PVO private volunteer organization
PW prisoner of war [do we want to use PW or POW? PW is the official
usage, but POW is more familiar.]
PZ pickup zone
PZCO pickup zone control officer
Q&A questions and answers
QC quality control
QM quartermaster

Glossary-20 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

QRF quick reactionary force

QSC quantity per shipping container
R reinforce
R&S reconnaissance and surveillance
R/GSR reinforcing/general support reinforcing
RA routing area
RAAM remote antiarmor mine
RAAMS Remote Antiarmor Mine System
RAP rocket-assisted projectile
RATELO radio-telephone operator
RAU radio access unit
RC reserve component
RCC regional combatant commander
RDD required delivery date
RDO radar deployment order
RECCE reconnaissance
RECON reconnaissance
RED risk estimate distance
REDCON readiness condition
RF radio frequency
RFA restrictive fire area
RFI request for intelligence; request for information
RFID radio frequency identification tag
RFL restricted fire line
RHO reconnaissance handover
RHOL reconnaissance handover line
RI relevant information
RM requirements management
ROE rules of engagement
ROI rules of interaction
ROM refuel on the move
RP release point
RPB regional PSYOP battalion
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RPOL rearward passage of lines
RPV remotely piloted vehicle
RS radio set; religious support
RSCAAL remote sensing chemical agent alarm
RSO reconnaissance staff officer; regional security officer
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-21

FMI 3-90.5

RSP regional supply point

RTQ response to query
RSR required supply rate
RSSA reconnaissance squadron support area
RSSP ration supplement/sundries pack
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RTD return to duty
RTS remote tracking station;
RUF rules on the use of force
RVT remote video terminal
RWS remote workstation
RX reparable exchange
S1 adjutant/personnel officer
S2 intelligence officer
S3 operations and training officer
S4 logistics officer
S5 civil affairs officer
S6 communications staff officer
SA security assistance
SAAS-MOD Standard Army Ammunition System-Modernized
SADARM search and destroy armor
SALT size, activity, location, and time
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SAMS Standard Army Maintenance System
SARSS Standard Army Retail Supply System
SARSS-O Standard Army Retail Supply System-Objective
SATCOM satellite communications
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SBF support by fire; suppress by fire
SC4 systems for command, control, communications, and computers
SCATMINE scatterable mine
SCATMINEWARN scatterable minefield warning
SCL standard conventional load
SCT scout (graphics)
SD self-destruct
SEAD suppression of enemy air defense
SECSGT section sergeant
SEE small emplacement excavator
SEN small extension node
SFC sergeant first class

Glossary-22 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

SFOR sustainment force

SGM sergeant major
SGT sergeant
SHORAD short-range air defense
SIDPERS Standard Installation Personnel System
SIGCOM (theater) signal command
SIGINT signals intelligence
SINCGARS Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SIP system improvement plan
SIR specific information requirements
SITREP situation report
SITTEMP situation template
SIV systems integration vehicle
SJA staff judge advocate
SMART-T secure, mobile, antijam reliable, tactical terminal
SME subject matter expert
SMFT semitrailer mounted fabric tank
SMU special-mission unit
SOEO scheme of engineer operations
SOF special operations forces
SOI signal operating instructions
SOO space operations officer; special operations officer; supply operations
officer; support operations officer
SOP standing operating procedures
SOR specific orders and requests
SOS source of supply; special operations squad; strategic operating system
SOSRA suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault
SP start point
SPBS-R Standard Property Book System-Revision
SPIES special patrol insertion/extraction system
SPINS special instructions
SPLL self-propelled loader-launcher
SPO support operations officer
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPOE seaport of embarkation
SPORT soldier portable-system repair tool
SPOTREP spot report
SPT OPS support operations
SRC Standard Requirement Code
SRO system readiness objective; standing route order; singly resonant

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-23

FMI 3-90.5

oscillator
SRP Soldier readiness preparations
SSC small-scale contingency
STAMIS Standard Army Management Information System
STANAG Standardization NATO Agreement
STANG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
STE ICE simplified test equipment/internal combustion
STE secure telephone equipment; simplified test equipment
STON short ton
STRIKEWARN strike warning
STU secure telephone unit
SU situational understanding
SUA support unit of action
SUAV small-unit unmanned aerial vehicle
SVML standard vehicle-mounted launcher
SWEAT-MS sewage, wear, energy, academics, trash, medical, and security
SR system-revised
T/ESM target/effects synchronization matrix
TA target acquisition
TAA tactical assembly area
TAC terminal attack controller
TACAIR tactical air
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAI target area of interest
TAIS Target Airspace Integration System
TALO theater airlift liaison officer
TAML theater army medical laboratory
TAMMIS The Army Medical Management Information System
TAMMS The Army Maintenance Management System
TARSOC theater army special operations command
TAV total asset visibility
TB technical bulletin
TC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement
System II
TC-AIMS Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement
System
TCAM TAMMIS customer assistance module
TCAM threat condition alerting message
TCF tactical combat force; tactical command force

Glossary-24 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

TCMD transportation control and movements document

TCN transportation control number
TCO troop commanding officer
TCP traffic control point
TCRIT target criteria
TDA table of distribution and allowances
TDD time definite delivery
TDIS time and distance
TDMA time distance multiple access
TECHCON technical control
TEP theater engagement plan
TEWT tactical exercise without troops
TF task force
TI tactical internet
TIB theater intelligence brigade
TIM toxic industrial materials
TIO tactical intelligence officer
TIRS Terrain Index Reference System
TIS thermal imaging sensor
TLE target location error
TLP troop-leading procedures
TM team (graphics)
TMDE test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment
TMIP Theater Medical Information Program
TMM target management matrix
TMR transportation movement release; technical modification request
TNC theater network command
TO task order
TOA transfer of authority
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table of organization and equipment
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TPFDDL time-phased force and deployment data list
TPL time phase line
TPN tactical packet network
TPS Tactical Personnel System
TPT tactical PSYOP team
TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRI-TAC tri-service tactical communications
TRMT treatment

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-25

FMI 3-90.5

TRP target reference point

TSC theater sustainment command
TSM TRADOC systems manager; TRADOC systems management
TSOP tactical standing operating procedures
TSS target selection system; target selection standard
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
TVS television sensor
TWV tactical wheeled vehicle
UA unit of action
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UBL unit base load
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UEx unit of employment x
UEy unit of employment y
UGR-E unitized ground rations-express
UGR-H&S unitized ground rations-heat and serve
UGR unitized ground rations
UGR-A unitized group ration-A
UGR-B unitized group ration-B
UH utility helicopter
UHB ultrahigh brightness
UHF ultrahigh frequency
UHN unit hub node
UJTL universal joint task list
ULLS Unit-Level Logistics System
ULLS-(A/G/S4) Unit-Level Logistics System- (Air/Ground/Logistics)
ULLS-G Unit-Level Logistics System-Ground
UMCP unit maintenance collection point; unit maintenance control joint
UMO unit movements officer
UMT unit ministry team/unit maintenance technician
UN United Nations
UO urban operations
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAR United States Army Reserve
USMC United States Marine Corps
UTO unit task organization
UXO unexploded ordnance
VBIED vehicle borne improvised explosive device

Glossary-26 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 Glossary

VHF very high frequency

VHSIC very high-speed integrated circuits
VMF variable message format
VOIP voice over internet protocol
VSAT very small aperture terminal
VT variable time
WAN wide area network
WARNO warning order
WCS weapons control status
WIA wounded in action
WILCO will comply
WIN Warfighter Information Network
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WO warning order
WP white phosphorus
WSM weapon system manager
WSRO weapon system replacement operations
XO executive officer
ZOR zone of responsibility

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 Glossary-27

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 References

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
AR 40-3. Medical, Dental, and Veterinary Care. 12 November 2002.
AR 190-8. Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees. 1 October 1997.
AR 360-1. The Army Public Affairs Program. 15 September 2000.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
DA Form 2823. Sworn Statement.
DA Form 4137. Evidence/Property Custody Document.
DA Form 5368. Quick Fire Plan.
DA Form 5988-E. Equipment Inspection Maintenance Worksheet (EGA).
FM 1-02 (FM 101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004.
FM 1-113. Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations. 12 September 1997 (will be revised
as FM 3-04.113).
FM 2-0 (FM 34-1). Intelligence. 17 May 2004.
FM 3-0 (FM 100-5). Operations. 14 June 2001.
FM 3-04.111 (FM 1-111). Aviation Brigades. 21 August 2003.
FM 3-06.11 (FM 90-10-1). Combined Army Operations in Urban Terrain. 28 February
2002.
FM 3-07 (FM 100-20). Stability Operations and Support Operations. 20 February 2003.
FM 3-09.22 (FM 6-20-2). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Corps Artillery,
Division Artillery, and Field Artillery Brigade Operations. 2 March 2001.
FM 3-09.32 (FM 90-20). (J-Fire) Multiservice Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 29 October 2004.
FM 3-3. Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance. 16 November 1992 (will be
revised as FM 3-11.3).
FM 3-5. NBC Decontamination. 28 July 2000 (will be revised as FM 3-11.5).
FM 3-19.40 (FM 19-40). Military Policy Internment/Resettlement Operations. 1 August
2001.
FM 3-20.15 (FM 17-15). Tank Platoon. 1 November 2001.
FM 3-34.2 (FM 90-13-1). Combined-Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 2000.
FM 3-34.230 (FM 5-105). Topographic Operations. 3 August 2000.
FM 3-90 (FM 100-40). Tactics. 4 July 2001.
FM 3-90.1 (FM 71-1). Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team. 9 December 2002.
FM 3-90.3. The Mounted Brigade Company Team. 1 November 2001.
FMI 3-90.6. Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 15 March 2005
FM 3-100.4. Environmental Considerations in Military Operations. 15 June 2000 (will be
revised as FM 4-04.4).
FM 4-01.30 (FM 55-10). Movement Control. 1 September 2003.
FM 4-02.4 (FM 8-10-4). Medical Platoon Leaders' Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures. 24 August 2001.

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 References-1

FMI 3-90.5

FM 4-02.7 (FM 8-10-7). Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Environment Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. 1 October 2002.
FM 5-0 (FM 101-5). Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005.
FM 5-71-2. Armored Task Force Engineer Combat Operations. 28 June 1996 (will be
revised as FM 3-34.222).
FM 5-102. Countermobility. 14 March 1985 (will be revised as FM 3-34.1).
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985 (will be revised as FM 3-34.112).
FM 5-104. General Engineering. 12 November 1986 (will be revised as FM 3-34.250).
FM 6-0 (FM 100-34). Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11
August 2003.
FM 6-22.5 (FM 22-9). Combat Stress. 23 June 2000.
FM 7-0 (FM 25-100). Training the Force. 22 October 2002.
FM 7-10. The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990 (will be revised as FM 3-21.10).
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 31 August 2003.
FM 8-42. Combat Health Support in Stability Operations and Support Operations. 27
October 1997 (will be revised as FM 4-20.42).
FM 12-6. Personnel Doctrine. 9 September 1994 (will be revised as FM 1-0).
FM 17-95. Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996 (will be revised as FM 3-20.95).
FM 23-10. Sniper Training. 17 August 1994 (will be revised as FM 3-22.10).
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956 (will be revised as FM 1-04.10).
FM 34-2. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning. 8 March 1994 (will be
revised as FM 2-33.3).
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994. (will be revised as FM
2-01.3).
FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000. (will be revised as FM 3-05.40).
FM 44-8. Combined Arms for the Air Defense. 1 June 1999 (will be revised as FM 3-01.8).
FM 71-100. Division Operations. 28 August 1996 (will be revised as FM 3-91).
FM 90-4. Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987 (will be revised as FM 3-18.12).
FM 90-7. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 29 September 1994 (will be revised as
FM 3-34.1).
FM 90-13. River Crossing Operations. 26 January 1998 (will be revised as FM 3-34.13).
FM 100-7. Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. 31 May 1995 (will be revised
as FM 3-93).
FM 100-14. Risk Management. 23 April 1998 (will be revised as FM 5-19).
FMI 3-07.22. Counterinsurgency Operations. 1 October 2004.
FMI 3-90.6. Heavy Brigade Combat Team. 15 March 2005.
STP 19-95B1-SM. Soldier’s Manual for MOS 95B, Military Police Skill Level 1. 14
January 2003.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS
DD Form 2745. Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Capture Tag.
DOD Directive 2310.1. DOD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War (POW) and Other
Detainees. 18 August 1994.
DOD Directive 5122.5. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. 27 September
2000.

References-2 FMI 3-90.5 15 March 2005

 References

DOD Instruction 4515.3. Environmental Conservation Program. 3 May 1996.

JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April
2001.
JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. 16 June 1995.
JP 3-07.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
30 April 2004.
JP 3-07.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations. 12 February
1999.
JP 3-63. Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations. 27 July 2004.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS
ST 2-91.1. Intelligence Support to Stability Operations and Support Operations. 4
November 2004.

15 March 2005 FMI 3-90.5 References-3

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 FMI 3-90.5
15 MARCH 2005
Expires 15 MARCH 2007

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

SANDRA R. RILEY
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0506002

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