Captain Rhodes (Taitz) v. Colonel MacDonald (Obama) - Supreme Court Order List Page 6 - Denied - 1/10/2011
Captain Rhodes (Taitz) v. Colonel MacDonald (Obama) - Supreme Court Order List Page 6 - Denied - 1/10/2011
Captain Rhodes (Taitz) v. Colonel MacDonald (Obama) - Supreme Court Order List Page 6 - Denied - 1/10/2011
___ (2010).
The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded to the United
(2010).
___ (2010).
(2010).
term of imprisonment.
CERTIORARI DENIED
10-457 CHESNEY, KEVIN G., ET UX. V. VALLEY STREAM UNION FREE, ET AL.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
petition.
denied.
petitions.
as amicus curiae under seal with redacted copies for the public
denied.
10-546 ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO., ET AL. V. SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CA, ET AL.
certiorari is denied.
denied.
20
petition.
petitions.
petition.
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the
21
curiam).
denied.
petition.
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the
curiam).
22
petition.
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the
curiam).
23
petitions.
petition.
24
petitions.
unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) is paid and the
curiam).
petition.
petition.
petition.
25
MANDAMUS DENIED
denied.
REHEARINGS DENIED
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27
28
29
30
Per Curiam
PER CURIAM.
We granted certiorari, 562 U. S.___(2010), on the ques
tions “whether tribal sovereign immunity from suit, to the
extent it should continue to be recognized, bars taxing
authorities from foreclosing to collect lawfully imposed
property taxes” and “whether the ancient Oneida reserva
tion in New York was disestablished or diminished.” Pet.
for Cert. i. Counsel for respondent Oneida Indian Nation
advised the Court through a letter on November 30, 2010,
that the Nation had, on November 29, 2010, passed a
tribal declaration and ordinance waiving “its sovereign
immunity to enforcement of real property taxation
through foreclosure by state, county and local govern
ments within and throughout the United States.” Oneida
Indian Nation, Ordinance No. O-10–1 (2010). Petitioners
Madison and Oneida Counties responded in a December 1,
2010 letter, questioning the validity, scope, and perma
nence of that waiver; the Nation addressed those concerns
in a December 2, 2010 letter.
We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
That court should address, in the first instance, whether
to revisit its ruling on sovereign immunity in light of this
new factual development, and—if necessary—proceed to
address other questions in the case consistent with its
sovereign immunity ruling. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 559
U. S. ___ (2010) (per curiam).
Petitioners are awarded costs in this Court pursuant to
2 MADISON COUNTY v. ONEIDA INDIAN NATION OF N. Y.
Per Curiam
——————
3 At least 31 States have some form of body armor regulation. For
instance, Maryland makes it a crime to wear body armor while commit
ting certain crimes, Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §4–106 (Lexis Supp.
2010), and also prohibits individuals who have been convicted of crimes
of violence or drug crimes from possessing, owning, or using body
armor, although individuals may be exempted through a permit sys
tem. §4–107 (Lexis 2002). Virginia makes it a Class 4 felony to wear
body armor while possessing a knife or firearm and committing a drug
or violence offense. Va. Code Ann. §18.2–287.2 (Lexis 2009). North
Carolina, by comparison, enhances all felony offenses by one class level
if the offender wears or possesses body armor during the commission of
the felony. N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A–1340.16C (Lexis 2009). The
States also define “body armor” in many different ways. See M.
Puckett, Body Armor: A Survey of State & Federal Law (2d ed. 2004).
Montana, Hawaii, Alaska, Maine, Nebraska, and Rhode Island, among
others, have elected not to regulate body armor at all. See United
States v. Patton, 451 F. 3d 615, 631, n. 7 (CA10 2006) (categorizing the
various state schemes).
8 ALDERMAN v. UNITED STATES