Conduct Befitting A Great Power

AP Photo/Charles Dharapak
Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Responsibility and Sovereignty in U.S.-China Relations
Nina Hachigian January 2011
w w w.americanprogress.org
Conduct Befitting a Great Power
Responsibility and Sovereignty in U.S.-China Relations
Nina Hachigian January 2011

Contents 1 Introduction and summary
4 China policy in the first half of the Obama administration
7 Sources of tension
12 A better test of global responsibility
16 Leadership fatigue?
18 Where to go from here
20 Policy recommendations
26 Conclusion
27 Endnotes
29 About the author and acknowledgements

Introduction and summary
Chinese President Hu Jintao arrives in Washington for a state visit later this
month, with hopes high in both capitals that his trip may serve to smooth out the
edges of a U.S.-China relationship that has frayed over the past year. Clashes over
security, the global economy, and differing political values challenge the relation-
ship today. At the heart of many of these disputes are conflicting understandings
about how a great power should act in the 21st century.
Washington and Beijing have different conceptions of global responsibility. China suspects
Washington has spent decades since World War II investing in an international
architecture of economic and security accords that delivered stability and enabled America’s desire to
China’s growth. Now Washington wants Beijing to play by the rules, help improve
the international system, and contribute to solving urgent global problems— see it play a larger
many of which China helps to create, among them economic imbalances and
global warming. global role is part of
The United States believes China’s incredible growth rate, astronomic foreign cur- a strategy designed
rency reserves, and track record of making successful investments in its national
priorities means it is more able than most nations to contribute to the needs of to stifle its growth
the global community. In contrast, China suspects America’s desire to see it play a
larger global role is part of a strategy designed to stifle its growth and challenge its and challenge its
autonomy. Beijing wants to remain highly focused on its domestic problems and
argues that it is being internationally responsible in many ways, whether or not it autonomy.
is fulfilling America’s wishes.
Reconciling the Chinese and American ideas about global responsibility

involves questions of sovereignty as well. This is because China is now a “sys-
temically important” player in many areas.1 In the international economy, global
climate concerns, Asian regional security, cyber security, space, pandemic
prevention, and other arenas, China today is more than a regular “stakeholder.”
China has become, like the United States, a country on whose actions the health
of the whole system depends.
1 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

This poses challenges to China’s ideas of national sovereignty. China’s leaders hold
to a fairly absolutist, 19th century view that national governments have the right
to do whatever they please inside their own borders without outside interference.
Yet many of China’s decisions on domestic policy, such as the value of its currency,
have global implications.
A shared understanding of even the basic components of global responsibility

could offer a starting point for eventual convergence of U.S. and Chinese view-
points. Understanding that countries act only to fulfill their national interests, a
test of global responsibility should have the following three parts:
A shared
• Will the action in question benefit the global community as well as the country?
• Does the action strengthen the international system or weaken it? understanding
• Is the action enough, given the magnitude of the problem and the capacity of
others to act? of even the basic
By this test, China has been responsible on some issues, including voting for and components
enforcing U.N. sanctions against North Korea in 2009 and then exerting pres-
sure on Pyongyang to end its provocative attacks on South Korea in 2010, and in of global
enacting a huge domestic economic stimulus package amid the Great Recession.
But on many other issues, including efforts to address global economic imbal- responsibility could
ances, maritime disputes, and human rights, China has not met this standard. Yet
for the international system to operate well, China cannot pick and choose when offer a starting
to honor 21st century ideas of sovereignty and when to remain tied to a 19th cen-
tury conception. point for eventual
China’s willingness to act responsibly also bolsters the political consensus in the convergence of
United States that supports the U.S. role as the responsible superpower. This
consensus is weakening. Policymakers increasingly voice concerns about spend- U.S. and Chinese
ing for global obligations in light of domestic priorities and the soaring national
debt. And among conservatives in our country, there is a growing and danger- viewpoints.
ous dedication to an absolutist ideal of national sovereignty—one that China’s
leaders share—according to which America does not have to abide by the rules
of the international order.
It is possible that American and Chinese conceptions of global responsibility

and sovereignty will converge over time to meet the needs of the 21st century as
China adjusts to its global role, assuming that the consensus in the United States
holds for America continuing to play the role of the responsible leader. If so, we
can expect progress on rebalancing the global economy as well as tackling global

warming, poverty, pandemics, and nuclear proliferation, among other global
issues. But that convergence is hardly a sure thing, especially given the politically
charged window of the next two years leading up to a power transition in China
and a U.S. presidential election in 2012.
In order to meet the goals of maximizing the upside of the bilateral relationship
for the United States, increasing Chinese responsibility, and maintaining U.S.
leverage and leadership, this report argues that the Obama administration should
take steps that include:
• Facilitating job-creating Chinese direct investment in the United States

• Maintaining U.S. leverage in Asia by continuing to deepen our ties with partners
and allies in the region
• Acting like a 21st century superpower by engaging with and strengthening the
international architecture of rules, norms, and institutions
• Not losing the current consensus in the U.S. Congress, media, and public that
favors a pragmatic U.S.-China policy
In the pages that follow, this report will offer a brief history of U.S.-China relations
under the Obama administration and then explore differing U.S. and Chinese
conceptions of global responsibility and national sovereignty, including some
of the political debate surrounding the future of the American leadership role in
the world. It will conclude with detailed policy recommendations for the Obama
administration as outlined briefly above. Hopefully these recommendations will
help foster the understanding and dedication needed to build a 21st century rela-
tionship of global responsibility between the United States and China.

China policy in the first half
of the Obama administration
The Obama administration succeeded in changing the historical pattern of

U.S.-China relations post-election. In a 2008 report, the Center for American
Progress pointed out that past administrations since President Ronald Reagan
all came into office promising to be tough on China, only to retreat a few
months later and pursue a more pragmatic approach once the realities of the
relationship became apparent.2
To its credit, the Obama administration changed this standard script. It instead
led with the case for cooperation, stating a clear desire to work with China on
critical global issues and welcoming a strong China. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton visited China on her first trip abroad for the administration in February
2009 and stated that profound differences on human rights would not prevent
cooperation on global warming and other pressing issues. Then at the April 2009
Group of 20 meeting of leading developed and developing nations in London,
President Obama pledged along with President Hu to forge a “positive, coopera-
tive and comprehensive” Sino-American relationship. President Obama’s state
visit in November 2009—widely and inaccurately characterized in the media as a
“kowtow tour”—was similarly designed to show respect while still being forthright
with critiques of Chinese human rights, media freedom, and internet freedom.3
In effect, the Obama administration suggested a bargain to China: If you help us

and the world tackle serious global challenges, your cooperation will go a long
way toward dispelling our concerns about your future intentions; we will, in turn,
grant you the respect you deserve and will not let our chronic differences prevent
progress on issues of shared concern. This approach led to some important results
on global challenges, among them the November 17, 2009, announcement of
a joint clean energy research center; China’s decision to coordinate its massive
RMB 4 trillion ($586 billion) economic stimulus with the efforts of G-20 to
respond to the global economic meltdown; and U.N. Security Council Resolution
1874 imposing strict sanctions on North Korea for its May 2009 nuclear test.

But the framework did not hold. The year ended with China leading the oppo-
sition among the leading developing nations to a binding climate treaty at
Copenhagen, and from there relations continued south. Early in 2010, President
Obama met with the Dalai Lama at the White House and later approved a $6.4
billion package of arms sales to Taiwan—decisions that were vehemently pro-
tested by the Chinese even though the Obama administration was continuing
longstanding U.S. policy.
China then took a series of steps that alarmed the United States and its Asian
neighbors. Beijing declared that the South China Sea was a “core national inter-
est,” language earlier reserved only for China’s non-negotiable territorial claims The Obama
of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Then Beijing adopted a series of new policies to
implement its “indigenous innovation” strategy that gives government procure- administration has
ment preference to companies that develop and register their technology in China.
This riled the U.S. and European business communities, both of which previously led with the case
had been generally supportive of China’s efforts to define its evolving entry into
global procurement agreements. for cooperation,
China’s apparent decision to cut off rare earth shipments to Japan over an incident stating a clear
involving the Senkaku-Diaoyutai disputed island territories in the East China Sea
also crossed a red line in the eyes of many businesses and political leaders. While desire to work with
Beijing claimed its program to close down illegal and highly polluting mines con-
strained its rare earth supplies, the timing of the restrictions suggested a correla- China on critical
tion to political events. China accounts for more than 90 percent of the rare earth
elements used in high-tech products such as hybrid automobiles, wind turbines, global issues and
and weapons systems.
welcoming a
The U.S. responses to these actions further irritated the Chinese, especially
because Washington successfully united other nations around them. At a July strong China.
meeting in Hanoi of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Secretary
Clinton worked with other members of ASEAN to suggest a collaborative process
to resolve territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea. A few months
later, the United States reassured Japan that the Senkaku Islands fall within the
scope of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and that the United States would meet its
commitment to defend Japan.
The United States, Japan, and others also immediately sought to diversify their
sources of rare earths, and the United States and the European Union success-
fully protested the procurement policies, uniting rather than dividing the two

competing business communities. An opinion piece in the People’s Daily accused
the United States of manufacturing these incidents: “In Asia … US foreign policy
basically encourages disagreements among Asian countries, especially by rallying
Asian countries against China. The US then collects the fruit.”4
Toward the end of 2010 came renewed North Korean aggression toward the
South, including the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan and the
shelling of a South Korean island, which further stressed the U.S.-China relation-
ship. The United States was surprised by China’s refusal to condemn Pyongyang’s
behavior, and China strongly protested joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises
in the Yellow Sea. Yet toward the end of the year China also exerted quiet pres-
The April 2010 sinking of the South Korean
sure on Pyongyang to end its provocative attacks. Clearly, though, the U.S.-China naval vessel Cheonan by North Korea put
relationship has been under some stress. In the next section we’ll examine the a strain on U.S.-China relations. The United
States was surprised by China’s refusal to
underlying sources of tension. condemn Pyongyang’s behavior.
AP Photo/Yonhap, Jin Sung-chul

Sources of tension
Tension in the U.S.-China relationship is unavoidable. The rapid ascent of a rising

power causes friction because the old patterns of interactions have to account for
the rising power’s expanded interests and influence. The rising power resents the
status quo and existing powers are suspicious of its motives and jealous of its suc-
cess. In this case, different values in the United States and China when it comes to
individual political rights and systems of government exacerbate mistrust.
Separate histories, geographies, and stages of development account for Washington Different values
and Beijing’s divergent points of view on many of these issues as well. One simple
case in point: The fact that China shares a long border with North Korea will natu- in the United
rally give it a different perspective than that of the United States, a Pacific Ocean
away. But at the core of many differences between the United States and China are States and China
distinct ideas about how a great power should act in the 21st century.
when it comes to
Washington has spent decades investing in a global order that enabled China’s
growth and wants Beijing to play by the rules and help solve global problems, many individual political
of which it helps to create. China is suspicious of America’s motivations in making
this case and maintains its right to make its own decisions without regard to global rights and systems
implications. Let’s unpack both viewpoints to see where the core frictions lie.
of government
Global responsibility in the 21st century exacerbate mistrust.
America and China understand that cooperation on global challenges such as the
economy, climate change, and nuclear proliferation is critical to ensuring both
Americans and Chinese can live prosperous, safe lives. Yet they disagree on the
terms of that cooperation—on what “responsibility” for major powers entails.
America’s historic role as the architect of the international system in the post-
WWII era and its national security priorities today drive its view of responsibility.
The most immediate and lethal threats that face Americans are transnational, and

the United States cannot fight them alone, despite its formidable strength. The
international system of laws, rules, networks, institutions, and norms that America
and its friends built after WWII fosters strategic collaboration with others to
address threats such as global economic crises, terrorism, nuclear proliferation,
pandemics, and climate change.
Consequently, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy is to encourage emerging powers

such as China to become, in the words of then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick, “responsible stakeholders,” who play by international rules, do their part
to solve global problems, and act to strengthen the international order of institu-
tions, rules, norms, and networks. From the American point of view, China today A central goal of
is the number one beneficiary of the existing international system. It is also a major
contributor to the huge challenges that the world currently faces such as macro- U.S. foreign policy
economic imbalances fostered by China’s domestic economic policies and global
warming. (The United States contributes to these problems, too, of course.) is to encourage
In short, the United States believes China’s incredible growth rate, astronomic emerging powers to
cash reserves, and track record of making enormous investments in its national
priorities make it more able than most other countries to contribute to the needs play by international
of the global order, certainly more so than any other developing nation.
rules, do their part
Indeed, the United States’, Europe’s, and Japan’s own investments in the global
order are now constrained by very difficult economic conditions. While many to solve global
developed nations are still contributing significantly, they agree that additional
help should come from those who are expanding in the system. For all these rea- problems, and act
sons, the United States believes that China has a responsibility to help solve the
problems and strengthen the system that is dedicated to solving them. China, in to strengthen the
Washington’s view, is not consistently living up to this responsibility.
international order.
China’s foreign policy thinkers have a different view. Officially, as Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi described last year, the Chinese government position is consistent
with American hopes:
A more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities and

will never pursue interests at the expense of others. We know full well that in
this interdependent world, China’s future is closely linked to that of the world. …
while focusing on its own development, China is undertaking more and more
international responsibilities commensurate with its strength and status.5

That neat formulation, however, hides an intense discussion among China’s
increasingly multifaceted foreign policy community about how China should pur-
sue its global engagement. China expert David Shambaugh divides China’s foreign
policy elite into seven schools of thought, ranging from Nativist to Globalist.6
Similarly, a recent report from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, or SIPRI, documents dozens of actors who now seek to shape China’s
foreign policy, of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only one in a field that
also includes the Chinese military, large state-owned enterprises, and China’s
vocal netizens.7 This occurs against a backdrop of the Chinese Communist Party,
whose politics are complex, divided between populist and elitist, left and right,
liberal and conservative, traditional and modernist, business interests and workers, Most Chinese
city and rural, young and old, central and provincial, among other splits.8
analysts believe that
But one point of view is common across these spectrums. Most Chinese ana-
lysts believe that calls by the United States and Europe for China to become a calls by the United
responsible global player is just the latest plot designed to entangle China, drain
its resources, and constrain its rise.9 One official put it this way: “During the States and Europe
1980s, you [the United States] tried to subvert us politically; during the 1990s,
you tried to contain us strategically; in this decade, you are trying to overextend for China to become
us internationally.”10
a responsible global
Similarly, while a variety of interest groups vie for influence over China’s foreign
policy, SIPRI authors conclude that they are linked by a common view that inter- player is just the
national pressure on China to contribute more to global public goods is a deter-
mined effort to undermine China’s rise.11 latest plot designed
Some other salient points emerge from this debate. First, China’s leadership is still to entangle China,
focused inward, on its own challenges, people, growth, and neighborhood.12 In
that vein, China’s leaders argue that by taking care of China’s own 1.3 billion people, drain its resources,
especially the 400 million who live on less than $2 a day, China is being responsi-
ble—to its own people and, by extension, to the world. As Premier Wen Jiabao said and constrain its rise.
in 2009, “I firmly believe that running our own affairs well is the biggest contribu-
tion [China can make] to … mankind.”13 Global responsibility is not a “popular
concept” in China, explained one Chinese scholar in an off-the-record discussion.14
Another line of argument is that China is, in fact, making progress, and the
United States is too impatient in asking for responsibility. One older Chinese
academic in an off-the-record session put it this way: “You know, it took 60

years for America to move from being the
world’s largest economy to being a global
leader. China just became No. 2, and already
there are constant demands for responsibility.
It’s not fair.”15
Chinese thinkers also argue that the United

States does not appreciate the ways in which
China is already being responsible, for example,
by shutting down smaller coal-fired power
plants at great cost and replacing them with
cleaner (sometimes renewable energy pow-
ered) ones.16 According to the government,
China has shut down some 70 gigawatts of
small power plants since 2006, greatly increas-
ing average efficiencies.17 China took these
steps despite an overwhelming need to increase
its energy supplies, as energy demand is pre-
dicted to increase 75 percent by 2035 and even
though power supplies in some areas are not
adequate to meet basic needs.18
China is also unsure what it will gain from

global responsibility. Given the continuity
in U.S. policy, Beijing is unlikely to achieve
concessions on the issues that matter to it
most, such as Taiwan. Thus, “the expecta-
tions Obama has placed on China to shoulder
more responsibilities entails added burdens
but little benefit.”19 Yuan Peng, an analyst at
CICIR, a government-affiliated security think
tank, argues that the central problem is that
America’s definition of global responsibility
is hopelessly self-referential. As Peng writes,
“When the United States invites China to be a AP Photo/Alexander F. Yuan
constructive and responsible stakeholder, what A woman wearing a mask cycles past cooling towers of a coal-fired power plant in
it really wants is for China to become a global Beijing. The United States believes China should be doing more to reduce its global
warming emissions while China argues that the United States does not appreciate
power that does what America wants.”20 the ways it is already being responsible.

In sum, while the Chinese government claims a desire to be responsible, there is,
as Georgetown University’s Robert Sutter puts it, a tendency on the part of the
Chinese leadership “to avoid onerous obligations and commitments that would
hamper China’s growth and development, even though China’s success at home
and abroad depends on ever closer interaction with world affairs that requires
China to take up more international responsibilities than in the past.”21
Americans responding to these arguments point out that America is not asking
China to take actions that implicate only U.S. interests. Countries the world over
are affected by global warming and also by global economic imbalances caused by
China’s fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar because it places their own exports
at a competitive disadvantage. Brazil’s new trade minister, for example, recently
announced that he will put the value of the renminbi on the agenda with Beijing.22
Along with the United States, regional neighbors also feel threatened by North China is making its
Korea’s aggression and its nuclear program as well as the nuclear ambitions of Iran,
which Beijing has supported through its purchases of energy resources. debut on the world
Many of these nations, taking advantage of America’s leadership, will often let stage again at a
America make the case to China instead of appealing to Beijing themselves, as
they are all eager to maintain a positive relationship with China. Yet China would unique and highly
make a serious mistake to think other countries do not share America’s desire for
Beijing to act more consistently to solve global challenges. global moment in
As for the calls for Beijing to be responsible so soon after its ascent, that is more world history.
a product of the times than of U.S. impatience. The fact is the world has changed
dramatically over the past 60 years. The interconnected global economy, the
increase in nuclear proliferation, pandemics, and global warming are prompting
the calls for China to take on global responsibilities. China is making its debut on
the world stage again at a unique and highly global moment in world history. How
to judge major power responsibility in this era is the subject of the next section.

A better test of global responsibility
One common misconception about global responsibility is that it requires a sac-

rifice of a country’s national interests. American analysts often conclude, in fact,
that China will not be globally responsible because it will only act according to
its national interests. But all nations only and always act to further their national
interests, including the United States. It is just that there are more and less glob-
ally responsible ways of realizing those interests, and countries can define them
more broadly or narrowly.
Long-term and short-term interests may conflict as meeting a nation’s long-term On the positive
interests may require sacrifice in the short run. In the post-WWII era, for example,
opening American markets to European and Asian countries required an eco- side, China has
nomic sacrifice by the United States (made possible by a booming economy) but
resulted in economic growth in those countries, which anchored them as impor- been a globally
tant allies of the United States. Similarly, the American underwriting of maritime
security today allows trade flows, including energy supplies, that benefit the responsible player
United States in addition to the rest of the global community.
numerous times.
A shared understanding of even the basic components of global responsibility
could offer a starting point for eventual convergence of U.S. and Chinese view-
points on global responsibility and sovereignty in the 21st century. A test of global
responsibility should have the following three parts:
• Will the action in question benefit the global community as well as the country?
• Does the action strengthen the international system or weaken it?
• Is the action enough, given the magnitude of the problem and the capacity of
others to act?
What do these criteria tell us about how China has acted? On the positive
side, China has been a globally responsible player numerous times. Its large
economic stimulus package, coordinated with G-20 partners, helped to turn
the corner on the biggest global economic crisis since the Great Depression.

China’s vote for a tough sanctions package against Iran in mid-2010, despite its
energy needs, increased the international pressure on Tehran’s nuclear weapons
ambitions. And in the first decade of the 21st century, China helped ensure that
the swine flu epidemic was contained. From 2003–2006, Beijing was even reluc-
tantly playing a leadership role on North Korea’s nuclear program and recently
urged Pyongyang to show restraint.23
China’s actions fall short of this standard, however, when it comes to other con-
temporary issues such as continuing global economic imbalances, the export of
rare earths, the Law of the Sea, universal human rights, intellectual property, inter-
national agreement on climate change, and, recently, North Korea. (Of course, China’s actions fall
American actions do not always pass this test either, the invastion of Iraq being a
clear example.) short of international
The question of China’s currency is a case in point. There is a lively debate responsibility
within China about whether the appreciation of its currency, the renminbi, will
help or hurt the Chinese economy in the short run, even though most Chinese when it comes
economists agree it must rise in the long run to help encourage domestic con-
sumption, control inflation, and help Chinese products and services be more to continuing
globally competitive. When the health of the greater international economy,
upon which China’s export-driven economy depends is also factored in, there is global economic
a clear case for appreciation.
imbalances, the
Similarly, China’s unique interpretation of the Law of the Sea is dangerous in the
short term as it can lead to unexpected confrontations, and over the long term it Law of the Sea,
could undermine a global consensus that has kept the peace on the high seas since
the end of WWII. Conversely, if China were to follow contemporary customary intellectual property
international law, it would be strengthening a system that will continue to deliver
benefits—such as stability and predictability—to itself, but also to the world. and other areas.
The challenge for the United States is to keep making the case that these global
challenges will not go away, that the calls for China to act will only increase, and
that the health of the international system will affect China’s ability to grow and
prosper. Steps taken now will prevent insecurity later. The more the United States
acts like a responsible power itself—using the international system and reforming
it, as the Obama administration has been doing, and addressing its own contribu-
tions to international problems like its high national debt and carbon emissions—
the easier this case is to make.

Sovereignty for a systemically important player
Reconciling the Chinese and American ideas about responsibility also implicates
questions of sovereignty. This is because China is now a “systemically important”
player in many areas.24 In the global economy, climate, Asian regional security,
cyber security (in which Chinese players are extremely active), space, pandemic
prevention, and other arenas, China has moved beyond a regular “stakeholder”
and has become, along with the United States, a country on whose actions the
health of the whole system depends.
This poses challenges to China’s ideas of national sovereignty. Beijing adheres to a China is beginning
fairly absolutist, 19th century view of sovereignty, which holds that national gov-
ernments have the right to do whatever they please inside their own borders with- to show increasing
out outside interference. Beijing’s credo is and remains reciprocal noninterference:
We will not impose our values on you, and you should not impose them on us. flexibility about
China vociferously defends this strict ideal of sovereignty in part because of its sovereignty,
extreme concern about the status of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. China also
invokes this absolutist ideal of sovereignty with regard to human rights. Awarding recognizing the
the Nobel Peace Prize to jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese Foreign Ministry
official insisted, was “a violation of China’s judicial sovereignty.” Its reluctance need to balance
to impose economic sanctions on other countries is also partly explained by an
allergy to foreign imposition in other countries’ affairs. its principle of
Similarly, a major sticking point in climate change negotiations has been China’s noninterference
refusal to allow international inspectors to verify reductions in its carbon dioxide
emissions. The head of its delegation at the Copenhagen climate change sum- with its increasing
mit explicitly invoked sovereignty to explain that stance. In general, as David
Shambaugh notes, “Most Chinese analysts believe (and there is virtual consensus global involvement.
across the spectrum) that the whole concept of global governance is a Western
trap which tries to undermine China’s sovereignty.”25
China is beginning, however, to show increasing flexibility about sovereignty,

recognizing the need to balance its principle of noninterference with its increas-
ing global involvement. Beijing, for example, contravened its usual rhetoric when
it voted in favor of strong U.N. sanctions against North Korea in 2009 and then
enforced them.26 While it rarely pressures countries, China “deliberately played
a visible role in pressuring the Sudanese government, in order to improve its
national image that has been undermined by the Darfur issue.”27 And when it

first joined the United Nations in 1971, China objected to the whole notion of
peacekeeping as meddling in the internal affairs of a state, yet today China has
approximately 2,000 active peacekeepers serving in 10 U.N. missions, making it
the largest provider of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council, though only the 14th overall.28
For the international system to operate well, China cannot pick and choose when to
honor 21st century ideas of sovereignty and when to remain tied to a 19th century
conception. A systemically important actor must consider consequences to the sys-
tem and to other nations at every turn. A modern conception of sovereignty (while
increasingly contested in the United States as discussed below) requires that nations
often take outside consequences into account when deciding on domestic policies. For the international
China does have a sovereign right to decide its own currency policy, yet China system to operate
cannot ignore the effects on the whole system if it is to be responsible. China
recognizes this reality to some degree. Beijing does do the minimum necessary to well, China cannot
answer heated political pressure from the United States and others on the value of
the Renminbi, though its steps to make its currency fully convertible on interna- pick and choose
tional markets are halting.
when to honor
Similarly, on energy and global warming, China’s domestic efforts and goals are
impressive and laudable, but a “systemically important” player needs also to take 21st century ideas
actions that will lead to workable international agreements on climate. On the
one hand, China appears to have done so in Cancun by recording its voluntary of sovereignty and
emissions cuts targets from Copenhagen in a formal agreement under the United
Nations and agreeing to a new system of “international consultation and analysis,” when to remain tied
which would meet acceptable standards for measuring, reporting, and verifying
emissions.29 China also facilitated international agreement on the architecture to a 19th century
of a “Green Climate Fund,” which would support developing countries’ efforts
in combating global warming, and advocating for the World Bank as the initial conception.
trustee of the fund.30 But on the other hand, China continues to resist inter-
national efforts to bind them to the emission reduction targets that they have
already accepted for themselves.
Increasingly, the United States and the international community will be asking
China to take steps that will challenge its invocation of an outdated, absolutist
view of national sovereignty. If China doesn’t do so there could be consequences
in the United States that would be detrimental to the long-term interests of both
nations—as we explore in the next section.

Leadership fatigue?
At the same time that America is working to convince China to accept its role as a
systemically important, responsible player in the international system and accept
a more modern view of sovereignty, bipartisan political support in the United
States for America’s leadership role in that system is eroding. In the post-WWII
period, the shared global architecture that delivered political and economic
benefits to America and the world rested on two conditions. First, it depended on
America’s willingness to be more responsible for costs at a time when others were
broke—to spend more to ensure global security, to bleed more for global security,
and to take on responsibility for being the consumer market of last resort. Second,
it demanded a common view that responsibility also meant restraint.
The world community agreed to abide by rules the United States and its allies
developed in exchange for these contributions to the global common good and
for the U.S. agreement to restrain its actions and also to be bound by the rules
and requirements of the international system. Both of these foundations are
under assault today.
From both ends of the political spectrum, there is an increasing willingness to

question the costs of America’s global obligations. America’s participation in inter-
national trade, its funding of international financial and economic development
institutions, and its underwriting of global security are under pressure in an era of
high debt and a greater need for investment at home.31
In addition, the idea that America should accept constraint is at the heart of
neoconservative argument of what is and has been wrong with U.S. foreign policy.
The George W. Bush administration’s endorsement of preventive war, for example,
flows from an assumption of unfettered American freedom of action. Relatedly,
in his recent book, How Barack Obama Is Endangering Our National Sovereignty,
George W. Bush’s former ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, lays
out the right wing’s view of national sovereignty. When the United States engages
with international organizations to address global problems, he writes, it “cede[s]

some of our sovereignty to institutions that other nations will also influence.” He
warns that “is unquestionably a formula for reducing U.S. autonomy and reducing
our control over the government.”32
Such views empower China’s own 19th century framework of national sovereignty,
and they neglect the fact that Americans enjoy enormous benefits by stewarding
the global order, from safe airplane travel to reduced exposure to lethal viruses to
profits garnered from exports.
Neoconservative
The political support for the United States continuing to be a responsible world
leader is not as robust as it once was, but it continues to hold. Most respected views empower
leaders on the left and the right and most, but not all, of the potential presidential
candidates in 2012 will operate inside the consensus that says the United States China’s own 19th
will lead and will pay large sums in blood and treasure to keep the global peace
and international order. century framework
But the ability of the United States to maintain this role will depend on America’s of national
ability to convince others in Europe and Asia, particularly China, that this archi-
tecture of shared responsibility is worth maintaining and bolstering. This means sovereignty.
China will have to demonstrate its willingness to see past its domestic concerns
and punch “at its weight” on international issues.
In short, for the consensus that America should continue to lead and shoulder its
international burdens to hold in the United States, Americans need to know that
the system will deliver results and that other countries are on board and fulfilling
their own responsibilities.

Where to go from here
A central U.S. foreign policy challenge continues to be getting emerging powers

to contribute significantly to global problem solving. And strategic collaboration
with China in particular continues to be necessary for U.S. security and prosperity.
Yet this year and the next will be challenging for the U.S.-China relationship. Both
countries face a period of political turmoil, with 2012 bringing presidential elec-
tions in the United States and a leadership transition in China, as seven of the nine In America, there
members on the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party, China’s
highest decision-making authority, will reach retirement age and step down. is political pressure
The bad news is that short-term political dynamics are likely to incentivize con- to be “tough” on
frontation. In America, there is political pressure to be “tough” on China. In China,
there is a strong political imperative not to appear in any way as caving to pressure China. In China,
from the United States. But the good news is that if the United States and China
can avoid clashes in the short term, their ideas of responsibility and sovereignty there is a strong
could converge over time.
political imperative
One reason is that China’s image of itself will eventually catch up to where it
really is. The historical narrative of a humiliated nation will drop away for future not to appear in
generations in the face of China’s major accomplishments. This recalibration will
embolden China when it comes to core issues such as Taiwan, but it will also any way as caving
make it increasingly difficult for Beijing to claim poverty when it comes to global
obligations, especially as challenges like global warming worsen. Of course, that to pressure from
will not automatically lead to responsible actions. But China will have more and
more to lose, and it will likely slowly adopt the mantle of a systemically important the United States.
player because it benefits so much by the system working well.
Second, as time goes on, the system itself—international organizations, networks,

and rules—and the nations in it will continue to adjust to China’s new influence
and will welcome Chinese participation more fully, as the International Monetary
Fund did recently by expanding China’s voting power within the organization.

That will, in turn, make China more confident that its preferences will be taken
into account and will make it more willing to take actions that improve and
strengthen the system.
Moreover, the United States will continue to adjust to having more players,
including China, on the world stage. Many American policymakers have already
made this mental leap, including President Obama. But the U.S. bureaucracies,
which are used to drafting all the international agendas and calling all the shots,
need to catch up. The same goes for a vocal minority on the right, which still
seems to think America can reach its goals by domination. Finally, over time, the
U.S. economy will recover, and a positive trend line will help maintain the political
consensus in favor of America’s historic leadership role. With this possible future
in mind, let’s now turn to the policy recommendations.

Policy recommendations
The following are 10 policy recommendations broken down into three policy goals to:
• Maximize the upside of the bilateral relationship for the United States.
• Increase Chinese responsibility on global challenges.
• Maintain U.S. leverage and leadership.
Of course, as Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) argued in his speech on China at the Center
for American Progress last month, any improvement in U.S.-China relations
requires the United States to do more at home to get itself back in shape for the 21st
century, with investments in education, innovation, green energy, and infrastruc-
ture. But with that as a given, here are some other steps Washington should take.
Maximizing the upside of the bilateral relationship
Facilitate job-creating Chinese direct investment in the United States
Local and state governments in America are clamoring for Chinese investment, yet
some potential Chinese investors are concerned they will meet political resistance
if they buy American companies or assets. Consistent with trade regulations, state
and local governments should develop specific mechanisms such as foreign invest-
ment fairs (with Chinese-language assistance) or foreign investment zones to
encourage the inflow of Chinese funding that will create American jobs.
These mechanisms can provide Chinese investors assurance that their job-
creating capital is welcome and will receive fair treatment. But as China expert
Elizabeth Economy suggests, it is critical for the U.S. side to negotiate hard to make
sure investments actually create jobs.33 This means steps such as assessing the deal
specifically in terms of job creation and working with labor and other local groups
to evaluate the economic benefits of the deal to the community. Economy offers an
example of how the United Steelworkers union struck a deal with Chinese compa-

nies to develop a $1.5 billion wind-farm venture in Texas that will create 1,000 jobs
for U.S. workers—rather than 330 U.S. jobs in the initial proposal.34
The Obama administration also could help spread local best practices on how to
maximize the benefits of foreign direct investment. And it should ensure that the
process through which the interagency Committee for Foreign Investment in the
United States reviews foreign investments that do implicate national security is as
clear as possible and available in easy-to-understand terms, in Chinese (and every
other major language, for that matter).
Focus on increasing net exports to China
President Obama has pledged to double U.S. exports by 2014 in order to create
more U.S. jobs and rebalance the global economy. China is America’s fastest-
growing export market but it still maintains significant barriers to U.S. goods and
services. In addition to pushing China to address its current account surplus and
other restrictions in multilateral forums, as discussed below, and through bilateral
forums, such as the annual Strategic & Economic Dialogue, the Joint Commission
on Commerce and Trade, and others, the administration should focus on assisting
American companies, especially small- and medium-sized ones, as China’s domes-
tic demand for goods and services grows over the coming years.
The Obama administration should further pursue steps it has already taken includ-
ing increasing funding available to small businesses from the Export-Import Bank,
looking for particular areas where Ex-Im Bank financing is useful for exports to
China, such as aviation, pursuing Ex-Im Bank cooperation with counterparts in
China on identifying business opportunities, and increasing the number of per-
sonnel at the U.S. embassy and consulates in China that can assist exporters.
Increase Chinese responsibility
Work with other countries to make the case to China that its responsibility
is welcome and needed
As it has already, the Obama administration needs to make the case directly and
consistently in bilateral meetings with China that when it steps up to the plate
on key global issues the effort is welcomed publicly and privately and, conversely,

that free-riding is not appropriate to a country of China’s stature. The United
States needs to encourage its partners and allies to do the same, as international
respect is an important lever to move China.
In the recent past, this approach worked. International pressure on China over
its role in supporting the murderous regime in Khartoum was a major reason
Beijing began to use its leverage with Sudan to convince it to accept peacekeepers.
Similarly, once the administration began to work with Russia on Iran and left China
isolated on the Security Council, Beijing eventually agreed to tougher sanctions.
Multiple voices pointing out that, for example, China is not a top 10 contributor to
the U.N. annual budget, even though it is a member of the Security Council and its
economy ranks second in the world, might cause Beijing to be more generous.35
Encourage greater Chinese responsibility on less controversial

transnational issues
On issues such as human trafficking, pandemic prevention, humanitarian relief

coordination, narcotics interdiction, and other less politically sensitive issues, the
United States should encourage China to take a more proactive role. China will
garner the international accolades and respect it seeks, the problems will get atten-
tion, and advocates in China for a more global posture will have more evidence of
potential benefits.
One recent example: Chinese ships battling pirates off the coast of Somalia side by
side with coalition and noncoalition naval forces, while limited, have been power-
ful in their ability to showcase the positive potential of a cooperative China. China
deployed vessels to the Gulf of Aden region in 2009 with the stated intention
to safeguard and provide security for Chinese vessels sailing through the region.
But Chinese officials from the Ministry of National Defense also made the case
for China’s presence in terms of multilateral cooperation: China was “willing to
strengthen intelligence and information exchanges and, when necessary, take part
in humanitarian relief operations with all countries, including the United States.”36
Of course, China is picking and choosing carefully when to involve itself with
international issues, and there is not an automatic path from peripheral incidents
to major hot spots such as Afghanistan or bold action on its current account sur-
plus. Still, these minor involvements may serve to get China’s “feet wet” and lead
to more important involvements.

Use international organizations to increase Chinese responsibility
International organizations are another forum in which to push for Chinese respon-
sibility. The Obama administration should support “pay to play” rules, in which a
nation’s power in an organization is tied to its contributions, as in the IMF, as well
as accountability mechanisms where members are required to undergo a review of
their conduct. For instance, since the United States joined the U.N. Human Rights
Council, it can participate in a regular review of China’s human rights practices.
Similarly, the Mutual Assessment Process in the G-20, whereby countries review
each others’ macroeconomic plans against the needs for growth in the global
economy, provides an excellent forum for multilateral scrutiny of China’s current
account surplus. Now that International Monetary Fund reform has corrected
China’s underrepresentation, the United States can continue to push for reforms to
make the IMF an effective watchdog for the global economy, including on currency.
Engage China in trying to develop rules of the road in new areas
Washington should work with Beijing in areas where the international rules are
not yet established. For instance, rules of conduct in the global commons of
cyberspace and outer space are two areas where, difficult as it is, the United States
could try to engage Beijing on discussing common principles for frameworks
that both countries and the rest of the international community could endorse.
Extensive hacking from individuals based in China and China’s unannounced
shooting down of a defunct satellite in 2007 provide reason to be skeptical that
Beijing would agree to a set of rules, but also make the case for why those stan-
dards are needed. The United States could, for example, propose a ban on debris-
producing intentional destruction or damage of space systems.37
Maintain U.S. leverage and leadership
Maintain U.S. leverage in Asia
The United States should continue to deepen all aspects of its relationships with
its allies and partners in Asia and make common cause with them when appro-
priate, including in response to misguided Chinese actions. Our key allies and
partners in the region welcome continued U.S. engagement and leadership.

As the Obama administration has already begun, the United States should
expand its engagement with regional forums such as the Association of South
East Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, and others,
strengthening those multilateral mechanisms. Washington should also continue
to support economic integration in Asia through the Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement, a free trade agreement that includes Brunei,
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. Australia, Peru, Vietnam, and Japan have
voiced interest in joining the agreement. The TPP has the potential to build a
larger Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and could provide another mechanism
for the United States to engage the region economically and strategically. Finally,
U.S. support for an expanded UN Security Council that includes India and Japan
as permanent members would strengthen that institution but also increase U.S.
diplomatic leverage.
Implement the 100,000 Strong Initiative
The Obama administration should fully implement its 100,000 Strong Initiative,
launched in May 2010. This program is designed to increase and diversify the
number of U.S. students studying in China. Training the next generation of China
watchers will be critical for the United States to maintain its understanding of,
communication with, and ability to influence China.38
Continue to act according to 21st century standards of responsibility

and sovereignty
A conservative-led U.S. House of Representatives and an increasingly austere

budget environment will put pressure on America’s role as a global leader.
Contributions to international organizations such as the United Nations and IMF,
as well as agreeing to and meeting international goals on carbon reduction, will be
contentious issues again in the coming years.
But every time a policymaker or pundit makes the case that America should not
meet its longstanding obligations toward international institutions or should shirk
international rules, it strengthens China’s own arguments that it has the right to
make its own decisions without regard to the outside world, whether it be on cur-
rency, climate, or maritime claims.

Thus, to narrow China’s wiggle room on being a responsible global actor, the
United States should continue to be fully engaged in the international system,
pay its dues, push for reforms that make the laws and institutions more effec-
tive as well as ratify extremely sensible agreements such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The
more aggressive the United States is on climate, the easier it will be to push Beijing
into agreeing to binding international goals for greenhouse gas reduction.
Don’t lose the pragmatists in the United States
In both the media and Congress, as in many other areas of policy, extreme views
about China on the left and especially on the right are coming to dominate the
debate. The Obama administration and progressive leaders in Congress need to
help pragmatists in both political parties and in the media champion effective
policies that the administration is supporting. Messaging on China policy is
notoriously difficult, but a clearer and shorter articulation of U.S.-China policy
would be useful.
The administration should also push back on extremist neoconservative argu-

ments about China. Pundits cannot argue that the Obama administration is not
being tough enough on China and at the same time espouse 19th century ideas of
responsibility and sovereignty that let China off the international hook.

Conclusion
The United States and China have different conceptions of global responsibility
and national sovereignty. Yet their ability to solve problems together is a key deter-
minant for the welfare of Americans, Chinese, and the rest of the planet. There
is reason to hope their ideas will converge over time, though the next two years
could be fraught. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen
said at the Center for American Progress in December 2010, America as a nation
chooses to engage because doing so “leaves the world potentially in a better place.”
We can hope China makes that choice, and for that reason, more and more often
in the years to come.

Endnotes
1 Personal communication with Daniel Rosen, director, China Practice, 17 “China Closes 10.71 Gigawatts of Small Coal-Fired Power Plants,
Rhodium Group, January 4, 2011. Xinhua Says,” Bloomberg, July 25, 2010, available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-25/china-closes-10-71-gigawatts-
2 Nina Hachigian, Michael Schiffer, and Winny Chen, “A Global Impera- of-small-coal-fired-power-plants-xinhua-says.html. For more on
tive: A Progressive Approach to U.S.-China Relations in the 21st China’s clean energy policies, see: Julian L. Wong and Andrew Light,
Century” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2008). “China Begins Its Transition to a Clean-Energy Economy,” Center for
American Progress, June 4, 2009, available at http://www.american-
3 See, for example: James Fallows, “Manufactured failure: press cover- progress.org/issues/2009/06/china_energy_numbers.html.
age of Obama in Asia,” The Atlantic, November 20, 2009, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2009/11/ 18 Clifford Krauss, “Charting China’s Energy Explosion,” The New York
manufactured-failure-press-coverage-of-obama-in-asia/30615/; Times Green Blog, November 9, 2010, available at http://green.
Nina Hachigian, “Stop Already with the China Hysteria,” Center blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/charting-chinas-energy-explosion/.
for American Progress, February 9, 2010, available at http://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/stop_china_hysteria.html. 19 Nina Hachigian and Yuan Peng, “The US-China Expectations Gap: An
Exchange,” Survival 52 (4) (2010): 67–86.
4 “Beware of US ‘smart power’ in Asia,” People’s Daily Online,
November 10, 2010, available at http://english.people.com. 20 Ibid., 72–73.
cn/90001/90780/91343/7194895.html.
21 Robert G Sutter, “Global Responsibility or Free Riding: The Implica-
5 Yang Jiechi, “A Changing China in a Changing World,’’ Munich, Ger- tions of the ‘Win-Win’ Principle for China’s Approach to Managing
many, February 5, 2010, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/ Global Crises and International Affairs.” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting
eng/zt/768675/t657039.htm. Paper (Washington: APSA, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1642057.
6 David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” The Washington
Quarterly 34 (1) (2011): 7–27. 22 John Lyons and Matthew Cowley, “Brazil Is Posed to Pressure Beijing
on Currency Policy,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2011, avail-
7 Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China” able at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704835504
(Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 576060211379610444.html.
2010), available at http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP26.pdf.
23 For more discussion of Chinese leadership in the North Korea case,
8 For more on divisions within CCP, see, for example: Kerry see, for example: Nina Hachigian, “China’s New Engagement in the
Brown, “The Power Struggle Among China’s Elite,” Foreign International System: In the Ring, but Punching Below its Weight”
Policy, October 14, 2010, available at http://www.foreignpolicy. (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2009).
com/articles/2010/10/14/the_power_struggle_among_chi-
nas_elite?page=0,1; Cheng Li, “China’s Team of Rivals,” Foreign Policy, 24 Personal communication with Daniel Rosen.
March/April 2009, p. 88.
25 Shambaugh, 17.
9 Shambaugh, 18.
26 Louis Charbonneau, “China committed to enforcing North Korea
10 Ibid., 18. sanctions: U.S.,” Reuters, July 30, 2009, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56T5WV20090730.
11 Jakobson and Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China.”
27 Chengqiu Wu, “Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility:
12 Evan Medeiros, “Is Beijing Ready for Global Leadership?”, Current His- Changes in China’s Response to International Humanitarian Crises,”
tory 108 (719) (2009): 250–256. Journal of Chinese Political Science 15 (1) (2010): 71–97.
13 “Transcript: Wen Jiabao,” Financial Times, February 2, 2009, avail- 28 “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations,”
able at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-11dd-8790- available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contribu-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1AMqxicoN. tors/2010/sept10_2.pdf (last accessed January 2010).
14 Chinese analyst in off-the-record conference, Washington, 29 Jennifer Morgan and Deborah Seligsohn, “What Cancun Means for
December 2010. China and the U.S.,” World Resources Institute, December 16, 2010,
available at http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/12/what-cancun-
15 Chinese analyst in off-the-record conference, Shanghai, means-china-and-us.
November 2010.
30 Richard W. Caperton, “Headway Made on Climate Change Action,”
16 Chinese analyst in off-the-record conference, Washington, Center for American Progress, December 13, 2010, available at
December 2010. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/cancun_head-
way.html.

31 See, for example: Michael Mandlebaum, The Frugal Superpower 36 Alison A. Kaufman, “China’s Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations
(New York: PublicAffairs: 2010). off the Horn of Africa: Drivers and Implications” (Alexandria, VA:
CNA, 2009), available at http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/
32 John Bolton, How Barack Obama Is Endangering Our National Sover- news/2009/Piracy%20conference%20report.pdf.
eignty (New York: Encounter Books, 2010).
37 For more on this proposal, see: Ross Liemer and Christopher F.
33 Elizabeth C. Economy, “The Game Changer: Coping With China’s Chyba, “A Verfiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons,” The
Foreign Policy Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 89 (6) (2010), available at Washington Quarterly 33 (3) (2010): 149–163, available at http://
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66865/elizabeth-c-econo- www.twq.com/10july/docs/10jul_LiemerChyba.pdf.
my/the-game-changer .
38 “100,000 Strong Initiative,” available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/
34 Ibid. regional/100000_strong/index.htm.
35 Shambaugh, 23.

About the author
Nina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at American Progress. Based in Los Angeles,

she is the co-author of The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as
Other Powers Rise (Simon & Schuster, 2008). She focuses on great power relation-
ships, international institutions, the U.S.-China relationship, and U.S. foreign
policy. Prior to American Progress, Hachigian was a senior political scientist at
RAND Corporation and served as the director of the RAND Center for Asia
Pacific Policy for four years. Before RAND, she had an international affairs fel-
lowship from the Council on Foreign Relations during which she researched the
Internet in China. From 1998 to 1999, Hachigian was on the staff of the National
Security Council in the White House during the Clinton administration.
Hachigian has published numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles,
and her earlier book was The Information Revolution in Asia (RAND, 2003). She is
on the board of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford
University and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Hachigian received
her B.S. from Yale University and her J.D. from Stanford Law School.
Acknowledgements
I am greatly indebted to Winny Chen for her quick and able assistance with
this report. I also want to thank Di Wu for her research contributions and my
colleagues Andrew Light, Adam Hersh, and Sabina Dewan for their good ideas.
Ed Paisley’s edits were as helpful as always, and the art team did their usual ter-
rific job. Finally, I would like to thank John Podesta and Rudy deLeon for their
thoughts and for giving me the opportunity to try out some of these arguments
before putting them to paper.

The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute
dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity
for all. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to
these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values.
We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and
international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that
is “of the people, by the people, and for the people.”
1333 H Street, NW, 10th Floor, Washington, DC 20005 • Tel: 202-682-1611 • Fax: 202-682-1867 • www.americanprogress.org

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Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Nina Hachigian January 2011

Nina Hachigian January 2011

4 China policy in the first half of the Obama administration

12 A better test of global responsibility

18 Where to go from here

29 About the author and acknowledgements

Reconciling the Chinese and American ideas about global responsibility

1 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

A shared understanding of even the basic components of global responsibility

It is possible that American and Chinese conceptions of global responsibility

2 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

• Facilitating job-creating Chinese direct investment in the United States

3 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

The Obama administration succeeded in changing the historical pattern of

In effect, the Obama administration suggested a bargain to China: If you help us

4 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

5 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

AP Photo/Yonhap, Jin Sung-chul

6 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Tension in the U.S.-China relationship is unavoidable. The rapid ascent of a rising

7 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Consequently, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy is to encourage emerging powers

A more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities and

8 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

9 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Chinese thinkers also argue that the United

China is also unsure what it will gain from

10 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

11 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

One common misconception about global responsibility is that it requires a sac-

12 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

13 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

China is beginning, however, to show increasing flexibility about sovereignty,

14 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

15 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

From both ends of the political spectrum, there is an increasing willingness to

16 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

17 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

A central U.S. foreign policy challenge continues to be getting emerging powers

Second, as time goes on, the system itself—international organizations, networks,

18 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

19 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Maximizing the upside of the bilateral relationship

Facilitate job-creating Chinese direct investment in the United States

20 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Focus on increasing net exports to China

Increase Chinese responsibility

21 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Encourage greater Chinese responsibility on less controversial

On issues such as human trafficking, pandemic prevention, humanitarian relief

22 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Engage China in trying to develop rules of the road in new areas

Maintain U.S. leverage and leadership

Maintain U.S. leverage in Asia

23 Center for American Progress | Conduct Befitting a Great Power

Implement the 100,000 Strong Initiative

Continue to act according to 21st century standards of responsibility