Ledesma V CA
Ledesma V CA
Ledesma V CA
NOCON, J.:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the Decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 1990 1 ordering the dismissal of her ejectment
complaint before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-
compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the
Resolution of January 7, 1991 2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of said Decision.
The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum are as follows:
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated
December 10, 1984 and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-to-month" basis
pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of monthly
rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that as of October 31,
1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in the total sum
of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and received by, private
respondent.
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred
the matter to the Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification
to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is
not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipts and
prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist, copies of which are attached as Annexes
"E-E10" of the said Petition.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to vacate the premises,
petitioner was constrained to retain the services of counsel to initiate this
ejectment proceeding. 3
The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision on June 21, 1989 ordering
private respondent to vacate the premises, to pay rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,500.00. 4 The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on
appeal, affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of attorney's fees which it reduced to
P1,000.00. 5
Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of Appeals when he
elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled, thus:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989 of the RTC of Manila,
Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is reversed and set aside and the Complaint for
Ejectment against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of action. No costs. 6
Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the Court of Appeals erred
—
2. In failing to consider that private respondent had waived his right to question
the lack of cause of action of the complaint, if there is any, contrary to law,
established jurisprudence, and evidence on record;
5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated, contrary to law and evidence
on record.
6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court and
Regional Trial Court below.
Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and
9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for review with the appellate court and which mislead the court
to erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.
Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private respondent in the court
below, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals,
citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo. 7 Private respondent had waived said objection, following the line of
reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate Court. 8
Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the
Metropolitan Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6
and 9 of P.D. 1508 and consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of cause of action, to wit:
We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D.
1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated
that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was
stating that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable
settlement. Without the mandatory personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the
MTC. Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was never summoned
or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as
alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action was improperly
issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the
mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in
substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or objections in the court below.
Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared before the Lupon
Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated in her Petition 11 and her
Memorandum 12 that:
Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand letters, petitioner referred
the matter to the barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a certification
to file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma, (who is
not a lawyer) during the barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring
psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from the receipt and
prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist copies of which are attached herewith as
Annexes
"E-E10."
However, as found out by the respondent court:
We agree with the petitioner that private respondent Cecile Ledesma failed to
comply with section 6 of P.D. 1508. The record of the case is barren showing
compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the documentary evidence of the
private respondent herself attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion.
They show that it is not the private respondent but her son. Raymund U.
Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania Navarro who dealt with the petitioner
regarding their dispute. Thus, the demand letter dated October 18, 1988 sent to
the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum of P14,039.00 was signed by
Raymund Ledesma. On the other hand, the demand letter dated November 14,
1988 was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More telling is the Certification to File
Action signed by Barangay Chairman, Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the
complainant is Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent. 13
As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties
because:
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the barangay Chairman was
because of her recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988 15 — specifically
September to December 6 — there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her
psychiatrist for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner.
There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman's office.
Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented by counsel or even
by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. 16
Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the
ejectment case in the MTC of Manila.18 Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us
to discuss the other issues involved.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent Court are affirmed in
toto with treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
1 Rollo, p. 34.
2 Rollo, p. 50.
6 CA-G.R. SP No. 19704 dated Aug. 30, 1990, penned by Justice Reynato S.
Puno and concurred in by Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Artemon D. Luna (Rollo,
p. 47).
9 Rollo, p. 51.
10 Rollo, p. 52.
11 Rollo, p. 12.
12 Rollo, p. 116.
13 Rollo, p. 44.
16 Section 9, P.D. 1508; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, 695.
18 Section 4(d), P.D. 1508; Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, 695.