CABIB ALONTO TANOG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RASAD G.

BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional

DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Cabib Alonto Tanog (Cabib) assailing the orders dated
February 11, 2009; February 13, 2009; and March 2, 2009, respectively, issued by respondent Hon. Rasad G.
Balindong (Judge Balindong), then Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8,
Marawi City, in Criminal Case No. 4471-04.

The Antecedents:

On July 5, 2004, Cabib Tanog, Jr. was shot to death by a group of armed persons inside the canteen of
Dansalan College Foundation, Inc. in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur.

On the same day, members of the Marawi City police apprehended Gapo Sidic (Sidic) at a police checkpoint
while he was on board a Tamaraw FX vehicle bound for Iligan City.

On July 8, 2004, the petitioner filed a complaint for murder before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Marawi
City against Sidic, Anwar Bonsalagan, Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong, and Arsad Balindong for the death
of his son, Cabib, Jr.

In its resolution dated August 3, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the five
(5) accused, and recommended the filing of an information[2] for murder against them.

The prosecution filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City against the
accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 447i_04. This case was raffled to Branch 9, which was presided by
Judge Amer Ibrahim. Thereafter, Judge Ibrahim issued an "order of arrest" against the accused.

On January 8, 2005, Sidic filed a motion to fix bail before the RTC, claiming that the evidence of guilt against
him was not strong.[3] After the prosecution presented four witnesses, the RTC, Branch 9: (a) considered the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution for the purposes of the motion to fix bail deemed terminated; and
(b) set the presentation of Sidic's counter evidence on May 21, 2008.

Due to the death of Judge Ibrahim, Judge Lacsaman Busran of the RTC, Branch 11, Marawi City, was
designated as Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 9. The records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 was re-raffled to
Branch 10 because Judge Busran had been previously designated as its Acting Presiding Judge.

On February 4, 2009, Sidic filed an urgent ex-parte motion to direct special raffle before the RTC, Branch 10
since he had been in detention for more than four years, and Branch 10 was already overburdened with
numerous cases.

In its Order of February 4, 2009, Judge Busran granted Sidic's motion to direct a special raffle, and directed his
Branch Clerk of Court to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC).

On the next day, the OCC transmitted the records of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 to RTC, Branch 8, presided
by respondent Judge Balindong.
In its order dated February 11, 2009,[4] the RTC, Branch 8 granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, and fixed the
amount at P30,000.00. It essentially held that evidence of guilt against Sidic was not strong since the
witnesses presented by the prosecution did not actually see the victim shot.

In its order[5] of February 13, 2009, the RTC, Branch 8 directed the City Warden to release Sidic after the latter
had posted the P30,000.00 cash bond.

The prosecution filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of
the accused and for inhibition[6] before the RTC, Branch 8.

In his order[7] dated March 2, 2009, Judge Balindong held that "[t]he motion to fix bail was resolved justly and
fairly in accordance with the law, rules and jurisprudence."[8] He, however, opted to inhibit himself "from further
taking action on the other incidents"[9] of the case out of "delicadeza." The dispositive portion of this order
provides:

WHEREFORE, the undersigned Acting Presiding Judge is inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case
of accused Gapo Sidic. The rest of the accused are at large, hence, the most that the next Judge/Acting Judge
can do is to archive the case insofar as they are concerned and issue alias Warrant of Arrest.

Let the record in its entirety be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court for appropriate action considering
that it cannot be re-raffled to RTC Branch 9 as the latter sala is presided by Judge Lacsaman M. Busran of
RTC Branch 10 who earlier inhibited himself from trying this case.

SO ORDERED.[10]

The Petition for Certiorari

In the present petition, the petitioner alleged that Judge Balindong committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail despite the strong
evidence of guilt against him, and in fixing the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. He maintained that Judge
Balindong should have inhibited himself from taking part in Criminal Case No. 4471-04 since the latter is
related to the accused within the prohibited degree under Rule 137 of the Rules of Court.

OUR RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to DISMISS the petition.

The case is already moot

A case is said to be moot or academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a ruling would be of no practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction
over moot cases because there is no substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[11]

In
Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v. Santiago,[12] we held that:

The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy—one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is
no justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not
sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

The events which took place during the pendency of the present case have rendered the present petition for
certiorari moot. The record shows that during the pendency of this petition, the RTC, Branch 28, Catbalogan
City, presided by Judge Sibanah E. Usman,[13] rendered a decision on January 20, 2015, in Criminal Case No.
4471-04 finding Sidic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The decision became final and executory on March 26, 2015.

We recall that the present petition questioned Judge Balindong's orders granting the motion to fix bail filed by
Sidic and setting the amount of bail at only P30,000.00. Sidic was charged with a capital offense, and his
conviction clearly imports that the evidence of guilt against him of the offense charged was strong. Thus,
whatever judgment is reached in this case would no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, can no longer be enforced. Simply put, the petitioner's conviction of a capital offense, which had
already attained finality,[14] warranted his incarceration. Any resolution on the propriety of Judge Balindong's
challenged orders relating to Sidic's provisional release would be of no useful or practical value.

The petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of judicial hierarchy.

We also point out that the present petition for certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the CA, and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction, the commonality does not give the petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice in the forum to be used.[15] The appropriate forum is the court lowest in the judicial
hierarchy.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (b)
it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases that some
of these cases may have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or because these courts are better equipped to resolve the issues given that this Court is not a trier
of facts.[16]

In
Dy v. Bibat-Palamos,[17] the Court recognized various exceptions to the strict application of the principle of
hierarchy of courts, as follows:

xxx, the invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in certain
instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when
dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances (such as cases of national interest and
of serious implications) justify the use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction.[18] Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez v. Romulo on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America v. Purganan
on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Quijano-Padilla on government contract
involving modernization and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora
on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich v. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of
the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.[19]

In the present case, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation on why he failed to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy; he gave no justification why he did not challenge the assailed

RTC orders before the CA. We thus reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain a direct invocation of its jurisdiction unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the

appropriate courts below, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the resort to this Court through the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari.[20] We reiterate
that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and the party who seeks to avail of this remedy must
strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law and the rules.

The grave abuse of discretion issue

Even if we decide the case on the merits, we still dismiss the present petition for its failure to establish that the
assailed orders of Judge Balindong were tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

a. The grant of the motion to fix bail

The right to bail flows from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the
law who may be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any
court, as required under specified conditions. Before conviction, bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Bail is denied if the
evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong.[21]

Corollarily, Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, states that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.

We point out that the accused were charged of murder, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. If
the information charges a capital offense, the right to bail becomes a matter of discretion and the grant thereof
may be justified as a matter of right if the evidence of guilt is not strong. The determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.

To be sure, the discretion of the trial court is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised
within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge's individual
opinion and the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules that, while allowing the
judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent rulings that are out of control.[22]

In the present case, we find that Judge Balindong did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, and capricious manner when he granted Sidic's motion to fix bail. The records showed that a

hearing on the application for bail was conducted and that the prosecution presented four witnesses, namely
Noma Tanog, Cabib Tanog, Sr., Saripada Tanog, and Saripoden Tanog Lucman. Judge Balindong evaluated
the testimonies of these witnesses, and found out that none of them witnessed the actual shooting of the
victim: Noma merely saw Sidic running towards the direction of the vehicles after he (Noma) went to Dansalan
College Foundation, Inc. to verify the gunshots he heard; Saripada admitted that he did not see Sidic shoot the
victim; Cabib admitted that it was Noma who pointed Sidic to him as one of the victim's assailants; and
Saripoden merely described the attire of one of the men he saw at the canteen, and did not mention the name
of Sidic. On the basis of these testimonies, Judge Balindong concluded that the prosecution failed to show that
the evidence against Sidic was strong.

We additionally examined the affidavits of Cabib and Noma,[23] and found that these documents supported the
findings of Judge Balindong.

In his affidavit, Cabib stated that he was informed of the death of his son by Adil Dima;[24] and that it was Noma
who told him the identities of five of the assailants. For his part, Noma stated in his.affidavit that he saw Sidic
as one of the persons who ran towards a maroon Tamaraw FX (bearing plate number ATF 754) and a blue
Toyota Corona (without any plate number) after the shooting. He (Noma) mentioned, however, that the
Tamaraw FX the police flagged down was colored red.[25]

In the light of the testimonies and affidavits of the witnesses, we cannot fault Judge Balindong if he had ruled that the evidence of guilt against the accused was not strong.

That the RTC eventually convicted Sidic is of no moment, since the trial judge, in determining the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail, did not sit to try the merits of the case.

b. Amount of bail

Contrary to the petitioner's claim, we also hold that Judge Balindong did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he set the amount of Sidic's bailatP30,000.00.

Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial ability of the accused to

give bail; (b) nature and circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e) age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the

evidence against the accused; (g) probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (j)

pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.

It is settled that the amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. In implementing this mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner's pecuniary circumstances. We point out that what is

reasonable bail to a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man charged with a like offense. Thus, the right to bail should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is relatively

excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the defendant when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.[26]

Judge Balindong explained how he arrived at the amount in this manner:

Considering the guidelines under Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court, among them: the health of the accused
who has languished in jail since his apprehension on July 5, 2004 and up to the present or for more than four
(4) years; his character and reputation as he is a former Councillor of Pualas, Lanao del Sur, in fact, he was
incumbent councillor at the time of his detention; the weight of evidence against him, a weak one; and his
financial ability and considering further the constitutional and statutory provision that "excessive bail shall not
be required," the bail is fixed at P30,000.00.[27]

Assuming that the bail set by Judge Balindong is low considering that the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommends "no bail" for murder, we cannot use this fact alone to hold that his
order -with respect to the amount of bail set - had been issued with grave abuse of discretion. We point out that
the DOJ Bail Bond Guide - while persuasive and merits attention - is not binding on the courts. In fixing the
amount of bail, the judge is given the discretion to set an amount which he or she perceives as appropriate
under given circumstances in relation to the factors enumerated under Section 9 of Rule 114. As quoted
above, Judge Balindong enumerated the reasons (i.e., accused's incarceration for more than 4 years; his
reputation as a former councillor; his financial ability; and the weak evidence against him) why he set the
amount of bail at P30,000.00.

c. Non-inhibition of Judge Balindong

The rule on disqualification of judges is laid down in Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either
party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

xxx

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above, (emphasis ours)

The reason behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges was explained in Villaluz v. Judge
Mijares[28] as follows:

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent
judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle
that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot
objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear
and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

In the present case, we hold that the petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation that Judge Balindong is
related to Sidic within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to warrant his (Judge Balindong's) mandatory
inhibition from the case.

In his omnibus motion for reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and
for inhibition, the petitioner prayed, among others, that Judge Balindong inhibit himself from trying and deciding
the case on the merit[s]. He alleged that:
xxx the accused is allegedly a relative of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge of this Court especially the
other accused, namely: Papas Balindong, Nago Balindong alias Hilal and Arsad Balindong. Besides, accused
Gapo Sidic is a resident and native of Barangay Yaran which is an adjacent or adjoining barangay of Barangay
Dapao which is allegedly the native place of the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge. Moreover, Barangays
Yaran and Dapao are parts of the Sultanate territory of Picong wherein the Honorable Acting Presiding Judge
of this Honorable Court was crowned as Sultan [of] Picong.[29] (emphasis ours)

The petitioner described the relationship between Judge Balindong and the accused with more specifity in the
present petition for certiorari by alleging that: Judge Balindong is the "uncle-in-law" of Sidic; Judge Balindong is
the first cousin of accused Papas; and accused Nago and Arsad are Judge Balindong's "nephews by first
degree cousins."

To support these claims, the petitioner attached to the present petition an affidavit executed by Manorbi Sidic
essentially stating that: (1) Sidic's mother-in-law is the sister of Judge Balindong; (2) Judge Balindong and
Papas are first-degree cousins; and (3) Nago and Arsad are the "nephews by first-degree cousins" of Judge
Balindong.

To our mind, these bare claims, supported by a mere affidavit of Manorbi that had not been presented before
the RTC, Branch 8, are grossly insufficient to determine whether Judge Balindong falls within the compulsory
inhibition under Rule 137. We point out that the petitioner's use of the term 'allegedly' in his omnibus motion for
reconsideration to cancel bond posted for the provisional liberty of the accused and for inhibition revealed that
he himself was unsure and uncertain if Judge Balindong was indeed related to Sidic and the other accused.
Corollarily, the presentation of Manorbi's affidavit - attached for the first time in this petition for certiorari -
without any other evidence to substantiate the matters stated therein, is inadequate and lacking to determine
the degree of Judge Balindong's relationship to the accused. We note in this regard that a mere relation by
affinity or consanguinity is not enough cause for the compulsory inhibition of a judge; it should be shown that
the he or she is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree.

We are not unaware that after Judge Balindong had granted Sidic's motion to fix bail, he opted to inhibit
himself "from further taking action on the other incidents"[30] of Criminal Case No. 4471-04 out of "delicadeza."
The records do not indicate what Judge Balindong meant to convey when he used the term "delicadeza" to
justify his inhibition; we cannot imply something that is not supported by the records of the case.

It would have been ideal if the petitioner had filed an administrative case against Judge Balindong if he truly
believed that the latter committed a violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics or the Rules. This would have
enabled Judge Balindong to properly answer the charges against him, particularly his decision not to initially
inhibit from Criminal Case No. 4471-04. It would have also given us ample and sufficient basis to rule on the
validity of the petitioner's claim that Judge Balindong was related to the accused within the prohibitive degree
under Rule 137.

We reiterate that grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or an arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility.
The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. In this case, the petitioner failed to establish that Judge Balindong gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the challenged orders.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Cabib
Alonto Tanog.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco,* Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur
Brion,** J., Acting Chairperson.

* Designated as Acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2282
dated November 13, 2015.

** Designated as Acting Chairperson in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2281
dated November 13, 2015.

[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

[2] The Information reads:

That on or about July 5, 2004, in Marawi City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused Gapo Sidic conspiring and confederating with Anwar Bonsalagan, Papas Balindong, Nago
Balindong alias Hilal, and Arsad Balindong who are still at large mutually aiding and assisting one another,
then armed with .45 Caliber Pistol and other firearms, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength and with the use of motor vehicles, a
maroon FX Tamaraw bearing plate no. ATF-754 and a Blue Sky Toyota Corona with no plate number did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Cabib Tanog, Jr. with said weapons
with which they were then provided for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the
head and other vital parts of the body of the said Cabib Tanog, Jr. which caused his instantaneous death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.