Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma.

Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner  Gerardo  Concepcion  and  private  respondent  Ma.  Theresa Almontewere married in 1989. Almost a year
later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma.
Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter had
married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario
was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It
declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa
while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario and not
petitioner Gerardo.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage
between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes
that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of
the child because such right is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage
of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any
right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

FACTS:

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of a parcel of land owned by Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, herein defendant, donated
the land by virtue of donation propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was suffering from tuberculosis in January
1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly
move and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria
gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.

ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.

HELD:

Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be
a legitimate son of the latter because he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The fact that
the husband was seriously sick is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. This presumption can only be
rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access by husband to wife includes absence during
the initial period of conception, impotence which is patent, and incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that
cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man other than
the husband during the initial period does not preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.

Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
69. CASE DIGEST (Tison v. CA)

Tison vs. CA

Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero,
who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller . The present action for reconveyance involves a parcel of
land with a house and apartment which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero. It. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived
only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners’ father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter

Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of
Hermogenes.

Issue: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes

Held:

NO. the private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. There is no presumption
of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it,
in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory.
Macadangdang vs. CA [1980]

FACTS:

Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. Sometime in Marcg 1967 she allegedly had intercourse with Antonio
Macadangdang. Elizabeth alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.

October 30, 1967 (7 months or 210 days after the illicit encounter) – she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando
Macadangdang in baptismal rites held on December 24, 1967.

April 25, 1972 – Elizabeth filed a complaint for recognition and support against Rolando.

February 27, 1973 – lower court dismissed the complaint.

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court. They ruled that minor Rolando to be an illegitimate son of
Antonio Macadangdang. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied.

ISSUE:

WON the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of the spouses Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin
Anahaw. YES

HELD:

In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal certificates. It
thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to
prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified — but not the veracity of the states or
declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa vs. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31, 1967). Again, in
the case of Fortus vs. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held that a baptismal administered, in
conformity with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the relationship of the person baptized. Such
declarations and statements, in order that their truth may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized
by law.
The separation of Elizabeth and Crispin was not proven. The finding of the court of appeals that Elizabeth and Crispin
were separated was based solely on the testimony of the wife which is self-serving. Her testimony is insufficient without
further evidence.

Judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts

The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court

When the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence
on record.

Art. 225 of the CC provides that : Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband's
having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256: The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress

Art. 257: Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no physical
impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in Article 255, the child is prima facie presumed to be
illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband. For the purposes of
this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case
During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no concrete or substantial proof that
was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between Elizabeth and Crispin.

Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province, therefore there is still the possibility of access to one another.

The baby was born seven months after the first illicit intercourse and seven months from the separation of the spouses.

Under Art. 255 of the CC the child is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate child of the spouses. (note the baby was
not premature). This presumption becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of
access between the spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child.

The presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.

In order to overthrow the presumption it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have
enabled the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed when personal access is not
disproved.

Policy of law is to confer legitimacy upon children born in wedlock when access of the husband at the time of the
conception was not impossible and there is the presumption that a child so born is the child of the husband and legitimate
even though the wife was guilty of infidelity during the possible period of conception.
Guevara v. Guevara G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943, 74:479

FACTS:

It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, apparently with all the formalities of the law. On September 27,
1933, he died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding
ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M.
Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions
thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last will and testament in her custody, presented the will to the
court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his
natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption
that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator
in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of appeals sustained that theory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not probate is necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter.

RULING:

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or
that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those
rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs
may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because
the law expressly provides that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court”; and,
second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding,
judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the
publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in
evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system
of the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition
San Juan Dela Cruz vs Gracia, GR 177728 (Case Digest)

FACTS:

Dominique and Jenie were living together without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2
months before Jenie gave birth.
Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
When Jenie applied for registration of child’s birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
Certificate of Live Birth
AUSF, together with Dominique’s handwritten autobiography
Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by Dominique’s father and brother
Respondent denied the registration because the child was born out of wedlock.
Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition because the document (autobiography) was unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father) which states that:
“Private handwritten instrument must be duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity”
Furthermore, petition was denied because the document did not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a recognition of
paternity

RULING: YES.

RATIONALE:

Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument must be signed by putative father. It must be
read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.

Special circumstances to the case:

Died 2 months prior to child’s birth

Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence

ARTICLE 174 AND CASE DIGEST

Legitimate children shall have the right:

1. To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in

conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;

2. To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in

proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the

provisions of this Code on Support; and

3. To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights

granted to them by the Civil Code.

Explanation:
USE OF SURNAME

Under Article 174 of Family Code, emphasizes the right of legitimate or legitimated children to use the Surname of the
father but also of Mother’s Surname. The law said the child is not mandated to use the surname of the father alone;
children under Article 174 of the Family Code may likewise use the surname of the mother. It means the law which uses
the phrase “shall have the right” to bear the surname of the father simply means it is more of a right, but not a duty on his
part to bear the surname of the father simply means that it is more of a right, but not a duty on his part to bear the
surname of the father, it likewise gives the child the right to carry the surname of the mother.

SUPPORT

A child has the right to be supported. In facts, it is a duty of the parents to provide every child support. Child support is
necessary for the maintenance of the child. In fact, it cannot be renounced, waived or transferred to a third person. The
exception against its waiver is support in arrears for the reason that it is no longer needed by the person who is entitled to
be supported.

LEGITIME OR OTHER SUCCESIONAL RIGHTS

Under the law, the legitime of the legitimate children is equivalent to ½ of the parent’s estate. But if there are several of
them, the same shall be divided among them equally (Article 888, NCC). In fact, the legitime is that part of the estate of
the parent which is reserved by law in favor of the children of which they cannot be deprived unless there is a valid and
legal reason to be disinherited (Article 919, NCC). The ground for disinheritance is exclusive. Any other ground relied
upon by the parent in disinheriting a child will invalidate or render useless the said disinheritance.

If the child who is entitled dies ahead of the parent, then, the child’s offspring may inherit what their parent was entitled to
by right of representation, where they would be elevated to the level of their father but they are limited only to the extent
that their parent was entitled to inherit from their parent’s predecessor-in-interest.

CASE DIGEST ARTICLE 174

FACTS:

In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against respondent Ronnie
S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence is the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed
that Vasquez be obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence Montefalcon, whose certificate of live birth he signed as
father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as support for Laurence since Laurence was born
in1993. Vasquez allegedly also refused to give him regular school allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner
Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married, and that Vasquez has his own family. Vasquez was
declared in default for failure to answer the service of summons (substituted). The court ordered Vasquez to acknowledge
Laurence and to pay P 5000 monthly. In the same year, Vasquez surfaced. He filed notice of appeal to which petitioners
opposed. Appeal was granted by the court. Before the appellate court, he argued that the trial court erred in trying and
deciding the case as it “never” acquired jurisdiction over his person, as well as in awarding P5,000-per-month support,
which was allegedly “excessive and exorbitant.” The appellate court granted Vasquez’s contention.

ISSUE:

Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.

HELD:

YES. Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines mandates that illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under Article 172, appearing in the civil register or a final order; or
(2) by admission of filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned; or
in default of these two, by open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child or by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Laurence’s record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible piece
of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with Dolores. He signed as
father in Laurence’s certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent
evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact, if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in
the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said
modes is by itself a consummated act. As filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. Petitioners
were able to prove that.