Perido v.

Perido, 63 SCRA 97
FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio
married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo.
Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage.
The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second marriage filed a case regarding the partition
of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and grandchildren of the second
marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling
them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife are presumed married.
G.R. No. 105625 January 24 1994 [Article 163-171 - Legitimate Children]

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both died intestate. The
special proceedings for administration of the properties were filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister
Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the
petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of administering his
estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses treated her as
their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the spouses
failed to beget a child during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the
biological child of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the
CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of
the late spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain
couple.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was
not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was
repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that
he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the estate.

-Mariategui vs. CA

GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his
lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children
with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario,
Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo,
Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named
Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a
daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco
and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as
husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected
to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was
issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no
evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record
of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo
and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.

De Asis vs. CA
GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for
maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide
support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in
1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it
seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995,
Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal
guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He
maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between
the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The
original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s
contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel
in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial
relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be
decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity
must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially
established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of
the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the
same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel
was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.
Aruego vs ca
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional
rights was filed before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister
Evelyn Aruego represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed
alleging that the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall
have a retroactive effect thereby the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the
ground of prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect in
so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the vested rights of
respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. It is a well
settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless it would impair vested rights.
Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot be given a retroactive effect.
 Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mother’s
death and when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the
continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his
family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such
that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present
total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way
and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the
various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be
evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the
child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such
in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously”.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was
employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competence evidence as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the
preparation of baptismal certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was
25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the position that if Monina
were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to
such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the
“high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence, Monina
proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.