See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/307513203

CONCEPTS AND PROSPECTS FOR IP OVER WIDEBAND HF

Conference Paper · August 2016

CITATIONS READS

2 2,710

3 authors, including:

Eric Koski
Harris Corporation
28 PUBLICATIONS   134 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Eric Koski on 31 August 2016.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

 CONCEPTS AND PROSPECTS FOR IP OVER WIDEBAND HF

Eric Koski, Charles Linn, and Jeffery Weston

Harris Corporation
RF Communications Division
1680 University Avenue
Rochester, New York 14610
U.S.A.

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

SUMMARY

In the near future, tactical wireless communications assets may have relevance in the
government/military marketplace only to the extent that they support delivery of internet (IP)
traffic within a flexible, survivable tactical network architecture. The extension of HF
communications to wider bandwidths gives HF the potential to serve as a valuable component
of such a network architecture. The principal benefits of wider HF bandwidths come in the
form of increased throughput and increased reliability (link margin). However, these are not
sufficient by themselves to ensure that HF can continue to add value to tactical networks.
Further issues such as latency and Quality of Service must also be addressed, and the inherent
characteristics of HF communications will continue to pose distinctive challenges in these
areas. In this paper, we first review characteristic challenges of IP-based network
communications over disadvantaged wireless channels, including HF. We then review known
techniques for effective IP-based communications under such conditions, and show how such
techniques have promise to make Wideband HF a very effective bearer for IP network traffic.
In the bulk of the paper, we then consider an exemplary IP-based tactical network system-of-
systems, the US Army Tactical Internet or LandWarNet, and discuss roles in which Wideband
HF could be beneficially applied within this system-of-systems.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen the emergence and increasingly widespread use of a new generation of
HF radio communications technology known as Wideband HF (or WBHF), motivated by the
need to provide higher data rates in order to support emerging applications such as multimedia
transmission (primarily image files), HF E-mail (potentially with large file attachments and
store-and-forward capabilities), and command and control (C2) and situational awareness (SA)
applications[1]. The C2 and SA applications are salient members of a growing assortment of
applications tactical networks need to support, that use standard TCP/IP protocols to
communicate over heterogeneous transmission media including both wired and wireless
subnetworks. The TCP/IP protocols impose distinctive burdens, requirements, and constraints
on the physical and link layer bearer mechanisms used to deliver network traffic. Mature
solutions to these challenges for HF are still only emerging, and this may already have slowed
the adoption of otherwise promising WBHF technology.

Military tactical communications is an area in which WBHF technology could be especially

beneficial; however, the increasing adoption of Network Centric Warfare doctrines [2] entails
that successful application of WBHF in this area will require sound approaches to delivery of
TCP/IP traffic over WBHF. In this paper, we provide a concise overview of some of the
distinctive problems arising in delivery of TCP/IP traffic over HF and WBHF bearers, briefly
discuss some promising candidate solutions, and explore specific application areas in which
successful IP-over-WBHF solutions could have important benefits. Section 2 of the paper
surveys challenges and potential solutions for IP over WBHF. Section 3 explores in some depth
an exemplary application of Network-Centric Warfare concepts to tactical communications, the
US Army Tactical Internet or LandWarNet, discussing the network architecture, bearer
mechanisms, and supported applications. It then considers some potential limitations and
vulnerabilities of this ambitious system-of-systems, where WBHF could play a beneficial
reinforcing role. Finally, section 4 presents conclusions.

2 TCP/IP OVER WIDEBAND HF

Internet traffic delivery predominantly uses either of two transport layer protocols, TCP, which
provides a connection-oriented reliable delivery service, and UDP, providing a connectionless
datagram service. Of these two protocols, recent studies indicate that TCP continues to account
for a substantial majority of Internet traffic volume, in the range 70 to 90%, with the remainder
being almost entirely UDP [3]. TCP traffic is composed primarily of HTTP/S traffic, while
UDP traffic includes DNS and, increasingly, streaming media, although a substantial fraction
of streaming media content is also delivered over TCP [4]. The predominance of TCP can be
attributed to its providing functionality – reliable, in-order delivery – meeting requirements of
a substantial majority of Internet application traffic. If application developers eschew use of
TCP for whatever reason, they are then usually required to develop an application-layer
protocol providing this functionality. The congestion control mechanisms built into TCP also
play an important role in stabilizing TCP/IP networks; substantially bypassing these
mechanisms by using UDP in place of TCP could potentially complicate network management
[5].

Wireless links have been observed to raise special challenges for the delivery of TCP traffic,
due to their relatively limited data rates, high delivery latencies, and significant channel error
rates [6]. Since HF links exhibit these characteristics in many cases to an even greater degree
than other wireless media, delivery of TCP traffic over HF has been observed to be especially
challenging [7][8]. For these reasons, there has been a tendency to avoid use of TCP over
wireless media, preferring to use UDP instead for applications designed specifically for use in
wireless scenarios. This can be an effective approach, provided that the purpose-built
application layer protocols used by these applications operate effectively over the wireless
media. However, this strategy has potentially serious disadvantages:

 It limits the networks to supporting only specially-designed applications, failing to

deliver on the promise of the wireless internet to provide application-generic delivery
capabilities.
 The application developers must attempt to anticipate the entire variety of wireless
media over which the application may be used and optimize their protocols for the
characteristics of these media, a challenge outside the bounds of typical application
developers’ skill sets and concerns.
 If wireless communications system designers of attempt to provide bearer capabilities
optimized for the delivery of TCP/IP application traffic, their task is greatly complicated
by the requirement to tune and optimize their bearer facilities for the protocols used by
each new application that comes along.
For these reasons, it would be quite beneficial if sufficiently effective mechanisms for wireless
delivery of TCP traffic could be developed and embedded into radio systems. If this were
successful, future application developers would be freed from having to develop specialized
application layer protocols. Furthermore, an applicable subset of these techniques might suffice
for effective delivery of wireless UDP traffic as well, where necessary.

RFC 3135 [9] describes a variety of Performance Enhancing Proxy (PEP) techniques intended
to address some of the TCP performance shortfalls experienced on high-latency links – satellite
links in particular. Widely used PEP components employ techniques such as connection
splitting and TCP spoofing to mitigate end-to-end performance impairments due to increased
latency and packet loss [10]. These techniques have been fairly well validated for satellite links,
with a number of commercial products available using them; however, the amount of reported
experience with using such techniques over HF is quite limited.

An earlier paper by the authors used a simulation framework based on OMNeT++ to analyse
and validate an application of TCP PEP techniques to a simulated narrowband HF link [11]. In
more recent work, the authors have extended the ‘erracle’ simulation model of [11] to the
wideband HF waveforms of MIL-STD-188-110C Appendix D, allowing them to estimate the
likely performance of these waveforms and the STANAG 5066 data link protocol in delivering
TCP traffic with and without TCP PEP techniques. Figure 1 compares the performance
achieved on an 18 kHz ITUR-MLD channel for delivery of a 3.0 megabyte data payload, with

 STANAG 5066 native bulk data facilities such as CFTP,

 Delivery over a TCP connection using STANAG 5066 without PEP
 Delivery over a TCP connection using STANAG 5066 with a PEP prototype.

Figure 1. Throughput, TCP over STANAG 5066 with and without PEP, 700 byte frames
TCP throughput without the PEP is generally abysmal, reaching a maximum no higher than
1500 bps; TCP interprets its round-trip timeouts as indicating congestion and never increases
its congestion window. STANAG 5066 bulk delivery achieves the best throughput, having no
TCP overhead; however, the PEP is quite successful in restoring most of the potential
throughput that is lost with unassisted TCP. Further PEP refinements and STANAG 5066
tuning could yield further improvements in performance.

3 THE US ARMY ‘TACTICAL INTERNET’

3.1 OVERVIEW

Beginning in the 1990s, the US Army has been engaged in a long-term initiative to fit all of its
tactical communications assets and networks into a common, universal IP-based
communications framework, the Army’s Tactical Internet [12], providing seamless
connectivity and interoperability from the deployed warfighter to the DoD’s enterprise network,
the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN), and to Intelligence Community networks
and/or Allied (e.g., NATO) networks [13][14][15]. The Tactical Internet as originally
envisioned had a two-tiered structure, with the upper tier connecting deployed command
facilities typically at brigade level and above, to these enterprise networks via high-bandwidth
long-haul links provided by satellite communications (SATCOM) assets such as SMART-T
(AN/TSC-154) and Joint Network Node (JNN) [16]. The lower tier, connecting units and
soldiers at brigade level and below, relied upon a generation of what are now considered
narrowband radio systems, including SINCGARS Combat Net Radios (CNRs), the Enhanced
Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS), and the Mobile Subscriber Equipment
(MSE) system all initially procured around 1990 [17]. While these systems were advanced for
their time, the ambitious network connectivity and capacity requirements of the emerging
doctrine of Network Centric Warfare [2] outstripped their networking capabilities, leading to
the procurement of a successor generation of networking radio systems, primarily within the
JTRS initiative, supporting a new portable and interoperable family of wideband networking
waveforms [18]. With this evolution came changes of terminology: what had been known as
the lower Tactical Internet came instead to be called the Integrated Tactical Networking
Environment, or ITNE [13]; while the term “Tactical Internet” was supplanted by
“LandWarNet,” which refers to the Army’s portion of the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG),
or later, the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN) [19], the totality of
communications and information systems connected to the DoD enterprise network, the DISN
[20].

Figure 2 presents an overview of an Army network deployment conforming to the Army’s

objective network architecture as of approximately 2015. The diagram gives a sense of the
remarkable diversity of means employed and scenarios addressed by this architecture.

At the center of the diagram is the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) of a Brigade Combat
Team (BCT). Brigade Combat Teams play a key role in Army tactical doctrine, as a BCT is
intended to be capable of functioning as an autonomous and self-sufficient tactical unit [21].
Accordingly, the BCT TOC is a critical nexus for command and control (C2), and lies at the
boundary between the Upper and Middle tiers of the Army LandWarNet.

The upper tier of the Army LandWarNet can provide connectivity from the BCT to a Division
headquarters and/or to a Joint Command headquarters and the DISN as a whole, as required.
For a deployed force, the means employed are predominantly satellite links using a mixture of
DoD-owned and commercial satellites. A major component of the upper tier is the Warfighter
Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) system, which has both space-based and terrestrial
components. The WIN-T Network Centric Waveform (NCW) is used for satellite
communications with typical data rates of up to 8.192 Mbps per channel, while the Highband
Networking Waveform provides terrestrial line-of-sight communications with raised antenna
masts at up to 30 Mbps per link [22].

DISN
W WGS DISN
NC Ka/X band
-T

WI
IN

N-T
W Ka/Ku
band

NC
MU O
S

CW
Upper MUOS

WI
TN
UHST

WIN

N-
WIN-T
tier

N-

TN
WI
Regional

-T N

CW
Hub
MUOS

CW
JNN
Node Division

S
Radio Access

UO
Tactical Ops Facility Ka/Ku

M
Center (TOC) WIN-T band

MUOS
MRAP
PoP
JNN
BCT W
Tactical Ops IN
-T UAV
HN
UFO
Center (TOC) TCN W
IW (L

P
BFT2 SRW OS

SN A
er

(LO NW
catt )
Brigade

po s
Tro

-T H
S)
nets

TRC-170

WNW

WIN
TCN Battalion
IW

Battalion
JB

TOC WIN-T
Mid tier TOC
C-P

SRW SRW MRAP SNAP

SNE VSAT
JBC-P
Battalion

ANW2
nets

WNW Company
Command Post
AN
W2
Company Company Company
Company

Command Post Command Post Command Post

nets

SRW SRW SRW SR

W
W
SR
Lower SRW SRW SRW
SRW SRW SRW
tier SRW
Platoon
nets

Figure 2. US Army LandWarNet ('Tactical Internet') Overview1

While earlier WIN-T increments (1a and 1b) were restricted to at-halt operation, WIN-T
Increment 2 adds an on-the-move (OTM) communications capability at lower data rates for
both SATCOM and LOS, while increasing capacity and throughput [22]. Increment 2 also adds
the ability to switch automatically between LOS and SATCOM, using LOS preferentially when
it is available because of its lower latency [23]. Two on-the-move vehicular configurations are
added in Increment 2, both in Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles: a Point of
Presence (PoP) configuration employed at division, brigade, and battalion levels, and a Soldier
Network Extension (SNE) configuration providing on-the-move WIN-T connectivity down to
the company level [24][25].

The middle tier of the Army LandWarNet extends from the BCT through Battalion TOCs and
networks to the level of company command posts. The principal mid-tier communications asset
is the Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) running either the JTRS Wideband
Networking Waveform (WNW) or the Harris proprietary Advanced Networking Wideband
Waveform (ANW2). Both WNW and ANW2 are IP-based wideband mobile ad hoc networking
(MANET) waveforms offering self-forming and self-healing connectivity at on-air adaptive bit
rates anywhere from tens of kilobits to 10 megabits per second or more, depending on mode
and link conditions [26][27]. ANW2 came into use after unforeseen delays in the availability
of WNW, but both waveforms are now being fielded and used [13][14][28]. The MANET
character of the waveforms is intended to transcend the characteristic limitations of line-of-
sight waveforms – limited range and obstruction by terrain – by permitting traffic to take
adaptive multihop routes through the network from source to destination [24]. Typically, each
brigade and battalion has a WNW or ANW2 command net, and additional nets can be
established for a variety of purposes. WNW and ANW2 are also applied to communications

1
Artwork credits: Darth Panda, Drash Inc.
with rotary-wing aircraft and with unmanned sensor/shooter platforms such as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

While the WNW and ANW2 MANET waveforms are considered to be the primary resource
for mid-tier connectivity, other communications resources are also used on a supplemental
basis. WIN-T equipment, both LOS and SATCOM, can be deployed at battalion and company
levels [24]. Range extension well beyond line-of-sight ranges can be provided by AN/TRC-
170 troposcatter systems [24] and UHF SATCOM using the Integrated Waveform (IW) and the
UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite constellation, although data rates with the latter are limited to
19.2 kbps [28]. Due to the system’s limited capacity and approaching end-of-life of the UFO
satellites, a new UHF SATCOM system known as the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS)
is now being developed and in the early stages of deployment. In contrast to the legacy IW
system, MUOS uses a Wideband CDMA waveform design to offer higher user data rates of up
to 64 kbps, far higher system capacity, and LandWarNet connectivity via NIPR/SIPRNET [29].

The lower tier of the Army LandWarNet extends from the company command post to the
individual solder or vehicle. The Army’s primary lower-tier communications resource is the
JTRS family of handheld and manpack radios, including already-procured AN/PRC-117G and
AN/PRC-152A radios as well as the Rifleman and Manpack radios of the JTRS Handheld,
Manpack, and Small-form Fit (HMS) program, which are being competitively procured from
multiple vendors. The principal waveform used for communications among these radios will
be the Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), which is (like WNW and ANW2) an IP-based Mobile
Ad-hoc Networking (MANET) waveform, and offers adaptive data rates from 50 kbps to 2
Mbps depending on mode and link conditions [1][30].

SRW nets are typically established at company, platoon, and squad levels. Higher echelons
also make use of SRW nets for support functions such as logistics and medical. SRW is also
used for communications with rotary-wing aircraft [24].

Occupying a less clearly–delineated position in this hierarchy is the Joint Battle Command-
Platform (JBC-P) system, the latest iteration of the well-known system Force XXI Battle
Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) / Blue Force Tracker (BFT). JBC-P is both a
communications system and a battle command / awareness application; its purpose is to provide
distributed timely situational awareness (SA) information to the forces in an area of operations.
The term “Blue Force” refers to friendly forces; however, the system also accepts and reports
hostile force locations and other tactically-relevant information. The JBC-P application
provides an intuitive map-based interface on a touchscreen computer with touch-to-zoom and
drag-and-drop facilities and free drawing, text messaging, and chatroom features. Having been
installed on more than 120,000 platforms, the system uses VSAT terminals and commercial
satellite links for long-haul communication, but also has capabilities to exchange information
using the legacy EPLRS system and current LandWarNet assets [24][31].

3.2 APPLICATIONS

The Army’s insatiable demand for communications bandwidth and network capacity arises
from its use of an extensive library of tactical applications aimed at providing rich and
sophisticated analysis and C2 capabilities drawing from a widely-disseminated and almost
instantly updated common operational picture. To completely list and describe these
applications here would be quite impractical; the best we can do is to briefly discus a few of the
most important applications, their roles, and their communication requirements.
Two major systems are used by the Army for global and theatre-wide SA and C2: Distributed
Common Ground System – Army (DCGS-A) and Global Command and Control System –
Army (GCCS-A) [32].

 DCGS-A is an expansive system-of-systems providing consolidated access to

intelligence information from a wide variety of sources, including threats and other
operationally relevant information such as noncombatant, geospatial, and weather data.
Included in DCGS-A are capabilities for data analysis, visualization, and dissemination
as well as intelligence sensor tasking. DCGS-A is one member of a family of DCGS
systems employed by the military services, the US Special Operations Command
(USSOCOM), and the US Intelligence Community [33][34], using a DCGS Integration
Backbone (DIB) based on an open-source facility known as Distributed Data
Framework (DDF) [35] for information sharing among the different DCGS users.
 GCCS-A is the Army’s strategic, theatre, and tactical command, control and
communications system. As with DCGS-A, GCCS-A is the Army’s version of a family
of GCCS systems operated by the various military services, with the Joint version
GCCS-J providing an overarching view for the National Command Authority
(Commander in Chief, Secretary of Defense) or joint force commanders
[32][36][37][38].

DCGS-A and GCCS-A are the primary SA and C2 applications used at division level and above,
and access to them is also provided in most cases to brigade TOC staff, and in exceptional cases
at battalion level. On-the-move access to these systems is facilitated by the OTM capabilities
provided by WIN-T Increment 2. In most cases, however, network bandwidth limitations
preclude providing access to these systems at battalion level or below [39].

A second and more numerous collection of applications is used at the BCT TOC, including

 DCGS-A (see above)

 GCCS-A (see above)
 The Tactical Mission Command System, a suite of applications including
o Command Post of the Future (CPOF), a situational awareness and command
decision support applications
o Common Tactical Vision, a touch-screen situational awareness viewer
o Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), for supply, logistics, and
convoy tracking. [32]
 Air and Missile Defense Planning and Control System (AMDPCS)
 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
 Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS)
 Digital Topographic Support System (DTSS)
 Joint Battle Command – Platform (JBC-P) (successor to Force XXI Battle Command
Brigade and Below (FBCB2) and Blue Force Tracker). [21]

Many of these applications originated at the time of the Army’s original efforts at ‘battlespace
digitization,’ being developed as discrete software applications sometimes executed on
specialized workstations and with no automated data sharing capabilities. Integrating the
multiple battlespace views provided by different applications often required ‘chair-swivelling’
and manually entering data from one application to another – a time-consuming, error-prone
process [40]. In recent years, the Army has sought to achieve greater sharing of situational
awareness and agility in decision making by integrating these applications into a Command
Post Computing Environment, in which the applications function more as different views into
a common representation of the battlespace as a whole rather than as discrete ‘stovepipes’ [41].
A key enabling technology in this transformation has been the publish-subscribe pattern for
data interchange, supported initially by an Army-specific framework known as Publish and
Subscribe Service (PASS). More recently, PASS has been replaced by an open-source
framework, Data Dissemination Service (DDS), which adds advertisement capabilities and
security enhancements [42]. DDS is used not only for information exchange among servers
and application instances on a command post LAN, but also for exchange between command
posts and across the tactical internet [43][44]. The intended end-state for this transition is one
in which SA and C2 capabilities are provided not by stand-alone applications but by a collection
of lightweight web-based applications in a Service-Oriented Architecture framework [40][42].

At the lower levels of company, platoon, platform (vehicle), and dismounted soldier, the Army
emphasis is on agility and mobility. Tactical applications must be right-sized so as not to
overburden frontline users having tactical tasks to perform with excessive or extraneous
information or complexity; they must run on computing hardware right-sized for use in combat
vehicles or by dismounted soldiers. As at the command post, the Army is developing and
deploying standardized computing environments at these levels: an Android-based Mounted
Computing Environment (MCE) for SA/C2 systems in combat, mobile command, and support
vehicles, providing multiple mission command functions on a single screen; and a
Mobile/Handheld Computing Environment (M/HH CE) using the Nett Warrior handheld device
(an adapted Android smartphone) to provide the dismounted squad or platoon leader with
access to the Army tactical network via Rifleman radios. Various applications are under
development for these environments, including mobile handheld fires, machine foreign
language translation, tactical combat casualty care, and counterintelligence/human intelligence
reporting [45]. However, the initial prototype applications for these environments are the JBC-
P (FBCB2/BFT) application discussed above for the MCE, and the Tactical Ground Reporting
(TIGR) application for Nett Warrior, which we discuss next.

The Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) system extends situational awareness capabilities to the
tactical edge, giving dismounted patrol leaders the ability to retrieve and disseminate
battlespace information in the form of rich media such as maps, still images, and video clips
via the handheld Nett Warrior terminal and Rifleman radio. TIGR was initially developed by
DARPA in the period 2005 – 2009, as the tactical environments in Iraq and Afghanistan were
underscoring the urgent need for improved information sharing and collaboration at the
company level and below, to equip soldiers on patrol with the timely, actionable intelligence
they need to complete their missions and protect against threats such as Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) [46].

The TIGR application is a browser-based application with customizations making it usable on

a range of devices from Nett Warrior handhelds to Android tablets and laptop PCs. The user
interface is carefully designed for simplicity and familiarity for soldiers accustomed to using
common mobile applications such as social media and Google Maps. Selecting a map location
gives the user the option to view related geodata and in many cases 360° ground-level views of
the location. TIGR breaks the traditional paradigm of hierarchic information flow and filtering
through the command hierarchy, making a theatre-wide cloud-hosted database of tactical
information searchable by and accessible to those who need it, for whom maintaining and
enriching the database becomes a shared and mutually-beneficial effort.

The TIGR system architecture is designed for efficient and resilient data flow over
disadvantaged tactical networks with limited bandwidth and subject to frequent outages. TIGR
information resides within a hierarchy of servers, consisting of rack-mount core servers at
stable, well-connected locations such as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) or BCT TOC, and
edge servers, typically hosted by laptop computers, at more mobile installations closer to the
tactical edge. Core servers store the entire database contents including full-resolution media;
database replication between the core servers takes place over the high-bandwidth links
connecting them. Edge servers store full-resolution media only for the immediate surrounding
area; other information is represented by metadata and compressed representations such as
image thumbnails or low-resolution copies. This allows each user to search the entire database
by contacting only the nearest edge server (which the client application does automatically);
the metadata allow the edge server to locate the information and retrieve it efficiently from a
core server, providing timely response to user queries while minimizing network traffic. At the
command post, data exchange facilities based on PASS/DDS support data exchange between
TIGR and higher-echelon SA/C2 applications such as CPOF and DCGS-A [47]. Evans et al
[46] report that at its largest, the Iraq TIGR database encompassed over 170 Gigabytes of data
maintained in a network of nine core servers and more than 140 edge servers; the total database
for Afghanistan was even larger at 300 Gigabytes. In Afghanistan, each edge server would on
average transfer approximately 2 Mbytes per day of information to its directly-connected core
server, and receive on average about 15 Mbytes per day from the core server. When
significantly larger traffic volumes occurred, they were most often due to database
resynchronization after a temporary loss of connection, even though only the new information
missed during the outage had to be transferred.

3.3 LIMITATIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

3.3.1 Threats to SATCOM

Looking again at Figure 2, one is inevitably struck by the extent of the Army’s dependence on
satellite communications (SATCOM). Indeed, while a mixture of dedicated and commercial
undersea cables provide communications spanning the distances between continents [48],
SA/C2 communications to BCTs deployed in-theatre are completely dependent on SATCOM.
In the recent conflicts Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
(Afghanistan), US DoD dedicated MILSATCOM assets have been stretched past their limits
by the bandwidth demands of emerging tactical applications and weapons systems such as
UAVs, and DoD struggled to find sufficient bandwidth from commercial satellites to make up
the difference [49]. Even at brigade and below, the Army relies upon satellite-based systems –
WIN-T (NCW), UHF TACSAT (IW), MUOS, and BFT – for long-haul communications not
served by the WNW, ANW2, and SRW MANET systems.

In network centric warfare, the networks enabling information superiority constitute a strategic
center of gravity of the networked force [50].2 This being the case, the very effectiveness of
satellite communications as an element of the network makes it at the same time a key point of
vulnerability [52]. This is not at all lost on the United States’ potential adversaries, as was
underscored dramatically by the Chinese demonstration of an ASAT capability in January 2007,
in which a kinetic kill vehicle deployed by a land-based ballistic missile destroyed a Chinese
weather satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), creating a cloud of debris that even now endangers
other LEO satellites [53]. Indeed, considerable evidence indicates that this was only one of a

2
See the interesting discussion in [51]: “This example shows that [von Clausewitz’s] CoG concept refers less to
the concentrated forces than to the thing … that causes them to concentrate and gives them purpose and
direction.” (Emphasis added.)
series of tests conducted in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2013, and 2014, with the 2013 test
reportedly occurring on a ballistic trajectory reaching nearly to geosynchronous Earth orbit
(GEO) [54][55][56]. Information from open Chinese sources suggests that ASAT capabilities
play a key role in a Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy aimed at ensuring
Chinese regional military supremacy in East Asia [57][58][59].3 Of course, the threat is not
limited to China: the Soviet Union conducted a series of 41 ASAT system tests from 1963 to
1982 [61], and Russia now appears to have revived two aircraft-based ASAT programs from
the late Soviet period [62] and to have conducted a test of an orbital system with ASAT potential
in 2014 [63]. The United States, for its part, demonstrated a ground-based ASAT capability
with the destruction of the US-193 satellite in 20084 [64], and is developing a variety of systems
and technologies with potential ASAT applications, from space planes to maneuverable
satellites and directed-energy weapons. Of all these threats, the potential kinetic destruction of
a geostationary satellite may be most worrisome, as the expanding debris field from such an
event could wreak havoc on other satellites in the crowded GEO ‘belt’ [66].

Direct physical attacks on the communications satellites themselves are hardly the only threats
to satellite-based communications [67]:

 Ground stations for transmission, reception, or control can be physically attacked. This
is a greater risk for ground stations in remote locations and especially for commercial
satellite ground stations, which may not have the level of physical security typical of
military facilities.
 Uplink signalling can be jammed by a high-power transmitter, blocking
communications traffic or impairing satellite control.
 Downlink signalling can be jammed. This requires less power but may affect a smaller
area and require transmission from an airborne platform.
 An increasingly important threat is that of cyber attacks on the satellites themselves or
on ground segment computers or networks, through which an adversary could deny use
or control of satellite assets or even seize control of them with destructive results
[68][69].

The most worrisome aspect of these threats to the SATCOM element of LandWarNet is that
they are asymmetric threats. Having less invested in military space-based systems, and less
requirement for global force projection in foreseeable future conflicts, the United States’
potential adversaries would suffer far less reduction in military capability from loss or
impairment of space-based assets than the United States would. This makes deterrence of
hostile ASAT operations extremely difficult, since US counter-space operations would have
limited leverage, and retaliatory attacks on terrestrial assets would risk escalation of the conflict
[57].

3
For instance, [59] states the following without citing sources: “PLA writings emphasize the necessity of
‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy’s reconnaissance ... and communications satellites,’
suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of
attacks designed to ‘blind and deafen the enemy.’” However, Kulacki in [60] cautions against overly aggressive
inferences of Chinese intentions from passages in less authoritative sources that may be merely polemical,
speculative, or reviews of non-Chinese publications.
4
The stated rationale for this action was to prevent intact reentry of a large quantity of highly toxic hydrazine
fuel [65]; however, even assuming this rationale is valid, the inference to ASAT capabilities is unavoidable.
The US Air Force’s Space Command and others in the aerospace community have considered
and proposed a number of plausible countermeasures to these threats to MILSATCOM;
however, each of these has limitations and other disadvantages as shown in Table 1 [70].
Table 1. SATCOM threat countermeasures
Response Disadvantage(s)
Active defences:
 Satellite shoot-back capabilities or  Greatly increased system cost
escort satellites  Unfavorable cost balance (cheaper to
build more ASATs than to defend
against them)
 Create orbital debris
 Target terrestrial origin of attack (e.g.,  Risk of conflict escalation
ASAT launch site)
Passive defences:
 Satellite hardening  High cost; limited protection (only
against physical attacks, and can be
overcome)
 Waveform hardening (antijam)  Modestly higher cost; limited protection
 Satellite crosslinks (eliminate ground  Much higher satellite cost and
station vulnerabilities) complexity; limited protection
 Disaggregate and disperse SATCOM  Higher launch costs
capabilities: simpler, cheaper, more  Requires new satellite designs
numerous satellites, individually less  Takes years to design and deploy
capable without sacrificing system  Attacker retains cost advantage – kill
capability vehicles are still cheaper than replacing
what they destroy
 Make systems easier to replace after  Restoring capability still takes weeks or
attack: stockpile satellites and launch months (launch vehicle integration,
vehicles, add mobile launch facilities and launch, orbital insertion)
ground control stations  Stockpile soon exhausted in a protracted
conflict
 Attacker retains cost advantage
What all of these options have in common is that they result in increased costs, at least in the
near term [70]. This makes them all the more difficult to realize in the US DoD’s present
budget-constrained environment.

These options are all formulated from an Air Force perspective, aiming to make the Air Force’s
space-based capabilities more resilient and survivable. Implementing a judicious combination
of these measures would undoubtedly achieve this objective to a worthwhile degree, but would
not eliminate the risk of substantial damage to US tactical communications capabilities in a
conflict with a space-capable adversary. The US Army and DoD need to view the problem
from a holistic perspective, focusing on the survivability and resilience of the Army’s
LandWarNet SA/C2 communications capabilities as a whole. From this perspective, it seems
necessary for the Army to consider supplementing the present LandWarNet with alternative
long-haul communications approaches not vulnerable to these threats.

3.3.2 MANET connectivity

The Army itself has contemplated its dependence on SATCOM and the prospect of “a day
without space.” Lieutenant General Joseph Formica reported to a Senate subcommittee in 2013
that “We must continue to make certain that our Army does not face a day without space and
space-related capabilities.” He then added, “and that the Army is prepared to conduct
operations in a space-degraded environment” [71]. How essential communications are to be
maintained in a space-degraded (or –denied) environment is not clear – especially for the upper-
tier communications most dependent on SATCOM. For mid- and lower-tier communications
at brigade and below, the Army’s intent is, apparently, to rely upon the mesh networking
capabilities of the WIN-T HNW, WNW, ANW2, and SRW waveforms to maintain connectivity
even over medium to long-haul distances [72][73].5 Even setting the extreme case of satellite-
degraded or –denied conditions aside, the Army operational concept for these mesh networks
appears to rely heavily on their ability to maintain connectivity of an entire network under
dynamic battlefield conditions in potentially unfavourable terrain [74][75], and this assumption
may warrant careful scrutiny.

In considering the feasibility of wireless MANETs for a given application, we are frequently
interested in what assurance we can have of the connectivity of the network: i.e., for any two
nodes a and b in the network, can we be confident that there is a path from a to b traversing a
series of links between pairs of nodes ni and nj such that the direct RF path from ni to nj is usable
(i.e., unobstructed and not exceeding a maximum length)? The most desirable case is that every
pair of nodes in the network is connected in this way. When this condition is not satisfied, we
may become interested in connectivity metrics such as the percentage of node-pairs (a,b) that
are connected, or number of nodes in the largest fully-connected subnetwork, or the number of
disjoint fully-connected subnetworks and the number of isolated nodes, etc. For generality, we
may consider nodes to be placed at random locations within a land surface of a given shape and
dimensions; this makes the connectivity metrics random variables whose statistics can be
characterized analytically or by means of simulation.

Many analyses of wireless MANET connectivity have used the Erdös-Rényi (E-R) graph-
theoretic model [76] to estimate these connectivity statistics, assigning every pair of nodes a
uniform random probability of being directly connected (having a closed link), and determining
aggregate connectivity statistics for the network as a whole as functions of the link closure
probability and number of nodes. Missing from the original E-R model is any consideration of
the distances between nodes; recent work on MANETs usually extends the original model in
various ways in order to account for distance, transmit power, etc. [77][78]. A common finding
of such work is that connectivity statistics exhibit a ‘phase transition’: a threshold value of some
network parameter such as number of nodes, link closure probability, or transmit power; such
that, as the parameter-value is increased past the threshold, some desired network property
quickly undergoes a transition from very low to very high probability. For instance, in the

5
For instance, “At the core of these concepts are meshed networks, where each radio, or vehicle, serves as a
node. The Army is developing on a smaller scale the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) system,
where every radio — whether it is carried in a backpack or is vehicle-mounted — serves as a repeater. A soldier
may be cut off from the rest of the force, but if he has line-of-sight communications with at least one other radio,
and that second node can connect to others, he can join the network.
The Army sees WIN-T being used in difficult environments such as mountain valleys or urban areas where line-
of-sight communications are difficult.” [72] This may be intended to refer at least as much to WNW as to WIN-
T, since WIN-T radios are not carried in backpacks.

Also, “A key feature of the MNVR is its ability to provide terrestrial, ground-level connectivity with restricted or
non-existent satellite communications. The radio, which uses the Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) and
Soldier Radio Waveform (SRW), operates as a node in a mobile network so information can hop from one
MNVR system to another until it reaches its destination. Both the WNW and SRW allow communication
without a fixed infrastructure such as a cell tower or satellite network.” [73]
simplest form of the E-R model, the probability of full network connectivity in a 15-node
network goes from near zero to near one as the link closure probability increases from 0.1 to
0.2 [79]. The observation of such ‘phase transitions’ may underlie some of the commonly-
expressed optimism about the potential for wireless MANETs to solve diverse communications
problems.

The complicating factor not routinely considered in such analyses is terrain. In recent work, a
research team at the Institute for Defense Analyses has investigated precisely this issue
[80][81]. Three circular regions 16 km in diameter were chosen, in the areas of Fort Huachuca,
Arizona, White Sands, New Mexico, and Charlottesville, Virginia. USGS NED data [82] were
used to characterize the terrain in each region. For each region, a series of experiments was
performed:

1. For each number of nodes n, place the n nodes at uniform random locations in the region.
2. Use the terrain data to determine, for each pair of nodes, whether there is an
unobstructed LOS path between the two nodes. Use this as a proxy for link closure
(since the region diameter isn’t much larger than the maximum LOS range).
3. Determine network-wide connectivity statistics, repeating steps 1 and 2.
4. Averaging over numerous node placements from step 1, determine the empirical link
closure probability for each region.
5. Using the link closure probability from step 4, conduct numerous Monte Carlo trials
with the E-R model to estimate distributions of network-wide connectivity statistics;
compare these with the sampled empirical distributions from step 3.

After doing this, the team reported that

 The E-R model consistently and substantially over-predicted connectivity in all three
regions.
 In two of the three regions, the E-R model results exhibited a ‘phase transition’: the
expected fraction of nodes contained in the largest fully-connected subnet quickly
approached 100% as the number of nodes increased.
 There was no ‘phase transition’ in any of the empirical statistics; the probability of the
network’s being fully connected was below 20% in all three regions at the maximum
number of nodes (50).
 Empirical connectivity as a function of number of nodes was qualitatively very different
from one region to another, in ways not explained by the different link closure
probabilities.

The authors’ conclusions are provocative, and very suggestive for our present study:

1. In real-world terrain conditions, there are no grounds for the expectation that MANETs
based on LOS waveforms will exhibit a ‘phase transition’ guaranteeing that a fully-
connected network can be achieved as long as sufficient resources (nodes, power, etc.)
are provided.
2. Frequently, a random node laydown in real-world terrain results in several disconnected
subnets together with multiple isolated nodes. In such cases, attempting to coalesce the
network by adding a relay node in an advantaged location – a UAV or high-elevation
retransmit site – will result in the relay node’s having to carry a majority of the total
network traffic, making it a bottleneck and single point of failure.
 3. The CONOPS for mobile units relying on MANET waveforms for all-informed
communications will have to reflect the constraints on individual nodes’ mobility
imposed by the need to keep the network connected [81].

Two further implications bearing on our present study suggest themselves:

1. The Army may be overly optimistic in expecting mid-tier communications using

MANET-based waveforms such as WNW to make up for the loss or degradation of
satellite-based long-haul communications at brigade and battalion levels.
2. Even in the lower tier, MANET-based waveforms (SRW) may be less reliable than
expected in ensuring network connectivity under conditions of fast-paced maneuver
warfare.

3.4 POTENTIAL HF ROLES

HF has over many years played a traditional role in strategic communications, supporting
continental-scale networks such as Australia’s Modernised High Frequency Communications
System (MHFCS) [83] and global networks such as the US Air Force’s HF Global
Communications System (HFGCS) [84]. Recently, however, HF has often been supplanted in
that role by SATCOM because of the higher bandwidths the latter can provide. However, in
scenarios in which satellite communications could be lost or substantially degraded, HF could
play a valuable fall-back role. This may require formulation of suitable doctrines and operating
procedures to preserve as much as possible of the SA/C2 capabilities now made possible by
SATCOM, over HF links offering far less capacity. Recent work has demonstrated the
capability of WBHF technology to provide communications with unprecedented throughput on
a transatlantic link at transmit power levels of 1 kW and below [85], and under challenging
high-latitude conditions [86]. In a satellite-denied environment, such capabilities could have
enormous strategic significance.

By comparison with Tactical SATCOM systems such as MUOS or UFO TACSAT (IW),
WBHF may be said to have no disadvantage in achievable throughput, SWAP, or ease of use
and deployment, making WBHF an attractive option to mitigate the risk of SATCOM denial or
for the many users unable to obtain satellite access.

Vehicular NVIS configurations have been demonstrated compatible with WBHF, and can meet
requirements for comms-on-the-move [87]. With suitable routing capabilities and interfaces,
an on-the-move vehicular node could simultaneously operate both a MANET waveform such
as WNW or SRW and Wideband HF, routing traffic over whichever medium offers the more
desirable combination of throughput, capacity, and reliability at the current time. Simultaneous
operation of the LOS MANET and NVIS HF subnetworks could provide a very attractive
combination of higher MANET bandwidth within the fully-connected portion of the
subnetwork, and NVIS HF connectivity to nodes or clusters of nodes not reachable via the
MANET waveform due to terrain or other factors. We expect that ongoing work within the HF
industry will continue to elaborate these applications for WBHF and validate its suitable for
important roles in critical tactical networks, complementing the wideband LOS MANET and
SATCOM capabilities now being deployed.
4 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have explored the suitability and need for Wideband HF capabilities in
emerging tactical network architectures, using the US Army’s LandWarNet as an illustrative
example. We first considered the challenges of delivering TCP/IP traffic over ‘disadvantaged’
bearers such as WBHF; recent progress in marrying WHBF waveforms and protocols with TCP
Performance Enhancing Proxy (PEP) techniques provides grounds for optimism in this area.
We then provided a survey in some depth of the Army LandWarNet architecture and
communications assets, as well as the SA/C2 applications used within LandWarNet, to better
understand the throughput requirements WBHF would have to meet in this context. Especially
noteworthy are the reported traffic demands of the TIGR application presented in section 3.2,
which are well within the limits of WBHF capacity.

The most urgent needs for WBHF capabilities in a network architecture such as LandWarNet
arise from vulnerabilities and limitations of the primary communications bearers presently used
within this architecture. We considered two of these: the emerging threats to SATCOM assets
arising in A2AD environments, and the connectivity limitations of LOS MANET waveforms.
Credible evidence indicates that these are real and serious potential issues. Section 3.4 sketched
potential roles in which WBHF capabilities could be used to supplement existing tactical
networks so as to address these issues, with the promise of greatly improving the survivability
and resilience of tactical communications.

REFERENCES
[1] E. Johnson, E. Koski, W. Furman, M. Jorgenson, and J. Nieto, Third-Generation and Wideband HF Radio
Communications. Boston, Artech House, 2012. ISBN-13: 978-1608075034.
[2] D.S. Alberts, J.J. Garstka, and F.P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging
Information Superiority, 2nd Edition (Revised), DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 1999.
http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Alberts_NCW.pdf. (25 June 2016)
[3] Alessandro Finamore et al, “Experiences of Internet Traffic Monitoring with Tstat,” IEEE Network,
May/June 2011. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5772055&tag=1. (16 July
2016)
[4] Dongjin Lee et al, “Media Streaming Observations: Trends in UDP to TCP Ratio,” International Journal on
Advances in Systems and Measurements, vol 3 no 3 & 4, year 2010.
https://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~brian/media-UDP-TCP.pdf. (16 July 2016)
[5] Van Jacobson and Michael Karels, “Congestion Avoidance and Control,” Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
’88, pages 314–329, August 1988. http://ee.lbl.gov/papers/congavoid.pdf. (16 July 2016)
[6] George Xylomenos et al, “TCP Performance Issues over Wireless Links,” IEEE Communications Magazine,
April 2001. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=917504. (16 July 2016)
[7] D.J. Brown, S.E. Trinder and A.F.R. Gillespie, “An Analysis of HF for IP Sub-Networks,” HF Radio
Systems and Techniques, Eighth International Conference on (IEE Conf. Publ. No. 474), 2000.
[8] D. Kallgren, “Internet Protocol over HF: BLOS Experience during Exercise Allied Warrior ’05.”
Presentation slides.
http://www.hfindustry.com/meetings_presentations/presentation_materials/2006_jan_hfia/presentations/07_
aw05_ip_over_hf.pdf. (14 July 2016)
[9] IETF RFC 3135, “Performance Enhancing Proxies Intended to Mitigate Link-Related Degradations,” June
2001. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3135. (14 July 2016)
[10] SatLabs, “INTEROPERABLE PEP (I-PEP) Transport Extensions and Session Framework for Satellite
Communications: Air Interface Specification,” issue 1a– 27 Oct 2005. http://satlabs.org/pdf/I-
PEP_Specification_Issue_1a.pdf. (16 July 2016)
[11] Eric Koski and Jeffery Weston, “Efficient high-fidelity simulation of HF communications systems and
networks,” Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) Proceedings, 2015.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/abstractCitations.jsp?arnumber=7357650&tag=1. (16 July 2016)
[12] George Elmasry, Tactical Wireless Communications and Networks: Design Concepts and Challenges,
Hoboken, NJ, 2012. ISBN 978-1-119-95176-6.
[13] TRADOC Capability Manager Tactical Radios (TCM-TR) Signal Center of Excellence (SIGCoE),
Integrated Tactical Networking Environment Concept of Operations. Version 1.0, 8 July 2013.
http://www.afcea.org/events/augusta/13/documents/130911ITNECONOPSv1.0signedGryzbowski.pdf. (6
June 2016)
[14] LTC Greg Grzybowski, “Integrated Tactical Networking Environment (ITNE) Concept & Requirements,”
(presentation slides), 06 Sep 2012. http://www.afceaaugusta.org/resources/83.pdf. (25 June 2016)
[15] Defense Information Systems Agency Enterprise Connection Division, Defense Information Systems
Network (DISN) Connection Process Guide (CPG). Version 5.0, November 2014.
http://www.disa.mil/~/media/Files/DISA/Services/DISN-Connect/References/DISN_CPG.pdf. (25 June
2016)
[16] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for the Joint Network
Node-Network (JNN-N) FMI 6-02.60, SEPTEMBER 2006. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi6-02-60.pdf.
(25 June 2016)
[17] Headquarters, US Army Communications Electronics Command, Fiscal Year 1998 Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Sensors, and Information Management
(C4IEWS&IM) Project Book. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a337392.pdf. (25 June 2016)
[18] Joint Tactical Radio System Operational Requirements Document (ORD), Version 3.2. JROCM 087-03, 9
April 2003.
[19] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-02, SIGNAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS. 22 January 2014.
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm6_02.pdf. (25 June 2016)
[20] Defense Acquisition University, “Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms”,
https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/Pages/Default.aspx.
[21] Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-96, BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM. 8 October 2015.
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_96.pdf. (22 June 2016)
[22] Harold L. Epperson, “Satellite Communications within the Army’s WIN-T Architecture” (presentation
slides), 6 February 2014. http://www.ndia.org/divisions/divisions/c4isr/documents/492c_brief.pdf. (22 June
2016)
[23] David Perera, “WIN-T ushers in new dawn for battlefield communications,” Defense Systems, 1 May 2009.
https://defensesystems.com/Articles/2009/05/06/PEO-Interview-Hoppe.aspx. (28 June 2016)
[24] US Army Program Executive Office Command Control Communications –Tactical (PEO C3T), 2015 PEO
C3T Portfolio: Connecting Our Soldiers. http://peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/docs/2015-Portfolio-Book.pdf. (28
June 2016)
[25] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate, “FY13 DOD Programs:
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles (FoV).”
http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/fy2013/pdf/dod/2013mrap.pdf. (28 June 2016)
[26] Spectrum Signal Processing, “Wideband Networking Waveform OFDM PHY” (data sheet),
http://www.spectrumsignal.com/products/pdf/wnw_ofdm_web.pdf. (29 June 2016)
[27] Harris Corporation, “Tactical Radio offers adhoc mobile networking” (press release),
http://news.thomasnet.com/fullstory/tacticalradiooffersadhocmobilenetworking804711. (1 July 2016)
[28] TRADOC Capability Manager Tactical Radios (TCM-TR) Signal Center of Excellence (SIGCoE),
Integrated Tactical Networking Environment Concept of Operations Appendices. Version 1.0, 8 July 2013.
http://www.afcea.org/events/augusta/13/documents/130911ITNECONOPSAppendicesv1.08July2013Gryzb
owski.pdf. (22 June 2016)
[29] Christopher Matassa, Comparing the Capabilities and Performance of the Ultra High Frequency Follow-On
System With the Mobile User Objective System (Master’s Thesis), Naval Postgraduate School, June 2011.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a547909.pdf. (30 June 2016)
[30] John K. Dewey, “Joint Tactical Radio System update: tactical networking,” Army Communicator, 1 Jan.
2007. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Joint+Tactical+Radio+System+update%3a+tactical+networking.-
a0160715566. (1 July 2016)
[31] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate, FY15 Army Programs:
Joint Battle Command – Platform (JBC-P).
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2015/dot-e/army/2015jbc-p.pdf. (1 July 2016)
[32] Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASA(ALT)), Weapon Systems
Handbook 2016. https://www.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/431298.pdf. (3 July 2016)
[33] Greg Slabodkin, “Distributed common ground system comes under fire,” Defense Systems, 1 Oct 2012.
https://defensesystems.com/articles/2012/10/01/defense-it-2-distributed-common-ground-system.aspx. (3
July 2016)
[34] DCGS Multi-Service Execution Team (MET), “Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS)
Integration Backbone (DIB),” http://www.afei.org/PE/4A07/Documents/DIB%20factsheetNov2014.pdf. (3
July 2016)
[35] “Distributed Data Framework,” http://codice.org/ddf/index.html. (3 July 2016)
[36] US Navy Program Executive Office C4I, “PMW 150 Command and Control Systems Program Office tear
sheet.”
http://www.public.navy.mil/spawar/PEOC4I/Documents/Tear%20Sheets/PMW%20150_Tear%20Sheet_JA
N2015-approved.pdf. (4 July 2016)
[37] Lockheed Martin, “Lockheed Martin Awarded GCSSAF” (press release),
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/pressreleases/2011/september/LockheedMartinAwardedGCSS.ht
ml. (4 July 2016)
[38] Defense Information Systems Administration (DISA), “Global Command & Control System – Joint
(GCCSJ),” http://www.disa.mil/missionsupport/commandandcontrol/GCCSJ. (4 July 2016)
[39] Chief Information Office (CIO/G6), United States Army, “Deployed Tactical Network Guidance” version
1.0, 31 May 2012.
http://ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/Architecture/Appendix%20D%20Deployed%20Tactical%20Network%20Gu
idance%20-%20Version%201.0%20docx.pdf. (4 July 2016)
[40] LTC Joel Babbitt et al, “Next-Gen Command Post,” 25 May 2015. http://asc.army.mil/web/access-next-gen-
command-post/. (4 July 2016)
[41] Stephen Kreider, “COMMAND POST COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT: Convergence of OPS/INTEL Info
Space” (presentation slides), 20 September 2013.
http://www.afcea.org/events/armyintel/13/documents/Mr_Kreider.pdf. (4 July 2016)
[42] Michael Phillips, “SOA Testing Tools: Army Testing in a Services Oriented Architecture (SOA)
Environment” (presentation slides), 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011test/11638WednesdayPhillips.pdf.
(4 July 2016)
[43] Sam Easterling, “US Army Tactical C2 Interoperability Services: Publish and Subscribe Server (PASS) and
Data Dissemination Service (DDS)” (presentation slides), 2 December 2009.
https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-
s/telligent_5F00_evolution_5F00_components_5F00_attachments-13-975-00-00-00-00-59-74-
5_5F00_%20Easterling%20_2D00_%20Army%20C2%20Interop%20Services%20_2800_PASS_2D00_DD
S_29005F00_ppt/5.-Easterling-_2D00_-Army-C2-Interop-Services-
_2800_PASS_2D00_DDS_2900_.ppt.pdf. (4 July 2016)
[44] Kathryn Bailey, “Delivering tactical software enhancements in Operation Enduring Freedom,” 5 April 2012.
https://www.army.mil/article/77290/Delivering_tactical_software_enhancements_in_Operation_Enduring_F
reedom. (4 July 2016)
[45] US Army Acquisition Support Center, “Common Operating Environment” (booklet), October 2015.
http://asc.army.mil/web/wp-content/uploads/COE_Flip_Book.pdf. (4 July 2016)
[46] Joseph Evans et al, "TIGR: the tactical ground reporting system," in IEEE Communications Magazine, vol.
51, no. 10, pp. 42-49, October 2013. doi: 10.1109/MCOM.2013.6619564.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6619564&isnumber=6619551. (6 July 2016)
[47] General Dynamics C4 Systems, “Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) System” (datasheet), 2012.
https://gdmissionsystems.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/TIGR-Handout-Final.pdf. (6 July 2016)
[48] Michael Sechrist, “Cyberspace in Deep Water: Protecting Undersea Communication Cables,” Harvard
Kennedy School, 23 March 2010. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/PAE_final_draft_-_043010.pdf.
(8 July 2016)
[49] LTC Karl Ginter, Space Technology and Network Centric Warfare: A Strategic Paradox. M.S.S thesis, US
Army War College. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469763. (9 July 2016)
[50] Lt Gen Ellen Pawlikowski et al, “Space: Disruptive Challenges, New Opportunities, and New Strategies,”
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2012. http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2012/spring/pawlikowski.pdf. (8
July 2016)
[51] LTC Antulio Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” Naval War
College Review, Winter 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 1. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art4-w03.htm.
(10 July 2016)
[52] Adm. Cecil Haney, Address to Center for a New American Security, 22 Jan 2016.
https://www.stratcom.mil/speeches/2016/156//. (9 July 2016).
[53] Shirley Kan, “China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test,” Congressional Research Service order code RS22652,
23 April 2007. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf. (10 July 2016)
[54] Michael Gordon and David Cloud, “U.S. Knew of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent,” The New York
Times, 23 April 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/23/washington/23satellite.html?pagewanted=print&_r=2. (10 July 2016)
[55] Brian Weeden, “Through a glass, darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian antisatellite testing in space,” The
Space Review, 17 March 2014. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2473/1. (8 July 2016)
[56] Timothy Farnsworth, “China Conducts ASAT Test, U.S. Says,” Arms Control Today, 29 August 2014.
https://www.armscontrol.org/print/6417. (8 July 2016)
[57] Ashley J. Tellis, “Punching the U.S. Military’s ‘Soft Ribs’: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic
Perspective,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief 51, June 2007.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb_51_tellis_final.pdf. (10 July 2016)
[58] Maj. Richard Adams and Col. Martin France, “The Chinese Threat to US Space Superiority,” High Frontier,
Winter 2005.
http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfas/Papers/20052006/The%20Chinese%20Threat%20to%20US%20Space%20Sup
eriority%20-%20France.pdf. (8 July 2016)
[59] US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments
Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, 7 April 2015.
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf. (10 July
2016)
[60] Gregory Kulacki, “Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Technology in Chinese Open-Source Publications,” Union of
Concerned Scientists, 1 July 2009.
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/Kulacki-Chinese-ASAT-Literature-
6-10-09.pdf. (10 July 2016)
[61] Claude Lafleur, Spacecraft Encyclopedia (web site). http://claudelafleur.qc.ca/Scfam-
antisatellites.html#2008. (10 July 2016)
[62] Jana Honkova, “The Russian Federation’s Approach to Military Space and Its Military Space Capabilities,”
Marshall Policy Outlook, November 2013. The George C. Marshall Institute, Arlington, VA.
http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Russian-Space-Nov-13.pdf. (10 July 2016)
[63] Paul Rincon, “Russia tests 'satellite catcher',” BBC News, 20 November 2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-30097643. (10 July 2016).
[64] Sam Jones, “Satellite Wars,” FT Magazine, 20 November 2015. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/637bf054-8e34-
11e5-8be4-3506bf20cc2b.html. (10 July 2016)
[65] James Oberg, “U.S. Satellite Shootdown: The Inside Story,” IEEE Spectrum, 1 August 2008.
http://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/satellites/ussatelliteshootdowntheinsidestory. (8 July 2016)
[66] Jeremy Hsu, “Global Conflict Could Threaten Geostationary Satellites,” Scientific American, 31 March
2014. http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/global-conflict-could-threaten-geostationary-satellites/.
(10 July 2016)
[67] Tom Wilson, Threats to United States Space Capabilities, report to the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization, 2001. https://fas.org/spp/eprint/article05.html. (8
July 2016)
[68] Aditya Sood and Richard Enbody, “U.S. Military Defense Systems: The Anatomy of Cyber Espionage by
Chinese Hackers,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 19 December 2014.
http://journal.georgetown.edu/u-s-military-defense-systems-the-anatomy-of-cyber-espionage-by-chinese-
hackers/. (10 July 2016)
[69] Paul Wood, “Cyber Attacks: An Emerging Threat to Satellites” (presentation slides), 2012.
http://flightsoftware.jhuapl.edu/files/2012/FSW12_Wood.pdf. (10 July 2016)
[70] Todd Harrison, “The Future of MILSATCOM,” The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), 2013. http://csbaonline.org/publications/2013/07/the-future-of-milsatcom/. (8 July 2016)
[71] Lt Gen Joseph Formica, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, Strategic Forces
Subcommittee, United States Senate, First Session, 113th Congress, 24 April 2013. http://www.armed-
services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Formica_04-24-13.pdf. (12 July 2016)
[72] Stew Magnuson, “U.S. Forces Prepare for a ‘Day Without Space’,” National Defense Magazine, February
2014.
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/February/pages/USForcesPreparefora%E2%80%98
DayWithoutSpace%E2%80%99.aspx. (8 July 2016)
[73] US Army Program Executive Office Command Control Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T), “2015
Annual Report to the Stakeholders,” January 2016. http://peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/docs/2015-Annual-
Report.pdf. (12 July 2016)
[74] Argie Sarantinos-Perrin, “Advancing waveforms plays a key role in creating Army radio marketplace,”
https://www.army.mil/article/127310/169530. (13 July 2016)
[75] Maryann Lawlor, “Waveform Navigates Radio Labyrinth, AFCEA SIGNAL, November 2010.
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=waveform-navigates-radio-labyrinth. (13 July 2016)
[76] P. Erdös and A. Rényi, “On random graphs,” Publ. Math., vol. 6, pp. 290–297, 1959.
http://snap.stanford.edu/class/cs224w-readings/erdos59random.pdf. (14 July 2016)
 [77] Christian Bettstetter, “On the Minimum Node Degree and Connectivity of a Wireless Multihop Network,”
MOBIHOC’02, June 9-11, 2002, EPF Lausanne, Switzerland. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/On-
the-minimum-node-degree-and-connectivity-of-a-
Bettstetter/ccaf1eeb48ced2dc35c59356439fc128ca571d25/pdf. (14 July 2016)
[78] Soufian Ben Amor et al, “Optimizing Mobile Networks Connectivity and Routing Using Percolation Theory
and Epidemic Algorithms,” 10th International Conference on Innovative Internet Community Services
(I2CS), – Jubilee Edition 2010 – June 3 - 5, 2010, Bangkok, Thailand. ISBN 978-3-88579-259-8.
http://subs.emis.de/LNI/Proceedings/Proceedings165/P-165.pdf. (14 July 2016)
[79] Bhaskar Krishnamachari et al, “Phase Transition Phenomena in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” Proceedings
of the Symposium on Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks, GlobeCom2001, San Antonio, Texas, November 2001.
http://anrg.usc.edu/www/papers/phaseTransitionWirelessNetworks.pdf. (14 July 2016)
[80] David Tate et al, “Impact of Terrain Features for Tactical Network Connectivity,” Institute for Defense
Analyses, September 2014.
https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/STD/D-5026.pdf. (14 July
2016)
[81] Lance Joneckis et al, “Modeling terrain impact on MANET connectivity,” Military Communications
Conference (MILCOM) Proceedings, 2014.
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/abstractCitations.jsp?arnumber=6956949&tag=1. (8 July 2016)
[82] US Geological Survey, National Elevation Database, http://nationalmap.gov/elevation.html. (16 July 2016)
[83] Boeing Corporation, “Boeing Modernised High Frequency Communications System Enters Service With
Australian Defence” (press release), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/2009-10-01-Boeing-Modernised-High-
Frequency-Communications-System-Enters-Service-With-Australian-Defence-Force. (16 July 2016)
[84] Dwayne Harris, “HFGCS Status” (presentation slides), presentation to HF Industry Association, 4 February
2010,
http://www.hfindustry.com/meetings_presentations/presentation_materials/2010_feb_hfia/presentations/HF
GCS_HFIA_Feb_2010.pdf. (16 July 2016)
[85] William Batts, Vivianne Jodalen, and Terje Mikal Mjelde, “Performance of a Transatlantic Long-Haul
Wideband HF System,” Conference Proceedings, Nordic Shortwave Conference 2016, Fårø, Sweden, 2016.
[86] Vivianne Jodalen, Terje Mikal Mjelde, and William Batts, “Wideband HF in the Arctic”, Conference
Proceedings, Nordic Shortwave Conference 2016, Fårø, Sweden, 2016.
[87] Olivier Langlois, “COBHAM WBHF Half-Loop Antenna “On The Move” WBHF Trial results”
(presentation slides), presentation of HF Industry Association, 17 February 2016.
http://www.hfindustry.com/meetings_presentations/presentation_materials/2016_feb_hfia/presentations/HFI
A_2016_WBHF_Trial_KYYNEL_COBHAM.pdf. (16 July 2016)

View publication stats