Filing # 107159936 E-Filed 05/06/2020 10:27:47 PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT

Case No.: 4D19-0700

L.T. No.: CACE-17-002198 (25)

JAMES MILLER

Appellant/Plaintiff,

vs.

HENDERSON MACHINE, INC.,

Appellee/Defendant.
________________________________/

__________________________________________________________________

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR BROWARD COUNTY
__________________________________________________________________

REPLY BRIEF

JAMES MILLER
Appellant/Plaintiff, Pro Se
1775 Blount Rd. #413
Pompano Beach, FL 33069
[email protected]
954-978-2171

May 6, 2020

i
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………….….…ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.……………………………………………….….…iii

TABLE OF CITATIONS………………………………………………….….…...iii

APPENDIX AND COURT RECORD NOTES……………………………………v

I. INTRODUCTION….……………………………………….…………….…1

II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT…………………………………………….2

III. TRUE THREATS ARE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED………………………3

IV. NOT FRIVOLOUS………………………………………………………….5

V. FRIVOLOUS………………………………………………………………..8

VI. STANDARDS OF EQUITY……………………………………………….12

CONCLUSION..………………………………………………………………….15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE..…………………………………………………..16

CERTIFICATE OF FONT COMPLIANCE..…………………………………….16

ii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
28 U.S. Code § 1654……………………………………………………………….2

Fla. Bar Rules 4-3.3(a)(4); 4-3.4(a), and 4-8.4(d)………………………………….5

Fla. Constitution, Article I, Section 21…………………………………………....10

Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a) and 9.100(I)………………………………….………….16

Fla. Stat. § 943.045(2)……………………………………….….………………...11

Judiciary Act of 1789………………………………………………………………2

The Supreme Court…………………………………………………………….3, 14

U.S. Constitution, First Amendment………………………………...……………..3

U.S. Constitution, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments………….…….….....2

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Andreas v. Bandler (Sup.) 56 X.Y. Supp. 614……………………………………..8

Baker v. Grant, 497 So.2d 895 (1986)………………………...………………….14

Balch v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., 128 So.3d 179 (2013)………...…………………8

Bradley v. Waldrop, 611 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)………….………………15

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)……………………………………4, 15

Brown v. Jenison, 1 Code R.N.S. (N.Y.) 157………………………………………8

Burns v. Huffstetler, 433 So.2d 964 (1983)……………………….………………15

Carnival Corp. v. Beverly, 744 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…………………15

Cmty. Hosp. of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Guerrero,

579 So.2d 304, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) aff'd, 610 So.2d 418 (Fla.1992)…9

iii
 TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Cottrill v. Cramer, 40 Wis. 558…………………………………………………….8

Delio v. Landman, 987 So.2d 733 (2008)…………………….…………………...15

Ervin v. Lowery, 64 (N.C.) 321……………………………….……………………8

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)…………………...……………………2

Favreau v. Favreau, 940 So.2d 1188 (2006)…..……………………………….6, 8

Fla. Land Rock Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 50 Fla. 501, 39 So. 392, 394 (1905)..9

Golden v. Buss, 60 So. 3d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)………………………….5

Gray v. Gidiere, 4 Strob. (S.C.) 442………………………………………………..8

Grosso v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 195 So.3d 393 (2016)……………………….15

Hamilton v. State, 945 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 2006)……………………………………8

Hoyt v. City of Danbury, 69 Conn. 341, 37 A. 1051 (1897)……………………….9

Huffman v. State, 693 So.2d 570 (1996)………………………………………….15

Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (1973)………………………………………………9

Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)……………………...15

Martin v. Garrison, 658 So.2d 1019 (1995)………………………………………15

May v. Barthet, 934 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2006)………………………………………8

Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 527 (Fla.2001)…………………………….9, 15

Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So.2d 221 (2002)…………………………………...15

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)………………………..4

iv
 TABLE OF CITATIONS
Page
Pantori, Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So.2d 1357 (1980)……………………………...15

Peacock v. Williams (C.C.) 110 Fed. 910…………………………………….…….8

Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)………………………………….14, 15

People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 461, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972)………………………...2

Psychiatric Assocs., 610 So.2d at 424……………………………………………...9

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)………………………..……...3

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)…………………………………………..9, 15

Rose v. Palm Beach Cty., 361 So.2d 135 (1978)………………………….………14

Sandstrom v. State, 309 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…………….………..15

Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So.2d 330 (1964)……………………………….…………15

Smith v. Fisher, 965 So.2d 209…………………………………………………….9

State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (1999)………………………………….…………15

Strong v. Sproul, 53 (N.Y.) 499……………………………………………………8

The Florida Bar v. Sayler, 721 So.2d 1152 (1998)…………………...…………..15

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003)…………………………………….…3

Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)……………………3

Willis v. State, 736 So.2d 723 (1999)……………………………………………..15

APPENDIX AND COURT RECORD NOTES
Appellant's 08/23/19 Brief Appendix as referenced herein is "A-***"; and
Clerk's Record On Appeal as referenced herein is "R-***", respectfully.
v
 APPELLANT, JAMES MILLER, Pro Se ("Appellant"), herein replies

("Reply") to Appellee's 12/06/19 Answer Brief ("Answer") filed by and thru

counsel, Mark A. Cullen, ("Mr. Cullen") objecting to the 08/23/19 second amended

Initial Brief ("Brief") appealing the lower court's 02/11/19 order terminating

Plaintiff's pro se status ("Order")1 from the hearing held on 01/15/19 (A-887).

All references to "Appellee" shall be construed to mean Mr. Cullen.

I. INTRODUCTION

Every person who comes before the Court, whether they are an attorney, or

an individual in propria persona, stands before the court as in "individual." They

have individual experiences, individual beliefs, individual educations, and

individual personalities. Each with unique ways of reacting to others who conduct

themselves in a way they perceive as disrespectful, disingenuous, dishonorable,

and disproportionate to the facts as they know them to be: freedom of expression.

The Answer uses eleven of its thirty-six pages demonizing the Appellant, re-

arguing Appellee's contorted allegations with ever expanding perpetual contempt.

Despite Appellee's hysterical opinions of Appellant's written excerpts,2 the

fact remains: none of Appellant's statements rise to any reasonable interpretation 3

of a "threat," or "[i]nterfering with the effective administration of justice."

1
A-1043.
2
Appellant has never been admonished by any court for his conduct or filings.
3
By people of like knowledge, education and experience to litigant negotiations.
1
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

In the landmark case of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the

Supreme Court ended the controversy surrounding the nature of self-

representation. Finding that the right was of constitutional rather than merely

statutory 4 dimension and not a matter reserved to the discretion of the trial court,5

the Court held that the right of self-representation was independent of the right to

counsel. This right was found implicit in the language and historical background of

the Sixth Amendment. 6 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that

the state may not force a defendant to accept counsel against his will if the choice

is a "knowing and intelligent" relinquishment of the benefits associated with the

right to counsel.7 No distinction between criminal and civil obviates this holding.

The Fourteenth Amendment principles held in Faretta are intrinsically tied

through due process to the Fifth Amendment and the right to protect one's

property: the core of this action. In the absence of frivolous claims, or interference

with the effective administration of justice, the trial court's "extreme sanction" was

an egregious abuse of judicial discretion; it was unsupported; law was misapplied.

4
In federal courts the right of self-representation has been preserved from the
enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
No distinction between plaintiff or defendant, civil or criminal is distinguished.
5
People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 461, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972). This California case,
holding that the right of self-representation did not have constitutional
protection, was overruled by Faretta. (Emphasized.)
6
422 U.S. 806, 821.
7
Id. at 836.
2
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
III. TRUE THREATS ARE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED

The U.S. Supreme Court has cited three “reasons why threats of violence are

outside the First Amendment”: “protecting individuals from the fear of violence,

from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened

violence will occur.” 8

In Watts v. United States, however, the Court held that only “true” threats

are outside the First Amendment. 9 The defendant in Watts, at a public rally at

which he was expressing his opposition to the military draft, said, “If they ever

make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” 10 He was

convicted of violating a federal statute that prohibited “any threat to take the life of

or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States.” The Supreme

Court reversed. Interpreting the statute “with the commands of the First

Amendment clearly in mind,”11 it found that the defendant had not made a “true

‘threat,’ ” but had indulged in mere “political hyperbole.” 12

Appellant's opinions to facts did not constitute a "true threat," or any threat.

8
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
9
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
10
394 U.S. at 706.
11
394 U.S. at 707.
12
394 U.S. at 708. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), the Court, citing
Watts, upheld a statute that outlawed cross burnings done with the intent to
intimidate. A cross burning done as “a statement of ideology, a symbol of group
solidarity,” or “in movies such as Mississippi Burning,” however, would be
protected speech. Id. at 365–366.
3
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., white merchants in Claiborne

County, Mississippi, sued the NAACP to recover losses caused by a boycott by

black citizens of their businesses, and to enjoin future boycott activity. 13 During

the course of the boycott, NAACP Field Secretary Charles Evers had told an

audience of “black people that any ‘uncle toms’ who broke the boycott would

‘have their necks broken’ by their own people.”14 The Court acknowledged that

this language “might have been understood as inviting an unlawful form of

discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of violence . . . .” 15 Yet, no

violence had followed directly from Evers’ speeches, and the Court found that

Evers’ “emotionally charged rhetoric . . . did not transcend the bounds of protected

speech set forth in Brandenburg. . . . An advocate must be free to stimulate his

audience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and action in a

common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless action, they must be

regarded as protected speech.”16 Although it held that, under Brandenburg, Evers’

speech did not constitute unprotected incitement of lawless action, 17 the Court also

cited Watts,

implying that Evers’ speech also did not constitute a “true threat.” 18

13
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
14
458 U.S. at 900, n.29. See Id. at 902 for a similar remark by Evers.
15
458 U.S. at 927.
16
458 U.S. at 928.
17
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
18
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928 n.71.
4
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
IV. NOT FRIVOLOUS

1. On 04/06/17, Appellee's MTS (R-045) was denied (R-097).

2. On 04/26/17, Appellee filed a 2nd MTS previously denied (A-075).

3. On 05/10/17, Appellant filed a response to the MTS (A-079), setting

forth arguments supported by exhibits (A-087 thru 099) that chronicled a pattern of

Appellee's deceptive, unprofessional conduct for more than a year in breach of Fla.

Bar Rules 4-3.3(a)(4); 4-3.4(a), and 4-8.4(d); the trial court ignored.

4. On 05/26/17, Appellee's 04/26/17 MTS (A-075) was denied (A-116).

5. On 06/05/17, having initiated a contentious personal attack from his

vexed 08/29/16 sixth affirmative defense (A-167 ¶ 56), Appellee willfully files a

false statement to the court (R-299-300), alleging: "[d]ozens of pro se law suites":

Sixth Affirmative Defense: The Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant pursuant to

section 68.093, Florida Statutes, and has abused the court system by filing
too many frivolous lawsuits without an attorney and should be prohibited
from filing this or any other lawsuit without counsel. By his litigation,
Plaintiff attempts to bully Defendants, including HMI, against which he has
no valid claims, into settling with him due to the costs in time and money for
litigation by Defendants. The Broward County court records reveal that
Plaintiff has participated in [dozens of pro se lawsuits]. “Courts have the
inherent power and duty to limit abuses of the judicial process by pro se
litigants.” Golden v. Buss, 60 So. 3d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

6. On 06/07/17, Appellant filed an Amended MTS (A-117) Appellee's

06/05/17 affirmative defense (R-292), methodically listing each deficiency and

illustrating Appellee's contentious bad faith and gross misrepresentations (A-117,

¶¶ 2, 16/(a)/(b), 18/(a)); in breach of Bar Rule 4-3.3 (R-241 ¶33); the court ignored.
5
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 7. On 06/30/17, Appellant filed three (3) amended notices of intent

(NOI) to sanction for breach of conduct in three (3) depositions (A-169/170/171).

8. On 07/18/17, desperate to taint Appellant's credibility in an imminent

complaint to the Fla. Bar, Appellee filed a motion to terminate pro se (A-172);

with reference in footnotes to prior county court filings (A-186/191/195).

9. On 09/14/17, Appellant filed a 2nd amended objection to Appellee's

first motion to terminate (Ibid at ¶8) (A-237), dispelling all of Appellee's erroneous

case law, including, Favreau v. Favreau, 940 So. 2d at 1189, etc. (See A-242).

10. On 09/25/17, Appellant filed a second amended motion for summary

judgment (MSJ) (R-2260), to correct filing errors from the 09/22/17 iterations.

11. On 10/24/17, Appellant filed a notice of intent for protective order

(A-446) against Appellee's abuse of a Subpoena for Deposition (A-449) seeking

Appellant's Form 1.977 (A-451) from an attorney who lost a case to Appellant.

12. On 11/21/17, Appellant's response to case law (A-456) in the 11/27/17

hearing (A-467) to terminate pro se, exposed the same Appellee fraud as used here.

13. On 11/30/17, the motion to terminate pro se was denied (A-497); and

both parties instructed to cooperate in a professional manner to resolve scheduling

and set hearings, which Appellee soon defied, restarting the contentious tone. 19

19
On January 17, 2018, Petitioner sent a letter to the Court regarding Respondent's
contentious conduct setting hearings (R-3456), and harassing demands to retest
the damaged parts a second time; Petitioner accommodated without being
compelled, and filed a contemporaneous memorandum on 02/02/18 (R-3906).
6
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 14. On 12/11/17, Appellant provided an [unsecured] response (R-7405) to

Appellee's request for production after losing five (5) months because the court

failed to provide the confidential agreement per its own order 07/19/17 (R-6006).

15. On 02/23/18, Appellant filed an amended motion for protective order

(A-500) in response to Appellee's "harassing" third request for production seeking

bank records and subpoena for Appellant's confidential Form 1.977 (Id. at ¶11).

16. On 03/06/18, the court granted (A-529) Appellant's MPO (A-500);

specifically writing "[D]iscovery is becoming overbroad and harassing." 20

17. On 03/07/18, the court denies Appellee's harassing 02/23/18 second

MTC (R-4351) of their first request for production (A-537); no order was entered.

18. On 05/01/18, Appellee defies Fifth Request for Production to provide

the "Fixture" (R-7481-82); misrepresents its prior history. Appellant's #1 evidence.

19. On 09/20/18, the court granted Appellant's motion in Limine (A-622)

barring any trial questions of prior convictions (See A-587; see A-594:2~596:14 21).

20. On 10/09/18, a hearing was held (A-624) on Appellant's MTC

Appellee to produce the "Fixture", and sanctions, granted in part; but ambiguous.22

21. While Appellee's conduct contradicts his "civil" e-mails and breaches

Fla. Bar Rules 4-3.3 and 4-3.4, the record establishes this action is not frivolous.23

20
The court concedes its knowledge of Appellee's "harassing" Appellant. (A-497)
21
A-595:8~19, and A-596:7~14: Mr. Cullen's vexed "struggle" with court's ruling.
22
This order led to an e-Mail to the court (A-655), after Appellee failed to comply.
23
Court's favorable opinions to Appellant: ¶¶ 1, 4, 16, 17, 19 and 20, supra.
7
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
V. FRIVOLOUS

22. "Frivolous" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:

An answer or plea is called “frivolous” when it is clearly insufficient on its

face, and does not controvert the material points of the opposite pleading,
and is presumably interposed for mere purposes of delay or to embarrass the
plaintiff. Ervin v. Lowery, 64 N. C. 321; Strong v. Sproul, 53 N. Y. 499;
Gray v. Gidiere, 4 Strob. (S. C.) 442; Peacock v. Williams (C. C.) 110 Fed.
910. A frivolous demurrer has been defined to lie one which is so clearly
untenable, or its insufficiency so manifest upon a bare inspection of the
pleadings, that its character may be determined without argument or
research. Cottrill v. Cramer, 40 Wis. 558. Synonyms. The terms “frivolous”
and “sham,” as applied to pleadings, do not mean the same thing. A sham
plea is good on its face, but false in fact; it may, to all appearances,
constitute a perfect defense, but is a pretence because false and because not
pleaded in good faith. A frivolous plea may be perfectly true in its
allegations, but yet is liable to be stricken out because totally insufficient in
substance. Andreas v. Bandler (Sup.) 56 X. Y. Supp. 614; Brown v. Jenison,
1 Code R. N. S. (N. Y.) 157. 24

(a) The record is clear: this case is not frivolous. Appellee's four case

authorities (infra) are not relevant, as each are rooted in "frivolous" litigation:

See, Hamilton v. State, 945 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 2006); May v. Barthet, 934
So.2d 1184 (Fla. 2006); Balch v. HSBC Bank, USA, NA., 128 So.3d 179, 181
(5th DCA 20 13) ("When a pro se litigant files frivolous law suits or
pleadings in a lawsuit, the court has the authority to restrain such a litigant
from abusing the legal system and prevent him from abusing, annoying, or
harassing those against whom such suits or pleadings have been filed.");
Favreau v. Favreau, 940 So.2d 1188 (5th DCA 2006) ("A court has the
inherent power to prevent abuse of court procedure which interferes with the
effective administration of justice.'') (A-1044, ¶ 3).

Appellee's case law, embellished with subjective conclusions like "threat,"

interjected behind more benign pejoratives, is unreasonable and truly frivolous.

24
https://thelawdictionary.org/frivolous/
8
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 23. While inherent authority is cited to terminate propria persona in

frivolous cases, the constitutionality of the Vexatious Litigant Law, § 68.093, was

determined in Smith v. Fisher, 965 So.2d 205 (2007), where the Court observed:

Although courts generally oppose any burden being placed on the right of a
person to seek redress of injuries from the courts, the legislature may
abrogate or restrict a person's access to the courts if it provides: 1) a
reasonable alternative remedy or commensurate benefit, or 2) a showing of
an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of the right, and finds
that there is no alternative method of meeting such public necessity.
Psychiatric Assocs., 610 So.2d at 424; see Cmty. Hosp. of the Palm Beaches,
Inc. v. Guerrero, 579 So.2d 304, 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), aff'd, 610 So.2d
418 (Fla.1992). [Id. at 208]

In Mitchell v. Moore, 786 So.2d 521, 527 (Fla.2001), the supreme court
equated the Kluger "no alternative method of correcting the problem" test
with the "goal-method test used in both substantive due process and equal
protection analysis for cases in which a fundamental right is taken." Under
substantive due process goal-method analysis, if a state enacts legislation
that infringes fundamental rights, courts will review the law under a strict
scrutiny test and uphold it only when it is "narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest." Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct.
1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). "Narrowly tailored" means that "the method for
remedying the asserted malady must be strictly tailored to remedy the
problem in the most effective way and must not restrict a person's rights
more than absolutely necessary." Mitchell, at 209.

The compelling state interest behind section 68.093 is to prevent vexatious

litigation from interfering with the business of the court system. "`Every
lawsuit looks to two results—to end a controversy, and to end it justly. . . .'"
Fla. Land Rock Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 50 Fla. 501, 39 So. 392, 394
(1905) (quoting Hoyt v. City of Danbury, 69 Conn. 341, 37 A. 1051 (1897)).
Meritless lawsuits filed by vexatious litigants interfere with the court
system's ability to timely and justly process cases. Such lawsuits generate
hours of work for judges and court personnel, so that litigants with
legitimate legal matters are delayed. In a frivolous lawsuit, justice delayed is
justice denied to a defendant who expends time and money to bring the case
to an end. [Id. at 209] (All emphasized, supra.)

9
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
The Vexatious Litigant Law, and the holdings in Psychiatric Assocs, Mitchell and

Smith all support the high bar Florida's constitution gives to a person's right to

access the court and self representation; it clearly defines what the standard for the

"interfering with the administration of justice" means. The "business of the court

system" is the administration of justice; not an attorney's e-Mail negotiations.

24. These dictums, supra, hold Fla.'s Art. I, Sec. 21 to be beyond the

reach of disgruntled attorneys which hardly applies to Mitchell's "narrowly tailored

to fit a compelling state interest." Secondly, Appellant's prima facie testimony of

limited financial resources dispels "[a] reasonable alternative remedy[]."

25. The 02/12/19 Order drew its validation (Id., p.3 ¶5) from this finding:

The behavior exhibited by Plaintiff (l) interferes with the efficient

administration of justice, (2) takes up this Court's time and energy in
an attempt to curb Plaintiffs behavior: and (3) lowers the discourse in
this litigation into the gutter. (Emphasized.) 25

Clearly, the trial court's inherent authority is drawn exclusively from the

"[i]nterference with the efficient administration of justice." However, there's three

(3) problems: 1) The disgruntling e-Mails to counsel have nothing to do with the

administration of justice; and 2) interfering with the administration of justice is

specifically defined by case law as repeated frivolous pleadings or abuses in court;

and 3) each allegation in the Order is characterized without its requisite specificity.

25
The term: "administration of justice" is used nineteen (19) times in the Fla. Rules
of Judicial Administration; each pertain to procedural tasks of the courts`
oversight and operations. Out of court attorney discourse is not given deference.
10
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 26. Fla. Statutes § 943.045(2), Definitions, states:

"Administration of criminal justice" means performing functions of

detection, apprehension, detention, pretrial release, posttrial release,
prosecution, adjudication, correctional supervision, or rehabilitation of
accused persons or criminal offenders by governmental agencies. The
administration of criminal justice includes criminal identification activities
and the collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of criminal justice
information by governmental agencies. (Emphasized.)

No reasonable distinction to civil can apply for what the administration of justice

embodies. Justice is justice, and the proper administration of justice, be it criminal

or civil, still entails the same underscored judicial infrastructure, supra.

27. The Florida Bar, Florida's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

(1986, Rev. 2015), hereinafter "the Standards," as approved by The Florida Bar's

Board of Governors, sets the yardstick for sanction procedures; it states in part:

This view of the professional relationship requires lawyers to observe the

ethical requirements that are set out in the Model Rules.[] While the Model
Rules define the ethical guidelines for lawyers, they do not provide any
method for assigning sanction for ethical violations. The Committee
developed a model which requires a court imposing sanctions to answer each
of the following questions (Id. at p.5, ¶ 2):

1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate? (A duty to a client, the
public, the legal system, or as a professional?)

2) What was the lawyer’s mental state? (Did the lawyer act
intentionally, knowingly, or negligently?)

3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct? (Was there a serious or potentially serious
injury?) and

4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?

11
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
VI. STANDARDS OF EQUITY

(a) If a non-attorney pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a

reasonably competent attorney, should they not therefore be granted the same

fairness of review for alleged incursions of "professionalism" or "civil" conduct?

Considering a non-attorney is not a professional, trained, experienced or skilled in

the rules of a legal discipline mired layers deep in the graduate education required

to pass the Bar, where "professionalism" is taught: should this not be the very least

a non-attorney could expect? If so, then similar elements as those prescribed in the

Standards should be adopted. If they had, this case would have never occurred.

(b) A non-attorney pro se litigant is his own client. By the Bar's very

definition of duty to one's client, a pro se litigant has an obligation to present his

case in the most thorough, strategic, lawful but aggressive manner possible,

especially if there are mitigating circumstances imposed by an adversary that

elevates this criteria to a contentious pre-trial state requiring judicial intervention.

(c) A non-attorney pro se litigant is, in most cases, a first person witness

to the facts of an action; unlike an attorney, representing a client from the arm's

length with third person trust his or her client is being forthcoming of the truth.

(1) If the adversarial counsel developed a track history of contentious

conduct (e.g., reneging on discovery agreements; failure to timely set pro se

hearings; repeated unilateral set hearings; withholding discovery), then

12
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 would not such history, as recorded in this cause, mitigate the aggravation of

a non-trained, non-attorney pro se litigant expected to act "professional"?

(d) Should not the state of mind of a pro se litigant be considered? Given

the contentious atmosphere cited, supra, should not the escalating, two year history

on unfinished discovery protracted by Appellee not mitigate a court's appropriate

considerations of a non-trained professional, who's appearances before that court

have always been respectful, without incident and presented in good faith?

(1) Appellant was without knowledge of what the court deemed was

behavior deserving of termination of civil rights; and Appellant, respectfully,

deserved specificity from the court. The court not only failed to provide

guidance, but ignored the Appellee's bad faith of discovery and unilateral

hearings that had been repeatedly brought to its attention by the Appellant.

(2) The facts of this case show the only interference with the

administration of justice was from the Appellee's relentless deferments and

frivolous motions on issues normally resolved without judicial intervention,

done solely to circumvent Appellant's due process, and test the trial court.

(e) The characterized "bad behavior" harmed no one but the Appellee's

arrogance, for failing to intimidate and bully Appellant. All Appellant's conduct

before the court was courteous, and its operational norm was not impaired or

diminished, and for which the trial court has never alleged it was.

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4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 (f) The trial court had various options beyond the extreme sanction it

imposed; and didn't even consider them. It could have admonished with specificity

exactly what it expected in policing a hostile discovery attorney; it could have

imposed attorney fees for a justified Appellee hearing to admonish Appellant; it

could have become more involved in the issues raised by Appellant on discovery.

28. In Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), the United States

Supreme Court noted:

Freedom of discussion should be given the widest possible range compatible

with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of
justice. P. 328 U. S. 347. (Emphasized.)

Appellant agrees. De minimis non curat lex.

29. In Baker v. Grant, 497 So.2d 895 (1986), the Fifth District reversed:

[a] civil claimant is not required, barring extraordinary circumstances, to be

represented by counsel. Unless a case is presented which shows that a
litigant has abused his pro se right of access to the court system so as to
interfere with the effective administration of justice, a court cannot prevent a
litigant in a civil matter from appearing on his own behalf. (Emphasized.)

30. In Rose v. Palm Beach Cty., 361 So.2d 135 (1978), the Court noted;

Every court has inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, subject to
valid existing laws and constitutional provisions. (Emphasized.)
31. All thirty-nine (39) of the Answer's case law, save for procedural and

jurisdictional citings, pertain to repeated "frivolous" filings or "egregious conduct"

before the court (i.e., "in" court). An attorney's litigant communications cannot be

extrapolated to include "the administration of justice."

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4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 "How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg?
…Four. Calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg." ―Abraham Lincoln

CONCLUSION

32. None of the Answer's case law is applicable to the instant matter; nor

is any other related case law beyond the Brief, Appellant has studied at length. 26

33. Even adding the allegations from the Appellee's [failed] first motion

to terminate pro se that was apparently needed to bolster his waning argument,

whatever incursions of tact, tone, prose or "professionalism" Appellant may be

guilty of, even as a collective, don't rise to a temperature which justifies the

extreme sanction barred by constitutional law, when other remedies were available.

34. Even a Laicus understands rebranding legal semantics to extrapolate

key phrases that fit a preordained, convenient conclusion ― is not justice; nor just.

An affirmation of the trial court's order would be in conflict with established

law in other Districts and the U.S. Federal Courts. Reverse and remand, is just.

26
Bradley v. Waldrop, 611 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Burns v. Huffstetler, 433 So.2d 964 (1983); Carnival Corp.
v. Beverly, 744 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Delio v. Landman, 987 So.2d
733 (2008); Grosso v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 195 So.3d 393 (2016); Huffman v.
State, 693 So.2d 570 (1996); Lloyd v. Farkash, 476 So.2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1985); Martin v. Garrison, 658 So.2d 1019 (1995); Mitchell v. Moore, 786
So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So.2d 221 (2002); Pantori,
Inc. v. Stephenson, 384 So.2d 1357 (1980); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Sandstrom v. State, 309 So. 2d 17,
21 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Shotkin v. Cohen, 163 So.2d 330 (1964); State v.
Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (1999); The Florida Bar v. Sayler, 721 So.2d 1152
(1998); Willis v. State, 736 So.2d 723 (1999).
15
4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing instrument was served to:
Mark A. Cullen, Esq., 500 S. Australian Ave., #543; West Palm Beach, FL 33401;
via Court's E-Filing to e-Mail at: [email protected]; and the Honorable
Carol-Lisa Phillips, 201 S.E. 6th St., #15127, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 via direct
E-Mail to Division 25 on: 6 May 2020.
By: /s/ J.M. Miller Date: May 6, 2020
J.M. Miller, Pro Se May 6, 2020

CERTIFICATE OF FONT AND FORMAT COMPLIANCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing instrument was prepared in accordance

with the page format and Times New Roman 14-point font type requirements as set
forth by Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a) and 9.100(I).
By: /s/ J.M. Miller Date: May 6, 2020

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4D19-0700, Reply Brief, 200506