Levi Strauss v. Clinton

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LEVI STRAUSS & CO., & LEVI STRAUSS (PHILS.) v. CLINTON APPARELLE, INC.

,
G.R. No. 138900, September 20, 2005
NAZARIO, JJ.

Levi Strauss & Co (L.S. & Co) and Levi Strauss Philippines (Levi) filed a complaint for
Trademark Infringement, Injunction and Damages against Clinton Apparelle (Clinton) and
Olympian Garments (Olympian) alleging that the defendants manufacture in the local market
jeans under the brand name “Paddocks” using a device which is substantially, if not exactly,
similar to their “Dockers and Design” trademark which was owned and registered with the
petitioners, without their consent. The petitioners’ ownership of the trademark is evidenced by its
valid and existing registrations in various member countries of the Paris Convention including its
registration in the Philippines.

For the absence and/or failure of Clinton and Olympian to attend the hearing for the case, the
trial court issued a TRO in favor of Levi. Thereafter, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was granted in favor of Levi. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court and granted the petition of Clinton for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

For its defense, Clinton maintain that it was not validly served with summons since the same was
only served upon Olympian, hence the TRO was void. It likewise contented that there was no
confusion between the two marks and that the erosion of petitioners’ trademark may not be
protected by injuction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not injunction is a valid remedy in the case at bar.

RULING:
NO. For an injunction to lie, clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection
must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or
future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an actual
right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected
and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.

Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at
any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or
a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity
or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties,
and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary
remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard. It may be
resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no
other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any
standard compensation.
In the case at bar, petitioners registered trademark consists of two elements: (1) the word mark
Dockers and (2) the wing-shaped design or logo. Notably, there is only one registration for both
features of the trademark giving the impression that the two should be considered as a single
unit. Clinton Apparelles trademark, on the other hand, uses the Paddocks word mark on top of a
logo which according to petitioners is a slavish imitation of the Dockers design. The two
trademarks apparently differ in their word marks (Dockers and Paddocks), but again according to
petitioners, they employ similar or identical logos. It could thus be said that respondent only
appropriates petitioners logo and not the word mark Dockers; it uses only a portion of the
registered trademark and not the whole.
 
Given the single registration of the trademark Dockers and Design and considering that
respondent only uses the assailed device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the
latter from using the challenged Paddocks device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is not
evident whether the single registration of the trademark Dockers and Design confers on the
owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is also unclear
whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark registered in its entirety
constitutes material or substantial invasion of the owners right.
 
It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed to the word mark, is the
dominant or central feature of petitioners’ trademark the feature that prevails or is retained in the
minds of the public an imitation of which creates the likelihood of deceiving the public and
constitutes trademark infringement. In sum, there are vital matters which have yet and may only
be established through a full-blown trial.
 
From the above discussion, we find that petitioners right to injunctive relief has not been clearly
and unmistakably demonstrated. The right has yet to be determined. Petitioners also failed to
show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of
an injunctive writ. Neither were petitioners able to show any urgent and permanent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.

The issue of Trademark Dilution was also discussed in the case.

Trademark dilution is the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of:
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties; or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to an injunction
against another persons commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins
after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. This
is intended to protect famous marks from subsequent uses that blur distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it.
 
Based on the foregoing, to be eligible for protection from dilution, there has to be a finding that:
(1) the trademark sought to be protected is famous and distinctive;
(2) the use by respondent of Paddocks and Design began after the petitioners mark became
famous; and
(3) such subsequent use defames petitioners mark.

In the case at bar, petitioners have yet to establish whether Dockers and Design has
acquired a strong degree of distinctiveness and whether the other two elements are present
for their cause to fall within the ambit of the invoked protection. The Trends MBL Survey
Report which petitioners presented in a bid to establish that there was confusing similarity
between two marks is not sufficient proof of any dilution that the trial court must enjoin.

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