See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/274373471

AN ANALYSIS OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY’S COMPETITIVENESS USING

PORTER’S FIVE FORCES FRAMEWORK

Article · April 2014

CITATIONS READS

4 60,937

1 author:

Mohammed Hokroh
Saudi Aramco
13 PUBLICATIONS   15 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Mohammed Hokroh on 22 September 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

AN ANALYSIS OF THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY’S COMPETITIVENESS USING

PORTER’S FIVE FORCES FRAMEWORK
Mohammed A. Hokroh*
MBA in Finance, University of Leicester, UK.

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the oil and gas industry’s competitiveness using Porter’s Five Forces
framework. The paper starts with an overview of the oil and gas industry and proceeds with analysing its competitiveness
with implications to new firms that are considering entering into the industry. Then, it discusses strategy literature
assumptions about future certainty and approaches to strategic decision making. Finally, it concludes with key points and
recommendations.

1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the oil and gas industry’s competitiveness using Porter’s Five Forces
framework. The paper starts with an overview of the oil and gas industry and proceeds with analysing its competitiveness
with implications to new firms that are considering entering into the industry. Then, it discusses strategy literature
assumptions about future certainty and approaches to strategic decision making. Finally, it concludes with key points and
recommendations.

2. Industry Overview
One of the most important industries that has a rich and fascinating history is the oil and gas industry. This history
spans thousands of years and has played a significant role in structuring this business.

A. Early History
Underground oil was first discovered by the Chinese who used bamboo pipelines to transport oil and gas drawn
from wells to be used for lighting. During the 13th century, Azerbaijan inhabitants developed various methods to collect
oil seeps on the surface. By the mid 1590’s, they were able to dig pits that reached a depth of 115 feet in order to
facilitate the collection of oil. (Library of Congress 2010).
Producing companies were mainly from Italy and Germany before the Indonesia entered into the European oil
market in 1643. In 1650, the first European commercial oil well was discovered in Romania, about 200 years later, the
world’s first oil refinery was established there. The 1850’s witnessed the birth of the first oil company in the world, the
Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company. (Antill and Arnott 2000).
The first major oil company, the Standard Oil Company, was established in 1870 by John Rockefeller, which proceeded
to dominate the next decades (1870-1895) despite fierce competition. (Library of Congress 2010).

B. From 1859 to 1995

In 1895, an increase in worldwide oil demand was offset by a corresponding increase in supply; most of these
increases came from the United States as it exported 44% of its crude oil production. Subsequently, the consumption of
oil increased by 16% per annum whereas production increased by 12% per annum in the period from 1900 to 1910.
(Antill and Arnott 2000) .
During 1909, Standard Oil was divided into 34 separate companies due to the enactment of antitrust laws (Library
of Congress 2010). In 1933, an affiliation of Standard Oil named California Arabian Standard Oil Company was created
and obtained the concession to explore Saudi Arabia for oil, and after five years of extensive exploration, commercial oil
was finally discovered in Saudi Arabia. (Datamonitor 2009).
This period of the oil and gas industry history ended in 1950 with the United States as the dominant player
accounting for more than half the world’s production (Library of Congress 2010).

C. Modern History
As market globalization began to emerge, more competitors appeared across Europe, Russia and Asia, such as
Royal Dutch, Shell and Anglo-Persian (British Petroleum). (Library of Congress 2010)
Enormous discoveries of oil around the world, particularly in the Middle East, led to a decreasing U.S. dominance of the
oil industry as Middle Eastern production reached 5.2 million barrels of oil a day (about 24% of the world’s total
production) by 1960. (Antill and Arnott 2000).
These discoveries were followed by rapid increases in oil consumption at a rate of 7 percent per annum. This
significant increase of consumption was primarily driven by the expansion of automobile industry and was compounded
by economical and political instability in the Middle East during the 60’s and 70’s. This resulted in increased oil prices, a
situation exacerbated by embargos by the oil producing counties leading to a reduction in the world’s total oil production.
Due to this oil supply shortage, the International Energy Agency (IEA) was established.

76
G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

Moves by competitors to influence the Middle East oil prices led the oil producing countries to establish the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). IEA and OPEC play several roles in forecasting economical
growth rates and petroleum supply and demand scenarios. (Library of Congress 2010).

3. Major Oil Companies

In the early 19th century, the oil and gas industry was dominated by what was known as “the seven sisters”. These
were: Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) then (Exxon), Standard Oil of New York (Mobil), Standard Oil of California
(Chevron), Royal Dutch Shell, Texaco, Gulf, and British Petroleum (BP). However, massive discoveries of oil and gas
fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Persia led to the creation of conglomerates. (Library of Congress 2010).
According to Energy Intelligence (2010), the major 10 oil companies in the world today are as follows:
Rank Company Name Country State Ownership %
1 Saudi Aramco Saudi Arabia 100
2 National Iranian Oil Company Iran 100
3 Exxon Mobil US N/A
4 Petroleos De Venezuela Venezuela 100
5 China National Petroleum Corporation China 100
6 British Petroleum UK N/A
7 Royal Dutch Shell UK/Netherlands N/A
8 ConocoPhillips US N/A
9 Chevron US N/A
10 TOTAL France N/A

4. Industry Competitive Analysis

Porter’s Five Forces framework points out that the state of competition in any industry depends on five competitive
forces: (a).threat of entrants, (b).threat of substitutes, (c).power of suppliers, (d).power of buyers and (e).rivalry among
industry’s firms. However, a company’s success in an industry depends on how it is related to that industry and how the
industry is structured. (Porter, 1980).
Industry structure (manifested in the five competitive forces) drives competition and profitability. In order to reveal
the roots of an industry’s current profitability and anticipate future trends, a company has to understand the underlying
causes of the five competitive forces. (Porter, 2008).

Assessment of the Five Forces

A.1. Threat of potential entrants:
Porter (2008) indicates that new entrants bring with them new capacity and the desire to gain market share. This
desire, Porter suggests, puts pressure on costs, prices and the rate of investment that is necessary to compete. As he
indicates, threat of entry depends on two factors: the height of entry barriers and the incumbents’ reaction to new
entrants.
According to Jones et al. (1978) the major barriers to entry in the oil and gas industry are:
1. Patents
2. Large capital requirements
3. Economies of scale
4. Governments regulations
5. Product differentiation
6. Predatory behavior by cartels
7. Ownership of resources
Patents of technology and innovation work as driving forces of cost reduction and differentiation (Santos et al.
1999). For example, in early 2010, Exxon Mobile introduced advanced technology to reduce cost while increasing
production capacity, enabling the company to boost its production capacity by 5.8 million barrels of oil and extend the
life of its oil and gas fields. (Datamonitor 2010) However, in refining, technical patent barriers are minimized as the
technology involved in refinery’s construction is widely known. The barriers for entry rising from large capital
requirements and economy of scale are also minimized and sometimes do not serve as barriers to entry in efficient oil and
gas markets such as the U.S. market. For instance, if an industry cartel sought to monopolize the refinery sector, it has to
restrict refinery input and output until the cartel marginal cost equals the marginal revenue. At this point, the refinery
outputs would exceed marginal cost allowing a potential entrant to earn greater profit. Economies of scale do not prevent
entry from occurring in an efficient oil market. For example, it is possible for an industry with large economies of scale
to experience a limit-pricing situation. In this case, a potential entrant must achieve a high level of output to operate in an
efficient scale. This is going to lower market price below the break-even level of costs if the existing rivals maintained
their level of output. (Jones et al. 1978).
In the marketing sector, barriers to entry arising from government regulation have influenced the competitive
strategies of the oil and gas companies. For example, the U.S. oil and gas companies have always succeeded in product
differentiation because of many years of advertising and development. However, this success did not prevent independent
markets from selling similar products at lower cost. Nonetheless, government regulations have shut out such independent
markets. (Jones et al. 1978).

77
G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

Jones et al. (1978) suggest that governments have conferred upon themselves some form of cartel power over the
industry due to their regulations. This supports Amarcher (1976) who points out that OPEC’s success in influencing oil
prices demonstrates the power such cartels have on primarily commodities. Although OPEC does not set oil prices, its
decisions play a major part in pricing, because the OPEC countries produce 40% of the world’s oil supply (Library of
Congress 2010). Consequently, these governmental policies and regulations work as a barrier for new firms to enter the
industry (Porter 2008). Natural resources obviously play the biggest barrier to entry as new entrants must have the
secure and competitive resource to risk entry into the industry as rivals have to acquire a comparable amount of secured
resources (oil and/or gas) to compete (Jones et al. 1978).

B.1. Threat of substitutes:

Porter distinguishes between rivalry (the fifth force) and substitution (the third force). The term rivalry describes
competition between companies that provide similar products while substitution refers to products that are not in direct
competition. (Strategy, Business Information and Analysis 2009) Substitutes affect the industry through limiting its
anticipated profit by placing a ceiling on price (Porter 1980).
With the use of advanced technology, major oil and gas companies are looking for alternative sources of energy as
possible substitutes. For example, in April 2009, TOTAL formed a partnership with Gevo, a US company developing
transportation biofuels and chemical products. (Datamonitor 2010) Porter (2008) indicates that a substitute’s threat is
high when it offers an attractive price trade-off to the industry’s products or when the buyer’s cost of switching to
substitute is low. For instance, the Chinese government aims to have biofuels account for 15% of its total transportation
fuel consumption by 2020, and in comparison, the European Union has set a target of 20% for the same period. China
National Petroleum Corporation is already taking steps to leverage this expected increase in demand in China and
Europe. (Datamonitor 2010) If biofuels offer an attractive price trade-off, it would provide competitive substitutes, thus
threatening crude oil products (Porter 2008).

C.1. Power of suppliers:

Porter (2008) illustrates that powerful suppliers affect the market through charging higher prices, limiting
production, and/or integration. The first two elements were made obvious during the 70’s when embargos by the oil
producing counties led to reducing the world’s oil production and this oil supply shortage led to a dramatic increase in
the nominal price of a barrel of oil (Library of Congress 2010) from $2.7 to $11.2 during the period from 1973 to 1974
(Backus et al. 2000). This reveals the power oil and gas suppliers have over the industry. Any move by a competitor to
influence prices will be followed by changes in competitors’ strategies. For example, the move of Esso (Exxon Mobile
today) in 1959 to influence Middle East oil prices led to the creation of OPEC, whose decisions play a part in oil prices
today. (Library of Congress 2010).
As suppliers, oil and gas companies bring power to the recipient countries through international vertical integration.
Cash can be injected into the refining industry to foster competition and enhance supply security to consumers. (Terzian
et al. cited in Al-Moneef 1998) For example, Petroleos de Venezuela S. A. (PDVSA) controls its refining and marketing
operations in the U.S. through CITGO Corporation, in which it owns 100 percent through PDV America. (Datamonitor
2009) Vertical integration reduces risk and maximizes profitability at every stage of the chain from wellhead to gasoline
station. It helps the oil companies balance their operations and protect themselves from markets instability. For instance,
when crude oil price goes down, the refining and marketing margins would generally be expected to be positive. (Al-
Moneef 1998)

a. Power of buyers:
Powerful buyers have the ability to reduce prices, demand better quality or more service (thereby increasing costs)
and play industry participants off against each other, at the expense of industry profitability (Porter 2008). Major oil
companies outsource much of their field operations to oil and gas service companies. As buyers, oil companies are in a
powerful position to bargain prices, demand better quality or additional service.
Oil and gas companies seek to obtain rights to invest in exploration and production areas internationally. These
rights are acquired through buying a percentage of another company’s right or through participating in licensing rounds.
In this highly competitive environment, oil and gas companies join together and form a Joint Venture. (Tavares 2000)
According to Berg et al. (cited in Kent 1991), Joint Ventures are formed primarily for three reasons:
1. Gain more market power (buyer)
2. Reduce or share risk
3. Acquire or share information
Moreover, oil and gas companies form Joint Ventures to overcome political and/or legal impediments or to meet host
country requirements (Chu et al. cited in Kent 1991). ConocoPhillips for example, has 50% equity investment in Joint
Venture with Spectra Energy a natural gas infrastructure company in North America (Datamonitor 2010). A 50:50 Joint
Venture between Shell and Exxon Mobil (Infineum) manufactures and markets high-quality additives used in fuel,
lubricants, and specialty additives (Datamonitor 2010). This, as Porter (2008) suggests, increases the buyer’s negotiating
leverage relative to competitors which leads to increasing the buyer’s power.

b. Rivalry amongst competitors:

High rivalry between existing competitors can limit industry profitability depending on the competition intensity
and basis (Porter 2008). Major oil and gas companies are relatively equal in size, power and capabilities (Datamonitor
2009 and Datamontor 2010). This increases the intensity of rivalry (Porter 2008) which can manifest itself in a price war
if a competitor tries to influence prices (Menghini 1997).

78
G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

According to Porter, (2008) slowdown in production such as experienced by oil and gas companies combined with
declining net liquids production and reserves (Datamonitor 2010), could increase the intensity of rivalry in this industry.

Figure 2: Possible industry future production of “All Hydrocarbons” Bentley (2002).

Rivalry in any industry is intense if rivals have goals that go beyond economic performance (Porter 2008).
According to Bernstein et al. (cited in Kent 1991), one purpose of Joint Venture in the oil and gas industry is to manage
rivalry through turning potential competitors into allies. This is particularly critical in the oil and gas industry where there
is little to distinguish rivals (Hennart et al. cited in Kent 1991).

Five Forces Summary:

Figure 2: Five force model (Porter 2008).

79
G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

Other Analysis:
a. SWOT Analysis:

Figure 3: SWOT analyses (Strategy, Business Information and Analysis 2009).

b. PEST Analysis:
Political (P), Economic (E), Sociological (S), Technology (T)
Probability of Occurrence

Figure 4, PEST analyses (Strategy, Business Information and Analysis 2009)

Literature Assumptions
Future Certainty and Strategic Decision Making:
A company’s external environment is a source of uncertainty. Because it is uncontrollable, the external environment
influences the structure, decisions and performance of organizations. Therefore, organizations have to adapt to the
external environment by restructuring themselves. (Jauch et al. 1986).
Milliken (1987) points out that the term “environment uncertainty” is a source of confusion since it has been used to
describe the state of the organization’s environment as well as the state of the organization when lacking critical
information about the environment. This has caused scholars to argue whether environment uncertainty should be
measured as a perceptual phenomenon or as a property of organizational environments (Child et al. cited in Milliken
1987). Rational planning and analysis are the means to combat external uncertainty of the environment (Whittington
2001). Organizations that spend more time and resources in scanning and forecasting the environment will have more
ability to understand the probabilities of various events or changes in the environment. However, organizations operating

80
G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

in an unstable market will perceive more environmental uncertainty than organizations operating in more stable one.
Since effect uncertainty is the inability to predict what future environmental changes will be on the organization, any
increase or decrease in uncertainty impacts the organization's ability to function in future states of the market. (Milliken
1987).
Hofer et al. (cited in Milliken 1987) pointed out that it is difficult for organizations to go through all the steps
outlined in the rational planning model to identify opportunities and threats in an environment with a high degree of
uncertainty. Even if they did, the outcome would resemble the “garbage can approach” (Milliken 1987). The
Evolutionary theorists realize the limited capacity of organizations to anticipate future changes in the environment and
respond to it. Thus, Evolutionary theorists suggest that the best strategy is the one that is selected directly by the
environment. (Whittington 2001) However, in the oil and gas industry, organizations may try to influence the external
environment (rather than adapting it) to create uncertainty for competitors thereby enhancing its own competitive
position. The embargo of oil in the late 70s is one example. (Jauch et al. 1986).
This illustrates the Transition view in that sources of uncertainty are both external and internal and organizations
have the ability to influence the environment (Milliken 1987). Processual theorists, on the other hand, argue that the best
strategy should also encompass profit maximization in addition to environmental factors, while the Systemic theorists
argue that strategies must be socially sensitive in order to understand the internal and external environment (Whittington
2001). Thus, it is important to identify the sources of uncertainty as well as the type of uncertainty being experienced.
Organizational attempts to respond to environmental uncertainty are associated with understanding the response options
that are available to the organization and what the value or utility of each might be. Accordingly, response uncertainty is
likely to be high when there is a perceived need to act because a pending event or change is perceived to create a threat or
to provide an opportunity to the organization. (Milliken 1987) Thus, the Systemic perspective on strategy indicates that
the internal contest of organization is not only individuals or departments, but the social groups’ interest and the
surrounding resources (Whittington 2001).

Conclusion
Based on this analysis, investing in the oil and gas industry is neutral to a negative proposition (Menghini et al.
1997). A new firm considering entering the industry first has to assess the competitiveness of the industry using the five
forces (Porter 2008). This assessment is even made more difficult due to the high degree of uncertainty in the oil and gas
industry (Hofer et al. cited in Milliken 1987). Thus, we need to rethink our approach to strategic decision making by
analyzing both the internal and external sources of uncertainty as well as identifying the type of uncertainty being
experienced (Milliken 1987).

Recommendations
1. To be able to enter into this industry, new entrants have to assess barriers to entry (natural resources,
government regulations, politics and technology) cautiously (Jones et al. 1978).
2. To anticipate future trend of this industry, new entrants have to analyze the industry’s past trends and
performance (Menghini et al. 1997).
3. To outperform rivals, new entrants have to establish a difference that can be preserved (Porter 1996).
4. To invest or diverse into different market segments, oil and gas companies have to select the right market
segment carefully (Garcia et al. 2000).

References
1. Al-Jubran H. H. and Bu Hassan, S. A. (2009) ‘Safety and operations measures taken by one company to conduct onshore rigless
critical well intervention operations in water, oil and gas wells’ paper presented at the 2009 SPE/ICoTA coiled tubing and well
intervention conference and exhibition held in Woodlands, Texas 31 March-1 April 2009, U.S.A.
2. Al-Moneef, M. A. (1998) ‘Vertical integration strategies of the national oil companies’ The development economics 36(2):203-222
3. Amarcher R. C. and Sweeney, R. J. (1976) ‘International commodity cartels and the threat of new entry: implications of ocean
mineral resources’ Kyklos 29(2):292-309
4. Antill, N. and Arnott, R. (2000) Valuing oil and gas companies Cornwall, England: T J International Ldt
5. Backus, D. K. and Crucini, M. J. (2000) ‘Oil prices and the term of trade’ Journal of international economics 50(1):185-213
6. Bentley, R. W. (2002) ‘Global oil and gas depletion: an overview’ Energy policy 30(3):189-205
7. Datamonitor (2009) ‘China National Petroleum Corporation company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (26
September 2010)
8. Datamonitor (2009) ‘Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (27 September
2010)
9. Datamonitor (2009) ‘Saudi Aramco company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (18 September 2010)
10. Datamonitor (2010) ‘ConocoPhillips company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (27 September 2010)
11. Datamonitor (2010) ‘Exxon Mobile Corporation company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (19 September 2010)
12. Datamonitor (2010) ‘Royal Dutch Shell plc company profile’ Available from: Business Source Premier. (26 September 2010)
13. Datamonitor (2010) ‘TOTAL S.A. company profile’ Datamonitor Available from: Business Source Premier. (24 September 2010)
14. Deam, R. J., Leather J. and Hale J. G. (1975) ‘World petroleum energy model’ paper presented in at the 1975 SPE 9th world
petroleum congress held in Tokyo 11-16 May 1975, Japan
15. Energy Intelligence (2010) ‘PIW ranks the world’s top oil companies’ Available online at:
http://www.energyintel.com/documentdetail.asp?document_id=137158 (26 September 2010)
16. Gracia, P. (2000) ‘Market segmentation and pricing strategies in the North American natural gas market’ paper presented at the
2000 SPE annual technical conference and exhibition held in Dallas, Texas 1-4 October 2000, U.S.A.
17. Hira, A. and Oliveira, L. G. (2009) ‘No substitute for oil? How Brazil developed its ethanol industry’ Energy policy 37(6):2450-
2456

81
 G.J.C.M.P.,Vol.3(2):76-82 (March–April,2014) ISSN: 2319 – 7285

18. Jasimuddin, S. M. (2001) ‘Analyzing the competitive advantages of Saudi Arabia with Porter’s model’ Business and industrial
marketing 16(1):59-68
19. Jauch, L. R. and Kenneth K. L. (1986) ‘Strategic management of uncertainty’ The academy of management review 11(4):777-790
20. Jones, R. O., Mead, W. J. and Sorensen, P. E. (1978) ‘Free entry into crude oil and gas production and competition in the U.S. oil
industry’ Natural resources journal 18(1):859-876
21. Kent, D. H. (1991) ‘Joint ventures vs. non-joint ventures: an empirical investigation’ Strategic management journal 12(5):387-393
22. Library of Congress (2010) ‘Industry Cartels and Orginizations’ Available online at:
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/issue5/cartels.html (12 September 2010)
23. Library of Congress (2010) ‘The oil and gas industry’ Available online at:
http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/BERA/issue5/issue5_main.html (12 September 2010)
24. Milliken, F. J. (1987) ‘Three types of perceived uncertainty about the environment: state, effect and response uncertainty’ The
academy of management review 12(1):133-143
25. Porter, M. E. (1980) ‘Industry structure and competitive strategy: keys to profitability’ Financial Analysts Journal 36(4):30-41
26. Porter, M. E. (1996) ‘What is strategy?’ Harvard business review 74(6):61-78
27. Porter, M. E. (2008) ‘The five competitive forces that shape strategy’ Harvard business review 86(1):78-93
28. Santos, E. M. (1999) ‘Competitive strategies and competitive strategies and strategic positioning of oil companies in the
international oil Business: theory and practice in perspective’ paper presented at the 1999 SPE annual technical conference and
exhibition held in Houston, Texas 3-6 October 1999, U.S.A.
29. Saudi Aramco. (2008) Setting New Standards Our Legacy, Our Future Annual Review 2008 Dhahran: Al Jazeera Printing Co.
30. Saudi Aramco. (2009) Saudi Aramco Annual Review ’09 Dhahran: Al Jazeera Printing Co.
31. Strategy, Business Information and Analysis (2009) Master of business administration, Strategy, Business Information and
Analysis Great Britain: 292 High St, Cheltenham GL50 3HQ
32. Tavares, M. J. D. (2000) ‘Bidding strategy: reducing the “money-left-on-the-table” in E&P licensing opportunity’ paper presented
at the 2000 SPE annual technical conference and exhibition held in Dallas, Texas 1-4 October 2000, U.S.A.
33. Whittington, R. (2001) What is strategy and does it matter? Cornwall, England: T J International Ldt

* Corresponding Author
Mohammed A. Hokroh is a corresponding author and business system analyst in Saudi Aramco, Ras Tanura, Saudi
Arabia. He is a PhD candidate at the University of Bolton, Manchester, United Kingdom. He holds Master of Business
Administration (MBA) in Finance degree from the University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom and Bachelor of
Science in Management Information Systems (MIS) from King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia. He has published several papers in international journals like Research in Applied Economics, Asian
Journal of Finance and Accounting, International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting.

82
View publication stats