Villareal
Villareal
Villareal
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
352
353
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
354
ever, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done
in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether
the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the
verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
355
lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted. If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,
jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the
decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court
of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other
party’s time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the court of
origin shall cease — including the authority to order execution pending
appeal — the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the
appellate court. Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the
authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as
well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That
power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally
disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event,
even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first place.
Same; Same; Same; If the case was previously appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be
attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk of
the court from which the appeal was taken. The court of origin then
reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action.—According to
Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, “[n]o penalty shall be executed except
by virtue of a final judgment.” A judgment of a court convicting or
acquitting the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the
following conditions among others: after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the
grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the sentence has already been
partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for
356
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge,
and eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring
jurisdictional faux pas is a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the
law or an underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or
Tecson, et al., or both — to which this Court cannot give a judicial
imprimatur. In any event, Tecson, et al. were ineligible to seek probation
at the time they applied for it. Probation is a special privilege granted by
the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their
liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance
of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance
to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record by making them undergo
rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are
to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and
self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration
with the community. It must be reiterated that probation is not a right
enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace or clemency conferred
by the state.
Same; Same; All offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from
seeking probation.—Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is
that the offender must not have appealed the conviction. In the 2003 case
Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 298, this
357
Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for
probation even after the trial court has imposed a nonprobationable verdict,
provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence
within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the
accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was
beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for
probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed
to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión correccional. In deciding the
case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 243
SCRA 384 (1995), and ruled that the accused was ineligible for probation,
since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized
that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not
provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is that
all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason
for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.
Accordingly, this Court enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are
disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of probation if they
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
358
359
360
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 8/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
_______________
1 Villareal v. People, G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 & 178080, 1
February 2012, 664 SCRA 519.
2 CA Decision (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 10 January 2002),
Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 221-249; CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, C.A.-
G.R. CR No. 15520, 30 August 2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp. 209-218.
Both the Decision and the Resolution of the CA were penned by Associate Justice
361
_______________
362
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 10/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
_______________
363
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 11/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites.” These rites
included the “Indian Run,” which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of
two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
the “Bicol Express,” which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with
their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the “Rounds,” in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the “auxiliaries” (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during
initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms
or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the “Auxies’
Privilege Round,” in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to in-
364
flict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes
were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their
first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day — 9 February 1991 — the neophytes
were made to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were
also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles.
Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms
or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured
on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day
officially ended.
After a while, accused nonresident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito
Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially
refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened
the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal,
then subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so
strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at
the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon
dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When
they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 12/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
the Aquilans
365
366
367
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed
the charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his
right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003
and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the
CA in C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders
and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions
were individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
_______________
368
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 15/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
_______________
369
_______________
370
have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the
cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was
supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various
dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that
Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had
already granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11
October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and
conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the
criminal case against them terminated on various dates in April
2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true
copies of their respective Applications for Probation and the RTC
Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation,
and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they
maintain that the Decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 15520 had already
lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, when they
waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
Issues
_______________
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861, 1897, 1942 & 1967.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 17/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
12 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002),
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.
13 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 29 April 2003),
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1875; RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-
38340, 10 April 2003), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1906, 1952; RTC Order (People
v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 3 April 2003), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p.
1979.
14 Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1875, 1897-1906, 1942-1952, 1967-1979.
371
Discussion
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 18/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
372
_______________
Serrano, Sr., 374 Phil. 302; 315 SCRA 686 [1999]; and People v. De Grano, G.R.
No. 167710, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 550).
18 Villareal v. People, id., at p. 551 (citing People v. De Grano, id.; and People v.
Maquiling, 368 Phil. 169; 308 SCRA 687 [1999]).
19 Villareal v. People, id., at p. 552 (citing People v. Maquiling, id.; and Teknika
Skills and Trade Services v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 339 Phil. 218; 273
SCRA 10 [1997]).
373
374
_______________
375
thought.” The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime
is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of
is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus
a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional
felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with
the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill — or animus interficendi —
cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not
have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death
resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent — but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence — the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in
homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262
to 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries
must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the
existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 21/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
376
377
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 22/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
378
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 23/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
The finality of a CA decision will not bar the state from seeking
the annulment of the judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
_______________
379
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 24/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
_______________
380
the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases
supplied)
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 25/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
381
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 26/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and
that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the
very jurisdiction of the court that issued the crimi-
_______________
382
_______________
29 People v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 (citing People v. Serrano, Sr., supra
note 17 at p. 306; p. 690; and People v. De Grano, supra note 17).
30 People v. Nazareno, supra note 28 at p. 451.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 27/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
383
The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have no legal effect,
as they were issued without jurisdiction.
_______________
384
_______________
32 Id.; and Antiporda v. Garchitorena, 378 Phil. 1166; 321 SCRA 551 (1999).
33 See: Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the Probation Law, Sec.
4.
34 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp.
1098-1132.
385
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 29/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
_______________
386
_______________
387
from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then
reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is
during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the
execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45
including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet
relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of
Tecson, et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective
applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA
settled the motion only upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August
2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson, et al. had filed
their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or
almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 31/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
45 Revised Penal Code, Arts. 78 to 88 (in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 17; Rule 121,
Sec. 8; Rule 36, Sec. 2; Rule 39, Sec. 1)
46 Probation Law, Sec. 4.
47 Tecson, et al. filed their applications on various dates in January 2002. See:
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1861-1863, 1897-1901, 1942-1944, & 1967-1969.
48 See: CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra note 2 at p. 6, Rollo (G.R.
No. 154954, Vol. I), p. 214.
49 See: CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 14 February
2002), Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 1972. In the Resolution, the CA stated that “the
records of this case cannot be remanded at this stage considering the motions for
reconsideration filed hereto.” See also: Letter of Presiding Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, CA Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2686-2688; Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19
February 2008, Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), p. 918.
50 CA Resolution dated 30 August 2002, supra, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I),
supra.
388
_______________
51 RTC Order (People v. Dizon, Criminal Case No. C-38340, 11 October 2002),
Rollo (G.R. No. 155101), pp. 1872-1873, 1904-1905, 1950-1951, 1977-1978.
52 CA Resolution (People v. Dizon, C.A.-G.R. CR No. 15520, 29 October 2002),
CA Rollo, Volume II, pp. 2724-2725.
53 Supreme Court Resolution dated 25 November 2002, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954,
Vol. I), p. 10-A.
54 The Supreme Court granted the Motion for Extension filed by the OSG. See:
Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), p.
675.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 32/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
55 Supreme Court Resolution dated 13 October 2003, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954,
Vol. I), p. 675.
56 Supreme Court Resolution dated 21 October 2009, Rollo (G.R. No. 155101),
pp. 1156-1160.
57 Transmittal Letter from the CA dated 19 February 2008, Rollo (G.R. No.
155101), p. 918; See also Letter of Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, Caloocan
City RTC Branch 121, CA Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 2686-2688. Judge Angeles informed the
CA that the records of the case had not yet been remanded to Branch 121, thus
preventing her from complying with the CA Resolution to release the cash bond
posted by one of the accused. The CA Third Division received the letter on 22
October 2002 — or 11 days after RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications.
389
_______________
58 Probation Law; Francisco v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 241; 243 SCRA 384
(1995); and Baclayon v. Mutia, 214 Phil. 126; 129 SCRA 148 (1984). See: Del
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 33/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
390
_______________
60 Reply of OSG dated 25 November 2004, Rollo (G.R. No. 154954, Vol. I), pp.
1098-1132.
391
Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial
court has imposed a non-probationable verdict, provided that the CA
later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the
probationable limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the
accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which
was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became
eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the
penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisión
correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in
Francisco and ruled that the accused was ineligible for probation,
since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we
emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity
and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception.
What is clear is that all offenders who previously appealed their
cases, regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by
the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated
in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from availing themselves
of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to
apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of
their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 issued its various Orders discharging Tecson,
et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere
reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case
Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Fran-
_______________
61 Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 270; 312 SCRA 298 (2003); and
Francisco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 58.
62 Id. See also: Francisco v. Court of Appeals, id.
63 256 Phil. 328; 174 SCRA 566 (1989).
392
the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an
arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross that it divested the
court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the
RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson, et al.
and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be
deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders,
resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson, et al. null and void
for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our
pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz.:
_______________
64 228 Phil. 42, 90; 144 SCRA 43, 89 (1986). E.g., People v. Jardin, 209 Phil.
134, 140; 124 SCRA 167, 174 (1983) (citing Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717
[1925]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 133 Phil. 661; 24 SCRA 663 [1968]; Paredes v.
Moya, 158 Phil. 1150; 61 SCRA 526 [1974]).
393
ther binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 36/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
_______________
394
_______________
395
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals
“from the judgment of conviction” is disqualified from availing himself of
the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction
have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court, now set aside; and two, a conviction for attempted
homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled
judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the
severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme
Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will
also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse
errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel
to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v.
Court of Appeals that the probation law requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But
there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice
between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, “By taking
this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation.” The stiff
_______________
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 38/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
396
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus,
a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of
conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their
right to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of
two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the
right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of
probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation
Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused
only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would
be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law
should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal
law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right
and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months
maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one
could say with certainty that he
397
would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him.
The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he
got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to
deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 39/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the
trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and
found Tecson, et al. ultimately liable for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in
its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to
prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months,
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering that the new ruling
in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson, et al., we rule that they are
now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is
also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC
Branch 130, which granted the Applications for Probation, we
cannot disregard the fact that Tecson, et al. have fulfilled the terms
and conditions of their previous probation program and have
eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for
probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their
antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them
under probation at this time and in determining the terms,
conditions, and period thereof.
398
_______________
70 See, e.g.: People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, 17 December 2008, 574
SCRA 258; People v. Gabres, 335 Phil. 242; 267 SCRA 581 (1997); and People v.
Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109 (1933).
399
_______________
71 Revised Penal Code, Art. 73. People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636, 644 (1935).
According to Silvallana: “It is therefore unnecessary to express the accessory
penalties in the sentence.”
72 See, e.g.: Moreno v. Commission on Elections, 530 Phil. 279; 498 SCRA 547
(2006); Baclayon v. Mutia, supra note 58.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 41/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
400
_______________
76 See ISL, Sec. 5; Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, id., at, pp. 718-720.
77 Article 365 provides: “In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall
exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-
four.”
78 People v. Temporada, supra note 70; People v. Ducosin, supra note 70. See,
e.g.: Bongalon v. People, G.R. No. 169533, 20 March 2013, 694 SCRA 12;
Guinhawa v. People, 505 Phil. 383; 468 SCRA 278 (2005); People v. Dy, 425 Phil
608; 375 SCRA 15 (2002); People v. Darilay, 465 Phil. 747; 421 SCRA 45 (2004);
People v. Bustamante, 445 Phil. 345; 397 SCRA 326 (2003); People v. Catuiran, 397
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 42/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
Phil. 325; 343 SCRA 293 (2000); People v. Barro, 392 Phil. 857; 343 SCRA 238
(2000); Austria v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 408; 327 SCRA 668 (2000); Ladino v.
People, 333 Phil. 254; 265 SCRA 422 (1996); People v. Parohinog, 185 Phil. 266; 96
SCRA 373 (1980); and People v. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952).
79 People v. Temporada, id. The case explained the difference between a
“prescribed penalty,” “imposable penalty,” and “penalty actually imposed.”
80 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, 9
October 2012, 683 SCRA 1; Aratea v. Commission on
401
_______________
Elections, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012, 683 SCRA 105; and People v.
Silvallana, supra note 71.
81 See Art. 27 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: “Prisión correccional,
suspensión, and destierro.—The duration of the penalties of prisión correccional,
suspensión, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except
when the suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its
duration shall be that of the principal penalty” and Art. 33, which states: “Effects
of the Penalties of Suspension from Any Public Office, Profession or Calling, or the
Right of Suffrage.—The suspension from public office, profession or calling, and
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall disqualify the offender from holding such
office or exercising such profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of
the sentence. The person suspended from holding public office shall not hold another
having similar functions during the period of his suspension.” (Emphases supplied)
Cf: Lacuna v. Abes, 133 Phil. 770; 24 SCRA 780 (1968). The Court En Banc
explained therein that then Mayor-elect Benjamin Abes was released from
confinement on 7 April 1959 by virtue of a conditional pardon granted by the
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 43/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
President of the Philippines, remitting only the unexpired portion of the prison term
and fine. It then clarified that without the pardon, his maximum sentence would have
been served on 13 October 1961. Accordingly, the Court said that the accessory
penalty of temporary absolute disqualification would have barred
402
_______________
him for seeking public office and for exercising his right to vote until 13 October
1961.
82 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80.
83 See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, id. (citing Lacuna v. Abes, supra
note 81); Aratea v. Commission on Elections, supra note 80; People v. Silvallana,
supra note 71.
84 Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, id.
85 Revised Penal Code, Art. 36. See: Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 205033, 18 June 2013, 698 SCRA 742; Monsanto v. Factoran, 252 Phil. 192; 170
SCRA 190 (1989); Lacuna v. Abes, supra note 81.
86 Supra note 58.
87 Supra note 72.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 44/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
403
404
_______________
405
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 46/47
4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 743
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc19c9bd4e18c93003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 47/47