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Protecting Smart Buildings from Cyber Attacks


Home (https://iiot-world.com) | Cybersecurity (https://iiot-world.com/category/cybersecurity/) | Protecting
Smart Buildings from Cyber Attacks

It was an attack on a hospital like no other, reported the news in February 2016. The Hollywood
Presbyterian Medical Center had been hacked. Its services were crippled. As emergency patients
were diverted to other area hospitals, hospital administrators received an ominous message. Pay a
ransom to get your hospital systems back. The hospital ultimately paid $17,000 worth of bitcoins.
The FBI and the Los Angeles Police Department have yet to find the culprit.
The hospital attack brings to light just how vulnerable buildings and institutions are to hackers. For
hospitals, it can cause a disruption of medical services that could include blocked access to patient
records, laboratory results, surgery and critical patient information updates. The potential cost in
lives and loss of public trust is on par with what might occur with significant natural disasters.

IoT Smart Technology and Risk

Over the past few decades, there have been a number of seismic shifts in technology. Mainframe
computing, client/server and cloud computing are some examples that easily come to mind. The
emergence of the Internet of Things (IoT) has seen a technological shift that could potentially
change the way our society operates.

The emergence of the IoT will affect urban planning and engineering as much as it will impact net-
work computing services. The IoT will be at the core of the smart cities we live in, the smart build-
ings we occupy, and even the smart bodies we inhabit.

The construction and engineering industries will be significantly disrupted as the IoT transitions
from a new technology into a standard feature of the built environment. While a building that fully
integrates your preferences and activities can offer almost limitless opportunities, this shift can al-
so expose buildings and all those associated with them to the increased likelihood of cyber-attacks.

Industry predictions suggest that by 2020, there will be an installed base of some 30.7 billion IoT
devices. Many of these devices will be deployed within smart buildings, critical infrastructure and
public works. Engineering professionals have previously been largely ignored by cyber criminals and
Internet-based security threats; however, as engineering firms find themselves with a much greater
online presence, and as the technological integration of the occupant and the built environment
gains momentum, cyber criminals are now placing a much greater focus on buildings as the targets
for their attacks. Engineering firms can no longer simply hope to be ignored by these groups, as
their intellectual property has become a much sought-after commodity by criminals.
An image of a Control System as a DMZ. (Image courtesy of ICS-CERT.)

Closing the Gap Between Corporate and Control Domains

Historically, the control systems domain was protected by physical separation. The corporate do-
main was segregated from the control systems domain,which created a break in outside accessibil-
ity that was generally adequate for the time. However, as global services delivery, data sharing and
data acquisition became critical functions within modern business and technology markets,this
model was no longer sustainable.

The requirement for cost-effectiveness and modern system architectures saw system owners mov-
ing toward interconnected technologies. These technologies provide asset owners with access to
open architectures and improved communication technologies that were not previously available.
The benefits were immediate and significant, with improved efficiency, operation and analytics
available to assist the asset owner to help ensure that their building performed according to their
requirements. Of course, with these connection opportunities came an increased risk exposure to
attack scenarios and exploits from external sources.

Cyber criminals who had previously concentrated on enterprise networks and online service are
now targeting industrial control systems (ICSs) at an increasing rate. The stakes are extremely high.
Bringing down a retail website isn’t the goal of the criminal online presence any more. They can now
target critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, government departments and power stations.
Pathways for intruding the control systems environment. (Image courtesy of the InfoSec Guru.)

Government and Military

Prior to the Stuxnet attack, very few outside the engineering profession had heard of a programma-
ble logic controller (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_logic_controller) (PLC), let alone
what its purpose might be. In 2010, the Stuxnet virus targeted industrial computer systems across
the globe and caused significant damage to critical infrastructure, notably to an Iranian nuclear
power plant.

Stuxnet specifically targeted PLCs, which in general allow the automation of industrial processes
such as those used to control machinery on assembly lines and heating, ventilation and air condi-
tioning (HVAC) systems. Stuxnet affected the centrifuges for separating nuclear material. Exploit-
ing system flaws, the virus targeted systems using the Microsoft Windows operating system. Once
established on the network, Stuxnet sought out Siemens STEP 7 software. The compromised Iranian
PLCs caused the nuclear plant’s centrifuges to behave erratically. The resulting damage forced the
centrifuges offline and caused a major delay in Iran’s nuclear program.

Clearly, this created disruption on an unprecedented scale. The convergence of technologies and
shared network communications provided an opportunity for state-sponsored cyber warfare. This
may have been the first attack of its kind, but it certainly will not be the last.Overnight,industrial
control systems were on alert. This was not just a concern for power plants and government infra-
structure. Possible victims could include medical facilities, entertainment complexes, smart build-
ings and public infrastructure. With Stuxnet, the world experienced its first industrial-scale cyber
warfare attack, and unlike conventional warfare, the perpetrators achieved their goals without even
a hint of detection. The target was a building, specifically its centrifuges. The payload was a virus
transmitted via the network, which was capable of mass destruction. A building’s engineering blue-
print had become a weapon of attack.

It’s possible that some engineers may consider these scenarios to be more Hollywood blockbuster
than real-world possibility. This line of thinking is now considered shortsighted in many industry cir-
cles. Building and engineering clients are increasingly aware of how their brand and services can be
exposed in an all-connected, always-on digital age. The need for cost-efficiencies have increased the
risk exposure that providers and asset owners are facing. The benefits of IP convergence are consid-
erable, but they do come at a “cyber risk” cost.

Of course, the best cyber security strategy can be worthless unless it is integrated into a holistic se-
curity approach. All the password and cyber protection isn’t of much use if someone leaves their
laptop logged in while they mingle at a conference. Creating a robust cyber security system involves
ensuring that physical security is addressed, along with adhering rigorously to sound digital security
processes. Only when digital, physical and cyber security are working together can an asset truly be
considered secure.

Increasingly, organizations are looking at designers and engineers to factor these concerns into
their engineering designs and specifications. Clients know they are exposed. The continued growth
in organizations seeking comprehensive and expensive cyber insurance clearly highlights this point.
It is not solely whether the end product is functional, innovative and cost-effective that drives the
client’s selection process. It’s increasingly about their risk profile.How will it hold up to a cyber at-
tack? And if it does not, how will this affect baseline operations?
Critical infrastructure sectors. (Image courtesy of the Department of Homeland Security.)

Facilitating and Monetizing Cyber Attacks

Cyber-attacks were once all about “sticking it to the man.” The attacks were usually commercially or
politically motivated, and the outcomes where generally the same: public release of commercial
software or the disclosure of classified information.

Today, attacks are just as likely to be about extracting the best possible ransom in the least possible
time. Cyber criminals are often working with organized crime and are using the convergence of
technologies to access ever-increasing critical services and sensitive information to extract a sub-
stantial toll. They know that every moment that a critical technological element is down, such as an
investment banker’s trading floor or a critical government department, the cost to the party being
attacked begins climbing. It is the critical nature of these services that has changed the playing
field. Cyber criminals know that they have a good chance of receiving ransom if the cost of fighting
an attack is much greater—and the cost of a successful attack on a big business can be astronomi-
cal. To aid in these attacks, cyber criminals are sizing up urban planning and design, seeking soft
points to launch new cyber-attacks.

Security by Design

In an IoT world where a camera or building management system (BMS) can potentially launch a
cyber-attack and disable a building’s critical services, there is an imperative to address these risks at
all levels of the build, design and deployment stages. Builders, engineers and critical services spe-
cialists who do not factor in potential cyber risk threats as part of their design considerations ex-
pose their assets, their occupants and the public to considerable risk. This is not to suggest that en-
gineers are required to become cyber security specialists; however, it does imply that urban plan-
ning, design engineering and automation processes need to be considered and factored into the
overall cyber world ecosystem.Put simply, the inclusion of smart technologies within building ser-
vices and design considerations requires a collaborative approach to help ensure that security and
privacy standards are maintained.

This collaboration must extend to electrical and mechanical engineers, HVAC, fire safety, BMS, and
audiovisual specialists. Whether engineering companies work in collaboration with cyber security
firms or build out their own competencies, the need for an integrated approach to cyber security
challenges is required.

IoT Cyber Frameworks—A Need for Cyber Industry Engagement

Smart Cities Security by Design Framework (Image courtesy of IoT Security Institute.)

Many cyber security experts have long identified a need to bring more than just words to the critical
infrastructure and IoT security design table. Urban planners and engineers need collaboration tools,
methods and frameworks to make their buildings more cyber safe. These frameworks are long over-
due. Recently, industry bodies such as the IoT Security Institute (IoTSI) (https://iotsi.io)has released
a global, publically available IoT cyber security and privacy framework for buildings and critical in-
frastructure. The objective of such foundations is to open the channels of communication between
engineers, designers and urban planners when it comes to the cyber security challenges affecting
build and critical environments. In addition, the IoT Security Institute acknowledges the collabora-
tive benefits of working with those who build smart cities, enable Industry 4 technologies, and facil-
itate their deployment. These enablers advise civic leaders and organisations on emerging trends
and business opportunities. They play a vital role in the conversation.

 At the IoTSI we quickly recognised the success of any IoT Security Framework depended on working
with an array of players and stakeholders within smart technology eco-systems. We are constantly
fostering working relationship with the broader smart technology industry, Our objective is to bet-
ter align cyber and privacy controls from design to build completion. A security and privacy by de-
sign approach.
IoTSI Critical Infrastructure Framework (Image courtesy of IoT Security Institute.)

The cyber security industry is establishing a presence within the smart building and critical infra-
structure markets at a rapid pace. The future of smart urban planning will usher in an era of possi-
bilities, functionality and convenience that can provide unprecedented opportunities. These oppor-
tunities will need to be protected. As the public and private sector transition to smart city ecosys-
tems, the insistence and maintenance of cyber safety and privacy will be critical, whether at the
HVAC system, smart parking station, industrial plant or a child’s Internet-connected smart toy. As
the IoT becomes a common part of building design, businesses that work in the built environment
must give cyber security as much consideration as they would the structural integrity of a building.

(https://iiot-world.com/team-view/alan-mihalic-founder-president/)This article was


written by Alan Mihalic (https://iiot-world.com/team-view/alan-mihalic-founder-presi-
dent/), the President of IoT Security Institute. He is a senior Cyber Security Advisor and
Risk professional with demonstrated expertise and success in cyber security, ICS secu-
rity, cyber practice development,risk management, security architecture methodolo-
gies and principles supporting strategic enterprise security initiatives.

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