Advisory Years To 1965
Advisory Years To 1965
Advisory Years To 1965
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
ROBERT
F. FUTRELL
With the assistance of
MARTIN BLUMENSON
O F F I C E OF AIR F O R C E HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR F O R C E
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1981
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
11
This publication is the first of a series titled The United States Air Force in
Southeast Asia. It tells the story of the Air Force’s involvement in the region from
the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops
into Vietnam in 1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air
Force’s principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force
in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government.
This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force:
the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign
ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and
civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issues unique to the
Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air
force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and
how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle
environment.
Additional volumes in this series will tell the story of the Air Force in South
Vietnam, in Laos, and over North Vietnam until the cessation of the Air Force’s
direct role in 1973.
J O H NW. HUSTON
Major General, USAF
Chief; Office of Air Force History
Robert Frank Futrell’s works on Air Force history span the decades from
the second World War to Vietnam. For the former conflict he contributed
sections to The Army Air Forces in World War II, edited by Craven and Cate.
His volume The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 is the official
history of the Air Force in that action. His Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine book is a
fundamental primer of basic thinking about air power among American military
services from 1907 through 1964. Before his retirement in 1974, Dr. Futrell wrote
a detailed manuscript on the early years of the USAF involvement in the
Vietnamese war. I consider it an honor to have been called upon to prepare this
manuscript for publication.
I wish to thank Major General John W. Huston, Chief, Office of Air Force
History, for a hospitable environment; Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Chief Historian, for
invaluable counsel and support; Mr. Max Rosenberg, Deputy Chief Historian,
Mr. Carl Berger, Chief, Histories Division, Colonel John Schlight, Chief, Special
Histories Branch, and Mr. Jacob Van Staaveren, historian, for helpful com-
ments; Dr. George M. Watson for responses to my requestsfor information; and
all the members of the Office of Air Force History for making me feel at home.
1 a m responsible for any omissions or distortions in this narrative.
Martin Blumenson
Page
Foreword
Preface
Appendices
Growth of Major United States Air Force and Vietnamese
Air Force Units to February
Page
2 Development of a Viet Cong Antiaircraft Capability.
1962- 1965 283
Notes 287
Glossary 325
Bibliographic Note 347
Index 357
Vlll
Page
F-8F Bearcats ferried to Vietnam; C-47 and C-1 19s with French
markings .................................................... 8
Refugees fleeing from North Vietnam when the country was divided at
the 17th parallel .............................................. 32
Gen. Nathan F. Twining; Gen. J. Lawton Collins and Premier Ngo Dinh
Diem; MAAG Headquarters in Saigon .......................... 38
L-19s of the Vietnamese Air Force; Sikorsky H-19 helicopter at Tan Son
Nhut ...................................................... 51
Brig. Gen. Rollen Anthis and Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert on
tour in the Pacific 99
Viet Cong prisoners unload rice from a C-I23 at Quang Ngai during a
Mule Train resupply mission; supplies pushed from a C-I 23 for an
outpost at Binh Hung; C-123s at Da Nang; aerial view of a
government outpost 109
C-1 23s on a defoliation mission; brass sprayers in the rear of a C-I 23;
C-123K aircraft at Hickam AFB, Hawaii, enroute to Vietnam for
defoliation activities I14
Maj. Ivan L. Slavich briefs Gen. Earle G. Wheeler and Gen. Paul D.
Harkins on a rocket mount of the UH-1 B helicopter; ARVN para-
trooper prepares for a jump over Cu Chi; TSgt William W. Cameron
instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation of the gunsight on a
T-28; Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace
after its bombing 164
ARVN paratroopers leap from USAF C-123; O-1E Bird Dog FAC;
Capt. B. D. Lassman and Capt. D. F. Schell with Vietnamese
observer 180
X
Outposts or hamlets of South Vietnam 223
AIC Leonard A Rowe; SSgt Harold Inman; AC-47 at Tan Son Nhut;
B-57 destroyed by Viet Cong mortar attack; Brink BOQ area. following
xi
arts, and Graphs
Page
Xlll
50 100 Kilometers
Part one:
The Truman Years
Origins of
The American commitment
to Vietnam
About 700 miles west of the Philippine Islands, across the China Sea, lies the
great lndochinese peninsula. China is to the north, Burma to the west, and
Malaysia to the south. The western part of the peninsula holds Thailand (ancient
S a m ) while the eastern portion contains Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam
(formerly elements of French Indochina). This area of Southeast Asia (SEA)
attracted little American interest and attention until the closing months of World
War II.
American policymakers who shared President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
anticolonial sentiments expected Indochina to be freed from French hegemony.
Yet France reestablished control over Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which had
been part of the French Empire since the 19th century. To some extent this
occurred because the British government wished to resuscitate France as a
European power to help Britain balance somewhat the growing strength of the
Soviet Union. The United States acquiesced in this aim, and increasingly so as
the confrontation of the postwar superpowers evolved into the cold war. It was
the cold war that drew the United States into this region.'
Japan had virtually occupied Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam after the fall of
France in 1940. While allowing the French to maintain a presence and a measure
of control, the Japanese incorporated the Indochinese economic resources into
their system. In March 1945, with Metropolitan France liberated and a full-
fledged member of the Allied coalition, the Japanese interned French civilian and
military officials and removed the pretense of a combined occupation.²
French police agencies and other offices of internal control having been
eliminated, indigenous groups seeking Vietnamese independence began to
expand their activities. The most vigorous organization was the Viet Minh.
Dominated by the Indochinese communist party and directed by Ho Chi Minh,
the Viet Minh launched guerrilla operations against the Japanese and soon
claimed to control much of northern Vietnam, the Tonkin provinces. T o help
harass the Japanese and also to gather intelligence, the U.S. Office of Strategic
Services sent several small teams to Vietnam.
By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Viet Minh had
emerged as the leading nationalist group in Vietnam. Viet Minh soldiers on
August 19 arrived in Hanoi, capital of Tonkin, and assumed de facto control. In
Hue, capital of Annam, the central provinces, Emperor Bao Dai, last of the
Vietnamese royal family and a puppet of both France and Japan, abdicated. In
Saigon, capital of Cochin China in the south, a committee took power while
3
THE ADVISORY YEARS
4
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT
5
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
*French Air Force Indochina consisted of two squadrons totaling forty-six British MK-IX
Spitfires, three squadrons of sixty-three American F-63 Kingcobras, two squadrons of thirty-five
German JU-52 transports, and one squadron of twenty American C 4 7 s . plus some light liaison
planes. The French Navy had a patrol squadron of eight American PBY-SA Catalinas and a
reconnaissance squadron of nine British Sea Otters. A lack of specialized aircraft
required the use of fighters for reconnaissance, strafing, and bombing missions. In general, however,
bombardment was conducted by PBY patrol planes and by JU-52 transports under contract.
6
I
* Hereafter in this work, the terms"Air Force,” ”Army,””Navy,"and "Marine Corps" will mean
"U.S. Air Force,””U.S. Army," "U.S. Navy," and "U.S. Marine Corps." Military forces of other
nations will be specifically designated, for example. "French Air Force."
THE ADVISORY YEARS
(Bottom) F-8F Bearcats ferried to Vietnam. (Upper left) C-47 with French markings. (Upper right) USAF
C-1 19s with French markings leave to drop supplies at Dien Bien Phu.
P. 9: (Top) B-26s. (Center) Morane-500 Crickets. (Bottom) F-8F Bearcats on Dien Bien Phu Airfield.
8
T H E ORIGINS OF AMERICAN COMMITMENT
9
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
COMMAND (Japan)
JUNE1950
Part Two:
The Eisenhower Years
II. Dien Bien Phu
Early in his administration, President Eisenhower decided that three actions
were necessary for French success in Indochina. France had to give “greater
reality” to Vietnamese nationalistic aspirations and thereby deny the Viet Minh
their claim of struggling for independence. With the Vietnamese people thus
allowed a greater stake in their destiny, the French had to place more reliance on
indigenous military forces, requiring better equipment and training facilities.
Finally, the free world had to furnish more assistance to France, which alone was
carrying on what appeared to be an international struggle.’
In March 1953 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles advised French
authorities that the United States would enlarge its fiscal support if France
framed a n acceptable plan for resolving the war.² Before the French government
could make a detailed response, the Viet Minh launched another offensive in
western Tonkin in April 1953, moved into Laos, and threatened
A NATO foreign ministers conference was in progress in Paris and French
officials asked Dulles for the loan of C-1 19 transports to lift tanks and other
heavy equipment into Laos. Although Eisenhower was unwilling to employ
USAF crews on these combat missions, he agreed to lend the planes if Civil Air
Transport contract crews from Taiwan flew them. These arrangements made,
F E A F received the order to provide the aircraft. In May USAF crews flew six
C-1 19s to Nha Trang where contract pilots took them to Cat Bi Airfield near
Haiphong. The 24th Air Depot Wing sent a supporting maintenance and supply
detachment to Cat Bi, and then to Gia Lam Airfield near Hanoi. The aircraft and
detachment withdrew from Vietnam late in July after satisfying the
General Henri Eugene Navarre, a new commander in chief, arrived in
Vietnam in May 1953, with instructions to defeat the Viet Minh and bring the
war to a close in conformance with American provisos. Navarre drew a plan to
use mobile strike forces against main enemy units. He hoped to expand support,
heighten cooperation among ground, naval, and air forces, secure fresh rein-
forcements from France, and improve Vietnamese forces. He proposed to lure
the Viet Minh into open battle, break up their main forces by 1955, and reduce
them to a low level of guerrilla warfare that for the most part indigenous troops
could
To help Navarre and incidentally to observe the local conditions, an Ameri-
can joint military mission headed by Army Lt. Gen. John W. O’Daniel and
including Maj. Gen. Chester E. McCarty, commander of FEAF’s 315th Air
Division (Combat Cargo), reached Saigon on June 20. O’Daniel was favorably
impressed with Navarre’s plan. So was McCarty. Because of the personnel
shortages in French Air Force Indochina, McCarty noted, deliveries of more
U.S. aircraft without air and maintenance crews made little sense. Navarre
wanted extra paratroop lift capacity, and McCarty proposed to lend the French
C-119s. The planes could be dispatched to Cat Bi a day before a planned
15
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
operation, flown in combat by French crews, and returned to Clark Air Base for
17
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
to Dien Bien Phu would have “considerable success” against low-flying trans-
ports. But after studying aerial photographs, the officers concluded that the
French had exaggerated the threat-there were no enemy 37-mm guns in the
President Eisenhower was apprehensive that the Viet Minh would overrun
the troops besieged in the isolated fortress at Dien Bien Phu, but Navarre
remained optimistic. The position was attracting a large part of the Viet Minh
military forces and if they attacked, the French would inflict heavy casualties on
them. The report of the American antiaircraft artillery experts was reassuring.
French Minister of Defense Rene Pleven and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt.
Gen. Paul H. R. Ely visited the site in February and were impressed with the
strength of the defenses. General O’Daniel enthusiastically reported the land
garrison able to withstand any attack that the Viet Minh could launch “at
present.”The USAF directorate of intelligence decided in March 1954 that Ho
Chi Minh would be “stupid” to attack and take heavy losses when “hit and run”
tactics were so much more effective.”
In talks completed on February 18, 1954, France, the United States, Great
Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to discuss political solutions for Korea and
Indochina at a conference to be held in Geneva on April 26. Secretary of State
Dulles had opposed setting a specific date for further international negotiations,
arguing that a fixed time would tempt H o Chi Minh into a spectacular
operation. 18
His concern was prophetic-Ho sought a n all-out victory at Dien Bien Phu.
Chinese advisors had trained and equipped Viet Minh artillery and antiaircraft
units. Disassembled weapons, brought in on the backs of human carriers, had
been reassembled and placed in positions concealed under heavy vegetation in
the hills surrounding the French garrison. Artillery pieces included 75- and
105-mm howitzers, the latter of American manufacture that had been captured
in Korea. Among the antiaircraft arms were Soviet-made 37-mm automatic
weapons and 12.7-mm heavy machineguns. A 100-mile road was opened to a
major depot on the Chinese border, and a fleet of 1,000 trucks arriving from
China assured sufficient shells for a high rate of
Before the Viet Minh launched their attack against Dien Bien Phu, guerril-
las struck the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airfields inside the Hanoi-Haiphong perim-
eter. On the night of March 3, infiltrators used plastic explosives to damage o r
destroy ten civil transport aircraft at Gia Lam. Three nights later at Cat Bi,
guerrillas destroyed one B-26 and six Morane-500 Crickets and damaged three
parked
The attack against Dien Bien Phu began on March 10 with shelling of the
two airstrips. At nightfall on the 13th the Viet Minh mounted massed assaults
against outposts. Although the French dropped two paratroop battalions into
Dien Bien Phu on March 14 and 16, the Viet Minh clung to the surrounding hills
and sent artillery fire plunging down upon the garrison and airstrips. Ground
support came from all available air units of French Air Force Indochina, the
French aircraft carrier Arromanches, and from some naval patrol airmen flying
18
DlEN BlEN P H U
PB4Y-2 Privateers out of Cat Bi. Sorties during the week of March 11-17
averaged forty-three per day.
On the 14th communist gunners closed the principal airstrip at Dien Bien
Phu, then destroyed seven F-8Fs, two C-47s, one C-I 19, four Crickets, and two
H-19B helicopters on the ground. A B-26 hit by antiaircraft fire crashed upon
landing at Cat Bi. Enemy fire the next day downed one F-6Fand one F-8F. That
same week, flak damaged three F-8Fs and one C-I 19. C-47s and smaller planes
sneaked into the airstrip at night for two weeks to evacuate casualties. These
missions ceased after an air ambulance was destroyed by artill :ry on March
French fighters and light bombers giving direct and close air support to the
ground troops had to operate from higher altitudes because of the accurate
antiaircraft fire. The crews therefore found it harder to locate and hit dug-in and
carefully camouflaged positions. Since napalm dropped by C 4 7 s seemed partic-
ularly potent, the French on March 18 asked to use F E A F C-I 19s for larger
napalm drops on moonlit nights. While General Weyland thought the C-I 19s
rather vulnerable for such work, he agreed to furnish them. One plane carrying
4,000 gallons of drummed napalm crashed during takeoff from Cat Bi on March
23. Nevertheless, the French flew some C-I 19 drops with satisfactory results. But
napalm, effective in the rice paddies of the Red River Delta, was less suitable to
the canopied and rain-soaked forest around Dien Bien Phu.22
With the major airstrip at Dien Bien Phu closed, the 170 tons of ammuni-
tion and 32 of food required each day to sustain the garrison had to be dropped
into ever-shrinking zones. All military air transports, including American C-I 19s,
were committed to this resupply, even though high-altitude drops from 8,000 to
10,000 feet dispersed much cargo into Viet Minh territory. Drops from 3,000 to
4,000 feet were impossible because of the 37-mm antiaircraft fire. Supplies in lieu
of aircraft and crews were sacrificed, and one-half to two-thirds of the items fell
into enemy
President Eisenhower seriously considered a direct U.S. military interven-
tion. But judging adequate ground forces to be already engaged, he was reluctant
to commit American ground troops in Southeast Asia or to employ air units
squarely in support of the French. He was unwilling to authorize stronger U.S.
measures unless a coalition of powers, including Britain in particular, gave moral
meaning to such a n
Talk of using American air and naval forces to support the French
prompted Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White to direct a study on how
best to employ the Air Force in Indochina. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Matthew B.
Ridgway dispatched a team of officers under Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin to
Vietnam to gather facts on a possible ground force commitment. President
Eisenhower, noting that General Trapnell was due for rotation, directed that
General O’Daniel, a n experienced combat commander who still visited Indo-
china periodically, be assigned as Chief of
In Washington on March 20, French General Ely met with President
Eisenhower, Secretary of State Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN, who were gravely and sympathetically
19
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Courtesy: USlA
20
DlEN BIEN P H U
P. 20: (Top) USAF C-124 at Ceylon airlifting French soldiers to Vietnam. (Center) French paratroopers.
(Bottom) French Foreign Legion.
P. 21: (Top) President Eisenhower with Gen Paul Ely and Adm. Arthur W. Radford. (Below) Supplies
unloaded in Indochina under the Military Defense Assistance Program.
21
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
concerned about the situation. Eisenhower directed Radford to give the French
whatever materials they requested. He was speaking of logistic assistance, but Ely
had the impression that much more was involved in the offer. Dulles reiterated
the position that overt U.S. participation in the war would depend on French
willingness to expand the training of indigenous forces and to give ultimate
independence to the Associated States. Radford was more encouraging. He
spoke of direct U.S. intervention by sixty B-29 bombers escorted by 150 carrier
aircraft of the Seventh Fleet against the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu.
In Paris, Ely reported Radford’s personal assurance of naval air support if
the situation required it. The French government on March 29 then sent Col.
Raymond Brohon to Vietnam to see if American intervention was needed to save
Dien Bien
In Hanoi, Brohon told General Navarre of possible American air strikes. At
first feeling that they might trigger overt Chinese intervention, Navarre informed
General Ely on the night of April 3 that direct American action might “have a
decisive effect particularly if it comes before the [next] Viet-Minh assault.” The
Viet Minh had already launched a massed attack on the evening of March 30,
and were about to mount another on the night of April 4. They seemed to be
taking heavy
On the 3d of April in Paris, the French government asked the United States
to fly two battalions of French paratroopers and some naval personnel from
France to Vietnam. The Americans agreed and set the first airlift for the
Alerted on April 3 to assume the mission, the United States Air Forces in Europe
planned to use C-] 19s of the 322d Air Division (Combat Cargo). On the 6th,
however, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru refused to permit flights over India,
even though the troops transported would be unarmed and dressed in civilian
clothes. Air Force headquarters accordingly directed the 62d Troop Carrier
Wing to deploy C- 124s from Larson Air Force Base, Washington. On April 20,
six C - 124s picked up 5 14 passengers in Paris and Tunis and traveled to Vietnam,
with intermediate refueling stops in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan,
Ceylon, and Thailand. The planes unloaded at Tourane on the 23d. A second lift
of five C-124s departed Marseilles with 452 passengers on May 5, followed much
the same route, and arrived at Tourane on the
Meanwhile, at midnight on April 4, Premier Joseph Laniel asked Ambas-
sador C. Douglas Dillon for strikes by Navy carrier pilots against Viet Minh
artillery around the besieged French forces. As a n alternative, he requested the
immediate loan of ten to twenty B-29s, these to be maintained by USAF
personnel and flown by French
Secretary Dulles had earlier spoken of the determination of the United
States to resist Chinese aggression. In a speech to the Overseas Press Club in
Washington on March 29, he expressed strong opposition by “whatever means”
against the extension of communist power into Southeast
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wanted to be sure exactly what
Dulles meant, for Eden thought it useless to encourage the French in a n
adventure that would succeed only with more than limited military assistance.
22
DlEN BlEN PHU
Accordingly, the British Ambassador Roger M . Makins informed Dulles that his
government believed the French situation in Indochina to be beyond salvage. It
was therefore important, he said, to refrain from jeopardizing the negotiations to
be held in
Secretary Dulles, Admiral Radford, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
Roger M. Kyes on April 3 briefed a select group of congressional leaders. The
latter made it clear that the Congress would support no unilateral U.S. interven-
tion in Indochina unless three conditions were met: unified action by the non-
communist nations in Southeast Asia and by the United Kingdom, complete
independence to be granted to the Associated States, and continuation by the
French of their military effort on the same scale after other nations entered the
conflict
Because congressional support for U.S. air and naval assistance to France
depended on a British alignment, President Eisenhower wrote Prime Minister
Winston Churchill a personal letter on April 4. Churchill’s response three days
indicated little enthusiasm for
On April 5 Dulles had revealed in testimony before the House foreign affairs
committee that the Chinese were “coming awfully close” to overt military
intervention. This, he said, Eisenhower would not countenance. Yet, given the
British position, the United States on the 6th informed France that other
circumstances were necessary for a direct American role in
On the same day, Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff,
recommended against lending B-29 aircraft for two reasons. The French had
little ability to operate the planes and none to support them. Suitable targets for
the large bombers were
General Navarre informed Paris on April 7 that he lacked French flight
crews to man borrowed B-29s. Furthermore, without fighter escorts, the B-29s
might be shot down if the Chinese sent in MIG
Convinced of Indochina’s major importance to the free world, President
Eisenhower on the 7th explained to the press why he thought so. The surrender of
any free people to communism, he said, was inimical to freedom everywhere. The
loss of Vietnam would expose other nations in Southeast Asia to communist
aggression. “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one,
and what will happen to the last one is the certainty it will go over very
American military studies were far from optimistic about the prospect of
employing U.S. combat forces to support the French. A F E A F staff paper
stressed the point that the French still followed a n “arrogant”colonial policy and
had so alienated native loyalties as to make a military solution probably impossi-
ble. Besides, rigid ceilings on French military manpower and a reluctance to
develop native forces had dashed what hope there might have been to deal with
the Viet Minh militarily. More specifically, the French had failed to exploit their
planes fully, for they had neither interdicted enemy supply routes nor properly
used air strikes against the hostile concentrations ringing the
A USAF staff study concluded that air power would contribute to the
efforts of land forces, but several factors would seriously inhibit air effectiveness.
23
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Cited were the character of the ground operations, the terrain, the weather, the
absence among the indigenous population of a will to fight, the general scarcity of
good air targets, and the want of target
The Army fact-finding team headed by General Gavin reported that eight
U.S. divisions plus thirty-five engineer battalions would have to fight in the
Hanoi Delta and possibly seize Hainan Island. Because Southeast Asia had no
good ports, airfields, and land communications, support requirements were
tremendous. “We finally decided when we were all through,” Gavin said later,
“that what we were talking about doing was going to war with Red China under
conditions that were appallingly disadvantageous.” Ridgway sent the report to
President Eisenhower who was struck by the enormity of the requirements
Yet U.S. military commanders in the Far East tried to furnish all-out logistic
support to the French, even drawing equipment from American units. Gen. Earle
E. Partridge, who assumed command of Far East Air Forces on March 26,1954,
directed “full, prompt, and effective” action. Thus, when the French High
Commissioner asked Ambassador Heath early in April for eighteen C-47s to
replace losses, the planes were flown from .Japan to Tourane on April 9 and
placed on loan. When the French wanted twenty-five B-26B aircraft, these too
were provided. Other expedited deliveries included H-19 helicopters taken from
Marine Corps units in the Far East, L-20 liaison aircraft from the Air Force, and
twelve F-8F replacement aircraft diverted from Thailand commitments. The
carrier Suipan brought twenty-five F-4U Corsair fighters to Tourane to augment
the F-6Fs aboard the Arromanches. While F E A F sent large air shipments of
munitions, paraflares, and white-phosphorus bombs, larger deliveries of heavier
ordnance came by surface vessels loaded in Korea and
Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, FEAFdeputy for operations, offered the French
on April 7 the Hail (Lazy Dog) munitions stored in Japan. These small finned
bullets had been manufactured for antipersonnel missions during the Korean
War but had never been used in combat. With 11,200 of the missiles packed in a
cluster adapter about the size and weight of a 500-pound bomb, the tactic was to
drop the clusters from 15,000feet and burst them at 5,000 feet. This allowed the
finned bullets to gain lethal velocity as they approached the
Five million of these small missiles and 500 cluster adapters arrived at
Haiphong on April 16, but the ship was delayed on berthing and did not unload
until the 23d. When the shipment was unpacked, about half the missiles were
corroded and many had damaged fins that affected their ballistic flight. Two
F E A F technical experts, Lt. Col. William B. Sanders and Maj. Robert V.
Prouty, urged the French to employ the finned bullets in a fairly large strike
against enemy personnel. The French, however, preferred to use them against
antiaircraft artillery emplacements. Four PB4Y-2 aircraft, each carrying 12
cluster units, opened the attack and through May 2 dropped 227 units; B-26s
dropped 132.
Though Sanders and Prouty were unable to obtain concrete evaluations of
results, the French appeared to be happy with circumstantial evidence. On April
24
DIEN BlEN P H U
30 and May I the missile bombs were extensively employed in conjunction with
air resupply missions, and on these dates C-1 19 crews reported less antiaircraft
fire than usual. Perhaps more indicative, the Viet Minh dispersed their antiair-
craft batteries. T o Sanders it seemed that “the finned bullet attacks were success-
ful but only due to volume rather than good delivery
When Generals Partridge and Smart visited Vietnam during April 14-18,
General Navarre asked whether B-29 operations were feasible. On his way home,
Partridge radioed Brig. Gen. Joseph D. C. Caldara, commander of the F E A F
Bomber Command (Provisional), to meet him at Haneda airport in Tokyo.
There Partridge told Caldara of Navarre’s request. According to Navarre, B-29
operations had been cleared through diplomatic channels. Partridge had
received no such directive. In any case, Caldara was to go to Vietnam and see
whether B-29s would be effective. If so and B-29 flights were authorized, Caldara
would have complete operational control. Partridge wanted him to employ his
force as a total unit under mass-strike
Leaving Japan on the following day, Caldara flew to Saigon. After con-
ferring with Robert McClintock, Charge d’Affaires at the American Embassy,
and with French officials, Caldara received a n intelligence briefing. He then flew
over Dien Bien Phu. He concluded that there were “no true B-29 targets.” But if
B-29s were “the only aircraft that can put the required tonnage on the roads and
supply areas, we can d o the job if directed.” The monsoon weather had set in,
limiting visual bombing. Hence bombing by shoran radar or by airborne radar
would be essential.
Believing that B-29 operations could best be mounted from Clark Air Base
in the Philippines, General Caldara planned to fly a maximum effort strike with
1 / IO-second-delay-fused, 500-pound general purpose bombs. Navy fighters
operating from carriers would escort the bombers. “The bombing raid,” Caldara
later reminisced, “could have effectively destroyed the entire enemy force sur-
rounding Dien Bien Phu.”
This may have been wishful thinking. Although General Navarre repeatedly
sought information on the ability of the B-29s to destroy antiaircraft facilities, he
felt that the absence of ground-based radar guidance made a mass strike so close
to the camp impossible. He preferred an American air strike against the major
Viet Minh supply base at Tuan Giao, a road-junction town about fifty miles
northeast of Dien Bien Phu. Caldara made a personal aerial reconnaissance of
the enemy supply lines from Dien Bien Phu to the Chinese border and presented
target information to the French. In Hanoi he discovered the French possessed
more fighter-bombers and light bombers than they could use on any given day
because of personnel and maintenance restrictions. Finally, Caldara judged a
mass bombing by B-29s to be impractical under the conditions. He also informed
Partridge, who directed him to return to
Arriving in Paris on April 19, Secretary Dulles learned that the situation at
Dien Bien Phu was “virtually hopeless.” It could be saved only through U.S. air
intervention. Dulles suggested to the French government that Generals Navarre
and O’Daniel hold a n emergency consultation. But on the 23d when Navarre
25
THE ADVISORY YEARS
asked for a n American B-29 air strike, Dulles told Foreign Minister Georges
Bidault that direct U.S. intervention required a prior political basis.
Dulles conferred with Admiral Radford when the latter reached Paris on
the evening of April 24, and they concluded that it was too late for United States
action. In Geneva the following evening, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden made
it quite clear that the United Kingdom opposed direct American air involvement.
Discussions next turned toward a new policy on the basis of a French defeat in
northwest
With direct American intervention ruled out, the sole hope for continued
French resistance at Dien Bien Phu rested on reinforcing the garrison. Para-
troopers flown from France to Vietnam in USAF aircraft offered the prospect of
releasing experienced paratrooper battalions in reserve at Hanoi. Nevertheless,
the dispatch of relief was meaningful only if air transport supply was available.
Navarre dropped small numbers of paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu on the
nights of May 3,4, and 5 , but canceled another planned drop because of scarce
airlift. Through April and early May, French combat aircraft and transports
operated under the most severe restrictions of adverse weather and terrain as well
as of hostile ground
As the defensive perimeter at Dien Bien Phu contracted, the drop zone
diminished to a diameter of about 2,000 yards. Antiaircraft weapons sited on
high ridges alongside the drop zone caught aircraft flying through the slot in a
murderous crossfire. To escape flak, French C - 4 7 ~dropped parabundles from
10,000feet and had to make several passes over the target before they could kick
out their complete loads. In deference to the ground fire, C-I 19s raised their drop
altitude to 5,000 feet, and dumped their loads quickly in a single pass. Hardly safe
from flak at that height, Civil Air Transport pilots complained that the C-47s
dropped parabundles through their flights and that escorting flak-suppression
aircraft were dropping bombs through flight formations. These were hazardous
conditions for civilian crews whose contracts made no mention of flying in active
combat areas.
To increase drop accuracy at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, French airborne techni-
cians devised an ingenious procedure. They used a refueling line to hobble a
cargo parachute until it neared the ground. Then a n explosive time-delay fuze cut
the line and allowed the parachute to deploy. The device appeared to work, and a
detachment of the U.S. Army 808 1st Quartermaster Airborne Supply and
Packaging Company, which loaded C-I 19s at Cat Bi, adopted the parachute
delay apparatus and used it on all C-1 19 drops during the last two weeks of the
Dien Bien Phu
Fragments of a 37-mm shell severely injured Civil Air Transport pilot Paul
Holden on April 24. His fellow civilians refused to fly to Dien Bien Phu again
without adequate combat air support, so French military pilots manned the
C-1 19s. On the 26th, antiaircraft fire downed one F-6F and two B-26s. Flak-
suppression missions (including a heavy concentration of Hail missiles), flown a t
the expense of close air support strikes and supply line interdiction, improved the
situation. The civilian pilots returned to their planes on the 30th. Breaking a short
26
DIEN BIEN PHU
period of silence, 37-mm guns on May 6 scored hits on one C-I 19 and shot down
another flown by civilian pilot James B.
On the 6th planes delivered 196 tons of supplies to the garrison. What was
to be the final Viet Minh assault started that evening. At noon of the 7th,
soldiers broke into the heart of the French defenses, and the battle ended
several hours later. Ho Chi Minh had scored a decisive victory that coincided
with the negotiations in Geneva. There, delegates had failed to reach political
agreement on Korea and were about to take up the problem of restoring peace
to
21
Victory at Dien Bien Phu allowed the Viet Minh to move troops and
weapons toward the Hanoi-Haiphong perimeter. During the night of May 12,
500 Vietnamese regulars at Hanoi deserted with their arms. Grave doubts about
holding the Red River Delta arose among the French. Deciding that the safety of
the Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam had become the prime consideration, the
government directed the French commander to withdraw. He could retire as far
as the 18th parallel to safeguard the southern part of Vietnam.’
Although President Eisenhower believed overt Chinese intervention in
Indochina hardly likely, he permitted the military services to plan for the
contingency. Identifying the options open to the United States may have bene-
fited French morale. At the time, Adm. Felix B. Stump, USN, was Commander
in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the unified commander responsible for
U.S. military operations in Asia south of the 30th parallel. He conceived that an
American commander of a Southeast Asia Defense Command ought to move
into Vietnam with U.S. naval and air forces, perhaps eight Army divisions, and
probably exercise operational control over the French
General Partridge, F E A F commander, promptly protested Admiral
Stump’s concept because it would divide the unity of air command in the Pacific
and base air units on hazardous airfields. Less than enthusiastic about B-29s with
conventional weapons, Partridge favored using carriers. Believing the struggle to
be basically a civil war in which long-term pacification and unification rather
than destruction were the prime objectives, he thought that conventionally
armed B-29s might produce favorable short-term psychological effects but no
lasting results. Indecisive and devastating air attacks would be counterproductive
because the real task was to build indigenous military, economic, political, and
psychological
Toward the end of May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to place
large numbers of American forces in Vietnam. They wished to avoid a defensive
Korea-type response and preferred a n offensive against mainland China, includ-
ing attacks against the Chinese war-making capability and “employing atomic
weapons, whenever
President Eisenhower sent General Trapnell, M AAG-Indochina chief, to
Paris at the end of May to discuss cooperative planning with General Ely, who
was preparing to go to Vietnam as Commander in Chief and High Commis-
sioner. When Ely failed to receive positive assurance of U.S. intervention even in
the event of a n overt Chinese attack, he was unwilling to accept a n overall
American commander and was averse to having American ground troops,
except for one or two divisions as a show of good
29
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
parts, North and South, were to start no later than July 20, 1955, to prepare for
the
The Soviet Union wished all parties to accept the Geneva accords formally,
but the United States preferred to keep them a matter between the two principals.
Nevertheless the American delegate, Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith,
gave assurance that the United States would “refrain from the threat or the use of
force to disturb” the agreements and would “view any renewal of the aggression
in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threaten-
ing international peace and security.” The delegate from South Vietnam
solemnly protested that his country was not bound by agreements. He objected
that the French High Command had arrogated to itself the right to fix a date for a
future election, a political rather than a military
The Geneva accords led to the removal of USAF logistic support detach-
ments, and General Partridge had started the withdrawal as early as May 13. But
when the French need for support to hold the Red River Delta slowed the
evacuation, Partridge directed the detachments to take necessary measures for
their own safety and
The C-47 detachment at D o Son Airfield departed on June 29. The C-I 19
detachment at Cat Bi moved on May 23 to Tourane and joined the B-26 support
31
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Courtesy: USlA
32
GENEVA AGREEMENTS A N D FRENCH WITHDRAWAL
33
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Few efforts were made to evaluate the air operations of the Indochina War,
quite possibly because of a general feeling that it was pointless to draw lessons
from a conflict that was doomed from the start. The French had been unable to
win the support of the people where the war was fought.
Even so, a t General Twining’s direction., General visited the region
and prepared a detailed report. His main conclusion was that the manpower
strength of the French Air Force had been hopelessly inadequate to support
ground troops dispersed in many garrisons. Air operations were largely
responses to urgent ground force requests. In consequence the French had tried
to d o too much, in far too many places, with much too
Summarizing the reasons for this lackluster performance, noted the
personnel shortages and the poor organization. Often more aircraft than pilots
were available, and too few maintenance men were on hand to keep planes
serviceable. Furthermore, tactical air planners had been unable to develop
targets in the “monsoon mountain mass” of North Vietnam, and interdiction
missions had been relatively ineffective against enemy supply lines, particularly
against the flow of goods from Both General and
assessment implied that the existing problems were correctable. But neither
echoed a n earlier estimate by Gen. French air commander,
who suggested that the Minh tactics of concealment, dispersal, surprise, and
psychological warfare were extremely difficult to counter with fast-flying mili-
tary
President Eisenhower welcomed the end of bloodshed in Indochina. Ameri-
can assistance, he said, had been unable to cure a n “unsound relationship
between the Asiatics and the French” and had therefore been “of only limited
Two emerged. In both, most people lived in two great river deltas,
the Red in the north and the in the south, as well as in
between the sea and the mountains.
North Vietnam, under Chi Minh a t Hanoi, had about million people
including a communist political elite and battle-hardened military forces. Brutal
collectivization programs in and decreased the popularity of the
revolutionaries. The migration of nearly a million inhabitants south during the
year after the Geneva accords was a protest against the regime and the conditions
of life. But the communists confidently expected the national reunification
plebiscite in to deliver the other Vietnam peacefully to them.
In South Vietnam, with million people, failure of the French to develop
indigenous leaders hampered the anti-communist nationalists. During the
absence of in France, control of the state devolved upon
Diem, a member of the Catholic minority. He became head of the cabinet in
Saigon on June and a few weeks later was invested as President of the
Council of Ministers. Not widely known in the country and somewhat aloof,
Diem depended heavily for advice on his immediate family, especially on his
brother and political counselor,
GENEVA AGREEMENTS A N D FRENCH WITHDRAWAL
Ho Chi Minh made no secret of his determination to extend his control over
all of Vietnam. Immediately after the Geneva agreements, he called for a “long
and arduous struggle” to win the south, which he described as “territories of
He soon sent cadres across the 17th parallel, and they became known as
Viet Cong. They expanded the communist apparatus in the south, prepared for
future infiltration of men from the north, and worked for eventual unification
under Hanoi through subversion as well as open conflict.
President Eisenhower retained the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and worked to
strengthen the indigenous government in conjunction with the French, who had
agreed to stay in Indochina until national forces could emerge. To compensate
for and bolster the weak government, Secretary Dulles actively concerned
himself with stimulating strong native military
According to a National Security Council (NSC) paper in August 1954, the
Viet Minh victory in Tonkin had enhanced communist military and political
prestige in Asia. Now the Viet Minh were certain to try to extend their influence
beyond North Vietnam by military and non-military pressures, that is, by overt
aggression and by exploiting internal political instabilities and economic weak-
nesses in neighboring free countries.
To counter this estimated course of action, the United States decided to
pursue three principal policies: negotiate a Southeast Asia security treaty pledg-
ing members to act promptly against armed aggression; swiftly support legiti-
mate governments requesting and requiring assistance to defeat local subversion
and rebellion; and, more specifically, support France in assisting the South
Vietnamese to gain and maintain the military forces and the economic conditions
needed to meet foreign aggression and insure internal
Moving speedily, the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines signed the Southeast Asia
Defense Treaty in Manila on September 8, 1954. The major threats triggering the
agreement were subversion from within and aggression from outside a country.
Although an individual nation had primary responsibility for countersubversive
activities, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) would act as a
clearing house to exchange information among the members and to discuss
common policies. It was external armed aggression against any member that was
recognized as the main common danger, and this the members pledged to meet
collectively. Because the Geneva agreements prevented Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia from joining the organization, SEATO spread its protection to them.
In the case of Vietnam, the United States would work through the French to
maintain the military forces “necessary for internal security.” For all members,
the United States would discharge its treaty obligations by deploying mobile
forces rapidly into the area rather than by stationing units in the region. The
treaty became effective in February
Since SEATO was to be a shield against external aggression, Secretary
Dulles felt that South Vietnam needed military forces for internal security only.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were hesitant to spend scarce funds in Vietnam until a
stable government existed. They believed, however, that U.S. military assistance
35
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
to Vietnam should afford both internal security and limited defense against
external
Much of the American problem stemmed from the kind of government in
South Vietnam. The Saigon government had yet to consolidate its power, and
there were conspiracies to unseat Diem. The Joint Chiefs wanted a reasonably
strong civil government in control before the United States undertook a military
training mission. Secretary Dulles understood this concern, but he thought that
well-trained armed forces would strengthen the Vietnamese government. Under
pressure from Dulles, the Joint Chiefs conceded that five indigenous divisions
would permit Vietnam to maintain internal security and present a limited
response to external attack. But it would take two or three years to train that
force. If the United States decided to d o the training, it should be assigned low
priority so as not to impair more promising programs elsewhere.”
Between 1945-1954 the French had built up the Vietnamese regular and
paramilitary forces to varying degrees of effectiveness. The Vietnamese Air Force
consisted of the 1st Liaison Group with two squadrons of Morane-500 Cricket
liaison planes and one squadron of Dassault M.D.-315 light combat assault
aircraft, and a training center at Nha Trang. Few Vietnamese had held high rank.
Most were inexperienced. Enlisted desertions were frequent and
The French had declined the offer of American help in training the Vietna-
mese, but they changed their minds about the time of the Geneva accords.
Generals O’Daniel and Ely in Saigon agreed that the United States should
assume some responsibility. The Geneva agreements fixed the maximum
strength of the MAAG at 342 U.S. officers and men, the number in the country
when the accords were signed. Since this group was too small to do a great deal,
the French retained management of the programs.
In October the Joint Chiefs ruled that the MAAG in Saigon could execute a
training mission if this became a political necessity and if the French refrained
from interfering. After a National Security Council meeting, the President
ordered Ambassador Heath and General O’Daniel to “collaborate in setting in
motion a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty
and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces.” He instructed the Joint Chiefs
to prepare a long-range program to reorganize and train the minimum number of
Vietnamese forces necessary to preserve internal security. 28
The President also wrote to Diem to ask for Vietnamese-American coopera-
tion on developing a strong and stable state capable of resisting subversion and
aggression. In return for U.S. assistance, Eisenhower expected Diem to reform
his government, make it responsive to the nationalist aspirations of the Viet-
namese people, and shape it into a representative and democratic regime. 29
American policy statements stressed internal security considerations, but
public announcements indicated the intention to strengthen the nation to repel
aggression as well as subversion. The military forces projected were modeled on
the U.S. tri-service pattern. They were more suitable for conventional military
operations than for internal security and counterinsurgency activities. 30
To dramatize interest in Vietnam and to evaluate the situation. President
36
GENEVA AGREEMENTS A N D FRENCH WITHDRAWAL
37
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
Courtesy: USlA
38
GENEVA AGREEMENTS A N D FRENCH WITHDRAWAL
policy that the national air forces in the Pacific-Far East should be shaped to
cope with internal aggression, to defend to a limited degree against external
aggression, and to furnish air base complexes suitable for USAF use if neces-
Whether the three were compatible remained to be seen.
In September 1955 a program to forge indigenous countersubversive mil-
itary forces seemed to demand highly mobile ground commando troops operat-
ing closely with tactical air; slow-flying conventional strike aircraft carrying
diversified weapons and loitering over target areas for extended periods, plus
visual and photo-reconnaissance planes, light transports, and helicopters; and a
strong militia to overcome communist infiltration at local levels.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that a U.S. effort to defend South
Vietnam against external aggression under SEATO procedures would be sub-
stantial, costly, and difficult to manage, especially without atomic weapons. To
defeat a North Vietnamese invasion would call for two to four Army divisions
besides the South Vietnamese ground forces. To invade and occupy North
Vietnam would take eight U.S. divisions. Moreover, quite a few Air Force
tactical fighter wings would have to be committed, and this depended on proper
air facilities. To prepare to meet a North Vietnamese invasion in the near future,
the Joint Chiefs suggested increasing the efficiency of the South Vietnamese
forces and improving the air bases in the country and in neighboring
When Ho Chi Minh called upon Diem to open negotiations for a national
plebiscite, not only Diem but Dulles protested publicly. An honest election
would be impossible, they said, because the totalitarian regime in Hanoi would
direct the vote of the people it controlled in the more populous North. Diem on
August 9 positively rejected elections as long as the communist regime refused to
grant democratic freedoms and fundamental rights to the people of North
Vietnam. An October vote in South Vietnam gave Diem a mandate to set up a
republic under his presidency. On October 26, 1955, the Republic of Vietnam
came into being, and on the same day the United States extended recognition and
established diplomatic relations.
Because Ho Chi Minh was building a powerful army in North Vietnam, a n
invasion of South Vietnam would overwhelm Diem’s forces that were organized
and equipped chiefly for internal security. had therefore suggested that
the Vietnamese army concentrate on repelling outside attack and that the United
States concentrate on training the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Approv-
ing, the Joint Chiefs recommended that General Collins’ ceiling of 94,000 men
for the Vietnamese military forces be raised to 150,000. This would be enough for
4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, 13 territorial regiments; and about 4,000 air,
4,000 navy, and 5,000 civilian
Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams, USA, was appointed the new MAAG chief in
Saigon. Arriving on November 15, 1955, he had to deal at once with a n
impending withdrawal of French forces to meet the revolt in Under
arrangements made by General O’Daniel, French advisors were serving with
American personnel in a Training Relations and Instructions Mission. The
French departure required a larger American complement. While the Interna-
39
THE ADVISORY YEARS
40
IV. U.S.command Problems
in the Pacific:
Emphasis on Southeast Asia
Authorities in Washington had closely managed the assistance to France
during the Indochina War, but U.S. commanders in the Pacific exercised increas-
ing influence afterward. They looked to American military interests on a divided
basis. The Far East and United Nations Commands existed on the one hand and
the Pacific Command on the other. Because of budgetary constraints, the latter
had no Air Force theater headquarters or tactical units. All USAF resources
were assigned to Far East Air Forces, headquartered in Tokyo. Under F E A F
were Fifth Air Force and 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo) in Japan, and
Thirteenth Air Force in the Philippines.’
After March 26, 1954, Admiral Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Command, became responsible for reviewing all military assistance programs in
this area, which took in Southeast Asia. Since Stump found it hard to manage
without a n air headquarters, the Joint Chiefs on March 31 directed General
Twining to create a command at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Hence Pacific Air Force
(PAF) came into being under Maj. Gen. Sory Smith on the 1st of July. While
Smith reported directly to Admiral Stump, he likewise answered to General
Partridge, F E A F commander. This reflected a n understanding that all USAF
tactical air units in the Pacific and Far East would be assigned to F E A F in the
interest of command unity throughout both theaters. Stump, who was described
as “exceedingly if not unduly sensitive on the subject of command prerogatives,”
found it vexing, and understandably so, that F E A F should have a say in
CINCPAC’s area of responsibility. Yet General Partridge considered that a
common USAF policy for the Pacific and Far East areas required him to be
abreast of events in both places. He directed the Far East Air Logistics Force to
have the 6410th Materiel Group support all air components in Southeast
In February 1955, when General Partridge held a conference of air attachés
and MAAG-Air representatives from all nations in Southeast Asia to discuss
problems and programs, Admiral Stump reminded him of CINCPAC’s primary
responsibility for that area. Stump wanted General Smith to help promote
projects consistent with U.S. military and political objectives in the Pacific
Command. Placing Thirteenth Air Force under P A F on June I facilitated his
wish.
Under revised directives issued by Defense Secretary Wilson in July, Admi-
ral Stump gained more authority in carrying out the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program. Unified commanders like him were to be in the direct line of command
over the MAAGs in their areas. Thus Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel
assigned to MAAGs were no longer “allocated to CINCPAC” but rather placed
41
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
under his direct command. Stump therefore integrated the control of assistance
programs in his headquarters. Only on technical matters did he allow MAAG
chiefs to communicate directly with their military departments, their component
commanders, and other service agencies. As for Stump’s component Army,
Navy, and Air Force commanders, they were limited to advising
The Air Force’s centralization of global logistics under the Air Materiel
Command further diluted F E A F influence over assistance concerns. General
Partridge insisted on controlling his logistics, but Gen. Laurence S. Kuter who
replaced him on June 4, 1955, accepted the new concept in the interest of
economy and efficiency. Transferred to Air Materiel Command on October 1,
1955, Far East Air Logistics Force was redesignated Air Materiel Force Pacific
Area. Under this organization the Northern Air Material Area Pacific handled
support and technical assistance for Japan and Korea. The Southern Air Mate-
rial Area Pacific at Clark Air Base similarly served Okinawa, Taiwan, the
Philippines, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Guam, and
MAAG-Air personnel now went straight to these materiel commands with
their logistic problems, without need to go through the theater air command. In
November 1955 Far East Air Force headquarters invited MAAG-Air represen-
tatives to a conference in Tokyo. Again CINCPAC objected that F E A F had no
right to indoctrinate air sections with its philosophy and
The inspection team dispatched by General Smith to Southeast Asia in
November-December 1955 reported that the Army appeared to be dominating
the MAAGs. T o some extent, no doubt, this was in response to the desire of the
individual countries. Still most MAAG chiefs, deputy chiefs, and chiefs of staff
were Army officers. In Vietnam the MAAG-Air Section people were described
as being “relegated to a minor role and treated as junior partners,” without access
to current war plans and unable to coordinate or consult with MAAG-Air
sections in neighboring countries. There was a “deplorable lack of definite
relationship” between the indigenous air forces supported by mutual defense
assistance programs and the overall strategic objectives of the United States.’
After remarking on the close association between the Japanese and Korean
Air Forces and Fifth Air Force, General Kuter urged Thirteenth Air Force (now
under PAF) to foster similar rapport with indigenous air forces in Southeast
Asia. On February 17, 1956, Smith charged Thirteenth Air Force with monitor-
ing and reviewing assistance programs in SEA so that national air forces were
developed in line with U.S. strategic aims.*
Austerely manned, Thirteenth Air Force headquarters needed twentyeight
more manpower spaces to perform theadditional task. These slots were not to be
had because the entire Air Force was trying to build to a n authorized 137 wings
without increasing personnel. Kuter and Smith conferred in April 1956 on how
to improve the review and monitoring of assistance activities. In May and
November, Air Materiel Force Pacific Area sponsored conferences of MAAG-
Air representatives to the same end.’
Air commanders were disturbed by Admiral Stump’s reliance on subordi-
nate command organizations for local operations. As a matter of principle,
42
U.S. COMMAND PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC
43
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Kuter instructed the commanders of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces in
August 1957 to act as “rallying points” for informal discussion with indigenous
air leaders. In November he invited air and MAAG-Air representatives
to a conference in Hawaii, and urged them to work together to create a common
purpose in the “packets of democratic air power” forming in Southeast Asia.
Improving air facilities ranked high on his agenda.
Planning for the possible deployment of U.S. forces during the early months
of 1958, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, conceived of the mobile
strike force. It would depart its home base within 24 hours after receiving an
execution order, and engage in 15 days of self-supporting combat in Southeast
Asia. 19 Since General Kuter wanted Thirteenth Air Force to have a dominant
role in SEA air activities, he charged Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Moorman (who
became Thirteenth’s commander on March 4) to take command of the PACAF
Mobile Strike Force when it deployed through Clark Air Base. The force
included three troop carrier squadrons and one combat airlift support unit from
the 3 15th Air Division (Combat Cargo); a fighter squadron, a bomber squadron,
a reconnaissance task unit with photo processing cell, and half of an air refueling
squadron from Fifth Air Force; one fighter squadron from Thirteenth Air Force;
and a search and rescue detachment from the 3 1st Air Rescue Squadron of Air
Rescue Service (Pacific). Clark Air Base was to furnish logistic support, and
Thirteenth Air Force was empowered to draw on P A C A F resources to establish
detachments at forward air bases.
45
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Because commitment of this mobile strike force would reduce the general
war deterrent elsewhere, Tactical Air Command (TAC) began to alert in the
United States a composite air strike force for rapid global deployment, mainly to
back up an immediate response by PACAF to aggression.
During April 1958 the P A C A F mobile strike force concept was tested in a
SEATO exercise in Thailand against a simulated land aggressor force. For the
first time in a SEATO exercise, nuclear weapons were inserted into the scenario.
One observer, Lt. Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr., Fifth Air Force commander,
believed it vital to interdict a n enemy land force by air. Upon returning to Japan,
he directed a staff study on the use of nuclear weapons if the Chinese invaded
Southeast Asia. contrast, CINCPAC regarded forward defense in the Pacific
as resting upon the twin pillars of strong mobile U.S. forces and of allied ones
strengthened by American military assistance programs.
The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 markedly broad-
ened CINCPAC’s authority as a unified commander. Army, Navy, and Air
Force units previously allocated to him were now under his “full operational
command.” The roles of the military departments and of the component com-
manders were confined to the administration and support of Army, Navy, or Air
Force units assigned to the unified commanders. A new CINCPAC, Adm. Harry
D. Felt - a n experienced naval aviator whose exceptionally long tenure was to
last from July 31, 1958, through June 1964 - would exercise operational
command through his component commanders or through the commanders of
subordinate unified commands.
Responsible for the immense area of the Pacific and its islands -excluding
the Aleutians and the Bering Sea, but including Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia,
and the eastern part of the Indian Ocean -- Admiral Felt as CINCPAC was
comparable to a theater commander in World War II.All the U.S. armed forces
in that region were under him, and Vietnam was one of his obligations. Head-
quartered at Pearl Harbor, he also had at Hawaii the major subordinate com-
mands of USARPAC, PACFLT, and PACAF, each headed by a component
commander. Logistic and support forces, subordinate unified or triservice com-
manders, area representatives, and military assistance advisory groups like the
one in Vietnam were also under him. His mission was to defend the United States
against attack and “to support and advance United States policy and interests in
the Pacific Command
An advocate of the twin-pillar strategy, Admiral Felt perceived the separa-
tion between U.S. strategic planning and military assistance programs. The
remedy involved, on the one hand, completing a ClNCPAC contingency con-
cept for Southeast Asia as a whole and, on the other hand, relating each country
program to the entire strategy. A joint U.S. task force, he believed, should
respond to aggression in Southeast Asia. He accordingly arranged for Marine
forces on Okinawa to become the nucleus of a permanent CINCPAC Joint Task
Force (JTF) 116. Since Marines would be airlifted to meet an emergency, the
initial commander of this force was to be a Marine officer. When Army rein-
forcements arrived by air and sea, command was to pass to a n Army officer.
46
U.S. C O M M A N D PROBLEMS IN T H E PACIFIC
P A C A F designated the Thirteenth Air Force commander to head the air com-
ponent of JTF I16 in order to establish his authority over affairs in Southeast
Asia.
During the autumn of 1958, Admiral Felt began to show the MAAGs how
to relate their programs to regional as well as to country PACAF’s
major task was to build air facilities and a n air operating environment in
Southeast Asia. General Kuter and Lt. Gen. William F. McKee, vicecommander
of Air Materiel Command, felt that aviation projects of the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) and of the International Cooperation Administration, Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), were oriented to individual countries. They saw no
reason why these projects could not be loosely connected to regional defense as a
whole. Better relations between PACAF and MAAG-Air personnel, they
believed, would ensure that petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ammunition,
ground-to-air communications, fire trucks, refueling vehicles, and other essen-
tials would be in place. Maintained by indigenous air forces, these services would
be available for USAF use if necessary. June 1959 the MAAGs received from
CINCPAC the first of a series of lists setting forth the priorities for accomplish-
ing projects of this
But coordination between CINCPAC contingency planning against an
overt aggression and individual country assistance programs continued to be
inadequate. For example, the latter were not designed or funded to build facilities
that could be used by USAF units. These projects were the responsibility of the
Department of Defense The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, which reviewed assistance programs, was often
compelled to delete projects for indigenous military forces in Southeast Asia that
could not be justified according to the law. The MAAGs also hesitated to
recommend projects warranted only by U.S. interest. In Laos, for instance, it was
“extremely difficult to explain why you need a n 8,000-foot heavy duty runway,
flat concrete, and sweepers to go with it in a country that uses Gooney Birds.””
Another set of programs sprang from the Army orientation of the MAAGs.
For example, aviation equipment obtainable through military assistance pro-
grams was relatively high-priced and competed with projects desired by the
Army. After visiting Pacific areas in 1959, Maj. Gen. Donald R. Hutchinson,
USAF assistant for mutual security, found that Army officers held 15 of 23
worldwide MAAG chief positions. This, he suggested, resulted in unbalanced
recommendations from the field. The Air Force sought a more equitable man-
ning ratio, but it would take several years to bring about changes..”
Despite these difficulties, General White (who had replaced General Twin-
ing as Chief of Staff) wished P A C A F to exert a strong influence on air matters
throughout the Pacific, to include assistance programs. Soon after Gen. Emmett
O’Donnell became Commander in Chief, PACAF, on August 1, 1959, MAAG-
Air representatives were allowed to deal directly with the Air Materiel Force
Pacific Area. Amendments to USAF manuals in September and November 1959
permitted P A C A F to administer contracted technical services for the military
assistance program. In February 1960 a change in a USAF regulation directed all
47
THE ADVISORY YEARS
for liaison purposes, observation, and adjustment of fire, that kind of thing.”
Later, another transport squadron and a fighter squadron were to be added. ³
Few MAAG spaces were allocated to USAF advisors, for the French were
to organize and train the Vietnamese Air Force. U.S. aircraft deliveries to
Vietnam in August 1955 under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program
equipped the Vietnamese Air Force with aircraft and materiel released by the
French -twenty-eight F-8F fighter-bombers, thirty-five C-47 transports, and
49
THE ADVISORY YEARS
PRINCIPAL USAFNNAF
AIRFIELDS IN SOUTH VIRNAM
TO FEBRUARY 1965
L-19s of the
Vietnamese Air Force.
F-8Fs, the Vietnamese were disappointed. They wanted jet aircraft because the
Thais, Filipinos, and Chinese Nationalists had them. But the Geneva accords
prohibited the introduction of jets and, on the ground of maintenance alone,
MAAG felt that the Vietnamese establishment was not sophisticated enough to
handle them.
By mid-1956 American aid built a 7,200-foot runway at Tan Son Nhut,
South Vietnam’s international airport. The U.S. International Cooperation
Administration next started work on another concrete runway, this one 10,000
feet long. Though the French in 1953-54 had laid a NATO-standard 7,800-foot
asphalt runway at D a Nang, there were no runway lights or maintenance
buildings. The depot at Bien Hoa featured permanent warehouses and hangars,
but its pierced-steel runways could not be greatly expanded. The French had also
operated a 5,900-foot pierced-steel runway at Cap Saint Jacques. Even so, the
airfield was stripped of necessary facilities at the time F-8F transition training
ended. At all of these airfields, the Vietnamese Air Force looked to the Vietna-
mese army for air base maintenance, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and
other specialized
Yet all seemed t o be going smoothly enough. Secretary of State Dulles could
say in 1958 that the communist process “of trying to pick up one country after
another has been pretty well brought to a stop by our collective defense treaties
around the world which give notice that the Soviets cannot attack one without
everybody coming to its defense.” In other words, the American threat of massive
retaliation and the collective free world defensive alliances were preserving the
peace in Southeast Asia.
In South Vietnam there was incipient trouble. Certain conditions enhanced
enemy efforts to disrupt life. The abolition of elected village councils in June
1956, the use of a compulsory labor a s a tax in kind, experiments in forced
resettlement, maladroit attempts to turn peasants into landholders, and other
measures promoted discontent in the countryside. The absence of police in many
rural areas, a scarcity of civil servants on local levels, and the inability of new and
hastily organized paramilitary forces to substitute for a n effective constabulary
badly handicapped the Saigon government in dealing with guerrillas who exploit-
ed dissatisfactions of one sort or another. By 1958 many persons wedded to the
unification of Vietnam under control of the North were ready “to launch
immediately a n armed struggle” to sustain the communist movement and to
secure its forces in the south.”
In September 1958 North Vietnam proposed to South Vietnam an under-
standing on peaceful relations. The Diem government declined the offer because
communist guerrillas in South Vietnam had kidnapped 236 persons and assassi-
nated 193that year. Political killings in the south would continue to mount, and
the local communists or Viet Cong would step up attacks on South Vietnamese
armed forces.
The Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam convened
in May 1959. It decided “to continue the national democratic revolution in South
Vietnam”and “to use force to overthrow the feudalist imperialist regime in order
52
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1957-1960
53
THE ADVISORY YEARS
By then the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the senior American officials
in Saigon and CINCPAC to draw up a broad counterinsurgency plan as a guide
to the Diem government and to the small in South Vietnam.
PAC’s plan contained among its key provisions a Vietnamese command and
control system to integrate military and civil counterinsurgency operations. A
fide military field command might end President Diem’s meddling in
operational affairs. Also needed was first-rate, centrally controlled intelligence
and counterintelligence within the Vietnamese government. Ambassador
brow believed these to be all-important. The problem was to persuade Diem to
approve and implement them.
Other proposed measures included better use of the Vietnamese forces to
fight guerrillas without lessening their ability to meet a n overt attack; improved
governmental financial procedures; border and coastal patrols to stop infiltra-
tion and outside support of the anti-government guerrillas; better communica-
tions nets; more attention to civil affairs and psychological warfare; closer
planning for economic growth and political stability; and moving the Vietnamese
Civil Guard from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense.
Army Lt. Gen. Lionel C. became the chief on August
He and Ambassador elaborated the broad plan and worked with
Vietnamese officials during the autumn and winter of In October General
recommended and Admiral Felt concurred in enlarging the Vietnamese
army from to men. objected. A bigger army, he
thought, would bring economic hardship to the country. He also desired to use
the prospect of a greater military force as pressure on Diem for political reforms.
To ease counterinsurgency operations, Diem transferred the Civil Guard to
the Ministry of Defense in November, and in the following month took
responsibility for training and equipping it. Shortages in military assistance
funds limited support to instead of the planned Civil Guard
members.
T o USAF officers the measures for Vietnamese stability were, as Maj. Gen.
Theodore Milton, Thirteenth Air Force commander said, “entirely domi-
nated by classic ground-force The Vietnamese Air Force had
obsolescent aircraft and lacked trained pilots and technically qualified support
personnel. Diem had worsened the tight personnel situation in August by
terminating contracts with French air crews and service technicians who oper-
ated the Air Vietnam commercial airline. He replaced them with military flight
crews and mechanics.
After a mysterious crash in August, President Diem grounded all the
obsolete of the Fighter Squadron, then in September asked to
replace them. He pointed to the U.S. jets given to Thailand and the Philippines.
Sympathetic, Admiral Felt had two trainers and four photo-recon
aircraft added in the military assistance program funding for fiscal year
These would be the beginning of as well as a reconnaissance force. But
the planes, while remaining pledged, were not delivered because the Geneva
accords prohibited introducing jets into the country. To replace the the
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. 1957-1960
first notion was to make A D 4 available from Navy stocks. The Navy, however,
could not forecast continued supplies for these obsolete planes. Thus, the pro-
gram was amended early in 1960 to include AD-6 aircraft still operational in the
U.S. Fleet. The first six arrived in Vietnam in September 1960, and twenty-five
more were delivered in May
When in late 1960 some Vietnamese army rangers were ready for field
operations, the H-19B helicopters handed down by the French to the 1st Heli-
copter Squadron were worn out. MAAG secured approval for a hurried ship-
ment of eleven H-34Cs from the Army. They were airlifted to Saigon without
renovation, four in December and the others soon afterward.”
The AD-6s and H-34s had no immediate impact on operations. The high
aircraft out-of-commission rates stemmed from poor maintenance and supply at
Bien Hoa. Also to blame was the long pipeline time for processing spare parts
requisitions through USAF logistic channels to Army and Navy sources. Yet
between August and October 1960, the 1st Fighter Squadron flew twenty combat
sorties, the L- I9 liaison planes logged 9 17 combat hours, the helicopters accumu-
lated 166 hours on operational missions, and C-47s of the 1st Air Transport
Group flew thirty-two
Only five airfields were usable for AD-6 operations; no communications
network served dispersed airfields; and President Diem believed that air units
could not operate effectively from dispersed locations distant from depot sup-
plies. The Vietnamese Air Force was oriented to the support of the Vietnamese
army operations, but the ground troops gave little attention to spotting targets
suitable for air strikes. About ninety percent of the ground targets were located
by Vietnamese Air Force observers who flew in L- 19s, based at the same fields as
the fighters.
Approval for aircraft to strike ground targets was required from province
chief, regional commander, the Joint General Staff, and sometimes Diem him-
self. As a final guaranty against bombing mistakes that might hurt the govern-
ment’s image, politically cleared and technically competent observers had to
mark approved targets before air strikes could be launched against them -a rule
of engagement reportedly directed by Diem.
A USAF team visiting South Vietnam reported, “The high level approval
required for on-call fighter strikes, along with poor communications and/ or
procedures for requesting strikes, builds in excessive delays for efficient use of
tactical air effort. This is particularly true in view of the hit-and-run guerrilla
tactics of the Viet
Internal subversion in Southeast Asia still seemed minor in 1960. In com-
parison, China appeared to be threatening stability and peace. To counter this,
the United States continued to rely on the presence of SEATO and on the
credibility of its own treaty commitments in the area to discourage Chinese
adventurism.
While the Chinese cited Nikolai Lenin to prove that war was useful for
extending communism, Premier Nikita Khrushchev spoke to the United Nations
General Assembly in September on “the grave danger of colonial wars growing
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
into a new world war.” Sino-Soviet doctrinal divergencies came under debate in
November 1960 in Moscow. The apparent outcome was a compromise
announced on January 6, 1961, when Khrushchev noted that “world wars”and
“local wars that would grow into a world thermonuclear war” were to be avoided
while “national liberation wars” through which colonial peoples could attain
independence were “not only admissible but inevitable” and merited full com-
munist support.
Meanwhile, the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi had announced on September
10, 1960, the formation in South Vietnam of “a broad national united front” of
workers, peasants, and soldiers dedicated to overthrowing the Diem govern-
ment. Thereafter, the tempo of Viet Cong infiltration and insurgency quickened.
Viet Cong units of 100-300 men began to mount raids around Saigon. Even more
serious, Diem charged in October that attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area
involved regular North Vietnamese military units operating out of Laos. This
was aggression in the formal sense.
The inability of the Diem government to deal with the Viet Cong sparked
dissatisfaction within the Vietnamese army and led to a n attempted coup on
November I 1. A paratroop force seized government centers in Saigon, prepared
to attack the presidential palace, and called for Diem’s resignation on the
grounds of his autocratic rule, his nepotism, and his ineffective fight against
communism. The chief of staff of the Joint General Staff led loyal troops into the
capital and subdued the rebels on the following day.’’
Although Diem’s brother and political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, announced
the introduction of some reforms, Diem remained reluctant to decentralize his
authoritarian controls. Instead of delegating authority to military commanders
as Admiral Felt and General McGarr had recommended, Diem sought to
enhance his position by fragmenting and dividing the military hierarchy. Diem
made army regional commanders (later corps tactical zone commanders) inde-
pendent of one another but each responsible to him. Since he appointed and
removed province chiefs, many of whom were military officers, Diem frequently
gave them command over army units operating within their provinces. Hence the
field commanders looked to two superiors, their next higher military commander
in the chain of command and the politico-military province chief. These tangled
lines checked the quick movement and close control of units and reserves,
including the employment of Vietnamese Air Force units. But Diem insisted on
tight control of operations, chiefly those of the air force, because he feared a
revolt or a coup against his government.
There was also evidence that the Viet Cong benefited from security leaks at
high levels. At times Viet Cong fed false information into the intelligence system
to prompt bombardment of innocent targets. Now and then a province chief
requested air strikes for his own private purpose, for example, in another
province whose chief he disliked. Within this climate of suspicion, local officials
had to go on record as approving air strikes flown in their areas of authority. All
this spawned complexities, hesitations, and delays.
56
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
58
STRAINED CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, 1957-1960
All of these problems were weighed by officials who were very much aware
that President Eisenhower’s tenure would end in January 1961. As President
Eisenhower later explained, he wanted to make no major commitment in the
closing weeks of his administration that would obligate his successor to a
predetermined course of action. Briefing President-elect John F. Kennedy on the
19th of January, Eisenhower emphasized that Laos as the key to all of Southeast
Asia must be defended. If the allies failed to d o so, he said, “our unilateral
intervention would be O U T last desperate What happened in Laos, of
course, had meaning for Vietnam.
59
art Three:
ennedy Years
and Actions
President Kennedy took office two weeks after Premier Khrushchev
announced Soviet support for what he termed “wars of national liberation.”
These were neither the nuclear exchanges that had preoccupied American mil-
itary thinkers nor limited wars like Korea. Rather, a war of national liberation
consisted of subversion and guerrilla actions at a level far below that likely to
trigger nuclear retaliation. Such a war could nevertheless erode the will and
power of the target state until it was helpless.
The President tried to determine the real import of the Khrushchev doctrine
and the exact nature of the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Realizing that
the United States had few troops specially trained and equipped for counterin-
surgency warfare, he directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara on
February I , 1961, to increase them. On March 28 Kennedy asked the Congress
to give him the means to deal with “small externally supported bands of men.”
Pointing t o nonnuclear, limited, guerrilla warfare as the most constant threat to
free world security since 1945, the President wanted to be able to respond to this
kind of aggression with nonnuclear weapons and to “help train local forces to be
equally effective” against their enemies. The main burden of defense against
overt attack, subversion, and guerrilla warfare had to rest on local populations
and their military forces. Still, the United States needed strong and highly
mobile units ready to combat the so-called lesser forms of conflict.’
Pursuing this aim in June, President Kennedy specified that the Joint
Chiefs’ “responsibility for the defense of the nation in the cold war [was] similar
to that which they have in conventional hostilities.” Air Force officials assumed
that the new technique was to rank in importance with “preparation for conven-
tional warfare.” This belief seemed justified in July when the President trans-
ferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Department of Defense the
responsibility for preparing and mounting large paramilitary operations,
wholly or partially covert, requiring many militarily trained personnel and the
type of equipment or military experience peculiar to the armed forces.²
Spurring these actions was the worsening situation in Laos. Fighting there
between the government forces and the pro-communist Pathet Lao intensified.
Both sides had outside support, alternating victories and defeats, and several
coups d’etat had taken place. American concern centered not only o n Laos but
on the possible adverse consequences in Vietnam. During the first two months of
his administration, President Kennedy “probably spent more time on Laos than
on anything
Events in Cuba, climaxing at the Bay of Pigs in April, shaped the President’s
thinking. Urged to at least commit U.S. air power in Laos, Kennedy replied, “I
just don’t think we ought to be involved in Laos, particularly where we might find
63
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
ourselves fighting millions of Chinese troops in the jungles. In any event, 1 don’t
see how we can make any move in Laos, which is 5,000 miles away, if we don’t
make a move in Cuba, which is only 90 miles
The Soviets had called on April 4 for a cease-fire in Laos and an interna-
tional conference to resolve the problems. The Joint Chiefs were troubled.
Diplomatic negotiations would probably result in a neutralized Laos, perhaps
eventually a communist Laos, because SEATO had failed to curb the obvious
aggression there. Laos behind the Iron Curtain would expose Thailand and
South Vietnam to further communist infiltration. Most of the 12,000 Viet Cong
guerrillas in South Vietnam had come through the Laotian panhandle or the
thinly populated northeastern corner of Cambodia.
So serious did affairs appear that Kennedy on April 20 changed the advisory
military body in Laos to a Military Assistance Advisory Group. He ordered the
MAAG members to put on their uniforms and work closely with the demoral-
ized Laotian troops. At Camp Courtney, Okinawa, Joint Task Force 1 16(it and
its air component redesignated SEATO Field Forces) readied for action. Open
U.S. commitment in Laos looked imminent until Great Britainjoined the Soviet
Union on the 24th in appealing for a cease-fire and a n international conference in
Geneva.‘
The conference opened at Geneva in May, a time when retired General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur advised President Kennedy against putting
American ground forces on the mainland of Asia. If the United States intervened
in Southeast Asia, he said, it must be ready to use nuclear weapons to meet a
Chinese entry into the conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff categorically informed
Defense Secretary McNamara that
any intervention with United States forces in Laos, either unilaterally or under
SEATO auspices, should be taken only after firm U.S. governmental decision to the
effect that the United States is thereby prepared and committed to succeed in its
military intervention regardless of the extent of possible consequent Communist
escalation; this is an unequivocal position which is fundamental to United States
military actions.’
TOSecretary McNamara it seemed clear that the United States must soon
decide whether o r not to stand up and fight. Yet according to Army Chief of Staff
Gen. George H. Decker, the United States could hardly hope to win a conven-
tional war in Southeast Asia. General Decker suggested moving American
troops into Thailand and South Vietnam to see if that would produce a cease-fire
in Laos. But if the United States went into Laos, “we should go in to win, and that
means Hanoi, China, and maybe even using nuclear bombs.” Lacking enthusi-
asm for a ground war in Laos, Decker said later that
this is the last place in the world I would like to s e e . . .[U.S. forces]committed unless
absolutely necessary. . . . If it were only the Pathet Lao that was involved, there would
be no problem. But undoubtedly North Vietnamese would come in and probably the
Chinese Communists and when they do, it is hard to predict where our commitment
would
General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, was dubious of U.S.
policy on Laos, but he believed a cease-fire impossible without American military
64
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS
action. That meant nuclear weapons if the Chinese entered the conflict. General
at estimated that his air forces could prosecute a “small war”
in Laos with conventional weapons. He envisioned an enlarged conflict including
North Vietnam or China as requiring a “truly massive U.S. ground
and air forces.’
President Kennedy deferred sending U.S. troops into Laos, tried to salvage
as much as possible from a cease-fire, and offered reassurances to Thailand and
South Vietnam. The Geneva negotiations produced no solution, but at a summit
meeting in Vienna on June agreed with Kennedy’s proposal
all get out of have “a neutral and independent Laos under a govern-
ment chosen by the Laotians.” But as late as April the State Department
would find it “very hard to prophesy what is going to happen in
Part of the difficulties in dealing with a possible use of force, General
believed, was due to President Kennedy’s procedural habits and tendencies. The
President seemed to depend on ad hoc committees in lieu of the Joint Chiefs,
leading to vetoes, stalling, lengthy discussions, and too many people “in the act
and making decisions in areas where they weren’t competent.” This approach to
policy, believed, failed to recognize that “going to war is a very serious
business and once you make that decision that you’re going to d o that, then you
ought to be prepared to d o just that.””
General uneasiness with President Kennedy’s methods came at a
time when other international crises clamored for attention. The Soviets were
again threatening allied rights of access to West Berlin, so Kennedy requested
and the Congress authorized the call to active duty of more than Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel. Included were thirty-six squad-
rons and members of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve.
On September the Soviet Union broke the nuclear test moratorium of several
years by exploding megatonic nuclear bombs in the atmosphere. The President
instructed Defense Secretary to resume American nuclear tests.
Though Laos overshadowed South Vietnam in SEA affairs during the first
months of President Kennedy’s administration, the fates of the two countries
were intertwined. Soon after taking office the President considered plans to
combat the insurgency in Vietnam. He agreed to enlarge the Republic of
Vietnam Armed Forces by men and to expand military training for the
Civil Guard. In February he directed Ambassador to secure President
Diem’s cooperation on these and other matters.
In November President Eisenhower had strengthened the role of
American Ambassadors in all countries. Each had “affirmative responsibility”
for all U.S. activities, including military assistance. The Ambassador was to be
informed on all that took place and to report “promptly to the President”
whenever necessary. In May President Kennedy reiterated this instruction.
However, he exempted American military forces in the field from the Ambassa-
dor’s direct authority they were responsible through military channels. In
Southeast Asia CINCPAC, a n area commander, reported to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. While the Ambassador was
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Courtesy: John F
Courtesy F. Kennedy Library Courtesy: U.S. Nav
66
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS
outside this line, he was the Chief of Mission. He worked hand in glove with the
military commander in the mutual exchange of information, the coordination of
programs, and the formulation of policy. 14
In early 1961, six Vietnamese Air Force squadrons were combat-ready
-one AD-6 fighter, two C-47 transport, two L-19 liaison, and one H-19 helicop-
ter. The fighter unit by March had upped its monthly sortie rate 200 percent,
from 40 to 120. 15
The Army of the Republic of Vietnam comprised seven infantry divisions,
one airborne group, and nineteen separate battalions. Their limited combat
readiness reflected “inexperienced leadership above the battalion level, inade-
quate logistical and technical service development, and other deficiencies of an
organizational nature.” The enduring need to divert troops to internal security
missions interrupted training.
Complementing the army were several paramilitary forces. The 68,000 men
of the Civil Guard (later called Regional Forces) had been organized in 1955 and
were controlled by the province chiefs. Since October 1960 under the Ministry of
Defense, the Civil Guard could neither arrest nor investigate. Members had the
mission of patrolling. The Self Defense Force of 40,000 men constituted a
full-time home guard defending its members’ villages, and it was under the
district chiefs. The United States moved quickly in 1961 to arm and train these
two forces so as to free the army from static defense missions.
Against these forces and the general population, the Viet Cong had
redoubled their campaign of terror during the first part of 1961, perhaps to
disrupt presidential elections scheduled for April 9. The number of Viet Cong in
South Vietnam swelled to around 14,000. By March the North Vietnamese army
units in southern Laos seemed strong enough to push across the border and set
up a “popular” government in the central highlands. If this took place, the
Sino-Soviet bloc might pursue the technique used in Laos recognize the
shadow regime as the legitimate government of South Vietnam and furnish
assistance. But what impressed President Kennedy above all were the assassina-
tions. Sustained by North Vietnam, well-disciplined Viet Cong guerrillas in 1960
had killed over 4,000 civil officers, 2,000 state employees, and 2,000 police in
South Vietnam.”
The elections in April were reasonably orderly, and President Diem received
an overwhelming vote. With Diem’s position as head of state thereby confirmed
and apparently secure, President Kennedy sent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Lemnitzer and Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman to
Saigon to support Ambassador Durbrow who was pressing Diem to make
certain reforms. Calling on Diem, they urged him in particular to form a military
field command and a central intelligence organization. Inasmuch as these crea-
tions might nurture potential political rivals, Diem found the decision hard to
make. He did agree to try to upgrade the paramilitary forces, get better intelli-
gence, start a junk navy to stop enemy infiltration by sea, establish internal
security councils, decentralize his government, and undertake fiscal reforms. 19
61
THE ADVISORY YEARS
69
THE ADVISORY YEARS
and supporting irregular forces would hardly be possible without airlift, medical
evacuation, and close air support. The Air Force would soon be
Also on May I I , the President sent Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to
Saigon to demonstrate continuing U.S. support for Diem. Johnson’s visit was
designed to strengthen Diem’s position at home, to make him feel safe enough to
delegate power to subordinates (chiefly to a functioning field force command), to
encourage accelerated Vietnamese and American actions, and to give Diem
confidence in the United States. Johnson carried a letter from Kennedy promis-
ing more U.S. assistance if Diem promoted the economic and political develop-
ment of his
Johnson and Diem discussed the question of committing U.S. forces to
South Vietnam, and Johnson had the impression that “Asian leaders - at this
time- d o not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on
training missions.” The Embassy confirmed this point of view. Diem would
welcome American combat forces solely in the case of overt
When Johnson asked Diem what he thought his country’s military needs
were, Diem said he would give a detailed answer later. He observed dryly that the
Vietnamese were not “accustomed to being asked for our own views on our
A communique issued on May 13 at the conclusion of their talks made
no mention of committing U.S. forces.
Upon his return to Washington, the Vice President said he saw no need for
American troops in Vietnam except to help the Vietnamese train their forces. The
nations of Southeast Asia had to make decided efforts, with stronger American
support, to develop their economic and political systems and to provide for their
own defense. He passed on Diem’s concern that the communists would employ
the same strategy they had used in Laos -- infiltration, aerial resupply, and
establishment of a recognizable government. “Any help,” Johnson said,, “eco-
nomic as well as military, we give less developed nations to secure and maintain
their freedom must be part of a mutual effort. These nations cannot be saved by
the United States alone. To the extent the southeast Asian nations are prepared
to take the necessary measures to make our assistance effective, we can be -and
must be - unstinting in our
Deputy Defense Secretary Gilpatric’s Committee .on Vietnam consisted of
members of the State and Defense Departments. O n May 19 it proposed these
objectives for American forces that might be deployed to Vietnam: deter the
North Vietnamese and Chinese, release Vietnamese forces for fuller use in
operations, train local troops, form a nucleus for future U.S. buildup, and
demonstrate American firmness. The committee favored the founding of two
training centers, each to be run by a reinforced U.S. infantry battalion, and the
sending of minimal air and naval forces to stop infiltration and act against the
insurgents. The Army urged deploying a n infantry division plus special forces.
The Air Force was reluctant to place combat units in a country where the major
threat appeared to be insurgency and where the Vietnamese Air Force could
afford the limited air support required by that threat..”
70
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS
71
THE ADVISORY YEARS
progress. A free society and a self-sustaining economy in Vietnam gave the best
basis of hope for the future.”
I
Military planners in Washington came to the same conclusion in July and
August Adding to the Vietnamese armed forces or deploying two rein-
forced American battalions would hardly solve the problems. Preventing the
communist domination of South had to come through a series of
mutually supporting political, military, economic, psychological, and covert
actions.
Cool to Diem’s request for more soldiers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
August decided that a nine-division force of Vietnamese was sufficient.
They thought priority should go to training the 20,000-man increase, the Civil
Guard, and the Self Defense Corps, as well as to retraining existing forces. On
August I President Kennedy approved U.S. support for a Vietnamese military
establishment of men. As Secretary of Defense told his
principal subordinates a week later, internal security was the first priority,
although military operations would give no lasting results without “continued
and accelerated” economic and social But in September the
intensified the conflict, occupying towns, cutting roads, slowing the flow of
rice to market, and impeding other commercial traffic. They also assassinated
about people each month, mainly intermediate government officials.
Although the Vietnamese army had mauled several large guerrilla units in the
Delta during June, it was able to d o so because the foe stood and fought
in the open. This was a n ominous sign, since strength in combat units
was now an estimated men. The evaluation division of the Air
Staff in Washington felt that “the communists are making a determined bid to
take over that nation, and perhaps all of Southeast Asia, in the very near
FUTURE
Infiltrators in and had been chiefly administrators, propagan-
dists, and logisticians. In combat soldiers-mostly trained veterans of the
war against France and many of them born in South Vietnam-arrived and
formed main force battalions and combat support companies. They had pushed
south along two routes. The primary one was a corridor along the border. The
other, kilometers to the east, was called Chi Minh Trail by the Ameri-
cans, a name they later gave the whole system.
These small determined men moved beneath the forest canopy, brushed
away their tracks when necessary, preserved rigid march discipline, and kept
their movements secret. They traveled in groups of several hundred, an estimated
in I, in Their presence was mirrored in the rise of incidents
involving the assassination of officials, the destruction of government outposts,
and the eagerness of guerrillas to fight in the
There were reported battles in the country during August but
September. A telling action took place on the 18th of September. Around
guerrillas overran the capital of Province. They
publicly beheaded the province chief, held the town most of the day, and left
before the Vietnamese troops arrived. President Diem was alarmed by the
INITIAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS
infiltrators streaming from North Vietnam through Laos and by the Viet Cong’s
ability to assemble large units, to operate in battalions, to use extensive radio
command nets, and to raid key provincial cities. On September 29 Diem asked
Ambassador Nolting for a bilateral defense treaty with the United States. He
pressed Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, for a “large increase in advisors of all types”
and for American tactical air squadrons to help break up big communist units
massing for attack. Diem’s apprehension colored his address before the National
Assembly on October 2: “It is no longer a guerrilla war. It is a war waged by an
enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped and who
seeks a strategic decision in Southeast Asia in conformity with the order of the
Communist
Controlling infiltration into the country was virtually impossible. South
Vietnam’s land border stretched 900 miles along neighboring Cambodia, Laos,
and North Vietnam. Three-quarters of this distance consisted of rugged moun-
tains, the rest of swamps and jungles. Portions of the frontier had never been
precisely delineated. MAAG suggested using helicopters to patrol the border, but
maintenance facilities were in short supply or entirely lacking. Surveillance by
high-performance aircraft was hardly enough. Requesting S E A T 0 forces to
exercise border control would only place these units in a vulnerable position,
grossly complicate communications and logistical support, and reduce but cer-
tainly not stop Viet Cong crossings.
The best technique came into being about the time of the Laotian crisis in
May. The Vietnamese set up patrol bases and primitive airfields along the
border. Manned by regular army troops, rangers, Civil Guard companies, and
Montagnard scouts, these facilities were home for the roving patrols that located,
harassed, and ambushed infiltrators. The landing strips made air resupply by
C-47s possible. The ranger training center, which had been moved from Da Nang
to Nha Trang, recruited and instructed Montagnard scouts. But the core of the
system was the group of 400 Special Forces troops committed by President
Kennedy. They brought direction and substance to the border-control
13
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
74
INITIAL CHALLENGES A N D ACTIONS
76
lNlTlAL CHALLENGES AND ACTIONS
I I
77
VII. opening Farm Gate
The USAF combat detachment that President Kennedy ordered to Viet-
nam on October 1 I , 1961, had its roots in a small, secret organization created in
the late 1950s when General LeMay was Vice Chief of Staff. In March 1961
LeMay responded to the President’s instructions for the armed services to
examine how each could best contribute to counterinsurgency. When there was
no doubt about communist aggression, LeMay personally favored a direct and
open American response with the necessary strength. He defined “necessary” as
“more than is actually necessary to d o the job,” hitting “with overwhelming
weight”to avoid “stretching things out over a period of time.” LeMay, soon to be
Chief of Staff, was very much aware that the military services had to abide by
different rules. Tactical Air Command was therefore directed to form a small,
elite, volunteer unit a r o u n d t h e organization. Its mission would be
air operations in support of ground forces to be flown in older conventional
aircraft.
The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (nicknamed Jungle Jim)
came into being at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on April 14, I96 I . Commanded
by Col. Benjamin H. King, the unit had 124 officers and 228 airmen, sixteen
C-47s, eight B-26s, and eight T-28s. Equal numbers of the same types of aircraft
were in temporary storage. The squadron’s mission of training indigenous air
forces in counterinsurgency would combine with a mission of air operations.’
Officers and airmen of the 4400th-at times called air commandos-were
volunteers, above average in physique, hardiness, and sense of adventure. Each
was closely interviewed and approved by Colonel King. Next came psychiatric
screening at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, and survival indoctrination at
Stead Air Force Base, Nevada. Those completing the program were certified to
be emotionally mature, highly motivated, and stable. Unfortunately, not all were
mentally attuned to teaching members of other cultures o r in fact to perform a
training mission-they were combat-oriented. Later, several men would prove
unable to work with Asian officers. As volunteers dwindled, the rigorous stand-
ards were eventually lowered. The picturesque air commando uniform, person-
ally picked by General LeMay, featured an Australian-type bush hat (with
turned-up brim), fatigues, and combat
Two of the three types of Jungle Jimaircraft were extensively modified. The
T-28 received armorplate and carried about 1,500 pounds of bombs and rockets,
plus two SO-caliber machineguns with 350 rounds per gun. Loaded, the aircraft
could speed at 160 knots to a target 200 miles distant then return to base. The
C-47 (redesignated SC-47 after modification) boasted twice the normal fuel load,
a stronger landing gear suited to dirt strips, and jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) racks
for operations from short fields. The B-26 twin-engine attack bomber needed no
modification, carrying 6,000 pounds of bombs and rockets, plus machineguns.
79
THE ADVISORY YEARS
When fully loaded, it had a combat radius of 400 miles at a normal speed of 200
knots and could loiter 30 to 45 minutes. The B-26 was designed for a glide
bomb-delivery pattern, not for dive-bombing with rolling pullouts nor for
landing with external ordnance in place after an aborted mission.³
To halt communist infiltration into South Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs on
August 24 suggested to Secretary McNamara air interdiction of the inland trails
over which the Viet Cong secured supplies. If the United States had no desire to
commit American forces openly, why not institute unconventional, guerrilla-
type
The President had mentioned several times to the Secretary of Defense the
benefits of testing counterinsurgency techniques in Vietnam. On September 5
McNamara informed the three service secretaries that he intended to establish an
experimental command under MAAG as a laboratory for refining organiza-
tional and operational procedures. General LeMay at this point invited Secretary
of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert’s attention to the 4400th Combat Crew
Training Squadron. Sending an element of the unit to Vietnam would be an ideal
way to devise and evaluate special warfare methods. On September 19 Secretary
Zuckert recommended this to Secretary McNamara. A detachment of the 4400th
had just become operationally ready. If moved to Vietnam, it would acquire
counterinsurgency experience and at the same time train the
McNamara liked the proposal, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment,
and on October 5 had their recommendation to place a detachment of Jungle Jim
with MAAG in Vietnam. The Secretary next made the idea known to the
President Kennedy weighed the burgeoning Viet Cong strength, the more
frequent reference in planning papers to U.S.covert operations, the desire of the
Joint Chiefs to make a reassuring commitment of air strength to Vietnam, and
President Diem’s change of heart on acceptance of American combat units in his
country. On the morning of October 1 I , 1961, the Commander in Chief author-
ized the deployment of the Jungle Jim squadron to Vietnam “to serve under the
MAAG as a training mission and not for combat at the present time.”’
But the 4400th was not specifically a training unit-it was “designed to
fight.” It had been “singled out”for deployment because its combat capacity and
involvement would shore up “South Vietnamese sagging
The President’s decision five months earlier to send a n Army Special Forces
group to Vietnam now enunciated a new mission statement for Jungle Jim. It was
to train indigenous airmen while working with and supporting the Special
Forces, rangers, and irregular forces along the border. In this light, General
LeMay saw the USAF unit as a regular part of the triservice team. Essentially,
however, Jungle Jim was a n experiment and one of its purposes was to forge
counterinsurgency tactics. It could use sod runways and operate austerely in
remote areas; carry out strike, reconnaissance, and airlift missions; fly close
support for ground troops; drop small forces up to company-size; deliver sup-
plies; and perform medical
80
OPENING FARM GATE
Thus it was that Air Force officers and airmen, volunteers to support
friendly guerrillas, flying eight extemporized fighter-bombers, four light bombers
of World War II vintage, and four twin-engine transports designed prior to the
second World War, learned that they would go to Vietnam to support the
government of President Diem. Exactly how was in some
On the 13th of October, Colonel King and two of his officers visited Hawaii
to coordinate Jungle Jim’s movement with Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, who
“enthusiastically supported the approved deployment.” In Saigon the three
officers briefed Ambassador who was happy to have Jungle Jim to train
Vietnamese, develop tactics and techniques, and conduct other operations “as
directed by the Ambassador.” He asked that all aircraft arrive with Vietnamese
insignia.”
Returning to Hawaii, King was assured by officers that no major
problems existed. A tent camp would be ready for the detachment’s arrival at
Airfield and support arrangements were underway. On October
Felt asked that the detachment be sent forward at once, without waiting for the
Air Force to procure some Super Courier light aircraft and Side-
winder air-to-air missiles for the At Eglin the task force designated
for Vietnam received the formal name of Detachment 4400th Combat Crew
Training Squadron, and the code name of Farm
Meantime, members of the 6009th Tactical Support Group under Col.
Claude entered Vietnam with the utmost secrecy during late
October. These officers and airmen deployed on temporary duty from
Air Base, Japan, to Clark, then to where they prepared the
base facility for Farm Gate. Additional detachments came from Thirteenth Air
Force and (chiefly from the 6010th Tactical Support Group) to service
and support the beginnings of a n expanded USAF presence in Vietnam and
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. All were formed into numbered temporary duty
detachments on November and at Tan Son Nhut, at and
at Don Thailand. Detachment was a headquarters staff; operated the
“prime set-up” for a n air operations and a combat reporting center, as well as a
photo processing cell; while and 10 maintained and serviced
Farm Gate departed Florida on the 5th of November. Four flew to
Clark Air Base. Eight were disassembled in California and, together with
officers and airmen, were ferried to Clark by MATS. After reassembly,
Colonel King led two flights of to Tan Son Nhut. The detachment became
operationally ready on the though a week passed before the last of the
SC-47s and arrived. Farm Gate accepted four previously sent to the
Far East. These hardnosed, strafing-model, light bombers reached
near the close of
At the Farm Gate detachment found a rundown French air base
with a flight surface consisting of a single pierced-steel-plank runway by
feet. Tear-outs the steel tie strips demanded constant attention of welding
crews, and the 15th Air Division C-130s bringing in communications equip-
ment for a tactical air control system further tore up the runway. About
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Vietnamese soldiers defended the airfield, because heavy vegetation and swampy
terrain nearby afforded good cover for Viet Cong troops surrounding the air
base. Farm Gate at once contacted the two USAF mobile reporting posts at Tan
Son Nhut, and set about to organize a tactical air control system of sorts and to
establish communications and supply
The members of Farm Gate thought they were to conduct combat opera-
tions while training the Vietnamese. That was how General LeMay had briefed
Colonel King, and King was more than willing to make his unit combat capable
and responsive to Ambassador Nolting and to American military authorities. In
early familiarization flights, T-28 crews trailed Vietnamese AD-6s to targets,
observed their attack procedures, and, when authorized, fired on targets. The 155
men were highly motivated and eager to
Nevertheless, on November 16 Admiral Felt tasked Farm Gate with con-
ducting tactical training and pilot upgrading for the Vietnamese. President
Kennedy was advised that the unit was “training Vietnamese aircrews and
supporting Vietnamese operations against the Viet
Uncertainties of mission and the absence of combat lowered morale from
the start. The pilots expected to carry an air offensive to the Viet Cong. Instead,
they trained and supplemented the Vietnamese Air Force, seeking to evolve
techniques for what McNamara described to the press as “not full-scale warfare
but guerrilla warfare.” Without clearcut agreement at higher levels on Farm
Gate’s mission, the early operations tended to be improvised and experimental
rather than systematic. 19
Farm Gate’s first regular employment was to reconnoiter and count the
junk and sampan traffic in Vietnam coastal waters, a tedious job lasting from
December 6 through 22, 1961. C-47s and pairs of T-28s flew four-hour search
patterns and recorded sightings. Thirty-seven sorties turned up 6,294 vessels, but
the aircrews had no way to tell how many were enemy. MAAG was equally at a
loss to interpret the findings. The long uneventful flight patterns were a physical
hardship for the T-28 crews. They were not allowed to crack their canopies in
flight, even though weakened by thecockpit heat from the tropical sun. A second
series flown during February 5-7, 1962, furnished no meaningful
Farm Gate likewise also acquired the mission of supporting the Army
Special Forces and their Civilian Irregular Defense Group. The C-47s operated
under an ad hoc system free of MAAG and Vietnamese army control, to keep
materiel, transportation, and funds in U.S. hands. The aircraft delivered locally
procured items and emergency ones flown in from the United States. (Formal
supply accountability was discarded.) These operations were small, Farm Gate
flying just 205 sorties in the first six months of
While valuable, these missions were outside of what Farm Gate wanted to
do. When Admiral Felt on December 4, 1961, directed General O’Donnell at
PACAF to ready plans for operations, O’Donnell at once permitted Farm Gate
to fly combat missions “with at least one South Vietnamese national aboard any
aircraft so committed.”Secretary McNamara, meeting with the Joint Chiefs that
day, approved combat with mixed crews. On December 6 the Joint Chiefs
82
OPENING FARM GATE
granted formal authority for Farm Gate aircraft to fly combat if Vietnamese were
aboard for
On the 6th submitted to CINCPAC the same concept for opera-
tions. Actually, U.S. aircraft and personnel would support Vietnamese armed
forces and help them deny the Viet supply routes and concentration areas,
fly armed patrols of South Vietnam’s land and sea borders, and seek out and
destroy Viet headquarters as well as communist airlift into South
Viet
Together, Vietnamese and Americans were to destroy Viet lifelines
and support bases. From Tan Son Nhut, and combat air bases to be
developed at and Pleiku, air operations were to stress photo reconnais-
sance, surveillance, interdiction, and close support of ground
Needed at once were a tactical air control system and a jointly manned
American-Vietnamese air operations center. When Admiral Felt approved a
limited tactical air control system on December it appeared that operations
would get under way. Thirteenth Air Force issued a draft plan on the and
distinguished between combat actions performed in support of the Vietnamese
within South Vietnam and advisory and training actions. On the Ambassa-
dor directed that no combat mission of any description be undertaken
without his
The next day, General suggested that Farm Gate should not wait
for “tailor-made jobs” but should center on training. Secretary
repeated his approval of combat missions if the planes had Vietnamese aboard.
However, he wanted all such flights to be confined to South Vietnam owing to
the experimental nature of the program. Stressing the difference between “riding
double” combat training missions and operational missions, he charged CINC-
P A C with the latter. He wanted Admiral Felt to use combat missions solely for
“important jobs” and to monitor them closely. In other words, according to
“Jungle Jim is to be used for training and operational missions
South Vietnam with Vietnamese riding rear
On December the Joint Chiefs sent a message “to insure no misunder-
standing in the authority granted for the use of Jungle Jim aircraft.” Farm Gate’s
principal purpose was training Vietnamese Air Force personnel. On the follow-
ing day, Admiral Felt made known his conviction that Farm Gate, besides
training Vietnamese, could carry out “all kinds of conventional combat and
combat support flights” if a Vietnamese was to receive
Admiral Felt’s conviction sparked a reexamination of American policy in
Washington. The National Security Council inclined toward authorizing U.S.
uniformed personnel in Vietnam for “instruction in and execution of air-ground
support techniques.” That appeared broad enough to embrace all U.S. air
actions. Yet the State Department view, later voiced by
held that the statement hardly covered interdiction air strikes far from friendly
ground troops. General forwarded detailed clarifying instructions to
Admiral Felt and General on December He wanted Farm Gate to
conduct combat missions only when the Vietnamese Air Force could not.
THE ADVISORY YEARS
84
Several hours after announcing on October I 1, 1961, the dispatch of Farm
Gate to Vietnam, President Kennedy disclosed that he was sending his military
adviser General Taylor to Saigon. Taylor was to make a n “educated military
guess” of the situation in the country and to find “ways in which we can perhaps
better assist the Government of Vietnam in meeting this threat to its independ-
ence.” In his letter of instructions to the general, Kennedy said, “the initial
responsibility for the effective maintenance of the independence of South Viet-
nam rests with the people and government of that country.” Concerned with
political, social, and economic matters in addition to military problems, the
President appointed Walt W. Rostow as Taylor’s deputy. Actually, Taylor was
to advise the President whether to deploy U.S. combat forces for a direct role in
Vietnam, or to continue U.S. training and support functions only.’
Public knowledge of Taylor’s mission produced an immediate reaction
from the communists. On October 12 Premier Chou En-lai warned that China
could scarcely “be indifferent to the increasingly grave situation caused by United
States imperialism in South Vietnam.” Ho Chi Minh went to Peking for discus-
sions. The Soviet Union linked the Taylor mission with flagging diplomatic
discussions at Geneva and charged the United States with planning to send
troops to Vietnam to bring pressure to bear on the situation in Laos. On October
14 North Vietnam protested to the International Control Commission that the
Taylor mission was meant to “intensify United States intervention in South
Vietnam and prepare the way for introducing United States
What was the exact state of affairs in South Vietnam? Increases in Viet
Cong numbers, aggressiveness, and incidents constantly surprised the Viet-
namese National Intelligence Agency. United States intelligence estimates placed
the strength of Viet Cong main forces at 17,000 men, eighty to ninety percent of
whom were recruited President Diem was complaining to the Interna-
tional Control Commission of the international threat to his government,
Hanoi’s determination to “liberate the south,” the massive infiltration of com-
munist agents, the ruthless strategy of terror waged against the South Vietnamese
people, and the endeavors to establish “liberated territory”in the central reaches
of the Republic, susceptible of gaining recognition and support from the com-
munist powers. CINCPAC intelligence assessments identified enemy goals as
consolidating control over the richer agricultural areas of the country, isolating
Saigon and the Diem government from the people, and keeping the infiltration
approaches into South Vietnam
What military assistance did the South Vietnamese want? As the Viet-
namese defense minister told Ambassador Nolting on October 13, Diem wished
American combat units or “combat training units” to be stationed near the 17th
parallel to make a show of force and also to free Vietnamese units for antiguer-
rilla action.’
85
THE ADVISORY YEARS
En route to Saigon, Taylor and Rostow stopped off in Hawaii for a briefing
by Admiral Felt. The admiral stressed that the Vietnamese required prompt U.S.
assistance. He pinpointed two serious Vietnamese weaknesses-the tendency of
province chiefs to meddle in military matters, and the penchant of military
commanders to stay in static defensive positions. Felt indorsed the Farm Gate
commitment, but saw no present need for other American combat forces to take
a direct part in the war. He recommended continuing USAF reconnaissance
flights, accelerating the delivery of T-28s, and refining military communications.
He wanted the primitive airstrip at Pleiku enlarged and stores of ammunition,
equipment, and war consumables positioned at bases for a possible introduction
of S E A T 0
The Taylor-Rostow mission arrived at Tan Son Nhut on October 18, spent
six days in Vietnam, and departed for Baguio in the Philippines,where the group
sent President Kennedy an interim report. By November 3 the members drew up
a lengthy final report.
General Taylor defined the situation in South Vietnam as “an acute crisis of
confidence” at every social level-doubt on the seriousness of the U.S. commit-
ment, concern over Viet Cong successes, and discouragement over recent floods
that burdened an “already strained state.” The military crisis mirrored political
weakness. Diem was “an old fashioned Asian ruler, seeking to maintain all the
strings of power in his own hands, while fragmenting power beneath him.”The
military suffered from skimpy intelligence, scant command control, and sparse
mobility. A “lack of target intelligence and a frustrating structure” hampered the
“small but capable” Vietnamese Air Force. It had made no significant contribu-
tion to the struggle, because there had been little photo reconnaissance before the
USAF Able Mable missions. “While the very nature of guerrilla war makes good
targets hard to find,” Taylor noted, “sophisticated aerial photography should
find such good targets as there are.” Finally, the general saw “none of the
controlling structure necessary for effective tactical operations.”
There were less than 800 American military personnel and even fewer
civilians in the country. None worked inside Vietnamese ministries, and few were
in the field, for Diem preferred Americans to remain in Saigon. Some U.S.
officials apparently thought it improper to report anything critical of the Diem
government. As a result, it was not easy to secure a thorough estimate of the
situation. Still the unsettled Laotian situation had probably lessened Vietnamese
confidence in the United States, and a more visible U.S. military presence might
restore Vietnamese morale.
General Taylor’s recommendations included continuing USAF reconnais-
sance flights in Vietnam, setting up a U.S. tactical air-ground system run partially
as a training program, giving Farm Gate a liberal rather than a restrictive
mission, and improving Vietnamese air facilities. He saw no reason to commit
U.S. combat forces in a direct role for the moment. He envisioned success as
hinging on Diem’s willingness to undertake political and social reforms.’
With a clear impression that “a U.S. military presence of some kind” was
greatly desired, General Taylor reported that he leaned toward bolstering Ameri-
86
THE TAYLOR MISSION
87
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
can military aid and advisory support for a broadly conceived counterguerrilla
campaign. Central to his concept was making MAAG a n operational headquar-
ters for a theater of war, with 8,000 military advisors to quicken Vietnamese
training, upgrade intelligence and communications, enrich research and devel-
opment, and give quick military and economic support to Vietnamese offensive
operations. An alternative was to deploy perhaps 10,000 U.S. ground troops for
defense, to release the Vietnamese army for active counterinsurgency.
Though Taylor and his colleagues believed American support for counter-
insurgency inside Vietnam to be basic, they warned against sending more U.S.
reinforcements until the nature of any final settlement in Laos and the way in
which Hanoi adjusted to it were clear. If Hanoi persisted in its guerrilla infiltra-
tion, the United States would be forced “to attack the source of guerrilla
aggression in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi government a price for
participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage inflicted
on its neighbors to the
The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not care for the interim and final Taylor-
Rostow reports. They wanted a positive American commitment to the clear
objective of preventing the fall of South Vietnam, even ifthat meant U.S. military
forces must fight. The loss of South Vietnam would lead to communist control
over neighboring nations, and the chiefs favored a n immediate deployment of
strong American combat forces instead of a gradual entry of combat support
units. They proposed to warn Hanoi of punitive action unless Viet Cong aggres-
sion ceased. There was little chance of staving off the fall of South Vietnam
without U.S. forces “on a substantial scale.” The United States could persuade
North Vietnam of its serious intent solely by a “clear commitment”to keep South
Vietnam out of the communist camp, plus a diplomatic warning to Hanoi that its
continued support of the Viet Cong would bring American retaliation. A long
war and perhaps the intervention of the People’s Republic of China might ensue.
If it did, the United States would have to put at least 205,000 military men into
the
Secretary McNamara discussed the matter with the Joint Chiefs. On
November 8 he informed President Kennedy of his and their support of the
Taylor-Rostow recommendations as “first steps” toward realizing the American
aim-averting the fall of South Vietnam. Defending Southeast Asia would take
no more than six U.S. divisions, about 205,000 men. The United States, however,
should introduce major U.S. units into Vietnam only if it was willing to make an
unalterable espousal of that
McNamara and the Joint Chiefs were candid in saying that success would
turn upon many factors “not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem
himself and other leaders in the area.” They were uneasy about American
domestic political problems, but expected Congress to “respond better to a firm
initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in
the meantime are sure to involve casualties.”The key, of course, was the firmness
of American intent. Without that, there was no point to deploy sizable units.”
88
T H E TAYLOR MISSION
89
THE ADVISORY YEARS
90
T H E TAYLOR MISSION
South Vietnam strong enough “to assure the South Vietnamese of our determi-
nation to support their government and t o defeat communist
should be “a military command and modus operandi in South Vietnam which
will assure loyalty and maximum combat effectiveness in the campaign against
the
Secretary was not convinced. As he afterwards told the Presi-
dent, I a m not prepared to endorse the views of the Chiefs until we have had
more experience with o u r present program in South Vietnam.” Kennedy
93
THE ADVISORY YEARS
American helicopter and naval units were to be under exclusive U.S. command.
Diem’s government would take no decisions or actions entailing combined
operations “without full prior consultation with the qualified U.S. agencies.”
Although doubting that Diem’s reply would be fully acceptable, Ambassador
Nolting radioed the State Department, “I nevertheless think memorandum
represents U.S. moving confidently
The new Kennedy program dictated that the MAAG in Saigon be reorgan-
ized and augmented. Then it could better help subdue the subversion and
insurgency, and as ‘‘an advanced party” command forces sent to Vietnam to
oppose aggression in SEATO terms. In the latter case, Task Force 116 was the
ready force. Admiral Felt had said in May 1961 that, if large-scale U.S. combat
forces entered Vietnam, he would name the MAAG chief as the Commander,
United States Forces, Vietnam. This commander would function under
CINCPAC control.
Now there was talk of appointing a four-star general to command U.S.
forces in Vietnam. As early as November I , the State Department was skeptical
about the necessity. Secretary Rusk said, “While attaching greatest possible
importance to security in Southeast Asia, I would be reluctant to see”the United
States further commit “American prestige to a losing horse.” Ambassador John
K. Galbraith in India pointed to Diem as “a wasting asset” who was “losing, not
gaining, popularity.”The United States, he thought, should refrain from putting
American ground troops into Vietnam and from
On November 22 the Joint Chiefs recommended to the Secretary of Defense
a new subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. It would be designated
as United States Forces, Vietnam, and organized in Saigon with Army, Navy,
and Air Force component commands. The commander in Vietnam was to have
four stars and be coequal with the Ambassador. He would draw together all
American military activities in the country related to counterinsurgency, includ-
ing intelligence, MAAG, and whatever economic assistance had military impli-
cations. A four-star commander would signal a considerable commitment of
American prestige and a major endorsement of Diem’s government. Conse-
quently the Joint Chiefs wished, before altering the command structure, to have
the United States clearly spell out its objectives in Vietnam and extract a pledge
f o r a suitable military program from Diem. McNamara approved on
November
The proposed command ran counter to CINCPAC contingency planning
f o r a possible deployment of JTF I 16. Admiral Felt nonetheless admitted that it
was justified in light of a n enlarged MAAG, P A C A F units deployed into
Vietnam, and the arrival of Army helicopter companies. Drawing up a detailed
table of distribution, Felt suggested an Army general as the commander and a
small joint staff with USAF officers as chief of staff, J-2 (Intelligence), and J-5
(Plans). The new command, the CINCPAC thought, might well give Diem the
assurance of American support that he appeared to need before carrying out his
own
94
2d A D V O N A N D MACV
95
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
thought this a distinction without a difference, but he learned that the Diem
government had no objection. He accepted as needed to administer
and control elements that might be deployed to Southeast Asia in
coordination with
Thirteenth Air Force specified that execute with the Viet-
namese Air Force “sustained offensive, defense, and reconnaissance air opera-
tions aimed at the destruction or neutralization of forces, resources,
and communications within the borders of South Anthis was
to “set the pattern for Vietnamese Air Force In short, he was to act
as the commander of a tactical air force.
But the peculiarly ad hoc nature of the organization led to problems. For
example, what control did unit commanders have over their logistic support‘?In
the standard USAF command, such questions had been carefully worked out
through the years, but for they needed to be rethought. Further-
more, General Anthis faced a somewhat more complex chain of command. He
reported to CINCPAC through on operational matters, but he went
direct to Thirteenth Air Force on strictly USAF operational, logistic, and
administrative
Colonel King, the Farm Gate commander, was also confused. When
Detachment at tried to take operational control of his
unit, King protested this as inconsistent with General instructions. He
understood that Detachment was limited t o furnishing base logistic support.
King prevailed in this matter, but proved less successful in clarifying his own
operational mission. He visited Saigon and was unable to see General Anthis.
But the operations officer speculated that it was highly unlikely for
Farm Gate even to be cleared for daylight combat. King’s officers then borrowed
several aerial flares from the Vietnamese, pressed an into service for
improvised flaredrops, and under the illumination made strike passes with their
Colonel King went back to Saigon and reported that his unit could make
night attacks.
As King later recalled, dispatched a C-47 and some on at
least two night attacks later in November. Against an enemy position the
jungle south of the pilots never saw an exact target under the
flarelight, and merely placed their ordnance into the trees. Flying to the aid of a
fort in the delta under attack, the crews found the air strike request to be
several days old. When they arrived on the scene, there were no targets. Another
mission in late November responded to a report of intention to cut the
railroad between and Bearing flares in addition to their
guns, four reconnoitered the rail line. They illuminated and inspected
possible ambush sites but saw no sign of the
While the Departments of State and Defense discussed organizing the
American command in Vietnam, was “over its head operations and
intelligence planning to the neglect of its primary duty, the training and advisory
Authorized a strength of persons in May at the end of
the year had Military Assistance Program spaces and
2d ADVON AND MACV
91
T H E A D V l S O R Y YEARS
(Timmes had been McGarr’s deputy). The MAAG was split into Army, Navy,
and Air Force Sections. Each handled military assistance, plans and programs,
training and logistic advice to the Vietnamese, and administration of American
field advisory
Yet the separation of functions between MACV and MAAG remained
fuzzy. General Harkins opposed Anthis’serving as both the MACV air compo-
nent commander and chief of the MAAG Air Force Section. He suggested and
Admiral Felt directed on May 12, 1962, that General Anthis be relieved as
MAAG chief of Air Force Section and replaced by the USAF colonel who was
the deputy.
General LeMay saw the change as a complication, for the USAF liaison
officers with Vietnamese army divisions, who should have been under Anthis’
command, were instead assigned to the MAAG. LeMay also protested the
proposed reduction in rank of the MAAG chief of Air Force Section. General
Anthis held his two jobs a while longer.
Felt and Harkins agreed in October to accept Brig. Gen. Robert R.
Rowland as MAAG chief of Air Force Section. On December 1, 1962, Rowland
relieved Anthis of his MAAG duty. Although Anthis and Rowland worked well
together, some MAAG-Air officers wondered how far they might go in advising
and training before entering into operational
Believing that he was “responsible for all that U.S. military d o or fail to d o in
South Vietnam,” General Harkins argued for full operational command over all
American military resources i n the country, to include projected covert opera-
tions. Admiral Felt thought otherwise. On April 20, 1962, he placed under
MACV operational command those units having the primary mission of advis-
ing and assisting the training of Vietnamese military and paramilitary forces.
Other units were to remain under CINCPAC component commanders. General
Anthis deemed this interpretation important because the Air Force was meagerly
represented on the MACV
The United States Army, Pacific-unlike the Air Force-elected to give
MACV operational command over the Army helicopter companies in Vietnam.
Created as the MACV component Army command, the United States Army
Support Group, Vietnam, furnished administrative and logistic support to Army
units in the country. General Harkins exercised direct operational command
over U.S. Army helicopter companies through the MAAG senior Army advisor
at each Vietnamese corps headquarters.
This arrangement appeared contrary to the principle restraining a unified
commander from personally commanding a component force. Moreover, the
MACV joint staff had to handle peculiarly Army matters that might have been
more properly the work of a n Army component command staff. The extra
workload was often cited as a compelling reason for so many Army personnel on
the MACV
Since MACV’s birth on February 8, 1962, had been publicized, Lt. Gen.
Thomas S. Moorman, vice commander in chief of PACAF, saw no reason why
2d ADVON should stay a paper organization. On February 20 General Moor-
98
2d ADVON A N D MACV
CINCPAC
CINCPAC
CINCPACAF CINCUSARPAC
99
THE ADVISORY Y E A R S
101
!
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Anthis’ ability to speak with the MACV commander at any time. He further
certified that Harkins and Weede were superior officers and fully experienced in
air-ground tactics. Harkins was angered by what he described as General
LeMay’s “preferring charges”against him in Washington. He explained that the
Air Force chief seemed to be thinking of command and control of large numbers
of aircraft as in World War II, whereas there were essentially limited tactical
opportunities for relatively few USAF aircraft in
Throughout 1962 the MACV staff deficiencies were clear to Air Force
officers who sought to unite air and ground power in utmost cooperation against
the insurgency. But the defects were scarcely understood by those who believed
that counterinsurgency was chiefly a n Army mission and that USAF contribu-
tions could be but secondary. Secretary McNamara for one argued that the
Army must be in the driver’s seat. “If you have two or three men engaged in an
operation.” he explained, “one has to be primary. The Army has to be primary in
land war. The Air Force is there to serve the Army in the airlift role and the close
support role, and the Air Force must tailor its activities to the
As CINCPAC divorced P A C A F from operational considerations and
confined its authority to logistic support of 2d ADVON and, of late, to the 2d Air
Division, General Anthis found it hard to secure a prompt hearing at MACV for
his proposals. He discovered that several of his written communications were
slow to reach General Harkins. The MACV commander’s duties often took him
from Saigon, and his staff carried on much of the business of command. Harkins
followed Army practice in using his J-3 (Operations) for daily operational
planning. Hence his J-5 (Plans), General Dunning, was frequently outside the
routine MACV activity, especially since the J-5 division was situated in another
part of Saigon away from the major MACV staff
I02
The Viet Cong thought in November 196 I that victory was virtually in their
grasp. Completing the first phase of insurgency, they had surrounded Saigon and
other urban centers and blocked many highways. For the second phase, they set
up subversive apparatus and were mounting overt attacks by guerrillas, many of
whom had been trained in the north. During each of the first four months of
1962, an estimated 1,000 communists entered South Vietnam. Soviet aircraft
stood ready to support two North Vietnamese regiments, poised in the Laotian
panhandle for a possible thrust across the border. Either the North Vietnamese
meant to move through the central highlands to cut South Vietnam in half, or
they were forging an infantry division for attacks on Saigon. Both seemed likely
alternatives.
To hide its control over the insurgency, Hanoi in late 1961 renamed the
southern branch of the Lao Dong Party the “People’s Revolutionary Party.”On
December 7 the Provincial Committee of the Lao Dong Party in South Viet-
nam’s Ba Xuyen Province declared:
The People’s Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of a n independent exist-
ence; actually our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet-Nam. unified from
North to South, under the direction ofthe Central Executive Committee of the Party,
the Chief of which is President Ho.
Securing a copy of this statement, President Diem sent it to President Kennedy
with the comment, “Here at last is a public admission of what has always been
clear-the Viet Cong campaign against my people is led by communists.”²
There was nothing new in this-the point was, how to combat it? The
actions of President Diem’s government in November and December 1961 did
nothing to reassure American observers. The apparent response to American
demands for reforms appeared in a series of newspaper articles. Presumably
prepared in the presidential palace, these pieces denounced the United States for
imperialism. Still fearing a coup, Diem resisted forming a n unbroken military
command chain and giving confidence and authority to the chief of the Field
Command. Diem was not alone in feeling that the United States was pushing too
hard. At times several Vietnamese officers referred to counterinsurgency meas-
ures as the “American plan.”They were far from convinced that U.S. ideas and
methods would work in their country. In consequence Diem continued to
approve every U.S. military advisor, explaining that he “didn’t want to give the
monopoly on nationalism to Ho Chi Minh.”³
Having commenced resettlement projects, President Diem was drawn to the
ideas of Sir Robert G. K. Thompson (former secretary of defense of the Federa-
103
I
tion of Malaya). Sir Robert arrived in Saigon during September 1961 as head of
a British advisory mission. He suggested a program of strategic and defended
hamlets to clear communists from the Mekong Delta. That same month, Diem
started the Strategic Hamlet Program under the sponsorship of his brother, Ngo
Dinh Nhu. It would take more than military activity to subdue the guerrillas,
Diemjudged, and permanent victory rested on restoring the faith of the people in
the government. Resettlement, he felt, would
In contrast, American officials pinned their hopes on a centralized nation-
wide counterinsurgency strategy to secure Saigon, other major centers, and lines
of communications. It would also keep the Viet Cong off-balance with search-
and-destroy operations to clear, seize, and hold what were becoming sizable Viet
Cong base areas known as zones. The strategy further sought to seal off the
border against
In January and February 1962, Diem gradually conceded the need for a
national concept of action, and he seemed to tilt toward a master plan by
approving a series of separate projects in various places. The Vietnamese presi-
dent desired that his and Farm Gate’s aircraft attack Viet Cong supply routes. He
appeared willing to authorize saturation air attacks against communist zones
without exact targeting. Because his troops could not enter these areas, he
deemed them solidly hostile.
In comparison, Generals O’Donnell and McGarr believed indiscriminate
bombing might well disturb pacification efforts. Sir Robert Thompson also
thought that innocent casualties would alienate potentially friendly people. At
least two influential men in the State Department, W. Averell Harriman and
Roger Hilsman, shared Thompson’s
American officials devised strategic guidelines for a massive counterinsur-
gency operation. Due to internal political reasons, Diem refused to accept an
overall Vietnamese military commander. He opted for each corps tactical zone
commander’s having a “forward command post.” More to Diem’s liking was his
decree of February 3 that designated an Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic
Hamlets to draw up a national plan. Besides the 784 defended hamlets completed
and the 453 being built, he planned 6,066 more in 1962.
Failing to convince the Vietnamese to accept all-out military counterinsur-
gency, Defense Secretary McNamara acceded to a concept of smaller clear-and-
hold operations. CINCPAC wished them to begin in Binh Duong Province
where large communist groups threatened Saigon and Bien Hoa. But Thompson
pointed out that a cleared Binh Duong would be hard to hold without pouring in
thousands of troops. Diem okayed the Binh Duong mission, which got under
way in March as the publicized beginning of the countrywide Strategic Hamlet
Program. As he told Thompson, “It makes the Americans happy, and it does not
worry either me o r the Viet Cong.” Decentralized clear-and-hold operations and
the Strategic Hamlet Program comprised the major ventures against the Viet
Having repeatedly ordered the U.S. military services to come up with special
measures for the insurgency, President Kennedy remained dissatis-
I04
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, M U L E TRAIN, A N D RANCH HAND
with results. Urged by the Joint Chiefs and CIA to create a single authority
Washington to fuse all efforts, he formed on January the Special Group
(Counterinsurgency) chaired by General The group worked on the
premise that subversive insurgency was a valid form of politico-military conflict,
equal in status to conventional warfare. That perception was to be properly
reflected in the organization and doctrine of all American programs. The group
was to judge how well U.S. resources and actions dealt with subversion in South
Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. T o coordinate with the group, the joint staff of the
gained a new office-the Special Assistant to the Director for Counterin-
surgency and Special ACTIVITIES
in autumn I96 I over American advisors engaging in combat now
vanished. The special group pinpointed the particular character of counterinsur-
gency. Subtly but perhaps not always clearly, the group pushed for less American
and more Vietnamese involvement in the war. This point of view clashed with
President Kennedy’s intent to have U.S. armed services use Vietnam as a
laboratory for studying and testing counterinsurgency techniques and equip-
ment. The President encouraged civil and military agencies to send senior
officials on temporary duty to Vietnam for orientation and .learning.
By November the Joint Chiefs of Staff mirrored the new outlook. The
“scale of United States involvement and the level of said, “should be
limited” and merely supplement that of indigenous forces. Where guerrilla
warfare flared, American military men were to give “operational assistance” to
show U.S. resolve. They were to extend material aid and planning guidance, and
to furnish intelligence, operational, and communications facilities that could be
further expanded should the United States enter the war. American representa-
tives were to “bring the combat conditions under control and reestablish
stability” by using Vietnamese forces in “well coordinated, integrated, and
adequately supported operations.” Yet the United States might have t o act
“outside the host country” to deny safe havens to insurgents spilling across
country borders. Somewhat contrary to the prevailing emphasis on training
Vietnamese armed forces, the U.S. military services were expressly directed to
refine their own doctrine, tactics, procedures, organization, and
A wide assortment of schemes was tried amid a lingering uncertainty about
the thrust of American policy and strategy. Nevertheless, President Kennedy’s
and Secretary program of expanded American assistance sparked
some noteworthy achievements.
For the United States Air Force in Vietnam, “the most pressing require-
ment” was a strong countrywide tactical air control system. The system would
enable “effective and responsive Vietnamese Air Force tactical air operations,”
and squeeze the most from scarce Vietnamese and American air power. If
President Diem saw how well central control worked, he might scrap the divided
control of military and provincial chiefs. Since the Vietnamese could not run a
control system, it would be “US manned and
A tactical air control system had proved its worth in World War II and the
Korean War both for air defense and close support. An air operations center
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
I06
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND
Force liaison officers to advise and assist Vietnamese ground commanders got to
Vietnam in April.
At first the USAF controllers were attached to Vietnamese ground forces
likely to’clash with the enemy. President Diem wished only rated Vietnamese
observers to control strikes, so the Americans worked mainly as assistant air
liaison officers. They also flew the L-19 for the Vietnamese observer-forward air
controller and would help him. And they served as duty officers in the air
operations
Crippling the tactical air control system were the limited and failure-prone
communications between the centers and the airfields. Through the early break-
in period, numerous communications equipment failures took place. PACAF
had obtained newly developed AN/ TSC- 15 high-frequency single-sideband
radios for long-distance voice and teletype channels. The sets reached Clark on
December 30, 1961, for field installation by the 1st Mobile Communications
Group. Problems arose at once. Operators in the small mobile vans sweltered as
temperatures often soared to 130 degrees Fahrenheit. Atmospheric conditions
caused poor transmission and extensive use jammed the bands.
Mr. McNamara in January 1962 approved a J C S request for a civilian
contractor to install an M RC-85 tropospheric scatter communications system.
Page Communications Engineers, Inc., set about supplying many main link
channels that joined Saigon, Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Da Nang. One channel
linked Pleiku with Ubon, Thailand. Not until Page wound up its work in
September I962 were there rapid, positive, and dependable communications for
central control over air
The air control system in being sufficed for a few forces, but an entirely
integrated countrywide structure would enhance air power and train Viet-
namese. It would in addition be a framework, under American command and
control, for directing Farm Gate and USAF operational units later deployed to
Vietnam.
Yet General McGarr, the MAAG chief, undermined the concept of a
centralized tactical air control system by his handling of the two Army H-21
helicopter transport companies deployed to Vietnam in November 1961 He
assigned them to senior Army advisors of corps, then urged the Joint General
Staff to reorganize the three Vietnamese L-19 liaison squadrons and the one
H-34 helicopter squadron into four composite groups. He wanted three of the
groups located at the three corps field headquarters and the fourth held in general
support. That would give each Vietnamese army corps the helicopters and planes
to conduct reconnaissance, move platoon- or company-size combat patrols,
transport critical supplies, evacuate casualties, and perform staff and command
liaison. When McGarr asked for Army CV-2 Caribou light transports, L-20 and
L-I8 liaison aircraft, and UH-1 (formerly HU-1) Iroquois helicopters for better
support of the MAAG Army field advisors, he planned to place this air fleet
under local rather than central
Some Vietnamese questioned this parceling out of pilots and technicians of
the Vietnamese Air Force, for it seemed to point to a n “army air force.”The main
107
THE ADVISORY YEARS
hope for expanding tactical fighter strength lay in upgrading and C-47
pilots. This would be impossible if the liaison squadrons passed to army control.
Beyond that, maintenance and repair facilities at the corps headquarters for
helicopters and liaison craft were
Impetus for centralized airlift control came from the arrival in January
of Mule Train, a temporary duty detachment designed to give logistic support to
Vietnamese and American forces. Mule Train drew its aircraft and personnel
from Tactical Air Command’s 346th Troop Carrier Squadron (Assault) at Pope
Air Force Base, North Carolina. Sixteen C-I23 Providers arrived overseas in
January, the first four touching down at Tan Son Nhut on the Mule Train
had officers and airmen and was complete with its own maintenance, air base
personnel, medical detachment, and loadmasters. The commander was Lt. Col.
Floyd
In March permanent duty personnel from the 776th Troop Carrier Squad-
ron started to replace the original Mule Train. The transfer was finished in June.
Of the sixteen Mule Train C-I four were at Clark in the Philippines, ten
at Tan Son Nhut, and two at Operational control rested with
CINCPAC through Thirteenth Air Force, and A joint
aircraft allocation board in the (Logistics) represented interested
agencies and commands, set movement priorities, and designated space require-
ments. The airlift branch of the joint operations center, part of the tactical air
control system, directed flights. Specialists on temporary duty from
15th Air Division (Combat Cargo) joined Vietnamese Air Force officers in the
airlift branch to control Mule Train. And they often helped the Vietnamese work
the Transport
In the initial seven weeks, Mule Train flew more than sorties of
flying hours, moved tons of cargo and over passengers, and kept an
operational readiness rate of eighty-five percent. Every C-I was scheduled for
flying hours monthly, leaving time for training, testing, and flight to Clark for
maintenance. The number of sorties rose steadily, from in January to in
(Left) C-123s at
Upgrading Vietnamese C-47 pilots to fill T-28 cockpits stripped the trans-
port group, and Secretary McNamara authorized thirty USAF pilots to augment
the unit. The pilots reached Tan Son Nhut in March and April. At once their
relations with the Vietnamese pilots become prickly. Tension built until August
when the commander, Lt. Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, assembled them all and asked
that they work together. The meeting cleared the air, cemented close cordial
relations, and boosted the sortie
T o meet Army needs, the Air Force had developed the C-I 23 as an assault
transport capable of carrying eight tons. In the late 1950s, however, the Army
procured the CV-2 Caribou transport featuring a 2½-ton capacity and good
short-takeoff-and-landing characteristics. By March I962 Army leaders were
pressuring Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, to approve a Caribou company for Viet-
nam. Late that month, General Harkins put in for a Caribou company and one
squadron of C-123s. He intended that the Caribous concentrate on delivering
supplies (chiefly food) to American advisors and isolated troops at remote spots.
Of the I82 airfields in Vietnam, Harkins pointed out that 162 could accommo-
date CV-2s while only I 15could handle C-123s. To avoid additional overcrowd-
ing at Tan Son Nhut, he planned to base the Caribous at the unoccupied airfield
of Vung
To check General Harkins’evaluation of airfields, the 2d ADVON surveyed
operating conditions. Aerial photographs disclosed fewer fields than listed, for
some had been duplicated under French and Vietnamese names. Many small
ones were unfit for either C-123s or CV-2s due to low load-bearing capacity,
vegetation, or danger from the Viet Cong. At first 83 airfields seemed possible for
C-123s, but another survey showed that 145 o f the current I53 fields were suitable
in dry
Admiral Felt was out of sympathy with General Harkins’desire for extra
airlift. The Army’s 18th Fixed Wing Aviation Company at Da Nang already
owned sixteen U- I Otters for corps support. A light utility plane, the Otter could
haul one ton of small bulk cargo or seven to eight passengers. Additional aircraft,
Felt believed, would overload the few facilities in South Vietnam. He favored
better use of the C-123s and C-47s on
Like Felt, General LeMay and his party visiting Vietnam in April 1962
thought more transports, whether C-123s o r CV-2s to be unnecessary. T o attain
better airlift, they suggested assigning an experienced officer to establish tighter
control. Col. George M. Foster, formerly PACAF director of transportation,
reported to General Anthis for duty on May I . Later in the month, Tactical Air
Force Transport Squadron Provisional-I was formed at Tan Son Nhut to bring
the management of Mule Train and other C-I 23s under a single
General Harkins was still bent on securing CV-2 Caribous. He suggested
using C-1 23 Providers to handle the main-line, long-haul airlift to thirty-nine
airheads. At the same time, Caribous would take care of short-haul, feeder air
transport to fifty-four locations. (The CV-2 could manage items too bulky and
heavy for the U-1 Otters and UH-1 helicopters.) Once more the MACV com-
mander requested an additional C-123 squadron and an Army CV-2 company.
1 10
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, M U L E TRAIN, A N D RANCH HAND
Five of the C-I 23s were earmarked for Mule Train, five for airstrip alert, two for
training, and four for maintenance and reserve. Two of the CV-2s were tagged
for each corps to directly support advisors, four for the air transport system, two
for MACV staff support, and four for maintenance and
Admiral Felt acceded but told General Harkins that daily air supply to
fifty-four points through thirty-nine airheads meant “many of your customers
are eating too high on the hog.” The Army’s 1st Aviation Company of CV-2
Caribous went to Thailand with Joint Task Force 116, mainly for testing under
field conditions. From Thailand the Army sent six CV-2s to Vietnam for
dispersal in pairs to the corps advisors. American activities in Thailand tapered
off during December, and General Harkins reassembled the whole Caribou
company in Vietnam. He gave as his reasons the increased need for airlift and the
desire for further field
When the J C S ordered Tactical Air Command to deploy a second C-123
unit to Vietnam, the 777th Troop Carrier Squadron at Pope furnished sixteen
aircraft. These C-I 23s staged through Clark, four of them flying on to Thailand.
The other twelve arrived at Da Nang on June 15, 1962, going under the Tactical
Air Force Transport Squadron
General Moorman, PACAF vice commander in chief, had proposed that
the 3 15th Air Division (Combat Cargo) form a lower headquarters in Vietnam to
control the C-I 23s. General Milton, Thirteenth Air Force commander, protested
the proposal. He said it would add another air headquarters in Vietnam inde-
pendent of 2d ADVON, thereby tangling relations with MACV. Moorman next
asked Milton to set up a combat cargo group in Vietnam under the operational
control of General Anthis, the MACV air component commander. In addition
to the airlift units assigned or attached to 2d ADVON, Anthis would control all
USAF air terminal facilities in Southeast Asia. Moorman thought a Southeast
Asia Airlift System complete with a combat cargo group to be “the damnedest
exercise in overstaffing a proposal that I have ever heard of.” Milton accepted the
idea because it achieved professional supervision “without creating another little
General Moorman asked Admiral Felt to approve the plan for centralized
control of regional airlift, and he requested General Harkins to establish an airlift
allocations board. The board would require fifty more people in Thailand and
Vietnam along with small movement control sections at Tan Son Nhut and Da
Nang and in Thailand. Moorman also wanted an aerial port squadron in
Vietnam. The overall concept appealed to Harkins, but he thought that the
MACV J-4 could discharge the duties of the airlift allocation board. He agreed to
let the system take in all Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force airlift save
helicopters. Felt then directed the MACV commander to form a joint airlift
allocation board within his J-4, and told Moorman to create a combat cargo
group as planned. At Tan Son Nhut PACAF organized the 6492d Combat
Cargo Group (Troop Carrier) and its 6493d Aerial Port Squadron. Both provi-
sional units were replaced in December 1962 by the 315th Troop Carrier Group
(Assault) and the 8th Aerial Port
THE ADVISORY YEARS
112
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, M U L E TRAIN, A N D RANCH H A N D
The approvals were cautious. They called for carefully controlled defolia-
tion flights along key roads and railways before undertaking food denial. There
was to be n o spraying in Zone D or along the border “until there are realistic
possibilities of immediate military exploitation.” In other words, spraying for the
sake of spraying was out-it had to be linked with ground tactical operations. In
theory the Vietnamese government was managing the operations and the United
States was simply supplying the means and serving as a consultant.
United States planners saw the technique as an excellent measure to counter
ambush, the classic guerrilla tactic mastered by the foe. Killing foliage would
deny him hiding along roads and railways. The outcome of wiping out his crops
was less But into the summer of General and Ambas-
sador continued to harbor reservations on the untried chemicals. The
State Department remained apprehensive that the common nontoxic herbicides
would provoke communist charges of chemical warfare. In the meantime,
however, Secretary was eager to continue defoliation activities.
Since the Viet had already gathered their seasonal crops when the
spray planes entered the country, the initial plan was to defoliate along miles
of strategic roads north and northeast of Saigon. President Kennedy severely
pared this proposal on January He authorized experimental spraying
against separate targets that comprised merely of the nearly miles between
and Tau on Route
The State Department wanted no advance notice aside from local and
low-key warnings. Still, the Vietnamese government on January
“announced plans to conduct an experiment to rid certain key communications
routes of thick tropical vegetation. U.S. assistance has been sought to aid
Vietnamese personnel in this undertaking.” Because the C-I spray planes
had no armorplating, General voiced concern that advance notice of
flights would expose them to Viet ground fire. The conse-
quently scheduled fighter cover from Farm
According to the rules then in force, a Vietnamese needed to be aboard each
spray plane. The planes were to stay clear of areas where food crops were
growing. Province chiefs had to be alerted three days in advance of flights so they
could explain the nontoxic spraying to their citizens.
Three each fitted with an internal 1,000-gallon chemical tank and
removable spray bars attached under the wings, departed Clark and arrived at
Tan Son Nhut on January After poring over aerial photos, the crews flew
two familiarization sweeps along Highway before embarking on their first
full-scale mission on the 13th. For three days the planes sprayed a 200-meter-
wide swath on both sides of selected segments of Route Complete defoliation
in ten days was counted on. However the leaves turned brown slowly, the
vegetation remained alive, and few immediate military advantages resulted.
Several tries at burning the sprayed areas fizzled.
The Viet turned the spraying into a propaganda advantage. They
claimed that the spray was chemical warfare and led the peasants to believe it was
to blame for all dying plants. A Vietnamese government board established to
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
I
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND
evaluate claims for accidental destruction angered those people whose suits were
denied.
On February a C-123 on a low-level training mission was lost. The
cause of the crash was not clear. Enemy ground fire or sabotage was suspected,
but the exact reason was never officially The three crewmen were the
first USAF fatalities in South Vietnam.
By February several U.S. officials concluded that the spray project was
badly managed. General termed it “a blooper from start to
sought to discontinue the program, reconvert the C-123s to standard transports,
and give them to Mule Train. He told Secretary that the spray
operations were a waste of aircraft, and he recommended removal of the tanks
and spray plumbing. General joined in calling the project
militarily ineffective, and the State Department labeled it “too reminiscent of gas
warfare.” In the face of this opposition, went for continued herbicide
experiments. He decided to press to make the spray work, sending a
scientific team to Vietnam in April for a technical assessment. Brig. Gen. Fred
USA, commanding general of the Chemical Corps Research and
Development Command, headed the
General what had gone wrong with the Ranch
Hand defoliant missions. Most of the plants had been dormant, and the herbi-
cide was a growth-regulating chemical that worked only on actively growing
plants. Furthermore, the spray system had dispensed too light a dose of chemi-
cals. The system required readjustment and modifications.
These findings reassured President Diem. He was willing to begin herbicide
operations against Viet crops in the central highlands, where guerrillas
were seizing food from the tribal people. Relocating the
nards to strategic hamlets and destroying the crops would cause the Viet to
go HUNGRY
Secretary agreed to seek approval for the use of herbicides
against Viet crops. Ambassador and General Harkins in July
forwarded a specific proposal to allow the South Vietnamese to spray
in Yen PROVINCE
Following the Viet killing of two Vietnamese perimeter guards near
the Airfield, Admiral Felt suggested spraying the areas around air-
strips. Approval came in late June from Washington for defoliating the forest
area north of the runway. Vietnamese helicopters made these
flights in July.
General Harkins next urged that Ranch Hand 23s treat some acres
(around fourteen square miles) of mangrove forests bordering the rivers and
canals of the Peninsula to deprive the communists of ambush cover.
After approval, two C-123s started the spray operations on September
Another sprayequipped C-123 sent from the United States joined in later.
Finished on October I , the flights killed ninety to ninety-five percent of the
vegetation along the waterway. It was estimated that the view from the air was
five to seven times better than before.
I16
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL, MULE TRAIN, AND RANCH HAND
I
Too Cautious?
During a conversation with President Kennedy in November 1961, Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara had “volunteered to look after”the Vietnam War. To
d o this he set up monthly conferences in Hawaii or Saigon.’ There, he and a Joint
Chiefs of Staff member (usually the chairman) met with the Commander in
Chief, Pacific Command, the Ambassador to Vietnam, and various component
and unified commanders. The conferees discussed problems, courses of action,
and progress. They traded views, reports, and briefings, and kept each other
current on events in Southeast Asia and in Washington. Secretary McNamara
often settled things on the spot, accepting or rejecting subordinates’ suggestions.
A case in point was the first Secretary of Defense Conference held on
December 16, 1961, in Hawaii. Mr. McNamara opened themeeting by stressing
that the President did not desire to introduce American combat troops openly
into Vietnam at that time. The Secretary conveyed his concern over the danger of
alienating the Vietnamese people by careless bombing. The Army “has a particu-
larly important role to play,”he said. “While naval and air support operations are
desirable, they won’t be too effective, and we should not think they will win the
war.” McNamara wanted the C-I 23s in Vietnam used not for taxi service but for
tactical airlift in support of the combat effort, to include drops of materiel and of
Vietnamese troops. His one objective in Vietnam was “to win this
A chief order of business was the CINCPAC plan “to guide”the Vietnamese
armed forces in a field campaign against the insurgents. The operations projected
were in terms of task forces. Three or four battalions of infantry with supporting
artillery and logistic units would attack Viet Cong bases, cut lines of communica-
tion, and clear and hold ground gained. No one knew what resources President
Diem would give to this program. If Diem refused to take American advice, J C S
Chairman Lemnitzer pointed out, the United States would be “in a bad fix.” Mr.
McNamara brushed this aside and brusquely told his followers to get on with
their jobs.’
General O’Donnell, PACAF commander in chief, was impressed with
McNamara’s extremely strong statements of American determination to keep
Vietnam from falling to the communists. But it soon became evident to him that
strong talk did not necessarily mean strong action. The United States had chosen
a prudent perhaps too prudent course and was accenting ground rather
than air action. O’Donnell said that he personally deplored “overcontrol from
the Washington level”but“as a soldier would comply with the spirit of the policy
to be ultra cautious.” Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, likewise believed that policies
curbing air power were scarcely in the best American interest. General LeMay,
Air Force chief, was also impatient with “our own military rules to handicap
ourselves.” He later reminisced: “If Khrushchev had been running it [the war], he
I I9
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
couldn’t have done any better, as far as handicapping us, by what we did to
ourselves all through the thing from start to
In January 1962 USAF planners felt sure they had solved the problem of
creating a “clear, realistic, jointly agreed concept for the elimination of Viet Cong
influence.” Their idea called for a quick reaction force of Vietnamese airborne
troops, supported by U.S. or Vietnamese transport and strike aircraft.
All would respond to radio calls from villages under communist attack, thus
supplying the “missing ingredient of truly effective action in South Vietnam.”
This simple and direct reaction to overt enemy assaults on villages would entail
nine Vietnamese battalions of paratroopers, ten C-I 23s, forty T-28s, and eighty
H-34 helicopters. Split among several locations, the force would be on twenty-
four-hour alert - quick to react to calls for help from communications teams in
villages.
Since Farm Gate was to take part in the program, precise targeting was a
must. Guerrilla warfare blurred distinctions. The insurgents disguised themselves
as civilians, found shelter among the populace, and depended on innocent
inhabitants for food and other items. President Diem emphatically insisted that
his airmen exercise utmost care to avoid angering the people by injuring inno-
cents. Carelessness during an air strike could lead to a prison sentence.‘
Thirteenth Air Force asked PACAF to lay down rules of engagement for
Farm Gate, and the request was referred to CINCPAC for resolution. Admiral
Felt stressed caution. The French Foreign Legion in Indochina had tried to work
free of restraints hamstringing operations, on the basis that the native people
knew that innocent and guility would suffer alike if they harbored Viet Minh
members. The French command had rejected this view, and “more temperate
policies for using air power prevailed - although many tragic errors in target
designation continued to be made until the end of the war.” According to Felt, a
realistic policy pivoted on good air-ground communications and on being “as
careful as possible when shooting things up around friendly forces.”’
Farm Gate bombs hit a Cambodian village by accident on January 21, 1962.
killing several civilians. The incident raised a t the “highest level” of the U.S.
government the question of how to select targets without imperiling innocent
people. To guide the discussion expected at the next conference attended by the
Secretary of Defense, P A C A F offered:
We must exercise the greatest possible control and discretion to assure that we achieve
our objectives without undue o r unnecessary alienation of the civilian populace. If we
are to avoid the imposition of highly limiting controls on the application of Farm
Gate. we must make every effort to avoid another incident and in addition, demon-
strate the effectiveness of our control and ability t o discriminate in the selection and
designation of targets as well a s in the conduct of air
I20
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS?
121
THE ADVISORY YEARS
assist, Farm Gate flew a series of strikes. Vietnamese reports the next day claimed
fifty to sixty Viet Cong dead. A U.S. advisor put the figure at twenty-five. 13
As MAAG told Defense Secretary McNamara on February 19, 1962:
“South Vietnam had earlier been described as a country going down a steep slope
to disaster. We can’t say that the direction has been reversed, but for the moment
the slope has leveled out a
For Farm Gate personnel the slope still seemed to be downhill. Their tasks
were largely routine, and morale sagged. Being specially chosen, highly moti-
vated survivors of rigorous training and selection, they expected to work with
friendly guerrillas fighting behind enemy lines. But apart from a few challenging
Special Forces missions, they performed close air support, airlift, medical evac-
uation, and psychological warfare - not at all what they had volunteered to do.
The rules of engagement stymied these men - carry Vietnamese insignia and a
Vietnamese airman, and d o nothing that the Vietnamese Air Force can d o itself. l 5
A chance to tackle something more exacting in psychological warfare had
arisen in December 1961. Because certain areas controlled by the Viet Cong were
open only to counterpropaganda by air, 2d ADVON turned to Farm Gate for
testing loudspeaker and leaflet operations. Targets embraced the town of Ban
Me Thuot, Pleiku, and Kontum, along with thevillages of Polei Klengand Polei
Krong. Farm’Gate planes carried out the broadcast and leaflet flights. To stave
off starvation in Polei Krong, the aircraft further dropped rice and salt. 16
Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF counterinsurgency specialist, ques-
tioned the rationale of the tests. He suggested that unless technical experts knew
precisely what they wished to achieve, probably nothing could be accom-
plished. 17
On January 30, 1962,2d ADVON put in for three officers, two specialists,
and one clerk, all well-versed in “military-political-economic-psychological
aspects” of this type of warfare. They would develop, test, and conduct opera-
tions in the “ideal environment” of South Vietnam. Missions suggested were
dropping leaflets, food, and clothing. Unfortunately, no psychological warfare
specialists were on hand. There had been several hundred trained officers in the
early 1950s, but the Air Force had inactivated psychological warfare units in
1958.
Farm Gate nonetheless flew seven missions from December 14, 1961, to
February I 1, 1962, dropping leaflets and making aerial broadcasts. The initial
flights impressed Vietnamese villagers, but speaker quality was marginal. For the
messages to be heard from the speakers in the belly of the SC47, the run over the
target needed to be at 600 feet at an airspeed of 100 knots or less. Even then, the
message could not exceed sixty seconds. The speakers were later mounted on a
rack in the plane’s door. This let the aircraft circle an area while a crewman aimed
the speakers at a specific spot. Still, the run had to be at a dangerously low 500
feet.
On February 1 1 a n S C 4 7 took off in good weather for a routine leaflet
mission south of Da Lat. The aircraft crashed for reasons unknown, killing eight
Americans (six Air Force and two Army) plus one Vietnamese. This flight was
I22
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS?
I24
AIR POLICY: TOO CAUTIOUS?
hired employees at snack bars in officers’ and service clubs were poorly super-
vised. The outcome was a high sick
No wonder that General during his Vietnam visit in April
found USAF aircraft to be
Lowered vitality and loss of energy among the men grew out of chronic
low-level fevers, dysentery attacks, and too few fresh fruits and vegetables.
Medical detachments of the U.S. Army gave local area medical support. Hospi-
talization became available on April when its 8th Field Hospital opened
at
Pay was erratic. Checks regularly arrived late and at times never. Men could
not meet mess bills and travel expenses. Emergency casual payments often
resulted in overpayments. 32
Mail service was primitive. Units outside of Saigon received no regular
deliveries, and n o arrangements existed to buy stamps, cash money orders, or
dispatch classified mail. Mail came through Clark on Mondays, Wednesdays,
and Fridays. The U.S. Army post office in Saigon was closed on Saturdays and
Sundays. Recipients of classified or registered mail were notified informally and
needed to make their own delivery arrangements. 33
Aggravating these problems were austere maintenance procedures,
unconventional organization, adherence in Washington to peacetime
practices in procurement and purchase, and the general inability to forecast the
number of Americans committed to South Vietnam. Ironically, USAF person-
nel were not in the jungle with guerrillas but were for the most part in or near
metropolitan Saigon, a seaport and industrial center of almost two million
people in There, the Air Force engaged in routine tasks and trained the
Vietnamese Air Force, which began to expand and to fly more operational
missions.
I25
I
Gate and the
I27
THE ADVISORY YEARS
and Lt. Col. Robert L. Gleason made an afternoon flight and took photographs
of the exact spot. Shortly after dark, King led a bomb and rocket strike. The
S C 4 7 flareship approached the target area with the T-28s in trail and about
2,000 feet higher. After the flares ignited, the strike aircraft swooped down and
demolished the enemy boats. Photos revealed that one 500-pound bomb,
dropped by Capt. William E. Dougherty, scored a perfect strike in the middle of
the sampans.’
Such rapid reaction induced the joint operations center to place an SC-47
on strip alert, ready to join T-28s and B-26s in night action. While these tactics
failed to wipe out enemy units, they forced the Viet Cong to break off attacks and
fade into the jungle. Meanwhile, Vietnamese C-47 crews were sufficiently trained
by February 1962 to fly night missions with Farm Gate.
Farm Gate experience in the first months of 1962 dictated a change in
ordnance loads. The detachment sharply cut back on general purpose bombs,
and shifted from the 250-pound bomb to the M-IA2 cluster of six 20-pound
bombs. By June, Farm Gate upped its use of rockets, napalm, and strafing.
Sometimes more than one canister of napalm was requiredto burn a hole in the
ground cover.
Strike aircraft inhibited the Viet Cong from firing. If the aircrews spied the
source, they quickly opened up with formidable firepower. The T-28 packed two
.50-caliber machineguns, the B-26 eight. Both planes carried bombs and
The white smoke of the M-19 marker dissipated too swiftly, while the
aircrews rarelysaw the red smoke ofthe M-18 through thejunglecanopy. Smoke
bombs in general were unreliable, and the method of dropping them on poorly
defined targets was “most
The first combined American-Vietnamese air operation occurred near the
end of December 1961. Two U.S. Army helicopter companies whisked 360
Vietnamese troops to five landing zones in the Viet Cong-dominated Zone D,
then several days later brought inadditional troops. A Vietnamese L-19 forward
air controller and two AD-6 bombers orbited the area but saw no targets. The
troops failed in their main mission -capture o fa radio transmitter - but killed
two Viet Cong, wounded one. and captured forty-six suspects.
A larger operation took place on January 5, 1962, t o rescue prisoners in a
Viet Cong camp near Saigon. A Vietnamese forward air controller directed
AD-6s, T-28s, and B-26s to fly preparatory strikes. Under this cover, thirty-one
helicopters shuttled in 1,000 Vietnamese troops. These efforts went for
naught - the information about the prison camp proved to be erroneous.‘
A number of the problems in search-and-destroy operations stemmed from
three factors: preliminary air reconnaissance tended t o destroy surprise, plans on
occasion were too complex for the fledgling Vietnamese Air Force to carry
through, and coordination between ground and air units was weak.
The air defense system likewise left much to be desired. Since the Soviet
Union had transport aircraft at Hanoi, a key aim of the American presence was
to deter this airlift from extending t o Laos and from affordingair support to the
Viet Cong. Rumors in early 1962 told of Viet Cong in the central highlands
I28
FARM GATE A N D T H E VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
receiving secret air resupply drops. Time and again the air warning radars at Tan
Son Nhut and Da Nang together with the light radar at Pleiku picked up
unidentified tracks. At times these turned out to be tricks of the atmosphere, but
often were U.S. Army aircraft on flights the reporting center knew nothing of. On
the other hand, the Da Nang radar could not detect planes flying at low and
middle levels because the terrain to the west screened them. Furthermore, the
AD-6s, T-28s, and B-26s were unsuitable for intercepting communist aircraft
penetrating South Vietnamese airspace. In February I962 General O’Donnell
called for unified air action. To establish “law and order in the air,”he suggested
that the air operations center control and coordinate all air operations, including
helicopter combat support.
Two mutinous Vietnamese flyers first tested the air defense system, designed
to signal communist intrusion. On the morning of February 26, 1962, the two
diverted their AD-6s from a planned strike in the delta, and zeroed in on
President Diem’s palace. The 1st Fighter Squadron scrambled two flights of
AD-6s to intercept the rebels, but the planes merely gathered hits from small-
arms fire. Farm Gate aircraft took to the air to elude possible destruction on the
ground. Antiaircraft fire downed one of the two attacking planes, and its pilot
was captured. The other escaped to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, where he emerged
unscathed from a crash landing. Interrogation of the captured flyer confirmed
that the two pilots were engaged in a vendetta against Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh
Nhu.
Although there appeared to be no general plot against the government,
Diem grounded the Vietnamese Air Force temporarily. Later he permitted the
Vietnamese strike planes to carry only 20-mm ammunition. Still later he ostensi-
bly authorized the planes a full array of ordnance, but the Joint General Staff
restricted bombloads for missions in 11 and III Corps. Ambassador Nolting
secured permission from Washington for Farm Gate aircraft to support ground
operations. T o dispel the impression that the United States was taking over the
fighting, AD-6s had to accompany American planes.’
In March 1962 a total of 1,861 incidents (attacks, acts of terrorism, sabo-
tage, and subversion) stirred apprehension that the communists were about to
step up the war. 10 Pleiku radar on theevening ofthe 19th showed seven unknown
flight tracks over the central highlands. Farm Gate scrambled a B-26 from Bien
Hoa, and when it reached the area, radar control placed the aircraft directly over
one of the tracks. The crew saw nothing. The next day, reconnaissance pilots
noticed some bundles in the trees. On the night of the 20th, Tan Son Nhut radar
detected unknown tracks leading out of Cambodia. Two Farm Gate T-28s were
scrambled but the tracks faded. Soon after these T-28s were recalled, Pleiku
reported ten to fifteen low-altitude tracks emerging from Cambodia. One SC-47
and two RB-26s were dispatched from Bien Hoa. The S C 4 7 dispensed flares
while the RB-26s searched in vain. 11
Upset over the sharp rise in Viet Cong incidents, President Diem asked for
U.S.jet interceptors to deal with enemy overflights. Ambassador Nolting quickly
cleared the request with Washington. On March 22 the 405th Tactical Fighter
I29
THE ADVISORY YEARS
131
THE ADVISORY YEARS
132
F A R M GATE A N D T H E VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE
Since the number of Vietnamese combat sorties fell short of meeting the
rising demands for air missions, Farm Gate operations reached new high levels.
By August it was clear that Farm Gate had t o have fresh aircraft and crews. The
coming of two new U.S.Army helicopter companies in September meant even
greater requirements for escort and supply sorties by strike aircraft. This clashed
with Secretary desire t o phase out American units.
General Anthis, had foreseen that mission demands would compel Farm
Gate planes to stretch beyond monthly programmed flying hours. He suggested
that additional U S A F units be allocated to Vietnam, chiefly to allow air strike
teams to be kept permanently on station a t Thirteenth Air
Force in mid-August sent Farm Gate four from Far East assets.
Farm Gate continued to fly too many hours, and in September Anthis asked
for ten more five and two General Harkins made no reply,
but recommended that the Air Staff put the proposal on the agenda of
the October Secretary of Defense Conference. Gen. Walter C. Sweeney,
commander of Tactical Air Command, and Brig. Gen. Gilbert
Special Air Warfare Center commander, agreed that the Air Force could furnish
the planes and crews. However, they cautioned Anthis to “go adding to
Farm Gate until he was completely convinced that the Vietnamese were doing as
much as they could. Sweeney did not want Farm Gate “to become a crutch to
compromise progressive and objective development of indigenous
States to become pilots. T o furnish the crewmen required on Farm Gate planes,
the Vietnarnese Air Force sent fifteen noncommissioned officers to Farm Gate.
This plugged the gap but was a subterfuge, because the enlisted Vietnamese were
uninterested in flight training. When General Moorman, Thirteenth Air Force
commander, heard of the arrangement, he urged Anthis to d o his best to meet
McNamara’s wishes. 27
Admiral Felt visited Vietnam in late October and talked with Anthis. He
said Vietnamese opposition had scuttled the prospect of using Chinese pilots to
fly Vietnamese transports. Any Farm Gate growth would have to be small and
piecemeal. 28
Acting on Anthis’ suggestion to shore up Farm Gate, General Harkins in
November asked for five T-28s, ten B-26s, and two C-47s More, he said, would
likely be required in the future. Admiral Felt routed the request to the Joint
Chiefs, adding that he saw no other way to secure the urgently needed combat air
power. 29
The Joint Chiefs of Staff well knew that President Kennedy wished the
Americans to prepare the Vietnamese to fight their own war. Hence in November
and December the chiefs carefully weighed the question of bolstering Farm Gate.
They likewise plumbed the oft-stated position that counterinsurgency was for the
most part a ground war, with air forces accounting for maybe ten percent of the
effort. Some USAF officers viewed counting Viet Cong casualties as an
“unpleasant task”and “not necessarily the military objective.” Even so, statistics
on the number of enemy killed, wounded, and captured were important. In all
known cases where ground forces entered areas struck by air, their actual body
count exceeded aircrew claims. (Of the estimated number of enemy casualties in
1962, twenty-eight percent were due to Vietnamese and American air power.) Yet
air operations did more. They shrunk the enemy’s options, crimped his move-
ments and attacks, flew in men and supplies to assault him, protected surface
convoys and trains as well as heliborne assaults, and thwarted the foe from
massing large forces in the field. Air power had proved - at least to USAF
officers - that it held equal rank with ground operations in any counterinsur-
gency venture. 30
This assessment was not altogether shared in Washington. Following a visit
to Southeast Asia in December 1962, Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs, and the President’s Special Assistant for Far
Eastern Affairs, Michael V. Forrestal, reported:
On the use of air power and the danger of adverse political effects, our impression is
that the controls on air strikes and the procedures for checking intelligence against all
sources are excellent. In spite of this, however. it is difficult to be sure that air power is
being used in a way that minimizes the adverse political effects , . . and the use ofair
power is going up enormously.3’
I34
In World War II and the Korean conflict, interdiction had slowed the flow
of enemy forces, supplies, and equipment into and within battle areas. In
Vietnam, according to General “the most lucrative targets” were
training areas, troop concentrations, supply depots, and sampans. Admi-
ral Felt and General had the same impression. Interdiction air attacks
against Viet base areas held a special attraction because the Vietnamese
ground forces seldom penetrated to them.
Yet air interdiction was very complex. The Viet rarely wore distinctive
uniforms, and they mingled freely with civilians. To tell them from the general
populace called for timely intelligence and reliable aerial reconnaissance. Unfor-
tunately, the Vietnamese Air Force owned but two rigged with cameras for
day photography. The single air photo intelligence center and its twelve photo
observers were situated in the division of the Joint General Staff. The
observers could d o visual reconnaissance, but the best of them were being shifted
to tactical fighters.
Able operated out of Don Airport near Bangkok,
Thailand. They sustained a daily sortie rate of flights, and photographed
high-priority areas of interest to MACV and the Vietnamese. When over South
Vietnam, these planes as a rule staged through Tan Son Nhut, where they turned
over their film to the small USAF photo processing cell for interpretation.
Although the was good for general reconnaissance of clearly fixed
targets, it was not suited to spotting an enemy who hid under heavy foliage by
day and moved at night. Furthermore, processing and interpreting the photog-
raphy in Saigon, then delivering it to requesting units by U.S. Army courier
plane, usually took several days. Some ground commanders complained that the
interval between a request and a delivery was at times thirty to forty-five days.
Intelligence from members of the enemy forces was needed, and was
scarce. Starting in December U.S. intelligence advisors did their best to
teach their methods to Vietnamese. Besides the specialists in MACV
(Intelligence), Americans worked with Vietnamese units in the field. Unpro-
ductive from the USAF point of view, MACV intelligence was oriented toward
ground operations.
Normally, Vietnamese interrogations of prisoners should have yielded sig-
nificant information. But the law authorized the military to hold prisoners only
two days before handing them over to provincial authorities for a court hearing.
This was not time enough to learn about enemy activities vulnerable to air
interdiction.
I35
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Vietnamese army units in the field, provincial officials, and covert agents
could request Saigon for specific strikes. If Saigon approved, Vietnamese pilots
were free to attack these targets, usually marked by air observers. While USAF
officers were not empowered to question an approved strike, General Anthis
asked for “positive control” by radar or forward air controllers when Farm Gate
aircraft took part. Targets were often described in vague terms like “groups of
huts,” “troop concentrations,” or strong points,” and were frequently
hidden under jungle cover.
In spite of precautions air strikes were dangerous, particularly in heavily
populated and poorly mapped regions. In January for example, Vietnam-
ese officers wanted a n air strike at dawn on the Viet village of
in the Parrot’s Beak close to the Cambodian border in War Zone C. Because the
Vietnamese could not handle predawn takeoffs, Farm Gate was asked to fly the
mission. At first Colonel Farm Gate commander, thought the target
too close to Cambodia, but accepted the task when the Vietnamese labeled
crucial.
Radar at Tan Son Nhut monitored the flight, warning the planes as they
neared the canal that supposedly was the border. The aircraft failed to receive the
message, but a n SC-47 that had performed weather was flying
back and forth over the canal to mark it. From another S C 4 7 positioned along
the border, Colonel led and an airborne coordinator directed the strike.
As eight and three bombed, rocketed, napalmed, and strafed, the
Minister of Defense and the III Corps commander watched from a
The Farm Gate commander felt sure no one had made a mistake. Yet a few
days later, the Cambodian government charged with having crossed the
frontier, killed a villager, and injured three others. The Vietnamese defense
minister shrugged off the protest, saying that the whole area was a hot bed.”
The State Department, however, wished to prevent disruption of Vietnamese-
Cambodian relations. At American insistence Saigon apologized and awarded
compensation. General Anthis, commander, forbade Farm Gate to
strike within five miles of the border during daylight and ten miles at night.
Moreover a forward air controller, airborne or on the ground, had to mark the
targets. These restrictions might have afforded the Viet complete sanctuary
along the border, but the rules did not apply to Vietnamese pilots who could
operate more
Toward the end of January, all available Vietnamese and Farm Gate planes
at Pleiku, and simultaneously attacked fourteen carefully
pinpointed targets in five areas. After-action reports revealed good results. The
defense minister said the strikes were so timely and accurate that the
suspected spies in their midst. All the same, top American officials had nagging
doubts about the validity of the targets selected by the Vietnamese. They stressed
to the Joint General Staff the value of intelligence, proper controls, and serious
poststrike assessments.
Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, knew the problems of bombing areas where
friendly and hostile people intermingled. Impressed by Vietnamese officers who
I
I36
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962
137
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Anthis. Nolting at first thought of curtailing air activity, but Jablonsky would
not cite instances of air attack. Harkins then pointed out that tighter curbs would
benefit merely the Viet Cong.
General Jablonsky in Hawaii repeated the charge he had made in Saigon,
and the question was reexamined at the Secretary of Defense Conference of
March 21. Ambassador Nolting urged close scrutiny to prevent killing innocent
people, and Defense Secretary McNamara agreed to allow air operations to go
on under strict controls and stringent intelligence criteria. Roger Hilsman,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, later defined this decision as
the worst of two worlds military men disturbed by air restrictions and
diplomats fretting about propaganda benefits to the enemy.
To assist the Vietnamese in gathering better intelligence of air force interest,
Admiral Felt authorized and the Air Force sent a detachment of the 6499th
Support Group to Saigon. Six officer and six enlisted intelligence specialists
arrived in March, but two officers were unqualified and removed. Denied direct
access to enemy prisoners, the others could ask questions only through Vietnam-
ese interrogators. 13
An additional obstacle was the lengthy procedure in processing a request for
a preplanned interdiction strike. The 2d ADVON intelligence directorate could
propose a target, and the Joint General Staff‘s air photo intelligence center
researched and prepared data sheets and folders. One copy went to the province
chief for checking, a second to the air operations center for preliminary planning.
Field Command next decided if the target was susceptible to ground action,
which took precedence over air. These steps could consume several days or
several weeks. Actually, most intelligence rose from the ground force division
and province chief levels. These authorities often suggested targets to the corps
commander who routed the requests to the operations center. Yet no matter how
intelligence generated strikes, the province chief was the key. He alone deter-
mined whether bombing a target would imperil his people. 14
To pinpoint Viet Cong radio transmitters for air intelligence, the Air Force
delivered a C-54 to Vietnam in March 1962. The transport featured infrared
detectors, cameras, and a high-frequency direction finder. About the same
time, the U.S. Army Security Agency put airborne radio homing units in three
Army L-20s. During their first operational flight on the 12th of April, the C-54
and L-20s came upon far more Viet Cong radio transmitters than expected.
However. the direction finding equipment could not give a precise fix on the
radio sites. The Viet Cong radios were short-range, low-power sets, and they
operated in periodic short bursts. Though the American eqipment was not
advanced enough to place the signals accurately, the C-54 flew 102 special
missions in ten months. The cameras worked fine for ordinary photography, but
the infrared and the direction finder did poorly.
The U S A F pilots could return fire against “a known source”in self-defense,
but needed to be very careful for they rarely knew a source’s exact location. In the
daytime, Farm Gate planes could not fire unless under positive control of a
Vietnamese forward air controller, and cooperation with Vietnamese L- 19 con-
I38
AIR OPERATIONS,
trollers was frequently difficult. In addition the elaborate reconnaissance and the
target marking no doubt alerted the Viet to impending strikes. This
impeded action against a n already elusive foe.
the spring of interdiction focused on small groups of guerrillas and
sampans near Vietnamese army positions. Then late in May, the Joint General
Staff and MACV targeted the D o War Zone headquarters area of Interzone
With utmost care they identified, authenticated, and pinpointed nineteen
targets spread over a n area of square miles. As a final validation, a plane flew
a Viet defector over the area.
Vietnamese and American aircraft eleven eleven and six
took off on May Bad weather obscured five of the targets, but the
planes made repeated strikes on the other fourteen. Regardless of the careful
preparations, a pounded the friendly village of Dak killing four persons
and demolishing a dozen buildings. The strike pilots saw no Viet on any of
their runs, but bomb damage assessment photography showed a command post
wiped out, fourteen other structures burned and destroyed, and thirty damaged.
The Vietnamese field commanders hailed the attacks as a “total success,” and
(President Diem’s brother) reported about four hundred enemy
killed. Some Viet defectors later credited their change of heart to the
bombings.
Both and were willing to accept the mission of
disrupting Viet security in base areas beyond the reach of ground forces.
The American Embassy in Saigon nonetheless questioned the wisdom of the
attacks. Some U.S. observers were positive that air power at Dak KET had killed
no more than fifty of the enemy. The commander of Interzone V had escaped.
Innocents had been killed. Consequently, General ordered Farm Gate no
longer to fly free-area missions without a forward air controller.
As spring wore on, a more extreme belief nudged aside assertions of how air
interdiction hurt pacification because it endangered guiltless people. On April I5
MACV published the first extensive Viet order of battle, listing
battalions, seventy-nine companies, and platoons. The overall strength was
put at less than the estimated by the Vietnamese. But backing up
the regular troops were paramilitary organizations of around part-time
guerrillas. And over the first two weeks of May, to more Viet
had stolen into Zone D from Laos to form a new battalion. After weighing this
information, MACV J-2 (Intelligence) concluded that air interdiction had no
military effect on the Viet
What then could isolate the Viet from the populace who furnished
them food and other supplies? Or from their logistic routes that brought them
weapons, ammunition, medical materials, and fresh troops? There was no other
way than by air interdiction and ground thrusts into enemy base areas. Admiral
Felt desired these missions continued. He especially wanted Vietnamese rangers
and regular units to fight guerrilla-style in the Viet war zones. “It is, of
course, basic to our side,” Felt told General “that the initiative be denied
the Our concept is to harass them, push them down and extend them far
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
beyond the capabilities of their logistics support, thus destroying them.” On the
other hand, Harkins deemed nearly all of the ground commanders too inexpe-
rienced for large-scale efforts, and the rangers lacked leaders for extended field
operations. 21
Unlike the army, the Vietnamese Air Force could carry the war into the
jungle areas held by the Viet Cong. What the pilots needed was valid target
intelligence. In August Col. Ralph A. Newman, air liaison officer with Vietnam-
ese Air Force Field Command, instructed liaison officers to work closely with the
ground forces at division and regimental levels. The aim was to identify targets
for interdiction, chiefly for Vietnamese planes returning from sorties with unused
ordnance. Most crews hesitated to land with bombs and rockets hanging outside
the aircraft, and since 1958 had jettisoned them on vacant land near the airfields.
Aware of this waste, General Anthis proposed assigning preplanned targets,
preferably in Zone D, so at least the munitions would fall on Viet Cong territory.
Anthis and the air liaison officers pressured Iand II Corps to accept this
proposal. They stressed that a backlog of such targets would ease scheduling,
distribution, and use of aircraft, as well as keep the Viet Cong off-balance. By
September 1962, however, the suggestion was still hanging
Admiral Felt asked General Harkins, MACV commander, whether “area
denial” methods might make Zone D too hot for the Viet Cong. Felt advised:
Entire extent of techniques and devices available for such purpose should be used. We
have in mind. for example. scatter bombing with butterfly bombs, proven lethal in
Korea. and other type A F mines. We also visualize use of chemical irritants and
defoliants t o expose targets for air strikes. . , . In other words we want to destroy or
drive sick, starved. blistered. and blasted Viet Cong from Zone D so that we can scoop
them up outside of their nest or prevent them from setting foot in the area
Thus spurred, MACV and the Joint General Staff started to target War
Zones D and X (headquarters of Viet Cong Interzone V) for a n intensive air
campaign. On October 3 the 5th Division submitted 129 specific targets. Presi-
dent Diem next ordered a five-day bombing attack in Zone D to begin on
November 1,followed by a Special Forces ground penetration. He also called for
the Iand II Corps to cooperate in a similar bombing and to follow up penetration
into War Zone X which lay i n the mountains dividing the two corps. Gradually,
the corps commanders and Field Command obtained many more targets
through military channels. Provincial chiefs designated free areas for air attack.
Vietnamese crews could strike these areas without a forward air controller, but
Farm Gate had to have targets marked by a Vietnamese
Review of the free areas came when Vietnam’s strained relations with
Cambodia worsened. Feeling threatened by both South Vietnam and Thailand,
Cambodia on August 20, 1962, had appealed to President Kennedy for a neutral
status like that of Laos. President Diem resented the implication that South
Vietnam was an aggressor. He said there was little question that Viet Cong
redoubts drew support from across the border. Vietnamese troops who carried
out sporadic raids into Cambodia had captured communist weapons and
ammunition destined for the Viet Cong. Undeterred, Prince Norodom Siha-
140
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962
141
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
were taken to strengthen the air operations center at Tan Son Nhut and the radar
facilities at Da Nang and Pleiku, procure and employ American air liaison
officers and forward air controllers, and persuade locally powerful army com-
manders to coordinate with air forces. In general these commanders were jealous
of their authority, secretive about their plans, and inexperienced in applying
tactical air support. Inasmuch as the air operations center depended on day-to-
day knowledge of Vietnamese ground operations, U.S. Army and Vietnamese
liaison officers were assigned to the center in February 1962. The idea was to
inject tactical air into operational planning at the
If Vietnamese ground commanders had but a n inkling of how the support
system was supposed to work, U.S. Army advisors had not the air experience to
qualify them as air liaison officers. They refused to accept the tactical air control
system outright, and from the USAF view were “quick to criticize, slow to
help.””
Bolstering of the joint operations center was one of the benefits accruing
from the April 1962 visit of General LeMay. He ordered several USAF officers
assigned to the center, Lt. Col. Charles J. Bowers assuming the duties of deputy
director. These officers monitored and encouraged the submission of daily
requirements for air support, and allocated sorties on the basis of available
aircraft.
Quite a few things weakened centralized control of tactical aircraft. Inexpe-
rienced personnel and unreliable equipment bred problems. In April, for exam-
ple, communications between Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang remained out for
three days. Moving aircraft from rotational duty at Da Nang and Pleiku
demanded special approval from Vietnamese Air Force headquarters. Conse-
quently, the air operations center could not route these planes rapidly to areas of
greater need. Also, the center was heavily committed to operations requested by
Field Command and III Corps. This led I Corps at Da Nang and II Corps a t
Pleiku to look upon the AD-6s at these fields as theirs to use without telling the
center. Likewise, the fighter squadron at Nha Trang now and then flew T-28
strikes in response to local requests without the center’s knowledge. When
General Anthis made staff visits to corps, division, regimental, and battalion
headquarters, he found little understanding of how the tactical air control
system was meant to
Attempts to bring helicopter activities under the air operations center did
not go well. General Harkins in April directed armed tactical aircraft to accom-
pany helicopter assault missions. He was therefore certain that the center was
wholly aware of all U.S. Army flight operations in the country. Yet Army ground
liaison officers readily admitted that the MACV order for escort planes was
observed only about ten percent of the
The figure of ten percent was misleading, seeing that these ground opera-
tions mostly involved small forces of company or platoon size in very brief
firefights. Since the air operations center was unable to coordinate all air
operations, it could not wholly exploit available air support. Data on ground
operations being planned was often not to be had. The commanders were
I42
AIR OPERATIONS,
not converse with strike aircraft and ground forcesat thesame time. The PRC-10
lash-up was a poor makeshift, and ground units wanted man-pack radios that
could mesh with existing U H F / VHF airborne sets. No such radios were obtain-
able in 1962. The U.S. Agency for International Development was giving large
numbers of radios to provincial paramilitary forces. These sets were the commer-
cially procured HT-1 and TR-20 with characteristics similar to those of the
PRC-10. An a n interim measure, MAAG refitted U.S. Army helicopters and
Vietnamese and Farm Gate aircraft with the AN/ARC-44 Army radio. This set
could tie in with the PRC-10, HT-1, and TR-20.
Complications of this sort paled beside the general insufficiency of the
L-19s. They were often simply unavailable. In April, for example, Farm Gate
pilots arrived over the target and could see a firefight on the ground. But the
Vietnamese controller never showed up.
Toward the end of 1962. Farm Gate received two L-28As (later known as
U-10As) for forward air controller duty. They were too costly for such use.
Moreover, Farm Gate still had to have Vietnamese air observers or air guides on
the ground to mark targets for strikes.
Three U.S. Army helicopter companies, each attached to a corps, enabled
troops to move swiftly against the Viet Cong. On the way to the target areas, the
chopper pilots liked to fly a t 700 feet and hug the terrain. Their success led
Secretary of Defense McNamara to deploy a Marine squadron of twenty-four
UH-34D helicopters t o Vietnam. Afterwards he moved two more Army H-21
companies to the country, plus a company of fifteen armed UH-1 A and UH-1 B
helicopters from Okinawa and Thailand. Manned by Americans, these gunships
were to deliver “suppressive fire,” now deemed to be self-defense. In September
1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered all helicopter gunships bearing U.S.
markings to carry a Vietnamese observer.
In July 1962, strike aircraft flew I39 combat sorties in support of helicop-
ters. Farm Gate (now commanded by Lt. Col. Eugene H. Mueller, Jr.) perfected
tactics whereby two T-28s supported each helicopter flight. One T-28 swooped
down to 200 feet, flew slightly ahead of the leading helicopter, and made slow
turns to search for theenemy. The second T-28 stayed above the formation, set to
make a firing pass on a target. As the helicopters approached in trail for landing,
the strike aircraft flew on each side and strafed the flanks to suppress enemy
Despite Admiral Felt’s belief that transport helicopters constantly required
fighter escort, General Harkins authorized helicopter gunships to operate alone
if need be. Bad weather now and then grounded strike aircraft but not necessarily
helicopters. In addition, escorts were hard put to fly slowly enough to stay with
the helicopters. Seeking to put U.S. Army air operations under the tactical air
control system, General Anthis warned Harkins against fighting two distinct air
wars. On the other hand, Army officers tended to seearmed helicopters best used
when under a ground commander’s control and carrying out local operations. In
August, MACV gave the tactical air control system supremacy solely over air
traffic
144
AIR OPERATIONS.
The Viet ambushed road convoys during the first seven months of
most of them in III Corps north of Saigon and near Zone On the
morning of June some four to five hundred Viet took up ambush
positions along the road to about five kilometers south of Ben Cat.
Opening fire on the convoy in mid-morning, the communists killed two Ameri-
can advisors and twenty-three Vietnamese. The column requested air support,
and three hours elapsed before the strike units at got orders to take off.
By that time, the enemy was withdrawing toward Zone Even so, a and
two AD-6s under I9 control killed fifty enemy and enabled pursuing Vietnam-
ese troops to recover nearly all the equipment and weapons stolen from the
convoy. Air Force officers pointed out to Vietnamese commanders that a single
over the convoy would probably have sighted and reported the enemy, and
no doubt would have prevented the
On July a Viet battalion ambushed a convoy en route from Saigon
to Long, killing twenty-five persons (including a U.S. Army advisor) and
wounding twenty-nine others. The convoy had not asked for air cover. In fact,
neither III Corps nor Field Command had known that the column was on the
road. The request for air support came one and one-half hours after the fighting
erupted. By then the guerrillas had long been
General emphasized to MACV the advantages of air cover for
convoys and rail movements. Not only would tactical air enhance security, it
would also absorb Vietnamese and Farm Gate sorties currently unused. At
General suggestion, President Diem in August directed his army com-
manders to call on the Vietnamese Air Force to protect trains and convoys
conveying arms, ammunition, and other critical cargo.
The simple presence of the unarmed often broke up a n ambush. On
August two spied guerrillas lying in wait between and
a n ammunition train headed north. When the planes appeared, the
Viet fled. Later that month, a n stopped the first vehicle of a convoy
just short of an explosive CHARGE
In contrast to the requests for convoy escort from January to July
there were between August and October. Doing most of the train and truck
convoy escort, flew ahead of the movement and searched for signs of
ambush. They radioed for ground or air reinforcement as required. Except for
the compulsory combat air cover for high-priority cargoes, tactical aircraft
selected to escort usually stayed on ground alert. The combination of planes
devoted to this duty constituted about ten percent of the total tactical air effort.
Convoys would have incurred less damage, had they kept travel to days and
hours when aircraft were on hand to afford cover and protection. The technique
was effective. From July on, no train or convoy escorted by air ran into ambush
for several
Helicopter assault operations proved more complex than train or convoy
escort. On August I Corps mounted an air-ground operation fifty-five miles
south of Plans envisioned ten Vietnamese and twelve U.S.
Army I to lift two hundred rangers and two hundred Special Forces troops
I45
THE ADVISORY YEARS
to the battle area. Four T-28s would fly helicopter escort while four AD-6s, four
T-28s, and one B-26 readied the landing zone. A CV-2 Caribou out of Da Nang
was to be the airborne command post. The I Corps air liaison officer, Lt. Col.
Byron R. Kalin, pointed out in vain that the Caribou lacked the fuel capacity for
orbiting during the whole operation. The plane would have to return to Da Nang
for refueling.
Early on D-day, six (2-123s ferried two hundred Vietnamese troops from Da
Nang to Quang Ngai to join the others. The Caribou command post checked the
weather in the battle area and signaled for the first heli-lift of two hundred troops.
The strike planes made their prelanding attacks but, by the time the helicopters
came, fog had rolled into some of the landing areas. The Caribou sent the
helicopters back to Quang Ngai. When the fog lifted, the Caribou called for the
mission to continue. Although the four T-28s escorting the helicopters completed
another prelanding strike, the Viet Cong opened up on the choppers with sharp
fire. A damaged H-2 I escaped to a n emergency landing area. After the crew was
rescued, a T-28 destroyed the craft to avert its capture.
Subsequent to the safe landing of a second wave of helicopters, the Caribou
needed to go to Da Nang for refueling. While it was away for over an hour,
orbiting fighters relayed messages to the commander. But he was out of direct
contact with his troops.
The fighting on theground was inconclusive, and in mid-afternoon helicop-
ters began extracting the forces. As the last chopper left the scene, the Viet Cong
opened fire, downing another H-2 I . The wounded crewmen were rescued, and a
T-28 shattered the copter on the
Why were the T-28s unable to suppress the Viet Cong fire? The Caribou's
limited communications for directing fighters and ground troops were frequently
interrupted for one reason or other. Target marking was poor. An American
forward air controller flew a n L-I9 over the area for three hours at 2,000 feet. His
Vietnamese observer marked just one target, the smoke bomb missing by 3,000
feet. Lastly, the delay between the prelanding strikes and the first helicopter
landing had likely alerted the Viet
At Da Nang on September 22, the 2d Division commander planned a
heliborne attack to begin on the 24th. The six Vietnamese T-28s on station could
not muster the firepower for the air support required. Delayed until fresh aircraft
arrived, the operation went on September 26. By then, the Viet Cong had slipped
The growing accuracy of Viet Cong ground fire against aircraft caused
concern among USAF officers. The toll of Farm Gate planes shot down
mounted -- a T-28 on August 28, 1962, a U-10 on October 17, and a low-flying
B-26 on November 5. Other aircraft were damaged. Following a night napalm
strike, Lt. Col. Miles M. Doyle nursed his B-26 home after losing an engine to
.30-caliber rounds. To silence enemy gunners, the Farm Gate commander
ordered his pilots to strafe while delivering ordnance at low
Army pilots of armed helicopters were optimistic about the defensive
abilities of the UH-1. The chopper carried two eight-tube 2.75-inch rocket
I46
AIR OPERATIONS, 1962
I47
THE ADVISORY YEARS
suspended aerial reconnaissance over Laos, and by October Able Mable was
flying about eighty-eight percent of its sorties over Vietnam. This sparked the
move in December of all four RF-101s to Tan Son Nhut, where they continued to
fly 2.8 sorties a day. Flying from Vietnam rather than Thailand widely expanded
the total photo coverage per sortie.”
Detecting the Viet Cong from the air demanded night and infrared photog-
raphy, side-looking airborne radar, and infrared “snooper scope” techniques.
Most of these methods were still in development. In April 1962 MACV had
secured two RB-26C night photo aircraft for Farm Gate, the planes reaching
Bien Hoa in During the last half of 1962, they gave good service in the
face of obstacles. Flash-illuminant cartridges were in short supply. Reflections
from flooded rice paddies blurred night photos. A ground accident on October
20 put one RB-26C permanently out of action.”
The coming of the Army’s 23d Special Air Warfare Detachment to Nha
Trang in September 1962 reinforced reconnaissance. The detachment had six
OV-1 Mohawk turboprop observation aircraft, rigged with cameras and .50-
caliber machineguns. It further featured two portable laboratories to process
photographs at division headquarters and at remote locations. Split into teams of
two, the OV-1s assumed direct support of Vietnamese ground units. The
Mohawks flew mostly visual and photo reconnaissance, but carried Vietnamese
observers who could approve targets.
General Anthis still felt it foolish to give aircraft to ground unit command-
ers. When he protested to General Harkins, the reply was, “We must all be
objective.” A USAF forward air controller with the 23d Division at Ban Me
Thuot noted in November that the Mohawk detachment could makea nine-hour
delivery on photo requests, compared to the normal USAF time of seven days.
Apprised of this, Anthis could only hope that the U.S. Air Force might not lose
assigned roles and missions because of a failure to provide resources to perform
them. Even with RF-101s flying from Tan Son Nhut and the photo processing
cell working at peak efficiency, photo delivery took from three and one-half to
more than five hours. The local Mohawks could deliver emergency photo
requests within two to three
Admiral Felt pondered the status of the OV-1s Was their local employment
a n economical use of force? Or did their presence ignore the basic U.S. policy of
having Americans train the Vietnamese instead of fighting their war for them?
Yet General Harkins cited the excellent results chalked up by Mohawks, and on
December 14 asked for four more. Like the helicopter gunships, Harkins
explained, the OV-1s complemented but did not compete with USAF air
Nevertheless, by December 1962 the Army had 199 aircraft in Vietnam, the
Air Force 61; there were eight Army generals, three Air Force. As the USAF
director of plans noted:
I t may be improper to say we are at war with the Army. However, we believe that if the
Army efforts are successful, they may have a long term adverse effect in the U.S.
military posture that could be more important than the battle presently being waged
with the Viet
148
AIR OPERATIONS,
Both Army and Vietnamese Air Force aircraft remained outside the
tactical air control system. As early as May Brig. Gen. Stephen
Thirteenth Air Force vice commander, commented on the situation to
General Anthis. Air Force flew combat while Vietnamese were on
the ground. Army helicopters made combat lifts while Vietnamese were
unused, unreported, or transporting passengers. In response, Anthis acknowl-
edged this said, “can only be measured in small
units” meaning
A team from the Royal Australian Air Force noticed the same condition.
The Vietnamese Air Force (along with the navy) did not perform up to its full
potential. Perhaps this was due to the absence of proper representation at senior
military levels. Hence there was no joint planning as practiced in more sophisti-
cated armed services, and air force “views and requirements receive little
consideration.”“
In June the forty-nine Vietnamese strike aircraft flew but of the
sorties of which they were capable. Too few flight leaders, no desire to fly
combat, and scarce targets were the causes. Flying fell off markedly during
weekends, siesta hours, nights, and bad weather. At any rate, the picture was not
entirely dismal the sorties in June were a decided improvement over the
in
The signs were mixed as I962 closed. But it was unmistakably clear that the
Republic of Vietnam, so shaky at the start of the year, had not collapsed. Even
more encouraging was the attitude of the National Liberation Front, Hanoi’s
political structure in South Vietnam. Its press release in July called for the
creation of a neutral state much like Laos. Was Hanoi thinking of abandoning
the effort to unify Vietnam by force? And what was the meaning of Chi
quoted statement praising Diem’s patriotism? In had predicted
the defeat of South Vietnam in a year. In September he began saying that
victory might take fifteen to twenty years. Was he concerned that the Americans
might bomb North
The war against the President Diem informed the National
Assembly on October had taken a n “incontestable the better. Later
that month, Admiral Felt and Ambassador bolstered Diem by assuring
him that the American resolve to resist communism in Vietnam would not
Obviously, then, the step-up in U.S. support for Vietnam that had started
late in seemed to be working.
American support arrested many adverse trends in Vietnam, and by May
Secretary of Defense was looking ahead to the end of the
counterinsurgency. As he said at his conference in Honolulu, the Military
Assistance Program for Vietnam would then be somewhere between million
and million a was hoping to phase out the war in Vietnam
I and in the near future to send home major U.S. combat, advisory, and logistic
activities. No doubt heartened by the signing of a new agreement on Laos, he
directed General Harkins, MACV commander, to draw up a program. The plan
would prepare Vietnamese armed forces to fight and win the war themselves, so
that a systematic withdrawal of American forces could to the headway
made.
“Six months ago,” said the Defense secretary, “we had practically nothing
and we have made tremendous progress to date. However, we have been
concentrating on short term crash-type actions and now must look ahead to a
carefully conceived long-range program.” He then asked how long it would take
to eliminate the as a “disturbing force.” General Harkins replied,
“About one year from the time that we are able to get [the Vietnamese] fully
operational and really pressing the in all areas.”
Assuming that it would take about three years to bring the “under
control,”the Secretary directed Harkins to plan on this basis. Besides training the
Vietnamese to manage the war themselves, Harkins was to arrange a turnover of
materiel to them. “The objective,” said, “is to give an adequate
military capability without the need for special U.S. military
The size of the American contributions was substantial. By mid-August
there would be I I U.S. personnel in Air Force, Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps. Of the S767 million in materiel programmed
since more than S600 million had been delivered. Airfields refurbished, or
set to be, included Tan Son Nhut, Pleiku, Qui
Ban Me Hue, and A like upgrading of land and naval
facilities was underway. The Military Assistance Program, subject to congres-
sional approval, called for I77 million in fiscal year and million the
next year. Over and above these totals, the United States had given Vietnam over
I billion for roads, railways, electric lines, water, communications, hospitals,
and
U.S. advisors operated from Joint General Staff to battalion level, and some
worked with province chiefs and training centers. Farm Gate had trained and
certified sufficient Vietnamese crews to man a second fighter squadron that flew
missions out of The Air Staff had approved sending four to
Farm Gate for forward air controller duty. Two more glass-nosed were on
THE ADVISORY YEARS
hand for reconnaissance. Mule Train was supplied a second C-I23 squadron to
achieve the quick reaction General LeMay
Ignoring these hopeful signs, LeMay remained skeptical. The Air Force
chief’s disagreement with the war strategy was widely known among the top U.S.
leaders, and Admiral Felt alluded to it at the May Secretary of Defense Confer-
ence. General O’Donnell, P A C A F commander in chief, was disappointed with
the emphasis on politics and economics at the conference. So many civilians were
there that he could not make his points. Instead of preparing for victory in three
years, he wanted to urge actions at once-“better utilization of available air in
South Vietnam, improved air lift management, and .[a] three-star slot for the
Air Force deputy” to
General Anthis told the conferees that the basic stumbling block to expand-
ing the Vietnamese Air Force-a precondition to removing USAF elements-
was the shortage of pilots. There was no debate on
What mattered was that McNamara had set 1965 as the planning date for
ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Harkins needed to make it possible.
By September MACV prepared a National Campaign Plan as a guide.
After briefing Mr. McNamara in October, General Harkins presented the plan to
the Joint General Staff and the Vietnamese president. Diem informally approved
the blueprint in principle, and on November 26 did so formally. No immediate
implementation followed, but rather a discussion of when execution should
begin. Not really a series of maneuvers, the plan was more a n organizational and
conceptual framework, a setting for the process of rooting out the guerrillas. A
key provision was the restructuring of the Vietnamese armed forces. This would
deprive provincial chiefs of control over paramilitary forces in their areas, and of
their freedom to appeal directly to Diem. Placing the paramilitary forces
squarely in the military chain of command would d o away with the provincial
chiefs’ private armies.
CINCPAC harbored reservations as to the costs and the ability of the
Vietnamese to train sufficient personnel in time, and MACV revised the plan in
December 1962 and again in early 1963. The plan’s intelligence annex contained
merely territorial data and a map of what MACV thought were the Viet Cong
tactical zones and secret bases. Missing was a n enemy order of battle. The Joint
Chiefs nevertheless approved the plan on March 4, 1963. They recognized that
success hinged on the “parallel development of many mutual supporting” pro-
grams, meant to lead ninety percent of the native population to identify with the
Diem government. The trouble was that many programs lay outside the military
sphere. Civilian agencies were to work on political, economic, and social prob-
lems, and much would rest on additional deficit spending by the Vietnamese
government. There were no doubts expressed on Diem’s administration or the i
course of the war. The Air Staff, however, wondered where the government
could find enough trainees t o fill the pilot
These seemed to be mere details. More to the point was Admiral Felt’s
comment that Diem had “finally delegated operational authority” tohis military
I52
A P BAC A N D RELATED MATTERS
The National Campaign Plan called for nine regular divisions plus other
Vietnamese units-a total ground combat force of about fifty-one divisions.
Operating under four autonomous corps tactical zone field commanders, these
troops were to decimate local Viet Cong elements, cut off replacements, and
destroy supply, communications, control, and support facilities. The commu-
nists would first be hemmed into specific areas. Next would ‘come a general
offensive to annihilate them by simultaneous “explosion” operations in the four
corps zones. This explosion of effort was supposed to drive the Viet Cong out of
the country within a year.
“Sounds reminiscent of Korea, of course,” someone said, referring to
General McArthur’s famous communique, “out of the trenches by Christmas.”
General Weede, MACV chief of staff, estimated that the “military effort to at
least drive VC underground should be concluded in one to two years. It would
then be up to GVN [Government of Vietnam] to take over to win minds of
people, improve economy, conduct civic action, etc.” According to General
Harkins, the plan could eliminate the Viet Congas early as 1963. President Diem
apparently believed so too, but later would feel that the strategic hamlet program
first had to be completed. This could not be done before the spring of
Diem reorganized the military. Inactivating the central Field Command, he
divided Vietnam into four corps tactical zones, created the new 1V Corps in the
Mekong Delta with headquarters at Can Tho, and established the Capital
Military District around Saigon. The corps tactical zone commanders would be
given greater responsibilities. They were to exercise operational control not only
over their ground forces but over supporting Vietnamese Air Force elements as
Exactly what control the 2d Air Division commander was to have over air
operations was unstated, but General Anthis protested placing air power in the
hands of the corps commanders. He wanted as always a strong tactical air
control system.”
A related issue was how to compute the air requirements for the ‘‘explosion’’
ground operations. Preliminary estimates showed a doubled strike sortie rate
along with an upturn in calls for reconnaissance, target spotting and identifica-
tion, and aerial resupply. How much and how fast the Vietnamese Air Force
could be expanded was the central
General Rowland, chief of the MAAG Air Force Section, outlined an
ambitious program. Besides a second AD-6 fighter squadron in fiscal year 1964,
he projected two more fighter squadrons in fiscal year 1966. Both would be
equipped with the Northrop N-156 light jet fighter (later designated the F-5
Freedom Fighter). Rowland envisioned the replacement of the T-28s in one
squadron and the A-1 Hs in another with F-5s sometime between 1966 and 1968.
He called for a total of nine L-19 liaison squadrons (one for each regular ground
division) and four helicopter squadrons. He visualized air reconnaissance
handled by a squadron of four RT-33s and eighteen RT-28s. Air transport would
be performed by a single squadron of C-47s during fiscal year 1965 and by two
I53
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
C-I23 squadrons, one each in 1965 and 1968. This program was eventually
trimmed. The nine liaison squadrons, for example, were cut to
Rowland also pointed out the advantages of pilot training in Vietnam. In
October a detachment of the Air Training Command was scheduled for move-
ment, to open an H-19 helicopter pilot training program at Tan Son Nhut. Two
months later, a second detachment was dispatched t o give liaison pilot training at
Nha
T o meet the rise in air requirements envisaged by the National Campaign
Plan, General Anthis in October and November 1962 asked for these new
squadrons: one T-28 (25 aircraft), one B-26 (25 planes), a third C-I23 (at least),
two RF-101, two RB-26, and three liaison. Anthis justified the liaison units on
several grounds. General Rowland’s program had been whittled down, a current
shortage of forward air control craft had delayed or deferred many strike
missions, and a step-up in visual reconnaissance and convoy cover could be
The MACV J-4 set forth airlift requirements in support of the National
Campaign Plan. His ideas of “wholesale” and “retail” operations resembled
Army thinking. He specified sealift to five port areas, then C-I23 lift to various
airfields where U-1 Otters, CV-2 Caribous, and helicopters working with the
corps were to pick up the cargo for ultimate delivery. He estimated having to
move 36,000 short tons per month by air (4.3 million ton miles of airlift). This was
almost twice the capacity of the two C-I23 squadrons and the CV-2 company
I54
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS
O D A NANG
PLEIKU
II CTZ
the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force sent twelve nonorganic helicopters
and four liaison planes to Vietnam for the Special Forces, to enable team chiefs
to visit remote and otherwise inaccessible posts. Harkins agreed to use the other
craft within the tactical air control system. But in December and over Felt’s
objections, he withdrew the four Army Caribou transports from the Southeast
Asia Military Airlift System and committed them to direct support of the Special
Forces.”
Preliminary “explosion” operations got under way in late October 1962.
Ranger forces gathered for a penetration into Viet Cong Zone D i n Phuoc Long,
Binh Long, and Phuoc Thanh Provinces (called a Special Tactical Zone). In spite
of poor weather and deficient target marking, AD-6s on November 20 conducted
prelanding bombardment. Five Mule Train C-1 23s and twelve Vietnamese C-47s
dropped five hundred paratroopers at a site selected as a base camp on the
eastern edge of Zone D. On December 19 troops moved into Zone D, where
double tree-canopy-cover towered to eighty feet. Planes flew eight interdiction
strikes and also close support missions. O n the 23d a B-26 dropped napalm, and
on January I , 1963, a B-26 and two T-28s attacked with general purpose bombs.
Results in this thickly forested but fairly dry terrain turned out better than
expected. An Army advisor who visited four interdiction targets found proof of a
hasty enemy retreat. Rockets and SO-caliber rounds had pierced the jungle
canopy, and 500-pound bombs had smashed trees to scatter lethal wood frag-
ments. There were ten fresh Viet Cong graves. In three weeks the rangers killed
sixty-two Viet Cong and took ten prisoners, at a cost of twelve killed and
sixty-eight
When a report revealed a large Viet Cong assembly east of the city of Tay
Ninh in northern Tay Ninh Province, IIICorps hurriedly launched a three-day
heliborne assault by the 5th Division on December 19. The size of the enemy
force was overstated but the troops caught three Viet Cong. The prisoners gave
the locations, functions, and staffing of twelve headquarters of the National
Liberation Front. After special agents verified this information, Ill Corps asked
the Joint General Staff to authorize a three-day strike against the headquarters.
Most of the twelve lay within ten miles of the Cambodian border, too close in the
opinion of Americans. The Joint General Staff disapproved the air attacks, but
President Diem considered the chance too attractive. He set the operation for
January 2, 1963.
The operation was planned to kick off with a heavy hour-long air attack
against nine targets most distant from the border. Some delayed-action bombs
would be used. Next was to be a drop of 1,250 paratroops and a helicopter
landing of a ranger battalion, covered by “light strafing attacks.” The fighters
would fly airborne alert from daybreak to dark, with C-47s helping out through
the night. President Diem wanted American pilots to keep a n eye on Vietnamese
troops, and prevent them from straying across the border into Cambodia. So
that advance reconnaissance flights would not warn the enemy, key commanders
flew over the terrain in a C-123.
156
A P BAC A N D RELATED MATTERS
The entire force of twenty-six Vietnamese AD-6s and Farm Gate’s sixteen
B-26s and twenty-four T-28s at Bien Hoa engaged in the operation. Their
day-long support was called “splendid.” The paratroopers and rangers suffered
nine casualties but killed seventy-six Viet Cong and captured individual weapons
and documents. Early assessments based on prisoner of war interrogations and
on a n intercepted Viet Cong radio message credited the air strikes with killing
about four hundred persons. Later information coming from Cambodia raised
the number to between eight hundred and one thousand. American observers
praised the operation as the most successful ever undertaken in III Corps,
terming it a n intelligent use of tactical air
Overshadowing these encouraging successes was the failure near the village
of Ap Bac in I V Corps. Ap Bac involved the 7th Division, reputed to have killed
more Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta than any other division. So well had the 7th
performed in the important Plain of Reeds that it appeared to have wrested
control from the communists. The enemy leaders seemed on the point of pulling
back their regular units to sanctuary bases.
Late in December 1962, intelligence pinpointed a Viet Cong radio in a
relatively out-of-reach area near Ap Bac. The village was situated in a complex of
hamlets thirty-five miles southwest of Saigon and around fifteen miles northwest
of the 7th Division command post at My Tho, capital of Dinh Tuong Province.
In this rice-growing delta region, canals, dikes, and dirt roads channeled move-
ment. Villages and tree lines offered cover and concealment to defenders. Soft
fertile earth made digging foxholes easy, and paddies gave good fields of fire.
Nearly a company of Viet Cong troops was suspected to be in position to protect
the radio, which was supposed to transmit for the Viet Cong Central Office for
South Vietnam. On December 29 the newly appointed 7th Division commander
decided to knock out this prize.
He selected two battalions from different regiments, a company of mech-
anized infantry in M-1 13 amphibious armored personnel carriers, a ranger
company, and three battalions of artillery (two of 105-mm and one of 155-mm
howitzers). A paramilitary provincial force of three battalions would help out.
The division commander planned heliborne landings north and west of Ap Bac,
these troops to sweep south and meet the M-113s rolling north. Lt. Col. John P.
Vann, senior U.S. Army advisor, wished to start the operation at once to avert
intelligence leaks. He suggested December 31 at the latest, but helicopters were
not to be had before January 2, 1963.
Maj. Herbert L. Prevost, a USAF air liaison officer first learned of the
operation on December 30. He readied a plan for strike aircraft support, but
discovered on the 31st that all available aircraft would be supporting the opera-
tion in northern Tay Ninh Province. The U.S. Army 93d Helicopter Company
nonetheless agreed to go ahead with the helicopter landings. It furnished ten
transport helicopters plus one UH-1B and four HU-1A helicopter gunships
(armed with rockets and machineguns) to fly cover and fire-support missions. At
the final briefing on January 1 Major Prevost accented the absence of fighter
I57
THE ADVISORY YEARS
I58
A P BAC A N D RELATED MATTERS
159
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Admiral Felt also believed that the air operations center and the airlift
coordinating board had to be “fully exploited” for combined and joint ground
and air operations. He judged this the way to make best use of limited air
resources and facilities. “Until the Army air effort joins the club,” General
O’Donnell stated, “with the intent to cooperate wholeheartedly in the achieve-
ment of valid operational objectives, there will not be unity in the air
The USAF element of Strike Command, a joint readiness force in the
United States, proposed a return to World War II organizational procedures.
That is, the Air Force would own and man air request communications down to
Army battalion level. To expand communications for air liaison officers and
forward air controllers, the Air Staff furnished 2d Air Division with twenty
contingency teams. Each consisted of a n airman operator and a commercial
KWM-2A single-sideband “suitcase”radio. Although messages were speeded to
the air operations center, there were too few teams to go around. General Anthis
eventually suggested setting up a n air request net within the Vietnamese ground
General O’Donnell felt sure that the tactical air control system had proved
its worth in the battle for Ap Bac. After all it had diverted planes to aid
Vietnamese troops at a critical time. With a n air request net, he suggested, the
system would be flexible enough to support the decentralized National Cam-
paign Plan. General Harkins disagreed. He said geography and imperfect com-
munications ruled out direct centralized control of the total air effort. Better, he
thought, to commit teams of Vietnamese and USAF strike aircraft to the corps
tactical zones and under their control. Harkins said the main function of the joint
operations center was to redistribute planes among the several zones according to
the tempo of local
These and other factors induced MACV in March to form a Flight Service
Center and Network at Tan Son Nhut to which every military flight would
report. General Harkins sought by this action to satisfy in part Admiral Felt’s
wish for General Anthis, the MACV air component commander, to possess
complete “coordinating authority” over air operations in Vietnam.
160
AP BAC A N D RELATED MATTERS
Seeking to settle the matter onceand for all, Admiral Felt compromised. He
asked Harkins to operate USAF aircraft in Vietnam under the tactical air control
system. The air operations center was to assign or allocate aircraft to the control
of the tactical corps for fixed periods. Felt also requested Harkins to bring U.S.
Army aviation units under the control system. Placing air operations under
centralized control would prevent mutual interference, facilitate flight following,
simplify air defense identification problems, and upgrade combat
General Harkins responded that the tactical air control system had not the
communications for precise coordination. In July he gave the MACV J-3 Army
air operations section general supervision over U.S. Marine Corps and U.S.
Army aviation. He designated the Marine Corps headquarters in I Corps and the
Army aviation battalion headquarters in the other corps zones to direct their air
operations. General Anthis protested the arrangement, saying it would create
two and perhaps five separate air control systems-and separate air wars-
within Vietnam. Harkins replied, “Let’s give these things a three or four month
trial.” He promised to change the setup if it failed to
The controversy reflected an overall decentralization. After Michael V.
Forrestal of the White House staff and Roger Hilsman of the State Department
visited Vietnam in December 1962, they criticized the “elaborate, set-piece”
military operations and the use of air power. Too many people, they informed
President Kennedy, were managing the American effort. There was n o overall
direction. They recommended a single strong executive-possibly a general,
preferably a civilian (an ambassador)-to dominate all departments and agen-
cies in the country and to give a single thrust to the multiple
The USAF directorate of plans drafted a position paper for possible use by
General LeMay at the Joint Chiefs meeting of January 7,1963. According to the
paper, the situation was of the “greatest concern,” even though many U.S.
programs enjoyed a long leadtime. “But when I see the Viet Cong continue to
grow in strength, Ican only assume that W E A R E N O T WINNING.” Army and
Air Force doctrinal disputes ought to be taken out of Vietnam. CINCPAC’s
requests should receive prompt attention. Harkins was in need of the “best
possible advice” through a n Air Force deputy, and Anthis should manage all air
operations. The major political obstacle of the war was Diem’s failure to secure
the real support and backing of his people. The major military obstacle was
trying to erase the guerrillas in the face of a seemingly endless stream of
replacements. Needed were greater U.S. air power until the Vietnamese Air
Force could go it alone, in-country pilot training of Vietnamese, and destruction
of Viet Cong food crops. “We should consider now the application of selected,
measured sanctions against the North Vietnamese.” Actions would range from
infiltrating agents through air bombardment to
Whatever was said at the January 7 meeting, the chiefs chose to send Gen.
Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, and a team of senior officers from the
military services to Vietnam. The group’s mission was “to form a military
judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the conflict within a
reasonable period of
161
THE ADVISORY YEARS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff swiftly authorized U.S. Army helicopters “to
engage clearly identified elements which are considered t o be a threat
to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers.” Admiral Felt then permitted
arming the Mohawks with 2.75-inch rockets.”
While the Wheeler team was sympathetic toward augmenting Air Force
units, the civilian leadership in Washington was more concerned with turning the
conflict over to the Vietnamese. On February Hanoi called upon the Interna-
tional Control Commission t o eject from Vietnam the USAF units that were
“playing a key role” and causing widespread damage. Secretary of State Rusk
was disturbed. He could hardly prevent American reporters from observing and
writing about U.S. operations. However, he wanted the MACV to
release no information on American combat air actions. The United States,
Rusk said, ought not t o hand the communists an excuse to escalate
The U.S. newspapers publicized the authorization for American helicopters
to fire on the enemy. Secretary refused t o comment except to say that
American military personnel were under instructions to fire their weapons only
when their own safety was a t stake, Secretary Rusk reiterated, “Our policy
remains that the American role in Vietnam be strictly limited to advisory,
logistic, and training
General Wheeler’s assessment in January rang with optimism.
The situation in Vietnam, Wheeler said, had been “reoriented, in the space of a
year and a half, from a circumstance of near desperation to a condition where
victory is now a hopeful prospect.” A heartening sign was the steep rise in
American advisory strength from nine hundred a t the start of 1962to more than
three thousand. At first there had been no advisors with battalions, but now there
were over four hundred. In a year the number of advisors helping province chiefs
had grown from two to one hundred or more. Though “we have not given
Chi Minh any evidence that we are prepared t o call him to account for helping
keep the insurgency alive,” Wheeler said, “we are winning slowly in the present
thrust.” There was compelling reason to
Air Force officers on the team did not quite agree with General Wheeler’s
evaluation. They believed sizable and long-lasting U.S. help a must. The war
I62
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS
could not be won quickly, nor could it be won finally until the Vietnamese people
got behind the government. This demanded military, political, and economic
actions - “U.S. assistance is vitally engaged in building a country, not in
defending a weak country against superior
MACV intelligence estimates showed that the number of full-time Viet
Cong guerrillas had risen through infiltration and local recruitment t o between
twenty-two thousand and twenty-five thousand. Each month about five hundred
stole into Vietnam by way of Laos and Cambodia. Late in January 1963 a
meeting was reportedly held in the Chinese Embassy at Phnom Penh, Cambo-
dia. Representatives of Hanoi, the National Liberation Front, and the Soviets
agreed to add twelve battalions to the Viet Cong. Eight were to be transferred
from Laos and four recruited in
T o the Viet Cong the battle of A p Bac was apparently a major turning point
in the war. It instilled confidence in their ability to fight American helicopters and
armored vehicles. Enemy leaders took credit for a new tactic - the deliberately
invited battle, described as “wipe-out-enemy-posts-and-annihilate-enemy rein-
forcements.” They would often resort to this tactic in the Mekong Delta, almost
always to good
On the Vietnamese side, there was a lull in military action after Ap Bac.
Admiral Felt believed the calm to have “both visible and hidden meaning.” The
Vietnamese seemed t o be in no hurry to launch operations. General Harkins in
February 1963 wrote President Diem. urging him to swiftly exploit the initiative
that his forces seemed t o have seized from the foe. “Time and weather,” Harkins
said, “are either for us or against us.”The communists, he added, “must not be
allowed to regroup or rest. We must attack and destroy them. We must hurt them
so badly that they will be forced to apply all their remaining resources merely to
survive.”Otherwise the Viet Cong might “neutralize much of the gain we won at
great cost and
But the Ap Bac engagement and American press coverage had damaged
relations with the Diem government. Newspaper accounts of the battle aroused
serious resentment in Vietnamese officials, particularly David Halberstam’s
criticism in the New York Times of Vietnamese performance. Newsmen spread
their belief that U.S. advisors had died while trying to lead Vietnamese troops
who would neither follow nor fight. Embittered Vietnamese leaders complained
that correspondents were interested merely in splashing sensational news on the
front pages when Americans were hurt. Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu recalled the
presidential palace bombing, when she and her children were in grave danger.
She said that U.S. reports revealed solely a n “ill-concealed regret that the
bombing had failed in its objective.” The Wheeler report commented on the
“mutual dislike and distrust” between the Vietnamese government and the
American press. Embarrassed by t he news reports of Vietnamese battlefield
misconduct, President Kennedy strove to repair the eroding trust between the
two governments. In his State of the Union Message t o Congress on January 14,
he declared that the spearhead of aggression had been blunted in
I63
THE ADVISORY YEARS
(Top left) Maj. Ivan L. Slavich briefs Gen. Earle G. Wheeler (center) and Gen. Paul D. Harkins on a rocket
mount of the UH-1 B helicopter.
(Top right) An' ARVN paratrooper prepares for a jump over Cu
(Center) TSgt. William W. Cameron instructs Vietnamese airmen in the operation
of the gunsight on a T-28.
(Below) Vietnamese tanks move toward the burning presidential palace after its bombing.
164
AP BAC AND RELATED MATTERS
Signs of dissension and mistrust were all too obvious. Back in November
1962, reports had reached Admiral Felt that Diem was withdrawing more into
seclusion and leaving many decisions to his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Both
sometimes regarded the numerous American advisors as a n encroachment on
Vietnamese sovereignty. They feared that the cautious U.S. policy in Laos
mirrored a weakening interest in Vietnam. They were upset by Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield’s report in February 1963. It said that after seven years
and four billion dollars of American aid, “the same difficulties remain, if, indeed,
they have not been compounded.” Vietnam was less stable and “more removed
from . . . popularly responsible and responsive government.” Did this fore-
shadow dwindling U.S. support?
The defense minister scored American allegations of hit-or-miss Vietnamese
bombing as a “corrosive influence” on the military effort. American attempts to
help the Government of Vietnam create an intelligence capability were probably
seen by Diem as a threat to his regime. The Minister of Interior resented the
involvement of Americans in the country as a danger to the republic’s internal
politics. President Diem labeled the Special Forces rural aid advisors and the
sector advisors as “particularly irritating.” Even though U.S. economic assist-
ance financed nearly all of the counterinsurgency, Diem objected to American
controls over matching counterpart funds. He called them degrading to Viet-
nam’s
In a series of private and public statements during April 1963, Ngo Dinh
Nhu dwelt upon U.S. “infringements” of Vietnamese sovereignty. Aid came, he
said, with too many strings attached. He told CIA Chief John H. Richardson
that it would help if the American presence were reduced anywhere from five
hundred to three or four thousand men. Richardson got the impression that Nhu
feared an emerging U.S. protectorate. Diem, Nhu said, had received many
complaints from subordinates about their American counterparts. Publicly, Nhu
was quoted as demanding the withdrawal of over two thousand U.S. advisors at
lower unit levels. Obviously referring to Ap Bac, he said that some American
casualties had occurred because the advisors were “daredevils” who exposed
themselves needlessly to enemy fire. Taking this statement as a forerunner of
things to come, the Vietnamese Air Force commander alerted his key personnel
to the possible withdrawal of U.S. forces. He warned them to conserve reserves,
prepare to go it alone, and get ready for hard days
The Vietnamese government did not officially request a reduction of Ameri-
can personnel, but Nhu’s statements induced a review of U.S. troop levels.
Evidence seemed to favor a lesser commitment of forces. Sir Robert Thompson
in March had reported the government as “beginning to win the shooting war
against the Viet Cong,”due chiefly to the American helicopters. He proposed a
psychological ploy that Admiral Felt passed to the Joint Chiefs by message. “If
things go right by end of 1963,”Felt said, “we should take one thousand military
personnel out of RVN at one time, make big proclamation out of this and
publicize widely. This would show ( I ) RVN is winning; (2) take steam out of
anti-Diemites; and (3) dramatically illustrate honesty of U.S. intentions.”
I65
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
I
Although some U.S. units were scheduled to leave Vietnam by the end of
1963, the J C S earlier that year had suggested and Secretary McNamara
approved an additional C-I23 Provider squadron for Da Nang. Arrival of the
777th Troop Carrier Squadron in April 1963 with sixteen C-I 23s augmented the
airlift of the twenty-nine C-I 23s at Tan Son Nhut. Crew manning permitted each
Provider to fly sixty hours per month. In addition eight U-1 Otters, sixteen 0-1 A
Bird Dog observation planes, ten UH-1B Iroquois helicopters, and a second
CV-2 Caribou company reached Vietnam to support the corps tactical zones and
Special Forces.’
General Harkins, MACV commander, had agreed to place the CV-2s under
the coordinated airlift system. However, Army headquarters in Hawaii urged
Admiral Felt to recognize the special features of the Caribou. The Army had
purchased the planes for short-takeoff-and-landing, which rendered them
instantly responsive to ground commanders in combat zones. While centralized
control of airlift was more efficient for cargo deliveries, swift reaction to a field
commander’s needs came first. In this context Harkins assigned the two Caribou
companies to centralized airlift control, but one of these had the further mission
of immediate support to the senior corps advisors.*
The Southeast Asia Airlift System managed the forty-eight Air Force
C-I 23s, thirty-two Vietnamese C 4 7 s , and thirty-two Army CV-2s. Though the
C-123s normally made deliveries to four major depots and twenty-nine other
distribution points, they actually operated at ninety-five different airfields and
sixty-five drop zones. Carrying a lighter load than the C-123, the CV-2 could use
shorter runways. But reversible propellers let the Provider land on wet surfaces in
distances impossible for the Caribou, not yet so equipped.)
The 8th Aerial Port Squadron expanded in May by creating Detachments 6
and 7 at Qui Nhon and Can Tho. Temporary duty personnel served 120-day duty
tours at the new
Much of the Southeast Asia Airlift System’s work dealt with tactical
operations. About thirty percent of the troop carrier flights were paradrop
resupply, paratrooper drops, and assault air landings. Resolute efforts to support
remote stations drew grateful praise from the ground troops. They deemed the
system reliable and
Uncertain surface travel, the conservative bent of logistic planners, and the
use of scaled U.S. planning factors tended to inflate requirements. In October the
airlift system’s excess capacity prompted plans for reduction. In December
MACV strength was pared by one thousand. Released were personnel of the
Army’s 1st Aviation Company (Caribou), the thirty USAF C 4 7 pilots flying
with the Vietnamese Air Force, and half of the 8th Aerial Port Squadron’s
people. The 61 st Aviation Company (Caribou) with twenty-five CV-2s stayed
behind to support senior corps advisors. Some of these Caribous became spares
I67
THE ADVISORY YEARS
I68
AIR OPERATIONS,
170
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963
171
THE ADVISORY YEARS
one C-47 at Soc Trang, where the unimproved 3,200-foot runway admitted. only
T-28 operations. 25
Until General Harkins in midyear gave the Vietnamese border control
troops some aircraft of their own, Farm Gate flew combat support for them.
These forces embraced about five thousand Vietnamese army, rangers, and
Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel, accompanied by U.S. Special For-
ces advisors. They manned 103 outposts along Vietnam’s 900-mile land border to
cut down on Viet Cong infiltration. Varying in size from platoon to battalion,
they further carried out covert penetrations across the frontier. State Depart-
ment pressure prompted the Joint General Staff to forbid ground and air
operations within ten kilometers of the border without prior approval. MACV
termed the restriction “completely incongruous,”for this strip of de facto demili-
tarized territory afforded the Viet Cong safe haven. 26
Over the last days of March 1963, U.S. Special Forces mounted an opera-
tion in the Seven Mountains of southwestern Vietnam. Farm Gate bombing
before the assault killed about one hundred fifty enemy and let the ground troops
move into the hills. Capt. John Sercel, the 2d Air Division forward air controller
assigned to the operation, went with the troops on foot and directed air strikes
with a PRC-10 radio. Even though the attack brought Vietnamese territory
under government control, the I V Corps commander protested the intrusion into
his zone. The Joint General Staff then ruled that Special Forces teams had to
request air support through Vietnamese
Ten days later the Joint General Staff removed earlier curbs on border
operations. Vietnamese ground forces could now operate to the border wherever
a geographical feature such as a river or road clearly marked it. Elsewhere they
could go to within one thousand meters of the border, except along the northern
part where a strip of ten thousand meters applied. Vietnamese aircraft could
operate to the border where it was clearly visible, elsewhere to two thousand
meters if a forward air controller was at hand, and to five thousand meters
without air control. Corps headquarters rather than the Joint General Staff had
to approve all actions along the
The State Department ordered Ambassador Nolting to press for suspension
of the new procedures since they could inflame Cambodia, North Vietnam, and
China. Nolting was sympathetic to the new rules because of the considerable
supplies coming across the borders to the Viet Cong. All the same, he and
General Harkins talked with Vietnamese officials about how border violations
seriously disturbed the common interests of Vietnam and the United States.
Admiral Felt knew border incidents could be disruptive, but thought that
trimming infiltration was worth the risk. General O’Donnell proposed having
U.S. aircraft survey the border to correct map errors. His proposal was shelved
for fear of breaching the 1962 Geneva agreement on Laotian
At the Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii on May 6, the partici-
pants agreed that the troops stationed along the border must d o their utmost to
slow down enemy movements. But they believed putting pressure on Hanoi to be
a better way to end infiltration. In April the Joint Chiefs had identified eight
I72
AIR OPERATIONS.
targets in North Vietnam that were vulnerable to attack from American carrier-
and Thailand-based aircraft. Among them were the Dong and air-
fields, several highway bridges, POL storage, the thermal powerplant,
a rolling mill, and a chemical plant. Bombing would be a warning to Chi
Minh but risked bringing Chinese air assistance to North Vietnam.
Mr. now recommended to theconferees that CINCPAC embody
air strikes against North Vietnam for planning options. Perhaps the State
Department fetters on covert operations into North Vietnam could be
loosened.
Roger of the State Department informed the group that he was
optimistic about the border control exercised by the Special Forces and
Strategic hamlets combined with operations were mak-
ing dramatic gains. He predicted, “You have circles; in the center of each circle is
a Special Forces team. These circles are getting bigger. When they close up,
think you will see a noticeable choking down of the use of the infiltration
groups.”“
Admiral Felt said he also expected solid progress from the air strikes against
Viet war zones and bases. He scored these power centers as the “nuclei of
the ‘governmental’ structure,” giving “protective sanctuaries” for offensive
enemy operations, and providing “little arsenals and installations.” Unfortu-
nately, all-out interdiction clashed with the individual interests of the largely
independent corps commanders. While USAF liaison officers called for interdic-
tion, air attacks not tied directly to ground operations began to decline.
Vietnamese probes into Viet Zone D during February and March
made good use of air interdiction strikes. Rangers swept into the area
later and burnt enemy headquarters and camps along the Ma River. They
discovered deep, log-covered bunkers built by the communists to protect against
air attacks. Inasmuch as fighters usually circled before striking, there was enough
time for everybody to take cover.
In March the Air Force and Army advisors in that area got the go-ahead for
a prolonged low-priority interdiction bombing program. Planes returning to
base with unused ordnance could attack targets under thedirection of a Vietnam-
ese forward air controller. Strikes got under way on April and went on almost
every day. It was difficult to assess results due to the jungle cover. On April
fighters surprised a gathering of Viet and attacked. Inspecting the area the
next day, the Province chief estimated that over one hundred
enemy had been killed. Viet deserters confirmed that the strikes inflicted
casualties, damaged morale, and kept everyone on the move, but said the attacks
were no serious threat to their existence. The communists kept a firm grip on
Zone continuing to collect road taxes and to exact tribute from plantation
owners.
Between April and May the Corps commander spearheaded a drive
into the Do War Zone headquarters area of Viet Interzone in the
mountains on the borders of and Tin Provinces.
His five regiments of ground troops and two battalions of Vietnamese marines
I
T H E A D V I S O R Y YEARS
totaled about ten thousand men, assisted by an air support operations center.
The three days of preliminary interdiction generated thirty-six A-I H, fourteen
T-28, and t hirty-four B-26 sorties. Throughout the month-long operation, pilots
flew I 15 A-I H, 108 T-28, and seventy-four B-26 sorties. Besides killing five Viet
Cong, these timely and potent air strikes destroyed 238 structures and damaged
77. The badly scattered enemy would need several months to return and reestab-
lish Viet Cong Region 5 which, like the old Interzone V, guarded infiltration
routes to base areas. 35
Air Force and Vietnamese pilots faithfully followed the rule that air strikes
had to be handled by a Vietnamese forward air controller. Although the proce-
dure precluded armed reconnaissance aircraft from attacking targets of oppor-
tunity, it was a sound precaution against indiscriminate bombing. Crews staging
to and from forward airfields were encouraged to fly low and seek out the enemy.
Before they could attack, however, they needed an airborne forward air con-
troller. Army OV-I crews enjoyed less stringent rules of engagement. They
frequently flew as low as fifty feet, enticing the Viet Cong to open fire so they
could shoot
Lt. Col. David S. Mellish, I l l Corps air liaison officer, secured authority i n
September to start a n air interdiction program. Vietnamese province chiefs
certified certain areas free of friendly people. The air operations center scheduled
air strikes under forward air controllers into these regions. Provincial officials
reviewed each target belt weekly. . . . -
This interdiction paid off in Tay Ninh and Phuoc Thanh Provinces during
October, though, the Viet Cong learned to disperse and take cover as soon as the
L-19 dropped smoke grenades to mark targets for the strike planes. Mellish
persistently urged armed reconnaissance in wholly Viet Cong sections. “Vietnam-
ese pilots,”he said, “should sweep these areas and shoot VC on sight. At present,
we are ineffective because our politically inspired target-marking is the best
possible air raid warning the VC could hope to have.”
Col. Donald H. Ross, 2d Air Division director of operations, reminded his
associates that the Vietnamese - not the Americans - were waging the war.
Forward air controllers were vital to protect friendly people. 37
Carefully targeted and controlled interdiction strikes on Viet Cong base
camps, assembly areas, and logistic installations were designed to help ground
troops clear and hold Vietnam. But the overriding air mission was support,
preparation and cover for heliborne landings, night hamlet defense, and escort
for convoys and trains. 38
Over the first half of 1963, Vietnamese L- 19s usually escorted truck convoys
and trains but strike aircraft covered those transporting high-priority cargoes.
Vietnamese and USAF platies flew close to one thousand sorties in these
missions. The Viet Cong ambushed no surface movement having air cover, yet
were quick to pounce on motor columns and trains wanting aerial
Developed from original Farm Gate tactics, night flare/strike missions in
defense of outposts and hamlets under attack remained effective. One Vietnam-
ese C-47 flareship stayed on night ground alert at Pleiku, a second stood similar
I74
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963
duty at Da Nang, and a third flew airborne alert every night over III and I V
Corps. Yet the commander of the 514th Fighter Squadron refused to accept
orders for A-I H night-strike crews alerted at Bien Hoa and Pleiku. He argued
that his pilots were not ready to fly at night, but yielded to American pressure and
accepted about half of the missions requested. Fighters working with a flareship
could commonly dispense with a forward air controller during strikes in defense
of an installation. However, for close air support of friendly troops under attack
at night, a controller was required to mark targets.
Success of flare/strike defensive missions depended upon the speed with
which those under attack could report to an air support operations center. By
May 1963 most villages had radios, and the time lapse between attack and report
averaged about forty-eight minutes. The delay stemmed chiefly from the short
ranges of the provincial radio transmitters that demanded retransmission of
messages, often at district, sector, and division levels. Viet Cong attacks on
hamlets and outposts from January through April were few, and an average of
thirty-three C 4 7 sorties was flown each month. The enemy customarily broke
off an attack when a flare plane came on the
In the far northern I Corps, the 1st and 2d Divisions controlled the coastal
plain to the mountains. The Viet Cong owned the mountains aside from Special
Forces camps along the Laotian border and in the A Shau Valley corridor
toward Da Nang. In mid-January 1963 the U.S. Marine Corps helicopter
squadron H M M-162 became operational at Da Nang, with staging areas at Hue
and at a point midway between Da Nang and Quang Ngai. This unit’s H-34s
supported the border outposts with resupply and troop-exchange missions that
normally needed no strike aircraft support. But air mobile troops assault opera-
tions took careful advance planning for fighter escort, landing-zone preparation,
and air cover. In these operations the H-34s flew in three-ship elements, one
minute apart, en route to the landing zone. The helicopter commanders ran the
whole affair, calling for strike aircraft to neutralize enemy fire. Even though the
Marine Corps helicopter commanders evaluated the Vietnamese A-I H pilots as
“outstanding,” they favored USAF fighters because there was no communica-
tions language problem. When a platoon of Army UH-1 helicopters at Da Nang
was attainable in April, these gunships protected landing zones.
The I Corps commander had to approve all requests for air strikes.
Members of 2d Air Division who visited the air operations center there had the
impression that U.S. Army advisors dominated the scene. For example, the
advisors funneled many air support requests to the two armed OV-1 Mohawks
stationed at Da
In the II Corps eight USAF B-26s joined the four Vietnamese A-I Hs at
Pleiku. At once air support sorties rose, probably because Vietnamese ground
officers could see the aircraft on hand. But communications with the division
command posts at Qui Nhon and Quang Ngai were regularly unreliable. And
bad weather in the moutains east and northeast of Pleiku repeatedly impeded
flights to the coastal provinces. 42
175
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
AIR OPERATIONS
CAI
unable to accept strike aircraft at assigned rendezvous points. Air Force L-19s
with American pilots and Vietnamese observers solved the problems. 45
Poor performance by Vietnamese aircrews imperiled several ground opera-
tions in the I 1 Corps. Operations nonetheless made marked gains around Saigon,
disrupting a key Viet Cong base and defending strategic hamlets in Quang Ngai
Province against severe communist attacks. More and more local residents came
forth with information on Viet Cong movements, and the Popular Forces
defending the hamlets killed 383 enemy while losing 33 of their
In the III Corps north of Saigon, Vietnamese forces were busy. Rangers
probed into Zone D, the 5th Division engaged the enemy in Zone C of Tay Ninh
Province, and the 23d Division attacked Viet Cong bands and protected hamlets
in the Ban Me Thuot area. Not one of these operations received enough tactical
air support. The L-19s of the 112th Liaison Squadron at Tan Son Nhut worked
both IIIand IV Corps, and thus were often unavailable to one or the other. Poor
communications between III Corps headquarters and Ban Me Thuot led to
authorizing the 23d Division eight T-28 sorties each day from Nha Trang. As the
division pushed deeper into Tay Ninh Province and outran dependable landline
communications, radio equipment troubles increasingly impeded air support.
The use of U.S. Army armed helicopters for fire support came to be
The IV Corps employed the 7th and 21st Divisions in the generally flat and
water-sodden terrain of the densely populated Mekong Delta, where transporta-
tion was mostly by canal but some by road. The ground favored the guerrillas
who massed at places and times of their choosing. Skimpy landline communica-
tions made for heavy radio traffic. At Soc Trang the five USAF T-28s, together
with a detachment of L-19s from the 122d Liaison Squadron at Can Tho,
afforded air strikes and forward air control. Like all other airfields in the delta,
SOCTrang needed development. Its unlighted 3,300-foot runway was suited
solely to daytime T-28 operations. The glide slope was too steep for a T-28 to
touch down safely in wet weather. Though a T-28 could take off at night or in bad
weather to land after a mission it had to go to Saigon. MACV proposed
constructing a n airfield at Can Tho to replace SOCTrang. Even so, building a
6,000-foot runway would take nearly $4.5 million in Military Assistance Pro-
gram funds and about two years to complete. The project continued under study
in
The 7th Division was distinctly less aggressive following the battle of Ap
Bac. The division commander, believing that the Viet Cong were monitoring his
radio, directed unit commanders to handcarry requests for air support to the
division headquarters. The 2 1st Division engaged extensively in heliborne opera-
tions through February and March. Plans were usually too ambitious for the
troops committed, and the enemy was never where he was supposed to be.
Postponements and no-notice changes in plans complicated the air scheduling of
escort and strike planes. After three visiting Americans were pinned down by
enemy fire for a n hour while strike aircraft were circling overhead and no
forward air controller was to be had, three USAF pilots were assigned to the
Vietnamese L- 19 detachment at Can
I77
THE ADVISORY YEARS
I78
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963
electrical specialists, armorers, and other skilled men. There was also a dearth of
specialist tools, test sets, as well as bomb-handling trailers and other ground-
handling equipment. In consequence the Vietnamese aircraft at forward fields
were quickly out of Yet Col. Harvey E. Henderson, deputy
commander of 2d Air Division, could say, “In my six months here, I have been
amazed a t the rapidity with which the VNAF have learned and improved their
Belying the progress was the resurgence of Viet Cong attacks. In July the
communists successfully struck hamlets south of Ban Me Thuot, and ambushed
the roads leading into the area. They cowed the Montagnards, who became less
helpful intelligence sources. In a ten-minute attack just before midnight on July
16, twenty to thirty 60-mm mortar rounds slammed into troop housing at Can
T h o Airfield and wounded seventeen Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces
troops. The guerrillas slipped away without
Statistics revealed a rising trend in Viet Congattacks and other incidents but
a drop in the number of communist casualties, weapon losses, and defections.
Even though General Harkins was pleased with the fifteen thousand Vietnamese
operations per month in Julyand August, the National Campaign Plan needed a
shot in the arm. Many offensive forays failed to find the foe. There were too
many one-day-only operations, too few night ones. The Vietnamese did not
patrol deep within Viet Congareas, pursue enemy troops that broke contact, and
capitalize on air
Beginning in September, the Viet Cong swept over exposed hamlets in the
area south of Ban Me Thuot. In the better-defended hamlets of Quang Ngai
Province, enemy “activity teams” of three to five men achieved some gains.
Vietnamese intelligence identified a large-scale, well-planned communist offen-
sive in the Mekong
Visiting Vietnam during the last week of September, Secretary McNamara
and General Taylor deemed the military situation good but political conditions
explosive. A week later in Saigon, General Harkins told members of the House
foreign affairs Far East subcommittee that the military effort was going well
despite the shaky political scene. A significant JCS assessment supported this
The faster tempo of Viet Cong attacks created new air support needs as
Vietnamese and U S A F air power diminished. Vietnamese Air Force units
appeared to be more interested in training than in combat. The 516th Fighter
Squadron commander trimmed the T-28s in his detachment at Da Nang from
eight to four. He based his action on the desire t o release some T-28 pilots for
upgrade training to A-I Hs. In September the 5 14th Fighter Squadron com-
mander gave on the average just nine of his twenty-six A-I Hs to the air opera-
tions center for daily strike missions, saying he had to divert flying hours to A-I H
pilot upgrading. For reasons unclear to Americans, he regularly ignored requests
for napalm strikes. This happened principally in the IIIand I V Corps during the
rainy season, even though incendiaries worked better than explosives in the
I79
THE ADVISORY YEARS
I80
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963
water-soaked terrain. Crews deployed for a while away from home bases seemed
t o be unmotivated, uneager, and
Under the rules of engagement, Farm Gate continued to fly those combat
missions that the Vietnamese could not. Though given more people, Farm Gate
failed to increase its sortie rate. The unit had been permitted to scale down
normal maintenance because of the field operating conditions. Moreover, the
planes were being overworked, and by autumn they were becoming less safe to
fly. The operational readiness rate reached only fifty to sixty percent, due chiefly
to spare parts shortages. lnflight mechanical failures and enemy action likewise
took their toll.
A major cause of B-26 fatigue not yet identified in the field was the
eight 750-pound bombs hung on specially designed racks under the aircraft’s
wings. When the B-26 was airborne, this weight did not overstress the wings. But
taxiing the heavily armed plane for many months over rough runways and ramps
imposed excessive “negative G-force” that brought the wings to their fatigue
limit. A B-26 lost a wing in flight during a combat mission on August 16, killing
two Americans and a Vietnamese. September was no better. Twenty-three
aircraft suffered battle damage. Another B-26 and a T-28 crashed because of
mechanical failures. On the 23d, three Viet Cong guerrillas cut through the
perimeter fence at Nha Trang and with package explosives blew up two
General Anthis hoped to keep the B-26s going by having the crews fly them
cautiously and use soft approach and recovery tactics. In any event, every B-26
was set for rotation through depot maintenance contracted with Air Asia in
Taiwan. Anthis urged replacing the battle weary B-26s with dual-control Navy
A-I E fighters or with “On Mark” B-26Ks being refurbished in the United States
by the On Mark Engineering Company. In August and September the 1st Air
Commando Squadron was down to an average of nine T-28s and nine to twelve
B-26s. Still, Farm Gate was supposed to up its sortie rate by twenty percent to
support planned Vietnamese ground
Although Farm Gate owned fewer planes after October 1963, standard
U S A F maintenance procedures by the 34th CAMRON at Bien Hoa lifted the
operationally ready rate to around seventy-eight percent. Past Farm Gate practi-
ces required thirty to forty-five minutes to refuel, rearm, and turn around a flight
of two T-28s. New safety checklists made two-hour turnarounds for T-28s and
three-hour ones for B-26s the norm. Too few aircraft and a cutback in flying
dampened morale in the overmanned 1st Air Commando Squadron. Depressed
crews waited for days to fly a strike
A dearth of L-19s (0-1s) and crews for forward air control also sharply
curtailed combat operations. Between May and August, 43 1 air support requests
had to be turned down. The arrival of the Army’s 73d Aviation Company and the
activation of the Air Force’s 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron did not cure the
trouble. Instead of placing the twenty-two 0-1s of the 73d Aviation Company
under the tactical air control system, MACV assigned them to support Army
advisors. The Vietnamese promptly withdrew their L-19s from the ground
divisions because they felt that their craft were no longer needed. Army 0-1s flew
THE ADVISORY YEARS
the local visual reconnaissance and convoy escort previously flown by the
Vietnamese liaison planes. However, removal of the deprived forward air
controllers and air liaison officers of transportation, unless they could borrow
from the Army advisors.
As for the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron, it was fully operational
September The unit, commanded by Lt. Col. John kept sixteen
Is at and six at Can Tho. By year’s end they flew sorties, chiefly
forward air control. I visual reconnaissance, and combat support
liaison. The and can-do attitude” of the crews bred a huge
demand for their services. The Americans met with slight success in trying to
augment rather than supplant Vietnamese liaison
A few USAF pilots who flew with Vietnamese forward air controllers
realized that these men had been doing a boring and fairly thanklessjob for many
years with no end in sight. Since the average Vietnamese pilot saw the law of
averages working against him, he was reluctant to fly below two thousand feet. If
he directed an attack on friendly people, criminal prosecution awaited him.
Nonetheless, the prevailing American view pictured Vietnamese crews as unag-
gressive and unreliable. By October this disapproval was being expressed by the
overwhelming sentiment that “we must run
As sorties swelled to meet attacks, premission briefings were
seldom practical. Responding to requests, Vietnamese forward air controllers
frequently flew many miles to an unfamiliar area. They radioed the ground unit
to find out the locations of friendly and enemy troops, then marked targets for
the strike crews. Air Force officers repeatedly urged the Vietnamese to attach air
liaison officers and forward air controllers to divisions, so they could get to know
the local conditions. The Vietnamese Air Force said no, citing the scarcity of
qualified officers, the failure of the young ones to work well when removed from
close supervision, and the discord between air and ground
Divisions tended to rely upon helicopter firepower. For example, in numer-
ous small operations in Ban Me area throughout September, the
Division requested fighter air support only once. The lone C 4 7 flareship stand-
for the Saigon area could not cope with the burgeoning night attacks in
the and Corps. Moreover, when the struck the
outpost on the Peninsula during the night of August the province
commander’s indecision delayed that C-47. In the one hour and forty-five
minutes before it came, the communists overran the outpost. A few days later,
the enemy sacked the Ben strategic hamlet that had been founded a year
before with much fanfare. Using flareships to light the way for helicopter airlifts
of company-size forces into besieged hamlets proved impractical. This was due TO
the great number of hamlets (some twelve hundred in the III Corps) and the slow
reaction time of reinforcement units flying in the
The Air Division wrestled with the problems. alerted A-I H
loaded strike ordnance and two flares, the latter for use if flareships were not to
be had. For additional flare missions, the best bet appeared to be the C-I which I
I82
AIR OPERATIONS, 1963
crewman hand-dropped the Mark V and VI flares, they often hit the sides of the
aircraft and were swept back into the open rear cargo door. T o prevent this, local
shops devised a flarebox that dispensed flares from the C-I 23's rear cargo ramp.
This device let the C-123s a t Tan Son Nhut join the Vietnamese C-47s, and in
September I72 flare and I32 strike sorties were flown against Viet Cong night
attacks. Fewer communist forays in October resulted in 60 flare and 94 strike
sorties. But the pace accelerated, and up to three flareships each night were kept
in the air over the 1V Corps. At least one of these planes could reach any point in
the delta within twenty t o thirty minutes. The Viet Cong captured no outpost or
hamlet after a flare/strike team arrived. Even so, the hamlet program was so
overextended that in many cases the defenders could not hold off the attackers
until air support got
The vulnerable Mekong Delta induced the Viet Cong to escalate the war
from simple guerrilla tactics t o sustained field operations. A five-day battle
erupted in the wee hours of September 10 as 81-mm mortar rounds arced onto
SOCTrang Airfield. Inside of five minutes, four Farm Gate pilots scramhled two
T-28s, called for flareship and more fighters, and strafed the mortar muzzle
flashes. This swift air support along with Vietnamese mortar fire drove off the
communists, foiling their bid to neutralize and destroy the American fighters and
helicopters on the airstrip. The aggressive action of the pilots was "commenda-
ble." All the same, they had broken the rules of engagement by attacking without
Vietnamese crewmen and without target assistance from a forward air controller
or
At about the same time, Viet Cong battalions pounded the district head-
quarters town of Dam Doi and Cai Nuoc near the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula.
Swarming over Cai Nuoc, they set up roadblocks and laid mines on the sole
surfaced road between Bac Lieu and Ca Mau. Right after daybreak, T-28s out of
SOCTrang escorted heliborne Vietnamese marines to Dam Doi and carried out
prelanding strikes. Most landings went well, but that afternoon a T-28 crashed
from fire received during a third pass over a n enemy machinegun. A UH-1
gunship rescued the crew, and the T-28 was destroyed t o keep its machinegun out
of communist hands. While marines encircled Dam Doi, ten C-47s and seven
C-123s flew 498 paratroopers of the 21st Division to the scene.
The battle cost the enemy 122 killed (30 by air strikes) and huge stores of
munitions. Around Cai Nuoc the paratroopers killed 50 communists, captured
eight, and seized weapons. The sortie rate for September 10 exceeded all past I V
Corps records for a single day. Over September 10-14 the sortie total ran t o
seventy-two air cover, ten escort, eighteen prelanding, and twenty-two forward
air control. The government troops won a victory but the Viet Cong reduced the
towns to rubble and left 153 civilians killed or
The most critical shortcoming was too few strike aircraft to support the
bitter war in the delta. Only one B-26 could be spared to cover heliborne
operations in the 2d Division area. The five USAF T-28s at SOCTrang were
invaluable for quick reaction but the primitive airstrip hampered them, and
their guns were too light to silence ground fire. Heavier-armed A-I Hs or B-26s a t
I83
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Bien Hoa had to make a thirty-minute flight to Can Tho or a one-hour one to the
deep delta. Aware of this lag, the Viet Cong usually attacked in mid-afternoon to
make it difficult for aircraft to get into the area, to swing into position, and to
strike during the few remaining hours of In January 1964 CINCPAC
approved the construction of a new airfield at Can Tho, to beready a year
Planning a helicopter assault into three landing zones in mid-October, the
21st Division asked for strong tactical air support. Five USAF T-28s, two
A-I Hs, and one B-26 were available for cover, escort and prelanding strikes. On
the morning of October 19, T-28s supported the first helicopter lift of troops
which met with light ground fire at the landing zone. The Viet Cong put stiffer
fire on the second heli-lift and pinned down the troops that landed. They also hit
and damaged a B-26 and a T-28, forcing the planes to leave their covering
stations. The third heli-lift overshot its landing zone, and enemy fire downed a n
H-2 I , injuring two of the four Americans aboard. With troops in the second and
third heli-lifts nailed down, Vietnamese forward air controllers diverted all of
their air cover to close air support strikes.
In response to the division commander’s call for more air support, the
planes returned and renewed their strikes that afternoon. Army advisors praised
the aggressiveness of the support, chiefly that of the B-26. It pursued the attack
with other ordnance after its guns quit, even though under fire from six to eight
automatic weapons. The Viet Cong held firm in their trenches and fired doggedly
at attacking aircraft. When they withdrew at nightfall under cover of rain, pursuit
by flareship and fighters was out of the question because locations of government
forces were uncertain. During the battle, Vietnamese flew six A-1 H and eight T-28
sorties while USAF crews flew sixteen T-28 and two B-26 sorties. Ground fire
struck two Vietnamese T-28s, four USAF T-28s, and two USAF B-26s. Friendly
losses included forty-one killed, eighty-four wounded, (twenty-three Americans)
and one H-21 shot down. Thirty-two of the enemy were killed and in addition
fifty-nine freshly dug graves were
Early on the morning o f November 7, some two hundred Viet Cong
attacked a pagoda and then holed up in a mud-walled fishing settlement about
twenty miles from Soc Trang. In late afternoon, regular ground forces and Civil
Guard troops located and surrounded them. Although no friendly people were in
the village, the government troops made no assault. Instead, they let four T-28s
from Soc Trang conduct repeated strikes. The next day, blood marks within the
enclosure suggested that the aircraft had killed about forty Viet
By the end of I963 the government military offensive was collapsing, despite
occasional and isolated successes. The Viet Cong were seizing the initiative nearly
everywhere. The limited number of USAF and Vietnamese aircraft in Vietnam
had nevertheless scored some tactical gains i n the face of severe handicaps.
184
XVI. Collapse of the
Diem Government
At the Secretary of Defense Conference in Honolulu on May 6, 1963, the
participants discussed the tensions between the American and Vietnamese
governments. Ambassador Nolting labeled American-Vietnamese relations as
“somewhat less than good.” President Diem was intimating that the United
States was infringing on Vietnamese sovereignty. Nhu, his brother and counse-
lor, was suggesting that the American advisory effort was “appearing to tamper
with Diem’s political base.” Both were suspicious of the strength of the American
commitment and the thrust of U.S. policy. Nevertheless, Nolting said, Nhu was
“efficient and continues to accumulate power.” Despite causes for concern, “the
Country Team is of the unanimous opinion that the current leadership is the best
the U.S. can get. It is sincere, albeit not particularly adept, but it is better than
most in Southeast Asia.”’
Two days later in Saigon, demonstrators celebrating Buddha’s birthday
paraded with religious flags, banners, and devotional images. The procession
violated the 1950 ordinance forbidding the flying of any flag in public without the
national emblem beside it. A monk delivered a sermon protesting the Diem
government’s discrimination against Buddhists. When Civil Guard troops
moved to break up the rally, an explosion killed several persons including
children. In a communiqué to the press, Buddhist leaders demanded that the
government admit responsibility for the loss of life, rescind the flag regulation,
and give Buddhists equality with Catholics.²
Some eight million Vietnamese were Buddhists, as compared with one and
one-half million Christians. Diem, Nhu, and their families had connections with
French missionaries who represented the old order. 3
When a Washington newspaper published an anti-American statement
attributed to Ngo Dinh Nhu, Representative Otto Passman, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Appropriations vented his indignation to Defense Secretary
McNamara. “Certainly,” Passman said, “the Diem government ought to be
made to understand that the American people have no interest in propping up a n
unpopular regime if it is more concerned with the pursuit of personal aims than
with the protection of the country from communism.” An embarrassed President
Kennedy told newsmen that he hoped to withdraw some Americans by the end of
the year.
Diem meanwhile offered no redress to a Buddhist delegation but promised
to investigate the parade incident, which he believed had political rather than
religious roots. Dissatisfied, Buddhists demonstrated early in June in Hue.
Several deaths resulted, and disorders spread to Quang Tri and Nha Trang.
While the Defense Department ordered U.S. aircraft not to transport Vietnam-
ese troops on anti-Buddhist missions, and while General Harkins instructed
185
THE ADVISORY YEARS
186
COLLAPSE OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT
I87
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
the American people and government against Diem, Secretary of State Rusk
told when he returned to Washington. “We can’t stand any more
burning,” Rusk said.”
At a National Security Council discussion, made the point that
refusal t o support Diem and would renege on past commitments. Ball
argued that continued support for them risked losing the war against the
moreover, Diem and had massively violated their promises.
man felt that had been profoundly wrong for quite some time.
Replying to the cabled instructions, Ambassador Lodge suggested telling
the generals hostile to Diem that the United States had grave reservations about
the The State Department approved on August and commented that
the would have to go and “a coup will be responded on the
“We are launched on a course from which there is no respectable turning
back: the overthrow of the Diem government.” President Kennedy weighed this
appraisal then ordered Lodge and Harkins to support a coup if it had a good
chance of success but to avoid any direct American involvement. He authorized
them to suspend U.S. air support to the Diem government whenever they wished.
Also on the Secretary of State Rusk permitted Lodge to explore
Harkins’ suggestion that a threat to withdraw U.S. assistance might well force
Diem to d r o p the This seemed to Lodge t o cancel the earlier instrumenta-
tions t o “make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem’s replace-
now understood the President to want him “not to coup, not
to help plan a coup, but rather to keep in close touch with plotters so he could let
Kennedy know of developments that might need American decisions. Looking
for the imminent overthrow government, Lodge stopped seeing Diem and
17
I88
C O L L A P S E OF T H E D I E M G O V E R N M E N T
sions had been unwise. Could the government regain the affection of the people?
“With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel,” the President said, “I think
it can. If it doesn’t make those changes, I
would think that the chances of winning
would not be very
De Gaulle’s scheme to unify and neutralize Vietnam led Ngo Dinh Nhu to
admit having contacted Viet Cong leaders of the National Liberation Front of
South Vietnam. Apparently he was also in touch with Hanoi. On September 2 he
told Lodge of his talk with the Polish member of the International Control
Commission. The Pole had sought Nhu’s reaction to De Gaulle’s proposal, so
that he could forward it to the North Vietnamese foreign minister.’’ Many
top-level Vietnamese officers were convinced that Nhu would make a deal with
Hanoi if he felt it to be in his best
Diem answered U Thant’s letter on September 5 . He stressed his govern-
ment’s actions to free the Buddhist hierarchy from political agitation and propa-
ganda, which benefited foreign interests and harmed the Buddhist religion and
the Vietnamese state. He invited U Thant to send a fact-finding mission to
Vietnam. When a United Nations group visited, it reached no conclusions.
Nevertheless, the Costa Rican member said that he personally had found no
religious discrimination or persecution. He believed that the troubles were
political and involved but a small part of the Buddhist
On 8 September General Smart radioed General LeMay:
My own feeling is that if we intend to remain committed in Viet Nam and I
believe that it is strongly in the national interest that we d o so -then we must support
Diem. Whether we like him or his family is not germane., My conclusion is that we
must stick with Diem and that we must quickly demonstrate this by positive action
even though we may have to pay some price in terms of embarrassment. We are
probably going to have to swallow the fact that Diem will not exile his brother.. and
from my discussions I a m not at all convinced that this should be our objective. I get
distinct impression from Vietnamese that he isvaluable and important to Diem, just as
Diem is important to the
Unlike Nolting who had used the country team to secure policy consensus,
Lodge was ordered by Kennedy to guard closely the cables they exchanged.
Keeping even Harkins in the dark, he thus appeared to be running the U.S.
Mission as “a one-man operation, conducted in total secrecy.” General Smart
noted, “The American team left me with the impression of a divided house
and divergent directions.” Opinions about Diem, as observed by Smart, ranged
from the view held by J o h n H. Richardson, CIA station chief, that Diem could
be supported and Nhu was useful, to theview that the Diem government must go
no matter what took its Reports to Washington from the Embassy,
MACV, and the air attache differed markedly. Joseph A. Mendenhall of the
State Department and Maj. Gen. Victor H. Krulak of the Marine Corps visited
the country together to determine Vietnamese attitudes toward Diem’s govern-
ment. After hearing their disparate findings, President Kennedy asked whether
they had visited the same country.”
Suspending U.S. aid to pressure Diem, as Lodge now suggested, seemed to
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to threaten the war effort. President Kennedy
I89
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
I90
COLLAPSE OF T H E DIEM GOVERNMENT
coalition resolved t o remove the IV Corps commander who was also military
governor of Saigon and loyal to Diem.
Although American officials took care t o avoid any part in the coup, some
U.S. military circles received persistent reports that a conspiracy was afoot. On
October 28 the Joint Chiefs directed CINCPAC to sail a naval task force t o
positions off Vietnam, and that same day three USAF F-102Jet interceptors flew
to Tan Son Nhut. General Harkins was taken aback when told of these moves.
He had no idea that Diem’s overthrow was near.
On the morning of November 1 the conspirators gathered in the Joint
General Staff compound, and began to bring troops into Saigon. General Don
announced that a coup had begun, and in the afternoon American CIA person-
nel were informed. Troops with red neckerchiefs poured into Saigon from the
north. By midafternoon they captured and imprisoned all Vietnamese Special
Forces in the city who were loyal to Nhu.
The rebellion ran with precision. Troops took over key installations and
surrounded Diem and Nhu in the palace. Four A-1 Hs and two T-28s made gun
and rocket strikes against the presidential compound. Efforts of the IV Corps
commander to march troops to the capital fizzled. That evening Diem and Nhu
escaped from the palace through a n underground passage. On the following day
they surrendered. They were assassinated while being taken to the Joint General
Staff complex.
As the fighting in Saigon ceased on November 2, a Military Revolutionary
Council of twenty-four generals and colonels under Generals Duong Van Minh
and Tran Van Don became the provisional government. Besides dissolving the
National Assembly, it suspended the 1956 constitution and decreed an interim
one. The United States recognized the new government on November 8.”
Judging that the council was united and set on stepping up the war,
Ambassador Lodge proposed that the United States not press for instant politi-
cal reforms. The generals had agreed to pursue the strategic hamlet program
(now called “fortified hamlets”) and to consolidate and upgrade their defenses.
They spoke of massing all military, paramilitary, and civil forces for an all-out
campaign against the communist threat. In addition they recognized the Joint
General Staff.
Despite their designs, major tasks remained stalled. Wholesale purges and
transfers sowed concern. There was little military movement.
North Vietnam exploited at once the confusion created by the coup. Viet
Cong attacks rose. Because the Vietnamese Air Force was temporarily on “coup”
duty, U S A F crews shouldered the bulk of the operational load. On the night of
November I , for example, the mere appearance of flareships caused the Viet
Cong to break off attacks on eight outposts. Over the following week the
guerrillas assaulted seventy-one outposts and hamlets. Enemy pressure prompt-
ed a total of 284 flare and 298 strike sorties in November. The insurgents
nevertheless inflicted about twenty-eight hundred casualties that month, demor-
alizing the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Though Viet Cong losses were
191
I
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
put at twenty-nine hundred for the period, government forces lost nearly three
weapons for every one they captured.
President Kennedy on November announced that Rusk and
were going t o Honolulu for a meeting on the 20th. Its purpose was to size up the
situation and to find out how t o intensify the struggle and t o end the American
involvement. “Now.” the President said, “this is our objective, to bring Ameri-
cans home, permit the South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and
independent country, and permit democratic forces within the country to
operate.
Among the impressive group a t the meeting in Honolulu were Secretaries
Rusk and Ambassador Lodge, presidential aide
CIA Director J o h n A. Chairman Taylor, Admiral Felt, and
Generals Smart, and Secretary remarked that
certain set in since the coup, but actually “the Generals head a very
fragile government.” Rusk asked whether “an increase in dollars would make a
difference in shortening the war.” Lodge said he thought the Vietnamese had
enough dollars; what they needed was “greater motivation.” argued
that more funds would help.
Despite continuing difficulties the conferees resolved t o adhere to present
plans. The United States would hurry the growth of Vietnamese military power
and pare U.S. personnel in Vietnam. The much publicized withdrawal of one
thousand Americans would therefore proceed as scheduled. The first three
hundred departed on December the rest ten days later.
But the assassination of President Kennedy in November signaled the
end of a n era, and the accession of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency marked
the beginning of another.
I92
The Johnson
Four days after taking office, President Johnson reaffirmed past American
objectives in Vietnam. The United States was to help the republic win the war
against the externally directed and sustained communist conspiracy, assist the
government in developing public support, and keep U.S. military and economic
aid at the same level. “This is a Vietnamese war,” the President said, “and the
country and the war must in the end be run solely by the Vietnamese.” He
reiterated the October pledge to withdraw some Americans from the
country. Yet at the same time he instructed the State Department to prepare a
white paper, documenting Hanoi’s control of the and its supply of
them through Laos. He further solicited plans for stepped-up clandestine
warfare on North Vietnam and for cross-border incursions into Laos to check
infiltration.’
Informing General Taylor on December that Vietnam was the
“most critical military area” for the United States, President Johnson asked the
chairman to have the Joint Chiefs assign the best available officers to
-“blue-ribbon men” at every level. He also sent Secretary to visit
Vietnam
During December in Vietnam, the Defense secretary found General
government “fragile”and “indecisive and drifting.” Unless current trends
were reversed in the next two or three months, they would lead “to neutralization
at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.” The dilemma for
American policymakers was that pouring in personnel and other resources to
prosecute the war would hinder rather than help the Vietnamese stand on their
own feet.
Unable to resolve the basic problem, the secretary listened to CINCPAC
plans for covert actions against North Vietnam. Vietnamese troops were to carry
out a wide variety of sabotage and psychological operations to pressure the
insurgents with minimum risk. As for extensive forays envisioned along the
Laotian border, doubted if they would be politically acceptable or
militarily effective. But he approved having high-altitude photo planes in
Vietnam to obtain better information on enemy infiltration routes.’
At suggestion, the President on December assured Minh of
lasting American support. He gave final approval to clandestine actions against
North Vietnam and to the flights. The movement of Strategic Air Com-
mand’s to proceeded so swiftly that knew of it when
the planes entered the traffic pattern at The high-level photography
later revealed extensive logistic networks in North Vietnam and Laos, supply
routes capable of infiltrating large numbers of trucks, men, and material into
South
I95
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
General Harkins felt hopeful that the Viet Cong attacks had peaked imme-
diately after the coup. His optimism was short-lived. Government ground
actions that had decreased after Diem's downfall sprang back to between five
hundred and six hundred a day by November 20, but they were blunted by
mismanagement and defeat. A new commander spurred the lethargic 7th Div-
ision south of Saigon, but he was relieved before the month was up. Neither of
two battalions conducting clearing operations in Long An Province knew that
the other was there, and they fired on each other. The clash killed two men and
wounded twenty, exerting a "demoralizing effect on both
Before dawn on November 24, the aggressive 21st Division fell victim to a
carefully planned and executed ambush in An Xuyen Province. After the Viet
Cong struck the Cha La outpost and a strategic hamlet near the tip of the Ca
Mau Peninsula, the division hurried four heli-lifts of troops into two landing
zones, with tactical aircraft flying prestrike, escort, and air cover. Enemy fire
downed a n H-21 and damaged ten H-21s and UH-1s. While the ground troops
took cover, U S A F and Vietnamese A-I Hs, B-26s, and T-28s made repeated
attacks in which valor at times outweighed discretion. C-47s and C-123s para-
dropped a battalion t o pinch off the foe's withdrawal route. The guerrillas
escaped because the C-I 23s put most ofthe troops on the far side of the Cai Nuoc
River. Three bodies were discovered and there were signs that a t least one
hundred fifty insurgents had been carried away in sampans.
Brig. Gen. Robert H . York, USA, who saw the entire operation, com-
mended the fine work of tactical air. The operation was nevertheless costly to the
aircrews, most damage coming from .50-caliber fire. Aircraft losses included a n
H-2 1, a B-26 shot down with loss of the crew. and the crash landings after battle
damages of two Vietnamese A-I Hs and one T-28. Ground fire hit twenty-five
planes. The helicopter force had consisted of twelve H-21s and thirteen UH-1s.
Its support came from four T-28s for prestrike missions, two B-26s for escort,
and three B-26s, eight A-I Hs, and twelve T-28s for cover. It was the largest
one-day close air support operation to date.'
In a n otherwise cheerless month Capt. Richard W. Von Hake, air liaison
officer, engineered one small air victory against the guerrillas along the Dong Nai
River. The Viet Cong habitually fired at aircraft but slipped through a sweep of
the area by a government battalion. On December 8 Von Hake persuaded the
province chief tojoin him on an L-19 flight over that ground. Since the battalion
had just finished its sweep, the chief felt sure he was wasting time. T o his great
surprise, he saw more than fifty people as the L-19 drew brisk fire.
Von Hake drafted an air strike plan and on the 9th and 12th dropped leaflets
to warn that persons working with the Viet Cong were in danger. Because the
area was bordered by strategic hamlets, the hamlet chiefs blocked egress from
dawn to noon on December 14. On that morning Von Hake and a Vietnamese
observer flew into the area, discreetly trailed by three T-28s and two B-26s. When
the L-19 was fired upon, the observer marked the target and the strike planes
swept in. Twenty-three enemy were killed and others wounded.' This modest
victory showed that armed reconnaisance could succeed in Vietnam.
I96
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED
197
THE ADVISORY YEARS
198
!
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED
The new government could not immediately turn the tide. About twelve
miles south of Tay Ninh City lay the village of Ben Cau, a cluster of six strategic
hamlets housing some six thousand people. Before dawn on February 6, nearly
one thousand guerrillas drove the Vietnamese militia out of Ben Cau. While
waiting for the government forces to appear, the Viet Cong forced the villagers to
dig firing positions and shelters. Although USAF officers thought that precise air
attacks would dislodge the insurgents with least danger to civilians, the IIICorps
commander authorized firing into the village by artillery, strike aircraft, and
helicopter gunships. Pairs of A-IHs, B-26s, and T-28s struck as directed by
Vietnamese forward air controllers.
The insurgents fled after dark, leaving eleven of their dead behind. Civilian
casualties numbered forty-six killed, sixty wounded, and 670 burned in varying
degrees. The bombardment demolished 670 houses and damaged two hundred
others, depriving two thousand people of shelter. Though American relief sup-
plies soon came, the survivors were more grateful to the enemy who made them
dig for cover. Vietnamese officers said there would be no complaint about the
civilian casualties. Yet the USAF counterinsurgency expert, Maj. Gen. Edward
G. Lansdale, pointed out that the government forces had violated a cardinal rule
by not protecting people under Viet Cong attack.
Cambodia posed a prickly problem to the Khanh regime. Prince Sihanouk
charged on February 1 1 that two Vietnamese aircraft had attacked a Cambodian
village and killed five people. He held the United States partly to blame because it
had “overarmed” Vietnam and “torpedoed” plans for an international confer-
ence to establish Cambodia’s neutrality. Later border incidents impelled
Sihanouk to accept arms from China and the Soviet Union. During Vietnamese
border actions on March 19, Cambodian T-28s shot down a USAF O-1. The
American pilot, Capt. Uwe-Thorsten Scobel, and the Vietnamese observer were
199
e
THE ADVISORY YEARS
NHON
As the war seemed about to enter a new phase, there was talk in Washing-
ton, Hawaii, and Saigon of voluntary repatriation of U.S. dependents from
Vietnam. But the hope of keeping Khanh in power led to the decision not to
move dependents out of the country.²²
General Khanh on February 22 published the National Pacification Plan
that MACV had desired since Diem’s overthrow. The concept called for local
“spreading oil stain”or “oil spot” operations. These were military clear-and-hold
actions starting in safe areas and rolling back the Viet Cong. Within pacified
regions a new “life development program”wou1d enhance the civilian standard of
living. These pacification measures were to be completed in I and II Corps by
January I , 1965, and in III and I V Corps a year
Corps commanders were to write their own plans for pursuing the overall
goal. In the IIICorps, for example, a program commencing in June was expected
to push outward in concentric circles until the adjacent provinces of Gia Dinh,
Bien Hoa, Binh Duong, Hau Nghia, Long An, and Phuoc Tuy were firmly under
government
General Harkins concluded that the offensive would work “if there are no
more coups and Khanh stays And the Joint Chiefs accepted the oil spot
idea as part of “an integrated political, socio-economic, and psychological
offensive to support more fully the
Themilitary effort.” chiefs endorsed givingjet
aircraft to the Vietnamese Air Force and to the Farm Gate 1st Air Commando
200
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED
20 I
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Before making up his mind on the options at hand, President Johnson sent
Secretary and General Taylor to Vietnam. During March they
accompanied General on his speechmaking visits t o Can Tho, Lieu,
the area, Hue, and Saigon. On the platform, and Taylor
stood on either side of and lifted his hands in the air as a visible sign of
U.S.
In private talks, and Taylor gained the impression that the
military situation had gone downhill. Nearly forty percent of the countryside was
under influence and control, including the critical provinces around
Saigon. In eight of the forty-three provinces the insurgents held seventy-five to
ninety percent of the land. was sure that his government troops could
clear the country but doubted if they could keep it. He preferred covert actions
against North Vietnam until “rear-area set up. No one was optimis-
tic about limited covert operations although clandestine activities could be
expanded by easing curbs on bombardment. “Men, money, and materiel were no
object,” said. The United States had t o press on. After discussing the
aerial mining of North Vietnamese waters, the Defense secretary directed that
mine-laying training for Vietnamese pilots begin a t once.
Ambassador Lodge objected to “massive destruction” before trying a “car-
rot and stick” approach. The United States could offer North Vietnam advan-
tages for ceasing aggression, while at the same time confronting Hanoi with
covert actions such as unacknowledged air strikes. Photos by reconnais-
sance planes revealed active: bases right across the border in Cambo-
dia. But hot pursuit across the frontier was ruled out, in light of American
negotiations to keep Cambodia from giving up neutrality and winding up in the
Hanoi and Peking camp. The political would far outweigh any military
worth.
Secretary asked if it was better to shore up the Vietnamese Air
Force or t o send more U S A F aircraft. He learned that Americans had to “fill in
the gaps caused by lack of motivation” on the part of the Vietnamese Air Force,
inability t o produce fast reaction strikes, and its reluctance to fly at night and
on
After a round of talks in Hawaii, and Taylor flew back to
Washington. The Defense secretary proposed twelve steps to President Johnson
for changing the course of the war. Though stressing actions within the country,
the secretary suggested that plans be laid for border-control actions inside Laos
and Cambodia on seventy-two hours notice. These would be “tit-for-tat” bomb
strikes and commando raids by Vietnamese forces on such North Vietnamese
targets as communications centers, training camps, and infiltration routes. For
the present, resisted border-control or graduated military pressure
operations. He nevertheless thought there ought to be standby plans for gradu-
ally tightening the screws on North Vietnam. The plans would be triggered on
thirty days notice and involve air attacks on military and possibly industrial
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED, METHODS EXPANDED
203
THE ADVISORY YEARS
by covert U.S. support for Vietnamese aerial mining and strikes, and lastly
by covert American-Vietnamese naval displays, bombardments, and air attacks.
Rusk felt that the limited resources given Vietnam inhibited U.S. officials from
daring new efforts. He wondered whether enough Americans were aiding civil
administrative services in cleared areas that had to be held. On April the
President therefore suggested t o Lodge that “two or three hundred” troops be
replaced by civilian advisors to shift the emphasis toward “the art of
Hanoi meanwhile became more belligerent. On April Chi Minh
declared that if the United States carried the war to North Vietnam, he had
“powerful friends ready to help”him. In the Laotian panhandle, North Vietnam-
ese construction crews, signalmen, and truckdrivers improved infiltration routes.
Also in April a North Vietnamese regiment was recalled from Laos and given
special military and political training for operations in Vietnam. Hanoi began
form new regiments for dispatch SOUTHWARD
Having probed Laotian government forces since November
Lao and North Vietnamese troops on April launched heavy attacks on the
of Jars After boasting that they could take any district headquarters in
the Delta, the Viet on the night of April overran the district
capital of Long on the Peninsula. In the ensuing air-ground battle,
the enemy lost at least fifty-five men killed including the commander. Yet
Vietnamese and Americans were casualties, the capital was in ruins, and some
two hundred civilians were killed or wounded. On May a under-
water demolition team sank the U.S. aircraft ferry Curd while it was berthed in
the Saigon River and delivering helicopters.
Stung by these successes, General told Lodge on May that he
wanted to declare war on North Vietnam. He wished to have ten thousand
Special Forces troops “to cover the whole Cambodian-Laotian border. Would
the United States start bombing beyond the confines of South
On this question there was a serious split between American policymakers
and even within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. and Gen. Wallace
had urged low-level reconnaissance and air strikes against
the north by U.S. aircraft. In a shift of opinion the other members-
Chairman Taylor, Gen. Harold Johnson, USA, and David
McDonald, that heavy pressure was not warranted, at least for
the present.
In its study of how to tighten the screws on North Vietnam, Sullivan’s
Vietnam Coordinating Committee noted that North Vietnam’s economy was
chiefly agrarian. There were relatively few industrial targets that if wiped out
would have a n immediate military impact. Still a steady in air power,
from psychological applications to selective strikes, could hurt Hanoi and slow
its support to the Viet CINCPAC meantime firmed up plans for the
United States to take part in military operations in Laos, Cambodia, and North
Vietnam if the authorities in Washington so
Communist in the Laotian panhandle prompted the Joint Chiefs to
plan with the Government of Vietnam for airlifting Vietnamese intelligence
I
OBJECTIVES CONFIRMED. METHODS EXPANDED
teams into the area around Tchepone. When Secretary McNamara and General
Taylor visited Saigon during May 12-13, McNamara let Khanh know that
bombing North Vietnam would be no substitute for clearing the Viet Cong out of
South Vietnam. The two found Harkins optimistic, Westmoreland less so, and
Lodge satisfied with the size and composition of U.S. efforts. “Further large scale
contributions.” he said, “are not
The collapse of government defenses on the Plain of Jars on May 17
demanded rapid reaction within Laos and a second look at the merits of exerting
pressure on North Vietnam. A National Security Council working group,
chaired by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy, prepared a thirty-day
scenario of political actions leading to air strikes against North Vietnamese
targets and a call for an international conference on Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs
J-3 (Operations) listed targets in these categories of ascending importance: to
convince Hanoi that it was too risky to back the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao, to
deter Hanoi from escalating the conflict, and to destroy the North Vietnamese
industrial
In meetings on May 24 and 25, the executive committee of the National
Security Council put forward selected portions of the scenario. President
Johnson then enjoined his senior advisers t o hold a major strategy conference in
Hawaii on June I and
The Soviet Union early in 1964 had advocated new meetings of the Geneva
powers on Vietnam and Cambodia, and on May 27 a Polish diplomatic initiative
called for a conference on Laos. After hearing charges of border violations, the
United Nations Security Council suggested that observers be placed along the
Cambodian frontier to ease tensions. The United States and South Vietnam
welcomed the proposal, but the Viet Cong and Cambodia spurned
As acting chairman, LeMay advised the Joint Chiefs on May 28 that the
United States was “losing Southeast Asia chiefs, he argued, ought to
present a t the upcoming Honolulu military conference a clear record on how to
“start winning.” He said the only way to end Hanoi’s support of the insurgency in
Vietnam and Laos would be to destroy its means to do so. Air attacks should be
made on infiltration points a t Dien Bien Phu and Vinh to show the sharp change
in American outlook and resolve. On the 30th the Joint Chiefs accepted LeMay’s
views and passed them to McNamara. Upon his return, Chairman Taylor
disagreed with these views and sent his own to the Defense secretary, initially
proposing more limited actions against targets less risky than Vinh and Dien
Bien Phu. The purpose, he stated, would be to impress upon Hanoi U.S.
readiness to take more drastic action should North Vietnam enlarge its support
for the Viet
Present at the Secretary of Defense Conference on June land 2 were
Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Lodge, General Taylor, Admiral Felt, and Mr.
Sullivan of the President’s Vietnam Coordinating Committee. General Harkins,
whose relations with Lodge had soured, did not attend. The atmosphere was
gloomy. The talk focused on getting congressional approval for wider action in
Southeast Asia. Envisioned were commitment of American divisions, a partial
205
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
U.S. mobilization, and air attacks on North Vietnam. Lodge favored a careful
bombing campaign. He believed it would bolster the shaky Khanh government
and impart a feeling of unity to the war-weary South Vietnamese. At the end the
consensus was to wait and see what
Mr. James B. Seaborn, the Canadian member of the International Control
Commission, visited North Vietnam and apprised the government of American
thoughts on a negotiated peace based on concessions by both sides. If Hanoi
would stop sending men and arms south. Washington would respond with
economic aid. Denying any attempt to threaten, the United States was well aware
of Hanoi’s strings on the Viet Cong. If the war heated up, thegreatest devastation
would be loosed upon North Vietnam. Seaborn stressed President Johnson’s
desire for a settlement based on Hanoi’s promise t o abide by the Geneva
agreements of 1954 and 1962. North Vietnamese officials were unimpressed.
They wanted the United States to withdraw totally from Vietnam. This would be
followed by a “neutral” regime in Saigon, with the National Liberation Front
charting the future of the country. Seaborn during a second trip in August
conveyed the warning that American patience was wearing thin. Hanoi’s reply
was hardly encouraging for
Secretary McNamara and General Taylor had asked the J C S and
C I N C P A C t o forge a three-phase air strike plan against North Vietnam. If set in
motion it would signal American readiness to attack all major military targets in
the country. On July I 1 the planners settled on ninety-four air strike objectives in
North Vietnam-eighty-two targets and twelve armed reconnaissance routes.
They next set about drafting detailed plans for this massive air
CINCPAC rather than MACV was to have overall direction of operations
against North Vietnam, through the P A C A F and PACFLT commanders. But
the principal thrust of American policy continued to be countering the insur-
gency within the borders of South Vietnam. T o that end the MACV commander
was to devote his full
206
Once asked why the United States should not have command over the
Vietnamese armed forces, General Harkins replied that this would be contrary to
U.S. national policy. More to the point, the Vietnamese government would not
agree to the arrangement, since it jealously guarded its sovereign right to accept
or reject American advice.' Although this question and this position were never
officially challenged, certain other command problems continued to vex the
carrying out of the counterinsurgency. Among them were the tie-in of MACV
and MAAG; the role and influence of the U.S. Air Force in directing policy in the
country, chiefly in the controversy over the single management of aircraft; and
the organization of the Vietnamese Air Force. These received attention in 1964.
In the U S A F view, the principal command problem in Vietnam since 1962
was the absence of experienced high-ranking air officers on the MACV joint staff
to explain what air power could and could not do. The MACV staff was
dominated by Army officers rather than really jointly manned. No component
Army and Navy units existed under MACV with the equivalent status of the 2d
Air Division.
Admiral Felt was sympathetic to having a senior USAF officer in the
mainstream of MACV current operations. In September 1963 he had proposed
filling the MACV chief of staff slot with a USAF officer when it became vacant in
mid-1964. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved but the Secretary of Defense did
not. After talking with Harkins during his December 1963 visit to Saigon, the
Defense secretary was set on making changes along lines suggested by the Army.
Early in 1964 he created the new position of Deputy Commander, MACV, and
named Army Lt. Gen. William C. Westmoreland to it. He placed Brig. Gen. Ben
Sternberg, USA, in the J-1 (Personnel) niche. He downgraded the USAF colonel
serving as J-2 (Intelligence) to Deputy J-2 and put a Marine Corps brigadier
general over him. He directed Harkins to reorganize MACV and the subsequent
alterations shrunk the USAF allocation of J-staff jobs to the post of J-5 (Plans)
held by Maj. Gen. Milton B. Adams. McNamara nevertheless believed the Air
Force t o be well-represented. He pointed to the 2d Air Division commander and
the MAAG Air Force Section chief who were both general officers and present in
Saigon.²
Admiral Felt and Gen. Jacob E. Smart, P A C A F commander, questioned
the wisdom of revamping MACV while the Vietnamese government was trying
to recover from the shock of two coups. They had not concurred in a Joint Chiefs
suggestion on February 15 to merge MAAG and MACV. But a study by General
Sternberg addressed the broader question. The existence of the two headquarters
had surely led to duplication of effort, occasional lapses in coordination, and a
needlessly complicated advisory program. If the functions were fused under
207
THE ADVISORY YEARS
208
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM, 1964
(Bottom) Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore and Gen. Jacob E. Smart discuss air tactics with Maj. Xuan Vinh,
commander of the 23d Air Support Group, VNAF.
209
THE ADVISORY YEARS
T o General Smart the new setup did little to extend air knowledge and
experience at MACV. Rather than trimming the headquarters, the change
triggered a request to raise staff spaces by 3 10(283 U.S. Army, 24 Navy/ Marine
Corps, and 3 USAF). Smart recommended at least 38 more USAF officers as
directorate and branch chiefs.’”Disregarding his desires, MACV in September
asked for 71 new USAF spaces mostly for field advisory
General Westmoreland rose to MACV commander when General Harkins
reached retirement age on June 20. Ambassador Lodge resigned on the 23d to
join in the national elections at home, and President Johnson selected General
Taylor for the post. On July IS Admiral Felt retired and Adm. Ulysses S. Grant
Sharp, Jr., became CINCPAC. A whole new leadership emerged.
Should an Air Force officer be named as Westmoreland’s deputy? West-
moreland had said in early June that he needed no deputy. But General LeMay
argued in J C S discussions that a deputy from another service was a must to
preserve the unified nature of MACV. Because of broadening air operations he
thought the deputy should be a USAF general. The Navy and Marine Corps
thought so too. General Wheeler, Army chief, suggested that the 2d Air Division
commander be designated Deputy Commander for Air as an additional duty if
air operations grew. Chairman Taylor was for giving the deputy position to an
officer who could afford across-the-board assistance to Westmoreland. Owing to
the nature of operations, he wished to see a two- or three-star Army general in the
job. Taylor queried Westmoreland who then said he wanted an Army general.
After McNamara’s approval on June 18. Lt. Gen. John L. Throckmorton was
assigned.
General LeMay reiterated the need for USAF expertise on the MACV staff.
In September Westmoreland proposed to give the 2d Air Division commander
the second hat of Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV. The Air Staff
and PACAF opposed this action because it offered the MACV staff n o real
additional help. Westmoreland nonetheless went ahead with the proposal. On
November 12CINCPAC bowed to the “political climate”and put it forward to
the Joint Chiefs.¹² Not until seven months later was the new title approved.
Still the reshuffling of May 15 bestowed some benefits. Tucking the Air
Force Advisory Group under 2d Air Division was long overdue and fostered
unity and control.¹³ The harmony between Westmoreland and Moore nurtured
better working relations between MACV and 2d Air
Yet General Westmoreland continued to command U.S. Army compo-
nents, violating the principle that commanders of unified activities must be
divorced from service operations. In effect the MACV air component com-
mander answered to the Army component commander.
Moreover, the sparse service expertise on the MACV staff made it hard to
pursue joint matters properly. A case in point was the MACV airlift allocation
board run by one overworked USAF officer i n Army officers so ruled the
MACV Joint Research and Test Activity that the Air Force hesitated to test
combined concepts for combinations of Just eight of the forty-five
210
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM,
AUTHORIZED officer spaces in were Air Force. Only one was a colonel's slot, the
newly created Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for
for the most part entrusted air matters to the Air Division staff, but
more and more assumed control of day-to-day air operations. This was done at
first through a n American MACV staff element in the Vietnamese armed forces
joint operations center. Later an Army air operations section was formed with
personnel, to allocate Army aircraft to the corps and to control other Army
aviation resources. T o coordinate Army and Air Force infrared reconnaissance,
the MACV Target Research and Analysis Center was founded in December
This function took care of centralized targeting
The tactical air control system survived and outwardly appeared to meet
doctrinal needs. Still it was soon evident that the status of the tactical air
commander was severely eroded-the Air Division commander had no
command authority, no direct operating duties, and no staff support. Senior
USAF officers perceived that the local situation in Vietnam dictated several
deviations from proven tactical air doctrine. But they cautioned against adopting
the MACV air control system as a model for worldwide air command and
control
The performance of the Vietnamese Air Force also stirred concern. Central
to the Vietnamese military concept was the parceling out of resources among the
four corps commanders who governed all ground, air, naval, and paramilitary
forces within their areas. Air Force officers, notably General Smart, protested
splintering the meager Vietnamese air power. Even so, many Army officers
believed this grouping was required in what they saw as largely a ground
The MACV commander and CINCPAC voiced grave concern over the loss
of the B-26s, which General Westmoreland called his “Sunday punch.” Both
headquarters proposed a squadron of B-57s with Vietnamese markings and
mixed crews to operate out of Bien Hoa under Farm Gate rules. On March 2 the
Joint Chiefs made the same suggestion to Defense Secretary
At March conferences in Saigon, McNamara questioned General Moore
regarding Vietnamese Air Force needs. The secretary judged it cheaper to give
212
T H E WAR IN VIETNAM, 1964
the Vietnamese further aircraft than to bring in fresh USAF planes. He settled on
equipping all Vietnamese fighter units with A-I Hs, twenty-five tagged for the
514th Fighter Squadron in the III Corps area to replace the T-28s. In addition he
earmarked thirty for the 1st Air Command Squadron to take over from the
wornout B-26s and
General Smart told McNamara in Hawaii that tactical airchalked up more
than thirty percent of the enemy casualties in South Vietnam-14,944 out of
49,100 in 1962 and 1963. If a few obsolete aircraft could d o this damage, think of
what new and better planes could achieve. McNamara replied that he appre-
ciated why B-57s were desired. First, however, the United States should exploit
the easier method of sending in more nonjet planes to help win the war. What
interested him was the possible use of B-57s in covert operations against North
Vietnam. The Defense secretary’s recommendations, approved by President
Johnson, embodied equipping the Vietnamese with twenty-five A-I Hs in
exchange for T-28s. At the close of March, forty-eight B-57s and crews flew from
Yokota Air Base in Japan to Clark Air Base in the
Col. Benjamin S. Preston, Jr., commander of the 34th Tactical Group at
Bien Hoa, went all out to keep his B-26s in the air. But clearly they could not be
saved-every plane had cracked stress plates and loose rivets throughout its
wings. On April 8 the last of the B-26s and RB-26s were t o be ferried t o Clark Air
Base for
So long as the T-28s faced no heavy ground fire, they did the job despite
their fairly slow speed and small armament load. As Viet Cong firing heated up,
however, they became vulnerable. On February 18 a T-28 took a hit while flying
interdiction, but the crew fortunately escaped serious injury in the crash-landing.
The next day a second T-28 was shot down while strafing in support of a ground
operation, and the crewmen were killed. Three Vietnamese A-I Hs shared a like
fate in
Since the T-28s had outlived their safe employment in Vietnam, replace-
ment A-I Skyraiders came in. On March 18 the newly formed Vietnamese 518th
Fighter Squadron, with ten of twenty-five authorized began to fly
combat from Bien
Col. George 1. Ruddell, deputy t o the MACV J-3, surveyed the ground-fire
threat. He thought that a return to the Air Force’s standard four-aircraft fighter
flights was in order, with each echelon of two protecting the other during
low-level passes. This called for more planes, so Ruddell recommended that the
34th Tactical Group get two squadrons each of twenty-five in lieu of a
single squadron of thirty. Harkins, Smart, and Felt approved and passed the
proposal to the Joint Chiefs of
Compelled to stand down the combat-worn B-26s, Colonel Preston won-
dered how he could keep the 1st Air Commando Squadron going. On March 24
a T-28B lost a wing and crashed while on a bomb run near Soc Trang, killing the
pilot, Capt. Edwin G. Shank, Jr., and the Vietnamese crewman. All T-28s had
been closely inspected and aircraft maintenance was excellent. Even so, the loss
213
THE ADVISORY YEARS
of the so soon after the wing failures impaired pilot morale. By April
the Air Division was “practically flat out of business.”
On April a crew was completing a third strafing pass over a
well-defended target when the wing snapped off and the plane crashed. Two
specialists from the North American Aviation, Inc., flew to and ran
inspections. They said that the could not take the “slam-bang type flying” I
because it was a trainer-not a properly stressed fighter-bomber. At their
suggestion, Colonel Preston retired the five remaining Gate that had
been in combat since He borrowed nine newer from the
Vietnamese, bringing the I Air Commando Squadron’s combat-ready aircraft
to fifteen. He warned pilots about cautioned them not to land if
carrying external ordnance, and placed limits on loading the wing stations of
T o cut damages from small-arms fire, Preston set a minimum
altitude of feet for attack runs. The stayed in operation until A-I
took their PLACE
At least air strike requests were received in the first three months of
Of the not honored, were due to a shortage of planes. These figures
did not present a true picture, for ground commanders and forward air con-
trollers disliked to file new requests after being turned
Air-ground operations yielded slight results. Between January 16and the
Division in An Province was supported by the most tactical air
sorties yet flown in the division area-forty-four on the first day. However, the
troops came to grips with no sizable enemy forces on the
During January the 7th Division mounted a massive search-and-clear
and water invasion into District of Province.
Artillery fire and strikes by and supported the operation.
Still, the enemy poured withering ground fire into the first waves of helicopters,
peppering all thirty-two craft and downing one, a gunship. On the 18th
another armed U was hit and plunged into the water. Only the copilot and a
crewman were rescued. Even with constant air cover, friendly losses totaled
twenty dead, twenty-five wounded, and destroyed. The
lost forty-six killed and ninety-seven CAPTURED
The main problem probably lay in the lack of directives on aerial coordina-
tion and command over a landing area. The sole person actually
allowed t o tell tactical air what t o d o was the Vietnamese forward air controller.
And he had neither the rank nor the experience to be an air COMMANDER
Problems also pervaded the smaller air operations for provincial forces. In
the 5th Division area of IIICorps, for example, the USAF liaison officer pointed
that the kindled cooking fires at dusk. They could take this risk
because Vietnamese strike pilots were not routinely ready t o fly at night. An
exception occurred on January when a Vietnamese: flareship and four
A-I struck an assembly point in Province. Most night air requests
were not honored. As for day pinpoint strikes, just fourteen of sixty-seven
requested interdiction targets were attacked in February. Pilots of the 514th
I
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM, 1964
Fighter Squadron said they were “sick and tired of expending their ordnance on
nothing but empty fields, trees and
This frustration stemmed from the drawn-out air request handling required
by the 5th Division commander-all immediate sightings of the enemy vanished
before being targeted. There were, however, some good results from strikes
against enemy-held areas that provincial troops could not enter. These were the
“remote locations” in the east coast provinces of III Corps. The Phuoc Tuy
forward air controller had good rapport with the province chief, who knew the
enemy’s movements and could and would approve targets for air action. Else-
where, air strikes were hindered by controllers unfamiliar with the area, and by
Popular Forces commanders who feared close fire support by artillery, armed
helicopters, or
In light of the lag in strike aircraft response, Army advisors in III and I V
Corps accented the importance of helicopter assaults. The Vietnamese as a rule
needed thirty minutes to scramble fighters, while processing a request commonly
consumed one hour. Colonel Mellish, air liaison officer of III Corps, urged the
forward staging of aircraft to shave this delay. Three T-28s were sent on ground
alert to Phan Thiet, where Viet Cong attacks were foreseen. When the foe failed
to appear, the little-used T-28s remained exposed to the hazards of a primitive
The number of tactical air sorties available to the III Corps on a busy day
was around 30. This contrasted sharply with the average of 275 sorties a day
flown by U.S. Army planes in support of III Corps. The Army aviation assigned
to the corps was sizable-seventeen utility UH-Is, eleven UH-I gunships, two
CV-2 transports, four U- I utility transports, two OV- I armed reconnaissance
planes, and eight L-19 liaison
Lesser operations in the difficult I V Corps entailed up to four or five
heliborne missions every day in the 7th and 21st Division areas. Five USAF
T-28s at SOCTrang could react swiftly, but it took 1 1/2 hours to get ground alert
aircraft from Bien Hoa. Though the Vietnamese 1 12th Liaison Squadron kept a
detachment of five O-1s at Can Tho, the planes were confined to forward air
control and target-marking duty. The USAF liaison officers hitched rides on
Army liaison aircraft when they could. Most of the time, however, they were
grounded at the division command post. Hence their sole knowledge of the air
situation at a target area came from an Army liaison communication-relay plane
that flew cover over heliborne landing
During March barely 7 I of 126 air support requests from the 7th Division
could be satisfied in the IV Corps, and in April merely 84 of 148 requests were
approved. The air liaison officer and forward air controller spent a lot of their
time in keeping ground officers from becoming discouraged with the sparse air
support. According to Lt. Col. Clarence R. Osborne, Jr., instant air support
from armed UH-I helicopters often “saved the
On April 12 the Viet Cong destroyed the district town of Kien Long in
Chuong Thien Province. The Vietnamese Air Force turned in a splendid per-
formance, featuring a n A-IH hit on a 105-mm howitzer before dawn and a
215
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
steady stream of air support strikes throughout the day. The tactical air support
system squeezed thirty to forty-five sorties out of the aircraft at Bien Hoa, but this
was not enough to stave off a serious government
Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs asked if two separate air control systems
operated in Vietnam and if Vietnamese commanders were getting conflicting
advice from U.S. Army and USAF advisors. MACV replied that one system
directed Air Force aircraft, while the other was a separate aviation headquarters
that managed Army and Marine Corps air units. Since these units afforded
special assistance and had “no role in the development of the Vietnamese air
structure, Ihave been free to employ them as I see fit to [the] maximum support
of the ground
The U.S. Army senior advisor at III Corps, a colonel, was an extreme
partisan of Army aviation who slighted tactical air support. He never invited the
corps USAF liaison officer to planning conferences, and as a matter of fact was
not on speaking terms with him. The senior advisor prepared pacification plans
that made no mention of tactical air support. When General Moore offered help,
he was turned down. Moore told General Westmoreland of this, and MACV
directed that province pacification plans contain an air operations annex drawn
by USAF advisors. From then on, the colonel called the air liaison officer to all
briefings and planning
Air advisors were few among the ground units. The 2d Air Division had
authority for seventeen lieutenant colonels as air liaison officers with corps and
divisions, and Army advisors outranked them. There were thirty-two captains
and lieutenants as air-advisor forward air controllers with regiments. In compar-
ison Army advisors numbered up to five hundred in a corps, with assignments
going down to company level. General Moore had kept the rank of air advisors
low to avoid dwarfing relatively junior Vietnamese counterparts. General
Maddux, Thirteenth Air Force commander, wanted a senior USAF colonel to
be assigned to the Joint General Staff. He further wished corps air liaison officers
to be colonels, thus giving them equal prestige with Army senior corps
General Westmoreland was dead-set against raising the corps air liaison
officers to the rank of colonel. He regarded the Army senior advisors as MACV
senior advisors, responsible for all military matters to include the use of air
power. Corps air liaison officers were supposed to advise the senior advisors, and
Westmoreland assured General Moore that they would be listened to. When
Moore learned that Vietnamese wing commanders would be the chief air advi-
sors to the corps commanders. he acceded to the MACV commander’s point of
Indeed, the 2d Air Division commander felt that conflict between the two
distinct control systems was overdrawn. Confident of cooperation he said, “The
Army isjust as strongly opposed to Air Force control of its aircraft as we are for
the Army to control Even so, Moore desired to enlarge the tactical air
control system by adding a n air request communications net, manned and
operated by the Air Force. It would resemble the U.S. Strike Command-Tactical
Air Command system worked out during maneuvers i n the United States. He
216
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM, 1964
hoped t o d o away with the long delays in passing air requests up through
channels over Vietnamese army
General Moore’s proposed net for handling Vietnamese air requests would
enhance USAF advice at lower ground echelons. An Air Force pilot (forward air
controller) and two radio operators were to man tactical air control parties at all
levels down to battalion. They would process air support requests, provide
advice, and direct close air support strikes. To man this countrywide setup, the 2d
Air Division was to draw pilots from the USAF 19th Tactical Air Support
Squadron. Moore envisioned a continuing need for Vietnamese controllers to
mark remote and hard-to-find interdiction targets. However he saw no reason
why Air Force controllers, Army liaison pilots, and Army and Vietnamese
forward air guides could not mesh their efforts to designate targets for air
217
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Force Vice Chief of Staff, stated that the Air Force was planning for the third
squadron to be fully equipped at Can Tho by March 1965. General Wheeler
justified the A-I E expansion because of low Vietnamese performance. Neverthe-
less, the additional USAF planes would delay Vietnamese self-sufficiency and
undermine the principle that Americans were to help rather than to
Two events revealed that the rule restricting USAF advisors from engaging
in battle was being strained if not entirely broken. The first took place on March
8 when Col. Thomas M. Hergert, deputy chief of the MAAG Air Force Section,
was killed. He was flying an A-I H as wingman to a Vietnamese flight leader on
an interdiction mission. Both had made a dozen passes t o deliver ordnance when
Hergert’s plane crashed. Smoke was seen billowing from the right-wing root just
before the right wing
Investigation disclosed that eighty-nine U S A F pilots were flying Viet-
namese aircraft. But no advisor could lead a flight. be the first to expend
ordnance, or continue a mission if the Vietnamese flight leader aborted. Colonel
Hergert was the twentyeighth U S A F combat fatality in Vietnam since January
The second event concerned Captain Shank who had died in a T-28 crash
on March 24. On April 21 U.S. Congressmen and the press were furnished
several letters Shank had written home. He had criticized the airworthiness of
U.S. aircraft and told of 1st Air Commando pilots flying combat missions with
Vietnamese basic airmen, popularly called “sandbags.”The airmen went along as
the required Vietnamese crewmen, for t o obtain qualified crewmembers meant
diverting fifty to seventy-five Vietnamese pilots from their own planes. Seeing
that these pilots were assigned on the basis of 1.5 for each cockpit, this would
severely hamper Vietnamese air power. If legitimate Vietnamese observers flew
with Americans, the liaison and forward air controller programs would be
bankrupt. Consequently, General Moore suggested that the arbitrary require-
ment for a Vietnamese aboard a U.S. strike aircraft be lifted. Nonrated airmen
scarcely contributed to the missions normally flown to augment Vietnamese
218
T H E WAR IN VIETNAM,
fourth fighter squadron. This would take the place of a third U.S.
used to. Hence several A-1 Hs suffered damage in ground accidents. When ten
A-I Hs arrived in May, they sat on the ramps at Da Nang. Since the Vietnamese
41st CAM RON was unfamiliar with the aircraft, the incommission rate averaged
merely four or five a day and at times dipped to
At Bien Hoa the 1st Air Commando Squadron stayed operational with the
borrowed T-28s. One was lost in a takeoff accident and six were transferred on
May 20 to combat in Laos. This left only
Due chiefly to fewer T-28s, combat sorties dwindled in May even as requests
for air support climbed. In mid-month USAF personnel followed McNamara’s
guidance to the letter. They worked to lift the Vietnamese fighter pilot ratio to
two per plane. They pushed the enlargement of the fighter force to four A-I H
squadrons so that the 1st Air Commando Squadron could be withdrawn. The
Defense secretary wanted the tactical reconnaissance squadron converted to the
fourth fighter squadron by October. And he authorized air transport and other
Vietnamese pilots to fly fighters.
As the crash plan for the secretary’s program neared completion, the J C S
directive banning U.S planes from combat without giving bona fide training to
Vietnamese crewmembers foreshadowed a decline in USAF combat sorties. This
came at the time when there were too few aircraft to meet requirements and the
Vietnamese were building two new A-I H squadrons. Recognizing the emer-
gency, MACV ruled that the 1 st Air Commando Squadron could continue to fly
its eight T-28s carrying Vietnamese crewmen who were not potential pilots. As
soon as A-1 Es replaced T-28s, however, A-I E combat operations would be held
strictly to genuine
On May 28 MACV decided to equip the present three Vietnamese fighter
squadrons to attain two pilots per plane by October I. It likewise intended to
form three more fighter squadrons as soon as aircraft became available, by
February 15, 1965, if all went well. Only Vietnamese pilots were to attend the
intensive A-I H pilot training program. The 34th Tactical Group would present
the initial two-week indoctrination, Naval Air Squadron VA-I52 was to furnish
the five-week transition course, and the 34th would administer the final
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs on June 8, Secretary McNamara directed that
the first four Vietnamese fighter squadrons receive primary attention, the two
others secondary. On June 17 Admiral Felt accepted a PACAF evaluation and
reported to the chiefs that MACV was trying to d o too much too fast. He
suggested that the 5 16th Fighter Squadron be brought to full strength in Sep-
tember and that the 520th Fighter Squadron be made operational at Can Tho by
the end of the year. He judged that the Vietnamese could man four fighter
squadrons without inactivating their two C-47 transport units. On July 24 the
J C S agreed to the four-squadron
On May 30 Lt. Col. John M. Porter, commander of the 1st Air Commando
Squadron, had led the original flight of six A-IEs from the Philippines to Bien
Hoa. Colonel Preston noted that his 34th Tactical Group had “moved up into the
big league . . . with a first-line aircraft.”On the 3 1st the A-I Es flew their maiden
220
T H E W A R IN V I E T N A M . 1964
strike sorties. Col. William E. Bethea, who assumed command of the 34th Group
in June, was impressed by the plane’s large and varied ordnance, takeoff from a
4,000-foot runway fully loaded, extremely long range, and good loitering. Still
the A-IE’s normal cruising speed of 155 knots retarded rapid response to air
support requests, chiefly in the far reaches of the Mekong Delta. And the aircraft
could barely defend itself in aerial combat. With twelve A-I Es on site by June 30,
the T-28s were retired. The 34th Tactical Group set about giving transition
training to Vietnamese
Air support requests totaled 1,546 during January-March 1964 and 2,040
from April through June. Lack of aircraft accounted for 68 of the 807 requests
that could not be honored in the second
Generally, USAF communications were deemed better than those of the
U.S. Army. General Westmoreland therefore ordered the Army aviation battal-
ion control center, situated in the joint operations center of the Joint General
Staff, to relocate within the USAF-Vietnamese air operations center. General
Moore expected the move, which commenced on May 18, to enhance coordina-
tion among Army, Air Force, and Vietnamese air activities. This did not
The single-sideband PRC-47 and KWM-2A radios were the backbone of the
Vietnamese air request net. But the sets did not always work properly due to the
tropical climate and inexperienced operators. In addition ground commanders
were unwilling to allow the air request system to function a s designed. The Joint
General Staff issued no directive and the ground commanders refused to be
bypassed on strike firepower. In consequence the air request net served merely to
provide information. All official requests continued to travel the tortuous route
over the old Vietnamese army air request
Nor did the Joint General Staff relax its ban on strike aircraft releasing
ordnance close t o ground forces except at the direction of a Vietnamese forward
air controller. On April 23, U S A F T-28s were over Vietnamese rangers who
were trapped near Trung Lap. Although the planes had voice communications
with a U.S. Army L-19 and with wounded American advisors o n the ground,
they were not permitted to attack. Armed Army helicopters arrived, were fired
upon, and returned the fire. But the T-28sjettisoned their unused ordnance and
returned to
There were other problems. Unless Vietnamese pilots could speak English,
USAF controllers were unable to communicate with them. Air liaison officer
and forward air controller duties were clearly unpopular among Vietnamese.
And the manning ratio of two pilots to each fighter aircraft sharply curtailed the
number and caliber of Vietnamese pilots who could be spared for such duties.
Finally, the human and natural environment worked against ground tactical air
control parties. Their heavy bulky radio gear was hard to lug through thejungle.
Sometimes it was out of the question to direct a n air strike safely from the
ground, because of the presence of civilians who could be seen solely from the air.
Mountains and heavy vegetation hampered the ground view and the flat ground
of the delta pffered no elevations t o help determine range. Numerous tree lines
and canal ridges also obstructed the view. 79
22 1
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
222
T H E W A R IN VIETNAM, 1964
(Center) A1 E aircraft.
223
THE ADVISORY YEARS
In mid- it was generally agreed that ground tactical air control parties
could not take THE place of airborne control. Yet potent air support demanded
something better than the plodding Vietnamese and their often indifferent
observers. Strong pleas to prevent the demise of the 19th Tactical Air Support
Squadron proved futile. The unit remained under orders to transfer its aircraft to
the
Like the building of the Vietnamese air strike force, the Vietnamese air
strike system held promise for the future. However, neither Vietnamese air power
nor control procedures were able to withstand Viet attacks. Over theearlier
months of C-47 and C--I23flare support for outposts and villages more
than doubled and night sorties But on the night of July when the Viet
assaulted the Dong Special Forces camp near the demilitarized zone,
a flareship orbited overhead and dropped flares till dawn. Not until first light did
two A-I and an forward air controller arrive over the target. Then they
were unable t o strike because the controller could not make radio contact with
the besieged forces to verify the target. The insurgents partially overran the camp,
killed fifty-five South Vietnamese, two U.S. Special Forces soldiers, and an
Australian advisor. The delay in A-I H reaction stemmed from the Fighter
Squadron pilots being unable t o fly at night. A further factor was the operating
rule that barred the from making a target close to friendly forces without
positive
A more grievous failure ensued on July I in Province. Viet
stormed the Cut outpost before dawn and set ambush positions
along the road to be taken by relief forces. Within the one hour needed to get a
Vietnamese controller t o the scene, the ambush decimated the friendly troops
forty-one and wounding fifty-six. Two Vietnamese A-I on ground
alert came one and one-half hours after the air support mission was requested.”
On the morning of July the Viet hit two hamlets and a post
immediately north of Ben Cat in Binh Province. A battalion responded,
lost a lead tank to 57-mm recoilless rifle fire, and broke apart under assault. In an
initial air support strike, four USAF accepted targets from a U.S. Army
I pilot. But the Vietnamese A-I H pilots next on station refused to act without a
Vietnamese air controller, even though the Army liaison pilot and Vietnamese
ground observer marked enemy positions with smoke rockets. By the time a
Vietnamese controller got there, the guerrillas had faded into the jungle.
The policy of defining counterinsurgency as something distinctly different
from other states of armed conflict resulted in not developing enough air
firepower to defeat the Viet Occasional two-plane air strikes on well-
known enemy base areas did little more than harass. One proposed solution was
to ask the civilians to leave Viet havens. Then large-scale bombing of these
havens could be carried out by USAF tactical aircraft from bases in Thailand,
and the Philippines. With refueling, the planes need not ever
land in South
In mid- I964 General Westmoreland was “deeply concerned” with the surge
in successful Viet hamlet and outpost attacks and ambushes of troop units
T H E WAR IN VIETNAM. 1964
and convoys. His basic approach lay in sending more U.S. forces into the
provinces at the district level. Their presence spurred Vietnamese paramilitary
and lower-level units to speed up pacification.“ Concluding that the air reaction
time to night attacks was too slow, Westmoreland directed Army advisors to
keep armed helicopters (some flare-equipped) on night alert at provincial head-
q u a r t e r ~ . ~He
’ requested more Army Special Forces troops. And he asked for
one helicopter company in direct support of each Vietnamese division, plus
additional armed helicopter companies and platoons. 88
In addition the MACV commander instructed General Moore and Brig.
Gen. Delk M. Oden, commander of the United States Army Support Command,
Vietnam, to shore up all American air support of troop movements, convoys,
and reaction forces. Moore and Oden issued a formal agreement that Westmore-
land placed in a MACV directive dated September 7. To refine coordination,
Army and Marine Corps aviation was to be collocated as would Air Force and
Vietnamese control agencies. Ground reaction forces would not normally move
without air support. In many cases, armed helicopters would engage and pin-
point the enemy until more heavily armed fighters arrived. If too few fighters
were to be had, extra armed helicopters would be
The Moore-Oden agreement was perhaps useful as a n interim measure
required by conditions in South Vietnam. Still it differed in important respects
from proven tactical air doctrine. The agreement perpetuated two separate air
control systems (Air Force and Army-Marine Corps), which made it possible for
a ground commander to receive conflicting advice. Time and again General
LeMay protested the presence of armed helicopters in Vietnam, because tactical
fighters performed better. Even so, the Moore-Oden agreement recognized
complementary needs for both types of aircraft.
Some USAF officers believed that the 2d Air Division was being “hood-
winked” in the roles and missions agreement, but theory had to give way to
practicality. With the absence of enemy air power, armed helicopters proved
useful. Their instant reply to ground fire offset their inaccurate and rather light
firepower. But the Viet Cong’s introduction of more .50-cal and 40-mm weapons
trimmed the helicopters’ advantages.
The Air Force concept of centralized control of all air resources remained
“fundamental and sound” in the words of Col. Allison C. Brooks, General
Moore’s deputy. However, since the fairly slow A-I aircraft in Vietnam could not
be moved rapidly from one base to another, Brooks agreed they should be
dispersed into the areas where the battles occurred. So long as there was no
deviation from the principle of centralized control, the planes could be shifted as
required without fragmenting the
225
President Johnson had intimated shortly after taking office that he was
inclining toward expanded covert operations against North Vietnam. With the
least risk he wanted t o put pressure on Hanoi, t o force lessened support for the
The President early in January approved additional resources
for covert actions, including beach landings and airdrops of Vietnamese intelli-
gence and commando teams. Closely managing this work were the Office of the
Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (headed by General now in Washington) and the MACV
Special Operations Group in Saigon.’
As in other international waters, U.S. Navy patrols were routinely operating
in the Gulf of to monitor various North Vietnamese activities by visual
and electronic In February aircraft from Strategic Air Command
resumed their reconnaissance missions. Averaging one or two sorties a day, they
photographed the border areas of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam.’ In
March more naval patrolling was deemed necessary. Done by air as well as by
sea, it focused on naval movements.’ By April the sum of this intelligence
suggested that Hanoi was readying forces to invade South Vietnam through
Laos. So General repeated announcements t o the Joint Chiefs seemed
to be sound -there could be no satisfactory solution to the situations in Laos
and South Vietnam without military action against North
At the end of June the President selected General Taylor to succeed Henry
Lodge as Ambassador to Vietnam. In recognition of Taylor’s prior role as
one of the major architects of the war, Johnson entrusted the entire military
effort t o his hands. He authorized the new ambassador t o wield whatever
command control he thought proper. If Taylor acted independently of CINC-
PAC, he would infringe on the command prerogatives of Admiral Sharp, the
newly installed commander in chief. He might also split the unity of air power
into three packages operations in Vietnam and in Laos plus those planned
against North Vietnam. Gen. Hunter Harris, picked to head on
August I , would find that possibility frustrating. After talking with Admiral
Sharp in Hawaii, Ambassador Taylor reached Saigon on July He told General
Westmoreland that he would not interfere with to day BUSINESS
T o Taylor the government seemed weak. As he later wrote, “We
lived dangerously in this period, never sure from night to night when a new
might overthrow another feeble government or when we might some
important town to a surprise attack or a military base to mortar fire.”‘
The weakness of the Saigon government, heavy deliveries of modern weap-
ons by North Vietnam to the and infiltration of North Vietnamese
Army units into the south called for greater American effort. Since January the
I
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
J C S had been advocating a shift from advisory assistance to more direct aid.
Now in May they proposed assigning U.S. Special Forces teams to provinces and
districts as advisors to Regional and Popular Forces. General Westmoreland
opposed flooding the country with American servicemen. He believed the key to
success was honing the cutting edge of the small fighting units. Hence on June 25
and again on July 16, he recommended that U.S. military strength in Vietnam be
expanded by about forty-two hundred men to work as advisors a t the district
level. Admiral Sharp agreed. 7
On July I8 General Khanh delivered a n emotional address at a rally to mark
Vietnam’s “day of shame,” the anniversary of the country’s division in 1954. He
asserted that his government was unwilling to remain indifferent in the face of the
firm determination of the people who wanted a “push northward” as “an
appropriate means to fulfill our national history.” The next day a government
statement declared, “If Communist China and Communist Vietnam obstinately
continue their way of aggression, the government and entire people of Vietnam
will step up the war with determination until total victory liberates the whole of
our national
One week earlier a detachment of C-130s from the U S A F 6091st Recon-
naissance Squadron, recently moved from Japan to Don Muang near Bangkok,
had begun flying communication intercept missions off the North Vietnamese
coast. On the 28th a Navy DeSoto patrol, consisting solely of the destroyer
Muddox, also commenced sailing close to the coast t o collect radar and com-
munications intelligence and to make a “show of
Hanoi broadcasts revealed that the North Vietnamese knew of the burgeon-
ing covert activity. In a talk with newsmen in July, Air Commodore Nguyen Cao
Ky admitted that troops were being parachuted into North Vietnam. He said
training was in progress for bigger special missions, entailing ground attacks and
airborne operations beyond the confines of South Vietnam. 10
Conferring with Ambassador Taylor on July 23, General Khanh insisted
that the war had entered a new phase - South Vietnam needed t o be on the
offensive. But the next day he asked Taylor whether he should resign. In a cable
t o the State Department, the Ambassador said that if the United States opposed
a march to the north, the Vietnamese might break with American policy. A single
“maverick pilot taking off for Hanoi with a load of bombs”could touch off an
unwarranted extension of hostilities. This would cloud the chances for internal
pacification in Vietnam. The chief need, Taylor felt, was a stable Vietnamese
government and that required time. T o gain this time, he suggested that the
Vietnamese military make contingency plans for heightened actions against
North Vietnam. 11
But the Vietnamese chafed for action. Four of their patrol boats, operating
under U.S. guidance, left Da Nang on July 30 and sailed north. That night they
shelled a radar station on Hon Me Island and a radio transmitter on Hon Ngu
Island. Both installations were off the North Vietnamese coast near Vinh, and
both were deeply involved in Hanoi’s sea infiltration. 12
228
T H E G U L F OF TONKIN INCIDENT
229
THE ADVISORY YEARS
230
THE G U L F O F INCIDENT
China
strikes against individual surviving aircraft could be carried out. 19 But Sharp
needed the go-ahead from higher authority, and it was not given.
On August 7 General Westmoreland suggested that MACV and the Viet-
namese government make General Moore the combined air commander. With a I
Yet there was a nagging doubt as to whether the Maddox had actually been
attacked on the night of August 4. High-speed naval operations at night made
precise observation and rapid and accurate reporting difficult. In September
Hanoi would publish a lengthy white paper t o justify the August 2 attack as
proper defense against a covert operation. Rut it declared that none of its naval
craft was in the area two nights later. 22
William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, was
impressed by Ambassador Taylor's assessment of the Khanh government's
weakness. He therefore drafted a policy memorandum for the National Security
232
T H E G U L F OF INCIDENT
235
xx of ASSETS
General Moore, the Air Division commander, counted General West-
as the biggest “booster” of tactical air support in Vietnam.’ But
Westmoreland’s requests for more air resources in mid-1964 hewed to Army
aviation doctrine. He asked for a fourth C- I23 squadron (sixteen planes) to take
care of “wholesale” supply under the Southeast Asia Military Airlift System, a
second Army Caribou company to handle “retail” deliveries within the
corps areas, two new Army helicopter companies numbering seventy
(some for command use, others for gunships), and two additional airmobile
platoons with twenty Among the forty-eight hundred personnel in the
package were forty air liaison officer and forward air controller teams.
understood and agreed to the need for the C-I squadron, in light
of Viet success in attacking surface transportation. But an extra Caribou
company seemed unnecessary, if the already in Vietnam were put under
central control of the airlift system for common use. General the
position of “complementary” needs for armed helicopters and
tactical air. He objected strongly to helicopter gunships. Despite the Air Force
chief‘s contention that strike aircraft gave more firepower, Secretary of Defense
on August approved Westmoreland’s list of requirements.’
Three days later, a Royal Australian Air Force detachment of six Caribous
arrived a t Tan Son Nhut and went under control oftheairlift system. But the new
Army Caribou company reaching Vietnam in September remained outside
systematic control. The Air Force Reserve furnished the fresh squadron of
the planes flown to Tan Son Nhut in mid-September by rotating
replacement crews. In early October the 19th Air Commando Squadron (Troop
Carrier) was formed and assigned to the 15th Troop Carrier Group.
In August the Joint Chiefs of Staff had forwarded General ques-
tion on the comparative merits of tactical air and armed helicopters. General
Westmoreland, MACV commander, responded and asserted that the latter had
numerous advantages over strike aircraft support. General Moore took excep-
tion and argued that many of the alleged benefits were invalid. Continuing
discussions consumed a lot of staff energy that might better have gone to the
combat
Westmoreland did not neglect tactical aviation, even though he heartily
endorsed armed helicopters. For the first time, MACV critiques of Vietnamese
ground operations pointed out missed opportunities for tactical air support. For
example, in Yen Province on August three battalions attacked about five
hundred without once calling for strike aircraft. This, MACV com-
mented, was “the major fault” of the
Past counterinsurgency experts had viewed air strikes as impeding pacifica-
tion. Then Leon a n analyst with The R A N D Corporation, interviewed
prisoners and concluded that the adverse effects were far less than
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
assumed. He further found that since the Viet Cong were on the lookout for
strike aircraft, they feared even liaison planes.‘
Yet MACV desired more helicopters because strike aircraft and liaison
planes were too few, a shortage seen by General Moore as the most important
limiting factor in the USAF effort.’ Due to training demands, only eight of the
twenty-nine A-I Es of the 1st Air Commando Squadron were on hand for twelve
combat sorties a day. An average of just thirty Vietnamese A-I Hs were available
for thirty-five to forty-five combat Eight aircraft of the 1st Air Com-
mando Squadron crashed, at least two due t o enemy ground fire. These A-I Es
were shot down on the night of September 23, when silhouetted by flares while
making a low-level napalm pass.’
General Moore had proposed in August that the Vietnamese be given a fifth
and a sixth A-I H squadron, and he asked that the B-57 and F-100 jets at Bien
Hoa and Da Nang be used within the country. MACV and the J C S concurred.
When the Joint Chiefs took up in September the matter of lagging tactical air
support, they suggested using jets but President Johnson was unwilling t o d o so.
To up USAF sorties, Ambassador Taylor advocated deleting the need for a bona
fide Vietnamese trainee pilot aboard an A-I E during a combat mission. Perhaps,
the Joint Chiefs said, USAF A-I Es could fly combat while carryinga Vietnamese
observer if a pilot was not on hand. Although at first “entirely negative,”
Secretary McNamara on September 25 agreed to permit A-I E combat opera-
tions with a Vietnamese observer or student pilot aboard.
The J C S tried again t o allow USAF crews to respond to immediate and
emergency air requests. But Ambassador Taylor still resisted opening the door to
wider use of American crews, and McNamara agreed. In mid-October the Joint
Chiefs authorized A-1Es to engage in combat with a Vietnamese pilot or
observer aboard. For the Vietnamese Air Force they recommended a fifth A-I H
squadron in May 1965 and a sixth in October 1965. Until then, two USAF A-I E
units were required in the country. 10
During October-December 1964 the 34th Tactical Group and the Vietnam-
ese Air Force slightly expanded their strike aircraft. Organized under the 34th
Group on October 12, the USAF 602d Fighter Commando Squadron began to
build in both personnel and planes. The 520th or fourth Vietnamese fighter
squadron, formed at Bien Hoa in October, prepared to move t o the new Can Tho
airfield.
In December the 34th Group flew about fifty A-I sorties a day, seventeen of
them available for combat. The planes performed admirably on strike missions
but proved hard to maintain, chiefly due to in flight engine failures. The Ameri-
cans nonetheless kept eighty percent of the aircraft operational. In contrast, the
Vietnamese could muster only fiftyeight percent. For example, the 5 16th Fighter
Squadron at Da Nang ha’d fifteenaircraft but its sortie rate was about six per day.
The 520th Fighter Squadron flew a few missions in December, but construc-
tion lagged at Can T h o (later called Binh Thuy) and the field was insecure a t
night. Beginning December 20 the squadron daily deployed a detachment of five
237
I
to Binh The pilots were on call for missions until they returned to
just before nightfall.
The expansion of the Vietnamese Air Force was supported by adequate
aircraft delivery and aircrew training. It suffered from troubles in training
maintenance men, owing in part to shortages of ground support and handling
equipment. The Vietnamese borrowed a few dollies, loading hoists, and other
equipment from the 34th Tactical Group. Only main bases like owned
these items, which hardly helped the situation at forward bases.
On August at the height of the Gulf crisis, issued orders
inactivating the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron as had earlier been
planned. General Westmoreland expressed surprise to Admiral Sharp and
asked t o retain the unit. In lieu of giving liaison planes to the Vietnamese
Liaison Squadron as contemplated, Westmoreland proposed the purchase
of aircraft t o equip that unit. On September Defense Secretary
approved.
The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron was reactivated at on
October MACV recommended thirty more planes for it and each of the four
Vietnamese liaison units as
The reversal of the earlier phaseout decision left the squadron in limbo.
Until pipeline support could be restored, the 34th Tactical Group possessed
twenty-four and twelve liaison pilots, three of whom were about to complete
their tours. A detachment of stayed a t t o train newly graduated
Vietnamese pilots arriving from Ten with liaison officers and
forward controllers, went under the air support operations centers.
The with the 14th Regiment at was Capt. Lloyd
E. Lewis. When he received an and a Vietnamese observer in September, he
began to fly day-long surveillance missions coordinated with the Binh
province commander. The result was a n appreciable decline
activity. Friendly ground action became more productive as did interdiction
targeting and air strikes.
In September William Graham and Aaron of R A N D studied the
use of USAF liaison officers and forward air controllers on constant visual
reconnaissance and strike control. The two analysts gathered data for a new
concept they called the “Single Integrated Attack idea was presented
in Saigon, Hawaii, and Washington in October and next in a R A N D report. The
theory favored and closely coordinated air and ground strike forces as the
best counterinsurgency weapon. crews were to carry out continuous and
extensive airborne surveillance and strike control. They would work with Special
Forces ground teams of about eighty men, who were to hold the Viet
groups long enough for strike aircraft to sweep in. Unfortunately, the concept
was better-suited t o an insurgency in its initial stages than to the field warfare the
were starting to wage.
Meanwhile, General had embarked on a general following
the abortive coup against him in September. His sweeping personnel changes in
the Joint General Staff and among the field commanders produced officers
THE ADVISORY YEARS
unfamiliar with the air request system. T o explain the system's features, a team
from the USAF Air-Ground Operations School completed a countrywide circuit
in October and November. But all attempts to persuade the Vietnamese to assign
sufficient workers to the request net, to disperse 0- I As to forward locations, and
to let others besides Vietnamese air observers mark targets were fruitless. The
field commanders refused to be bypassed in requests for air strikes. Neither the
Vietnamese Air Force nor ground commanders were willing to assume responsi-
bility under civil law for mistakes that the other might make in marking targets.
Strike pilots refrained from accepting targets unless a Vietnamese air observer
designated them. And deploying 0- I As to forward and remote airstrips meant
danger from guerrillas, logistic difficulties, and loss of command control.
Despite these drawbacks, Secretary McNamara in November approved a
fifth and sixth fighter squadron for the Vietnamese Air Force. He authorized
building the Vietnamese liaison squadrons to thirty aircraft each, by deliveries of
sixty-eight 0-1As and U-17As from March through May 1965. He said he would
probably go along with General Westmoreland's request to give the 19th Tactical
Air Support Squadron thirty 0-1Fs. However, he wanted to postpone his
decision until the political climate in Saigon improved. 19
The continuous surveillance concept could not be properly set in motion
during the winter of 1964-65, due to the dearth of USAF and Vietnamese aircraft
and forward air controllers. By December the 19th Tactical Air Support Squad-
ron was down t o seven airmen and nine pilots, when it received eight single-
engine pilots who needed to be checked out in 0-1s. The Vietnamese liaison
squadrons owned only sixty of 120 authorized 0-1As and U-17As. In the II
Corps there were just four 0-1 controllers on hand. 20
In compensation USAF research and development had turned out some
new weapons that TAC's Special Air Warfare Center had tested. A munitions
survey team visiting Vietnam thought that these weapons and new techniques
ought to replace older munitions and methods.*'
The hazards of Viet Cong ground fire to low-flying aircraft, particularly
those on napalm runs, demanded a different approach to hamlet defense.
Fragmentation clusters replaced napalm on night flare-assisted missions. Fight-
ers delivered the clusters from a dive to shave the time they were silhouetted by
The 1st Combat Application Group at Eglin Air Force base had devised and
tested a three-gun side-firing installation in a C-47. The Air Staff called for
operational testing of these rapid-fire 7.62-mm Gatling guns (miniguns), either
affixed to the racks of a n A-I or mounted and fired from the side cargo doors of
an orbiting C-47. In September Mk-44 Lazy Dog free-falling finned bullets were
approved for use in Vietnam. The Lazy Dog worked well at first but not in terrain
covered with heavy growth. The fins of the small projectiles easily bent out of
shape when loaded into the dispensers from which they were dropped. This
caused the missiles to tumble and lose their impact. Moreover, the size and shape
of the pattern of the falling projectiles were erratic. Clearly, Lazy Dog was no
240
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
substitute for napalm when enemy and friendly troops were fairly each
Other new weapons also proved not entirely
Tests by the 1st Combat Application Group verified that it was desirable t o
modify the C-47 with lateral-firing miniguns. Still P A C A F and T A C were
reluctant to employ the minigun-equipped plane in combat. They deemed it
obsolete, vulnerable to ground fire, and unable to perform as well as strike
aircraft.
To Gen. John P. McConnell, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff (who would
succeed General LeMay as Chief on February 1965) a n armed C-47 was a
highly specialized weapon for use solely in areas of light ground fire. The aircraft
could fly long night alert missions and react swiftly to surprise attacks. Circling
above small-arms range, it could pin down the enemy until fighters got there. The
armed C-47 would help offset the shortage of strike aircraft and the inefficiency
of night fighter airborne alerts.
Following a November 2 briefing on the armed C-47, General LeMay
ordered a combat evaluation that got under way in early December. A test team
led by Maj. Ronald W. Terry fitted two C-47s of the 34th Tactical Group with
miniguns. These aircraft were a n instant success against enemy troops in the
open. Using a n improvised gunsight and putting the plane’s wing down in a
“plyon 8”turn, the pilot could direct fire from the three miniguns mounted in the
left-hand cargo door. When fired together, they spewed 18,000 rounds-per-
minute into a space about the size of a football field. An aerial gunner cleared
jams and reloaded the weapons in flight. While the small-caliber bullets were
easily deflected in wooded stretches, the AC-47 gunships were outstanding for
night fort and hamlet defense. Awed by the stream of tracers, the Viet Cong
spoke of the new “ray gun” turned upon
Integrated air reconnaissance fully responsive to users’ needs did not
develop in 1964. And the absence of a coordinated reconnaissance-intelligence-
target system was a serious defect. The main stumbling block was the splintering
of air reconnaissance in and out of the country. Many elements were involved,
but the stateside U S A F Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center placed most of the
blame on the shortage of keen and influential senior Air Force officers in
Time and again Col. Harvey E. Henderson, 2d Air Division deputy com-
mander, had suggested that all these resources be brought into a tactical recon-
naissance squadron. To d o so, however, would have exceeded the Air Force’s
authorized unit force levels. Mirroring the talk of out the American
forces from Vietnam, planners programmed a decline in U.S. reconnaissance.
Furthermore the Vietnamese 716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron
THE ADVISORY YEARS
(Bottom) A mounted in an
I
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
with three RC-47s and eighteen RT-28s, together with photo processing cells in
the corps tactical zones was becoming operational. Except for problems in
camera installation, this squadron was making solid progress. As the 7 16th
reached its projected goal in early 1964 of 374 sorties a month, the Able Mable
RF-101s were to depart along with six Army Mohawk armed photo-recon-
naissance
Unforeseen events buffeted the projections. The U-2 aircraft from Bien Hoa
flew very high altitude photo missions over Southeast Asia. Film from these
flights swamped the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, which had to call
upon other PACAF, SAC, and Navy facilities in the Philippines and Japan..
Unfortunately the U-2 photography, needed for national strategic planning, had
slight value for tactical Moreover, the wing-stress weakness of the B-26
led to the removal of the RB-26s from Vietnam at the close of March 1964,
diminishing night photo coverage. At the same time, the Vietnamese reconnais-
sance program ran into technical snags. The improved RC-47 infrared photo
systems were operational in April and could locate the enemy by heat-source
imagery. But MACV intelligence could not use this information because proce-
dures had not been worked out to exploit the infrared
Two things were to alter sharply the whole reconnaissance program the
U.S. decision in May to begin air reconnaissance over Laos, and Secretary
McNamara's orders to retrain Vietnamese RT-28 pilots for a fourth A-1H
squadron. Six more USAF RF-101s arrived to augment the six Able Mable
aircraft. All RT-28s were removed from the Vietnamese 7 16th Squadron, and
three RC-47s were assigned to the Vietnamese 43d Transport After a
few transport missions, the RC-47s were restored to photo duty in the IIIand IV
Corps.
In midyear the RF-101s commenced flying out of Tan Son Nhut over Laos.
Yet authorized occasional night photography and infrared reconnaissance were
out of the question. The two RC-47s for this work had no self-contained
navigation systems (chiefly terrain clearance radar), and mountains and uncer-
tain weather made the flights too hazardous. The Air Force set up delivery of two
more R C 4 7 s with doppler navigation and inflight readout infrared sensors.
These planes could not be modified and in place until December
General Harris, PACAF commander, pressed for low-level reconnaissance
to secure more detailed coverage for tactical air operations. Admiral Sharp had
no hope of obtaining blanket approval for these flights, due to their danger to
low-flying planes. CINCPAC needed to justify each mission to officials in
Washington on a case-by-case basis. 35
As the photo-reconnaissance workload grew in South Vietnam, PACAF
sent six more RF-101s to Tan Son Nhut. Another six RF-101s that had been
dispatched to Kadena in the wake of the Tonkin Gulf crisis also assisted. The
Vietnamese RC-47s continued their coverage in the III and IV Corps, two
Vietnamese aircrews being permanently assigned to reconnaissance. Requests
for photography forwarded straight to air support operations centers markedly
increased.
243
THE ADVISORY YEARS
corps tactical operations center. After collation with other intelligence, infrared
material was useful for artillery and air strikes. 39
While the RB-57s were in test during July, 29 infrared targets were requested
and 21 were completed. With one more RB-57 in use in December, there were
261 requests for infrared and 228 executed. Most infrared coverage was in the III
Corps. T o exploit both visual and infrared sightings, the 2d Air Division pro-
posed target centers for the other
These centers were to funnel information and needs to the air operations
center, which would coordinate strike aircraft. On December 20, 1964, however,
MACV formed the Central Target Analysis and Research Center at Tan Son
Nhut as a unit of MACV J-2 (Intelligence). Its main mission was to coordinate
Army and Air Force infrared reconnaissance. The center set up units at the corps
headquarters, and they were responsive to MACV J-2 Flights by RB-57s and
OV-1Cs proved invaluable. By January 1965 the new setup was absorbing the
entire infrared capability in Vietnam. In February there were so many requests
for RF-101 coverage that the 13th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron was
again unable to handle the processing load. Chiefly through correlation of
infrared sensor indications with other intelligence, the center identified 250
possible enemy targets in two months. Included were Viet Cong battalion camps
in Phuoc Tuy Province that would eventually be struck by B-57Jet
Although the Air Force supported the MACV program to improve intelli-
gence, the system removed control of infrared sorties and much of the RF-101
effort from the air operations MACV enjoyed several intelligence
sources that by law could not be disclosed to Vietnamese agencies. Consequently,
the Vietnamese delayed and in some cases refused t o allow strikes against targets
so generated. The Central Target Analysis and Research Center worked at
cross-purposes with the 2d Air Division's desire to develop close relations with
province chiefs for intelligence and quick air
Had the MACV system been staffed with more USAF targeting, interpreta-
tion, and reconnaissance officers, they might have produced more air strikes. But
General Westmoreland regarded all air operations as support for ground troops
and of necessity responsive to ground commanders. He even included interdic-
tion, a normal USAF responsibility. Hence the MACV J-2 had the principal say
on how air reconnaissance and surveillance resources were to be used. This left
the 2d Air Division commander, working through the air operations center, with
only nominal operational control over reconnaissance forces. These, like the
aircraft flying close support and interdiction in South Vietnam, became chiefly
geared to ground
So too the airlift. Although General LeMay preferred to have C-I23 assault
transports used in tactical operations rather than as logistic carriers, the insecure
rail and road net imposed great stress on air. At times U.S. commanders joked
that the Vietnamese army refused to travel on the ground and t o keep roads and
rails open because the Air Force moved everything for them. The adding of air
escort for trains and convoys did little to restrain requests for air
245
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
The 315th Troop Carrier Group at Tan Son Nhut operated the Southeast
Asia Airlift System. Its transport control office in the air operations center
managed common-use airlift in South Vietnam and Thailand. Assigned to the
3 15th Air Division at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, the group came under MACV
operational control exercised by the 2d Air Division.
American and Vietnamese forces projected monthly airlift requirements
and sent them to the Joint Airlift Allocation Board in MACV J-4 (Logistics).
The board in fact consisted of one officer i n the J-4 movements branch. He
screened and processed the requests, set priorities, and with the Joint General
Staff levied the requirements on the airlift units by monthly increments.
The 3 I 5th Group commander also served as director of air transportation
for the Southeast Asia Airlift System. In theory he could call upon the forty-eight
USAF C-123s of his three squadrons, three C-47s of the 1st Air Commando
Squadron, two of sixteen U.S. Army CV-2B Caribou transports, several Viet-
namese C-47s, and two Bristol Type 170 transports of the Royal New Zealand
Air Force operating in Thailand. Actually, three C-I 23s and three air commando
C-47s were kept on station at Nha Trang to support U.S. Army Special Forces at
remote spots. A “Fire Brigade” of three C-123s a t Tan Son Nhut and one at Da
Nang stood alert, ready t o respond on fifteen-minute notice to the need for a
paratroop drop or equivalent emergency. Besides, two C-I 23s were regularly
allocated for service in Thailand. And the Vietnamese C-47s were usually flying
other
Col. David T. Fleming, commander of the 315th Troop Carrier Group,
depicted the airlift system as a hodgepodge of badly tacked-together elements,
saturated with requirements. The sole officer on the Joint Airlift Allocation
Board could not possibly screen requests for validity. Cargo that should have
gone by surface transportation was airlifted, and cargo for airlift was often late or
absent a t air terminals. Communications for keeping track of transport flights I
were unreliable. Aircraft frequently left bases empty or partially
The great demands constantly pushed the C- 123s above their programmed
sixty hours of flying time a month per aircraft. They were wearing out, stressed !
by landings and takeoffs on rough fields. By May I964 skin wrinkles appeared on
the top sides of two planes. Further inspection a t Tan Son Nhut disclosed visible
damage on all thirty-seven C-123s that had been in Vietnam for nearly three
years. Eleven required extensive repairs. Those at Da Nang in the theater for a
year had minor damage. Airlift further declined when three C-123s went to
Thailand in July to join the two on station there. That same month, two U.S.
Army Caribous were lost in crashes.
The debut in August of six CV-2B Caribous of the Royal Australian Air
Force helped redress the balance. They contributed six hundred tons of short-
range airlift a month, proving that all the Caribous could be scheduled and used
within a centralized
The system did well despite its shortcomings. Over the first half of 1964, the
C-123s bore the bulk of the airlift load. They airdropped 1,270 tons of supplies,
moved 1,252 paratroopers and I I5 tons of materiel in assault missions, and flew
246
I
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
Washington. The chemicals worked best in the wet season when the vegetation
was actively growing. Ranch Hand therefore waited until June and July 1963
before clearing growth from the Saigon to Da Lat powerline and canals in the Ca
Mau Peninsula. This and other spraying over the year improved the view and
reduced cover for hostile ambush operations. There were eighty-seven square
kilometers defoliated throughout 1963, compared to twenty in
In January 1964 the U.S. Army division advisors were allowed to make
wider use of aerial spray around depots, airfields, and outposts. They could also
approve hand-spray operations against enemy crops. Warnings had to go out to
the civilian population before spraying. In consequence the Ranch Hand C-123s,
flying at 150 feet, were exposed to enemy ground fire. In 1962 and 1963 the
average number of hits on each spray plane per mission was four small-arms
bullets. The risk rose in 1964 as spray flights treated areas totally dominated by
the Viet Cong. On April 30 a Ranch Hand aircraft ran into .50-caliber fire that
wounded the copilot and tore forty holes in the plane. Fighters regularly escorted
spray missions and struck the areas from which the C-123s took ground fire.
The Ranch Hand C-123s staged to Da Nang in May and June 1964. They
set about spraying the elephant grass and other vegetation that sheltered the
enemy along the roads in the A Shau-A Luoi valley and other areas near the
Laotian border. Completed quickly before the Viet Cong could fully react, these
flights sustained just four hits in the course of twenty-six sorties. On five spray
missions in III Corps during May, C-123s were struck fifteen times by ground
fire. On two occasions MACV suspended operations where heavy firing
248
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
In November and December Ranch hand sprayed enemy rice near War
Zone AN intelligence source quoted the provincial
committee as reporting that the destroyed rice would have fed their troops the
area for years. During these flights ground fire shot out an engine on a C-
and the plane barely made it back to A fourth C-I23 was added in
December. By the end of the year the detachment had flown seventy-two survey
flights and spray sorties, defoliated square kilometers of vegetation, and
destroyed acres of crops. This contrasted with the acres of
crops sprayed by the Vietnamese in and the acres in
Concern of Washington officials over strengthening the government
focused fresh attention on psychological operations during the spring of
Psychological warfare had been conducted since I but with uneven results. In
November Farm Gate had first used four SC-47s for leaflet drops and
loudspeaker broadcasts. The SC-47, however, was not well-suited to remote-area
work. Farm Gate wanted a plane that could land at a forward site, pick up local
officials or defectors, and let them speak from the air to people who
would recognize their voices. To d o this the Super Courier (later
designated seemed ideal. The aircraft, specially configured for the CIA,
featured short-takeoff-and-landing and other admirable characteristics. Farm
Gate requested eight and authority to create a psychological warfare
branch of three qualified officers and two technicians, to forge “a sophisticated
psychological warfare
These efforts were abruptly dampened. On February I , a low-flying
dropping leaflets near crashed and killed eight Americans and one
Vietnamese. Embarrassed by the loss of so many Americans on a flight that was
supposed to train Vietnamese, Secretary ordered leaflet and speaker
missions turned over to the Vietnamese. The Joint Chiefs directed that U.S.
aircraft refrain from such operations “except in unusual CIRCUMSTANCES In
June the Vietnamese equipped a C-47 with speakers for airborne
The Air Staff and wanted Farm Gate to train Vietnamese Air
Force personnel for psychological warfare. But by April the Air Division
director of operations, Col. Winston Anderson, judged the Vietnamese to
have little recognition of its importance. From June through January
the Vietnamese speaker-equipped C-47 had a total of twenty-two flights-
fourteen loudspeaker and eight psychological warfare. Now and then the stand-
ard dispensed leaflets, and the OFTHE liaison squadrons participated
in a small program of civic action, troop information, and enemy leaflet
t ON
In September Farm Gate received two of four authorized
Super Couriers, one being rigged with speakers. Between December
and May Farm Gate made a number of flights in the to evaluate it
as a psychological warfare And in May, Mr. approved the
use of American planes to supplement Vietnamese psychological operations,
provided minimum U.S. personnel were
DIFFUSION OF AIR ASSETS
The mission was then divided between the Vietnamese Air Force and the 2d
Air Division, with neither of them given authority to coordinate the overall
psychological warfare The 2d Air Division favored the Helio Super
Courier. While the C-47 carried a navigator and was better for night flights, the
U-10 was more maneuverable, not as noisy, and less susceptible to ground fire
since it was smaller. The weight of the U-10’slaminated fiberglass armor dimin-
ished aircraft performance, but protected the crew against light-caliber fire.
After speakers and other equipment were installed in two more U-10s, the
2d Air Division had three planes for speaker and leaflet missions. Their flights
stepped up after May 1963. By October 22, 2d Air Division aircraft had flown
386 psychological warfare
In the spring of 1964, aerial psychological operations were often the sole
swift means of communication between the government and remote rural
peoples. Since part of President Khanh’s weakness stemmed from loss of contact
with the hinterland, it was proposed to expand the training of Vietnamese in
psychological operations. While visiting Saigon, Carl T. Rowan, director of the
U.S. Information Agency, was impressed with the potential of these activities. He
supported the proposal to enlarge them, which President Johnson approved on
April
To support the Vietnamese armed forces in “political warfare,” the Viet-
namese Air Force set up a general political warfare directorate with headquarters
at Tan Son Nhut and officers at each wing. Ten single-engine utility aircraft (six
U-6As and four were delivered to the Vietnamese Air Force for modifi-
cation to psychological warfare duty.
Also over the summer of 1964, the 2d Air Division worked with the United
States Army Support Command, Saigon, to test a public address system. It
consisted of eight 125-watt speakers installed in a Vietnamese H-34 helicopter.
Messages could be heard on the ground as the chopper flew at a fairly safe
altitude of three thousand feet, but the rotor blades distorted the sound. The 2d
Air Division abandoned the project, while the Army continued to maintain seven
UH-1B copters fitted with the public address
American and Vietnamese aircraft in August 1964 reached a new high of
132 psychological warfare sorties. The Vietnamese were nevertheless more con-
cerned with internal “personnel services” tothe soldiers and airmen. Caught up in
the conversion to fighter aircraft, the Vietnamese paid scant attention to psycho-
logical warfare. Four U-17s were used in and around Saigon, yet only one U-6
was modified due to the complications in installing
The U-10 section of the 1st Air Commando Squadron was authorized four
aircraft and six pilots. An accident claimed one plane in September, and the
absence of a planned flow of replacement pilots proved even more serious. In
November the U-10 section was down to two pilots, each averaging more than
one hundred flying hours during the month.
Psychological warfare sorties by USAF and Vietnamese aircraft totaled 106
in September, 109 in October, 69 in November, and 102 in December 1964.
Although four USAF replacement pilots finally joined the U-10 section, the
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
impression was current that “we are piddling with” psychological operations
“and not getting
That impression applied also to the broader canvas of events in Vietnam.
I
252
End of
Phase
Viet Cong night outpost and hamlet attacks doubled in intensity during the
last half of 1964. They were especially severe in the Ill and I V Corps Tactical
Zones. In October the enemy scored marked successes in the II Corps, which had
been almost pacified a few months earlier.'
General Moore thought it just a matter of time before the Viet Cong tried to
spring a psychologically damaging surprise raid or a mortar bombardment on a
major air base. Although the Vietnamese were responsible for interior security
and perimeter defense, the 2d Air Division had its own force of one officer and
280 airmen as additional guards.
Proper aircraft dispersal was virtually impossible a t the overloaded airfields,
thus inviting sabotage or attack. This prompted P A C A F to ask CINCPAC in
August 1964 to allow one of the two B-57 squadrons to move from Bien Hoa to
Takhli. Action was put off until October, when General Harris spoke personally
with Admiral Sharp. The latter then permitted half of each squadron to return to
Clark Air Base for training. This trimmed the number of B-57s on alert at Bien
Hoa to eighteen, but the field remained overcrowded and poorly defended.
How insecure Bien Hoa was became clear on the night of November 1,when
a Viet Cong mortar squadron penetrated the Vietnamese perimeter defenses. The
ensuing thirty-minute barrage killed four and wounded seventy-two, destroyed
five B-57s and one H-43 helicopter, and damaged thirteen B-57s and three H-43s.
Vietnamese losses totaled two killed, five wounded, three A- I Hs destroyed, and
three A-I Hs and two C-47s damaged. Some houses, a mess hall, vehicles, and
fuel tanks were also destroyed or damaged.²
The attack provoked discussions on countermeasures at the highest levels of
government in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had previously agreed on
positive action against North Vietnam, but differed on the severity, timing, and
location of that action. The major point of indecision stemmed from the stand of
Ambassador Taylor. He held that the United States could start no strong move
against North Vietnam until a stable government existed in Saigon. Conse-
quently, planning for a n air campaign had continued on a contingency basis. At
the end of his first year in office, President Johnson remarked that his principal
advisers had made no unanimous recommendation for air activity against North
Vietnam.
As noted earlier, Secretary of Defense McNamara put hard questions to the
Joint Chiefs regarding the effects of bombing the ninety-four strategic air targets
identified in North Vietnam. In their reply the chiefs accepted CINCPAC
assurances. The targets could be attacked without depleting fuel and ordnance
needed to meet a Chinese intervention. CINCPAC had already prepared a plan
to attack all the targets in twenty days. Since there was no doubt that Hanoi was
253
THE ADVISORY YEARS
administering and sustaining the war, General LeMay pushed for Air Force and
Navy air strikes on North Vietnam’s source of supply. He felt that interdiction
would be far more expensive and much less efficient than closing North Viet-
nam’s ports and destroying the supplies by strategic bombing before they started
south.
General Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant, had backed LeMay but
the other chiefs supported Ambassador Taylor’s view. LeMay countered that
there could be no sound Saigon government without morale-building offensive
operations. The Vietnamese military establishment was the sole stabilizing force.
If that collapsed, the United States might well have to fight to get its military
advisors and their dependents out of the country.
Now, the Bien Hoa attack spurred the Joint Chiefs toward a strong reprisal.
On November 1 they verbally recommended to Secretary McNamara immediate
U.S. air strikes against infiltration targets in the Laotian panhandle; airlifting
U.S. Army and Marine Corps units to defend Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, and Bien
Hoa; and assembling USAF units within sixty to seventy-two hours for air I
operations against North Vietnam. The air campaign would consist of an initial
B-52 night strike flown from Guam against Phuc Yen airfield, first-light naval air
strikes on other airfields and the Hanoi-Haiphong oil storage areas, and rapidly
progressing attacks against the entire ninety-four targets listed.
Angered by the Bien Hoa affair, Ambassador Taylor favored limited
retaliation against selected North Vietnamese targets by American and Viet-
namese aircraft, coupled with a policy statement warning of a similar U.S.
response to future incidents. President Johnson’s civilian advisers, chiefly Secre-
taries Rusk and McNamara, counseled patience. The President listened. He was
concerned about the upcoming election and about possible Viet Cong action
against American dependents in Saigon.
Ruling out a n instant response, the President ordered quick replacement of
the destroyed and seriously damaged B-57s at Bien Hoa. He further directed a
National Security Council working group, chaired by William P. Bundy, to
outline political and military options available against North Vietnam. In its
earlydeliberations the Bundy group leaned toward restrained action. In contrast,
the Joint Chiefs on December 18 recommended, first, a hard-hitting, fast,
“full-squeeze’’ air campaign against North Vietnam completed in twenty days.
Secondly, as a fall-back position, they proposed tightly controlled and gradually
increasing air pressure over a two-month period.³
Meanwhile on the night of November 6, Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao K y
led thirty-two Vietnamese A-1Hs against a Viet Cong camp in Zone D. The
mission was a widely announced reprisal for the Bien Hoa incident. According to
South Vietnamese intelligence reports, the attack caused five hundred enemy
casualties.
On the 16th the Viet Cong troops in Zone D forayed out and battled
Vietnamese forces for six hours near Ben Cat. General Khanh personally
directed a massive operation in response. One hundred fifteen U.S. Army and
254
E N D OF T H E A D V I S O R Y P H A S E
255
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
256
END OF T H E A D V I S O R Y P H A S E
Navy planes flew on December 17. Four A-I Hs escorted by eight F-4Bs
conducted armed reconnaissance of Routes 12 I and 12, with the Ban Boung Bau
road bridge as the fixed alternative. The aircraft failed to damage the bridge but
destroyed eight buildings at one end.
The next mission sent four F-100s of the 428th Tactical Fighter Squadron
along Route 8 on December 21. Lightly armed with CBU-2As and 2.75-inch
rockets, the fighters became disoriented after receiving heavy flak, ran low on
fuel, and found no secondary target.
Reports on the first two USAF missions disturbed General LeMay. He sent
word to General Moore that heexpected higher professionalism, even though he
recognized that the tight curbs complicated air operations.
To prepare for the fourth mission, PACAF's 44th Tactical Fighter Squad-
ron deployed six F- 105s from Okinawa to Da Nang. Four of them reconnoitered
Route 23 on December 25, with a strike against the military barracks at
Tchepone. The operation went well, though the dive-bombing at Tchepone was
inaccurate. During the fifth mission on December 30, four Navy A-I Hs struck
the military camp.¹¹
Planners for a mission on January 13chose the Ban Ken bridge, the most
important potential checkpoint on Route 7. Aerial photos showed thirty-four
antiaircraft guns (37-mm and 57-mm) in place, with up to seventy more firing
positions built but not occupied. The planners scheduled an RF-101 as path-
finder and another for bomb damage assessment, eight F-100s carrying CBU-
2As for flak suppression, and sixteen F-105s from the 44th and 67th Tactical
Fighter Squadrons as strike aircraft. The two flights of F-100s were to fly
low-level and abreast across the gunsites to knock them out with cluster bombs.
Immediately thereafter the F-105s would attack the bridge. Each of the first eight
F-105s were to drop eight 750-pound bombs. This would be followed by eight
F-105s loaded with six bombs and two AGM-12B Bullpup air-to-ground mis-
siles. An Air America C-I23 was to serve as airborne control for rescue
helicopters.
The F-100s pummeled the gun positions but some firing continued. The first
wave of F-105s cut the bridge with their sixty-four bombs. The F-100s and the
second wave of F-105s made multiple runs on the gunsites, the mixed ordnance
of the F-105s requiring at least three passes to expend. Moreover, the Thunder-
chiefs had to descend into flak range to control their missiles, and one plane was
downed. An F-100 on its fifth pass was also shot down. Four other aircraft were
damaged.
General Moore said that poor judgment was displayed in the attack. To
escape the losses, the planes should have broken off the engagement after
knocking out the bridge.¹²
While it seemed impossible for ground transportation to bypass the Ban
Ken bridge, the communists within three days converted the top of a dam just
upriver into a traffic route. Press reports of the two lost aircraft prompted
Senator Wayne L. Morse to charge that the air operation violated the 1962
Geneva agreements on Laos.¹³
251
THE ADVISORY YEARS
258
END OF T H E ADVISORY PHASE
259
THE ADVISORY YEARS
During the night of December 10, two Viet Cong battalions struck outposts
at Long My in Chuong Thien Province and ambushed relief forces. A U.S. Army
L-19 and located the ambush and put four covering on the
camouflaged foxholes. U.S. Army helicopters from Soc Trang held the enemy
until Vietnamese in arrived and delivered ordnance in the face of intense
ground fire. One A-I H was downed, and five helicopters damaged. i
the same time, H-34s evacuated thirty-four killed and forty-nine wounded men.
A C-47, four and one AC-47 furnished night illumination and fire
support.²¹
The 4th Marine Battalion battled its way into the rubber forest on
December 31, and was soon surrounded by the enemy (identified from captured
documents as the 48th Main Force Viet Cong Regiment). The Marine com-
mander radioed the USAF forward air controller overhead for air support. Four
responded and hit enemy positions with napalm and general. purpose
bombs. In the afternoon, eight were scrambled and sent to the scene. But
the senior ground commander ordered them returned to Bien Hoa, because air
support had not been requested through Vietnamese army channels.
260
E N D OF T H E ADVISORY P H A S E
Armed helicopters tried to launch strikes later that day. However, they
learned from U.S. Marine Corps advisors with the surrounded battalion that the
thick branches of the rubber trees absorbed the rockets and machinegun fire
from the air. Attacking a t dusk and using massed automatic weapons, the Viet
Cong overpowered the 4th Marine Battalion. All through the night of the 31st,
three C-47s, two C-123s, one A C 4 7 , and four A-IHs supplied flare/fire sup-
port. Even so, just 232 of the 532 men of the 4th Marine Battalion managed to
straggle back to Binh Gia.²²
General Khanh took personal charge of a large operation set afoot in Phuoc
Tuy Province on January I , 1965. C-1 23s flew the 1st and 3d Airborne Battalions
from Tan Son Nhut t o Vung Tau, then helicopters whisked them to the battle
area. On January 2 helicopters transported the 7th Airborne Battalion directly
from Bien Hoa. Tactical fighters supported continuing operations with cover
and escort, landing-zone preparations, and strikes on enemy positions.
On the 5th of January, eight A-1Es were each loaded with one Lazy Dog
XM-44 cannister and normal high-explosive ordnance. The aircraft employed
the Lazy Dog missiles against Viet Cong troops firing at U.S. Army helicopter
observers. Government troops kept clear of the Lazy Dogzones, but U.S. Army
air observers reported that after the drops they no longer received ground fire. An
intelligence report stated that the Viet Cong carried away from the strike areas
fifteen oxcart loads of dead and wounded.²³
At General Khanh’s order, government battalions with tanks and armored
vehicles continued to swing through the safer areas of Phuoc Tuy Province.
From January 10 through February 15, a small air support operations center
managed the flights aiding the massive sweeps. The operations achieved little, for
the Viet Cong evaded ground
Analysis of the Binh Cia defeat revealed a failure to use available fixed-wing
air support properly. Armed helicopters were unable to provide the needed
firepower. As the MACV J-3 reported, “the armed UH-1 B did not possess heavy
enough ordnance to destroy the VC in prepared positions or deter their assault,
since they were concealed under a dense canopy of
Meanwhile, a n incident in downtown Saigon brought the United States to
the verge of direct all-out action. On Christmas Eve 1964 a 300-pound charge
exploded in the Brink Hotel (bachelor officers’quarters for U.S. advisors), killing
two Americans while injuring sixty-four Americans and forty-three Vietnamese.
Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs recommended an immediate reprisal. On
December 29 President Johnson ruled against it.
The Brink Hotel explosion, a direct attack against and a n open challenge t o
the United States, was ominous, but the battle a t Binh Gia was potentially
disastrous. T o U.S. officials in Saigon it was a “highly visible”defeat of serious
proportions. On December 3 I Ambassador Taylor reversed his thinking. Bol-
stered by Deputy Ambassador U . Alexis Johnson and General Westmoreland,
he sent a joint message to Washington. It advocated American air action against
North Vietnam despite the persistent weakness of the Saigon
26 I
THE ADVlSORY YEARS
Courtesy: U.S.Army
262
E N D OF T H E ADVISORY P H A S E
Attention then turned to the air strike aircraft on hand. Attack planes in
Vietnam numbered forty-eight USAF A-1Es and ninety-two A-1Hs of the
Vietnamese Air Force. This combined force could fly about sixty combat and
thirty training sorties a day. Air Vice Marshal Ky’s need to have a n elite “Palace
Guard” flight of standby A-1Hs at Tan Son Nhut constrained Vietnamese
combat sorties. These planes were piloted by highly trained, screened, and
politically dependable personnel who routinely flew strike missions in the IIIand
IV Corps areas. However, assignments to thwart coups and to control dissidence
often diverted them from action against the Viet Cong.
Although individual Vietnamese strike crews performed valiantly, the grow-
ing independence of unit commanders diluted the control of the air operations
centers. Typically, fifty percent of the aircraft were held on five-hour ground
alert. A squadron deciding to fly would call for a target about a n hour before the
end of its ground alert and receive a set of coordinates for attack, usually in a
“free-strike”zone. Hence it was difficult to scramble or to redirect aircraft to meet
emergencies.
Early in January 1965 the Vietnamese 62d Tactical Wing and a detachment
of the 516th Fighter Squadron’s A-1Hs deployed from Pleiku to Nha Trang,
where work was to start on a new runway in February. The move stationed these
strike aircraft too far away to properly support the critical highland provinces,
including Pleiku and
Ambassador Taylor now wanted to use the USAF B-57s at Bien Hoa in
combat. He also wished to put off indefinitely the plan to form a fifth and sixth
Vietnamese fighter squadron, so that the Vietnamese could focus on operations
in lieu of P A C A F on January 12, 1965, suggested that heavier air
demands argued for greater air assets. It asked for thirteen tactical strike squad-
rons in Vietnam (seven to be USAF jet units), extra USAF air liaison officers and
tactical air control parties to extend direct air support nets to province and sector
levels, and at least 175 USAF and Vietnamese 0-Is-more if continuous air
reconnaissance was
Defending the role of U.S. Army helicopter gunships, General Westmore-
land said that they had “performed magnificently” at Binh Gia. At a briefing on
January 13, he asked if stepping up air firepower made sense in Vietnam. In other
words, were there significant and vulnerable targets in Viet Cong sanctuary areas
and how could they be brought under attack? General DePuy, the MACV J-3,
addressed the question in a paper that was largely the work of USAF Col. Alan
C. Edmunds, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff J-3 for Air.
Targets were available, the study said, and lifting the curbs on using USAF
aircraft in the country would expand air power. This could best be done by
drawing on Guam-based B-52 bombers as well as USN carrier aircraft on South
Vietnamese offshore stations, for air facilities in Vietnam were scarce and
overcrowded. The Vietnamese ground forces were apparently unable to give a
high degree of security against Viet Cong attack of air bases. And it was hard to
haul ordnance and aviation fuel to Vietnamese
263
THE ADVISORY YEARS
Air analysts agreed with part of the study. Calling on aircraft outside
the country would indeed alleviate the airfield security problem. As early as
December General had suggested sending U.S. ground combat
units into Vietnam for air base defense. The Navy and Marine Corps had
demurred, saying that it was contrary to national policy. The Army had objected
on the ground that four divisions would be needed to defend eighteen operating
sites. As for the supply system, there was no doubt that conveying POL and
ordnance was cumbersome, slow, and risky. This was especially true when done
by barges, lighters, and trucks requiring security guards.
On the other side of the coin, using aircraft located outside the country
could hamper attempts to improve air base security and Vietnamese air facilities.
Both were long overdue. Although the bombers were unmatched in all-
weather, heavy saturation attacks, the long flights from Guam would be expen-
sive. Furthermore, using these strategic bombers would reduce worldwide
deterrent posture. While the interest of General Westmoreland in tactical air was
encouraging, he failed to understand Air Division and hopes for
building a well-rounded air command, coordination, and control structure in
I
On January General Moore advised General Westmoreland that
the fastest way to bolster air power was to full use of the USAF resources
now in the country. Moore believed that the most compelling needs were to let
fly missions in South Vietnam, d o away with the requirement to carry
a Vietnamese observer or trainee on operational missions, and remove helicop-
ters from air bases to allow an expansion of
Some optimistic signs emerged from the lingering debate on air demands. A
measure of political stability in Saigon seemed to give the Vietnamese armed
forces confidence and initiative. A MACV press release told of air attacks killing
about twenty-five hundred in November and December Given
these indications, were more strike planes really
Vietnamese and USAF A-Is flew combat sorties in January
filling every request for close air support. The combined air forces flew a total of
sorties, yet could not meet fifty percent of the requests for all types of air
activity. Estimates showed that all of them could have been met, had there been
no operational
In a saturation test during January Vietnamese and USAF A-Is
dropped eight hundred tons of bombs on targets in the
woods of Zone Ranch Hand C-123s then began a massive defoliation
program in to cover forty-eight square miles of dense forest hiding a key
base. The operation tied up many of the combined strike aircraft. On
January in a separate action, government battalions surrounded an
enemy battalion near Helicopter gunship and strikes accounted for
half of the estimated four hundred fifty insurgents killed that
Late i n January the Joint Chiefs secured approval for using USAF jet
aircraft in a strike role within South Vietnam-if Ambassador Taylor agreed in
advance to each mission, and if these strikes could not be carried out by
I
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE
Vietnamese A-Is. According to this formula, Taylor could authorize jet air
strikes solely to save American lives or to spoil huge Viet attacks like the
one at Binh He could d o this only if the air support operations center
certified that conventional aircraft were unavailable, and if a corps tactical zone
commander, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, and MACV all thought the
action
As for air strikes on North Vietnam, President Johnson rejected them in
January despite his growing conviction that the feeble Saigon government
needed help of some sort to Trials and tribulations, including militant
Buddhist opposition, prompted CIA Director to expect to fall
from power and a serious political crisis to
On January in a speech interpreted by some observers as a bid for
negotiations, William suggested a diplomatic meeting similar to the
Geneva accords as “the answer” for a secure and independent South
Vietnam. Five days later, Presidential Assistant informed
President Johnson that he and Secretary were “pretty well convinced
that our current policy can lead only to disastrous defeat.” The preferred
alternatives were to “use our military power in the Far East and to force a change
of Communist policy,” or to “deploy all our resources” along “a track of
negotiation, aimed at salvaging what little can be preserved with no major
addition to our present military risks.” Secretary of State Rusk opposed both
options. “The consequences of both escalation and withdrawal are so bad,“ he
said, “that we simply must find a way of making our present policy work.”
Not sure whether to support Saigon more vigorously or to disengage from a
losing proposition, the President on February sent a fact-finding party headed
by to Saigon. The party’s arrival coincided with a visit to
Hanoi by Soviet Premier Since departure
from power in October had tried to restore closer Russian ties with
Hanoi. He and a sizable Moscow delegation that included top Soviet air force
officials reached Hanoi on February
According to the Chinese, hoped to persuade Hanoi to halt
military aid to the Viet Congas a precondition to negotiations (as William
seemed to have suggested). But in opinion, sensed an immi-
nent Viet victory and wanted the Soviet Union to share in it.
would probably offer more economic and military aid and encourage stepped-up
warfare in South Vietnam. Consequently, proposed that the United
States start air attacks on targets in North Vietnam. These would commence at
the 17th parallel and work progressively
Conflicting signals stopped on Sunday morning, February Viet
mortar squads and demolition teams attacked the small U.S. advisory
detachment in II Corps, four and one-half miles north of Pleiku. In addition they
struck Camp headquarters of the U.S. Army Aviation Battalion,
also near Pleiku. The joint assaults killed eight Americans and wounded
destroyed five Army B helicopters and two transports, three USAF
THE ADVISORY YEARS
0-1Fs, and one Vietnamese 0-IF. Moreover the teams damaged the main
building o f the advisory
Bundy, Westmoreland, and Taylor jointly sent from Saigon their recom-
mendation for a reprisal strike and President Johnson ordered an instant air
response. That afternoon USN aircraft, and on the 8th Vietnamese and U S A F
planes, hit enemy military barracks near Dong Hoi in a n operation called
Flaming Dart. At the same time, P A C A F air transports commenced to lift U.S.
Marine Corps light antiaircraft missile units from Okinawa to Da Nang and to
evacuate U.S. dependents from South
The Viet Cong struck on the 10th near Qui Nhon, taking twenty-three
American and seven South Vietnamese lives. On the following day, USAF,
USN, and VNAF aircraft (in Flaming Dart II) pounded troop barracks in the
North Vietnamese panhandle. The Joint Chiefs quickly ordered the deployment
to South Vietnam and Thailand of four and one-half U S A F tactical squadrons
from bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, and the movement of thirty
B-52s t o
I
South Vietnamese control deteriorated in all of the corps tactical zones as
Viet Cong action exploded. On February 8 a major enemy force crossed Route
19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon. The crossing occurred, even though four
A-1Es dropped Lazy Dogs and killed about one hundred of the enemy. The
attackers then enveloped and damagedtwo battalions of the 40th Regiment and
a troop of M-115 armored personnel carriers in Vinh Binh Province. That night
a n AC-47 poured 20,500 7.62-mm rounds into the area, killing around 250 enemy
soldiers.
T o shore u p the II Corps defense, General Moore ordered eight A-I Es to
Qui Nhon where conditions were “unsafe in every respect.” Staying close to the
scene of action, each pilot flew a t least three strike sorties a day and significantly
helped to blunt the enemy
On February 13 President Johnson gave the green light to measured and
limited air attacks on North Vietnam. Called Rolling Thunder and planned for
swift execution, the strikes were delayed for two weeks by political and military
turmoil in Saigon and by bad weather.
The capital was directly and immediately threatened by the Viet Cong 9th
Division, which had no less than two well-armed regiments under forest cover in
Phuoc Tuy Province. The mystery of how these troops were getting modern
weapons was solved on February 16. A U.S. Army helicopter pilot discovered,
and Vietnamese A-I Hs sank, a steel-hulled vessel at Vung Ro Bay. An investiga-
tion turned up one hundred tons of arms and ammunition in a nearby cove a t
Cap Varella. The U.S. Seventh Fleet at once started naval patrols to stop these
deliveries.
General Westmoreland wanted to send B-57 light bombers against the Viet
Cong 9th Division base camps in Phuoc Tuy Province, which had been pin-
pointed by infrared reconnaissance. Securing emergency authority on February
17, he planned to launch the planes on the 19th.
I
266
END OF THE ADVISORY PHASE
261
THE ADVISORY YEARS
from a few hundred to over ten thousand men. Its five squadrons of obsolete
French and American planes at two air bases swelled to fourteensquadrons and
almost three hundred more modern aircraft at five major air bases. In addition
the Vietnamese Air Force forged a chain of command mirroring that of its
American advisors. Most of these changes took place through the final three
years of the period when the threat from north grew ever more serious.
The U.S. Air Force experienced parallel growth in Southeast Asia during
the decade. In the late 1950s there were airmen stationed in Vietnam and in
Thailand. From on, these numbers gradually rose and on the eve of
Americanization of the war stood at and respectively. By February
the Air Force had planes i n South Vietnam and in Thailand. Seventy
percent of those in South Vietnam were clustered around the Saigon area,
operating from Tan Son Nhut o r Air Base. The remainder were up
north, primarily at One-third of all these aircraft were C-123 trans-
ports, operating for the most part out of Tan Son Nhut. Reconnaissance
missions also originated from Tan Son Nhut, flown by and on
temporary assignment. This Saigon base further housed a handful of for
air defense. The attack fleet of for in-country strikes was
positioned at nearby also the headquarters for the forward air control
mission performed by twenty-two From the Air Force operated
one transport squadron and one temporary duty squadron of for mis-
sions in Laos. A sprinkling of support aircraft rounded out the total.
The USAF presence in Thailand was still small at the start of Air
defense of the country was provided by four from Don Airport
outside Bangkok. Farther up-country, a squadron of at Royal
Thai Air Force Base and another at flew against the
infiltration routes in the Laotian panhandle. At just south of the
Laotian capital, twenty worked to stem the Lao tide in northern
Laos. These were supported by eight air rescue helicopters from the same base.
None of these aircraft took part in operations in Vietnam.
Despite this sizable swelling of personnel and aircraft between and
the U.S. advisory mission failed to end Hanoi’s support insurgency in
South Vietnam and Laos. The decision early in to replace advisors with
combat troops recognized two facts that had come clear in late 1964: infiltration
from north into South Vietnam was growing rather than tapering off. and the
government of South Vietnam unstable since the assassination of Diem)
could not cope with the situation. U.S. policymakers saw theconfluence
two factors spelling defeat for the South unless a new approach was taken. Thus
the purely advisory function was abandoned in favor of direct U.S. air and
ground in theconflict. The USAF units in placeearly in would
form the nucleus for the coming buildup.
I
Appendices
I
Growth of Major United States Air Force and
Vietnamese Air Force Units to February
I. VIETNAM
USAF
Hoa Air Base
June Air Force Depot transferred here
from Hanoi.
USAF VNAF
1964 January
field.
272
USAF VNAF
December . . .. . D e t a c h m e n t 2, 8 t h A e r i a l
Squadron organized.
273
THE YEARS
USAF
July on t e m p o r a r y assign-
ment from Clark Air Base.
Air Base
I
USAF VNAF
1964 February Three C-123s and three C-47s 516th Fighter Squadron moves
here to support Army Special to Da Nang.
Forces.
June 2d T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S q u a d r o n
(C-47s) organized.
215
THE ADVISORY YEARS
USAF VNAF
R a n c h H a n d arrives. T h r e e
C-I 23s for defoliation.
216
USAF VNAF
21 1th H e l i c o p t e r S q u a d r o n
(H-34s) replaces 1st Helicopter
Squadron.
277
THE ADVISORY YEARS
USAF
Six Able
!
II. THAlLAND
219
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
October F-100s d e p l o y e d h e r e t e m -
porarily.
July 6 0 1 1 t h A i r Base S q u a d r o n
organized.
280
assumes control of all
USAF operations in Thailand
and Laos.
January
assumes responsibility
for Thai air defense from Don
I
Development of a Viet Antiaircraft Capability
By Ronald Cole
During the first three years of the war, the Viet grew accustomed to
their reputation for superior mobility over forces. In the fall of
however, the Vietnamese Air Force introduced and close air support
operations that temporarily jarred Viet complacency. The effectiveness of
the South air strikes resulted in the Viet sagging morale,
rising fear, and suspicion of spies in their midst. Defections occurred and the Viet
had to recruit arduously among the peasants to maintain their forces. Steps
to counter the air threat intensified at once. As a stopgap, the Viet
instructed their soldiers to shoot directly at the fuselage of the enemy aircraft with
any gun at hand or hurl a “flying
Among the Viet only those and North Vietnamese Army
cadres who had infiltrated south after had any semblance of antiaircraft
training. Thus, the visceral reaction of Viet officers and noncommissioned
officers to South Vietnamese air operations in September was to order their
men “to shoot aircraft flying straight’ and to fire “liberally and with all available
means.” The training of gunners and the drafting of field manuals took time.
Nonetheless, during the winter of Hanoi worked feverishly to develop
antiaircraft tactics for infantry weapons that could be instantly used by men in
the field. Programs to train inexperienced soldiers in the basics of antiaircraft
warfare were also BEGUN Still, it was not until the end of that the Viet
had a n effective antiaircraft capability.
In October Viet provincial committees distributed to district and
village troops the first detailed antiaircraft directive. The document depicted the
vulnerable points on South Vietnamese fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and
helicopters. It further outlined procedures for organizing antiaircraft personnel
and firing commands, and methods of shooting at aircraft with infantry
weapons.
In a section entitled “Nature of an Objective in the Air,” the directive
explained how to gauge the target size of an aircraft by its shape and angle of
approach. For example, “At we only see the aircraft nose. Target size At
30” we can see the wing and the fuselage, equal in size. Target size At 50” the
wings seem longer than the fuselage. Target size At we see the entire
aircraft, or target size directive described the average fighter plane used
by the South Vietnamese in late 1962 as about I3 meters long, and flying at 200
kilometers-per-hour at an altitude of 150 to 200 meters. Since the aircraft was
therefore vulnerable to rifle and machinegun fire, a formula was devised for
computing a firing lead.
The Viet Cong taught their trainees both “passive” and “active” antiaircraft
tactics. Passive tactics consisted of camouflage, spiked landing zones, and “sen-
tinel chambers.” For camouflage the Viet Cong used dirty brown netting, natural
cover, and concealment. To spike a possible landing zone they planted pointed
bamboo shafts, 2 to 4 inches in diameter and 6 to 15 feet high, very close together
in areas as large as 100by 800 meters. The Viet Cong dug conical holes 5 feet into
the ground with their walls slanted down at 50° for sentinel chambers. These
echo chambers permitted a sentinel to hear a n aircraft approaching from a great
distance and to determine its direction of approach.
Active antiaircraft tactics included mortar assaults on landing zones, infan-
try charges against unloading helicopters, and the “three-man cell tecniques.” In
the latter method riflemen formed three 3-man cells arrayed in a n L-shaped
configuration with three machinegun teams. The machinegunners positioned
themselves at the two ends and at the junction of the “L.” (See Chart.) The
riflemen and machinegunners practiced synchronized firing in this formation,
which was specially designed to down fixed-wing aircraft. By December 1964
U.S. and South Vietnamese pilots had not yet assessed the success of this
formidable-looking technique, since the number of Viet Cong antiaircraft
attacks fluctuated monthly from 20 to 100.
CELL
and RIFLES
The Viet Cong constructed their first antiaircraft weapons training center in
Quang Ngai Province. Aerial reconnaissance revealed that this site probably
offered instruction in aircraft recognition, techniques of fire, calculation of firing
leads, preparation of antiaircraft sites, drills in the use of these sites, and basic
tactical formations for use against South Vietnamese heliborne operations. One
major difficulty persisted - the scarcity of antiaircraft weaponry.
The Viet Cong began to receive more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons
from Hanoi in the fall of 1963. Infiltrators brought with them 12.7-mm (Soviet
DSHK) and .50-caliber machineguns. In addition reports reached Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam, of 20-mm cannon and 13.2-mm machineguns in
War Zone D, and of a 35-mm antiaircraft gun in Kien Phong Province.
Moreover, in April 1964 MACV J-2 (Intelligence) anticipated the earlyarrival of
two new antiaircraft weapons from Hanoi, the 37-mm gun weighing 4,600
pounds and the 40-mm gun weighing 10,000. Within months the impact of this
influx in weapons was felt.
Records of antiaircraft attacks commenced in January 1963. Monthly
incidents remained low throughout 1963, rose to about 100 in January 1964, and
tapered off to only 50 in March 1964. The number then climbed to more than I80
for April 1964, and the average over the next six months was at least 180 - the
greatest number for any one month being nearly 400 in September 1964. After
April 1964 the correlation of increased antiaircraft attacks and the quantity of
antiaircraft weapons available to Viet Cong gunners is obvious. (See Graph.)
300
50
200
50
100
50
0
JAW FEB MAR APR MAY JUW JUL AUG SEP OCT WOW DEC JAW FEB MAR A P I MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT
1963 1964
285
I
tes
Chapter I
287
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages
Chapter I1
I . Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Albert Vice Far East Air
Years: f o r Change, (Garden Logistics Force, to
City. 337-38; U.S. of State,
American Foreign Policy, p 10. de
Report of Senator Mike on a
Study Mission to the Associated States of Indo- I I . 315th Air French Indo-China Partic-
china, ipation. hist. Plans. USAF. Jan-
(Washington, 1943). p 4:
Paris, Mar in Pentagon I?. Intel Roundup.
Papers. 9: Hist, Asst for Mutual Security, USAF.
USAF Air Intelligence 25-26; note by the Executive
Secretary the National Security Council. Jan
MR by Douglas and memo by Brig Gen C. Bones-
in DOD Pentagon Papers. 9: 38: US III Jan in D O D
of State. American Foreign Policy, Pentagon Papers. 9: I8 and 240-44;
2369-70; hist, 24th Air Depot Jan- to 10. 1954; Col Robert
and 8: History of Project LILES to Hist
Swivel Chair. In response to a request made by 1954: Staff Section Monthly Hist
the Thai Ambassador to in May, emer- Feb
gency air shipments of ammunition and other U.S. Air Forces in Europe established an
urgently needed items were rushed to Bangkok. accelerated training program for French
U.S. of State, American Foreign Policy. crews and mechanics in France, and in June, the
French would allocate an additional techni-
de cians to Vietnam. to
(Paris, 1954; hist, Plans. USAF.
Hist. USAF. hist. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF,
Lt Gen John to p 145; Liles to Hist
CINCPAC), in D O D Pen- 1954: HQ 6424th Air Depot
tagon papers. 9: 69-96; hist, 315th Air Support to the French Air Force, Feb
(Combat Cargo), 1954; Public Papers of the Presidents;
Hist, Asst for Mutual Security, USAF. Dwight Eisenhower, (Washington,
45-46: USAF Statistical Sum- 1960). p
mary p "Interview with Gen Otto
of State. American Foreign POLICY Can Air Power Win 'Little Wars?". U.S.
2370-72; Hearings before the Com- World Report, 54-61; flight
mittee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representa- with by Ken
tives, The Mutual Security Act of Capt Robert Hickey and
(Washington, 1954). 6-7; Hear- Robert Floyd to Mar
ings before the Committee on Appropriations,
US Senate, Mutual Security Appropriations f o r Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change. 339;
84th (Washington, p de
67; Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 338; and 217: to Feb in
memo. Bradley for I I, in D O D Pentagon papers, 9: 248; USAF Air
D O D Pentagon Papers. 9: Intelligence Digest, Mar p I I.
to 1953; hist, John Robinson John Foster
Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, p (New 204-06: U.S.
and Brig Gen State, American Foreign policy,
Notes to Pages 18-26
1955,pp 2372-73. See also Khrushchev Remem- 36. Hist. Dir/Ops, USAF, Jan-Jun 54.
bers (Boston, 1970). pp 481-82, for an assess- pp 44-45.
ment that Ho was acting in desperation early in 37. Fall, Hellina VerySmall Place, pp 303-04.
1954 because China was too weak to help him. 38. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 347;
19. Navarre, L‘Agonie de I’lndochine, p 218; Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D.
Dep/ Intel, 13th AF. IR-29-54, Jul 19, 1954; Air Eisenhower, 1954 (Washington, 1960)pp 382-83.
Attache Saigon. IR-142-54, Jul 9, 1954; Hear- 39. Stf study, FEAF, T o Recommend a Feasi-
ings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, ble Military Course of Action to Achieve U.S.
House of Representatives, The Mutual Security Objectives in Indo-China, Apr 13, 1954.
Act of 1954. 83d Cong, 2d sess (Washington, 40. Study, Apr 19, 1954, in Hist, Dir/Plans.
1954). pp 9, 15. 18, 20. USAF, Jan-Jun 54. pp 90-92.
20. Hist, 483d T C Wg, Jan-Jun 54, p 36; see 41. Ridgway, Soldier, pp 176-277; Gavin,
also FEAF Intel Roundup, Jun 54, p 40. “Letter to Editors.” Harpers Magazine. Feb 66,
21. Air Attache Saigon. IR-56-54. Mar 23, pp 16-21; Hearings before the Committee on
1954; Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: Foreign Relations, U S Senate, Supplemental
Insurgency in Indochina, 1946-1963. 3d rev ed Foreign Assistance Fiscal Year 1966 - Viet-
(Harrisburg, 1963). p 317. nam. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1966). pt
22. Rprt, Lt Col William B. Sanders, Com- I , pp 226, 234-35.
bat Ops Div. FEAF, to Dep, Ops, FEAF, Jun 42. Hist, Asst for Mutual Security. Jan-Jun
14, 1954; msg, Chief MAAG Saigon to Comdr 54, pp 14243. and 146; Itr, Liles for Historian
FEAF. MG-650-D-I, Mar 18. 1954; msg, FEALOGFOR. Jul 15, 1954; Itr, Vice Adm
Comdr FEAF to Chief MAAG Saigon. n.d.; Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret), Dir/Naval Hist.
315th Air Div (Combat Cargo), French Indo- to Brig Gen B. S. Gunderson. Ch/Af Hist. Dec
China Participation. pp 17-18. 20, 1972; Hist. Summary, Armament Div. Dep
23. Hist. 315th Air Div (Combat Cargo), for Materiel, FEAF, Apr 54.
Jan-Jun 54, pp 2627; Dep/Intel, 13th AF, 1R- 43. Hist, Dir/ Rqmts, FEAF, Apr 54, Tab C:
29-54, Jul 19, 1954. The expenditure of para- Standard Operational Procedures for Use of
chutes and other drop equipment nearly de- Lazy Dog.
pleted USAF stocks in Japan, and emergency 44. Msg, FEAF to Chief MAAG Saigon.
shipments had to come from the United States. ADO-RQMTS-3551, Apr 7, 1954 msg, FEAF
24. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 341. to Chief MAAG Saigon, ADO-CO&T-3768,
25.Ibid.; Jules Roy, The Battle of Dienbien- Apr 15, 1954 rprt, Sanders to Dep/Ops, FEAF,
phu (New York, 1965). p 155; hist, Dir/Plans, Jun 14, 1954. Survivors of the campaign later
USAF, Jan-Jun 54, pp 90-92; Gen M. B. Ridg- reported that their Viet Minh captors had ques-
way, Soldier (New York, 1956), p 276. tioned them closely about the missiles. and one
26. Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 194-95, repatriated French officer stated that the “cigar
and 198, Eisenhower, Mandarefor Change, p 345. shaped pellets” had been very effective. Dep/
27. Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 214-15; Intel. 13AF. IR-29-54, Jul 19, 1954.
Navarre, LYgonie de I‘lndochine. p 244; Fall. 45. Caldara had available for combat thirty-
Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien two B-29s of the 98th Bombardment Wing at
Bien Phu (Philadelphia, 1967), p 299; FEAF Yokota Air Base, Japan, and sixty-seven B-26s
Intel Roundup, Apr-May 54, pp 22 and 24. of the 307th Bombardment Wing at Kadena Air
28. Msg, Air Dep SHAPE t o ClNCUSAFE. Base Okinawa.
RL-I 172, Apr 3, 1954; msg, ClNCUSAFE to 46. Ltr. Partridge to Navarre. Apr 19. 1954;
Comdr 17AF,etal., ECINC-1616-C,Apr3.1954. MR by Maj Gen Joseph D. Caldara (USAF-Ret),
29. Hist, USAFE, Jan-Jun 54,III, App VI1B; Mar 8, 1966; Caldara to Gen Curtis E. LeMay.
hist, 62d T C Wg. Jan-Jun 54; hist. Asst for Apr 30 and May 3. 1954 Navarre, L’Agonie de
Mutual Security, USAF. Jan-Jun 54. p 148. I’lndochine. p 244.
30. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place. p 302; 47. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change. pp
Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu, pp 22 1-22, 349-50; Eden, Memoirs, p 116; msg. Geneva
3 I . Dept of State, Vital Speeches of the Day. (Dulles) to State. DULTE-5, Apr 25, 1954. in
Apr 15. 1954. p 387. D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk 9: 388-89.
32. Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony 48. Early in May, the American detachment
Eden Full Circle (Boston, 1960). pp 102-03. of the 483d Troop Carrier Wing that maintained
33. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 347; the C-I 19s at Cat Bi secured a Ground Control
Beal. John Foster Dulles, pp 20648. Approach radar, but it was not installed, and
34. Eisenhower. Mandate f o r Change, p 347. operations in the Hanoi area continued to be
35. House of Representatives, The Mutual hazardous. Rprt, Sanders to Dep/Ops, FEAF.
Security Act of I954.83d Cong, 2d sess, pp 9. 15, Jun 14. 1954.
18, and 20; Roy, Battle of Dienbienphu. p 224. 49. Rprt. Hewitt to SECDEF, Apr 6. 1954
289
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 26-34
F E A F Intel Roundup. Aug54, p 8; L. S. Waddell. Troop Carrier Wing had flak damage to nine-
“Phase Out for Charlie-One-One-Nine,” Pega- teen C-I 19s while flying 477 sorties to deliver
sus, Oct 55. p 4; Itr, Maj Edward S. Ash, et a/, to supplies to Dien Bien Phu. Hist, 483d TC Wg.
C o m d r 315th Air Div. subj: High Altitude
Delayed Parabundle Drops, n.d. C-I 19 crews
claimed they could put cargo pallets into a 330- Place, pp 328.336-37.373-74; Corey Ford.”The
yard square from 10,000 feet. but on April 27 Flying Tigers Carry On.” Saturday Evening
only one-third of the dropped supplies could be Post, Feb pp 24 ff. and Feb 12. 1955. pp
retrieved. French and American cargo-dropping 30 ff.
aircrews agreed that escorting flak suppression Fall. Hell in a Very Small Place, p p 374-
flights operated too high to be effectiveand were 431-32.487.
frequently absent when needed. In April the 483d
CHAPTER III
I. Navarre, L’Agonie de I’lndochine. p p 268- can Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York, 1955).
69; Jean Lacouture and Philippe Devillers, La pp 283-310; Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin
Fin d’une Guerre, Indochine 1954 (Paris, 1960), d’Une Guerre. p p 276-82.
p p 162-63; msg. C o m d r F E A F to C o m d r IO. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p p
F E A L O G F O R , ca. May 13, 1954, quoting msg 370-71; Curl, Documents. p p 315-17.
from USAIRA Saigon, May 13, 1954. II. M s g , C o m d r F E A F t o C o m d r
2. Msg. C l N C P A Ct o C O M S E A D E F C O M , F E A L O G F O R . et al, V-DOO-238. ca. May 13.
A p r 28. 1954; C I N C P A C OPlan 56-54, Apr 29, 1954.
1954. 12. Dir/Hist Services, FEAF. Far East Air
3. Msgs, Comdr F E A F to CSAF. May 4, Forces Support of French Indo-China Opera-
1954. May 20, 1954, and J u n 7, 1954. tions. Jul I. 1952-Sep 30, 1954, pp 162-71. 294-
4. Memos. Radford for SECDEF. May 20, 302. Guerrillas o n J u n e 14 captured five enlisted
May 21. and May 26, 1954, in D O D Pentagon men w h o were illicitly beyond the airfield
Papers, Bk IO: 477-82 and 487-93. p e r i m e t e r a n d held t h e m p r i s o n e r until
5. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 361. August
6. Fall. Street Without Joy, pp 169-230
Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change, p 368; Eden Security, USAF, Jul-Dec 54. p p 23-24; F E A F
Memoirs. p 149; Public Papers of the Presidents: Staff Section Monthly Hist Rprts. Dep/Ops,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp 599-600. Jul-Dec 54; hist. Curr Ops Div, Aug and Sep 54;
7. Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin d’Une Div(Combat Cargo). Jul-Dec 54,
Guerre, p p 252-68; Amry Vandenbosch and pp 32-47.
Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia among the 14. Far East Forces Support of French Indo-
World Powers (Lexington, 1957). pp 295-97; China Operations, p p 239-48; Itr, Hooper to
Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade: America Gunderson, Dec 20, 1972.
in Vietnam(NewYork, 1970),pp90-91.See also 15. Far East Air Forces Support of French
Robert P. Randle. Geneva 1954: The Settlement Indo-China Operations, p p 248-51. 270-74; US
of the Indochinese War (Princeton. 1969). pp Dept of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-
371-85. 1955. p 2399.
8. Lacouture and Devillers, La Fin d’Une 16. Rprt, Hewitt to SECDEF. Apr 6, 1954.
Guerre, pp 252-68; Hearings before the Sub- 17. F E A F Intel Roundup, Aug 54. pp
committee o n the F a r East and the Pacific of the 18. Gen G . J. M. Chassin. “Lessons of the
Committee o n Foreign Affairs, House of Repre- War in Indochina,”Interavia. VI I ( 1952). 670-75.
sentatives. United States Policy Toward Asia, 19. Eisenhower, Mandate f o r Change. p p
89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 1966). pt 2, pp 372-73; Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisen-
398-99. In its final form, the Geneva agreements hower, 1954. p 168.
comprised separate military accords for Viet- 20. Lacoutre and Devillers, La Fin d’Une
nam, Laos, and Cambodia, a n unsigned final Guerre, p p 298-99; U S A F Air Intelligence
declaration of the nations represented a t Geneva, Digest, Feb 55, pp 36-37; David Halberstam,
and several unilateral national declarations, The Making of a Quagmire (New York, 1965).
9. Peter V. Curl, ed. Documents on Ameri- pp 38-39.
290
Notes to Pages 35-40
21. Ho."Appeal Made."Jul22. 1954,quoted view with Gen J. Lawton Collins: What We're
in Bernard B. Fall. ed. H o Chi Minh on Revolu- Doing in Indo-China," U.S. News & World
tion (New York. 1967). p 272. Report, Mar 4. 1955, pp 82-88; USA FAir Intel-
22. Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisen- ligence Digest. Feb 55. p 38. .
hower, 1954. p 168; Dept. of State. American 32. Hist, Asst for Mutual Security. USAF.
Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, pp 2400-0 I . Jan-Jun 55. pp 146-50; MACV. Military Assist-
23. Statement of Policy by the National ance, pp 2-5; D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk 2:
Security Council on Review of U.S. Policy in the IV.A.4.. 6.
Far East. Aug 20, 1954. in D O D Pentagon Pap- 33. Memo. Col Edward G . Lansdale for SEA
ers, Bk IO: 731-41. Subcommittee of the Draper Committee. Mar
24. Curl. Documents, 1954. pp 319-23; Dept 13. 1959: U S Air Force Academy Oral History
of State. American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Program, intvw with Maj Gen Edward Lansdale.
pp 2334-37; FEAF Intel Roundup, Jan 66. pp Apr25, 1971; Edward G. Lansdale. In the Midst
12-13, and Apr 55, p 25; hists. Dir/ Plans, of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast
USAF. Jul-Dec 54, pp 57-59. and Jul-Dec 56, pp Asia (New York. 1972).
138-39; Dep/Ops. Pacific AF. A Pacific Air 34. IR-163-55. AIRA Saigon, Oct 21. 1955;
Force Staff Study, Sep 55. in hist PAF, Jul-Dec U S Dept of State, American Foreign Policy.
55. pt I I , Doc 21: Statement of Policy by the Current Documents, 1956 (Washington, 1959).
National Security Council on Review of U.S. pp 859-63; Hearings before the Committee on
Policy in the Far East, Aug 20, 1954. Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
2 5 . Ltrs. Dulles t o Charles E. Wilson. Mutual Security Act of 1955.84th Cong. I st sess
SECDEF, Aug 18 and Oct I I . 1954; memos. (Washington, 1955). pp 190-9 I .
Twining for SECDEF. Aug 4. 1954, and Rad- 35. H Q C I N C P A C . R e c o r d , S e c o n d
ford for SECDEF, Sep 22. 1954, and Oct 19. S E C D E F Conference, Jan 15. 1962. Item 5;
1954, in D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 70 1-02, D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: IV.A.4.. 22-23.
728-30. 756-58. 768-89. and 771-74. 36. Dep/Ops. PAF. A Pacijic Air Force
26. MACV, Military Assistance. pp 2-5; hist. Staff/ Study on M D A P Air Force Objectives f o r
Dir/ Plans. USAF, Jul-Dec 54, pp 62-65; memo, Title III Countries in the Pacific Command.
Radford for SECDEF. Sep 22, 1954, in D O D Sep 5 5 .
Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 756-58. 37. [bid.
27. Ltr. Dulles to Wilson, Aug 18, 1954. in 38. Memo, Twining for SECDEF, Sep 9.
D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 728-30: MACV, 1955, in D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk 10: 1002-15.
Military Assistance to the Republic of South 39. Dept of State, American Foreign Policy):
Vietnam. pp 2-5; Hearings before the Subcom- 1950-1955, p 2404; Cole, Conflict in Indo-China.
mittee on State Department Organization and pp 226-27.
Public Affairs of the Committee on Foreign 40. Hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 55.
Relations. U S Senate, Situation in Viernam. pp 81-84.
86th Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1959). pt I. 41. Ibid.: D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk 2:
p 49; Robert Scigliano. South Vietnam: Nation IV.A.4., 20.
under Stress (Boston, 1964). pp 162-67. 42. Hist. Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 5 5 ,
28. Hist, Dir/Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 54, pp 81-84; "Why the U S is Losing in Vietnam-
pp 62-25; memo, Radford for SECDEF. Oct 19, An Inside Story, Interview with Former Chief
1954, in D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 768-74; US Military Advisor, Lt Gen Samuel T.
see also D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk I : IV.A.4.. Williams (Ret)." U.S. News & World Report.
3-6. NOV9. 1964. pp 62-63.
29. Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisen- 43. Ibid.; Hearings before a Subcommittee of
hower, 1954, pp 948-49; R. Frank Futrell. the Committee on Government Operations.
"Chronology of Significant Airpower Events in House of Representatives, Foreign Aid Con-
Southeast Asia. 1954-1967," Aerospace Studies slruction Projects. 85th Cong. 2d sess (Washing-
Institute. Air University; Journal of Military ton, 1958). pp 872-73.
Assistance, 1954, 44. U.S. News & World Report, Nov9, 1964,
30. Statement of Policy by the National pp 63-64; memo. Capt B. A. Robbins. Jr.. U S N .
Security Council on Current U.S. Policy in the May 10. 1957, in D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk 10:
Far East, Dec 22, 1954, in D O D Pentagon 1 106-07; USAF Journal of Mutual Security, X
Papers. Bk IO: 835-52; Public Papers of the (Jul I . 1957). 128. and XI (Nov I. 1957). 117.
Presidents: Eisenhower, 1954. pp 948-49; Dept 45. Memo. S E C D E F for SA. et al, Jul 16,
of State, American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. 1956. and Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy in
p 2403; hists, F E A F Dep/Intel. Jan 55. w/incl. Mainland Southeast Asia, Sep 5. 1956. in D O D
and Feb 55, w/incl. Pentagon Papers, Bk 10: 1064. 1082-95.
3 I . Curl, Documents, 1954. pp 237-38; "lnter-
29 I
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages
Chapter
ton. 1960). pp 35-46: hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 58. 31. NAMAP. rprt of5th Asian-MAP. Logis-
I. Pt I. 172-75. tic Conf, Nov 59, p 353: hist. Asst for Mutual
25. CINCPAC hist. 1964. pp I and 3. Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 60, n.p.. and Jan-Jun
26. Msg. PACAF t o CSAF. PFCCS-61-7-3. 62. pp 35-36.
Jul 12. 1961: hist. 315th Air Div (Combat 32. Hist,AMFPA,Jul I , 1959-Mar31, 1960.
Cargo). J a n - J u n 62. pp 53-54; George F. 11, App 18. Dec 9. 1959: hist. PACAF, Jan-Jun
Lemmer. The Laos Crisis of 1959 (Office of Air 60. I l l ; P F M L P hists, Apr 60. w/atch, Apr 17.
Force History. 1961). pp 39-49. 1960, and May 60. w/atch; Lt Col William G.
27. US Senate. Mutual Security Act of1959. Beno. “How to Improve the USAF Portion of
86th Cong. 1st sess, pt 1,pp 5. 10-1 I , and 19-20. the Military Assistance Program in Southeast
28. NAMAP, Asian-MAP Logistics Conf, Asia,” (Thesis. USAWC, Apr 60).
Dec 58. pp 45 1-53, 33. P A C A F Ref Bk for Jan 62 S E C D E F
29. N A M A P , 5th Asian-MAP Logistics Conf, Tab 15F: Country Force Imbalance:
Conf. Nov 59. pp 67-7 1. NAMAP. rprt of 5th Asian-MAP Logistic
30. Ibid.. pp 69-71; NAMAP Asian-MAP Conf, Nov 59. pp 53-58 and 61-62.
Logistic Conf. Dec 58, pp 456-58; Lemmer, The 34. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 S E C D E F
Laos Crisis of 1959. pp 39-49: rprt. Air Vice Conf. Tab 15F: Country Force Imbalance;
Marshal Kamol Thejatunga. RTAF. and Maj NAMAP. rprt of 5th Asian-MAP Logistic
Gen Thomas S. Moorman. USAF, to C h / Conf. Nov 59, p 353.
SEATO Mil Plng Ofc. Mar 23. 1959. p 2.
CHAPTER V
I . DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: IV.A.4.. 24- Smith, Comdr PAF. to CINCPAC, Nov 27,
31; U.S. News & World Report, Nov 9. 1964, 1956: Robbins memo, May 15. 1957; hist,
p 63: OASD-ISA, MAP. FY 1962-66. Sep I. PACAF/FEAF Rear, Jan-Jun 57.11: Hist Sum,
1960. Dir/Plans and Policy. Apr 57; hist Asst for
2. NAMAP. Asian-MAP Logistic Conf. Dec Mutual Security. USAF. Jan-Jun 57, App;
58. pp 154-60. USAF Journal of Mutual Security. X (Jul I,
3. Hist. Dir/Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 55, 1957). 106. and (Aug I, 1957). 131.
pp 62-65; hist, Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, 7. Background Paper on Vietnam. prepared
Jan-Jun 55, pp 146-50; MACV, Military Assist- by Maj William L. Nicholson, III, H Q PACAF.
ance. pp 2-5: rprt. Collins for SECSTATE. Jan ca. Jan 62; Robbins memo. May 15. 1957.
20, 1955, in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 865- 8. USAF Journal of Mutual Security. XI
84; U.S. News & World Report, Mar 4, 1955, (Nov I . 1957). 131; NAMAP. Asian-MAP
pp 82-88. Logsitic Conf. Dec 58, pp 154-60: hist. Asst for
4. Hists. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, Mutual Security. USAF. Jul-Dec 58. n.p.:
Jan-Jun 55. p 146. Jul-Dec 55. pp 33-34. Jan- PACAF Curr Intel Sum. Oct 23. 1959. p 9.
Jun 58. n.p.: DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 3: 9. USAF Summary of M D A P a n d Progress.
IV.B.3.. 125;AMFPA. Title I I I M D A P Logistic No. 42, Dec 31, 1955. p 99; PACAF Base Devel-
Conf. May 7-10, 1956, p 303: hist, PAF, Jan- opment Plan, Jul 15. 1964, App 2, Tab G: rprt of
Jun 56. I l l . 527. Dep/Ops P&R Team to Comdr PAF. Jan 2.
5. IR-223-54. AlRA Saigon. Dec 15. 1954: 1956: USAF Journal of Mutual Security. VIII
IR-149-55. AlRA Saigon, Sep 15. 1955: VNAF. (Sep I. 1956), I37,and lX (Dec I . 1956). 104and
Welcome to Vietnam. pp 5-8; Secord. “The 126.
Viet-Nam Air Force, pp 60-61: F E A F Intel 10. See Dept of State. American Foreign Pol-
Roundup. Apr 55, pp 21-24; A M F P A Area I l l icy, Current Documents. 1958. pp 120-12 l .
M A P Logistic Conf May 7-10. 1956.p 303,and I I . Cong Rec, May 9. 1968. pp 12615-16.
Nov 14-19. 1956, p 314; rprt of Dep/Ops R&R 12. Futrell”Chron”; rad, ClNCPAC to DIA.
Team to Comdr PAF. J a n 3. 1956: hist. Asst for Mar 63; DOD Pentagon Papers, Bk 2: 24.43.
Mutual Security. USAF, Jan-Jun 58, n.p. 13. Ibid., pp 68-70.
6. AMFPA. Area I l l MAP. Logistic Conf. 14. Lemmer. The Laos Crisis of 1959, p 40;
Nov 14-19. 1956, p 312; NAMAP. Asian-MAP memo, J C S for Dep Asst SECDEF for NSC
Logistic Conf, Dec 58, p 154; Itr. Maj Gen Sory Affairs and Plans. Jul 14. 1959. in D O D
293
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 53-59
Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: I2 15; Hearings before ADVON to PACAF. Jan 13. 1962: telephone
the Committee on Appropriations, U S Senate, conversation. Futrell and Col Harvey Brown.
Mutual Serurity Appropriations f o r 1960 (and USAF (Ret), Sep 28. 1972.
Related Agencies), 86th Cong. 1st sess(Washing- 29. U S Senate. Mutual Security Appropria-
ton, 1959). p 5 I 1. tionsfor 1960, 86th Cong, 1st sess, p 516: see
15. H Q MACV. “Infiltration Study,” Folder also Operations Coordinating Board. Rprt on
Vietnam. Nov 1-30. 1965, 69A-3853. box 34. Southeast Asia, Aug 12, 1959, and 68-2-
16. Halberstam. Making. of a Quagmire. 59, The Situation in Laos. Sep 18. 1959, in DOD
pp 63-64; msg, AmEmb Saigon to DA. 278. Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 1238-39, 1242-47.
Mar 7, 1960. in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 30. “Declaration on Granting Independence
1260 Cong Rec. May 9, 1968, p 12616. to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” Khrushchev
17. Ibid. in New York (New York, 1961). p 90; Hearing
18. HQ MACV, Sum of Highlights, Feb 8, before the Subcommittee to Investigate the
1962-Feb 7. 1963. p 21. Administration of the Internal Security Act and
19. Memo, Lansdale for Draper Committee, Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the
Mar 13, 1959; Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: J u d i c i a r y , US S e n a t e , Analysis of the
Nation Under Stress (Boston, 1964). p 179; Khrushchev Speech of January 6. 1961, 87th
Williams “Interview”; CINCPAC Rcrd. Second Cong, 1st sess (Washington, 1961). pp 64-65,
SECDEF Conf. Jan 15, 1962, item 5A. 77-78.
20. MACV hist monograph, Military Assist- 31. Cong Rec, May9. 1968,p 12617; MACV
ance to the Republic of South Vietnam, pp 6-7, hist monograph. Military Assistance to the
9-1 1. MACV, Sum of Highlights. Feb 8, 1962- Republic of South Vietnam, pp 9-1 I ; Douglas
Feb 7. 1963. pp 46-49; DOD Pentagon Papers. Pike. Vier Cong: The Organization and Tech-
Bk 3: IV.B.3., 125. niques of National Liberation Front of South
21. Msg. Lemnitzer to JCS, May 8. 1961; Vietnam (Cambridge, Mass., 1966). p 79.
Journal of Mutual Assistance, Jun 61, 32. USAF Journal of Mutual Assistance.
22. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF X l l l (Dec 60). 149; Buttinger, Vietnam, I I , 990.
Conf, Tab 6A; CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961. 33. Arthur F. Schlesinger. Jr.. A Thousand
pp 172 and 174-75; Scigliano, South Vietnam, Days (Boston, 1965). p 450; Robert Shaplen.
pp 164-65; U S A F Journal of Mutual Serurity The Lost Revolution (New York, 1965), p 149;
XIII (Dec 60). 149. See also msg. AmEmb Sai- Maj William L. Nicholson. III, Background
gon to SECSTATE, 276, Jan 4. 1961, in DOD Paper on Vietnam, ca. Jan 62; Schneider rprt:
Pentagon Papers, Bk IO: 1357-59. Presentation by Gen Moorman before Congres-
23. Maj Gen Theodore R. Milton. “Air sional Committee. 1. 1 - 1 I ; hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec
Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia.” Air Uni- 61. I. 107-09; Intelligence Estimate. SVN. ca. Oct
versity Review, Nov-Dec 63, p 4. I . 1961. in Hist. 2d ADVON. Nov61-0ct 62, 1.
24. USAF Journal of Mutual Security, XII Doc 15.
(Sep 59). 164-55. 34. Cong Rec, May 9, 1968. pp 12617-18:
25. PACAF Curr Intel Sum. Oct 23. 1959. Pike, Vier Cong. passim: Douglas Pike, War,
pp 9-10 hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, Peace. and the Vier Cong (Cambridge. Mass..
Jan-Jun 60, n.p.; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 60. III, 1969). pp 1-18.
Wkly Activities Rprts. PFMLP. May22-26and 35. Presentation by Gen Moorman before
Oct 10-14. 1960; msg, CINCPAC to DIA. Mar Cong Committee. 1. Maj William L.
13. 1963; PACAF Reference Book for Oct 8. Nicholson, III, Background Paper on Vietnam.
1962, SECDEF Conf. Vietnam Sec. Tab 4. ca. Jan 62; Schneider rprt.
26. Hist. Asst for Mutual Security, USAF, 36. Arthur L. Dommen. Conflict in Laos:
Jul-Dec 60, n.p.; hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 61. III, The PoliticsofNeutralization (New York. 1964).
Wkly Activities Rprt. PFMLP, Feb 27-Mar 3, p 175; Fifth A F Wkly Intel Brief. Jan I I . 1961.
1961. 37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House
27. Rprt of USAF Asian MAP Logistics Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 (Garden City.
Confs, Nov 1-3. 1960, pp 254-55. hist. PACAF, 1965). p 612; Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage
Jul-Dec61. I l l ; Wkly Activities Rprts. PFMLP. Point (New York. 1971). p 51; Schlesinger.
Jul 24-28 and Sep 18-22, 1961; rprt, Col Edwin Thousand Days. pp 163-64.
A . Schneider, Asst for MAP, PACAF, to 38. Memo, Clark Clifford for the President.
CINCPACAF, Oct 25, 1961. subj: Conf on Jan 19. 1961, dated Sep 29. 1967,
28.Ibid.;intvw w/Capt Donald V. MacKellar in D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk IO: 1360-64.
by J. W. Grainger. Aug 29. 1963; msg. 2d
294
Notes to Pages
Chapter VI
296
Notes to Pages 74-82
n.p.; Rprt of C S A F Visit to SVN. Apr 62. Monthly Hist Rprt. Oct 61; hist. PACAF. Jul-
46. SVN Radar Environment Survey. Jul61, Log, PipeStem
Jul-Dec61. AppXXV. Det, Oct 18-21. 1961.
47. Memo, Phillip F. Hilbert for Dir/ Plans. 49. Journal of Military Assistance. Sep 61. p
J u n 8. 1961; CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961, pp 153; Schlesinger, Thousand Days, p 450;
33-34; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, Ill, Hist Rprt Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p 149; Maj William
of C-E Opns. Elec Systems Div. Aug 61; hist. L. Nicholson, III, Background Paper on Viet-
PFOCO. Dec 61; Itr. Brig Gen R. M. Anthis to nam. ca. J a n 62; Schneider rprt; Presentation by
13th AF, n.d.; Schneider rprt; Joseph W. Grain- Gen Moorman before Congressional Commit-
ger and TSgt George P. Day. Hist of the 2d tee. 1,.1-1 I ; hist 13th AF. Jul-Dec 61. I. 107-09;
ADVON. Nov 15, 1961-Oct 8. 1962; Itr, Lt Gen Intel Est, ca.Oct I , 1961. in hist, 2d ADVON.
Earle E. Wheeler, Dir Jt Stf, to CJCS, Nov 14. Nov61-0ct 62. 1. DOC15.
1961. 50. Hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF.
48. Kennedy Program and Commitments, Jan-Jun 61. n p . and Jul-Dec 61, pp 28-29.
1961; Futrell, “Chron”; hist, 13th AF. Jul-Dec 51. JCSM-700-61, Jet Aircraft for SVN, Oct
7. 1961; hist, Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec 61, p
5 ; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, I. pt 2. 18-32, III, 262; AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-
A-2 Monthly Hist Rprt, Oct 61; msg, CINC- 64. Item VII-A; CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961. p
PAC to JCS. Nov 11, 1961; Rprt on Able 186; H Q USAF Memo (OPS 50-61). Sep 20,
Mable, ca. Feb I. 1962, in hist. 2d ADVON, Nov 1961; hist, Asst for Mutual Security. Jul-Dec61.
15. 1961-Oct 8, 1962. Doc 72; DOD Pentagon n.p.; hist, PACAF. Jul-Dec61,III, Wkly Activi-
Papers, Bk 2: IV.B.1.. 91; hist, 19th TFW, Jul- ties Rprt, PFMLP. Dec 11-15, 1961.
Dec 61. p 62; hist, PACAF, Jul-Dec 61, I l l , A-2
Chapter VII
Opening Farm Gate
I . Ltr, Col Robert L. Gleason to Col Ray intvw with Lt Col Charles E. Trumbo. Jr.. by
Bowers, O f c / A F Hist. Dec 30. 1971; Book of J . W. Grainger.Jul 13, 1963; LeMay comments.
Actions in SEA, p 6; SO G-4. TAC. Langley intvw by Thomas G. Belden, Mar 29. 1972; see
AFB. Va.. Apr 10, 1961; memo, Dir/Ops, also Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist intvw with
USAF. Apr 27. 1961, incl7. Vol2; TSgt Robert Brig Gen Benjamin H. King. Sep4, 1962. pp 1-5.
J . O’Neill. History of Special Air Warfare Cen- IO. Rcrd. Second S E C D E F Conf, J a n 15,
ter, Apr-Dec 62, Air Archives; intvw with Lt Col 1962. p 111-2; intvw. J . Grainger with Lt Col
M. M. Doyle, Bien Hoa, Feb 16. 1963; hist. 2d M. M. Doyle, Feb 16. 1963. in App D. Hist, 2d
ADVON, NOV61-Oct 62. ADVON, Nov 61-Oct 62.
2. Ltr, Gleason to Bowers; Doyle intvw, Feb I I . MR, Dir/Plans. USAF,subj: CINCPAC
16. 1963. Briefing on Jungle Jim, Oct 16, 1961.
3. Hist, 2d ADVON. Nov 61-Oct-62. p 8: 12. Msg, US Amb Saigon to State, Oct 13.
hist. 2d Air Division. Jan-Jun 64, p 4: John 196 I. in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp
W. R. Taylor. ed, Combat Aircraft ofthe World 140-41; see also Taylor, Swordsand Plowshares,
(New York 1961). pp 491-92; Tactical Air Sup- Hist, 1961,pp 187-
port Handbook,Oct 62, Sec IX; MR, Detailson 91, Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist intvw with
Modification and IRAN’S Perf on T-28 and B- Col King. pp 15-21.
26 Acft, n.d.. Binder COIN o p s 774-64, box 12, 13. Detachment I was spending several
68A-4994. weeks in Mali. the Republic of West Africa,
4. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961- training paratroopers.
64, Item IV-B. 14. Progress Rprt. 6009th TSG. ca. Dec 5 ,
5. Ibid., Item Ill-B, pp 21-22. 1961, in Hist, 2d ADVON, Nov61-0ct 62, and
6. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1961, p 187. Doc 6: hist, 5th AF, Jul-Dec 61. I, 53-56; msg,
7. Kennedy Program and Commitments, PACAF to 13th AF. Nov 17, 1961.
1961. p 84. 15. Hist, SAWC, Apr-Dec 62. pp 12-13.
8. Hist, Dir/Plans. USAF, Jul 1-Dec 31. 16. Msg. Det 9.2d ADVON to PACAF. Nov
1961. Vol 22, 78. 21. 1961; Intel Rprt, Debriefing of the Com-
9. Book of Actions in SEA, p 2 and Item II; mander and Intelligence Officer. Det 2. 4400th
hist. SAWC, Apr 27-Dec 31, 1962, pp 1-10; I , 1962; Briefingby
291
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 82-88
Capt M . K . Palmer, Jan 16. 1962. in Hist, 5th. Asia, 1962-67(Research Analysis Corp. Jun 69).
AF, Jan-Juri 62. I I . Doc 144. p 117.
17. Hist, 2d ADVON, pp 8-9; 4400th CCTG 22. Msg, JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 6, 1961;
Intel Rprt. Apr I. 1962; msg, CSAF to CINC- C I N C P A C Comd Hist, 1961, pp 190-91;
PAC. N o v 9, 1961; msg, CINCPAC to JCS. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64,
Nov 15, I961:CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. Item VII-B.
Dec 16. 1961, msg. Item 8A: AFCHO Oral Hist 23. Msg. PACAF to CINCPAC, Dec 6.
lntvw with LeMay, Jun 8, 1972; telephone con- 1961; PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF
versation. Futrell with Col Robert L. Gleason, Conf. Action Tab H.
Lt Col John Pattee. and Lt Col William E. 24. ClNCPACComd Hist. 1961.p 171;msg.
Doughterty, Jul72; Victor B. Anthony, The Air CINCPAC to Chief MAAG VN. Dec 6. 1961:
Force in Southeast Asia: Tactics and Tech- CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. Dec 16. 1961.
niques of Night Operations. 1961-1970. (Ofc/ Item 4.
A F Hist, Mar 73). 25. Msgs, PACAF to CINCPAC, Dec 8.
18. Msg, CINCPAC to Chief MAAG VN, 1961. 13th A F to PACAF, Dec 10. 1961;
Nov 16. 1961; rprt, S A F to Pres, Feb 6, 1962. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64,
Binder Vietnam 11-62, Item Ill-C: CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. p 188.
19. Msg. CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13, 1963; 26. CINCPAC Rcrd, SECDEF Conf. Dec
New York Times. Feb 20. 1962. p 3: PACAF 16. 1961, Item 8A; msg. PACAF to CSAF. Dec
Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5. 17. 1961.
20. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF 27. Msg. CINCPAC to PACAF. Dec 20,
Conf, Tab 3B. Mar 62 SECDEF Conf, Item 5; 1961.
Futrell's conversation with Gleason. Jul 72. 28. lntvw with Anthis by Gausche and
21. Paul S. Ella, Richard P. Joyce, Robert H. Grainger, Aug 30. 1963; msgs. 13th A F to
Williams. and William Woodworth, U.S. Army PACAF, Dec28, 1961. CSAF to PACAF. Mar
Special Forces and Similar Internal Defense 23. 1963. JCS to CINCPAC, Dec 26. 1961;
Advisory Operations in Mainland Southeast PACAF Ref Bk for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf.
Chapter VIII
I . The President also asked the State Depart- 6. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. pp 187-91.
ment to solicit comments on this question from 7. Ltr. Taylor to the President (Taylor Rprt).
allied nations. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in Nov 3, 1961; Kennedy Program and Commit-
SEA. Item Ill-B; Van Staaveren. U S A F Plans ments. pp 98-99.
and Policiesin South Vietnam, 1961-1963; M R , 8. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. pp 241-
Roswell Gilpatric, Oct 1 I. 1961. and NSAM 44; New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 141-
104. Oct 13. 1961, in D O D Pentagon Papers, Bk 48; D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk 2: IV.B.1.. 100-
I I: 322-38: Public Papers of the Presidents: 08; Van Staveren, USAF Plans and Policies in
Kennedy. 1961. p p 656. 660: Taylor. Swords South Vietnam. 1961-1963.pp 10-1 I ; Schlesinger.
and Plowshares. pp 225-26. Thousand Days. pp 546-47; Roger Hilsman, To
2. CQ Background, Chinaand U.S.Far East Mow a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in
Policy, 1945-1967. p 108; see also Cooper, Lost the Administration of John F. Kennedy
Crusade, pp 193-94. (Garden City, 1967). pp 422-23; George W. Ball.
3. MACV hist monograph. Military Assist- The Discipline of Power: Essentials ofa Modern
ance to the Republic of South Vietnam. 1960- World Structure (Boston. 1968). p 334; Dept of
1963. p I I ; Itr, Diem to Kennedy. n.d., in Public State Bulletin 56. 514.
Papers of the Presidents: Kennedy, 1961, pp 9. Covering note, sgd William P. Bundy with
801-02: PACAF Reference Book for Dec 61 draft memo, SECDEF for President, Nov 6.
SECDEF Conf, Tab B-I; Intel Estimate SVN, 1961; Background Paper on CINCPAC OPlan
ca. Oct I , 1961. in Hist, 2d ADVON. I. Doc 15. 32-59: Kennedy Program and Commitments.
4. PACAF Reference Book for Dec 61 1961, pp 122-23; SM-1212-61. Recommended
SECDEF Conf. Change to the Proposed Memo for the Pres,
5. Msg. USAmb Saigon to State, Oct 13, Nov6. 1961; hist. Dir/Plans, USAF, Jul-Dec61.
196I . in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp pp 176-78.
140-41. 10. Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies
298
Notes to Pages
in South Vietnam, p I I: memo, Talking Paper on Determination of Effec-
for the Pres. tive U.S. Policy toward South Vietnam,
Pentagon papers, I:
I I . Kennedy Program and Commitments, for the on
122-23; Taylor, Swords and Plow- 5.1961; Book on Actions in SEA.
shares, Jan
Thousand p 547; In Penragon Papers, 12:
Monthly Background Paper on
A-2, to
CINCPAC to draft memo for thinking
and 1961; Pentagon Papers, was consistent with that of the Army at least. On
November Army had embarked a brigade
THOUSAND DAYS p task force in the Pacific Command, plus some
memo, for the Pres, thirty-five thousand combat and logistical sup-
I I. in Pentagon Papers, I: port units from the United States, for deploy-
359-66; Taylor. Swords and Plowshares. ment. Memo with Lt Gen Earl Wheeler,
to
Hist, Dir/Plans, USAF,
Van USAF Plans and Memo, to Pres. Jan
Policies in South Vietnam. p 12; to
Penragon Papers, 2: with Mar
I I I. First Phase of See Summary Sheet, USAF.
Program, 1961; memo with in to
Memo, to Col
Frank Pancake). CINCPAC to
Chapter
I. Pentagon Papers. 2: I
108: Ref
Tab
The Kennedy Program and Commit- IO. Book of
ments. 129-30; memo, to CINCPAC t o
and Chief
Note to Control I I. a controland reporting center
Note by the the of the Thirteenth Air Force had been at Don
Rear to Thailand. since April under a
command element known as Thirteenth Air
Felt and Force (abbreviation for Advanced
Echelon). This was the first that in
Saigon to Vietnam became the second.
I96 I . to I I,
Pentagon Papers. Feb to
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 1962.TO 1961;
Relations. US Senate, Foreign Assistance. SO C-85. 1963; 5th
89th (Washington. 1966). I,
263; New to Pres. to State.
Pentagon Papers. II: CINCPAC to and
I I Saigon to
CINCPAC to Chief
and 1961; hr. to CINCPAC,
USAF Plans and Policies in Viet- 1961; with by
nam,
CINCPAC to 13th 10.
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 96-102
to CINCPACFLT. et al, May 22. 1962. Felt
16. This technique wasevaluated as being less believed that no requirement existed for a
satisfactory than cooperative C-47 flareship/ MACV Navy component command. Yet on
strike aircraft operations mainly because of the July I . 1962. Headquarters Support Activity
limited number of flares that a T-28 could load Saigon, a naval organization. came into being to
on its wing stations and the consequent reduc- provide common administrative and logistic
tion of ordnance that it could Msg. support, including construction. commissary. ex-
PACAF to CSAF. Dec 17. 1961: Project change, and housekeeping services. to MAAG
Oral Hist intvw with King, pp and MACV units.
51-56. 27. Msg, P A C A F t o 13th A F and 2d
17. See msg. MACV to CINCPAC, Sep 17. ADVON, Feb 20. 1962.
1962. 28. Martin and Clever. I I . 17-18: The Public
i
18. Of the former, 2.066 were allocated to the Papers of'the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962
Army. 6 to the Marine Corps, 135 to the Navy, (Washington, 1963). p 137: msgs. PACAF to
and 187 (68 officers and I19 men) to the Air 13th A F a n d 2d ADVON, Feb 20. 1962, CINC-
Force. CINCPACComd Hists. 1961.p 175.and PAC to MACV. Feb 25. 1962. MACV to
1962. p 155; hist. PACAF, Jul-Dee 61, I l l ; CINCPAC, Mar I. 1962. and 2d ADVON to
P F M L P Wkly Activities Rprt, Dec 22-29. 1961; 13th AF. Mar 9, 1962.
PACAF Ref Bk for Dee 61 S E C D E F Conf, 29. Hetherington Rprt, Apr 25. 1972: msg.
Action Tab F. P A C A F to 13th AF. May 24. 1962.
19. Memo, S E C D E F to Pres. Dec 22. 1961: 30. Dept of State. American Foreign Policy:
Van Staaveren. USAF Plans and Policies in Current Documents. 1962 (Washington. 1966).
South Vietnam, 1961-1963. p 15. pp
20. Msg. P A C A F t o 13th A F a n d 2d 31. NY Herald Tribune. Apr 28, 1962.
ADVON. Feb 20, 1962. 32. Ibid.
21. A F C H O Oral Hist lntvw 522, with Gen 33. Brig Gen Thomas R. Phillips, USA (Ret).
Paul D. Harkins, Feb 23, 1972: mg, CINCPAC in St. Louis Post-Dispatch. May 6, 1962.
to DEPCINCUSARPAC. Feb 8. 1962. 34. Intvw, Grainger with Lt Col M. M.
22. Msgs, J C S to CINCPAC, Jan 31 and Doyle. Feb 16. 1963; Martin and Clever, App 2.
Mar 2. 1962. to MACV, Apr 7. 1962. C S A F t o COIN Intvws, Tab M.
PACAF. Feb 21. 1962: Martin and Clever. IV. 35. New York Times, May I . 1962.
38-39; Van Staaveren. USAF Plansand Policies 36. Chicago Tribune. May 6. 1962.
in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. pp 16-17. Later. 37. A. Rose. "Our Undeclared War i n Viet-
Brig Gen Milton B. Adams was Assistant Chief nam." Reporter. May IO. 1962.
of Staff J-5 (Plans). 38. Msg. PACAF to 13th AF. May 24. 1962:
23. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC. Sep 17, hist. 2d ADVON. Nov 61-0ct 62. pp 21-31, 34;
1962: Itr. Anthis to Eugene C. Zuckert. SAF, msgs. C l N C P A C t o MACV. J u l7 a n d 2 8 . 1962.
J a n 9. 1963: Brig Gen Frank A. Osmanski, MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 19. 1962: P A C A F
MACV J-4. Rprt on Vietnam. Sep 26, 1963, pp SO G-87. Sep 24. 1962; hist. 13th AF. Jan-Jun
63. p 20.
24. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Mar I , 39. Hist. 2d ADVON. Nov 61-0ct 62. p 42:
1962. 2d ADVON to PACAF, May 7. 1962. msg. PACAF to 13th AF. Nov 10, 1962.
C I N C P A C t o MACV, May 12, 1962, 2d 40. Msgs, 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Apr 21
ADVON to 13th AF. May 16. 1962. C S A F to and 25. 1962: Van Staaveren, USAF Plansand
Chief MAAG. Jun 21. 1962. and CINCPAC to Policies in South Vietnam. 1961-1963. pp 46-47;
CSAF.Oct31,1962: DAFSOAA-2164,Nov9, AFCHO Oral Hist intvw with Harkins. Feb 23.
1962; Itr. Anthis to Zuckert. Jan 9. 1963. 1972.
25. Msgs, CINCPAC to MACV, Feb 25, 41. Hearings before the Committee on
1962. MACV to CINCPAC, Mar I. 1962. Apr Armed Services, House of Representatives. Mil-
6. 1962. Apr 7. 1962, May 6. 1962. P A C A F to itary Posture. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington.
13th A F and 2d ADVON. Apr 27. 1962. 2d 1966), pp 7609-10.
ADVON to PACAF. May 5, 1962, P A C A F to 42. Van Staaveren. USAF Plansand Policies
CSAF. May 12. 1962. CINCPAC to MACV, in South Vietnam, 1961-1963. p 47: memo, Col
Sep 30. 1963. Winston P. Anderson. Dir/Ops. 2d AD. for
Anthis. Feb 23. 1963; msgs, 2d A D to PACAF.
Zuckert. J a n 9. 1963; msg. C N O / C S A / C S A F Jan 27, 1963. and Sep 29, 1963.
300
I
Notes to Pages 103-107
Chapter X
I . Wilfred G. Burchett. Vietnam: Inside Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-64. Item Ill-C;
Storyofthe Guerrilla War(New York. 1965),pp hist, 315th AD. Jan-Jun 62. pp 44-45; CINC-
88-89; PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 22-24, 1962. PAC Rcrd. 2d SECDEF Conf. Item 3.
S E C D E F Conf. Item B; MACV hist mono- 13. Hist, 2d ADVON. pp XVII-XX: Chief,
graph. Military Assistance to the Republic of AF Sec. MAAGV. Agenda Book for Feb 62
South Vietnam, 1960-63. pp I 1-12. SECDEF Conf. Item 3 (a)A: rprt, Brig Gen
2. Cong Rec. May 9, 1968.pp 12617-18: Pike. Travis M. Hetherington, DCS/ Plans and Ops.
Viet Cong, passim, and War, Peace, and the Viet PACAF. Apr 25. 1962; rprt. Lt Col Charles D.
Cong, pp 1-18. Easley. ca. Aug 5. 1962: Itr, Easley to 2 ODC. ca.
3. Msg. USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. Jul I . 1962; Proj Corona Harvest Oral Hist
1961: PACAF Reference Book for Jan 1962, intvw w/Anthis, pp 64-68: PACAF Ref Bk for
SECDEF Conf. Tab 13; CINCPAC Rcrd, Jan 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 3: MACV Sum-
Second SECDEF Conf, Jan 15. 1962, Item 13, mary of Highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. 1963. p
and Dec 16. 1961. Item 2. 135; msg. USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Mar 21.
4. CINCPAC Rcrd, Second SECDEF Conf. 1962.
Jan 15, 1962. Item 5A: HQ MACV, Summary 14. Ralph A. Rowley, U S A F F A C Opera-
of Highlights. Feb 8, 1962-Feb 7. 1963, p 97; Itr, tions in Southeast Asia. 1961-65 (Ofc/AF Hist.
R . K . G. Thompson to Diem. Nov I I . 1961. in Jan 1972). pp 15. 18. 24-25: hist. 2d ADVON. p
D O D Pentagon Papers. Bk I I : 345-58. 97; Draft presentation. Anthis for Mar 62
5. CINCPAC Rcrd. Third SECDEF Conf. S E C D E F Conf, Hist. 2d A D V O N : rad,
Feb 19. 1962. Items 2 and 4. USAIRA Bangkok to PACAF; Jan 31. 1962.
6. Msg. MACV to CINCPAC. Apr 14. 1962; 15. PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF
CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf, Dec 16,1961, Conf. Action Tab I. for Jan 62 SECDEF Conf.
Item 2, and 3d SECDEF Conf. Feb 19. 1962, Tab 9, for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 9;
Items 3 and 5; memo, Moorman to PFDALand CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf. Dec 16. 1961,
PFDOP. Feb 23. 1962: Hilsman. To Move a Item 8-1; Rprt of CSAF's Visit to South Viet-
Nation. pp 44 1-44, nam, Item I I ; Hetherington rprt, Apr 25. 1962:
7. CINCPAC Rcrd. 2d SECDEF Conf. Jan Easley End of Tour Rprt, ca. Aug 5. 1962.
15. 1962. Items 5.5A. and 14. and 3d SECDEF 16. The 8th and 57th Transport Helicopter
Conf. Feb 19. 1962. Item 4: Sir Robert Thomp- Companies arrived as identifiable units at Sai-
son. Defeating Communist Insurgency': The gon aboard an aircraft carrier on December l l .
Lassons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York. 1962. and were so reported in the New York
1966). pp 129-39. Times. The International Control Commission
8. The members were Robert Kennedy, U. promptly recorded this violation of the Geneva
Alexis Johnson. Roswell L. Gilpatric, General accords. The companies were based at Tan Son
Lemnitzer. J o h n A. McCone. McGeorge Nhut and Qui Nhon under the U.S. Army senior
Bundy. Edward R. Murrow.and Fowler Hamil- advisors to the I I and I l l Corps. On January26,
ton. 1962. the U.S. Army's 93d Helicopter Company
9. Taylor. Swords and Plowshares, pp 20 1-3; arrived at Da Nang and was placed under the
NSAM 124. Jan 18, 1962. in D O D Pentagon U.S. Army senior advisor to the I Corps. The
Papers, Bk 12: 442-44: Hearings before a Sub- companies flew combat support missions and
committee of the Committee on Appropria- trained the Vietnamese army in air mobility tac-
tions. House of Representatives. Department of tics. U.S. Army's 18th Fixed Wing Aviation
Defense Appropriationsfor 1965.88th Cong. 2d Company. with sixteen U - l Otter aircraft.
sess (Washington. 1964). pt 2. p 612. reached Nha Trang on February 7. 1962, and
10. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares. pp 201- these liaison aircraft (able to transport two thou-
03; NSAM 162. J u n 19. 1962. and NSAM 182. sand pounds of cargo or eight passengers) sup-
Aug 24. 1962. in DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 12: ported the U.S. Army field advisors. The 339th
48 1-86; US Overseas Internal Defense Policy. Transportation Company (Maintenance) ar-
Aug I . 1962; JCSM. Nov 20, 1962. rived on February I I , 1962. Chief, A F Sec,
I I . AFXOPJ Book of ActionsinSEA. 1961- MAAGV, Agenda Bk for Feb 62. SECDEF
64, p 23. Conf. Item 3 (3); CINCPAC Rcrd, 2d SECDEF
12. Hists. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 61. 1. 73-74. and Conf. Jan 16. 1962. Item 3; CINCPAC Comd
1962. I. 72-74; 13th A F OPlan 226-61, Dec 30. Hist, 1961. p 194.
1961: hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 61. I l l : AFXOPJ 17. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1961. p 189; msg.
30 I
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 108-1 16
USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. 1961; Tour Rprt. Aug 2. 1962.
CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEFConf. Dec 19.1961. 31. Ltr. Moorman to Anthis. Sep 25. 1962;
Item 7: Martin and Clever. IV. 31-34. msgs, 13th A F to PACAF, May 26. 1962,
18. Ltr. O’Donnell to CINCPAC. Dec 12. PACAF to 13th AF. May 29. 1962. and AFCC
1961: msg, USAIRA Saigon to CSAF. Nov 28. J T F I16 to PACAF, May 29, 1962.
1961; PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF 32. Ltrs. Moorman to CINCPAC. Jul 6.
Conf. Tab B-1. 1962. and to Anthis. Sep25. 1962: PACAFSOs
19. Hist. 315th TC Gp (Assault). 1962. p 16: C-85 and G-92. Sep 19 and Oct 19. 1962: msgs,
intvw with Lt Col E. W. Strong by Grainger. CINCPAC to MACV. Jul 18. 1962, MACV to
Nov 7.1962: AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. CINCPAC. Aug 23. 1962.
1961-64. p 25; Jane AIl the World Aircraft. 33. P A C A F Summary of Actions, Gen
1955-56. ed Leonard Bridgeman (New York. Wheeler’s Party. Sec II. Tab C; Itrs. Anthis to
n.d.), p 259; CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Moorman. ca. Apr 16, 1962. and Bowers to
Conf. Feb 19, 1962: PACAF Ref Bk for Dec 61 Mann. ca. Jun 62 and Jul25. 1962: Reaves End
SECDEF Conf. Tab A-5 and Action Tab A: of Tour Rprt. Aug 2. 1962: JCS/2d ADVON Jt
msgs. CINCPAC to 13th AF. Dec 9. 1961. OPlan 62-2. Oct 17. 1962; Moorman presenta-
PACAF to 13th AF. Dec 13. 1961. tion. ca. Feb 63. 1. 38; msg, 2d A D to PACAF.
20. Talking Paper on USAF Ops in VN. Apr 5. 1962.
3. Folder Policy-Vietnam. Jan 1-31. 1964. 34. P A C A F Summary of Actions. Gen
21. Moorman presentation t o Congressional Wheeler’s Party. Sec II. Tab C.
Committee. ca. Feb 63, I, 38; Itrs, Anthis to 35. Msgs. PACAF to 13.
Maj Gen W. Martin. Sep 2. 1963,and Moorman 1961.
to Anthis. ca. Feb 28. 1962: msgs. MACV to 36. Doris Krudener. formerly of the Office of
CINCPAC, Mar 12. 1962. and 13th A F to 2d Air Force History. kindly supplied this docu-
ADVON. Mar 18.1962; Rprt of CSAF‘s Visit to mentation: Memos, J C S for McNamara. Nov 3.
SVN. Apr 62. Ops Sec. 1961. and William P. Bundy for Rusk and
22. MACV Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. McNamara, Nov 14 and 30. 1961.
1962-Feb 7, 1963. p 69; Itr. Lt Col Floyd K. 37. NSAM 115, Nov 30. 1961: Marvin E.
Shafner, May 12. 1962. Hintz. History of the Thirteenth Air Force, Jan
23. 2d ADVON. Agenda and Info Bk for I-June 30. 1963. pp 75-76: msg. CHMAAGV to
Mar 62 SECDEFConf. Item 17; hist. 13th AF, CINCPAC. Dec 23. 1961,in ISA files.
1962, pp 103-05. 38. JCSM-2-62(U), Jan 2. 1962; msg. CINC-
24. Msgs. 2d ADVON t o 13th AF. Mar 9. PAC to CHMAAGVN. Dec 28, 1961: memo.
1962. Mar 12, 19.and26. S E C D E F t o the President. Feb 2. 1962: and see
1962. msg. CHMAAGV t o CINCPAC Jan 17. 1962;
25. Anthis presentation at May 62 SECDEF and PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 S E C D E F Conf.
Conf: msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF, Mar 27, Tab 16A.
1962. CINCPAC to JCS. Mar 30. 1962. and 2d 39. Msg. SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon,
A D to 13th AF. Nov 20, 1962. Jan 4. 1962: and msg. CHMAAGV to CINC-
26. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF, Mar 27. PAC. Jan 12. 1962.
1962. MACV to CINCPAC, Apr 9. 1962. and 40. Capt George T. Adams. TAC Aerial
May22, 1962. PACAF toCSAF, May 12,1962. Spray Flight Operations in Southeast Asia,
and CINCPAC to MACV. Aug 13. 1962: 1961-1964 (TAC/SASF. n.d.). p 8.
Hetherington rprt. Apr 25. 1962; hist. 315th T C 41. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 62. III.
Gp (Assault), 1962, p 27; rprt. Lt Col Howard P. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 S E C D E F Conf. Tab
Reaves. Aug 2, 1962. Items3
27. Ibid.; Rprt of C S A F s Visit to SVN. Apr and 4: Chief, A F Sec. MAAGV, Agenda Bk for
62: PACAF Status Rprt. May 2 to 9. 1962; msg. Feb 62 S E C D E F Conf. Item 3( I); CINCPAC
CINCPAC to JCS. May 8, 1962. Rcrd. 3d S E C D E F Conf. Feb 19. 1962. Item 3.
28. Msg, MACV to CINCPAC, May 22, and 4th SECDEF Conf. Mar 21. 1962. Item I:
1962. msg. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 20. 1962; Moor-
29. J T F 116, AAR, Dec8, 1962: msgs, 2d A D man memo, Feb 23. 1962. In April, when Tacti-
to 13th AF. Jul28and CINCPAC cal Air Command moved two spray planes to
to JCS. May 25,1962. to MACV, May 25.1962; the Middle East to work against locust infesta-
PACAF Summary of Actions, Gen Wheeler’s tionsand to save food crops. it added two stand-
Party, Jan 63. ard C-1 23s to the Mule Train airlift detachment.
30. One plane was lost without crew fatalities 42. 3d ADVON Agenda Bk for SECDEF
in a major accident on July 15. Hist, PACAF. May 62 Conf. Item 3: CINCPAC Rcrd, 4th
Jan-Jun62. III. May and SECDEF Conf, Mar 21, 1962. Item 1. hist,
Gp (Assault), 1962. pp 27-28: Reaves End of PACAF. Jan-Jun 62. III. Apr 62.
302
Notes to Pages
Chapter XI
Air Policy: Too Cautious?
TSgt Harry M. Nonamaker. Dec I I. 1962, with ibid., Tab L; hist. 2d ADVON. pp 67-70.
Capt Edwin J . Rhein. Jr.. Jan 3. 1963. with 30. Report of CSAF's Visit to SVN, Apr 62.
Chaplain Squires. Jan 16, 1963.and with CWO p 11.
William Weakley. Jan IO. 1963; Martin and 3 1. Maj Gen Spurgeon Noel, Medical Sup-
Clever. App 2. COIN Intvws. Tabs F. G. and H . port of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1965-70
28. Intvw. Maj Thomas J. Hickam with Capt (Dept of the Army, Wash D.C.. 1973). pp 5 and
(Chap) Donal M. Squires. Jan 16, 1963; Martin 9.
and Clever, App 2. COIN Intvws, Tab I; hist, 2d 32. Intvw. Hickam and Grainger with CWO
ADVON. Nov61-Oct 62.pp 67-70; End of Tour A C. Liberator, Nov 20. 1962; Martin and I
Reports, Lt Col Kenneth M. Keyte, Apr 20, Clever, App 2. Tab A.
1963. and Capt Forrest P. Meek, Apr 9. 1963. 33. Hist, 2d ADVON. pp 182-83.
29. Intvw. Hickam with Auten, Feb 15,1963;
Chapter XII
I . Chief. A F Sec. MAAGV. Agenda Bk for 12. Msgs. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE.
Feb 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5C; Gleason paper. Mar 28. 1962. PACAF to 13th AF. Mar 22.
ca. Mar I. 1962;ClNCPAC Rcrd.4thSECDEF 1962, J C S to CINCPAC. Mar 27. 1962; hist.
Conf. Item 5. 13th AF. 1962. 1.81-83: MR. Maj Gen John M.
2. PACAF Ref Bk for Jan 62 SECDEF Reynolds. Mar 22. 1962.
Conf. Tab 3. TP-I; Proj Corona Harvest Oral 13. Report of CSAF's Visit to SVN. Apr 62. I
304
Notes to Pages 133-138
1962. SECDEF Conf. Tab A3; Itr, Harkins to 26. Msgs. C S A F to PACAF. Oct 6, 1962.
Moorman, Oct I. 1962: ClNCPAC Summary of CINCPAC
Decisions Taken at Seventh SECDEF Conf. Summary of Decisions Taken at 7th SECDEF
Oct 8. 1962. Item 6: msg. PACAF lo TAC. Oct Conf. Oct 8. 1962. Item 6.
13. 1962: Long rprt. Oct 18. 1962. 27. Msgs, PACAF to TAC. Oct 12 and 13.
22. Msg. 13th A F to PACAF. Aug 6. 1962; 1962; Itrs. Anthis to Pritchard. Oct 20. 1962. and
hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 62. III. Aug 13. 1962. Moorman to Anthis. Oct 23. 1962.
23. Msg, PACAF to CSAF. Sep 29, 1962; Itr. 28. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF and 13th AF.
Pritchard to Anthis. Oct 1, 1962. Oct 22. 1962.
24. 1st and 2d Fighter Squadrons became the 29. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Nov 7 .
514th and 516th; 3d Liaison became 1962. and CINCPAC to JCS. Nov 9. 1962.
the 110th. 112th and 114th; 1st and 2d Helicop- 30. Msgs. 2d ADVON to 13th AF. Mar 9.
ter became the 211th and 213th: 1st and 2d 1962. CINCPAC to ADMINO. CINCPAC.
Transport became the413thand 415th; the Spe- Oct 22. 1962, 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 24. 1963:
cial Air Mission became the 312th Squadron; Moorman presentation, ca. Feb 63. 1. Question
tactical reconnaissance elements formed the I I: P A C A F S u m m a r y of Actions. Gen
716th Squadron: the 12th. 23d. 30th. and 41st Wheeler’s Party. Sec I. Tab C; msg. PACAF to
Air Base Squadrons operated at Nha Trang. CSAF, Feb 14. 1963.
Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut,and Da Nang, respec- 31. Hilsman. To M o w 4 Nation, pp 453-67.
tively. Msg. CHMAAGV to CINCPAC. Sep 32. AFXOPJ Book ofActionsin SEA. 1961-
19, 1962. 1964. Item I l l F; msg. C S A F to PACAF. Dec
25. Msg. DA to USARPAC. Aug 16. 1962. 12. 1963.
Chapter XIII
I . Anthis presentation at Mar 62 SECDEF AmEmb Phnom Penh to OSD, Jan 22. 1962.
Conf. in Hist. 2d AD. I I , Docs 200.203, and 205; SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon, Jan 24. 1962.
CINCPAC Rcrd. SECDEF Conf, Dec 16.1961. and AmEmb Saigon to CINCPAC. Jan 26,
Item 2. 1962.
2. Chief, A F Sec. MAAGV, Agenda Bk for 7. CINCPAC Rcrd, 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb
Feb 62 SECDEF Conf; Moorman presentation 19. 1962, Item 3: msg. USAIRA. Bangkok. to
to Congressional Committee, ca. Feb 63, 1. PACAF, Jan 31. 1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Feb
pp 1 - 1 I . MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb8 62 SECDEF Conf. Item 5.
1962-Feb 7, 1963, pp 14. and 27-30: PACAF 8. Msg, CINCPAC to CHMAAGV. Feb 4,
Ref Bk for Dec 61 SECDEF Conf. Action 1962.
Tab F. 9. CINCPAC Rcrd, 3d SECDEF Conf, Feb
3. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul62 SECDEF Conf. 19. 1962. Items 2. 3. 4. 5: Moorman memo, Feb
Tabs 1A. MACV toCINCPAC, 23. 1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF
May I . 1962: Itrs. Anthis to Brig Gen H. D. Conf, Items 3 and 5: Itr. Maj Gen Richard C .
Aynesworth. Oct 28, 1963. and to Gen Jacob E. Weede, Feb 27. 1962: msgs. J C S to CINCPAC.
Smart. Nov 25, 1963, and Col Harry O. Patter- Mar 12. 1962. P A C A F t o CSAF. Feb 20. 1962.
son to CINCPAC. Jun 62; rprt. Capt Charles H. 10. Anthis briefing. Mar 62 SECDEF Conf.
Tardiff, Aug 4. 1962. in Hist. 2d AD. II. Doc 205.
4. Report of CSAF’s Visit to SVN, Apr 62, I I . Msg. 13th A F to PACAF. Mar 4. 1962;
Intel Sec; MACV, Rcrd, 5th SECDEF Conf, PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf.
May I I , 1962. Item 8. Items 3 and 5.
5. Chief, A F Sec, MAAGV, Agenda Bk for 12. PACAF Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF
Feb 62 S E C D E F Conf. Item 5; PACAF Ref Bk Conf. Item 7 ; CINCPAC Rcrd. 4th SECDEF
for Feb 62 S E C D E F Conf. Tab 5. TP-I; Conf, Mar 21. 1962. Item 5; Hilsman, To Move
CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d S E C D E F Conf, Feb 19. a Narion, pp 441-44.
1962. Item 5. 13. Easley End of Tour Report, ca. Aug 5 .
6. PACAF Ref Bk for Feb 62 SECDEF Conf 1962.
pt I-B a n d T a b C; C I N C P A C Rcrd. 3d 14. Ltr, Anthis to Pritchard. Dec 20, 1962.
SECDEF Conf, Feb 19, 1962. Item 5; msgs, 15. The direction finder had been designed by
305
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages
General in the basement of his quarters
in Washington. was personally inter- CINCPAC to I I,
ested inelectronics and he hoped that various air to Saigon.
navigation aids, such as radio to 1962;
range indicators, would give instant and unam- Anthis to
biguous bearings on radio stations. Ref for Mar
Item 3: Anthis briefing at the Mar
CINCPAC 4th in AD. Doc 203;
Mar Item hist, End of Tour Report, 1962;
Recon Sq. I. Final Analysis Directive Program No.
Hist, AD, 157; MACV to 39-43; 13th to
May 1963; Ref for Mar 1962; see Moorman
May Agenda Item Tab 3: Anthis, Feb
CINCPAC 8th May Thomas and Douglas
Item 3; Air Interdiction and Evans Feb 1962: paper,
Ground Support, in Martin Mar I. 1962: to
and Clever, Tab A.
Ref for May and Evans May 1962:
Agenda Item Tab E. MACV to CINCPAC. May
Bernard Fall, The Two A to I and II
Political and Military Analysis, (New
1963). 355-56; see Hetherington 1962:
to MACV, May and to 1962:
Report of Visit to and Evans to May 1962;
Intel MACV 5th End of Tour Report.
May I and 8: 13th to Mar
Agenda Book for May Item MACV to and
I-A; hist. I. to 13th and 1962:
citing Intel Digest. May Ref for Mar
1962: CINCPAC 6th Item
1962; Item 5: CINCPAC to MACV, MACV to CINCPAC, May
to 13th Mar 1962:
MACV to I I, to I.
CINCPAC to MACV, and and Evans May 1962;
and to
Anthis to to 13th to
Moorman to Harkins, 1962: and and CINCPAC to MACV.
CINCPAC
and Evans May 1962:
Harkins to Moorman, I , 1962: Lt Col William Lewis to Mar 1962:
Maj Andrew Chapman to paper. Mar I . 1962: hist. AD. I.
16 1962; I 10: Anthis to Maj Carl
CINCPAC t o
and A D to MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb
US of State. American Foreign 1962-Feb Col John C.
Policy: Current Documents. 13th 10. Lt Col
Saigon to Miles Doyle to I I . 1962:
1962: MAY9, ADVONto
Ref for Tab Feb and A D to
Report of Visit by Team to Jan 1962; paper, Mar I . 1962:
para Ref for Mar
CINCPAC Tab See also Counterinsurgency
Saigon 1962: Lessons Learned. 1962: Col
MACV Summary of Highlights, Feb Winston Anderson, Jan 1963: Anthis
Feb 40: memo, Lt Gen Le Van to Moorman. 1963; 13th Final
Limitation of Air and Artillery Supports along Report,
Vietnam Republic Border Corridor, to Anderson,
Moorman to Henderson. with
to Saigon, 1963: Report of Visit by Brig Gen Gilbert
to and 1962;
Notes to Pages 144-149
rprts. Maj Hal G. Bowers, Jan 9. 1963, and Capt 52. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF
Bryant C. Kuhman. Sep 4, 1962; 2d ADVON/ Conf, Tabs IA. IC. and 5; Itr. Patterson to
A F Sec. MAAG. MAAG Symposium. Aug 9, CINCPAC, Jun 62. Visiting Saigon in July.
1962. Gen. Walter C. Sweeney, Jr.. Tactical Air
39. MACV Army Sec. Lessons Learned I Command commander, urged General Anthis
and 6. Mar 30 and Apr I I . 1962; msgs, MACV toestablish photocellsat Pleikuand Da Nangat
to CINCPAC. Jun I and Jul9.1962. CINCPAC once in order to speed the delivery of data to I
to JCS, Jul9, 1962. and Aug I I . 1962.2d A D to and I I Corps. Msg, 2d ADVON to PACAF, Jul
13th AF. Dec21, 1962. P A C A F t o 13th AF, Jul 17. 1962.
30, 1962. J C S to MACV, Aug 3, 1962. to 53. CINCPAC Rcrd.6th SECDEF Conf. Jul
CINCPAC. Jul27. 1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 6th 23, 1962. Item I ; msgs. MACV to CINCPAC.
S E C D E F Conf, Jul 23, 1962, Item 1. The Aug 8. 1962. and CINCPAC to JCS, Aug 8,
Marine helicopters wished to be based at Da 1962; PACAF Ref Bk for Oct 62 SECDEF
Nang. but because the U.S. Army had a com- Conf, Tab H.
pany there. they went to the Soc Trangairfield in 54. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Sep 8. 1962;
the delta. Later, they traded stations with an rprt. Col J . L. Asbury. Jr.. Nov 22. 1963: hist. 2
Army company. because they were more effec- ODC, Jan-Jun 64. in Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64.
tive in mountainous terrain. Maj John J. Cahill IX, Doc 9; Oakah L. Jones, Organization, Mis-
and Jack Shulimson. Draft, "History of U.S. sion and Growth ofthe Viernamese Air Force,
Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 1949-1968. p 50: hist, PACAF. Jul-Dec 62, II.
65,"pp 14-16, and 76-81. and Jan-Jun 63. I I ; hists. PFIDC, Sep 62, Apr
40. Mueller r p r t , A u g 4, 1962; msg, 63; hist. 13th AF. Jan-Jun 63, 1, xiv.
CINCPAC to JCS. Aug I I. 1962. 55. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS. Sep 8,1962.2d
41. Msgs. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Sep 16, A D t o PACAF, Sep 14. 1962.and Nov 14. 1962.
1962,and ClNCPACto MACV. Ju128 and Aug and to 13th AF, Nov 28. 1962; Itr. Harkins to
3. 1962; MR, Col S. H. Nigrc. Jan 9. 1963. Moorman. Oct I , 1962; PACAF Summary of
42. Hiat. 2d AD. pp 149-50: Martin and Actions, Gen Wheeler's Party. Sec 11. Tab B.
Clever, V. 52-53; Fall, Two Vier-Nums. 56. Two other RB-26s went at the same time
pp 378-79; msg, CINCPAC to MACV, Sep 12. to Thailand. PACAF Ref Bks for Jan and Mar
1962. SECDEF Confs; msg. MACV to CINCPAC,
43. PACAF Ref Bk for Jul 62 SECDEF May I , 1962.
Conf, Tab I . 57. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Nov 14, 1962.
44. Ibid.; 2d AD, Ops Analysis Paper 3, Oct and Jul 10, 1963; PFLPL, Sep 12. 1963.
15. 1962; msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 31 58. Ltr, Felt to MACV, Sep I. 1962: MACV
and Aug 27, 1962. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 28. Summary of Highlights, pp 189, 213: msgs. 2d
1962. A D to CSAF. Nov 30. 1962. and MACV to
45. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug I I , 1962; CINCPAC, Apr 29. 1963; memo, Anderson for
rprt, Maj Eugene R. McCutchan, Aug 24, 1962. Anthis, Feb 23. 1963.
46. Ltr. Harkins to Moorman. Oct I , 1962; 59. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Sep 15. 1962.
hist, 2d ADVON, Nov 15, 1961-Oct 8. 1962. and Jun 26. 1963. and to 13th AF. Sep 26, 1962;
p 150; Martin and Clever, V, 54; End of Tour Itrs. Anthis to Pritchard, Aug 4, 1962, and to
Report. Capt Edwin J. Rhein, Jr., Dec 28. 1962; Milton. Aug 9, 1962: .PACAF Summary of
msg, 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 6.1963: 2d A D Ops Actions. Gen Wheeler's Party. pt 11. Tab 1 I ;
Analysis Paper 3, p 17. memos, Col Harvey W. Brown for Rowland,
47. Rprt, Lt Col Byron R. Kalin, Sep4, 1962; Apr 19 and 22. 1963.
observations, Capt Bryant C. Ruhman, Sep 4, 60. P A C A F Summary of Actions. Gen
1962; msgs. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Sep 22, Wheeler's Party, Sec I, pt I l l , Tab A; msgs, 2d
1962, and MACV to CINCPAC. Sep 14, 1962. A D to PACAF, Dec 23, 1962. MACV to
48. Ruhman observations; Capt Kenneth H. CINCPAC. Apr 29. 1963.
Wells, Sep 14. 1962; msgs. C I N C P A C to 61. Memo. Dir/Plans. USAF. for DCS/
MACV. Sep5. 1962,and MACV to CINCPAC. Plans and Ops, USAF. Dec 17, 1962.
Sep 14, 1962. 62. Ltrs. McElroy to Anthis. May 6. 1962,
49. Rprt. Maj William J . Kuntz, Sep 30, and Anthis to McElroy, May 22. 1962.
1962: msg, 2d A D to 13th AF. Dec 21, 1962. 63. App C, RAAF ASU 18/3/Air (28). Jun
50. Msgs, 2d A D to PACAF, Oct 31, 1962. 14, 1962.
and to CSAF. Dec 15, 1962: Burgin rprt, Nov 64. Ltr, Anthis to Nguyen Cao Ky. Aug I I.
15, 1962: Anderson to PACAF. Jan 14. 1963; 1962.
hist. SAWC. Apr 27-Dec31. 1962. pp 188, 197. 65. Msg. CINCPAC to DIA, Mar 13, 1963;
51. MR, Anthis. Oct 19. 1962; hr, O'Donnell PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf. Oct 8,1962,
to Harkins, Mar 8, 1963 Tab K-I. and for May 63 S E C D E F Conf.
307
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 149-160
Chapter XIV
I . CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. 16. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF, Oct 22. 1962.
May 6. 1962, pp 2-a/ b-3. Jan 27. 1963. and MACV to CINCPAC. Dec 2.
2. PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF 1962; MACV Summary of Highlights. p 66:
Conf. Item I ; MACV Summary of Highlights. PACAF Summary of Actions. Gen Wheeler's
Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. 1963, p 95. Party. pt 11. Tab D: Air Staff Observations.
3. Msg. J C S toSECDEF. Aug 13. 1962; rprt. South Vietnam. Jan 16-30. 1963. pp 9-1.
J-5 to JCS. Aug 7. 1962. 17. Msgs, 2d A D to PACAF. Sep 14 and
4. Ibid.: memo. Review of USAF Actions 30, Oct 30 and 31. Nov I. and Dec 23, 1962. Jan
and Progress since May I . Ref Bk l'or July 62 27.1963,and toCSAF.Sep30.1962; MACVto
SECDEF Mtg. CINCPAC, Oct 25, Nov 17 and 19. 1962:
5. Ltr. O'Donnell to LeMay. Jul 28, 1962. PACAF Summary of Actions, Gen Wheeler's
6. CINCPAC Rcrd. 6th S E C D E F Conf. Party. Sec II. Tabs A and 10: msg, Maj Gen
p 2-2. John W. Carpenter I l l to Burchinal. Jan 23.
7. Memo. J C S for SECDEF, Mar 7. 1963; 1963.
memo and tabs. Lt Col Franklin Rose. Jr.. 18. Rprt. Capt Lester G. Frazier. n.d.: Nigro
Dir/Plans. USAF. to CSAF. Jan 28. 1963; memo of Felt Visit with Diem. Jan 9. 1963;
MACV National Campaign Plan for SVN. Dec msgs. CINCPAC to JCS, Oct 22. 1962. and 2d i
15. 1962. AD to 13th AF. Nov 22, 1962: Itr. Bowers to
8. Msg, CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13. 1963. Dep/Dir. JOC, Dec I I. 1962.
9. PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF 19. Bowers rprts. Dec 28. 1962. and Jan 10:
Conf. Item I ; Report of Visit by J C S Team to 1963: Maj Eugene R. McCutchan rprt, Jan 15.
SVN, Jan 63. Scc I l l : MR, Col E. H . Nigro, Jan 1963; Nigro memo, Jan 9. 1963: msg, 2d A D to
9. 1963; intvw with Lt Col Charles E. Trumbe. PACAF. Mar 5. 1963.
Jr.. by Grainger, Jul 13. 1963; msg. 2d A D to 20. Rprt. Maj Herbert L. Prevost. Jan 15.
PACAF. Nov 5, 1962. 1963; Report of Summary Briefing Given by Lt
10 Msgs. USARMA to DA. Nov 26. 1962. Col John P. Vann. Jan 6. 1963; Halberstam.
2d A D to PACAF. Oct 18. 1962; Itr. Col Making of a Quagmire. p 146; Burchett. Viet-
Winston P. Anderson to Dir/ Mat. 2d A D . Jan nam. pp 193-94: J O C Briefing Summary, Jan 3.
15. 1963. 1963; msgs, 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 3 and 7, Apr
I I . Rprts. Bowers to Dep/Dir. JOC, Jan 9 6. 1963, and to 13th AF, Jan 4. 1963.
and Feb I . 1963, and Lt Col Donald K. Reamy, 21. Msg, 2d A D to CSAF. Jan 18. 1963.
Feb 8. 1963. 22. MR. Col S. N. Nigro, Jan 9. 1963; mags.
12. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Feb 6, 1963: 2d A D to 13th AF. Jan 10 and 1 I . 1963. and
memo, Anderson for Anthis. Feb 23. 1963: Itr. CINCPAC to MACV, Jan 4. 1963.
M a j James C . D u n n to 13th AF. Jan 21. 1963. 23. Ltrs, Anthis to MACV, Jan 16. 1963.
13. Ltrs. Moorman to Harkins. Sep 3. 1962. Anderson to Dir/Mat, 2d AD. Jan 15. 1963:
and Rowland to Maj GcnGlen W. Martin. Mar intvw with Truinbo by Grainger, Jul 13. 1963:
14. 1963.2d A D to PACAF. Oct 22. 1962.and PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf.
Jan 3. 1963. Agenda Item I.
14. Msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF. Oct 22, 1962, 24. Rprts. Lt Col Donald K. Roamy. May 8.
Dec 10. 1962.and Jan IO. 1963. and PACAFto 1963. Maj William J . Kuntz. Feb IO. 1963. Lt
13th AF, Dec 8. 1962: hist. 13th AF, 1962. I. Col Bill A. Montgomery t o 2d AD, Aug63. Oct
107-08. 63. and Nov 63. and Lt Col Charles J. Chennault
15. Memo. Anderson for Anthis. Feb 23, to 2d AD. Nov 13. 1963; End of Tour Report.
1963; msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Oct 22, 1962. Col Benjamin S. Preston. Jul 64: Itr. Capt B. L.
Jan 8. 1963, and to 13th AF. Dec IO. 1962. and Ruliman to Chief ALO/ FAC Sec, 2d AD, Jul2.
Jan IO, 1963, and CINCPAC to JCS, Nov 9. 1963.
1962. 25. Ltr. Anthis to Smart. Nov 25, 1963.
308
Notes to Pages 160-167
26. Ltrs. Anthis to Gen Jacob E. Smart. Nov (Washington. 1963). pp 549-53: Martin and
25. 1963. and O’Donnell to Harkins. Mar 8. Clever. 11. 8-10,
1963: msg, CINCPAC to JCS. Feb 16, 1963. 42. Burchett. Vietnam. pp 85-99.
27. Msg. CSAF to PACAF. Jan 9. 1963: Itr. 43. Ibid.: intvw with Lt Col Charles E.
Anthis to JCS. n.d.: Anthis notes on matters to Trumbe by Grainger, Jul 13, 1963: rnsg.
be taken up with Gen LeMay. ca. Mar 63. CINCPAC to DIA. Mar 13. 1963: and PACAF
28. Ltrs. Harkins to O’Donnell and Felt. Mar Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. Agenda
22. 1963. Item I .
29. Ltrs. Felt to Harkins. May 20, 1963, and 44. MR.Col E. H. Nigro. Jan9. 1963: Public
to O’Donnell. May 24, 1963. Papers ofthe Presidents: John F. Kennedy. 1963
30. Ltrs. Harkins to Felt. Jun 21. 1963. (Washington. 1964), p 1 1 : Report of Visit by
Anthis to Martin. Sep 2. 1963: MACV Directive J C S Team to SVN. See IV. para 7.
44. Jul 8. 1963: intvw with Henderson by 45. Msg. ClNCPACto MACV, Nov9. 1962:
CHECO. Dec 20, 13thAF. CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf. May 6.
Feb 6. 1964. 1963. Items I b and 4: House of Representatives.
3 1. Hilsman. Two Movea Nation. pp 453-67. Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. 88th Cong. 1st
32. Memo. Col W.V. McBride. DiriPlans. sess (Washington. 1963). p 8: hr. O’Donnell to
USAF. to CSAF. Jan 5. 1963. Harkins. Mar 8. 1963: and PACAF Ref Bk for
33. Report of Visit by J C S Team to SVN. May 63 SECDEF Conf. Agenda Item 4.
Jan 63. The USAF contingent consisted of Lt. 46. MR, Conf with Ngo Dinh Nhu on Apr
Gen. David A. Bruchinal. Lt. Gen. G.P. Disosway, 12. 1963. Intel Rprts63 and 69A-702. box 1/ 15:
Maj Gen William W. Momyer. Col Robert M. PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf.
Levy. and Lt Col Harry M. Chapman. Agenda Item 4: msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb
34. Report of Visit by J C S Team to S V N . Saigon, May 13, 1963: House of Representa-
Jan 63. pt III. tives. Fureign Operations Appropriations. 88th
35. Ibid.. see also msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Cong. 1st sess (Washington. 1963). pt 2.
Jun 27. 1963. MACV to CINCPAC, Nov 17. pp 89-91,
1962. C l N C P A C t o MACV, Nov 19. 1962.and 47. Ibid.. pp 94-95: msg. CINCPAC to JCS.
PACAF to CSAF, Apr 16. 1963. Apr 4. 1963: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF
36. Report of Visit by J C S Team. Jan 63. Sec Conf. May 6,1963. Items I and I b: and PACAF
IV: msgs. J C S to CINCPAC. Feb 17. 1963. and Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf, Agenda
CINCPAC to MACV. Feb 17. 1963: Itr. Moor- Item I .
man to Anthis. Feb I I . 1963. 48. DOD Pentagon Papers. Bk 3: IV.B.4..
37. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 24 and Dir/Plans. USAF,to
27. 1963. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 14. 1963. PACAF, Apr 30, 1963. and to TAC. May 20.
SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon. Feb 15. 1963: 1962: CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF Conf,
Report of Visit by JCS Team. Jan 63, pt IV. May 6. 1963, Items 2 and 4.
38. Msgs. CINCPAC to MACV, Mar 2. 49. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun 63. 11. Jun 63:
1963. and PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 2. 1963. Manpower Review and Analysis of 13th A F
39. Report of Visit by J C S Team to SVN. Activities. Jun 28. 1963: End of Tour Report. Lt
Jan 63. See 11. paras 2 and 2a. and See V, Col James C. Dunn. Jul22. 1963: hist. PACAF,
para la. Jul-Dee 63. I. pt 2. Oct 63: DOD Pentagon
40. Air Staff Observations. South Vietnam. Papers, Bk 3: IV.B.4.. 12-13. 15-16.
Jan 16-30. 1963. 50. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF
41. Msg. MACVto DIA. Mar 12. 1963: Hear- Conf, Tab 4C: intvw with Trumbo by Grainger,
ings before the Committee on Armed Services. Jul 13. 1963.
US Senate, Military Procurement Authoriza- 51. Msg. MACV to JCS. Jun 13. 1963.
tion, Fiscul Year 1964. 88th Cong, 1st sess
Chapter X V
I . Three C-123s were detached to Thailand. 2. Msgs. USARPAC to CINCPAC. Apr 19.
PACAF Ref Bk for May 63 SECDEF Conf. 1963. CINCPAC to USARPAC. May 1. 1963.
Agenda Item I: rnsg. CINCPAC to MACV. and to MACV. Jan 24 and Jul21. 1963. and 2d
Jun24, 15. A D to PACAF, Jul 9. 1963: Itr. Anthis to
309
THE A D V I S O R Y Y E A R S Notes to Pages 167-1 71
Martin. Sep 2. 1963; intvw with Kennedy by 1963; hist. 6091st Recon Sq. Jul-Dec 63. pp I I-
Gausche. Feb 4. 1964. 15; P A C A F Counterinsurgency Lessons
3. Ihid.: ltr, Anthis to Smart, Nov 25. 1963; Learned, Sep 12. 1963.
msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF. Feb 25. 1963. and 12. CINCPAC Rcrd, 8th S E C D E F Conf.
315th A D to P.4CAF. Feb 25. 1963. May 6. 1963. Item 3; hr. Rose to MACV 5-5, Oct
4. Hist. 315th T C G p . Jan-Jun 63. pp 15. 19. 23. 1963: P A C A F Ref Bk for May63 S E C D E F
35; Itr. Maj Gen R.G. Weede to 2d AD, Apr 18. C o n f . A g e n d a Item 4; msg, M A C V to
i
1963; hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 63. II. Jun 63. CINCPAC, Apr 29, 1963: intvw with Kennedy
5. Hist. 315th T C Gp. Jan-Jun 63. p 24; Itrs. by Gausche, Feb 4. 1964.
Capt Louis W. Gaylor to USAFS( P)V. Jun 16, 13. L t r s . A n t h i s to Brig G e n H. D .
1963. Anthis t o Martin. Sep 2. 1963. and to Aynesworth. Oct 28. 1963. and to Smart. Nov
315th CP. May I I , 1963; ACTIV. Final Rprt. 25. 1963; Mellish rprts. Dec9. 1963,and Jan 15,
P 9. 1964: Col Harvey E. Henderson End of Tour
6. Hist. 13th AF. Jul-Dec63. I. 17; intvw with Report. Feb 5, 1964; PACAF Ref Bk for May63
Kennedy by Gausche. Feb 4. 1964; Itr. Anthis to S E C D E F Conf. Agenda Item 4; Ops Analysis
Smart. Nov 25. 1963. Ofc. 2d A D . Counterinsurgency Lessons
7. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Mar 22. 1963, Learned. Jan-Jun 64. Jun 4. 1964.
Sep 29, 1963. and Oct 5. 1963, MACV to 14. Rprt. Brig Gen Virgil L. Zoller to CSAF.
CINCPAC. Oct 3. 1963. P A C A F t o 2d AD. Oct Jul 5. 1962; see also Proj Corona Harvest Oral
30.1963,CINCPACtoCSAF. Mar 15and May Hist lntvw 83 with Col William M. Martin. cu.
I I . 1963: Hearings before the Committee on Jan 30. 1971; PACAF Ref Bk for S E C D E F
Appropriations. US Senate, Foreign Assisrance Conf. May 13. 1964. Fact Sheet 6; MACV
and Related Agencies Appropriations,for 1965. Summary of Highlights, p 135.
88th Cong. 2d sess ( W a s h i n g t o n , 1964). IS. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF, Jul IO. 1963.
pp 160-61: Hist Data Rcrd. 34th TG. Jul-Dec 16. P A C A F Summary o f Actions. Gen
63. p I and atch 3: hist. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 63. 1, Wheeler's Party. pt 2. Tab 20: Lt Col Miles M.
116; hist. Asst for Mutual Security. USAF, Jul- Doyle End o f Tour Report. Feb 6. 1963; intvw
Dec 63. pp 53-54; memo with atch. Col Roger E. with Maj William J . Johnson and Capt Ernest
Phelan. Dir/ Plans, USAF. to Asst VCS. USAF, C. Cutler, Jr.. by Grainger. Feb 7, 1963: Anthis
Aug 13. 1963; hr, Carpenter to Moorman, Apr file of items to be taken u p with Gen LeMay, ca.
I . 1963. Mar63: msgs. 13th A F t o PACAF, Aug9. 1963.
8. Hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec62. II. Dec62: hist. 17. Ltr. Anderson to Anthis, Apr 12. 1963;
13th AF. 1962. I. 107-08: msg. A F Sec, hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 63, I I . May 63; Itrs.
MAAGV. to PACAF. Aug 12. 1963; PACAF Anthis to Brig Gen Joseph W. Stilwell and to
Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned, Sep 12. Moorman. May 28. 1963; msg. 2d A D to I
310
Notes to Pages
Hist, 13th 22-23: 1963; A D to Jan 10
"Chronology." for William C. and to AD, Feb 1964; marginal
"Reconnaissance in SEA," comments by Ross on
1-90; End of Tour Report. Col John C. Ref for May
Feb 1963: Moorman to Agenda Item
Anthis, Feb I I . and Anthis Counterinsurgency Lessons
to Moorman, Mar 1963: hist. Learned. 1963; hist. AD.
to May VI. Doc A D to 13th
and A D to Jan IO, 1964; 1963: Army Lessons Learned
Anderson End of Tour Report, 1963: Feb IO.
Order 1963; 315th Martin and Clever. 67-69: AD
(Assault), and to 10. 1963: Final Opera-
I ; hist. III, tional Test and Evaluation. in
A D to 6220th Jan I I: Col Thomas to Hien.
May 1963; to 1963:
Report of Visit by Team to Ref for
Jan para 8; MACV Summary of Tab
Highlights. Capt to AD.
Memo of Felt-Diem Meeting. Jan and Capt Fred
1963: with by CINCPAC to
Anthis to Milton. 1963: Jan 1963; and (draft),
Capt John 1963: and "History of US Marine Corps Operations in
to Anthis. Vietnam, 65." 16-17:
Saigon to to 1963; with by
10 1963: Simmons to
to Saigon, 1972; Capt Donald
and Saigon to to AD,
and 1963; Ref 63; Capt Ronald A. Johnson to
for May Agenda Item I: AD. and
and CINCPAC 8th May Anderson to Anthis. 1963;
Item Lt Col Henry C. to II Jan
CINCPAC 8th and Lt Col James
May Item I ; of Actions in Maj Magnus Johnson, Feb
SEA, Items VI-E. and Lt Col Charles Allen, Feb
Hearings before the Committee on For- I I , 1963; to ea.
eign Affairs. House of Representatives, Foreign
of 88th to II Jan
(Washington, 1963). and to AD, and Mar
CINCPAC 8th 1963; Maj Magnus Johnson, to II
May Item 3; CINCPAC to Corps. Feb and Lt Col Charles
Allen. to AD. Feb I I . 1963; Lt Col
Digest. Charles Allen. Mar and May
Capt Lester Jan I I . 1963: Van Plans and Policies in
Feb and Mar South Vietnam, Hist. 1965).
Maj James Maj John 1963;
and Capt Edward Robinson, May 63;
Ref for May Bruce End of Tour Report. ea. 64;
Agenda Item I . Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropria-
Lt Col Charles Allen, tions, House of Representatives. Foreign
Capt Louis A. 30-May Appropriationsfor 88th
and 1963; CINCPAC of (Washington, 230; AD
Special 13th
Item End Maj Walter
Bruce, CINCPAC of Special
Hist. AD, 13-14; Item
A D Regulation Jan 1963; Maj William I . Jan 10
Harkinsto Lt Col James Feb 1963; End of
Anthis. May Lt Col Charles Allen to Tour Maj Robert Butler.
AD. May Ref for May
and Agenda Item I ; Doyle End of Tour Report. Feb
I
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 177-183
6. 1963; msg, 2d A D to PACAF, Feb 15, 1963: Col Bill A. Montgomery, ea. Aug 63.
hist. PACAF, Jul-Dec 63. I, pt 2. Nov 63; hist, 62. End of Tour Report, Col Harold E.
PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. I, pt 2, Jan 64. Walker, Aug 21, 1964; Debriefing of Walker,
49. Rprt, Maj Clarence M. Van Meter. Jul3, Sep 15, 1964 hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec63, I l l , Doc
1963; rprts, Lt Col Donald K. Rearny. Feb 28, 79; rprt. Lt Col Carry Oskamp, Oct I , 1963; ltr,
1963. Mar8, 1963,and 1st Ind. Lt Col James O. Col R L. Gleason to Carl Berger. May 12, 1972.
Cowee. n.d.: rprt, Capt Bob W. Quinn, n.d.,and 63. Msg, 2d A D to 13th AF, Sep 2, 1963; Itr,
1st Ind. Cowee, Apr 8. 1963: M Rs, Maj Stephen Anthis to Maj Gen Sam Maddux, Jr., Oct I I ,
J. Carrig, Mar 28, 1963, Apr I . 1963; rprt, 1963; msg, PACAF to CSAF, Oct 9 1963.
Burgin, Apr I , 1963, and 1st Ind, Cowee, Apr 8, 64. Hist, 34th CAMRON, Jul 8-Dec 31,
1963. 1963; Henderson End of Tour Report. Feb 5.
50. Rprt, Burgin. Apr 22, 1963, and 1st Ind, 1964: Capt Glenn E. Frick End of Tour Report,
Cowee. n.d.; P A C A F Ref Bk f o r May 63 Jul 20, 1963; rprt, Mellish. Jan 15. 1964; End of
SECDEF Conf. Agenda Item I . Tour Reports. Capt Roy H. Lynn, Jr., Capt
5 1. Ibid.: rprt. Burgin, Apr 21, 1963, and 1st Thomas G. Cain, and Lt Wells T. Jackson, in
Ind. Jun 6, 1963; rprt. Lt Thomas G. Mclnerney. Hist. S A W C , J u l - D e c 63. II. D o c 35.
Jun 22, 1963. 65. Martin a n d Clever, I V , 62-64; Maj
52. 1st Ind, rprt, Burgin, Apr 25. 1963; rprt. William I. Burgin End of Tour Report. Jul I I .
Mclnerney, Jun 22. 1963. and Cowee. 1st Ind. 1963: rprts. Mclnerney. Jul 22, 1963, and
n.d.; rprt. Burgin. Jul 1. 1963. Mellish, ca. Aug 21. 1963; MacKellar intvw by
53. Martin and Clever, V. 96-97; rprt. Capt Grainger. Aug 29, 1963: Lt. Col K. L. Collings
Fred W. Maberry. Jul 5-6, 1963. rprt. Sep 15. 1963; Combat Ops. 19th TASS.
54. Doyle End of Tour Report, Feb 6, 1963; Dec 31. 1962. in Hist, 13th AF. Jul-Dec63, I l l ,
hist, 13th AF, Jul-Dec63.111, Doc79; Summary Doc 80: Mellish rprt, Oct 16, 1963; msg. 2d A D
of Aircraft Lost and Damaged, 1963; msgs, 2d to PACAF. Oct 5, 1963; and Lt Col John J.
A D t o PACAF, Jul 5 and Jul IO. 1963; Itrs. Wilfong End of Tour Report. Jun 30, 1964.
Martin to Anthis, Sep 17. 1963, and Anthis to 66. Rprts. Mellish. Jan 15. 1964. and Maj.
Martin, Oct 9, 1963. John G. Schmitt, Jr.. Sep 2. 1963, and 1st Ind.
55. Anderson End of Tour Report, Apr 5, Allen. Sep 12, 1963; memo. Ross for Anthis. Oct
1963; Itr, Maj Gen Robert R. Rowland to Maj IO. 1963.
Gen Robert N. Ginsburgh, Apr 72. 67. Van Meter. rprt.Jul 18. 1963,and 1st Ind,
56. Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64. VI, Doc 31; Cowee. n.d.: Maj Harold L. Johnson rprt. Sep6,
PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 S E C D E F Conf, 1963, and 1st Ind, Allen. Sep 17. 1963; Schmitt
Tab 28; Itr, Henderson to Moorman, Aug I , rprt. Sep 18, 1963, and 1st Ind. Allen, Sep 28.
1963. 1963: Mellish rprt. ca. Sep 18. 1963.
57. Msg. AmEmb, Vientiane. t o SEC- 68. Ltrs. Cowee to 7th Div ALO, Jul8, 1963,
STATE, Apr 26. 1963: PACAF Ref Bk for Nov and Mellish to Dep/Dir. I l l ASOC. Aug 20.
63 S E C D E F Conf. Tab 28: rprt, Mellish. ca. 1963; Mellish rprt. Sep 16. 1963; msg, MACV to
Aug 21, 1963; msg. USAIRA, Saigon, to DIA, CINCPAC, May 18. 1963; PACAF Ref Bk for
Jul 18. 1963. Nov 63 SECDEF Conf, Tab 28; hist. 2d AD,
58. Msgs, J C S to CINCPAC, Nov I , 1963, Jan-Jun 64, VI, Doc 31; Quane rprt, Oct 19.
MACV to JCS, Jun 13. 1964, 2d A D to 13th 1963.
AF, Aug 21. 1963. 69. Msg, 13th A F t o PACAF, Aug 12, 1963;
59. Bruce End of Tour Report. ca. Jun 64; PACAF Ref Bk for May 64 SECDEF Conf, II.
C I N C P A C R c r d of Special S E C D E F - Ops Fact Sheet 6; Lawrence J. Hickey. Night
SECSTATE Mtg, Nov 20, 1963, Item A4; rprt, Close Air Support in RVN, 1961-1966 ( H Q
Maj Robert K. Butler, Oct 30, 1963: Butler End PACAF, Proj CHECO, Mar 15. 1967).pp 5.32:
of Tour Report, Jun 8, 1964; Burchett, Vietnam, PACAF
p 89. 2B; msg, 2d A D to PACAF, Jan 10, 1964; intvw
60. Hearings before the Committee on with Kennedy by Gausche. Feb 4, 1964: hist.
Appropriations, US Senate, Foreign Assistance msg. 2d AD, Jan-Jul 64, VI; msgs. 2d A D to
and Related Agencies Appropriations f o r 1964, PACAF, Nov 16, 1963.and PACAF to 5th AF.
88th Cong, 1st sess (Washington. 1963), p 374: Oct 9, 1963.
MR, Ross. Oct 7, 1963; Van Staaveren. USAF '70. Msg, 2d A D to 13th AF, Aug 21. 1963;
Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963, Butler rprt, Oct 3, 1963: msg. 34 Tac Gp t o 2d
pp 73-74. AD, Sep 13, 1963: Capt Thomas G. Cain, End of
61. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 SECDEF Tour Report, n.d.. in Hist, SAWC, Jul-Dec63,
Conf. Tab 28; rprt, Capt Donald V. MacKellar, II. Doc 35.
Oct 9. 1963: MR, Henderson, Oct 7. 1963; rprts. '7 I . Butler rprt. Oct 3, 1963: msg. 34th Tac Gp
Maj John G. Schmitt, Jr.. Sep 17, 1963, and Lt t o 2d AD, Sep 13. 1963: Cain End of Tour
312
Notes to Pages 184-189
Report, n.d.. in Hist. SAWC. Jul-Dec 63, II, J u n 64, III. hist rprt, J a n 64.
Doc 35. 74. Butler rprt. Nov 26. 1963; Itrs, Pierce to
72. Collings rprt. Sep 15. 1963, and 1st Ind. Dep/Dir. AOC. Oct 19. and 21. 1963; Quane
Lt Col Milton R. Pierce. Sep 24, 1963: rprt. Capt Notes. Oct 19-21. 1963.
Don O.Quane, Oct 23.1963; Butler End of Tour 75. Mclnerney rprt, Nov 27. 1963.
Report. J u n 8. 1964. 76. Msgs. MACV to JCS. J u n 13. 1964. and
73. Msgs. P A C A F to 2d AD. Nov 19, 1963, J C S t o CINCPAC. Nov I , 1963; Pierce. End of
t o C I N C P A C , Dec I , 1963. and MACV t o Tour Report. Jul 24. 1964.
C I N C P A C , Dec 24. 1963: hist. PACAF, Jan-
CHAPTER XVI
313
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 189-198
p 995: Dept of State. Bulletin. VoI 56. 799. 5th AF. Aug 27. 1963: msg. J C S to CINCPAC.
Kennedy on November 7 ended secret reports. Oct 29. 1963; Shaplen. Lost Revolution.
and Lodge restored the country team concept. p p 188-212; H a l b e r s t a m . M a k i n g of a
26. Msg, 2d A D to PACAF, Mar 12. 1964; Quagmire. pp 277-99.
M a r t i n a n d Clever. I l l , 80-81. 99-104; 31. Ibid., pp 288-99: msgs. 2d A D t o
Halberstam, Makingofa Quagmire, pp 252-53. PACAF, Nov 28 and Dec 2. 1963; Martin and
27. Halberstam, p 659: Schlesinger. A Thou- Clever. 111. 110-18.
sand Days, pp 995-96; memo, McNamara and 32. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov 63 S E C D E F
Taylor for the President, Oct 2, 1963. in D O D Conf. Tab IA: hist. Dir/ Plans, USAF. Jul-Dec
Pentagon Papers. Bk 12: 554-89: msgs, 2d A D to 63. p 233: US Dept of State. American Foreign
PACAF, Sep 29 and 30, 1963, and Oct 2, 1963. Policy: Current Documents. 1963. pp 879-80.
PACAF to 2d AD. Oct 9. 1963: Itrs. Frederick 33. CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEF-
W. Flott to Harbin, Oct 2, 1963, Wade to SECSTATE Meeting, Nov 20, 1963. Item IA:
CHMAAGV, Sep 30. 1963. PACAF Ref Bk for Nov63 SECDEFConf. Tab
28. Public Pupers of the Presidents: Kennedy. 4A; msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Dec 3. 1963;
1963, PP 759-60. Mellish rprt, Dec 9. 1963.
29. CINCPAC Comd Hist. 1963. p 280 US 34. Martin and Clever, III 118: PACAF
Dept of State. Ameriran Foreign Po1icy: Cur- Background Bk for S E C D E F meeting of May
rent Documents, 1963. pp 875. 877; CQ Back- 13, 1964, I I . Ops Fact Sheet 6 hist. 2d AD.
ground, China and US Far East Policy, 1954-67, Jan-Jun 64. VI. Doc 31; CINCPAC Record of
p 129; Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Special SECDEF-SECSTATE Meeting. Nov
Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on 20. 1963. Items A2 and 83.
Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives. 35. Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Kennedy. I
United Stares Po1icy toward Asia. 89th Cong. 2d 1963. p 846.
sess (Washington. 1966). pt I, pp 154-55. 157; 36. CINCPAC Record of Special SECDEF-
Duncanson. Government and Revolution in SECSTATE Meeting, Nov 20. 1963. Items B3
Vietnam, pp 286-338. and B4; Hearings before the Committee on
30. Martin and Clever. I l l , 106-07, 109-10; A p p rop rial i o ns. US Senate . Foreign Assistance
Thompson. Defeating Communisr Insurgency. and Related Agencies Appropriations,for 1964.
p 42: Mecklin, Mission in Torment. pp 277-78; 88th Cong. 1st sess (Washington. 1963). p 348;
hist. 13th AF, Jul-Dec 63.1.75; msg, PACAFto hist. 13th AF. Jul-Dec 63, I, 16 and 66.
CHAPTER XVIl
314
Notes to Pages 198-204
tions,for 1966. 89th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, 28. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-
1966). p 62: msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Dec 20 64. Item IV: Hearings before a Subcommittee of
and 21, 1963: Shaplen. Lost Revolution. p 232; the Committee on Appropriations. House of
C I N C P A C Record of Special S E C D E F - Representatives. Foreign Operations Appropria-
SECSTATE Meeting. Item B3; see also memo. tions for 1965. 88th Cong. 2d sess (Washington.
McNamara for the President. Mar 16, 1964. in 1964). pt I. p 369: msg. J C S to SECDEF. Mar
Gravel Pentagon Papers. I I I , 502. 2, 1964.
13. Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Night- 29. 2d A D Chronology. Jan-Jun 6 4 Sharp-
mare (New York. 1965). pp 153-54: DIA. Cold Westmoreland. Repor,. p 92; Hearings before
War (Counterinsurgency) Analysis. Republic of Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria-
Vietnam. Dec 1, 1964. SecD,pp 10-1 I ; Hearings tions, House of Representatives, Supplemental
before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Defense Appropriations for 1966.89th Cong. 2d
Appropriations. U.S. Senate. Dept of Defense sess (Washington. 1966). pp 64-65: msg, 2d A D
Appropriations for 1966, 89th Cong. 1st sess to CSAF. May 12, 1964.
(Washington. 1965). pt 2. p 764. 30. Msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF. Mar 3. 1964.
14. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA, 1961- and PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 13. 1964: Mellish
1964. Item VI-I: Gravel Pentagon Papers. III. rprt, Apr 15. 1964.
35-42. 3 1. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, p 3 10:
15. Msgs. AmEmb Saigon to CINCPAC. msgs. 2d A D to CSAF, Mar 11. 1964. and
Jan 30. 1964. MACV t o CINCPAC, Jan 31. PACAF to CSAF, Mar 12, 1964.
1964; Hearings on Military Posture before 32. Msgs, 2d A D to PACAF. Mar 6. 8, and
the Committee on Armed Services. House of 10. 1964; PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of
Representatives. 88th Cong, 2d sess (Washing- Mar 12. 1964. Tab 2; memo. McNamara for
ton, 1964). pp 7120-21, and 154-56: Public Johnson, Mar 16. 1964.
Papers of the Presidents: Johnson, 1963-64, 33. Msgs. 2CCR-64-077C and 0848.
pp 256-60 Gravel Pentagon Papers, I l l , 38-39. 34. Memo, McNamara forJohnson, Mar 16,
16. CJCS to Dir Jt Staff. Feb 5. 1964. 1964.
17. Msg. CSAF to Smart [Feb 641. 35. AFXOPJ Book of ActionsinSEA. 1961-
18. Capt Donald V. MacKellar rprt. Feb 10. 64. Item IV-I; PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF
1964: Hearings before the Subcommittee to Conf of May 13. 1964. pt I: Public Papers of the
Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees Presidents: Johnson, 1963-64. I , 387-88:
and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary. Johnson, Vantage Point, pp 66-67; msg, CSAF
US Senate, Refugee Problems inSouth Vietnam to JCS. Mar 14. 1964; Gravel Pentagon Papers.
and Laos. 89th Cong. 1st sess (Washington, III.499-510.
1965). pp 294-95. and 298: 2d A D APEX 36. Msg, J C S to SECDEF. Mar 17, 1964.
CPSACT Rprt. Feb 6. 1964; Maj Gen Edward 37. Hearings before the Committee on
G. Lansdale. "Viet Nam: Do We Understand Foreign Relations, US Senate, Foreign Assist-
Revolution?" Foreign Affairs. Oct 64. pp 84-85. ance. 1964. 88th Cong, 2d sess (Washington.
19. C Q Background. China and US Far East 1964), pp 541-64: msg, MACV to 2d AD, Mar
Policy, 1945-67(Washington 1967). pp 134. 136: 27,1964: msg, J C S to CINCPAC, May 12. 1964
2d A D Chronology, Jan-Dec 64. msgs, MACV to 2d AD. Oct 29. 1964. and to 2d
20. Memo. McNamara for Taylor, Feb 21. AD. Nov 20. 1964.
1964: see also msgs. PACAF to CSAF, Feb 21, 38. Msg. 2d A D to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964
1964, and CSAF to Smart, n.d. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of May 13.
2 I . Hilsman, To Move a Nation. pp 527-34; 1964. Plans Fact Sheet 12; AFXOPJ Book of
Public Papers ofthe Presidents: Johnson, 1963- Actions inSEA. 1961-64, Item IV-M: msg. State
64. I. 304. to AmEmb Saigon, Apr 28, 1964; Public Papers
22. See msg, PACAF to CSAF. Feb 24. of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966
1964. (Washington, 1967). II, 760-63.
23. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS, Feb 8, 1964, 39. Cong Rec, May 9. 1968. p 12618: CQ
and MACV to JCS. Jun 13. 1964; PACAF Ref Background, China and Far East Policy,
Bk for SECDEF Conf of May 13. 1964, pt I. 1945-67. p 139.
Tab F. 40. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2, 66-67.
24. Adm U. S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, and 41. PACAF Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of
Gen W.L. Re- May 13. 1964, pt I. Tab C: Butler to ALO IV
port on the War in Vietnam (as of 30 Jun 1968) Corps rprt, May27,1964; Sharp-Westmoreland,
(Washington. 1969). Report. p 93; msgs, 2d A D to CSAF May 12
25. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Mar 8, 1964. and 13. 1964: New York Times, Pentagon
26. Gravel Pentagon Papers. III, 43-45. Papers, p 246.
27. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Feb 24, 1964. 42. Memo, CJCS to SECDEF. subj: Alterna-
315
THE ADVISORY YEARS
tive Courses of Action. Apr 14, 1964: Joseph C. ments on American Foreign Relations, 1964,
Goulden. Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf pp 232-29.
of Tonkin Affair-Illusion anti Reality 48. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA. 1961-
(Chicago. 1969). pp 64, Item IV-O; CM-451-64. Jun 5. 1964.
49. New York Times, Pentagon Papers,
Diri Plans, USAF. Apr 64. pp 250-51 (Gravel Edition. III 174-77).
44. Lodge. Verbatim of Conf. Saigon. 50. New York Times, Pentagon Papers.
May 12. 1964, p 19: P A C A F Ref Bk for p 256 (Gravel Edition, III 182); Johnson,
S E C D E F Conf of May 13. 1964. pt Tab G; Vantage Point. p 67.
New York Times, Pentagon Papers. p 246. 51. Msg, J C S to CINCPAC. Jul 2 and 9.
45. Ibid.. pp 245-49: msg. J C S to CINCPAC, 1964: hist. PACAF, Jul-64-Jun 65. Nov 6 4
May 1964. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-64.
46. New York Times, Pentagon Papers, Item IV-O. I
pp 249-50. 52. Hist. PACAF. Jan-Jun64, I, pt 2. 171-72;
47. Ibid.. p 250: Jules Davids, ed. Docu- New York Times. Pentagon Papers. p 247.
CHAPTER X V l l l
I . Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 27, 1963; 13. End of Tour Reports. Lt Col Bill A.
Sharp-Westmoreland Report. p 104. Montgomery. Jun 27. 1964. Col Robert J.
2. Hist. PACAF. Jul64-Jun 65. I.pt 2.46-55: Loughry, Jul 22. 1964. Pierce. Jul 22 and 24.
hist. Dir/ Plans. USAF. Jul-Dec 63. p 233; Itr. 1964.and Walker.Aug 21. 1964;msg,2d A D t o
Smart to Taylor, Apr 8. 1964. PACAF, Jan 28. 1965.
3. Msgs, J C S to CINCPAC. Feb 15. 1964, 14. Ltr. Moore to Baron. J a n 18, 1965.
P A C A F to 13th AF. Mar 6. 1964. to CSAF. 15. Dir/Plans, USAF, Debriefing Rprt of
Mar 21. 1964. and CINCPAC to JCS. Mar, 22, Col David T. Fleming. Aug 9, 1965.
1964. 16. Ltr. Col W. D. Ritchie to 2d AD. Oct 2.
4. Ltrs. Smart to Taylor. Apr 8, 1964. Taylor 1964.
to Smart. n.d.: msg. CINCPAC toJCS. Mar 22, 17. Msg. PACAF to 2d AD, Jan 23. 1965.
1964; hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64. I, pt 2. Apr 64. 18. 2d AD. Ops Analysis Div. Tech Memo 4,
5. Hearings before the Committee on Appro- Jul I . 1965.
priations. US Senate. Foreign Assistance and 19. Hist. MACV, 1965.p 95: MACVDir95-
Related Agencies Appropriations for 1964.88th I I . Jun21. 1966; 7th A F Pamphlet 55-1. Mar 20.
Cong, 2d sess (Washington. 1964). pp 206-07; 1968. pp 25-26.
msg. 2d A D to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964. 20. Hist. PACAF. Jul-Dec 63. I, pt 2. Dec63;
6. Talking Paper on USAF Ops in VN. J a n msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Dec 3 and 9. 1963; Itr.
1964. Brig Gen Milton B. Adams to CHMAAGV.
7. Msgs. 2d A D to CSAF. Apr 17. 1964. to Dec 8. 1963: msg. P A C A F t o MACV. Dec 13.
PACAF. Mar 24. 1964. and to 5th AF. Apr 29. 1963; msg. P A C A F to 13th A F a n d 2d AD. Dec
1964. 1963.
8. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Apr 20 and 23. 21. The 41st Tactical Wing was establishedat
1964. Da Nang, the 516th Fighter Wing moved from
9. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF, May 7. 1964: Nha Trang to Da Nang, and the 62d Tactical
P A C A F Ref Bk for S E C D E F Conf of May 13. Wing was organized at Pleiku.
1964. Plans Fact Sheet 8; hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 22. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Apr 20 and
64. I, pt 2. May 64. May 4. 1964. P A C A F t o 2d AD, Apr 18, 1964.
IO. P A C A F Ref Bk for S E C D E F Conf to CSAF. Jun 3. 1964; Proj Corona Harvest
of May 13. 1964. Talking Paper 4. Oral Hist Intvw 241 with Lt Gen Joseph H.
I I. Hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. I. pt 2. Moore, Nov 22, 1969, pp 2-3. and 29.
46-55. 23. Lt Col Bill A. Montgomery rprt. Mar 12.
12. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item 1964; Itr. Maj Gen J . H. Moore to Ky. Apr 3.
msgs. C S A F t o PACAF, Jun 17and 19, 1964; msg, PACAF to CSAF. Jun 3, 1964.
1964, and MACV to JCS. Jun 19, 1964; hist, 24. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF, Apr 20 and May
PACAF, Jul 64-Jun 65. I. pt 2, 46-55. 2. 1964.
316
Notes to Pages 212-219
25. Montgomery rprt. Apr 16. 1964. 47. Quane rprt, Apr 14, 1964. 2d Ind.
26. Ltr. Anthis to Smart, Nov 25. 1963: Osburne, Apr 22. 1964: Maj Alan G. Nelson
P A C A F Ref Bk for Nov 63 S E C D E F Conf. rprt. May 4. 1964.
Tab 2A. 48. Butler rprt, May 27. 1964.2d Ind. Lt Col
27. Ltr, Ross to MACV J-5. Oct 23, 1963: Milton R. Pierce, May 30, 1964.
P A C A F Ref Bk for Nov63 49. Msgs. PACAF to 2d AD, Apr 14. 1964,
2A; msg. P A C A F to CSAF, Nov 9, 1963: hist. 2d A D to PACAF. Apr 15. 1964. MACV to
PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, 1. pt 2, Jan 64. CINCPAC, Feb 17, 1964; hist, 2a AD, Jan-Jun
28. Msgs, 2d A D t o PACAF. Jan 10and Feb 64. 1. 70-7 I .
21, 1964; 2d A D Ops Analysis Paper 4, Feb I I , 50. Msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF, Mar 3, 1964. to
1964: hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64. II, 28. ASOCs, Mar 21, 1964. to PACAF, Mar 18,
29. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64.1. pt 2. Jan 64; 1964. and Apr 20, 1964.
msg. 2d A D to 13th AF. Jan 23, 1964. 51. Msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF. J a n 21. 1964,
30. Msgs, 2d A D t o PACAF. Feb 18. 1964. and Feb 6, 1964.
CINCPAC to JCS, Feb 21. 1964, MACV to 52. Msg, 2d A D to 13th AF, May 15, 1964.
JCS. Feb 22, 1964: AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 53. Msgs. 2d A D to 13th AF. Feb 6, 1964, to
SEA. 1961-64. Item Ill-K. PACAF. Apr 20. 1964.
31. Msgs, 2d A D to PACAF, Mar 8 and IO. 54. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Apr 12, 1964.
1964: hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. III. Mar 64. 55. Msgs, 2d A D t o 13thAF, Mar2. 1964.10
32. Ltr. Smart t o Taylor, Apr 8, 1964; CSAF. Apr 15. 1964. to PACAF. Apr 20, 1964.
P A C A F Ref Bk for S E C D E F Conf of Mar 12, and PACAF to 13 AF, May 8, 1964.
1964. Tab IB; AFXOPJ Book of Actions in 56. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Apr IS. 1964,
SEA, 1961-64. Item Ill-K. and to CSAF. Apr 17, 1964; Itr. Harkins to Maj
33. Msg. 2d A D to PACAF. Mar I. 1964; Gen Tran Thien Khiem, Apr 17. 1964 PACAF
Preston End of Tour Report. Jul 64; hist, 2d Ref Bk for May 13,1964, S E C D E F Conf. Plans
AD, Jan-Jun 64, IX. Doc 12. Fact Sheet 3; and AFXOPJ Book of Actions in
34. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, II, 31; msg, SEA. 1961-64, Item Ill-N,
PACAF to CINCPAC. Mar 28. 1964. 57. Ltr. Moore to LeMay. Apr 7, 1964: msgs.
35. 2d A D Chronology. Jan-Dec 6 4 hist. 2d 2d A D to CSAF. Apr 12, 1964. P A C A F to 2d
AD, Jan-Jun 64, VI. Doc 21. AD, May 6. 1964. and C S A F to PACAF. Apr
36. Msgs. 2d A D to PACAF. Mar 18. 1964, 30. 1964.
P A C A F t o CINCPAC, Mar 28, 1964, and 58. Memo. Sandborn for Moore, May 7.
CINCPAC to JCS, Apr 1. 1964. 1964.
37. Preston End of Tour Report. Jul 64; 59. Msgs, PACAF t o CINCPAC, Apr 27,
msgs. 2d A D to CSAF, Mar 25. 1964. and Apr I . 1964, C S A F t o PACAF, Apr 30, 1964. 13th A F
1964; trip rprt. Justin MacDonald and Howard to PACAF. May 8, 1964, and 2d A D to
Anderson, McClellan AFB, Calif.. Apr 10, 1964: PACAF. May 8. 1964.
Itr. Moore to LeMay, Apr 7. 1964: hist, PACAF, 60. Memo, Rowland for Ginsburgh, Apr 2.
Jan-Jun64, A D t o 13thAF. 1972.
Apr 24. 1964. 61. P A C A F Ref Bk for SECDEF Conf of
38. Msg, 2d A D to PACAF, Apr 12. 1964: M a r 12, 1 9 6 4 , . T a b 9; Itr. Rowland t o
Mellish rprt. Jan 15. 1964:Itr. Moore to MACV, Ginsburgh, Apr 72.
Oct 22, 1964. 62. Msgs, 2d A D to 13th AF. Apr 24. 1964.
39. Capt Don O. Quane rprt. Jan 29. 1964. and PACAF to CSAF, May 6. 1964.
40. Lt Olin B. Gundiff rprt. Jan 28, 1964. 63. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. 1961-
41. 1st Ind to Gundiff rprt. ca. Jan 28, 1964; 64, Item Ill-M; msgs. C S A F to PACAF, Apr
and Butler rprt. Jan 16, 1964. 30, 1964. P A C A F to 2d AD. May 6. 1964. to
42. Mellish rprts. J a n 15 and Mar 15, 1964; CINCPAC. May 4, 1964. and CINCPAC to
2d A D Chronology, Jan-Dec 64. and Jan 16. JCS. May 8. 1964.
1964; Lt Anthony J . Zilinsky Report of Staff 64. Msgs, 2d A D to PACAF. May I I. 1964.
Visit. Mar IO. 1964. to CSAF. May 13. 1964.
43. Mellish rprt. Apr 15. 1964. 65. Msg. C S A F to PACAF, May 16, 1964;
44. Quane rprt. Jan 30. 1964; Maj Earl D. Hearings before the Committee on Appropria-
Jameson rprt. Mar IO. 1964, 1st Ind. Mellish. tions, US Senate, Foreign Assistonre and Re-
Mar 13, 1964.2d Ind. Lt Col Albert H. Holman, lated Agencies Appropriations for 1965. 88th
Mar 19. 1964; Mellish rprt, Apr 15. 1964 Mellish Cong, 2d sess (Washington. 1964). p I8 I .
Itr. Mar 18. 1964. 1st Ind. Capt William M. 66. Msg J C S to CINCPAC, May 20. 1964.
Leimkuehler, Apr I. 1964.and atchd memo, n.d. 67. Hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 64, I. 48-52;
45. Mellish rprt, Apr 15. 1964. P A C A F Ref Bk for S E C D E F Conference of
46. Butler End of Tour Report, Jun 8. 1964. May 13. 1964, Item 6A; Maj Walter S. Bruce
317
T H E ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 220-229
End of Tour Report. ea. Jun 64; Sharp- Carlos O. Beasley Report, May 5. 1964; Butler
Westmoreland. Report, p 90. rprt. Jun 4. 1964.
68. Montgomery Rprt, Jun 8, 1964; msg. 2d 80. Mellish rprt. May 15. 1964; Montgomery
AD to PACAF. Jun I. 1964. End ofTour Report. Jan27. 1964; Pierce End of
69. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, IX. Doc 12; Itr. Tour Report. Jul 24. 1964; hist, PACAF, Jan-
Moore to MACV. Jun 2, 1964. Jun 64. I. pt 2. Hist Rprt. Dir/ Policy. Jun 64.
70. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jun 64. to 81. Rprt. Moore to MACV. Aug 3, 1964.
PACAF. Jun 4. 1964. 82. Ltr. Moore to Brig Gen W. E. DePuy. Jul
71. Msgs, 2d AD to PACAF. Jun I and 7, 17, 1964; Sharp-Westmoreland. Report, p 93.
1964. to CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT. Jun 3. 83. Pierce End of Tour Report, Jul 24. 1964;
1964. hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II. 58-60.
72. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS, Jun 17. 1964; 84. Capt Franklin D. Peschel rprt. Jul 29,
AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, 1961-64, 1964. 1st Ind. Maj Earl D. Jameson, Aug I ,
Item VII C. 1964; hist. 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, I I . 61-64; Itr. Lt
73. Preston End of Tour Report, Jul64; msg. Col John P. O’Regan to Dep/ Dir, III ASOC.
2d AD to PACAF. Jun 4, 1964: Itr. Moore to Aug 21. 1964.
MACV, Jun 2, 1964; intvw with Col William E. 85. Ops Analysis Ofc. 2d AD, Counterinsur-
Bethea. Jan 65, in Hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 65. V. gency Lessons Learned. Jul 4. 1964.
Doc 5; hist. PACAF, Jan-Jun 64. III. PFMSS 86. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC. Jul 16.
Wkly Activity Rprt. Jun 26-Jul 3, 1964: rprt. 1964. CINCPAC to JCS. Jul 20, 1964. and
Moore to MACV, Aug 3. 1964. MACV to CINCPAC. Jul 28, 1964.
74. Ltr, Moore to MACV, Oct 22, 1964. 87. Maj Alan G. Nelson rprt. May 4. 1964.
75. Msgs. 2d AD to CSAF, Apr 17. 1964. to 88. Msg.MACVtoCINCPAC.Jul 16,1964.
PACAF. Apr 20. 1964. and May 18. 1964. 89. Msg. MACV to OASD/PA, Aug 20,
76. Ops Analysis Office. 2d AD, Counterin- 1964: 2d AD Operating Instructions I. Aug I .
surgency Lessons Learned. Jul 4. 1964: Lt Col 1964: Itr. Col W. D. Ritchie to 2d AD, Oct 2.
Albert H. Holman rprt. Jun 8 . 1964: and Itr. 1964; MACV Directive 95-4, Sep 7, 1964.
MSgt Clarence M. Hall to AOC. ca. Jul I. 1964. 90. Ritchie rprt. Oct 2. 1964; hist. TAC. 1964.
77. Hist Data. 2d AOC. Jul-Dec 64, in Hist, I. 294; msgs. PACAF to CINCPAC, Sep 5,
2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. V. Doc I I : Itr, Moore to Col 1964. CSAF to PACAF, Sep 7, 1964; Ops Anal-
Oakley W. Baron, Jan 18. 1964. ysis Div, 2d AD, Tech Memo 4. Jun I . 1965.
78. Mellish rprt. May 15. 1964. 91. Msg. 2d AD to CSAF. Sep 21. 1964; Itr.
79. Ibid.; Itrs, Rowland to Ky. Oct 26. 1964, Moore to Baron. Jan 18. 1964;and Brooks End
Hall to Dep/Dir OAC. ea. Jul I I . 1964; Maj of Tour Report. Jan 9, 1964.
CHAPTER XIX
1. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, 1. pt 2, Jan- 7. Msgs, MACV toCINCPAC,Jul 16. 1964,
Mar; Goulden. Truth pp 33, 92-95. and CINCPAC to JCS. Jul 20. 1964; DOD
2. Hist. SAC. Jul-Dec 64. III. 122-23. Pentagon Papers. Bk 3: IV.B.3.. 43-54.
3. Ibid.. pp 124-25; msg, CINCPACFLT to 8. Goulden. Truth p 32; CQ Background,
CINCPAC. Jul 24, 1964; hist, 41st Air Div, China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. p
Jul-Dec 64, pp 66-70. 142.
4. Msg. 13th A F to ATF. Oct 10, 1964; 9. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC, Jul 17 and
AFXOPJ Hook of Actions in SEA, Item IV-Q. Aug 16. 1964.
5. Msgs, JCS to CINCPAC, Jul2. 1964, and 10. Hist, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64. 1. pt 2, Jan-
2d AD to PACAF. Mar23. 1964: Itr. Johnson to Mar; Goulden. Truth pp 92-95.
Taylor. Jul 2, 1964, quoted in msg, CINCPAC I I . New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp
to PACAF, Jul3. 1964; see Taylor, Swords and 258, 288-89.
Plowshares. p 3 16. 12. Goulden. Truth pp 86, 127-28.
6. Maxwell Taylor, "The Case for Continued 13. The question of the covert activities and
Bombing of the North," Washington Star, Oct the South Vietnamese patrol-boat raids as prov-
22, 1967: see also Taylor, Swords and Plow- ocation for the attacks on the Maddox can be
shares. pp 3 15-17. followed in: Hearings before the Senate Com-
318
Notes to Pages 229-236
mittee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf of Ton- 1964 Incidents. 90th Cong, 2d sess. passim;
kin. The 1964 Incidents. Feb 20, 1968, and pt I I , Goulden. Truth. pp 76-81, 122-57; Davids, ed,
Dec 16, 1968. 90th Cong. 2d sess (Washington, Documents on American Foreign Relations.
1968); Goulden, Truth; John Galloway, The 1964, pp 216-17; Johnson, Vantage Point. pp
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, 'N.J.. 112-19.
1970); Eugene G. Windchy. Tonkin Gulf(New 23. Bundy Memo on Actions Available to the
York. 1971); and Anthony Austin, The Presi- U.S. after Tonkin, in New York Times, Pen-
dent's War (New York, 1971). tagon Papers, pp 294-98; AFXOPJ Book of
14. Msg. CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 5, 1964. Actions in SEA. Item IV-T.
15. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item 24. Msg, CINCPAC to JCS. Aug 17, 1964.
I l l - P msg. JCStoCINCPAC. Aug5. 1964; Hist in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp
Data, Plansand Rqmts Div, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 6 4 298-300.
hist. TAC, Jul-Dec 64, IV, Doc 4; hist, 405th Ftr 25. Msg, U.S. Mission Saigon to State. Aug
Wg, Jul-Dec 64. I I , Docs. 2, 3. and 4; hist, 41st 18, 1964. in ibid., pp 349-52.
Air Div. Jul-Dec 64. pp 55-58: hist. 401st TFWg. 26. Hist Data. Plansand Rqmts Div. 2d AD,
Jul-Dec 64. pp 33-34: hist, 27th Ftr Wg, Jul-Dec Jul-Dec 64; msgs, 2d AD to PACAF, Aug 25,
64. App I; hist, 313th Air Div. Jul 64-Jun 65. p 1964, and 2d AD to 13th AF. Oct 28. 1964.
302; hist, SAC. Jul-Dec 64. p 131. The Thai 27. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item
government approved the movement of addi- IV-x.
tional USAFforces into Thailand but was reluc- 28. DIA. Cold War (Counterinsurgency) A-
tant to have combat sorties flown from the coun- nalysis, Dec I . 1964; Sharp-Westmoreland. Re-
try. The Thais finally agreed to the latter if they port, p 94; 2d AD Chronology, Jan-Dec 64.
were absolutely necessary and if their bases were 29. JCS Memo for SECDEF. Aug 26. 1964,
not publicly revealed. Msg, DEPCOMUSM- in New York Times, Pentagon Papers, pp
ACTHAI. to CINCPAC, Aug 7. 1964. 354-55.
16. Telecon I . 2d A D to 13th AF, Aug 7. 30. AFXOPJ Rook of Actions in SEA, Item
1964. IV-x.
17. Msg. MACVtoCINCPAC,Aug6.1964. 31. Memo. Bundy for President Johnson.
18. New York Times. Pentagon Papers, pp 268- Sep 8. 1964. in New York Times, Pentagon Pa-
69; msgs. PACAF to CINCPAC, Aug 8, 1964, pers. pp 357-59.
and 2d AD to multiple addressees, Aug 7, 1964; 32. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item
Sharp-Westmoreland, Report. p 13. IV-T: Johnson Vantage Point, p 120.
19. Msg, PACAF to CINCPAC. Aug 8. 33. NSAM 314, Sep IO, 1964, in New York
1964. Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 359-60.
20. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC, Aug 7, 34. DIA, Cold War Analysis, Dec I . 1964;
1964. and CINCPAC to MACV, Aug 8. 1964. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, pp 90. 94-95; 2d
21. Msg. AmEmb Saigon to SECSTATE, AD Chronology. Jan-Dec 64; AFXOPJ Book
Aug 9. 1964. in New York Times, Pentagon of Actions in SEA. Item IV-V.
Papers. pp 346-48; excerpts from Summary of 35. CINCPAC Comd Hist, 1967, I I , 962:
Taylor's Mission Rprt from Saigon, Aug IO. Goulden. Truth, pp 159-60; Briefing by Chief.
1964, in ibid..pp 291-94. PACAF Assistance Team, Sep 64, in Hist, 2d
22. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, pp 11-13; AD, Jan-Jun 64, VI, Doc 3; Hist Data, Plans &
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Rqmts Div, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 6 4 Itr, 20th PR to
Relations, US Senate, The Gulf of Tonkin, the PACAF. Jan 1, 1965.
CHAPTER XX
I . Ltr. Moore to Ferguson, Mar 16. 1965. 3. Hist Data, 2d AD Ops Services Div. Jul-
2. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA, Item Dec 6 4 hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. Ill. Hist
Ill-C. Because forty air liaison officer and for- Rprt, DPO, Jul-Dcc 6 4 hist, TAC, 1965. p 627..
ward air controller teams would take all of 4. Msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. Aug I I , 1964.
STRICOM resources. only twenty were sent. MACV to CINCPAC. Aug 19, 1964, PACAF
Memo. SECDEF to JCS, Aug 7, 1964; DJSM- to CINCPAC. Sep 5. 1964. CSAF to PACAF.
1349-64 to ADS/ISA, Aug 5 . 1964. Sep 7, 1964, 2d AD to CSAF. Sep 21. 1964;
319
THE ADVISORY YEARS Notes to Pages 236-241
Brooks End of Tour Report, J a n 9, 1965. Oct 64.
5. Hist, 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II. 5. 18. Ltr, Moore to Baron. J a n 18. 1965; Hist
6. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Feb 21. Data, 2d AOC, Jul-Dec 64: Itr, Rowland to Ky.
1965. and PACAF to 5th AF. Apr 12. 1965. Oct 27, 1964: memo. Stilwell f o rC / S . RVNAF.
7. C H E C O intvw with Lt Col Garth Rey- n.d.: and Itr, Moore to Pritchard. Apr 27. 1965.
nolds. Jan 65: rprt. 2 C C R to MACV. Sep 2. 19. AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item
1964. From July through September 1964.3.553 VII-G; msg. C S A F to PACAF. Feb IO. 1965.
requests for air support were received. of which 20. Bethea intvw, J a n 65: hist. PACAF. Jul
2.403 were honored: 918 were refused because of 64-Jun 65. III. Feb 65: rprt. 2 CCR to MACV
a lack of aircraft. Ltr, Moore to MACV. Oct 22. J-3. Feb 5. 1965: Guthrie End of Tour Report,
1964. ra. Aug 65: Bailey End of Tour Report, Mar 20.
8. Ltr, Lt Col Clarence R. Osbourne. Jr., to I 1965; Eichelberger End of Tour Report,ca. May
CALO. Sep 3, 1964. 9. 1965; 2d A D Ops Analysis Div, Tech Memo 4.
9. The 34th Group then discontinued the use Jun I. 1965.
of napalm on night support missions. Reynolds 21. Hist Data. 2d A D Ops Services Div. Jul-
intvw. Jan 65; Hickey. Night Close Air Support Dec 64: Itr. Maj Gen A. J. Kinney to Moore, Sep
in RVN, 1961-1966. p 34. 2. 1964.
IO. USAF advisors assigned to Vietnamese 22. Hickey. Night Close Air Support. p 34: 2d
squadrons had never been prohibited from fly- A D Ops Analysis Office. Counterinsurgency
ing single-seater A- I Hs in strike formations. but Lessons Learned, J a n 18, 1964; P A C A F Assist-
Taylor first learned about this practice late in ance Team Briefing. Sep 64.
October. Thinking that high-ranking officials in 23. Ltr. Kenny to Moore, Sep 2. 1964: Hist
Washington were unaware of this. he informed Data. 2d A D Ops Services Div. Jul-Dec 64;
McNamara and General Wheeler, who saw no Capt Joseph Yarrish End of Tour Report. Mar
reason to change the situation. Rprt, 2 CCR to I. 1965.
MACV. Sep 2. 1964; msgs. P A C A F to CSAF, 24. An XM-70 pod for launching 40-mm
Sep 4. 1964, t o CINCPAC, Sep 5. 1964. C S A F grenades from A-Is as an antipersonnel weapon
to PACAF. Sep 6. Oct I . and Oct 17. 1964, and had a feed system that frequently malfunctioned.
CINCPAC to JCS. AFXOPJ The old 2.75-inch aerial rocket. previously little
B o o k of A c t i o n s i n S E A . I t e m used because it buried itself in theground before
VIII-G; exploding, received another warhead and a n
I I . Rprts. 2 CCR to MACV. Nov 3, 1964. XM-427 super-quick graze-action fuze. A new
J a n 4 and Dec 2. 1965: msg. 34th Tac Gp to 2d "Westo" mix of napalm incendijel proved stable
AD. Nov 11, 1964; Bethea intvw. J a n 65; in storage. and stabilizing fins added to napalm
MACV Monthly Eval Rprt, Dec64, Annex B. p tanks allowed delivery in a dive-bomb mode.
22; Bailey End of Tour Report, Mar 20.1965: Lt But the fire pattern was small and left a long-
Col William R. Eichelberger End of Tour burning incendiary puddle in the impact crater.
Report, ra. May 9. 1965; hist. 2d AD, Jul-Dec The best napalm employment continued to be
64. I I , 44-45; hr. Rowland to Ginsburgh. Apr 72. the low-level splash attack. Variable-time radar
12. Hists, PACAF. Jan-Jun 64, I. pt 2, Jun proximity-fuzed general purpose bombs failed
64. and Jul64-Jun 65. III.Jul64; Bethea intvw. to have good antipersonnel effect. and the 2d Air
J a n 65; msg, P A C A F to 2d AD. J u n IO. 1964: Division fell back on the "daisy-cutter" tech-
Wilfong End of Tour Report, Jan 30. 1964. nique. whereby nose-fuze extenders attached to
13. Msgs, MACV to CINCPAC, Aug 1 1 . bombs produced a waist-high explosion. Yar-
1964. and C S A F to PACAF. Aug 29, 1964: rish End of Tour Report. Mar I . 1965; address
AFXOPJ Book of Actions in SEA. Item Ill-R. of Gen Moore at P A C A F Commanders Conf.
14. Hist PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65, III. Oct 64. Feb 22-25. 1965.
15. Bethea intvw. Jan 65: Oxburne to I 25. Kenneth Sams. First Test and Combat I
CALO. Sep3. 1964; Miller End ofTour Report, H Q PACAF. Proj CHECO. Dec
Feb 7. 1965; and Itr. Janssen to Woodyard. Oct 8. 1965): Itr, Ferguson to Moore. Nov 12, 1964:
29. 1964. msg, MACV to CSAF. Dec 29, 1964; Hearing
16. Lt Clare C. Eaton rprt, n.d. before the committee on Armed Services. House
17. William B. Graham and Amron H. Kat7. of Representatives. Fiscal Year 1966 Supple-
SIA T: Single Integrated A t t a d Team. A Con- mental Authorization for Vietnam. 89th Cong.
ceptfor Ofrensive Military Operations in South 2d sess (Washington. 1966). pp 5125 and 5160;
Vietnam (The R A N D Corp. 1965): Itr, Col Wil- USAF Spec Ops Force. Proj Corona Harvest
liam Burke to 2d AD. Oct 29. 1964: msgs. C S A F rprt. J a n I. 1965-Mar 31. 1968. chap 3. pp 1-3.
to 2d AD. Nov20. 1964.2d A D t o 13th A D a n d 26. Msg.2d A D t o CSAF. Mar 15. 1965: hist,
13th AF, Dec 3, 1964, MACV to CINCPAC, TAC. 1965. I. 298-99.
Feb 21. 1965: hist. PACAF, Jul 64-Jun 65. I l l . 27. Rprt, Asbury to PFODC. Nov 22. 1963:
320
Notes to Pages
Lt Col Paul Rainowski End of Tour Report, 21-22: MACV to AD. Mar
to Mar 1965:
Ross to MACV 1963; Col WITZENBURGER to MACV
A D to Jan IO. 1964: Feb
Jan AD. Analysis Tech Memo
Ref for of I . 1965; Col James HAGERSTROM to
Mar Tab 8; hist. AD.
III, Mar 64: MACV to CINCPAC, Jan to Mar
and MACV to AD. Mar 1965: MACV
Hist. 64: to Directive I.
Ginsburgh. Hist, AD. I.102-3: Mont-
I, gomery End of Tour Report,
Film processed at Tan Son Nhut was Hist. AD. Of
flown immediately to Clark Air Base. where the the remaining thirteen Caribous of the U.S.
Armed Forces Courier Service picked it u p and Army's Aviation Company, four were
delivered it to Washington. usually within thirty- assigned to the 145th Aviation Battalion in
four hours after a photo mission. Other copies Corps. three to the I Corps Aviation Detach-
went to for the U.S. Air Attache in Vien- ment. the Aviation Battalion in the
tiane. who received them within twenty-four Corps. three to the Delta Aviation Battalion
hours. In July. two were assigned to the in Corps, and one to Bangkok.
Air Division as photo couriers. A D to Dir/Plans. USAF. Debriefing of
May 1964; Hist Data. Fleming. 1965: AD. Debriefing
64; hist, III, May of Col Robert Jones. 10.. 1965;
64: Col Allison C. Brooks to MACV Analysis AD. Counterinsurgency Les-
sons Learned. Jan
Three were flown to Hist. Materiel, AD. 64;
where Thai pilots used them to photograph the MACV to CINCPAC. 1964: hist.
results of strikes in Laos. Since the U.S. air AD, I. and 51: A.
attache in Vientiane wanted this photography and E. Patterson. Assault
within twelve hours, established a Operations, Jan (HQ
photo processing cell at Hist, Feb 1967). 40:
I. to MACV. 1964; to
MACV Jan 1965; A D Monthly Sum-
Jan mary of Aviation Activities. Jan IO.
to CINCPAC. May A D Stat of Combat Support
13th Missions, in Hist, AD.
and to I I. VI. Docs
CINCPAC to Mar with Kennedy by Feb
1964; Analysis A D Counterinsur-
Jan I, 1965: gency Lessons Learned. 1964; Lt Col Vic-
A D to 1964: to tor Curtis, Tour Report. Jan 65:
MACV Jan Maj Leonard End of Tour
Col Alfred The €C-47 in Report. Mar
Southeast Asia. MAY 1966-June (HQ Fleming Debriefing 1965;
1968). hist. 315th (Assault). 64; Hist
A D to I. to Data, A D Services 64:
IO. AD. to MACV. and Curtis End
to I I. of Tour Jan
Hist. 64: to and Patterson. Assault AIRLIFT
MACV, Operations. 40; MACV to CINC-
Hist. to PAC, and 1964; Book of
MACV. Jan 1964; his!. AD Actions in SEA, Ill-C.
Hist. Dir/Plans. USAF,
Analysis AD, Counterinsur- Saigon to
gency Lessons Learned, Jan 1965; Anal- 1963; Charles Herbicide
ysis. TAC. draft. Planning and Control of the Operations in Southeast Asia, 1961-June
Air-Ground Operations in South Vietnam by (HQ
Thomas 65; Col Lauren 1967).
to AD. 1965; MACV Saigon to
Monthly Eval Jan Annex 1963; Moore to MACV. 1964:
I
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S Notes to Pages 250-257
rprt. Montgomery to 2d AD. Jun 8. 1964: msg: and Ross to MACV. Nov 3. 1963.
2d AD to PACAF. Jun 18. 1964; Collins. Herbi- 61. Msgs. MACV to CINCPAC. Mar I I .
cide Operarions in SEA, pp 7-9. 1963. CINCPAC to ADMINO. CINCPAC.
55. Hist Data. 2d AD Ops Services Div. Jul- Oct 22, 1962; CINCPAC Rcrd. 8th SECDEF
Dec 64; rprt. Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964: Conf. May 6. 1963. Item I ; msgs.CINCPAC to
rprt. 2d AD) to MACV, Nov 3 and Dec 2. 1964. MACV. May I I . 1963. and CSAF to PACAF.
and Jan 4. 1965; Collins, Herbicide Operations May 13. 1963.
in SEA, pp 9- 15. 62. Lt Col Ray A. Robinson. Jr.. End of
56. Msg. 2d ADVON to PACAF. Jan 30. Tour Report. Apr IO. 1965.
1962: Gleason paper. ca. Mar I . 1962: PACAF 63. Ltr. Ross to MACV. Nov 3, 1963.
Ref Bk for Mar 62 SECDEF Conf. Tab 8; intvw 64. D O D Penragon Papers. Bk 3: IV.C.1.. p
with Col R.L. Gleason. May 12. 1972. 39; msg, SECSTATE to AmEmb Saigon. Apr
57. CINCPAC Rcrd. 3d SECDEF Conf. 28. 1964.
Feb 19. 1962. Item 3; msgs. JCS to CINCPAC. 65. USAF Spec Ops Force, Proj Corona
Mar 12. 1962. and CSAF to PACAF. Apr 20. Harvest, Apr I , 1968-Dec 31. 1969. Sec 2. pp
1963. 25-26; rprt. Moore to MACV. Oct 22. 1964;
58. General Moorman presentation before Robinson End of Tour Report. Apr 10. 1965.
Congressional Committee. I. ca. Feb 63: MACV 66. Ltr, Moore to MACV. Oct 2. 1964;
Summary of Highlights. Feb 8 . 1962-Feb 7, USAF Spec Ops Force. Proj Corona Harvest.
1963. p 53. Apr I. 1968-Dec 31. 1969. Sec 2. pp 25-26 and
59. Msg, CSAF to PACAF. Apr 20. 1963; Itr. Robinson End of Tour Report. Apr IO. 1965.
Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963: MACV 67. Rprts. 2 CCR to MACV J-3 Dec 2. 1964.
Summary of Highlights. Feb 8. 1962-Feb 7. and Jan 4, 1965: Reynolds intvw. Jan 65. and
1963. Bethea intvw. Jan 65. both in Hist. 2d AD.
60. Ltr. Anderson to Anthis. Apr 12. 1963: Jul-Dec 64, V. Docs 5 and'8; Capt Earl E. Tighe
Itr. Doyle to 2d AD. Oct I I . 1962; Maj John P. End of Tour Report, Apr 15. 1965.
Anderson to D/AFTU-Vietnam. Aug 21, 1963.
CHAPTER XXI
322
Notes to Pages 258-267
dents: Lyndon E. Johnson. 1965 (Washington. memo. Edumunds for Moore. Jan 18. 1965;
1966). 1.57: New York Timer. Pentagon Papers. PACAF Activity Input to Proj Corona Harvest
p 339. on In-Country Strike Operations in Southeast
14. Msgs. ADMINO. CINCPAC. to CINC- Asia. I J a n 6 5 - 3 1 M a r 6 8 . V . p t I. 1965. 15-18;
PAC. Feb 27. 1965. AmEmb Vientiane to SEC- and msgs. PACAF t o 13th AF. Jan 23, 1965.
STATE. Jan 18. 1965. to CINCPAC. Mar 1. and 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 28. 1965.
1965. and 13th A F t o CINCPAC, Jan 30. 1965; 31. AFXOPJ Book of Actionsin SEA, 1961-
AFXOPLC, Analysis of Southeast Asia Air 1964. Item V-1: msgs, MACV to CINCPAC,
Operations. I. Sec 2. Jan 2 . 1965. PACAF to 13th AF, Jan 23. 1965.
15. Msgs. CINCPAC to JCS. Jan 21. 1965. 13thAF to
PACAF to 13th AF. Jan 23, 1965. AmEmb 2d AD, Feb 15. 1965.
Vientiane t o S E C S T A T E . Mar 6. 1965. 32. Msg, 2d A D to PACAF. Jan 28. 1965.
USAIRA Vientiane to CSAF. Jan 24. 1965. 33. Ltr. Col H.L. Priceto 2d AD, Jan 2. 1965:
J C S to CINCPAC. Jan26. 1965. AmEmb Vien- MACV Immediate Release, Jan 65.
tiane to CINCPAC. Jan 27. 1965. OASD/lSA 34. MACV. Monthly Evaluation Rprt. Jan
to AmEmb Vientiane,-Feb 3. 1965. 13th A F to 65. Annex B. Air Force, p 19.
PACAF, Feb 6. 1965, AFXOPLC, Analysis of 35. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65, II. 16-17. 22.
Southeast Asia Air Operations. I. Sec 2 . p 8-9: 36. Feb
Helmka and Hale. USAF Operations from 4. 1964; hist, 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65, II. 29: Robin-
Thailand, 1964-1965. pp 19. 7 I. 84. son End of Tour Report, Apr 10. 1965; MR.
16. Msg. MACV t o 2d AD. Dec 28. 1964: Woodyard, Mar I. 1965.
New York Times, Pentagon Papers. pp 336-37: 37. New York Times, Pentagon Papers. p
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 337; Ball, Discipline of Power. pp 317-18: Tay-
pp 43. 166-67: James C. Thompson, Jr.. "How lor. "The Casefor Continued Bombing."
Could Vietnam Happen'?". p 5 1. 38. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report. p 107;
17. Sandborn. End of Tour Report, Dec 8. hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. II. 8.
1961: Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur- 39. Stebbins. Documents on American For-
gency, pp 106-08. eign Relations, 1966. p 129: Cooper. Lost Cru-
18. Hist. 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. II, 99; Itrs. sade. pp 255-62: Donald S. Zagoria. Vietnam
Moore to Ky. Dec 29, 1964, and Rowland to Triangle (New York. 1967). p 151: Johnson.
Ginsburgh, Apr 72. Vantage Point. pp 122-24.
19. Hist, 2d AD. Jul-Dec 64. I I , 109-12; rprt. 40. Rprt of Investigation, Pleiku Incident. by
Capt Stanton R. Musser. Dec 14. 1964. Board of Officers to Investigate Incident at
20. Ltr. Moore to Baron. Jan 18. 1965: rprt. 2 MACV Compound and Camp Holloway.
CCR to MACV J-3. Jan 4. 1965: S a m , First Pleiku, RVN. Maj Gen Milton B. Adams,
Test and Combat Use ofAC-47. p 5. USAF, President. Feb 16. 1965.
21. Woodyard rprt; Kenneth Sames. The 41. Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. pp 14-15:
Battle of Binh Gia. 27 Dec 64 I Jan 65 ( H Q hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. pp 22-26.
PACAF. Proj CHECO, Dec 27. 1965). p 2. 42. Hist, PACAF. Jul I , 1964-Jun 30, 1965.
22. Ibid.. pp 2-6. I. pt 2, 96: hist, SAC, Jan-Jun 65. II. 238-239:
23. Woodyard rprt: hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. msg, PACAF to 13th A F and 5th AF. Feb 65.
I I . 12 and 15. 43. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65. II. 26-28;
24. Ibid., p 15. Bethea intvw. Jun 6, 1965: Guthrie End of Tour
25. Sams, The Battle of Binh Gia. pp 6-8. Report, ca. Aug 65.
26. New York Times. Pentagon Papers. pp 44. Hist. 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65. II. 31-33.
337-40. 45. Sharp-Westmoreland. Report. pp 107-
27. Hist. 2d AD, Jan-Jun 65, II. 8 and I I: Itrs. 108: hist, 2d AD. Jan-Jun 65, II. 34-35: Itr.
Everding to Hiller, Jan 8. 1965. Rowland to Mataxis to 2d AD, Feb 28. 1965: msg. MACV to
Ginsburgh. Apr 72; Brig Gen A.W. Schinz CINCPAC. Feb 21. 1965.
Debriefing Report. Oct 22. 1966. 46. MACV. Monthly Evaluation Rprt. Mar
28. Msg. PACAF to CSAF. Jan 6. 1965. 65, Annex B. p 23.
29. Hist, PACAF. Jul 64-Jun 65. III. Jan 65; 47. Msgs. PACAF to 2d AD. Mar 2. 1965.
msgs, PACAF to 13th AF, Jan 23, 1965, and to CSAF to PACAF. Mar 6, 1965. CS to CINC-
5th AF. Apr 12. 1965. PAC. Mar 9. 1965,and ADMINO. CINCPAC.
30. Sharp-Westmoreland, Report, p 107: to MACV. Mar 10. 1965.
323
A- I E Skyraider Prop-driven, single-engine, land- o r carrier-based multipurpose aircraft.
developed to permit greater versatility as a n attack bomber o r utility
aircraft. Two crew. Formerly designated AD-5.
A-I H Skyraider Prop-driven, single-engine. land- o r carrier-based multipurpose aircraft.
Carrying heavy stores on its centerline rack, this plane is especially
equipped for low-level attack bombing. A single-seater, like all Skyraiders
other than the series. Formerly designated AD-6.
A F Sec, MAAGV Air Force Section, Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam
AFXOD Director of Doctrine. Concepts. and Objectives. United States Air Force
aPP appendix
326
ARMA Army attache
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency. A separately organized research and
development agency of the Department of Defense under the direction
and supervision of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
asst assistant
A-Staff Air Staff. Formerly used in numerical combinations as with J-Staff. which
see.
atch attachment
atchd attached
8-47 Stratojet A swept, high-wing, multi-engine jet aircraft with swept tail surfaces and
tandem landing gear. Four engines are paired in pods below and for-
ward of the wings. Other two engines are in individual pods at wing tips.
Three crew.
8-57 Canberra A wide-short, midwing, twin-jet bomber aircraft with retractable tricycle
landing gear. Two crew.
B-58 Hustler Long-range, high-altitude, high-speed aircraft. Wing is full cantilever mid-
wing modified delta design. Powered by four turbojet engines equipped
with afterburners. Engines mounted inindividual nacelles, two per wing.
mounted on pylons beneath each wing.
Bristol Type 170 Prop-driven, twin-engine. cantilever high-wing monoplane designed a s a
freight o r passenger transport. Used in Southeast Asia by the Royal New
Zealand Air Force.
British Supermarine I An amphibious aircraft used by the British during World War I I for
Sea Otter reconnaissance and general naval duties, including air/sea rescue. The
French Navy employed this aircraft in Indochina.
327
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Barn Door Establishment of tactical air control system in South Vietnam ( 1962). Barn
Door II extended the system to Thailand.
Bell Tone United States Air Force airdefense detachment at Don Royal Thai
Air Force Base.
Big Safari Air Force Logistics Command technical rework of infrared equipment
Binh Lam Special Republic of Vietnam Armed tactical zone in the provinces of
Zone Binh and Lam Dong (1964).
book
Box Top United States Air Force intelligence over the Gulf of
1964).
C-I Flying Boxcar A twin-boom, high-wing. land monoplane of all-metal construction having
a conventional tricycle gear with a steerable nose gear. I t s two recipro-
cating engines have constant-speed. four-blade. reversible-pitch pro-
pellers. Five crew. forty-two troops.
C-I Provider Prop-driven. two-engine, high-wing monoplane. Used to transport combat
and other equipment for airborne assault troops, the resupply by air of
advanced combat positions, evacuation of wounded. and air transporta-
tion of paratroops to the d r o p ZONE Two crew, sixty troops. o r fifty
litters plus four attendants. Also served a5 a forward air control/flare-
ship. (The features two pod-mounted turbojets in addition to its
piston engines.)
C/ Chairman o r Chief of
CALO corps air liaison officer
C A M RON consolidated aircraft maintenance squadron (USAF)
Candy Machine United States Air Force F-102 interceptor air defense teams in Vietnam.
Superseded Water Glass.
CATO Combat Arms Training and Organization Division, United States Military
Assistance Advisory Group. Saigon
Cat Paw Provisional United States Air Force C-I 19 maintenance detachment in
Vietnam (1954).
329
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
Chien Thang “The Victorious.” Government of Vietnam military campaign plan offi-
cially issued in February 1965.
Chieu Hoi “Open Arms.” Government of Vietnam cause designed to persuade Viet
Cong (0rally to the government cause.
CHMAAGV Chief. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam
chron chronology
C1 counterintelligence
COIN counterinsurgency I
Cold War A hostile encounter between nations o r groups of nations that stops short
of actual armed conflict. I t uses the weapons of politics. diplomacy.
economics, espionage, police action, and propaganda to gain advantage. I
comd command
comdr commander
COMFEAF Commander, Far East Air Forces
COMPAF Commander. Pacific Air Force
COMSEADEFCOM Commander. Southeast Asia Defense Command (US)
C O M USMACTHAI Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
330
conf conference
Corona Harvest United States Air Force evaluation of air operations in Southeast Asia.
CQ Congressional Quarterly
D C S / S&L Deputy Chief of Staff. Systems and Logistics, United States Air Force
dept department
Dir/ Director of
direction finding Procedure for obtaining bearings of radio frequency emitters with the use
of a highly directional antenna and a display unit o n a n intercept receiver
of ancillary equipment.
Dirty Thirty United States Air Force C-47 transport pilots attached t o the Vietnamese
Air Force (1962-63). An unofficial nickname.
33 I
T H E ADVISORY Y E A R S
division
doc document
Department of Defense ( U S )
doppler radar A radar system that differentiates between fixed and moving targets by
detecting the apparent change in frequency of the reflected wave due
motion of target or the observer.
Duke’s Mixture Provisional United States Air Force aircraft maintenance detachment
Vietnam 1954). Formerly “Project Revere.”
drop ZONE
EA- I F Skyraider Similar to A-I E except that it is equipped for countermeasures. Four crew.
Formerly designated AD-SQ.
electronic intelligence
est estimate
evaluation
F-102 Delta Dagger Single-engine. supersonic, all-weather. delta-wing, jet interceptor used in
air defense. Has tricycle landing gear. speed brakes, and drag chute. One
crew.
Farm Gate Detachment 2. 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron. and subse-
quently United States Air Force air commandoactivity at Bien Hoa Air
Base. Vietnam.
Field Goal United States Air Force RT-33 photo jet reconnaissance in Laos (1961).
Fire Brigade United States Air Force-Vietnamese Air Force air transport rapid alert
capability for Army of the Republic of Vietnam airborne employment.
Flaming Dart United States-Vietnamese Air Force air reprisal strikes against North
Vietnam (February 1965).
FM frequency modulation
fragmentary The daily supplement to standard operations orders governing the conduct
operations order of the air war in Southeast Asia. It contained mission number and
function. type of ordnance. time on target. and other instructions.
ftr fighter
FY fiscal year
333
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
gP group
GPO Government Printing Office (US)
Green Python United States Air Force reconnaissance operations at Udorn Royal Thai
Air Force Base, Thailand.
Green Turnip Loan of United States Air Force C-47s to the French (1954).
G-Staff Army staff; used in numerical combinations with J-Staff, which see.
334
H o p Tac Sequential concentric military operations to safeguard Saigon under the
plan.
HQ headquarters
inclosure
i indorsement
instructor
intelligence
interview
Age Overall program for United States Air Force materiel support of the
French in Indochina (1953-54).
I SA International Security Affairs (US)
it joint
J ungle J i m The 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron and subsequent United
States Air Force air commando activity at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida.
KB-50 Superfortress Tactical aerial tanker powered by four reciprocating engines and two
turbojet engines. Capable of simultaneous aerial refueling of three
fighter-type aircraft by the probe and drogue method. Six crew.
KC- I35 Stratotanker Long-range. high-performance tanker powered by four turbojet engines.
Has a flying boom for aerial refueling. Performs high-speed. high-
altitude refueling of bombers and fighters. Can be used as a cargo
a n d / o r troop transport. carrying up to eighty troops. Four crew.
K BA killed by air
landline system Telephone o r telegraph communication by wire over, on. or under the
ground.
Lazy Dog Nickname for M k-44 bomb. earlier called “Hail’ and later “Elda.”
Leaping Lena United States and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces long-range recon-
naissance interdiction teams.
In liaison
Itr letter
336
Lucky Dragon High-altitude aerial reconnaissance flown by Strategic Air Command U-2
aircraft (1964). Later called "Trojan Horse."
landing zone
Marcel Dassault French prop-driven. twin-engine, all-metal. light military transport and
M.D. 3 15 Flamant liaison monoplane.
Mail Pouch RT-33 photo courier service from Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base.
Thailand (1961-62).
Market Project for the loan of United States Air Force B-26s to the French in
Vietnam (1954).
Market Time United States Navy patrols off South Vietnamese coasts
mat materiel
memo memorandum
MG machinegun
MIG A popular designation for certain Russian fighter aircraft designed and
developed by Mikoyan and Gurevich.
331
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
monthly evaluation
manuscript
message
Mule Train Nickname of initial United States Air Force C-I detachment in Vietnam.
Bird Dog Single-engine, two-place tandem. closed cabin, high-wing aircraft of con-
ventional strut-braced, two-spar design. All metal and semi-monocoque
fuselage with a fixed pitch propeller. Twenty-four volt elec-
trical system. Two crew. Formerly designated
Mohawk Prop-driven. single-engine. surveillance (day and night) airplane with vis-
ual observation and photographic capabilities. Crew of two.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
!
PA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Public Affairs
office
office in charge of construction
on-the-job training
One Buck United States Tactical Air Command composite air strike force deploy-
ment t o Southeast Asia in August in response to the Gulf
attack.
On Mark Extensive modification of aircraft performed by the On Mark
Engineering Company.
Operation Plan
operations
order of battle The identification. strength, command structure. and disposition of the
personnel, units. and equipment of any military forces.
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PFDOP Deputy Chief of Staff. Plans and Operations, Pacific Air Forces
PFIDC Director of Intelligence, Pacific Air Forces
PFLPL Plans Division. Directorate of Plans. Pacific Air Forces
PFMLP Assistant for Logistical Plans. Directorate of Materiel. Pacific Air Forces
PFMSS Supply and Services Division. Directorate of Materiel. Pacific Air Forces
PFOCO Combat Operations. Assistant Chief of Staff Operations. Pacific Air
Forces
PFODC Assistant Chief of Staff Operations, Pacific Air Forces
PFOOP Operations Plans Division. Directorate of Operations, Pacific Air Forces
Phyllis Ann EC-47 airborne radio direction finding aircraft and project. Followed
experimental “Hawk Eye.”
Pierce Arrow United States Navy retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam. August
5. 1964.
Pipe Stem United States Air Force photographic reconnaissance detachment at Tan
Son Nhut Air Base (1961-62).
POL petroleum. oil. and lubricants
POW prisoner of war
P PC Photographic processingcell. A facility. generally mobile. equipped for the
processing, printing. and interpretation of reconnaissance sensor pro-
ducts and other production normally related to the reconnaissance
intelligence function.
president
project
People’s Revolutionary Party (southern branch of the North Vietnamese
communist ( L a o Dong) party).
PSP pierced steel planking
pt part
Queen Bee United States Air Forcecommunications reconnaissance missions over the
Gulf of Tonkin (1964).
R-4D United States Navy transport similar to the Air Force C-47
RB-26 Invader The B-26 modified for reconnaissance missions by changes in nose and
installed equipment. Three crew.
RB-47 Stratojet The B-47 modified and equipped for photographic reconnaissance mis-
sions. Three crew.
RB-57 Canberra The B-57 modified for photo reconnaissance. Two crew.
RC-47 Skytrain The C-47 transport with equipment permanently installed for photo-
reconnaissance and/ o r electronic reconnaissance missions. Three crew.
RF-101 Voodoo Day o r night photographic reconnaissance version of the F-101.
RT-28 Trojan The T-28 configured for photo reconnaissance. Two crew.
RT-33 Shooting Star Reconnaissance version of the T-33. Two crew.
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
I
340
rad radio
Ranch Hand Nickname of United States Air Force C-I23 aerial spray detachment
deployed to Vietnam in 1961-62 and applied to later defoliation and
herbicide activity.
RAND Research and Development (The R A N D Corporation, Santa Monica.
California).
R&D research and development
rcrd record
recon reconnaissance
ref reference
Revere Provisional United States Air Force aircraft maintenance detachment in
Vietnam (1954). Later called “Duke’s Mixture.”
RF Regional Forces (the former Vietnamese Civil Guard). These were local
South Vietnamese defense forces. recruited and used within one of the
administrative regions into which the country was divided.
RKG Royal Khmer (Cambodian) Government
RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force
Rolling Thunder Sustained United States air strikes against North Vietnam (March 1965-
October 1968).
rprt report
rqmt requirement
RTAF Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base
RVN Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF Ripublic of Vietnam Armed Forces
34 I
THE ADVISORY YEARS
342
Strike Command (US)
subject
sum summary
Sunrise "Binh Minh." Highly publicized Government of Vietnam clear-and-hold
operation in Binh Province (1962).
South Vietnam
Sweet Sue Experimental night reconnaissance aircraft equipped with early
infrared sensors.
Swing Back Spare parts support for aircraft through cannibalization.
Swivel Chair Project for the loan of United States Air Force C-I 19s t o the French and
associated USAF maintenance support
344
for armament. and capability to carry three litters. Two crew, seven
passengers. Formerly designated
U Chickasaw All-metal. semi-monocoque fuselage helicopter. Has one all-metal. three-
blade, main rotor and a n all-metal two-blade, antitorque, tail rotor.
Engine mounted in nose. landing gear. side-by-side seating,
external cargo sling. dual controls. Used for general utility operations.
Two crew, ten passengers. Formerly designated
Similar t o Choctaw. Utility version. Two crew, twelve passengers.
UHF ultra high frequency
United Nations
United Nations Command
us United States (of America)
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
United States air attache
United States Ambassador
United States Army attach;
United States Army. Pacific
United States Army Special Forces, Vietnam (Provisional)
United States Army War College
United States Marine Corps
United States Navy
United States Operations Mission
Water Glass United States Air Force rotational air defense deployments to T a n
Son Nhut (1962-63). Superseded by “Candy Machine.”
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
I
Water Pump Detachment 6, 1st Air commando to Thailand in
1964 and applied to subsequent special air warfare activity at Udorn
Royal Thai Air Force Base.
wg wing
WIA wounded i n action
Wounded Warrior United States Air Force aeromedical evacuation of French repatriated sick
and wounded military personnel from Vietnam to Europe (1954).
Wring Out United States Air Force project to reach authorized strength of 137 wings
with existing personnel (1956).
346
For the purposes of both history and self-evaluation, the United States Air
Force began in a n extensive effort to identify and collect documents on its
role in the conflict in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Air Force expanded
its normal historical program. It also established a new activity named Project
Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, later
called Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations
During the next several years, USAF commands and agencies involved in the
war searched their records and selected papers pertinent for historical research.
Records of USAF staff agencies in the Washington National Records Center at
Suitland, Maryland, and of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command
(CINCPAC) in the Federal Records Center at the Naval Supply Depot,
Pennsylvania, were screened for data on the air war.
All these sources, together with others, were indexed into the computer-
processed Data Base Inventory (DABIN) System at the Aerospace Studies
Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Maintained by the
Technical Systems Branch of the Albert Historical Research Center
at Maxwell AFB, DABIN identifies source materials ranging from multivolume
studies to single-page messages, including title, issuing agency or author, date,
general subject, and significant key words in titles. It reveals the location of
sources by finding numbers in the collections noted above as well
as those in the Reference Division of the Historical Research Center and the Air
University Library. A query to DABIN by an authorized researcher can obtain
the listings of sources and, more specifically, the locations of the items referenced
in the footnotes of this volume of history.
GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES
The records kept by the United States Air Force and its subordinate
commands and agencies are the major source materials for this volume. At the
Washington level, the holdings of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Opera-
tions, are the most useful collection of high-level Air Force policy and planning
papers. The semiannual histories of the Directorate of Plans and of the Assistant
for Mutual Security give succinct information on policy formulation. The study
cited this history as Book of Actions in Southeast Asia,
July was prepared in the Directorate of Operations. It summarizes
recommendations of the USAF Chief of Staff with respect to the conflict. Special
studies prepared by the Office of Air Force History also give perspective on
policy matters, and the following are particularly useful:
I
348
Project established in October was designed to give
a n immediate reporting operations. In was
additionally charged to microfilm documents for incorporation in at the
Air University. A few microfilmed documents trace back to the period of this
history, but the major importance of as a source to this history of the
period lies in the following studies, most of which are often accom-
panied by voluminous supporting documents:
Anderson, Capt USAF. and Rescue in Southeast Asia, October
Jones. Maj USAF. Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force,
October
Lt Col Robert USAF, and Porter, Melvin Air Traffic Control in S E A ,
February
Lt Robert USAF. Yankee Team, MAY 1964-June March
Martin. Lt Col Donald USAF. and Clever. Carl Southeast Asia Report. October
1961-December May
Wesley The War in Vietnam. January
Evolution OFTHE Engagement f o r Southeast Asia, September
CONGRESS
Senate. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield on a Study Mission to the Associated States of Indochina.
October 27. 1953. Indochina. 83d Cong. I st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office.
1953.
House. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Mutual Security Act of 1954. 83d
Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954.
Senate. Compilation of Studies and Surveys Prepared Under the Direction of the Special Committee
to Study the Foreign Aid Program. Foreign Aid Program. Senate Document 52.85th Cong. 1st
sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1957.
House. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. Mutual Security Program in Laos. 85th Cong. 2d sess. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1958.
350
Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Situation in Vietnam. 86th Cong. 1st sess. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1959.
House. Seventh Report by the Committee on Government Operations, June 15 1959. U.S. Aid
Operations in Laos. House Report 546.86th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing
Office. 1959.
Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary. Analysis of the Khrushchev
Speech of January6, 1961.87th Cong, 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961.
Senate. A Study Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations.
The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination. Senate Document 36. 88th Cong. 1st sess.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963.
Senate. Report of Senator Mike Mansfield to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Vietnam
and Southeast Asia. 88th Cong, 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1963.
House. Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on
Armed Services. Close Air Support. 89th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing
Office. 1966.
Senate. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and
Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary. Refugee Problems in South Vietnam and Laos.
89th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965.
House. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. Fiscal Year 1966 Supplemental Authoriza-
tionfor Vietnam. 89th Cong. 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1966.
Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Assistance Fiscal Year 1966- Vietnam. 89th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1966.
House. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. United States Policy Toward Asia. 89th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1966.
Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and
Vietnam. 90th Cong. 1st sess. 3d revised edition. Washington: Government Printing Office.
1967.
Senate. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Submission of the Vietnam Conflict to
the United Nations. 90th Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1967.
Senate. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations on February 20. 1968. The Gurfof
Tonkin. The 1964 Incidents. Parts I and 2. 90th Cong, 2d sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office. 1968.
“Working Paper on the North Vietnamese Role in the War in South Vietnam.” Congressional
Record. May 9, 1968, pp 12614-12620.
Senate. Hearings before the Subcommitteeon United States Security Agreementsand Commitments
Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad. Kingdom ofLaos. Part 2.91st Cong. 1st sess. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1970.
P R E S I D E N TPAPERS
IAL
The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: Victory and the Threshold of Peace.
New York: Harper and Brothers. 1950.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1951. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954. Washington:
Government Printing Office. 1960.
Public Papers o f the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1959.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957. Washington:
Government Printing Office. 1958.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1959.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61. Washington:
Government Printing Office. 1961.
T H E ADVISORY YEARS
Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1962.
Public Papers ofthe Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1963. I
Public Papers ofthe Presidents ofthe United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963. Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1964.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64. Washington:
Government Printing Office. 1965.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. Washington:
Government Printing Office. 1966.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1967.
DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Articles
Bundy. William P. “The Path to Viet-Nam: A Lesson in Involvement.” US Department of State
Bulletin 57, September 4, 1967. pp 275-287.
Durbrow. Ambassador Elbridge. “Hanoi’s Intensified Aggression- 1959.” Air War College Sup-
plement. November 1967. pp 7-8.
Kennedy. Col Thomas B.. USAF. ”Airlift in Southeast Asia.” Air University Review 16 (January-
February 1965). 72-82.
Knox. Capt Thomas R.. USAF. “Waterpump, 1964-1965.” Aerospace Commentary 2 (Spring,
1970), 5 1-59,
Milton, Maj Gen Theodore R.. USAF. “Air Power: Equalizer in Southeast Asia.” Air University
Review 15 (November-December 1963). 2-8.
Secord, Mack D. “The Viet Nam Air Force.”Air University Review I5 (November-December 1963).
60-67.
Smith. Gen Frederic H.. Jr.. USAF.”Nuclear Weaponsand Limited War.”Air University Quarterly
Review I2 (Spring, 1960). 3-27.
Sunderman. Lt Col James F., USAF. “Air Operations in Viet Nam: Night Flare Strike.” Air
University Review 15 (September-October 1964), 82-91,
NON-GOVERNMENTAL SOURCES I
Books
Acheson. Dean. Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York: W. W.
Norton and Company. 1969.
Austin, Anthony. The President’s War. New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1971.
352
Ball, George W. The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Strucrure. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1968.
Bates. Victor. Vietnam, A Diplomatic Tragedy: The Origins of the United Stares Involvement.
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965.
Beal, John Robinson. John Fosrer Dulles. 1888-1959. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1959.
Bouscaren, Anthony Trawick. The Last of the Mandarins: Diem of Vietnam. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1965.
Burchett, Wilfred G. Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War. New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1965.
Buttinger, Joseph. Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. 2 vols. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
Champassak, Sisouk Na. Storm Over Laos: A Contemporary Hisrory. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger. 1961.
Cole. Allan B., ed. Conflict in Indo-China & Inrernational Repercussions: A Documentary History.
1945-1955. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1956.
Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade:America in Vietnam. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
1970.
C Q Background. Chinaand U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. Washington: Congressional Quarterly
Service. 1967.
Curl. Peter V.. ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1955.
Davids, Jules, ed. Documentson American Foreign Relations, 1964. New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, 1964.
de Gaulle. Charles. The War Memoirs of Charlesde Gaulle. Vol 3: Salvation, 1944-1946. New York:
Simon and Shuster, 1960.
Dommen. Arthur J . Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1964.
Duncanson. Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968.
Eden, Anthony. The Memoirs of Anthony Eden: Full Circle. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
1960.
Eisenhower. Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandare for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City.
N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1963.
The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, 1965.
Fall, Bernard B. Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu. Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 1967.
Ho Chi Minh on Revolution. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.
Street Without Joy: insurgency in Indochina, 1946-1963. 3d revised edition. Harrisburg:
The Stackpole Company, 1963.
The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis. 2d Edition. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1963.
Galloway. John. The Gulfof Tonkin Resolution Rutherford. N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University
Press. 1970.
Gould-Adams. Richard. The Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles. London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962.
Goulden. Joseph C. Truth is the First Casualty: The GUlfof Tonkin Affair-Illusion and Reality.
Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.
Graff, Henry F. The Tuesday Cabinet: Deliberarion and Decision on Peace and War under Lyndon
B. Johnson. Englewood Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Halberstam. David. 7he Making of a Quagmire. New York: Random House. 1965.
Halpern. Joel M. Government, Politics, and Social Structure in Laos: A Study of Tradition and
Innovation. Yale University Southeast Asia Series. No. 4. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1964.
Hemmer, Ellen. The Strugglefor Indochina. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 1954.
Higgins, Marguerite. Our Vietnam Nightmare. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Polirics of Foreign Policy in the Adminisration ofJohn F.
Kennedy. Garden City. N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1967.
Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1948.
Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspecrives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: Holt.
Rinehart and Winston. 1971.
353
THE ADVISORY YEARS
ARMY and Richard A. SOUTHEAST Asia Among the World Powers. Lexing-
ton: University Press.
Warner. The Last Confucian. New The Company,
Eugene C. GULF New Doubleday and Company,
Donald Vietnam TRIANGLE New Pegasus.
Paul E.. on American Foreign Relations, New Council on
Foreign Relations,
Documents on American Foreign RELATIONS New Council on Foreign
Relations.
Articles
Strategy." THESATURDAY Evening Post, March
Bowers. Ray "Americans in the Vietnamese Air Force: 'The Dirty Thirty.' Aerospace
Historian, September
William C. "The Saddest War." Life, December
Chassin. Gen G.J.M.. French Air Force. “Lessons of the War in Indochina” Interavia 7 (1952).
670-75.
Collins. Gen J. Lawton, USA. “What We’re Doing in Indochina.” Interview. U.S. News World
Report. March 4. 1955, pp 82-88.
Fall. Bernard B. “Talk with H o Chi Minh.” The New Republic, October 12. 1963, pp 19-22.
Ford, Corey. “The Flying Tigers Carry On.” Saturday Evening Post, February 5 , 1955, pp 24-25ff.
and February 12, 1955. pp 30ff.
Graff, Henry F. “Teach-In on Vietnam by The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary of State.”New York Times Magazine, March 20. 1966. pp 25.
128-133.
Kuter, Gen L.S., USAF, CINCPACAF. “The Pacific Air Forces.” Air Force, October 1957,
pp 63-66, 69-70.
Lansdale. Maj Gen Edward G., USAF. “Viet Nam: D o We Understand Revolution‘?” Foreign
Affairs, October 1964, pp 75-86.
“The Lowdown from the Top U.S. Command in Saigon.” Life, November 27. 1964. p p 46, 51-53.
McNamara. Robert S. “The Communist Design for World Conquest, Some Shift in our Military
Thinking Required.” Viral Speeches ofthe Day, March I. 1962. p p 296-99.
Nixon, Richard M. “Cuba, Castro and J o h n F. Kennedy.” Reader’s Digest. November 1964,
pp 283-300.
Rose, Jerry A. “Our Undeclared War in Vietnam.” Reporter. May 10. 1962. p p 30-32.
Taylor. Maxwell. ”The Case for Continued Bombing of the North.” Washington Star. October 22,
1967, p E2.
Thompson, James C., Jr. “How Could Vietnam Happen? An Autopsy.” Atlantic, April 1968.
pp 47-53.
Waddell, L.S. “Phase Out for Charlie-One-One-Nine.” Pegasus. October 1955. pp 1-6.
Weyland, Gen Otto P.. USAF. “Can Air Power Win ‘Little Wars?” Interview. U.S. News World
Report. July 23, 1954. p p 54-61.
Williams. Lt Gen Samuel T.. USA, Ret. “Why the US is Losing in Vietnam-An Inside Story.”
Interview. U.S. News World Report, November 9, 1964, pp 62-72.
355
I
I
A Luoi Valley: 248
A Shau Valley: 175, 248
Able Mable: 147-148, 171, 229, 241-243
Acheson. Dean: I I
Adams, Milton B.: 207
Advanced Echelon (ADVON), 2d: 95-102, 108, 110-1 13. 122. 124. 138
Advanced Research Projects Agency: 73, 112, I16
Advisors
assessment of accomplishments: 267-268
civilian: 204
in combat role: 105, 218-219
French, with MAAG: 39
details from MAAG: 40, 75
number. expansion and reduction: 97, 151. 162, 166-167. 171. 192. 195, 216. 268
range of operations: 151, 162, 216
Aerial Port Squadrons
8th: 11 1, 167
6493d: I l l
Aerial Resupply Unit, 8081st: 16
Agency for International Development: 144
Air America: 257
Air Asia: 181
Air Base Group, 23d: 171
Air Base Squadrons
33d: 171
34th: 171
6220th: 101
6221st: 101
6222d: 101. 171
6223d: 101
Air bases. See Airfields
Air Commando Squadrons
1st: 171, 181. 200-201, 212-214. 218-220. 238, 246, 251
19th: 236
Air Defense, RVN Air Force: 128. 131
Air Depot Wing. 24th: I I . 15
Air Divisions
2d: 101, 112, 141. 146, 153, 160, 171-172. 175. 178.
230, 232, 235. 241. 244-246, 250-253. 264
315th: 16. 31. 41, 45. 81. 106. 108. I I 1. 171, 247
322d: 22
Air drops. See Airborne operations: Airlifts of troops and supplies
Air Forces
Far East: 10-1 I . 15-17. 23.41-42
Fifth: 41, 43-45. 74-75. 131
Pacific: 41. 43-44, 47-48. 81, 83, 95. 101, 106. 112. 120, 217, 229, 232. 236, 241. 244. 250. 253
263-264. 266
Thirteenth: 41-42. 45, 47. 81, 83,95. 101. 106. 108, 120, 124, 131, 133. 147. 232
Air-ground liaison: 106. 128. 131, 140. 143, 159. 168. 178, 182, 196. 215-216. 239, 244
Air-ground operations. See Tactical air support
Air-Ground Operations School: 178. 240
*Numerals in italic indicate a n illustration of the subject mentioned
357
Air Materiel Command: 42
Air Materiel Force Pacific Area: 42
Air National Guard: 65
Air operations
air-ground liaison: 106. 128. I3 I . 140. 143. 159. 168. 178. 182. 196. 239.
244
airstrike missions: 120-122. 128. 136-139. 172-174. 178. 183-184. 191. 196-197. 199.
212. 220-22 I. 245. 254. 257-267
artillery fire direction: 37
bombing missions: 25-26. 120, 139. 156. 158. 172. 264
communications intercept missions: 228
communications systems and equipment: 55. 81. 106-107. 142-144. 146. 159-160.
172, 175,177-178. 247
composite strike force in: 46. 247
convoy support missions: 174. I78
coordination and control: 42-44. 55-56. 74-75. 82-83.95-96. 105-106. 124. 136. 159.
175. I. 214-215. 217. 225. 227. 260-261
cropdestruction missions: 219. 247-250
damage assessments: 174. 199. 212
defoliation missions: I 247-250. 264
effect on pacification: 236-238
effectiveness. studies on: 25. 134. 157. 213
electronic intelligence missions: 235
escort missions: 25. 133. 145
forward air controllers in: 106-107. 121. 128. 136. 138-140. 142-144. 151, 168.
172-176. 180. 181-182. 184. 197, 199,214-215. 221.224.
236. 267
hamlet defense. support of I74
helicopter missions. escort of 144. 146. 157-158, 174. 176. 197. 267
identification. friend or foe: I3 I
infrared reconnaissance missions: 138. 148. 168-169. 243-245, 266
intelligence collection and transmission in: I38
joint operation. first: I28
joint operations center in: 83. 106. 128. 142, !
language barrier in: 221
logistics centralization: 42 I
mixed crews in combat: 220.267
mobile combat reporting post: 74. 82
napalm strikes: 10, 19. 121. 128, 141. 146. 156, 158. 179. 238. 260
night missions: 96, 127- 127. 132, 168.174-175. 224. 244. 247. 259-260
operations center in: 142
photographic reconnaissance missions: 74-75. 127. 135, 138, 147-148.
psychological warfare missions: 122. 219. 251-252
reconnaissance missions: 25. 37. 82. 128-129. 139. 143,147-148, 169. I7 I. 174. 182.
196, 227. 239-241. 243-244. 256-259, 268
restrictions on: 133. 141, 159, 172. 224
results, assessment of I34
rocket assault missions: 158. 130. 158. 237 I
roles and missions in: 49
search-and-rescue missions: 50, 170. I83
tactical air support missions. See Tactical air support missions
target acquisition and designation: 55, 136, 138-139. 140, 143. 146, 156, 196. 245
traffic control in: 131
warning system: I29
358
Air refueling Squadron. 421st 229
Air Rescue missions. See Search-and-rescue missions
Air Rescue Serv ice (Pacific): 45
Air Rescue Squadron. 3 1 s t : 45
Air Training Command: 154
Air warning system: 129
Airborne operations
American: 120. 167
French: 16-18. 20. 26
Republic of Vietnam: 112. 156-159. 164. 180. 196. 228. 246
Aircraft
armament loads: 128. 132. 240. 256-257
casualties evacuation by: 31. 122. 219. 260. 267
combat readiness and faults: 181. 212-214. 218. 20. 238. 243. 246
corps. assignment to: 21 I
losses: I 16. 146. 158. 178. I8 I . 183- 184. 2 13. 220. 229-230. 238. 246-247. 250. 253. 257. 260.
265-266. See also Helicopter losses
maintenance and repair: 50-52. 55. 125, 181
modifications in: 79-80
obsolete models: 54-55
spare-parts stocks: 50
types. See Aircraft types
Aircraft types
A-1: 77, 153. 174-176. 179. 181-184. 196-197. 199.212-214. 222. 224-225, 238-240. 243.
253-254. 257.259-261.263-264. 266-268
AC-47: 24 I . 242. 260-26 I . 266
AD-4: 55
AD-5: 131. 169
AD-6: 55. 67. 75. 82. 84. 121. 127-129. 132. 137. 139. 142-143. 145-146. 156-158. 178
8-26: 7. 9. 10. 17-18. 24. 31. 77. 79-80. 121, 127-129. 130. 131. 133-134. 136-137. 139. 145-146.
151. 154. 156-158. 171. 174-176. 178. 181. 183-184. 196-197. 199. 212-214. 217.242
0-29: 22-23. 25-26. 29
B-52: 263
B-57: 69. 2 12-2 13. 2 17. 229. 237, 238. 245. 253.262. 263. 267
Bristol Type 170: 246
C-45: 50. 147
C-47: 6n. 8. 10-1I. 16-17. 19. 24. 26. 31. 49-50. 55.67. 73 77.79. 82.96. 108. 112. 123, 128.
131-135. 147. 153. 156. 167. 171-172. 174-175. 181-183. 196.214.220.224, 240-241.244.
246-247.249. 25 I . 260-261. 267
C-54: 138
C-I 19: 8. 15- 17. 19. 22. 25-26. 3 I
C-123: 93. 108. 109. 110-113. 114-115. 116, 119-120, 141, 146, 152, 154-156, 167, 180, 182-183.
196. 224. 236, 245. 247-250. 257. 261. 264. 268
C-124: 20. 22. 31
C-130: 58. 81. 228. 230
CH-34: 222
CV-2: 107, 110-1 12, 146. 154-155. 167. 215. 236. 238. 246-247. 265
Dassault M.D.-315 Flamant: IO, 36
EA-I: 169-170
EC-47: 244
F-4: 257
F-4U: 24
F-5: 153
359
F-86:
I3 I ,
184
KC-135:
138.
L-26
MIG-15:
MIG-17:
Spitfire:
Morane-500 Cricket: 10,
:
I I I I I I
I12
Supermarine-I:
U-1: I 10,
U-10:
I
UH-1: 107, 144. 147, 155, 157-158,164, 167, 175. 178, 183.
UH-34: 144
Airfields
air strikes against: 173
conditions at: 55, 123-124. 132, 177, 183. 215, 263
construction and repair: 39, 52, 81, 151, 177, 184, 217, 238, 263
defense of: 82. 264
security measures at: 170. 253, 264
suitability survey: I 10
tenant status of USAF: 123
Viet Cong attacks on: 253
Airlifts of troops and supplies: 8, 16. 19. 20-21. 24-27, 33. 50, 55. 58. 73-74, 106. 108. 110-1 12.
121-122, 128, 130, 144-146, 154-156, 171. 178, 182-184. 196,204-205.
214. 219. 245-247.254-255. 260-261. 266
Airmen, personal hardships of: 124
Ambush operations by Viet Cong: 53. 112-1 13. 145, 174, 179, 196-197. 224. 259-260
An Khe: 176. 267
An Lao: 259
An Xuyen Province: 178, 196, 214
Andersen Air Force Base: 230
Anderson, Winston P.: 250
Annam: 4-5
Anthis. Rollen H.: 99
and air operationscoordinationand control: 106. 136, 142-144. 147-149. 153, 155. 159-161. 171
and airborne operations: I12
and aircraft overuse: I8 I. 2 I2
and aircraft strength expansion: 133-134, 154
and airlift operations: I 1 1 - 1 12
appointed special assistant for counterinsurgency: 227
on Army concept of aircraft use: 160
on combat role for Air Force: 123
commands ADVON: 95-96
commands MACV air components: 97-98
commands 2d Air Division: 101
and communications systems: 160, 178
on defensive measures: I78
Diem and Nhu. assessment of 187
and escort missions: 145
Harkins. relations with: 101-102
and helicopter missions escorts: I59
on intensifying operations: 192
on interdiction missions: 135
and MACV command authority: 98
and mixed crews in combat: 131
and pilots training: 132, 152
and radio homing: 168
and reconnaissance operations: I71
on roles and missions: 148
and self-sustaining RVN Air Force: 134
sonic boom, use of 141
and sorties by RVN Air Force: 132
a n d tactical air strikes: 120. 136-139. 171-172
and tactical target designations: 140-141
and training programs: 127
36 I
I
Ba Thu: 136
Ba Xuyen Province: 103
Bac Lieu: 183. 202
Ball. George W.: 100. 187-188
Ban Boung Bau road bridge: 257
Ban Ken bridge: 257
Ban Me Thuot: 53. 122. 148. 151. 169. 177. 179. 182
Ban Tang Vai: 259
Bao Dai: 3. 5. 7, 10-1 I . 34
BARRELL ROLL Operation: 256
Bartley. John P.: 170
Bay of Pigs incident: 63. 68
Ben Cat: 145, 197, 224, 254
Ben Cau: 199
Ben Suc: 255
Ben Tuong: I82
Berlin blockade: 5
Bethea, William E.: 221. 222
Bidault. Georges: 26
Bien Hoa Airfield: 50, 52. 55, 81. 83. 96, 104. 113. 116. 124. 127. 129, I30. 136. 145. 148. 151.
157. 168, 171. 175. 181-182, 184. 195. 197. 21 1-220. 229. 233, 235. 238-239.
243, 250, 253-254, 260-261. 262. 267-268. 27 1-272
Bien Hoa Province: 75. 200
Binh Dinh Province: 37. 255
Binh Duong Province: 104. 200. 224
Binh Gia: 260. 263
Binh Hung: 109
Binh Long Province: 156. 197
Binh Thuy (formerly Can Tho): 238-239
Binh Xuyen (religious group): 37
Black Watch: 171
Blanchard. William H.: 217-218
Boat bases. air strikes against: 230
Boi Loi woods: 264
Bomb loads and types: 128. 181. 197,212.230. 340. 257
Bombardment Squadrons. 8th and 13th: 229
Bombardment Wing, 3d: 212
Bombing missions. See Air operations
Bonin Islands: 44
Bowers. Charles J.: 142
3 62
Bridges, air strikes against:
Brink, Francis
Brink Hotel incident:
Raymond:
Brooks, Allison, C.:
Buddhists, demonstrations by:
William
Bunker systems, Viet
C. Turner Joy.
Peninsula: I
River:
Joseph C.:
Cambodia
American recognition of
bombing OPERATIONS in and near:
border violations charged by:
breaks relations with
breaks relations with United States:
French patrol of
Japanese occupation of
military assistance to:
neutral status sought by:
as sanctuary:
relations with
supply ORGANIZATION for:
Cameron. William
Camouflage. use of
by Viet
by Viet Minh:
Camp Courtney:
Camp
Can T h o (later Binh Airfield:
(religious group):
C a p Saint Jacques Airfield. See T a u Airfield
Cap
Capital Military District,
Card.
Carpenter. John III:
Carrier aircraft. strikes by: I73
Fidel:
Casualties
from air power, estimates of:
American:
attitude toward figures:
Australian:
civilians:
evacuation by airlift:
first in USAF:
French: I
Navy. evacuation by: I
REPUBLIC of Vietnam:
VEIT
Minh:
Cat Airfield:
Central Highlands:
Central Intelligence Agency:
Central for South Vietnam
Central Target Analysis and Research Center:
Ceylon:
La:
Chemical agents
tests of
use charged:
Chemical plants, air strikes against:
China, Nationalist:
China, People's Republic of
on Air Force combat role:
India. incursions into:
intervention, threat of
military assistance by:
nationals, evacuation of
Taylor mission, reaction to:
China Theater extended:
Province:
Churchill. Winston:
Civil affairs:
Civil Air Transport: I
Civil Guard.
Civilian Irregular Defense Group.
Civilians
casualties:
evacuation of
Clark Air Base: I I . I I I. I
I
Cluster
Cochin China:
Collins,
and air support for
and armed forces strength estimates:
and army loyalty, investigation by:
Combat Application Group.
Combat Cargo Group. II I
Combat Crew Training Squadron. 4400th:
Commander in Chief, Pacific. Felt. Harry Sharp. Grant; Stump. Felix
Pacific Command
Commander, United States Forces. Vietnam:
Communications intercept missions:
Communications systems. equipment and operations: 55, 81, 106-107, 121, 142-144, 146. 159-160.
172. 177- 178. 22 I. 247
Composite Air Strike Force: 46, 247
Composite Reconnaissance Unit. 363d: 230
Congress
and American commitment: 23
military assistance, amendment to: 190
and reserve units call-up: 65
Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance Squadrons (CAM RON)
23d: 171
33d: 171, 181
34th: 171
41st: 220
Constellation, USS: 230
Convoys. See Motor convoys
Core. USNS: 115
Corps Tactical Zones
I: 106, 140, 142, 145-146, 159. 161. 174, l90,200,211-214,267
II. 106. 121, 129, 137. 140. 142, 173, 175. 177. 190, 200, 211. 219, 240, 253, 265-266
III. 106. 129, 142, 145. 156-157, 175, 177, 179. 182, 190, 197, 199-200, 213-217, 243, 245, 248,
253. 263
IV: 153, 157-159, 172. 175, 177, 179. 182-183, 191, 200, 215, 235. 243. 253, 263
Counterinsurgency
policy of differentiating: 224
RVN concept of 39, 54, 103
Crew chiefs. See Technicians
Cropdestruction missions: 219, 247-250
Cua Ron: 229
Cubi Point, Philippines: 131
Curtis. Victor N.: 247
Czechoslova kia: 5
365
I
Diem, I
advisors criticized by:
and air operations and units. control
and air units commitment:
and American troops commitment:
and armed forces expansion:
and armed forces reorganization:
assassinated:
and bombing operations:
on Cambodia as sanctuary:
Central Intelligence Organization formed by:
charges invasion by North:
and Civil Guard improvement:
and clear-and-bold operations: I19
command structure fixed by.
conspiracies against:
and counterinsurgency operations:
defense treaty with U.S. sought by:
and defoliation project:
on economic assistance:
elected President:
fiscal reforms, promised by:
and government reforms:
infiltration, alarm over:
intelligence activities control by:
jets requested by:
Kennedy program, reaction to:
and expansion:
and MACV activation:
martial law declared by:
and military command formation:
military operations, control by:
and national campaign plan:
and National Internal Security Council:
and navy. formation of
optimism of
plebiscite protested by:
and political disturbances:
popular support lacking:
ranger units activated by:
relations with United States:
religious affiliation:
resettlement project:
residence attacked:
security agency formed by:
strategic hamlets plan:
and supply routes, interdiction of
on tactical air support:
and tactical zones organization:
Taylor evaluation of
threats to government, complaints about:
and training programs:
unification, opposition to:
elimination, estimates for: 153
I
C. Douglas:
Direction finders:
D o Son Airfield: I
Do War Zone:
use by patrols:
Don. Van:
Don Airport:
Dong
Dong River:
William E.:
Doyle. Miles
John Foster:
and American commitment:
on Communist threat:
and Geneva Accords:
and military assistance program:
and military forces of concern for:
plebiscite protested by:
Dunning. John
Eden, Anthony:
Alan C.:
Edwards
Eglin Air Force Base:
Eighth Army:
Eisenhower, Dwight I I,
and air commitment: I 7
ambassadors role strengthened by:
and American
and armed forces strength:
armistice proposals by:
and Chinese intervention:
and defense of
and defense:
government stability, concern for:
and independence movement, policy on:
and Laos. intervention in:
and military assistance programs:
and requisites for French success:
support of
and training programs:
Electricians. See Technicians
Electronic intelligence missions:
Paul
England. See United Kingdom
Equipment losses. See Materiel losses
Escort missions:
I
368
and mobile combat reporting post:
and napalm strikes:
and national campaign plan:
and pilots training program:
on political disturbances;
on province chiefs' meddling:
and reconnaissance MISSIONS
retires:
on supplies
and supply routes, air interdiction of:
and tactical air strikes: I73
and target acquisitions:
and targets in North: I73
training programs:
and troop units commitment:
and flights:
and unified command for Vietnam:
evaluation of
Field Hospital. 8th:
Fighter Commando Squadron.
Fighter Interceptor Squadron. 509th:
Fighter Squadron. 16th:
Finned ammunition:
FLAMING D A R T I and II Operations:
Flares. use of
Fleming, David
I30
Flight Service Center and Network:
Floods. effect on operations:
Food service. deficiencies in:
Foreign Legion:
Michael
Fortified hamlets plan. See Strategic hamlets plan
Forward air controllers:
FRANCE
advisors with
air operations by:
aircraft deliveries to: I.
aircraft losses:
aircraft recovered from:
aircraft strength:
airfield construction and repair:
ammunition deliveries to:
casualties: I
finned missiles. use by:
flight crews. lack of
Foreign Legion:
government, aid in stabilizing:
independence. agreement on:
manpower strength: 10.
materiel losses: I9
military assistance to:
Mobile Group 100:
sorties, number of 7, 19
and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35
supply requirements: 19
supply system and operations: 10
support of war declines: I I
training programs: 36, 49-50
and Vietnam partitioning: 30
Vietnamese, alienation of 17, 23-24, 34
Vietnamese. desertions from: 29 I
on bombing operations:
on Diem support:
and government reforms:
and political disturbances:
and troop units commitment:
Harris, Hunter.
and air operations coordination and control:
and air strikes against North:
and Laos, incursions into:
and low-altitude reconnaissance:
Province:
Haven.
Heat detecting devices:
Heath. Donald 10,
Helicopters
airplane escort of
in airlifts:
armament loads:
Army concept of use:
I
casualties evacuation by:
control by Army:
in gunship role:
losses:
Marine Corps operations:
tactical strikes by:
transfer t o Air Force:
types. Aircraft types
Henderson. Harvey E.: I
HERGERT I8
Albert
Air Force Base:
Hicks, Robert
High National Council.
Highways (numbered). See Routes
Roger
on air power lethality results:
on bombing operations:
on border control operations:
CRITICIZES air and military operations:
and political disturbances:
on tactical air strikes:
Chi Minh
Diem praised by:
and
and independence movement:
intensified operations. reaction
plebiscite, demand for:
support by China and Soviet:
Taylor mission, reaction to:
unification, plans for:
Chi Minh 'Trail:
(religious group):
Holden, Paul:
Me Island:
Island:
Honolulu CONFERENCES See
also Saigon. conferences at
Hue:
Hung
Air Force Base:
Hutchinson, Donald
Identification. friend o r
Indochina (see also each area BY later
allied cooperation in:
American policy toward:
Chinese policy in:
French control o f
geographical features:
independence movement:
Japanese occupation:
Infrared devices:
Harold:
Intelligence collection and reports: 18. 54. 85. 135. 137-138. 152. 157. 163. 169. 179. 199. 227-228.
235.243.245, 250, 261
Inter-Ministry Committee for Strategic Hamlets. RVN: 104
International Control Commission: 30. 40. 50. 53. 85. 100. 162. 189. 230
International Cooperation Administration: 52
Interzone V: 139. I73
373
and communications systems and equipment: 107
and counterinsurgency operations: 54
and defense of RVN: 43
and defoliation project: 112. 247
on Diem crisis. security during: 191
government. concern for stability: 35-36
and helicopters combat role: I62
on intensifying operations against North: 198-190. 201. 203-205
and jets for RVN Air Force: 200. 238. 264. 266
and Laos. incursions into: 64. 204-205. 254
and Laos as infiltration route: 64
and MACV commander authority: 97
and MACV staff structure: 207. 210
and military assistance programs: 6. 35-36
military situation. report on: 179 I
and mixed crews in combat: 82-83, 144. 238
and national campaign plan: 152
and psychological warfare missions: 250 I
314
aggression blunted, belief in:
and air units commitment: I70
and aircraft deliveries t o
assassinated:
and assistance withdrawal threat:
ambassadors. role strengthened by:
civic action program:
and cold-war defense. responsibility for:
on combat developments and test center:
counterinsurgency plans:
and Cuba crisis:
and defoliation project:
on replacement:
economic development program:
and government reforms:
on guerrilla warfare, danger from:
on as MACV commander:
on intensifying operations:
and Laos, intervention in:
expansion:
and military assistance programs:
nuclear tests resumed by:
policy on Vietnam:
and radar facilities:
reserve units. call-up by:
and armed forces expansion:
government, aid to:
Special Forces commitment:
Special Group (Counterinsurgency) formed by:
Taylor mission to government:
training programs expanded by:
troop units commitment by: I
and atrocities:
and VIETNAMIZATION of conflict:
376
Lattre d e Tassigny, Jean de: 10
Lazy Dog finned ammunition: 24-25, 240, 261, 266
Leaflet drops: 37, 122, 196.249, 250
LeMay, Curtis E.: 87
and ADVON reorganization: 100
and air-base defense: 264
and air commando units; 79-84, 100
and Air Force representation on MACV: 101
and air operations policy: 119, 201
and air strikes against North: 201. 204-205. 254
and air units commitment: 90
and aircraft for Army: I 10, 244
and aircraft for RVN Air Force: 168
and aircraft underuse: 125
and airlift operations: 245
and armed C-47 evaluation: 241
and combat role for U.S. Air Force: 132
criticizes air and military operations: 161
on Farm Gate declassification: 170- I7 I
and helicopters as gunships: 225, 236
on intensifying operations against North: 203
and joint operations center: 142
and Laos, incursions into: 64-65, 227, 257
and MACV staff structure: 97-98, 210
and mixed crews in combat: 132
and options for action against North: 234
and RVN Air Force combat effectiveness: 131-132
strategic plans, disagreement with: 152
and troop units commitment: 90
on Vietnam policy: 91
Lemnitzer, Lyman L.: 66
and air commando missions: 83
and clear-and-hold operations: I19
and command structure: 44
and government reforms: 67
on mixed crews in combat: 84
on troop units commitment: 69
Lenin, Nikolai: 55
Lloyd, Robert M.: 17
Lodge, Henry Cabot
and air power, RVN failure to use: 197
and air strikes against North: 206
and assistance withdrawal threat: 188-189
becomes ambassador: I86
and conspiracies against Diem: 186
o n Diem-Nhu replacement: 188-190
on intensifying operations against North: 202-205
Khanh. assessment of 198
on motivating Vietnamese: 192
and political disturbances: 187-188
and political reforms: 191
resigns: 210
Logistical operations and systems. See Supply operations and systems
Long An Province: 198. 200
377
Long My:
Loudspeaker, use of:
Ma River:
Douglas:
Sam, I.
Mail service:
Maintenance crews. Technicians
Maintenance and repair: IO.
Roger
Pass:
Manila:
Mansfield. Mike:
379
Medical Air Evacuation Group. 6481st: 31
Medical services: 3 I. 122. 125. 2 19, 260, 267
Meier, Henry C . : 176
Mekong Delta. operations in: 34. 3'7. 49. 72. 74, 153. 157. 177. 179. 183. 204. 21 7. 221
Mellish, David S.: 174. 215
Mendenhall. Joseph A,: 189
Mendes-France. Pierre: 30. 33
Military Air Transport Service: 3 1, 8 I
Military assistance advisory groups
Air Force Army representation on: 47, 49
local air forces. developing: 48
military assistance, role in: 4 7 4 8
Military Assistance Program
annual allotments: 151
priorities in: 7
Military Revolutionary Council. RVN: 191. 233
Military Sea Transport Service: 31
Milton. Theodore R.: 54. I I I
Minh. Duong Van: 186. 190-191. 195. 198, 233-234
Minh, Tran Van: 267
Minh. Tri Pham: 77
Minigun. See Gatling gun
Mining operations by Viet Cong: 183
Misawa Air Base: 229
Missile assaults: 230. 257
Mobile combat reporting post: 74. 82
Mobile Communications Group, 1st: 107
Mobile Group 100: 30
Molotov. Vyacheslav M.: 30
Monroe Doctrine: 58
Montagnards: 73. 116-1 17. 173. 179
Moody Air Force Base: 130
Moore, Joseph H.: 209
and advisors grades: 216
and air base defense: 253
and air escort missions: 225
and air-ground liaison: 216
and air operations coordination and control: 21 I . 216. 225
and aircraft strength expansion: 217. 238
commands 2d Air Division: 208
and helicopters as gunships: 236
and helicopters. removal from air bases: 264
and infrared reconnaissance: 244
and jets. use of 264
and joint air operations center: 221
Joint General Staff. liaison with: 217
and Laos. incursions into: 257
and liaison and strike aircraft shortage: 238
and MACV staff structure: 208
and mixed crews in combat: 218, 264
and RVN Air Force organization: 21 I
and tactical air support controls: 216-217
and tactical air support missions: 217
380
Thomas
and reorganization:
and airlift operations:
and defoliation project: I16
heads mobile strike force:
and self-sustaining Air Force:
Morale status
American:
Air Force:
armed forces:
Viet
Morse. Wayne
Mortar assaults, by Viet
Morton.
Motor convoys
support missions for: I78
Viet attacks on:
Mountbatten. Louis:
Eugene
Mule Train:
Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949):
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1950):
My Tho:
Air Base:
Dong:
Napalm strikes: IO.
Nape road bridges:
Wilfred C.:
Frank C.:
National Intelligence Agency.
National Liberation Front (Viet
National Security Council
and air strikes against North:
and Communist expansion. threat of
and defense of Vietnam:
and Diem support:
on intensifying operations against North:
and Laos. incursions into:
and military assistance program:
military operations, proposals for:
and naval patrols resumption:
and armed forces expansion:
and training programs:
on troop units commitment:
Eugene:
Navigation systems:
New Times:
New Zealand: See Royal New Zealand Air Force
Ralph
I
I
Nha Trang Airfield: 10-1 I , 15, 36, 50, 96, 101, 107, 125, 127, 132, 142, 148, 151, 154-155, 168,
171. 176-177, 181, 185, 211, 239,.246-247. 263, 274-275
Nhu, Madame Ngo Dinh: 163-186
Nhu, Ngo Dinh: 34. 56, 58, 104, 129, 139. 165. 185-191. Seealso Diem. Ngo Dinh
Night operations
by RVN forces: 96, 127-128, 132, 168, 174-175, 182-183. 214, 224. 244, 247, 259-260
by Viet Cong: 253, 260
by Vier Minh: 22
Night-vision devices: 148
Nixon, Richard M.: 33
Nolting. Frederick E.: 87
and ADVON operations: 95-96, 101
and air commando units: 81-82
and air operations, restrictions on: 172
and aircraft deliveries to RVN air force: 75, 131
and American combat role: 170
and Cambodia border violations: 141
and defense treaty with United States: 73
and defoliation project: 113, 116-1 17
Diem reassured on U.S. support: 149
on Diem reply to Kennedy program: 94
on Diem support: I88
and jets for RVN Air Force: 129
and Kennedy comprehensive plan: 71
and napalm strikes: 141
on relations with RVN: 166, I85
and tactical air control: 83
and tactical air strikes: 129. 137-139
North American Aviation. Inc.: 214
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 5
North Vietnam (see also Ho Chi Minh)
aggression by affirmed: 100
air strikes against: 230
aircraft strength: 230
airlifts of troops and supplies: 128-129
Communist control of: 34
Diem overthrow exploited by: 191
independence proclaimed: 4
invades South: 53
migration to South: 3 I , 34
navy, assaults by: 229. 232
Nhu contact with: 189
number in South: 198
peace negotiations rejected by: 206
population: 34
recognition by China and Soviet: 5
regular forces move to South: 204, 227
supply system and operations: 195. 198
Taylor mission. reaction to: 85
on USAF combat role: 100, 162
and Viet Cong expansion: I63
Northern Air Materiel Area Pacific: 42
Nuclear weapons
considerations on use: 29. 64-65
382
in test exercise: 46
Pacific Command (see also Felt. Harry D.; Sharp. Ulysses S. Grant; Stump, Felix B.)
in command structure: 41. 43-44. 46, 65
territorial area: 46
Pacific Fleet: 44, 219, 229. 232
Pacification, effect of air operations on: 236-238
Page Communications Engineers, Inc,: 107
Pakistan: 35
Paramilitary units: 67-68, 152, 157. 225. See also Civil Guard; Civilian Irregular Defense Groups;
Montagnards: Popular Forces; Regional Forces; Self-Defense Corps
Paratroopers. See Airborne operations
Paris. airlift from: 22
Parrot's Beak: 136
Partridge. Earle E.
and air operations conduct: 29
and American commitment: 29
begins U S A F withdrawal: 31
383
I
in command structure: 41
logistics, control by: 42
and military assistance program: 24-25, 31
Passman, Otto E.: 185
Pathet Lao: 63, 204, 268
Patricia Lynn: I71
Patrols
ground: 179
naval: 227-229, 234-235, 266
Pay service: 125
People's Revolutionary Party (North Vietnam): 103
Personnel carriers: 157-158, 260
Petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL). See Fuel supplies
Phan Thiet: 21 5
Philippine Air Lines: 3 I
Philippines
in command structure: 44
nationals. evacuation of: 31
and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35
supply organization in: 42
Phnom Penh: 129, 163
Pho Sinh: 182
Photographic reconniassance missions: 74-75. 127, 135, 138, 147-148, 168, 241-243
Phu Quoc Island: 141
Phu Yen Province: 116-1 17, 236
Phuc Yen: 230. 235,254
Phuoc Long Province: 117, 145, 156
Phuoc Thanh Province: 75, 156, 174,250
Phuoc Tuy Province: 200,2 15,245.26 I , 266267
Phuoc Vinh: 72
Pilots
civilian. See Civil Air Transport
friction with Vietnamese: I 10
training programs. See Training programs
Plain of Jars: 204-205, 233
Plain of Reeds: 53, 157
Pleiku: 30, 53, 56, 83, 106-107, 122, 127, 129, 132-133, 136, 142, 147, 151, 169, 171, 174-176,
2 I I . 263. 265-266, 275
Pleiku Province: 263
Pleven, 18
Poland: 25
Polei Kleng: 122
Polei Krong: 122
Pope Air Force Base: 108, I 1 1 - 1 12
Popular Forces, RVN. 177, 215. 225
Porter. Daniel B., Jr.: 158
Porter, John M.: 220
I
Potsdam Conference (1945): 4
Power plants, strikes against: 173
Press reports. effect of 163, 170, 185- 186, 257
Preston, Benjamin S.. Jr.: 213-214, 220 I
384
I
Gilbert
Propaganda by Viet
Robert
Psychological warfare missions:
Duc Province:
Province:
Tin Province:
I85
Quartermaster Airborne Supply and Packaging Company,
Quarters. conditions in:
Qui
Reconnaissance Squadron,
Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, 13th:
Red River and Delta:
Refueling operations:
Region Viet
Regional Forces,
Religious groups. demonstrations by:
Republic of Korea
supply organization in:
war in:
Republic of Vietnam (See also Diem,
American troop strength in:
border defenses: I72
Cambodia. relations with:
economy, plans for improving:
elections in: I ,
financial procedures, improving:
government stability. concern over:
independence :
infiltration by North:
materiel delivered to, value of
migration from North:
military staff inaction, effects of
political disturbances in: 58.
population:
provincial organization:
provisional government recognized: I
terrain features:
warfare begins in: 53
Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF). See also Republic of Vietnam armed forces
air crews, combat effectiveness: 176-1 77
air defense by: 128, 131
airborne operations. See Airborne operations
and aircraft assignment and control: 107-108, 142
aircraft deliveries to: 49-50, 52. 54-55, 75. 127. 132-133, 151, 153-154, 179, 238-239, 243, 251,
263, 267-268
airlifts of troops and supplies. See Airlifts of troops and supplies
combat effectiveness: 67. 75
command positions, Army officers in: 50
equipment shortages: 179, 239
ground crews effectiveness: 132
morale status: 18 1, 2 I7
organization and strength: 37-39, 49. 75, 153, 207
organizational unity: 133
pilots, combat effectiveness of 50, 54. 127, 131-132
relations with U.S. Air Force: 42
resources parceling by: 21 I
scramble time: 132. 175, 182, 2I5
sorties, numberflown: 55.67, 131-133, 149,
squadrons renumbered: 133
surprise applied by: 219
Taylor Report on: 86
training programs: IO, 36, 50. 79-84, 125. 127-128, 131, 134, 147, 151-152, 154. 168, 179, 219.
22 I , 239,243. 25 1
units activated: 50
62d Tactical Wing: 263
1st Air Transport Group: 50,55. 108, 131
1st Liaison Group: IO, 36
43d Transport Group: 243
1st Air Transport Squadron: 50
1st Fighter Squadron: 50, 54-55, 127. 129. 132
1st Helicopter Squadron: 50, 55
1st Liaison Squadron: 50, 127
1st Radar Squadron: 74
2d Air Transport Squadron: 50
2d Fighter Squadron: 127, 131-132
2d Liaison Squadron: 50. 127
3d Liaison Squadron: 127
I
I 10th Liaison Squadron: 176
I I 2th Liaison Squadron: 177. 2 15
116th Liaison Squadron: 239
122d Liaison Squadron: 177
312th Special Mission Squadron: 10
514th Fighter Squadron: 175, 179, 213-215
5 16th Fighter Squadron: 179. 2 19-220, 224, 238, 259. 263
518th Fighter Squadron: 212-213
520th Fighter Squadron: 220, 238
716th Composite Reconnaissance Squadron: 147, 212,
Republic of Vietnam armed forces
casualties: 145, 156-158. 177, 179. 184, 191, 196-197. 266
civil affairs, neglect of 54
Civil Guard: 37, 39, 54. 65-66, 67, 71-73, 184-185. 191
3 86
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups:
Combat Developments and Test Center:
commands, discontent in:
counterinsurgency operations:
desertions from:
discontent over Diem policies:
intelligence collection dissemination:
joint operations center:
materiel losses:
morale status:
offensive actions, number of
organization and strength:
paramilitary units:
Popular Forces:
psychological warfare campaigns:
Regional Forces:
security systems:
Self-Defense Corps:
supply operations and systems:
388
conference at: 119. 212. See also Honolulu conferences
operations in and around: 49, 56. 103-104, 145, 177, 196, 248,255, 261. 266
political disturbances in: 185-187, 192, 266-267
a s special tactical zone: 68
troop unit arrivals in: 17
Viet Minh control of 3-4
Saigon River: 204
Saipan, USS: 24
Salan. Raoul: 10
Sandborn. Richard T.: 217
Sanders, William B.: 24-25
Schell, D.F.: 180
Scobel. Uwe-Thorsten: 199
Seaborn. James B.: 206
Sealift of troops: 154
Search-and-clear missions: 214, 219
Search-and-destroy missions: 104. 128
Search-and-rescue missions: 50. 170, I83
Security measures: 17
Self-Defense Corps, RVN: 37. 39. 66, 67. 71-72, 191
Sercel. John: I72
Seven Mountains: 172. 178
Seventh Fleet: 22, 259, 266
Shank, Edwin G.. Jr.: 213, 218
Sharp, Ulysses S. Grant: 209
and air base defense: 233
and air operations coordination and control: 232
and air strikes against North: 229. 232, 235, 253
and aircraft assignment and replacement: 212
appointed CINCPAC: 210
and covert operations against North: 233
and Laos. incursions into: 233, 256. 259
and low-altitude reconnaissance: 243
and MACV staff structure: 210
and naval patrols: 233
and troop units commitment: 233
and troop units strength, expanding: 228
Shaughnessy. John F.. Jr.: 170
Shaw Air Force Base: 74
Shofner, Floyd D.: 108
Side-firing system: 240
Sides. J. H.: 87
Sihanouk, Norodom: 140-141. 199
Slavich. Ivan L.: 164
Smart. Jacob E.: 209
and advisors in combat role: 219
and aircraft assignment and replacement: 213
and 8-57 for contingency use: 218
Chiang. conference with: 188
and corps, assignment of aircraft to: 2 I 1
and Diem crisis: 189
and Hail finned missile: 208
at Honolulu conference: 192
and MACV staff structure: 207-208. 210
389
on tactical air support missions: 213
Smith. Frederic H., Jr.: 46
Smith. Sory: 4 1 4 3
Smith, Walter B.: 3 I
Smoke bombs and markers: 128. 174, 224, 247
Soc Trang Airfield: 133, 171, 177, 183-184, 213, 215, 260
South Korea. See Republic of Korea
South Vietnam. See Republic of Vietnam
Southeast Asia Airlift System: I I 1-1 12, 156. 167. 236, 246
Southeast Asia Command: 4
Southeast Asia Defense Treaty (1954-55): 35
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 35, 58,203
Southern Air Materiel Area Pacific: 42, 50
Soviet Union
armistice proposals: 30
and Geneva Accords: 31, 203
intervention. threat of 203
and Laos. cease-fire in: 64
military assistance by: 17-18, 103, 128, 199
nuclear explosions by: 65
Taylor mission. reaction to: 85
and Viet Cong expansion: 163
West Berlin. threats to: 65
Spare parts: 50
Spears. Ken C.. Jr.: 197
Special Aerial Spray Flight: I12
Special Air Warfare Center: 240
Special Assistant t o the Director for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities: 105
Special Forces
American: 53. 73. 82, 155-156. 172-173. 179. 224. 246-247
Republic of Vietnam: 145-146. 175. 187, 191. 239
Staley, Eugene: 71-72
State, Department of. See Acheson. Dean: Rusk. Dean
Stead Air Force Base: 79
Steel plants, strikes against: 173
Sternberg, Ben: 207
Stilwell, Richard G.: 208
Strategic Air Command: 195. 227. 230. 264
Strike Command: 160. 229
Students, demonstrations by: 233
Stump, Felix B.
and air units. control of 44
and American commitment: 29
and command structure: 41-44
and defense of RVN: 43
and military assistance programs: 41-42
and mobile forces. reliance on: 46
Sullivan, William H.: 199. 204
Supply operations and systems
Air Force organization for: 42, 45, 47-48. 108
Air Force withdrawal from: 3 1
air units, commitment of 17
aircraft. use in. See Airlifts of troops and supplies
American: 15. 24
390
centralization of
French: 10
in Laos:
losses in. See Materiel losses
North Vietnamese:
reserve stocks, lack of
Republic of Vietnam:
surface vessels in: I24
suspension of I
I
Minh:
Support Group, 6499th:
Sweeney. Walter C.,
Sweet Sue:
Air Base:
Tactical Air Command:
Tactical Air Reconnaissance Center:
Tacticalairsupport:
613th:
614th:
615th:
Tactical Fighter Wing. 405th:
Tactical Groups
34th:
Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron,
Tactical Support Groups
6009th:
6010th:
Tactical Wing,
Taiwan:
Air Base. Thailand:
Tam
Tan Airfield:
Tan Son Nhut Airfield: 10 I IO,
I
Tay Ninh Province: 37. 157, 174. 177. 214
Taylor, Maxwell, D: 87
and advisors. number of 190
and advisors in combat role: :219
and air strikes against North: 205-206, 233, 253-35, 261. 266
and aircraft strength expansion: 218. 263
appointed ambassador: 210. 227
authority in military affairs: 227
and covert actions against North: 233. 255
and crop-destruction project: 248
and Diem-Nhu replacement: 190
and government. stability for: 228, 255-256, 259
and helicopters as gunships: 2 19
hostilities end. prediction of: 190
and infiltration routes interdiction: 255
on intensifying operations against North: 192. 198, 204. 228
and jets for RVN Air Force: 264-265
Khanh government, assessment of: 227. 232
and Laos, incursions into: 233, 255-256
and MACV staff structure: 208. 210
and mixed crews in combat: 238 !
and naval patrols resumption: 233
missions to RVN: 77. 84-89. 190. 202
and options for action against North: 233
on political conditions in RVN: I79
and reconnaissance missions over North: 233
Special Group (Counterinsurgency) headed by: 105
Tchepone: 74, 205.257
Technicians
commitment t o Vietnam: 15, 17
French lack of 34
training programs: 10
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission: 53
Terrain. effect on operations: 26, 157. 169. 177, 221, 261
Terry, Ronald W.: 241
Thailand
air strikes from: 173
aircraft strength in: 268
Diem crisis, reaction to: I88
mobile strike force test: 46
and Southeast Asia Defense Treaty: 35
supply organization for: 42
threats to: 15
Thanh Phu District: 214
Thant, U: 188-189
Thompson. Robert G. K.: 91. 103-104. 165
Throckmorton. J o h n L.: 210
Thua Thien Province: I I 7
Ticonderoga. USS: 229-230, 232
Timmes, Charles J.: 97, 137
Tonkin: 4-6, I I . 15-17
Tourane. See Da Nang
Traffic control: I 3 I
392
Transport Squadrons, Provisional
1st: I IO. I12
2d: Ill
Trapnell. Thomas J. 10. 16
Tribal Area Development Program: 69
Troop Carrier Group: 171, 236. 246. 248
Troop Carrier Squadrons
309th: 171
310th: 171. 247
311th: 171
346th: 108
773d: 58
776th: 108
777th: I I I . 167
Troop Carrier Wings
62d: 22
314th: 230
463d: 230
464th: 112
483d: 16
516th: 230
Truehart, William C.: 186
Truman. Harry 6
Trung Lap: 221
Tuan Giao: 25
Tunis. airlift from: 22
Tuy Hoa: 151
Twining. Nathan 38
and Air Force expansion: 41
French air operations. evaluation by: 34
and military assistance program: 23
and organizational pattern, RVN Air Force: 37-39
Tyrell. Robert L. 186
393
war materiel. embargo on: 5
United States Air Force
advisors. See Advisors
and air units commitment: 70. 74
airborne operations. See Airborne operations
aircraft for Army needs: I 10
aircraft deliveries to RVN Air Force: 131. 133. 148. 167-168, 171-172. 208, 212-213. 219.
229-230, 238. 250. 268
airlifts by. See Airlifts of troops and supplies
Army. rivalry with: 148
combat role situation: 100-101. 138-139
counterinsurgency units: 79-84
first units committed: I I
expansion program: 42
MACV staff. representation on: 97. 207-208. 210-21
morale status: 82. 122. 181. 214
personnel strength. See Advisors
policy direction. role in: 207
relations with RVN: 42
sorties. number flown: 108. 135, 144. 148, 167. 174. 81. 184. 191, 238. 251. 264
Taylor report. reaction to: 90
tenant status at airfields: 123
on troop units commitment: 68
turnaround time rates: 181
unit reorganization: 171
weapons development by: 240-241
on Wheeler assessment: 162- I63
United States Air Force Council: 37-38
United States Air Force Pacific: 43-44
United States Air Force Reserve: 65, 236
United States Army
and air base defense: 264
Air Force. rivalry with: 148
and air operations coordination and control: 143
aircraft assignments: 21 5
aircraft losses: 246. 260, 265-266
aircraft strength: 148
communications systems: 221
defoliation and crop-destruction projects: 248 I
394
Aviation Company:
Aviation Company: I8 I
Helicopter Company:
Special Air Warfare Detachment:
United States Army, Pacific:
United States Army Security Agency:
United States Army Support Command, Saigon:
United States Army Support Command, Vietnam:
United States Army Support Group, Vietnam:
United States Forces. Japan:
United States Forces, Korea:
United States Forces. Vietnam:
United States Marine Corps
and air base defense:
and air operations coordination and control:
helicopter deliveries t o Air Force:
helicopter operations by:
Helicopter Squadron: I75
troop strength in Vietnam:
troop units commitment:
United States Military Assistance Advisory Group. Indochina (see also Harkins, Paul McGARR
Lionel C.):
activation and mission:
Air Force representation on:
air patrols proposed by:
and aircraft for Air Force:
and airlifts. control of
arrivals:
in command structure:
and counterinsurgency operations:
defoliation project:
functions shifted to MACV:
inactivated:
MACV, relationship with:
military assistance programs, role in:
ORGANIZATION and strength:
and photographic jets for Air Force:
training programs:
United States Military Assistance Command, Laos:
United States Military Assistance Command. Vietnam (MACV). See also Harkins, Paul
Westmoreland. William C .
activated:
Air Force representation: I
deputy commander authorized:
Geneva Accords violation affirmed:
relationship with:
organization and staff structure:
personnel strength:
United States Navy
and air base defense:
air operations by:
aircraft deliveries to Air Force:
aircraft losses:
Amphibious Group One:
escort missions: 25
patrol operations: 227-229. 234-235. 266
personnel strength in Vietnam: 151
I
pilot training program: 219
VA-I52 Squadron: 219-220
United States Navy. Pacific: 43, 48
United States Taiwan Defense command: 44.97
396
supply operations and systems: 18
withdrawal t o North: 30
Vietnam, State of
air force activation and strength: 10, 36
aircraft deliveries to: 10, 16
American recognition of 5
armed forces effectiveness: 36
armed forces expansion: 10
armistice supervision: 30-3 I
demarcation line agreed on: 30
elections scheduled: 30
refugees. evacuation by aircraft: 31, 32
withdrawals by U.S. Air Force: 31
Vietnam Coordinating Committee: 199. 204
Vinh: 173. 205. 228-230
Vinh Binh: 121
Vinh Binh Province: 239, 266
Vinh, Kuan: 209
Voice of America: 187
Von Hake, Richard W.: 196
Vung Ro Bay: 266
Vung Tau Airfield: 50, 52. 110. 113. 261
397
and pilot training program:
and Special Forces units:
and supply operations:
and tactical air support:
on target acquisition:
and troop units strength, expanding:
success, concern over:
Wheeler, EARLE
and air operations coordination and control:
and aircraft strength expansion:
on intensifying operations against North:
and MACV staff structure:
and options for actions against North:
and tactical air control:
Vietnam situation, assessment of
White, Thomas
White phosphorus bombs:
John
Williams, Samuel
Wilson, Charles E.:
Wilson,
Women in forces:
Cut:
Air Base:
Robert
Eugene,