Campaign Planning Handbook: Academic Year 2020
Campaign Planning Handbook: Academic Year 2020
HANDBOOK
The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Middle States Commission
on Higher Education (MSCHE), 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, 19104, (267) 284-5000. MSCHE is an institutional accrediting
agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for
Higher Education Accreditation. Initial accreditation was granted in 2004.
Table of Contents
Page
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………….…..1
CHAPTER 1: National Strategic Direction and Guidance..............................................3
Strategic Direction………………………………………………………………………..3
National Level Strategic Documents…………………………………………………...5
DoD/Joint Staff Level Documents .......................................................................... 7
Theater Level Documents .................................................................................... 16
CCDR dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs and Planning) .... 18
FDOs/FROs ......................................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER 2: Joint Planning ...................................................................................... 27
Integrated Context ............................................................................................. 27
Multi-National Planning ...................................................................................... 28
Unified Action .................................................................................................... 29
Joint Planning .................................................................................................... 29
JPEC ................................................................................................................. 30
Strategic and Contingency Planning .................................................................. 32
Conceptual to Detailed Planning ....................................................................... 34
Campaigning ..................................................................................................... 37
Detailed Planning .............................................................................................. 38
Risk ................................................................................................................... 39
CHAPTER 3: Operational Design .............................................................................. 43
Purpose ............................................................................................................... 43
The Spectrum of Design ..................................................................................... 43
Joint and Army Design......................................................................................... 43
Elements of Operational Design .......................................................................... 45
Divergence and Convergence ............................................................................. 46
Frames ............................................................................................................... 47
Conducting Operational Design – Methodology ................................................... 48
o Understand and Frame Strategic Guidance ............................................ 49
o Understand and Frame the Environment ............................................ 51
o Understand and Frame the problem ................................................... 57
o Develop an Operational Approach ...................................................... 61
Organizing for Operational Design Work ............................................................. 69
Link between Operational Design, Planning, Execution and Assessment ........... 73
Reframing ............................................................................................................ 75
CHAPTER 4: Joint Planning Process ........................................................................ 77
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 77
Initiate Planning ................................................................................................... 79
Conduct Mission Analysis .................................................................................... 80
Develop Courses of Action .................................................................................. 93
Analyze Courses of Action ................................................................................. 107
Courses of Action Comparison .......................................................................... 114
i
Approve a Course of Action ............................................................................... 117
Develop the Plan ............................................................................................... 122
CHAPTER 5: Development of Theater Strategy and Campaign Plans ...................... 133
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 133
Sources of Guidance and Direction for Theater Strategy ................................... 135
Components of Theater Strategy ................................................................... 136
Using Operational Design for Building a Theater Strategy ........................... 139
The Combatant Command Campaign Plan ....................................................... 145
Components of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan .................................. 147
Appendix A – Management and Review of campaign and Contingency Plans ................ A-1
Appendix B – Combined / Joint Task Force Headquarters .......................................... B-1
Appendix C – PMESII Systems Construct ................................................................... C-1
Appendix D – OPORD Format with Staff Estimate Information .................................... D-1
Appendix E – Commander’s Estimate Format ............................................................. E-1
Appendix F – Reference Times ................................................................................... F-1
Appendix G – Operation Assessment .......................................................................... G-1
The most current doctrinal publications and CJCS guidance can be found at The CJCS
Directives Library at http://www.jcs.mil/Library/ and the Joint Electronic Library at
http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/
ii
List of Figures
iii
List of Figures (continued)
4-16 Sample COA Decision Brief Agenda ........................................................... 119
4-17 Sample Commander’s Estimate .................................................................. 121
4-18 JPP Step 7: Develop the Plan ..................................................................... 122
5-1 Example Theater Strategy Depiction .......................................................... 145
5-2 Campaign and Contingency Planning ........................................................ 147
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Introduction
The purpose of this document is to assist United States Army War College students
during the Military Strategy and Campaigning (MSC) course. It also serves to assist
commanders, planners, and other staff officers in combatant commands (CCMD), joint
task forces (JTF), and service component commands. It supplements joint doctrine and
contains elements of emerging doctrine as practiced globally by joint force commanders
(JFCs). It portrays a way to apply published doctrine and emerging doctrine at the
higher levels of joint command, with a primary emphasis at the combatant command
level.
In the wake of the publication of the National Defense Strategy and National Military
Strategy, campaign planning has received renewed attention within the Department of
Defense. As directed by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, combatant commanders and subordinate commanders develop a
comprehensive set of nested strategies and plans that must address global priorities
while incorporating regional or functional strategies and campaign objectives which are
supported by other specific plans like theater security cooperation, contingency, and
posture plans. All of these are developed in a dynamic strategic environment
characterized by ongoing operations and variable national guidance.
While joint and Service doctrine remain authoritative sources for planning, this
handbook provides ideas and insights for those charged with developing theater
strategies and campaign plans, whether as a coordinating authority or as a collaborator.
This handbook focuses at the combatant command and subordinate joint force
command levels. In some cases, where there are apparent differences between joint
and Service doctrine, the handbook reconciles the differences where possible and
focuses on "best practices" for theater commanders.
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CHAPTER 1: NATIONAL STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE
3
Figure 1-1: Strategic Direction
4
JRS – Joint Regional Strategies [Dept of State and USAID]
JFS – Joint Functional Strategies [Dept of State]
NDS – National Defense Strategy (Classified document)
NMS – National Military Strategy (Classified document)
NSS – National Security Strategy
MRRs – Mission Resource Requests [Dept of State]
PDs – Presidential Directives [currently titled National Security Presidential Memorandums]
POTUS – President of the United States
PlanOrd – Planning Order
RCP – Regional Campaign Plans (developed by Coordinating Authorities) (Classified document)
SECSTATE – Secretary of State
SOCs – Summary of Conclusions [from NSC meetings]
Subordinate Campaign Plans (Classified document)
TDP – Theater Distribution Plan (Classified document)
TPP – Theater Posture Plan (Classified document)
UCP – Unified Command Plan
5
decision-making style. These directives have been labeled by different names under
different administrations: National Security Directives (NSDs) under G. W. Bush;
Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) under Barack Obama; and National Security
Presidential Memorandums by President Donald Trump.
f. Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) [Dept of State and USAID] - This DOS-USAID
plan is a blueprint for investing in America’s future and
achieving the goals the President laid out in the NSS. It lays
out strategic goals and objectives for four years and includes
key performance goals for each objective. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)
6
j. Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) [USAID] - The country
development cooperation strategy is a five-year country-level
strategy that focuses on USAID implemented assistance, including
nonemergency humanitarian and transition assistance and related
USG non-assistance tools. (JP 5-0, p. II-3)
a. National Defense Strategy (NDS) – Congress mandated that the SECDEF write
a NDS every four years. Although a classified document, an unclassified summary
provides the essence of the strategy.
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b. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (classified document) – This document is
focused on force development. It provides direction to the Services on what capabilities
to prioritize, guidance to the CCMDs on which Services will “own” which bases within
their AOR, and guidance to the planning community on resource prioritization (e.g.
budget, personnel, etc.). This document informs the GFMIG, GFMAP, TPPs, and TDPs.
The 2018 NMS (Figure 1-3), consistent with the Joint Strategic Planning System
(page 12), is the way CJCS executes the NDS. It describes new trends in the strategic
environment, including: the return of great power competition with others having global
reach, the homeland no longer being a sanctuary, and every domain (land, air, sea,
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space, cyberspace) being contested by capable potential adversaries are the most
important. The NMS calls for increased joint capabilities, integrated globally, and
capable across all domains.
The document directs the joint force to be capable across five mission areas:
Respond to threats
Deter strategic attack (and proliferation of WMD)
Deter conventional attack
Assure allies and partners
Compete below the level of armed conflict (with a military dimension)
The Joint Force will be employed using a concept of Dynamic Force Employment
(DFE) which is intended to create and maintain a sufficient readiness level across the
joint force for contingency operations including large scale combat, while providing the
required day-to-day operations, activities, and investments necessary to shape the
strategic environment. The NMS highlights the key role of allies and partners in
contributing to world-wide common goals. Another facet of force employment is the
exercise program that serves to sharpen U.S. joint and multinational force capability and
capacities across all domains.
Force development and force design are directed by the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations (CCJO). This is the overarching framework that will ultimately drive the
required investment in material and personnel to achieve and maintain competitive
military advantage over time across the globe and across all domains.
d. Force Employment. A key element of the NDS is the resourcing that will provide
for “lethal, agile, and resilient force posture and employment.” The NDS posits a Global
Operating Model philosophy that directs a Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept.
The CJCS executes DFE via a Force Management Framework that will use the Global
Force Management process.
The Global Operating Model broadly describes the types of forces that will execute
the day-to-day operations and activities around the globe and surge forward in crisis to
control escalation or fight and win. At any particular time the armed forces will sit in one
of four layers. Contact forces will compete below the level of armed conflict. Blunt forces
will delay, degrade, and deny adversary aggression. Surge forces will deploy into
theater to manage conflict escalation and win in the case of open hostilities. Homeland
forces ensure the territorial integrity of the United States and the safety of the American
people. DFE balances the requirement for an actively employed joint force that operates
around the world with the necessity for a credible and capable surge capability. This is
“top down” driven by national leadership rather than “bottom up” where combatant
commanders’ perceived needs had the effect of reducing overall force readiness to
unacceptable levels. The Global Force Management process will be discussed below.
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Figure 1-4: Global Force Management
(1) Global Force Management (GFM) is the process the SECDEF (advised by
the CJCS) uses to identify service specific forces and establishes how they flow to
combatant commanders for employment. The GFM process allows SecDef to
strategically manage US Armed Forces to accomplish priority
missions assigned to the CCDRs, enabling the DOD to meet the
intent of the strategic guidance contained in the [NDS], NMS,
UCP, CPG, and Defense Planning Guidance. This is accomplished
via three related processes: assignment, allocation, and
apportionment. The assignment and allocation processes allow
SecDef to distribute forces to the CCDRs in a resource-informed
manner while assessing the risks to current operations and
missions; potential future contingencies; and the health,
readiness, and availability of the current and future force. (JP
5-0, p. E-1)
10
Figure 1-5: Assignment, Apportionment, and Allocation
11
e. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) – The 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the CJCS to perform six statutory functions:
The enclosures to the JSPS align the process to the six functions. The strategic
direction function is largely accomplished by the National Military Strategy described
above. The force employment part of global military integration is also described above.
The strategic and contingency planning function is described below.
12
(1) Strategic and Contingency Planning:
13
Figure 1-7: Coordinating Authority
14
applicable DOD agencies for preparation of plans based on
current military capabilities. The JSCP operationalizes the NMS
and nests with the strategic direction delineated by the NSS,
NDS, and the DOD’s planning and resourcing guidance provided in
the CPG. The JSCP also provides integrated planning guidance and
direction for planners. (JP 5-0, p. II-7)
15
agreements. The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5,
is the lead directorate for posture issues. In that role, the
directorate coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on
global defense posture issues, such as force management and
prepositioned equipment, and introduces posture recommendations
to the Department of Defense’s senior body overseeing global
defense posture, the Global Posture Executive Council. The
primary Joint Staff forum for reviewing posture issues and
recommendations is the Operations Deputies Tank. As required,
posture issues and recommendations are elevated for
consideration in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank. (CJCSI 3100.01D,
Joint Strategic Planning System)
The JSCP provides Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Globally Integrated Base Plan
(GIBP), and directs three other types of campaign plans:
a. Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)
b. Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)
c. Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs)
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resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives. A CCP has a five
year planning horizon. (From JP 5-0, p. II-4)
17
and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. A strategy
should describe the ends as directed in strategic guidance and
the ways and means to attain them. A strategy should begin with
the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format
for a strategy, it may include the commander’s vision, mission,
challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources.
CCDRs employ strategies to align and focus efforts and resources
to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies, and
support and advance US interests. To support this, strategies
normally emphasize security cooperation activities, force
posture, and preparation for contingencies. Strategies typically
employ military engagement, close cooperation with DOS,
embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy
should be informed by the means or resources available to
support the attainment of designated end states and may include
military resources, programs, policies, and available funding.
CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and
supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination with other
USG departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR
operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan. (JP 5-0,
p. II-9)
5. CCDR Dialogue with National Leaders (Military Options, COAs, and Planning).
a. A major responsibility of the CCDR is to assist the CJCS in advising the President
and SecDef on the use of military power to achieve national objectives. Civilian leaders
often ask for military options to help them visualize “the art of the possible” during the
development of policy objectives, and CCDRs often discuss military options to help map
out the policy boundaries that inform planning. These dialogues play out along a
spectrum from the conceptual to the detailed. Civilian and military actors use various
terms to describe similar types of advice, and terms are often used dissimilarly by
different actors. The United States Army War College attempts to align its lexicon with
concepts found in JP 5-0, such that:
Conceptual discussions most often lead to “Military Options,” while
detailed discussions most often lead to “Courses of Action (COAs).”
(Figure 1-10)
“Options” often produce multiple potential mission statements, while
COAs all develop from one mission statement.
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Figure 1-10: Options and COAs
Flexible Deterrent Options and Flexible Response Options (as defined by joint doctrine)
are subordinate to, or equal to, COAs for the reasons articulated below.
The phrase “military options” first appeared in doctrine in the 16 June 2017 edition of
Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning. Although the phrase is not explicitly defined, it is
explained on page I-1 as follows. “Joint planning identifies military
options the President can integrate with other instruments of
military power (diplomatic, economic, informational) to achieve
those national objectives.” Two sentences later the publication indicates that
the minimum essential elements of a military option are objectives and military end
states.
To provide the proper political context, it is reasonable to add the policy goals (or
outcomes) that the military options would achieve. In addition, stating termination
criteria implies more than just the military end state desired, and leads to wider political,
societal, regional, or developmental conditions. Importantly, a complete military option is
a product of essential dialogue between policy makers, military commanders, and the
political leadership. The creators of military options can validate policy goal assumptions
and political leaders can communicate expectations of military actions or activities.
19
Figure 1-11: Elements of Military Options
The most common tension between civilian and military leaders is in the risks
associated with Adequacy (focused on ends), Acceptability (focused on ways), and
Feasibility (focused on means). Low fidelity options/COAs make for quicker and more
robust civ-mil discussions, but may equate to higher risk to force and policy/mission.
Higher fidelity options/COAs lower the risk in some areas, but increase the risk that
proposed solutions are too late and retard the civ-mil dialogue. Strategic planners must
quickly determine where best to place risk in order to ensure robust, but effective,
dialogue between the CCDR and civilian leaders during strategy development and
planning development.
20
Although not prescribed in joint doctrine, military planners should anticipate that
political leaders want to discuss military options early in the decision-making process
before they issue clear policy and planning guidance and before planners have been
able to conduct detailed FAA-DC analysis. This turns out to be like answering the
question “which came first, the chicken or the egg?” Determining “which comes first,
policy or options?” can lead to friction and miscommunication between civilian and
military leaders. Strategic planners must be able to describe a range of possible actions
and outcomes before policy makers have committed to the objective they seek. (See
Figure 1-12)
Most importantly, the friction between civilian and military leaders can be reduced by
adjusting the military’s development of options to better accommodate civilian
expectations. Every civ-mil dialogue is unique and is shaped by the participants’ past
experiences and engrained heuristics and by the context of the particular national
security issue at hand. Strategic planners must develop an appreciation for these
realities and provide military options which can meet civilian policy-makers’ unique
requirements. Developing military options to address national security requirements is
the ultimate expression of military judgment and therefore no process, procedure, or
template is guaranteed to be successful in every context.
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the other, civilian leaders might start with a general idea of what policy responses they
are comfortable with. Conversely, they may initially approach a problem with a range of
possible objectives to pursue. Ultimately, the best approach should be informed by an
understanding of the objectives each instrument of national power can enable.
Therefore, military options should initially include a range of military activity that
supports a broad range of potential policy objectives that provide civilian leaders
understanding of where there is alignment between acceptable objectives and those the
military can enable at acceptable risk.
The task for military leaders is to explain the complexity of the military instrument in a
manner such that civilian leaders can be comfortable with their decision to use it. An
iterative dialogue allows civilians to achieve a working knowledge of how a military
operation will unfold, on what timeline, with which forces, and the associated level and
nature of risk. This level of understanding is facilitated by helping civilian leaders
understand the logic behind the military’s theory of victory, or how each option’s
outcome is viewed as a success by the military in light of the problem each option
addresses. Although civilians may not agree with the logic, they will ideally understand
the military perspective which will allow them to make informed decisions about the
utility of the military instrument.
Senior military leaders must communicate options in a format and language that is
easily understood by civilian leaders and policy makers. Though there is no standard
format for an option, each one should contain the following elements:
Scenario and assumptions upon which the option is based
Desired outcomes and associated policy aims
A description of the concept with emphasis on the use of military actions in
the context of the use of other instruments of power
A general description of the resources required
A general timeline for how the option would play out
An explanation of the causal logic that links the recommended actions to
the desired outcomes
The strategic and operational risks entailed in this option
22
b. Example.
Military Options:
Option 1 - Do Nothing
o Assumptions – Do nothing does not equal abandon U.S. Military
personnel, Does equal Non-Mil AMCITs are on their own, U.S. will
not support International efforts
o End states – no U.S. end states (other than protect U.S. military)
o Ways available:
Pull all U.S. military forces from the area (3 days to finish)
COA 1 – Airlift focus
COA 2 – Sea-based focus
COA 3 – Use commercial transport
o Ties into Whole-of-Government Plan – prepared to support
evacuating DOS personnel if necessary.
o Risks - AMCIT casualties. International response forces respond
late and we are caught on our heels.
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o Risks – Small risk to force. Expectation that U.S. will “save” Haiti
forces mission creep later. If Haitian government fails, the response
force would enable follow on forces, but would have to transition to
consequence management vice prevention.
Option 4….
6. Flexible Deterrent Options & Flexible Response Options – FDOs and FROs are
the hybrid of the OptionCOA discussion. FDOs and FROs are pre-planned actions
and thus fall at the detailed end of the planning spectrum; however, they are designed
to provide adaptable responses to the President during a crisis. For more information on
FROs and FDOs, see JP 5-0, Appendix F.
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rapid de-escalation, and crisis resolution by laying out a wide
range of interrelated response paths. (JP 5-0, p. F-1)
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CHAPTER 2: JOINT PLANNING
1. Joint Planning in an Integrated Context. Integrated planning is used by the Joint
Force to address complex strategic challenges that span multiple geographic CCMD
AORs and functional CCMD responsibilities. Integrated planning synchronizes
resources and integrates timelines, decision matrices, and authorities across CCMDs,
the rest of the interagency, and multinational partners to achieve directed strategic
objectives. (JP 5-0, p. I-6)
The integrated context (see Figure 2-1) includes all of the relevant actors in the national
security environment (including, but not limited to, the ones below). Unified Action
synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational
operations with the operations of other USG departments and agencies,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (e.g.,
the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Each layer of
planning has a somewhat distinctive title to enable planners to understand which layer
of planning they are working in.
The joint community [JOINT PLANNING]
Whole of Government [OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES]
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Multinational partners [COALITION, ALLIED, or MULTI-NATIONAL]
International Organizations (e.g. the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, the Organization of American States) [NATO Planning, or UN Planning,
etc. – planning and operations usually assumes the name of the organization leading
the effort.]
Non-Governmental Organizations (e.g. Oxfam, Médicins Sans Frontières
[Doctors without Borders], the Afghan Women’s Network) [No specific title exists]
Relevant non-state actors (e.g. financial institutions, shadow governments,
multinational corporations, terrorist organizations, empowered academics and
consultants) [No specific title exists]
Complicating the planning endeavor is the fact that different actors have different
outcomes, different timelines, different processes, and different decision structures.
Some examples are:
DOS may have different priorities in Nation X that affect the ways and means
DOD may use to accomplish tasks in adjacent Nation Y.
A classified DOD plan may not be shared with other U.S. governmental
organizations until late in planning.
A coalition nation may be unable to discuss a sensitive topic until its elections
are complete.
Nation 1 may not want Nation 2 to know that it is participating in some
activities and operations. This would warrant bilateral planning that is synchronized
outside the normal coalition planning channels.
NGO A may wish to synchronize with some elements of the plan, but not wish
to know about other elements of the plan.
2. Multi-National Planning. As it is unlikely that the United States will operate alone in
future conflicts, comprehensive planning must be conducted with a multinational
perspective, rather than as an add-on to U.S. planning. U.S. forces may operate as part
of a coalition or an alliance, work through unity of effort between nations of similar aim,
or work toward an end state that supports U.S. partner nations’ objectives as well as
U.S. national objectives. Commanders and staffs must consider interests, equities,
contributions, and limitations posed by the multinational environment. Some
considerations for planners and operators during multinational operations:
National objectives of the various partners
Building and maintaining a multinational force
Differences in language, culture, and national sovereignty
Legal considerations by the participants (international law and law of war)
Doctrine, training, and resources
Differences in force protection and rules of engagement (ROE)
Limits to sharing intelligence and information
Communications and spectrum management
Logistics and host nation support
Differing standards for health service support
Nuanced perspectives on media relations
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3. Unified Action - Whereas the term joint operation focuses on the
integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the
term unified action has a broader connotation. Unified action
refers to the synchronization, coordination, and integration of
the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities to
achieve unity of effort. (JP 3-0, p. I-8)
To prevent internal conflicts and assist with Unified Action, DOS, USAID, and DOD (as
the three foundational pillars for promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad) have
established “Diplomacy, Development, and Defense (3D) Planning.” 3D Planning is an
ongoing initiative to build understanding and synchronize plans to improve collaboration,
coordination, and unity of effort among these organizations.
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of the military in addressing national interests and achieving
the objectives in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and
[National Defense Strategy].
30
Figure 2-2: Joint Planning and Execution Community
(Figure II-3 in JP 5-0)
31
Figure 2-3: Joint Planning Activities, Functions and Products
(Figure II-4 in JP 5-0)
6. Strategic and Contingency Planning. The JSCP directs the number and types of
documents that CCDRs produce as they turn strategic challenges into actionable
operations and activities. The Joint Strategic Planning System provides the planning
construct to bring a global perspective to threats that were previously stove-piped within
Combat Command structures.
JSCP directed strategic and contingency planning consists of all planning efforts,
relationships, authorities, roles, and responsibilities designed to integrate the planning
of problem sets requiring coordinated action by CCMDs, CSAs, Services, other
government agencies, and foreign partners. This planning seeks to increase
collaboration across the whole of government and increase unity of effort to address
transregional, all-domain, and multi-functional (TRAM) national security problems within
available resources.
32
The Strategic and Contingency Planning construct organizes planning as follows:
Global Campaign Plans (GCPs) and Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBP)
Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)
Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)
CCMD Campaign plans (CCPs) (legacy Theater Campaign Plans)
Contingency Plans (CPs)
Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs) when related CPs are grouped together
for execution and resourcing.
[See Figure 2-4. These are explained in detail in Chapter 1.]
a. The CJCS is tasked by Title 10, Section 153, of US Code with preparing and
reviewing strategic campaign and contingency plans. The Chairman is responsible for
operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of
the Joint Force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to the
SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities.
33
c. Cross-Functional Teams – A cross-functional team (CFT), comprised of members
of the Joint Staff, develops guidance for the Global Integrator and supports globally
integrated planning. (See Chapter 1 for more on CFTs.)
d. Collaborator – A Joint Force organization assigned by the CJCS (via the JSCP) to
support integrated planning for a problem. (See Chapter 1 for more on collaborators.)
The CJCS will assign GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs to Coordinating Authorities. Those
CAs will work with collaborators to develop campaign plans (written and updated by the
CA) and supporting plans (written by collaborators).
Cross-Functional Teams will monitor problem sets and work with the CJCS to
recommend guidance, advise senior leaders, and organize IMOs, tasks and
assessments across problem sets. The relationship between CFTs and CCMDs has yet
to be determined beyond “support.”
7. Conceptual to Detailed Planning. Joint Planning integrates four functions and two
interconnected processes. The first process is oriented toward the conceptual and
artistic side of ‘planning’ and is titled “Operational Design.” Its counterpart is oriented
more towards the detailed and scientific sides of planning and is titled the “Joint
Planning Process.” Both processes support Strategic Guidance, Concept Development,
Plan Development, Plan Assessment – the difference is in the degree to which each is
used. While listed as two distinct processes, they are better described as sides of a
continuum from conceptual to detailed planning. (See Figure 2-5 and 2-6)
34
Planning has a conceptual component and a detailed component.
Conceptual planning involves understanding operational
environments and problems, determining the operation’s end
state, and visualizing an operational approach to attain that
end state. Conceptual planning corresponds to the art of command
and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed
planning translates the commander’s operational approach into a
complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is
associated with the science of control including synchronizing
forces in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions.
Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or
technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and
synchronizing the actions of the force toward the desired end
state. (ATP 5-0.1)
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to understand the OE, visualize and describe the desired end
state, and employ assigned resources to achieve objectives. (JP
5-0, p. I-5)
Fed by: All Strategic Guidance documents, other Strategic Direction from
HHQ, the CCDR’s strategic estimate of his theater, problems, and
opportunities.
Feeds: CCMD Strategy
(a) The CCDR’s strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means
within the limitations established by the budget, GFM processes,
and strategic guidance/direction. The strategy must address risk
and highlight where and what level risk will be accepted and
where it will not be accepted. The strategy’s objectives are
directly linked to the achievement of national objectives.
36
approach to applying military power in concert with the other
instruments of national power in pursuit of the objectives and
the risks inherent in implementation.
Fed by: All Strategic Guidance documents, other Strategic Direction from
HHQ, the CCDR’s Vision.
Feeds: CCMD Campaigns and Global Campaign Plans
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multiple operations over time to achieve a strategic objective, but may also link multiple
operations over space to achieve the objective.
a. Campaigning has traditionally reflected the operational level of war; that is, the
linkage of tactical operations to achieve strategic objectives. In many cases, the Joint
Force will be in a situation which is complex enough that it cannot achieve the desired
ends through the execution of a single operation. There are various reasons that this
may be the case. Insufficient forces may be available to defeat the enemy in a single
operation (consider the U.S. Civil War in 1861-65). Physical, mobility, or political
limitations may force sequential operations (consider DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM, the defeat of Japan in WWII, or Cuba, 1898). The enemy’s center of gravity
may be so well protected that it must be attacked indirectly (consider the defeat of Nazi
Germany).
The JSCP directs that CCDRs develop assigned plans to a specified level. Similarly, the
CCDR may direct preparation of internally-directed plans to a particular level of detail.
38
annexes [or a Time Phased Force Deployment Data
(TPFDD)]. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including
FDOs, to provide flexibility in addressing a
contingency as it develops or to aid in developing the
situation. (JP 5-0, p. II-23)
Level 3 (Concept Plan): CONPLAN is an [Operation Plan]
OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require
considerable expansion or alteration to convert it
into a complete and detailed Level 4 OPLAN or an
[Operations Order] OPORD. It includes a plan summary,
a BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes: A
(Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations),
D (Logistics), J (Command Relations), K
(Communications), S (Special Technical Operations), V
(Interagency Coordination), and Z (Distribution).
o If the development of a TPFDD is directed for the
CONPLAN, the planning level is designated as 3T.
A troop list and TPFDD would also require that an
Annex E (Personnel) and Annex W (Operational
Contract Support) be prepared. (JP 5-0, p. II-23)
Level 4 (Operations Plan): An OPLAN is a complete and
detailed plan containing a full description of the
CONOPS, all applicable annexes to the plan including a
time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), and a
transportation feasible notional TPFDD. The notional
TPFDD phases unit requirements in the theater of
operations at the times/places required to support the
CONOPS. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements,
functional support, and resources required to execute
the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow
into the theater. (JP 5-0, p. II-25)
10. Risk. Central to planning and execution at any level is the concept of risk. Merriam-
Webster’s dictionary defines risk as “the possibility that something bad or unpleasant
(such as injury or loss) will happen.” The DOD dictionary (JP 1-02) defines risk as
“probability and consequence of loss linked to hazards.” In most cases, military
professionals first experience the concept of risk with the operational risk management
process when risks are identified and controlled by educating subordinates and
establishing measures to avoid or reduce the probability of negative outcomes. At the
lowest level, the holiday safety briefing to subordinates is perhaps the most well-known.
Range safety briefings are other examples. The definitions above and the operational
risk management process are necessary but not sufficient to advise senior leaders on
conducting strategic and operational planning.
There are several considerations for examining strategic and operational risk. The
general strategy model of ends, ways, and means, risk results from the imbalance of
these three components. The concept of risk resides firmly in the realm of decision
39
making. Risk has meaning when leaders weigh options to achieve desired objectives
and assess the likelihood and magnitude of adverse outcomes. Those who write about
risk often reside in academia or the business world where risks must be quantified to be
useful. The discipline holds that risks can be accepted, avoided, transferred, or offset.
A whole industry – insurance – deals with offsetting (or transferring) risk.
The two types of risk are Strategic Risk (risk to national interests) and Military Risk
(risk to military objectives and to the Joint Force).
• Strategic Risk is the potential impact upon the United States - including the U.S.
population, territory, civil society, critical infrastructure, and interests - of current
and contingency events given their estimated consequences and probabilities
(e.g. the security of the United States and its citizens).
• Military Risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the Joint Force’s
projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission),
while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force). In the
context of the CRA, military objectives come from the NMS.
o Risk to Mission - operational risk and future challenges risk.
• Operational Risk (Risk-to-Mission) reflects the current force’s ability
to attain current military objectives called for by the current NMS,
within acceptable human, material, and financial costs. A function
of the probability and consequence of failure to achieve mission
objectives while protecting the force from unacceptable losses. The
time horizon is 0-2 years.
• Future Challenges Risk (Risk-to-Mission) reflects the future force’s
ability to achieve future mission objectives over the near and mid-
term (0-7 years) and considers the future force’s capabilities and
capacity to deter or defeat emerging or anticipated threats.
o Risk-to-Force - force management risk and institutional risk.
• Force Management Risk (Risk-to-Force) reflects a Service and/or
Joint Force Provider’s ability to generate trained and ready forces
within established rotation ratios and surge capacities to meet
current campaign and contingency mission requirements; force
management risk is a function of the probability and consequence
of not maintaining the appropriate force generation balance
(“breaking the force”). Near-to mid-term (0-7 years).
• Institutional Risk (Risk-to-Force) reflects the ability of organization,
command, management, and force development processes and
infrastructure to plan for, enable, and improve national defense. All
three time horizons.
o Time Horizons: Near Term (0-2 yrs), Mid-term (3-7 yrs), and Far Term (8-
20 yrs)
At the strategic level, senior national security professionals must have the ability to
articulate risk to senior decision makers at the national level who may not have a
military or national security background. Therefore, campaign planners must expand the
40
conventional categories of risk to encompass others that are relevant to people making
strategic decisions. The risk categories below are not intended to be prescriptive, since
each planning situation is unique; there may be others not listed that should be
considered and assessed.
Mission – achieving campaign objectives
Forces – joint and coalition forces assigned, allocated, or apportioned
Time – expected duration of the campaign
Coalition – maintaining external political and material support
Commitment – maintaining domestic political and popular support
Escalation – adversary reactions that may require more resources
Resources – money, time, and interagency and intergovernmental
participation
Inaction – likely or foreseeable trends that may lead to undesirable
developments
Once the staff develops categories of risk that are relevant to the campaign, risks can
be assessed and managed using a logical framework, such as in Figure 2-7. The Joint
Risk Analysis Methodology (JRAM), represented by the Joint Risk Framework, seeks
first to increase an individual's understanding of risk and then to implement and monitor
risk-based decisions. It provides a consistent, standardized way to assess risk and
41
recommend risk mitigation measures. Joint doctrine mandates a risk assessment
(specifically, risk-to-mission) as part of the mission analysis phase of the Joint
Operation Planning Process. It also directs that risk be addressed during in-progress
reviews (IPR). In addition to the probability and consequences of any particular source
of risk, another dimension that should be considered is the immediacy of the risk, or
how rapidly the risk may arise and impact operations. Another variable here is the ability
of any organization to recognize the risk or its precursors. Immediacy affects the
leader’s ability to take timely mitigating activities to address the risk.
Another important source of guidance regarding risk is in the commander’s intent for the
campaign or operation. Purpose, end state, and operational risk are the essential
elements of intent. An explicit statement of where, when, and what kinds of risk will be
accepted or rejected provides a way to prioritize effort in the absence of resources and
allows subordinate commanders to better execute mission command.
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CHAPTER 3: OPERATIONAL DESIGN
Joint Planning uses two processes that attempt to span the spectrum of art/creativity
and science/efficiency: Operational Design (Op Design) and the Joint Planning Process
(JPP). This chapter will describe Op Design and Chapter 4 will describe the JPP, but
they should not be viewed as two separate and disconnected processes. They are
symbiotic and interconnected.
3. Joint and Army Design. Note that there are some differences in terminology
between the Army’s description of the "Army Design Methodology” in ADRP 5-0, The
Operations Process, and ATP 5-0.1, Army Design Methodology, and the joint
description of "Operational Design" in Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation
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Planning. Though most of the differences are superficial, they are explainable largely by
the purposes of the publications. ADRP 5-0 is intended to provide an approach to deal
with any complex situation not just joint operations; from that perspective it has broader
applicability. In slight contrast, JP 5-0 is intended for situations in which joint warfighters
may find themselves; it is more narrowly focused on the requirements of joint
operations. Thus, "operational design" can be thought of as a subset of the "Army
design methodology.” Both methods use the same logic and seek similar outcomes.
While this campaign planning handbook remains consistent with joint doctrine in that it
uses operational design terminology and logic, it incorporates some of the underlying
thinking behind the Army design methodology so that operational design can be applied
beyond the realm of joint warfare.
The critical and creative thinking that underpin operational design are not new. The
great captains of history, from Sun Tzu to General U.S. Grant to Field Marshall
Rommel, have all used this thinking. Hence, operational design is not a discovery, but
instead is a reminder within a methodology for use by contemporary military and
national security professionals to deal with an incredibly nuanced and complex global
environment. The goal of operational design is deeper and broader understanding,
not closure. The JPP works with operational design to provide the needed
closure that will drive orders and action.
44
Figure 3-1: Joint Design and Planning (Conceptual-Detailed)
45
Note: For a detailed discussion of the Elements of Operational Design – see JP
5-0, Chapter IV (Op Art and Op Design), Section C (Elements of Op Design).
5. Divergence and Convergence. Another way to describe the ebb and flow of
Operational Design and JPP is the idea of ‘Divergence’ and ‘Convergence’. Figure 3-2
shows a way to graphically represent an operational design approach to strategy
formulation and campaigning. Note that this figure shows that taking action (via
convergent thinking, coming to closure, and issuing orders that drive this action) will
likely change the operational environment, recursively requiring divergent thinking and
possibly reframing of the environment.
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Some questions you may ask to determine if you should spend time developing the
conceptual framework through the use of operational design might be:
Do we know enough about the situation to move forward in a meaningful
way? Is a course of action clear and evident?
Are actions we are taking having unexpected and/or surprising effects?
Is the problem so familiar and solution so obvious that we already know
what to do (a heuristic, or standard operating procedure)?
Do we know what end state conditions we are trying to achieve, or are the
desired end state conditions unclear?
Are actions and techniques that were originally effective now falling short
of achieving the desired impact?
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The real power of operational design comes from the synthesis of all four frames.
They really are not separate activities, but four areas of thinking in the same
methodology. They are totally iterative and a better understanding of one frame will lead
to a deeper understanding of the other frames. To frame the environment, you cannot
help but see the competing trends emerge which will help to better define the problem.
As you see a potential operational approach emerging, you may discover new problems
or need to modify existing ones and ask more questions about the environment. As you
analyze the operational approach and look for ways to avoid or mitigate undesired
effects, you will likely redefine the problem and see aspects of the environment that you
had not previously understood. As you work with operational design, you will get more
comfortable working the frames iteratively, so it will feel less and less like four separate
frames and more like a single, synthetic, cognitive approach.
The commander and his operational planning team should use a set of interconnected
cognitive activities to help build their understanding of the situation and visualization of
the campaign. These iterative activities constitute a methodology for the commander
and his team to learn about the answers to four broad questions:
What do our national leaders want to solve?
What is the context in which the campaign will be conducted?
What problem is the campaign intended to solve?
What broad, general approach for the campaign could solve the problem?
The deliberation on these four questions is iterative and recursive--that is, as one
question is answered, new questions will be generated, and questions already asked
may be asked again to gain deeper understanding. The purpose of the dialogue is to
develop an operational approach that can be turned into an executable campaign plan,
or into modifications to an existing plan, and can be continued throughout the campaign
to help determine when adaptation to the plan is appropriate.
Those conducting operational design collaborate extensively with all parties who are
interested in the problem or have knowledge about the problem that may help enlighten
the operational approach. Inclusion of interagency and coalition partners, as well as the
whole range of those with unique expertise or broadening perspectives, is absolutely
critical. Not only will the analysis be richer, but such collaboration might also enable
broader "buy-in" by other agencies early on, and then continuously. Dialogue between
echelons of command is also critical to gain the best understanding possible.
a. Methodology. JP 5-0 lays out a general methodology for conducting design. Laid
out sequentially in written form, they are better viewed as interconnected. Since work in
48
one will lead to changes in others, prudent designers will attempt to work them
synthetically and iteratively, vice step-by-step.
49
or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they
may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in
differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where
compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-7)
(f) Eventually the commander and staff must decide what they will work with and
what is outside the scope of the current challenge. Deciding what fits within the frame of
relevant strategic guidance does not negate other guidance, it simply determines what
is relevant at the time (think “Area of Operation”) and what is just outside the frame but
matters (think Area of Influence) and what is outside the frame and still of interest (think
Area of Interest). Determining and communicating the CCMD’s “Strategic Guidance
Frame” ensures all relevant actors know which parts of the systems of systems the
CCMD will focus on.
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(2) Understand the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics).
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Why has this situation developed?
What is causing conflict among the actors?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant actors?
What does it mean?
Why is the situation (or the projected future situation) undesirable?
What’s the real story?
What conditions need to exist for success?
What are indicators that we are on the path to success?
What are indicators that we are going in the wrong direction?
As with Strategic Guidance, there is more information available than any team can
handle. The commander and staff must attempt to understand the environment well
enough to decide what parts of the environmental system they will work with and what is
outside the scope of the current challenge. Deciding what fits within the “Environmental
Frame” scopes the challenge, the relevant actors, etc. It does not negate other parts of
a CCDR’s environment; it simply determines what is relevant at the time (again, think
logical “Area of Operation”), what is just outside the frame but matters (think logical
Area of Influence) and what is outside the frame, and while interesting, is not relevant
(think logical Area of Interest). Determining and communicating the CCMD’s
“Environmental Frame” ensures all relevant actors know which parts of the systems of
systems the CCMD will focus on. For example, if a CCDR decides to frame the planning
team’s environment to Korea, it doesn’t negate the South China Sea challenges and
how they might impact Korea…but it does put it out of the planning team’s focused
efforts.
One way of viewing these interrelated challenges for most military operational
situations is from a systems perspective. In doing so, it is critical to consider the
relationships between key elements of the system in order to understand causation.
That is, an understanding of what is causing the environment to trend in an unfavorable
direction and what would be required to cause it to trend in a more favorable one.
Understanding causation requires an understanding of the adversarial, environmental,
and friendly systems. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the
adversaries, on ourselves, and on relevant neutral or other interested parties by
collecting and analyzing a wide array of data.
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(b) The JIPOE process is a comprehensive analytic tool to
describe all aspects of the OE relevant to the operation or
campaign. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)
(d)In analyzing the current and future OE, the staff can use
a PMESII analytical framework to determine relationships and
interdependencies relevant to the specific operation or
campaign. (JP 5-0, p. IV-10)
Analysis must ensure that the creation of PMESII lists moves beyond mere
categorization of information and determines the relevant and critical relationships
between the various actors and aspects of the environment in order to understand
causation. PMESII is useful in this process, however, the planning team must be careful
not to stovepipe the analysis – the most important analysis leads to an understanding of
the dynamics of the relationships between the various parts of the environment that are
categorized in the PMESII lists. This analysis produces a holistic view of the relevant
enemy, adversary, neutral, and friendly systems as a complex whole, within a larger
system that includes many external influences. While identifying the nodes and links
within a system may be useful in describing important aspects of the OE, more
important is describing the relevant relationships within and between the various
systems that directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand. Commanders and staffs
must understand that relationships, especially those dealing with human interaction, are
extremely dynamic. These dynamic relationships often make it difficult to determine
clear causality, which makes it difficult to know if actions taken in the context of the
operational approach will ultimately be effective. This reinforces the importance of the
iterative nature of operational design and “learning as you act.”
Note: Appendix C provides some points to consider and questions to ask during
analysis.
53
Figure: 3-4: Holistic View of the Operational Environment (OE)
(Figure IV-5 in JP 5-0)
54
o Infrastructure, such as transportation, energy,
and information systems.
o Operational limitations such as rules of
engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force
(RUF), or legal restrictions on military
operations as specified in US law,
international law, or HN agreements.
o All friendly, adversary, and enemy
conventional, irregular, and paramilitary
forces and their general capabilities and
strategic objectives (including all known
and/or suspected chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards).
o Environmental conditions (earthquakes, volcanic
activity, pollution, naturally occurring
diseases).
o Location of toxic industrial materials in the
area of interest that may produce chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards.
o Psychological characteristics of adversary
decision making.
o All locations of foreign embassies,
international organizations, and NGOs.
o Friendly and adversary military and commercial
capabilities provided by assets in space, their
current or potential use, and critical
vulnerabilities.
o Knowledge of the capabilities and intent, COGs,
and critical vulnerabilities of forces,
individuals, or organizations conducting
cyberspace operations.
o Financial networks that could impact the
adversary’s ability to sustain operations.
Analysis (opposing, neutral, friendly)
o Tendencies and Potentials - Tendencies reflect
the inclination to think or behave in a certain
manner. Tendencies are not considered
deterministic but rather model the thoughts or
behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies help
identify the range of possibilities that
relevant actors may develop with or without
external influence. Once identified, commanders
and staffs evaluate the potential of these
tendencies to manifest within the OE. Keep in mind
that the OE continues to move forward, so the planning team
needs to project the current OE into the future to be able to
affect it. If no outside actors influence the OE, it will still change
55
due to inherent tendencies in the system. It is important to
understand the natural tendencies of the system, and project
what the conditions will be through this system inertia. Given the
natural tendencies of the OE, we may be able to better define
our desired end state. The team may also be able to use this
insight to help form their operational approach. The point of time
for the projection in the future depends on the timeframe of the
campaign.
o Describe the key conditions that must exist in
the future OE to achieve the objectives.
Planners should put a temporal aspect to this
set of conditions in order to be able to
conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses.
o Determine the objectives of relevant actors
affecting the OE. These actors will have
different sets of conditions for achieving
their respective objectives.
(f) Key Outputs
Description of the current operational environment
o Systems perspective of the operational
environment
o Impacts of physical and information factors on
the operational environment
o Friendly/enemy COGs
Description of the desired operational environment
o Military end state - set of required conditions
that defines achievement of all military
objectives. It normally represents a point in
time and/or circumstances beyond which the
President does not require the military
instrument of national power as the primary
means to achieve remaining national objectives.
(JP 5-0, p. IV-20)
o An example of a national strategic end state:
An economically-viable and stable Country
X, without the capability to coerce its
neighbors.
o An example of a military end state is:
Country X is unable to project military
power against its neighbors.
o Termination criteria - the specified standards
approved by the President and/or SecDef that
must be met before military operations can be
concluded. Termination criteria are a key
element in establishing a military end state.
Termination criteria describe the conditions
that must exist in the OE at the cessation of
56
military operations. The conditions must be
achievable and measurable… (JP 5-0, p. IV-19)
o Some examples of termination criteria are:
Country Y’s borders are secure.
Country Y’s national army is sufficient to
repel internal rebellion.
Country X no longer poses an offensive
capability robust enough to defeat countries
within the region.
Description of the opposing end states (JP 5-0, p.
IV-11)
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(c) The problem statement articulates how the operational
variables can be expected to resist or facilitate transformation
and how inertia in the OE can be leveraged to ensure the desired
conditions are achieved…The problem statement identifies the
areas for action that will transform existing conditions toward
the desired end state….It identifies areas of tension and
competition—as well as opportunities and challenges—that
commanders must address to transform current conditions to
attain the desired end state. (JP 5-0 IV-14)
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Figure 3-5: Tensions that Describe the Problem
(f) Though it is important to understand the root causes of the divergence of the
OE from the desired end state conditions, the planning team may not be able to, or
even need to, address the root causes to achieve the desired conditions. Instead, they
should be interested in identifying their problem(s) – and what they must do to achieve
their desired conditions. For example, if the planning team is in a combatant command,
the operational approach will be to apply military power in coordination with other
instruments of national power to achieve desired military conditions. Operational design
might reveal several problems well beyond the remit of the JFC. In these cases,
multinational partners, other governmental, or non-governmental agencies should take
the lead to resolve or manage them.
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COGs at different levels, but they should be nested. At the
strategic level, a COG could be a military force, an alliance,
political or military leaders, a set of critical capabilities or
functions, or national will. At the operational level, a COG
often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities—
such as a powerful element of the armed forces—but could include
other capabilities in the OE. The COG construct is useful as an
analytical tool to help JFCs and staffs analyze friendly and
adversary sources of strength as well as weaknesses and
vulnerabilities. COGs are formed out of the relationships
between adversaries, and they do not exist in a strategic or
operational vacuum. (JP 5-0, p. IV-23)
* Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of three
critical factors:
Critical capabilities - the primary abilities
essential to the accomplishment of the objective.
Critical requirements - essential conditions,
resources, and means the COG requires to perform the
critical capability.
Critical vulnerabilities - those aspects or components
of critical requirements that are deficient or
vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner
achieving decisive or significant results. In general,
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complete the transition of security responsibilities from ISAF and be
capable of providing security within Afghanistan. The ANSF will
need continuing and residual assistance to reach these conditions.
The United States desires a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ where all
states are secure in their sovereignty and territorial integrity, enjoy
freedom, peace, and prosperity, and respect the rights of other
nations, and follow established norms of international behavior. The
People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a malign actor in the region,
and has made extraterritorial claims in the East and South China
Seas, militarized these areas, has used tactics of coercive
gradualism, flaunted the accepted rules of international behavior,
and has developed advanced weapons systems. The U.S. Joint
Force is now in a hypercompetitive security environment where
changes in force capability, presence, posture, international
relations and partnerships, threats to access, and international,
intra-regional, and domestic public opinion are constant.
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(1) Develop the operational approach.
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An objective should link directly or indirectly
to higher level objectives or to the end state.
An objective is specific and unambiguous.
An objective does not infer ways and/or means—it
is not written as a task.
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Figure 3-6: Endstate – Objectives – Effects – Tasks
(Figure IV-8 in JP 5-0)
- DPs may be physical in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a town, WMD
capabilities, or destruction or neutralization of a key insurgent group. Key events, such
as an election, repair of damaged key infrastructure, control of a population center, or
establishment of a competent local police force, may be DPs. In still other cases, DPs
may be systemic, such as political linkages among key leaders of the regime; trust
among a particular influential social group; or discrediting an adversary leader.
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- At times, the planning team may not be able to find a vulnerability associated
with a critical capability, and instead may have to attack its strength to uncover or create
a vulnerability that can be exploited. Exploitation of one vulnerability in one area may
well expose vulnerabilities in other areas. For example, disruption of a cellular phone
network may cause the enemy to increase use of couriers. This traffic could uncover a
key transit route for forces or supplies, which can then be monitored and attacked at the
appropriate times.
- The team must determine and prioritize which vulnerabilities, capabilities, or key
events offer the best opportunity to achieve the effects on the OE that will lead to
accomplishing our objectives. Some potential DPs may be:
In-theater ports, airfields, rail lines, or roads needed for
deployment/operational movement.
Maritime or land choke points at canals, straits, or mountain passes.
Training infrastructure for host-nation security forces.
Country Z begins conducting effective counterinsurgency operations.
Credible national and local elections.
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Figure 3-7: Sample Line of Operation (Figure IV-11 in JP 5-0)
66
to pass. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the
unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.
Operational design is iterative, and the operational planning team should revisit
each frame. Go back to the environment frame to analyze the potential impacts of the
approach on the environment. While the first order effects should be as expected (since
the operational approach was developed to achieve those effects), the team must look
carefully for potential undesired effects. Note any undesired second and third order
effects and either modify the operational approach to mitigate those effects, or transmit
those risks to the operational approach to planners and other interested parties in the
effort. Strategic guidance may have shifted, with new options or constraints. Perhaps
you need to reframe the problem (for instance, an insurgency has morphed into a civil
war). Iterative examinations may yield a significantly different operational approach.
(2) Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization). During
planning, commanders inform leadership of the decisions that
will need to be made, when they will have to be made, and the
uncertainty and risk accompanying decisions and delay. This
provides leaders, both military and civilian, a template and
warning for the decisions in advance and provides them the
opportunity to look across interagency partners and with allies
to look for alternatives and opportunities short of escalation.
The decision matrix also identifies the expected indicators
needed in support of the intelligence collection plan. (JP 5-0,
p. IV-17)
(3) Refine the operational approach(es). Understanding the situation and visualizing
solutions to the problem are only part of the challenge. This understanding and visualization
must be described to other commanders, leaders, and planners so that they can help implement
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the solution. The synthesis of the four activities can be described through the commander’s
operational approach. The operational approach describes the commander’s understanding and
resultant visualization of the campaign’s parameters. He must clearly transmit his synthesized
approach to his staff and other interested parties who will be involved in planning and executing
the campaign; this transmission can take the form of commander’s initial or updated planning
guidance.
The operational approach can help transmit to the planners and operations team
not only the commander’s planning guidance, but also the logic for the guidance. The
operational approach is a synthesis of the strategic guidance, environment, and
problem frames combined with the development of a conceptual way forward. It should
include graphical representations and narrative descriptions of the logic behind each
frame. Products of the synthesized operational approach could include:
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and how the command intends to measure the progress and success
of its military actions and activities. (JP 5-0, p. IV-17)
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common vision or synthesis, which can enable unity of effort. For this reason,
operational design is especially appealing in interagency and coalition efforts.
There are many ways to organize to do operational design work. The way that works for
your organization depends on several aspects: the organizational climate; the degree to
which the commander will be involved in the operational design work; the size,
experience, and training of the staff; the amount of time available; and the degree of
complexity of the problem. The team should be large enough to enable a range of
diversity of perspective, but not so large as to preclude achieving some consensus on
issues to keep the process moving forward. The team should seek diversity of
perspective and should solicit subject matter expertise as needed to inform and broaden
the discourse. Generally, higher level headquarters will have more staff and more time
available, and will deal with greater levels of complexity than lower level headquarters.
This suggests a larger team with more diverse representation.
While “Designers” and “Planners” are closely linked (and may even be the same
people), their roles are very different. “Designers” focus on broadening their aperture,
better understanding the context, making causal connections, and seeking new
paradigms if necessary. They are focused on exploring and the art of decision making.
“Planners” are focused on building the plan and the science of decision making. Both
roles are required, but planners can solve the wrong problems if designers fail, and
great solutions won’t be implemented if planners fail.
a. Designer Roles. To enable the proper balance between broad discourse and
progress (after all, the goal is to produce a usable concept), the planning team leader
may assign roles to team members:
Someone to record the discussion and key results.
Someone to capture ideas in graphical form (pens and whiteboards work
well for this, especially when framing the environment).
Someone to think about and develop metrics to test insights.
Someone to facilitate the team discussion.
Someone to play devil’s advocate to question assumptions (though all
members must keep this in mind).
Someone who ensures the feasibility of concepts discussed (again, this is
the responsibility of all planning team members).
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Recognizing when the team is unnecessarily “in the weeds” (worried about
details) and getting out of those weeds.
Managing team members who are disruptive, dismissive, or domineering.
Balancing input across the team.
Helping the team to converge eventually to a decision.
d. Tools and Techniques. The following are tools and techniques from ATP 5-0.1,
Army Design Methodology, 1 July 2015, and represent ways in which commanders,
planners, and other leaders can actually use operational design.
(1) Brainstorming and mind mapping. (See Figures 3-9, 3-10). Brainstorming is a
group creative thinking technique that uses the different perspectives of individuals in a
group to develop and build on ideas. Used effectively, it will generate a large quantity of
ideas while avoiding the immediate judgment of the relative value of each. A technique
for brainstorming involves a divergent thinking phase where the planning team attempt
to answer key “focal questions” about the environment or problem followed by a
convergent phase where the group then culls the different answers or thoughts into
categories which can then generate further dialog and/or mind mapping. Outliers are
carefully considered by the group for much greater investigation or are possibly
irrelevant and discarded. The use of sticky notes and a white board are ideal for this.
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Figure 3-9: Brainstorming
Mind mapping is a technique for discerning and depicting the relationships of
relevant phenomena, variables, and actors in an operational environment or complex
problem. A technique for mind mapping begins with a single idea, actor, or topic
represented in the center of a white board or paper (for example insurgent recruitment).
The planning team then writes out secondary and connected ideas, phenomena, actors,
or words associated with insurgent recruitment using lines, symbols, pictures, and
colors to show relationships. As the planning team builds and expands the mind map on
the white board, it continues dialog to broaden and deepen the members’ understanding
of the growing mind map. At some point, the team should refine the “map” and develop
an accompanying narrative that captures the members’ synthesized understanding of
the environment and/or problems. This synthesized understanding will help shape the
operational approach portion of operational design. (See Figure 3-10).
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(2) Meta-questioning and four ways of seeing. These techniques are individual
and group thinking techniques that can be used by the planning team while conducting
mind-mapping or other operational design activities. Meta-questioning is a critical
thinking skill that enables a more complete understanding of a topic by asking higher
order questions. A way to understand the concept of meta-questioning is by thinking of
the different views one gets from different levels of a ladder. An individual’s view is
somewhat restricted when standing next to a ladder. However, as the individual takes a
few steps up the rungs of the ladder, the view becomes broader. This is true of meta-
questions. As individuals or groups ask and answer successively higher order
questions, their understanding should become broader and more comprehensive.
In the four ways of seeing technique, the planning team seeks to broaden and
deepen its understanding of the environment or problem specifically by looking at them
through the eyes of the adversary (ies) or other actors. For example, the planning team
can answer the following about actors X and Y:
How does X view itself?
How does Y view itself?
How does X view Y?
How does Y view X?
Of course, there are many more possible questions about how X and Y above
relate to the environment and/or problem that the planning team should ask when
conducting operational design. These four are just a start. Finally, the techniques above
are not necessarily stand-alone events that must be chosen at the exclusion of others.
Indeed, the planning team should conduct many of them simultaneously or nearly so. It
is ultimately up to the planning team and its leadership to determine which are used, for
how long, and for what part of the design methodology. Ultimately, and when used in an
iterative manner, they will contribute to a deeper and broader understanding of the
environment and help shape a sound operational approach.
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command of its AOR, with greater emphasis given to those situations or locations
designated as areas of potential crisis and instability within the theater campaign plan.
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10. Reframing is the iterative or recurring conduct of operational design in the event
that the commander’s understanding of the operational environment (OE) or of the
problem have changed to such a degree that a different operational approach is
warranted. Essentially, reframing is required when the hypothesis of the current problem
and/or operational approach may no longer be valid. As he updates his understanding
and visualization of the environment and its tensions, the commander may determine
that changes to the operational approach could range from minor modifications to a
completely new campaign plan. Reframing may cause the commander to direct the
command to shift the campaign’s approach.
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CHAPTER 4: JOINT PLANNING PROCESS
1. Introduction. Commanders and their staffs develop plans for campaigns through a
combination of art and science. The art of operational design enables us to continuously
understand the environment of the campaign, visualize the problem that the campaign
must address, and develop a "running hypothesis" for an operational approach to solve
the problem. Commanders must transmit their vision, to include their view of the
operational approach, to their staff, subordinates, partner commands, agencies, and
multinational/non-governmental entities so that their vision can be translated into
executable plans. The science of planning facilitates this translation by applying the
rigor of coordination and synchronization of all aspects of a concept to produce a
workable plan.
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Operational Design does not end with the beginning of the JPP. Instead JPP feeds
refinement to the four frames. (See Figure 4-2). It prepares the commander and staff for
potential reframing and/or continued assessment of the environment, problem,
approach and the strategic guidance that underpins both processes.
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to ensure that the military plan is nested with the supported plan. This will require
collaboration with many other actors to assist them in developing their plans (while
enriching our own), to include when the military is the supporting organization.
The commander will likely form a Joint Planning Group (called an Operational Planning
Group or Operational Planning Team in some commands) to focus on the mission.
The staff must conduct some preliminary actions before they can begin planning. (See
Figure 4-3). They must determine:
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What do they NOT know? – Holes in information must be identified quickly
so that the staff can determine how best to deal with unknowns.
Who else needs to know? – Building the planning roster is one of the first
steps in “Planning to Plan.” The staff must think through what agencies,
organizations, and staff sections should be present for planning and how
best to incorporate them (VTC, invitations to planning meetings, etc.).
Some organizations are key to planning, some important but not vital, and
others must at least achieve buy-in.
What timeline are we on? – The second most important document in the
“Plan to Plan” is the timeline. Commander availability, required updates to
HHQ, subordinate planner considerations, and potential enemy timelines
must all be considered and built into a realistic schedule.
Operational design, if not already done by the commander and his staff, may occur
at the start of step 1 of the JPP.
3. Conduct Mission Analysis. The staff analyzes the mission to: 1) provide a
recommended mission statement to the commander, and 2) to better inform the
commander’s initial analysis of the environment and the problem. This helps him refine
his operational approach. As the staff presents analysis on both the requirements and
potential points of focus for the campaign, they enable the commander to develop his
vision further to use synchronized, integrated military operations as a part of unified
action. He can then provide detailed planning guidance to his staff and share his vision
with his counterparts to enable unity of effort in application of all of the instruments of
power across the U.S. government and our international partners. Concurrently, the J-2
leads the initial steps of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment (JIPOE) to describe the potential effects of the OE on operations, analyze
the strengths of the enemy/adversary, and describe his potential courses of action. See
Figure 4-4 for the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved.
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(6) How will I know when the mission is accomplished
successfully? (JP 5-0, p. V-4)
a. Update staff estimates. Each staff section develops a staff estimate that is a
running assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations
are supportable from the perspective of that staff section’s function. The estimate
focuses on supportability of the potential mission from that staff section’s functional
view. This estimate helps the staff provide recommendations to the commander on the
best COA to accomplish the mission. The staff estimate also provides continuity among
the various members of the staff section. If the staff has not already begun a staff
estimate by this point, it should do so now.
Note: See Annex D for a staff estimate template (based on JP 5-0, Annex B)
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them to subordinate and supporting commanders in time to help them prepare annexes
for their supporting plans.
Answering the "why" and "how" questions of the higher headquarters is different at the
strategic level when compared to the operational and tactical levels. Often, there is no
clear, definitive guidance collected in one location. There is no "higher order" from
which a planner can simply "cut and paste" the pieces into the emerging plan’s OPORD.
Instead, much of the CCDR's strategic guidance is less clearly defined.
Since partners within integrated planning may have different guidance, if time permits
the staff should look for overlaps, gaps, and friction points that may exist between U.S.
Government strategic guidance and that of other nations/organizations who are also
interested in the problem.
d. Determine facts and assumptions. Facts are the major pieces of information
known to be true and that are pertinent to the planning effort. First, understand and
summarize the geostrategic factors derived from analysis of the OE that will influence
the strategic end state. This synopsis is no mere laundry list of factors, but a synthesis
of the key factors in the OE that will enhance mission analysis. To answer this question,
consider the long- and short-term political causes of conflict, domestic influences
(including public will), competing demands for resources, economic realities, legal and
moral implications, international interests, positions of international organizations, and
the impact of information.
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The JPG should leverage the strategic estimate as a useful means to organize and
consider geostrategic factors in an attempt to gain a better understanding of their impact
and interrelationships. This analysis includes not only the PMESII analysis, but also the
physical characteristics (topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and demographics)
and temporal characteristics (the effect of timing aspects on the OE and on the
campaign). The key is to determine potential effects of these physical and temporal
aspects on possible operations of friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy military forces
and other instruments of power. Additionally, the planners should assess factors such
as adversary organization, communications, technology, industrial base, manpower and
mobilization capacity, and transportation.
The staff develops assumptions to continue the planning process in the absence of
facts. Assumptions are placeholders to fill knowledge gaps, but they play a crucial role
in planning and must be held to a minimum throughout planning. These assumptions
require constant revalidation and reassessment. Facts should replace them as more
information becomes available.
Political:
o Countries A & B will allow over-flight, basing and host nation support.
o Countries C & D will remain neutral.
o Country E will support Country X with air and naval forces only.
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Forces:
o APS 3 and MPS 1 & 2 will be available for employment at C+10.
o A CSG and a MEU/ARG are forward deployed in theater.
Timeline:
o Major deployments begin upon unambiguous warning of enemy attack.
o There will be X days unambiguous warning prior to enemy attack.
Enemy:
o Country X’s forces can sustain an offensive for seven days before
culmination.
o Country X will use chemical weapons once coalition forces cross the
border.
f. Determine specified and implied tasks and develop essential tasks. Analyze
strategic direction to determine the strategic tasks specified or implied as a part of the
given strategic end state and objectives. Examples of specified tasks to a combatant
command might be:
Deter Country X from coercing its neighbors.
Stop Country X’s aggression against its neighbors.
Reduce Country X’s WMD inventory, production, & delivery means.
Remove Country X’s regime.
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These tasks focus on achieving the end state and are extracted from guidance from
higher echelons. They are broad tasks that may require integrating many instruments of
national power and the action of several elements of the joint force. Finally, they do not
specify actions by components or forces.
After identifying specified tasks, the staff identifies additional, major tasks necessary
to accomplish the assigned mission. These additional, major tasks are implied tasks –
those the joint force must do to accomplish specified tasks. Tasks that are inherent
responsibilities, such as deploy, conduct reconnaissance, sustain, are not implied tasks
unless successful execution requires coordination with or support of other commanders.
Examples of implied tasks are:
g. Develop the initial mission statement. After identifying the essential tasks, and with
the context of the relationship of those tasks to the achievement of the national end
state and military end state, the staff normally develops a derived mission statement
using the format of who, what, when, where, and why. This statement should be a
direct, brief, and effective articulation of the essential tasks and purpose for military
operations.
Since mission statements are primarily intended to focus the staff, military
subordinates, and supporting commands, translation of the wording of tasks into
doctrinal terms for completion is important. Mission statement refinement during the
entire plan development process, and, in fact, throughout execution of the campaign, is
important to ensure that it meets the needs of the commander and the national
leadership. A mission statement might look like this:
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h. Conduct initial force and resource analysis.
(1) The SecDef issues the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance
(GFMIG). For campaign and contingency planning, planners must review the GFMIG
and GFMAP. In a crisis, assigned and allocated forces currently
deployed to the geographic CCMD’s AOR may be the most responsive
during the early stages of an emergent crisis. Planners may
consider assigned forces as likely to be available to conduct
activities unless allocated to a higher priority. Re-missioning
previously allocated forces may require SecDef approval and
should be coordinated through the JS. (JP 5-0, p. V-12)
It is important to note shortfalls in forces that were apportioned for planning but
may not actually be available for execution due to readiness issues or previous
commitments. Determine if the forces available are sufficient to accomplish the mission
and the specified and implied tasks. This is a preliminary look, recognizing that detailed
force requirements cannot be determined until a concept of operations is developed.
However, it is necessary to enable the command to identify significant force and
capability shortfalls early in the planning process to 1) alert higher headquarters that
additional forces and capabilities will be required; and 2) develop feasible COAs.
(2) In many types of operations, the commander (and planners) may have access
to non-force resources, such as commander’s initiative funds, other funding sources
(such as train and equip funding, support to foreign security forces funding, etc.), or can
work with other security assistance programs (foreign military sales, excess defense
article transfers, etc.). Planners and commanders can weave together resources and
authorities from several different programs to create successful operations. (JP 5-0, p.
V-12)
Mission success criteria should be set not only for the overall campaign, but also for
each subordinate phase or operation. Since these success criteria should be echeloned
and nested, they will necessarily be different for each level of command, focused on
accomplishment of that command’s mission.
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j. Develop COA Evaluation Criteria. These criteria are standards the
commander and staff will later use to measure the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs.
Developing these criteria during mission analysis or as part of
commander’s planning guidance helps to eliminate a source of
bias prior to COA analysis and comparison. Evaluation criteria
address factors that affect success and those that can cause
failure. (JP 5-0, p. V-13)
Some examples:
The viability of the coalition will be threatened by a prolonged
campaign.
Pressure from Country M may cause Country Z to limit the use of
its seaports by the U.S. military in the campaign.
If friendly military operations in Country X cause collateral
damage to infrastructure and personnel from Country M who are
working in Country X, then Country M may deploy protective
military forces to Country X, risking escalation of the conflict.
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l. Identify initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). CCIRs are
elements of information the commander identifies as being
critical to timely decision making. CCIRs help focus information
management and help the commander assess the OE, validate (or
refute) assumptions, identify accomplishment of intermediate
objectives, and identify decision points during operations.
CCIRs belong exclusively to the commander. They are situation-
dependent, focused on predictable events or activities, time-
sensitive, and always established by an order or plan. The CCIR
list is normally short so that the staff can focus its efforts
and allocate scarce resources. (JP 5-0, p. V-14)
m. Update staff estimates. Staff officers should update their estimates with their
analysis of the mission now that they have a better idea of what the functional
requirements may be.
n. Prepare and deliver the mission analysis brief. The purpose of the mission
analysis brief is to provide to the commander and the staff, as well as other key
partners, the results of the staff’s analysis. See Figure 4-5 for a possible briefing
agenda. The commander has likely been continuing his own analysis in parallel so this
brief should be an opportunity to dialogue about the mission. At the conclusion of the
brief, the commander should not only approve or modify the command’s mission, but
also provide his understanding and vision of the campaign or operation through
commander’s intent and planning guidance. Depending on how much time the
commander has had to think about the situation, he may update his initial intent and
guidance that he discerned through his operational design.
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Figure 4-5: Sample Mission Analysis Brief Agenda
o. Develop and issue the refined commander’s intent and planning guidance. The
commander now uses the understanding he has gained through his operational design,
informed additionally through the mission analysis process, along with his experience,
education, and wisdom, to update his vision for the campaign. This vision is the
commander’s personal insight on how he will employ military operations, in conjunction
with interagency and multinational efforts to apply all instruments of power, to achieve
success. This vision, provided through commander’s intent and planning guidance, will
facilitate military course of action development, as well as proposed actions among the
interagency that he believes will accomplish the desired national strategic end state and
objectives.
(1) The commander’s intent is a concise narrative describing the key aspects of
his understanding of the environment and the problem and his visualization (Purpose,
Method, End state) of how the campaign must progress to achieve the desired end
state. He uses operational design to build his intent, enriching both his understanding
and visualization through interaction with the staff as it progresses through the planning
process. The purpose of commander’s intent is to focus the staff and assist
subordinates and supporting commanders in taking actions to achieve the desired end
state, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Given the complexities of the OE
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at any joint level, the commander must empower subordinates to make decisions within
an overall vision for success in the campaign. Using mission command, the commander
leaves much of the detailed planning and execution of joint warfighting to his
subordinate commanders and requires them to use initiative and judgment to
accomplish the mission.
At the strategic level, commander’s intent will be much broader than at the tactical
level. It must provide an overall vision for the campaign that helps the staff and
subordinate commanders, as well as other non-U.S. and non-military partners, to
understand the intent to integrate all instruments of national power and achieve unified
action. The commander must envision and articulate how joint operations will dominate
the adversary and support or reinforce other actions by interagency partners and our
allies to achieve strategic success. Through his intent, the commander identifies the
major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points and events where operations
must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the OE, and where other
instruments of national power will play a central role. He links national strategic
objectives to military objectives, and lays the foundation for the desired conditions of the
military/theater end state. Essential elements of commander’s intent follow:
Commander’s intent may also include other items, which assist the staff,
subordinate commands, and coalition partners to share more fully the commander’s
vision for unified action. Other possible elements of commander’s intent are:
Objectives provide clear statements of goals of the campaign that, in
combination, will lead to achievement of the military end state. The commander may
also relate the campaign objectives to the national strategic objectives to enable the
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staff to better develop COAs that will ensure proper nesting, and better enable planning
interaction of all instruments of power.
Effects Guidance provides a vision of the conditions and behaviors in the OE
that must be in place at the successful conclusion of the campaign. This guidance
enables the staff to better link the objectives as visualized by the commander with
concepts of operation that may result in tasks to achieve those objectives.
Method provides a visualization for subordinates on arrangement and
synchronization of the major operations to develop future options for action. While
method will focus on how the commander envisions operations to achieve the military
end state, it should also explain how to support policy aims as the command becomes a
supporting effort to the final achievement of the U.S. strategic ends at conflict
termination. Method does not describe the specific conduct of these operations; it
enhances concept of operation development and understanding by others, but does not
describe those details. The commander generally should not give detailed guidance on
the method so as to allow maximum flexibility to the JPG in developing COAs.
(2) Once the commander has given his intent for the upcoming campaign, he will
normally provide the JPG/staff and subordinate commanders with updated planning
guidance that provides additional clarity and detail essential to facilitate timely and
effective COA development. The commander will have built this planning guidance
through his own operational design approach, as enriched by the staff’s analysis.
Planning guidance should enable the staff and components to understand the major
themes and guiding principles for the campaign and develop detailed COAs for action.
However, guidance should not be so specific as to limit the staff from investigating a full
range of options for the commander. Planning guidance will provide a framework, the
"left and right limits," to develop options to integrate the use of military and non-military
power. The content of planning guidance is at the discretion of the commander and
depends on the situation and time available. No format for the planning guidance is
prescribed. This refined planning guidance should include the
following elements:
(a)An approved mission statement.
(b)Key elements of the OE.
(c)A clear statement of the problem.
(d)Key assumptions.
(e)Key operational limitations.
(f)National strategic objectives with a description of
how the operation will support them.
(g)Termination criteria (if appropriate, CCMD-level
campaign plans will not have termination criteria and
many operations will have transitions rather than
termination).
(h)Military objectives or end state and their relation
to the national strategic end state.
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(i) The JFC’s initial thoughts on the conditions
necessary to achieve objectives.
(j)Acceptable or unacceptable levels of risk in key
areas.
(k)The JFCs visualization of the operational approach
to achieve the objectives in broad terms. This
operational approach sets the basis for development of
COAs. The commander should provide as much detail as
appropriate to provide the right level of freedom to
the staff in developing COAs. Planning guidance should
also address the role of interorganizational and
multinational partners in the pending operation and
any related special considerations as required.(JP 5-
0, p. V-19)
The commander may provide guidance in a variety of ways and formats, based
on his preference. He may provide it to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders,
or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as dictated by
geography, security, and type and volume of information. Additionally, the commander
can give guidance in written or verbal form. The key challenge is to ensure universal
understanding of this guidance across all elements of the command, a wide range of
supporting commands, and enabling agencies. The commander may issue updated
planning guidance throughout the decision making process. Because the COA
development process will continue to analyze the OE and examine effects on enemy,
neutral, and friendly elements, the commander may participate in the COA development
process as the JPG examines issues, challenges, and limitations. This engagement
may also cause the commander to revisit his operational design for the campaign.
Consequently, there is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may
refine and reissue his planning guidance.
p. In Progress Review. At the theater level and as part of the plans review process,
CCDRs conduct a series of in-progress reviews with the SecDef (or his designated
representative) to keep the orientation of the campaign planning in line with the thinking
of the national leadership. If the combatant command does not identify the correct end
state and corresponding objectives to orient the campaign, further planning is
meaningless. Based on strategic direction, the supported CCDR will participate in this
first of up to three IPRs to ensure the CCDR’s views are in-synch with those of the
SecDef before further planning proceeds. The CCDR will normally present his initial
analysis in the form of a briefing (at most, a few slides) that synopsizes his
understanding of strategic guidance, the linkage of the theater/military end state to the
national end state, the analysis of facts and assumptions, and proposed mission and
intent for the upcoming campaign. These IPRs have evolved to be more about dialogue
between civilian and military leaders than about concrete approval. The national
decision makers always want to keep options open and do not like to be conceptually
“boxed in,” even when the CCDR needs some form of approval to allow continued
planning.
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The commander considers his operational design as complemented and
supplemented by the staff’s analysis. While the staff has been focused on the planning
aspects, the commander has continued to apply an operational design approach to the
overall situation. Through his dialogue with the national policy makers (President,
SecDef, CJCS), Joint Staff, military service chiefs, other supporting commands and
agencies, allies, subordinate commanders, academia, think tanks, and others, he
continues to enrich his understanding of the environment and the problem, and
continues to extend and refine his visualization of the campaign. Through his
experience and application of operational design, he is able to sense changes in the
environment and refocus his understanding as appropriate. He transmits this increased
understanding and visualization to his staff and subordinates as often as he believes
there is need for updated focus. The CCDR brings his most recent understanding and
visualization to the SecDef IPR.
A result of the first IPR is a common view of the problem and mission analysis and
initial estimate insights. The SecDef will provide further guidance to guide continued
operational design and planning. The CCDR uses these results to refine his vision for
the campaign and provide further guidance to both staff and subordinate commands on
how they should begin developing options for future, unified action. See Annex A for
more on SecDef IPRs.
4. Develop Courses of Action. The commander and staff will work together to refine
and develop the commander’s initial vision and intent for the campaign into a specific,
well-developed concept to accomplish unified action. See Figure 4-5 for the inputs,
outputs, and potential steps involved. The staff supports the commander through in-
depth analysis and presentation of a range of options for future military and non-military
actions that will accomplish the desired strategic and military ends. One way staffs help
commanders refine their visualization is to develop alternative Courses of Action (COA)
to execute the commander’s envisioned operational approach and achieve the
objectives.
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Figure 4-6: JPP Step 3 – Develop Courses of Action
Each COA will expand [on the Operational Approach] with the
additional details that describe who will take the action, what
type of military action will occur, when the action will begin,
where the action will occur, why the action is required
(purpose), and how the action will occur (method of employment
of forces). (JP 5-0, p. V-20). Each COA also describes, in broad
but clear terms, the size of forces deemed necessary, time in
which joint force capabilities need to be brought to bear, and
the risks associated with the COA. These COAs will undergo
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additional validity testing, analysis, wargaming, and
comparison, and they could be eliminated at any point during
this process. (JP 5-0, pp. V-20, 21).
For each COA, the staff must enable the commander to envision the holistic
employment of friendly forces and assets, taking into account externally-imposed
limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions from
mission analysis. Equally important, the commander must envision how military force
will work in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to achieve military
and strategic ends. The LOOs/LOEs, objectives, and decisive points developed during
operational design should drive and shape COA development.
(2) Determine opposing courses of action. Before developing possible COAs, the
staff must gain an appreciation of what other actors may do to shape the future
environment to their desired end state. They can use the JIPOE process to help them
gain such an appreciation, though they must consider not only enemy and adversary
actions, but also neutral and friendly actions that may (unintentionally) impede
achievement of their desired end state.
The staff determines how other relevant actors will attempt to accomplish their
strategic goals by identifying their likely objectives and desired end states, potential
strategic and military capabilities, and estimate how the opposition leader may apply his
instruments of power in the future – the opposing courses of action (OCOAs). They
must also consider aspects of other adversarial and even neutral actors’ courses of
action as they may either support or limit achievement of our desired end state.
The staff’s analysis should identify all known factors affecting the opposition’s
actions, including time, space, weather, terrain, and the strength and disposition of
military forces, as well as other key factors that may oppose achievement of our desired
conditions. The analysis of military capabilities should look across the air, space,
maritime, land, and cyberspace domains. [Cyberspace planning tips can be found in
https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/USACSL/Publications/Strategic_Cyberspace_Operations
_Guide.pdf ]
(3) Developing OCOAs requires the commander and his staff to think as the
opponent thinks. From that perspective, they postulate possible adversary objectives
first and then visualize specific actions within the capabilities of adversary forces to
achieve these objectives. Potential adversary actions relating to specific, physical
objectives normally must be combined to form course of action statements. Below are
the key elements of an OCOA, which may be in the form of a sketch, or a narrative, or a
combination:
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Adversary objectives.
Adversary force posture at the outset of the conflict.
How the adversary will employ his instruments of power to accomplish
objectives.
Adversary posture when the conflict is over.
Aspects of the desired OE opposed by neutral or friendly actors.
Posture of relevant neutral actors at the outset of conflict.
Likely actions taken by neutral or friendly actors that may impede, or assist,
achievement of our desired conditions.
The staff will identify for the commander both the most-dangerous OCOA, as
well as the most-likely OCOA, based upon the situation anticipated and/or at hand.
Often, the most-likely and most-dangerous OCOAs are not the same, so there must be
a conscious decision for the baseline assumption OCOA for friendly planning. Usually,
commanders consider the most-likely OCOA as their baseline for friendly action unless
the consequences of not focusing on the most-dangerous OCOA preclude doing
otherwise.
Finally, this analysis will not only influence the JPG’s development of COAs, but
will also form the basis to focus and develop PIR and those FFIR related to potentially
unhelpful friendly and neutral actions. Based upon the commander’s guidance, PIR
serve as the focus to develop collection-and-analysis efforts and forwarding requests for
information (RFI) to supporting agencies. The staff can focus efforts to collect, process,
produce, and disseminate the required intelligence and other information.
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(5) Review operational objectives and tasks and develop ways
to accomplish tasks.
The JPG will analyze the commander’s guidance to develop a more detailed
framework of nested objectives and effects (see Figure 4-7) for accomplishment during
the campaign to achieve the military end state. In refining the commander’s operational
design, the staff analyzes how the broad, overarching guidance for the campaign will
break down into more detailed and achievable blocks as the campaign unfolds. This
analysis of nested objectives and effects provides a framework for the logical
development of tasks by components and functions that will achieve the desired
conditions in the OE. With this framework, the staff then identifies the key tasks that
must be performed to achieve the commander’s visualization.
(a) The national strategic end state describes the conditions that must be met
from a unified action point of view in order to achieve or preserve U.S. national
interests. These conditions will often be similar to the termination criteria for the
campaign or major operation.
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(b) The military end state describes the conditions that the military must
achieve, through the accomplishment of its assigned objectives, in support of the
national strategic end state. It is also the point beyond which the President does not
need the military to serve as primary instrument of national power to achieve the
remaining national objectives or interests. However, this does not indicate the cessation
of all military activity. The military might still conduct transition activities, force
protection, reconstitution, and redeployment after the military end state has been
achieved.
(c) Objectives are the clearly-defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which
joint capability is focused to accomplish the military end state. Military objectives are
one of the most important considerations in operational design and campaign or major
operation planning. They define the role of military forces in the larger context of – and
nested within – national strategic objectives. They specify what to accomplish and
provide the basis to describe campaign effects. Although the commander describes his
visualization of the campaign’s objectives in his intent and guidance, his staff should
verify and refine them.
Other agencies and partners can use the desired effects to help them visualize
their activities to support the military activity if it is the primary means of achieving
objectives, or how they will be supported by military activity if they provide the key
means to achieve national strategic objectives. Thus, effects may be a prime means to
bridge military and interagency understanding by describing how the OE should behave
to show policy achievement.
Joint doctrine has no specific convention for writing effects, but there are four
primary considerations according to JP 5-0:
They should link directly to one or more objectives.
They should be stated as conditions of the environment, not as another
objective or task.
They should be measurable.
They should not specify ways and means for accomplishment.
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Once the commander and staff understand the objectives and effects that define
the campaign, they then develop appropriate tasks to create the desired effects, and
preclude undesired effects. Not all tasks are connected to effects, e.g., support tasks
related to logistics and communications. However, the commander emphasizes the
development of effects-related tasks early in the planning process because of the
obvious importance of these tasks to objective accomplishment. The following is an
example of the nesting of these components:
(e) Endstate: Regional stability, territorial integrity, and trade are restored to pre-
conflict levels. Newland no longer threatens Oldland or the region through the use of
insurgency or state-sponsored terrorism.
(f) Objective 1: Restore and protect Oldland’s (our key partner and neighbor of
Newland) western border with Newland IAW the 1956 agreement.
Effect 1: Oldland’s Armed Forces and police are capable of providing for
internal defense against insurgency and terrorism.
Effect 2: Oldland’s military is an active participant in regional security
structures.
o Task 1: Build and implement a robust security cooperation program
with Oldland.
o Task 2: Enable Oldland military participation in annual exercises
Assured Resolve, Python Quest, and Iron Fist.
Because COAs are meant to be initial concepts, designating phases at this point
may not be useful. One possible method of visualizing the sequence during COA
development is to organize tasks and lines of operation/effort into Pre-hostilities,
Hostilities, and Post-hostilities periods vice more detailed phases.
Develop an initial concept graphic and narrative. Based upon the initial framework,
the JPG visualizes how to accomplish these objectives/effects over time. The staff
develops an initial concept narrative and, if appropriate, a graphic that describes the
major actions of the campaign as a useful reference.
(6) COGs and decisive points (or areas of influence for CCMD-
level campaigns). The commander and the staff review and refine
their COG analysis begun during [operational design] based on
updated intelligence, JIPOE products, and initial staff
estimates. The refined enemy and friendly COG analysis,
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particularly the critical vulnerabilities, is considered in the
development of the initial COAs. The COG analysis helps the
commander become oriented to the enemy and compare friendly
strengths and weaknesses. (JP 5-0, p. V-25). (Operational Design
inserted to remove some inconsistencies within JP 5-0)
Review the operational centers of gravity (COG) as the point of focus for the
operations and post the major physical and logical decisive points that will be relevant to
the COA. These might include ports, population centers, critical infrastructure, major
events such as elections, support of key actors, etc. During COA development, these
serve as points where friendly actions can, and probably will, come in contact with the
enemy, and serve to orient planners on where major tasks/actions must focus.
Array Forces at Military End state. Position forces geographically where they
are needed in the theater at the end of the campaign and determine what those forces
will do. Use the sketch to help visualize the forces and their locations.
Identify Initial Entry Points. Based on initial guidance and knowledge of theater
access and facilities, display where the forces can enter the theater from land, air, and
sea deployments, and show the initial bases/staging areas available to support this
deployment. Also portray the initial lines of communication that will connect forces back
to in-theater (intermediate staging bases) and strategic (CONUS or forward-deployed)
bases of operations.
Maneuver the Forces Forward to Military End State. Looking at the sketch with
the end state and objectives/effects by period (or phase) in mind, determine the best
way to get the forces into theater from bases in friendly territory to their ultimate
locations at the end of the campaign. This activity will help formulate the desired basing
plan for the beginning, middle, and end of the campaign.
Array Forces at Pre-Hostilities. Visualize force positioning in Pre-hostilities
after they enter the theater at these potential entry points, and formulate the initial
concept for a basing plan and Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (JRSOI).
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(9) Identify a Reserve that can exploit success or prevent disaster. Identify
decision points and assessment process. The commander will need
to know when a critical decision has to be made and how to know
specific objectives have been achieved. (JP 5-0, p. V-25).
During each of the periods, analyze how military and non-military actions will
accomplish the required changes in the operational environment. It is not important yet
to identify which subordinate organization will accomplish each of the actions, which are
the tasks. It is, however, important to identify suitable tasks for or requests to our
interagency partners (DOS, Dept. of Treasury, etc.), coalition and international
organizations (UN, NATO, regional organizations like the European Union, etc.), and
other non-governmental partners (International Committee of the Red Cross, etc.).
Focus on the effects to achieve or to avoid, and consider how to employ joint forces
(via the joint functions) in conjunction with other instruments of power. Considerations
for tasks include:
Tasks required by the main effort.
Tasks required by the supporting efforts.
Initial entry into theater: basing, access, and overflight.
Deployment and reception of the force (JRSOI).
Protection of forces and host-nation points of entry.
Building and maintaining a coalition force.
C2 with joint, host-nation, and coalition forces.
Achieving the desired effects.
Preventing undesired effects/events, such as a humanitarian crisis, loss of
local support, etc.
Tasks required to support the use of other instruments of power.
Tasks to protect the force from cyber-attack or exploit the use of cyber-
attack.
Sustaining the joint force, and additional support required to enable and
maintain host-nation and coalition participation.
Post-hostilities conditions, and how the joint force will maintain military
gains and transform them into long-term strategic success.
Determine if the forces and capabilities allocated and/or are sufficient to meet the
task requirements. Note any deficiencies. Sketch a troop-to-task analysis to help with
determining the appropriate command structure.
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(11) Integrate Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs). Some
IRCs help to create effects and influence adversary decision
making. Planners should consider how IRCs can influence
positioning of adversary units, disrupt adversary C2, and
decrease adversary morale when developing COAs. (JP 5-0, p. V-
26)
At this point, identify the basics of how you will organize, by components any
JTFs requirements, and how the joint force will control or coordinate its efforts with the
host nation, multinational forces, and interagency elements as necessary. Again, this
structure is an initial organization around which to continue COA development, and may
change when tested in wargaming. Some considerations:
Geometry – how to allocate the battle space (e.g. joint operations area,
joint special operations area, or joint security area).
Organization (functional components, service components).
Interagency considerations (coordination mechanisms).
Multinational considerations (initial coalition command/coordinating
structure).
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detailed deployment concept will be developed during plan
synchronization, enough of the concept must be described in the
COA to visualize force buildup, sustainment requirements, and
military-political considerations. (JP 5-0, p. V-27).
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Figure 4-8: COA Development Element for the Narrative/Sketch
(17) Test the Validity of Each COA. All COAs selected for
analysis must be valid, and the staff should reject COA
alternatives that do not meet all five of the following validity
criteria:
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(b) Feasible — Can accomplish the mission within the
established time, space, and resource limitations. This test focuses
on means and risk.
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(e) Complete — Does it answer the questions who, what, where,
when, how, and why? The COA must incorporate:
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(b) Direct revisions to COA(s), combinations of COAs, or
development of additional COA(s).
Staff directorates analyze and refine each COA to determine its supportability. A
purpose of the staff estimate is to determine whether the mission can be accomplished
and to determine which COA can best be supported. This, together with the supporting
discussion, gives the commander the best possible information from which to select a
COA. Each staff section analyzes each COA, its supportability, and which COA is most
supportable from their particular, functional perspective.
5. Analyze Courses of Action. The JPG analyzes in detail each COA that survived
Step 3. The objective of this step is to analyze each COA critically, independently, and
according to the commander’s guidance in an effort to determine the advantages and
disadvantages associated with each COA. COA analysis is the process of
closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will
allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that
are valid and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each
proposed friendly COA. (JP 5-0, p. V-31). See Figure 4-10 for the inputs,
outputs, and potential steps involved. Wargaming is a “Garbage in – Garbage out”
phenomenon. A poorly developed COA will produce wargame(s) that waste time and do
not satisfyingly uncover the information necessary to improve COA Alternatives.
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Figure 4-10: JPP Step 4 ― Analyze Courses of Action
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Identify potential decision points.
Determine task organization options.
Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or
related tool.
Identify potential plan branches and sequels.
Identify high-value targets.
Assess risk.
Determine COA advantages and disadvantages.
Recommend CCIRs.
Validate end states and objectives.
Identify contradictions between friendly COAs and
expected enemy end states.(JP 5-0, p. V-33)
It is critical that the analysis first looks at each COA independently from the other COAs;
a comparison will come later. At this point, the staff is looking for best answers to the
following questions (not inclusive):
Will the tasks identified achieve the desired effects in a way that will
achieve the desired conditions, and avoid generating unintended effects?
How will military operations change the adversary and the operational
environment over the course of the campaign?
What are the points at which COAs don’t offer enough flexibility to oppose
adversary actions, and where might branches/sequels be required?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of each COA, and how well does
each COA meet the commander’s vision for success? How well do they
hold up under the rigor of a realistic opposing force or situation (for an HA
mission, the enemy might not be an armed force).
What are potential decision points where the commander must make a
key decision, and the critical information requirements (CCIR) for the
commander to make such a decision?
Which aspects of the COA may introduce strategic challenges that must
be resolved?
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identify the strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each
friendly COA. While joint doctrine refers to visualizing the flow of a military operation as
the key element in wargaming, the commander and staff must also consider the
application of all instruments of national power (DIME).
Methods include:
Major periods construct with Pre-Hostilities, Hostilities, and
Post-Hostilities.
Phasing model articulated in joint doctrine or another
phasing model developed for the campaign.
Critical events sequencing, decisive points, or major tasks.
Computer assisted.
(2) The second decision involves deciding in what order you will wargame. The
JPG prioritizes to ensure key concerns are addressed before available time runs out.
For example, it may decide to prioritize war gaming against the enemy’s most
dangerous COA before the most likely COA, or vice versa. Similarly it may decide to
wargame a specific COA early in the process because there is concern over partner
capabilities that needs to be looked at closely.
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(3) War game each COA independently. The COAs must be evaluated through
the other actors’ eyes, given their political and cultural perspectives and biases, to
determine if the proposed actions will change the intended behaviors in the manner that
friendly planners believe -- a key aspect to achieve desired, rather than undesired,
effects. Keep in mind that, in addition to actions by adversaries, actions by neutral or
even friendly actors may need to be considered as "opposing" actions, as the goal is to
achieve our desired operational environment. While the main effort is on applying the
use of military power, consider all available instruments of power. While the
commander may not be able to control the D, I, and E actions, he can coordinate these
instruments with other actors who may be able to influence their application.
c. Conduct the war game. The JPG will conduct the war game by assembling
information, marshalling and assembling the proper tools and teams for analysis, and
following a well-ordered process for systemic analysis of the proposed COAs. See
Figure 4-11 for sample steps that can be conducted.
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use the Lines of Operation or Lines of Effort sequentially to work through the campaign.
The supervisor of the war game directs the questioning and ensures that war game time
is not wasted. Blue, Red, and, if appropriate, Green (neutral actors) teams who THINK
and speak for their forces when directed by the supervisor are critical to the process.
The supervisor should identify a separate recorder to document the results in a useful
format and to record any issues that cannot be resolved quickly.
As the JPG conducts the war game, they interpret the results of analysis to
ensure each COA remains valid. If a COA is inadequate, infeasible, or unacceptable,
they must discard or modify that COA. The JPG may also find that it needs to combine
aspects of COAs to develop new ones. Throughout the analysis and wargaming
process, the JPG must remain focused on the following areas:
Objectives.
Balance between creativity and the realities of the OE.
The elements of operational design.
Joint functions (JP 3-0).
d. Record the war game. Proceedings of the war game can be recorded by a variety
of means:
Narrative describing the action, probable reaction, counteraction, assets,
and time used.
Sketch-note which uses a narrative but adds operational sketches to paint
a clear picture.
Synchronization matrix organized by time or major events as columns,
with functional and other major activity areas as rows. If used as a
recording tool, this would form the beginning of the synchronization matrix
that will provide the commander and staff a visualization tool for the
campaign. It can be refined throughout planning, and should be updated
throughout the campaign. The synchronization matrix helps staff officers
build the detailed functional plans that support the campaign plan.
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e. Evaluate the Results. he analysis of the COA as a result of the war game should
include the following areas.
After the war game is complete, there should be sufficient visualization of the
campaign to solidify the tasks required. Some of these tasks will be related directly to
achieving effects that will enable objectives to be met, while others will be supporting
tasks (such as building bases, establishing logistics stocks and resupply routes,
conducting JRSOI). Visualization and decision making tools that should come out of the
evaluation include:
g. Adjust the COA to mitigate risk and enable it to better achieve objectives. After
analysis of the COA through wargaming, the staff can refine the COA to improve its
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likelihood of achieving the objectives in the time desired (given other limitations noted)
and reduce the elements of risk. If the COA becomes significantly different, then it
should be re-briefed to the commander. Care must be taken not to "morph" the COA so
that it is no longer distinguishable from the other COAs.
h. Update staff estimate. Record observations about the COAs in the staff estimate,
to include functional requirements, relevant challenges to the functional area, and
mitigation measures relevant to the staff section’s function.
During the comparison process (See Figure 4-12 for the inputs, outputs, and potential
steps involved), the JPG focuses on evaluating the value of each COA through the
commander’s eyes -- using his visualization of the campaign as the standard. The
purpose of the comparison is to determine which COA is the best fit for his intent, with
least cost and risk, and greatest chance of success. Using evaluation criteria derived
mostly from his intent and guidance, the staff evaluates the COAs against the
evaluation criteria ― not against one another ― to identify the one that best
meets the commander’s needs.
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Figure 4-12: JPP Step 5 ― Compare Courses of Action
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o Time. (JP 5-0, p. V-36 and 44 combined)
o Force protection.
o Casualties or collateral damage.
o Use of Flexible Deterrent Options.
o Impact on coalition interests.
c. Compare COAs using evaluation criteria. The COAs are compared using the
evaluation criteria that was established prior to the wargaming (and probably
augmented as a result of wargaming). The inputs to COA comparison are the
independent staff estimates and war game results. The chief of staff or JPG leader
directs the comparison discussion. Staff planners normally conduct the comparison in
isolation from the commander, and may include the subordinate component staffs.
The staff should remain as objective as possible when comparing the COAs and
avoid manipulating criteria to promote a "favorite COA." Weighting evaluation criteria is
a frequent and often helpful technique to identify the most-critical criteria. Weighting, like
evaluation criteria selection, should come prior to formal COA comparison to avoid
assigned weight manipulation.
d. Select the "best" staff-recommended COA. After the comparison analysis, the staff
must select the COA that they will recommend to the commander. This selection must
consider not only the JPG analysis, but also each staff section’s functional analysis of
the COAs. COA comparison is ultimately a subjective process that uses collective staff
judgment and should not become a purely mathematical exercise, though using “+, -, 0”
or 1, 2, 3 as expressions of relative value may be appropriate. The key element in this
process is the ability to articulate to the commander why one COA is preferred over
another in terms of how well the COA meets the evaluation criteria. Using some type of
decision matrix may help, but be careful to keep it as objective as possible. In essence,
the staff is trying to use a measure of objectivity to evaluate and differentiate
subjectivity. See Figure 4-13 and F-14 for examples.
One type of COA comparison matrix uses weighted numerical comparisons. In this
method, each criterion is given a comparative weight based on its importance. This
weight likely would be derived from commander’s intent and guidance. Because the
COAs are compared to the evaluation criteria, rather than to each other, there is no
need to identify the 1st, 2nd, 3rd "place" COAs for each criterion. If "+, -, 0" is used, "+"
means it does well in meeting the criteria, "-" means it does not do as well, and "0"
means it is balanced. If 1-3 is used as a scale, lower is better, so 1 means that the COA
meets the evaluation criteria well, 3 means not well, and 2 is in the middle.
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Figure 4-13: Sample COA Comparison Matrix (Weighted Numerical)
Some commanders are less comfortable with numerical ways to present the
comparison. Another type of comparison matrix is below. Each COA is described in
terms of advantage or disadvantage against the evaluation criteria.
7. Approve a Course of Action. In this JPP step, the staff briefs the
commander on the COA comparison and the analysis and wargaming
results, including a review of important supporting information.
The staff determines the preferred COA to recommend to the
Commander. (JP 5-0, p. V-45). See Figure 4-15 for the inputs, outputs, and
potential steps involved in COA Approval. The aim is to obtain his decision on which
COA to develop into the concept of operations (CONOPS) of the campaign. This
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enables the commander to refine his visualization of the campaign and provide further
guidance to the staff on how to proceed with CONOPS development.
b. Recommend COA to the commander. During the brief (see Figure 4-16 for an
example agenda), it is important that dissenting views be heard so that the commander
can understand all aspects of the analysis. Staff officers should be encouraged to
expound on issues in their functional areas if needed. Subordinate commands should
be present, or linked via video-teleconference. Other partners also should be invited to
the brief, to include other government agencies and key multinational partners, to the
extent possible or appropriate. Staff officers from those organizations are probably part
of the JPG, so there should be no surprises.
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Figure 4-16: Sample COA Decision Brief Agenda
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d. Receive commander’s guidance for concept development. As part of the COA
decision brief, or following it, the commander will likely provide additional guidance that
will guide the development of the approved COA into the concept of operations
(CONOPS).
e. Confirm updated commander’s intent. Upon hearing the analysis of the COAs, the
commander is likely to understand the environment and the problem(s) better. This may
cause him to adapt his intent and/or guidance. This is an opportunity for the commander
to transmit any updates to the staff and other relevant planning parties.
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continuously updated source of information from the perspective
of the commander. (JP 5-0, p. V-48). It also provides the necessary focus
for continued campaign planning and for developing an OPLAN/ OPORD. (See Figure
4-17 for a potential outline for this estimate).
i. Conduct CJCS Estimate Review and possible IPR. During this Review and IPR,
the CJCS and SecDef (or his representative) will consider the CCDR’s analysis and
approve (or modify) the CONOPS for further development. The estimate review
determines whether the scope and concept of planned operations
satisfy the tasking and will accomplish the mission, determines
whether the assigned tasks can be accomplished using available
resources in the timeframes contemplated by the plan, and
ensures the plan is proportional and worth the expected costs.
As planning is approved by SecDef (or designated representative)
during an IPR, the commander’s estimate informs the refinement
of the initial CONOPS for the plan. (JP 5-0, p. V-49)
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8. Develop the Plan. After the commander has approved a course of action and
provided additional guidance to the staff for development of the CONOPS and the full
plan (with updates as required after any IPRs for combatant commands), the staff
develops the CONOPS into an operations plan or operations order. See Figure 4-18 for
the inputs, outputs, and potential steps involved. The CONOPS must be developed to
provide the detail required for the staff to build the base plan and prepare supporting
annexes, and supporting and subordinate organizations to build supporting functional
plans. The CONOPs is the centerpiece of the plan/OPORD (JP 5-0, p. V-50)
a. The CONOPS:
States the commander’s intent.
Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take
to accomplish the mission.
Provides for the application, sequencing,
synchronization, and integration of forces and
capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including
those of multinational and interagency organizations
as appropriate).
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Describes when, where, and under what conditions the
supported commander intends to conduct operations and
give or refuse battle, if required.
Focuses on friendly, allied, partner, and adversary
COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.
Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation.
Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and
functions involved.
Relates the joint force’s objectives and desired
effects to those of the next higher command and other
organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of
tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders. (JP 5-
0, p. V-49)
c. The potential steps below lay out a way to conduct these activities. While it makes
sense to conduct them sequentially, in reality many occur simultaneously and are
adjusted as necessary when significant changes happen within other activities (e.g. the
Force Planners will begin building the TPFDD and make adjustments as the support
planning adjusts what and when units are needed).
(1) Review planning guidance. The staff should review the commander’s
guidance as updated throughout the planning process and as modified as a result of the
IPR and associated discussions by the commander.
(2) Update the commander’s intent. The commander should republish his intent,
with any changes to it that may result from his increased understanding of the OE and
the problem, and his vision for the campaign.
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(3) Phase the concept. Refine the phasing of the operation or campaign. Each
phase is designed to nest with the intent for the overall campaign and sequenced to
achieve an end state that will set conditions for commencement of the next phase. The
commander will declare his intent for each phase that supports his overall intent for the
operation or campaign. Each phase must have a specified set of conditions for both the
beginning and intended end state. Leaders should recognize that lines of operation or
effort are likely to run throughout the phases to provide the logical framework for the
entire operation or campaign. Each operation or campaign is unique and the
phasing must make sense for the campaign. While phases should ideally be flexibly
event-oriented, the staff must also consider the time-oriented resourcing requirements
for the activities of each phase.
While phasing has traditionally been described in a six phase model, this model
has been problematic in describing operations that are not predominately military. While
it works well for operations such as Desert Storm, it breaks down in describing some of
the operations, activities and actions associated with long term campaigns and
competition activities that occur below the level of armed conflict (e.g. U.S. actions
toward Russia in Ukraine). JP 3-0 models several phasing constructs that may apply.
The bottom line is that the phases should be adapted to the environment, the problem,
and the operational approach – not vice versa.
For each phase, the campaign’s CONOPS should describe the following
elements.
Intent and schemes of movement and maneuver. The commander’s intent
for the phase must be clear. Describe the purpose, end state, and the operational risk to
the campaign during this phase. The schemes of movement and maneuver may be
narratives of the various lines of operation and effort as they are executed during this
particular phase. The flow of forces and capability into theater are broadly described as
are subsequent joint force maneuver schemes to achieve the various operational
objectives. In campaigns where LOEs are used (as opposed to LOOs) and/or where
positional advantage may not be consistently critical to success, the scheme of
maneuver uses the logic of purpose and may describe how and when certain objectives
within each LOE must be achieved, especially in relation to the objectives on the other
LOEs of the campaign.
Objectives and effects (desired and undesired). Describe the objectives for
each phase, and the major effects that must be achieved to realize those objectives.
Describe how the force’s objectives are related to those of the next higher organization
and to other organizations (especially if the military is a supporting effort).
Tasks to subordinate and supporting commands and agencies. The
commander assigns tasks to subordinate commanders, along with the capabilities and
support necessary to achieve them. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on that
specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities
focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more
Military Departments operating in the same domain (air, land, sea, or space) or where
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there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Include
identification of requests for support to organizations outside of DOD.
Command and control organization and geometry of the area of
operations. Note any changes to the command and control structure or to the geometry
of the area of responsibility (for combatant commands) or joint operations area (for
subordinate joint forces) or area of operations (for subordinate non-joint forces).
Assessment methodology. Identify the basic methodology for assessing
accomplishment of objectives. Include assessments to help gauge if the objectives
actually support achievement of the end state.
Risk mitigation. Identify the areas of risk concern to the commander and
outline how the risk may be mitigated.
CCIR and associated decision points.
Transition to the next phase. Describe how the joint force will move to the
next phase. Describe the end state conditions for the phase, which should tie directly to
the initiation conditions for the next phase. Include a description of transition of control
from the joint force to other parties for aspects of the overall campaign.
(4) Develop supporting functional concepts. Once the general CONOPS is built,
supporting concepts are built to ensure supportability and coordination among all of the
functions. Some of the key functional concepts are for logistics support, force projection,
information operations, joint fires, force protection, and command, control, and
communications. The staff will review the functional concepts to ensure coordination.
Synchronization of the plan takes place once all of the supporting concepts have
been developed. Synchronization is the art of arranging all activities (military and
otherwise) in the right sequence and place, with the right purpose, to produce
maximum effect at the decisive points. Synchronization will continue after
development of the plan, through brief-backs, rehearsals, and execution. A
synchronized and fully integrated CONOPS becomes the Base Plan. For Level 2 plans,
this is the end of plan development, other than coordination.
(5) Expand the CONOPS into a Base Plan with annexes. “Management and Review
of campaign and Contingency Plans” (CJCSI 3141.01F) provides specific guidance and
procedures on the activities for organizations to prepare required plans and concepts. It
directs the typical activities that other organizations will accomplish as they plan for joint
operations. For example, a combatant command which is preparing a crisis-related
OPORD at the President’s direction will follow specific procedures and milestones in
force planning, TPFDD development, and shortfall identification.
The staff and supporting commands focus on developing a cohesive and detailed
plan for how to employ forces and capabilities throughout the campaign to realize the
commander’s vision. As the CONOPS develops into a fully-detailed plan, a number of
activities coincide in a parallel, collaborative, and iterative fashion rather than in a
sequential and time-consuming manner. Time is always a factor; conducting
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simultaneous, synchronized development activities at all levels will be critical to shorten
the planning cycle and make best use of the limited time available.
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(b) Force planning. During CONOPS development, the commander
determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential
actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission
consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities
available. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing
of activities or forces into the OA, providing the link between
the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and
force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the
sequencing of forces into the OA via a TPFDD. (JP 5-0, p. V-50)
Force planning begins early during concept development but must be refined and
finalized during detailed planning. There must be a balance between the flexibility
provided by the plan and the requirements to identify forces, recalling that inclusion in a
plan implies a level of preparation requirement for units. The commander determines
force requirements, develops a letter of instruction for time phasing and force
planning, and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in
accordance with the concept under development. Major forces and elements initially
come from those apportioned or allocated for planning by operational phase, mission,
and mission priority. Service components then collaboratively make tentative
assessments of the specific combat and supporting capabilities required. The
commands should not be constrained by the apportioned forces, but must be able to
provide clear rationale for capabilities required that are not apportioned. The
commander typically describes force requirements in the form of broad capability
descriptions or unit type codes, depending on the circumstances.
After sourcing the actual forces, the CCDR’s staff refines the force plan to ensure
it supports the concept, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander
identifies and resolves shortfalls, or reports shortfalls with a risk assessment during his
review. The supported CCDR submits the required force packages through the Joint
Staff to the force providers for sourcing as described in Appendix B.
(c) Nuclear strike planning. Commanders must assess the military as well as
political impact a nuclear strike would have on their operations. Nuclear-planning
guidance issued at the combatant-commander level depends upon national-level
political considerations and the military mission. Although USSTRATCOM conducts
nuclear planning in coordination with the supported GCC and certain allied
commanders, the supported commander does not control the decision to use nuclear
weapons. Due to the strategic and diplomatic consequences
associated with nuclear operations and plans, only the President
has the authority to employ nuclear weapons. (JP 5-0, p. V-57)
(d) Supporting Plan Development. At the combatant command level, the CJCS
issues a planning order or alert order to direct preparation of supporting plans after
receipt and approval of the commander’s COA as transmitted in the commander’s
estimate. Similarly, the combatant command issues a planning order to subordinates.
Subordinate commands generally will build their supporting campaign CONOPS upon
receipt of the command’s CONOPS, but have almost certainly been working in parallel
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with their higher headquarters. Other organizations will also develop supporting
concepts. The command informally coordinates with organizations outside of DOD to
build mutually supporting concepts and plans. The command will integrate subordinate,
partner, and interagency concepts and plans into the campaign plan (in the base plan
as appropriate and in the annexes) where appropriate.
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completion of plan development is not delayed pending the
resolution of shortfalls. (JP 5-0, p. V-59)
(g) Feasibility analysis. The focus in this activity is to ensure assigned mission
accomplishment using available resources within the plan’s contemplated time frame.
The results of force planning, support planning, deployment planning, and shortfall
identification will affect OPLAN or OPORD feasibility. The primary factors
analyzed for feasibility include forces, resources, and
transportation. (JP 5-0, p. V-59). The goal is to determine whether the
apportioned or allocated resources can deploy to the joint operational area when
required, be sustained throughout the operation, and be employed effectively, or
whether the scope of the plan exceeds the apportioned resources and supporting
capabilities. Measures to enhance feasibility include adjusting the CONOPS, ensuring
sufficiency of resources and capabilities, and maintaining options and reserves.
(6) Complete coordination of the plan. The planning requirements described above
enable good coordination of the plan. The supported command’s CONOPS drives the
supporting concepts, but not until the supported command completes coordination of all
of the annexes to the plan can the supporting commands and agencies ensure that they
have addressed all of the requirements adequately. Supported commands review all of
the supporting plans once they are prepared to ensure that the plan is fully coordinated.
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unity of purpose and then unity of effort in the campaign or operation. However, formal
coordination of OPLANs is done at the Department level, once an OPLAN is approved
by the SecDef.
(7) Review and Brief the plan for approval. Once completely coordinated, the plan
should be briefed through to the commander for his validation, as well as to prepare him
to brief the plan to the national leadership.
(a) Final in progress review (IPR). Once the plan is completed, the CCDR submits
it with the associated TPFDD file to the Joint Staff for review. The Joint Planning and
Execution Community (JPEC) reviews the plan for adequacy (does the plan satisfy the
mission and comply with guidance provided?); feasibility (are the required resources
available in the timeframes anticipated?); acceptability (are the anticipated operations
proportional and worth the anticipated costs? Is it politically supportable?);
completeness (does the plan include all required components and answer the 5Ws
plus how?); and compliance (does the plan comply with joint doctrine?).
(b) In conjunction with the CCDR’s final IPR brief, the CJCS and Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy (USD-P) will also offer their advice. This advice includes
identification of national strategic issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review,
such as key strategic risks and national-level decision points. The result of the final IPR
is SecDef approval of the Base Plan and required annexes, the resolution of any
remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan assessment, as applicable,
with any amplifying guidance or direction.
(8) Issue the OPLAN or OPORD. The approved plan is distributed to all subordinate
commands and supporting commands, agencies, and other appropriate organizations.
The command will maintain the plan, that is, distribute all changes to stakeholders and
to solicit reviews of the plan.
(b) Transition. Effective transition of the plan from the planners who have been
intimately involved in developing all of the details of the plan, to the operators, who will
not be as familiar with the intricate details of the plan, is critical. Transition is an
orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those
tasked with execution of the operation. It provides information,
direction, and guidance relative to the plan or order that will
help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it
provides an understanding of the rationale for key decisions
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necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to
execution. These factors coupled together are intended to
maintain the intent of the CONOPS, promote unity of effort, and
generate tempo. … Transition may be internal or external in the
form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs between
future plans and future/current operations. Externally,
transition occurs between the commander and subordinate
commands. (JP 5-0, p. V-60)
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(9) Review the Plan Periodically. Following final approval, the command
maintains and updates the plan as required by changing conditions in the operational
environment, strategic guidance, and resource levels, so that it remains current and
readily executable during future crisis action as the President and SecDef may require.
In most cases, the plan is reviewed regularly (up to every 18 months, annually for CMD
Campaign Plans), but should be reviewed as the commander’s assessment of his AOR
changes through his continual operational design approach. For the highest priority
JSCP-directed OPLANs, the SecDef may require more frequent reviews.
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CHAPTER 5: DEVELOPMENT OF THEATER (CCMD) STRATEGY
AND THE COMBATANT COMMAND CAMPAIGN PLAN (CCP)
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security cooperation activities, military-to-military
engagements, force posture, and preparation for contingencies.
Strategies typically employ close cooperation with DOS,
embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy
should be informed by the means or resources available to
support the attainment of designated end states and may include
military resources, programs, policies, and available funding.
CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and
supporting commands and improve coordination with other USG
departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR
operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan. (JP 5-0 II-
9).
c. Commanders and their staffs employ Strategic Art and Operational Art to develop
a Strategic Estimate (Frames the Environment and the Problem) and their CCMD
Strategy (Frames Strategic Guidance and the Strategic Approach).
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by analyzing and describing political, military, economic,
social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and
trends, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or
hinder achievement of the objectives over the timeframe of the
strategy. (JP 5-0, II-8 & 9 Emphasis Added)
Note: For more on the “Strategic Estimate” see Appendix B of JP 5-0.
The purpose of CCMD strategy is to clarify and exert influence over the environment of
today to create strategic effects favorable to achievement of the desired environment of
tomorrow. CCMD strategy must be framed in terms that allow adaptability and flexibility
to react to the changing environment, to seize opportunities, and to hedge against
setbacks. CCDRs develop a CCMD strategy focused mainly on the desired end state
(described by a set of desired conditions at the end of the considered timeframe) for
their area of responsibility that will further national interests.
In time of war, the President or SecDef may designate a theater of war, in which case a
CCDR, or an assigned subordinate commander, may develop a theater strategy for the
accomplishment of national or coalition aims within that theater of war. However, for the
purposes of this chapter, our point of reference for developing a theater strategy is the
CCDR’s assigned AOR in the Unified Command Plan. Note that the thought process
for developing a strategy for a theater of war would be very similar.
a. The combatant command translates national policy and strategy into military
operations, actions, and activities. The guidance to the CCDR formulating the theater
strategy comes from a variety of formal and informal sources. Very often, the national
policy and corresponding guidance is not explicit. This places a premium on the
CCDR’s ability to interpret, analyze, and synthesize the many sources of national intent,
and then communicate this synthesis back to the national policy makers to ensure that
he/she is in sync with their vision (in fact, the CCDR may actually shape their vision).
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Chapter 1 describes the CPG, NDS, NMS, and JSCP, as sources of formal guidance.
However, in a dynamic strategic environment, policy may evolve and the CCDR must
stay attuned to evolving descriptions and applications of national interests as described
by the President, SecDef, and other senior government officials through less formal
means such as speeches, social media, and verbal guidance. Though not directive in
nature, guidance contained in various U.S. interagency and even international
directives, such as UN Security Council Resolutions, will also impact campaign end
states and objectives. Perhaps most importantly, the CCDR must continually analyze
the dynamic relationships within the theater to describe the desired end state and
present limitations on ways to achieve that end state.
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The Command’s Mission
Assumptions
Ends
o Description of the desired strategic goals or outcomes
o As directed in strategic guidance and/or policy
o Achievable with projected resources
Ways
o Strategic approach to apply military power
o In concert with the other instruments of power
o Achievable with projected resources
Means
o Resources needed to source the operational approach
Risks in implementing the strategy
a. Environment. The CCDR must describe the current environment of the theater,
as well as the desired environment that meets national policy aims. This provides the
context for the strategy. While strategy is always subordinate to policy, to be effective it
is also subordinate to the environment; that is, as the environment changes, the
strategy may have to change. The CCDR and staff conduct a strategic estimate,
which provides the commander’s perspective of the strategic and
operational levels of the OE, threats and opportunities that
could facilitate or hinder the achievement of [CPG or JSCP}-
directed objectives, desired changes to meet specified regional
or functional objectives, and the commander’s visualization of
how those objectives might be achieved. (JP 5-0 B-1). This continually
updated estimate should address the following:
Strategic Direction
o U.S. Policy Goals
o Non-US/Multinational Goals
o Opposition [competitor] Policy Goals and Desired End
State
o Endstate(s)
Command Mission
Operational Environment
o Area of Responsibility
o Area of Interest
o Adversary Forces - States or non-state actors in the theater (or
outside of the theater) that may challenge the command’s ability to
secure U.S. interests in the theater.
o Friendly Forces
o Neutral Forces
Assessment of the Major Strategic and Operational
Challenges
o Significant geo-political considerations
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o Potential for spillover, with other CCDRs’ AORs or
functional areas(JP 5-0, B-1)
Potential Opportunities
Capabilities available to and limitations facing the command
Assessment of Risk
b. Ends. “Ends” is a word that may cause some friction with interagency partners.
Military efforts are almost by definition bounded in time, space, and effect. At some
point, military operations and activities cease when required conditions have been
achieved that will place the environment into a favorable and sustainable state.
However, senior civilian and military leaders know that the environment will continue to
change based on forces acting on the system. An effective military campaign or
operation should be planned and executed with a view towards positive sustainable
outcomes. Sustainable (with favorable trends) without the presence of military forces
and eventually sustainable with little or no requirement for U.S. resources. In a planning
context, (and to be consistent with doctrine) the ends for the theater describe system
conditions required to achieve the national aims as derived from various sources of
strategic guidance. The comprehensive aims will likely not be clearly and completely
laid out in directive guidance to the CCDR, so he/she must combine guidance with an
understanding of the environment to clearly describe the set of conditions in the theater
environment that will further national interests. Theater Strategies typically look 5-10
years into the future. This set of desired conditions (with time horizons) describes the
desired end state, which provides the context for understanding what aspects of the
current environment must change or must remain the same.
c. Ways. The strategy’s ways describe the strategic approach to achieving the end
state. This strategic approach should describe in general how resources (means) will
be applied over time to achieve the desired conditions. It describes the general activities
needed to accomplish the objectives (which, in turn, achieve the desired theater
conditions). (In some interagency circles, the word “objective” may sound too military-
oriented. Interagency planners should feel free to substitute another word like “outcome”
to overcome semantic differences.) The strategic approach should be explicit enough to
provide sufficient guidance to planners, but not so detailed as to inhibit their creativity.
One way to lay out the strategic approach is to develop lines of effort that lead to
accomplishment of the objectives. LOEs should also consider potential second and
third order effects that will cascade towards achievement of other strategic effects. The
strategist must also anticipate potential undesired effects and work to avoid or mitigate
them. The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is a useful source in
describing some typical ways in which military power can be applied to accomplish
objectives. Since some military objectives support other actors’ objectives, it is critical
that the objective and its supporting line of effort be closely coordinated with them.
d. Means. Means are the resources necessary to support the strategic approach
(Ways). Resources may be tangible (such as military forces, foreign military financing,
or seats in U.S. schools), or intangible (such as processes, cultural appeal, goodwill
from previous activities, or fear of invasion by another country). Closely associated with
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means are the authorities required to use them and the permissions required to use that
authority. The CCDR should consider the authority they have to use the necessary
means and the permission required to use that authority in support of a theater strategy.
The theater strategy focuses on how military power can be employed in concert with the
other instruments of national power. The CCDR should consider all instruments that
are available or may be made available from U.S. and partner sources. Insufficient
means require adjusted ways or ends. After adjusting the theater objectives, if there is
still no alternative approach that can achieve the desired conditions, then the CCDR
must go back to the national policy makers and show how the national aims cannot be
met, to reassess the national policy.
e. Risk. The strategist must weigh the potential advantages and disadvantages of
the strategy in terms of risk and ensure a proper balance between ends, ways, and
means, as discussed above. Part of the purpose of building the strategy is to identify
shortfalls in required resources. On the other hand, if there is no reasonable expectation
that a gapped resource may become available, then an infeasible strategic approach
results, causing an unbalanced and hence risk-prone strategy. At that point where
constraints on the strategic approach or on the means available to execute that concept
risk achievement of the end state, the strategy is in jeopardy.
Current joint doctrine does not provide a definitive method for developing theater
strategy. The Joint Planning Process (JPP), described in JP 5-0 and earlier in this
handbook, provides a systematic process to develop a plan, but focuses on
development of courses of action to accomplish a specified mission. Planners can use
a process such as JPP to guide development of the theater campaign plan, but the
strategy that underpins that campaign plan should be clearly understood and
communicated first. Operational design as described in Chapter 3 provides a way to
think through the complexity to build the strategy. While operational design can help
planners work the conceptual aspects of any plan, to include a campaign plan, it is
especially suited to the development of theater strategy, which must inherently deal with
complexity and a multitude of unfamiliar and ill-structured problems.
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initial development of the strategy to constantly assess impact on the environment, to
reframe the strategy as needed during execution.
(1) Describe the current environment. This effort is described in the previous
chapter. At the theater level, it is critically important to consider the impact of history
and culture on aspects of the environment. To understand the essence of the
environment that will affect the strategy, the analysis should enable a dialogue on how
the various systems interrelate. Identification of the relevance and impact of key
relationships between the many state and non-state actors are extremely important in
this analysis and synthesis. Finally, there must be a clear understanding of how U.S.,
allies, and partner national interests are affected by the theater environment.
(2) Determine the tendency of the OE. Based on an understanding of the current
environment, project the environment into the future to determine its tendencies that the
commander needs to affect. This will help describe the desired end state and help the
commander capitalize on opportunities presented by the natural tendencies wherever
possible. Since campaign plans generally organize efforts and actions, the logical
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projection of the environment should be 2-5 years. If there are anticipated major
milestones in the interim, or aspects of the environment that are of longer term
consideration, consider multiple projections of the tendency of the OE.
(3) Analyze guidance. These may be written directives; oral instructions from the
President, SecDef, or CJCS; Presidential or Cabinet-member speeches; domestic and
international laws; policies of other organizations that have interest in the theater; or
existing strategic estimates (ours or other parties). Some of the guidance may be
contradictory and should be clarified and confirmed. It is likely that the CCMD will have
recent perspectives on the theater that will enable a reconciliation of guidance. One
challenge in reconciling the various sources of guidance is in the varying timeliness of
the guidance. It is important to include policy-makers in this dialogue to gain their
insights, and to reconcile the differences in interpretation of the multiple forms of
guidance among both policy-makers and the CCDR.
(5) Determine the desired future condition (end state) for the theater. Describe
the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the national aims. Focus
on military conditions, but do not exclude other conditions that may impact the military
conditions or achievement of which military activity may support (or potentially interfere
with). Get a sense for the realistic timing for achievement of these conditions: 1 year, 5
years, sometime far into the future? Review the relationship between national and
theater end states from the previous chapter.
b. Define the problem set that the theater strategy must solve. This entails
identifying the differences between the desired conditions at end state and those that
others want to see, and also between the desired conditions and those of the natural
tendency of the environment. Think of the natural tendency as another actor, likely the
most powerful actor. These comparisons between the desired conditions and the
alternatives describe the relevant tensions in the environment. The points of
congruence between the desired conditions and others’ desires must also be identified.
Those points of congruence offer opportunities that, if exploited, can help the CCDR
achieve the desired conditions. Some of these opportunities are significant enough that
they should also be part of the problem description.
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Though identifying the root causes of problems in the theater is certainly important, it
is not the end of the problem framing. The CCDR may find that the military cannot
solve the root causes, and can only mitigate the effects of the root causes on the
theater strategy.
The commander may see that the tensions are too great and the opportunities too
few to be able to achieve a particular desired condition or set of conditions. In that
case, the commander may see a need to adjust the desired end state. In this case,
they are obligated to dialogue with the national policy makers.
The goal in framing the problem is to describe the problem set concisely and
completely. This problem statement is the one that the operational approach must
answer. An example might be:
c. Develop the strategic approach. The strategic approach describes how the
problem will be solved or managed. It is detailed enough to provide direction and
boundaries for those implementing and supporting the strategy, but not so much that it
precludes creativity by those implementers. The purpose is to outline the way to
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achieve the desired theater end state. It is important to understand that in the volatile
and complex theater environment, the approach is only a hypothesis to address/solve
the problem. Thus, the approach must include flexibility to adapt to a different approach
if the hypothesis is shown to be incorrect as the strategy influences the environment.
(1) Develop objectives that will address the problem set. Determine the set of
objectives that will enable the required conditions by reconciling those aspects of the
environment that may preclude achievement of those conditions, especially those
opposing desired conditions of other actors. The objectives should be focused on the
stated problem, and should consider four areas: key actors, key relationships, managing
tensions between actors, and managing opportunities presented by the convergence of
desired conditions among actors. Some examples of theater objectives are:
Regional countries, with US assistance, have organized a military
cooperation forum.
Country R is a “security exporter” vice a “security importer” by 2028.
The United States has an effective military relationship with Country S by
2022.
Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Blue is maintained without
interruption.
(2) Build a strategic approach that will link the objectives together in such a way
as to achieve the desired conditions. An example approach statement might be:
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assets in the western part of the AOR. While we accept risk in the southeastern
countries of our region, I believe we can mitigate it by close coordination with
BLUECOM forces near our boundaries.
(3) Capture the strategic approach in a narrative that forms a hypothesis for
solving the strategic problem. (“Here’s what’s likely to happen in the region and why it
matters so much. Here’s what we have to do about it to achieve a future that looks like
this…”). Supplement the narrative as needed with graphics.
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Figure 5-1 Example Theater Strategy Depiction
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The CCP’s long-term and persistent and preventative activities
are intended to identify and deter, counter, or otherwise
mitigate an adversary’s actions before escalation to combat.
Many of these activities are conducted with DOD in support of
the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts of USG
partners and partner nations. (JP 3-0 V-6)
The CCP flows from the commander’s theater strategy and provides the action plan to
implement the strategy. While each combatant command’s campaign plan may
approach the task of executing the strategy differently, the plan will address the
commander’s AOR in an interconnected and holistic manner and seek to avoid what
can be a myopic focus on one or two stove-piped contingency plans. The current
construct for nesting plans is first to build the GCPs, RCPs and FCPs, then to build a
CCP that implements the activities required to achieve the desired conditions for the
theater while dealing with deviations from the strategy through branch plans. Branch
plans are brought back into a global planning framework by the creation of Integrated
Contingency Plans (ICPs). Supporting activities (to ICPs and to the GCPs/RCPs/FCPs)
are contained in Campaign Support Plans (CSPs).
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Figure 5-2 Campaign and Contingency Planning
(based on Figs II-5 & III-2 in JP 5-0)
6. Components of a CCP. The elements of the CCP are currently in flux as the Joint
Staff and planning community sort out what will transition to GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, ICPs
and supporting plans. The draft 2017 JSCP mandate some of the elements that must be
included in the legacy TCP/FCP, but neither prescribed a format. In fact, several of the
GCCs use a slightly different format, and even the substance of the various extant
TCPs differs, though all generally address the key requirements directed by the draft
2017 JSCP.
(2) Mission Statement. Outlines the essential tasks and the “who, what, where,
when, and why” to achieve the campaign plan’s main objectives.
(3) Posture Plan. Outlines the forces, footprints, and agreements within each
AOR and how the CCDR intends to synchronize these to achieve their campaign
objectives.
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(4) Intermediate Military Objectives. Describes the milestones to achieve the
CCP’s objectives. Serves as the basis for tasks to subordinate organizations and
requests to other partners to accomplish tasks.
(6) Resources. Describes forces required and funding programs. Describes the
impact of resource shortfalls in terms of strategic and operational risk, and possible
mitigation measures.
b. Relationship of the CCP to GCPs and Integrated Contingency Plans. The JSCP
directs contingency planning consistent with the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG). It expands on the CPG with specific
objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency
plans. Related contingency plans are further integrated within
an Integrated Contingency Plan (ICP). The JSCP also delineates
support plans to foster Joint Force collaboration and
coordination in time, space, and purpose. The coordinating
authority (CA) assigns a Joint Force organization to be a
collaborator that supports integrated planning. (CJCSI 3100.01D
Joint Strategic Planning System.)
The CCDR may also direct preparation of contingency plans to deal emerging or
potential crises. One example might be a plan to deter the aggression of and, if
necessary, defeat a regional threat in order to ensure stability in a part of the world
important to U.S. and allied interests. Such a plan is likely to be an integrated campaign
plan that would link several major operations together to achieve the military end state
that is essential to a positive and enduring political outcome. Another example of a
contingency plan might be a plan to conduct a noncombatant evacuation operation
(NEO) in the event of instability in a country. Such a plan would probably be a single
operation plan, rather than a campaign plan.
The GCP, RCP, and FCP should identify the likely conditions that might lead to
execution of a contingency plan. Execution of a contingency plan should either bring the
situation back to the CCP desired conditions, or cause a revision of the theater strategy
due to the changed environment.
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and outcomes, contributes to the theater campaign plan’s goal of a cohesive framework.
Some of the FCCs may also integrate security cooperation plans into their campaign
plans. FCCs must be very conscious of coordinating their plans with those of the
regional GCCs. Security cooperation activities have included the following focus areas:
(1) Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action. Gain unfettered access to
and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture
realignment and U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access needs.
(2) Operational Capacity and Capability Building. Build usable, relevant, and
enduring partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and partner objectives.
(4) Intelligence and Information Sharing. Gain and share specific kinds of
intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats.
(5) Assurance and Regional Confidence Building. Assure allies and partners,
enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter/intra-state conflict,
and expand the community of states dedicated to a more secure international order.
(6) Institutional Capacity and Security Sector Reform. Assist allies with
transforming their defense/security establishments to become publicly accountable,
well-managed, and subject to the rule of law.
(9) Human Capacity and Human Capital Development. Enable the ability of
partner country civilians and military personnel to understand the proper role of the
military in society, promote human rights, and respect the rule of law.
(10) Support to Institutional Capacity and Civil Sector Capacity Building. Help
develop the ability of partner country civil sector organizations to provide services to
their populations, respond to humanitarian disasters, and improve living conditions.
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d. Theater Posture Plan (TPP) (classified document) The Theater Posture Plan
has been an annex to extant TCPs that describes how the theater is currently prepared
to meet the objectives of the various Campaign Plans. GCCs have updated the Theater
Posture Plan on an annual basis and submitted it to the Joint Staff and OSD. The Joint
Staff is now synchronizing Global Defense Posture; CCDRs are required to
submit TPPs every two years (with annual updates) to support
campaign and contingency plans. Posture plans align basing and
forces to ensure theater and global functional security, respond
to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility (JP
5-0 pg II-5). A key consideration of GCP and plan reviews is
global defense posture. Foreign and overseas posture is the
fundamental enabler of Joint Force activities. From a posture
perspective, GCPs foster an integrated approach to requirements,
trade-offs, and risk across three interdependent posture
elements: forces, footprints, and agreements. The J-5 is the
lead directorate for posture issues. In that role, the
directorate coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on
global defense posture issues, such as force management and
prepositioned equipment, and introduces posture recommendations
to the DOD’s senior body overseeing global defense posture, the
Global Posture Executive Council. The primary Joint Staff forum
for reviewing posture issues and recommendations is the
Operations Deputies Tank. (CJCSI 3100.01D Joint Strategic
Planning System). This process is still being developed. OSD prepares an annual
global defense posture synchronization report that enables coordination of department-
wide activity across the global lines of effort. Past Theater Posture Plans have included
topics such as:
Forces – composed of assigned, allocated, and enabling
units, personnel, and assets. It includes rotational and
mobility forces. (JP 5-0 H-2)
Footprint – includes enduring locations, supporting
infrastructure, and prepositioned equipment. (JP 5-0, H-2)
Agreements – provides access, basing, lawful mission
execution, protection, and relationships which allow the
footprint to be established and forces to execute their
missions. Examples are access agreements, basic ordering
agreements, transit agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and
treaties. (JP 5-0 H-2)
Identification of ongoing or new initiatives to further theater objectives.
Proposed costs to implement any required posture changes.
Identification of risks to assured access and associated mitigation plans.
Any required deconfliction with other DOD or other agency activities.
Supportability of global reach in support of contingency plans (own theater,
other theaters, functional plans).
[For more on TPPs, see Appendix H of JP 5-0 and DoDI 3000.12 Management of
Global Defense Posture (GDP)]
150
e. Theater Distribution Plans. The Theater Distribution Plan (TDP) has essentially
been a staff estimate that describes how the theater is currently logistically prepared to
meet the objectives of the various campaign plans. TDPs describe the
distribution network within each of the geographic CCMDs’ AOR
(outside the continental US) as directed by the [CPG] and JSCP.
They describe the distribution pipeline from the point of need
to the point of employment. TDPs [also] provide detailed
theater mobility and distribution analysis to assist in planning
current and future operations, inform the TCP/CCP and other
plans, and aids theater distribution decision making.
151
g. Support Plans. Once the Global Integrator assigns a CA and
issues guidance and direction for a problem set, the CA will
refine the campaign plan or contingency plan with the
collaborators. Collaborators prepare support plans to document
assigned tasks and how to address them. CAs use support plans to
develop the overall concept of operations for the campaign or
contingency, synchronizing the actions of the Joint Force in
time and space. Collaborators work with the CA to ensure their
support plans effectively address the problem set and integrate
with the Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) of other
organizations. Support plans do not change supported/ supporting
command relationships.
j. Assessment. The CCP must include the methodology to assess plan progress in
achieving the desired conditions. Note: For more on Assessment, see CPH Appendix G.
152
APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT AND REVIEW OF CAMPAIGN AND
CONTINGENCY PLANS
Pursuant to legislation passed by Congress in the 2017 National Defense
Authorization Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directed globally
integrated planning across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). CJCSI
3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans was
approved on 31 January 2019 to establish procedures to coordinate the planning and
approval process for those plans requiring senior leadership review. These plans are
Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs),
Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs), and other plans directed by the Contingency
Planning Guidance (CPG) or the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). For a detailed
description of this process consult CJCSI 3141.01F and succeeding publications.
This process essentially replaces the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
construct that used specific in progress reviews (IPRs) to receive guidance and
approval from senior leadership. In the APEX, the CCDR and the planning staff would
present the plan directly to the Secretary of Defense (or the designated authority) for
approval. The intent of the new process is for plans to be continuously reviewed in order
to provide the most up-to-date advice to the Secretary and President. In addition, the
planning and collaboration has been expanded to provide a true global perspective
which includes the Services. The culminating events are a series of JCS Tank sessions
at the Operations Deputies (OpsDeps) and CJCS level.
As explained in the CJCSI, the plan review process has four purposes:
To ensure the plans are executable. Of particular concern is the plan’s feasibility,
acceptability, and completeness.
To make sure plans are up-to-date, provide military advice to civilian leadership
and provide guidance to CCDRs with a global and all-Service perspective.
To integrate policy guidance from SecDef and the other OSD stakeholders. The
iterative nature of the review process allows civilian department leadership to
refine policy and planning direction.
To facilitate the integration of plans across CCMDs, defense agencies,
departments and Services.
The review process provides a common understanding of the strategic and operational
environment, and the problem set requiring military planning. It involves the entire Joint
Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) which consists of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Services, the CCMDs, the National
Guard Bureau, the DoD combat support agencies, and other defense agencies. As the
Global Integrator, the CJCS is responsible for providing strategic direction, integrating
the planning activities of the JPEC, and establishing the frameworks and processes to
execute those responsibilities that allows input from all affected organizations.
A-1
The CJCS publishes the Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) that directs the
planning activities across the Joint Force. The two basic types of plans are campaign
plans and contingency plans. Campaign plans are most concerned with the day-to-day
Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) that address a problem which requires
coordination across the DoD and most likely the entire U.S. government. Campaign
plans include GCPs, Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs), Functional Campaign Plans
(FCPs), and Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs). Contingency plans are
best described as branches or sequels to campaign plans. Several related contingency
plans may be bundled together as integrated contingency plans (ICPs). A significant
challenge for the JPEC is to align campaign plans and contingency plans in such a way
that campaign plans achieve national outcomes that would not require execution of an
associated branch or sequel contingency plan or ICP. At the same time, campaign
plans must be designed and executed in such a way that, if required, contingency plans
or ICPs could be executed successfully.
After the priority challenge GCPs are created by the Joint Staff they are turned over
to a coordinating authority (CA) to integrate planning and campaigning across the JPEC
(especially with other CCMDs). A CA is the CCDR with the preponderance of
responsibility for plan execution. The CJCS will also designate CAs for RCPs and
FCPs. The CJCS will also create Priority Challenge Cross-Functional Teams (CFT) to
assist CAs with their planning integration responsibilities. The Joint Staff will also create
Globally Integrated Base Plans (GIBPs) that will direct modifications of Operations,
Activities and Investments (OAIs) across the joint force if a contingency plan or ICP is
likely to be executed.
The plan review process is a vehicle intended to provide a conversation among the
JPEC and especially the civilian leadership in OSD. The process has two
complimentary lines of effort:
To ensure planning supports policy
To ensure plans are militarily executable and they provide adequate, feasible,
and acceptable options to SecDef and the Commander-in-Chief.
The process is a series of interactions between the CA, OSD, Joint Staff, and other
members of the JPEC.
The planning review process starts when a plan’s CA or originator begins informal
coordination, collaboration or information exchange at the Action Officer (AO) level. As
the plan matures, reviews are conducted at increasingly senior levels. Reviews can be
conducted by paper, by Secure Video Tele-Conference (SVTC), or in person. Paper
reviews will normally be conducted for non-contentious issues.
A-2
Formal reviews are normally coordinated by the Joint Staff J-5 using Joint Planning
Boards (JPBs). The lowest level JPB will be convened at the O-7/O-8 level with
subsequent reviews conducted as required. Increasing reviews are likely to be held at
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD), OpsDeps, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy (USD(P)), JCS Tank, and SecDef (for approval) levels. The plan
review process is intended to be flexible enough for planners to raise issues and for the
JPEC to provide input to resolve those issues in a timely manner.
For existing plan updates, plan reviews will be conducted using in-progress reviews
(IPRs). The plan update process is very similar to the previously described priority
challenge plan review process. The lead will be the CCDR (i.e. CA) who will describe
those essential elements of the plan which must be modified. After AO level stakeholder
interaction, CCMD planners should use the JPB process to formally resolve remaining
issues, update, and approve the plan.
The following table lists the plan originator and approval authorities.
A-3
Link to CJCSI 3141.01F The Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans:
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/CJCSI%203141.01F.pdf?
ver=2019-03-18-121700-283
A-4
APPENDIX B: COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS
The demand for joint task forces ready to respond to contingencies is likely to remain
high in the future. Determining the composition of a headquarters and the command
relationships with the forces involved is often influenced as much by commander
personalities and service interests as operational necessities. Some of the most
contentious disagreements between service component, functional, and multinational
commanders can be simplified by the arguments "I do not work for you" and "Do not
touch my stuff." Two imperatives of the authorizing commander during task force
establishment are unambiguous articulation of each subordinate commander's role and
responsibility (to include supporting/supported relationships) as well as each
subordinate commander's control authority over the forces involved (to include OPCON
and TACON designations as a minimum).
Joint Publication 3-30 "Joint Operations" pages IV-7 through IV-14 and Joint
Publication 3-33 "Joint Task Force Headquarters" provide guidance for the selection of
task force commanders, headquarter elements, forces, and operating areas. This
guidance clarifies that a joint force must have the ability to conduct joint functions.
Accordingly, either the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) on its own, or through
support from a combatant command HQ or a Service component HQs, must have the
ability to conduct the Joint Functions of command and control, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, sustainment, and protection.
Usually JTFs are formed to accomplish missions with specific, limited operational
objectives. The CCDR often looks within his or her CCMD to select a JTF HQ, usually a
Service component HQ or an existing Service component’s subordinate HQ (e.g., Army
corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet and Marine expeditionary force). The
Theater Special Operations Command or a subordinate SOF HQ with the requisite C2
capability can also form the basis for a JTF HQ staff (see Figure E-1).
Joint Pub 3-33 Appendix A, Annex A through M provides detailed considerations for
establishing a Joint or Multinational Task Force HQ. Although not specifically presented
this way in Joint Doctrine, the following are examples of the types of general questions
oriented along the lines of Joint Functions that can facilitate JTF HQ selection:
B-1
o Where will the JTF HQ need to operate?
o To what degree will JTF actions need to be integrated with the plans and
operations of other CCMDs or organizations?
o What capacity for the control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land,
space, or cyber forces will the JTF require?
o What are the JTF requirements for a Joint Operations Center?
o What are the JTF communications requirements?
o Do the CCDR's subordinate HQ elements have the capabilities required
by the JTF HQ?
Intelligence:
o What ability to collect, process, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
information will be required by the JTF?
o What level of connectivity will the JTF have with the CCMD Joint
Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)?
o What are the intel capabilities of the CCDR's subordinate HQ elements?
Fires:
oWill fires from multiple services occur in the same physical domain?
oWill fires need to be synchronized to occur simultaneously?
oWill fires need to be deconflicted to occur separately in time or space?
oWill an element of the JTF need to synchronize fires or can this be
accomplished by a CCMD element with liaisons in the JTF?
o What liaison capability will the JTF need with other CCMD and/or service
component fires elements? (CCMD Joint Operations Center, Air
Operations Center, Maritime Operations Center, Marine Air to Ground
Task Force, SOF Operations, etc)
o What type of control authority will the JTF commander need to have over
combat forces?
Movement / Maneuver:
o Will the JTF use forces already in theater or will additional forces need to
be deployed?
o How will forces arrive in the JTF AO?
o What capability for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and
Integration (JRSOI) of forces will the JTF required?
o What are the JTF requirements for developing logistics plans?
o What are the requirements for the JTF to integrate and synchronize
logistics resources?
o What authorities for logistics will the JTF require?
Sustainment:
o How long can JTF forces operate on their own without additional
sustainment?
o What level of sustainment, or how much sustainment and of what type, will
JTF forces require?
B-2
o What sustainment-related authorities will the JTF require?
Protection:
o What type of protection will JTF air, maritime, land, space, or cyber forces
require?
o What capacity for control, coordination, or liaison of air, maritime, land,
space, or cyber protection forces will the JTF require?
CCDRs normally respond to crisis with in-place HQs (See Figure B-1 for potential HQ)
because of their familiarity with the strategic environment, resident expertise, and
availability. The CCDR and staff must understand the capability of each of the
subordinate HQ elements within the CCMD in order to select one as the core of a JTF
HQ. Although not clearly described in Joint Doctrine, the general capabilities and
service preferences of various HQs are listed in Figure E-1 with the HQ element
preferred by each Service in bold type.
B-3
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK
B-4
APPENDIX C: PMESII SYSTEMS CONSTRUCT
The following is a partial list of the areas that should be considered during an analysis of
each of the PMESII areas. Some may be potential nodes in each of the systems as
well:
Political System
Leadership
Core Leadership
National Leadership
Regional Leadership
Local Leadership
Local Workers Parties
Regime Control of National Resource Systems
Security Apparatus
Secret Police
Detention Camps
Informants
Alliances & External Support
Legal
Symbolic
Domestic Image of Omnipotence, Omnipresence, Infallibility
Military System
Leadership
Command and Control
Intelligence
SIGINT
HUMINT
Electronic Warfare
Logistics
Mobilization
Civil Defense
Training
Underground Facilities
Stockpiles
Power Ventilation Access
Communications
Missile Forces and Missile Defense
Army
Artillery
Long-Range Missile Systems
Infantry
Armor
C-1
Engineers
Mobility
Mine Clearing
Bridging
Counter Mobility
Obstacles
Survivability
Navy
Surface Capabilities
Subsurface (Submarine)
Remote Control Vehicles
Mine Laying Submarines
SOF Platforms
Patrol Fleet Anti-Ship Missiles
Coastal Defenses
Radar Capabilities
Air Forces
Air-to-Ground
Fixed Wing
Rotary Wing
Air Defense
Radar/Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
Precision Munitions Capabilities
Bases (Runways, Refuel Capabilities, Ramp Space)
Force Projection
Special Operations
Direct Action, IW, ISR, etc.
Industrial/Technical Base (For Production and Repair of Advanced Equipment)
Communications
EW/Jamming Forces
Cyber Forces (military and non-military)
Information Operation Forces (military and non-military)
Missiles (Theater/Ballistic)
WMD (Research, Production, Storage, Delivery)
Space
Insurgent Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored
Terrorist Groups – sponsored/non-sponsored
Economic System
Industry
Financial
Debt
Distribution of Humanitarian Aid
Currency/Exchange Rates
Arms Exports
Corruption/Linkages
C-2
Food Markets
Black Market Agriculture
Drug Crops & Trafficking
Fuel/Power Markets
Mining
Natural resource areas/production
Foreign investment
Trade linkages
Remittances
Taxes/Revenue
Social System
Culture/System
Personality
History
Religion
Demography
Ethnicity
Urbanization
Family Ties/Tribal Linkages
Literacy/Education
Life Expectancy
Entertainment, Immigration
Organized Crime
Families: Traditional/Influential Controlling Major Decisions
Impact of Local Traditions
Infrastructure System
Transportation
Railroads
Trains
Bridges
Tunnels
Switches
Roads
Ships/Boats
Dams
Locks
Airports
Communications
Military Networks
Radio Telephone
Teletype Fiber Satellite
Visual
Civilian
Radio Telephone
C-3
Television Speakers
Signs
Energy/Power
Coal
Oil
Natural Gas
Hydro
Nuclear
Renewable Sources
Water
Fuel Stations
Electricity networks
Food Markets
Courthouses
Hospitals/Clinics
Water Treatment
Sewage/Treatment
Schools
Fiberoptic cables
Network services
Cell phone networks
Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
Social Media Saturation
Information System
Education
Propaganda
Inside Country
Outside Country
Newspapers/Magazines
Information Technologies
Radio
Television
Internet
Social Media
Informal Transmissions (Word of Mouth/Rumor)
Cyberspace
C-4
TAB A: POLITICAL SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Political analysis of a foreign country begins with an assessment of the basic principles
of government, governmental operations, foreign policy, political parties, pressure
groups, electoral procedures, subversive movements, as well as criminal and terrorist
organizations. It then analyzes the distribution of political power - whether it is a
democracy, an oligarchy, a dictatorship, or has political power devolved to multiple
interest groups such as tribes, clans, or gangs. Analysis must focus on determining how
the political system really operates, not the way it is supposed to operate.
Basic Governmental Principles. The starting point of political analysis is the formal
political structure and procedure of a foreign nation. Analysts must evaluate:
Constitutional and legal systems.
Legal position of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
Civil and religious rights of the people.
People's national devotion to constitutional and legal procedures.
Foreign Policy. Analysis of a target country's foreign policy addresses the country's
public and private stance toward the United States, foreign policy goals and objectives,
regional role, and alliances. Analysts gather data from various sources, to include:
Diplomatic and military personnel.
Technical collection systems.
Official foreign government statements.
Press releases.
Public opinion polls.
International businessmen and other travelers.
Academic analyses.
Political Parties. Analysts study special interest parties and groups (e.g., labor,
religious, ethnic, industry) to evaluate their:
Aims.
Programs.
Degree of popular support.
C-5
Financial backing.
Leadership.
Electoral procedures.
Pressure Groups. With few exceptions, most states have some type of formal or
informal pressure groups. Examples include political parties, associations, religious or
ethnic organizations, labor unions, and even illegal organizations (e.g., banned political
party). The analyst must identify these pressure groups and their aims, methods,
relative power, sources of support, and leadership. Pressure groups may have
international connections and, in some cases, may be almost entirely controlled from
outside the country.
Organizational size.
Character of membership.
Power base within the society.
Doctrine or beliefs system.
Affiliated organizations.
Key figures.
Funding.
Methods of operation.
C-6
Political System Questions
C-7
International - Non-adversarial and adversarial? How are relations maintained –
through economics, religion, culture, ideology, common needs?
Potential Allies during a conflict - National resolve to engage in conflict? Military
resolve to engage in politically motivated action?
Other Considerations:
C-8
TAB B: MILITARY SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
The analysis of the adversary’s military will focus on its leadership, capabilities,
dispositions, and morale/commitment to its government, to include:
Key military leadership, including their training and previous experience in senior
leadership.
Installations and facilities of a military significance (both primary and secondary
purpose).
Infrastructure in place to support identified installations and force structure.
Military Units, including personnel and chain of command.
Assigned equipment.
Current and projected weapons system capabilities.
Military Environment:
Will the national leadership use military means to achieve objectives?
Does the leadership intend to forge or enhance military ties with another state that
poses a threat to regional security or U.S. interests?
Does the leadership intend to enhance national military capabilities in a way that
could be regionally destabilizing?
Are the national leader’s goals a cause for concern?
Key Leadership – residence, office, wartime command post, telephone, email,
political patronage, religious affiliations, ethnic affiliations, personal assets, non-
military activities, influences.
Soldiers -- ethnic/religious composition by region of regular forces and elite forces,
pay, training, morale, benefits, gripes/issues.
Capabilities.
o Equipment imports: what, from whom, where based, points of entry.
o Support (spare parts, maintenance, and operational training).
o Indigenous production and assembly.
o Raw materials, natural resources.
o Supply - production, movement, storage.
o Days of supply on-hand of key supplies (e.g. rations, fuel, ammo, etc…).
Transportation.
o Road capacity, primary lines of communication (LOC), organic transportation assets.
o Rail (same as roads).
o Water - Inland? Intra-coastal?
o Bridges - classification, construction materials, length, bypass.
o Tunnels - height/width restrictions, bypass.
Organizations.
o Garrison locations, brigade or larger combat, battalion or larger combat support
(CS) and combat service support (CSS).
o Naval port facilities, home stations.
C-9
Airfields.
o Fixed fields, home station, associated dispersal/highway strips.
o Number and type aircraft at base.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
o Assets and capabilities by echelon.
o National level/controlled assets.
o Associated ground stations/downlinks.
o Centralized processing and dissemination facilities.
o Center of excellence/HQ for each intelligence discipline.
o Commercial sources for imagery, dissemination capability, mapping, other.
Military Communications.
o Fixed facilities.
o Mobile capabilities.
o Relay/retransmission sites Commercial access.
Integrated Air Defense.
o Early warning.
o Target acquisition and tracking, guidance.
o Fixed launch sites.
o Mobile AD assets.
o Centralized C2.
o Airfields associated with counter-air assets.
o Airborne warning aircraft (e.g., AWACS).
o Electrical power requirements.
Theater Ballistic Missile/Coastal Defense missiles.
o Fixed launch sites.
o Mobile assets.
o Meteorological stations supporting.
o C2 decision makers.
o Target acquisition.
o Target guidance/terminal guidance.
o Power requirements.
Weapons of Mass Effects Capabilities.
o Number and type.
o Production, assembly, storage, delivery means.
o Imports required - source and mode of transport.
o C2 decision maker.
C2.
o Rivalries - personal and inter-service.
o Decision making – dissemination/transmission means, direct or through chain of
command.
Special Capabilities.
o Special Operations Forces (SOF).
o Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
o TBM.
o Human Intelligence (HUMINT).
o Submarines.
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o Force Projection
o Cyber
o Propaganda
o EW/Jamming
o BMD
o Insurgents
o Terrorists.
Military Situation: Under what conditions does the military execute its missions?
Internal Conflict: Is there internal conflict within the military that could destabilize this
country?
o Rivalry/Factionalism: Are there emerging or increasing rivalries or factionalism
within the military?
o Power Struggle: Are there emerging or increasing power struggles within the
military?
o Deteriorating Morale/Increasing Dissention: Is there deteriorating morale or
increasing dissention within the ranks or in the officer corps?
Civil-Military Relations: How loyal is the military to the current regime? Are there
cultural or religious factors that might cause frictions and dissention? Are there
changes or developments in civil military relations that could destabilize the country?
o Government - Military Relations: Will the senior military leadership support
and defend the government against internal resistance and insurgency? What
factors might cause a loss of confidence and/or support? What factors might
cause a military coup to occur?
o Civil-Military Conflict: Is there increasing conflict between the civilian and
military leaders? Is there a difference in views between junior and senior
leaders toward service to the government? To the peoples/constitution?
o Constitutional/Legal Conflict: Is there increasing civil military conflict over
constitutional/legal matters?
Socio-Military Conflict: Are there growing tensions/conflicts in socio-military relations
that could destabilize the country?
o Internal Security Role: Is the military assuming a new internal security role or
increasing its involvement in internal security affairs?
o Military Activities: Are military operations/activities having an increasingly
adverse impact on society?
o Criminal Activities: Is the military involved in criminal activity that is contributing
to increased tensions/conflict between the military and the public?
External Military Threat: Is an external military threat emerging or increasing?
o Limited/Covert Military Action: Is an adversary engaging in or increasing
limited/covert military action?
o Conventional Military Action: Is an adversary preparing to engage in
conventional military action against this country?
o WMD/Advanced Weapons: Is an adversary trying to acquire or is in the
process of deploying WMD or advanced weapons?
C-11
Operational Status/Capability: Are there changes or developments in the military's
operational status or capabilities that suggest pending military action?
o Activity Levels/Patterns: Is there unusual change or a sudden increase in
activity levels/patterns?
o Personnel Status: Are there changes or developments in personnel status?
o Force Capabilities: Are there significant changes or developments in force
capabilities?
C-12
TAB C: ECONOMIC SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis focuses on all aspects of the adversary’s economy that have the potential for
exploitation. Among these are industrial production, agriculture, services and armament
production. Concentration will be on those elements of the economy that are factors in
foreign trade and factors on the internal economy that can have an impact on the
political decision making process and popular support for the government. Both the
official and underground (black-market) economies must be examined.
Concentration will be on the adversary and the regional and global countries with which
it has its major trade and exchange linkages. Certain specific nations and regional
economic alliances could be highly dependent upon adversary exports, and the impact
upon these must be considered. The focus will be on critical elements of the trading
partners that may be exploited and not their economy as a whole.
In the economic system, a great deal of information is available from open source. The
initial task is to develop a baseline of information on the adversary’s economy, such as
gross domestic product, growth rates, unemployment rates, money supply, economic
plans, inflation, and national debt. Analysis may include:
C-13
Economic System Questions
What are the key indicators of the economic health of the country(ies) of interest
(COI)?
Which external factors have the most impact upon the economy? What areas of
the economy are most susceptible to foreign influences and exploitation?
What is the impact of foreign economic assistance? What would be the impact of
its reduction/removal?
What percentage of the economy should be classified as "black/gray market"? Are
we able to quantify activities in this sector? Can we influence this sector?
What are the governmental rules on foreign investment? Who do they favor?
Which nations have the most to gain or lose from damage to, or a collapse of the
economy? What are the most likely areas of economic growth?
Will there be growth in the private sector share of the economy? Who would
benefit the most from this change?
How effective will be steps to diversify the economy?
What is the inflation rate? To what extent will steps to control inflation be
successful?
Will government subsidies of selected products for domestic use continue? What
would be the impact of their reduction/removal?
What is the anticipated trend in demand for foreign (particularly U.S.) currency?
What is the prognosis for food production? Are they dependent on imports? Will
rationing of essential goods continue? Which items are most likely to be rationed?
How will demographic factors (e.g., birth rate, adult/child ratio, rural migration to
urban areas, etc.) affect the economy in the future?
What is the impact of the drug trade on the overall economy? Regional
economies?
Will imports of military spending/hardware increase? Who are the most likely
suppliers? Will these be cash transactions, or will a barter system be established?
What is this nation's standing within the International Monetary Fund and World
Bank?
Is trade with European Union member nations expected to increase? If so, in what
specific areas?
Have any key members of the economic sector leadership been educated in the
West or China? If so, have they maintained contacts with their former colleagues?
Are changes to the current system of state-owned monopolies anticipated? If so,
what will be the impact?
What are the key industries of the state(s)?
What are the major import/export commodities?
What is the trade balance? Is this a strength or vulnerability?
What is the labor situation (e.g., unemployment statistics, labor sources, unions,
etc.)?
Who/what are the key government economic leaders/agencies?
Who are the principal business leaders in the country?
C-14
TAB D: SOCIAL SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis must study the way people, particularly the key leadership and natural leaders,
organize their day-to-day living, including the study of groups within society, their
composition, organization, purposes, and habits, and the role of individuals in society.
For intelligence purposes, analysts study seven sociological factors. The detailed list
should be viewed as a guide for developing the necessary information to develop the
Sociological Systems Summary for the target countries.
Population. Intelligence data derived from censuses and sample surveys describe the
size, distribution, and characteristics of the population, including rate of change. Most
countries now conduct censuses and publish detailed data. Analysts use censuses and
surveys to evaluate an area's population in terms of:
Location.
Growth Rates.
Age and Sex.
Structure.
Labor Force.
Military Manpower.
Migration.
Characteristics of the People. Analysts study social characteristics to determine their
contribution to national cohesion or national disintegration. Social characteristics
evaluated by analysts include:
Social Stratification.
Number and Distribution of Languages.
Prejudices.
Formal and Informal Organizations.
Traditions.
Taboos.
Nonpolitical or Religious Groupings and Tribal or Clan Organizations
Idiosyncrasies.
Social Mobility.
Public Opinion. Key indicators of a society's goals may be found in the attitudes
expressed by significant segments of the population on questions of national interest.
Opinions may vary from near unanimity to a nearly uniform scattering of opinion over a
wide spectrum. Analysts should sample minority opinions, especially of groups capable
of pressuring the government.
Education. Analysts concentrate on the general character of education and on the
quality of elementary through graduate and professional schools. Data collected for
these studies include:
Education Expenditures.
Relationship between education and other social and political characteristics
Education levels among the various components of society.
C-15
Numbers of students studying abroad.
Extent to which foreign languages are taught.
Subjects taught in schools.
Religion. Religious beliefs may be a potentially dangerous friction factor for deployed
U.S. personnel. Understanding those friction factors is essential to mission
accomplishment and the protection of friendly forces. Analysts evaluate data collected
on an area's religions, which includes:
Types.
Size of Denominations.
Growth or Decline Rates.
Cooperative or confrontational relationships between religions or sects, the
people they represent, and the government.
Ways the government deals with religious organizations.
Roles religious groups play in the national decision making process.
Religious traditions and taboos.
Public Welfare. To evaluate the general health of a population, analysts must identify:
Health delivery systems.
Governmental and informal welfare systems.
Social services provided.
Living conditions.
Social insurance.
Social problems that affect national strength and stability (e.g., divorce rate,
slums, drug use, crime) and methods of coping with these problems.
Narcotics and Terrorism Tolerance. A population's level of tolerance for narcotics and
terrorist activities depends on the relations between these organizations and the
population as a whole. Analysts should determine if the tolerance is a result of the huge
sums of money trafficker’s pump into the economy or a result of trafficker's use of force.
Terrorists may be accepted and even supported by the local populace if they are
perceived to be working for the good of the local people. The intelligence analyst must
evaluate the way these organizations operate.
Sources. Due to the nature of the social focus area, the preponderance of information
is envisioned to be open source. The initial task is to develop a baseline of information
on the target nation. Basic data will be collected and analyzed. Numerous studies,
sponsored by the U.S. Government as well as academic treatises, are available. A more
difficult problem will be making the essential linkages within the sociological area and
with other focus areas, particularly political and economic.
C-16
Social System Questions
What are the general perceptions of social stability?
Who are the population’s most respected figures, why are they so respected, and
how do they maintain the public focus?
What are the government's most effective tools for influencing the masses?
What dominant areas of society are emerging and causing instability or areas of
conflict? Are any of these areas linked to political factors? Ethnic/racial?
What are the predominant economic areas that are contributing to, promoting, or
exacerbating social instability?
How can interrelationships be established between religious and ethnic minorities
in the COI? How can we effectively manipulate these relationships to affect a
desired outcome?
What are perceptions of public safety primarily attached to? How is the level of
violence defined by society? What elements may make it appear excessive?
What psychological effects does an increased level of violence have on a
person's notion of safety?
What are the effects of increased criminal activity: on the family, the town, the
region, and nationally?
How can the Coalition increase the psychological perception that the global
economy is surpassing the COI?
How can the Coalition stimulate the notion that the government is failing to
provide for basic elements, or is slow to produce results?
Examine the adverse effects of increased organized criminal activity upon society
by industrial component. White collar or financial crime. Drugs and drug
smuggling.
Proliferation of weapons: Note the types of weapons and to whom they are going.
Gang related activity: Is there a predominant ethnic group asserting themselves in
this arena, and are they utilizing any particularly violent tactics to assert
themselves?
What are the significant effects of increased public health problems? What public
health issues have increased and how effective is the government response?
Identify how extensive the division of wealth is between ethnic and religious
groups and their potential for promoting tension or conflict.
What are the effects of environmental problems having on society?
Identify the key groups adversely affected by increasing poverty rates.
Identify primary tools used by the government for influencing the masses. How do
the masses validate information obtained by the government? Do they feel they
need to validate information?
Who are the key opposition leaders? How do they influence the masses? How
are they funded and by whom are they primarily funded?
Who are the key opposition groups? How do they influence the masses? How are
they funded and by whom are they primarily funded? Identify any common
themes to unite them, identify areas that may divide them.
How do opposition groups recruit? Do they target a specific social group? Is there
a hierarchical structure? How are members dismissed from the ranks?
C-17
How do these groups affect one another? How do they affect similar groups in
neighboring countries? Do they have external support?
What are each faction’s mechanisms for influencing the others? How do they
communicate officially and unofficially? What factions are armed? Where do they
get their weapons?
Are acts of civil disobedience increasing? Is the level of violence employed by the
government to quell civil disobedience increasing? Are acts of vigilantism on the
rise? How are disturbances quelled? What tools are brought to bear?
Identify consumer goods that are most valued by the COI's populace. Who
controls supply? How are they networked? Any increase in a particular product?
What are the "hot button" issues dividing the various factions of the society?
What networks and mediums can be used to subvert and confuse each faction?
What are the capabilities of regional allies to polarize these factions?
How are rumors spread most effectively?
What is the social perception of the military's ability to meet that threat? The
states’ ability to meet the threat? The state’s ability to provide overall security in a
micro/macro context?
How are troops conscripted? What are the incentives for service? What unofficial
groups/associations exist within the military? How do they recruit or dismiss
people?
Is criminal behavior increasing within the military? What types of criminal activity
occur within the military?
Identify the hierarchal structure of the military. Is there a dominant ethnic group
assuming more leadership roles? What ethnic groups stay the most connected in
the military, which groups are more apt to include outsiders?
Which ethnic and religious minorities feel the most repressed? How do they
express their discontent? Do any organizations exist to channel their feelings?
How responsive do they feel the government is to their issues?
How does the population view outside assistance? How likely is the government
to ask for assistance? How is the need for assistance determined?
How are relief organizations viewed within the country? Are they busy? How
effective are they at solving problems and meeting the needs of those they serve?
Problems with immigrant flows? How are refugees treated?
What consumer goods are in short supply? How are those goods brought to
market, and who controls the flow of such goods? Is there a dominant ethnic
group controlling the flow? How effective is the Black Market in producing hard to
obtain goods?
What goods dominate the Black Market? Who are the primary producers and end
receivers of goods? Is there a particular group emerging as the leader of the
Black Market?
How are minority laborers networked with minority leaders? What are the links
between labor groups and minority activists? What ethnic group(s) compose the
majority of the skilled labor force? How is skilled labor kept from going abroad?
C-18
TAB E: INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Infrastructure analysis focuses on the quality and depth of the physical structures that
support the people and industry of the state. In developed countries, it is the underlying
foundation or basic systems of a nation state; generally physical in nature and
supporting/used by other entities (e.g., roads, telephone systems, and public schools).
Lines of Communications: Where are the key ports, airfields, rail terminals,
roads, railroads, inland waterways, etc. located? Where are key bridges, tunnels,
switching yards, scheduling/control facilities, depots/loading stations, switching
yards, etc.?
Electrical Power: Where are power plants, transformer stations, and relay and
power transmission lines located? Where are the key substations, switching
stations, and line junctures?
Potable Water: Where are the water treatment plants, wells, desalination, bottling
plants, and pumping stations? Where are the key pumping stations, control
valves, and distribution line junctures?
Telecommunications: What are the location and architecture of the domestic
telephone system, cable, fiber-optic, microwave, internet, and cell phone networks
and satellite stations? Where are the key control points and junctures?
Petroleum and Gas: Where are the gas and petroleum fields, gathering sites,
pumping stations, storage areas, refineries, and distribution lines? Where are the
key pumping stations, control valves, and distribution junctures?
Broadcast Media: What are the location, frequency, power, and radius of
effective range (coverage) of the am/fm radio and TV stations? Where are the
studios, antenna, and rely towers located? How are they powered? Where are the
key control points and junctures?
Public Health: What are the location of the hospitals and clinics? Are they
adequately staffed, supplied, and equipped? Is the equipment well maintained? Is
the staff well trained? Do they depend on foreign or domestic sources for their
supplies, medications, and spare equipment parts? Where are the key control
points and junctures?
Schools: What are the location of the public, private, and religious primary and
secondary schools and universities? Where are the key control points and
junctures?
Public Transportation: What are the public (bus/streetcar/taxi/etc.) transportation
routes? Where are the key control points and junctures?
Sewage Collection and Treatment: Where are the collections systems, pumping
stations, treatment facilities, and discharge areas located? Where are the key
control points and junctures?
C-19
Common Infrastructure Questions
C-20
TAB F: INFORMATION SYSTEM POINTS OF ANALYSIS
Analysis of Information Systems and Operations includes:
Telecommunications capabilities and level of sophistication, tele-density rates,
radio and television broadcast coverage including television, landline, cellular,
Internet, radio, etc.
Interconnectivity of communications via ISDN, fiber optic, satellite, and
microwave.
Primary nodes and trunks of telecommunications infrastructure including
government, non-government, citizen, and military use of Information Operations.
Knowledge of COI key leaders' style and decision making habits, advisors'
perception, and cultural influences.
Understanding governmental use of media influence, public affairs, and civil
affairs interrelationships.
Knowledge of military, non-governmental organization, and law enforcement
interrelationships.
Understanding of effects on adversary under psychological, computer network
attack and defense, electronic warfare, and space operations.
Locations and purpose of physical infrastructure of communications and
broadcast towers, cables, and supporting operations centers are included within
the infrastructure focus.
Development of and use of computer network operating systems, IT industry skill
sets, and software applications.
Media affiliations, perceptions, and sympathies to include censorship and self-
censorship in news and entertainment print, and broadcast industries.
How effective are the COI’s network defense capabilities? What reactions could
be expected following an incident? What recovery procedures are routinely
exercised?
What is the organizational structure of the telecommunications industry? How
effective is the COI at managing physical security of infrastructure an
implementing network security practices?
What interrelationships exist between civil law enforcement, military, commercial
and non-governmental agencies that would enhance the COI's response to an
emergency?
What redundancies exist within the COI's network to eliminate or reduce network
down time? Cellular, satellite, landline, power back up? How effective is their
exchange, backbone, architecture in providing redundancies?
What would cause a slow-down of COI's network? In what ways can the effect be
localized? (Geographic, logic, by agency, etc.)
What bandwidth issues exist within the COI's communications industry? How well,
and in what ways, does the government manage its allocation?
C-21
What type of OPSEC practices does the COI routinely exhibit to deny
exploitation?
In what ways have military/civil/corporate operations centers improved their
practices/tactics in keeping with the COI's technological improvements? Do they
rely more heavily on computers/cellular/networks than in the past?
What are the indicators, if they exist, that the COI has developed a more focused
vision and strategic plan for using technology than it had in the late '90s? What
effect has technology had on productivity, transportation, logistics, etc. in
government, commerce, corporate, private sectors?
How does the COI perceive their use of technology from a governmental
perspective? From the citizens' perspective? Military? Business? Legal? Law
enforcement? Non-governmental organizations?
What is known about the COI's assessment of Blue network vulnerabilities and
defense measures?
Do regional and neighboring countries or satellite broadcasts (television, radio,
and internet) have an audience in the COI's population? Which broadcasts are
popular with citizens and what is the audience's demographic and statistic data?
What programs or broadcasts are popular with minority political parties, resistance
movements, academia, etc.?
What is the topology design the COI networks utilize? Which exchanges and
trunks are co-located within government-controlled facilities? Are government-
commercial partnerships used to provide network services?
What is known of current and planned technology projects: fiber optic cabling?
ISDN access expansion? Satellite leases and launches? What is the operational
status and capability of COI's Low-Earth Orbit satellites?
What Internet domains are accessible to the population? Is reliable language
interpretation software available? What licenses does the government require for
web hosting?
What governmental directives address network security in supporting national
security objectives?
What messages might be effective in the COI? What themes are prevalent in the
media?
What advances in communications technology have enabled improvements in
military hardware employment? Describe the use of telecommunications
technology in law enforcement operations.
To what degree and direction are telecommunications infrastructure investments
impacting military readiness? Describe the state of international
telecommunications connectivity to the COI.
Which current telecommunications and Internet security operations have been
exercised? Is there a national crisis action plan?
What practices and policies does the government use in monitoring information-
related media (TV, radio, Internet, etc.)? What enforcement methods have been
employed?
Which print media and on-line content do citizens turn to for news?
Entertainment? Social Media? Do censorship policies or self-censorship trends
exist in the COI?
C-22
Is there a market and distribution pipeline for recorded or intercepted news or
entertainment programs? In what ways does law enforcement interact in this
market?
What is known about COl's network operating systems? What IT skill sets are
known to be in high demand?
Is software piracy prevalent? Counterfeiting? Drug smuggling? Organized crime?
Identity theft?
C-23
C-24
APPENDIX D: OPORD FORMAT W/ STAFF ESTIMATE INFORMATION
REFERENCES:
1. (U) Situation
a. (U) General. See Annex B (Intelligence).
(1) (U) Environment of Conflict
(a) Geostrategic Context
(b) Domestic and International Context
(c) Systems Perspective of the OE
(2) (U) Policy Goals
(a) US/Multinational Policy Goals
(b) End states.
1. Strategic End state & Objectives
2. Termination Criteria (and issues w/ these criteria)
2. Military End states
3. Time Estimates – Mil End states and Termination Criteria.
(3) Non-US National Political Decisions
(4) Operational Limitations
b. (U) Area of Concern
(1) (U) Joint Operations Area/Higher Commander’s Area of Operations.
(2) (U) Area of Interest.
c. (U) Deterrent Options
d. (U) Risk
e. (U) Adversary Forces. See Annex B (Intelligence).
(1) Adversary Centers of Gravity
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
D-1
(2) Adversary Critical Factors
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(3) Adversary Courses of Action
(a) General (including Strength, weakness, composition, location,
disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time/space factors, utilized and available
bases, efficiency and proficiency in joint ops ---- Capabilities/Limitations)
(b) Adversary’s Political Intentions & End states
(c) Adversary’s Strategic Objectives
(d) Adversary’s Operational Objectives
(e) Adversary CONOPs
(f) External Sources of Support
(4) Adversary Logistics and Sustainment
(5) Other Adversary Forces/Capabilities
(6) Adversary Reserve Mobilization
f. (U) Friendly Forces
(1) (U) Higher.
(2) (U) Adjacent.
(1) Friendly Centers of Gravity
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(2) Friendly Critical Factors
(a) Strategic
(b) Operational
(3) Multinational Forces
(3) Supporting Commands and Agencies
g. (U) Facts (Relevant & Key)
h. (U) Assumptions.
(1) Threat Warning/Timeline
(2) Pre-Positioning and Regional Access
(3) In-Place Forces
(4) Strategic Assumptions
(5) Legal Considerations
(a) ROE
(b) International Law, including LOAC
(c) US law
(d) Host-nation and partner nation policies
(e) Status of forces agreements
(f) Other bilateral treaties and agreements including Article 98 agreements
(6) Deductions from Facts/Assumptions
2. (U) Mission.
3. (U) Execution
D-2
(1) Commander’s Intent
(a) Purpose and End state
(b) Objectives
(c) Effects, if discussed
(2) General
(a) JFC Military Objectives, supporting desired effects and operational
focus
(b) Orientation on the adversary’s strategic and operational COGs
(c) Protection of friendly strategic and operational COGs
(d) Phasing of operations, to include Commander’s intent for each phase.
1. Phase I:
a. JFC’s intent
b. Timing
c. Objectives and desired effects
d. Risk
e. Execution
f. Employment (and/or Deployment)
(1) Land Forces
(2) Air Forces
(3) Maritime Forces
(4) Space Forces
(5) Cyber Forces
(6) SOF Forces
g. Operational Fires
(1) Joint forces policies, procedures, & planning cycles
(2) Joint fire support assets for planning purposes
(3) Priorities for employing target acquisition assets
(4) Areas that require joint fires to support op maneuver
(5) Anticipated joint fire support requirements
(6) Fire Support Coordination Measures (if required)
2. Phase II through XX:
b. (U) Tasks
(1) Specified
(2) Implied
(3) Essential
c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
d. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.
(--) COA Evaluation Criteria – Staff recommendations (…then final Cmdr Decision)
(--) COA Comparison w/ respect to Evaluation Criteria. Include staff
recommendation.
D-3
e. (U) Civil Military Operations. See Annex G (Civil Affairs).
f. (U) Meteorological and Oceanographic Services. See Annex H (Meteorological
and Oceanographic Operations).
g. (U) Environmental Considerations. See Annex L
h. (U) Geospatial Information and Services. See Annex M (Geospatial Information
and Services).
i. (U) Health Service Support. See Annex Q (Medical Services).
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT
ANNEXES:
A – Task Organization
B – Intelligence
C – Operations
D – Logistics
E – Personnel
F – Public Affairs
G – Civil-Military Affairs
H – Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
J – Command Relationships
K – Communications Systems
L – Environmental Considerations
M –Not Currently Used (previously - Geospatial Information and Services)
N – Not Currently Used (previously - Space Operations)
P – Host Nation Support
Q – Medical Services
R – Reports
S – Special Technical Operations
T – Consequence Management
U –Notional Counter proliferation Decision Guide
W – Operational Contract Support
X – Execution Checklist
Y – Communications Synchronization
Previously Communications Synchronization and before that Information Management
Z – Distribution
OFFICIAL:
s/
<Name>
<Rank and Service>
<Title>
D-4
APPENDIX E: COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE FORMAT
HEADQUARTERS US XXXX
APO xx xxxxx
Date xx xxxxxxx xxxx
Title: Campaign for XXXX
1. Mission Analysis.
a. List relevant facts.
c. List limitations.
e. List enemy centers of gravity (COG). Identify the critical capabilities supporting each
COG, critical requirements and the critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability
g. List friendly COG. Identify the critical capabilities supporting each COG and the
critical vulnerabilities within each critical capability.
2. Situation and Courses of Action (COAs). This paragraph is the foundation of the
estimate and may encompass considerable detail.
a. End states specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.
E-1
b. National strategic objectives specified by the President or Secretary of Defense and
the supporting desired effects developed by the combatant commander.
d. Enemy Capabilities
(2) Describe likely indications and warning that an enemy is preparing for military
operations in the affected area.
(3) Provide other information that will assist the Secretary of Defense and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evaluating various COAs.
e. Friendly COAs. List COAs that offer adequate, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable
and complete means of accomplishing the mission. Address the following for each COA:
(1) Combat capability required (e.g., urban combat, air superiority, maritime
interdiction)
f. COA Analysis. Summarize results from wargaming friendly and enemy COAs.
Highlight enemy capabilities that may significantly affect friendly COAs.
g. COA Comparison. Identify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each
COA.
E-2
APPENDIX F: REFERENCE TIMES
Plans, reports, orders, and messages often reference dates & times defined as follows:
e. H-hour (amphibious operations). For amphibious operations, the time the first
assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone,
and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.
f. I-day. The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a
potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened
threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is
ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and
other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.
i. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization
commences or is due to commence.
j. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or
redeployment.
F-1
l. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more
than 200,000).
F-2
APPENDIX G: OPERATION ASSESSMENT
Conducting operation assessment requires a detailed study of the following references:
Lynette M. B. Arnhart and Marvin L. King, “Are We There Yet? Implementing Best
Practices in Assessments,” Military Review (May-June 2018)
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-
2018/Are-We-There-Yet-Implementing-Best-Practices-in-Assessments/
Definitions:
G-1
Measure of Performance: An indicator used to measure a friendly
action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also
called MOP. (JP 5-0)
The following is from the Executive Summary of Joint Publication 5-0 (2017 pages xxvi
to xxix, with clarifying figures and texts from Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment.”
Operation Assessment
Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the
operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and
subordinate commanders, key leader engagements, and battlefield
circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s
awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE,
identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally
providing recommendations to improve progress towards mission
accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the
organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step)
and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s
decision cycle. Assessment analysis and products should identify
where the CCMD’s ways and means are sufficient to attain their
ends, where they are not and why not, and support
recommendations to modify the campaign plan or its components.
G-2
Tenets of Operation Assessment
G-3
Figure G-2: Operation Assessment Steps (Figure VI-3 in JP 5-0)
G-4
Linking Effects, Objectives, and End States to Tasks
through Indicators
Figure G-3: Linking End State, Objectives, Tasks, Conditions and Mission to
Tasks (Figure VI-12 in JP 5-0)
G-5
Guidelines for Indicator Development
G-6
Joint Publication 5-0, Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment” suggests two approaches
and the complete detailed approach found there is briefly summarized here.
Figure G-4: Linking End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and
Mission to Indicators (Figure VI-14 in JP 5-0)
G-7
(1) Statements about effects, objectives, or end states can
refer to anything that specifies the changes in the OE being
sought. the refinement of a statement into “smaller statements”
refers to any statement that increases the specificity of the
original statement. For example, for a military end state, we
may have several objectives; for an objective, we may have
several effects; or, for a strategic objective, we may have
several termination criteria. Assessors help develop specific
desired effects, objectives, or end states, which may have one
or more associated assessment questions.
G-8
Approach 2 — Develop indicators to assess operations. This
approach facilitates the development of MOPs and MOEs (See
Figure G-5).
G-9
are indicators that may inform MOPs and MOEs. Performance-
oriented indicators reflect friendly force actions and
activities and inform MOP. They help answer the question, “Are
we doing things right?” Effectiveness-oriented indicators
reflect a current condition for the state of some part of the OE
and are commonly referred to as MOEs. MOEs help answer the
question, “Are we doing the right things?” The following steps
present a logical process the staff can use to develop measures
and indicators (either MOPs or MOEs) for each desired effect.
G-10