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Military Deglobalization?
Author(s): Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Source: Foreign Policy, No. 122 (Jan. - Feb., 2001), pp. 82-83
Published by: Slate Group, LLC
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3183232
Accessed: 18-03-2020 20:15 UTC

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Foreign Policy

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 ARGUMENT

Military
Deglobalization?
Long-distance military interdependence is taking new forms.

By Joseph S. Nye Jr.

hen people say that our era is defined by rapid

globalization, they are quick to cite the usual evidence: a litany of impressive statistics such as the trillion-

and-a-half dollars that flow daily across borders, the growth of trade as a proportion of world output, transna-

tional industrial production chains, and, of course, the advent of cheap, instantaneous communication over

the Internet. But in military terms, is this an era of deglobalization?

With so much focus on economic globalization, between the Soviet Union and the United States.
we sometimes forget that there are other forms of Not only did it produce world-straddling alliances
interdependence-ecological, social, cultural, mil- and interventions in distant local conflicts but
itary-that do not always vary in the same way. either side could have destroyed the other with
Discussions of global interdependence often nuclear missiles in 30 minutes.
require an adjective to be accurate. For example, In that sense, the end of the Cold War has
the assertion that 19th-century globalization halt- meant military deglobalization. In 1985, the two
ed in 1914 and did not recover to prior levels superpowers had more than a million troops
until the 1970s holds true for economic global- abroad; today, that number has been cut by more
ization but is completely off the mark for global than two thirds, and annual world military expen-
military interdependence. The period from 1914 to ditures are down considerably from their 1987
1991 was one of extraordinary globalization, with peak of roughly a trillion dollars. In the 1960s,
two world wars and a Cold War that involved all U.S. presidents visited Vietnam to cheer up the
inhabited continents. It is in fact hard to imagine
troops; today, they go to sign trade agreements. In
the 1970s, President Carter's National Security
anything more global than the strategic balance
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski declared that strate-
gic-arms limitation talks died "in the sands of the
Joseph S. Nye Jr. is dean of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University and a member of Ogaden"; now the outside world seems largely
FOREIGN POLICY's editorial board. indifferent to turmoil in the Horn of Africa. There

82 FOREIGN POLICY

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are even faint signs of d6tente in that Cold War spurred military interventions in places like Soma-
military remnant, the Korean Peninsula. lia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. While highly
So, has geoeconomics replaced geopolitics? It's not selective and not purely altruistic, these military
that simple. In earlier centuries, economic and mili- interventions cannot be explained solely in terms of
tary globalization went hand in hand. Nineteenth-cen- classical strategy. Could social globalization be
tury patterns of trade and finance depended on Euro- leading to some revival of military globalization?
pean empires on which "the sun never set." As for the Unipolarity is also misleading in that it focuses
disruption of economic globalization during the solely on the balance of power among states. But
1920s and 30s, economic anthropologist Karl military technology continues to flow transna-
Polanyi's The Great Transformation reminds us that tionally, and nonstate actors can use chemical, bio-

With the rise of social globalization, humanitarian concerns

economic hardship came not just from war but from logical, or electronic technologies to exploit vul-
the inability of European polities to cope with the nerabilities in open societies. In addition, weak
inequalities (and the disruptive responses of com- states can follow asymmetric strategies of sup-
munism and fascism) that grew out of laissez-faire porting terrorists or manipulating transnational
economic growth. Moreover, the roots of contem- interdependencies to counter U.S. power. For exam-
porary economic globalization go back to U.S. geopo- ple, young Chinese officers have written about
litical strategy after 1945 and the belief that open using terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental
economies and liberal institutions were necessary as degradation, and computer viruses to update Sun
a bulwark against communism. Economic and mil- Tzu's The Art of War for an age of globalization.
itary globalization are not always opposing forces. On the dimension of geopolitical competition
Today, many observers describe the state of among states, the world since the Cold War has
global military interdependence as "unipolar." been marked by military deglobalization. But the
That is, only one country has truly global military electronic herd is not fully in control. Long-dis-
reach, with air, naval, and ground forces that tance military interdependence is taking new
include almost 300,000 troops in Europe, Asia, forms. And a geogovernance of military global-
and near the Persian Gulf. Even with a one-third ization is slowly evolving. In the 19th century,
reduction since the Cold War, U.S. military expen-states faced few legal constraints on recourses to
ditures exceed the defense budgets of the next fivewar or trade in weapons. Since 1945, the United
countries combined. In today's unipolar world, Nations Charter has tried to limit war; peace-
the Cold War strategic chessboard is gone. Instead,keeping forces have been interposed to dampen
as journalist Thomas Friedman argues, an "elec-local conflicts; and multilateral treaties have
tronic herd" of investors creates disincentives for slowed the spread of nuclear, chemical, and bio-
conflict. According to this view, because countries logical weapons as well as missile technology.
are punished for fighting, regional conflicts are International humanitarian law is gradually tak-
more likely to become ghettoized than globalized.ing shape, but as the U.N. Security Council impasse
But there are some things wrong with this pic-over intervention in Kosovo demonstrated, con-
ture. For one thing, economic globalization is not sensus is not yet at hand. Geogovernance of military
everything. With the rise of social globalization, globalization still lags far behind the dynamic
humanitarian concerns interacting with global com-
changes in the technologies of destruction and the
munications have dramatized some conflicts and increasing roles of transnational actors. I

JANUARYI FEBRUARY 2001 83

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