Ate Pia
Ate Pia
Development
in
Conflict-‐Affected
Areas
of
the
Philippines
Annexes
1. Case
Study
Summaries
of
CBD
Projects
2. CBD
Design
Considerations
in
Conflict-‐affected
Areas
3. Maps
4. Acronyms
5. Bibliography
Annex
1:
Case
Study
Summaries
of
CBD
Projects
ACT for PEACE: Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: The Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme in
Southern Philippines. ACT is phase 4 of Government of Philippines and United Nations Multi-
Donor Programme (UNMDP) for peace.
Cost : US$16.2
Duration: 2005-2010
Donor: Governments of Australia, Spain, and New Zealand. The European Commission funded
the program’s humanitarian and rehabilitation component.
Region(s): Southern Philippines – Mindanao & Palawan (ARMM, South Central, Western
Mindanao, Caraga Region, covering 19 provinces in total).
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The multi-donor funded Act for Peace (ACT for Peace) Programme emerged as a direct response
to the 1996 peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF). The project, was managed by the UNDP and overseen by the
Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and ARMM Regional Government. The project
provided support to former MNLF combatants and their communities in the Special Zone for
Peace and Development (SZOPAD). The project has an explicit peacebuilding and conflict
transformation objective and supports institutional capacity building, service delivery (health),
community economic development, conflict transformation skill building, and systems and
training to support a 'culture of peace'. The project worked at the community level with Peace
and Development Communities (PDC) that serve as the primary unit for sub-project
identification and implementation.
The theory of change focuses on analyzing and proposing relevant actions towards
transformative changes which require flexible think-action logic. Action for Conflict
Transformation- ACT has the following basis for change:
c) Project Objectives:
The ACT for Peace is a peace building and conflict transformation program, operating in conflict
affected areas of Southern Philippines. The objectives are developed in the context of a conflict-
sensitive environment in which the program intends to address the complex situation of conflict
in Mindanao such as peace building, governance, human security, and conflict management. It
aims to achieve the following objectives.
• Helping to transform the Peace & Development Community (PDCs) and conflict-
affected/conflict-vulnerable areas through peace building initiative.
• Aiming for strengthening of Peace building and conflict transformation (prevention,
management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions.
• Development and strengthening of critical partnerships towards an environment of
trust, confidence, and collaboration for peace and development.
The Peace and Development Community (PDC) is central to the community based approach of
ACT for Peace Programme. The PDC is the basic social unit upon which the whole peace and
development framework of the GoP-UNDMP peace building is based. The social and economic
transformation takes place in a PDC (which can be a barangay) through capacity building,
livelihood rebuilding through sustainable agriculture and micro enterprises, rebuilding
infrastructure and forging linkages with local service providers, local government units, NGOs etc.
to improve access to basic services.
The PDC serves as a resource centre to ensure the equitable spread and distribution of resources
amongst the community members. Such resources may include community organizations, trained
development leaders, technicians, education facilities, health centres, household saving pools, a
pool of farm production equipment and farm animals etc.
The program was managed by UNDP and implemented through Program Management Office-
(PMO) under the supervision of the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) and the ARMM
regional Government.
• The financial counterpart was based on the thrust and priorities of the LGUs.
• Granting of funds was based on the needs of the barangay as stipulated in the Barangay
Development Plan (BDP).
• Alignment of the BDP to the thrust and priorities of municipal government
comprehensive development is a requirement for funding.
• Endorsement of the MLGU to MinDA and ARMM is a requisite in the granting of funding
assistance.
f) Site Selection
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
Based on the Logical Framework of Analysis (LFA) each outcome is reviewed using both
quantitative and qualitative analyses.
Social Capital / Social Cohesion for Peace Building: Improved access to clean water for
28,808 people through installing 97 water supply systems. Created more than 1,000
new jobs. Created more than 400 new community enterprises. Improved access to
health services for more than 140,000 people.
Social Capital/ Social Cohesion for Peace Building: 227 PDCs have enhanced abilities to
plan, implement, institutionalize and replicate initiatives that promote peace and
address threats to human security. Increased the number of People’s Organizations (PO)
and local social formations (LSF) that were able to undertake and participate in peace
based planning process (263 POs and 526 LSFs organized and strengthened in all
programs in PDCs).
Human Security: Basic Social Services: Improved community access to integrated health
services (102 BHUs) constructed. Addressed the needs of communities affected by
armed conflict (70,000 affected families provided with food, medicines and temporary
shelter, 300 core shelter units constructed in PDC Macuyon, Sirwai, Zamboanga del
Norte).
Human Security through Community Economic development: Enhanced stakeholder
awareness and appreciation of community economic development principles, concepts
and approaches (438 community economic projects implemented in 238 PDCs).
Improved competence among stakeholders (352 of 438 projects are managed by 268
PO.
Governance in Conflict Context: Enhanced local stakeholder appreciation of human
security, peace building and culture of peace principles (83 LGUs currently have basic
peace promoting capacities, systems, and processes). Improved competence among
local stakeholders, Established mechanisms supportive of stakeholder initiatives in
promoting or advancing human security and peace building (22 provincial peace
resource centres established).
Peace Building & Conflict Management: Enhanced local capacities to practice and
promote peace (12 regional and 29 provincial partnerships forged).
Peace building intervention alone is not sufficient in addressing conflict. What is required is
a fully integrated, holistic approach to community development. The program should
develop capacity-building mechanisms to address the underlying structural inequities that
could give rise to another conflict.
Based on the experience of the program, there is strong evidence that for a peacebuiding
intervention to be effective, responsive, adequate, appropriate and relevant, it has to be
context-sensitive and conflict-specific. As such, any peacebuilding and development
interventions of donors working in, on, or around conflict environs must adopt peace-based
approaches which are helpful in promoting peace rather than exacerbating potential or
latent conflicts.
Successful community development projects in conflict context can be useful to
communities that are empowered and socially prepared. The control of resources must
emanate from the community where they become accountable of their decisions.
Social development projects must be sensitive to the need to redress ethnic and imbalances
and must incorporate indicators to measure the distributional impact of development
assistance. From a consolidation perspective, infrastructure projects that create
employment must be targeted at the youth in particular.
There is a need for a flexible project management approaches. Given that subprojects are
devised at the community level, there are a wide variety of timetables, capacity levels, levels
of access to resources, geographic distances, supporting logistics, and conflict dynamics.
To achieve a complex objective to support productive subprojects that are community
driven, economically viable, and environmentally sound requires substantial investment in
local learning and technical support. New processes and clear rules for decision making have
to be introduced as building blocks, and this introduction needs to be made over long
periods of time.
The competence of the implementers and staff must be a priority for donors working in
conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas. Implementer’s efficiency and staff continuity
improves program and project practices. In a climate of great influx and insecurity, it is
important to have consistency in project personnel. This allows key actors to obtain deeper
history and context, which supports the learning and application of better practices
throughout a project.
The relevance of a demand-driven approach in validity of community based approaches
when existing institutional capacity is weak and development challenges are enormous.
Sustainability of demand-driven projects is greater when local government administrations
are involved in planning, appraisal, execution, monitoring and evaluation. Integrated
implementation through local government bodies avoids the pitfalls of parallel institutions
that have affected many social funds. At the same time, local governments are susceptible
to local political influence and often face capacity constraints. National and local ownership
of the Programme by government institution is chief to sustainability of interventions as
well as gains in peace and development.
“Sustainability depended on factors such as the participation of local government bodies,
national government agencies, NGOs, and other groups; responsiveness to community
demands; adequate social capital (or capacity to promote peace building through
development at the community level); linkages with other livelihood, financing, and
1. DESCRIPTION:
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP) is a World Bank (and JICA) supported project that works
explicitly with the communities and government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao to deliver services and institutional capacity strengthening. The project supports
community development assistance, regional infrastructure, and institutional strengthening and
governance. Within the community development assistance component, the provide uses CDD
methods- through People's Organisation supported by Municipal Facilitators and local
governments- to deliver community based infrastructure (CBI), learning-livelihood and self
sufficiency (LLFS) and a quick response program (QRP). The project works with up to eight
barangay per municipality, providing up to 1.5million Pesos per barangay, 80% of which is used
for infrastructure and 20% for livelihoods. Under the institutional strengthening, the project
explicitly supports the ARMM government and local governments to improve service delivery,
transparency and accountability.
The project theories of change are founded on the premises that reducing poverty and providing
support mechanisms for peace building will bring about sustainable development in the ARMM,
and that improving living conditions will contribute to addressing underlying causes of conflict.
c) Project Objective:
Specific program objectives of the ASFP are to provide and/or improve sustained access to social
and economic infrastructure and services by the poor and conflict-affected poor communities;
provide capacity building for women, out of school youth and other community groups for
improving food security, employment opportunities and household incomes; strengthen social
cohesion and partnerships between and within communities in the ARMM region; and improve
local governance and institutional capacities for implementation in the ARMM Region, with a
focus on improved transparency and accountability in the allocation and management of public
resources by the participating communities, local government units.
The program has three major components: (i) community development assistance, which aims
to provide community-based infrastructure (CBI) and learning-livelihood and food self-
sufficiency (LLFS) training for beneficiaries; (ii) strategic regional infrastructure, which seeks to
work with the regional government in the repair of critical infrastructure, such as port facilities
and government buildings, that was damaged by the 2000 conflict; and (iii) institutional
strengthening and governance.
To deliver the first component, People’s Organizations (POs) were formed in each barangay.
Each PO, with the support of the LGU, was responsible for preparing investment plans for
priority subprojects and beneficiaries complete with procurement and field appraisals. These
proposals were submitted during Multi-Stakeholders’ Meeting, and once approved, were
implemented by the POs themselves. POs were provided with community block grants to
support their activities once funds from the WB and JICA were coursed through the DSWD-
ARMM regional office and Provincial Social Welfare Office (PSWO). PO committee members
were extensively trained on subproject implementation and management, which integrated
capacity building into the subproject. For projects related to community infrastructure, POs
were responsible for mobilizing officers and committees for specific tasks to carry out
implementation.
Cost-sharing arrangements for the Community Development Assistance (CDA) component were
set at a level of 15%, and included provision for cash and in-kind contributions to be shared 10%
by the LGU and 5% by the community. The same counterpart scheme is also applied for regional
infrastructure projects.
f) Site Selection:
Sites were selected to prioritize highly populated, conflict-affected, remote, and poor barangays,
which are rarely reached by government services. To identify these sites, beneficiary barangays
were chosen based on their compatibility with specific weighed criteria: Poverty (40%), Conflict-
Affected/Conflict Influenced (20%), Population (20%), Distance and Means of Accessibility (20%).
Selected barangays with a population of 1,000 or more are entitled to a P1.5 million grant. If the
population is less than 1,000, the grant amount is P1,500 per barangay resident but no less than
P500,000 for the entire barangay. The bulk of the funds are used for the construction of the
community-proposed sub-project, with around 20% (or P300,000 from a total of P1.5M)
allotted for LLFS subprojects.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
The key indicators measuring project performance, inputs, outputs, and outcomes are as
follows:
AFSP funded the completion of 2,398 community based infrastructure sub-projects which
benefited around 14.5 percent of the total population in ARMM. Among these projects,
community infrastructure subprojects contributed to the reduction of vulnerability, indicating
either an increase in income and/or better access to food. For food sufficiency initiatives under
LLFS, the number of people who eat three full meals a day increased by 76 percent. Social and
educational facilities, such as school building and learning centers, provided physical spaces for
community activities such as training, particularly for women and youth. In fact, functional
literacy training was provided to 29,419 people. For women in particular, being able to read and
write opened opportunities to engage in livelihood activities. Two batches of Early Childhood
Education classes were conducted in each barangay, reaching out to a total of 1,991 pre-school
children. Children who completed the ECE program had relatively higher academic performance
when they proceeded to the subsequent grade levels. The program also had a positive effect in
improving the institutional capacity of local communities. A total of 1315 POs were formed to
plan and operate their respective community based infrastructure. PO participants thus
acquired skills in community based development planning, financial management, procurement,
and environmental and social management planning.
a. Description of Conflict
The project was designed to provide assistance to the conflict-affected areas of the ARMM
where, in 2000, escalated armed conflict had displaced over 400,000 people in the central parts
of Mindanao, and an additional 100,000 in the island provinces of Basilan and Sulu. The number
of displaced persons later decreased, but at the time the ASFP was formulated, many people
were still unwilling to return to their communities because of the tenuous peace situation. The
ARMM is characterized by high poverty incidence and unstable political environment challenged
by a history of weak governance. The region has the second highest poverty incidence in the
country, and four of its provinces belong to the country’s poorest 44 provinces.
However, the current types of conflict that occur in the ASFP beneficiary communities are often
of the domestic type, or involving clan conflict. These conflicts are usually managed or settled
by community elders or religious leaders. The barangays visited for purposes of this study,
particularly those in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur are no longer directly affected by armed
Key recommendations:
Communicate ASPF more strongly and more purposively as a peace building program in
addition to being a poverty alleviation program. This gains importance in the light of the
current fragile status of the peace talks between the GPH and the MILF, because a
critical mass that is oriented on peace and supportive of peace at the community level
will have stronger resolve to adhere to peaceful ways of change.
In relation to the above, it would be beneficial for the PMO, together with its funders to
level off on a program-wide or institutional definition of peace building, and from there,
include specific peace building indicators in its program framework or logical
framework. This is to ensure a strong and clear link between project outcomes and the
program’s goal of contributing to the promotion of a peaceful and safe environment in
the conflict-affected areas of the ARMM. In this manner, program processes will be
more deliberate and purposive towards achieving these peace building indicators.
To support the program objective of strengthening social cohesion and providing an
environment supportive of conflict reduction, deliberate and explicit conflict resolution
activities should be incorporated as part of the assistance to the communities to
complement the CDD project cycle. For example, local residents and members of the
Barangay Dispute Mediator Councils would benefit from capacity-building initiatives on
dispute resolution and legal awareness (Stephens 2009).
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Basic Education Assistance to Mindanao (BEAM): Contribution on Conflict
Management & Peace Building. The project was undertaken in two stages.
Cost : US$52.1 Million
Duration: 2000-2009
Donor: AusAID.
Region(s): Southern Philippines – Mindanao- (Region 11: Davao Oriental and Compostela Valley,
Region 12: Sultan Kudarat and Sarangani, ARMM: Basilan, Sulu, Tawai-Tawi, Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao and Marawi City )
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
BEAM theory of change is aimed at linking better learning and higher education with the
establishment of peace and development in Mindanao.
c) Project Objective:
BEAM’s goal under Stage 1 was to improve the access to, and quality of, basic education in
Southern and Central Mindanao. Its purpose was to improve the quality of the management of
basic education in Regions 11, 12, and ARMM, and to respond to local educational needs of
minority and isolated communities in these regions.
For Stage 2, the primary goal was to improve the quality of, and access to, basic education in
Mindanao to aid in the achievement of peace and development in the Southern Philippines. The
project’s purpose was to improve the quality of teaching and learning in basic education in
Regions 11, 12, and ARMM and to implement strategies that will provide opportunities for all
children to access quality education and develop key life skills.
Learning and developing capacities to improve educational outcomes were the common thread
for both stages.
Various reasons have contributed to the selection of Mindanao for BEAM. Mindanao is home to
six of the 10 poorest provinces based on survey results released by the National Statistical
Coordination Board (NSCB) in 2000. Although rich in natural resources, economic development
is constrained by low investments, political instability and civil unrest. DepEd’s Education for All
(EFA) 2015 program has flagged Mindanao, particularly the ARMM, as having a functional literacy
of 62.9 % that is significantly below the national rate of 84.1 %. This is a consequence of civil and
political unrest that disrupt the lives and education of people and children in conflict-affected
areas. Similarly limited economic opportunities have increased child labour incidence with seven
out of 10 Mindanao households having working children within the ages of five to 17 years old.
These factors have contributed to low levels of educational achievement compounded by
difficult access to schools.
Diversity of cultures in Mindanao has also hindered the full implementation of a standard basic
education curriculum required by DepEd. Predominantly influenced by western counterparts,
the required curriculum lacks cultural sensitivity for students who come from Muslim and
indigenous communities.
The BEAM project targeted vulnerable communities of 5,822 public schools spread across 29
divisions in regions 11, 12, and ARMM. Although its target communities were mostly DepEd
teachers and managers, the ultimate beneficiaries were the students from diverse cultures
whose literacy rates needed improvement. For the BEAM project, the target beneficiaries were:
BEAM was a bilateral project jointly managed by pre-identified implementing agencies for the
Australian and the Philippine governments. For the Philippines, the main implementing agency
was DepEd through the Educational Development Project Implementing Task Force (EDPITAF) and
the Regional offices in Regions 11, 12, and ARMM. AusAID was the implementing agency for the
Australian aid program to the Philippines, of which BEAM was one of the projects under its
management. On the ground, BEAM was managed through a Project Management Office (PMO)
contracted by AusAID to lead and provide strategic directions during project implementation. The
PMO was in charge of managing and ensuring that project deliverables were done in an efficient
manner and achieved on time. Several consultation and coordination mechanisms were also put
in place by the project.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
During the course of its implementation, the BEAM project introduced several reforms
that contributed to DepEd’s goal of providing access to quality of basic education
nationwide. These were (1) Revised basic education curriculum that included indigenous
and Muslim into the standard curriculum; (2) School Governing Councils; and a (3) Capacity
development program for managers and teachers.
Its impact may be classified into three: (1) learning outcomes of students, (2) the approach
to learning; and (3) school planning and management.
Economic Development: To help achieve its goals in Stage 2, BEAM provided parents with
functional literacy and livelihood skills training. By the end of the project, 226 livelihood
projects were established to generate additional income to support their children.
Governance: BEAM provided a vehicle for local governments to enhance service delivery.
Political will of the local chief executives are demonstrated through the release of Special
Education Funds meant for school-related activities. To date, DepEd has partnered with a
total of 164 local government units for its Access component, and has resulted in
increased education budgets in the three regions.
Social Capital: The project has a perceived impact on social cohesion. Horizontally,
communities are brought closer together due to the inclusion of cultural awareness and
gender sensitivity. At the vertical level, the presence of SGCs (School Governing Councils)
has contributed in better relationships between the community, school officials, and the
local government.
Community Empowerment: BEAM has set an example that developing local ownership
and project management capability is possible by decentralizing project management
which also empowered the DepEd community as a whole.
Peace Building and Conflict Management: To achieve its peace building goal in stage 2,
learning guides that introduced cultural awareness, gender sensitivity and conflict
resolution were created. Supporting Muslim education through the Standard Madrassah
Curriculum was one of the activities that supported peace building initiatives of the
government.
Peace-building
BEAM was not designed to be a peace building program. Although this was part of its goal, its
efforts focused on strengthening the institution and improving access to quality education.
However, in more ways than one, BEAM’s achievements in these areas have also contributed to
peace building efforts of the government. It has succeeded in increasing the government’s
visibility to communities in remote and hard to reach areas.
CCD Approach
BEAM was not a CDD (Community Driven Development) project. However, stakeholder
ownership and participation were visible factors that increased the faith of DepEd personnel in
their institution, and the community in DepEd. Having Muslims and indigenous communities
participate in crafting learning guides have not only given them a sense of cultural pride, it has
also given them initiative to share their belief systems to a larger audience. Implementing the
curriculum and using the learning guides have fostered better understanding and appreciation
of each other’s uniqueness in schools that have mixed student populations. BEAM was also able
to harness the combined strength of local governments, donors, grassroots organizations, and
other private organizations to enhance the delivery of basic services, particularly on increasing
access to education.
Governance
Working within the government’s framework and through a national government agency
allowed BEAM to expand to several regions and reach remote communities that needed this
project the most. Not only has it strengthened the institution, but it has contributed to the
government’s goals as well. DepEd managers stated that they continue to look forward to more
projects that are similar in scope and implementation.
Cohesion
Having a holistic appreciation of the dynamics within and outside the education system provided
BEAM with the opportunity to utilize the project management team’s experiences and lessons
learned into constructive engagement with various stakeholders. By keeping targets realistic,
BEAM was able to identify specific targets for intervention and provide strategies to address
these. At a glance, the provision of functional literacy and livelihood programs to parents may
seem disconnected to the goal, but activities like these provide income opportunities and
incentives for parents to keep their children in school.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Desarrollo Integral y Sostenible de Comunidades Rurales de Bicol y Caraga
(Mindanao), con Especial Atencion a la Mujer a Traves de la Articulacion y El Fortalecimiento del
Tejido Productivo y Social, Desde la Participacion Comunitaria, Filipinas (Integral and sustainable
development of rural communities in Bicol and Caraga (Mindanao), with special focus on women,
through the articulation and strengthening of the productive and social structures, through
community participation, Philippines). Also known as Convenio.
Cost: 4,377,439 Euro
Duration: 2008-2012
Donor: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarollo (AECID)
Region(s): Caraga Region (Agusan and Surigao provinces) and Bicol Region
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The AECID (Spanish) funded Convenio with is a 4,377,439 euro) integrated area development project
that works with selected barangays in Caraga (18 barangays) and Bicol (12 barangays). The project,
implemented by Fundacion InteRed, operates through a network of Filipino NGOs who work with
local people's organisations to implement activities in health, education, environmental/disaster
issues and livelihood support (primarily in agriculture). The project also supports institutional
strengthening for local governments and people's organisations. Each community may receive up to
7.5M pesos of investment that is managed through cooperation between the local NGO and people's
organisation.
Rural poverty in the Philippines, according to Fundacion InteRed, often breeds a host of other
problems like malnutrition, illness, poor access to quality education, and degradation of the
environment. Among the rural poor the need for food often competes with other family needs, thus
children are left undernourished and their education are listed last in the family’s order of priorities.
Malnutrition and exposure to extended hours of manual labor are surefire prescription for poor
health and oftentimes illness.
To effectively address rural poverty, Fundacion InteRed thought it would require a strategy that not
only meets the immediate needs of farmers but also transforms structures so as to act on the causes
of poverty. InteRed opted for a strategy that will promote comprehensive development, at all levels
and areas--social, economic, and political, because if one chooses only one component, the
sustainability of other initiatives is jeopardized (Fundacion InteRed, 2008).
The project of InteRed does not explicitly address peacebuilding but supports a comprehensive
development strategy that addresses rural poverty through interventions in social, political and
economic spheres. Having opted to work in conflict affected areas of Mindanao, it is fair to assume
that the project reflects AECID's larger theory of change that attributes the conflict to "exclusion of
c) Project Objectives:
The project aims to improve the quality of life of the residents of the chosen region and reduce the
poverty level in the rural communities of Caraga and Bicol by achieving the following.
Use capacity building and community mobilization for improving social structures of local
governments and local participation in 12 rural barangays in Bicol and 16 barangays in
Caraga.
Provide capacity building advice and financial support in production, processing, and
marketing by improving the production process of 28 communities and strengthen their
capacity for income generation.
Contribute to the preservation of the ecosystems of 16 communities of Caraga through
awareness building, community mobilization, ecological conservation and rehabilitation
activities.
Contribute to the improvement of the education conditions of 28 communities through the
involvement of teachers, parents, and the local authorities in education planning, through
capacity building of the education community and improvement in educational infrastructure
and equipment.
Improve the sanitation in 28 communities through a) commitment and involvement of local
authorities b) people’s organizations. c) Training and education of local health workers d)
Provision of sanitary installations and health and sanitary equipment.
Prepare and equip 12 communities in Bicol to respond to natural calamities through the
disaster management committees, advice to the local authorities and the promotion of
household resettlement and construction of infrastructure.
Fundacion InteRed and its partner NGOs implement the Convenio in three main phases:
Identification: This phase involved data collection and analysis, establishment of Convenio
database, selection of communities, and identification of specific interventions needed by
the communities. This phase was done with prospective partner NGOs using participatory
methodologies.
Transfer Phase: In this phase, the POs learn to assume responsibility in managing their
organization, their farms and livelihoods, and social services, working closely with their local
governments. This phase will also ensure that community priorities are integrated into the
development plans of the local governments and funded in the investment plans and
budgets.
f) Site Selection: The regions of Caraga (Agusan & Surigao provinces) along with the rest of the region
ear marked for this project were selected as their per capita income was the 2nd lowest not just in
Mindanao but in the entire Philippines. Also the regions of Caraga and Bicol have been identified as
the breeding ground for NPA (New people’s Army) insurgency.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
A participatory monitoring system involving all stakeholders of the Convenio was put in place.
The indicators measured the results of the activities as well as their effect on communities. The
appropriateness of the methods and processes is also examined.
InteRed initiates assessment meetings with NGOs per region which results in knowledge sharing
and cross pollination of good practices.
InteRed’s Coordinator of projects also travels regularly to the region to meet with NGOs and
communities to gather first hand information.
The communities of the 28 barangays now have access to health centres and related equipment,
school repairs, education materials, water pumps, sanitary toilets, loans, scholarship, livestock,
seedlings, sustainable agriculture technology, and market linkage.
Members in more than 109 Peoples Organizations in Caraga have received agricultural inputs
and trainings under the program. Two health centres and five pharmacies [Botika sa Barangays
(BsBs)] have been completed in six Caraga communities. Ten health centres have been provided
with basic equipment. According to community residents, the BsBs made cheap medicines more
accessible.
To address malnutrition among school children in Caraga, supplemental feeding was conducted
in 9 communities, covering 439 children. Books and audio visual equipment have been provided
to the schools. Teachers were trained on new teaching methods. The scholarships grant for 228
children was provided at the schools.
In Bicol, 437 malnourished children were given special care. Four health centres were provided
with basic equipment and two BsBs were provided with medicines. Of 100 families targeted, 35
families were provided with sanitary toilets. Eight water systems provided clean water to 112
families.
The Convenio supports 40 scholars (20 in high school and 20 in elementary) in San Isidro. They
were chosen in 2009 and will be supported by the Convenio for four years. Scholars receive
school supplies and their school fees are paid by the Convenio.
In many communities, the POs (People’s organizations) became important players in their
communities by acting as training grounds and as a source of new leaders. In many cases,
challenging the positions of local governments on issues like mining as in the case of Sta. Juana,
Tagbina, Surigao. In many barangays, the Convenio also led to the election of former PO leaders
as barangay officials.
The BDCs (Barangay Development Council) have been involved in developing the barangay’s
development plans- BDPs.
The training of barangay officials in participatory local governance along with PO members has
provided a venue for both parties to agree on how to run their communities. Participation of
women has greatly improved.
Participation in barangay assemblies have also increased. In Sta. Juana, for example, the
household participation has gone up to 90% from 50%.
The project did not have a peace building objective but it has been observed that it has helped in
strengthening the social cohesion which has led to increased sense of safety and security.
In Bicol, some communities feel safer due to implementation of disaster risk reduction
committees. The committees are tasked to warn about impending disasters particularly
typhoons and floods. During disasters, they manage evacuations, respond to emergencies, and
conduct rescues. They take charge of relief operations like the distribution of food, materials for
temporary shelter, and the rehabilitation of damaged houses. DRR have also been drawn.
a. Description of Conflict
Bicol and Caraga are affected by the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency, thus they had also been
selected as pilot areas for the government’s PAMANA project, which aims to bring back government
to remote communities by ensuring that basic services are delivered and local governments are
transparent and accountable. Also piloted for the PAMANA project are Quezon, Mindoro, Cordillera,
Negros, Samar, Compostela Valley, ZamBaSulTa, Central Mindanao, and ARMM, all conflict-affected
areas.
AECID should consider the development of NGO capacity in conflict analysis and in designing
program interventions that are conflict-sensitive and that contribute to positive peace. NGOs
have proven to be effective partners in implementing community-based projects because of
their familiarity with the areas and their strong background in organizing. The support is
especially needed in Bicol, a conflict area, where support to peace building is much less
compared to Caraga.
Fundacion InteRed a long-time AECID partner in Bicol and Caraga should explore the possibility
of using a peace building lens in the design of its programs. The foundation has been working in
some of the poorest communities of Bicol and Caraga. These are communities with experiences
of conflict or where conflict is still existing or emerging as in the case of conflicts related to
mining. Adopting a peace building approach will increase the effectiveness of the foundation’s
programs in conflict areas.
Fundacion InteRed’s program attempts to respond to the pressing needs of the communities in a
comprehensive way. The implementation of subprojects, however, should be carefully calibrated
so that the capacities of the communities taken in to account without wearing them down with
prolonged social preparations.
Working with local NGOs is a strength of the Convenio. NGOs are strong in community work,
they charge less in management fees, and most of them have established relations with local
governments. Fundacion InteRed, however, should ensure that the NGOs are also selected for
competencies related to the project and the Convenio and if they are lacking in these
competencies, technical support should be provided to them to compensate for their
weaknesses.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: The Education Awareness Support Effort (EASE)/Education Matching Grant
Program (EMGP). EASE-EMGP is a component of the Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM)
program of the USAID
Cost: USD 1.14 million plus an identical sum raised by Parent Teacher Associations (PTA).
Duration: 2008-2012
Donor: USAID
Region(s): ARMM, Western Mindanao, Southern Mindanao, Central Mindanao, Caraga.
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The Education Awareness Support Effort (EASE) (also referred to as the Education Matching
Grant Program (EMGP)) is part of the larger USAID-funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao
(GEM). GEM provides a range of support to communities in Mindanao. GEM-EASE is a matching
grant program that provides in-kind matching support for community investments in education
services - meaning that for every computer/desk/book that the community (usually the Parent
Teacher Association) purchases for a participating school, the GEM-EASE project will purchase
the equivalent number and amount of goods. In this way, the project aims to improve the quality
of education facilities and to empower PTAs to take a greater role in providing resources to their
schools.
The GEM program implicitly pursues a goal of peace and security, and the GEM-EASE program is
seen to support conflict prevention and stabilization through improved access to and quality of
education.
c) Project Objective:
The objective of the project is to provide peso-for-peso matching grants to the PTAs of
participating elementary and high schools. These grants provide resources to match those
provided by PTAs for the improvement of the quality of educational resources and/or programs.
The value of a grant is determined by the amount raised by the PTA of a qualified school (item-
for-item matching).
Generally, there are no stringent and voluminous eligibility requirements thereby making the
grant more available, accessible and less prohibitive to the needy schools.
1. Attend an EASE Orientation and secure an MGP (Matching Grant Program) Kit
2. Fill out MGP Activity Proposal Form
3. Submit completed form to GEM-PMO/EASE-EMGP Team
4. Verify after 30 days for the status of the application
5. If approved, a Notice of Approval will be awarded to the qualifying schools
6. Sign a Letter of Understanding (LOU) with GEM-EASE
7. Within 60 days after LOU signing, PTA/school to raise the counterpart funds
8. Submit/validate documents to GEM (official receipts)
9. GEM to procure counterpart items
10. GEM to delivery counterpart items
11. PTA and school officials to formally receive the items/commodities and sign delivery and
matching completion documents
Step 1: Delimit choice of schools in the pre-qualified/pre-identified areas (CAAM: ARMM and
Kalahi Para sa Kalayaan areas tied up with Armed Forces of the Philippines’ Kalahi Program.
Step 2: Visit/orient DepEd Division Head (courtesy and coordination) to help in identifying the
specific schools.
Step 4: If school/PTA is interested and willing to raise the counterpart funds, generate raw
project ideas with the schools/PTAs concerned.
Step 5: Prepare tentative Special Activity Fund (SAF) request for pre-approval and clearing
(making sure proposal within the supportable parameters of EASE-EMGP types of projects).
Step 6: If approved through a Letter of Approval, a LOU (Letter of Understanding) signing with
PTA and School Principals is made. (If counterpart funds are already available then skip Step 7).
Step 7: PTA/school to begin raising counterpart funds as approved and stipulated in the LOU;
funds raised also need to be validated by EASE-EMGP.
Parents Teacher Association raises the funds for the school and the EASE-EMGP matches that
figure.
f) Site Selection:
The conflict affected extremely poor areas of Mindanao: ARMM, Western Mindanao, Northern
Mindanao, Southern Mindanao and Caraga are major focus of this project.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
EASE-EMGP has no explicit monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and sustainability plan. The
EASE/EMGP Area Coordinators primarily monitor the schools as part of their functions. Those
Elementary & High Schools which demonstrate good management and stewardship of the
goods/equipment/facilities under the grant are candidates for re-match availment. But there is
no formal and clear obligation on how to sustain, maintain, and repair the EASE-EMGP grant
items
Social contribution: The projects’ explicit aim is to help improve education through improved
school equipment and facilities.
Economic contribution: The project has an indirect impact by allowing the students to gain
employable skills. Also, some purchasing leverage may be achieved because of increased
resource capacity through grants matching e.g. a school can get two computers by raising funds
for only one unit; the other one provided by the matching grant, thus getting two computers
while spending for only one. In some cases, sewing machines and gas range (home economics
grants) are also used for small-scale livelihood programs; computer laboratories are also
functioning as business centers whose income accrues to the PTA funds for use in school
projects.
Social capital and social cohesion: Supporting the schools through the PTAs has allowed an
important stakeholder’s participation and commitment in the education sector; tapping on the
social capital in the schools (PTAs) makes the schools vibrant (horizontal cohesion). There is no
explicit or formally arrangement for vertical cohesion, except in cases where the EASE/EMGP
coordinators tap the Local School Boards (LSBs) or the DepEd as a matter of strategy. But in the
beginning of the project, the program was presented to the various pertinent government
bodies (DepEd divisions, LGUs, etc) as a matter of informative orientation about the matching
grants.
Transparency and accountability: During their general assemblies, PTAs are compelled to
seriously and regularly come up with financial reports on the use of their funds in the matching
grants. On the other hand, there are a few instances where the counterpart goods procured by
Conduct baseline study, anent to the segmentation scheme. To scale up, USAID needs to
establish an empirical baseline profile of the matching-grant schools under the behest of the
EASE/EMGP, and generate data in terms of the grant distribution by school and area (what
types of grant and how much), as well as measure somehow the effect or impact of the grant
commodities to the education performance of the school. This baseline will benefit future
matching grants in terms of targeted aid.
Calibrate the grant criteria. Poorer schools and neglected areas (where poor schools are
located) will continue to be neglected and under-served because of their (poor schools)
incapacity to raise funds and participate in the EASE/EMGP matching grant program. When
the same qualification criteria are applied to both poorer schools and better-off schools, the
former will be understandably left out by the latter, resulting in some form of social
exclusion or elite capture among the recipient schools. In the interest of targeted aid to
better serve the poorer schools, the EASE/EMGP program can explore easing-off some rules
by differentiating the criteria according to the capacity of the schools.
Tap the existing structures, formally. As part of the strategy, tapping the education
stakeholders, most specifically the local governments through the Local School Boards (LSBs
in the province and municipal levels), will be very useful in augmenting and sustaining the
PTA initiatives to raise counterpart funds for the EASE/EMGP matching grants. Aside from
the LGUs/LSBs, there are private sector groups (e.g. Rotary Clubs) or civil society
organizations implementing education assistance programs.
Tap the Adopt-a-School program. The DepEd allows for the schools to be partners of private
sector and civic organizations or business groups under the Adopt-a-School program, where
the latter provide assistance (like scholarships, books, facilities, construction or repair) to the
partner-schools as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR). Good examples are
Sukailang Elementary School in Surigao City adopted by the Pacific Cement Corporation and
the Nueva Fuerza Elementary School in Tagum City, which also received regular book
donations from the Rotary Club.
Tap alumni graduates. Alumni graduates or alumni associations are also good sources of
assistance for the schools. The Zamboanga City High School in Zamboanga City, Malapatan
National High School in Saranggani Province, and Mindanao State University – Center for
Education Training and Development (CETD) in General Santos City have shown good work
among their alumni which benefit their schools in return.
Include research and citation ethics in the computer curriculum. Many schools availed of the
matching grants for computer units, and are able to expose their students to computer use
(encoding, surfing, research work, etc). But what is happening is that students just ‘copy and
paste’ online and encyclopedia materials without conscious regard on proper citation and
referencing, making these materials as their own to submit for their assignments and
research work. This is giving rise to future plagiarists, a frightening undesirable consequence
brought about by the matching grant. An ethics curriculum at this early stage will prevent the
future problem of plagiarism among the students of the EASE/EMGP schools. This may again
require for a greater complementation and integration with the USAID-EQUALLS as far as
school curriculum development is concerned.
To be able to gauge real impact of the EASE/EMGP assistance to schools, it may be helpful to
identify and articulate education indicators for impact. The current practice of ensuring
targeted outcomes is excellent (i.e. # of grants approved; # of computers delivered; # of
books purchased, etc) but they serve more meaningful contribution when made consciously
attributable to some education impact (literacy rates, cohort rates, enrolment rates, or
improvement in education performance, etc). This may require establishing baseline
conditions of the schools before the EASE/EMGP assistance (pre-grant), and target end-
states after the EASE/EMGP assistance (post-grant).
Market the program. Availment of the EASE-EMGP matching program could have been
better accepted or availed of through more education and marketing campaigns. Such
initiatives can also attract broader support to the schools/PTAs from the LGUs, LSBs and even
the Department of Education.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Expanded Small Farmers Marketing Program (ESFMP)
Cost: USD$ 4 million
Duration: 2008-2012
Donor: Catholic Relief Services (CRS) – under a grant from the US Department of Agriculture’s
Food for Progress program
Region(s): A total of 158 barangays (covering 20 municipalities and 3 cities) across 4 provinces
(Bukidnon, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat) in Mindanao.
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The Catholic Relief Services-funded Expanded Small Farms and Marketing Project (ESFMP) is a
relatively small ($4million over 3 years) agro-enterprise development project that works directly
with poor small-scale farmers to provide strategic skills, services and infrastructure to improve
their productivity. The project utilizes networks of NGOs to build and work with clusters of
farmers (10-15 farmers per cluster) who collaborate to develop and implement small crop based
projects relating largely to rice, cocoa and coffee production.
a) Project Objective:
The overall goal of ESFMP is to attain food security and sustain livelihoods for small farming
households through:
The project is delivered primarily by the three field-level NGO partners who recruit and deploy
Municipal Agro-Enterprise Facilitators (MAEFs). The MAEFs utilize an 8-step clustering
methodology to assist in the formation of farmer “clusters” (averaging 10-15 farmers per
cluster) that function as both production and marketing units. The partner NGOs also organize
and conduct Farmer Field Schools that aim to bring the production capabilities of the farmers to
a higher level while ensuring adherence to ecological responsibilities.
Each cluster must develop a Detailed Implementation Plan based on standardized participatory
tools, namely i) rapid area assessment; ii) product supply assessment; iii) market chain study;
and iv) value chain analysis.
Oversight is provided by provincial and municipal level Site Working Groups (SWGs) comprised
of relevant local government officials. The SWGs are responsible for providing technical support
such as agricultural extension services and financial support such as cost-sharing to
infrastructure sub-projects.
ESFMP requires a 25% counterpart contribution towards the cost of sub-project infrastructure
and equipment. This contribution can come from local governments and/or farmer clusters and
may include in kind support such as labor or donated land.
d) Site Selection:
The project covers a total of 158 barangays (in 20 municipalities and 3 cities) across 4 provinces
(Bukidnon, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat) in Mindanao. Municipalities and
barangays are selected primarily on the basis of available poverty data. Additional selection
criteria include:
production performance in any of the three priority crops (rice, coffee and cacao);
presence of available and accessible agricultural production extension services;
willingness of the local political and community leaders to participate in the Program;
Concentration of small farmers who are the actual tillers of land. (ESFMP targets at least 100
farmers per barangay, who form anywhere between four to ten clusters.)
In terms of beneficiary selection, CRS concentrates on the poorest of the poor whom they
define as small farmers working (as owners or tenants) on plots of land that are less than one
hectare in size.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
Facilitators are responsible for collecting and recording M&E data on cluster formation and
performance, but the key elements of the M&E framework are run by the clusters themselves.
Farmer mobilization has been successful with a total of 834 clusters having been formed
(averaging 10 clusters/barangay), with a total of 10,409 members. 63% of participants are
engaged in rice production, 34% in coffee and the remaining 3% in cacao.
Farmer income has increased, although composite financial data was not provided.
Anecdotal data, however, supported this conclusion. Coffee growers, for instance, were
receiving in excess of PP 100/kilo when selling directly to buyers versus PP 60-70 per kilo
when selling to a middleman.
Social impact also appears to have been positive having yielded stronger community
cohesion as a result of the participatory practices introduced and used throughout the
project. The introduction of the SWG (Site Working Group) provided an important link to
BLGU and MLGUs, strengthening vertical relations and enhancing local governance. This
mechanism enabled the clusters and the LGUs to discuss and generate options that will
effectively address the needs identified by the farmers to achieve their marketing
objectives. Cluster members gained confidence to bring their concerns directly to local
authorities. In turn this helps influence the investment plans of the LGUs for agriculture.
The ability to carry out collective marketing was the single most important factor in enabling
farmers to free themselves from the grip of often unscrupulous traders and middlemen.
Even when some clusters experienced net losses; they demonstrated a high degree of
resiliency. They generally proved able to analyse the reason behind losses and develop
solutions for subsequent rounds of production and marketing.
Participatory processes used throughout the project resulted in a changing mindset among
participants, eventually leading to critical behavioural change. In the past, farmers sold their
produce whatever form that made money immediately, even if this meant getting a raw
deal from exploitative traders. ESFMP has helped them think in terms of risks, costs and
returns and negotiate crop variety, volume and price with identified buyers. The project
consistently placed a high premium on making business decisions through participatory
processes.
b) Recommendations:
A stronger focus on formally establishing the clusters may, in the long run, prove crucial to
longer term sustainability beyond the project intervention. Midway through ESFMP
implementation, only half of the 834 clusters have complied with the basic tenets of
organization building (ie. having written policies and a formal management structure).
While natural farming technologies were intensively introduced to the farmers, ecological
sustainability took a backseat to market orientation. In the future it may be necessary to
put a greater emphasis on NFTS so as to ensure environmental sustainability.
Future initiatives of this nature may want to consider intensifying efforts to introduce a
more extensive application of conflict analysis with a view to strengthening the individual
and organizational competencies of the cluster, including their capacity in conflict
management.
Similarly, a more focused effort that would better integrate the gender equality principles
into the project framework is required.
Finally, there is a need for more pro-active advocacy work on agricultural policy reforms in
order to influence the enactment of local and national policies and regulatory frameworks
that are supportive of community agro-enterprise development.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB (The Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan- Comprehensive
Integrated Delivery of Social Services: Kapangyarihan at Kaunlaran sa Barangay).
Cost: US$182.4 Million (USD 100 Million – World Bank; USD 31.4 Million – National
Government; USD 51 Million – Local Governments)
Duration: Dec 2002- June 2009
Donor: World Bank.
Region(s): The program has national scope but does not cover the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The theory of change incorporates the dual need to (i) empower communities with skills,
institutions and experience to define, prioritize and implement their development priorities and
(ii) addressing poverty through improvement of community level infrastructure and livelihoods.
The repeated cycles are intended to allow communities to learn and familiarize themselves with
the concepts and processes of participatory governance.
c) Project Objective:
The main objective of the project is to empower communities through enhanced participation in
barangay (village) governance and involvement in the design, implementation and management
of development activities that reduce poverty. This is anchored on three important goals:
The program emphasizes strong community participation and accountability at the local
government level in addressing poverty. The key activities of KALAHI-CIDSS are expected to
empower communities, improve local governance and help reduce poverty by provision of
grants for community investment programs. The program expects immediate and long-term
contributions in alleviating poverty. The immediate benefits include construction and
rehabilitation of infrastructure and delivery of basic services at a lesser cost to government due
to higher community contributions. The long-term benefit is sustainable poverty reduction
through improvement in governance by empowering local communities to influence local
government structures.
d) Site selection:
KALAHI-CIDSS targets the poorest communities. It is national in scope but excludes the areas
covered by the ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP). The program has a systematic way of
identifying the targeted beneficiaries. The provinces with poverty incidence above national
average of 33.7% based on the computation of the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB)
were selected. Forty provinces with an estimated 5,378 barangays in 193 municipalities fall
under this list. From this, the poorest quartile of municipalities were chosen using a poverty
ranking methodology supported by rapid appraisals, household/barangay official interviews, and
the extensive use of secondary data.
Coverage will be expanded to include poor urban areas for the second cycle of KALAHI-CIDSS
through the US Government funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant. The cities
identified by DSWD for the piloting of urbanized KALAHI-CIDSS are Zamboanga, Davao,
Koronadal, Cagayan de Oro, and Butuan.
As of 2011, the KALAHI-CIDSS program covered 12 regions with 42 participating provinces. From
these provinces, 4,841 barangays in 214 municipalities are recipients of KALAHI-CIDSS projects.
These involves 1,014,489 households with an average household size of 5.2. The average
poverty incidence of LGUs with KALAHI-CIDSS projects is 53%.
Phases Steps
A. Social 1. Municipal Orientation
preparation 2. Brgy Orientation
3. Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA)
The Philippine National Government along with Barangay members and Local Governments are
the counterpart contributors to the KALAHI-CIDSS.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
The KALAHI-CIDSS program has a robust monitoring and evaluation system. The community
monitoring system trained the community to monitor and track the infrastructure projects.
The program also has its internal monitoring system and an external monitoring system
done by NGOs. For example, local NGOs in the municipalities of Magpet (North Cotabato)
and Lake Sebu (South Cotabato) participated in the monitoring and evaluation of the
KALAHI-CIDSS implementation in those communities. One published evaluation was done by
the Center for Policy and executive Development of the National College of Public
Administration of the University of the Philippines.
A baseline survey for proper monitoring and evaluation of the KALAHI-CIDSS project was
conducted in 2003 to capture information on household and barangay conditions in
intervention and comparison communities. It served as the first round of a panel survey that
will track 2,400 households and 132 barangays before, during, and after project
implementation. It will be used to evaluate the impact of the program on poverty
reduction, social capital, empowerment and governance. It was also used as guide in
management decisions. A midterm evaluation was done in 2006 and final evaluation in
2008.
The KALAHI-CIDSS projects created temporary employment for the members of the community.
While the community members volunteered some of their time as a part of their counterpart in
1. GOVERNANCE
The KALAHI-CIDSS projects provided opportunity for new community leaders to emerge. Some
of the KALAHI-CIDSS volunteers were elected as members of the barangay councils in the
communities visited. Some volunteers were hired to work as barangay secretaries and
treasurers.
The community members interviewed for this project are more aware about accountability,
transparency and participatory process. They are more aware about the concept of the
barangay development council, barangay development plan, participation in the planning, and
implementation process of local projects.
There was increased faith in governance because of the completed projects. Some communities
shared that they entertained doubts about the KALAHI-CIDSS projects. They did not believe
that it was possible to complete the projects. The completion of the projects and the
participatory nature of the process renewed their trust in governance. Because of this, the
participation of community members in barangay assemblies improved.
The communities also saw the KALAHI-CIDSS process as an alternative way for the government
in providing infrastructure. For the communities, this is a better way of providing infrastructure
compared to the traditional way of hiring contractors.
The projects also provided an opportunity for the local officials and the community members,
particularly the volunteers, to work together. Local officials saw this as an opportunity to
exercise leadership with the community. Even if barangay officials were not allowed to take on
bigger roles in the implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS, they still volunteered in the construction
of the sub-projects and mobilization of volunteers. These initiatives renewed the faith of the
community to the barangay leadership.
The KALAHI-CIDSS projects strengthened social capital in the communities. One of the critical
stages of the program is community organizing. This brought together the community
members to work together, identify community problems and help find solution to these
problems. Furthermore, community members were organized to form peoples’ organizations.
The program improved the relationship of the members of the community. It provided an
opportunity for the community to work together, go beyond their differences and revived the
spirit of volunteerism for the gain of the community.
The projects also improved the relationship of the community and the barangay government
officials because they were given the opportunity to work together.
3. COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT
With respect to community empowerment, the program provided capability building to the
community. The capacity building activities provided by KALAHI-CIDSS improved the skills and
confidence of community members.
The project also provided mechanism to ensure the participation of the marginalized in the
community, particularly women and indigenous people. The participation of women is very
apparent in the communities visited.
The program also ensures the participation of indigenous communities. Some noted that this is
the first time for IP communities to receive a grant from the national government and
participate in governance.
The KALAHI-CIDSS program has a mechanism to minimize elite capture by actively monitoring
the participation of women and IPs in the community. However, to some extent, there is a
limitation. Some community members are discouraged to participate because of low level of
literacy.
This research suggests that a community based approach to development may contribute to
peace building through the convergence of participatory processes that empowers the
stakeholders of the project and the outcomes that result to significant political changes and
access to material and non-material resources. Substantial or significant political changes
include reform or building of institutions that address grievances or governance issues,
improved transparency, and create initiatives for working on peace.
The implementation of KALAHI-CIDSS was able to facilitate resolutions of internal conflicts in
communities. It improved the relationship of community members allowing them easily
discuss and resolve conflict between households. In some cases, it was able to resolve issues
between barangays/tribes.
The KALAHI-CIDSS project was able to implement in areas where private armies and conflict
between traditional politicians exist but the project did not contribute to the management or
prevention of this type of conflict.
1. DESCRIPTION:
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The Mindanao Rural Development Program (MRDP) has been supported by the World Bank
since 1998. The project that was reviewed was the second APL commencing in 2007 and
consisting of an $83.75 million loan. The MRDP covers 225 municipalities and cities in the 26
provinces of Mindanao. The project supports rural infrastructure (72.8% of total project), a
community fund for agricultural development (CFAD, which is 19.3% of total project), a natural
resources management component (3.5%) and an institutional strengthening component
(3.5%). The CFAD component, which supports agricultural communities to identify and
implement livelihood projects and small infrastructure to meet food security and support
agribusiness, was the component reviewed most closely for the purposes of this study. The
CFAD component aims to integrate local governments through the Barangay Development Plan
(BDP) and through counterpart funding requirements, although funds and project
implementation is managed by Peoples Organizations (PO) directly.
The program’s theory of change lies in the belief that rural development will contribute to
poverty alleviation. More particularly, the provision of “social” projects (e.g., water systems), if
they address real community needs, is believed to contribute to poverty alleviation.
c) Project Objective:
MRDP was designed as a series of four Adaptable Program Loans (APL) implemented over a span
of 15 years. The MRDP supports four components: rural infrastructure (72.8% of total project),
a community fund for agricultural development (CFAD, which is 19.3% of total project), a natural
resources management component (3.5%) and an institutional strengthening component
(3.5%).
The CFAD component adheres to the concept of social participation, whereby local communities
are empowered and capacitated to serve as the designers, monitors, evaluators, and
beneficiaries of the project activities. The community driven development (CDD) cycle of the
CFAD component follows five general stages or steps: a) pre implementation/pre-project; b)
proposal preparation; c) appraisal and verification; d) implementation; and e) post project (CFAD
Manual 2011). In general, projects implemented through the CDD process are expected to be
completed within a timeframe of 12 months.
For the CFDA component the Peoples Organizations (PO) are asked to put up equity or
counterpart funds: 10% of the project cost for small support infrastructure and food security
intervention, and 25% for income generating projects. The bigger equity is justified for the
latter because the (PO) is expected to earn from the assistance from MRDP. Examples of
counterparts include provision of the lot/land and post planting maintenance for crop
production.
f) Site Selection:
During the 1990s Mindanao contained over three quarters of the Philippines poorest provinces.
This was the main justification for starting a Rural Development Program in Mindanao. There is
no sub-provincial selection process as MRDP covers all 225 municipalities. It is important to note
that even though all municipalities are covered, the provincial government, through a set of
criteria, prioritizes municipalities to be enrolled in the MRDP. Criteria include, among others,
agri-fishery potential, presence of Barangay Development Plans, poverty incidence, and absence
of foreign-assisted projects.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
The M&E framework that was investigated relates to the CFAD component.
The expected CFAD outcomes, at the end of APL2 in December 2012, are as follows:
30% of the community funds allocation are accessed by Indigenous Peoples (IPs), another
30% by women and the remaining 40% to be allocated to other marginalized groups,
including the youth sector;
At least 80% of participating communities develop, implement, and manage community
projects using appropriate and sustainable technologies;
At least 50% of participants in agriculture and related economic activities are women; and
At least 30% of the participants that actively take part in agriculture and related economic
activities in community projects are IPs.
After projects are finished, residents claim that there are less community level quarrels
because they are busy with productive endeavours and have less time for gossip. Family
conflicts and tensions are also lessened because of better income and petty thefts have
been reduced. In mixed communities, projects help lessen feelings of mistrust due to natural
interactions brought about by the use of facilities. Members of feuding families whose
individual members are not in conflict also interact with each other when using post harvest
facilities.
b. Key recommendations:
The CFAD manual is a comprehensive and detailed guide on the CDD process of MRDP.
What needs improvement is the procedural consistency and faithfulness to the letter and
spirit of the manual. In particular, the program needs to ensure inclusiveness and
representation in selection of beneficiaries and PO officers.
Special attention is also needed to strengthen the sustainability not only of the projects but
also of the POs which maintain and operate the projects. This will involve working more
closely with LGUs and soliciting their support in monitoring projects and providing post turn
over assistance to POs.
Although the program does not have an explicit peace building objective, working in
Mindanao necessitates that it strengthen its peace and conflict sensitivity processes. This
would ensure that program processes do not introduce unintended conflict or that they do
not unintentionally reinforce triggers and sources of conflict.
In relation to this, the program might want to consider developing outcome standards that
would help monitor results in terms of how the projects affect the peace and conflict
situation in areas served by the program.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Mindanao Trust Fund – Reconstruction and Development Program.
Cost: US$ 50 Million
Duration: March 2007- December 2010was
Donor: Multi-Donor fund administered by the World Bank. The main contributors are the US,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, and the European Commission.
Region(s): Mindanao- Philippines.
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
Mindanao Trust Fund and Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP) was a large
World Bank-funded project in areas affected by both GRP-MILF and GRP –MNLF hostilities in
Mindanao. Based on the community driven development (CDD) approach, MTF aims to directly
address development issues faced by conflict-affected areas by targeting communities with a
high percentage of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) or rebel returnees. MTF provides
community block grants that are intended to help restore key basic community-level services as
decided by the communities themselves. It is implemented primarily by the Bangsamoro
Development Agency but also seeks collaboration and co-funding assistance from participating
local governments.
c) Project Objective:
a) To strengthen the capacity of communities and other local partners in Mindanao to enable
them to participate in the economic and social recovery in the conflict affected areas in
Mindanao and to promote inclusive and effective governance processes;
b) To undertake sub-project activities for communities, LGUs and IDPs to assist in their economic
and social recovery.
d) Site selection:
Guided by the result of a multi-donor joint need assessment in 2005, the Mindanao Trust Fund
was created. The MTF-RDP was designed to support post-conflict reconstruction and assist the
economic and social recovery of conflict-affected and vulnerable areas in Mindanao. It aims to
“build confidence among the affected communities to strive for peace”. The program was for
conflict-affected areas, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and rebel returnees to identify the
basic services they need, benefit from the visible restoration of these basic services and for the
local government units to sustain these services. The program is implemented in conflict
affected areas affected by both GRP-MILF and GRP –MNLF hostilities.
This six-step process guided the BDA field workers and the ISP on-site coaches in assisting
communities. Priority projects are identified through a participatory process by the members of
the community. After the projects are prioritized and selected, municipal staff and project
The fund is jointly funded by the US, Australia, Canada, the EU, New Zealand, and Sweden under
the World Bank.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
In the project, the M&E impact to peace building is measured by the number of conflicts resolved
by the community. While the program has a peace building objective, staff of the BDA shared that
there are no peace building programs/activities under the MTF-RDP except for the VTT (Values
transformation trainings). They also shared that their M&E capacity should be strengthened and
that the role of the Trust Fund Recipient in M&E should be clarified.
1. Governance Impact:
The communities feel more aware of transparency, accountability and mechanisms which
improved participation of people. However, it is difficult to associate this to significant
change in governance in MTF-RDP communities. There is no clear way to institutionalize the
transparency, accountability and participatory mechanisms that the communities learned
from the MTF-RDP program.
The communities noted that there is less corruption with the process like MTF-RDP because
of transparency, financial reporting and monitoring. They also stressed that the quality of
construction of MTF-RDP projects is better than the usual government funded infrastructure
constructed through contractors because there is less corruption through the CDD process.
2. Community Empowerment:
The community recipients of the MTF-RDP projects felt empowered by the project because
of the participatory nature of the project. There was a sense of accomplishment for being
able to complete the sub-projects.
The trainings improved the capability of the members who participated in the
implementation of the program.
The conscious effort of the program to encourage the participation of women and IPs
empowered the minority groups and provided them with the opportunity to be part of the
decision process.
The communities who were able to interact and work with their community leaders were
provided with opportunity to interact and build relationships with their local officials.
Due to limited number of mobilized individuals in the community, the impact on social
cohesion is limited.
The establishment of POs in communities was very helpful in providing support to the
community.
The projects provided an opportunity for the members of the POs and the barangay LGUs
to work together. There is very limited impact on improving the relationship between the
community members and the MLGUs because of the limited interaction between them.
The MTF-RDP projects implemented in mix communities provided an opportunity for the
members of the community and the BDA to work together and change the perception about
Muslims and the MILF.
The peace building component of the project is very limited according to BDA staff. Based
on the interview, they shared that they have available modules on conflict resolution and
gender and peace building but only the VTT was part of the MTF-RDP project. The BDA staff
shared that only the volunteers are able to participate in the VTT training (around 20-30
volunteers in each barangay). This is very small relative to the size of the community.
The sub-projects that MTF implemented helped the community. The participatory nature of the
program empowered its members and gave them a sense of accomplishment. The trainings
that they underwent improved their confidence. Unfortunately, the MTF program was only able
to mobilize 20-30 members of the community to volunteer for the sub-project. Some
community members would express hesitation in participation in surveys. This limited the
success of the program. It indicated the need to review the social preparation process to
further understand the community and formulate strategies to increase participation and
improve trust between community members.
MTF-RDP has identified the role of LGUs as a critical element in achieving the end goals of the
program. The LGUs were envisioned to help sustain the delivery of basic services in the
community. The program identified some entry points for LGU participation. Unfortunately,
the actual participation of LGUs in the program was very limited. Except for some LGUs who
provided counterparts for the sub-projects, most LGUs do not see themselves as part of the
program. The sustainability of the sub-projects depends on the POs organized by program in
each community. Even though the communities learned the concepts of participation,
accountability and transparency from the trainings and the actual implementation of the sub-
projects, there was no opportunity to participate in governance or to improve governance. The
program has a limited impact in improving the relationship of the community and the local
governments.
The program was able to improve the access of communities to some basic services like water.
It provided opportunity to communities to improve their livelihood by providing solar dryers and
warehouses. Footpaths connected communities. And the provision of multipurpose buildings
provided places for the members of the communities to converge and discuss issues that
concern the communities. It contributed to improving their social relations and their quality of
life. However, the communities shared that their communities have many needs and one
project is not enough to lead to alleviate them from poverty. Some communities shared that
they also have to tailor their sub-projects based on the available funds provided by MTF-RDP
since the program cannot support their first priority. Furthermore, there is uncertainty on the
The MTF-RDP contributed to peace building. The projects provided an opportunity for Muslims,
Christians and IPs to work together and improve tolerance and understanding. To some extent,
it changed the perception of Christians involved in the community sub-projects about the MILF
and their ability to implement development projects.
MTF-RDP, however, has limited effect in addressing rido. In some ways, the provision of
facilities and resources in the community helped reduce potential conflicts between families but
the communities feel that to help manage conflicts like rido, key leaders of the communities
need to be trained in conflict management.
Overall, MTF-RDP has potentials in contributing to peace building, conflict management and
development in Mindanao. Improving social preparation to incorporate conflict analysis,
increasing the number of community members participating in the sub-projects to create more
venues to build trust between community members, partnering with local officials to provide
opportunity to affect governance and improve the relationship of the community and
government and longer interventions in the community may help in achieving the outcomes of
the program.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Philippine – Australia Community Assistance Program.
Cost: AUS $28.3 million
Duration: 2005-2010
Donor: AusAID
Region(s): Five provinces: Bohol, Northern Samar in Visayas, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte,
Misamis Occidental during the period covered.
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
In PACAP’s Theory of Change (Kelly & Crawford, p. 12), the PACAP Secretariat was responsible
for four major activities: facilitate the community-based development relationships (community
engagement); appraise, fund, and monitor partner projects (grant administration); strengthen
the capacity of partners (capacity building), and analyse and learn about the drivers of changes
and causes of failure (monitoring and evaluation). If these major activities were properly
implemented, PACAP would be able to innovate and respond to the community needs, through
their RAS, and build collaborative networks of civil society, government, and the private sector
so these could meet local priorities and create an enabling environment for further
development through the FOCAS. These two schemes would ultimately lead to poor
communities across the country empowered to pursue economic growth and achieve better
standards of living.
c) Project Objective:
The objective of the project was to tap and empower poor communities and local groups by
giving them grants, thus enabling them undertake economic and social projects. With these
projects, the beneficiaries tackled poverty in their own distinct ways, according to the latitude
afforded by their geographical location, social position, religious affiliation and economic
situation.
During the period covered, PACAP was coordinated by and Australian managing contractor and
consultants. PACAP screened all the proposals submitted by communities and groups,
monitored the implementation, and extended trainings and related activities to upgrade the
capability of the latter. The committee tasked to do the screening was composed of
representatives from AusAID, the Government of the Philippines, NGOs, and the academe. RAS
was focused on working with the community-based organizations (those who applied for grants)
and this involved the following steps:
e) Site Selection:
In most communities where FOCAS and RAS projects were implemented, the beneficiaries were
characterized as poor. Most of the households in the project areas were living below the
poverty line. They depended on subsistence farming, fishing and gathering of forest products.
Those who lived in far areas (uplands or on the other side of rivers) had very limited access to
education, health services, water and sanitation. Some had their sources of livelihood
threatened by floods, pollution, logging and mining activities, land conversion, and industrial
activities. Beneficiaries who were engaged in micro-enterprises did not have enough capital,
market linkage, proper equipment, appropriate skills and access to information. Unemployment
was a common problem, with fewer businesses investing.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
Giving Voice and Allowing Participation. The selection of the projects that were funded under
the FOCAS and RAS were based on seven parameters:
a) Socio-Economic Benefits and Technical Soundness. This included the ability of the
projects to encourage the creation of new enterprises or increase productivity of the
existing enterprises. Projects were validated if these responded to the needs of the
Building horizontal and vertical relationships. PACAP was able to build horizontal and vertical
relationships, with the local government units (LGUs) from the barangay to the provincial levels.
LGUs were focused on poverty reduction and PACAP created opportunities for the LGUs to be
involved in projects that were largely coming from the beneficiaries themselves (that is, more
demand-driven poverty-reduction projects). Secondly, vertical relationships also improved
within communities where PACAP projects were implemented, such that residents or local
groups acknowledged how strategic it was for them to share resources and expertise.
The PACAP program demonstrated how poor communities took development into their own
hands. Community-based development was achieved through the strength of the network of
support organizations, program design and execution, and the increasing involvement of the
stakeholders in program activities.
Exploring entry points for peace, development and governance. PACAP embedded the
participatory processes in its program design, starting from the identification of specific projects
until the conduct of monitoring and evaluation activities. PACAP encouraged better stakeholder
engagement. The program’s FOCAS scheme necessitated the collaboration between the LGUs,
the CSOs (civil society organizations) and the beneficiaries themselves, resulting to projects that
were aligned with the LGU plans and strategies. All participating organizations and key people
were mobilized according to their mandates, capacities and contributions.
The case of Baba’s Foundation, located in Davao City, generally provided micro-lending services.
However, to ensure that the beneficiaries were able to manage the funds they borrowed, the
Foundation also provided the cooperatives with training and installed systems in their financial
affairs. The training was on the topics of cooperative organizing, micro-credit management,
and leadership development. With this approach, Baba grew in terms of financial resources and
client base: PhP 3 million in 2004 to PhP 30 million, and they now have a client portfolio of
8,000 customers in 8 branches in Davao City, Davao del Norte, and Compostela Valley.
Another is the provision of “whole package of services” as demonstrated in the support to The
Philippine Foundation for Resource Management (PRFM) based in Lanao del Sur. Prior to
PACAP, their services were limited to providing farm inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides
and working animals. The realization of extensive needs of farmer-beneficiaries led to the
creation of “chain of agriculture centers” in key farming areas of the province. This approach
hinged on “full-scale mechanized farming”, underscoring that the “old method” was no longer
feasible due to market and environmental forces. Following consultation with the farmers and
the local leaders, the importance of organization was highlighted and addressed through
formation of farmers association. Subsequently, the association was provided with capability
building support to enable them to manage the centers, where facilities such as hand tractors,
rice threshers, rice milling equipment and hauling truck could be used by the farmers for a fee.
The PFRM also helped the association set-up a grocery store.
Impact on Governance:
Communities developed skills needed to manage local organizations and enterprises, resulting
in an increase in their financial resources and expanding linkages with resource agencies. The
interaction has also led to awareness of social issues, environmental problems, political matters
and governance practices. The newly acquired skill set has been useful in problem analysis and
conflict resolution and confidence building.
For indigenous peoples, the acquisition of tenurial instruments (such as Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title or Certificate of Land Ownership Award) has resulted in sense of control with the
IPs having rights to the land and income.
The inclusion of the beneficiaries in project activities allowed them to speak their mind leading
to a sense of commitment within the community. PACAP contributed to significant
improvements in the organizational capacity of the partner CSOs through the 668 capacity-
building workshops. The CSOs gained knowledge and skills on proposal preparation,
networking, internal systems and process, stronger relationship with LGUs, reinvigorating NGO
sectors and building credibility with other donors. With these competencies, the CSOs were
able to deliver the services needed by their final beneficiaries and allowed them to maximize the
resources provided by PACAP.
The involvement of stakeholders has been a critical aspect of the project. For example in
Basilan, after a fire razed a rubber plantation and the community did not have any fire-truck to
be used, the PACAP partner NGO invited not only the BLGU, the Bureau of Fire Protection,
private sector and all those that were living near or had stake at the plantation. They agreed on
improving the fire-fighting equipment and the rescue efforts (such as first aid). With resources
from PACAP, the LGUs in Lamitan strengthened their relationship by agreeing on a cooperative
arrangement in case of forest fires and other fire-related incidences. The direct beneficiaries
were actively involved in the process of identification, conceptualization, designing, planning,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This reinforced their sense of belonging (working
side-by-side on responding to accidents and calamities).
The Jamiatu Muslim Mindanao, Inc. (JMMI) was prompted to invest in the future of the Muslim
in-school youths (ISYs) and out-of-school youths (OSYs) particularly in computer/IT training. The
JMMI did not work in a vacuum and involved the Parents-Teachers-Community Association
(PTCA), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Education (DepEd) and the City Government
of Marawi City. Relationships were improved as each organization contributed resources to the
project: the TESDA with their computer instructors and computer lab technicians, the DSWD
with profiling and assessment of the beneficiaries, the PTCA for the policy formulation, DepEd
for the monitoring of school curriculum and performance assessment, and the CLGU-Marawi for
other networking. Another intervention provided by JMMI was to help build tolerance between
Muslim and Christian Youth through dialogue and cultural education.
Economic Condition:
PACAP enabled the beneficiaries to experience improvement in their economic condition. These
changes included increase in family income, savings, and capital for livelihood activities
improving living standards.
To understand PACAP’s economic impacts, the program conducted a survey of its 99 out of its
189 agricultural projects, which resulted in an increase household’s monthly income (Increase to
PhP 5,837 from PhP 3,296 before the project). For enterprises that were implemented by
cooperatives, it was also revealed that the average increase in enterprise profit was 135%,
leading to an increase of dividends paid to the members valued at PhP 12,000 per member per
year.
The tri-people youth that TPYO assisted were trained to generate their own home-based
business, such as organic farming, communal fishing, beads making, and banana-chips making,
and baking.
In Lanao del Sur, the farmers had more time to pursue other productive activities, since
mechanization had freed them from spending more time and energy on the farms. They were
also spending more time with their families. Wives of the farmers were also given training on
embroidery and sewing, which brought in extra money for the home expenses.
PACAP contributed to the peace-building and conflict management efforts at the community
level. One PACAP barangay established policies against carrying firearms into their community,
which in turn established itself as a sanctuary for internally displaced persons. On the
household level, marital disputes emanating from lack of financial depravity were responded
with livelihood projects for women. On the possible conflict related to delinquency, the out-of-
school youths were provided with education and employment opportunities. Conflict that
would have risen from biases rooted in differences in ethnicity were also addressed by
introducing 15 literacy programs incorporating “culture of peace” in the curriculum. Finally,
conflicts over resource use were responded to by projects related to conservation of the
environment. PACAP saw the establishment of 122 community-based environmental protection
groups and enacted 138 new local environmental ordinances.
The project sites of Baba’s Foundation may not extend to the conflict-affected (or conflict-
riddled) areas, but a key informant said their beneficiaries experienced conflict that stemmed
from poverty. Crimes that resulted from lack of income or livelihood sources such as robberies
were gradually addressed. The conflict between spouses as they struggled to meet their
financial needs was also lessened now that household income was augmented.
RAS has contributed in building the capacity of CSOs in managing or operating projects. FOCAS,
on the other hand, has addressed the development needs of project areas because of the
relatively longer presence, more extensive involvement of the stakeholders and expansive
response to the prioritized needs of the areas. Under PACAP Phase 2 (between 2005 to mid of
2009), RAS approved 271 grants, which had an average of 12 to 18 months duration, and about
80% of the beneficiaries came from Mindanao. Typical RAS projects were on agriculture, income
and employment, and the environment. PACAP also provided training on financial management
Sustainability:
PACAP projects are found to be sustainable because of the involvement of the stakeholders
from the project identification to implementation, and monitoring and evaluation phase. The
participants have owned the project and have provided counterpart, in terms of time, effort and
financial resources. Additionally, the projects were a translation to the development agenda of
the community, embedded in the LGU plans and supported by resolution, ordinances and
executive orders. Finally, sustainability mechanisms coupled with the commitment of the
officers were established, installed and continuously revised while the projects were still
managed by the assisting/support organizations (other NGOs and training providers). These
mechanisms ranged from reflows of micro-credit, increase in members’ shares, increase in
capitalization/investment, and increase in business activities.
There were projects that earned income and contributions from the users, such as the computer
classes provided by the JMMI in Marawi. Parents of the elementary students paid PhP 50 per
month for the use of the computers, incorporated in the monthly tuition fees. The OSYs on the
other hand, paid Php 2,000 per course on installment basis or PhP 500 per competency modules
that were collected prior to taking their module tests. TESDA gave out 40 slots of scholarships
for OSYs who enrolled on Computer Hardware Servicing NC II (valued at PhP 6,000 per trainee).
These fees and income were plowed back to paying the maintenance and other services. It was
also fortunate that with the good performance of the ISYs and the OSYs (some graduates landed
work as Internet technical while others found jobs overseas), the enrolment rate of the
computer literacy project was growing.
PACAP appeared to refine the roles of the program stakeholders, shifted their mindsets and
sharpened their motivation on community development.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Philippine-Australia Local Sustainability
Cost: AusAID: $31.4 million; Local Government Units:$5.783 million
Duration: 1999 - 2010
Donor: AusAID
Region(s): Misamis Occidental province
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
PALS theory of change revolved around joint capacity building of community-based Peoples
Organizations and local governments combined with collaborative participatory planning and
small project support. These efforts were intended to lead to sustainable livelihoods among
beneficiaries and eventually to province-wide poverty reduction.
c) Project Objective:
PALS was implemented under the umbrella of poverty reduction. PALS program goal was to
strengthen participatory planning processes and local management of resources for the
promotion of sustainable community livelihoods. To achieve these goals, PALS created
opportunities and provided resources for the local communities, barangays, and the local
government units (LGUs) to improve their capacities on participatory planning and development.
The other objective was for the PALS to be managed and monitored in a cost effective and
efficient manner.
PALS had two main delivery mechanisms organized by the Project Management Office:
• The Program Development Facility which provided extensive capacity building support
to LGUs, coupled with funding for the LGUs to make small grants to barangays that
identified community livelihood initiatives through a participatory planning process
linked to Barangay Development Plans; and,
• The Barangay Special Trust Fund which made grants of PP 1 million per barangay to
support development sub-projects formulated by People’s Organizations (POs) that
were established in participating barangays.
Counterpart LGU funding was not a prerequisite although some LGUs did, in fact, make
monetary or in-kind contributions or operational support upon sub-project completion.
f) Site Selection:
Misamis Occidental placed 7th poorest in the Philippine Poverty Statistics of 2003, 10th poorest
in 2006 and eased out of the top 10 poorest list in 2009. The project covered all 14
municipalities (excluding the three major urbanized areas) and all 347 barangays in the province
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
PALS initially used the M&E system developed by NEDA, but this proved to be too complicated. A
more simplified system was introduced but it was unclear, based on available project
documentation, exactly what was tracked.
Capacity building was a key dimension where the program made an impact, particularly on
the planning processes at the barangay and municipal levels.
The qualitative approach on the impact of PALS to the communities revealed that indeed
the program:
o Improved living conditions of the beneficiaries;
o Enhanced knowledge and skills (individual and organisational, which improved
productivity and capacity of people’s organisations POs; and
a. Description of Conflict
Misamis Occidental has not been a high conflict area in terms of the armed struggle for
autonomy. Localized conflict has been sporadic but had not recently impacted on the areas
visited for this study.
At a local scale, the study found that the most common causes of conflict were arguments
between spouses, problems with children, relationship with neighbors, violence against women
and workplace conflict associated with political affiliation.
PALS was successful in empowering the grassroots communities, the LGUs in three levels
(barangay, municipal and provincials), and the partner NGOs in the 14 municipalities
covered under the program. The interviews and focus groups conducted under this study
validated that there were changes in their relationships, there was upward movement on
their economic status, and there was better utilization of the people’s newly developed
capacities.
The livelihood and capability building activities triggered participants’ desire to be more
responsible and responsive to their own needs. As their household income increased and
as they gained more understanding of their socio-economic-political environment, they
became “content or satisfied”, fueling aspiration for more stability in their community.
PALS’s design was an “open” program menu where it provided the framework in guiding
communities on how to respond to their compelling development gap. The real benefits to
the community were working out the ‘details’ of each project. If there were divergent
opinions that existed prior to the PALS, or if there were apathy toward each other before
To a large extent, PALS has indirectly contributed to managing: (1) household level conflict;
(2) community level conflict or conflict between households; (3) inter-community/inter-
barangay conflict; (4) political conflict or conflict between feuding political clans; and (5)
conflict between the national government and non-state actors.
PALS excluded three cities Oroquieta, Tangub, and Ozamis on the grounds that these were
assumed to be “more resource-rich”. The program overlooked that these cities also had
their “share of urban poverty and blight” and would have benefited from the program.
Other operation problems of PALS included the large number of training activities for the
Community Organising/Community Development, the distant training venues that made it
difficult for the trainers to move from one place to the next and the tight schedules.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Poder y Prosperidad de la Comunidad Project
Cost: Not stated
Duration: 2005-2012
Donor: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarollo (AECID)
Region(s): 400 Barangays in Caraga, Bicol, and Region IV-A (Aurora Province)
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
PODER’s theory of change is to empower communities and, over time, reduce poverty through
the provision of small-scale infrastructure. The continued use of participatory processes
throughout the sub-project cycle is intended to build social and eventually enhance local-level
governance.
c) Project Objective:
The project aims to improve the quality of life of the residents of the chosen region and reduce
the poverty level in the rural communities of Caraga, Bicol, and the province of Aurora by
achieving the following:
Empower local communities by giving them access to and control over key development
decisions and resources.
Enhance local governance by creating structures and training volunteers in practices that
encourage transparency, accountability, and participation, and
Reduce rural poverty by funding key infrastructures and service facilities in the barangays.
Policy-making bodies: The National Steering Committee (NSC) and the National Technical
Working Group (NTWG) are the policy-making bodies of PODER. The NSC is responsible for the
resolution of implementation-related issues, the imposition of sanctions to non-complying local
governments and the recognition and reward of well-performing ones. Comprising the NSC are
the Secretaries of DSWD as convenor, NAPC as co-convenor, DILG, DOF, DBM, and NEDA as
members. Civil society is also represented with three members.
Management bodies: The management bodies are the National Project Management Team
(NPMT) and the Regional Project Management Team (RPMT). Over-all project management is
lodged at the NPMT. The NPMT directs and guides PODER’s implementation. Project operations
staff and consultants are also included in the team. The Regional Project Management Team
oversees the implementation of PODER in the region. DSWD’s Regional Director acts as
chairperson of the team.
Implementing bodies: DSWD is the implementing agency of PODER. It implements the project
through the National Project Management Office (NPMO), the Regional Project Management
Office (RPMO) and the Area Coordinating Teams (ACTs). The NPMO looks after the day to day
project operations at the national office. A National Project Manager heads the NPMO. The
NPMO provides technical assistance to field office through its consultants, technical staff and
DSWD personnel. At the regional level, project implementation is managed by the RPMO. It
implements national policies, regional directions and strategies. The office also supervises the
work of the ACTs and provides technical assistance. It is also the RPMO that manage relations
with local governments and other stakeholders. The ACTs are the field implementers of PODER.
Coordinating bodies: PODER organizes coordinating bodies both at the provincial and municipal
levels. At the former it is the Provincial Inter-Agency Committee (PIAC) and at the latter it is the
Municipal Inter-Agency Committee (MIAC). Both bodies are tasked to do the following:
e) Site Selection:
The regions of Caraga, Bicol, and the province of Aurora have been chosen for this project. The
reason for their selection was the low per capita income of the region, high rate of poverty, and
presence of the NPA (New people’s Army) insurgency.
PODER is designed to be a vehicle for learning and continuous improvement thus it involves the
communities in monitoring and evaluation. It also enlists the services of independent monitors
like NGOs and the media. The M&E component of PODER involves:
PODER is not a peace building or conflict management project, that said, its design has some of
the elements of a peace building project. It attempts to effect changes in the physical life of the
communities by funding projects like roads, bridges, and water systems. It also attempts to
effect political changes, particularly at the local level by opening avenues for citizens
participation in barangay governance and making local governments respond to community
needs.
PODER does not have a peace building objective. The project aims at empowering
communities, enhancing local governance, and reducing poverty.
The Mayor of Malinao explained that the project has contributed to peace building by
making various remote barangays in his municipality more accessible making it difficult for
rebels to recruit people there.
a. Description of Conflict
Bicol and Caraga are affected by the New People’s Army (NPA) insurgency, thus they had also
been selected as pilot areas for the government’s PAMANA project, which aims to bring back
government to remote communities by ensuring that basic services are delivered and local
governments are transparent and accountable. Also piloted for the PAMANA project are
Quezon, Mindoro, Cordillera, Negros, Samar, Compostela Valley, ZamBaSulTa, Central
Mindanao, and ARMM, all conflict-affected areas.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in
Mindanao (SERD-CAAM) -- Quick Impact Projects (QIP)
Cost: Total J-BIRD of assistance is ¥11.29B (Php5.98B). The SERD-CAAM component is ¥684M
(Php357.23M).
Duration: 2007-2009
Donor: Government of Japan -- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Region(s): 11 barangays in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM) specifically in the
provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, Davao
Oriental, Compostela Valley, and Zamboanga del Sur.
2. Narrative
a) Overview:
Within the larger J-Bird program, JICA supported a 3-year development study called the Socio-
Economic Reconstruction and Development in Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM).
Quick Impact Projects (QIP) is a component of SERD-CAAM to provide community infrastructure
to 11 sites as part of a process to assess project implementation mechanisms. The SERD-CAAM’s
QIP is implemented in partnership with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and Office of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) along with the implementation support
from the JICA Study Team. The project relies on a fairly rigid process of site selection based on
specific criteria established by the project steering committee. Procurement of goods and
services for selected projects is undertaken by the JICA Study Team and implementation is carried
out by external contractors and service providers. Community participation is carried out during
the identification of priority projects and social preparation stage.
SERD-CAAM Quick Impact Projects’ theory of change is focused on restoring confidence, and
appears to be limited to “enable people and the communities in target areas to enjoy the
dividends of peace” through the provision of visible infrastructure support in affected
communities.
c) Project Objective:
JICA’s overall priorities in the Philippines fall in three categories: (i) Sustainable Economic Growth
Aimed at Creating Employment Opportunities (ii) Poverty Reduction and (iii) Peace and Stability in
Mindanao.
In December 2006, JICA launched the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and
Development (J-BIRD) to contribute to the peace process and development in the Conflict-
QIP (or Quick Impact Projects) is a sub-component designed to provide community infrastructure
to 11 sites as part of a process to test project implementation mechanisms. The QIPs were
intended to serve as a pilot phase to help JICA determine strategies and lessons learned in
providing development assistance to Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM). QIPs were
implemented to enhance the institutional capacity of partners in implementing development
projects by offering the experience of being involve in every phase of a project cycle, from project
selection to feasibility study to construction work.
d) Site selection:
The QIP component of SERD-CAAM relied on a fairly rigid process of site selection (based on
specific criteria) and project selection (based on proposals from the selected sites). The range of
possible sites was covered in a social survey (e.g. In-Depth Barangay Need Assessment and
Barangay Profiling) conducted as part of SERD-CAAM. Results of the social survey were analyzed
to determine urgent development needs at the community level and which areas requiring
assistance and programs of critical development needs.
Due to the budget constraints of the QIP component, only 11 QIPs could be constructed (from
nearly 4,000 eligible barangays). Selection guidelines were developed and endorsed by a
technical working group in 2008. After that the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and JICA
project undertook a process of developing a shortlist, field validation, evaluation, ranking of
projects, and ultimately approval by the Project Steering Committee (co-chaired by OPAPP and
BDA).
The 11 QIP’s were widely distributed in CAAM specifically in the provinces of Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani, Davao Oriental, Compostela Valley,
and Zamboanga del Sur. Specific projects include: community multi-purpose building, potable
water system, post-harvest facility, health centers, and school buildings.
A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was organized and co-chaired by OPAPP and BDA. Its function
is to act as decision-making body (at a policy level), provide inputs on overall project direction and
strategy, ensure that the conduct of the Study is within the context of supporting the GPH-MILF
peace process, and endorse JICA Study Team reports.
A Technical Working Group (TWG) was organized in order to provide the technical support to the
PSC and JICA Study Team, provide inputs in the formulation of the Socio-Economic Development
Plan (SEDP), provide inputs in drawing up reports, work in tandem with the JICA Study Team,
In connection with the selection process there is a five step social preparation process. Social
preparation is a series of activities implemented prior to the construction of the physical
infrastructure. The activities are tailored to the organizational and technical capabilities of the
community so that they are able to ultimately operate, maintain, and sustain the infrastructure.
The process is facilitated by a local NGO called the implementation service provider (ISP) that is
selected by JICA study team with the endorsement of BDA.
After the sites and particular projects are identified and approved by the PSC, the procurement of
goods and services for the community projects is undertaken by the project team (composed of
JICA and BDA) and implementation is carried out by local private contractors through a bidding
process.
There was no mandatory financial counterpart from local government in order to implement the
projects. There are examples of non monetary counterpart such as the time allotted by the local
government engineer in quality monitoring and also the time of the community. It is not clear
whether counterpart would be required from the local government beyond the pilot stage or
whether plans were being made to integrate the projects into to the municipal development plan
which the LGU can allocate budget for counterpart to future projects.
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements
The JICA study team and BDA utilized standard post-completion monitoring form to capture
critical information from the beneficiaries, assess the project based on its financial and technical
sustainability, social impacts, costs and benefits, and inquiries on the challenges and
improvement the project had posed. While the primary focus was monitoring the implementation
and construction of the QIPs, there appeared to be no systematic capture of outcome data and
there was no evidence of evaluation of the project’s impact on conflict. It is not clear whether
this would have been added if the QIPs moved beyond pilot stage.
Economic. One objective of QIP was to provide employment during the construction phase. It
was provided in the contract agreement that contractors must hire workers from the community
where the project is located. In the implementation of nine QIPs, a total of 6,093 man-days
employment was generated with different wage rate per location.
Among the project sites visited, notable economic outcomes have bearing on the type of QIP
implemented in the community. In most cases, those QIP’s who have the notion of generating
income e.g. postharvest facility, and drinking water systems have the potential for greater
economic benefits.
At the community level, participation of Barangay LGU as an institution was minimal, however,
Barangay officials i.e. chairperson, councilor, treasurer, secretary to name a few participated in
the capacity building related activities but in a capacity as a community resident or as private
citizen holding positions mostly as members of the board and member of PO. Results of
community focus group discussion confirm responses that due to the limited participation of LGU
especially at the municipal and provincial level, vertical cohesion was very minimal, to some
extent none at all in some LGUs.
Social Cohesion. Outcomes on horizontal social cohesion were more attributed to the Values
Transformation Training (VTT) component of the social preparation. BDA senior management
was able to convince JICA to incorporate social preparation as a component in the
implementation strategies wherein VTT is among the major activities.
The series of capacity buildings in the social preparation component further improved horizontal
cohesion in the community. During trainings and meetings, Muslim, Christians, and Lumad
participate, interact, and learned. Due to limited participation of LGU especially at the municipal
and provincial level, vertical social cohesion was very minimal, to some extent none at all in some
LGUs.
Capacity development of the Peoples Organizations was concentrated during the social
preparation stage which was a series of activities ensuring capacity of PO is built upon to manage
and operationalize the project. However, participation of PO in the construction and monitoring
of the progress of construction was at the minimal or none at all in some project sites. In
addition, participation of PO was limited to the identification, prioritization, and maintenance of
the project; there was a gap in the project cycle which is during construction phase. Some or most
of the PO’s are dormant or inactive after the project turn-over and will be reactivated only once
BDA or JICA calls for a meeting or there is monitoring visit.
In all of the project sites visited, a majority of the POs indicated that participation of LGU is
primarily during project orientation and project turn-over.
The LGU is mandated to provide and deliver basic services to its constituents, thus is equipped
with technical skills and resource for that purpose. The utilization of technical skills of the LGU
engineer can be among the venue where LGU can assist the PO in the monitoring of the project
during construction phase. Time allotted by the LGU engineer in quality monitoring is an example
of counterpart; it doesn’t always mean that counterpart is always in monetary form which LGU’s
cannot provide easily.
In cases where LGU’s are capable of providing counterpart for the project, this can be formalized
through Memorandum of Agreement wherein a terms of reference will be created describing
tasks of each party – LGU, BDA, JICA, OPAPP, and PO and to include the contractor. The
Memorandum of Agreement will be a binding document that will ensure all parties adhere to the
terms and conditions from start of construction to turn-over. It could also contain a provision for
a continued technical assistance to the PO after project turn-over for follow through assistance on
maintenance of project and sustainability of PO.
Monitoring was largely concentrated on the construction phase of projects. The “Remote
Management and Supervision Strategy” was effective in remote management and supervision for
the works and the measures undertaken by project personnel to control the quality of the works,
especially in the areas where expatriate engineers and sometimes local QIP engineers may not be
able to visit the project site due to security reasons.
As originally planned, QIP is a pilot project implemented while Socio-Economic Development Plan
is formulated. There was no systematic monitoring and evaluation system that captures progress
and development of QIP that would relate to the larger objectives of SERD-CAAM. Community-
level monitoring, particularly after project completion is only conducted whenever a JICA mission
is scheduled. The presence of M&E tools that would not only measure physical outputs, but
would measure the results from the processes by which the project is implemented in the
community (capturing lessons learned, areas of improvement, social cohesion, and immediate
outcomes) will be an excellent approach in measuring outcomes of the project.
1. DESCRIPTION:
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The European Commission funded (Euro 18.4million) Support to Agrarian Reform in Central
Mindanao (STARCM) project supports integrated rural development through a close alignment
with the National Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the government's agrarian reform
program. Operating within the structure of Agrarian Reform Communities (targeting Agrarian
Reform Beneficiary households), the project supports infrastructure, agricultural production,
and enterprise development; institutional strengthening (people's organisations and local
governments); and rural finance (primarily rural credit). The project works with local
government structures and community groups to identify and implement subprojects in
infrastructure, enterprise development, and rural finance.
c) Project Objective:
The program seeks to support ARCs and improve the livelihoods of farming households by
achieving four objectives:
Build support infrastructure (SI) that better supports farmer productivity and social
welfare in the ARCs;
Increase agricultural productivity and income of farming households through targeted
Agricultural Production & Enterprise Development (APED) subprojects;
Improve the capacity of People’s Organizations (PO) and Local Government Unit (LGU) to
plan, implement and manage development project; and
Establish a system of rural micro-financing to increase farmers’ access to credit.
The two main types of projects delivered in the program were support-infrastructure for
communities (SI) and subprojects designed for specific farming enterprises (APED). In SI projects,
Participatory Action Planning (PAP) meetings are convened in each ARC to produce a
development plan with a list of sub-project proposals. These proposals are reviewed and
validated by Municipal/City Implementing Teams (M/CITs) which are formed at the LGU level to
supervise and coordinate DAR-STARCM activities. LGU engineers and representatives from
relevant government offices, such as the DPWH, prepare technical and feasibility studies for the
given project(s).Once the subproject is approved, the PO or LGU is responsible for subproject
management, including procurement, hiring of labor, rental of equipment, and/or tendering of
contracted work. During implementation, the PO or LGU continues to benefit from the
supervision of LGU engineers and/or NIA DPWH officials, who are responsible for submitting
monthly accomplishment reports and logbooks to the DAR-STARCM. Once the subproject is
completed and passes inspection tests, the M/CIT supervises the PO or LGU in the operation and
management of the facility as per the institutional strengthening objective of the program.
The project delivery mechanisms for APED subprojects follow a similar trajectory. After the ARC
engages in Agricultural Development Planning, the Barangay Development Council (BDC) or the
Barangay Council (BC), with the M/CIT, prioritizes sub-projects based on established criteria. The
M/CIT takes the lead in validating the sub-project requests and is required to secure formal
commitment and the allocation of resources (mainly technical) from the LGU and/or PO.
Monthly accomplishment reports are submitted for each sub-project and upon completion;
opportunities for further support in maintenance or operation are identified.
Counterpart equity depended on the type of project and income class of the LGU. For SI,
proponent LGU and/or PO proponents must share at least 30% of the total cost for irrigation
projects; 50 % for bridges; and 20% for the other types of infrastructure. In the case of feeder
road improvements in 4th, 5th or 6th class municipalities, the minimum counterpart set was 10%.
For APED sub-projects, proponent organizations must provide a minimum counterpart of 15%.
f) Site Selection:
DAR-STARCM targeted all households actively farming in fifty ARCs in the Provinces of Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat (i.e. Region X, XII, and the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao).
For APED subprojects, projects are prioritized based on the scale of the problem being
addressed, the number of participants, the economic status of the participants, and if cost
recovery and replication features exist. Beneficiaries of the project must be permanent
residents of an ARC, with farming as the main income source. In selecting prospective sites,
preference is given to a limited number of projects per ARC with large number of participants
rather than several very small diverse projects. Moreover, beneficiaries who did not benefit
from similar preceding subprojects are given consideration. At least 20% of farming households
in each ARC should be first-in-line or second-in-line participants in APED sub-projects.
The project’s monitoring and evaluation system, guided by its log frame, ensured participation of
the LGU, POs and CDFs. Progress was tracked through activity monitoring, which actively involved
the BMGs and BMTs. Results-based monitoring was also pursued, which was important to
determining outcomes of the sub-projects. Impact assessments and benefits monitoring were
done with inputs from the beneficiaries through focus group discussions. The project looked at
effectiveness efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the sub-projects.
Since the Log frame was confined to the components of the project, conflict sensitivity was not a
strong feature of the project’s planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle, despite working in
conflict environments.
The project reported having contributed to poverty reduction in the ARCs, citing the increase in the
number of rural households living above the poverty threshold in the DAR-STARCM areas from
11,700 in 2002 to 15,600 in 2007.
A total of 249 SI sub-projects were supported by DAR-STARCM, which included the rehabilitation of
139 km of barangay feeder roads, communal irrigation schemes covering 2,306 hectares, and the
construction of 337 meters of bridges and crossings. Construction of social infrastructure included
thirty-four barangay health stations, 11 day care centers, two marketing centers, and 13 two-
roomed school buildings. These infrastructure sub-projects provided access to drinking water and
health-care facilities, eased the movement of people and goods, improved agrarian production
yields, and reduced hauling costs and travel time.
APED subprojects benefited 15,295 households. Around 15,674 farming households benefited from
increased incomes due to increased productivity and higher yields, reduced production costs, value
addition or higher prices. This was achieved through planting of new crops or providing livestock,
and the construction of agrarian infrastructure such as cultivation machinery, rice threshers or corn
shelters.
Simultaneously, the project developed the organizational capacities of LGUs and 437 Interest Group
cooperatives, Barangay Water and Sanitation Associations, and Irrigators’ Associations with the
help of thirteen NGOs tapped to handle IS interventions. Local government functions were
improved with their involvement in the project, and local governance became more responsive to
needs identified by the communities through participatory processes.
a. Description of Conflict
Some of the sites reflect tensions arising from government resettlement policy between the
1920s and 1950s, when settlers from Luzon and Visayas were able to obtain ownership of
Various forms of conflict continue to challenge peace and stability in the DAR-STARCM areas.
Violent conflicts have been reported between government forces and the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), between soldiers and the MILF rebels, between government troops
and the New People’s Army (NPA), and between feuding clans (rido). During the period of the
Project implementation, armed hostilities between government and the MILF kept recurring, in
some cases requiring evacuation of residents from the ARCs with DAR- STARCM presence. The
ceasefire agreement that came with the resumption of the peace talks between government
and the MILF in July 2003 led to reduction of the violent incidents. Two elections also took place,
in 2004 and in 2007, intensifying security threats in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao.
The pivotal role of the local governments was key to developing vertical relationships,
tangible opportunities for resource complementation and integrating initiatives into local
development plans.
The performance of the M/CITs varied across LGUs. In some areas, these were not fully
functional, and decisions were solely made by the local chief executive. With the existence
of DAR’s MCIT, the project could have strengthened this existing structure. While the MCIT
had a broader mandate and the M/CIT was limited to the DAR-STARCM operations, working
with the MCIT could have avoided problems of scheduling, overlapping tasks in the ARCs
covered by the project, among others.
While several LGUs saw the opportunity of implementing projects by providing just a
portion of the total cost, not all LGUs were able to provide their counterpart, causing delays
in the approval of some sub-projects, suspending implementation or jeopardizing the
sustainability of some.
While efforts were taken to support the participation of the LGU staff and complement
technical skills lacking with the local government, it was noted that DAR-STARCM had
limited interventions in the institutional strengthening of LGUs to address changes in
political leadership, resource generation.
All the DAR senior officers interviewed agreed that having a separate PMO for DAR-STARCM
was a good option, since it can move with the pace in its approved workplan and not be
encumbranced by the bureaucratic maze of the Department.
Community organizations as implementers not only provided a forum for dialogue among
the citizens around shared objectives but also developed relationships of trust with LGUs
and enhanced technical capacities to certain degrees, though not sufficient enough for them
to produce the requirements (e.g.,proposals) on their own.
Some sub-projects, such as feeder roads and irrigation schemes, required highly technical
expertise which was difficult to develop in the area over a short period of time, requiring
more time and attention from the STARCM engineers to assist in designing and developing
the program of works, causing a slow down in the number of approved sub-projects in the
initial phase. Some trainings were given to the LGU engineers and templates were
computerized, to try to speed up the process.
The sub-project and approval process was viewed as tedious, given the forms, procedures,
and decision authorities stipulated in the DAR-STARCM manuals. The process reflected a
keen desire for technical and financial soundness, thus the need for the hands-on facilitation
of the CDF or LGU staff, who was themselves not as proficient in the beginning. Therefore,
the capacity to prepare proposals for subsequent projects on their own was not thoroughly
developed in the community.
What partially accounts for the unsuccessful enterprises is the absence of a clear market
orientation of the approved sub-projects. While the APED guidelines stated a preference for
proposals with Return on Investment features, emphasis was not given on business
planning, technical, or market feasibility studies. Insufficient market research involving
detailed product assessment, market, and value chain studies contributed to the livelihood
sub-projects with unfavorable outcomes, further increasing the sense of economic
vulnerability among the PO members. Weak market orientation jeopardized the
sustainability of the livelihood sub-projects.
Implementation was largely dependent on the ability to fund the costs and on the capacity
of the POs to withstand the complex challenges of business operations while at the same
time keeping the participatory practice. The LGUs do not have adequate resources to
shoulder maintenance costs of costly infrastructure sub-projects and not all POs are stable
enough to manage the sub-projects on their own.
1. DESCRIPTION:
Name of project: World Food Programme’s Food for Asset (FFA) Project
Cost : 6.4 Million Euro
Duration: 2010 - present
Donor: Food Facility Programme of the European Commission and implemented by the World
Food Programme of the United Nations.
Region(s): five provinces in Central Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato).
2. Description Narrative
a) Overview:
The European Union-funded Food for Asset Project of the World Food Programme provided
community based support, in the form of 10,000 metric tons of food to 194,000 households in
five conflict affected provinces of Central Mindanao where food insecurity has been a critical
issue. The one year project was implemented by the World Food Programme through local
governments in collaboration with local NGOs. The NGOs work with communities to identify
community assets (largely relating to agricultural improvement) that could be built utilizing
simple tools and local labor. Project beneficiaries received food transfers in exchange for labor
on these community projects (Food for Assets: FFA) and also for participation in training (Food
for Training: FFT).
The program assumes that providing food in exchange for work (or training) makes it possible
for the poor and hungry to devote time and energy to taking the first steps out of the hunger
trap and increase the food security of their households and communities.
c) Project Objective:
The primary objective is the immediate reduction of food insecurity amongst vulnerable
households, using a design (in collaboration with NGOs and local governments) that is intended
to strengthen local institutional capacity. Food securitization is also identified as an entry point
for peace building, development, and governance.
Specifically, the project was envisioned to: ensure the immediate food need of the targeted
beneficiaries; promote agricultural production and environmental care; Restore and maintain
livelihood and create additional community assets; contribute to the peaceful coexistence
amongst the community; assist the government at the national level on better targeting through
vulnerability analysis mapping and; establish early warning systems and train key stakeholders in
food security data collection and analysis.
The activities were implemented in five provinces in Central Mindanao (Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and North Cotabato). Geographical targeting was based
on selecting municipalities ranked as the poorest as per poverty incidence. The data on poverty
was also compared to results from other assessments by other UN agencies, NGOs, and local
government units. Consultations at the provincial and municipal level were conducted to
prioritize the most food-insecure barangays in the selected municipalities. While the
vulnerability selection criteria helped to identify priority areas, implementation also depended
on availability of complementary materials for the identified projects and the capacity to
implement these.
The over-all execution of the FFA project is handled by the World Food Programme through its
project office in Cotabato City. For the duration of the project, several implementation partners
were tapped to facilitate program management.
A National FFA Program Steering Committee focuses on policy and program coordination
activities. This committee was composed of the following agencies; namely the Department of
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), World Food Programme (WFP),
Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
and the Delegation of the European Union (EU-Del)
The Regional FFA Program Management Committee facilitated project approval, project
counseling and signal releases. This committee was composed of the DSWD in coordination with
regional counterparts such as the DA, DENR, and the ARMM Regional Government.
The Regional FFA Program Technical Committee was responsible for reviewing proposals for any
technical issues and then endorses them as appropriate. The Municipality FFA Program Task
Force was composed of those who directly implement the project.
The project encouraged the implementation of projects already identified by various local
government development plans and those identified by the line ministries such DA and DENR.
Identification and development of potential projects were done through the various local
governments in collaboration with the DSWD, DA, and DENR. Projects generated at community
level were validated against the set criteria and endorsed and approved by the respective
committee at provincial and Regional level.
Partner agencies like DSWD, LGUs even the POs/communities provided counterpart resources
but not necessarily in monetary terms (e.g., in the form of labor, equipment, assistance in terms
of design and preparation of technical plans, training, etc.).
3. Project Outcomes/Achievements:
WFP monitored the distribution of assistance and outputs through quantitative and qualitative
indicators. Quantitative indicators from the progress reports were submitted by implementing
and cooperating partners on a monthly and quarterly basis. These progress reports were
compared against WFP’s own monitoring data, collected on a regular basis by the WFP Food
Monitors.
WFP also signed a Field Level Agreement with one of their cooperating partners (Community
Family Services International) for the purposes of assessing projects, managing food
distributions, monitoring and reporting. WFP has put effort into capacitating stakeholders
through organizing training sessions in technical and management of projects including effective
monitoring.
While the primary focus was monitoring the implementation on food security as well as the food
for assets and food for training activities, there appeared to be no systematic capture of
outcome data and there was no evidence of evaluation of the project’s impact on conflict. It is
not clear whether this would have been added in subsequent phases.
a) Economic
Reducing Soil Erosion. The promotion of contour farming and water and soil
conservation technology into the communities of Barangay Chua, Pikit, and Libungan
has increased community awareness on environmental conservation and ecological
nurturance. Among the farmers there is now a growing consciousness on balancing
agricultural productivity with environmental conservation and sustainability. Bio
intensive gardens were established in 377 barangays on 168 hectares of land.
Development and Rehabilitation of Abandoned Rice and Corn Field. The activities under
this project restored production in 191 hectares of rice fields that had been previously
abandoned for several reasons such as lack of agricultural inputs and low yields.
Construction of dug out fish ponds and floating fish cages. Along the coastal areas,
fishing remains an important source of livelihood. In these areas, projects identified and
prioritized by beneficiary communities focused on improvement of the coastal eco-
system through mangrove plantation and construction of fish ponds and cages.
b) Governance
The FFA’s support for soil and water conservation activities has gained wide support and
recognition. During the FGP in Pikit, the mission was informed that said environmental
interventions were being endorsed for integration and mainstreaming into the Barangay
Development Plan, Municipal Development Plan, and Pikit, Pigcawayan, Aleosan,
Libungan Midsayap, Alamada (P-PALMA) Alliance plan and programs.
The government has adopted the food for assets program as an important tool to
alleviate poverty. As a result, the government pledged an in-kind contribution of 18,800
metric ton of rice to WFP for purposes of implementing FFA activities in Mindanao.
While the utilization of this contribution still depended on the availability of twining
funds from other donors, this provided a real opportunity to ultimately scale up FFA
activities at a national level.
c) Social Cohesion
Coordinated through the EU delegation office in Manila, effort had been made to bring
together UN agencies and NGOs to share experiences of projects with similar objectives.
In these regards, WFP has established a network and synergy with Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) in areas of Farmers Field school projects, post harvest technology
and Bio Intensive Vegetable Gardening; and with IFAD in the areas of irrigation
agronomy focusing on rehabilitation and management of small scale framers‘
cooperative irrigation systems. The FFA-supported FFW and FFT have caught the
attention of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for the Peace Process (OPAPP).
There were suggestions for WFP to implement FFW/FFT as start-up community activities
to launch their pilot programmes.
• The use of Letter of Intent (LOI) develops community stake and ownership over the
project idea and assets from the very beginning.
The LOI system was introduced in Lanao del Sur and Norte to encourage a barangay or
PO to forward to Community and Family Services International (CFSI) and WFP an idea
of a project for possible assistance. The one-page sheet signed and forwarded by the
PO head or barangay chairman shows the type of project, location and other offices
ready to commit to support the project. The letter is also an invitation to WFP and CFSI
to attend the community discussion on the project idea. This document has been one of
the attachments to the proposals forwarded to the PRC. The LOI is a practical thought
but because it is an easy thing to accomplish, it shouldn’t be a reason to cut the process
of community consultation. It should logically come before a proposal is even drafted
by an external proponent.
• FFA has encouraged strong participation of both men and women in all projects and
activities. More men participated in building fixed assets, while more women
participated in the activities that have opportunities to socialize, tag their children
along and that required nurturing touch.
FFW and FFT projects were partaken by both men and women, in most cases with a
balanced gender representation. It is noticeable though that there were more women
participants in communal gardens, vermi-composting, nursery establishment and home-
based livelihood activities. Most men are enlisted in construction projects and fish cage
management.
4. Model building: POs helping other POs because of common needs and interests.
This is apparent in some areas, like the Montai Farmers’ Association (MUFA) in
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte which is now providing technical assistance to its
neighboring barangays and POs in line with mangrove nursery establishment and coastal
resource rehabilitation.
Table
A-‐2:
Design
Considerations
for
CBD
Projects
in
Conflict-‐Affected
Areas
CBD
Procedure
Conflict
Related
Issues
Possible
Design
Modification
District
and
Conflict
can
be
exacerbated
by
Targeting
and
site
selection
should
be
village
targeting
or
beneficiary
selection
that
flexible
enough
to
adapt
to
local
targeting/Site
is
improper,
biased
or
uninformed.
conflict
conditions.
Template-‐driven,
selection
Areas
of
risk
include:
rigid
targeting
protocols
should
be
avoided.
• inadequate/inaccurate
data
(especially
when
selection
is
Blanket
and
equal
coverage
(i.e.,
all
based
on
poverty
statistics)
districts,
all
villages
within
a
district,
• selection
bias
(when
partisan
all
people
within
a
target
village)
can
parties
are
involved
in
selection
help
prevent
concerns
about
unfair
of
districts/villages)
distribution
of
resources
in
conflict
• improper
situating
of
sub-‐project
situations,
but
is
often
not
possible
infrastructure
(which
benefits
due
to
resource
limitations.
local
elite).
• selection
of
beneficiaries
at
the
When
blanket
coverage
is
not
village
level
(eg.
who
will
benefit
possible,
selection
criteria
need
to
be
from
livelihood
activities)
clear,
unbiased,
transparent
and
proactively
disseminated
in
all
coverage
areas.
In
longer
term
projects,
rotational
coverage
(ie.
where
other
districts,
villages,
neighbourhoods
are
assured
of
coverage
in
subsequent
years)
may
be
feasible.
High
degree
of
donor
oversight
and
political
sensitivity
required
to
ensure
those
responsible
for
targeting/site
selection
remain
unbiased.
M&E
systems
should
build
in
mechanism
to
ensure
oversight
of
village
and
beneficiary
selection.
Selection
of
Most
CBD
programs
rely
on
relatively
Selection
of
CFs
should
balance
local
Community
intensive
levels
of
community-‐level
knowledge
and
familiarity,
with
Choice
of
Projects
face
the
choice
of
either
A
decision
to
use
an
external
Implementing
establishing
a
specific
project
implementing
partner
must
be
Partners
secretariat
(often
called
a
Project
carefully
considered,
taking
into
Management
Office)
to
oversee
account
the
pros
and
cons
in
the
implementation
arrangements
or
context
of
ongoing
conflict:
ceding
this
role
to
an
external
state
or
• NGOs
must
be
technically
non-‐state
implementing
partner
competent
but
also
politically
(such
as
NGOs,
national
government
astute
and
ideally
politically
agencies
or
non-‐state
entities).
neutral
(though
this
is
rare).
• National
government
agencies
• Where
implementing
partners
will
likely
be
perceived
as
are
responsible
for
selecting
CBD
promoting
a
pro-‐government
sites
(or
otherwise
influencing
perspective.
When
this
is
project
implementation),
this
perceived
as
part
of
a
wider
decision
is
fraught
with
the
stabilization
effort,
it
may
actually
potential
to
raise
tensions.
exacerbate
conflict.
• In
conflict-‐affected
areas,
• Any
implementing
partner
that
is
implementing
partners
are
often
unfamiliar
with
local
conditions
in
the
best
position
to
monitor
can
be
more
easily
manipulated,
local
conditions,
and
adapt
and
will
have
more
challenges
programs
and
guidance
to
adapting
programs
to
local
facilitators
to
respond
to
dynamics,
increasing
the
risk
of
changing
circumstances.
negative
impact.
It
is
very
difficult
to
avoid
some
bias
Understand
the
political
associations
(or
perception
of
bias)
in
site
of
the
implementing
partner,
and
find
selection,
which
leads
to
local
ways
to
counter-‐balance
their
biases
resentment
or
heightened
tensions.
through
working
through
other
Development
partners
must
be
partners.
Government
and
non-‐
prepared
to
manage
the
government
organizations
will
almost
consequences
of
their
decision
on
always
have
affiliations
or
interests
implementing
partners.
that
will
affect
their
perceived
neutrality
by
some
segments
of
the
External,
professional
PMO’s
must
population.
Rather
than
seeking
a
choose
local
partners
and
lines
of
“neutral”
partner,
it
is
best
to
engagement,
which
will
usually
Competitive
Many
CBD
projects
are
based
on
the
In
conflict
areas,
where
tensions
may
Selection
of
Sub-‐ community
selection
of
activities
be
already
high,
it
is
generally
Projects
(sub-‐projects)
that
will
be
desirable
to
eliminate
the
competitive
implemented
by
the
community
itself.
aspects
of
sub-‐project
selection.
Where
full
coverage
of
a
target
area
is
If
competition
is
required,
it
is
not
possible,
CBD
planners
often
important
to
make
sure
that
the
introduce
an
element
of
competition
selection
includes
a
balanced
mix
of
among
sub-‐project
proposals
within
a
groups/communities
from
all
sides
of
district
(ie.
villages
competing
against
the
conflict.
one
another)
or
even
within
the
community.
Open
vs.
Closed
“Open
menu”
projects
give
broad
To
reduce
potential
tensions
in
Sub-‐Project
scope
to
communities
to
select
conflict-‐affected
areas
it
may
be
Menus
virtually
any
type
of
sub-‐project.
A
preferable
to
invoke
a
closed
menu
“closed
menu”
imposes
restrictions
that
limits
sub-‐project
selection
to
on
the
kind
of
activity
that
a
activities
that
produce
public
assets
community
can
choose
for
its
sub-‐ (usually
small
scale
infrastructure)
project.
Some
projects
are
limited
to
that
benefits
as
wide
a
cross
section
certain
sectors
(such
as
agriculture).
of
the
community
as
possible.
Others
do
not
permit
livelihood
activities
(such
as
micro-‐credit
or
income
generating
initiatives)
usually
on
the
grounds
that
they
generate
private
assets
which
benefit
only
some
residents
rather
than
the
entire
community.
Village-‐level
Most
CBD
projects
establish
a
village-‐ It
is
critical
to
understand
local
Implementing
level
entity
(e.g.,
People’s
power
arrangements
from
the
Arrangements
Organisations)
to
oversee
sub-‐project
beginning,
and
adapt
project
implementation
on
the
ground.
implementation
based
on
local
Formation
of
conditions.
There
may
be
some
People’s
• In
conflict
affected
areas,
where
circumstances
where
setting
up
a
Organization
exclusion
and
injustice
may
be
new
village-‐level
entity
may
actually
key
issues,
there
is
a
need
to
be
destabilize
the
community,
leading
to
Procurement
and
CBD
projects
that
aim
for
full
Consideration
should
be
given
to
Financial
community
empowerment
typically
taking
procurement
out
of
the
hands
Management
give
full
control
over
financial
of
the
community
in
conflict
areas
(in
arrangement
and
procurement
to
the
favor
of
using
an
external
agency
to
communities
themselves.
control
procurement
arrangements).
The points on the map represent the complete coverage of the projects in this review. The field sites
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