Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week
Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week
Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week
He knows he needs to look toward extricating his country from its five-year commitment in
the conflict, but is also determined to do so without admitting defeat and continuing to assert
Saudi Arabia’s control over Yemen to protect its regional and national interests. In light of his
limited choices and with such high stakes, what should he do next to ensure a favourable yet
realistic strategy for Saudi’s future in Yemen? There seems to be no easy answer for Prince
Salman, given the complex intricacies and historical roots of the Yemen Crisis his country is
now embroiled in.
This case was prepared by Ian Khoo Chun Liang, Tom Joju and Oshima Erika.
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
There were several key historical developments which formed the catalyst for the Yemen
Crisis. With the advent of the Arab Spring in Yemen in 2011, major anti-government protests
arose against then-President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Saudis were eager to exploit
this opportunity to remove Saleh, against whom they had long nursed a grudge over allegations
of collusion with a bitter regional rival Iraq. Taking advantage of its influence in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), they played a major role in pushing for Saleh’s resignation in
favour of his Vice President, Abdurabbo Mansour Hadi. Hadi was a southerner and a Sunni,
and someone who the Saudis could control and make their protégé.
As the Houthis advanced in Yemen, the young Prince Salman rose to power as the Kingdom’s
Minister of Defence when his father ascended the throne in January 2015. Eager to reassert
Saudi Arabia’s status as a regional powerhouse and prove himself as a rising star in politics, he
saw a felicitous opportunity in Yemen (Riedel, 2020). Both he and his officials agreed that the
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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Houthis was not merely a rebel Yemen group, but also an insidious force through which Iran
was surreptitiously building a puppet regime right on Saudi Arabia’s southwest border
(Salisbury, 2015). Intervening in Yemen to defeat the Houthi forces would therefore mean both
eliminating a threat to national security and scoring a proxy-victory over Iran.
Within days, the Saudi-led coalition commenced Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis
on 26 March 2015, supported by a partial naval and air blockade imposed upon the entire
country. At the start, the coalition seemed to be making good progress. The United Arab
Emirates (UAE) proved to be a key ally in providing significant military and financial backing
to the Southern Separatists in their fight against the Houthis. With their help, the anti-Houthi
coalition had retaken full control of the strategic port city of Aden in the South by July 2015
(Koch, 2009). With the size and strength of such a coalition on his side, Prince Salman was
confident that a swift victory would soon follow. His officials had reassured him that the
conflict would last only a few weeks.
In April 2017, Hadi fired Aden governor, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, for alleged disloyalty. This
proved to be the last straw as it signalled a further reduction in Southern representation in
government. Mass rallies in Aden were held in protest and on 11th May 2017, the Southern
Transitional Council (STC) was born. The STC’s main goal is to achieve secession from
Yemen to form a separate state (Al Jazeera, 2020).
While Hadi always deemed the group illegitimate, Prince Salman knew that the STC could not
be simply pushed away. They were both key to the anti-Houthi cause and was supported by
powerful organizations, including their ally the UAE who had their own national interests in
backing the South (Dahlgren, 2018). Despite this internal conflict, Prince Salman was still
confident that the coalition will hold strong, unified by their mutual enmity towards the Houthis.
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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He pressed on focusing his attention on the fight against the Houthis and disregarding the
growing tensions within his own coalition.
The Stockholm Agreement was important for a ceasefire, and both negotiating parties were
open to this agreement, where Griffiths called this a “confidence building measure” in order to
build trust between the parties involved (United Nations, 2019). The Stockholm Agreement
was hailed as a breakthrough in peace talks in Yemen but the difficulties in implementation
nullified the success of this agreement. The Houthis were willing to come to the table because
of the influence of the UN, which pressured them to take a seat at the table. However, the scope
of the agreement was poorly worded and vague, and left many clauses open for interpretation
and therefore breaches.
Prince Salman observed that while this peace deal was struck with good intentions, all of the
parties involved in the fight were not represented at the negotiating table. Looking at the
stalemate of this agreement, he knew that the next time any negotiations happened, Saudi
Arabia would have to be at the table to influence the other international parties involved.
On top of stopping the Houthi advances, Prince Salman now had to deal with these internal
divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition. He was disgruntled as such fractures only served to
undermine the effectiveness of the coalition in the long term, reducing their chance of victory.
He knew that the Yemeni Government needed the support of the South to defeat the Houthis
and considered how to bring these estranged allies back into picture.
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
However, while both parties ratified the agreement on November 5, the deadlines expired in
January 2020 without much implementation. While the STC complied with some of the
concessions laid out in the terms of the Riyadh Agreement, Hadi’s government did not accede
to any of the terms such as forming the new government, nor withdrawing the troops from clash
regions Shabwa and Abyan (Al Jazeera, 2019). The Riyadh Agreement’s vague language did
not define military and political cessations clearly, and it was also fraught with unclear
sequencing with an overly optimistic two-month implementation timeline (DeLozier, 2020).
The STC only conceded to this agreement as they knew it was the only way for them to get a
seat at the negotiation peace-talks with the UN so as to achieve their goal of achieving political
autonomy. With each party having their own vested interest, Saudi Arabia had much difficulty
aligning everyone into implementing the agreement, but one thing was certain; the Houthis
were a common enemy to bring down.
With the uncompromising Hadi government, STC launched a complaint to the UN over Hadi’s
failure to implement the agreement where Hadi’s government then retaliated with a slew of
microaggressions, leading to the STC eventually pulling out of the agreement in January 2020,
and then declaring ‘self-rule’ again in April 2020. Prince Salman sighed. What could he do to
get Hadi to soften his uncompromising views, and to be more cooperative in future negotiations?
In February of 2020, due to increasing costs of war and the lack of confidence in the Hadi
Government, the UAE removed large numbers of its troops on the ground and withdrew from
the fight against the Houthis (Walsh & Kirkpatrick, 2019). This was a major setback for Prince
Salman. Without the support of the UAE, there was little hope to push back Houthi advances.
While the UAE removed its troops from the war in the North, it still continued to support the
STC and back private militia in the South that was against both the Hadi Government and the
Houthi forces (Dahlgren, 2018). In creating private armies in the South and backing the
Southern Separatists who wanted independence, Prince Salman knew that the UAE were
looking to advance their own interests and gain control over Yemen’s Southern ports and
strategic waterways (Al-Qassab, 2018). On the other hand, he was also aware that the UAE’s
strong ties with the STC could prove crucial in Yemen’s future. The challenge on his hands
was how he could bring UAE back on board, keeping in mind their vested interests.
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
However, he also knows the Houthis have often resorted to force to control their territories.
With a looming economic and humanitarian crisis, the Houthis have been unable to win the
hearts of a large portion of the Yemeni people (Horton, 2020). Due to the many restrictions
that the Houthis have placed on the international delivery of aid, the US and other nations are
planning to cut a majority of humanitarian assistance to Yemen (Elbagir et al., 2020). Prince
Salman knows how badly the Houthis need this aid to maintain the calm in their regions.
A Divided Coalition
The anti-Houthi coalition Prince Salman has set up is also in tatters. With the UAE
removing their troops and the STC seeking secession, the coalition has never been more divided.
It is unsurprising that the Houthis are winning; they are against a deeply fragmented opposition.
With so many conflicting agendas, Prince Salman knows that the coalition cannot be depended
upon to end this conflict.
Trouble at Home
Moreover, Prince Salman’s kingdom has been badly hit by a pandemic and an economic
crisis in 2020 and the war has lasted far too long. He needs to find a way out of this crisis
(Riedel, 2020). Walking out would be easy, but this is not an option for Prince Salman - he
cannot afford the Houthis taking control of Yemen for national security reasons, and cannot
create the impression that his foray into Yemen has been an abject failure. He needs a face-
saving exit strategy that allows Saudi Arabia to continue asserting control over Yemen to
protect its regional and national interests.
The next moves are crucial. The outcome of this excruciatingly long crisis will impact Saudi
Arabia’s position as a regional powerhouse. More personally, he knows his reputation in the
international community is at stake as well. With his hands on his head, he sits down and begins
to ponder his next move.
What should Salman do next to ensure a favourable yet realistic strategy for Saudi’s future in
Yemen? Should he cut Saudi Arabia’s losses and exit quickly by making concessions to its
opponents, at the risk of losing control of Yemen to its regional rivals? Or should he be more
aggressive in asserting Saudi Arabia’s interests at the continued cost of the war? What kind of
political settlement should be negotiated for Yemen, given the deep divisions between the
stakeholders?
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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II. Principles
(3) Powers, functions, and responsibilities shall be allocated to each level of government,
either exclusively or concurrently, as best serves and is closest to those affected. Each
level of government shall have sufficient powers to function effectively and shall bear its
fair share of common responsibilities.
(4) The division of powers and responsibilities shall be clearly defined in the constitution
of the federal state. The central authority shall not interfere with the exercise of authority
of the executive, legislative, judicial and administrative bodies of the other levels of
government in their areas of exclusive responsibility, except in exceptional circumstances
as regulated by the constitution and law, and only for purposes of ensuring collective
security, essential common standards or to protect one regional authority from
interference by another.
(6) Each region shall have a leading role regarding its regional economic development.
The federal system shall ensure adequate standards for a decent life for all people and
ensure an equitable sharing of national wealth.
The committee shall consider the option of six (6) regions (four (4) in the North and two
(2) in the South), the option of two (2) regions, and any option between these two options
that can achieve consensus.
The federal constitution shall provide for a period for building the federal state of Yemen
to commence after the adoption of the constitution and shall adhere to a timetable that
ends within a period as defined in the constitution. The full and effective transition to a
new federal State of Yemen, as envisioned above, will require the development of new
institutions, capacities and legislation in every wilaya and region, as well as other reforms
that include the South’s “rights dossier”, ensuring the full implementation of the 20+11
points and establishing a trust fund for the South.
As such, investment and on-going efforts will be required to secure and develop the human
and material resources necessary for responsible governance serving the indicated aims
effectively and efficiently. Priority shall be given to enhancing the capacity of every wilaya
and region of the federal state, the responsibilities of their elected officials, and the
appropriate devolution of powers.
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
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