Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week

UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?
Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis
UTC2107 NEGOTIATION CASE WEEK

UTC2107-2020 v1.0
4 NOVEMBER 2020
IAN KHOO CHUN LIANG

TOM JOJU
OSHIMA ERIKA
“A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?

Negotiating the World's Largest Humanitarian Crisis
It is now the year 2020, and Saudi Arabia is playing a losing game in Yemen. Their
opponents in Yemen - the Houthis - have been gaining ground, launching attacks on Saudi
territory, and are refusing to negotiate. Fragmented relations between its allies are undermining
the effectiveness of the Saudi-led efforts to defeat the Houthis. The financial and human costs
of the war have become unbearable amid a weakening economy and a looming oil-price crisis.
The Yemen Crisis has not panned out the way Prince Muhammad bin Salman expected. As the
key figure behind the launch of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen on 26 March 2015, the
prolonged war has not only tarnished his reputation on the international stage, but is also
proving to be a major source of personal humiliation in exposing his ineffectualness as a
politician and leader.
He knows he needs to look toward extricating his country from its five-year commitment in
the conflict, but is also determined to do so without admitting defeat and continuing to assert
Saudi Arabia’s control over Yemen to protect its regional and national interests. In light of his
limited choices and with such high stakes, what should he do next to ensure a favourable yet
realistic strategy for Saudi’s future in Yemen? There seems to be no easy answer for Prince
Salman, given the complex intricacies and historical roots of the Yemen Crisis his country is
now embroiled in.
This case was prepared by Ian Khoo Chun Liang, Tom Joju and Oshima Erika.
Copyright © 2020. Please do not digitize, photocopy or otherwise reproduce, post or transmit without express permission.
For queries please contact Tembusu College, National University of Singapore.
This document is authorized for use UTC2107 Negotiation in a Complex World Case Week until 6 November 2020.
Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Background to the Yemen Crisis
Saudi Arabian Intervention in Yemen Politics (2011-2012)
There were several key historical developments which formed the catalyst for the Yemen
Crisis. With the advent of the Arab Spring in Yemen in 2011, major anti-government protests
arose against then-President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Saudis were eager to exploit
this opportunity to remove Saleh, against whom they had long nursed a grudge over allegations
of collusion with a bitter regional rival Iraq. Taking advantage of its influence in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), they played a major role in pushing for Saleh’s resignation in
favour of his Vice President, Abdurabbo Mansour Hadi. Hadi was a southerner and a Sunni,
and someone who the Saudis could control and make their protégé.
Yemen in Transition - Attempts at National Unification (2013 - 2014)
Following this change in leadership, Yemen began a transitional settlement facilitated

by the GCC and backed by international powers such as the United Nations. A critical part of
this transition was the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), intended to be an inclusive
opportunity for Yemen’s diverse political, geographic, and social groups to come together to
address the most critical issues facing the country. While the Saudis had paved the way for
Hadi’s transitional government to take power, Saudi leadership played a limited and marginal
role in the dialogue. The NDC concluded in January 2014, with the announcement that Yemen
would adopt a six state-federal resolution in hopes to achieve national unity (see Exhibit 1).
In reality, the NDC excluded some of Yemen’s major political players - most notably, the
Houthis and the Southern Separatists in making key decisions. Though these groups were
illegitimate in the eyes of the state, they wielded significant legitimacy and power on the
ground. Unsurprisingly, these excluded parties voiced dissatisfaction with the new federal
system almost immediately. The Houthis took issue with how their projected region would be
land-locked and made up of the poorest sections of North Yemen (AFP., 2018). While the
Southern Separatists tentatively accepted the outcomes of the NDC, they openly indicated their
support for the new Hadi government as only a short-term one in service of their ultimate goal
of achieving an autonomous South (Riedel, 2020). There was also deep mistrust of Saudi’s
protégé Hadi by all parties, as he had profited from corruption in his term Vice President at the
expense of the people.
Houthi Takeover of Yemen (2015-2016)

Disaffected by the new federal system and further economic and political grievances,
the Houthis launched a military campaign in September 2014 and successfully captured the
capital Sana’a. President Hadi was forced to flee Sana’a and sought asylum in Saudi Arabia as
the Houthis took over the government.
As the Houthis advanced in Yemen, the young Prince Salman rose to power as the Kingdom’s
Minister of Defence when his father ascended the throne in January 2015. Eager to reassert
Saudi Arabia’s status as a regional powerhouse and prove himself as a rising star in politics, he
saw a felicitous opportunity in Yemen (Riedel, 2020). Both he and his officials agreed that the
Houthis was not merely a rebel Yemen group, but also an insidious force through which Iran
was surreptitiously building a puppet regime right on Saudi Arabia’s southwest border
(Salisbury, 2015). Intervening in Yemen to defeat the Houthi forces would therefore mean both
eliminating a threat to national security and scoring a proxy-victory over Iran.
Operation Decisive Storm: A bid for regional and personal power

(2015-2016)
Not wanting to miss this chance, Prince Salman quickly took action. He garnered
support from nine regional allies and formed an anti-Houthi coalition to respond to Hadi's calls
for military support. Tapping into Saudi diplomatic alliances with international powers like the
US and the UK, the coalition also amassed significant logistical and intelligence aid on its side.
Having the backing of the United Nations also lent legitimacy to the coalition, and enabled
Salman to utilise the threat of economic isolation to put international pressure on the Houthis.
Within days, the Saudi-led coalition commenced Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis
on 26 March 2015, supported by a partial naval and air blockade imposed upon the entire
country. At the start, the coalition seemed to be making good progress. The United Arab
Emirates (UAE) proved to be a key ally in providing significant military and financial backing
to the Southern Separatists in their fight against the Houthis. With their help, the anti-Houthi
coalition had retaken full control of the strategic port city of Aden in the South by July 2015
(Koch, 2009). With the size and strength of such a coalition on his side, Prince Salman was
confident that a swift victory would soon follow. His officials had reassured him that the
conflict would last only a few weeks.
“Enough is enough”: Cracks in the Coalition (2017)

However, as weeks turned into years of stalemate, it became evident to Prince Salman
that there were acute problems facing the Saudi-led coalition blocking the road to victory. He
was aware of ongoing rivalries within the anti-Houthi camp. Arguably, the most concerning
one was the longstanding conflict between the South and the North. Under the leadership of
the Hadi Government, the people of Southern Yemen suffered, constantly feeling economically
and politically marginalized by the North (Karasik & Cafiero, 2019). Additionally, the
demands of the Southern Separatists for an independent South were being ignored by the Hadi
Government, and the alliance has been turning sour over the years.
In April 2017, Hadi fired Aden governor, Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, for alleged disloyalty. This
proved to be the last straw as it signalled a further reduction in Southern representation in
government. Mass rallies in Aden were held in protest and on 11th May 2017, the Southern
Transitional Council (STC) was born. The STC’s main goal is to achieve secession from
Yemen to form a separate state (Al Jazeera, 2020).
While Hadi always deemed the group illegitimate, Prince Salman knew that the STC could not
be simply pushed away. They were both key to the anti-Houthi cause and was supported by
powerful organizations, including their ally the UAE who had their own national interests in
backing the South (Dahlgren, 2018). Despite this internal conflict, Prince Salman was still
confident that the coalition will hold strong, unified by their mutual enmity towards the Houthis.
He pressed on focusing his attention on the fight against the Houthis and disregarding the
growing tensions within his own coalition.
Stockholm Agreement: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? (2018)

While Prince Salman chose to focus on hardball military tactics to deal with the Houthis,
he was also aware that other stakeholders were pushing for peaceful solutions. In December
2018, UN’s Martin Griffith brokered a voluntary peace deal between the Houthis and the
Yemen Government through the Stockholm Agreement (Baidhani, 2019). This stemmed out
of the necessity of the escalating tensions in the fight between anti-Houthi forces and the
Houthis over the port of Hodeidah, a key port where over 75% of Yemen’s aid and resources
came through (Dijkstal, 2019). The coalition was trying to prevent a Houthi siege of the port,
where the Houthis will likely channel these resources for war purposes instead.
The Stockholm Agreement was important for a ceasefire, and both negotiating parties were
open to this agreement, where Griffiths called this a “confidence building measure” in order to
build trust between the parties involved (United Nations, 2019). The Stockholm Agreement
was hailed as a breakthrough in peace talks in Yemen but the difficulties in implementation
nullified the success of this agreement. The Houthis were willing to come to the table because
of the influence of the UN, which pressured them to take a seat at the table. However, the scope
of the agreement was poorly worded and vague, and left many clauses open for interpretation
and therefore breaches.
Prince Salman observed that while this peace deal was struck with good intentions, all of the
parties involved in the fight were not represented at the negotiating table. Looking at the
stalemate of this agreement, he knew that the next time any negotiations happened, Saudi
Arabia would have to be at the table to influence the other international parties involved.
Friendly Fire? Clashes between the STC and Hadi (2019)

As the conflict dragged on, Prince Salman faced more trouble brewing within Yemen.
His worries about tensions between the Hadi government and the STC had not been unfounded.
Matters came to a head in August 2019, an internal dispute broke out between the Saudi-backed
Hadi government forces and the UAE-backed STC forces, leading to a military battle. For the
first time, an apparent rift in the Saudi-UAE coalition had been exposed (Al Jazeera, 2019).
The STC resorted to such drastic moves as its demands had not been met. The STC strongly
despised the mismanagement and corruption within the Hadi administration and has constantly
called for representation for the South in the Government of Yemen (Ghobari & Mokhashef,
2020).
On top of stopping the Houthi advances, Prince Salman now had to deal with these internal
divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition. He was disgruntled as such fractures only served to
undermine the effectiveness of the coalition in the long term, reducing their chance of victory.
He knew that the Yemeni Government needed the support of the South to defeat the Houthis
and considered how to bring these estranged allies back into picture.
Saving the Riyadh Agreement (2019)

Seeing how the STC played an important role in fighting the Houthis and with the
ineffectiveness of the UN in the Stockholm Agreement, Saudi Arabia led the negotiations for
the Riyadh Agreement in November 2019. The conflict between the STC and the Hadi
government demonstrated the need for a power-sharing deal between them to concentrate their
resources on fighting the mutual enemy (Wintour, 2019), the Houthis, rather than each other.
However, while both parties ratified the agreement on November 5, the deadlines expired in
January 2020 without much implementation. While the STC complied with some of the
concessions laid out in the terms of the Riyadh Agreement, Hadi’s government did not accede
to any of the terms such as forming the new government, nor withdrawing the troops from clash
regions Shabwa and Abyan (Al Jazeera, 2019). The Riyadh Agreement’s vague language did
not define military and political cessations clearly, and it was also fraught with unclear
sequencing with an overly optimistic two-month implementation timeline (DeLozier, 2020).
The STC only conceded to this agreement as they knew it was the only way for them to get a
seat at the negotiation peace-talks with the UN so as to achieve their goal of achieving political
autonomy. With each party having their own vested interest, Saudi Arabia had much difficulty
aligning everyone into implementing the agreement, but one thing was certain; the Houthis
were a common enemy to bring down.
With the uncompromising Hadi government, STC launched a complaint to the UN over Hadi’s
failure to implement the agreement where Hadi’s government then retaliated with a slew of
microaggressions, leading to the STC eventually pulling out of the agreement in January 2020,
and then declaring ‘self-rule’ again in April 2020. Prince Salman sighed. What could he do to
get Hadi to soften his uncompromising views, and to be more cooperative in future negotiations?
The UAE’s Great Betrayal: A key ally lost (2019)

Despite the numerous failed negotiations and attempts to reconcile divisions between
the Hadi government and the STC, Prince Salman could still leverage upon his Kingdom’s
regional influence to garner continued support of from other Arabic powers. The UAE, Saudi
Arabia’s strongest ally, was crucial in the fight against the Houthis.
In February of 2020, due to increasing costs of war and the lack of confidence in the Hadi
Government, the UAE removed large numbers of its troops on the ground and withdrew from
the fight against the Houthis (Walsh & Kirkpatrick, 2019). This was a major setback for Prince
Salman. Without the support of the UAE, there was little hope to push back Houthi advances.
While the UAE removed its troops from the war in the North, it still continued to support the
STC and back private militia in the South that was against both the Hadi Government and the
Houthi forces (Dahlgren, 2018). In creating private armies in the South and backing the
Southern Separatists who wanted independence, Prince Salman knew that the UAE were
looking to advance their own interests and gain control over Yemen’s Southern ports and
strategic waterways (Al-Qassab, 2018). On the other hand, he was also aware that the UAE’s
strong ties with the STC could prove crucial in Yemen’s future. The challenge on his hands
was how he could bring UAE back on board, keeping in mind their vested interests.
The Road Ahead for Saudi in Yemen

The Houthis winning territories, not hearts
Coming back to the present, the situation looks incredibly bleak for Prince Salman.
Despite being outgunned and outspent, the Houthis have only managed to gain a stronger
foothold of the country. He looks at the current areas of control (see Exhibit 2) and realizes
how much territory the Houthis have gained. 95% of the northern territories are now controlled
by Houthi forces and their allies, including the capital Sanaa (“Yemen: Houthi Army
Spokesman”, 2020). He may not want to admit it, but the Houthis are gaining the upper hand
and show no signs of stopping.
However, he also knows the Houthis have often resorted to force to control their territories.
With a looming economic and humanitarian crisis, the Houthis have been unable to win the
hearts of a large portion of the Yemeni people (Horton, 2020). Due to the many restrictions
that the Houthis have placed on the international delivery of aid, the US and other nations are
planning to cut a majority of humanitarian assistance to Yemen (Elbagir et al., 2020). Prince
Salman knows how badly the Houthis need this aid to maintain the calm in their regions.
A Divided Coalition
The anti-Houthi coalition Prince Salman has set up is also in tatters. With the UAE
removing their troops and the STC seeking secession, the coalition has never been more divided.
It is unsurprising that the Houthis are winning; they are against a deeply fragmented opposition.
With so many conflicting agendas, Prince Salman knows that the coalition cannot be depended
upon to end this conflict.
Trouble at Home
Moreover, Prince Salman’s kingdom has been badly hit by a pandemic and an economic
crisis in 2020 and the war has lasted far too long. He needs to find a way out of this crisis
(Riedel, 2020). Walking out would be easy, but this is not an option for Prince Salman - he
cannot afford the Houthis taking control of Yemen for national security reasons, and cannot
create the impression that his foray into Yemen has been an abject failure. He needs a face-
saving exit strategy that allows Saudi Arabia to continue asserting control over Yemen to
protect its regional and national interests.
The next moves are crucial. The outcome of this excruciatingly long crisis will impact Saudi
Arabia’s position as a regional powerhouse. More personally, he knows his reputation in the
international community is at stake as well. With his hands on his head, he sits down and begins
to ponder his next move.
What should Salman do next to ensure a favourable yet realistic strategy for Saudi’s future in
Yemen? Should he cut Saudi Arabia’s losses and exit quickly by making concessions to its
opponents, at the risk of losing control of Yemen to its regional rivals? Or should he be more
aggressive in asserting Saudi Arabia’s interests at the continued cost of the war? What kind of
political settlement should be negotiated for Yemen, given the deep divisions between the
stakeholders?
Exhibit 1 Key Agreements in the National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document
II. Principles
(3) Powers, functions, and responsibilities shall be allocated to each level of government,
either exclusively or concurrently, as best serves and is closest to those affected. Each
level of government shall have sufficient powers to function effectively and shall bear its
fair share of common responsibilities.
(4) The division of powers and responsibilities shall be clearly defined in the constitution
of the federal state. The central authority shall not interfere with the exercise of authority
of the executive, legislative, judicial and administrative bodies of the other levels of
government in their areas of exclusive responsibility, except in exceptional circumstances
as regulated by the constitution and law, and only for purposes of ensuring collective
security, essential common standards or to protect one regional authority from
interference by another.
(6) Each region shall have a leading role regarding its regional economic development.
The federal system shall ensure adequate standards for a decent life for all people and
ensure an equitable sharing of national wealth.
III. Defining the Regions

Authorized by the National Dialogue Conference, the President of the Republic in his
capacity as the President of the Conference, shall establish and chair a committee to
define the number of regions. The committee’s decision shall be binding.
The committee shall consider the option of six (6) regions (four (4) in the North and two
(2) in the South), the option of two (2) regions, and any option between these two options
that can achieve consensus.
IV. Arrangements for Construction of the New Federal State of Yemen
The federal constitution shall provide for a period for building the federal state of Yemen
to commence after the adoption of the constitution and shall adhere to a timetable that
ends within a period as defined in the constitution. The full and effective transition to a
new federal State of Yemen, as envisioned above, will require the development of new
institutions, capacities and legislation in every wilaya and region, as well as other reforms
that include the South’s “rights dossier”, ensuring the full implementation of the 20+11
points and establishing a trust fund for the South.
As such, investment and on-going efforts will be required to secure and develop the human
and material resources necessary for responsible governance serving the indicated aims
effectively and efficiently. Priority shall be given to enhancing the capacity of every wilaya
and region of the federal state, the responsibilities of their elected officials, and the
appropriate devolution of powers.
Exhibit 2 Current state of territorial control of Yemen by different stakeholders
References
Al Jazeera. (2019, August 29). Battle for Aden: Who is fighting who and how things got here.
Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/29/battle-
for-aden-who-is-fighting-who-and-how-things-got-here
Al Jazeera. (2020, April 26). Yemen: What is the Southern Transitional Council? Retrieved
October 22, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/yemen-what-is-
the-southern-transitional-council
Al-Qassab, A. (2018, March 09). Strategic Considerations of the UAE's Role in Yemen.
Retrieved October 22, 2020, from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/strategic-
considerations-of-the-uaes-role-in-yemen/
AFP. (2018, October 29). Yemen Al Houthi rebels slam federation plan as unfair. Retrieved
September 25, 2020, from https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/yemen-al-houthi-
rebels-slam-federation-plan-as-unfair-1.1289512
Dahlgren, S. (2018, April 26). The Southern Transitional Council and the War in Yemen -
Yemen. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/southern-transitional-council-and-war-yemen
Elbagir, N., Dewan, A., Bashir, N., Arvanitidis, B., Mawry, Y., & Smith, I. (2020, September
15). Aid cuts by Trump and some US allies are costing lives in Yemen. Retrieved
October 22, 2020, from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/15/middleeast/yemen-
funding-crisis-intl/index.html
Ghobari, M., & Mokhashef, M. (2020, April 26). Yemen separatists announce self-rule in
south, complicating peace efforts. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-south-idUSKCN228003
Horton, M. (2020, June 29). Hot Issue - The Houthi Art of War: Why They Keep Winning in
Yemen. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-
the-houthi-art-of-war-why-they-keep-winning-in-yemen/
Karasik, T., & Cafiero, G. (2019, December 23). The Geopolitics of Yemen’s Civil War (Issue
brief). Retrieved October 22, 2020, from Center For Global Policy website:
https://cgpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/The-Geopolitics-of-Yemens-Civil-
War-Website-ready.pdf
Koch, C. (2009). The Yemen War Actors, Interests and the Prospects of Negotiations (Vol.
V, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Rep.). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
Outcomes of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. (n.d.). In National Dialogue
Conference Outcomes Document. Political Settlements Research Programme
(University of Edinburgh). Retrieved from
https://www.peaceagreements.org/masterdocument/1400.
Riedel, B. (2020, April 13). Saudi Arabia wants out of Yemen. Retrieved October 22, 2020,
from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/13/saudi-arabia-
wants-out-of-yemen/
Walsh, D., & Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2019, July 11). U.A.E. Pulls Most Forces From Yemen in
Blow to Saudi War Effort. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/middleeast/yemen-emirates-saudi-
war.html
Yemen: Houthi army spokesman declares end of Jawf operation, holds ‘key to Marib’. (2020,
May 1). Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200501-yemen-
houthi-army-spokesman-declares-end-of-jawf-operation-holds-key-to-marib/
Dijkstal, H. (2019, May 31). Yemen and the Stockholm Agreement: Background, Context,
and the Significance of the Agreement. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/23/issue/5/yemen-and-stockholm-agreement-
background-context-and-significance
United Nations (2019, February 19). Progress on Recent Accords in Quest for Peace, Gives
Yemen Opportunity to Move Away from 'Logic of War', Security Council Hears |
Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13705.doc.htm
Baidhani, S. (2019, March 17). UN Security Council works to salvage Hodeidah ceasefire.
Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://thearabweekly.com/un-security-council-
works-salvage-hodeidah-ceasefire
DeLozier, E. (2020, July 30). Riyadh Agreement Redux: Political Gains Still Dogged by
Implementation Concerns. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/riyadh-agreement-redux-
political-gains-still-dogged-by-implementation-conce
Wintour, P. (2019, November 05). Yemen government signs power-sharing deal with
separatists. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/05/yemen-government-signs-power-
sharing-deal-with-separatists
Al Jazeera. (2019, October 30). UAE withdraws troops from Yemen's southern port city of
Aden. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/30/uae-withdraws-troops-from-yemens-
southern-port-city-of-aden

Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Utc2107 Negotiation Case Week

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

UTC2107-2020 “A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?

Negotiating the World’s Largest Humanitarian Crisis

UTC2107 NEGOTIATION CASE WEEK

IAN KHOO CHUN LIANG

“A Living Hell on Earth”: Can Yemen be saved?

Background to the Yemen Crisis

Saudi Arabian Intervention in Yemen Politics (2011-2012)

Yemen in Transition - Attempts at National Unification (2013 - 2014)

Following this change in leadership, Yemen began a transitional settlement facilitated

Houthi Takeover of Yemen (2015-2016)

Operation Decisive Storm: A bid for regional and personal power

“Enough is enough”: Cracks in the Coalition (2017)

Stockholm Agreement: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? (2018)

Friendly Fire? Clashes between the STC and Hadi (2019)

Saving the Riyadh Agreement (2019)

The UAE’s Great Betrayal: A key ally lost (2019)

The Road Ahead for Saudi in Yemen

Exhibit 1 Key Agreements in the National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document

III. Defining the Regions

IV. Arrangements for Construction of the New Federal State of Yemen

Exhibit 2 Current state of territorial control of Yemen by different stakeholders

Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/29/battle-

October 22, 2020, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/yemen-what-is-

Retrieved October 22, 2020, from http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/strategic-

September 25, 2020, from https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/yemen/yemen-al-houthi-

Yemen. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

October 22, 2020, from https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/15/middleeast/yemen-

south, complicating peace efforts. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

Yemen. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-

V, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Rep.). Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Outcomes of the Comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. (n.d.). In National Dialogue

Conference Outcomes Document. Political Settlements Research Programme

(University of Edinburgh). Retrieved from

Blow to Saudi War Effort. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

May 1). Middle East Monitor. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200501-yemen-

Retrieved October 22, 2020, from https://thearabweekly.com/un-security-council-

Implementation Concerns. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

separatists. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

Aden. Retrieved October 22, 2020, from

You might also like