Ocampo V Abando

G.R. No. 176830. February 11, 2014.*

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM
S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR
M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and
Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as
Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
respondents.
G.R. No. 185587. February 11, 2014.*
RANDALL B. ECHANIS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA

BUNYI-MEDINA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON.
EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18,
CESAR M.
_______________
* EN BANC.
674
MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and

Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in his capacity as
Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice,
respondents.
G.R. No. 185636. February 11, 2014.*

RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, HON.
EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18,
CESAR M. MERIN, in his capacity as Approving
Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in
his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice, respondents.
G.R. No. 190005. February 11, 2014.*

VICENTE P. LADLAD, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32, and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary

Investigations; Due Process; While the right to have a preliminary
investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it
is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.—A preliminary investigation is
“not a casual affair.” It is conducted to protect the innocent from
the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While
the right to have a preliminary investigation before trial is
statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and
a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice. In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to
due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard. It serves to
accord an opportunity for the presentation of the respondent’s
side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating
officer shall decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a
reasonable belief that a crime has been com-
675
mitted, and that it was the respondent who committed it.

Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the
complaint.
Due Process; The essence of due process is reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s
defense.—“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to
be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s defense.” What
is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has
been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story
cannot claim denial of due process.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary
Investigations; As long as efforts to reach a respondent were made,
and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.—Section
3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a
respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a
respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation
remains valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil
underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of
offenses.
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; The Supreme Court has
previously cautioned that “litigants represented by counsel should
not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case.”—We have previously cautioned that
“litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they
need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.”
Having opted to remain passive during the preliminary
investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his counsel cannot now claim
a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-
affidavit was of their own doing.
Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; It must be pointed
out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of
receipt of the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the
resolution.—As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a
motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the
Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice
is reckoned from the date of receipt of the
676
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution.

This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution
Service Rule on Appeal: Sec. 3. Period to appeal.—The appeal
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution, or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation if one has been filed within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the assailed resolution.
Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Search Warrants; No search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce.—Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides
that “no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce.”
Same; Same; Same; Probable Cause; Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by
the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, the Supreme Court has ruled that
a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.—Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
“such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.” Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by
the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing
is not necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not
mandatory and indispensable for determining the aptness of
issuing a warrant of arrest.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is enough that the judge
personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.—It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor’s report and support-
677
ing documents showing the existence of probable cause for the

indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to
disregard the prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission
of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge
Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by
Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed the
charge against them. Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that
Judge Abando did not point out facts and evidence in the record
that were used as bases for his finding of probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. The determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to
the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge. Further
elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the
issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v.
Sandiganbayan, 451 SCRA 533 (2005).
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; Political Offense
Doctrine; Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of
their character as “common” offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients,
and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.—Under the political offense
doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a
political offense, are divested of their character as “common”
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of
which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed with
the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.” Any
ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is committed in
furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion
as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as
rebellion alone.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the political offense doctrine
is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the
court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act
to be conclusively demonstrated; The burden of demonstrating
political motivation must be discharged by the defense, since
motive is a state of mind
678
which only the accused knows.—When the political offense

doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes
crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was
done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive
of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Petitioners aver that
the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the
political motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly
seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators. We had already ruled that
the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which
only the accused knows. The proof showing political motivation is
adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity
to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court
to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As held in the case of Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if during trial, petitioners are able
to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides the remedy.—As held in the case of Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 714 (2000), if during trial, petitioners are able
to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in
furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides the remedy, to wit: SECTION 14. Amendment or
substitution.—A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before
the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and
when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any
accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party
and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in
resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party. (n) If it appears at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense in accordance with
679
Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be

placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; If it is shown
that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the
filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.—If it is shown that the
proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as
petitioners would not be placed in double jeopardy. Section 7, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, states: SEC. 7. Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. Based on
the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first
jeopardy attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a
second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or
convicted, or the case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent, by a competent court in a valid
indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea during
arraignment.
Leonen, J., Concurring Opinion:
Criminal Law; International Law; Rebellion; Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes
Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851); View that acts committed in
violation of Republic Act No. 9851, even in the context of armed
conflicts of a non-international character and in view of the
declarations of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democ-
680
ratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in

furtherance of rebellion.—The Informations and Warrants were
issued for the crime of multiple murder. Petitioners assert that
they have a pending criminal charge of rebellion and that the acts
raised in their petitions should be dismissed because they are
deemed to be affected by the political offense doctrine. The
political offense doctrine states that certain crimes, such as
murder, are already absorbed by the charge of rebellion when
committed as a necessary means and in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion. I agree that this case should be
remanded because there has been no evidence yet to prove that
the acts imputed to the petitioners actually happened or are
attributable to them. Judicial economy, however, requires that we
state that there are certain acts which have been committed on
the occasion of a rebellion which should no longer be absorbed in
that crime. Acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851,
even in the context of armed conflicts of a non-international
character and in view of the declarations of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front, cannot be
deemed to be acts in connection with or in furtherance of
rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and their effective prosecution must be ensured by
taking measures at the national level, in order to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus contribute to
the prevention of such crimes, it being the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes.—International humanitarian law (IHL) is
the body of international law that regulates the conduct of armed
conflicts, whether of an international or non-international
character. This body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict
on individuals. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional
Protocols are the main instruments that govern IHL.
Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles contained in the
Geneva Conventions are largely regarded in the international
sphere as having the character of general or customary
international law given the fundamental nature of the rules and
“because they constitute intransgressible principles of
international customary law.” In the Philippines, Republic Act
No. 9851 was enacted in view of its policy to “[renounce] war x x x,
[adopt] the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the
681
land and [adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,

cooperation and amity with all nations.” Accordingly, “[t]he most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole must not go unpunished and their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level, in
order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such crimes, it
being the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
over those responsible for international crimes.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Jus Cogens; View that jus cogens
norms under the Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties are
“norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as [norms] from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”—Jus
cogens norms under the Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties
are “norm[s] accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as [norms] from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.” The principles embedded in Common Article 3 have
been held to apply even to international armed conflict, thus,
depicting a universal character. It lays down fundamental
standards which are applicable at all times, in all circumstances
and to all States and from which no derogation at any time is
permitted. As was stated, it “sets forth a minimum core of
mandatory rules [and], reflects the fundamental humanitarian
principles which underlie international humanitarian law as a
whole, and upon which the Geneva Conventions in their entirety
are based. These principles, the object of which is the
respect for the dignity of the human person, developed as
a result of centuries of warfare and had already become
customary law at the time of the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions because they reflect the most universally
recognized humanitarian principles.” (Emphasis provided)
Hence, nonobservance of the minimum standard provided for in
Common Article 3 triggers a violation of well-accepted principles
of international law.
International Law; International Humanitarian Law;
International Human Rights Law; View that international
humanitarian law and international human rights law are two
sets of regimes in
682
international law.—International humanitarian law and

international human rights law are two sets of regimes in
international law. The two regimes have been compared and
contrasted with each other, to wit: The two sets of rules certainly
have a different history and often a different field of application,
both ratione personae and ratione temporis. Human rights thus
apply to all people and humanitarian law applies to certain
groups of persons (for example, to the wounded, to prisoners o[f]
war, to civilians) and, furthermore, humanitarian law applies
only in times of armed conflict. On the other hand, ‘human rights’
and ‘humanitarian law’ regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights
at least insofar that they all intend to increase the protection of
individuals, alleviate pain and suffering and secure the minimum
standard of persons in various situations. (Emphasis in the
original) Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and
peace. The protection accorded by human rights laws does not
cease to apply when armed conflict ensues. Still, some “human
rights” are allowed to be derogated in times of “emergency which
threatens the life of the nation.” Nevertheless, provisions on the
right to life, prohibition from torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment, and slavery remain free from any derogation
whatsoever, having acquired a jus cogens character.
Same; Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity (R.A. No. 9851);
Criminal Law; Rebellion; View that Republic Act No. 9851 defines
and provides for the penalties of crimes against humanity, serious
violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), genocide,
and other crimes against humanity; These crimes are separate
from or independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur
on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the armed
uprisings.—Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the
penalties of crimes against humanity, serious violations of IHL,
genocide, and other crimes against humanity. This law provides
for the non-prescription of the prosecution of and execution of
sentences imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the Act. It
also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
the crimes defined in the Act. These crimes are, therefore,
separate from or independent from the crime of rebellion even if
they occur on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the
armed uprisings.
683
Same; Same; View that spies and civilians suspected of being

spies are also accorded protection under Republic Act No. 9851.—
Even spies are accorded protection under Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol
II are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees to persons
not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such as protection
from summary execution and right to fair trial. These
fundamental guarantees are also found in Article 75, in relation
to Articles 45 and 46 of Additional Protocol I. Spies and civilians
suspected of being spies are also accorded protection under Rep.
Act No. 9851.
Same; Same; View that persons committing crimes against
humanity or serious violations of international humanitarian law,
international human rights laws, and Republic Act No. 9851 must
not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the
different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent.
—Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against humanity or
serious violations of international humanitarian law,
international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No. 9851 must not
be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to recognize the
different nature of armed uprisings as a result of political dissent.
The contemporary view is that these can never be considered as
acts in furtherance of armed conflict no matter what the motive.
Incidentally, this is the view also apparently shared by the
CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of the
present government’s peace process.
Same; Same; View that torture and summary execution — in
any context — are shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may
have simply been transformed into desperate cowards. Those who
may have suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve
better than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.—The
rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of humanity,
cannot negate himself or herself. Torture and summary execution
of enemies or allies are never acts of courage. They demean those
who sacrificed and those who gave their lives so that others may
live justly and enjoy the blessings of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution — in any context — are
shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply been
transformed into desperate cowards. Those who may have
suffered or may have died because of these acts deserve better
than to be told that they did so in the hands of a rebel.

684
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. and Gerald DL. Vasquez for
petitioner V.P. Ladlad.
Romeo T. Capulong, Rachel F. Pastores and Amylyn B.
Sato for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 176830, 185636 and
185587.

SERENO, CJ.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by
elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine
Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan,
Inopacan, Leyte.1 The mass grave contained skeletal
remains of individuals believed to be victims of “Operation
Venereal Disease” (Operation VD) launched by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected
military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally
precludes a direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction, we
take cognizance of these petitions considering that
petitioners have chosen to take recourse directly before us
and that the cases are of significant national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too
insubstantial to require consideration. Accordingly, in the
exer-
_______________
1 Also allegedly found from 2009 to 2012 were more mass grave sites in
Gubat, Sorsogon; Camalig, Albay; and Labo, Camarines Norte — all in the
Bicol Region [http://www.interaksyon.com/article/38278/

photos--bones-in-npa-mass-grave-dont-easily-surrender-names-of-victims
(Last accessed on 13 January 2014)].
On 21 July 2012, a mass grave was found in San Francisco, Quezon
[http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/233887/remains-found-in-quezon-mass-grave-
include-a-pregnant-rebel-army-exec (Last accessed on 13 January 2014)].
685
cise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court

will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners
should be dismissed under the political offense
doctrine.
Antecedent Facts
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition2
seeking the annulment of the orders and resolutions of
public respondents with regard to the indictment and
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners for the
crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (PC/Insp.
Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional
Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army
Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine
Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U.
Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).3 The letters requested
appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits
attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein
along with several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements
of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army
discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at
Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.4
Recovered from the grave site were 67 severely
deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of
Operation VD.5
_______________
2 Except G.R. No. 190005, which is only a petition for certiorari.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 135-269.
4 Id., at p. 139.
5 Id., at p. 336.
686
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team

based in Regional Office 8 was immediately dispatched to
the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to
collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.6 Also,
from 11-17 September 2006, an investigation team
composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and
DNA experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and
collected from alleged relatives of the victims DNA samples
for matching.7
The Initial Specialist Report8 dated 18 September 2006
issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities
of the skeletal remains and even the length of time that
they had been buried. The report recommended the conduct
of further tests to confirm the identities of the remains and
the time window of death.9
However, in a Special Report10 dated 2 October 2006,
the Case Secretariat of the Regional and National Inter-
Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the
names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and
examination based on testimonies of relatives and
witnesses.11
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the
alleged victims of Operation VD. All of them swore that
their relatives had been abducted or last seen with
members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen
again. They also expressed belief that their relatives’
remains were among those discovered at the mass grave
site.
_______________
6 Id.
7 Id., at p. 337.
8 Id., at pp. 424-427.
9 Id., at p. 427.
10 Id., at pp. 336-338.
11 Id., at pp. 337-338.
687
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of

Zacarias Piedad,12 Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid,
Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P.
Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP.13 According to them, Operation VD
was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central
Committee.14 Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo
(Ocampo),15 Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),16 Rafael G.
Baylosis (Baylosis),17 and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)18
were then members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups
were formed to implement Operation VD, namely, (1) the
Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not
support the movement; (2) the Arresting Group charged
with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would
subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution
Group or the “cleaners” of those confirmed to be military
spies and civilians who would not support the movement.19
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been
abducted, hog-tied, tortured and executed by members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP20 pursuant to Operation VD.21
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments,
Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among
others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and
those of their
_______________
12 With Supplemental Affidavit dated 12 January 2007; id., at pp. 276-
278.
13 Id., at pp. 273, 287, 296, 309, 318 and 329.
14 Id., at p. 289.
15 Id., at pp. 288, 310, 319 and 329.
16 Id., at p. 319.
17 Id., at pp. 310, 319 and 329.
18 Id., at pp. 310 and 319.
19 Id., at pp. 289-290.
20 Id., at p. 89.
21 Id., at p. 291.
688
witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-

affidavit.23 Petitioners Echanis24 and Baylosis25 did not file
counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served
the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or
evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry
of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary
investigation.26 However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a
counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a
subpoena.27
In a Resolution28 dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor
Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15
counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of
the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the
death of the following: 1) Juanita Aviola, 2) Concepcion
Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5)
Restituto Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8)
Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil, 10) Pablo Daniel, 11)
Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel,
14) Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.29
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias
Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and
Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as
state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the
success of the prosecution.30 The Resolution was silent with
regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos,
Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge
Abando) on 28
_______________
22 Id., at p. 91.
23 Id.
24 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 10.
25 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 14.
26 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 51.
27 Id., at p. 52.
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 88-94.
29 Id., at p. 93.
30 Id.
689
February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-

1581.31 Petitioner Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set
Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior to
receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the filing
of the Information.32
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order
finding probable cause “in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged.”33 He ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail
for their temporary liberty.34
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us
this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R. No.
176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order
of Judge Abando and the 16 February 2007 Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero.35 The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP
custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct
of further proceedings during the pendency of the
petition.36
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis
and Baylosis37 and Ladlad38) docketed as Criminal Case
No. 06-944 was then pending before the RTC Makati,
Branch 150 (RTC Makati).39 Putting forward the political
offense doctrine, peti-
_______________
31 Id., at pp. 84-87.
32 Id., at pp. 96-99. Petitioner Ocampo received a copy of the
Resolution on 12 March 2007.
33 Id., at p. 82.
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 3-81.
36 Id., at p. 77.
37 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 451.
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 75.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 59. On 1 June 2007, the Supreme Court
granted the petitions in Ladlad v. Velasco — G.R. Nos.
690
tioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder

in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion
when committed as a necessary means, in connection with
and in furtherance of rebellion.40
We required41 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to comment on the petition and the prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary
injunction, and set42 the case for oral arguments on 30
March 2007. The OSG filed its Comment on 27 March
2007.43
The following were the legal issues discussed by the
parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition is the proper remedy of petitioner
Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was
denied due process during preliminary investigation
and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already
included in the rebellion charge against him in the
RTC.44
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their
memoranda within 10 days.45 On 3 April 2007, the Court
ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under
a P100,000 cash bond.46
_______________
172070-72, 172074-76 and 175013 — in which the RTC of Makati, Branch
150, was ordered to dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-944.
40 Id., at p. 62.
41 Id., at pp. 515-A – 515-B.
42 Id., at pp. 541-542.
43 Id., at p. 554-A.
44 Id., at pp. 554-C – 554-D.
45 Id., at p. 554-D.
46 Id., at pp. 557-558.
691
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral

arguments that the single Information filed before the RTC
Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts of
murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information and New Informations on 11 April 2007.47 In
an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in
abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended
the proceedings during the pendency of G.R. No. 176830
before this Court.48
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner
Echanis was arrested on 28 January 2008 by virtue of the
warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March
2007.49 On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and
Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/Determination of Probable Cause with
Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative
Prayer to Recall/Suspend Service of Warrant.50
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order
denying the motion.51 Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis
filed a Motion for Reconsideration52 dated 30 May 2008,
but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued
an Order dated 12 June 2008 transmitting the records of
Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC Manila.53 The Order was issued in compliance
with the Resolution dated 23 April 2008 of this Court
granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales to transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC
Manila) presided by Judge Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge
Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-
262163.54
_______________
47 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 426-427.
48 Id., at pp. 428-429.
49 Id., at p. 18.
50 Id., at pp. 430-460.
51 Id., at pp. 69-73.
52 Id., at pp. 461-485.
53 Id., at p. 486.
54 Id., at p. 19.
692
Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial

Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City. On 12 August 2008,
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their Supplemental
Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.55
In an Order56 dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina
suspended the proceedings of the case pending the
resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the
RTC Manila a Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss.57
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us
a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the
30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October
2008 Order of Judge Medina.58 The petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional and
immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain his further
59
incarceration.
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the
30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October
2008 Order of Judge Medina.60 The petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner Baylosis.61
_______________
55 Id., at pp. 487-519.
56 Id., at pp. 64-68.
57 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 162-218.
58 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 3-63.
59 Id., at p. 56.
60 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 7-71.
61 Id., at p. 64.
693
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on
12 January 2009.62
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further
consolidation of these two cases with G.R. No. 176830.63 We
required64 the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner
Echanis’ immediate release, to which the OSG did not
interpose any objection on these conditions: that the
temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his
attendance and participation in the formal peace
negotiations between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to
begin in August 2009; and that his temporary release shall
not exceed six (6) months.65 The latter condition was later
modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for
the duration of his actual participation in the peace
negotiations.66
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional
release of petitioner Echanis under a P100,000 cash bond,
for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.67
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its
Opposition68 to petitioner Ladlad’s motion to quash before
the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the
motion on 13 February 2009.69
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order70
denying the motion to quash. The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied
on 27 August 2009.71
_______________
62 Id., at p. 564.
63 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), p. 587.
64 Id., at pp. 606-607.
65 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 736-740.
66 Id., at pp. 1029-1032.
67 Id., at pp. 742-743.
68 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 331-340.
69 Id., at pp. 347-348.
70 Id., at pp. 108-111.
694
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a

special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27
August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.72 The petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of
G.R. No. 190005 with G.R. Nos. 176830, 185587 and
185636.73 We also required the OSG to file its comment
thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment74 on 7 May
2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its
Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636 and 185587.75 These
Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 201076
and on 21 January 2011,77 respectively. Petitioners
Echanis and Baylosis filed their Consolidated Reply78 on 7
June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent
Motion to Fix Bail.79 On 21 July 2011, petitioner Baylosis
filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.80 The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail
to them considering that they were consultants of the
NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding
negotiations with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a
peace accord.81
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of
petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount of P100,000, subject to the condition that their
temporary re-
_______________
71 Id., at p. 112.
72 Id., at pp. 3-107.
73 Id., at pp. 860-861.
74 Id., at pp. 879-922.
75 Id., at pp. 932-933.
76 Id., at pp. 940-1003.
77 Rollo (G.R. No. 185587), pp. 807-851.
78 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 1363-1391.
79 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 1006-1024.
80 Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), pp. 1399-1402.
81 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 1046; Rollo (G.R. No. 185636), p. 1419.
695
lease shall be limited to the period of their actual

participation in the peace negotiations.82
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply83 to the OSG Comment
on 18 January 2013.

Our Ruling
Petitioners were accorded due
process during preliminary inves-
tigation and in the issuance of the

warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.”84 It
is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.85
While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.86
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to
due process of law entails the opportunity to be heard.87 It
serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation.
Afterwards, the investigating officer shall decide whether
the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that
a crime has been committed, and that it was the
respondent who committed it.
_______________
82 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 1050-1053.
83 Id., at pp. 1073-1116.
84 Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, 4 December 2008, 573 SCRA
129, 146.
85 Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, 27 June
2008, 556 SCRA 73, 93.
86 Id.
87 Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 341,
369.
696
Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the

complaint.
“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to
be heard and submit evidence in support of one’s
defense.”88 What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be
heard.89 Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present one’s own side of the story cannot claim denial of
due process.90
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not
receive a copy of the complaint and the attached documents
or evidence.91 Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not
served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the
12 undated letters of P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain
Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.92 Furthermore, even though his
counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the
Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner Ladlad was still not sent
a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.93 Thus, they
were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in
collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden and Army Captain Tiu,
surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of
Zacarias Piedad in the records of the case without
furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy.94 The original
affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006
stated that a meeting presided by petitioner Ocampo was
held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD was
agreed upon.95 Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his
Counter-affidavit dated 22 December 2006
_______________
88 Kuizon v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 611, 630; 354 SCRA 158, 176 (2001).
89 Id.
90 Pascual v. People, 547 Phil. 620, 627; 518 SCRA 730, 736 (2007).
92 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), pp. 49-50.
93 Id., at pp. 51-52.
94 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 75-76.
95 Id., at pp. 288-289.
697
stating that he was in military custody from October 1976

until his escape in May 1985.96 Thereafter, the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 12
January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his
original affidavit, and that the meeting actually took place
in June 1985.97 Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was
denied the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental
Affidavit by not being furnished a copy thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the
right to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal the
Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19
days, effectively denying petitioner Ocampo his right to due
process.98
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we
quote the pertinent portion of Prosecutor Vivero’s
Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and
served with Subpoena at their last known address for them to
submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-
affidavits because they could no longer be found in their last
known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand,
Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and
Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However,
Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the
required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their
respective counsels.99
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows

Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence
_______________
96 Id., at pp. 45-46.
97 Id., at p. 277.
98 Id., at pp. 74-75.
99 Id., at p. 91.
698
before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As

long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he
was given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.100
The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded
attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of
offenses.101
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were
undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents
at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due
process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they
were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to
the nonexistent address “53 Sct. Rallos St., QC,”102 which
had never been his address at any time.103 In connection
with this claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena
to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s wife,104 was sent to the
same address, and that she was among those mentioned in
the Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-
affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena,
petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a formal entry of
appearance on 8 December 2006.105 Prosecutor Vivero had
a reason to believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the
subpoena and accordingly instructed his counsel to prepare
his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every
opportunity to secure copies of the complaint after his
counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to
participate fully
_______________
100 Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 248 Phil. 854, 859; 166 SCRA 618,
623 (1988).
101 Id.
102 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 136.
103 Rollo (G.R. No. 190005), p. 51.
104 Id., at p. 11.
105 Id., at p. 51.
699
in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to

participate.
We have previously cautioned that “litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need
to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
case.”106 Having opted to remain passive during the
preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his
counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since
their failure to file a counter-affidavit was of their own
doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s
allegation of collusion to surreptitiously insert the
Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records.
There was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental
Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an earlier affidavit and
admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the
alleged meeting. The date of the execution of the
Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated. Thus, it
was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had
submitted his counter-affidavit. Should the case go to trial,
that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the opportunity to
question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental
Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention
that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to claim
that he was denied due process by not being furnished a
copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested
on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that
the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the
collective affidavits of several other witnesses107 attesting
to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered
the launch of Operation VD.
_______________
106 Balgami v. Court of Appeals, 487 Phil. 102, 115; 445 SCRA 591,
601-602 (2004), citing Salonga v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 514; 269
SCRA 534 (1997).
107 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 587.
700
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a

motion for reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of
the Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of
the resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the
resolution. This is clear from Section 3 of the 2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within

fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution, or of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation if
one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall
be allowed. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution

of Prosecutor Vivero on 12 March 2007,108 the former had
until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion for
reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. Instead, petitioner Ocampo chose to
file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this
Court on 16 March 2007.

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
“no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not
comply with the requirements of the Constitution in
finding the
_______________
108 Id., at p. 74.
701
existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of

arrest against petitioners.109
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
has been defined as “such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.”110 Although the Constitution
provides that probable cause shall be determined by the
judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a
hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.111
In fact, the judge’s personal examination of the
complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a
warrant of arrest.112
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the
prosecutor’s report and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of
his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor’s resolution and require the submission of
additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining
its existence.113
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge
Abando painstakingly examined the records submitted by
Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably
dismissed the charge against them.114 Additionally,
petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not point
out facts and evi-
_______________
109 Id., at p. 21.
110 Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192,
199-200.
111 De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa, Jr., 317 Phil. 101, 111; 247 SCRA
85, 94 (1995).
112 People v. Grey, G.R. No. 180109, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 523, 536.
113 Supra note 111.
702
dence in the record that were used as bases for his finding
of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.115
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the
sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.116
Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial
judges in the issuance of warrants of arrest, this Court
stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan117 as follows:
x x x. The trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion should

not, as a general rule, be interfered with in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie to cure errors in
the trial court’s appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the
conclusion of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as
the conclusions of law. x x x
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact based
on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution of the
Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or
evidence appended to the Information.

Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual
matters indicated in the affidavits of the complainants and
witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no
probable cause for petitioners’ indictment for multiple
murder or for the issuance of warrants for their arrest. As
stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence
and conclusion of facts based thereon are not interfered
with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Again, “he
sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal
determination if he reviews the [I]nformation and the
documents attached thereto, and on the
_______________
115 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 64.
116 Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan, 491 Phil. 704, 720; 451 SCRA 533,
551 (2005).
117 Id., at pp. 720-721; p. 551.
703
basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably

guilty of the crime with which he is being charged.”118
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the
supporting documents is shown by the following portion of
the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as
submitted and filed by the Provincial Prosecution of Leyte
Province supported by the following documents: Affidavits of
Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other
pertinent documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp Crame, Quezon City, pictures
of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the findings
[sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused
of the crime charged.119

At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause
for an indictment and issuance of a warrant of arrest, as
petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of
fact that are normally not within the purview of a petition
for certiorari,120 such as the petitions filed in the instant
consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is
not a ground to dismiss the charge
against petitioners prior to a de-
termination by the trial court that
the murders were committed in
furtherance of rebellion.
_______________
118 Cuevas v. Muñoz, 401 Phil. 752, 773-774; 348 SCRA 542, 562
(2000).
119 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), p. 82.
120 Heirs of Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, 14 March 2008,
548 SCRA 409, 443; Serapio v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 444 Phil.
499, 529; 396 SCRA 443, 466 (2003); Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil.
984, 990; 321 SCRA 368, 373-374 (1999).
704
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes,

perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as “common” offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.”121
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being
absorbed in the crime of rebellion.122 Thus, when a killing
is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the
political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and
must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are
obliged to consistently charge respondents with simple
rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the
well-entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the
institution of criminal charges, including whom and what
to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public
prosecutor.123
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a
defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of
the act to be conclusively demonstrated.124
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged
murders were committed in furtherance of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political
motivation behind the alleged murders can be clearly seen
from the
_______________
121 People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515, 541 (1956).
122 People v. Lovedioro, 320 Phil. 481, 489; 250 SCRA 389, 395 (1995).
123 Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Malik, 530 Phil. 662; 499
SCRA 268 (2006); Punzalan v. Dela Peña, 478 Phil. 771; 434 SCRA 601
(2004); Potot v. People, 432 Phil. 1028; 383 SCRA 449 (2002).
124 Supra note 122.
705
charge against the alleged top leaders of the

CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating
political motivation must be discharged by the defense,
since motive is a state of mind which only the accused
knows.125 The proof showing political motivation is adduced
during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to
present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this
Court to determine this factual matter in the instant
petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,126 if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or

information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only
be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the
nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the
complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion
and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with
_______________
125 Id.
126 401 Phil. 945, 961; 348 SCRA 714, 728 (2000).
706
Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be

placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against
petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial
court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of
the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—

When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had
pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only
applies when: (1) a first jeopardy attached; (2) it has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first.127
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case has been dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
compe-
_______________
127 Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472, 28 September 2007, 534 SCRA
338, 352.
707
tent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has

entered a valid plea during arraignment.128
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime
of rebellion, as defined and penalized under Article 134 in
relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC
Makati against petitioners and several others.129
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal
Case No. 06-944. Even before the indictment for rebellion
was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo,
Echanis and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this
Court to seek the nullification of the Orders of the DOJ
denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of
the prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and
independence.130 When the indictment was filed,
petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed
supplemental petitions to enjoin the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 06-944.131 We eventually ordered the
dismissal of the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first
jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty
under the P100,000 cash bond posted before the Office of
the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC
Manila.
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional
liberty of petitioners Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad in view
of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release
from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each shall
continue under the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation
as CPPNDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the
govern-
_______________
128 Id.
129 Rollo (G.R. No. 176830), pp. 117-128.
130 Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76, 175013, 1 June
2007, 523 SCRA 318, 340.
131 Id.
708
ment or until the termination of the proceedings before the

RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be the duty of the
government to inform this Court the moment that peace
negotiations are concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are
DISMISSED. The RTC of Manila, Branch 32, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C.
Ocampo shall remain on temporary liberty under the same
bail granted by this Court until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B.
Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis and Vicente P. Ladlad shall
remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted
by this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF
consultants in the peace negotiations with the government
are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurring.
Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION

“Some say freedom is relative. One man’s freedom is another man’s

bondage. We may have been in chains, but we weren’t shackled by
delusions. Our movements were restrained, but we weren’t tied up
by myth. Our tormentors thought they were free, but they were
blinded by falsehood; their senses were deadened by the mirage of
power they clutched and made god. And then they were stunned by
their own shadows; paralyzed by fear of the very monsters and
demons they fashioned in their heads that stood to devour them at
the end of it all.
709
. . . Our eventual freedom was truly memorable. The process of
unchaining was both literal and symbolic, and not without drama
and fanfare. We weren’t released all at once, but one or two at a
time. Ka Ranel and myself were freed at the same time — around
December of 1988. ‘Free at last!’ we declared, grinning from ear to
ear. We were guided through some underbrush, after it we came
upon a clearing where the rest of the former captives were waiting.
We were greeted with applause. Tearful hugs, handshakes, up-
heres, singing, merry-making, even role-playing. Rage and
retribution will have to wait. The moment was a celebration.”
Robert Francis Garcia
“To Suffer Thy Comrades:
How the Revolution Decimated Its Own” 24 (2001)

LEONEN, J.:
Dissent affirms the dissenter’s belief in how human
dignity should be shaped. It assumes difference with the
status quo. It is this assertion that provides depth and
dynamism in our democracy.
However, indignities masquerading as dissent or even
brought about by misguided assessments of what is
pragmatic do not deserve any legal protection. Such acts
cease to become political. These are simply inhuman.
Acts which debase humanity even by the most organized
and ardent dissenters do not even deserve the label of
rebellion.
I concur with the Chief Justice that this case should be
remanded so that the court can properly examine the
evidence raised by the defense. I write this separate
opinion in the interest of judicial economy. Should it be
shown that there are acts committed in violation of
Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the Philippine
Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity, these acts
could not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
710
I
For our decision are consolidated petitions for certiorari
and prohibition that pray for the declaration of several
Informations and Warrants of Arrests as void. The
Informations and Warrants were issued for the crime of
multiple murder. Petitioners assert that they have a
pending criminal charge of rebellion1 and that the acts
raised in their petitions should be dismissed because they
are deemed to be affected by the political offense doctrine.
The political offense doctrine states that certain crimes,
such as murder, are already absorbed by the charge of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means and in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion.
I agree that this case should be remanded because there
has been no evidence yet to prove that the acts imputed to
the petitioners actually happened or are attributable to
them. Judicial economy, however, requires that we state
that there are certain acts which have been committed on
the occasion of a rebellion which should no longer be
absorbed in that crime.
Acts committed in violation of Republic Act No. 9851,
even in the context of armed conflicts of a non-international
character and in view of the declarations of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic
Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in
furtherance of rebellion.

II
We survey the evolution of the political offense doctrine
to provide better context.
_______________
1 However, see Ladlad v. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 172070-72, 172074-76, and
175013, June 1, 2007, 523 SCRA 318, wherein this court granted the
petitions and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 06-452 and 06-
944 for rebellion.
711
As early as 1903, this court distinguished common

crimes from crimes committed in furtherance of a political
objective. In United States v. Lardizabal,2 the accused,
Commanding Officer of Filipino insurgents, ordered the
execution of an American prisoner before retreating from
the enemy. We said in this case that the accused’s act falls
under the Amnesty Proclamation of 1902, thus:
x x x [the execution] was not an isolated act such as a “political

offense committed during the insurrection pursuant to orders
issued by the civil or military insurrectionary authorities,” but
was a measure which, whether necessary or not, was inherent in
the military operations for the preservation of the troops
commanded by him and of which he was the supreme officer on
that island. It was an act which, while from the standpoint
of military law might be regarded as one of cruelty, was at
the same time one depending absolutely upon the discretion
of an officer in charge of a command for securing the safety
of the troops under his control and constitutes no other
offense than that of sedition, within which term the war
itself is included by the letter and spirit of the
proclamation.3 (Emphasis provided)
In United States v. Pacheco,4 two men selling English

dictionaries within the Dagupan area were abruptly
abducted and killed by the accused and his men. Witnesses
testified that it was presumed by the accused that the
salesmen were American spies because the dictionaries
being sold were written in English. This court observed:
It does not appear from the record that the aggressors were
impelled to kill the deceased by any motive other than that the
latter were suspected of being spies
_______________
2 1 Phil. 729 (1903).
3 Id., at p. 730.
4 2 Phil. 345 (1903).
712
and, therefore, traitors to the revolutionary party to which the

defendants belonged. From the foregoing statement of facts, it
may therefore be said that the two murders prosecuted
herein were of a political character and the result of internal
political hatreds between Filipinos, the defendants having been
insurgents opposed to the constituted government.
The case has to do with two crimes for which, under the penal
law, the severest punishment has always been inflicted. However,
considering the circumstances under which these crimes were
committed and the fact that the sovereign power in these Islands,
in view of the extraordinary and radical disturbance which,
during the period following the year 1896, prevailed in and
convulsed this country, and prompted by the dictates of
humanity and public policy, has deemed it advisable to
blot out even the shadow of a certain class of offenses,
decreeing full pardon and amnesty to their authors — an
act of elevated statesmanship and timely generosity, more
political than judicial in its nature, intended to mitigate the
severity of the law — it is incumbent upon us, in deciding this
case, to conform our judgment to the requirements and conditions
of the decree so promulgated.5 (Emphasis provided)
Then in the landmark case of People v. Hernandez,6 this

court defined the term, political offense:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against

the political order, as well as such common crimes as may
be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive
factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as
common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance “to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof” then said offense
becomes stripped of its “common” complex-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 346-347.
6 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
713
ion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of

rebellion, the former acquires the political character of
the latter.7 (Emphasis provided)
This court in Hernandez first clarified whether common

crimes such as murder, arson, and other similar crimes are
to be complexed with the main crimes in the Revised Penal
Code. Thus:
x x x national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence

overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as “common” offenses and
assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be
punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.8 (Emphasis provided)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code covering complex

crimes provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.—When a single act

constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
The Hernandez ruling was then affirmed by this court in

subsequent cases, such as Enrile v. Salazar.9 It is worthy to
note, however, that in “affirming” the doctrine in
Hernandez, this court in Enrile said:
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 535-536.
8 Id., at p. 541.
9 264 Phil. 593; 186 SCRA 217 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].
714
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of

rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality that
justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love
of country than by lust for power and have become no better than
mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human
life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted
mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the
military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed
by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause — and the Court is no
exception — that not even the crowded streets of our capital City
seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to
clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be
considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of
illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no
power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly
within its province.10 (Emphasis provided)
However, other cases declined to rule that all other

crimes charged in the Information are absorbed under
alleged political offenses.11 In Misolas v. Panga,12 this court
ruled:
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 617-618; p. 233.
11 See Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga del Norte v.
Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 945; 348 SCRA 714 (2000).
715
Neither would the doctrines enunciated by the Court in

Hernandez and Geronimo, [sic] and People v. Rodriguez [107 Phil.
659] save the day for petitioner.
In Hernandez, the accused were charged with the complex
crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery while in
Geronimo, the information was for the complex crime of rebellion
with murder, robbery and kidnapping. In those two cases[,] the
Court held that aforestated common crimes cannot be complexed
with rebellion as these crimes constituted the means of
committing the crime of rebellion. These common crimes
constituted the acts of “engaging in war” and “committing serious
violence” which are essential elements of the crime of rebellion
[See Arts. 134-135, Revised Penal Code] and, hence, are deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Consequently, the accused can
be held liable only for the single crime of rebellion.
On the other hand, in Rodriguez, the Court ruled that since the
accused had already been charged with rebellion, he can no longer
be charged for illegal possession of firearms for the same act of
unauthorized possession of firearm on which the charge of
rebellion was based, as said act constituted the very means for the
commission of rebellion. Thus, the illegal possession of the
firearm was deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
However, in the present case, petitioner is being charged
specifically for the qualified offense of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition under P.D. 1866. HE IS NOT BEING
CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION
WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS
HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings
of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriquez find no
application in this case.13 (Emphasis in the original)
_______________
12 260 Phil. 702; 181 SCRA 648 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].
13 Id., at pp. 709-710; p. 656.
716
In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr.,14 this court held that:
x x x The Code allows, for example, separate prosecutions for

either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the
indictment alleges that the former has been committed in
furtherance of or in connection with the latter. Surely, whether
people are killed or injured in connection with a rebellion,
or not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no less real,
and the grief of the victims’ families no less poignant.
Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to
determine what acts or omissions other than those set out in the
Revised Penal Code or other existing statutes are to be
condemned as separate, individual crimes and what penalties
should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or
improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or
omission was but an element or ingredient of another offense, or
might usually have been connected with another crime.
The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases
cited is against attempts to complex rebellion with the so called
“common” crimes committed in furtherance, or in the course,
thereof; this, on the authority alone of the first sentence of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio of said
cases is that Article 48 cannot be invoked as the basis for
charging and prosecuting the complex crime of rebellion with
murder, etc., for the purpose of obtaining imposition of the
penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum period (in
accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not — indeed
they could not and were never meant to — proscribe the
legislative authority from validly enacting statutes that
would define and punish, as offenses sui generis crimes
which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may be viewed as
a complex of rebellion with other offenses. There is no
constitutional prohibition against this, and the Court never
_______________
14 279 Phil. 448; 202 SCRA 405 (1991).
717
said there was. What the Court stated in said cases about
rebellion “absorbing” common crimes committed in its course or
furtherance must be viewed in light of the fact that at the time
they were decided, there were no penal provisions defining and
punishing, as specific offenses, crimes like murder, etc. committed
in the course or as part of a rebellion. This is no longer true, as far
as the present case is concerned, and there being no question that
PD 1866 was a valid exercise of the former President’s legislative
powers.15 (Emphasis provided)

It is not our intention to wipe out the history of and the
policy behind the political offense doctrine. What this
separate opinion seeks to accomplish is to qualify the
conditions for the application of the doctrine and remove
any blanket application whenever political objectives are
alleged. The remnants of armed conflict continue. Sooner or
later, with a victor that emerges or even with the success of
peace negotiations with insurgent groups, some form of
transitional justice may need to reckon with different types
of crimes committed on the occasion of these armed
uprisings. Certainly, crimes that run afoul the basic human
dignity of persons must not be tolerated. This is in line
with the recent developments in national and international
law.16
III
International humanitarian law17 (IHL) is the body of

international law that regulates the conduct of armed
conflicts,
_______________
15 Id., at pp. 462-463; pp. 415-416.
16 In August 30, 2011, the Philippines ratified the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.
17 See Vincent Chetail, ‘The contribution of the International Court of
Justice to international humanitarian law,’ 85 IRRC (2003)
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_850_chetail.pdf> accessed
on February 5, 2014. Contemporary IHL developed from the early laws of
war (jus in bello), the Martens Clause and the “elementary considerations
of humanity,” and the Hague Conventions of 1907.
718
whether of an international or non-international character.

This body of law seeks to limit the effects of the conflict on
individuals.18 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols are the main instruments that govern
IHL.19 Nevertheless, IHL and the rules and principles
contained in the Geneva Conventions are largely regarded
in the international sphere as having the character of
general or customary international law given the
fundamental nature of the rules and “because they
constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law.”20
In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9851 was enacted in
view of its policy to “[renounce] war x x x, [adopt] the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and [adhere] to a policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations.”21 Accordingly, “[t]he most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must
not go unpunished and their effective prosecution must be
ensured by taking measures at the national level, in order
to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these
crimes and thus contribute to the prevention of such
crimes, it being the duty of every State to
_______________
18 See ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional
Protocols,’ International Committee of the Red Cross <http://www.

icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/

overview-geneva-conventions.htm> accessed on February 5, 2014. See also

C. Greenwood, Historical Development and Basis in The Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts 9-10 (1995).

19 The Philippines is a signatory of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. It
ratified the conventions on October 10, 1952. The Philippines acceded to
Additional Protocol II on December 11, 1986.
20 M. M. Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law 297
(2005) citing Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ
Reports, 1996, paras. 79 and 82.
21 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), “An Act Defining and Penalizing Crimes
Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes
Against Humanity, Organizing Jurisdiction, Designating Special Courts,
and For Related Purposes,” sec. 2 (a).
719
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for

international crimes.”22
Armed conflict in the law is defined as:
x x x any use of force or armed violence between States or a

protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State:
Provided, That such force or armed violence gives rise, or may
give rise, to a situation to which the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, including their common Article 3, apply. Armed
conflict may be international, that is, between two (2) or more
States, including belligerent occupation; or non-international,
that is, between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State. It
does not cover internal disturbances or tensions such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of
a similar nature.23 (Emphasis provided)
Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and

Additional Protocol II24 are the foundation of the applicable
rules in a non-international or internal armed conflict.
Common Article 3, which has attained a customary law
character,25 prescribes a minimum standard to be applied
to persons who are not actively taking part in an internal
armed conflict. Common Article 3 provides:
_______________
22 Rep. Act. No. 9851 (2009), sec. 2 (e).
23 Rep. Act. No. 9851 (2009), sec. 3 (c). See also The Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadic (Jurisdiction of the Tribunal), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995).
24 Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
And Relating To The Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) of 8 June 1977.
25 See J. M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law 1-2 (vol. I [reprinted with corrections], 2009).
720
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character

occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum,
the following provisions:
1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons:
a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
b) taking of hostages;
c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.
2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
This portion of the provision is substantially reproduced

in Section 4, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 9851, which
provides:
In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of

common Article 3 to the four (4) Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons
taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of the
armed forces
721
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful
killings, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees
which are generally recognized as indispensable.

Additional Protocol II supplements Common Article 3 in
terms of the rules applicable to internal armed conflict.26
Additional Protocol II specifies: 1) the guarantees afforded
to persons involved in the internal armed conflict; and 2)
the
_______________
26 Article 1 — Material field of application
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without
modifying its existing conditions of applications, shall apply to all
armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol.
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts
of violence, and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.
722
obligations of the parties to the internal armed conflict.

These rights and duties are seen in Articles 4 to 6, to wit:
Article 4 — Fundamental guarantees

1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to
take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been
restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and
convictions and religious practices. They shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no
survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the
following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1
are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever:
a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being
of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment
such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment;
b) collective punishments;
c) taking of hostages;
d) acts of terrorism;
e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and
any form of indecent assault;
f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
g) pillage;
h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
x x x x

Article 5 — Persons whose liberty has been restricted
1. In addition to the provisions of Article 4, the following
provisions shall be respected as a
723
minimum with regard to persons deprived of their

liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,
whether they are interned or detained:
a) the wounded and the sick shall be treated in accordance
with Article 7;
b) the persons referred to in this paragraph shall, to the same
extent as the local civilian population, be provided with food
and drinking water and be afforded safeguards as regards
health and hygiene and protection against the rigours of the
climate and the dangers of the armed conflict;
c) they shall be allowed to receive individual or collective relief;
d) they shall be allowed to practice their religion and, if
requested and appropriate, to receive spiritual assistance
from persons, such as chaplains, performing religious
functions;
e) they shall, if made to work, have the benefit of working
conditions and safeguards similar to those enjoyed by the
local civilian population.
2. Those who are responsible for the internment or
detention of the persons referred to in paragraph 1 shall
also, within the limits of their capabilities, respect the
following provisions relating to such persons:
a) except when men and women of a family are accommodated
together, women shall be held in quarters separated from
those of men and shall be under the immediate supervision
of women;
b) they shall be allowed to send and receive letters and cards,
the number of which may be limited by competent authority
if it deems necessary;
724
c) places of internment and detention shall not be located close

to the combat zone. The persons referred to in paragraph 1
shall be evacuated when the places where they are interned
or detained become particularly exposed to danger arising
out of the armed conflict, if their evacuation can be carried
out under adequate conditions of safety;
d) they shall have the benefit of medical examinations;
e) their physical or mental health and integrity shall not be
endangered by any unjustified act or omission. Accordingly,
it is prohibited to subject the persons described in this
Article to any medical procedure which is not indicated by
the state of health of the person concerned, and which is not
consistent with the generally accepted medical standards
applied to free persons under similar medical
circumstances.
3. Persons who are not covered by paragraph 1 but whose
liberty has been restricted in any way whatsoever for
reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated
humanely in accordance with Article 4 and with
paragraphs 1 a), c) and d), and 2 b) of this Article.
4. If it is decided to release persons deprived of their liberty,
necessary measures to ensure their safety shall be taken by
those so deciding.

Article 6 — Penal prosecutions
This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of
criminal offences related to the armed conflict.
No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a
person found guilty of an offence except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality. In particular:
725
a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed

without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against
him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all
necessary rights and means of defence;
b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of
individual penal responsibility;
c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at
the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the
imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit
thereby;
d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law;
e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried
in his presence;
f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt.
A convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial
and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may
be exercised.
The death penalty shall not be pronounced on persons who were
under the age of eighteen years at the time of the offence and
shall not be carried out on pregnant women or mothers of young
children.
At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour
to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have
participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are
interned or detained. (Emphasis provided)
726
Furthermore, protection for the civilian population is

expressly provided for in Additional Protocol II:
Article 13 — Protection of the civilian population

The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations. To give effect to this protection, the following rules
shall be observed in all circumstances.
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.
Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Some have asserted that Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions belongs to the body of jus cogens
norms.27 Jus cogens norms under the Vienna Convention of
Law of the Treaties are “norm[s] accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as
[norms] from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”28
_______________
27 See Rafael Nieto-Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus
Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law’ (2001) <http://
www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf> pp. 24-26, accessed
on February 6, 2014. See also Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The Effect of Jus Cogens
Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the
Consequences?,’ vol. 18, no. 5 European Journal of International Law
(2007) <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/5/248.pdf> pp. 853-871, accessed on
February 6, 2014. Consider Ulf’s discussion on the proposition that IHL,
in relation to the right to self-defense and the right to use of force, has jus
cogens character, pp. 865-867.
28 Article 53. Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general
international law (“jus cogens”).
727
The principles embedded in Common Article 3 have been

held to apply even to international armed conflict, thus,
depicting a universal character.
It lays down fundamental standards which are applicable at all

times, in all circumstances and to all States and from which no
derogation at any time is permitted. As was stated, it “sets forth a
minimum core of mandatory rules [and], reflects the fundamental
humanitarian principles which underlie international
humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva
Conventions in their entirety are based. These principles, the
object of which is the respect for the dignity of the human
person, developed as a result of centuries of warfare and
had already become customary law at the time of the
adoption of the Geneva Conventions because they reflect
the most universally recognized humanitarian
29
principles.” (Emphasis provided)
Hence, nonobservance of the minimum standard

provided for in Common Article 3 triggers a violation of
well-accepted principles of international law.
In a similar vein, there exist international human rights
laws or IHRL (not necessarily belonging to international
humanitarian law) that are of jus cogens nature. Thus:
_______________
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
29 See Rafael Nieto-Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus
Cogens) and International Humanitarian Law’ (2001)
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf> p. 26,
accessed on February 6, 2014.
728
There is a consensus x x x about the jus cogens nature of a

number of prohibitions formulated in international human rights
law x x x. These include at a minimum the prohibition of
aggression, slavery and the slave trade, genocide x x x,
racial discrimination, apartheid and torture x x x, as well as
basic rules of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflict, and the right to self-determination.30 (Emphasis
provided)
International humanitarian law and international

human rights law are two sets of regimes in international
law. The two regimes have been compared and contrasted
with each other, to wit:
The two sets of rules certainly have a different history and often a
different field of application, both ratione personae and ratione
temporis. Human rights thus apply to all people and
humanitarian law applies to certain groups of persons (for
example, to the wounded, to prisoners o[f] war, to civilians) and,
furthermore, humanitarian law applies only in times of armed
conflict. On the other hand, ‘human rights’ and ‘humanitarian
law’ regulate, ratione materiae, similar rights at least insofar that
they all intend to increase the protection of individuals, alleviate
pain and suffering and secure the minimum standard of persons
in various situations.31 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, all persons are protected in both times of war and

peace. The protection accorded by human rights laws does
not cease to apply when armed conflict ensues.32 Still, some
“hu-
_______________
30 O. De Schutter, International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials,
Commentary 65 (2010).
31 I. Detter, The Law of War 160-161 (2nd edition, 2000).
32 See M. M. Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law 311-
312 (2005) citing the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
on the Legal Consequences of the Construc-
729
man rights” are allowed to be derogated in times of
“emergency which threatens the life of the nation.”33
Nevertheless, provisions on the right to life, prohibition
from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
slavery remain free from any derogation whatsoever,
having acquired a jus cogens character.34
We do not need to go further to determine whether these
norms form part of “generally accepted principles of
international law” to determine whether they are “part of
the law of the land.”35 At minimum, they have been
incorporated through statutory provisions.
Rep. Act No. 9851 defines and provides for the penalties
of crimes against humanity, serious violations of IHL,
genocide, and other crimes against humanity.36 This law
provides for
_______________
tion of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, ICJ Reports, 2004,
par. 106.
33 See Art. 4, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or
ICCPR.
34 I. Detter, The Law Of War 162 (2nd edition, 2000) citing Articles 6,
7, and 8 of the ICCPR.
35 Consti., Art. II, sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
(Emphasis provided)
36 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 4 (b). In case of a non-international
armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 to the four (4)
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts
committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms
and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any
other cause:
(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(2) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(3) Taking of hostages; and
730
the non-prescription of the prosecution of and execution of

sentences imposed with regard to the crimes defined in the
Act.37 It also provides for the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court over the crimes defined in the Act.38
These crimes are, therefore, separate from or
independent from the crime of rebellion even if they occur
on the occasion of or argued to be connected with the armed
uprisings.
Not only does the statute exist. Relevant to these cases
are the Declarations made by the Communist Party of the
Philip-
_______________
(4) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as
indispensable.
37 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 11. Non-prescription.—The crimes
defined and penalized under this Act, their prosecution, and the execution
of sentences imposed on their account, shall not be subject to any
prescription.
38 Rep. Act No. 9851 (2009), sec. 18. Philippine Courts, Prosecutors
and Investigators.—The Regional Trial Courts of the Philippines shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes punishable under
this Act. Their judgments may be appealed or elevated to the Court of
Appeals and to the Supreme Court as provided by law.
The Supreme Court shall designate special courts to try cases involving
crimes punishable under this Act. For these cases, the Commission on
Human Rights, the Department of Justice, the Philippine National Police
or other concerned law enforcement agencies shall designate prosecutors
or investigators as the case may be.
The State shall ensure that judges, prosecutors and investigators,
especially those designated for purposes of this Act, receive effective
training in human rights, International Humanitarian Law and
International Criminal Law.
See also the Rome Statute which the Philippines ratified on August 30,
2011. See par. 10 of the Preamble, Article 1, and Article 17 of the Rome
Statute regarding the International Criminal Court’s complementary
jurisdiction over a case when a State party is unwilling or unable to carry
out an investigation or prosecution.
731
pines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front or

CPP/NPA/NDF invoking the Geneva Conventions and its
1977 Additional Protocols.
One of these documents is the Declaration of Adherence
to International Humanitarian Law dated August 15, 1991,
whereby the National Democratic Front “formally
declare[d] its adherence to international humanitarian law,
especially Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions as
well as Protocol II additional to said conventions, in the
conduct of armed conflict in the Philippines.”39
We may take judicial notice that on July 5, 1996, the
National Democratic Front issued the Declaration of
Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Protocol I of 1977. The National Democratic Front stated
that:
Being a party to the armed conflict, civil war or war of

national liberation and authorized by the revolutionary
people and forces to represent them in diplomatic and
other international relations in the ongoing peace
negotiations with the GRP, we the National Democratic
Front of the Philippines hereby solemnly declare in good
faith to undertake to apply the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol I to the armed conflict in accordance with Article
96, paragraph 3 in relation to Article 1, paragraph 4 of
Protocol I.
The NDFP is rightfully and dutifully cognizant that this
declaration x x x shall have in relation to the armed
conflict with the GRP, the following effects:
_______________
39 Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Protocol I of 1977, National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights
Monitoring Committee, Annex D, 98 (Booklet Number 6, 2005).
732
a. the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are

brought into force for the NDFP as a Party to the
conflict with immediate effect;
b. the NDFP assumes the same rights and
obligations as those which have been assumed by a
High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol I; and
c. the Geneva Conventions and this Protocol are
equally binding upon all Parties to the conflict.40
(Emphasis in the original)

In addition, in the context of peace negotiations, it
appears that there is a Comprehensive Agreement on
Respect for Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) executed by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and
the CPP/NPA/NDF. This agreement establishes the
recognition of the existence, protection, and application of
human rights and principles of international humanitarian
law as well as provides the following rights and protections
to individuals by the CPP/NPA/NDF. The agreement partly
provides:
PART III
RESPECT FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS
Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties
shall adhere to and be bound by the principles and standards
embodied in international instruments on human rights.
Article 2. This Agreement seeks to confront, remedy and
prevent the most serious human rights violations in terms of civil
and political rights, as well as to uphold, protect and promote the
full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including:
_______________
40 Declaration of Undertaking to Apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Protocol I of 1977, National Democratic Front of the Philippines Human Rights
Monitoring Committee, Annex D, 12-13 (Booklet Number 6, 2005).
733
1. The right to self-determination of the Filipino nation by virtue

of which the people should fully and freely determine their
political status, pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, and dispose of their natural wealth and resources
for their own welfare and benefit towards genuine national
independence, democracy, social justice and development.
x x x x
3. The right of the victims and their families to seek justice for
violations of human rights, including adequate compensation
or indemnification, restitution and rehabilitation, and effective
sanctions and guarantees against repetition and impunity.
4. The right to life, especially against summary executions
(salvagings), involuntary disappearances, massacres
and indiscriminate bombardments of communities, and
the right not to be subjected to campaigns of incitement
to violence against one’s person.
xxxx
7. The right not to be subjected to physical or mental
torture, solitary confinement, rape and sexual abuse,
and other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment,
detention and punishment.
xxxx
9. The right to substantive and procedural due process, to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, and against self-
incrimination.
xxxx

PART IV
RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties to
the armed conflict shall adhere to and be
734
bound by the generally accepted principles and standards of

international humanitarian law.
Article 2. These principles and standards apply to the following
persons:
1. civilians or those taking no active part in the hostilities;
2. members of armed forces who have surrendered or laid down
their arms;
3. those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds or any other
cause;
4. persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to
the armed conflict; and,
5. relatives and duly authorized representatives of above-named
persons.
Article 3. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the persons
enumerated in the preceding Article 2:
1. violence to life and person, particularly killing or
causing injury, being subjected to physical or mental
torture, mutilation, corporal punishment, cruel or
degrading treatment and all acts of violence and
reprisals, including hostage-taking, and acts against the
physical well-being, dignity, political convictions and
other human rights;
2. holding anyone responsible for an act that she/he has not
committed and punishing anyone without complying with all
the requisites of due process;
3. requiring persons deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict to disclose information
other than their identity;
4. desecration of the remains of those who have died in
the course of the armed conflict or while under
detention, and breach of duty to
735
tender immediately such remains to their families or to

give them decent burial;
5. failure to report the identity, personal condition and
circumstances of a person deprived of his/her liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict to the Parties to
enable them to perform their duties and responsibilities
under this Agreement and under international
humanitarian law;
x x x x (Emphasis provided)

The CARHRIHL has provided a clear list of rights and
duties that the parties must observe in recognizing the
application of human rights and international
humanitarian laws. The CPP/NPA/NDF, parties to an
ongoing armed conflict and to which petitioners allegedly
belong, are required to observe, at the minimum, the
humane treatment of persons involved in the conflict,
whether hors de combat or a civilian.
In all these instruments, even spies are accorded
protection under Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II
are broad enough to secure fundamental guarantees to
persons not granted prisoner of war or civilian status, such
as protection from summary execution and right to fair
trial.41 These fundamental guarantees are also found in
Article 75, in relation to Articles 45 and 46 of Additional
Protocol I.42 Spies and civilians suspected of
_______________
41 See J. M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law 2363 (vol. II, 2005).
42 Additional Protocol I, however, pertains to the protection of victims
of international armed conflicts. Article 75 on Fundamental guarantees
provides:
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article
1 of this Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict
and who do not benefit from more favourable treatment under the
Conventions or under this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all
circumstances and
736
being spies are also accorded protection under Rep. Act No.
9851.A
_______________
shall enjoy, as a minimum, the protection provided by this Article
without any adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar
criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, honour, convictions
and religious practices of all such persons.
2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by
military agents:
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of
persons, in particular:
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to
the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he
understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken.
Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons
shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as
soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or
internment have ceased to exist.
A4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a
person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and
regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized
principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following:
737
IV
Concomitantly, persons committing crimes against

humanity orC serious violations of international
humanitarian law,
_______________
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed
without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him
and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all
necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of
individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
offence under the national or international law to which he was
subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time
when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission
of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be
tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to
examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
C(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party
for an offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or
convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the
same law and judicial procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have
the judgement pronounced publicly; and
738
international human rights laws, and Rep. Act No. 9851

must not be allowed to hide behind a doctrine crafted to
recognize the different nature of armed uprisings as a
result of political dissent. The contemporary view is that
these can never be considered as acts in furtherance of
armed conflict no matter what the motive. Incidentally,
this is the view also apparently shared by the
CPP/NPA/NDF and major insurgent groups that are part of
the present government’s peace process.
_______________
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his
judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which
they may be exercised.
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to
the armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated from men’s
quarters. They shall be under the immediate supervision of women.
Nevertheless, in cases where families are detained or interned, they
shall, whenever possible, be held in the same place and accommodated
as family units.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related
to the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article
until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the
end of the armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of
persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the
following principles shall apply:
(a) persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted
for the purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the
applicable rules of international law; and
(b) any such persons who do not benefit from more favourable
treatment under the Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded
the treatment provided by this Article, whether or not the crimes of
which they are accused constitute grave breaches of the
Conventions or of this Protocol.
8. No provision of this Article may be construed as limiting or
infringing any other more favourable provision granting greater
protection, under any applicable rules of international law, to persons
covered by paragraph 1.
739
We, therefore, should nuance our interpretation of what

will constitute rebellion.
The rebel, in his or her effort to assert a better view of
humanity, cannot negate himself or herself. Torture and
summary execution of enemies or allies are never acts of
courage. They demean those who sacrificed and those who
gave their lives so that others may live justly and enjoy the
blessings of more meaningful freedoms.
Torture and summary execution — in any context — are
shameful, naked brutal acts of those who may have simply
been transformed into desperate cowards. Those who may
have suffered or may have died because of these acts
deserve better than to be told that they did so in the hands
of a rebel.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur that these petitions be
dismissed and the Regional Trial Courts be directed to hear
the cases with due and deliberate dispatch taking these
views into consideration should the evidence so warrant.
Consolidated petitions dismissed.
Notes.—Courts retain the power to review findings of

prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a
mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of
discretion. (Tan, Jr. vs. Matsuura, 688 SCRA 263 [2013])
A judge is not bound by the resolution of the public
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation
and must himself ascertain from the latter’s findings and
supporting documents whether probable cause exists for
the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. (De Los Santos-
Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614 [2013])
——o0o——
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G.R. No. 176830. February 11, 2014.*

G.R. No. 185587. February 11, 2014.*

RANDALL B. ECHANIS, petitioner, vs. HON. THELMA

MERIN, in his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and

G.R. No. 185636. February 11, 2014.*

G.R. No. 190005. February 11, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary

mitted, and that it was the respondent who committed it.

resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution.

ing documents showing the existence of probable cause for the

which only the accused knows.—When the political offense

Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be

ratic Front, cannot be deemed to be acts in connection with or in

land and [adhere] to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,

international law.—International humanitarian law and

Same; Same; View that spies and civilians suspected of being

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

cise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this Court

The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of

witnesses.22 Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-

February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-

tioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as murder

Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral

Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial

On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a

lease shall be limited to the period of their actual

tigation and in the issuance of the

Otherwise, the investigating officer is bound to dismiss the

stating that he was in military custody from October 1976

In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows

before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As

in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to

As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a

Sec. 3. Period to appeal.—The appeal shall be taken within

Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution

existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of

x x x. The trial court’s exercise of its judicial discretion should

basis thereof forms a belief that the accused is probably

against petitioners prior to a de-

termination by the trial court that

the murders were committed in

Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes,

charge against the alleged top leaders of the

SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution.—A complaint or

Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—

tent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has

ment or until the termination of the proceedings before the

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,

“Some say freedom is relative. One man’s freedom is another man’s

As early as 1903, this court distinguished common

x x x [the execution] was not an isolated act such as a “political

In United States v. Pacheco,4 two men selling English

and, therefore, traitors to the revolutionary party to which the

Then in the landmark case of People v. Hernandez,6 this

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against

ion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of