G.R. No.

133547 December 7, 2001

HEIRS OF ANTONIO PAEL and ANDREA ALCANTARA and
CRISANTO PAEL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE H. CHIN and RENATO B.
MALLARI, respondents.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 133843 December 7, 2001
MARIA DESTURA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JORGE H. CHIN and RENATO B.
MALLARI, respondents.
RESOLUTION

existing doctrines on land registration and land titles.—Be that as it may,

it bears reiterating that the title of PFINA Properties, Inc., Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 186662, was irregularly and illegally issued. As
such, the reinstatement of the titles of private respondents was proper
and did not constitute a collateral attack on the title of PFINA. It should
be recalled that the transfer of title from the Heirs of Pael in favor of
PFINA was replete with badges of fraud and irregularities which rendered
nugatory and inoperative the existing doctrines on land registration and
land titles. More important, the Heirs of Pael had earlier disposed of their
rights. There was nothing to transfer to PFINA. The transfer was not only
fictitious, it was void.

Same; Corporation Law; A mining company has no valid grounds to

engage in the highly speculative business of urban real estate
development.—At the time PFINA acquired the disputed properties in
1983, its corporate name was PFINA Mining and Exploration, Inc., a
mining company which had no valid grounds to engage in the highly
speculative business of urban real estate development.
Evidence; Where there is no showing of error in the appreciation of facts
by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court treats them as conclusive.—
In the Decision, we affirmed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
because they are amply supported by the evidence on record. Well
established is the rule that if there is no showing of error in the
appreciation of facts by the Court of Appeals, this Court treats them as
conclusive. The conclusions of law which the Court of Appeals drew from
those facts are likewise accurate and convincing.

Land Titles; Actions; Intervention; Where any pronouncement by the

Supreme Court affecting properties in a case would create a cloud over a
person’s title, it has a right to intervene in the proceedings.—During the
pendency of the motions for reconsideration, the University of the
Philippines filed a motion for intervention, alleging that the properties
covered by TCT No. 52928 and No. 52929 in the name of respondents
Chin and Mallari form part of the vast tract of land that is the U.P.
Campus, which is registered in the name of U.P. under TCT No. 9462.
Therefore, any pronouncement by this Court affecting the properties
would create a cloud over U.P.’s title, for which reason it had a right to
intervene in these proceedings. While as a rule, the intervention of a new
party at this late stage should no longer be allowed, there is in the cases
at bar an inescapable issue waiting to be resolved, and which issue can be
taken up herein without the necessity of separate proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; In order to avoid the institution of new cases and
thus obviate further litigation, the Court deems it best to have any
conflict and dispute on the matter speedily resolved through an
intervention.— Considering the conflicting claims by U.P. and
respondents, the ascertainment of boundaries of the lands they
respectively claim becomes imperative. The instant cases have altogether
taken more than eight (8) years. Despite the exceedingly voluminous
records, the boundaries of the properties covered by the disputed titles
of respondents and the boundaries of the lands covered by the title of
U.P. are not discussed therein. In order to avoid the institution of new
cases and thus obviate further litigation, we deem it best to have any
conflict and dispute on this matter speedily resolved through an
intervention. Concomitantly, there is a need for reception of further
evidence which, however, can not be done before this Court. Hence, this
case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for reception of
evidence relevant to determining the boundaries of the conflicting claims
between U.P. and respondents Chin and Mallari over the property in
dispute.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For resolution are the Motions for Reconsideration of our Decision
dated February 10, 2000, filed by petitioners Heirs of Antonio Pael,
Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael in G.R. No. 133547, and
petitioner Maria Destura in G.R. No. 133843. Likewise, University of
the Philippines filed a motion for intervention.
It is at once apparent that no new issues are raised in the motions
for reconsideration. The arguments presented are a mere rehash of
what have been said and reiterated in the pleadings, all of which
have been considered and found without merit in the Decision now
assailed.
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the title of PFINA
Properties, Inc., Transfer Certificate of Title No. 186662, was
irregularly and illegally issued. As such, the reinstatement of the
titles of private respondents was proper and did not constitute a
collateral attack on the title of PFINA. It should be recalled that the
transfer of title from the Heirs of Pael in favor of PFINA was replete
with badges of fraud and irregularities which rendered nugatory and
inoperative the existing doctrines on land registration and land
titles. More important, the Heirs of Pael had earlier disposed of their
rights. There was nothing to transfer to PFINA. The transfer was
not only fictitious, it was void.
PFINA claims that it acquired the properties from the Heirs of Pael
by virtue of a deed of assignment dated January 25, 1983, hence, it
filed a motion to intervene before the Court of Appeals. It is worthy
to note, however, that before it filed its motion for intervention, or for
a long period of fifteen (15) years, PFINA and the Heirs of Pael
were totally silent about the alleged deed of assignment. No steps
were taken by either of them to register the deed or secure transfer
certificate of title evidencing the change of ownership during this
long period of time.
Furthermore, at the time PFINA acquired the disputed properties in
1983, its corporate name was PFINA Mining and Exploration, Inc.,
a mining company which had no valid grounds to engage in the
highly speculative business of urban real estate development.
Both the decisions of the Court of Appeals and this Court show that
the alleged transfer in 1983 was not only dubious and fabricated; it
could produce no legal effect. As stated above, the Paels were no
longer owners of the land they allegedly assigned.
In the Decision, we affirmed the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals because they are amply supported by the evidence on
record. Well established is the rule that if there is no showing of
error in the appreciation of facts by the Court of Appeals, this Court
treats them as conclusive. The conclusions of law which the Court
of Appeals drew from those facts are likewise accurate and
convincing.
Insofar as the original parties in G.R. Nos. 133547 and 133843 are
concerned, the motions for reconsideration are, therefore, denied
with finality. No further pleadings from them will be entertained.
During the pendency of the motions for reconsideration, the
University of the Philippines filed a motion for intervention, alleging
that the properties covered by TCT No. 52928 and No. 52929 in the
name of respondents Chin and Mallari form part of the vast tract of
land that is the U.P. Campus, which is registered in the name of
U.P. under TCT No. 9462. Therefore, any pronouncement by this
Court affecting the properties would create a cloud over U.P.’s title,
for which reason it had a right to intervene in these proceedings.
While as a rule, the intervention of a new party at this late stage
should no longer be allowed, there is in the cases at bar an
inescapable issue waiting to be resolved, and which issue can be
taken up herein without the necessity of separate proceedings.
In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals,1 this Court stated:
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose
and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure
is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and
promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain
that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict
application of the rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the
alleged failure of, movants, to their successors-in-interest and
to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open
the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors’ claims be proven to be true. For it cannot be
gainsaid that if the petition for reconstitution is finally granted,
the chaos and confusion arising from a situation where the
 certificates of title of the movants covering large areas of land
overlap or encroach on properties the title to which is being
sought to be reconstituted by private respondent, who herself
indicates in her Opposition that, according to the Director of
Lands, the overlapping embraces some 87 hectares only, is
certain and inevitable. xxx xxx xxx.
Likewise in the case of Mago v. Court of Appeals,2 it was held:
These matters should have been taken into account by the
courts a quo for being of utmost importance in ruling on
petitioners’ motion for intervention. The permissive tenor of the
provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the same. But needless to say, this discretion
should be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of
all the circumstances obtaining in the case.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the
technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for
relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene
arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to
petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property
cannot be disputed. It must be stressed that the trial court
granted private respondent’s petition for prohibition with
injunction without petitioners being impleaded, in total
disregard of their right to be heard, when on the face of the
resolution of the Community Relations and Information Office
(CRIO) sought to be enjoined, petitioners were the ones
directly to be affected. We need not belabor the point that
petitioners are indeed indispensable parties with such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting,
nay injuring, such interest.
Therefore, notwithstanding its belated filing, the motion for
intervention of U.P. is granted, albeit the adjudication thereof shall
be limited to a determination of the alleged overlapping or
encroachment between U.P.’s title, on the one hand, and
respondents’ TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, on the other hand.
In its comment, intervenor U.P. cites several cases decided by this
Court wherein its title to the property contested in these cases has
long been upheld, namely:
1) Tiburcio v. PHHC and U.P., 106 Phil. 477;
2) Galvez and Tiburcio v. Tuason, dela Paz, U.P. and PHHC,
10 SCRA 344;
3) PHHC and U.P. v. Mencias, 20 SCRA 1031;
4) Katigbak v. IAC, Director of Lands and U.P., G.R. No. L-
67414, December 7, 1988;
5) Varsity Hills, Inc. v. Mariano, 163 SCRA 132;
6) Roberto A. Pael, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
97277, April 15, 1992; and
7) Krus na Ligas Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. U.P.
and Office of the Presidential Legal Assistant, G.R. No.
107622, March 23, 1993.
Intervenor U.P. specifically cites the decision in Roberto A. Pael et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, wherein the title of the Paels
was declared to be of dubious origin and a fabrication. Hence,
since respondents derive their titles from a defective title, their titles
should also be null and void.
By way of historical backgrounder, intervenor U.P. narrates that its
titles previously covered by TCT No. 9462 emanated from a sale by
the Commonwealth of the Philippines to the University in 1949.
Prior to that, the U.P. title can be traced back to OCT No. 730 in the
name of Mariano Severo Tuason and others as early as 1914.
On the other hand, respondents Chin and Mallari contend that their
titles, TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929, cover lands which are outside of
the properties validly and legitimately owned by, and titled in the
name of, U.P. They claim that there is neither encroachment nor
overlapping.
Considering the conflicting claims by U.P. and respondents, the
ascertainment of boundaries of the lands they respectively claim
becomes imperative. The instant cases have altogether taken more
than eight (8) years. Despite the exceedingly voluminous records,
the boundaries of the properties covered by the disputed titles of
respondents and the boundaries of the lands covered by the title of
U.P. are not discussed therein. In order to avoid the institution of
new cases and thus obviate further litigation, we deem it best to
have any conflict and dispute on this matter speedily resolved
through an intervention. Concomitantly, there is a need for
reception of further evidence which, however, can not be done
before this Court. Hence, this case should be remanded to the
Court of Appeals for reception of evidence relevant to determining
the boundaries of the conflicting claims between U.P. and
respondents Chin and Mallari over the property in
dispute.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for intervention
of the University of the Philippines is GRANTED. The case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on
the conflicting claims over the property covered by TCT Nos. 52928
and 52929 between the intervernor University of the Philippines, on
the one hand, and respondents Jorge H. Chin and Renato B.
Mallari, on the other hand. The motions for reconsideration filed by
petitioners are DENIED for lack of merit. This denial is FINAL and
no further pleadings from petitioners will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, JJ., concur.

Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals, 371 SCRA 587, G.R. No.
133547, G.R. No. 133843 December 7, 2001