PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee.

vs.
NOEL ENOJAS, ARNOLD GOMEZ, FERNANDO SANTOS, ROGER
JALANDONI, Appellants.
FACTS:
1. The case involves murder charges against four individuals prosecuted for the shooting of a police officer
along Alabang-Zapote Road in Las Pinas City sometime in August 29, 2006.

2. It was PO2 Eduardo Gregorio’s testimony that at around 10:30 in the evening, he and P02 Francisco
Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a
taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near the crime scene
(Alabang-Zapote Road).

3. The officers having that suspicion approached the taxi and asked the driver, namely Noel Enojas (one
of the accused) with regard to his identification details. Enojas complied but the officers entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, and so they asked him to come with them to
the police station in their mobile car for further questioning, such command followed by Enojas.

4. On the way to the police station, the officers stopped at a 7/11 to use the restroom. PO2 Pangilinan went
into the store and apprehended two robbers, one of whom shot and killed him. Upon hearing the
gunshots, the PO2 Gregorio got out of the car and fired at an armed man running towards Pilar Village.
He also saw another man coming from Jollibee outlet while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. These men
were able to escape through taking a taxi.

5. Returning to the police car, he found that Enojas had fled the scene. PO2 Gregorio then radioed for help.
Later, the police searched his abandoned taxi car and found Enojas’ phone. They monitored the
messages on the phone and communicated with the other suspects, resulting in an entrapment
operation.

6. The defense continuously points out that they must be granted acquittal because: 1) THEY WERE
ILLEGALLY ARRESTED and 2) TEXT MESSAGES WERE INADMISSIBLE, NOT HAVING BEEN
PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.

ISSUES:
1) Can text messages be admissible as evidence?
2) Are the accused entitled to an acquittal on grounds that they were illegally arrested?

RULING:
1) YES. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are
to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with
the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and
to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was
competent to testify on them.
2) NO. Assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but
for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as
an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text messages to and from
the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
RCBC BANKARD SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
MOISES ORACION, JR. AND EMILY L. ORACION, Respondents
FACTS:
1) Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. and Emily L. Oracion applied for and were granted by petitioner
credit card accommodations with the issuance of a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum7 with on
December 2, 2010.8

2) Respondents on various dates used the credit card in purchasing different products but failed to pay
petitioner the total amount of ₱117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum
amount due under the credit card.

3) Petitioner, in its complaint, attached "duplicate original" copies of the Statements of Account from
April 17, 2011 to December 15, 2011 (SOAs) and the Credit History Inquiry.

4) Despite the receipt of the SOAs, respondents failed and refused to comply with their obligation to
petitioner under the credit card.13 

5) Consequently, petitioner sent a written demand letter to respondents but despite receipt thereof,
respondents refused to comply with their obligation to petitioner.

6) Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money dated February 7, 2012 before the MeTC. When
the spouses did not file their answer, the MeTC submitted the case for resolution.

7) The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed the complaint for failure of RCBC to
prove its case by preponderance of evidence, noting that it did not submit the original copies of the
documents attached to the complaint, in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.

8) On appeal to the RTC, the latter dismissed the appeal. It noted that the documents submitted by the
appellant were mere photocopies of the originals with the notation “duplicate originals”. Even the
signature appearing on the stamp marks were not originals (Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court). Even the “Manifestation” submitted by RCBC were photocopies of the annexes. Thus, the
RTC agreed with the MeTC that RCBC failed to comply with the Best Evidence Rule.

9) The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC and thus, the instant
petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. (Whether or not the annexes attached to the
complaint are electronic evidence.)

RULING:
1) On the first issue, petitioner invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules on Electronic Evidence
to justify its position that it has preponderantly proven its claim for unpaid obligation against
respondents because it had attached to its complaint electronic documents.

Petitioner argues that since electronic documents, which are computer-generated, accurately representing
information, data, figures and/or other modes of written expression, creating or extinguishing a right or obligation,
when directly printed out are considered original reproductions of the same, they are admissible under the Best
Evidence Rule. Petitioner explains that since the attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-
generated print-outs which it caused to be reproduced directly from the computer, they qualify as
 electronic documents which should be regarded as the equivalent of the original documents pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal before the Court and abandon its
theory in its appeal before the RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules, petitioner may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below
and is within the issues framed by the parties.

Even in the complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the annexes to be considered as
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If such were petitioner’s intention,
then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis for their introduction and admission as electronic
documents.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings
before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal.Clearly, petitioner, by its acts and
representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not duplicate
original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to switch theories.

Thus, procedurally, the Court is precluded from resolving the first issue.

Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the Court
cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed electronic
documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are considered functional equivalent
of paper-based documents and regarded as the equivalent of original documents under the Best
Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility.

According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “[a]n electronic document is admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is
authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.”

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents.
Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein.

Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an
electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the
affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to
testify on the matters contained therein.

Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it
failed to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of
evidence. As earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint)
was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-
based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as
electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.

Even the section on “Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule” of Rule 8 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence requires authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness:

SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts,
events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time
of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular
course or conduct of a business activity, and such was the regular practice to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation by electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of
the custodian or other qualified witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person, the
said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and excepted
from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint fall within the Rule
on Hearsay Evidence and are to be excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules.

In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They correctly
regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit History
Inquiry, and not necessarily the original thereof. Being substitutionary documents, they could not
be given probative value and are inadmissible based on the Best Evidence Rule.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence identify
the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:

(1) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(2) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or
near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
(3) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall
be regarded as the equivalent of the original.

Apparently, “duplicate original copies” or “multiple original copies” wherein two or more copies are
executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3 above. If the
copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a “print-out or output” based on the
definition of an electronic document, or a “counterpart” based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.

It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)

Going back to the documents in question, the fact that a stamp with the markings:
DUPLICATE ORIGINAL
(Sgd.)
CHARITO O. HAM
Senior Manager
Collection Support Division Head
Collection group
Bankard Inc.

was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry did not make
them “duplicate original copies” as described above. The necessary allegations to qualify them as
“duplicate original copies” must be stated in the complaint and duly supported by the pertinent
affidavit of the qualified person.

The Court observes that based on the records of the case, only the signature in the stamp at the bottom
of the Credit History Inquiry appears to be original. The signatures of the “certifying” person in the SOAs
are not original but part of the stamp. Thus, even if all the signatures of Charito O. Ham, Senior
Manager, Collection Support Division Head of petitioner’s Collection Group are original, the required
authentication so that the annexes to the complaint can be considered as “duplicate original copies” will
still be lacking.

If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the proper allegations
should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of authentication as “print-outs”,
“outputs” or “counterparts” should have been complied with.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner.
vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
1) MCC Industrial Sales (MCC) is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading
company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines.

2) The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel
product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the
faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.

3) Ssangyong filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against MCC before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract
when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT
of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

4) After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was
based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the
best evidence the original fax transmittal.

5) On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence
since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules.

6) Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUES:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and
admissible as such?

RULING:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately
(Section 1, Rule 4 on Rules on Electronic Evidence). Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic
data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers
to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in
the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the
provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the
term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic data message,” which
excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s
focus on “paperless” communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile
transmissions are not, in this sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned,
sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless environment,
technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all
respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which,
as aforesaid, is interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions,
which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two
copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future
developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms
of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer
development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
“electronic data message.”

[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.