RCBC VS ORACION JR. (G.R. NO.

223274 JUNE 19, 2019)

RCBC Bankard Services Corporation vs Moises Oracion Jr and Emily

J. Caguioa

Facts:

Respondents Moises Oracion, Jr. (Moises) and Emily L. Oracion (Emily) (collectively,
respondents) applied for and was issued a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum (credit card)
on December 2, 2010 which was used on various dates but they failed to pay petitioner the
total amount of ₱117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum
amount due under the credit card despite the receipt of the SOAs and a written demand
letter dated January 26, 2012. Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money dated
February 7, 2012 before the MeTC attaching therewith as annexes the statement of account
as well as the demand letter.

The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed it on the ground that
petitioner, as the plaintiff, failed to discharge the required burden of proof in a civil case,
which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence justifying that the signature in
the attachments in support of the complaint are mere photocopies, stamp mark and that the
Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as stamp mark, as long as the original evidence can be
had. Absent a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be
produced in court; the photocopies must be disregarded being unworthy of any probative
value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence (PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILO MARCOS, respondents, G.R. No 127469
2004 Jan 15, 1st Division).

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated December 17, 2012 on the ground that the MeTC
Decision was contrary to the facts and law. In its Memorandum for Appellant, dated February
19, 2012, petitioner argued that what it attached to the complaint were the “duplicate
original copies” and not mere photocopies. Petitioner also argued that: x x x [if for] unknown
reasons or events the said Duplicate Original Copies were no longer found in the record of
the court or that the copy of the Complaint intended for the court, where these Originals
were attached, was not forwarded to the x x x MTC, [petitioner] respectfully submits that
justice and equity dictates that the x x x MTC should have required [petitioner] to produce or
reproduce the same instead of immediately dismissing the case on that ground alone. In
which case, a clarificatory hearing for that purpose is proper. This is especially true in the
present case considering that there were allegations in the complaint that the Duplicate
Original Copies were attached as annexes therein; and that the x x x MTC motu proprio
submitted the case for decision. Not to mention the fact that these documents are computer
generated reports, in which case, [petitioner] could simply present another set of printed
Duplicate Original Copies for the x x x MTC[‘s] perusal. The RTC found petitioner’s appeal to
be without merit.

The Court's Ruling

On the first issue, petitioner invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules on Electronic Evidence
to justify its position that it has preponderantly proven its claim for unpaid obligation against
respondents because it had attached to its complaint electronic documents. Petitioner argues that
since electronic documents, which are computer-generated, accurately representing information,
data, figures and/or other modes of written expression, creating or extinguishing a right or obligation,
when directly printed out are considered original reproductions of the same, they are admissible
under the Best Evidence Rule. Petitioner explains that since the attachments to its complaint are
wholly computer-generated print-outs which it caused to be reproduced directly from the computer,
they qualify as electronic documents which should be regarded as the equivalent of the original
documents pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal before the Court and abandon its
theory in its appeal before the RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules, petitioner may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below
and is within the issues framed by the parties.

In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not raise the Rules on
Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called "duplicate original copies" of the SOAs and Credit
History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted that they were duplicate original copies,
being computer-generated reports, and not mere photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found
by the MeTC. As observed by the RTC, petitioner even tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to
its complaint, by filing a Manifestation dated August 9, 2012 wherein it attached copies of the said
annexes. Unfortunately, as observed by the RTC, the attachments to the said Manifestation "are
merely photocopies of the annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp
marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp marks" that were placed in the annexes to the
complaint. Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before the RTC, it
may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.

Even in the complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the annexes to be considered as
electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If such were petitioner's
intention, then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis for their introduction and admission
as electronic documents.

Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings
before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. Clearly, petitioner, by its acts and
representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not duplicate original
copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for petitioner to switch theories.

Thus, procedurally, the Court is precluded from resolving the first issue.

Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles, the Court
cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are indeed electronic
documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are considered functional
equivalent of paper-based documents and regarded as the equivalent of original documents under
the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.

For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility.
According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic document is
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court
and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules."

Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic
documents. Section 1 of Rule 5 imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document
in any legal proceeding the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein. Section
2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required proof of authentication:

SEC. 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides:

SECTION 1. Affidavit of evidence. - All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of
an electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge
of the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of
the affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.

Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed
to authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. As
earlier pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to
have the annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-
based documents. Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible
as electronic documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.

Even the section on "Business Records as Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence requires authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness:

SECTION 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. - A memorandum, report, record or data compilation
of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar
means at or near the time of or from transmission or supply of information by a person with
knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a business activity, and such was
the regular practice to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by electronic,
optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witnesses, is excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.

In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other qualified person,
the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as business records and
excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence. Consequently, the annexes to the complaint fall within
the Rule on Hearsay Evidence and are to be excluded pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules.

In fine, both the MeTC and the RTC correctly applied the Best Evidence Rule. They correctly
regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit History
Inquiry, and not necessarily the original thereof. Being substitutionary documents, they could not be
given probative value and are inadmissible based on the Best Evidence Rule.

The Best Evidence Rule, which requires the presentation of the original document, is unmistakable:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. (2a)

With respect to paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original writing,
instrument, deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which are the subject of
the inquiry. Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is regarded as the
functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. As defined, "electronic
document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or
an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically; and it includes
digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The term "electronic
document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message" and the latter refers to
information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.

Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence identify
the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded as originals:

[1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical
contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.

[2] When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or
near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.

[3] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other
equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be
regarded as the equivalent of the original.

Apparently, "duplicate original copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more copies are
executed at or about the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3 above. If the
copy is generated after the original is executed, it may be called a "print-out or output" based on the
definition of an electronic document, or a "counterpart" based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be allowed
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules, which provides:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated. (4a)

Going back to the documents in question, the fact that a stamp with the markings:

DUPLICATE ORIGINAL

(Sgd.)
CHARITO O. HAM
Senior Manager
Collection Support Division Head

Collection group
Bankard Inc.

was placed at the right bottom of each page of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry did not
make them "duplicate original copies" as described above. The necessary allegations to qualify
them as "duplicate original copies" must be stated in the complaint and duly supported by the
pertinent affidavit of the qualified person.

The Court observes that based on the records of the case, only the signature in the stamp at the
bottom of the Credit History Inquiry appears to be original. The signatures of the "certifying" person
in the SOAs are not original but part of the stamp. Thus, even if all the signatures of Charito O. Ham,
Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head of petitioner's Collection Group are original, the
required authentication so that the annexes to the complaint can be considered as "duplicate original
copies" will still be lacking.

If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as electronic documents, then the proper
allegations should have been made in the complaint and the required proof of authentication as
"print-outs", "outputs" or "counterparts" should have been complied with.

The Court is aware that the instant case was considered to be governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, which does not expressly require that the affidavits of the witness must accompany the
complaint or the answer and it is only after the receipt of the order in connection with the preliminary
conference and within 10 days therefrom, wherein the parties are required to submit the affidavits of
the parties' witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with
their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Given the nature of the documents that petitioner needed to adduce in order to prove its cause of
action, it would have been prudent on the part of its lawyer, to make the necessary allegations in the
complaint and attach thereto the required accompanying affidavits to lay the foundation for their
admission as evidence in conformity with the Best Evidence Rule.
This prudent or cautionary action may avert a dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence, as what happened in this case, when the court acts pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and
attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to
the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

As provided in the said Section, the judgment that is to be rendered is that which is "warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint" and such facts must be duly established in accordance with the
Rules on Evidence.

Upon a perusal of the items in the SOAs, the claim of petitioner against respondents is less than
₱100,000.00, if the late charges and interest charges are deducted from the total claim of
₱117,157.98. Given that the action filed by petitioner is for payment of money where the value of the
claim does not exceed ₱100,000.00 (the jurisdictional amount when the complaint was filed in
January 2013), exclusive of interest and costs, petitioner could have opted to prosecute its cause
under the Revised Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases (Revised Rules for Small Claims).

Section 6 of the Revised Rules for Small Claims provides: "A small claims action is commenced by
filing with the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate,
accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action, and
Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the actionable
document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other evidence to support
the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was not attached to or submitted
together with the Statement of Claim, unless good cause is shown for the admission of additional
evidence."

If petitioner took this option, then it would have been incumbent upon it to attach to its Statement of
Claim even the affidavits of its witnesses. If that was the option that petitioner took, then maybe its
complaint might not have been dismissed for lack of preponderance of evidence. Unfortunately,
petitioner included the late and interest charges in its claim and prosecuted its cause under the Rule
on Summary Procedure.

Proceeding to the second issue, petitioner begs for the relaxation of the application of the Rules on
Evidence and seeks the Court's equity jurisdiction.

Firstly, petitioner cannot, on one hand, seek the review of its case by the Court on a pure question of
law and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant its Petition, nonetheless. For the
Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be presented to justify the same. A review
on a pure question of law necessarily negates the review of facts.

Petitioner has not presented any compelling equitable arguments to persuade the Court to relax the
application of elementary evidentiary rules in its cause.

Secondly, petitioner has not been candid in admitting its error as pointed out by both the MeTC and
the RTC. After being apprised that the annexes to its complaint do not conform to the Best Evidence
Rule, petitioner did not make any effort to comply so that the lower courts could have considered its
claim. Rather, it persisted in insisting that the annexes are compliant. Even before the Court,
petitioner did not even attach such documents which would convince the Court that
petitioner could adduce the original documents as required by the Best Evidence Rule to
prove its claim against respondents.

A Final Note

The present Petition is clearly a frivolous appeal. An appeal is frivolous if it presents no justiciable
question and is so readily recognizable as devoid of any merit on the face of the record that there is
little, if any, prospect that it can ever succeed. The Petition indubitably shows the counsel's frantic
search for any ground to resuscitate petitioner's lost cause, which due to the counsel's fault was
doomed with the filing of a deficient complaint. Thus, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 142 of the Rules
the imposition of treble costs on petitioner, to be paid by its counsel, is justified.