l\.

epuhlir of tbe flbilippines

~upreme <!Court
;fflanila

SECOND DIVISION

PACIFIC ROYAL BASIC G.R. No. 202392

FOODS, INC.,
Petitioner,
Present:

versus PERLAS-BERNABE, SAJ,

Chairperson,
HERNANDO,
VIOLETA NOCHE, JULIAN.A INTING,
L. ABRIGUNDA, CRISANTAA. GAERLAN, and
TALAVERA, MA. ASUNCION DIMAAMPAO, JJ.
A. ARGUELLES, CIRIACA A.
VELASCO, SEVERA B.
QUITAIN, ROSALINDA
BALAHADIA, ANICIA DAGLE,
NORMA K. PLATA, ZENAIDA
B. BULAH.AN and SUSANA D.
AMPARO,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------- --------------- ---------- - - - X

DECISION

HERNANDO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the December 28, 2011
Decision2 and the June 25, 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 112840.

1
Rollo, pp. 9-50.
2 'Id. at 52-65. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of the Court) and
concurred in by Associate Justices Priscilia J. Balrazar-Padilla (now a retired Member of the Court) and
Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
Id. at 67.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 202392

Th,; Antecedents:

Petitioner Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) is a business entity

engaged in the manufacturi11g, processing, and distribution of coconut
products for export.

PRBFI employed respondents Violeta Noche, Juliana L. Abrigunda,

Crisanta A. Talavera, Ma. Asuncion A. Arguelles, Ciriaca A. Velasco,4 Severa
B. Quitain, Rosalinda Balahadia, An.icia Dagle, Norma K. Plata, Zenaida B.
Bulah.an, and Susana D. Amparo (herein individually referred to by their last
names and collectively as respondents) as coconut parers.

On March 14, 2007, respondents filed a complaint for non-regula_rization

wit..h the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Quezon Field
Office. 5 They anchored their complaint for non-regularization on PRBFI's
supposed failure to regularize their employment despite the length of time that
they had been working for PRBFI.

On March 20, 2009, allegedly acting on prodU(;t quality complaints and

claims for reimbursement and damages from some of its clients, PRBFI sent
letters signed by one R.V. Macaraig, PRBFI's Production Manager, to
respondents. These letters were similarly-worded in the vernacular as follows:

Samantalang may mga huling pangyayari ukol sa kontaminasyon ng

ating produkto, mangyart sanang sa nalooban ng 24 oras pagkatanggap ng
sulat na ito, iyong bigyang linaw ./c,.,mg bakit hindi ka dapat lapatan ng
kaukulang aksyon ukol dito.

Pansamantala ika:w ay hindi muna naming papapasukin sa loob ng

Paga:waan ng labinlimang (15) araw simula sa araw na ito habang masusing
pinag-aaralan ang mga nabanggit. 6

In their joint answer to PRBFI's letters,7 respondents Abrigunda,

Talavera, Arguelles, and Velasco denied involvement in the product
contamination incident. They wrote in their March 21, 2007 letter:

Kami po xx x ay binibigyan o nais lapatan ng fobinlimang araw (15) na

suspension ng kontaminasyon ng ating produkto. Wala po kaming kinalaman o
maaaring gawin na gan/to dahil sa mga sumusunod na dahilan:

Una, mahal ko po ang ating pabrikang ito sapagkat sa mahabang

panahon IT)' dito ako kumukuha ng ikinabubuhay; sampu ng aking pamilya.

4
Referred to as Ceriaca Velasco in ether pa.,'is of the case record.
Roilo, p. 177.
6 id. at 104-ll5.
7
Id. at 197.
Decision 3 G:R. No. 202392

Ikalawa, sa amin pong pagkakaunawa hindi po sa aming seksyon

nagmumula ang kontaminasyon sapagkat mula sa amin ay mararni pang
proseso ang pinagdadaanan ng produkto.

Ikatlo. Kung mayroon mang ganitong pangyayari, ito po cy pananagutan

ng mga taong nakatalaga sa mga seksyong may kritikal o sensitibong
gumagawa.

Kaya batay po sa mga dahilang ito ay hindi makatarungan ang

pagsuspende sa amin sarnpu ng arning mga kasamahan.

Hinihiling naming ang isang masusing pag iimbestiga at palabasin ang

mga tunay na dahiian sa mga pangycryaring ito, 8

Velasco, Quitain, and Amparo sent a handwritten joint reply dated March
23, 2007, identically-phrased as t.lie above letter but wit.11 t.½.e following
additional assertions.

DAGDAG PALTWANAG:

Bakit po sa dami darning parer dito sa pagawaan ay kami lamang tatlo (3) ang
nabigyan ng suspended [sic], Bakit at ano ang basihan kung bakit ang aming
pangalan ang napili. 9

Respondents Noche, Balahadia, Dagle, Plata, and Bulah.an were not

shown to have responded to the accusations.

On April 27, 2007, PRBFI dismissed respondents from work. The

termination letters, signed by one \Villiarn Y. Gaw, PRBFI's Resident
Manager, all stated:

Una na naming ipinabatid sa inyo ang reklama tungkol sa kantaminasyon

ng ating mga produkto sa ating Pagcrwaan. Isa kayo sa mga taong
pinaghinalaan na may kagagawan nito na isang mabigat na pa,gkakamali na
maaring ipataw sa inyo bilang kapcwusahan ay pagkatiwalag sa Kompanya.

J,,fasusi naming pinag-aralan ang iyong kaugnayan sa pinakahuling

pangyayari ng kontaminasyon dito sa ating Pagawaan. Lubhang nabahala ang
ating Kompanya ukol sa kawalang interes mong unawain ang mga pangyayari
at makipagtulungan para bigyan ng linaw ito. Una na sanang nangyari na ikaw
cy magbigay ng detalyeng paliwanag, subalit, pilit mong inilcr;o ang iyong
kaugnayan at hindi din k:usang nakipaugnayan sa aming tanggapan.

Tinanggap naming ang iyong liha,m paliwanag ukol sa iyong naging

suspension sa trq,baho kaugnay ng mga pangyayaring kontaminasyon ng ating
pradukto at sa one-on-one interview na naganap sa iyo ng ating HR & Ad!nin
Officer ay nagpapatibay lamang na may kaugnayan ka sa masamang intensyon
laban sa Kompan;ya, guluhin ang operasyon nito at malisyosong sinadya ang
kontaminasyon at paninira sa ating mga produkto.

8 Id.
9
Id. at 198.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 202392

Dahil sa iyong kapabayaan, hindi paghain ng katibayan upang tumulong

sa paglutas ng problema at hindi pagsunod sa alituntunin ng Kompanya ay
napilitan ang Pangasiwaan na aksiyunan ang reklamo sa inyo sa pamamagitan
ng isang masusing pag-aaral at mga pagtingin sa mga huling kaganapan.

Sanhi ng mga nabanggit, ang Kompanya ay nawalan na ng pagtitiwala at

pananalig sa iyo. Sa layuning mapangalagaan ang interes ng higit sa
nakararami dito sa ating Paga:waan, ildnalulungkot kong ipabatid sa iyo na
ikaw ay aming itinitiwalag sa tungkuling simula sa ara-.,v na ito. 10

On April 23, 2007, respondents filed a complaint against PRBFI for

illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, regularization, damages, and
reinstatement before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
Regional Arbitration Branch IV.

In their Position Paper, respondents averred that they were dismissed

from work without a prior investigation or an opportunity to air their side.
Respondents claimed that their suspension and eventual dismissal from work
was PRBFI's retaliatory measure against respondents' complaint for non-
regularization and was violative of Article 118 of the Labor Code. They
further asserted that PRBFI violated their security of tenure as regular
employees, whose employment may only be termi.TJ.ated for just or authorized
causes under the Labor Code.

Respondents also raised the lack of basis of their dismissal due to loss of
trust and confidence, as this ground refers to managerial and confidential
employees and respondents were only rank-and-file workers of PRBFI. They
were also allegedly never paid the benefits extended to regular employees
despite their entitlement thereto. Respondents sought rei.ristatement to their
former positions in PRBFI ,vi.th full backwages and without loss of seniority
rights, and payment of the benefits enjoyed by regular employees. They also
prayed for payment of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, a.rid attorney's
fees.

PRBFI maintained that respondents were properly and correctly

dismissed from employment. It posited that its actions were propelled by a
hand,vritten letter dated March 15, 2007, allegedly sent to them anonymously
by one of their workers, which reads:

Sa Management ni Mr Gaw.

Pagbati ng magandang araw po. Bilang isa sa inyong manggagawa nais

ko kayong bigyang babala sa ilang tauhan ninyo na nagpaplanong pa bagsakin
ang kompanya. A1insan ko pong narinig ang usapang sirain and produksyon ng
turno mi Visora. !sang grupo ng parer na magkakapatid sa pangunguna ng
kasamang balo tubong Sariaya, ay inyong manmanan.

10 Id. at 116-126.
Decision 5 CiR. No. 202392

Mabuti na lamang at hindi sila sinang ayunan ng kapatid nila na asawa

ng dati ninyong poremang namatay.

Sir, nagmamalasakit Zang po.

Manggagawa din. 11

Per PRBFI, thirteen (13) coconut parers, including the eleven (11)
respondents herein, were thus subjected to an administrative investigation on
the product contamination incident. PRBFI mai.r1tained that letters were sent to
the suspected employees to explain their involvement in the incident. They
have been allegedly interviewed by one Veronica Aquino, PRBFI' s Human
Resource and Administrative Officer. After investigation and upon
respondents' failure to explain their side despite opportur1ities for them to do
so, PRBFI terminated their employment. Respondents were sent their
respective termination letters. PRBFI claimed that respondents were
subsequently dismissed for just causes, i.e., serious misconduct, willful
disobedience, and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by
PRBFI, since as coconut parers, they were employees who held positions of
trust and confidence affecting the entire coconut processing system of PRBFL

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:

The Labor Arbiter ruled for the respondents. In finding respondents to

have been illegally dismissed, the Labor Arbiter held that PRBFI had no just
cause for their dismissal. PRBFI showed no factual bases for or specific
circumstances of the infractions allegedly committed by respondents. The
latter were likewise not afforded procedural due process. In the first set of
letters sent to them, they were not informed of and given opportunity to
explain their alleged violation of company policies and regulations on quality
control, poor work performance, and repeated defia.'1ce of lawful orders of
their supervisors.

Thus, the Labor Arbiter declared respondents entitled to reinstatement to

their former positions in PRBFI, payment of full backwages and other
benefits, and enjoyment of seniority rights and privileges. They were also
awarded their wages corresponding to the period of their preventive
suspension, the same having been found u_rilawful for respondents' lack of
involvement in the accusations against them.

The Labor .Arbiter further found respondents to be regular employees of

PRBFI, agreeing with (fie DOLE Region IV-A.'s May 2, 2007 Order12 on the
complaint for non-regularization, since respondents "are regular extras, having
rendered more tha..11 one (1) year of service" 13 for PRBFI.

11 Id. at 102.
12 Per the Labor Arbiter's Decision dated April 28, 2008, rollo, p. 245; copy of the DOLE Region IV-A
Order appended as Annex I to PRBFI's Memonmdum of Appeai before the NLRC, rollo, p. 418.
13 Rollo, p. 245.
Decision 6 G:R. No. 202392

The Labor Arbiter also granted attorney's fees to respondents as they

were forced to litigate their cause. Respondents' ciaims for moral and
exemplary damages, however, were denied for lack of substantiating proof.

The Labor Arbiter disposed of respondents' complaint in his April 28,

2008 Decision, 14 as follows:

\VHEREFORE, premises considered, Complainants Violeta Noche,

Juliana L. Abrigunda, Crisanta A. Talavera. Ma. Asuncion A. Arguelles, Ciriaca
A. Velasco, Severa Quitain, Rosalinda Balahadia, Anicia Dagle, Norma K.
Plata, Zenaida B. Bulahan and Susana D. Amparo are declared illegally
dismissed. Hence, Respondent Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. is DIRECTED
to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
privileges and to pay them full backwages and other benefits from the date of
their dismissal up to the date of their actual reinstatement. Respondent
Company is likewise ORDERED to pay Complainants their wages
corresponding to the fifteen (15)-day period of their illegal preventive
suspensions and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their
awarded monetary claims.

Such awarded claims are computed as follow[s]:

Violeta Noche
Backwages:
From 3/27/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.08= P84,576.96
15 days wages (illegal suspension)
P251 x 15 = P3.765.00 P88.341.96

Juliana Abrigunda
Backwages:
From 3/21/07 to 4/28/08
P251 X 26 X 12 X 1.02 = P79,878.24
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3.765.00 P83,643.24

Crisanta Talavera
[Backwages]:
From 3/20/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.10= P86,143.20
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P89,908.20

Ma. Asuncion Arguelles:

Backwages:
From 3/20/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.10= P86,143.20
15 days wages:
P25i X 15 = P3,765.00 P89,908.20

Ciriaca Velasco
Backwages:

14 Id. at 233-248.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 202392

From 3/23 to 4/28/08

P251 x26x 12x 1.09= P85,360.08
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P89,125.08

Severa Quitain
Backwages:
From 3/23/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.09= P85,360.08
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3.765.00 P85,360.08

Rosalinda Balahadia
From 3/27/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.08= P84,576.96
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P88,341.96

Alicia Dagle
Backwages
From 3/27/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.08= P84,576.96
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P88,341.96

Norma Plata
Backwages
From 3/27/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.08= P84,576.96
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P88,341.96

Zenaida Bulahan
Backwages
From 3/27/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x 26 x 12 x 1.08 = P84,576.96
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3.765.00 P88,341.96

Susana Amparo
Backwages
From 3/23/07 to 4/28/08
P251 x26x 12x 1.01 = P79,095.12
15 days wages:
P251 x 15 = P3,765.00 P82,860.12

Subtotal P966,279.72

Attorney's Fees P966,279.72 x 10% = P96.627.97

Total Pl .062,907.69

Complainant[s'] claims for moral and exemplary damages are

DISMISSED for iack of merit.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 202392

so ORDERED. 15
PRBFI appealed to the N""LRC. It also filed an. Urgent Ex Parte Motion to
Reduce Bond 16 (1viotion to Reduce Bond) a..'1d tendered a cash bond in the
amou..11.t of Pl00,000.00. 17 In addition to its earlier arguments before the Labor
Arbiter, PRBFI accused respondents of forum shopping as to the issue of non-
regularization, since the same had been decided by the DOLE Region-IV-A in
its May 2, 2007 Order on respondents' complaint for non-regularization. 18

Respondents, aside from reiterating their position and earlier arguments,

assailed PRBFI's appeal for failure to post the required bond. 19

Ruling of the National Labor

Relations Commission:

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter. It held that respondents left the
fact of product contamination undisputed and failed to show any ill motive on
PRBFI's part in accusing t.'-J,em of having caused such contamination. The
NLRC discredited respondents' defense of mere denial of the allegations
against them. It took into consideration the difficulties of a food product
export industry, which demanded a higher degree of cooperation and concern
from the employees.

According to the J\1LRC, respondents were indifferent to such difficulties

of PRBFI. In fact, some of them would not even participate in the
investigation when they opted not to file their answers. The NLRC classified
respondents' conduct as gross negligence, as they were not new to their jobs
and were expected to know fully well the consequences of food product
contamination to the company, its employees, and the public health.

The NLRC declared in its May 29, 2009 Resolution: 20

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the labor arbiter dated 28 April 2008 is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED. 21

In its October 30, 2009 Resolution, 22 the NLRC de11ied respondents'

Motion for Reconsideration of its l'vfay 29, 2009 Resolution. 23

15 Id. at 245-248.
16 Id. at 569-575.
17
Id. at 605.
18 ld.at314.
19 Id. at470-477.
20 Id. at 478-486.
21
Id. at 485.
22 Id. at 507-508.
23
Id. at 487-505.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 202392

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. 24 They

imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the :N"LRC for entertaining
PRBFI's appeal, the requisite bond of which was posted only almost a month
after the appeal period had lapsed. Respondents also maintained that there was
no just or authorized cause for their dismissal, and that they were not given
any opportunity to confront their accusers as PRBFI merely relied on the
anonymous letter pointing at respondents to be the employees plotting the
sabotage of the company's operations.

PRBFI, in its Comment 25 to respondents' Petition for Certiorari,

asserted that it had filed a bond in the amount of Pl00,000.00 to perfect its
appeal before the NLRC. In tum, PRBFI questioned respondents' Petition for
Certiorari for being procedu..rally infirm due to its allegedly unnotarized
Amended Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping and non-
submission of other documents required by the CA. 26 It also stood by the
dispositions of the NLRC, stating th.at PRBFI presented substantial evidence
in establishing respondents' concerted actions against the company that
constituted serious misconduct. PRBFI also maintained that it proved the
factual and legal bases for its loss of trust and confidence i..7. respondents.
Likewise, in dismissing the latter, PRBFI stated that it complied with the twin
notice requirements. Thus, PRBFI posited that respondents were accorded
procedural and substantial due process and were validly dismissed from
employment as found by the l\TLRC.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

The CA granted respondents' Petition for Certiorari. It found that

PRBFI did not present any proof of compliance as to the required posting of
an appeal bond. Thus, PRBFI's appeal before the NLRC should have been
deemed not perfected, and the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over
PRBFI's appeal. \Vhile the J\TLRC did not resolve the procedural issue and
gave due course to PRBFI's appeai, the CA held t.h.at PRBFI cannot rely on the
presumption of regularity in the perfo1mance of official duties. On the merits,
the CA found no satisfactory basis in fact or in law to affirm the factual
findings of the NLRC.

The CA ruled in the following manner in its assailed December 28, 2011
Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRAJ¾"TED. Tne assailed May

29, 2009 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Aoril 28, 2008 Decision of the Labor
Arbiter is AFFIRT\1ED.

24 Id. at 509-534.
25
Id. at 535-551.
26 Id. at 535-537.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 202392

SO ORDERED. 27

In its June 25, 2012 Resolution, the CA lLk.ewise denied PRBFI's Motion
for Reconsideration of its December 28, 2011 Decision.

Hence, PRBFI's Petition for Review before this Court.

Issues

PRBFI raises the following issues -

A.

THE [CA] ERRED 1N RULING THAT THE [NLRC] ACTED "\>/ITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION Ac\10lJNTING TO LACK OF JURlSDICTION 1N
ENTERTAlNlNG AN APPEAL \VHICH WAS NOT DULY PERFECTED
WHEN IN TRUTH AND 1N FACT THE APPEAL WAS DULY PERFECTED
WITH THE POSTING OF A CASH BOND.

B.

THE [CA] VIAS CLEARLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS SUCH

Tff..AT IT SHOWED LIBERALITY TO THE LATTER BUT STRICTLY
APPLIED THE RULES AGAINST PETITIONER.

C.
THE [CA] COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LA\V IN HOLDING
THAT THE [NLRC] ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AMOlJNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF Tl'!E LABOR P.,RBITER.

D.

Th'E [CA] COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ADMITTING AJ."\!D

CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY PETITIO:N""ER
SHOWING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE LEGALLY DISMISSED.

TB..E [CA] ERRED IN REVERSTI.JG THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE [NLRC]

AND FAILING TO FIND THE FmDD.\fGS OF THE [NLRC] ARE BASED
ON SlJBSTANTIALEVIDENCEAND SHOULD BEAFFIR..MED [sic]. 28

Our Ruling

\Ve affirm the CA.'s ruling.

A petition for review on certiorari urider Ruie 45 of the Rules of Court

filed before the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law - questions on
27
Id. at 64-65.
28
Id. at 22-23.

7v
Decision 11 G:R. No. 202392

the application of the law on a certain set and state of established facts.
Questions of fact, or those seeking to verify the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts, will not be entertained. Essentially, a petition for review on certiorari
excludes a reassessment of the disputed facts of the case.

Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People 29 delineated the
parameters in the determination of whether a legal question raised is of law or
of fact:

For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an

examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants,
but must rely soleiy on what the law provides on the given set of facts. If the
facts are disputed or if the issues require an examination of the evidence, the
question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the appellation given to
a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can resolve the
issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in wJ:iich case, it is a
question oflaw; otherwise, it is a question of fact. 30

In assailing the CA's actions on the respective procedural obedience of

herein parties and its favorable appreciation of the argun1ents raised by
respondents, PRBFI necessarily prays the reopening of the factual records of
the case. PRBFI camiot do so in a Rule 45 proceeding. The Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts. Such a noble task is better left to the competence of the
trial courts and appellate courts.

Note, however, that this is not a.11 inflexible rule. A factual probe into the
case may be conducted in a Rule 45 petition if it falls under the exceptional
circumstances laid out by jurisprudence: (1) when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there
is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its fmdings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of bot_h appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the fmdii.1-gs of fact are conclusions -vvithout citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's main a..-id reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents; and (10) when the finding of fact of the Cou..rt of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record. 31 The case at hand does not fall under any of these
exceptions.

29 721 Phil. 760 (2013).

30 Id. at 767, citir,g Heirs a/Nicolas S. Cabigas v. Limbaco, G.R. No. 175291, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 643,
655.
31 Miano v. Manila Electric Ca., 800 Phil. i 18, i 23 (2016), citing Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil.
225, 232 (l 990).
Decision 12 G.R. No. 202392

Even if the Court lends procedural lenience to PRBFI and reviews the
factual circumstances of this case, the CA's judgment must still be upheld.

PRBFI first argues against the CA's act of allowing respondents' Petition
for Certiorari despite the latter's alleged failure to fully comply with the CA's
directive to submit additional supporti..'1g documents. Petitioner believes that
the petition should have been dismissed, but the CA i...r1stead unfairly gave due
course to the same.

The Court disagrees with petitioner.

Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court instructs that the failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the formal requirements of a petition for
certiorari shall be sufficient ground for its dismissal. The CA, however, is not
compelled to automatically order the dismissal of a formally-in.firm pleading.
Section 5, Rule 46 of the same Rules states:

SEC. 5. Action by the court. - The court may dismiss the petition outright
with specific reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a
comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice. xx x.

Two basic options are given to the CA under the foregoing provision: (1)
to dismiss the petition outright, wit.h. specific reasons, or (2) to require the
respondent to file a comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice.

The CA, however, holds a wide discretionary latitude in the disposition

of the cases filed before it and is not restricted to those provided under Section
5, Rule 46. It may make an initial determination of the necessity for the
submission of copies of pleading and other documents32 under the guidelines
provided by Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora: 33

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be
attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether t.li.e document in question will
support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will
make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the
court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it

need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also be
found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the
material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will s\Lffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is
attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case

record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon
showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it

31 Duremdes v. Jori/la, G.R. No. 234491, February 26, 2020.

33
529 Phil. 718 (2006).
Decision 13 G.R. No. 202392

will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits. 34 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In resolving respondents' Petition for Certiorari, the appellate court

exercised such judicial discretion by first instructing respondents to complete
the documentar; attachments. Respondents did so, albeit inaccurately. While
petitioner pointed out t..1-i.at respondents attached the allegedly wrong pleadings
to their Compliance, the CA noted the same, directed PRBFI to file a
Comment,35 and proceeded to decide respondents' Petition for Certiorari on
the merits.

Contrary to PRBFI's insinuations, the CA did not act arbitrarily. The CA

correctly relied on the available documents already submitted by the parties;
after all, litigants in a labor case must allege all their arguments and evidence
in their position papers and pleadings before 1he labor arbiter, and no other
argument or evidence will be considered oilier t.1.an those raised during the
proceedings before the labor arbiter.

It needs noting that there is no record of the existence of the document

alleged by PRBFI to have been omitted by respondents. Both the NLRC and
the CA never made mention of any Opposition to Complainants-Appellees'
Motion for Reconsideration supposedly filed by PRBFI. Neither did the
NLRC and the CA rely on th.is document in their respective disposition of the
cases before them. Only PRBFI claims to have actually filed t.'le same before
t.11.e NLRC - but even PRBFI itself had never bothered to append this
document to its Petition for Review before this Court. The Court is inclined to
view this missing docu..'Uent as a myth.

The Court affirms the CA's decision to gloss over 1he other technical
issues raised by PRBFI against respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the
CA, i.e., allegedly unnotarized Amended Verification and Certification and
lack of Affidavit of Service attached to respondents' Compliance36 to the CA
Resolution dated March 9, 2010. 37 These claims are unfounded. Per the CA
records, the A.'llended Verification and Certification was notarized, 38 and the
Affidavit of Service 39 required by the CA was attached to respondents'
Compliance.

Even if PRBFI was correct, such lapses are mere formal not jurisdictional,
errors. Labor cases have never been strictly bound by technicalities of form
and procedure. Also, a gran.t of liberality to one does not automatically
connote bias against the other party. An allegation of bias is a grave

34
Id. at 728.
35 Per CA Resolution dated April 30, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 112840; CA rollo, p. 196.
36 Id. at 118-119.
37 Id. at 116-117.
38
ld.atl20-12L
39 Id. at 133.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 202392

accusation that requires proof, and there can be no bias ascribable upon a
tribunal if its actions were clearly done in accordance with the law.

PRBFI further insists that t..he CA erred in considering its appeal of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision before the NLRC as not perfected for its failure to
file a bond. Petitioner asserts the sufficiency of its payment of a cash bond in
the amount of Pl 00,000.00 and its filing of a Motion to Reduce Bond, in
which claimed corporate financial difficulties, simultaneous with its appeal
before the NLRC on May 14, 2008.

The Court still fmds no reason to agree with PRBFI on this procedural
point.

Appeals of decisions rendered by a labor arbiter that grant a monetary

award in favor of an employee require the aggrieved employer to file a bond.
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended (2011
NLRC Rules), provides the relevant rules, to wit:

SECTION 6. BOND. - In case t.11e decision of the Labor Arbiter or the

Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which shall either be in
the form of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in the amount to the
monetary award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees.

xxxx

No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious

grounds, and only upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in
.relation to the monetary award.

The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying with

the requisites of the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the
period to perfect an appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

The general rule is that appeals by an employer before the NLRC of

decisions by a labor arbiter that involve moneta.--y awards to an employee must
be secured by a cash or surety bond in the full amount of the monetary award.
By way of exception, the payment of this full amount may be excused if the
appealing employer files a motion to reduce bond showing meritorious
grounds, and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount.

_M.cburnie v. Ganzon 40 (lvfcburnie) has already set the "reasonable

amount" of the provisional reduced bond at a percentage of 10% of the
monetary award, excluding the amount of damages and attorney's fees, if any.
Its ratio was stated in this wise:

To ensure that the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC

Rules of Procedure that give parties the chance to seek a reduction of the

40
719 Phil. 680 (2013).
Decision 15 GR. No. 202392

appeal bond are effectively carried out, without however defeating the
benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions
to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the
posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that
is subject of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable
amount of the bond in tb.e meantime that an appellant's motion is pending
resolution by the Commission. In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the
monetary award, for th.e purpose of computing the necessa.7 appeal bond, shall
exclude damages and attorney's fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the
required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect an appeal under the
NLRC Rules be deemed suspended.

The foregoing shall not be misconstrued to unduly hinder the

NLRC's exercise of its discretion, given that the percentage of bond that is
set by this guideline shall be merely provisional. The NLRC retains its
authority and duty to resolve the motion and determine the final amount of
bond that shall be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the
standards of "meritorious grounds" and "reasonable amount". Should the
NLRC, after considering foe motion's merit, determine that a greater amount or
the full amount of the bond needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party
shall comply accordingly. The appella.."lt shall be given a period of 10 days from
notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the
required appeal bond. 41 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied.)

Mcburnie requires the concurrence of the following conditions before an

aggrieved employer appealing before the NLRC may be allowed to post a
bond in a reduced amount:

(1) The employer-appellant files a motion to reduce bond;

(2) The motion to reduce bond shall be based on meritorious

grounds;

(3) The employer-appellant posts the provisional percentage of at

least 10% of the monetary award, excluding therefrom the award
of da...'Tiages and attorney's fees;

(4) The provisionai bond must be posted within the reglementary

period for appeal; and

(5) If the NLRC eventualiy determines that a greater or the full

amount of the bond shall be posted, the employer-appellant shall
comply accordingly within ten (10) days from notice of the
NLRC order directing the such posting of the increased or full
amount oft.½_e bond.

Once these are complied with, the aggrieved employer's appeal of the
labor arbiter's decision before the 1\i'LRC shall be deemed perfected. Notably,

41 Id. at 713-714.
Decision i6 CiR. No. 202392

the requisites laid out by lvfcburrzie also presupposes a sixth requirement: the
NLRC issues an express ruling on the appellant's motion to reduce bond.

Records, however, show that PRBFI's Motion to Reduce Bond was never
acted upon by the NLRC. Still, the NLRC resolved petitioner's appeal of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision on the merits and issued its own resolutions thereon.
Such final resolutions had been the subject of certiorari proceedings before
the CA, during which petitioner argued for the first time that the NLRC's
inaction on its Motion to Reduce Bond, coupled vvith its resolution of the case
on all its substa.11tial points, is tanta._111ount to an implied affirmance of the
perfection of PRBFI's appeal.

Now lies a qua.11dary in procedure in the disposition of labor cases: for

the perfection of appeals filed by an employer must the NLRC expressly rule
on motions to reduce bond, or would an implied approval of a motion to
reduce bond, i.e., the NLRC's disposal of the appeal by final decision, order,
or resolution, suffice as a grant of the appella..'1t-employer's motion to reduce
bond?

Section 6, Rule VI of th.e 2011 NLRC Rules provides that an appeal

may be perfected by the appellant-employer only by the posting of a bond in
the equivalent amount of the full monetary award granted to the appellee-
employee. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set
by law is not only mandatory butjurisdictional.42 Consequently, there should
be no implied approval of a jurisdictional requirement that has not been
complied with. Otherwise, the ground of lack of jurisdiction becomes a
waivable defect in procedure. \\'hether the 1'-.'LRC accepts or rejects the
appellant's motion to reduce bond, the ruling must be unequivocal, and such
ruling must be issued before or at the time the NLRC resolves the appeal by
final judgment. Failure to do so shall render the J\.i'LRC liable for grave abuse
of discretion for having ruled on an appeai without acquiring jurisdiction over
the same, and the judgment ithad issued shall be vacated as null and void.

The CA was correct in granting respondents' Petition for Certiorari and

finding grave abuse of discretion against tlle NLRC in t.his wise:

[PRBFI] cai."1llot rely on the mere presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duties in favor of th.e NLRC when the latter gave due
course to its appeal; not when it is faced with a serious imputation of non-
compliance from [respondents]. Considering that the requirements provided
under the Labor Code and its Implemenf,ng Rules are ma,-idatory for purposes
of perfecting an appeal, the mk on presumption of regularity cannot apply.

Worse, t.1-i.e NLRC did not resolve the issue. It remained silent on the
matter when [respondents] raised the lack of posting an appeal bond as a

42 Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal. 708 Phil. 443,457 (2013).

Decision 17 G.R. No. 202392

defense on appeal. In setting aside the ruling of the 1\'LRC, this Court is merely
exercising prudence in applying the provisions of the iaw. 43

At any rate, a further review on the merits only aggravates the defeat of
PRBFI' s cause against respondents.

PRBFI alleges that it had established substantial evidence in terminating

respondents' employment. It maintains that it had satisfied the evidentiary
requirement required by law wit.h the following undisputed circumstances: ( 1)
that PRBFI's clients claimed reimbursement and damages for poor quality and
contamination of products; (2) that PRBFI discovered that its products had
been contaminated with plastic, rubber, and other foreign objects; (3) the letter
sent by an anonymous employee warning PRBFI of some employees' intent to
sabotage the company; (4) that PRBFI investigated respondents and found
them liable for serious misconduct, violation of company rules,
insubordination, and loss of confidence.

PRBFI also claims that respondents committed isolated acts, which,

when taken together, showed concerted action against PRBFI and qualified as
serious misconduct. Based on the foregoing, PRBFI terminated respondents'
employment, a management prerogative th.at PRBFI insists was exercised with
adequate support in fact and in law.

It is PRBFI, not the CA, that has t<lUled a blind eye to the established
facts and the applicable laws.

The strengt..h of petitioner's case rests on its capacity to present the

required quantun1 of proof, which is substantial evidence. Section 5, Rule 133
of the Rules of Cou.,1: [now Section 6 under the 2019 Revised Rules on
Evidence] defines substantial evidence as follows:

Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. - In cases filed before administrative or quasi-

judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

PRBFI puts heavy premium on tl1e fact that respondents had never
contested the accusations against them during the investigations. It avers that
by way of default, respondents are deemed to have admitted the truth of the
said allegations and therefore ultimately liable therefor.

There is absolutely no merit in this contention.

The silence of an employee against t.lie allegations of an employer, by its

lonesome, should not disadvantage to the fonner. It remains incumbent upon

43
Rollo, p. 60.
Decision 18 CiR. No. 202392

the employer as the party making the allegations to demonstrate the truth of
the same by presenting substantial evidence.

PRBFI, however, had never really proved with substantial evidence the
alleged involvement of respondents in the contamination of its products. The
letter implicating respondents in the alleged plans to sabotage the PRBFI's
operations did not specifically name respondents as the culprits. Neither did
its anonymous writer surface to positively incriminate them. The process and
results of the supposed investigations 1i11at PRBFI claims to have conducted on
the contamination incident were unsubstantiated with any written report,
document, or corroborating affidavit on the matter. There was not even any
proof that PRBFI's clients had truly complained of poor product quality or
that the PRBFI had actually suffered financial damage from the incident.
These clients were not even identified by petitioner in the first place. The fact
that PRBFI employed coconut parers other than respondents, together with the
timing of the supposed product contamination incident, rings an alarm that
respondents may have truly been singled out by PRBFI for having instituted a
prior complaint for non-regularization.

In all, the Court is left with no basis to verify respondents' detrimental

acts to the PRBFI other than the latter's utterly one-sided statements. As such,
PRBFI cannot expect the Court to believe that respondents were validly
dismissed.

The same observations are relevant to the other causes for dismissal that
petitioner attributed to respondents, namely, serious misconduct and gross
violation of company policy. The Court's declaration in PNOC Development
Management Corporation v. Gomez44 is on point:

[Just causes for dismissal require] an underlying act, deed, or conduct

from which a reasonable belief x x x may be inferred. Without it, dismissals
undertaken on mere belief are arbitrary and will be outlawed.45 (Emphasis
supplied.)

Bare suspicion, like that harbored by PRBFI against respondents, is not a

just cause to fire a..'ly employee. The empioyer need not present proof beyond
reasonable doubt or clear a.1d convincing evidence to justify the dismissal, but
bare suspicion that the employee is doing someii'ibg detrimental to the
interests of the employer is just a hunch, a mere gut feeling that cannot
amount to substantial evidence. A reasonable mind requires reason. Mere
allegations are not legally compellbg unless proved.

Likewise, loss of trust and confidence as a ground to dismiss an

employee is inapplicable to herein respondents.

44 G.R. No. 220526-27. July 29, 2019.

45 Id.
Decision 19 QR. No. 202392

Following Wesleyan University Philippines v. Reyes, 46 two requ1s1tes

must concur for a valid termination of employment due to loss of trust and
confidence:

[T]he first requisite is that the employee concerned must be one holding a
position of trust and confidence, thus, one who is either: (1) a managerial
employee; or (2) a fiduciary rank-and-file employee, who, in the normal
exercise of his or her functions, regularly handles significant amounts of money
or property of the employer. The second requisite is that the loss of confidence
must be based on a "Ji.llful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts. 47

Petitioner claims that respondents are dismissible for loss of trust and
confidence since the latter's acts were inimical to the former's interest as a
company engaged in the delicate nature of food export industry.

This attempt to squeeze respondents into the mold of managerial and

fiduciary rank-and-file employees must fail.

M+ W Zander Philippines, Inc. v. Enriquez 48 differentiates managerial

and fiduciary rank-and-file employees within the purview of dismissals due to
loss of trust and confidence, as follows:

There are two classes of positions of trust: managerial employees and

fiduciary rank-and-file employees.

Managerial employees are defined as those vested with the powers or

prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively
recommend such managerial actions. They refer to those whose primary duty
consists of the management oft.½e establishment in which they are employed or
of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of
the managerial staff. Officers and members of the managerial staff perform
work directly related to management policies of their employer and customarily
and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment.

The second class or fiduciary rank-and-file employees consist of cashiers,

auditors, property custodians, etc,, or those who, in the normal exercise of their
functions, regularly ha..fldle significant amounts of money or property, These
employees, though ra.'1k-and-file, are routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employer's money or property, and are thus classified as
occupying positions of trust and confidence, 49 (Citations omitted.)

Respondents' positions as coconut parers are essential in PRBFI' s

business of coconut products, but in no case do t.11ey fit the job description of
managerial employees and fiduciary rank-ai"ld-file employees. Manual work

46 740 Phil. 297 (2014).

47
Id. at 312.
48 606 Phil. 591 (2009).
49
Id. at 607.
Decision 20 G.R. No. 202392

such as paring coconuts for commercial production is a task that does not
entail being routinely ent.-usted with the care and custody of money and
property belonging to the company like fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
Much less can coconut parers be considered to be directly involved in the
management and policy-making oft.1-ieir employer as managerial employees.

Indeed, trust is fundamental in every employer-employee relationship.

Not all employees, however, are dismissible on the basis of loss of trust and
confidence. Only managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-file
employees may be terminated from work on such ground. If PRBFI's theory
would be sustained, then all employees shall be inequitably deemed as holding
positions of fiduciary nature. Respondents having occupied ordinary rank-and-
file posts with petitioner, their dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence is illegal.

In Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Rivera 50 the Court discusses in brief

PRBFI's non-compliance with the guidelines for procedural due process that
must be accorded to employees who are due for dismissal, viz.:

[T]he following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termi.riation against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within
a reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Onmibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to
enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed
as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give
the employees an opportunity to lstudy the accusation against them, consult a
tmion official or lawyer, gather d~ta and evidence, and decide on the defenses
they will raise against tb.e corilplaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
employees to intelligently preparb their expla..,ation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narra*on of the facts and circumstances that will
serve as basis for the charge a~inst the employees. A general description
of the charge will not suffice. L~stly, the notice should specifically mention
which company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged !against the employees.

(2) A..fter serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and
conduct a hearina or conferenbe wherein the employees will be !riven the
opportunity to: (1) :xplain and cl~rify their defenses to, tb.e charge agahist them;
(2) present evidence in support 0f th.eir defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence
presented against tb.em by tb.e mililagement. During the hearing or conference,
tb.e employees are given the charlce to defend t.h.emselves personally, with the
assistance of a representative •r counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be usel d by the parties as an opportunity to come to
an amicable settlement.

(3) After determining that tehnination of employment is justified, tb.e

employers shall serve the emplo1ees a written notice of termination indicating

50 710 Phil. 124 (2013).

Decision 21 GR. No. 202392

that: (1) all circumstar1ces involving the charge against the employees have
been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance
of their employment. 51 (Emphasis supplied.)

While the wordings of the termination letters appear to be in acceptable

compliance with the third requisite, two out of the above three requirements
have not been complied with. In PRBFI's first series of letters for respondents,
the latter were informed that they were the suspected perpetrators of the
supposed product contamination. This, however, is a statement too thin and
sweeping to be considered as "a detailed narration of the facts and
circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge against the employees"
demanded by law52 and jurisprudence. Also again, PRBFI failed to prove with
substantial evidence that hearings and interviews of respondents were actually
conducted. The records only confirm the fact that PRBFI trampled on
respondents' rights to procedural due process.

The illegality of respondents' dismissal being established both in

substance and procedure, respondents are entitled to all the consequent
backwages and attorney's fees that they have duly proved before and granted
by the Labor Arbiter.

The Court adds that, following 1Vacar v. Gallery Frames, 53 these

monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid by PRBFI to
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The

assailed December 28, 2011 Decision and the June 25, 2012 Resolution by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112840 are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the monetary awards to respondents shall earn legal
interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid by PRBFI.

51 Id. at 136-137, citing King of Kings Trar.sport. Inc. v. Mamac, 553 Phil. 108 (2007).
52 Section 2 (I), Rule XX!ll, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:

Section 2. Standards of due process; requirements of notice. - In all cases of termination of

employment, t.'le following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:

I. For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 [now Article
297] of the Labor Code:

(a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving to said employee reasonable opportui.,ity within which to explain his side;

(b) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of
counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportu...--iify to respond to U.½e charge, present his
evidence, or rebut the evidence presented agai,.11st him; a..11d

(c) A written notice of termination served on the employee ir1dicating that upon due
consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
53
716 Phil. 267 (2013).
Decision 22 G.R. No. 202392

SO ORDERED.

• •

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA M~~lllCRNAJW
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

HEN SAMU~
Assoc=~

RB. DIMAAJVIP
Associate ust1ce
Decision 23 GR. No. 202392

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was ass igned to the writer of the opinion of the
Comi's Division.

ESTELA M. ~~BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 , Atiicle VIII of the Constitution and the Division

Chairperson's Attestation, r certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.