FINAL Libya Report

The Libyan Projects
Market 2012
A comprehensive overview of project opportunities
in the new Libya
A MEED Insight report

CONTENTS
Contents 2 TABLES/CHARTS/MAPS Table: Export terminals 32
Preface 4 Introduction Table: Refineries 32
Executive summary 5 Table: Selected members of NTC provisional cabinet Table: Petrochemicals 32
as of 22 November 2011 9
Introduction 7 The status of existing production facilities 40
Table: Key economic indicators 10
The Libyan projects market 11 Table: Output and status of major oil and gas facilities 45
The Libyan projects market
Oil & Gas 17 The future for Libya’s EPSA holders 47
Table: Contract awards, 2002-10 11
Introduction and background 17 Table: International firms that have signed EPSAs 47
Chart: Contract awards by sector, 2002-10 12
Major oil fields and transport networks 22 Table: EPSA contract holders 48
Table: Selected major projects awarded, 2002-10 13
Export, refining and petrochemicals facilities 28 Power 50
Chart: Top 10 international contractors in Libya
Industry structure and future prospects 35 Chart: Peak power demand growth 50
by value of work awarded 14
The status of existing production facilities 40 Table: Residential power tariffs 51
Chart: Nationalities of the top 10 contractors in Libya
The future for Libya’s EPSA holders 47 by value of work awarded 14 Table: Non-residential power tariffs 51
Power 50 Chart: Top clients in Libya based on awarded contracts, 2002-10 15 Chart: Breakdown of power demand by sector 52
Renewables 58 Chart: Budget value of planned projects prior to the conflict 16 Chart: Installed generating capacity by technology 52
Desalination 63 Oil & Gas 17 Table: Major power plants 53
The Great Man-made River project 67 Introduction and background 17 Chart: Breakdown of power plant feedstock by type 54
Wastewater 76 Table: Top 20 oil reserves by country 18 Chart: Gecol’s projected fuel mix 54
Industry 81 Table: Top 20 oil-producing countries by output 18 Table: Selected power projects under way as of early 2011 55
Housing and real estate 86 Table: Oil production of Opec countries 18 Chart: Power demand outlook 56
Social infrastructure 91 Map: Major oil producing basins 19 Table: Power plant projects planned by Gecol 56
Transport 97 Map: Production facilities, pipelines, export facilities, Renewables 58

refineries and petrochemicals plants 20
Airports 97 Table: Reaol’s renewable energy targets 58
Major oil fields and transport networks 22
Ports 102 Table: Average wind speeds at five coastal locations 60
Map: Western Libyan gas project facilities and pipelines 23
Roads 104 Map: Libyan wind map 60
Table: Oil fields, locations, producers and capacities 27
Rail 107 Table: Planned wind farm projects 61
Export, refining and petrochemicals facilities 28
Map: Solar thermal electricity generating potentials 62
© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 2

CONTENTS
Desalination 63 Industry 81 Transport 97
Table: Actual operating desalination capacity 64 Table: Existing cement plants 81 Airports 97
Map: Major desalination plants in operation 65 Chart: Cement producers by design capacity 82 Map: Main airports 97
Table: New desalination plants under phase 1 65 Table: Local cement producers 82 Table: Main airports 98
Table: New desalination plants under phase 2 65 Table: Licences granted for new cement capacity 83 Table: Contract awards on Libyan airport expansion programme 99
Table: New desalination plants under phase 3 65 Table: Libyan Iron & Steel Company facilities 84 Ports 102
The Great Man-made River project 67 Table: Existing steel and cement plants 85 Map: Ports 102
Chart: Water supply by source 67 Map: Existing steel and cement plants 85 Table: Major ports 102
Map: The Great Man-made River project 68 Housing and real estate 86 Roads 104
Table: The Great Man-made River wellfields 69 Table: The 2001-15 housing plan 87 Map: Road network 104
Table: Planned reservoirs on the Great Man-made River 69 Table: Key elements of the Housing & Infrastructure Table: Vehicles in Libya 104
Board programme 87
Map: The Great Man-made River phase 1 network 70 Table: Selected major road projects 105
Table: Selected major housing contracts under construction 88
Map: The Great Man-made River phase 2 network 72 Rail 107
Table: Selected major real-estate and tourism projects 89
Map: The Great Man-made River phase 3 network 73 Map: Planned Tripoli metro 107
Map: Tourist sites 90
Map: The Great Man-made River phase 4 network 74 Table: Metro line characteristics 108
Social infrastructure 91
Table: Major construction contracts awarded on the Table: Metro station locations 108
Great Man-made River project 75 Table: Mena university investment 91
Table: Metro technical aspects 108
Table: Planned water usage for the first three phases of Table: Selected projects on Odac’s university
Table: Rail projects 109
the GMR project 75 and campus building programme 92
Map: Planned rail networks 109
Wastewater 76 Table: Hospitals and health centres 94
Table: Major contract awards by Railway Executive Board 110
Table: Wastewater treatment plants 77 Chart: Health investment 95
Map: Major wastewater plants 78 Table: Projects under construction 96
Table: Selected Housing & Infrastructure Board contract awards 79
Copyright 2011 Emap Business Communications Ltd

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system, or transmitted in any
form, by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the
copyright owner. While every care has been taken in completing this report, no responsibility can be accepted for any
errors or omissions that may occur.

Preface
W ith the highest gross domestic
product per capita on the African
conflict. Initial findings suggest that damage
to key infrastructure is not as bad as first
“Thoughts are
continent and the eighth largest oil
reserves in the world, Libya has long
believed. With oil and gas output returning
close to pre-conflict levels, thoughts are
already turning to the
had excellent projects potential. However, already turning to the future and meeting future and meeting
until recently, its projects market was Libya’s widespread infrastructure needs.
largely moribund, held back by an over- Libya’s widespread
bloated bureaucracy and a lack of central In this latest MEED Insight report, Libya’s
decision-making. As a result, it fell well projects potential is assessed across all infrastructure needs”
below its promise. main sectors. The challenges and opportu-
nities are analysed, along with the history,
The fall of the Gaddafi regime and the tran- policy, targets, projects and key clients. In
sition to a new, democratic Libya have addition, an assessment is provided on the
transformed attitudes towards the local damage made to certain facilities.
market. After decades of mismanagement,
there is hope that the projects market can This report is the product of three months’
start living up to its potential. research and thanks go to everyone who
made it possible. It is the latest produced
For the time being, efforts are being focused in 2011 by MEED Insight, the bespoke
on the reconstruction of facilities and infra- research and analysis arm of MEED.
structure damaged or destroyed during the December 2011
For any questions regarding the contents of this report, please contact Edward James ([email protected]).
For more details on MEED Insight publications and its bespoke research services, please phone +971 (0)4 367 1302 or email [email protected]

Executive summary
T he capture and killing of former
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi
surprisingly quickly, while export facili-
ties have been reopened to enable Libyan
“Oil production as most still have performance bonds – in
many cases up to 10 per cent of their
on 20 October 2011 made headlines the
world over. And rightly so; after dominat-
crude to access the international market.
The speed with which this is happening
in many areas is contract values – with the clients and
much of their equipment is also still in
ing Libya since he took power in a mili- is testament not only to engineering inge- being brought back the country.
tary coup in 1969, the death of the mercu- nuity, but also to the fact that Libya’s
rial statesman was an event of significant hydrocarbons infrastructure – much of it up to capacity Contractors, spoken to as part of this
local, regional and global importance. in remote areas – has emerged remarka- report, state that advanced parties are re-
bly unscathed from the fighting. surprisingly quickly” entering Libya to assess the situation and
But his passing has also brought with it to gauge the right moment to return. If the
considerable uncertainty over Libya’s It is a similar story in most other sectors. situation on the ground rapidly improves,
future. The capture in late November Surveys carried out as part of this report then most of them will be in a position to
2011 of Saif al-Islam, Gaddafi’s most have found that most facilities and return by mid-2012.
influential son, and security chief Abdul- projects have experienced relatively little
lah Senussi has drawn a line under the damage as a result of the conflict and that The interim government has already
last vestiges of the previous regime, but in many existing plants, production is stated that it will honour legitimate
the National Transitional Council (NTC) already resuming. contracts signed under the previous
has its work cut out as it attempts to bring regime, although much depends on the
some semblance of normality back to Work on projects that were under con- NTC’s definition of ‘legitimate’. Certainly,
the country. struction is a separate matter. Interna- there are concerns among Chinese and
tional contractors have yet to return to Russian companies in particular, due
There are signs that this is already hap- the country while they wait for the secu- to their governments’ initial unwilling-
pening, however. Oil production in many rity situation to improve. However, there ness to support the rebels’ cause and it
areas is being brought back up to capacity is plenty of incentive for them to go back remains to be seen whether there will

be any lingering animosity towards projects investment and the finance is
these firms that could result in them available to fund this need. From housing
being unable to return. and hospitals to roads and railways, there
is considerable underdevelopment of
Whatever happens, the hope amongst existing infrastructure, which will require
contractors is that Libya will become a substantial investment in the medium to
major projects hub. It is fair to say that long term. In the short run, the emphasis
under the Gaddafi regime, the Libyan will be on completing existing schemes
projects market was anaemic at best. and ensuring that the nation’s hydrocar-
Despite oil production of more than bons and utilities infrastructure is operat-
1.5 million barrels a day (b/d) and the ing at a sufficient rate.
African continent’s highest gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita, the projects The private sector, both local and foreign,
market has consistently underperformed. will have a key role to play in this projects
Over the past decade, total annual con- evolution. The Libyan economy has hith-
tract awards have never exceeded $8bn erto been dominated by the public sector.
and have averaged less than $4bn. Any new government will be keen to liber-
alise the economy and attract urgently-
The fault lay primarily with a bloated and needed foreign investment into the coun-
inefficient bureaucracy, which had neither try. As an investment destination, Libya is
the decision-making authority nor the fertile territory. For example, its proximity
funding approval to proceed with the gov- to Europe, cheap power and competitive
ernment’s project plans. This is despite and gas licensing rounds, there was little figures compare very favourably with the feedstocks make it a prime industrial
Libya having no shortage of funds and the discernible increase in hydrocarbons country’s $96bn GDP. investment target, while its thousands of
pressing need for capital investment in activity. The downstream sector remained kilometres of unspoilt beaches, ancient
almost every sector as the country’s aging moribund, while international oil firms It will take time, however, for spending ruins and good weather should prove
infrastructure became increasingly unable have been reluctant to invest in upstream to accelerate. By definition transitional, attractive to tourism developers.
to serve the fast-growing population. production increases. the NTC is unlikely to embark on any
major capital spending programme. Until The emergence of a new Libya offers the
It was not uncommon for tendering With the demise of the Gaddafi regime, an elected government takes over, con- prospect of a major new projects market
activities and contract award procedures the hope is that the new government will crete developments are not expected to in North Africa. For suppliers, vendors,
to take years to complete. Projects were be more efficient in its capital spending take place and may not occur until 2013 investors, contractors and subcontractors,
frequently cancelled or remained perma- programme. It certainly has the cash to do at the earliest. it provides a potentially lucrative new
nently in limbo. Often, contracts were so. Libya had foreign exchange reserves of market that can offset the increasingly
awarded only for the successful contrac- close to $170bn as of late 2010, according But the potential is clear. The Libyan competitive environment in the Gulf. The
tor to discover that funding had not been to the International Monetary Fund, while projects market is in the optimum posi- risks may, for the time being, be relatively
approved for the project. Despite four oil its foreign assets totalled $152bn. Both tion where there is a pressing need for high, but so will the potential returns.

Introduction
History Ottomans began to assert greater control
Libya is a predominantly Arab state that over North Africa and this remained the
has a long and proud history, although it case until 1911, when Italy, seeking an
has only had a truly independent identity overseas empire, invaded Libya and took
of its own since 1951. References to the control. The Italians remained in the
area that is present Libya date back as far country until the end of the second
as 2,700BC, when ancient Egyptian world war, when temporary control was
inscriptions refer to troublesome Berber passed to the British under UN mandate.
tribes. The Ancient Greeks, followed by The UN voted to give the country inde-
the Romans, settled in Tripolitania and pendence and Libya declared its inde-
Cyrenaica, and there are still many rem- pendence on 24 December 1951. For the
nants of the Roman empire in Libya, such first time, the nation was in control of its
as the famous city ruins of Leptis Magna. own destiny.
The Arab conquest, along with Islam, Initially, Libya was a monarchy ruled by
swept across North Africa in 647AD and King Idris al-Senussi. But Idris was a
for the next several hundred years, Libya weak and ineffective ruler and civil dis-
was a nominal part of the various Arab content became rife. On 1 September
caliphates, although due to its remote loca- 1969, a group of army officers led by
tion from the Arab heartland in the Gulf Muammar Gaddafi took control, follow-
and Levant, direct rule from the caliphate ing a military coup and Libya was
capitals at Damascus and then Baghdad declared a republic. Gaddafi would rule
was limited to coastal areas only. Libya until the civil war in 2011.
From the 17th century onwards, the Under Gaddafi, Libya was a ‘democracy’

Climate and society
with direct rule by the people through
General Peoples’ Committees. However, Libya is primarily a desert state, with
“Its large size and where temperatures cool considerably
in the winter and seasonal rain is not
Gaddafi was the sole decision-making
authority in reality and democracy was
most of its geographical area falling in the
Sahara desert where human habitation is
small population uncommon; and a desert climate in the
interior, where temperatures soar in the
merely an illusion. His erratic and mercu-
rial personality resulted in Libya adopting
impossible outside of scattered oases. It is
the fourth largest country in Africa and
make Libya one of summer and rain is extremely rare all
year round.
several contentious and often bizarre poli- the 17th largest in the world. the most thinly
cies both at home and abroad, which Only 2 per cent of Libya receives enough
resulted in the country facing UN and US There are two main climates in Libya: a populated countries” rain to make human habitation possible.
sanctions throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Mediterranean climate along the coast, As a result, the vast majority of the coun-
try’s 6.5 million people live in coastal cit-
In 2003, Gaddafi’s government renounced ies. However, the fact that Libya’s two
terrorism and sought a rapprochement major cities, Tripoli and Benghazi, are
with the West. In the following two years, almost 1,000 kilometres apart has only
sanctions were lifted and there was a served to accentuate regional and politi-
renewed hope that Libya would become a cal differences between the Cyrenaica and
prime projects market and investment Tripolitania regions. This aspect was no
destination. However, in both cases this better demonstrated than by the fact that
was not the case as a lack of a strong gov- the 2011 uprising quickly spread in the
ernment institutional framework, an east of the country and took some time to
absence of any private sector activity and have an impact in the west.
a weak civil society meant that even after
opening up to the world, the economy Libya’s large size and small population
was simply unable to move forward. make it one of the most thinly populated
countries on earth, with a population den-
The civil war and the demise of Gaddafi sity of just 50 people a square km. More
have once again raised hopes that Libya than 95 per cent of the Libyan population
can start to live up to its potential. The speaks Arabic. In the south and west, Ber-
National Transitional Council (NTC) has ber languages predominate.
temporary control, with the expectation
that elections for a permanent govern- Tribes play an important role in Libyan
ment will be held in 2012. Having thrown society, with more than 20 existing major
off the shackles and constraints of the tribal groups. Because of the geographical
Gaddafi era, optimism about the country’s vastness of Libya and the prevalence of
prospects has never been higher. tribes being associated with specific areas
or towns, political or social differences
are often drawn along tribal lines.

The system of government “Libya’s economy Selected members of NTC provisional cabinet as of 22 November 2011
Name Position Remarks
By definition, the NTC is a temporary
government with a self-imposed mandate
suffers from inequity Abduraheem el-Keib Prime Minister Technocrat. Professor of electrical engineering
to oversee Libya until a permanent gov-
ernment can be elected. As of November
in the distribution of who has been living in exile from Libya since 1976,
primarily in the US and the UAE. Holds dual US/
Libyan citizenship. Family is from Sabrata
2011, it remains unclear just what the growth and high Mustafa AbuShagur Deputy Prime
Minister
Technocrat. Professor of electrical and computer
engineering who has been living in exile from Libya
NTC plans to implement during its period
in control, but it is likely that the council unemployment rates” since the 1970s, primarily in the US and the UAE.
Is thought to hold dual US/Libyan citizenship. Born
is going to leave the most important deci- in Tripoli
sions to the elected government once it Omar Abdullah Deputy Prime Technocrat. Former chairman of Eni Oil in Libya and
comes in. This will likely include deci- The presence of two former senior execu- Abdulkarim Minister worked for Agoco before that. Has a doctorate
degree in petroleum engineering from Waseda
sions on foreign investment, major project tives from Italian firm Eni on the cabinet University in Japan. From Benghazi
funding and oil sector strategy. will reassure Italy, which relies on Libyan
Ashour Ben Khayil Minister of Veteran diplomat and long-term dissident of Gaddafi
oil and gas for much of its energy needs. Foreign Affairs regime, he left the Foreign Service in 1984 in
The new NTC cabinet, announced in late It is hoped that the technocratic nature of protest over the Libyan embassy hostage crisis
in London. Has been an active member of the
November 2011, is broadly secularist and the cabinet in general will ensure steady opposition ever since. Until returning to Libya, he
technocratic, with a nod to the more leadership until elections. was a resident in Canada. Originally from Derna
prominent military commanders who Fawzi Abdulali Minister of Leader of the Misurata militia, which successfully
played a key role in the civil war. Its com- Structure of the economy Interior withstood a month-long siege and much of the
worst fighting during the conflict
position has already been welcomed by While Libya enjoys the highest gross
the major Western powers. domestic product (GDP) per capita in Abdulrahman bin Yazza Minister of Oil Technocrat. Former chairman of Eni operations in
& Gas Libya. Also previously worked for NOC
Africa, thanks to its low population and
Osama Juwaili Minister of Head of Zintan militia during conflict, responsible
There are a number of interesting aspects large oil and gas reserves, it suffers from Defence for capturing Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam. Former
about the new government. All three of several structural issues that have teacher and army officer
the top officials are academics and have impeded growth over the years. Primary Hassan Zaqlam Minister of
clearly been selected for their neutrality. among these is the centralised planning Finance
Interestingly, both Prime Minister Abdu- aspect of the economy and the previous Awad Barasi Minister of
Electricity
raheem el-Keib and Deputy Prime Minis- distrust of private sector activity.
ter Mustafa AbuShagur worked together
NTC=National Transitional Council; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; NOC=National Oil Corporation.
at the University of Alabama in the US As such, the economy is state-dominated Sources: NTC, MEED Insight
and, at the start of the conflict, were both with only little private enterprise. There
working in Dubai. Both are also believed is also inequity in the distribution of
to hold US citizenship. The other deputy growth and unemployment, especially
prime minister, Omar Abdulkarim, speaks among the young, is high. Libya also suf-
Japanese and is understood to have strong fers from poor social infrastructure, par-
ties to Japan. ticularly in affordable housing, healthcare

“Much needs to Key economic indicators (LDbn unless stated)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
be done to disconnect GDP, constant prices 41.7 44.8 45.9 44.8 46.7
the Libyan economy GDP, constant prices (% change) 6.7 7.5 2.3 -2.3 4.2
from its reliance on GDP, current prices 72.3 86.9 116.5 73.7 90.3
GDP, current prices ($bn) 55.1 69.0 95.3 58.8 71.3
crude exports” GDP per capita, constant prices (LD) 6,897.3 7,264.5 7,284.4 6,971.8 7,115.0
GDP per capita, current prices (LD) 11,967.2 14,090.4 18,505.0 11,461.4 13,768.1
GDP per capita, current prices ($) 9,112.4 11,188.7 15,140.1 9,149.4 10,872.8
and education, although the previous gov-
Total investment (% of GDP) 22.6 26.6 27.2 34.8 35.8
ernment had targeted these sectors for
investment over the last decade. Gross national savings (% of GDP) 73.6 69.8 66.1 50.8 50.2
Inflation, average consumer prices 94.5 100.3 110.7 113.9 116.7

Like many other regional oil producers, Inflation, average consumer prices (% change) 1.4 6.2 10.4 2.8 2.5
Libya’s economy is highly dependent on
Volume of imports of goods and services (% change) -2.6 17.4 37.6 5.0 2.2
crude, with oil exports comprising 97 per
cent of total export revenues. Unsurpris- Volume of imports of goods (% change) 1.1 26.6 9.4 17.7 11.3
ingly, real and nominal GDP rises and Volume of exports of goods and services (% change) 7.9 3.4 -6.5 -6.8 -7.2
falls with the oil price, so while real GDP Volume of exports of goods (% change) 9.2 3.4 -6.5 -7.5 -7.2
fell by more than 2 per cent in 2009 as the
Value of oil exports ($bn) 41.7 47.8 60.7 35.7 42.3
oil price slipped below $100 a barrel, it
rose by 4.2 per cent in 2010 as the oil General government revenue 47.5 59.3 76.4 44.7 56.0
price picked up. General government revenue (% of GDP) 65.6 68.2 65.6 60.7 62.0
General government total expenditure 23.2 33.5 46.2 40.8 48.2

With the oil price remaining steady,
General government total expenditure (% of GDP) 32.1 38.5 39.6 55.3 53.4
the Libyan economy should enjoy stable
growth once oil output reaches pre-conflict General government net debt -58.6 -72.4 -82.4 -81.6 -91.3
levels. Nonetheless, it is clear that much General government net debt (% of GDP) -81.0 -83.3 -70.7 -110.8 -101.1
needs to be done to disconnect the econ- General government gross debt 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
omy from this reliance on crude exports.
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Whatever happens, the NTC and the gov-
ernment that succeeds it, will have their Current account balance ($bn) 28.1 29.8 37.1 9.4 10.3
work cut out in transforming it into a Current account balance (% GDP) 51.0 43.2 38.9 15.9 14.4
market economy.
Exchange rate: $1=LD1.2488; GDP=Gross domestic product. Source: IMF

The Libyan projects market
P rior to the recent conflict, Libya was
well-known as a projects market with
“Libya was well- Contract awards, 2002-10
plenty of potential, but with little to show

for it. Tripoli’s rapprochement with the
known as a projects ($m)
US and the UK in late 2003 was greeted market with lots of 80008,000
with enthusiasm by many companies,
especially oil firms, which viewed the potential, but with 70007,000
country as an exceptional opportunity,

given its general infrastructure require- little to show for it” 60006,000
ments and the fact that it had the money

to fund them. 50005,000
the expected massive upstream invest-

Throughout 2004 and 2005, Libya was ment, while downstream investment deals 40004,000
a prime target for business development

among firms, with many establishing
with the likes of the UK’s Shell and BP
failed to materialise into physical activity.
30003,000
offices in the country in the hope of 20002,000
winning work. But over time, it became Indeed, project spending fell considerably
apparent that the country’s entrenched in the immediate aftermath of the lifting of 10001,000
bureaucracy, budgetary issues and sanctions, with the total value of contracts
inherently slow decision-making had awarded between 2003 and 2005 barely 0 0
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
not changed with the opening up of the exceeding those awarded in 2002 alone.
economy. At the same time, the explora- However, there was a marked increase in
tion and production sharing agreement spending from 2006 onwards, although Source: MEED Projects
(EPSA IV) licensing rounds did not create 2010 levels dropped substantially.

The decrease in activity in 2009-10 was
primarily due to upheaval and restructur-
“There has been Contract awards by sector, 2002-10
ing in the government, brought about by

several erratic decrees by Gaddafi. The
little investment in Industrial, 0.7
Pipeline, 2.3
Metal, 0.6 ($m)
Refining, 0.5
resulting bureaucratic inertia meant that
many planned projects did not proceed.
Libya’s hydrocarbons Gas processing, 4.5
11,361
10,223
sector over the past

Oil/Gas production Infrastructure
9,329
Surprisingly, given its huge oil and gas

nine years” 8.2 26.5
4,741
potential, there has been very little capital 3,526
%
investment in Libya’s hydrocarbons sector
1,930
over the past nine years. What spending
there has been has focused on upstream for a new petrochemicals complex with
11.1 985
Water and waste
production and processing projects, but the US’ Dow Chemical Company and the 310
with less than $6bn spent in total over this revamp of liquefied natural gas (LNG) 260
period, the sector has been slow moving. facilities with Shell failed to materialise 200
despite bilateral government support.
This largely reflects the relative failure
21.8 23.8
of the EPSA IV licensing rounds, where The most successful sectors have been
international oil companies (IOCs) have infrastructure, power and construction. Construction Power
been reluctant to implement field devel- Infrastructure has been the largest sector
opments either because oil and gas were since 2002, due to large contracts to
Source: MEED Projects
not found in sufficient quantities or upgrade the existing airports and build a
because it was not commercially viable to new railway network.
proceed. Even at producing fields, there
has been little in the way of upgrading Power has been another key sector. Rising
facilities. In some cases, this is due to lack electricity demand, due to economic and
of agreement with the IOC’s state-owned demographic growth, has meant invest-
joint venture partner on how to proceed. ment in new generating schemes,
In others, Opec quotas have meant that although progress on individual projects
there was little point in increasing capac- has frequently been slow and erratic.
ity if there was no export outlet.
Construction, primarily in the form of
Downstream has been even more disap- social housing projects, has been the other
pointing, with almost no investment at all mainstay of the Libyan projects market.
over the last decade despite an obvious Demographic growth has again been a fac-
need for the upgrading and rehabilitation tor, with the previous regime attempting to
of existing facilities. The high-profile deals address a considerable housing shortage.

Selected major projects awarded, 2002-10
Project Sector Contract value ($m) Award date EPC contractors

Railway Executive Board – Sirte-Misurata-Khoms railway line Infrastructure 1,850 2008 China Railway Construction Corporation
HUPEA – Tajoura, Benghazi and Tripoli housing project Construction 1,600 2009 Amona Ranhill Consortium Sdn Bhd
Gecol – Al-Khaleej steam power plant Power 1,463 2007 Gama Energy, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, Hyundai
Engineering & Construction
CAA -– Tripoli airport terminal, package II Infrastructure 1,350 2007 Consolidated Contractors Company, TAV Construction, Strabag
Odebrecht, Vinci
Gecol – Tripoli West power plant expansion Power 1,267 2007 Archirodon Group, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction, Hyundai
Engineering & Construction
HIB – Tripoli and Benghazi infrastructure network Infrastructure 1,250 2008 Tennessee Overseas Construction Company
GMRA – Great Man-made River, phase III Water and Waste 1,246 2005 Tekfen, Frankenthal, KSB Group, TML Construction Company, SNC
Lavalin Group
WOC – Farig field development, phase II Oil/Gas production 1,246 2006 Joannou & Paraskevaides
Eni – Wafa gas development Gas processing 1,200 2002 Tecnimont, Sofregaz, JGC Corporation
Gecol – 400kV overhead transmission lines Power 1,200 2007 KEC International, Saadiyat Free Trade Authority, Cobra Instalaciones y
Servicios, Kahromika
GMRA – Great Man-made River, phase IV Water and Waste 1,000 2004 Al-Nahr Company
Libya Investment & Development Company – Tobruk housing Construction 996 2009 Sungwon Corporation
development
Gecol – Transmission lines and substations Power 990 2010 Technologies, Investments, Services, Energy
ESDF – Tripoli Complex towers Construction 880 2008 Consolidated Contractors Company
Railway Executive Board – Hicha-Municipalities railway line Infrastructure 840 2008 China Railway Construction Corporation
Railway Executive Board – Misurata to Sebha railway Infrastructure 824 2008 China Railway Construction Corporation, Metis
Railway Executive Board – Coastal railway Infrastructure 805 2009 China Railway Construction Corporation, Russian Railways
Gecol – Power transmission line Power 800 2008 Laptechno Power
Edkhar Bank – Tripoli housing units Construction 800 2006 Saraya Construction Company
Gecol – Sebha power station Power 750 2007 Global Electrical Services Company, Enka Teknik
HUPEA=Housing & Utilities Project Execution Authority; Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya; CAA=Civil Aviation Authority; HIB=Housing & Infrastructure Board; GMRA=Great Man-made River Authority; WOC=Waha
Oil Company; LAP=Libya Africa Investment Portfolio. Source: MEED Projects

Top 10 international contractors in Libya by value of work awarded Nationalities of the top 10 contractors in Libya by value of work awarded*
($m)
($m)
5000 5,000 Italy
5,580
Singapore
6
3,048
Korea
4000 4,000
8 2,579
1,600
3000
Libya
8
%
1,400
3,000
34 1,300
1,000
2000 2,000
10
Malaysia
1000 1,000
16 18
0 0
on
cti n rin
g
rin
g hil
an m
l &
ou s CC
C
tio
n
Hy
fl ux em tion
tru tio ee ion ee ion nn ide uc ny aip ora
ns pora gin truct gin truct n a R or tiu Joa keva n str mpa S rp
o
C r n
iE s
n
E s o s Co Co Co
ay Co da on oo on Am Con ras ya on
China Greece
ilw un & C ew C Pa ara gw
a Ra Hy Da & S Su
n
in
Ch
*2002-10. Source: MEED Projects
Source: MEED Projects
The main contractors struction Corporation. This is due mainly

In terms of contracting, there have been to its large railway contracts with the
few successful Western firms in Libya Railway Executive Board, although it has
over the past decade. The market has completed some oil sector work too.
tended to be dominated by Chinese,
Russian, Korean and Turkish contractors, Versatile Korean contractor Hyundai Engi-
while local firms have had very limited neering & Contracting is in second posi-
success with the exception of Saraya Con- tion, due to work won in the construction,
struction Company power and hydrocarbons sectors, while
its compatriot Daewoo Engineering &
The most successful contractor in Libya Construction has been the dominant utili-
over the past 10 years, in terms of value of ties contractor in the country.
contracts awarded, is China Railway Con-

The leading clients that it awarded contracts without neces-
With one exception, the major clients in sarily having the required government
Libya over the past nine years have all financial approval.
been government entities. By far, the most
active client has been the General Elec- A more effective client has been the Civil
tricity Company of Libya (Gecol), which Aviation Authority, which awarded a raft
awarded more than $10bn worth of work of contracts in 2007 and 2008 to upgrade
between 2002 and 2010. Gecol’s ranking the Benghazi, Tripoli and Sebha airports.
reflects the pressing need for power in the
country, although its performance has Italy’s Eni is the only private sector and
been mixed; in many cases its projects non-Libyan client on the list due to its
have taken years to get off the drawing significant investment in the Western
board, while contractors have complained Desert Gas project. The Railway Executive
Top clients in Libya based on awarded contracts, 2002-10
($m)
12000
12,000
1000010,000
8000 8,000
6000 6,000
4000 4,000
2000 2,000
00
Ge
co
l ay
ilw d ori
ty En
i &
ing d
er
Riv ty
Ra oar uth us ar de thori
eB nA Ho re Bo a
-m Au
tiv tio an
cu Av
ia ctu tM
Ex
e il tru ea
Civ ras Gr
Inf
Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya. Source: MEED Projects

Board is the client behind major projects
won by Chinese and Russian firms to
Budget value of planned projects prior to the conflict “Libya’s projects
build a coastal railway linking Tripoli ($m) market is expected
with Benghazi.
90000
90,000
to accelerate once
The Housing & Infrastructure Board (HIB) 80000
80,000
is responsible for infrastructure, housing

70000
70,000
the new government
and wastewater development in the major
cities. It had a significant investment 60000
60,000 has settled in”
plan that was curtailed by the conflict. It
remains to be seen whether the plan will 50000
50,000
continue under the new government.

40000
40,000
many of them. New ministers and per-
Future projects 30000
30,000
sonnel at clients will almost certainly
Prior to the conflict, Libya had more want to revisit each project to determine
than $120bn worth of planned projects. 20000
20,000
its viability. In parallel, foreign investors
The majority were in the construction 10000
10,000 may well have second thoughts about
sector, consisting primarily of the two their project investment plans in Libya.
Energy City projects at Ras Lanuf and 0 0
tio
n
ise
r
sin
g
tria
l
tur
e
LN
G tal tio
n
ca
ls we
r
nin
g s te
uc r til es us uc Me uc mi Po fi wa
Marsa al-Brega, as well as the Madinat ns
tr Fe c Ind tr d e Re d Whatever happens, the contracting com-
Co pro ras pro och an
Ga
s Inf as Pe
tr ter
al-Hana development planned by the /G Wa munity can be relatively sanguine about
Oil
UAE-based Tatweer. the Libyan projects market going for-
LNG=Liquefied natural gas. Source: MEED Projects ward, due to the twin combination of
Metals was the second largest sector as a the country’s significant infrastructure
result of two aluminium smelters that had requirements and its financial ability
been planned by Russia’s Rusal and Swit- to pay for projects. The projects market
zerland’s Klesch & Company, while power is expected to accelerate once the new
and oil and gas production – the two tra- government is settled in, with the hope
ditionally largest sectors in the country – that it can comfortably exceed the
each had more than $5bn worth of invest- $5-8bn annual average witnessed over
ment planned. the past decade.
Due to the upheaval, it is unlikely that all

of the projects planned before the conflict
will proceed under the new administra-
tion. Even before the conflict, there was
considerable doubt about the viability of

Oil & Gas
Introduction and background
“According to the
L ibya has long been seen as a country
with huge, if unfulfilled, potential as
a major producer and exporter of oil and UK’s BP, Libya had
gas, refined fuel products and petrochem-
icals. This is with good reason. According the eighth largest oil
to the UK’s BP, the country had the eighth
largest oil reserves in the world in 2010, reserves in the world
with 46.4 billion barrels and the largest in
continental Africa.
in 2010”
However, BP data shows that Libya only
produced 1.66 million barrels a day (b/d) cites a lower 2010 production figure for
of oil on average in 2010, making it Libya of 1.49 million b/d and slightly
the world’s 18th largest producer of oil larger reserves of 47.1 billion barrels of oil.
behind relative minnows Kazakhstan,
Algeria, Angola and Norway. Among the
12 Opec member states, Libya produced
the ninth largest amount of oil in 2010,
despite having the seventh largest
reserves overall. It should be noted that
when compared to BP’s estimates, Opec

Top 20 oil reserves by country Top 20 oil-producing countries by Oil production of Opec countries “The National Oil
Country Proven reserves output
(billion barrels), 2010 Country 2010
Country Production
(million b/d) Corporation started
production
Saudi Arabia
Venezuela
264.5
211.2
(kb/d)
1
2
Saudi Arabia
Iran
8.17
3.54
nationalising Libya’s
Iran 137.0
1
2
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
10,270
10,007
3 Venezuela 2.85 oil assets almost
Iraq 115.0
3 US 7,513
4 Iraq 2.35
from its inception”
Kuwait 101.5 5 Kuwait 2.32
4 Iran 4,245
UAE 97.8 6 UAE 2.23
5 China 4,071
Russian 77.4 7 Nigeria 2.05 Oil output peaked at 3.34 million b/d
Federation 6 Canada 3,336
in 1970, which made Libya a bigger pro-
8 Angola 1.69
Libya 46.4 7 Mexico 2,958 ducer than Saudi Arabia at the time. This
9 Libya 1.49
was a year after former Libyan leader
Kazakhstan 39.8 8 UAE 2,849
10 Algeria 1.19 Muammar Gaddafi seized control of the
Nigeria 37.2 9 Kuwait 2,508
11 Qatar 0.733 country in a military coup and the same
Canada 32.1 10 Venezuela 2,471
year that state oil firm National Oil Cor-
12 Ecuador 0.476
US 30.9 11 Iraq 2,460 poration (NOC) was formed in place of
12 Nigeria 2,402 b/d=Barrels a day. Source: Opec the Libyan General Petroleum Company
Qatar 25.9
(Lipetco), created in 1968 to work on a
China 14.8 13 Brazil 2,137
strategic plan for the state-led develop-
Brazil 14.2 14 Norway 2,137
ment of the petroleum industry.
Angola 13.5 15 Angola 1,851
Algeria 12.2 16 Algeria 1,809 NOC started the process of nationalising

the country’s oil assets almost from its
Mexico 11.4 17 Kazakhstan 1,757
inception, a process that coincided with
India 9.0 18 Libya 1,659
a steady decline in output. Production
Source: BP 19 Qatar* 1,569 reached a historical low of 1.02 million
20 UK 1,339 b/d in 1984.
*=Includes condensates; kb/d=Thousand barrels a From 1984 onwards, production rose

day. Source: BP
steadily despite UN and US trade embar-
goes against Libya, with sanctions
imposed by the latter lasting from 1986
to 2004. In 2008-09, average daily pro-
duction topped 1.8 million barrels,

although it fell again in 2010 as Tripoli
abided by its Opec production quota of
Major onshore oil producing basins “Exploration and
1.47 million b/d. The increase in produc-
tion during the sanctions era was largely
Pelagian
basin
development work
attributed to the return of international oil
companies (IOCs) to the country and the TUNISIA Tripoli
was ongoing off the
lifting of embargoes on crucial equipment country’s coast in
to the country.
Gulf of Sirte the Gulf of Sirte”
In 2010, Oil Minister and NOC chairman
Cyrenaica
Shokri Ghanem announced that oil produc- platform
tion would hit 2.3 million b/d in 2013-14 The Ghadames basin, which borders both
Ghadames
and 3 million b/d by 2017. Earlier estimates basin EGYPT Algeria and Tunisia, is the site of 23 con-
from NOC had pegged output at 2.5 million cessions and most notably contains the
b/d by 2011-12 and 3 million b/d by 2015. Wafa gas field, operated by Mellitah Oil &
MEED Insight research that was conducted Gas, a joint venture of Italy’s Eni and NOC.
for this report shows that overall produc- Sirte
tion capacity at the end of 2010 was as high basin The Murzuq basin in the southwest
as 1.9 million b/d and much higher than borders Niger and holds 29 concessions,
the official Opec quota. which include both Eni’s major Elephant
field, also known as the El-Feel field,
Oil and gas basins Murzuq LIBYA and Spain-based Repsol’s Sharara field.
The oil and gas industry has six major geo- basin
graphic areas where the vast majority of Sirte, which stretches along the Libyan
exploration and production occurs: the coast from Tripoli to Benghazi and south
Pelagian, Ghadames, Murzuq, Sirte, Kufra to the border with Chad, is both the largest
and Cyrenaica basins. Prior to 2011, explo- basin and the country’s most prolific source
ration and development work was also of oil. It holds more than 50 concessions
ongoing off the country’s coast in the wider Kufra and includes some of the state’s most
Gulf of Sirte, although offshore production basin important fields, such as Mabruk, Sarir,
has played only a limited role in the coun- Al-Sarah Amal, Aguila/Nafoora and Bu
try’s hydrocarbons sector to date. NIGER Attifel. It contains the vast majority of the
country’s oil and gas reserves – 42-43bn
The offshore Pelagian basin sits to the CHAD barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of oil and gas.
northwest of Tripoli and contains seven
oil and gas concessions. Its most notable SUDAN The Cyrenaica basin to the east contains a
Source: NOC
acreage is the Bouri and Al-Jurf fields. further 15 concessions, none of which

Production facilities, pipelines, export facilities, refineries and petrochemicals plants “Libya’s refining
Zuara
Bouri
D1
G1
capacity is situated
Azzawiya
at Ras Lanuf, Sarir,
E1
TUNISIA Tripoli
Khoms Azzawiya, Tobruk
Derna
Oued Chebbi
Tigi
Misurata
and Marsa al-Brega”
Benghazi
Kabir
Tobruk
Bir Tiacsin
have been commercialised to date, while
Sirte Zueitina
the Kufra basin is home to a further nine
concessions that are also in the prospect-
El-Sider
Ras Lanuf ing phase.
Gozeil
Almas
Hamada/Al-Hamra
Marsa al-Brega Production facilities in all basins are
Emgayet Mabruk
Bahi
EGYPT connected by a 7,000km network of pipe-
Hateiba Lehib Dor Marada
Farad/Hofra
Dahra Graguba
Ain Jerbi/Meghil/Sorra lines to export facilities at Marsa al-Brega,
Ed Dib
Amal/Al-Sarah
Tobruk, Ras Lanuf, Azzawiya and Zueitina.
Zella El-Meheiriga
Oued Tahara Bualwan Kotla/Ora
Aguila/Nafoora
Aswad Nasser
Sabah
Zaggut
Jebel
Raleh
Intisar The country’s refining capacity is situated
Katib/ Rimal
Wafa Balat/Samah Bu Attifel at Ras Lanuf, Azzawiya, Tobruk, Marsa
Gialo
Khalifa
Al-Waha
Sarir N.
al-Brega and Sarir, while small petro-
Bel Hedan
Atshan chemicals plants are located at Ras Lanuf,
Majed/Messla
Marsa al-Brega and Abu Kammash.
LIBYA
Sarir
Defa
Sharara
Oil pipeline
Gas pipeline
Oil pipeline Elephant
Tanker terminal
Oil fields
Major gas processing plant
LNG export plant
Gas or gas/condensate fields
Oil refinery
LNG=Liquefied natural gas. Source: NOC

History of production and exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs)
Oil was first discovered in Libya in 1959. ERAP-Aquitaine and established the first NOC if oil was commercialised. Later third of equity – while IOCs took on the cost
The government at the time was led by state-run oil company, the Libyan General agreements under EPSA I saw the govern- of exploration and evaluation activities.
King Idris and was relatively weak with Petroleum Company (Lipetco). ment take a stake of 80 per cent plus.
only nominal control outside the main cit- Development costs for new commercial
ies. As a result, when Libya’s first oil and In 1969, a 27-year-old officer named In 1980, the existing EPSA was updated prospects were to be shared equally
gas law for the sector was passed in Muammar Gaddafi oversaw a military to increase the state’s revenue from oil between NOC and its foreign partners,
1955, it effectively handed control of all coup that resulted in the toppling of and gas concessions, with the new agree- while the cost of running production
aspects of the industry – from shoulder- the monarchy. Under him, Lipetco was ments described as EPSA II. A lack of suc- facilities was to be split along the lines
ing development costs to setting prices – replaced with National Oil Corporation cess saw the licences changed again in of equity shares. Where production was
to international oil companies (IOCs) that (NOC), while the government began to 1988 to allow foreign firms a bigger found to be commercially viable, the EPSA
had won exploration and production rights make moves to part-nationalise the oil share of concessions. The new terms agreements ran for 25 years from the ini-
through direct negotiations with the industry. A new subsidiary, Arab Gulf Oil were named EPSA III. tial production.
Petroleum Ministry. Company (Agoco), was set up to act as
NOC’s main operating firm and between Exploration and production activity slowed Winning bidders committed to two pay-
The new law allowed IOCs to produce and 1969-73, it was awarded 24 concessions between the late 1980s and early 2000s, outs to NOC – a signing-on bonus and a
export as much oil as they liked while set- – the majority of those made available largely because of international sanctions first-production bonus – and operating
ting prices as they saw fit, with the Petro- during this period. and trade restrictions placed on Libya companies working in the country paid a
leum Ministry acting as a tax-gathering by the US in particular. From 2001, rela- tax on their net profits after accounting
authority, but having no strategic oversight In 1972, Eni’s subsidiary Agip agreed to tions between Tripoli and the West slowly for royalty payments to NOC.
of the development of the sector. As a Agoco taking a 50 per cent interest in thawed and in 2004, the US lifted the last
result, until the late 1960s, Libyan oil was the Bu Attifel field and from this period of its embargoes on Libyan trade. Four rounds of contracts were awarded
among the cheapest in the world despite onwards the new government asked for a under EPSA IV, from 2004-07. The final
being an attractive, light, sweet crude. 51 per cent interest in all existing conces- With the lifting of sanctions came new auction focused on associated gas assets
sions and new licences. This led to dis- opportunities for the development of the and was one of the most financially lucra-
In the second half of the 1960s, the gov- putes, and a decline in exploration activity. oil and gas sector and NOC went to work tive for NOC.
ernment began to take more of an inter- on preparing new terms for future and
est in growing the role of the state in the In 1974, Tripoli offered an official EPSA existing exploration and production con- Separately, in 2007, BP directly negoti-
production and export of hydrocarbons for the first time on all new concessions, cessions, known as EPSA IV, which were ated an EPSA agreement with NOC,
and started planning a new petroleum law, with the first such award being made in introduced in 2004. which covered a vast swathe of the West-
which was implemented in 1966, giving February of that year. NOC took a majority ern Ghadames basin. The UK company
Tripoli more of a say in the way the indus- stake of 85 per cent in the concessions Under EPSA IV, NOC asked for a minimum committed to spend about $900m on
try was run. In 1968, Libya became one offered, while the US’ Occidental Petro- 50 per cent share in all new concessions the project, which marked its return to
of the first Arab countries to negotiate a leum committed to explore the available – unless consortiums were involved, when work in the country for the first time in
joint venture agreement with France’s areas and repay any development costs to it would consider a share of about one- 30 years.

Major oil fields and transport networks
Introduction “Oil and gas
Libya has dozens of active oil and gas
fields across its main basins. Most pro- production from
duction is located far inland and one
of the chief challenges over the years has the Pelagian basin is
been for National Oil Corporation (NOC)
and the international oil companies dominated by Italian
(IOCs) to find a means of transporting
crude and gas to the coast for export. In firm Eni’s Bouri field”
many cases, different fields and conces-
sions share the same pipeline export
infrastructure. But it has also meant that maximum production capacity was about
it is difficult to make small and isolated 45,000 b/d.
fields commercially viable, given the
added cost of building an export pipeline. The two oil production platforms at the
field are connected to a floating storage
The Pelagian basin and offloading (FSO) terminal, which
directly transfers oil produced at the field
The Bouri field to oil tankers for export.
Oil and gas production from the offshore
Pelagian basin is dominated by the Bouri Italy’s Saipem, was the lead engineering,
field, which sits within the NC-41 con- procurement and construction (EPC)
cession. It is jointly operated by Italy’s contractor during the development of the
Eni and NOC, through the Mellitah Oil & field. It has completed additional work
Gas venture. The field was discovered in since 2004 as Eni has made inroads
1976 and two production platforms were towards halting the slide in output.
commissioned in 1988. Initial production
was as high as 600,000 barrels a day The NC-41 concession includes the
(b/d), but by 1995, output had dropped to Bahr Essalam gas field, which is con-
about 150,000 b/d and by 2004, had nected by a 110-kilometre pipeline to gas
fallen again to about 60,000 b/d. In 2010, processing and export facilities at Melli-

tah. This is part of the Western Libya Gas
Pipeline development.
“The Ghadames Western Libyan gas project facilities and pipelines
To the southwest of the Bouri field lies

basin is the site
the Al-Jawf field, part of the NC-137 con-
cession owned and operated by France’s
of one of Libya’s
Total (37.5 per cent), Germany’s Winter- most significant Gela
shall (12.5 per cent) and NOC (50 per
cent). Like the Bouri field, oil produced gas developments”
from this field is transported to an FSO
terminal. In 2010, maximum output at the
field was estimated at 45,000 b/d. bons to export and processing facilities at
Mellitah on the northwest coast.
The Ghadames basin TUNISIA
The Ghadames basin is the site of one of From Mellitah, the gas processed at Wafa
the most important gas developments in is transported via a subsea pipeline, Bahr Essalam
Libya and also produces significant vol- known as Greenstream, to Gela in south-
110 km Greenstream
umes of oil. ern Italy, along with gas produced at the Gas pipeline 36” 520km
offshore Eni-operated Bahr Essalam field. Oil and condensates 10” Gas pipeline 32”
The Western Libyan gas Saipem was the main contractor for most
project/Greenstream of the work on the Western Libyan Gas
Discovered in 1991, the most significant Project and Greenstream pipeline.
hydrocarbons site in western Libya is the
Wafa field, which was developed by a The Al-Hamra fields
50:50 joint venture of Eni and NOC. Oil The remainder of the major oil and gas
Mellitah
and gas production on the scheme started assets located in the Ghadames basin is
in September 2004. largely made up of fields operated by Ara-
bian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco), a subsidi-
Some 15 oil wells and 22 gas wells were ary of NOC. These fields, about 13 in total,
drilled at the field with the stated aim all lie within the block 66 concession held
530km
of producing about 600 million cubic feet by the company and have been collectively Gas pipeline 32”
a day (cf/d) of gas and 60,000 b/d of oil, named the Al-Hamra, or Hamada, system. Oil and condensates 16”
with production understood to have been Oil from these fields is collected at a cen-
at around these levels in 2010. Production tral facility and transported to processing LIBYA
and processing facilities at the field are and export installations via a 241km pipe-
Wafa
connected to two pipelines, one for oil and line, which has been upgraded in recent
another for gas, which transport hydrocar- years to incorporate supplies from the km=Kilometres. Source: Eni

Murzuq system in the south of the
country. In total, the system produced
“The El-Feel-
about 12,500 b/d of oil in 2010.
Sharara pipeline
The Murzuq basin is still functional
The Sharara field and can be utilised
Spain’s Repsol is the operator of Sharara,
part of the NC-115 concession, along with if necessary”
Austria’s OMV and France’s Total.
Sharara is one of the biggest producers When it was first commissioned, El-Feel
of oil in the country, with a maximum was linked to Repsol’s Sharara facilties by
output of 360,000 b/d; in 2010, it pro- a 75km pipeline, with its oil transported
duced about 290,000 b/d. It is linked to by the Repsol-operated pipeline to the
the Hamada/Al-Hamra system processing Hamada/Al-Hamra system. In 2004, Eni
and distribution facilities in the Ghad- contracted Egypt’s Petrojet to construct a
ames basin by a 520km pipeline. $180m purpose-built pipeline, which
connects the field directly with Mellitah,
The Elephant (El-Feel) field following the path of the existing Sharara
The Elephant, or El-Feel, field, was one pipeline, first to Hamada and then north.
of the most significant oil discoveries to The El-Feel-Sharara pipeline is still func-
be made in recent years in Libya, when a tional and can be utilised if necessary.
UK-Italian-Korean consortium first found
oil in 1997. Following an Eni takeover of In September 2011, Eni confirmed that it
the UK partner, Lasmo, the field was was still in talks to sell half of its stake in
developed by Eni, NOC and South Korea’s the field to Russia’s Gazprom.
Korean National Oil Company, with Eni
acting as operator. NC-186
NC-186 is another Repsol-operated con-
On commissioning in 2004, the field cession. Its partners in the field are OMV,
produced about 10,000 b/d and this Total, Norway’s Statoil and NOC. Oil was
was ramped up to 125,000 b/d in 2006. first discovered in 2006 and as of 2010, it
Estimates on peak production capacity was producing about 80,000 b/d of oil,
vary from 130,000-140,000 b/d, but the with hydrocarbons transported to Sharara
field produced 127,000 b/d on average via a 31km pipeline. In 2009, Repsol
in 2010. announced another major discovery

within the bounds of the concession, but
as of 2010, was yet to announce a major
The Dahra field, meanwhile, is owned and
operated by WOC, a joint venture of NOC
“The Sirte basin The Graguba field is further connected to
a 171km oil pipeline linking the SOC-
addition to the overall output of NC-186. (59.2 per cent) and a group of US compa-
nies known as the Oasis Consortium,
is one of the world’s operated Jebel and Nasser fields with
Marsa al-Brega. In total, SOC can produce
The Sirte basin whose shareholders are ConocoPhillips
(16.3 per cent), Marathon Oil (16.3 per
biggest petroleum about 100,000 b/d of oil from the fields it
operates, with Nasser contributing about
The Sirte basin is the most productive cent) and Hess (8.2 per cent). provinces and has 30,000 b/d at most. Tibitsi has a maxi-
area of Libya and is also the most heavily mum output of about 20,000 b/d.
exploited. It is one of the world’s biggest The Gialo-Samah-El-Sider system 16 giant oil fields”
petroleum provinces and has 16 giant WOC also produces oil at the Al-Waha, The Rimal-Intisar-Zueitina system
oil fields, with reserves of 500 million Samah and Gialo fields and operates the To the east of the Sirte basin lie the
barrels or more. Among its most prolific 550km pipeline that links them with the Rimal and Bu Attifel oil fields, which
assets are the Nasser, Amal, Al-Waha, El-Sider export terminal. In total, WOC are operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas.
Nafoora, Intisar, Gialo and Bu Attifel can produce about 170,000 b/d from the Oil from the fields is transported to
oil fields and the Graguba gas field. Al-Waha field and a further 190,000 b/d Zueitina in eastern Libya via a 347km
from the smaller reservoirs. pipeline. The pipeline also connects
The fields are connected by pipelines to the Intisar oil field to the coastal town.
oil and gas processing and distribution The Gialo-Samah pipeline system also car- Intisar is operated by Zueitina Oil, a
facilities at the Bahi, Fahra, Al-Waha, ries oil produced by Harouge Oil Opera- joint venture of NOC (83 per cent), the
Amal and Bu Attifel fields. These facilities tions (HOC), a joint venture of Canada’s Pet- US’ Occidental (12.25 per cent) and
are in turn linked with coastal processing roCanada (50 per cent) and NOC (50 per OMV (4.75 per cent).
and export facilities at El-Sider, Marsa cent). HOC operates the El-Naga, Ghani and
al-Brega, Zueitina, Benghazi and the Marsa Amal fields, which have a combined aver- Gas from Bu Attifel and Intisar is
al-Hariga terminal at Tobruk. age output of approximately 60,000 b/d. transported to Zueitina by a separate
360km pipeline. Rimal produced a maxi-
The Bahi-El-Sider system The Defa-Marsa al-Brega, Jebel- mum of about 30,000 b/d before 2011,
The Bahi facilities connect the Mabruk, Marsa al-Brega systems while Bu Attifel’s output was about
Bahi and Dahra fields to the country’s oil Two further major pipelines pass through 73,000 b/d. Zueitina Oil claims that
and gas network via a 46km pipeline, run the WOC facilities. A 299km gas pipeline Intisar had a maximum output capacity
by Waha Oil Company (WOC), to El-Sider. travels north from the southern Defa field of 60,000 b/d, although non-company
The Mabruk field is a part of the C-17 to Marsa al-Brega and connects to the sources say that 2010 production was
concession operated by Mabruk Oil Oper- giant Nasser and smaller Hateiba fields. closer to 40,000 b/d.
ations. Its shareholders are Total with A second oil pipeline travels north to
37.5 per cent, Statoil with 12.5 per cent El-Sider through the Zaggut and Graguba The Sarir-Marsa al-Hariga sys-
and NOC holding the remainder. It pro- field facilities, which are operated by the tem
duced about 23,000 b/d of oil in 2010. state-run Sirte Oil Company (SOC), and The Sarir field, to the southeast of the
the Tibitsi field operated by Harouge. Sirte basin, produced a maximum

of 200,000 b/d in 2010 and is one of the
country’s most significant fields. It is
operated by Agoco and is connected
directly to the Marsa al-Hariga export ter-
minal, located next to the northeastern
town of Tobruk, by a 509km pipeline.
This pipeline also passes through the
Rimal field.
The Sarir-Messla, Messla-Amal-

Aguila/Nafoora, Amal-Ras
Lanuf system
Sarir is further connected to the Gialo
field to the west by a short trunkline and
to the Messla field to the north. Messla is
part of an Agoco-run network, which
links the Amal/Al-Sarah and Aguila/
Nafoora fields via a 420km pipeline. Oil is
then passed through a second 420km
pipeline to the Ras Lanuf export and
refining terminal.
Agoco produced about 140,000 b/d of oil

from the Nafoora/Aguila fields in 2010
and 55,000 b/d from the Messla field.
The Al-Sarah/Amal fields, in which Petro-
Canada and Wintershall hold stakes, pro-
duced a total of about 120,000 b/d.

Oil fields, locations, producers and capacities Oil fields, locations, producers and capacities (Continued)
Production Production
capacity, 2010 capacity, 2010
Field Basin Operator Shareholders (%) (kb/d) Field Basin Operator Shareholders (%) (kb/d)
Al-Jawf Pelagian Murzuq NOC (50), 45 Tibisti Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20
Total (37.5), Operations
Wintershall (12.5)
El-Naga Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20
Bouri Pelagian MOG NOC (50), 44.5 Operations
Eni (50)
Graguba Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
Hamada/ Ghadames Agoco NOC (100) 12.5
Nasser Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
Al-Hamra system
Lehib Dor Marada Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
Sharara Murzuq AOO NOC, Repsol, OMV, Total 290
Jabal Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
Elephant (El-Feel) Murzuq MOG NOC (33.33), KNOC (33.33), Eni 127 Ralah Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
(33.33)
Arshad Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
NC-186 Murzuq AOO NOC, Repsol, Total, OMV, Statoil 80
Ain Jerbi Sirte SOC NOC (100) na
Al-Waha Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips 170
(16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Wafa Sirte SOC NOC (100) 100
Amerada Hess (8.2)
Bu Attifel Sirte MOG NOC (50), 73.4
Samah Sirte WOC NOC (59.2), ConocoPhillips 25 Eni (50)
(16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3),
Amerada Hess (8.2) Rimal Sirte MOG NOC (50), 30
Eni (50)
Dahra Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips 25
(16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Intisar Sirte Zueitina Oil NOC (83), 40
Amerada Hess (8.2) Occidental (12.25),
OMV (4.75)
Gialo Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips 140
(16.3), Marathon Oil (16.3), Sarir Sirte Agoco NOC 200
Amerada Hess (8.2)
Nafoora Sirte Agoco NOC 140
Mabruk (C-17) Sirte Total NOC (50), 20
Total (37.5), Messla Sirte Agoco NOC 55
Statoil (12.5)
Al-Sarah Sirte Wintershall NOC (50), WIntershall (25), 90
Ghani Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 Gazprom (25)
Operations
Amal Sirte Harouge NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 30
Al-Jufra Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 Oil
Operations Operations
kb/d=Thousand barrels a day; MOG=Mellitah Oil & Gas; AOO=Akakus Oil Operations; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; WOC=Waha Oil Company; NOC=National Oil Corporation; KNOC=Korean National Oil Corporation;
SOC=Sirte Oil Company; na=Not available; The table above breaks down the major Libyan oil fields by location, detailing maximium output capacity as of 2010. On the basis of this data, maximum output in the country could
have been as high as 1.81 million barrels a day by the end of the year, with output likely constrained by a combination of infrastructure and Opec quotas. Source: MEED Insight

Export, refining and petrochemicals facilities
Introduction “The country’s
Libya’s major oil and gas export terminals
and its refining and petrochemicals total petrochemicals
facilities are nearly all located along
the country’s coastline. They stretch production capacity
from Abu Kammash, Mellitah, Azzawiya
in the west to El-Sider, Ras Lanuf, Marsa is 2.9 million tonnes
al-Brega and Zueitina in the centre and
Marsa al-Hariga, which is located next a year”
to the eastern town of Tobruk.
In total, Libya was exporting on average ther development of refining or petro-

1.5 million barrels a day (b/d) of oil chemicals capacity difficult.
products in December 2010 and
January 2011, with exports completely The country’s total nameplate petrochemi-
ceasing at the height of the civil war. cals production capacity is 2.9 million
The country’s refineries have a total tonnes a year (t/y), although actual output
nameplate capacity of 380,000 b/d, has recently averaged at about 2 million t/y,
although total output of refined products according to sources in the country.
was closer to 410,000 b/d in 2009 and
2010. Domestic consumption of refined Abu Kammash
fuel products hit about 270,000 b/d in The Abu Kammash petrochemicals com-
2010, with the remainder exported plex sits in the far west of Libya and is
largely to European markets. operated by state-owned General Company
for Chemical Industries. Its facilities, com-
Despite its huge natural wealth, Libya’s missioned in 1980, include a 140,000-t/y
downstream and petrochemicals indus- ethylene dichloride plant, a 60,000-t/y
tries is underdeveloped. The country’s vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) plant and
first major projects were commissioned a 60,000-t/y polyvinyl chloride (PVC)
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, shortly plant. Other chemicals produced at the
before US and UN sanctions made fur- complex include caustic soda, table salt,

chlorine, hydrochloric acid and sodium
hydrochloride, all of which are sold into
“The Mellitah
the local market.
complex contains
The main feedstocks are salt, which is pro-
duced at the nearby Sebkha salt mine and
a sulphur recovery
is used to produce chlorine and caustic plant for treatment
soda; and ethylene, which is transported to
the complex by tanker from a loading jetty. of sour gas”
The ethylene is mixed with chlorine gas to
produce VCM. The VCM is then used as
the main feedstock for the hydrochloric and one oil/condensate train, which have
acid and PVC units. a total capacity of 695 million cubic feet a
day (cf/d) and 31,000 b/d respectively.
In 2010, the Libyan Investment & Privatisa- The complex also contains a sulphur
tion Board planned to list General Com- recovery plant for the treatment of the
pany for Chemical Industries on the Tripoli sour gas from Bahr Essalam, which has a
bourse, but did not manage to accomplish capacity of 450 tonnes a day.
this before the uprising took place.
Gas from the Mellitah complex is trans-
Mellitah ported to the Greenstream gas compres-
The Mellitah facilities are operated by sion facilities, based at the same site,
Mellitah Oil & Gas, a 50:50 joint venture which have a total capacity of 10 billion
of Italy’s Eni and NOC, and are dedicated cubic metres a day. The main Mellitah
to processing and exporting oil and gas facilities were built by a consortium of
from the onshore Wafa and offshore Bahr Switzerland’s ABB, South Korea’s
Essalam fields. The complex is made up Hyundai Engineering & Construction
of two plants: the Wafa Coastal plant, and Italy’s Saipem.
which treats the oil and condensates pro-
duced at Wafa, and the Mellitah plant, Azzawiya
which processes the gas and condensates Further down the coast to the east lies the
produced at Bahr Essalam. Azzawiya terminal, whose site also
includes one of the country’s main refiner-
The Wafa Coastal plant has two treatment ies. The 120,000-b/d facility is owned and
trains, which have a total capacity of run by NOC subsidiary Azzawiya Refining
76,300 b/d of oil and liquids. The Melli- Company (ARC). NOC had planned to
tah plant has three gas processing trains revamp the refinery, commissioned in

1974 and expanded to its current capacity
in 1977, in order to improve the volume
“The El-Sider
and quality of its output. However, after
years of delay, NOC announced in 2010
terminal has storage
that it was looking for a foreign partner to
take a 50 per cent stake in ARC and partic-
facilities that can
ipate in the expansion. hold 6 million
ARC also operates the Azzawiya oil barrels of oil”
terminal, which consists of three offshore
berths that can handle tankers with capac-
ities of 140,000 tonnes, 100,0000 tonnes Ras Lanuf
and 20,000 tonnes. According to the UK’s The Ras Lanuf terminal is the site of Lib-
Lloyds Maritime Intelligence, 311,000 b/d ya’s biggest refinery and the majority of
of oil and petroleum products were the country’s petrochemicals facilities.
exported via the Azzawiya terminal in The Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing
December 2010. Company (Rasco), an NOC unit, operates
the 220,000-b/d Ras Lanuf refinery, along
El-Sider with the associated petrochemicals facili-
El-Sider is the location of the single ties: a 1.2 million-t/y naphtha cracker,
biggest export terminal in Libya, with which produces 330,000 t/y of ethylene,
447,000 b/d of crude passing through 170,000 t/y of propylene, 130,000 t/y of
the central coastal facilities in January C4s and 335,000 t/y of gasoline.
2011. The terminal is owned and oper-
ated by Waha Oil Company, a joint ven- In 2007, NOC announced plans to upgrade
ture of NOC and the US’ ConocoPhillips, the facilities, and that April, signed a
Marathon Oil and Hess. heads of agreement with the US’ Dow
Chemical Company for a $2bn expansion
The terminal has four offshore crude load- of the complex. In 2009, the state-run Eco-
ing berths, two that can load 40,000 barrels nomic & Social Development Fund
an hour (b/hr), while the third and fourth announced a $54bn development plan to
transport oil at 35,000 b/hr and 50,000 b/hr. turn Ras Lanuf and Marsa al-Brega into
The terminal also comprises storage facili- giant energy cities, which would include
ties capable of holding up to 6 million bar- the proposed Dow deal.
rels of oil.
The Ras Lanuf terminal includes
four offshore berths, which can

accommodate ships with capacities of
130,000-300,000 tonnes.
The port also contains ammonia and urea
production facilities with nameplate
“The refining and On average, about 90,000 b/d of oil was
exported from the Marsa al-Brega terminal
capacities of 700,000 t/y and 900,000 t/y export facilities at in December 2010, a figure which fell to
Marsa al-Brega respectively, operated by the Libyan Nor- 51,000 b/d in January 2011.
The refining and export facilities at Marsa wegian Fertiliser Company (Lifeco), a Marsa al-Brega are
al-Brega are smaller than elsewhere in the joint venture of Norway’s Yara Interna- The port has three offshore oil transfer
country and are among the oldest. The tional (50 per cent), NOC (25 per cent) smaller than in the berths, all of which can accept tankers
port is run by Sirte Oil Company (SOC),
which is headquartered there and also
and the Libyan Investment Authority
(25 per cent). Lifeco is one of the few rest of Libya” of up to 300,000 tonnes, and two
additional berths for liquefied natural
operates the refinery, which has a name- recent foreign investment success stories gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum
plate capacity of 10,000 b/d. in Libya. gas (LPG).

The LNG facilities were among the first of
Export terminals Petrochemicals
their kind in the world when they were
commissioned in 1970, but have long Terminal Oil capacity Speed (t/hr) Gas capacity Location/plant Capacity (t/y)
since fallen into disrepair. In 2008, the El-Sider 3 X tankers of 250,000 dwt 6,600 na
UK/Dutch Shell Group signed an agree- RAS LANUF
Marsa al-Brega 3 X tankers of 300,000 dwt na 2 X berths
ment to jointly redevelop the LNG facili- (LPG, LNG) Ethylene 330,000
ties with SOC and NOC. Under the plan, Tobruk (Marsa al-Hariga) 3 X tankers of 120,000 dwt 8,000 na
Propylene 170,000
the port’s LNG production capacity would Ras Lanuf 3 X tankers of 250,000 dwt 7,000 na
Mixed C4s 130,000
have risen to 3.2 million tonnes a year
Azzawiya 5 X tankers 175,000 dwt 6,500 na
Pyrolysis gasoline 325,000
(t/y) from about 700,000 t/y.
Zueitina 5 X tankers 270,000 dwt 6,500 4 X LNG loading
LLDPE 80,000
stations
Zueitina HDPE 80,000
The Zueitina export terminal can accom-
Refineries
modate as many as five tankers of up to
270,000 tonnes each and has a maximum Refinery Operator Nameplate 2010 October 2011 MARSA AL-BREGA
capacity (b/d) output (b/d) status Ammonia 700,000
oil transfer capacity of 6,500 tonnes an
hour (t/hr). The terminal also has four Ras Lanuf Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas 220,000 220,000 Under repair; end
Urea 900,000
Processing Company 2011 recommissioning
loading berths for LPG exports. In Decem-
ber 2010, it handled 311,000 b/d of the Azzawiya Azzawiya Oil Refining 120,000 120,000 As above
Company ABU KAMMASH
country’s exports, although this fell to
Tobruk NOC 20,000 20,000 Operational
Ethylene dichloride 104,000
199,000 b/d in January 2011.
Marsa NOC 10,000 10,000 Under repair; end
Vinyl chloride monomer 60,000
al-Brega 2011 recommissioning
The terminal can store 6.5 million Polyvinyl chloride 60,000
barrels of crude oil, 988,000 barrels of Sarir NOC 10,000 10,000 Operational
naphtha, 240,000 barrels of butane and t/hr=Tonnes an hour; dwt=Dead weight tonnes; na=Not available; LPG=Liquefied petroleum gas; LNG=Liquefied natural gas; t/y=Tonnes a year; LLDPE=Linear low-
270,000 barrels of propane. It is operated density polyethylene; HDPE=High-density polyethylene; b/d=Barrels a day; NOC=National Oil Corporation. Source: MEED Insight
by Zueitina Oil, a joint venture of NOC,
the US’ Occidental and Austria’s OMV.
Tobruk/Marsa al-Hariga pipeline to the 20,000-b/d Tobruk refin- Sarir

The Marsa al-Hariga terminal is run by ery, which is also operated by Agoco. The The only major downstream facility in
Agoco and has three offshore loading terminal and refinery are both fed by oil Libya not to be located along the country’s
berths capable of handling tankers of up from the Sarir field. The terminal coastline is the 10,000-b/d Sarir refinery,
to 120,000 tonnes and transferring oil and exported 51,000 b/d of oil on average in which sits alongside Agoco’s main pro-
fuel products at up to 8,000 t/hr. It has both December 2010 and January 2011. duction facilities at the Sarir oil field.
about 116,500 cubic metres of storage
facilities. The terminal is linked by a

Pre-2011 downstream “In 2004, the
deals and plans Libyan government
Following the lifting of international
sanctions in 2004, the government made
moved to attract
moves to attract international investors to [foreign] investors
the country to help kick-start downstream
projects and bring in key technologies, to the country”
which had been, in many cases, unavail-
able for decades.
chemicals company, the US’ Rohm
However, only four major development & Haas.
deals were signed with Dow Chemical,
Yara International, Dubai’s Al-Ghurair The Yara International deal was formally
Group and Shell. As of 2010, talks were completed in February 2009, having
also ongoing to turn Ras Lanuf and Marsa been in the works since 2007. Under the
al-Brega into energy cities – giant indus- terms of the deal, Yara set up a new com-
trial hubs – at a total cost of $54bn. pany, Lifeco, along with NOC and the
Libyan Investment Authority to operate,
The Dow Chemical deal was first mooted renovate and upgrade the Marsa al-Brega
in April 2007, when Dow and NOC fertiliser complex. The upgrade pro-
issued a joint statement announcing their gramme called for a 25 per cent output
plans to form a joint venture company to increase at the Lifeco facilities, which
operate and expand the Ras Lanuf petro- have a nameplate capacity of 700,000 t/y
chemicals complex. The plan called for of ammonia and 900,000 t/y of urea. The
the upgrade of the existing cracker and budget for the scheme, which was at the
the addition of new butadiene, butene, planning stage at the end of 2010, was
methyl teritiary butyl ether (MTBE) and about $2bn.
teryl-amyl methyl ether (TAME) units at a
projected cost of $2.5-3bn. The existing Lifeco facilities were shut
down in February 2011, with Yara pulling
However, Dow is understood to have its international staff from the country
pulled out of the deal during the 2008-09 at the same time. Workers were returning
global financial crisis, when it was to the facilities in September, with pro-
suffering from severe financial strain duction start-up scheduled for the end of
due to its $15.3bn takeover of another the year.

The Shell deal with NOC was one of
the first to be made in Libya after the Energy cities at Marsa al-Brega and Ras Lanuf
country started to open up in 2004, with
an initial heads of agreement signed in In July 2007, the Economic & Social At Ras Lanuf, Fluor outlined plans for a
March of that year and further endorsed Development Fund (ESDF) commissioned 50 per cent increase in cracking capac-
in April 2005. US engineering major Fluor Corporation ity, a 25 per cent boost to the existing
to develop a masterplan for the creation polyethylene plant, new LNG facilities, an
The agreement called for Shell to cooper- of two giant energy cities at Marsa aluminium plant and a new power plant.
ate with NOC and SOC in rejuvenating al-Brega and Ras Lanuf. At Marsa al-Brega, the plans called for a
and upgrading NOC’s LNG facilities at 25 per cent increase in fertiliser produc-
Marsa al-Brega. The plan aimed to boost Unveiled in October 2009 by the ESDF tion, a tripling of LNG capacity, a new
production capacity from 0.7 million t/y and the country’s Economic Development PVC pipe plant, new port facilities and a
to 3.2 million t/y at a cost of up to $450m. Board, the Fluor plan set out a 15-year new power station, along with a five-star
It included an exploration and production timetable for a total overhaul of all of the hotel resort.
sharing agreement for five new blocks, existing oil, gas and petrochemicals facili-
which Shell hoped to discover gas in. A ties at the two cities, along with plans for The plans, put on hold in early 2011, had
clause in the deal called for the construc- the development of new power, refining, attracted the interest of major interna-
tion of a new LNG plant at Marsa al-Brega, petrochemicals and LNG export facilities, tional oil and petrochemicals firms includ-
should a major new gas find be made; in and a huge tourist resort. ing BP and Dow Chemical.
December 2010, Shell said that it was
appraising a gas find in the Sirte basin.
opment of the Ras Lanuf refinery through had been done on the project as of early
However, progress on even the LNG plant a new joint venture company, Libyan 2011. It is thought that the scheme is
upgrade was slow. The partners tendered Emirati Refining Company. As of early unlikely to progress.
the engineering procurement and con- 2011, little progress had been made on
struction deal for the upgrade in 2009, the upgrade project, although the joint Other refinery upgrade projects were
but only the UK’s Petrofac submitted a venture deal had been concluded. The planned by NOC at Tobruk and Azzawiya,
final bid for the project. In 2010, contrac- refinery was closed in February 2011 as with the state oil firm in talks with poten-
tors were told that SOC and Shell planned the civil war broke out. tial partners in late 2010. NOC also
to retender the deal, with a new tender planned to build a new 220,000-b/d refin-
eventually being launched in 2011. Final In 2008, a Canadian engineering com- ery at Sebha, in the southwest of the
bids for the deal were due to be submitted pany, Winfield Energy, announced that country, to help ease domestic supply
in the first quarter of 2012, but the project the Libyan government had approved its issues in more remote parts of Libya.
was on hold as of the end of 2011. application to build, own and operate a
new 300,000-b/d refinery at Ras Lanuf.
In March 2009, NOC signed an agreement The company said in May 2010 that the
with Al-Ghurair Group for a $2bn devel- agreement still stood, although no work

Industry structure and future prospects
Since its formation in November 1970,
state energy firm National Oil Corporation
“By 2006, the
(NOC) has dominated all aspects of Lib- Energy Ministry
ya’s hydrocarbons sector, controlling
strategic long-term planning, a percentage had been handed
of all exploration and production conces-
sions and almost all of the country’s over to the National
downstream assets. NOC has also been
the country’s main marketer of oil since Oil Corporation”
its inception and has its own oil field
drilling and service companies, which
are widely used across the country. At the beginning of 2011, the industry
was effectively centred around NOC, its
Frustrated by its apparent lack of progress, subsidiaries and a series of joint venture
the government went as far as to shut companies. Owned by NOC and interna-
down the Energy Ministry in 2000 and tional oil companies (IOCs), the ventures
hand over all of its responsibilities to operated concessions under the terms of
NOC, although this decision was reversed exploration and production sharing agree-
in 2004. In 2006, then-Prime Minister ment (EPSA) licences.
Shokri Ghanem was appointed to the post
of NOC chairman and was given responsi- As of late 2011, the National Transitional
bility for all aspects of the energy industry, Council (NTC) had kept this structure
along with the Energy Ministry that now more or less intact and had in fact
came under the purview of NOC. retained many existing employees of state
firms, with the exception of a few top
In September 2009, Ghanem resigned as executives replaced. Ghanem, who is now
energy chief because of tensions within based in Dubai, was replaced by Nouri
the leadership and was replaced by his Berouin, a former top Arabian Gulf Oil
deputy, while a new supreme energy Company (Agoco) executive, whom the
council was set up. However, Ghanem NTC appointed in late August 2011. Until
returned to the post a month later. that point, a firm set up by the NTC, Lib-

yan Oil Company, had been co-ordinating
oil and gas operations and marketing from
healthy revenues and stabilising the coun-
try in the run-up to national elections in
“It is unlikely Agoco acts as both an exploration and
production company. It is largely focused
assets under NTC control. 2012. Executives with ties to NTC mem-
bers say that ministers are unlikely to
that any radical on fields in the Sirte basin, the most
important of which are Sarir, Messla,
In May 2011, the NTC appointed a new Oil
& Gas Minister, Ali Abdussallam Tarhouni,
want to make any big decisions before
elections are held, lest they be accused of
changes will be made Nafoora, Beda and Hamada. The company
also operates the Tobruk refinery and
the former US-based economist. He was acting without oversight. to the oil and gas export facilities and the Sarir refinery.
replaced in November 2011 by Abdulrah-
man bin Yazza, a former chairman of Eni’s However, it is likely that the Oil & Gas industry structure” The company is Benghazi-based and was
local operations. Ministry will begin investigating the the first oil firm to fall into the hands of the
terms and tendering process for major NTC. It started producing oil for export in
Exactly what shape the industry will take EPSAs and other contracts awarded late August and early September 2011.
in the future remains to be seen, with the under the Gaddafi regime. Officials have Key contact: Ahmed Majbri, Chairman
country’s main cash cow a source of fierce been at pains to make clear that contracts Telephone: (00218) (61) 222 90064
debate between NTC members, NOC com- awarded within the bounds of existing Website: www.agoco.com.ly
pany executives and the wider Libyan pop- laws will be honoured, but are likely to be
ulation. NOC was seen as more business keen to make an example of any company Azzawiya Oil Refining Company
friendly under Ghanem than in the past proved to have acted improperly. Given Azzawiya Oil Refining Company (ARC)
and less subject to the capricious whims of the already relatively harsh terms of EPSA was founded in 1976 to operate the
the Gaddafi regime, with international oil IV and the need to attract further invest- NOC-owned Azzawiya refinery. The
executives welcoming the chairman’s plans ment in the hydrocarbons sector, it is not company also manages the Azzawiya
to turn the firm into a more effective insti- thought likely that any new administra- oil export terminal.
tution modelled on quasi-independent tion will seek to introduce even stricter
companies like Saudi Aramco. terms. Indeed, it may well be the case that In 2009 and 2010, NOC started the search
EPSA IV is revised to make it more for a partner to participate in the kind of
However, many NTC members are not friendly for new concession agreements. deal it had pioneered at its Ras Lanuf
keen to see NOC enjoy the kind of auton- refining facilities: taking an equity
omy it enjoyed in the past. They foresee a State-run companies stake in the complex in exchange for
more central planning role for the Oil & a promise to fund an upgrade and
Gas Ministry or its successors, with state Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) improve management.
firms like Agoco and Sirte Oil Company Agoco is the successor to Arabian Gulf
(SOC) acting independently from NOC. Exploration Company (Ageco), set up in The refinery was briefly shut as the civil
1971 to take over part of UK-based BP’s war broke out in February 2011, but was
In the near term, it is unlikely that any stake in Libya’s oil and gas industry. In restarted the next month. In August 2011,
radical changes will be made to the indus- 1979, Agoco assumed assets previously the refinery became a focal point for fight-
try structure, with the NTC focused on held by BP and the US-based firms of Nel- ing between the NTC and the Gaddafi
ramping up oil production, generating son Bunker Hunt, Chevron and Texaco. regime, and was once again shut when the

NTC took control. It was restarted in early Rasco
September 2011 and has been running Ras Lanuf Oil & Gas Processing Company
more or less continuously since then, (Rasco) is the main operator of the Ras
largely working from existing stores of oil. Lanuf refinery, petrochemicals complex
Key contact: Nouri Berriuen, NOC Chair- and export terminal. The company was
man founded in 1983, in preparation for the
Telephone: (00218) (23) 764 3500 commissioning of the Ras Lanuf refinery,
Website: www.noclibya.ly and subsequently took on the task of run-
ning the adjacent petrochemicals facili-
Sirte Oil Company (SOC) ties, which were built in the 1990s by
Marsa al-Brega-based SOC was set up in mainly Yugoslavian contractors.
1981 to take over Esso Standard Libya, a
subsidiary of the US’ ExxonMobil Corpo- In 2008, management of the Ras Lanuf
ration, which quit the country rather than refinery was handed over to Libyan Emir-
agree to new licensing terms on its con- ates Refinery Company (Lerco), a joint
cessions. In 1986, it assumed the assets of venture of NOC and Dubai’s Al-Ghurair
another US firm, Grace Petroleum, after it Group, with Rasco continuing to act as de
was forced to relinquish its assets in the facto operator of the facility.
country under new US sanctions.
NOC also planned to set up a new joint
Until 2005, SOC was in charge of the fer- venture company to run the Ras Lanuf
tiliser complex now operated by Libyan petrochemicals facility, but these plans
Norwegian Fertiliser Company. It contin- fell through, when the deal to develop
ues to operate the Sirte oil refinery, the the complex with the US’ Dow Chemical
Marsa al-Brega export terminal and the was cancelled.
Marsa al-Brega liquefied natural gas Key contact: Mohamed Eltrshani
(LNG) plant, along with a number of oil Telephone: (00218) (54) 384 3450
and gas fields. These include the Nasser, Website: www.lercorefinery.com
Graguba, Jabal, Wadi, Ralah, Arshad, Ain
Jerbi and Al-Wafa oil fields and the Joint ventures
Hateiba, Sahil, Assamoud, Meghil, Sorrah
and Attahaddy gas fields. Zueitina Oil Company
Key contact: Nouri Berriuen, NOC Chair- Zueitina Oil Company was founded in 1986
man to take over the assets of the US’ Occidental
Telephone: (00218) (21) 361 0376 Petroleum, which had been working in
Website: www.soclibya.com Libya since 1966, but had to abandon its
concessions due to US sanctions.

In 2008, a deal was struck under the
terms of the EPSA IV licence for Occiden-
main Mellitah compression facilities and
the Greenstream pipeline, which trans-
“Mellitah Oil & and gas concessions, which it had oper-
ated with Germany’s Gelsenberg, later
tal to return to the country as a partner
in Zueitina, with a 12.25 per cent share,
ports the gas produced by Mellitah
Oil & Gas to Sicily.
Gas is a 50:50 joint renamed Veba Oil Libya, since the 1950s.
Following Mobil’s departure, Veba Oil
while Austria’s OMV took a 4.75 per cent
stake, and NOC holding on to the remain- Waha Oil Company
venture of Italy’s Operations was formed as a joint venture
between NOC and Veba.
ing 83 per cent. Waha Oil Company (WOC) was set Eni and National
up in 1986 to take over the assets In 2002, PetroCanada took over Veba Oil’s
The company runs the Zueitina oil termi- relinquished by the Oasis consortium, Oil Corporation” share of the company and in 2008, it
nal and operates the Intisar oil field, along which was made up of three US signed six new EPSA agreements with
with some smaller fields, including Zella, companies under the sanctions of that Veba Operations, now renamed Harouge
Sabah and Fida. Total output in 2010 was year – ConocoPhillips, Marathon and Oil Operations, acting as developer on the
about 40,000 b/d. The company is head- Amerada Hess. agreed areas.
quartered in Tripoli.
Telephone: (00218) (21) 338 01114 In January 2006, the three former partners Harouge operates the Amal, Farig, Ghani,
Website: www.zueitina.com.ly negotiated shares in the company. It is Tibisti and El-Naga fields, along with
now jointly owned by NOC (59.2 per the Ras Lanuf export terminal and asso-
Mellitah Oil & Gas cent), ConocoPhillips (16.3 per cent), ciated facilities.
Mellitah Oil & Gas, a 50:50 joint venture Marathon Oil (16.3 per cent) and Hess Key contact: Abdulwahab Elnaami, Chair-
of Italy’s Eni and NOC, was set up in 2008 (8.2 per cent). WOC operates the Al-Waha, man
to take on responsibility for all of the Samah, Dahra, and Gialo fields and asso- Telephone: (00218) (21) 333 0081
pair’s joint venture activities, which ciated facilities, along with the El-Sider Website: www.vebalibya.com
include the NC-118 oil field and the Wafa export terminal. The company also runs
gas field in the Ghadames basin, the Ele- the pipeline network that links the fields Akakus Petroleum Operations
phant field in the Murzuq basin, and the with El-Sider and carries crude from Akakus Petroleum Operations is a 50:50
Rimal, Khatib and Bu Attifel fields in the fields operated by Germany’s Wintershall joint venture of Spain’s Repsol and NOC,
Sirte basin. The company also operates and France’s Total. which, until 2007, was known as Repsol
the offshore Bouri and Bahr Essalam oil Key contact: Bashir Elshahab, Chairman Oil Operations. The company’s primary
and gas fields, and the main processing Telephone: (00218) (21) 333 1116 role is operating Repsol-led concessions,
and distribution facilities at Mellitah. Website: www.wahaoil.net including the Sharara oil field in the
Key contact: Najmi Krayem, Chairman Murzuq basin, the N-186 concession
Telephone: (00218) (21) 335 0890 Harouge Oil Operations in the Ghadames basin and the nearby
Website: www.mellitahog.ly Harouge Oil Operations, formerly Veba NC-190 concession.
Oil Operations, is a 50:50 joint venture of
Greenstream BV Canada’s PetroCanada and NOC. The Akakus also oversees Repsol’s explora-
Greenstream is another 50:50 Eni/NOC company was formed in 1987 to take over tion activities in the country and oper-
joint venture. It owns and operates the the US’ Mobil Oil’s share of a series of oil ates the Sharara-Hamada pipeline.

Repsol Oil Operations Company was set
up when it won its first EPSA deals in
Libya in 1994. It changed its name to
Akakus Oil Operations in 2007, as part of
negotiations around new concession
licences and a reworking of existing con-
cession terms under the EPSA IV licens-
ing terms.
Contact: Abdulmajid Shah, Chairman
Telephone: (00218) (21) 480 263039
Website: http://www.akakusoil.com
Mabruk Oil Operations

Until 2007, Mabruk Oil Operations, a
50:50 joint venture operating company
owned by NOC and Total, was known as
Total Oil Operations. The company’s
name was changed during negotiations
over new licences and updated terms for
existing concessions.
Its main activities are centred around

the Mabruk oil field in the C17 concession
of the Sirte basin, in which NOC holds a
50 per cent stake and Total and Norway’s
Statoil hold respective shares of 37.5 and
12.5 per cent. It also operates the offshore
Al-Jawf field in western Libya, in which
NOC holds a 50 per cent stake, Total
37.5 per cent and Germany’s Wintershall
a 12.5 per cent stake.
Key contact: Ahmed Abulsayen
Telephone: (00218) (21) 335 0401
Website: http://www.cptlibya.com

The status of existing production facilities
By and large, most of the civil war dam-
age to Libya’s oil and gas infrastructure
“Libya’s older oil
was fairly superficial, with most firms fields were in need
working in the country complaining
more about the looting and destruction of enhanced recovery
of accommodation and offices, rather
than significant damage to major produc- methods even before
tion facilities.
the civil war began”
However, oil executives in the country
were concerned about two key issues:
the speed with which many oil fields had a month later, local officials said it was up
been shut down and the danger of mines to 840,000 b/d. What follows is a detailed
left by pro-Gaddafi forces. breakdown of the status of the country’s
key oil and gas infrastructure.
The first issue is one that executives say
will take months, if not years, to fully West Libya:
gauge, with Libya’s older fields already in Bouri, Bahr Essalam, Abu Kammash,
need of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) tech- Mellitah, Azzawiya, Ghadames and
niques before the civil war. The second is Murzuq basins
most likely to be a problem for major inter-
national oil and engineering firms sending Bouri/Bahr Essalam fields
workers into the country. National Transi- The offshore Bouri and Bahr Essalam
tional Council (NTC) ministers remain fields, operated by Mellitah Oil & Gas
concerned that both groups might hold (MOG), were shut down in February
back because of safety concerns. 2011, with Italian shareholder Eni con-
cerned about them sustaining damage.
Nevertheless, oil output was recovering According to Eni, the facilities sustained
rapidly in the final quarter of 2011. Pro- no damage whatsoever. MOG started
duction had reached about 570,000 barrels working towards restoring production at
a day (b/d) in the first week of November; the Bahr Essalam field in early November,

Wafa field
targeting output of 380 million cubic feet a
day (cf/d) of gas by the end of the month, The Wafa field, which supplies the bulk of
“The Greenstream Spain’s Repsol restarted production at
the field on 25 October and targeted pro-
with production from the Bouri field set to
begin at the same time.
the gas to the Greenstream pipeline, also
suffered relatively little damage during
pipeline required duction of about 10,000 b/d by the end
of the month. In early November, former
Production at the Mabruk-operated

fighting and the main pipeline linking the
complex with Mellitah just required basic
light repairs, but oil & gas minister Ali Abdussallam
Tarhouni claimed that output from the
Al-Jawf field was restarted in late maintenance. Production started at Wafa was operational by field had reached 90,000 b/d, although
September and by early November had in mid-October. Eni said in early Novem- local executives disputed this, saying that
reached about 45,000 b/d. ber that it could technically return to full late October” the figure was closer to 60,000-70,000 b/d.
pre-war production levels at the field, but Full 2010 output of 260,000 b/d was not
Mellitah complex that it was only pumping enough gas to expected until the first half of 2012.
The Mellitah complex was the scene of meet domestic fuel and electricity needs –
some fighting during the civil war and is about 50,000 barrels of oil equivalent a Elephant field
understood to have sustained some dam- day (boe/d). The Elephant field facilities, operated by
age, most of it superficial. The Green- MOG, were among the most severely
stream pipeline required light repairs, but Hamada/Al-Hamra system affected by the civil war, with Eni initially
was operational by late October and offi- The Hamada/Al-Hamra system, operated reporting major damage to the infrastruc-
cials at Eni remained upbeat about the by Arabian Gulf Oil Company (Agoco) ture. The pipeline linking the field with
facilities’ capability to cope with increas- also escaped major damage, although the Mellitah also came under heavy attack.
ing production over the coming months. state-run firm confirmed in late October
that it was yet to restart production at its However, production resumed in mid-
Azzawiya facilities Ghadames facilities because of issues November and was running at 40,000 b/d
The Azzawiya refinery and export related to the speed and manner in which by early December, well down on the late
complex, run by Azzawiya oil Refining they were shut down. Pre-war output was 2010 average of 127,000 b/d.
Company (ARC), was the scene of heavy about 12,500 b/d.
fighting between NTC troops and Gaddafi NC-186
loyalists in August 2011. The Azzawiya Sharara field Production from fields at the Akakus-
facilities were shut down after the NTC The Sharara field, operated by Akakus Oil operated NC-186 concession restarted in
took control of the area and were not Operations, was initially thought to have November. Despite some damage to pipe-
reopened until September, when the sustained considerable damage during the line infrastructure, output ramped up
National Oil Corporation (NOC) reported civil war, with sustained fighting occur- swiftly and had reached 200,000 b/d by
that the refinery was operating at about ring in the vicinity of the main produc- early December.
half of its 120,000-b/d capacity. By early tion, processing and distribution facili-
November, the plant was processing ties. However, damage was limited to
about 90,000 b/d and was operating at living quarters and offices, with only light
full capacity a month later. All its output repairs required to key equipment and the
was going to the local market. pipeline linking the field with Hamada.

Central Libya: is back online and domestic gasoline
The Sirte basin, El-Sider, Ras Lanuf, needs have been met.
Marsa al-Brega and Zueitina
Marsa al-Brega facilities
Refineries and export terminals The Marsa al-Brega terminal suffered con-
siderable damage during the war and as
El-Sider terminal of early November was still under repair,
A major roadblock to boosting Libyan oil with the facilities not expected to be in
exports after the war was the sustained use until December. Full repair of the
damage caused to the key El-Sider oil ter- facilities is likely to run well into 2012,
minal, which saw almost all facilities in according to industry sources. Key repairs
need of repair. Repairs started in October, were also delayed by striking workers at
with local oil service firms taking on the Waha Oil Company (WOC), the terminal’s
majority of the work. Exports from the ter- operator, who demanded that the compa-
minal began in December, although it was ny’s chairman be sacked for co-operation
expected to be a year before the facility with the Gaddafi regime.
was fully repaired.
The Libyan Norwegian Fertiliser Company
Ras Lanuf facilities complex at Marsa al-Brega did not suffer
The Ras Lanuf refinery was the site of sev- severe damages and Norway’s Yara Inter-
eral pitched battles between Gaddafi loy- national began to assess repair needs at the
alists and NTC troops. However, the plant end of October, while targeting a restart for
was closed in March, with Ras Lanuf Oil the plant by year end.
& Gas Processing Company (Rasco)
employees trying to minimise the poten- Zueitina terminal
tial for damage and returning to the site to The Zueitina terminal suffered the least
undertake repairs whenever necessary. damage of all the Gulf of Sirte oil export
terminals, having been taken over by the
Production was expected to resume in NTC in March, at the start of the war,
December. However, full commissioning with enough repairs being made for oil to
of the 220,000-b/d refinery is not likely to be loaded at the facilities by mid-June.
take place before the first half of 2012.
Waha Oil Company facilities
The Rasco-operated petrochemicals facili- WOC operates the Al-Waha, Samah,
ties were not as badly affected by the Dahra and Gialo oil fields, which are
fighting as the refinery itself, but will not connected to its El-Sider export terminal
return to full production until the refinery by a 550-kilometre pipeline that it oper-

ates. The pipeline required some
repairs after the war, but is understood
collaboration with the Gaddafi regime was
finally resolved in mid-November. This
“The Zueitina Harouge Oil Operations facilities
The Harouge oil fields are connected
to be in good condition. The Dahra
and Samah fields were the first to restart
allowed production to resume at the first
two fields.
terminal suffered to two pipeline systems, with output
from the El-Naga, Ghani and Al-Jufra
and were jointly producing 16,000 b/d the least damage of fields linked to the WOC line to El-Sider,
by early December. Production was Mabruk Oil Operations facilities while the Tibisti field is connected by a
also about to start at the Gialo field, The C-17 (Mabruk) concession, which is all the Gulf of Sirte separate line, run by Sirte Oil Company
which had mainly suffered damage to run by Mabruk Oil Operations, was una- (SOC), to El-Sider.
its accommodation and administrative ble to start producing until the WOC dis- oil export terminals”
buildings. In contrast, the Al-Waha field pute was resolved, as exports pass Harouge started repairs to the fields in
required extensive demining, according through WOC pipelines. However, by early October and loaded the first tanker of
to WOC officials. early December, Mabruk production had oil for export in late October. The fields
risen to 45,000 b/d. Its facilities were had suffered varying degrees of damage,
The strike by company employees largely unaffected by the war, allowing largely to administrative and accommoda-
demanding that the chairman be sacked for production to resume quickly. tion buildings, which Harouge estimated

would cost about $30m to repair. Produc-
tion was about 30,000 b/d in early Novem-
“The Sarir and both the Sarir and Tobruk refineries,
which have a combined capacity of
ber and Harouge was confident it could
bring output up to the 2010 levels of
Tobruk refineries 30,000 b/d and were both largely
unscathed by the war. Meanwhile, the
80,000 b/d-plus by the end of the year. were both largely Marsa al-Hariga terminal was operating
at full capacity in early November.
Sirte Oil Company facilities unscathed by the
The SOC pipeline to El-Sider carries oil The Messla and Aguila/Nafoora fields
from its Zaggut and Graguba fields. The civil war ” were more affected by the fighting, but
Graguba field is linked in to another pipe- came on stream in early October, adding
line system, which also transfers oil some 80,000-90,000 b/d of production. As
from the Nasser and Jabal fields to Marsa of early December, Agoco’s total output
al-Brega. In total, fields operated by SOC tion in October. As of early November, was about 280,000 b/d.
produced 100,000 b/d in 2010. the company was pumping as much as
30,000 b/d from the Intisar field and Two more fields are connected to the
SOC’s offices and administrative head- undisclosed volumes of gas. Agoco-Ras Lanuf network: Amal and
quarters in Marsa al-Brega were among Al-Sarah, operated by Harouge and Ger-
the most affected by the fighting. The Arabian Gulf Oil Company many’s Wintershall. Wintershall reported
company has had the most difficulty in (Agoco) facilities in mid-October that it was producing
restarting oil production due to a lack of Agoco is the biggest producer in Libya about 20,000 b/d from Al-Sarah, while
accommodation or buildings at its fields, and was the first to be run by the NTC. Harouge was producing a similar volume.
heavy mining around some facilities and It operates the giant Sarir field, which
a lack of capacity. Total output from the produced 200,000 b/d in 2010. Sarir is
company’s fields was estimated in early directly connected to the Marsa al-Hariga
November at about 20,000 b/d. terminal by a dedicated pipeline. Its other
main fields are Messla, Aguila and
Rimal-Intisar-Zueitina system Nafoora, which are part of the network of
MOG was back at work at the Rimal and linked facilities that are connected to the
Bu Attifel fields in October and had Ras Lanuf export terminal.
reportedly boosted production at the
fields – 103,000 b/d in total before the war The Sarir field was the scene of some
– to about 70,000 b/d by late August, after fighting early in the war, but by Septem-
finding little damage at either field. ber, Agoco had made significant repairs to
both the field and the pipeline connecting
Zueitina Oil, which uses the same pipe- it with Tobruk, claiming that production
line as MOG to transport oil to its Zuei- was about 160,000 b/d. The output from
tina oil terminal, also returned to produc- Sarir was being used as a feedstock for

Output and status of major oil and gas facilities, November 2011
Production, Production Production restarted Estimated output, October
Basin Operator Shareholders (%) 2010 (kb/d) halted (2011) (2011) 2011 [kb/d)/Damage status
Al-Jawf Pelagian Murzuq NOC (50), Total (37.5), Wintershall (12.5) 45 March September 40
Bouri Pelagian MOG NOC (50), Eni (50) 44.5 February Mid-November (target) 0/MOG working towards mid-
November start-up
Hamada/Al-Hamra Ghadames Agoco NOC (100) 12.5 March na 0/Start-up issues causing delays
system
Sharara Murzuq AOO NOC, Repsol, OMV, Total 290 February October 90
Elephant (El-Feel) Murzuq MOG NOC (33.33), KNOC (33.33), Eni (33.33) 127 March na (November/December) 0/Severe damage to infrastructure,
pipelines
NC-186 Murzuq AOO NOC, Repsol, Total, OMV, Statoil 80 February na (November/December) na
Al-Waha Sirte WOC NOC (59.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon 170 March na 0/Damage to accommodation,
Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) worries over mines
Samah Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon 25 February na 0/Strike action
Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2)
Dahra Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon 25 February na 0/Strike action
Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2)
Gialo Sirte WOC NOC (50.2), ConocoPhillips (16.3), Marathon 140 February na 0/Strike action (accommodation
Oil (16.3), Amerada Hess (8.2) disruption)
Mabruk (C-17) Sirte Total NOC (50), Total (37.5), Statoil (12.5) 20 February na 0/Cannot be started until WOC
facilities are recommissioned
Ghani Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 March October 10
Operations
Al-Jufra Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 March October 10
Operations
Tibisti Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 March October 0/Damage to accommodation,
Operations worries over mines
El-Naga Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 20 March October 10
Operations
Graguba Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown General concerns over SOC capacity
remained
Nasser Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na
Lehib Dor Marada Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na
Jabal Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na

Output and status of major oil and gas facilities, November 2011 (Continued)
Production, Production Production restarted Estimated output, October
Basin Operator Shareholders (%) 2010 (kb/d) halted (2011) (2011) 2011 (kb/d)/Damage status
Ralah Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na
Arshad Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na
Ain Jerbi Sirte SOC NOC (100) na March Unknown na
Wafa Sirte SOC NOC (100) 100 March Unknown 20
Bu Attifel Sirte MOG NOC (50), Eni (50) 73.4 February October 50
Rimal Sirte MOG NOC (50), Eni (50) 30 February October 20
Intisar Sirte Zueitina Oil NOC (83), Occidental (12.25), OMV (4.75) 40 February October 30
Sarir Sirte Agoco NOC 200 February August 160
Nafoora Sirte Agoco NOC 140 February August 50
Messla Sirte Agoco NOC 55 February August 30
Al-Sarah Sirte Wintershall NOC (50), Wintershall (25), Gazprom (25) 90 February October 30
Amal Sirte Harouge Oil NOC (50), PetroCanada (50) 30 February October 20
Operations
kb/d=Thousand barrels a day; MOG=Mellitah Oil & Gas; AOO=Akakus Oil Operations; NOC=National Oil Corporation; Agoco=Arabian Gulf Oil Company; KNOC=Korean National Oil Corporation; WOC=Waha Oil Company;
SOC=Sirte Oil Company; na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight

The future for Libya’s EPSA holders
The opening up of the Libyan economy
in 2004 revived hopes for a huge boost in
“Between 2004 International firms that have
signed EPSAs*
International firms that have signed
EPSAs* (Continued)
production in a country that has consist- and 2008, National Company Company
ently underachieved as a producer of oil
and gas. Oil Corporation PetroCanada
Occidental (Oxy)
Sonatrach
Oil India
Initially, the signs were promising. closed 57 production Eni BG
Between 2004 and 2008, National Oil
Corporation (NOC) closed a total of sharing agreements” Woodside Petroleum
Royal Dutch Shell
Pertamina
Nippon Oil Corporation
57 exploration and production sharing
Repsol PGNIG
agreements (EPSAs) under the terms
of its EPSA IV contracts, bringing the RWE Chinese Petroleum Company (CPC)
total number of oil and gas concessions Total China National Petroleum Corporation
in the country, including those held Wintershall (BASF) Verenex
solely by NOC and its affiliates, to 228.
Tatneft Chevron
But despite the sheer number of contracts Nimir Petroleum Petrobras

signed after 2004, all of which required Inpex Holdings Hess
the winning IOCs to commit to a large StatoilHydro Boco
minimum spend on exploration activities
ExxonMobil OMV
and to pay significant signing on bonuses
running into hundreds of millions of dol- BP Algerian-Libyan E&P
lars, oil output was not increased at the Turkiye Petroleum Joint Operating Company
pace that many observers and industry
ONGC
insiders had expected.
*=Includes oil firms no longer active in Libya; EPSA=Exploration and production sharing agreement;
E&P=Exploration and production. Source: MEED Insight
IOC executives blamed this on a combina-
tion of poor exploration results, stifling
bureaucracy and tensions between the
government of the late Muammar Gaddafi,
NOC and the IOCs.

EPSA contract holders Gazprom and Tatneft and China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), winning
“Firms whose companies willing to earn lower margins,
or with strategic interests in capturing a
Year Production (kb/d)
2000 1,475
development contracts. When the fourth,
gas-focused round was held in December
governments had share of production at a national level,
were more successful in later bid rounds.
2001 1,427 2007, only 13 companies out of the 54
qualified bid and only six out of the 12
abstained from With a new administration in Tripoli, there
2002
working with the
1,375
contracts were awarded. has again been considerable speculation
2003 1,485
over new opportunities for IOCs, rewards
2004 1,623 At the same time, NOC, headed by NTC might suffer” for firms which lent early support to the
2005 1,745 former oil & gas minister Shokri Ghanem, National Transitional Council (NTC) and
2006 1,815 attempted to renegotiate all existing pro- penalties for those whose governments
duction sharing agreements under the were not as supportive of Gaddafi’s ouster.
2007 1,820
terms of EPSA IV. In 2009, France’s Total
2008 1,820
and its partners in Libya – Germany’s The speculation was fuelled by several
2009 1,652 Wintershall and Norway’s Statoil – agreed reports out of Libya. In an August 2011
2010 1,659 to the new terms, which reduced their interview with Reuters, an Arabian Gulf
share of production at existing conces- Oil Company (Agoco) official said that the
EPSA=Exploration and production sharing agreement;
kb/d=Thousand barrels a day. Source: BP Statistical sions from 50 per cent of oil output to firm had no issue with Western firms
Review 27 per cent. whose governments had recognised the
NTC and which had agreed early on to
Interest in the four post-sanctions bid Under the new deals, the companies work with the rebel government, but that
rounds also waned. In the first round, also agreed to take 40 per cent of gas those firms whose governments had
which ran from October 2004 to January output from their concessions, falling abstained, namely Russian, Chinese and
2005, 15 exploration and production areas to 30 per cent within five years, rather Brazilian firms, might suffer.
were offered. About 163 companies than the initially agreed 50 per cent.
applied to bid for the contracts, 63 were The deal followed a similar renegotiation This was followed in late October by NOC
approved and all of the concessions – nine between Italy’s Eni and NOC in 2007, releasing details of deals signed and pro-
onshore and six offshore – were awarded. which brought all of the firm’s contracts posed with IOCs for oil supplies and help
in line with EPSA IV. This was followed in restarting oil and gas production. Swit-
In the second bid round, held in October by a reworking of Spanish firm Repsol’s zerland’s Vitol was a major supplier of
2005, 26 areas were bid by 48 companies, concession agreements in Libya. fuel to the NTC, while Repsol offered help
many of which were smaller independent in restarting production.
and Asian firms. However, during the Coupled with higher signing-on fees and
third bid round, 14 areas were offered and a commitment to take on all development Tripoli has had to adopt a pragmatic
47 firms were prequalified to bid, but only costs, rather than sharing them with NOC, approach, with the need for a speedy
10 deals were completed, with more non- the new deals were becoming less attrac- resumption of production – and, with it,
Western companies, including Russia’s tive to IOCs. This largely explains why an inflow of revenues – overriding politi-

cal concerns. The NTC has said that it is
committed to upholding all contracts that
“National Oil
were signed in line with existing Libyan
laws, although it will investigate existing
Corporation’s focus
EPSA deals for any improprieties in the
way they were awarded. This, executives
is restoring oil output
say, includes all contracts signed with by working with
Russian, Brazilian and Chinese firms,
although the council does not want to existing partners”
alienate potential economic partners or
future oil consumers.
future oil & gas ministry, which may well
The chances of contract renegotiations reduce the role of NOC.
or new bid rounds before late 2013
are extremely low. The NTC is by nature A less idiosyncratic government can only
a transitional council and has been be a good thing for IOCs and if the NTC
cautious not to make major decisions acts on its promise to improve transpar-
that could come under scrutiny after ency and economic freedoms, the
a permanent government has been business environment could be signifi-
elected through a national vote in cantly improved. However, a clear picture
2012. As a result, new deals are of the structure of the industry – and an
unlikely to be struck until a democrati- opportunity for new oil and gas deals – is
cally elected oil minister has been put in unlikely to emerge until 2014-15.
place and has had time to work on a
long-term strategy, new petroleum laws
or concession terms.
NOC’s core focus is restoring oil output –

the country’s chief source of revenue – by
working with existing partners. The state
oil company hopes to reach pre-conflict
production of 1.6m b/d by the end of
2012. IOCs are unlikely to resume signifi-
cant exploration operations until they can
assess the security situation, following
the 2012 elections. They will also need
time to build new relationships with the

Power
P ower supplies were seriously dis-
rupted during the civil war, with
“In the decade Peak power demand growth, 2000-10
lengthy blackouts being experienced in

the major cities of Tripoli, Misurata, Sirte
up to 2010, power (MW)
and Benghazi. In most cases, disruptions demand growth 6000

6,000
were caused not by damage to power
plants, but by a lack of oil and gas feed- averaged 8-10 per 5000
5,000
stock or network issues. Feedstock avail-
ability will be crucial in determining how cent a year”
quickly power capacity and supplies can 4000
4,000
be restored to pre-2011 levels.
Demand 3000
3,000
Prior to 2011, Libya’s power sector experi-

enced strong growth both in terms of peak 2000
2,000
power demand and installed capacity. In

the decade up to 2010, power demand
growth averaged 8-10 per cent a year and
1000
1,000
reached 5,759MW, an increase of 9 per

cent over the 2009 figure. 00
20
00
20
03
20
06
20
08
20
09
20
10
The high growth was driven by a popula- Sources: Gecol, AUPTDE

tion that rose on average by 2.2 per cent a
year and an economy that expanded by an

“Between 2000 Residential power tariffs
Monthly consumption (kWh) Tariff (LD/kWh) Meter charge (LD)
and 2007, per capita 1-1,000 0.02 0.05
consumption climbed 1,001-1,400 0.03 na
1,400 and above 0.05 na

by 56 per cent to
4,158 kilowatt hours” kWh=Kilowatt hours; $1=LD1.3; na=Not applicable. Source: Gecol
Non-residential power tariffs

average of 7 per cent a year over the Tariff (LD/kWh) Meter charge (LD)
period. It was also due to a sharp rise
Commercial 0.068 0.55
in per capita electricity consumption.
Between 2000 and 2007, per capita Agricultural (large) 0.032 0.2
consumption climbed by 56 per cent to Agricultural (small) 0.02 0.2

4,158 kilowatt hours (kWh), which while Heavy industry 0.042 0.5
being relatively low compared to the Gulf
Light industry 0.031 1
states, was high in relation to elsewhere in
North Africa. Light industry 0.031 1
kWh=Kilowatt hours; $1=LD1.3. Source: Gecol

The increase in per capita consumption
reflected:
• a jump in installed generating capacity
• the near completion of a long-running
programme to connect the entire popula-
tion to the network
• rising living standards brought about by
higher oil prices
• Libya’s reintegration into the interna-
tional community, which paved the way
for increased foreign investment, new
infrastructure projects and the rise of a
middle class
An additional factor for the relatively

high per capita consumption was low tar-

Breakdown of power demand by sector, 2008 Installed generating capacity by technology
Agriculture
33 4,247
Steam turbine
33 2,355
Residential Gas turbine
21 1,747
13
Industrial
% MW
Combined-cycle
Commercial
Source: Gecol Source: AUPTDE
iffs. As in much of the Gulf, tariffs are set with commercial establishments paying a “Serious power cent of demand in 2008. Industrial users
well below the cost of power production flat rate of LD0.068 a kWh. Prior to 2011, made up 21 per cent, with most of the
and transmission and, as a result, are however, revenue collection was shortages in 2004 demand coming from the oil and gas sec-
heavily subsidised. This means there has poor, resulting in many residential con- tor and the Misurata steel complex, while
been little incentive for consumers to sumers effectively paying nothing for prompted Libya to agriculture accounted for the remaining
conserve energy. their electricity.
invest heavily in new 13 per cent.
The existing tariff system is broken down Compared to some Gulf states, the sources
generating capacity” Capacity
by sector and for residences by band, of power demand in Libya are relatively Serious power shortages in 2004 prompted
based on usage. The residential tariff balanced. According to the latest figures the government to invest heavily in new
ranges from LD0.02 ($0.016) a kWh up to from the General Electricity Company of generating capacity, which has provided
LD0.05 a kWh, excluding a LD0.05 meter Libya (Gecol), the residential and com- an increasingly wide cushion over sup-
charge. Non-residential tariffs are higher, mercial sectors each accounted for 33 per plies. In 2010, capacity reached 8,349MW,

“Technically, the Major power plants, 2010
Power station Capacity (MW) Contractor Operation date Fuel
state had a power Tripoli West 325 Alstom 1976 Heavy fuel oil
reserve margin of Benghazi North steam 160 Deutsche Babcock 1979 Heavy fuel oil
Tripoli West 240 Bharat Heavy Electrical 1980 Heavy fuel oil; light fuel oil
over 40 per cent Khoms steam 480 Deutsche Babcock 1982 Heavy fuel oil; light fuel oil;
in 2010”
natural gas
Abu Kammash gas 45 Westinghouse 1982 Light fuel oil
Kufra gas 50 Fiat Avio 1982 Light fuel oil
a significant increase on the 2008 total of Derna steam 130 BBC (ABB) 1985 Heavy fuel oil
6,196MW. Of the total installed, half was Tobruk steam 130 BBC (ABB) 1985 Heavy fuel oil
gas turbine technology, almost 30 per cent
Misurata steel 507 Hyundai Engineering & Construction 1990 Heavy fuel oil; natural gas
was combined-cycle technology, with the
remainder covered by steam technology. Sarir gas 45 Westinghouse 1990 Light fuel oil; natural gas
Tripoli South gas 500 ABB 1994 Light fuel oil

Technically, the state had a reserve mar- Zueitina gas 200 ABB 1994 Light fuel oil; natural gas
gin of over 40 per cent in 2010. However,
Khoms gas 600 ABB 1995 Light fuel oil; natural gas
the actual reserve margin may well have
Western Mountain 624 BHEL 2005-06 Light fuel oil; natural gas
been much lower, given that it is unclear
how much of the installed capacity was Benghazi North combined-cycle 810 Daewoo Engineering & Construction 2007 Light fuel oil; natural gas
available. In both the desalination and Azzawiya combined-cycle 1,350 Alstom, Hyundai Engineering & 2005-07 Light fuel oil; natural gas
wastewater sectors, a considerable Construction
amount of installed capacity was not Benghazi combined-cycle 750 Daewoo Engineering & Construction 2009 Light fuel oil; natural gas
operating in 2010 as a result of age, a lack Sarir 750 Hyundai Engineering & Construction 2010 Light fuel oil; natural gas
of investment, poor operations and main-
Zueitina gas 550 Enka 2010 Light fuel oil; natural gas
tenance. There is little to suggest that it
was any different in the power sector, Source: MEED Insight
especially as some 3,000MW of installed
capacity was built prior to 1995.

A feature of the local power sector is its
dependence on liquid fuels. Gecol’s latest “A feature of the
data shows that in 2008, liquids made up
the majority of feedstock, with heavy fuel
local power sector
oil accounting for 21 per cent of the total
and light fuel oil 32 per cent. Despite Lib-
is its dependence on
ya’s large reserves, natural gas had a rela- liquid fuels for the
tively low share, making up 47 per cent.
majority of feedstock”
Gecol’s long-term goal is to substantially
reduce the consumption of liquids. In 2009,
it announced plans to increase the share of in project implementation mean that these
gas in its total feedstock mix to 94 per cent targets are likely to be missed, although
by 2012 and to 99 per cent by 2016. Delays they should be reached by 2020.
Breakdown of power plant feedstock by type, 2008 Gecol’s projected fuel mix, 2008-16
(%)
47 100
100
Heavy fuel oil

Gas
32 90
90
21
80
80
70
70
%
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
Light fuel oil 1010
00
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
Natural gas HFO LFO

Source: Gecol Gecol=General Electricity Company of Libya; HFO=Heavy fuel oil; LFO=Light fuel oil. Sources: Gecol, AUPTDE

“Several projects Selected power projects under way as of early 2011
have been India’s Bharat Heavy Electri-
cals and Turkey’s Enka, which has carried
Capacity
awarded by General Plant Type (MW) Lead contractor
out a number of projects in partnership
with Global Electricity Services Company
Electricity Company Gulf (Al-Khaleej)
Sebha
Steam
Gas turbine
1,400
750
Hyundai Engineering & Construction
Enka
(Gesco), a joint venture of Gecol and
South Africa’s Eskom Enterprises. On the
of Libya failed to Western Mountain extension Gas turbine 312 Bharat Heavy Electricals consultancy side, the leading player has
been ACESCo, a joint venture of Gecol
proceed altogether” Benghazi North
Misurata
Combined-cycle
Combined-cycle
750
750
Daewoo Engineering & Construction
Daewoo Engineering & Construction

and the Egyptian Electricity Holding
Company (EEHC).
Tripoli West extension Steam 1,400 Hyundai Engineering & Construction
As of early 2011, over 6,000MW of new Zueitina Combined-cycle 750 Daewoo Engineering & Construction The outbreak of the civil war in early
capacity was at varying stages of comple- 2011 brought all project activity in the
Source: MEED Insight
tion. The list of projects included con- power sector to a halt. Following the
tracts dating back to 2007, such as Gulf end to hostilities in October 2011, all the
(Al-Khaleej) steam, as well as more recent leading international contractors in the
schemes, including the 750MW Zueitina market were preparing to visit Tripoli
2 combined-cycle project, which was to assess the state of their project sites
awarded to South Korea’s Daewoo Engi- and to hold talks with the National Tran-
neering & Construction in October 2010. sitional Council (NTC) over how to
resume construction activities.
Even before the civil war started, delays
were frequently encountered on Gecol’s Demand outlook
capacity building programme. A lack of The high volume of power plant contracts
clear direction, payment difficulties, awarded in the period 2007-10 under-
budgetary issues and bureaucracy were lined the pressing need for new capacity
all blamed. In the worst cases, several in the local power sector. Tripoli was, in
projects awarded by Gecol failed to effect, making up for the lost decade up
proceed altogether either as a result of to 2005 when no new power plants were
a change of heart by the client or a lack commissioned in the North African state.
of funds.
Gecol’s capacity building programme was
In recent years, the Libyan power market the outcome of a masterplan announced
has been dominated by Asian contractors, in 2008, which called for installed capac-
in particular Daewoo and its South ity to rise to about 13,000MW in 2012 and
Korean counterpart Hyundai Engineering to 19,000-20,000MW by 2020, from
& Construction. Their main competitors 6,196MW. The capacity forecast was

Power demand outlook, 2010-25 Power plant projects planned by Gecol, 2011-25
(MW) Power plant Type Capacity (MW) Proposed commissioning date
Sebha Gas 855 2011
20000
20,000
Zueitina phase 2 Gas 820 2011
Tripoli West Steam 1,400 2013
Gulf of Bomba
15000
Steam 1,050 2013
15,000
Misurata phase 2 Combined-cycle 750 2014
Tripoli East Steam 1,400 2015
10000
10,000 Benghazi West Steam 1,400 2016
West Derna Steam 1,400 2017
Mellitah Combined-cycle 750 2017
50005,000 Khoms expansion Steam 1,400 2018
Mellitah Combined-cycle 750 2019
Ras Lanuf Steam 1,400 2021
0 0
08 10 15 20 25
Abu Taraba phase 1 Combined-cycle 750 2022
20 20 20 20 20
Abu Taraba phase 2 Combined-cycle 750 2024
Source: Gecol, 2008 Source: Gecol
based on accelerated peak power

demand growth of 10-12 per cent a year
projects, for which contracts have already
been awarded, and the proposed “No agreements planned independent power project (IPP)
programme, which was to begin with the
in the period 2009-25. Under this sce-
nario, power demand was projected to
1,500MW Mellitah station, all of whose
output is destined for export.
were reached on Tripoli West plant. However, no agree-
ments were signed before the civil war
reach 12,621MW in 2015 and 15,078MW
in 2020, up from just 4,756MW in 2008. For the first time, the government pro-
the IPP programme broke out.
posed that some of the new capacity before the civil war Even before the civil war, there was grow-
To meet the demand growth and capacity should be developed by private compa- ing pressure on Gecol to revise its
targets, Gecol drew up a list of new nies, as opposed to being conventionally broke out” demand and capacity forecasts, as well as
projects to be executed in the period procured from the engineering, procure- its project timetable. The utility had
2011-25. This called for the addition of ment and construction (EPC) contracting envisaged a spike in power demand in
14,875MW of new capacity and included market. In 2009-10, Tripoli held discus- 2010 as a result of a series of large-scale
the Sebha, Tripoli West and Zueitina 2 sions with a number of developers over a real-estate and infrastructure projects

being completed. In the end, however,
project delays and cancellations meant “Steps have been
that demand reached 5,759MW, well
short of the 8,582MW projected in Gecol’s
taken to connect
2008 forecast. Libya’s domestic
The civil war has only served to make the power grid with the
future requirements of the power sector
even more uncertain. In 2011, peak regional network”
demand is reckoned to have fallen by
30-50 per cent and a return to pre-conflict
demand growth rates will largely depend
on how quickly the political situation can tian grids have been connected by a
be stabilised and investment can resume. 220kV line since May 1998 and there
Even in the best case scenario, Gecol’s were plans prior to the civil war to
2008 demand forecast for the year 2020 upgrade the voltage of the interconnec-
appears to be 3,000-5,000MW too high. tion to 400/500kV by 2012.
Transmission and Libya and Tunisia are linked by a 380km-

distribution long double circuit line between Mede-
Libya’s transmission network extends for nine and Abu Kammash, and a second
2,000 kilometres between the Tunisian 298km single line between Tataouine and
and Egyptian borders and for up to 900km El-Ruwis. The interconnections were
south into the Sahara desert. Gecol com- completed in 2003, but technical issues
pleted the internal interconnection of the held up their synchronisation.
national grid at the 220kV level in 1993 and
a decade later began upgrading the network A 400kV link between Libya and Algeria
to 400kV. As of 2009, there were 442km of has also been proposed, along with a
400kV lines, with a further 3,200km under subsea cable to Italy to export 1,000MW
construction and 2,000km more planned. It of power from the planned Mellitah
also had 14,000km of 220kV lines, power plant.
22,000km of 66kV and 33kV lines and
45,000km of 11kV distribution lines.
In recent years, steps have been taken to

connect the domestic grid with the
regional network. The Libyan and Egyp-

Renewables
A s a result of its energy riches, renew-
able energy has traditionally been “Renewables Reaol’s renewable energy targets, 2015-25
Planned share of total
overlooked in Libya. This is despite the
state having good solar and wind poten- made up well Wind (MW) CSP (MW) PV (MW) SWH (MW) energy mix (%)
2015 750 100 50 100 6
tial. Solar radiation levels are as high
as 7.5 kilowatt hours (kWh) a square a
under 1 per cent 2020 1,500 800 150 300 10
metre a day, while wind speeds reach
up to 7.5 metres a second. However, in
of the total energy 2025 2,000 1,200 500 600 25
2010, renewables made up well under mix in 2010” Reaol=Renewable Energy Authority of Libya; CSP=Concentrated solar power; PV=Photovoltaic; SWH=Solar
water heating. Source: Reaol
1 per cent of the total energy mix and
were confined to small scale photovoltaic
(PV) projects serving rural communities. Even before war broke out, international “These targets and strategy for renewable
By 2020, Reaol aimed for renewables to consultants were sceptical about Libya’s energy in Libya do not seem to be fully
The 2008 publication of an extremely reach 2,750MW, which it said would ability to meet its targets, concluding that shared among all participants, despite the
ambitious roadmap by the Renewable make up 10 per cent of the total energy these were more aspirational than deliver- cabinet’s approval of the target,” said the
Energy Authority of Libya (Reaol) mix, implying a total capacity of able. The scepticism was partly due to report. “One reason seems to be that the
moved renewable energy further up 27,500MW. However, this was well the state’s lack of experience in the sector targets and strategy have not been devel-
the agenda. Under the 20-year plan, above General Electricity Company of and its poor record for delivering power oped from any comprehensive analytical
Reaol called for 1,000MW of renewable Libya’s (Gecol’s) own 2008 estimate of projects. In a study on renewable energy in work. This lack of consensus means that
energy to be installed by 2015, with 20,000MW by 2020. Libya published in April 2010, Cairo-based the programmes and targets of Reaol may
wind accounting for 750MW of the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy & not in fact be realised in the time-scale
total, concentrated solar power (CSP) In the following decade, the renewables Energy Efficiency concluded that a lack of envisaged.” The targets have looked even
100MW, PV 50MW and solar water heat- share was set to reach 25 per cent in 2025 government coordination was a major more unrealistic since the war broke out
ers 100MW. and 30 per cent by 2030. stumbling block in the path of renewables. in early 2011.

Historical context
Renewable energy in Libya dates back to
“The new council
the 1940s, when the first wind-powered
schemes were implemented and to the
aimed to address the
mid-1970s for the first solar projects. In
1976, the state’s inaugural PV pilot plant
lack of co-ordination
was commissioned and was followed in between stakeholders
1993 by the establishment of a 10MW
pilot wind farm. in the energy sector”
Up until 2007, renewable energy largely
fell under the responsibility of Gecol. Derna wind farm scheme, there were few
However, in a major government reshuffle details about which schemes would pro-
that took place in March of that year, the ceed. In December 2010, just two months
General People’s Committee for Electric- before the civil war started, the state’s first
ity, Water & Gas was established to over- major renewable energy contract was
see the work of Gecol and four new enti- awarded, with Spain’s Amtors winning
ties, including Reaol. Two years later, the phase one of the Derna wind farm project.
General People’s Committee for Electric-
ity, Water & Gas was abolished and To date, there have been no serious efforts
replaced by the new General People’s made to reduce energy use, although
Committee for Utilities. In August 2009, this was part of the responsibility of the
the government set up a new Higher new energy council that was set up in
Council for Energy Affairs to formulate September 2009. Members of every
policy in the fields of oil and gas, nuclear energy-related organisation are on the
energy, renewable energy and electricity. board, from the Industry & Economic
Following the move, Reaol reported Development Ministry to the National
directly to the cabinet. Oil Corporation (NOC), Gecol and Reaol.
Despite all the changes, the decision to The council aimed to address the lack of
establish a dedicated renewable energy co-ordination between stakeholders in the
authority was warmly welcomed and seen energy sector and promote renewables. Its
as the start of a new era for renewables. objectives were to prepare energy policy,
Reaol was given a budget of $480m for the develop the structure of the sector, establish
period 2008-12 to undertake research, procedures for foreign investment, set out a
planning and implementation of alterna- pricing strategy and evaluate renewable
tive energy projects, although beyond the energy resources, especially solar power.

Policy
Libya has lagged well behind its neigh- “There is no law Libyan wind map
bours on the renewable energy front, hav-

ing no energy efficiency or enabling legis-
allowing private TUNISIA Tripoli
lation in place for renewables and no
financial support, such as feed-in tariffs.
sector participation
There is also no law allowing private sec- in the country’s
tor participation in the electricity sector.
electricity sector”
It was hoped that some of these legislative
gaps would be filled by a new electricity
law, which was under preparation in Wind power
2010. The draft law, expected to have Libya has a good wind profile. According
been similar to Egypt’s, was a key compo- to a 2004 wind measurement programme,
nent in a wider restructuring of the elec- average wind speeds are 6-7.5 metres a
tricity sector, which would have allowed second across the country. With 1,770 kil-
private generators for the first time. ometres of coastline, offshore wind gener-
ation is also a possibility, although to date
Explicit provisions were originally to this has not been pursued.
be made for both renewable energy and
energy efficiency in the draft. However, Wind power was first used in Libya in the
subsequent reports suggested these would 1940s for water pumping. However, it was
be removed and included in separate laws. not until the 2004 study that it was con-
At the same time, Reaol was expected to sidered for large-scale applications. In the
be split into two, with one entity looking study, five coastal sites were identified as ALGERIA
(m/s)
after physical assets and the other to 10.5
10
undertake regulation and planning. Draft result:
Average wind speeds at five 9.5 20.02.2001
coastal locations 9 Mean wind
As of mid-2011, the electricity law had 8.5
speed: 50m
(Grid size 5km,
still to be passed and there seems little Location Speed (metres a second) 8 1986-2006)
prospect of it materialising any time soon. Derna 7.5 7.5
7
Without it, progress on renewables will Misurata 6.6 NIGER
6.5
be limited. 6
Sirte 6.3
5.5
CHAD
Al-Maqrun 7.1 5
4.5
Tolmeita 5.9
SUDAN
Source: Planbleu m/s=Metres a second. Source: Reaol

offering the best prospects for wind gen-
eration. These ranged from Misurata in
central Libya to Derna in the east, which
had recorded the highest wind speeds at
7.5 metres a second.
Based on the wind speed measurements,

in 2008, Reaol drew up a wind energy
programme aimed at delivering 750MW
of capacity by 2015, 1,500MW by 2020
and 2,000MW by 2030. Two coastal sites,
Derna and Al-Maqrun on the Gulf of Sirte,
were selected for the first wind farms and
were to be followed by:
• Mellitah, Tarhouna and Asabab in the
western region with capacity of 250MW
• Gallo, Almasarra and Tazerbo in
the south eastern region with capacity
of 120MW
• Aliofra, Sebha, Ghat and Ashwairif in
the south western region with capacity
of 120MW
In December 2010, the first commercial

wind farm project was awarded for the
Derna 1 scheme. Spain’s Amtor beat off Planned wind farm projects reports in November 2011 that work
competition from the US’ GE and Germa- Wind farm Capacity (MW) Status had resumed.
ny’s Siemens to win the $142m contract,
Derna 1 60 Contract awarded in Dec 2010
which called for 60MW of wind turbine Derna 1 was always seen as the trailblazer
capacity to be installed by late 2012. Derna 2 60 Planned
for Libyan wind projects. However, the
Al-Maqrun 1 120 Planned conflict dealt a serious blow to it and
Turkish subcontractor Biltek managed to Al-Maqrun 2 120 Planned other planned wind farm prospects.
complete some of the project’s prepara- Delivery of wind energy infrastructure is
Western region 250 Planned
tory work before the civil war broke out. totally reliant on international companies
Despite the site being well away from Southeastern region 250 Planned
and technologies, so no further progress is
areas of conflict, the scheme was eventu- Southwestern region 250 Planned likely to be made until Libya stabilises
ally put on hold, although there were Source: Reaol and international companies return.

Solar
Libya has considerable solar potential.
“Even without Solar thermal electricity generating potentials
The country’s daily radiation levels are as war breaking out,

high as 7.5kWh a square metre, it enjoys TUNISIA Tripoli
3,000-3,500 hours a year of sunshine and meeting the 2012
most of its terrain is both flat and unin-
habited. The highest concentration of targets seemed
solar radiation is in the south.
highly unlikely”
To date, the only successful applications
of solar have been small scale. Since the
mid-1970s, PV panels have been used to about exporting solar power to Europe
power cathodic protection systems on oil through initiatives, such as Desertec. In
pipelines in the desert and telecommuni- late 2010, Abu Dhabi’s Al-Maskari Hold-
cations equipment and water pumping ing announced plans for a $3bn solar
stations in remote areas. In 2003, PV tech- energy hub near Tripoli, which included
nology was incorporated into a rural elec- a subsea cable to feed electricity under
trification programme, which is still ongo- the Mediterranean.
ing. As of 2010, there were more than
440 completed PV projects providing But even without war breaking out, meet-
power to over 2,000 rural inhabitants. ing the 2012 targets and delivering on the
Libya plans to have more than 2MW of planned export projects seemed highly
PV capacity by 2012 and 10MW by 2020. unlikely. Progress on all the large-scale DNI
schemes had been painfully slow and, (kWh/m2/y)
Success at a local level has not been unlike on the wind front where at least <1,800
1,875
translated into large-scale PV generation, the Derna contract had been awarded, 1,950
however. In its 2008-12 programme, Reaol there appeared to be very little progress 2,025
2,100
planned three 5-10MW PV plants to be on the state’s solar plans. 2,175
connected to the grid at Al-Jufra, Green 2,250
2,325 NIGER
Mountain and Sebha, and the installation 2,400
of 500 PV rooftop systems. It also pro- 2,475
2,550
posed the construction of the state’s first 2,625 CHAD
100MW CSP plant using parabolic 2,700
2,775
troughs. Finally, it called for the establish- 2,850 SUDAN
ment of joint ventures to manufacture and 2,925
3,000
assemble PV panels and solar water heat-
DNI=Direct normal irradiance; kWh/m2/y=Kilowatt hours a square metre a year. Source: MED-CSP
ers. The government had even talked

Desalination
Desalination has traditionally played a
minor role in Libya’s water sector, largely
“Desalination plant capacity being built, with the focus
on multi-stage flash (MSF) technology. A
as a result of Tripoli’s focus on developing
the Great Man-made River (GMR) project
made up only 11 per further 440,000 cm/d of new capacity,
largely based on multi-effect distillation
to meet its water requirements. In 2009, cent of the country’s (MED) technology, was installed between
it made up only 11 per cent of total water 1985 and 2010.
supplies, well below the GMR’s share of total water supplies
61 per cent. However, prior to the civil However, as in other infrastructure sectors,
war, Tripoli was proposing a significant in 2009” a significant amount of desalination capac-
ramp-up in desalination capacity to meet ity was not in operation before the civil
rising potable water demand in urban war due to bureaucracy, absence of distri-
areas and, for the first time, was targeting bution networks, poor maintenance and
private investors. the age of existing assets. In March 2010,
the General Desalination Company of
Libya was an early adopter of desalina- Libya (GDCol) estimated that total operat-
tion, building plants to process brackish ing desalination capacity was about
water in rural locations for domestic and 290,000 cm/d. This figure was well below
industrial use in the 1960s. Most of the the 850,000 cm/d of capacity that had been
200,000 cubic metres a day (cm/d) of installed in the state since the mid-1960s.
capacity was based on reverse osmosis
(RO) and electrodialysis technology. In GDCol and its predecessor, the General
the period 1975-85, an intensive invest- Electricity Company of Libya (Gecol),
ment programme was undertaken, which were unusually open about the problems
resulted in about 300,000 cm/d of new affecting the desalination sector. Ever

since the first plant was commissioned in
the 1960s, the sector has suffered from a
lack of skilled workers with desalination
experience. As recently as 2007, Gecol
blamed the lack of experienced operators
for 150,000 cm/d of capacity being out
of action.
Environmental issues have also handi-

capped production, particularly the
issue of seaweed playing havoc on filtra-
tion systems. Corrosion, poor design
and years of economic sanctions have
also been blamed for the sector’s poor
performance, which was underlined in
2007 when Gecol estimated that some
800,000 cm/d of capacity was either shut
down or under-utilised.
In an attempt to improve efficiency, the

sector underwent several restructurings
in the period 2007-10. The result was that
as of early 2011, existing and new stan-
dalone desalination infrastructure came Actual operating desalination capacity, 2010* trast, most of Saudi Arabia’s new plants
under the responsibility of GDCol. The Plant Operator Capacity (cm/d) First operational Technology have capacities of over 500,000 cm/d.
company, previously known as General Moreover, all GDCol’s capacity is based
Bomba Gecol 30,000 1988 MSF
Desalination Company (GDC), was a sub- on MED technology and has been built by
sidiary of Gecol until 2007, when it was Zliten GDCol 30,000 1992 MED
France’s Sidem, which until 2009, domi-
handed over to the newly formed Utili- Tobruk II GDCol 40,000 2002 MED nated the local desalination sector.
ties Ministry. Abu Taraba GDCol 40,000 2007 MED
Derna GDCol 40,000 2009 MED

With the exception of the Bomba MSF
plant operated by Gecol, all desalination Sousa GDCol 50,000 2009 MED
capacity is run by GDCol. By regional Azzawiya GDCol 20,000 2010 MED

standards, Libya’s desalination plants are Zuara GDCol 40,000 2010 MED
small with capacities ranging between *=Does not include small units serving industry and the military; cm/d=Cubic metres a day; Gecol=General
20,000 cm/d and 50,000 cm/d. In con- Electricity Company of Libya; MSF=Multi-stage flash; GDCol=General Desalination Company of Libya;
MED=Multi-effect distillation. Source: GDCol

Major desalination plants in operation “The planned independent water projects (IWPs). Under
the proposed model, foreign partners with
TUNISIA Zuara
Sousa
50,000 cm/d
Derna
40,000 cm/d plants were to be far technology, construction and operations
experience were to be brought into new
Zuara Tripoli
40,000 cm/d
Azzawiya Zliten Sousa
Derna
larger than anything project companies, which would build,
own and operate the plants.
Zliten
30,000 cm/d
Abu Taraba
Bomba
Tobruk Tripoli had ever
considered before”
Azzawiya
20,000 cm/d The IWP programme was divided into
Abu Taraba Tobruk
40,000 cm/d 40,000 cm/d three phases. Under phase 1, running
from 2010-14, an estimated 1.55 million
Bomba
30,000 cm/d
EGYPT Sidem’s stranglehold in the engineering, cm/d of new capacity was planned at four
procurement and construction (EPC) mar- separate sites in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misu-
ket was finally broken in November 2010, rata and Tobruk. The second phase, cov-
when GDCol awarded an estimated ering the period 2014-16, called for four
$100m contract to Singapore’s Hyflux to more plants to be built with a combined
build a 40,000 cm/d plant at Tobruk. The capacity of 600,000 cm/d. The third phase
LIBYA award was notable for being the first for a planned to add 300,000 cm/d of new
large-scale RO plant in over 20 years. capacity in the period 2017-20.
The Tobruk project marked a reversal in New desalination plants under

policy by GDCol. In 2008, the government phase 2, 2014-16
unveiled an ambitious programme to Location Capacity (cm/d) Status
build 2.5 million cm/d of new capacity Derna 100,000 Planned
through 11 projects up to 2020. The pro-
Sousa 100,000 Planned
gramme represented a radical departure
from past desalination procurement in Sirte 100,000 Planned
cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol Libya. For a start, the planned plants were Jifarah coast 300,000 Planned
to be far larger than anything Tripoli had cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol
NIGER
New desalination plants under phase 1, 2010-14 ever considered before, with capacities of
up to 500,000 cm/d. New desalination plants under
Location Capacity (cm/d) Status* Prospective developer
CHAD phase 3, 2017-20
Benghazi 400,000 Under discussion Hyflux
Moreover, GDCol proposed that all new Location Capacity (cm/d) Status
Tripoli 500,000 Under discussion Hyflux SUDAN plants would use RO technology and not Azzawiya 100,000 Planned
Tobruk 150,000 Under discussion Befesa MED. Finally and most critically, rather
Zuara 100,000 Planned
Misurata 500,000 Under discussion Befesa than tendering the work as EPC contracts
as had been the norm in the past, the gov- Bomba 100,000 Planned
*=As of 2010; cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: MEED Projects, GDCol ernment body opted to develop them as cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GDCol

In 2009, GDCol signed up two prospective South Korea’s Doosan Heavy Industries &
partners for the phase 1 programme. A Construction. The following July, Gecol
memorandum of understanding (MoU) scrapped the tender on account of high
was reached with Hyflux to build the costs. The project was subsequently inte-
500,000 cm/d plant at Tripoli and a grated into the planned Al-Khaleej steam
400,000 cm/d facility at Benghazi. This power project, which itself was later
was followed by Spain’s Befesa signing abandoned. The scheme was then resur-
an MoU to build three new plants with rected in 2008, with capacity increased to
total capacity of 800,000 cm/d at Misurata, 50,000 cm/d, but was never awarded.
Tobruk and Tripoli West, even though the
Tripoli site was not originally included in The lack of water was a major problem for
GDCol’s list of planned projects. several cities during the civil war, with
power disruptions and network problems
Little progress was made on any of the being the main issues, rather than damage
IWPs before the civil war, which may to desalination plants.
explain why GDCol decided to award
Hyflux a separate EPC contract for the Going forward, the National Transitional
Tobruk plant in late 2010. Even when the Council (NTC) faces major decisions on
privatisation scheme was launched, there the desalination, and wider water, front.
was scepticism about whether it could A key decision will have to be taken on
ever succeed. Libya lacks robust legal and the future of Gaddafi’s flagship infrastruc-
financial frameworks to support build- ture project, the GMR, and the role it
own-operate contract models and has no should play. NTC will also have to decide
experience of commercially financing whether the pre-revolution body GDCol
major infrastructure projects. There were and its procurement strategy should
also considerable doubts about the gov- remain in place. In September 2011, its
ernment’s commitment to increasing the UK representative, Guma el-Gamaty said
role of the private sector, given the past that the NTC was open to private invest-
state domination. ment in the desalination sector, but con-
ceded that it was still very early days for
Finally, the reputation of GDCol, and its the reconstruction programme.
predecessor Gecol, was poor for project
delivery, even when tendering much sim-
pler EPC contracts. This was demon-
strated with a planned 40,000 cm/d plant
at Sirte. It first attracted bids in early 2007
from Austria’s Wabag, France’s Sidem and

The Great Man-made River project
L ike its neighbours, Libya depends on
groundwater for the majority of its
“The major water Water supply by source
water supplies. However, most comes in

the form of fossilised water from aquifers
deposits under the Desalination
Water supply
deep in the desert, through the Great Sahara desert were 61
28
Man-made River (GMR) project.
first discovered in
GMR
11
The GMR has provided an increasing

share of Libya’s water in recent years, the 1950s”
%
accounting for 61 per cent of the total in
2009. The 4,000-kilometre network of
pipelines, linking massive underground Water Authority (GWA), a largely autono- Groundwater
aquifers at Kufra, Murzuq and Sarir with mous arm of the Agriculture Ministry.
Libya’s urban centres on the Mediterra-
nean coast, has also received the lion’s The major water deposits under the
share of investment in the water sector. Sahara desert were first discovered in the
1950s during oil exploration. The new-
In the 25 years up to 2010, the government found aquifers were partially developed
spent more than $20bn on the project, in the 1970s, with production reaching
which contributed over 1.6 million cubic about 500,000 cm/d and supplying
metres a day (cm/d) to the country’s water mainly agriculture. In the late 1970s, the
supply. Prior to the conflict, plans called government undertook studies to assess
for the GMR to supply about 6 million the optimum use for the fossilised water. GMR=Great Man-made River. Source: General Desalination Company of Libya
cm/d by 2030, according to the General It concluded that it would not be cost-

effective to grow crops in the south of the
country and proposed instead that a net-
The Great Man-made River project “Plans for the
work of pipelines should be built to trans-
port the water to the more fertile and
Great Man-made
TUNISIA
already developed coastal plains. Tripoli
River project were
Plans for the GMR project were first for-
Benghazi first formulated in
mulated in the 1980s by the UK’s Brown Tobruk
& Root, now part of the US’ KBR, and
Sirte
the 1980s”
Price Brothers, a pre-stressed concrete Ajdabiya
pipeline specialist. Initially, both firms
worked for the government and then for EGYPT northeast, east and west Jabal Hassouna
the Great Man-made River Authority Ghadames fields. The first two phases planned were
Brega PCCP plant
(GMRA), which was set up in 1983. considered priorities, producing the
majority of the water supply projected
The plans drawn up by the consultants Jaghboub under the GMR programme and account-
Northeast Jabal Hassouna wellfield
and the government called for a massive ing for most of the capital outlay.
water pipeline network to be built in
phases. In total, it envisaged the drilling
LIBYA Sarir PCCP plant
The development of a single wellfield at
Sarir wellfield
of some 1,350 production wells spread Kufra was then planned, which would
across the four basins, which would be East Jabal Hassouna wellfield add 1.68 million cm/d of supply. This
connected to the coast by 600,000 sec- was to be followed by new wellfields at
tions of pre-stressed concrete cylinder Ghadames and Jaghboub, which would
Tazerbo
pipes (PCCP). In total, more than 4,000km further tap the Hassouna and Sirte basins.
of pipeline were to be laid, delivering ALGERIA The Ghadames project called for the con-
over 6 million cm/d of water. struction of 144 wells to produce 90 mil-
Kufra lion cubic metres a year (cm/y), while the
The first wellfields to be developed were Jaghboub scheme was planned to produce
planned at Tazerbo and Sarir, in the east 50 million cm/y from 40 wells.
and southeast of the country, to tap the Phase IV
Sirte basin. A total of 284 wells were to be Phase III
Each wellfield was to be linked to storage
NIGER
drilled at the two locations, which would Phase I reservoirs and distribution networks for
ultimately pump 2 million cm/d of water. Phase II domestic and agricultural purposes
This was to be followed by the develop- Reservoir
CHAD through four-metre-diameter pipelines.
ment of three wellfields on the Hassouna Pipe production plant In the east, the Sarir, Tazerbo and Kufra
basin, which aimed to produce 2.5 mil- SUDAN wellfields were to be connected to the
PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe. Sources: GMRA, MEED
lion cm/d of water from 586 wells at the network, which would transport water to

The Great Man-made River wellfields “The Hassouna to be provided with water from specially
drilled wellfields. Seven wells were to be
Ghadames system
Number of wells
106
Projected production (kcm/d)
250
project was designed drilled to supply the Brega plant with
14,000 cm/d of water, while three wells
Northeast Jabal Hassouna 60 600 to transport water were planned to deliver 11,000 cm/d of
water for the Sirte facility. A 90MW power
system
East Jabal Hassouna system 479 1,400 directly to Tripoli plant was to provide energy at the Sarir
plant and the nearby drilling operations.
West Jabal Hassouna system 47 500
and Tarhouna”
Brega pipe manufacturing 7 14 Construction was originally planned to be
plant, water system
a holding reservoir at Ajdabiya and carried out in three phases:
Sarir pipe manufacturing 3 14 then on to two larger reservoirs, called • Phase 1 would cover the Kufra-Tazerbo-
plant, water system
Al-Gardabiya and Omar Mukhtar. The Sarir-Ajdabiya-Sirte-Benghazi systems
Sarir wellfield system 126 1,000 separate Jaghboub system, close to the • Phase 2 would take in the Hassouna-
Tazerbo wellfield 108 1,000 Egyptian border, was designed to service Tripoli-Tarhouna network
Kufra system 285 1,680
Tobruk and its surrounding area. • Phase 3 would involve the Jaghboub-
Tobruk and Ghadames-Azzawiya-Zuara
Jaghboub 40 137
In the west, the Hassouna project was to system, along with the Sirte-Tripoli link
kcm/d=Thousand cubic metres a day. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight transport water directly to the capital,
Tripoli, as well as Tarhouna, while the However, the plan was subsequently
Ghadames scheme would serve the revised, with another phase added. This
Planned reservoirs on the Great Man-made River project coastal towns of Zuara and Azzawiya. covered the development of the Kufra
Location Planned capacity (million cm) Eventually, the Kufra-Sarir-Tazerbo-Sirte- field, the Kufra-Sarir pipeline and the
Ajdabiya holding reservoir 4 Benghazi system would be linked via Sirte-Tripoli pipeline, which was removed
pipeline to the Hassouna-Tripoli network, from the first and third part of the project.
Al-Gardabiya reservoir 6.8
creating a nationwide system.
Omar Mukhtar reservoir 4.7 The GMRA had also considered undertak-
Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoir 15.4 In total, the GMR project called for the con- ing a fifth phase, which would link the
Grand Omar Mukhtar reservoir 24
struction of five major storage reservoirs wellfield at Sarir Qattusah in the west of
with total capacity of 55 million cubic the country to the Hassouna-Jifarah por-
cm=Cubic metres. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight metres. By far, the largest, with a proposed tion of the project. This phase would add
capacity of 24 million cubic metres, was 500,000 cm/d of production capacity to
the Grand Omar Mukhtar reservoir. the GMR, boosting overall output to a
peak of 7 million cm/d.
A key part of the project was the con-
struction of two PCCP manufacturing Under the 1983 masterplan prepared by
plants at Sarir and Brega. Each plant was the GMRA and Brown & Root, it was

intended that South Korea’s Dong Ah where there are two more 170,000-cubic-
The Great Man-made River phase 1 network
Construction would be the main contrac- metre tanks and the separate Sarir collec-
tor for each phase, with the US engineer- tion system joins the main pipeline.
ing firm overseeing its work. However,
TUNISIA Tripoli
financial difficulties and concerns over From here, two four-metre-diameter pipe-
its performance meant that Dong Ah lines extend a further 380km north to the
only worked on the first two phases of Ajdabiya reservoir. The two pipelines
Benghazi
the scheme. Tobruk then travel east and west to Benghazi and
Sirte
Sirte, where they meet end reservoirs as
Phase 1 Ajdabiya well as the Grand Omar Mukhtar and
The GMR’s first phase covered the Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoirs, built to
construction of the Tazerbo-Sarir-Sirte- EGYPT stockpile water in case of drought.
Benghazi system, which is often referred Ghadames
Brega PCCP plant
to as the SS/TB project. Dong Ah was Dong Ah designed and built the PCCP
awarded the $3.8bn main construction plants at Sirte and Brega and was also
contract in 1983, which was largely com- Jaghboub contracted to operate both factories for
pleted a decade later. the duration of the first phase. The Sarir
plant has the capacity to produce up to
While it carried out the majority of the
120 pipeline sections a day and the Beng-
Sarir wellfield
contract itself, the Korean contractor hazi plant can construct 80 pipeline sec-
also subcontracted out several packages, tions a day.
including the construction of the Grand
Omar Mukhtar reservoir at Benghazi As part of phase 1, the contractor also
Tazerbo
and the Grand Al-Gardabiya reservoir built 1,500km of road to transport equip-
at Sirte, which was won by the local ALGERIA ment along, as well as offices, workshops,
Al-Nahr Construction. A number of ele- accommodation and support facilities.
ments of the first phase project were not Kufra These facilities have since been consoli-
included in Dong Ah’s scope, including dated into operations and maintenance
the well drilling contract, which was stations at Tazerbo, Sarir, Brega, Sirte
awarded to Brazil’s Braspetro. and Benghazi. In addition, Dong Ah and
Japan’s Itochu Corporation built the
NIGER
The first phase programme breaks down 90MW Sarir power plant.
into several distinct parts. The Tazerbo Pipeline
wellfield is connected to a 170,000-cubic- Reservoir
CHAD GMR phase 1 was inaugurated in 1993,
metre collection tank, which is then Pipe production plant although overall completion was not
linked to the first major 256km pipeline SUDAN achieved until 1996/97.
PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe. Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight
network. This transports water to Sarir,

Phase 2
Dong Ah started work on the second “Dong Ah started tanks were built, along with 2,155km
of road.
line to link the Hassouna field with
Tarhouna and Tripoli at an estimated
phase of the project in 1986, although it
was not until 1990 that it was officially
work on the second Tripoli decided to review the project in
extra cost of $760m.
awarded the $6.1bn construction contract.

During this phase, which cost $7.4bn in
phase of the Great 1991, when some 25 per cent of the
scheme had already been completed, fol-
The initial scope of the second-phase
project had only covered the construction
total, 2,115km of pipeline was installed to Man-made River lowing issues related to collapsing wells of a central 1,715km pipeline linking the
carry 2.5 million cm/d of water from the on phase one. With coastal aquifers wellfield with Tripoli. The eastern line,
east, west and northeast Jabal Hassouna project in 1986” becoming depleted faster than expected which included a station at Assdada,
wellfields to Tarhouna on the Jifarah Plain and urban water demand increasing, how- allowed the system to be integrated into
and then on to Tripoli. In addition, associ- ever, Tripoli decided to expand Dong Ah’s phase one via a second pipeline linking it
ated pumping stations and regulating phase 2 contract scope, adding a 380km with facilities at Sirte. The central pipe-

line has a capacity of 880,000 cm/d,
while the eastern branch can carry
“In 1997, Libya The Great Man-made River phase 2 network
1.2 million cm/d.
decided to split
TUNISIA
In 1996, the South Korean firm was
awarded an additional $350m contract to
phase two of the Tripoli
drill about 260 new wells at Hassouna to Great Man-made Benghazi

boost production at the field. This exten-
River project”
Tobruk
Sirte
sion came to be known as Hassouna West.
In the same year, Dong Ah was informed Ajdabiya
that it would be awarded the $6bn con-
tract to build the third phase of the eventually liquidated by the South EGYPT
project, which then covered the Jaghboub- Korean government in 2001.
Tobruk and Ghadames-Azzawiya-Zuara
systems, along with the Sirte-Tripoli link. To ensure the second phase of the
project was completed, an agreement Northeast Jabal Hassouna wellfield
However, in 1997, Tripoli decided to was reached between Seoul and Tripoli
competitively tender the phase and split whereby Dong Ah’s Libyan operations
the work up into seven individual pack- were taken over by its former partner on
LIBYA
ages. In December of that year, France’s the project, South Korea’s Korea Express.
East Jabal Hassouna wellfield
Dumez submitted the lowest price for the The Libyan operation set up a consortium
first of these contracts, covering the Sirte- with its former subcontractor Al-Nahr,
Tripoli link and associated pumping sta- taking a 50 per cent stake in a new ven-
tions, with a price of about $1bn. How- ture. This was later reduced to 25 per cent
ever, a drop in oil prices and increasing and today, Al-Nahr is wholly owned by ALGERIA
political instability in the country saw the the GMRA.
project put on hold and no further deals
were tendered. Several other international contractors
worked on phase 2. These included
More worrying for Dong Ah was the onset France’s Vinci Construction, which won
of the 1997 Asian crisis. Unable to cope a $410m contract to build pumping sta-
NIGER
with debts of about $3bn, it slowed the tions at Al-Gardabiya, Wadi Wishkah
pace of work on the second phase of GMR and Assdada in 1999. Phase II
and in August 2000, applied for an Reservoir
CHAD
18-month extension to the phase 2 works. Tripoli-Sirte pipeline
This led to disputes between Tripoli and SUDAN
Sources: GMRA, MEED Insight
the South Korean contractor, which was

Phase 3
In 2001, a consortium of Japan’s Nippon
Koei and the UK’s Halcrow was awarded
the $15.5m contract to design the third
TUNISIA Tripoli
phase of the project, with a reduced
scope. This covered the construction of
pumping stations at the Kufra wellfield,
Benghazi
a 380km pipeline linking the field with Tobruk
Sirte
the Sarir/Tazerbo network, along with a
140,000-cubic-metre regulating tank, flow Ajdabiya
control stations and roads. The contract
ran until 2009 and required new studies EGYPT
Brega PCCP plant
of the field to be carried out.
Jaghboub
In 2005, Turkey’s Tekfen was awarded the

$500m contract to build the pipeline link- GMR 1
ing Kufra with Sarir, while in October
2010, Canada’s SNC Lavalin won a $450m
contract to design and build the Kufra
Sarir wellfield
wellfield system by 2015.
Tazerbo
ALGERIA
GMR 3 Kufra
NIGER
Phase III
Phase I
Reservoir
CHAD
Pipe production plant
SUDAN
PCCP=Pre-stressed concrete cylinder pipe; GMR=Great Man-made River. Sources: GMRA, MEED

Phase 4
In 2004, Al-Nahr was awarded a $960m
contract for the fourth phase of the Azzawiya
project, covering drilling, construction Zuara
TUNISIA Tripoli
of production facilities and installation
of pipeline systems for the Ghadames-
Azzawiya-Zuara and Jaghboub-Tobruk
Benghazi
systems at a cost of $960m. The following Tobruk
Sirte
year, the company awarded a design and
project management subcontract to Brown Ajdabiya
& Root. The Ghadames-Zuara-Azzawiya
section was due to be completed by the EGYPT
end of 2011 although this was delayed by Ghadames
the civil war.
Jaghboub
LIBYA
ALGERIA
NIGER
Phase IV Eastern Section CHAD

Phase IV Western Section
SUDAN
Sources: GMRA, MEED

Since 1983, the GMRA has awarded
more than $15bn worth of contracts, with
“The GMR project Major construction contracts awarded on the Great Man-made River project
the majority going to Dong Ah. Its sister is unlikely to be Phase 1

Description
Sarir-Sirte/Tazerbo-
Contract type
Main construction
Value ($m)
3,800
Contractor
Dong Ah
agency, the GMR Water Utilisation
Authority (GMRWUA), also became a sig- abandoned, given its Benghazi system
Reservoirs
contract
Construction subcontract na Al-Nahr

nificant client, placing over $2bn worth of
contracts for reservoirs, water distribution growing contribution Tazerbo/Sarir wellfields Drilling na
Construction
Braspetro
networks and infrastructure for new tracts
of agricultural land. to water supply” Phase 2 Hassouna-Tripoli-Tarhouna/
Assdada system
Main construction
contract
6,100 Dong Ah
Hassouna-Tarhouna system Main construction 760 Dong Ah

Agriculture was always earmarked as contract
the main beneficiary of the GMR project. ‘the eighth wonder of the world’. It is Hassouna wellfield Drilling 360 Dong Ah
From its inception, Tripoli set a target for unlikely to be abandoned completely,
Phase 3 Al-Gardabiya/Assdada Main construction 410 Vinci
at least 80 per cent of GMR water to be given the vast sums already invested in it pumping stations contract
used for agricultural production, by irri- and its growing contribution to water sup-
Al-Gardabiya-Assdada Main construction na Al-Nahr/Vinci
gating up to 160,000 hectares of land. ply. Moreover, if future investment is not pipeline contract
However, because of a rapid decline in forthcoming, then an alternative water Kufra wellfield system Main construction 450 SNC Lavalin
water production from Libya’s coastal production strategy will need to be devel- contract
aquifer system, as well as the slow pace oped and quickly, or Libya will face grow- Kufra-Tazerbo/Sarir pipeline Main construction 500 Tekfen
of development of the country’s desalina- ing water shortages. system contract
tion network, the target was lowered to Sarir pipe production plant Revamp and operation 1,100 SNC Lavalin
66-70 per cent prior to the civil war. Phase 4 Ghadames/Zuara/Azzawiya Design, construction, 960 Al-Nahr
GMR infrastructure sustained damage dur- system operation of Ghadames- Construction
Zuara-Azzawiya system;
ing the civil war, most notably the Brega Jaghboub-Tobruk system
PCCP plant, which was hit by Nato air-
strikes in July 2011. At the time, Nato said na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight
that the plant had been targeted as it was
under the control of Gaddafi loyalists and
was home to multiple rocket launchers.
Planned water usage for the first three phases of the GMR project (cm/d)
In the immediate aftermath of the civil Municipal Agricultural Industrial Total
war, it was unclear how much priority the
Phase 1 410,170 1,506,030 83,800 2,000,000
new government in Tripoli would attach
to completing existing contracts on the Phase 2 1316090 1,175,660 8,250 2,500,000
GMR, or to awarding outstanding work. Phase 3 253,000 1,427,000 0 1,680,000

The GMR always was a highly political
project for Gaddafi, who described it as GMR=Great Man-made River; cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: GMRA

Wastewater
E ven before the civil war broke out,
Libya’s wastewater sector was in des-
perate need of attention, investment and
additional capacity. Its aging infrastruc-
ture was struggling to meet the growing
demands of an expanding population.
The result was that increasing amounts of
sewage were being dumped either at sea
or in the desert. Six months of hostilities,
during which electricity was frequently
cut to sewage treatment plants, only
served to exacerbate the problem.
For many years, the wastewater sector

was a secondary priority for the Gaddafi
regime, coming well down the political
agenda and well below the Great Man-
made River (GMR) project. As of 2010,
there were about 40 large-scale plants
with total design capacity of just under
500,000 cubic metres a day (cm/d). But
actual capacity was considerably less at
about 240,000 cm/d, with only a handful
of plants operating near to their potential.

Wastewater treatment plants Wastewater treatment plants (continued)
Plant Commissioning year Design capacity (cm/d) Treatment type Plant Commissioning year Design capacity (cm/d) Treatment type
Ajdabiya 1988 15,600 Activated sludge Tripoli A 1966 27,000 Trickling filters
Benghazi A 1965 27,300 Trickling filters Tripoli B 1977 110,000 Activated sludge
Benghazi B 1977 54,000 Trickling filters Tripoli C 1981 110,000 Activated sludge
Al-Marj A 1964 1,800 Activated sludge Tajoura 1984 1,500 Activated sludge
Al-Marj B 1972 1,800 Activated sludge Tarhouna 1985 3,200 Activated sludge
Al-Beida 1973 9,000 Activated sludge Gharyan 1975 3,000 Activated sludge
Tobruk A 1963 1,350 Trickling filters Yafran 1980 1,725 Activated sludge
Tobruk B 1982 33,000 Activated sludge Meslata 1980 3,400 Activated sludge
Derna 1965 4,550 Trickling filters Khoms 1990 8,000 Activated sludge
Derna 1982 8,300 Activated sludge Zliten 1976 6,000 Activated sludge
Sirte 1995 26,400 Activated sludge Misurata A 1967 1,350 Trickling filters
Abu Hadi 1981 1,000 Activated sludge Misurata B 1982 24,000 Activated sludge
Marsa al-Brega 1988 3,500 Activated sludge East Garyat 1978 500 Activated sludge
Zuara 1980 41,550 Activated sludge West Garyat 1978 150 Activated sludge
Sabrata 1976 6,000 Activated sludge Topga 1978 300 Activated sludge
Sorman 1991 20,800 Activated sludge Shourif 1978 500 Activated sludge
Azzawiya 1976 6,800 Activated sludge Sebha A 1964 1,360 Trickling filters
Zenzour 1977 6,000 Activated sludge Sebha B 1980 47,000 Activated sludge
cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: Government of Libya, Wheida Edawi, Wastewater Treatment & its Applications as a Water Supply in Libya
The main problem facing the sector has

been the age of existing treatment capacity.
“Much of the planned waste collection and distribution
pipeline networks never having been built.
urban centres, such as Benghazi and
Tripoli, there has been a lack of capacity
Virtually all of the capacity was built
between 1965 and 1995, meaning that
state’s wastewater A further feature of the wastewater sector
and network.
much of it has now exceeded its sell-by capacity has now is the uneven spread of treatment capacity
date. The sector has also suffered from a across Libya. In rural areas, sewage treat-
lack of management, engineering and plan- exceeded its sell- ment plants are practically nonexistent,
ning expertise, with some plants never with the overwhelming majority concen-
having been used at all as a result of by date” trated along the Mediterranean. Even in

The lack of working treatment capacity
has meant that a significant amount of raw
Major wastewater plants “A significant
sewage is dumped in rural areas or piped
directly into the Mediterranean, with up
Zuara
41,500 cm/d amount of untreated
Zuara
to 700,000 cm/d of untreated effluent and
wastewater being disposed of at sea. Such
TUNISIA
Sorman
Tripoli
sewage is dumped
Misurata
widespread dumping has had a serious
Benghazi Tobruk
in rural areas or
environmental impact. In rural areas,
aquifers and surface water supplies have
Misurata
24,000 cm/d Sirte
Benghazi Tobruk
into the sea”
been heavily polluted, with saline content 54,000 cm/d 33,000 cm/d
at up to 5,000 parts per million. Polluted Tripoli B Sirte
110,000 cm/d 26,400 cm/d
seawater is also an issue for the local late 2010, it had still not awarded the
Tripoli C
desalination industry, which has had to 110,000 cm/d main consultancy contracts or any of the
contend with serious fouling. Privately, construction deals.
government officials have warned against
bathing in the sea near populated areas Other government agencies had similar
due to the risk of water-bound diseases. problems in turning their plans into
actual projects. In 2005, the National
Lack of investment in new capacity has
Sebha
LIBYA Infrastructure Development Plan (NIDP),
made things worse. In the two years up drawn up by the Housing & Infrastructure
Sebha
to 2010, the sector saw relatively little 47,000 cm/d Board (HIB), was launched to upgrade
project activity, despite the need to build infrastructure nationwide.
new capacity to serve the growing popu-
lation. The General Water & Wastewater The UK’s Biwater was one of the first
Company (GWWC), which is also known beneficiaries. In 2005, it won three con-
as the General Company for Water & tracts worth an estimated $70m to build
Sanitation (GCWS), awarded only one 14 small-scale wastewater treatment
major contract, which covered a E110m plants in the Jabal Akhdar region. It fol-
($150m) water treatment plant at Tripoli. lowed this up in 2007, with the e110m
This was despite its announcement, contract to build a new wastewater treat-
in 2008, that it would tender about ment plant in Tripoli, along with associ-
140 projects between 2009 and 2015 NIGER ated pumping stations and 14 kilometres
under a $5bn upgrade programme. In of pipelines.
August 2010, GWWC held a forum with CHAD
prospective contractors to discuss the Contractors had expected a steady flow of
projects, in a sign that the programme SUDAN contracts to follow under the NIDP plan,
cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Source: Government of Libya
might be about to proceed. However, as of but in late 2007, the plan was halted as

part of a government restructuring. How- Selected Housing & Infrastructure Board contract awards, 2007-10
ever, HIB did proceed with some of the Scheduled
planned projects. In 2009, Biwater had Value completion
been expected to win two larger contracts Contract Scope Awarded ($m) Contractor (original)
to manage the water infrastructure in both Tripoli and Benghazi Laying pipes for water supply, construction of sewage Q1 2008 1,250 Tennessee Overseas Q3 2010
infrastructure network system and roads, lighting, aquifer development, Construction Company
Tripoli and Benghazi, under a deal that associated facilities
would also have involved providing engi-
Tajoura infrastructure 200km of infrastructure, including sewage pipes for Q1 2008 640 Strabag Unknown
neering and construction services to the modernisation new wastewater system
GWWC. However, the contracts were not Al-Beida infrastructure Public service networks over 2,200 hectares, such as Q4 2009 545 Sacyr Q1 2013
awarded, due mainly to bureaucracy and telephone, gas, drinking water, wastewater and power lines
internal wrangling. Tripoli and Misurata Electricity, sewer, telephone and water networks Q3 2009 490 Impregilo Q2 2011
infrastructure
The biggest wastewater client in recent General infrastructure 600km of sewage lines, 450km of water lines, 600,000 Q1 2010 413 Nemzetkozi Vegyepszer Q1 2013
square metres of sidewalk lighting and 400km of roads
years has been HIB, which awarded some
$5bn worth of housing and infrastructure Benghazi infrastructure Public service networks over 2,200 hectares including Q4 2009 400 Sacyr Q1 2013
telephone, gas, drinking water, power and wastewater lines
contracts up to late 2010. In addition to
Infrastructure works at Roads, water lines, wastewater networks, electricity Q3 2009 392 Punj Lloyd Q4 2011
the infrastructure contracts, most of Zuara, Ragdaleen and grids, telephone lines and associated works
which contained a wastewater element, Al-Jamail
HIB made a handful of dedicated sewage Souk al-Juma utilities Water, sewage and stormwater drainage networks Q1 2009 276 Punj Lloyd Q2 2012
and electricity lines
treatment plant awards to the likes of
Austria’s Wabag, South Korea’s Kolon New township in Al-Marj 1,164 single-storey, semi-detached houses with Q3 2007 230 Simplex Projects Q1 2010
municipality municipal water supply, sewage networks and utilities
Engineering & Construction and Singa-
pore’s Salcon Engineering, a subsidiary of Arada township Construction and upgrade of general infrastructure Q3 2007 180 Punj Lloyd Q1 2010
infrastructure
Singapore’s Boustead.
Ain-Zara sewage 50,000-cm/d pumping station and sewage treatment Q2 2009 135 Kolon Engineering & Construction Q3 2012
treatment plant plant Company (South Korea)
The HIB projects also faced difficulties. In
Tarhouna township water Upgrade of water and wastewater service networks Q2 2008 130 Salcon Engineering Q2 2010
some cases, deals took up to 18 months to supply and wastewater and construction of new water and wastewater
be awarded. Even then, contractors infrastructure upgrade service networks, pumping stations and additional
water treatment plants
reported that they were unable to mobi-
Al-Guarchia sewage plant Renovation of existing sewage treatment plant to Q1 2008 122 Wabag Q3 2010
lise on certain projects as the sites were renovation, Benghazi 150,000 cm/d
not handed over to them. This affected
Al-Azharat development Roads, wastewater, water and telephone lines Q2 2009 93 Lotte Engineering & Q1 2013
Kolon Engineering & Construction on infrastructure works Construction (South Korea)
both the Ain-Zara and the Tripoli sewage
Tripoli sewage treatment Construction of a 60,000-cm/d treatment plant Q4 2008 86 Kolon Engineering & Q1 2011
projects, India’s Simplex Projects on the plant Construction
Al-Marj township scheme, and India’s Zenzour pumping stations Construction of 16 pumping stations and renovation Q1 2008 41 Wabag Q1 2010
Punj Lloyd on its contract to install sew- of main sewer
erage and stormwater drainage at Souk cm/d=Cubic metres a day. Sources: MEED Insight, MEED Projects

al-Juma, near Tripoli. Others fared even
worse. Salcon was forced to cancel one of
the past five years. Indeed, one of the larg-
est European players in the market warned
“Payment has structure, along with recommendations
for meeting water and wastewater
its contracts in 2009, involving the that it would significantly reduce its local proved to be a real demand up to 2025. It was finally com-
upgrade of the Tarhouna water supply presence unless the situation was resolved pleted in early 2010, although no details
and wastewater system, following a failed swiftly and projects were reactivated. issue for contractors on the findings were released.
attempt at price renegotiations made by
its parent company on a separate con- Planning, or rather the lack of it, seriously working in the local Following the end of hostilities in Octo-
struction project. handicapped the development of the
wastewater sector. To address the issue, wastewater sector” ber 2011, the initial indications were that
there had been only limited damage to
Over the years, payment has proved to be the Swedish office of the UK’s WSP was wastewater infrastructure. However, this
a real issue for contractors operating in contracted to draw up a masterplan for was of little consolation to a sector that
the local wastewater sector. In September the country’s water supply and sewage was already in a poor state of repair
2010, several firms reported that the cen- systems. Working alongside the local before the civil war and that desperately
tral government had halted payments to National Consulting Bureau, the project needed an integrated and comprehensive
local clients on a number of large-scale involved a complete review of existing approach to its rehabilitation.
projects as part of a spending review of water and wastewater supplies and infra-

Industry
C ompared to its neighbours, Libya’s
non-oil industrial base is limited and
“Prior to February Existing cement plants
Owner Plant Design capacity (t/y) Year commissioned
focused on cement and metals. This in
part reflects the small size of the Libyan
2011, Libya’s cement JLCC Benghazi 800,000 1972
market, but also highlights the lack of for- sector was preparing JLCC Al-Hawri 1,000,000 1978
eign investment in the non-oil economy
for a huge expansion JLCC El-Fatayah 1,000,000 1984
and the painfully slow decision-making
Arab Cement Company Zliten 1,000,000 1984
process during the Gaddafi era.
[of capacity]” Arab Cement Company Al-Marqab 330,000 1969
Cement (Khoms)
Prior to February 2011, Libya’s cement Arab Cement Company Souk al-Khamis 1,000,000 1977
sector was preparing for a huge expansion, Years of sanctions and poor maintenance Arab Cement Company Libda 1,000,000 1981
with some 18 million tonnes a year (t/y) of have meant that installed cement capac- Arab Union Contracting Burj 1 1,400,000 2005
new capacity planned. The new plants ity, estimated at 10.4 million t/y, has oper- Company
were to be built by European, Middle East, ated well below design. Arab Union Contracting Burj 2 1,400,000 2009
African and local investors and formed Company
part of the strategy by the General People’s Actual production was understood to be Al-Nisr Cement Company Tripoli 1,400,000 na
Committee for Industry, Economy & Com- no more than 4-5 million t/y in 2010, due
Total design capacity 10,330,000
merce and the National Mining Corpora- to the age of many plants. For example, the
tion to significantly expand sector activity. local Arab Cement Company, which owns na=Not available; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Sources: Arab Cement Union, MEED Insight
However, none of the new plants had four plants in the country, says that its
entered construction before the outbreak of Al-Marqab factory, which began produc-
civil war, which also forced all existing tion in 1969, produced in 2010 about
cement factories to halt production. 240,000 t/y, some 100,000 t/y below design

Historically, the sector has been domi-
nated by two state-run organisations, Lib-
“The sector has Cement producers by design capacity
yan Cement Company in the east and

Arab Cement Company in the west. The
been dominated Al-Nisr Cement Company
(Million t/y)
two commissioned seven plants in the

1970s and 1980s, with a significant
by Libyan Cement 3.3
2.8
amount of their capacity directed to meet Company and Arab 2.8
the requirements of the Great Man-made

Cement Company”
1.4
River (GMR) project.
However, since 2000, two new players

have entered the market. The first was
state-owned Arab Union Contracting
Company (AUCC), a leading local con-
tractor, which decided to capitalise on
the cement shortage in the country. It
Al-Hawri and El-Fatayah and increase
their output. Prior to the civil unrest,
JLCC had installed bag filter systems at all
three plants, which prevented serious
dust pollution that had affected the sur-
% Arab Cement
Company
commissioned its first cement plant, the rounding areas for years. It had also
Arab Union
1.4 million t/y Burj line, in 2005 and planned, but not completed, to: Contracting Company
added a second line of the same capacity
JLCC
in 2009. AUCC was joined by Tripoli- • implement and start production of
based Al-Nisr Cement Company, which limestone blended cement
t/y=Tonnes a year; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Source: MEED Insight
opened a 1.3 million t/y plant. • install and dispatch cement in large bags
• open cement retail shops, to be known
Cement has been one of the few manufac- as ‘Sales Express’, in order to supply
turing sectors to have experienced some bagged cement directly to end users Local cement producers
privatisation. In 2007, Austrian materials • install and open a silo terminal for bulk
Company Type Plants Capacity (million
manufacturer Asamer, in joint venture cement in eastern Libya t/y)
with the Economic & Social Development • gain the Conformite Europeene mark
Arab Cement Company State-owned, formerly Benghazi, Al-Hawri, 3.3
Fund (ESDF), acquired 90 per cent of the for exporting known as Al-Ahlia El-Fatayah
shares in Libyan Cement Company, with • commence the Al-Hawri cement plant Cement Company
the remaining 10 per cent being granted line upgrade JLCC Joint venture of ESDF Zliten, Al-Marqab, 2.8
to the employees. Following the acquisi- and Asamer Souk al-Khamis, Libda
tion, the company’s name was changed to Arab Union Contracting State-owned contractor Burj lines 1 and 2 2.8
the Joint Libyan Cement Company (JLCC). Company
Al-Nisr Cement Company na Tripoli 1.4
The main goal of the privatisation was t/y=Tonnes a year; na=Not available; ESDF=Economic & Social Development Fund; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement
to modernise three plants in Benghazi, Company. Source: MEED Insight

Following the outbreak of the civil war,
in February 2011, Asamer evacuated its
Licences granted for new cement capacity “Over the long
Plant Main investor Capacity (million t/y)
expatriate staff and all of JLCC’s plants
were shut down to prevent any damage Tobruk Italcementi 4
term, demand is set
being caused through the disruption of
power supplies. Local staff subsequently
Wadi Shati Cement African Company 1 to increase, given the
Nalout and Al-Jufra
infrastructure needs
Alhadena National Company for the Building 2
reported major damage and confirmed Materials Industry
that gas supplies had been interrupted
during the conflict. However, production
Ajdabiya
Misurata
Cemena Libya
Cemena Libya
2
2
of the country”
was expected to resume by the end of
2011, provided power supplies could be Wadi Zaza Aska al-Ramada Construction 1.5
restored. Al-Marj (Zliten) Emaar 1.5 2010 and construction was scheduled
Misurata Libya Africa Investment Portfolio 2 to start in 2013. Licences had also been
Asamer estimated local cement demand granted to the ESDF-owned Alhadena
Karsah Libya Africa Investment Portfolio 2
at 3.5-4 million tonnes in 2010 and was National Company for the Building Mate-
forecasting a similar level in 2011, before t/y=Tonnes a year. Sources: USGS, MEED Projects rials Industry to construct plants at
hostilities began. This represented a fall Nalout and Al-Jufra, to local contractor
from the 2007 peak of about 6 million Aska al-Ramada Construction for a
tonnes, when the re-opening of the coun- cement line at Wadi Zaza and to Dubai-
try after years of sanctions led to a surge based real-estate developer Emaar for a
in cement demand. new cement facility at Zliten.
As highlighted by Asamer, the local However, all the projects were put on
cement industry has attracted growing hold at the start of 2011 and it remains
interest in recent years, with investors unclear how quickly they will be reacti-
looking to take advantage of low energy vated. This is especially the case with the
and production costs to meet local and host of plants planned by Libyan Invest-
overseas demand. As of late 2010, ment Authority subsidiary ESDF, which
licences had been granted for up to was one of the most politicised organisa-
18 million t/y of new capacity. tions under the Gaddafi regime.
The largest project planned was a 4 mil- Over the long term, demand is set to
lion-t/y plant at Tobruk. Costing an esti- increase given the infrastructure needs of
mated $750m, the plant was under devel- the country. International expertise will
opment by Italian cement giant also be vital in rehabilitating the state’s
Italcementi in conjunction with ESDF. older cement plants.
Feasibility studies were concluded in

ment of the Misurata complex. India’s MN
Steel and aluminium Libyan Iron & Steel Company facilities
Dastur & Company has undertaken
Facility Products Volume (t/y)
Libya’s metals industry is concentrated in numerous engineering assignments at the
the Mediterranean port city of Misurata, site and had to evacuate 66 members of Direct reduction plant HBI 650,000
DRI 1,100,000
The city plays host to one of North Afri- its staff in March 2011, following the out-
ca’s largest integrated steel complexes. break of hostilities. Lisco’s main contrac- Steel melt shop 1 Billets and blooms 630,000
Owned by the national Libyan Iron & tor has been Austria’s VAI, which is now Steel melt shop 2 Slabs 611,000
Steel Company (Lisco), the Misurata steel part of the Siemens group. Bar and rod mills (2) Rebar 800,000
plant was supposed to symbolise Libya’s
Light and medium section mill Light and medium sections 120,000
economic progress, but it became a key Lisco’s production rates have varied in
battleground in the recent civil war. recent years. Total production of direct Hot strip mill Hot rolled coils and sheets 580,400
reduced iron (DRI) was estimated at Cold rolling mill Cold rolled coils and sheets 140,000
Galvanised coils 80,000
Although its foundation stone was laid in 1.6 million t/y in 2008, but this fell to Colour coating line 40,000
1979, it was not until 1990 that molten 1.1 million t/y in 2009, which Lisco
steel was first produced at Misurata. A attributed to the drop in demand caused HBI=Hot briquetted iron; DRI=Direct reduced iron; t/y=Tonnes a year. Source: Lisco
second phase expansion was completed by the global financial crisis. Figures col-
in 1997. Lisco has molten steel capacity of lected by Arab Steel for the first half of
1.34 million t/y and produces a wide
range of products through its mills and
2010 show that DRI output increased by
79 per cent to 753,000 tonnes, bringing
“Nearly all of ble, with the plant ultimately being able
to produce 2.1 million t/y of rods and
melt shops. Nearly all of its rebar produc-
tion is consumed locally, while most of
production close to 2008 levels.
Libyan Iron & Steel bars and a similar quantity of billets,
blooms and slabs.
its flat products are exported to southern
Europe. The company has also exported
Despite fluctuating demand, a series of
upgrades have been carried out by Lisco
Company’s rebar In a major shift, Lisco turned to private
some of its hot briquetted iron (HBI) pro- over the past decade. It commissioned production is investors to assist in funding the esti-
duction in recent years. an expansion of the strip pickling line in mated $2bn upgrade programme. In the
2005, followed by new drawing, galvanis- consumed locally” autumn of 2010, the firm hosted a private
Lisco imports all of its iron pellets from ing and colour coating lines in 2007. investment workshop to outline its plans,
abroad, mainly from Sweden and Brazil. Under plans approved in August 2007, which was attended by both local and
The company benefits from low-cost gas molten steel production was set to international firms.
feedstock, which has helped offset the ris- increase to 4.2 million t/y by 2015. The
ing prices of raw material imports. The plan included a new 1.8 million t/y However, the expansion plans were
gas is supplied to the steel complex’s cap- cold direct reduced iron (CDRI) facility placed on hold and the plant shut in Feb-
tive power plant, which has capacity at the existing direct reduction plant. ruary 2011, when Misurata became a
of 510MW. Other facilities were to be expanded, major battle site in the civil war. Many of
with HBI production set to increase from Lisco’s estimated 6,000-strong workforce
Two international companies have played 630,000 million t/y to 850,000 million t/y were involved in the civil unrest, while
key roles in the construction and develop- and melt shop capacity to more than dou- the plant itself suffered some damage.

Aluminium
Following the end of the war in October
2011, Lisco said that its biggest challenges Tripoli has long had ambitions to develop
“Libyan Iron the Libyan Investment Authority became
an investor in the Russian conglomerate,
in resuming production were securing staff
and ensuring adequate electricity supplies.
an aluminium industry to take advantage
of its low-cost gas feedstock and further
& Steel Company following the floatation of 10.6 per cent of
the firm’s shares on the Hong Kong Stock
Officials also maintained that the search develop its metal production base. How- should be able to Exchange in January 2010.
for private investors would restart once the ever, despite a burst of activity in 2008,
political situation had stabilised. the country still has no smelting capacity. restart rolling mill A third aluminium project was also
under discussion in 2008. Canada’s Rio
Given the high volumes of electricity In January 2008, the UK’s Klesch & Com- operations soon” Tinto Alcan confirmed that it was in talks
required to produce steel, it will be some pany signed an estimated $8bn joint ven- with the government to build a $2.5bn,
time before Lisco can again operate at full ture agreement with the Libyan African 360,000 t/y smelter. However, like the two
capacity, although it should be able to Investment Portfolio for the construction Russian aluminium giant Rusal for a other projects, no contracts were signed
restart some of its rolling mill operations of a 725,000 t/y smelter to be completed 600,000 t/y smelter joint venture. While prior to the civil war and Rio Tinto
sooner. Until then, the country will rely by 2011. This was followed nine months the Kletsch initiative was always consid- declined to comment in October 2011
on imports from Turkey, Italy, China and later by the signing of a memorandum of ered speculative, the Rusal project was about its future intentions in Libya.
other markets. understanding between the ESDF and taken far more seriously, particularly after
Existing steel and cement plants Existing steel and cement plants
Type of Producer Design
Location plant name capacity Cement plant
Misurata Steel Lisco 1.3 million TUNISIA Tripoli Al-Marqab Steel plant
t/y
Libda
Benghazi Cement JLCC 800,000 t/y Zliten
El-Fatayah
Al-Hawri Cement JLCC 1 million t/y Souk al-Khamis Misurata
Burj Al-Hawri
El-Fatayah Cement JLCC 1 million t/y Benghazi
Zliten Cement ACC 1 million t/y
Al-Marqab Cement ACC 330,000 t/y
Souk Cement ACC 1 million t/y

al-Khamis
Libda Cement ACC 1 million t/y
EGYPT
Burj Cement AUCC 2.8 million
t/y
Tripoli Cement Al-Nisr 1.4 million

t/y
t/y=Tonnes a year; Lisco=Libyan Iron & Steel Com-
pany; JLCC=Joint Libyan Cement Company. Source: Source: MEED Insight
MEED Insight

Housing and real estate
I n January 2011, hundreds of protesters
stormed buildings under construction in
“Despite huge
the cities of Beni Walid and Benghazi. The
protests were fuelled by growing popular
sums being pledged,
resentment at the lack of public housing, the local housing
lengthening waiting lists and seemingly
rampant corruption within the system. sector has never kept
Despite promises and huge sums being up with demand”
pledged, the local housing sector has never
kept up with demand in Libya. The provi-
sion of housing was declared a right for all government using low-cost loans. This
by Muammar Gaddafi, shortly after he route became much more difficult to follow
seized power in 1969 and was subsequently from the mid-1980s onwards, when loans
enshrined in the Green Book. However, dried up and building materials became
translating words into action proved much much more expensive.
more difficult, particularly when the oil
price crashed in the 1980s. Financial austerity forced the government
to change its policy. No longer would the
During the 1980s, some houses were built state provide housing for all, but it would
by the government under its Priority Hous- assist private developers by encouraging
ing Programme (PHP), but a large propor- banks to lend to individuals wishing to buy
tion of Libyans opted to build their own or build their own property. But again there
properties on land allocated to them by the were major problems. The Secretariat for

Housing was scrapped, creating a void in
both policy and planning. Shortages of
“Before the war, The 2001-15 housing plan
Targeted number Number of units
bank finance, construction materials and
contractors further exacerbated the housing
an estimated $11bn Long-term plan of new houses to be built a year Cost (LDm) Cost ($m)
shortage. worth of housing 2001-05

2006-10
214,200
117,190
42,840
23,438
6,242
3,768
5,205
3,053
By the early 1990s, the housing situation projects were 2011-15 134,598 26,920 4,345 3,520
was becoming acute. In response, the Gen-
eral People’s Committee for Housing & Util- under construction” TOTAL 465,988 31,066 16,368 13,263
ities (GPCHU) was formed in 1993 and the Sources: Meeting Housing Needs in Libya, 2007; Abdulsalam Ahmed Abdalla, Newcastle University UK,
Report on Housing Programmes, GHC, 2000
General Housing Corporation (GHC) was set have put the estimated shortfall
up to plan and deliver new housing. After at about 500,000 units by 2020.
being disbanded in the early 1980s, housing
cooperatives were also re-established, Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in Key elements of the Housing & Infrastructure Board programme
which helped their members to secure land, Libya, there had been an increase in the Large-scale housing projects 26, consisting of 115,000 units
finance and materials for housing projects. volume of major housing contracts by the
Small-scale local housing projects 85,000 units, mainly in southern communities
two main government agencies, the Hous-
One of GPCHU’s first tasks was to look ing & Infrastructure Board (HIB) and the Infrastructure projects to 146
support housing
at housing requirements over the short, Organisation for the Development of
medium and long term and set targets Administrative Centres (Odac). HIB was Main elements of infrastructure 10 million square metres of roads, 1,200 kilometres
projects of sewage pipes, 1,300km of water mains, 2,000km
and budgets for investment. The forecasts given the task of delivering 200,000 new of stormwater drainage, 1,000km of electrical conduit,
were based on estimated population growth homes, with supporting infrastructure, by 1,000km of telecoms cabling, 714 pumping stations and
173 sewage treatment plants
of 3 per cent a year and a housing deficit of 2020 and had appointed the US’ Aecom to
73,387 units in 2000. To meet demand, oversee the programme in 2007. Source: Aecom
GPCHU concluded that Libya needed
465,988 new housing units in the period Before the war, an estimated $11bn worth
2001-15. of housing projects were under construc-
tion, involving more than 60,000 units. The
Data on how many of these units were actu- largest by far was the 25,000-unit Benghazi
ally constructed is difficult to obtain, but it new town project, which was being built by
is clear that the new housing stock and China State Construction Engineering Cor-
financial allocations failed to satisfy poration at an estimated cost of $6bn. In
demand. In 2005, the General Committee addition, there was a significant volume of
for Planning & Finance sharply increased housing-related infrastructure contracts
the new housing requirement figure, stating under execution.
that 420,000 new homes were needed by
2010. More recently, independent studies Historically, Turkish contractors have car-

ried out the majority of housing projects in
Libya with the likes of TML Construction, “Historically, Selected major housing contracts under construction, late 2010
Project Value ($m) Contractor Scope Client
Mesa Mesken, STFA and Enka building
thousands of units across the country. Their
Turkish contractors Tripoli housing 800 Saraya Construction 400 housing Edkar Bank
have carried out the

units in 19
main competitors have traditionally been towers
Korean firms. However, in recent years,
Chinese, Malaysian and Indian contractors majority of housing Ghira housing 415 Simplex Infrastructures 2,000
housing units
HIB
have entered the housing and related infra-

structure market, with China State Con- projects in Libya” Tajoura housing 413 Amona Ranhill
Consortium
10,000
apartments
HIB
struction, India’s Punj Lloyd and Simplex Benghazi housing 774 Amona Ranhill 20,000 HIB
Infrastructure, and Malaysia’s Ranhill all Consortium apartments
winning major awards. New Benghazi housing 6,000 China State Construction 25,000 HIB
Engineering Corporation housing units
The housing programme was put on hold in Tripoli housing 413 Amona Ranhill 10,000 HIB
Consortium apartments
early 2011 and it is unclear when it will be
restarted. Questions remain about whether Tobruk housing 996 Sungwon 5,000 Lidco
housing units
some projects, including the new Benghazi
project that was being carried out by the Sirte city housing 50 NACO Construction & 100 housing Odac
Trading Company units
Chinese, will even be reactivated at least in
their original form. Sebha housing 300 CKG Engineering 4,000 new Odac
housing units
Souk al-Ahad housing 256 STFA 2,000 new Odac

Officially, the National Transitional Coun- housing units
cil (NTC) has told contractors and consult-
Suluk and Al-Mijineen 476 SMI Hyundai 7,000 new Odac
ants that it plans to honour existing con- housing housing units
tracts and that housing is a priority.
Qubah City 420 AMCO 2,000 new Odac
However, as of November 2011, firms were housing units
still waiting to hear what payments would HIB=Housing & Infrastructure Board; Lidco=Libyan Investment & Development Company;
be made available before they return to Odac=Organisation for the Development of Administrative Centres. Source: MEED Insight
work and what compensation would be
offered for the millions of dollars worth of
equipment, vehicles and materials looted
during the conflict.
Aecom was hard-hit by the civil war. It

announced in mid-2011 that it had lost an
estimated $10m from costs involved in
leaving Libya at the start of the conflict.

Real estate and tourism Selected major real-estate and tourism projects
Commercial real estate is a relatively new Project Value ($m) Pre-war status Scope Client
proposition for Libya. A range of tourism-
Energy City 5,000 Planned Business district for energy industry Gulf Finance House with ESDF
related schemes were planned in the
period 2006-08, many of them by Gulf The Waterfront 250 Planned Luxury residential development with Al-Libya al-Qataria
five-star hotel
developers, but none had made much
Barwa mixed-use 2,000 Planned 3,000-square-metre mixed-use Barwa
progress before being reined in, firstly by development
development
the 2009 economic downturn and Gulf
Sports and service complex 204 Planned Hotel and leisure complex Barwa/Lidco
property slump and then by the civil war.
Even schemes funded by local investors Berjaya Golf Complex 227 Under construction Golf course, villas and Mariott hotel Berjaya Oyia Development with ESDF
by Daewoo
had been slow to progress.
Corinthia Hotel, Benghazi 136 Planned Five-star hotel in Benghazi International Hotel Investments with Libya Arab
Foreign Investment Company (Lafico)
Tripoli Greens, a $4bn governmental com-
Zuara Economic City 15,000 Planned Tourism development over 40 Emaar
plex with the involvement of numerous kilometres of coastline
international architects, was halted in
Tripoli Towers 800 Under construction Two towers, one 48-storey, one ESDF
2008/09 with little explanation. Similarly, by CCC 30-storey
the $3bn Green Mountain tourism and Al-Waha 750 Planned 11 residential towers and one Lidco/Al-Maabar Real Estate Company
development had made little progress, commercial tower
despite being personally launched in Sep- Tripoli Greens 4,135 On hold New government congress complex Odac
tember 2007 by Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam
ESDF=Economic & Social Development Fund; Lidco=Libyan Investment & Development Company; CCC=Consolidated Contractors Company; Odac=Organisation for the
and employing the UK’s Fosters & Partners
Development of Administrative Centres. Source: MEED Projects
as masterplanners.
Some smaller real-estate projects seemed

Despite the lack of progress and the civil
war, real estate has considerable poten-
“The government ning to raise the number of hotel rooms
to 50,000.
to have fared much better than the
vast developments planned by the likes
tial in view of Libya’s largely undevel-
oped Mediterranean coastline and world-
estimated in 2010 It is a similar situation in the commercial
of Dubai-based Emaar, Bahrain’s Gulf class tourism sites. Developing tourism that there were only sector. Prior to the war, demand was rising
Finance House and Qatar’s Barwa Real infrastructure at its ancient Greek and from an increasing number of joint ven-
Estate. For example, Athens-based Con- Roman sites, most notably Leptis Magna 14,000 hotel rooms ture companies servicing the oil and gas,
solidated Contractors International and Sabrata, would assist in economic construction and financial sectors. Top-
Company (CCC) had been contracted to diversification and create much-needed in Libya” quality office space was only available in
build two tower blocks on the Tripoli jobs. However, the government estimated three buildings in Tripoli: Five Towers,
shoreline near the Corinthia Hotel by in 2010 that there were only 14,000 hotel Al-Fateh Tower and the Corinthia Busi-
the Economic & Social Development rooms in Libya. As part of a plan to ness Centre, which was built alongside the
Fund (ESDF). Both had been progressing boost tourism revenues from $7.9bn in Corinthia Hotel. All three, however, were
well prior to the war. 2009 to $22bn by 2019, Tripoli was plan- operating at 100 per cent occupancy.

Tourist sites
Farwa
TUNISIA Zuara
Tripoli
Sabrata
Leptis Magna Apollonia
Cyrene
Nalout
Ghadames
EGYPT
Adiri
Garama
LIBYA
The Awbari lakes
Tadrart Acacus
Waw an-Namous
NIGER
CHAD
Sources: Lonely Planet, www.tomehu.com SUDAN

Social infrastructure
Education Administrative Centres (Odac). The uni-
During Muammar Gaddafi’s rule, all versity programme was one of the largest
Libyans were eligible for free education, in the Middle East, second only to Saudi
which was provided by the state. Between Arabia’s in terms of value.
the ages of six and 15, it was compulsory
for children to attend school, where the Compared with many other infrastructure
curriculum was overwhelmingly focused projects in Libya, the university building
on Gaddafi’s political philosophy, Arabic programme progressed relatively smoothly
and Islamic studies. In the latter years, it and rapidly. In July 2009, US consultant
also included compulsory military train- Hill International was awarded the project
ing and during the 1980s, the teaching of management contract for what became
Russian instead of English. known as the 25 university programme, as
well as for the $2.5bn Al-Fateh University
An educational reform programme,
launched in 2005, was accompanied by Mena university investment
a 19-year ban on the teaching of English Country Investment value ($bn)
being lifted and significant new invest-
Saudi Arabia 19.4
ment going into higher education. In
2006, the government drew up a five-year Libya 7.5
plan to upgrade and expand education Kuwait 5.87

facilities. Its centrepiece was the con- Qatar 7.04
struction of about 30 new university cam-
UAE 1.95
puses, in a programme overseen by the
Mena=Middle East and North Africa. Source: MEED
Organisation for the Development of Projects

expansion, which was already under
way. At least four more – located at Sirte,
“Ten university Selected projects on Odac’s university and campus building programme
Location University Designer Contractor
Azzawiya, Ghadames and Ras Lanuf –
were under way, but fell outside of
campuses in the Ajdabiya Garyounis Argus tba
Hill’s responsibilities. west of the country Awbari Sebha BDP Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation
have been designed Beni Walid Misurata RMJM tba

The Al-Fateh University project was by
Birak Sebha BDP Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation
far the largest. It involved the expansion
and redevelopment of the existing univer- by the UK’s BDP” Derna Omar al-Mukhtar Argus Mesa Mesken
sity in Tripoli, through the construction of Garyounis Garyounis Argus tba

about 65 new buildings. As of early 2011, Gharyan Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP Akdeniz
it was about 60 per cent complete, with A further 10 campuses in the west of the
Houn Sirte Argus Unknown
numerous contractors, including Turkish country have been designed by the UK’s
firms Guris and Mesa Mesken, working on BDP. All had main contractors on board. Al-Tahadi Sirte Argus Dogus
the development. These included China’s Changjiang Geo- Misurata Misurata Idom Impregilo/Lidco
technical Engineering Corporation, Murzuq Sebha BDP Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation
On the 25 university programme, all Kuwait’s Gulf Group Construction Com-
Nalout Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP Cosmo
buildings were either under design or in pany, Turkey’s Akdeniz, Spain’s Bruesa
the construction phase as of early 2011. Construccion, South Korea’s Cosmo and Nasser Nasser Argus tba
For the designs, the client split the pro- Turkey’s BTK. Sebha Sebha BDP Changjiang Geotechnical Engineering Corporation
gramme into four packages. Sabrata Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP Gulf Group Construction Company
Spain’s Idom designed the Misurata
Sorman Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP Bruesa Construccion
The Argus Alliance, made up of UK firms University campus at the coastal city
Arup, Davis Langdon and Keppie Design, for which construction was under way Tarhouna Misurata Argus Impregilo/Lidco
had the contract to design 12 universities. by the Lidco/Impregilo partnership. The Tobruk Omar al-Mukhtar Argus China Building Technique Group
Contractors had been appointed for six of fourth design package was being carried Zintan Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP BTK
these: Mesa Mesken for Omar al-Mukhtar out by the UK’s RMJM and covered the
Zliten Al-Asmariya RMJM tba
University at Derna, the local/Italian joint Zliten campus of Al-Asmariya University
venture of Libyan Investment & Develop- and the Misurata University campus at Zliten Misurata Argus Impregilo/Lidco
ment Company (Lidco) and Impregilo for Beni Walid. Zuara Al-Jabal al-Gharbi BDP Bruesa Construccion
Misurata University’s Zliten and Tarhouna Al-Beida Omar al-Mukhtar Argus tba
campuses, China Building Technique Following the end of the civil war in
Jifarah Al-Fateh Argus Maltauro
Group for Omar al-Mukhtar University at October 2011, Hill was preparing to con-
Tobruk, a contractor identified as Way-2B duct a damage assessment of each site and Khoms Misurata Argus Way-2B
for the Misurata University’s campus at draw up an inventory for materials and Al-Marj Garyounis Argus Benaa & Tasheed/Arsel JV
Khoms, and Turkey’s Arsel for Garyounis equipment lost. Odac had also indicated Odac=Organisation for the Development of Administrative Buildings; tba=To be announced; Lidco=Libyan
University campus at Al-Marj. its desire to restart the programme and Investment & Development Company; JV=Joint venture. Source: MEED Insight

make payments as soon as it had the
authority to do so.
The damage to schools in some areas

was extensive, since many were used by
military forces as bases, which in turn
became targets of the bombing campaign.
Those hardest hit were located in villages
between Ajdabiya and Benghazi, in Zliten
and Sebha, and in parts of Tripoli. A
clearer idea of the damage to schools is
expected once Unicef and Paris-based
charity ACTED complete an assessment.
Education is a priority for the National

Transitional Council (NTC). Its focus will
not just be on rebuilding damaged infra-
structure and relaunching pre-conflict
projects. It will also look to overhaul the
curricula and staffing, which became
highly politicised during the Gaddafi era.
It was no coincidence that one of the
NTC’s first moves on the education front
was to appoint Faisal Kreshki as the new
dean at Al-Fateh University, which had
been renamed the University of Tripoli.
“The hardest
hit schools were
located in Zliten
and Sebha, and in
parts of Tripoli”
Healthcare ture of the public healthcare system.
Libya’s health sector has been the area Residents in need of specialist care drive
most severely affected by the civil war. mainly to Tunis, or Cairo, or fly to Malta,
From the destruction of primary health Germany or the UK.
centres to overwhelmed hospitals and
an exodus of medical professionals, the The healthcare system has suffered from a
already strained system was close to lack of investment and 15 years of inter-
breaking point when the end of hostilities national sanctions. A major issue has also
was announced in October 2011. been the fact that the system has been run
at the regional or Shabiat level without
The local healthcare system is sufficient clear policy guidance from the
almost entirely state-dominated, central government. Frequently, minis-
with just a few small private clinics. tries have appeared to give out conflicting
According to the World Health Organisa-
tion (WHO), the country had some
Hospitals and health centres
23,000 hospital beds, 96 hospitals and
Type of facility Number
1,424 primary health centres prior to
the conflict and employed more than Specialised hospitals 25
113,000 healthcare professionals. Central hospitals 18
General hospitals 21
The public healthcare system is
Rural hospitals 32
four-tiered. It starts with the primary
health centres, which typically serve a Total number of public 96
catchment area of 5,000-10,000 people. hospitals

Under the structure, patients are then Total beds in public hospitals 20,289
either referred to the 45 specialist clinics Total beds in welfare clinics 1,060
spread across the country or district hos-
Total beds in private clinics 1,433
pitals. If necessary, they are transferred
Total beds in all hospitals 22,782
to advanced or teaching hospitals for fur-
ther treatment. Beds per 10,000 population 37
Primary healthcare facilities 1,424

Most residents tend to go directly to the Polyclinics 37
hospitals, thus bypassing the primary
Quarantine units 17
health clinics. Those that can afford to
generally seek treatment overseas, so as
to avoid the staff shortages, overcrowding Source: WHO Country Co-operation Strategy Libya,
and inefficiency that have become a fea- 2010-15

policy advice. For example, in the 2009 management outsourcing and the establish-
Health investment
budget, the Finance Ministry said it wanted ment of non-government facilities. In Janu-
to build a series of major public hospitals, ($m) ary 2008, the UK’s Healthshare Interna-
while the Health Ministry said that the pol-
icy focus should be on primary healthcare,
3000
3,000 tional was awarded an LD250m ($197m)
contract to manage and modernise the
rather than large physical infrastructure. Al-Khadra hospital in Tripoli. Along with
To stem medical tourism and improve

2500
2,500 providing on-site training, Healthshare was
to renovate infrastructure, install a new
local healthcare expertise, former prime information technology system, and mod-
minister Al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi 2000
2,000
ernise the management training system.
announced a $500m investment pro-
gramme in 2006, aimed at attracting inter- International expertise was also tapped
national consultants and universities to 1500
1,500
for the Al-Marg hospital in the northeast
Libya. This led to a raft of partnership of the country. The UK’s International
agreements being signed.
1000
1,000 Hospitals Group (IHG) was contracted to
commission the new hospital building
In May 2008, the Libyan Secretary of State and brought in 20 senior staff to manage
for Education & Scientific Research and
the UK government signed a memoran-
500500 it. IHG was forced to evacuate its expatri-
ate staff in early 2011, although following
dum of understanding on medical train- the end of hostilities in October 2011, it
ing. This provided for local medical staff 0 0
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
was looking to send them back.
to be given a year’s training in the UK’s
National Health system, in areas includ- Source: General People’s Committee for Health & Environment Benghazi Medical Centre was expected to
ing endoscopy, while the UK’s Royal Col- be the next institution to follow the out-
leges trained Libyan surgeons in specialist
areas, such as obstetrics. In December
was to launch a centralised training pro-
gramme and in 2010, it sent 1,170 medical
“Recent years sourcing route. In 2010, it announced a
LD150m ($120m) tender for management
2009, the UK’s Liverpool John Moores
University secured a contract with Tripo-
professionals overseas to Jordan, Egypt,
Germany, the UK, Malaysia, Singapore,
have seen private and refurbishment.
li’s Al-Fateh Medical University to run Italy and France for training. It also companies take on Small-scale private hospitals were
degree programmes in nursing, although began to document and report on health also becoming more common prior to
it was yet to begin as of early 2011. indicators and statistics for every hospital, a role in Libya’s the war, with about 80 in operation.
recording information such as the fact One of the newest was the Libyan
Training was a particular area of focus for that the average Libyan visited a primary healthcare sector” European hospital in Benghazi, run by
the government. In 2009, the General Peo- health centre three times in 2010. Germany’s Epos Group. Its owners, the
ple’s Committee for Health & Environment Mercantile Group, were planning a sec-
was established to bring the fragmented Recent years have also seen private firms ond 200-bed hospital in Tripoli prior to
system together. One of its first initiatives take on a role in the sector, both through the revolution.

scale schemes. Among them was a
Projects under construction
200-bed hospital contract awarded to South
District Number of
Korea’s Daewoo Engineering & Construc-
projects
tion at a cost of $205m.
Albetnan 9
Sirte 9 The healthcare sector was hit hard during

Misurata 64 the six-month civil war. Primary health
centres were forced to close as staff, fund-
Derna 14
ing and supplies failed to arrive. This led
Jifarah 7
to an overwhelming number of people
Al-Marqab 37 seeking treatment in the hospitals. The
Jabal Akhdar 13 most stressed hospitals were in Misurata,
along the Ajdabiya to Brega road, Azzaw-
Morzig 11
iya in the Nafusa Mountains and in and
Tripoli 33
around Tripoli.
Al-Marj 13
Sebha 7 Following the end of hostilities, hospitals

and health centres desperately needed to
Benghazi 56
replenish their medical supplies and source
Wadi Alhiat 7
equipment. Many also faced acute staff
Azzawiya 34 shortages, with more than 20,000 health-
Al-Waha 7 care workers, most of whom were nurses,
Wadi Shati 18 Most of Libya’s existing healthcare infra- recent years with budgeted health spend- having left the country.
structure was built in the 1980s and ing reaching an all-time high of $2.6bn in
Nalout 8
1990s, and much of it was constructed by 2010, double the 2007 allocation. The NTC has stated that healthcare will
Kufra 9 eastern European and Korean contractors. be a key priority moving forward and,
Ghat 3 One of the biggest players in this period The higher spending was reflected in with needs in almost every area, from
Al-Nequt al-Ghamis 24 was Bulgaria’s Technoexportstroy, which increased project activity. According medical supplies and equipment to train-
carried out more than 25 health-related to the General People’s Committee ing and upgrading of facilities, the sector
Ajdabiya 6
contracts. These included a 500-bed for Health & Environment, there were is likely to become the focus of major
Al-Jabal al-Gharbi 36 trauma centre in Tripoli, 16 polyclinics 463 new healthcare facilities under con- investment. There is also widespread
Other 6 and three 201-bed hospitals in Sabrata, struction as of December 2010. These acknowledgement that after years of
TOTAL 463 Al-Zahra and Sirte. were spread throughout the country, with international isolation, foreign expertise
the biggest concentration located in the is needed to transform the sector, which
Project activity slumped in the period Misurata and Benghazi areas. Although makes it all the more likely that manage-
Source: General People’s Committee for Health & 1990-2005, as a result of tight government many of the projects were small scale and ment contracts and private investment
Environment budgets. However, funding has risen in clinics, there were also a handful of large- will be a key part of future strategy.

Main airports
Transport TUNISIA Tripoli Mitiga Tripoli

Airport
Airfield
Airstrip
Tripoli International
Misurata
Airports Sirte
Benghazi
Ghadames
Libya has 15 civil airports, although only
two – Tripoli and Benghazi – have signifi- EGYPT
cant international traffic. The majority
of its airports are small, serving outlying
communities and handling domestic and
charter flights. In addition to the commer-
cial airports, there are also a number of
private landing strips, generally serving
remote oil installations and military bases.
Sebha LIBYA
Much of Libya’s airport infrastructure is
old, having been built in the 1970s and
Ghat
1980s. Little investment was made in the
15 years up to 2003, when international
sanctions had a major impact on the local
aviation sector. However, the industry
Kufra
began to recover after 2004, with growing
international investment and tourism activ-
ity leading to Libyan Arab Airlines and its
sister airline, Afriqiyah Airways, undertak-
ing fleet and route expansion programmes.
NIGER
Source: World Food Programme

CHAD
Main airports
Location ICAO location indicator IATA location indicator Usage Customs Runway IFR runway Length (feet)
“In 2006, a $2.5bn
Ajdabiya HLAG Private No Paved No 3,200 upgrade of Libya’s
Amal V12 HLAM Private No Paved No 5,900
busiest airports
Beda M3 HLBD Private No Paved No 7,400
Benghazi HLLB BEN Civil Yes Paved Yes 11,800 was announced to
Birak BCQ Civil No Paved No 11,100
expand capacity”
Bu Attifel A100 HLFL Private No Paved No 7,000
Dahra HLRA Private No Paved No 5,100
Eddib V7 HLDB Private No Paved No 5,900 In 2006, a $2.5bn upgrade of the state’s
busiest airports was announced by the
Al-Beida HLLQ LAQ Civil Yes Paved Yes 11,800
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) aimed at
El-Sider HLSD Private No Paved No 6,800
expanding capacity to about 28 million
Fox 3 Private No Unpaved No 6,500 passengers a year from an estimated 5 mil-
Ghadames HLTD LTD Civil No Paved No 11,800 lion. Under the plan, Tripoli and Sebha
were to be expanded simultaneously, with
Ghat HLGT GHT Civil No Paved Yes 11,800
Benghazi following close behind. Other air-
Gialo HLGL Private No Paved No 6,500
ports earmarked for improvement included
Hamada Nc-5 HLHM Private No Paved No 7,700 Ghat, Ghadames and Tobruk, all of which
Hamada Nc-8 HLNM Private No Paved No 6, serve tourism sites.
Hateiba Private No Unpaved No 4,100
The civil war in early 2011 brought
Houn HLON HUQ Civil No Paved No 5,900
the local aviation sector to a standstill.
Kufra HLKF AKF Civil No Paved Yes 12,000 This was confirmed on 19 March 2011
Majed Private No Unpaved No 7,200 when a UN Security Council resolution
Marsa al-Brega HLMB LMQ Private No Paved No 7,200 in 1973 effectively banned all Tripoli-
S-21 based carriers from flying. Commercial
activity recommenced on 2 November
Messla HLML Private No Paved No 7,200
2011, when, following Nato’s announce-
Misurata MRA Civil Yes Paved Yes 10,300
ment that it was halting military
Nafoora M4 HLNR Private No Paved No 7,200 operations on Libya, Alitalia flew
Oxy 103 A HLZG Private No Paved No 5,600 100 passengers from Rome to Tripoli.
Ras Lanuf V HLNF Private No Paved No 5,900
The carrier was quickly followed by a
40 host of other airlines including Turkish
Airlines and Egyptair, as well as Qatar

Airways, which started flights to Beng-
Main airports (Continued)
hazi for the first time.
Location ICAO location indicator IATA location indicator Usage Customs Runway IFR runway Length (feet)
Sabah 74 Private No Unpaved No 5,200 Prior to the civil war, the local aviation
Sebha HLLS SEB Civil Yes Paved Yes 11,800 sector was preparing for a period of
expansion with the International Air
Sahil HLSH Private No Paved No 4,500
Transport Association (IATA) forecasting
Samah Private No Unpaved No 4,200
growth in Libyan passenger air traffic of
Sarir C-4 HLSA Private No Paved No 7,200 6.9 per cent a year between 2010 and
Sirte HLGD SRX Civil No Paved No 12,000 2013. Whether this can be achieved will
depend largely on how quickly the recon-
Tagrift V10 Private No Unpaved No 6,500
struction programme can begin and
Tobruk HLGN TOB Civil Yes Paved No 9,700
whether political stability can be restored.
Tripoli HLLT TIP Civil Yes Paved Yes 11,800
International
Tripoli Mitiga HLLM MJI Civil Yes Paved Yes 11,076
Ubari QUB Civil No Paved No 8,000
Zuara HLZW WAX Civil No Paved No 5,900
ICAO=International Civil Aviation Organisation; IATA=International Air Transport Association; IFR=Instrument Flight Rules. Source: World Food Programme logistics
cluster
Contract awards on Libyan airport expansion programme

Project Package Contractor Value ($m) Date of award Design consultant
Tripoli International airport New terminals Odebrecht, TAV, CCC 1,400 Q3 2007 ADPI
expansion
Air traffic control tower Vinci 76 Q4 2008 ADPI
Benghazi International airport Air traffic control tower Indra na Q3 2007 ADPI
expansion
New terminal SNC Lavalin 542 Q3 2007 ADPI
Sebha New terminal CCC, TAV 300 Q3 2007 ADPI
Air traffic control tower Indra 58 Q3 2007 ADPI
CCC=Consolidated Contractors Company; na=Not available. Source: MEED Insight

Tripoli airport “During the civil
Existing capacity: 3 million passengers
a year
war, damage to the
Planned capacity: 20 million passengers
a year
Tripoli airport and
Total project cost: $2.1bn construction site
Expansion of Tripoli’s international airport
was identified as a key priority in 2006, was limited”
when the then prime minister Al-Baghdadi
Ali al-Mahmoudi announced a $450m
project to build a new terminal and cost. After the negotiations, it was agreed
appointed France’s Aeroports de Paris that the interior fit-out package for the west-
(ADP) as designer, supervisor and project ern terminal would be removed from the
manager. By the time the main construc- Odebrecht/CCC/TAV venture’s scope. Even
tion contract was awarded to a joint ven- so, its contract value was still about $1.4bn.
ture of Brazil’s Odebrecht, Athens-based
Consolidated Contractors International By the time the civil war broke out, only
Company (CCC) and Turkey’s TAV in Sep- about 30 per cent of the expansion had
tember 2007, the scope of works had dou- been completed. During the conflict, dam-
bled to become a twin terminal project age to the airport and construction site
with capacity of 20 million passengers a was limited, although all vehicles, equip-
year. A year later, French construction ment and materials were looted. Con-
giant Vinci was awarded in joint venture struction work is not expected to resume
with Libyan Investment & Development until mid-2012 at the earliest.
Company (Lidco) a $76m contract to con-
struct the air traffic control tower. Sebha airport
The expansion was originally due to be a year
completed by September 2009, but it Total project cost: $500m
encountered serious delays. By August Lying 600 kilometres inland from Tripoli,
2009, it was already running two years the Sebha airport is undergoing a $500m
late as a result of changes to the project’s upgrade, which includes a new terminal
scope and rising costs. The cost-plus con- building. The project was awarded in two
tract model employed was also a factor: packages in 2007. The first, worth $58m,
although it minimised contractor risk, it went to Spain’s Indra for the air traffic
led to intense negotiations over the final control system and communications net-

work. The second, covering the new
$300m terminal building, was won by the
CCC/TAV venture, with a construction
period of 30 months.
As with Tripoli, the Sebha project was

suffering extensive delays before the civil
war. The main issue was that the CAA
decided to change the structure and
scope of the project from a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) to an engineering, pro-
curement and construction (EPC) deal in
early 2010.
Benina International airport

(Benghazi)
a year
Total project cost: $600m
Located 19km east of Benghazi, Benina
International is Libya’s second largest
airport. Like Tripoli and Sebha, it has
been undergoing a major expansion.
Designed by ADP, it centres on the con-
struction of a new terminal building with
capacity of up to 5 million passengers a
year. In 2008, Canada’s SNC Lavalin was
awarded a $542m contract to build the
terminal, while Indra won the air traffic
control package.
2011 proved unfounded. According to the
SNC had been due to complete the project UK’s Capita Symonds, which was work-
in 2010. However, when fighting broke ing as a project manager on the expan-
out in the coastal city in early 2011, the sion, damage to infrastructure was lim-
contractor was still pouring concrete for ited, with looting having been the main
the main structure. Rumours that the air- issue. As on Tripoli, construction work is
port’s runway was destroyed in February not expected to resume until 2012.

Ports
With more than 1,770 kilometres of Ports cations, is in charge of port infrastructure,
coastline and its strategic location at with work overseen by the Board for the
Abu Kammash
the boundary between Europe, Africa and TUNISIA Zuara Tripoli Execution of Transport Projects (BETP).
the Middle East, Libya should occupy a Azzawiya Khoms However, in 2010, plans were approved for
Derna
Misurata
prominent position in the Mediterranean the formation of a higher ports authority.
Tobruk
ports sector. However, a lack of invest- Benghazi
ment, bureaucracy and inefficiencies have Sirte Much of Libya’s port infrastructure was
combined to make it a peripheral player Zueitina
built in the 1970s and 1980s by contrac-
El-Sider
in the regional shipping industry. tors from the former Yugoslavia and is
Ras Lanuf
Marsa al-Brega
EGYPT now in urgent need of upgrading, on
Libya has more than a dozen ports, of account of age. Although there has been
which six are commercial, with the some investment in recent years, it has
remainder serving industrial users, such focused on refurbishing existing infra-
as Sirte Oil Company at Marsa al-Brega structure. The main exception was a plan
and Libyan Iron & Steel Company (Lisco) to build a new commercial port to the
at Misurata. By international standards, LIBYA west of Sirte, with a capacity of 8 million
the commercial ports are relatively small tonnes a year (t/y). The US’ Bechtel
and have drafts of less than 12 metres. signed a memorandum of understanding
The one exception is the state’s main sea- (MoU) to construct the port in 2008, for
port at Tripoli, which has an offshore which the Netherlands’ Royal Haskoning
berth with depth alongside of 16 metres. is the design consultant. However, the
$1bn contract never came into force.
The Maritime & Ports Administration, part Source: World Food Programme
Before the war, Tripoli had drawn up
of the Secretariat for Transport & Communi- plans to invest $1.3bn in its commercial

ports sector. The programme included the
development of Benghazi into a modern age, electrical works and fencing, and was
container terminal and the expansion of scheduled to take 33 months. However, it
Derna port. was still to be completed as of early 2011.
As in the aviation sector, the war halted all Azzawiya harbour

port projects and disrupted the local ship- Plans to build a new harbour at the Azza-
ping sector. Although naval ships became a wiya oil refinery, west of Tripoli, have
key target for the Nato bombing campaign, been under consideration for several
with the ports of Tripoli, Sirte and Khoms years. The aim of the estimated $280m
affected, the damage to port infrastructure project is to replace three offshore single
was minimal. The bigger problem was the buoy moorings with five sheltered berths
looting and theft of equipment. to serve liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) tank-
ers of up to 5,000 dead weight tonnes (dwt),
product tankers of up to 70,000 dwt and
crude tankers of up to 150,000 dwt. The
Port projects Azzawiya Oil Refining Company project
Tripoli Port breakwater reconstruction was out to tender as the civil war broke
Geneva-registered Archirodon Construc- out, with three bids having been submit-
tion (Overseas) won the $222m constructed, but not opened. Project sources said
tion contract to rebuild the Tripoli Port in November 2011 that the client was
breakwaters in the third quarter of 2007. keen to proceed with the scheme and was
Placed by the Maritime & Ports Authority, planning to approach the original bidders.
it covered construction of a 4,700-metre
rubble mound extended berm in front of Sirte East Port development
the two existing 2,000-metre-long break- Major ports Construction was reportedly under way
waters. The main consultant on the Tripoli Misurata Marsa al-Brega Benghazi Derna Tobruk on the Sirte East commercial harbour by
project was Royal Haskoning. The project an unidentified contractor in 2010. Royal
Area (km²) 3 3 1.15 4.4 na 1
was about 40 per cent complete at the Haskoning, along with the local Maward
Capacity (t/y) na 6 0.36 4 na 0.6
start of the civil war in early 2011 and it Consulting Engineers, was providing
sustained no damage during the conflict. Quay length (m) 4,029 3,550 1,120 4,490 453 1,702 technical assistance.
Max berth draft (m) 12* 11 13 10.53 9 9
Benghazi Port phase 2 Covered storage (m²) 34,546 67,000 1,500 7,500 0 3,600
A Turkish joint venture of STFA and
Open storage (m²) 377,220 600,000 64,500,000 44,500 15,000 15,000
EREN was awarded the $104m contract
by the Maritime & Ports Authority in Vessels a year 600 na na na 170 120
August 2007. It called for the construction km²=Square kilometres; t/y=Tonnes a year; na=Not available; m²=Square metres; *16m at offshore berth. Source:
of 37 new buildings, earthworks, drain- World Food Programme, Logistics Assessment, Libya, March 2011

Road network
Zuara Sabrata
Azzawiya
TUNISIA Tripoli
Khoms
Tarhouna Misurata Al-Beida
Derna
Zintan Gharyan
Nalout Benghazi Tobruk
Beni Waled
Roads
Sirte
Ben Jawad
El-Sider Ajdabiya
Ghadames Ras Lanuf
Marsa al-Brega EGYPT
Houn
Over the past 40 years, Libya has invested Vehicles in Libya LIBYA
heavily in developing a national road net- Number % of
work. As of 2010, it had an estimated Type (million) total
83,000 kilometres of road, of which Cars 1.388 76 Sebha LIBYA
47,000km was paved. This represented a
Minibuses and vans 0.219 12
significant expansion on the 8,800km of
paved highway in 1978. Vehicle usage has Buses 0.091 5
risen strongly in recent years and reached Trucks 0.091 5

1.8 million in 2008, with cars accounting Motorbikes and 0.036 2
for 76 per cent of the total. three-wheelers ALGERIA
TOTAL NUMBER 1.826 100
Libya’s most important road is the coastal
highway, which stretches along the entire Source: World Health Organisation
coastline from the Tunisian border in
the west to Egypt in the east. On the way,
it links the major cities of Tripoli and
Benghazi, and passes through Khoms, NIGER
Misurata and Sirte, before reaching Derna
and Tobruk.
CHAD
The 1,822km highway was built in the

SUDAN
1930s when Libya was under Italian colo- Source: www.ezilon.com
nial rule. The governor general, Italo

Balbo, was credited with building the
road, which opened in 1937. Thirty
“Most of Libya’s Selected major road projects
years later, it was repaved.
major road networks Route
Ras Ajdir to Imsaad
Length (km)
1,700
Cost ($m)
3,000
Status
Design
Scope
New road
Due to its size, Libya has several other
major arterial roads. A 787km highway
have been built by Ras Ajdir to Garabouli 200 146 Awarded to Strabag Upgrade
runs from Tripoli down to the southern Korean, Turkish and Al-Beida to Derna
Sabrata to Ras Ajdir
200
103
150
80
Awarded to MAPA
Awarded to MAPA
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
city of Sebha and on to Ghat, a further
552km. Heading southwest from the Chinese contractors” km=Kilometres. Source: MEED Projects
capital is the 602km road to Ghadames.
In the east, the main southerly highway
is the 871km road linking Ajdabiya to and a further €350m ($483m) in forward
Kufra, while the former is also connected orders. The company sent a reconnais-
to Tobruk via a 410km link. Most of the sance team into Libya in October 2011
major road networks have been built by and it reported that machinery had been
Korean, Turkish and Chinese contractors. stolen and camps destroyed. The contrac-
tor is planning to send expatriate staff
In recent years, Germany’s Strabag has back to Libya, although this is unlikely to
made a strong push into the Libyan roads take place before 2012 and only once
sector. In 2008, it was awarded, in joint security is guaranteed.
venture with Lidco, the 221km Ajdabiya-
Benghazi-Al-Marj section of the coastal Turkey’s MNG Group, through contractor
highway by the General People’s Commit- MAPA Contracting & Trading, was also
tee for Communication & Transport, working on several road contracts. These
Roads & Bridges. It followed this up with included the 200km rehabilitation and
a 210km road maintenance contract cov- dualisation of the Al-Marin-Al-Beida-
ering the highway between Misurata and Derna section of the coastal highway in
Sirte. In 2009, the contractor won a $66m the east. The $150m contract started in
contract to upgrade 22km of the highway late 2006 and was set to run into late 2011.
serving Tripoli International airport and a Another 103km dualisation contract for
year later, it was awarded a $143m con- the section between Sabrata and Ras Ajdir
tract to dualise the Ras Ajdir-Garabouli was also under way. MAPA declined to
road in the west. comment in October 2011 on the status of
its projects, but one of its subcontractors
Given its exposure and substantial order confirmed that work had stopped and
book, Strabag was hit hard by the civil there were no immediate plans to return.
war, writing off €50m ($69m) in losses Prior to the civil war, the largest upcom-

ing road project was the planned 1,700km
Ras Ajdir to Imsaad highway, which
These included two major consortiums of:
• Bonatti, Ghella, Grandi Lavori Fincosit,
“In the longer tion of the highway, running southwards
into Chad, for fear of causing instability.
was part of the friendship treaty signed
between Muammar Gaddafi and Italian
Toto Costruzioni Generali, Astaldi
• Impregilo, CMC di Revenna
term, contractors Dualisation of Libya’s main highways was
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2008. expect more road a key focus for Tripoli prior to the out-
The treaty called for Rome to invest $5bn One other major new road was also under break of the civil war. However, post war
in Libyan projects over the next 20 years discussion. The 787km link between dualisation contracts repairs of potholes and bomb damage will
as part of a compensation package for the Tripoli and Sebha formed part of the UN be a greater priority going forward, espe-
Italian colonial period. Economic Committee for the Africa Trans- to be awarded” cially on routes such as the Benghazi-
Highway 3 project, a planned 10,800km Sirte highway. Such projects are likely to
An Italian consultant was understood to road running from Tripoli in the north to be carried out by local contractors. In the
be carrying out preliminary design work Cape Town in the south. Despite being longer term, however, contractors expect
for the estimated $3bn highway and a backed by the UN, African Development more road dualisation and maintenance
number of Italian contractors had Bank and the African Union, Tripoli had contracts to be awarded.
expressed interest in building it in 2010. been reluctant to complete a second sec-

Rail
Although Libya does not have any rail
infrastructure in operation, it had a narrow Planned Tripoli metro
gauge network serving Tripoli and Beng-
B-10 B-9 C-18
hazi. Built by the Italians in the first half of C-1 C-2
B-11
the 20th century, the 950-millimetre gauge C-3 B-8 C-17
C-19 C-20
A-12 A-18
lines connected the cities with outlying
A-02 A-01 A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 A-9 A-10 A-11 A-13 A-14 A-15 A-16 A-17 A-19 A-20 A-21
areas. Tripoli had three lines, one of which C-4
B-12 B-7
C-16
Janzur B-13 B-6
headed west 100km to Zuara and a second C-15
east to Tajoura. The third and final line ran “A”-Central

C-5 B-14 B-5
C-14
100km south from the capital to Gharyan. B-4
C-6
C-12
B-16 B-3
Benghazi had two lines, both stretching Railway Terminal B-17 C-7 C-8 C-9 C-10 C-11
inland in a V shape from the city. One B-2 Tajoura
B-25 B-26 B-18
was 110km long and went to Al-Marj, University
B-1
B-01 B-02 B-03 B-04
while the other linked Suluk, a distance B-19
of 56km. During the second world war, a B-20
further 350km line was completed in B-21

1942 as part of the allied defence of North
B-22
Africa. However, this was closed in 1946.
B-23
By the mid-1960s, the last section of the B-24a

B-24c
narrow gauge network was also shut, but B-24b
following the Gaddafi coup in 1969, Airport

Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants
Tripoli began planning a major rail pro-

gramme. Taking in a national rail network
and a metro for the capital, it took until
Metro line characteristics “Most of the metro
Line Deep (km) Subsurface (km) Surface (km) Elevated
2008 for the first major construction con-
tracts to be awarded. A, green 14.56 15.04 0.0 0.0
network was to be
Tripoli Metro
B, red 19.15 13.72 14.53 4.88 subsurface, with
C, blue
only 19 kilometres of
20.95 1.38 0.0 0.0
Plans for a light rail system linking the
capital to the airport were first unveiled km=Kilometres. Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants
in the 1980s, when Hungary’s Uvaterv line above ground”
Engineering Consultants completed the Metro station locations
first study on the Tripoli metro. This
Stations Deep (km) Subsurface (km) Surface (km) Elevated
was followed up in 2007 by the same Most of the network was planned to be
firm being commissioned to produce a A, green 11 11 0.0 0.0 subsurface, with only 19km of line and
revised study. B, red 17 6 3 5 eight stations above ground. The client
C, blue 17 2 0.0 0.0 for the revised study scheme was the Rail-
The revised study proposed three metro roads Project Execution & Management
lines; A (green line), B (red line) and C km=Kilometres. Source: Uvaterv Engineering Consultants Board, which was given responsibility
(blue line) with a total length of 104km by the General People’s Committee in
and served by 72 stations. The longest of May 2006.
Metro technical aspects
the three was the 52km red line, which
would link Tripoli airport to the city Operational length 104.21km Although Uvaterv completed its revised
before running eastwards to the univer- Stations 72 study in 2009, the project has not pro-
sity and on to Tajoura. The second was Traffic system Automatic train control gressed since. Internal competition among
the 30km green line running directly ministries and committees was blamed
Electronic system Scada
across the city from Janzur to the east and for the lack of progress. As of early 2011,
the third blue line would run 22km from Power supply 750V DC using third rail with 3x400/230V AD for auxiliary consumer supply the Railway Executive Board, in charge of
the western coast, then take a southern Telecoms CCTV, exchange phone system, dispatcher phone system, radio phone system, the national rail system, and the Railroads
emergency call system, passenger text info service
run forming a U shape, before emerging Project Execution & Management Board
on the eastern side of the city. Signalling system Electronic in cooperation with train control system (ATO/ATP) system operated independently and competed for
funding with each other and different
km=Kilometres; ATO=Automatic train operation; ATP=Automatic train protection. Source: Uvaterv Engineering organisations within the General Secretar-
Consultants
iat for Transport & Communications. Nev-
ertheless, the rationale for going ahead
with the project remains strong, given the
need to connect the Tripoli University
project and the Tripoli airport expansion
to the city centre.

National rail network
Uvaterv also carried out studies in the
“The first contract Planned rail networks
1980s on a national railway. Unlike the

Tripoli metro however, several major
on Libya’s coastal Zuara Azzawiya
TUNISIA Tripoli
packages were under execution by Chi-
nese and Russian contractors prior to
line was originally Sabrata
Tarhouna
Khoms
Misurata Al-Beida
Zintan Derna
the civil war. But the outbreak of hostili- set to be completed Nalout
Gharyan
Benghazi Tobruk
ties brought construction activity to a
by 2013”
Beni Walid
halt and led to the death of Said Moham- Sirte
Ben Jawad
med Rashid, the chairman of the Railway El-Sider
Ghadames Ajdabiya
Executive Board. Rashid was credited for
the significant progress made in the rail CRCC won a further two packages on Marsa al-Brega
Ras Lanuf
sector since 2008. the coastal railway. In August 2008, it
Houn
was contracted to extend the line from
The first contract on the 2,000km coastal Khoms to Tripoli, also by 2013. Six LIBYA
line was awarded to China Railway months later, it picked up the 172km
Construction Corporation (CRCC) in section between Tripoli and Ras Ajdir
February 2008. It covered a 352km sec- on the border with Tunisia.
Sebha
tion between Khoms, Misurata and Sirte
and included the construction of 26 sta- The Chinese contractor was working
tions, 55 bridges and 370 footbridges. on one other rail project in the local
Estimated to be worth $1.85bn, it was market, the $824m minerals railway
originally scheduled for completion project. Involving the construction of a
by 2013. 800km line between Wadi Shati near
ALGERIA
Rail projects
Line Value ($m) Scope Status Client
Coastal high 6,500 2,000km coastal line Contracts awarded Railway Executive
speed line from Ras Ajdir in the in 2008/09 to Board
west to the Egyptian CRCC and Russian
border Railways
Minerals railway 800 800km inland railway Contract awarded in Railway Executive NIGER
from Wadi Shati to 2008 to CRCC Board
Misurata
Design currently being updated
Tripoli metro, 500 52km of track, plus Preliminary design Railroads Project Designed
CHAD
red line stations complete, project Execution & Not designed
on hold Management Board
SUDAN
Source: MEED Insight
km=Kilometres; CRCC=China Railway Construction Corporation. Sources: MEED Projects, MEED Insight

Sebha and Misurata, the contract also gramme, with employees from both the
Major contract awards by Railway Executive Board
covered five train depots, 40 bridges and Russian and Chinese contractors having to
940 footbridges. be evacuated. Despite the end of the civil Line Length (km) Value ($m) Contractor
war being officially declared in October Khoms-Sirte 352 1,850 CRCC
CRCC has not been the only beneficiary of 2011, it is likely to be some time before Sirte-Benghazi 550 3,100 Russian Railways
the Libyan rail expansion boom. In April construction resumes. As of November
Khoms-Tripoli 120* na CRCC
2008, Russian Railways was awarded a 2011, calls to both the Railway Executive
Ras Ajdir-Tripoli 172 805 CRCC
$3.1bn contract to build the 550km sec- Board and the Railroads Project Execution
tion of the coastal railway linking Sirte to & Management Board went unanswered, Wadi Shati-Misurata 800 824 CRCC
Benghazi, which will have about 30 sta- suggesting that restaffing and the resump- km=Kilometres; CRCC=China Railway Construction Corporation; *=Estimate; na=Not available. Sources: MEED
tions. Construction began in December tion of operations had still to take place. Projects, MEED Insight
2008 and was scheduled for completion
at the end of 2012.
Major subcontracts were placed by both

Russian Railways and CRCC, with the
main beneficiaries being Italy’s Ansaldo
and Selex Communications for signalling
and communications work and German-
based Vossloh Cogifer for fasteners and
switches. To support the rail programme,
a welding plant, with capacity for 500km
of track a year, was built by Russia’s Psko-
velectrosvar in June 2010.
Some 800km of the coastal line has still

to be awarded, with the focus on eastern
Libya and the link between Benghazi
and Imsaad on the Egyptian border. The
Imsaad to Tobruk section was in the
design stage in early 2011, while the $2bn
Benghazi to Tobruk link, covering a dis-
tance of about 450km, was under study by
Germany’s Dorsche Gruppe.
The outbreak of hostilities in early 2011

led to the suspension of the entire rail pro-

About MEED Insight
M EED Insight is a bespoke research
service brought to you by MEED’s
top country and sector experts. A paid-for
Premium Market
Intelligence Reports
MEED Projects
service that provides tailor-made research, Thanks to its own projects tracker, MEED
data and analysis, MEED Insight brings MEED Insight offers a selection of Projects, MEED Insight has access to
together our data-rich archives and premium market intelligence reports unparalleled, up-to-date information on
unique relationships with key business on a wide range of countries and sectors. the region’s projects market. We can
decision-makers across the Middle East. These reports are rich in project data provide companies with:
and are essential for anyone seeking new
MEED Insight has a particular focus business across the Middle East and Details of all major projects within
on project-related market data, thanks North Africa (Mena) region. a given market or sector, including
to its proprietary database of projects their scope
in the region, MEED Projects. Thanks Qatar Projects Report 2011-22
also to the respected MEED name, Contacts for clients, contractors
MEED Insight consultants have consid- Mena Rail Report 2011 and suppliers
erable access to the market, enabling
them to speak directly to clients, The Iraq Power Report 2011 Information on key clients and
consultants and other companies. their tendering processes
GCC ICT Projects Outlook & Review
With access to a wealth of regional GCC Projects Forecast & Information on how to register with
information ranging from broad Review 2010 clients and prequalify for projects
macroeconomic statistics to specific
sector data, MEED Insight is a paid-for Power & Water in the GCC 2010 Forecasts of future projects
service that helps clients accurately
and cost-effectively forecast market For further information, or to discuss how
growth and trends. We also offer an MEED Insight can assist your organisation
extensive range of Premium Market achieve its information objectives, please
Intelligence reports. visit: www.meed.com/insight or contact
the MEED Insight team.
Email: [email protected] Telephone: +971 (0)4 367 1302 Web: www.meedinsight.com

FINAL Libya Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

FINAL Libya Report

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FINAL Libya Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What sectors does the document focus on?

What sectors does the document focus on?

What are some of Libya's major oil and gas facilities and their status?

What are some of Libya's major oil and gas facilities and their status?

The Libyan Projects

A MEED Insight report

Preface 4 Introduction Table: Refineries 32

Desalination 63 Oil & Gas 17 Table: Major power plants 53

Transport 97 Map: Production facilities, pipelines, export facilities, Renewables 58

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 2

Map: Major wastewater plants 78 Table: Projects under construction 96

Table: Selected Housing & Infrastructure Board contract awards 79

Copyright 2011 Emap Business Communications Ltd

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 3

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 4

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 5

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 6

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 7

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 8

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 9

GDP, current prices ($bn) 55.1 69.0 95.3 58.8 71.3

Inflation, average consumer prices 94.5 100.3 110.7 113.9 116.7

General government total expenditure 23.2 33.5 46.2 40.8 48.2

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 10

plenty of potential, but with little to show

country as an exceptional opportunity,

ments and the fact that it had the money

the expected massive upstream invest-

a prime target for business development

offices in the country in the hope of 20002,000

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 11

ing in the government, brought about by

sector over the past

Surprisingly, given its huge oil and gas

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 12

Project Sector Contract value ($m) Award date EPC contractors

Gecol – Power transmission line Power 800 2008 Laptechno Power

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 13

The main contractors struction Corporation. This is due mainly

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 14

Top clients in Libya based on awarded contracts, 2002-10

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 15

is responsible for infrastructure, housing

continue under the new government.

Due to the upheaval, it is unlikely that all

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 16

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 17

Algeria 12.2 16 Algeria 1,809 NOC started the process of nationalising

*=Includes condensates; kb/d=Thousand barrels a From 1984 onwards, production rose

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 18

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 19

LNG=Liquefied natural gas. Source: NOC

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 20

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 21

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 22

To the southwest of the Bouri field lies

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 23

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 24

© MEED Insight www.meedinsight.com 25